This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 BEHLES LAW FIRM, P.C., 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3 v. No. 31,692 4 CURTIS HANLEN AND KAREN HANLEN, 5 Defendants-Appellees. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 C. Shannon Bacon, District Judge 8 Behles Law Firm 9 Jennie Deden Behles 10 Albuquerque, NM 11 for Appellant 12 Curtis & Karen Hanlen 13 Bosque Farms, NM 14 Pro se Appellees 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 172 The Behles Law Firm (Behles) appeals fro m the district court order enforcing 1 the settlement agreement and denying Behles’ s motion for reconsideration requesting 2 that the district court review the fees char ged by the special master. This Court issued 3 a calendar notice proposing to dismiss for lack of a final order. Behles has filed a 4 memorandum in opposition, which we haveduly considered. Unpersuaded, we 5 dismiss. 6 In this Court’s calendar notice, we propos ed to dismiss based on the lack of a 7 stipulated dismissal or other order reso lving the matter below. We noted that, 8 although the district court had entered an order enforcing the settlement agreement, 9 it had conditioned its entry of a signed, stipulated dismissal on the parties’ 10 certification that they had made the payments specified in the district court order. [RP 11 1371-72] We suggested that based on the way the district court’s order was drafted 12 the district court could revise its deci sion about the enforceability of the settlement 13 agreement based on the parties’ noncompliance or for reasons previously raised. [CN 14 3-4] Thus, we proposed to conclude that the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction 15 would be premature. 16 The crux of Behles’s response to this Court’s notice of proposed disposition is 17 that the matter to be resolved is mere ly collateral. Thus, according to Behles, 18 appellate review should be permitted at this time. We disagree. Generally, an order 193 or judgment is not considered final unle ss all issues of law and fact have been 1 determined and the case disposed of by the trial court to the fullest extent possible. 2 Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison , 113 N.M. 231, 236, 824 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1992). 3 The term “finality,” however, “is to be gi ven a practical, rather than a technical, 4 construction.” Id. “Where a judgment declares the rights and liabilities of the parties 5 to the underlying controversy, a question re maining to be decided thereafter will not 6 prevent the judgment from being final if reso lution of that question will not alter the 7 judgment or moot or revise decisions embodied therein.” Id. at 238, 824 P.2d at 1040. 8 9 To the extent Behles argues th at “[t]he only issue not d ealt with is the collateral 10 matter relating to the special master and his fees” [MIO 4], we conclude that our 11 Supreme Court’s opinion in Executive Sports Club v. First Plaza Trust , 1998-NMSC12 008, 125 N.M. 78, 957 P.2d 63, is instructive. In Executive Sports Club , the Court 13 recognized the distinction between attorney’s fees of the type in Kelly Innand those 14 that are “substantively part of compen satory damages nece ssary to remedy the 15 plaintiff’s injury.” Executive Sports Club, 1998-NMSC-008, ¶ 8. Here, the parties 16 made the payment of the special master’s fees part of the merits of the underlying 17 claim by including them in the negotiations and settlement agreement resolving the 18 underlying collection matter. Thus, to th e extent Behles is challenging the special 194 master’s fees, Behles is in essence ch allenging the underlying settlement agreement. 1 As such, we conclude it woul d be inappropriate for this Court to treat issues relating 2 to the special master’s fees as separate from the underlying merits. 3 Behles contends that the district court’ s order is practically final because it 4 represents “the last deliberative action of the court.” [MIO 6] Behles contends that the 5 order provides “that if and when the money is paid, the court will enter a dismissal.” 6 [MIO 7] Behles contends that the dismissal is automatic; th erefore, the district court 7 is left without any further di scretion in this matter. We disagree. The district court 8 drafted the order in such a way to make the final resolution of the underlying merits, 9 or the implementation of the settlement ag reement, contingent on Behles’s payment 10 of the special masters’ fee, therefore retaining discretion to act in the event Behles 11 fails to comply with the order. Thus, the district court still retains the authority to act 12 in the event of noncompliance, without re quiring that it await further action by the 13 parties. We conclude that the district court’s act of retaining control over the 14 enforcement of the settlement agreement by not entering the parties’ signed, stipulated 15 dismissal until the parties complied with th e terms of the order renders the order non16 final. 175 For the reasons stated above and in this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, 1 we dismiss. Behles may app eal this matter following th e entry of a final order in 2 district court. 36 IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

2 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 3 WE CONCUR: 4

5 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 6

7 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 8