IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-40252

Summary Calendar

JIMMY MOORE,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM CHARLES; D. ROHOE, Disciplinary Hearing Officer; RODGER A. 

MCDONALD, Assistant Warden; JUAN MARRONO; D. TOMPKINS, Captain; 

M. B. KARL, Assistant Warden; LINDA RICHEY,

Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:14-CV-825

Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jimmy Moore, Texas prisoner # 1771243, appeals the dismissal of his 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 action, in which the defendants who were served with process 

pleaded qualified immunity. The district court dismissed the action against 

Rodger McDonald, D. Tompkins, M.B. Karl, and Linda Richey with prejudice 

and dismissed the action against William Charles, D. Rohoe, and Juan 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 13, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Marrono without prejudice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Our review is de novo. 

See Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2014).

We disagree with the district court’s determination that Moore’s

procedural due process claims against McDonald, Tompkins, Richey, and Karl 

are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), and Edwards 

v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). Those claims stem from a disciplinary 

ruling that Moore had violated Texas Department of Criminal Justice Offense 

Code § 3.4, a ruling that was vacated by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus issued 

by the Northern District of Texas because the ruling was not supported by the 

necessary evidence. See Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Wapole v. Hill, 472 

U.S. 445, 453-55 (1985); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978); 

Teague v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 769, 777 (5th Cir. 2007). In any event, the 

due process claims do not affect the validity of Moore’s criminal convictions or 

the length of Moore’s confinement. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 

(2004). These claims are concerned only with deprivations of civil rights. See

Heck, 512 U.S. at 482. Nor do Heck and Edwards bar Moore’s claim that the 

disciplinary case was a retaliatory action. See Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 

1164-66 (5th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, as explained below, we reject all of 

Moore’s claims.

The procedural due process claims against Richey and Karl fail because 

those defendants were not involved in the disciplinary case. Their involvement 

was limited to the grievance proceeding that followed, and Moore has no 

constitutional right to have a grievance proceeding resolved to his liking. See 

Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005). The due process claims, 

including claims of conspiracy to infringe Moore’s due process rights, against 

McDonald and Tompkins fail because they are wholly conclusory. See

Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993); 

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Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1553 (5th Cir. 1988). That McDonald and 

Tompkins had some part in the initiation of the disciplinary case does not allow 

a “reasonable inference that the[se] defendant[s]” arbitrarily violated the 

Constitution. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Moore’s claim that the disciplinary action was instituted to cover up an 

assault by Charles does not state a retaliation claim, given that Moore does not 

contend that he exercised any right that caused the defendants to punish him. 

See McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998). Instead, Moore

argues that the defendants tried to conceal something Charles did. And even 

if Moore were understood to assert that the defendants conspired to punish 

him because he wished to be free from attack by his jailers, he does not put 

forth a chronology of events from which such a conspiracy might be inferred. 

See Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. Thus, Moore fails to state a claim of retaliation. 

See McDonald, 132 F.3d at 231; Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166.

Having shown no constitutional violation of any kind, Moore has failed 

to overcome these defendants’ qualified immunity defenses. See Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 990-91

(5th Cir. 2011). Additionally, we find no merit to Moore’s claim that the 

motions to dismiss were untimely. Equally unavailing is Moore’s contention 

that the district court should have allowed amendment of the complaint. 

Moore does not, and did not in the district court, specify what allegations 

would, if added, save the complaint from involuntary dismissal. See Bazrowx 

v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1998). Also, contrary to Moore’s 

contention, the district court did order service on Charles, Rohoe, and Marrono, 

and Moore does not show that precedent requires more.

AFFIRMED. 

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