IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCSC-137

No. 182PA21

Filed 16 December 2022

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

JAQUAN STEPHON GETER

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 

of the Court of Appeals, 276 N.C. App. 377, 2021-NCCOA-98, affirming two

judgments entered on 15 July 2020 by Judge R. Gregory Horne in Superior Court, 

Buncombe County, which revoked defendant’s probation. Heard in the Supreme 

Court on 24 May 2022 in session in the Old Burke County Courthouse in the City of 

Morganton pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-10(a).

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Liliana R. Lopez, Assistant Attorney 

General, for the State-appellee.

Jason Christopher Yoder for defendant-appellant.

MORGAN, Justice.

¶ 1 This Court allowed discretionary review to determine whether the Court of 

Appeals erred in affirming a trial court’s judgments revoking defendant’s probation 

entered over a year after defendant’s term of probation had expired. Because the trial 

court complied with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3), it possessed the 

jurisdiction to revoke defendant’s probation after defendant’s term of probation had 
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expired and further did not abuse its discretion in determining that good cause 

existed for doing so after defendant’s term of probation had expired. Accordingly, the 

Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, resisting a 

public officer, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and fleeing to elude arrest on 29 

August 2016 and was sentenced by the trial court to a total active term of twenty-two

to forty-five months which was suspended in favor of an eighteen-month term of 

supervised probation. While defendant was still on probation, the Asheville Police 

Department executed a search warrant on defendant’s residence on 18 January 2017

after conducting a series of controlled purchases of narcotics from defendant using a 

confidential informant. Upon executing the warrant, police recovered marijuana, 

defendant’s identification card which was situated on top of a digital scale, razor 

blades, a black ski mask, a .380 caliber pistol, and over $1,200 in cash. Of the 

recovered money, $40.00 had been used in an earlier controlled purchase of narcotics

from defendant. On 23 April 2017, defendant was charged with possession of a 

firearm by a felon, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and 

maintaining a dwelling for the purpose of keeping or selling controlled substances.

On 9 February 2018 and 12 February 2018, defendant’s probation officer served and 

filed violation reports for each case of probation which alleged that defendant had 
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committed new criminal offenses while on probation and listed the pending charges

which had resulted from the execution of the search warrant. Defendant’s probation 

expired on 28 February 2018, more than two weeks after he was served with the 

probation violation reports.

¶ 3 Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence which was seized during the 

search of his residence. The trial court granted defendant’s motion on 22 February 

2019, determining that the underlying warrant was too general in that it did not 

specify which of the two units of the duplex where defendant resided was the focus of 

the search. The State dismissed the charges against defendant on 17 March 2019. 

Defendant’s pending probation violation reports came on for hearing on 4 April 2019, 

at which time the State called the detectives who had executed the search warrant. 

Defendant’s probation violation hearing consisted of the detectives’ testimony, by 

which all of the items seized during the execution of the warrant—including the 

marijuana, firearm, and digital scales—were admitted as evidence that defendant 

had committed a new criminal offense while on probation. The trial court, finding

that defendant had committed a new criminal offense while on probation, revoked 

defendant’s probation. Defendant appealed the trial court’s judgments to the Court 

of Appeals. 

¶ 4 The State conceded, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the trial court had 

failed to specify which of the criminal offenses committed by defendant would serve 
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as the basis for revocation, and that the trial court had failed to find whether good 

cause existed to revoke defendant’s probation after the probationary period had 

expired as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3). State v. Geter (Geter I), No. COA19-

846, 2020 WL 3251033, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. June 16, 2020) (unpublished). The Court 

of Appeals remanded the case for clarification from the trial court as to which 

criminal offense the trial court had determined that defendant had committed which 

would serve as the basis for revocation, and further remanded for new proceedings 

concerning whether good cause existed to revoke defendant’s probation after his term 

of probation had expired. Geter I, 2020 WL 3251033, at *5–6.

¶ 5 On 15 July 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing on whether good cause 

existed to revoke defendant’s probation after the expiration of his term and found 

that the State had intentionally delayed setting the probation violation report for a 

hearing as part of the State’s normal practice to allow a probationer’s pending charges 

to be resolved prior to the pending probation violation hearing. The resolution of 

defendant’s outstanding charges would have a likely dispositive effect on the alleged 

probation violations, according to the trial court. The trial court announced the 

following:

[W]hile the [c]ourt recognizes that the [c]ourt can proceed 

with regard to a probation violation hearing alleging 

pending charges prior to a person’s conviction on those 

underlying offenses, the [c]ourt further acknowledges that 

in this case the underlying offenses were contested. That a 

Motion to Suppress was filed, heard, and granted by this 
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[c]ourt.

. . . .

While the State could have proceeded with regard to 

probation violation before the new offenses alleged were 

adjudicated, the State did not do so. That the State chose 

to prosecute the underlying action. Again, the Motion to 

Suppress was heard at the jury term. . . .

The [c]ourt would find that this does constitute good 

cause in that if the State — if Mr. Geter had been found 

not guilty of those offenses, or if for whatever reason the 

State had opted to dismiss the charges, that it would have 

had a direct impact on the later hearing of the probation 

violation. 

Again, as reviewed — as shown in the transcript, as 

well as the knowledge by this [c]ourt having heard the 

Motion to Suppress, and then argument on the Motion to 

Suppress, having been granted after probation violation, it

is clear to the [c]ourt that the State waited until disposition 

of the underlying offenses alleged before proceeding with 

the probation violation. The [c]ourt would find that this 

would constitute good cause.

The trial court reduced its finding of good cause to new judgments which revoked

defendant’s probation and announced, “[The] court finds and concludes good cause 

exists to revoke defendant’s probation despite the expiration of his probationary 

period.” The judgments were entered on 15 July 2020 but related back to the original 

probation violation hearing on 4 April 2019.

¶ 6 Defendant appealed this second set of judgments revoking his probation, 

arguing before the Court of Appeals that “the ‘good cause’ found by the trial court 

failed as a matter of law” to satisfy N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) according to defendant’s 
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interpretation of the opinion of the lower appellate court in State v. Sasek, 271 N.C. 

App. 568 (2020). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s second set of 

judgments revoking defendant’s probation. State v. Geter (Geter II), 276 N.C. App. 

377, 2021-NCCOA-98. The Court of Appeals concluded that Sasek was inapplicable

because the judicial panel in the case vacated the defendant’s probation revocation 

judgments not because there was evidence to suggest that any “good cause” that could 

be inferred from the record was legally sufficient or insufficient, but specifically 

because “there was no evidence in the record to indicate that good cause existed to 

justify the untimely revocation.” Id. ¶ 11 (emphasis added). The trial court in Sasek

“erred by not making the required finding that good cause existed,” id. ¶ 12 (emphasis 

omitted) (quoting Sasek, 271 N.C. App. at 576), unlike the trial court in the instant 

case which, upon remand, provided both a written finding of good cause “supported 

by the facts in the record” and an oral explanation of the reasoning behind the 

findings, id. ¶ 13. Because the state’s jurisprudence and statutory enactments were 

devoid of any factors or standard to apply in evaluating a finding of good cause, and 

because the trial court had in fact made the good cause finding required by N.C.G.S. 

§ 15A-1344(f)(3), the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had not abused 

its discretion in revoking defendant’s probation despite the “significant and 

unadvisable” delay between the expiration of defendant’s probation and the final 

probation revocation hearing. Id. ¶ 15. Defendant petitioned this Court for 
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discretionary review of the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals in Geter II

which we allowed by order on 10 August 2021. 

II. Analysis

¶ 7 Defendant first takes issue with the application of an abuse of discretion 

standard by the Court of Appeals in the lower appellate court’s analysis of the trial 

court’s finding of good cause. We agree with defendant that whether a trial court has 

the authority to revoke a defendant’s probation after the defendant’s term of 

probation has expired is a jurisdictional question. State v. Camp, 299 N.C. 524, 528 

(1980) (holding that “jurisdiction was lost by the lapse of time and the court had no 

power to enter a revocation judgment” because the trial court had failed to make a 

finding required by an earlier version of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)); State v. Bryant, 361 

N.C. 100, 103 (2006) (“In the absence of statutorily mandated factual findings, the 

trial court’s jurisdiction to revoke probation after expiration of the probationary 

period is not preserved.”). “We review issues relating to subject matter jurisdiction de 

novo.” State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 266 (2012). Therefore, with regard to the statutory 

authority at issue in this case, a trial court’s jurisdiction to revoke a defendant’s 

probation after the expiration of that defendant’s probationary term is established 

if all of the following apply:

(1) Before the expiration of the period of probation the 

State has filed a written violation report with the clerk 

indicating its intent to conduct a hearing on one or more 

violations of one or more conditions of probation.
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(2) The court finds that the probationer did violate one or 

more conditions of probation prior to the expiration of the 

period of probation.

(3) The court finds for good cause shown and stated that 

the probation should be extended, modified, or revoked.

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(1)–(3) (2021). The three enumerated conditions precedent to 

the trial court’s jurisdiction to revoke a defendant’s probation after the expiration of 

the term of probation are separate and distinct from one another. 

Subsection (f)(2) of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344 makes clear that 

in order to revoke a defendant’s probation following the 

expiration of his probationary term, the trial court must 

first make a finding that the defendant did violate a 

condition of his probation. After making such a finding, 

trial courts are then required by subsection (f)(3) to make 

an additional finding of “good cause shown and stated” to 

justify the revocation of probation even though the 

defendant’s probationary term has expired.

State v. Morgan, 372 N.C. 609, 617 (2019).

¶ 8 In State v. Rankin, this Court analyzed the provision contained in N.C.G.S. § 

15A-805 that a trial court must enter an order compelling the attendance in court of 

any incarcerated person so long as the movant produces “good cause shown.” 312 N.C. 

592, 597 (1985) (emphasis added). The Rankin defendant had filed a motion to compel 

the attendance of five witnesses at his trial for first-degree sexual offense one day 

before the trial was calendared to begin. Id. at 595. Without providing the defendant’s 

attorney with an opportunity to show the good cause underlying counsel’s request for 

the attendance of one of the witnesses, the trial court denied defendant’s motion “on 
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the grounds that (1) no affidavits were submitted as to why the witness should be 

brought to court; (2) the witness did not testify at the previous trial; and (3) the 

witness’s presence was requested at a late date.” Id. at 598. In reversing the trial 

court’s decision to deny the Rankin defendant’s motion to compel the attendance of 

his proposed witness, this Court explained:

Certainly the statute does not require that affidavits 

be submitted to show the “good cause” requirement of the 

statute. Neither can we find [a] viable reason why a 

witness must have testified in a previous trial in order to 

be subject to production as a witness for any other given 

trial. We do recognize, however, that a trial judge has the 

duty to supervise and control the course and conduct of a 

trial, and that in order to discharge that duty he is invested 

with broad discretionary powers. Shute v. Fisher, 270 N.C. 

247, 154 S.E.2d 75 (1967).

A late filed motion might delay the course of a trial 

and invite dilatory tactics by other parties to litigation. 

Therefore in [the] instant case it was incumbent on 

defendant to show substantial reasons why his motion to 

produce and compel the presence of the witness . . . was not 

filed until the day before the trial was to commence. Our 

examination of this record discloses, however, that 

defendant’s motion was denied without permitting him to 

show the “good cause” requirement of the statute or to 

advance any reasons, if any he had, why the motion was 

made at the eve of the trial. For this reason, under the 

particular facts of this case, we hold that defendant was 

effectively denied his right of compulsory process.

Id. at 598–99. 

¶ 9 The “good cause” discussed by this Court in Rankin contained within it at least 

two factors: implicitly, the reason why the attendance of the witness would be 
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material to the defendant’s trial strategy, and explicitly, the reason why the 

defendant’s motion to compel the attendance of the witness was filed only one day 

prior to the start of trial. In superimposing these factors over the otherwise undefined 

good cause required to be shown by the statute at issue in Rankin, this Court focused 

on “the particular facts of this case,” id. at 599. Similarly, in the present case,

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) “wisely makes no attempt to enumerate” what constitutes 

good cause, instead leaving “it to the judge to determine,” Shankle v. Shankle, 289 

N.C. 473, 483 (1976). Consistent with our determinations in Rankin and Morgan, the 

“good cause” contemplated by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) therefore must be shown by 

the State, as the proponent of the “ ‘good cause shown and stated’ to justify the 

revocation of probation even though the defendant’s probationary term has expired” 

and determined by the trial court, pursuant to its “broad discretionary powers.”

Unfortunately, the dissent fails to appreciate the established soundness of the abuse 

of discretion standard which the appellate courts have routinely applied to the review 

of trial courts’ “good cause” determinations and would instead prefer a list of 

parameters to guide and direct such discretionary matters.

¶ 10 N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) also requires that the good cause to revoke a 

defendant’s probation be “stated.” Given the proximity and relation of the word 

“stated” to the aforementioned term “shown” within the language of the statute,

[w]e are . . . guided in our decision by the canon of 

statutory construction that a statute may not be 
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interpreted in a manner which would render any of its 

words superfluous. This Court has repeatedly held that a 

statute must be considered as a whole and construed, if 

possible, so that none of its provisions shall be rendered 

useless or redundant. It is presumed that the legislature 

intended each portion to be given full effect and did not 

intend any provision to be mere surplusage.

Morgan, 372 N.C. at 614 (extraneity omitted). To avoid interpreting the requirement 

of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) that good cause be “shown and stated” as imposing a 

redundant burden on the State, we hold that the good cause found by the trial court 

must be “stated” on the record, either in open court by the trial court, by a party with 

the trial court’s endorsement, or within the trial court record. 

¶ 11 It is undisputed that written probation violation reports were filed with the 

clerk of court against defendant by the State prior to the expiration of defendant’s 

term of probation or that the trial court found—as was amply supported by the 

evidence—that defendant had in fact violated a condition of his probation by, at the

least, being in possession of a firearm as a felon while on probation. The trial court, 

after receiving the “showing” by the State, explicitly found both orally and in writing 

that “good cause exists to revoke defendant’s probation despite the expiration of his 

probationary period.” The trial court went on to satisfy its statutory requirement by 

both finding good cause and “stating” in open court the basis for its finding of good 

cause. 

¶ 12 The question before this Court, therefore, is whether the “good cause” found by 
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the trial court in this case is legally sufficient to justify the trial court’s exercise of its 

jurisdiction which is established by the strict adherence of the circumstances of this 

case, as described above, to the enumerated conditions of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3). 

In other instances where this Court has reviewed a trial court’s evaluation of good 

cause, we have deferred to the trial court’s intimate view of the circumstances of each 

case as the factfinder. In re S.M., 375 N.C. 673, 681 (2020) (holding that a trial court’s 

determination of the existence of “extraordinary circumstances” and “good cause” 

justifying a continuance in a termination of parental rights matter is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion); State v. Murphy, 321 N.C. 738, 740–41 (1988) (holding that there 

was no error in a judgment when the trial court failed to find good cause in a 

defendant’s request to sequester potential jurors during a capital murder trial); 

Peebles v. Moore, 48 N.C. App. 497, 504 (1980), aff’d as modified, 302 N.C. 351 (1981)

(“What constitutes ‘good cause’ depends on the circumstances in a particular case, 

and within the limits of discretion, an inadvertence which is not strictly excusable 

may constitute good cause . . . .”). Even in the employment context, where our search 

of the state’s jurisprudence has revealed a prevalent use of the phrase “good cause,”

the existence or dearth of good cause is, absent a statutory standard of review, “a 

matter for the factfinder . . . to decide.” Intercraft Indus. Corp. v. Morrison, 305 N.C. 

373, 377 (1982). Whether the jurisdictional requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) 

are satisfied is a question of law: (1) whether a probation violation report was filed 
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prior to the expiration of the defendant’s probation; (2) whether the trial court found 

that the defendant violated one or more conditions of his or her probation; and (3) 

whether the trial court found good cause “that the probation should be extended, 

modified, or revoked.” See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3). But whether good cause exists, 

being fact-intensive and dependent on the circumstances which result in the delay of 

a probation revocation hearing, is a finding of fact delegated to the discretion of the 

trial court.

¶ 13 What constitutes “good cause shown and stated” is a case-by-case, fact-specific

determination which requires a trial court to consider the particular circumstances 

which mandate that good cause be shown. In probation violation hearing matters 

governed by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) and its requirement of the existence of good 

cause in order for the trial court to be authorized to revoke probation after the period 

of probation has expired, we also find guidance in this Court’s treatment of 

continuance motions which are to be allowed upon “good cause shown.” In Shankle, 

this Court examined a situation in which a group of respondents in an estate action 

filed a motion to continue the trial after their retained counsel “left the court after 

the judge made strong remarks about respondents.” 289 N.C. at 478 (extraneity 

omitted). Now without counsel, the respondents in Shankle attempted to represent 

themselves after the trial court denied their joint continuance motion without 

providing a reason for the denial, which resulted in “obfuscation, judicial frustration, 
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and mounting tensions all around.” Id. at 479. This Court reviewed the trial court’s 

denial of the continuance motion for an abuse of discretion, while noting that Rule 

40(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provided that continuances “may 

be granted only for good cause shown and upon such terms and conditions as justice 

may require.” Id. at 482 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 40(b)). This Court looked with 

favor upon the absence of any factors or definitions of “good cause” within the rule, in 

light of the wide array of reasons which may be asserted by a party wishing to obtain 

a continuance. This Court explained:

Considering the myriad circumstances which might be 

urged as grounds for a continuance[, N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 

40(b)] wisely makes no attempt to enumerate them but 

leaves it to the judge to determine, in each case, whether 

“good cause” for a continuance has been shown. Thus, a 

motion to continue is addressed to the sound discretion of 

the trial judge, who should determine it as the rights of the 

parties require under the circumstances. However, this 

discretion is not unlimited, and must not be exercised 

absolutely, arbitrarily, or capriciously, but only in 

accordance with fixed legal principles.

Further, before ruling on a motion to continue the 

judge should hear the evidence pro and con, consider it 

judicially and then rule with a view to promoting 

substantial justice.

Id. at 482–83 (extraneity omitted). We find this logic to be both compelling and 

appropriate for the case at bar. Considering the vast variety of circumstances which 

might justify the extension, modification, or revocation of a criminal defendant’s 

probation after the expiration of the defendant’s term of probation, N.C.G.S. § 15A-
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1344(f)(3) does not delineate or describe any of them, but merely prescribes that, in 

each case, it is up to the trial court to decide whether “good cause” to extend, modify, 

or revoke a defendant’s probation after the expiration of the term of probation has 

been shown. The trial court’s discretion in this matter “must not be exercised 

absolutely, arbitrarily, or capriciously, but only in accordance with fixed legal 

principles.” Id. at 483 (quoting 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 5 (1963)). “In reaching its 

conclusion the court should consider all the facts in evidence, and not act on its own 

mental impression or facts outside the record, although . . . it may take into 

consideration facts within its judicial knowledge.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

17 C.J.S. Continuances § 97). Finally, the trial court’s “chief consideration” in 

determining whether a defendant’s probation should be revoked despite the 

expiration of the term of probation is whether “substantial justice” would be advanced 

or offended by the post-expiration revocation. Id. (quoting 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 

97). However, despite this Court’s recognition in Shankle that a trial court’s “sound 

discretion” to determine good cause from any number of any combination of any series 

of circumstances in a variety of cases—including probation violation hearings in 

which actions taken after the expiration of probation are dependent upon the 

existence of good cause—“is not unlimited, and must not be exercised absolutely, 

arbitrarily, or capriciously, but only in accordance with fixed legal principles,” 

nonetheless the dissent would prefer to more rigidly define and curtail a trial court’s 
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ability to find “good cause” in its discretion.

¶ 14 Applying an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court’s finding that good 

cause existed in this case to revoke defendant’s probation over a year after the 

expiration of defendant’s term of probation, we do not conclude that the trial court’s 

decision was arbitrary, capricious, or offended substantial justice. The record in this 

case demonstrates the manner in which both defendant and the State were benefited 

by the trial court’s determination of the existence of good cause. The probation officer 

filed probation violation reports against defendant on 9 February 2018 and 12 

February 2018—two weeks prior to the expiration of his probation, but ten months 

after defendant had been criminally charged for the behavior which served as the 

basis for the State’s efforts to revoke defendant’s probation. However, on all relevant 

dates, criminal charges were pending against defendant for behavior in which he 

allegedly engaged while he was on probation. Defendant’s probation expired on 28 

February 2018. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence which supported 

the criminal charges against him almost a year after his probation had expired. The

motion was heard and granted on 22 February 2019 by the same trial court which 

heard both defendant’s probation revocation matter and the hearing on remand to 

determine the existence of good cause. The State dismissed the charges against 

defendant on 17 March 2019. Less than a month later, the State brought forward the 

probation violation reports against defendant for hearing on 4 April 2019. Both the 
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State and defendant had the potential benefit of the delay in the occurrence of the 

probation violation hearing until after the resolution of defendant’s new criminal 

charges as reflected in the trial court’s stated rationale for finding good cause: 

[I]f [defendant] had been found not guilty of those offenses, 

or if for whatever reason the State had opted to dismiss the 

charges, . . . it would have had a direct impact on the later 

hearing of the probation violation. 

Again, as reviewed — as shown in the transcript, as 

well as the knowledge by this [c]ourt having heard the 

Motion to Suppress, and then argument on the Motion to 

Suppress, having been granted after probation violation, it 

is clear to the [c]ourt that the State waited until disposition 

of the underlying offenses alleged before proceeding with 

the probation violation. The [c]ourt would find that this 

would constitute good cause.

The fact that the State’s dismissal of defendant’s underlying charges did not have a 

“direct impact on the later hearing of the probation violation” is a product of 

hindsight, not the trial court’s weighing of “the rights of the parties.” Shankle, 289

N.C. at 483 (quoting 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 5). After all, the State dismissed the 

charges against defendant after it was discovered that the evidence was collected as 

the result of a search warrant which did not specify which of the two duplex units

where defendant resided was the subject of the search, not after the evidence against 

defendant was presented to a jury. Meanwhile, the State was afforded the 

opportunity to await the outcome of defendant’s trial on the new criminal charges 

and the potential effect on the probation violation allegations, in the event that 
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defendant was found guilty of the underlying charges.

¶ 15 Defendant further asserts that the Court of Appeals violated the principle of 

stare decisis and this Court’s holding in In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373 (1989), by 

“fail[ing] to apply two key holdings from its own prior published and binding 

precedent in State v. Sasek.” We disagree. The lower appellate court properly 

concluded that Sasek did not apply in the current case because, even if the trial court 

had made the required finding of good cause in Sasek, and the record had contained 

evidence to support an inferred existence of good cause in that case, the issue of the 

sufficiency of any good cause which may have existed was not before the Court of 

Appeals in Sasek; therefore, any comment on the issue by the Court of Appeals would 

constitute dicta and would also, in any event, remain discretionary in its application 

before this Court. Furthermore, defendant’s citation to Sasek is ineffectual in light of 

his argument that Sasek stands for the proposition that any “reasonable efforts” 

undertaken by the State to hold the revocation hearing earlier or before the 

expiration of his term of probation is a factor to consider in determining whether 

there is “good cause shown and stated” to revoke his probation after the term had

expired. In Sasek, the Court of Appeals recalled its observation in Morgan that a 

probation revocation judgment should only be remanded, as opposed to vacated, when 

“the record contain[s] sufficient evidence to permit the necessary finding of 

‘reasonable efforts’ by the State to have conducted the probation revocation hearing 
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earlier.” Sasek, 271 N.C. App. at 575 (alteration in original) (quoting Morgan, 372 

N.C. at 618). The lower appellate court’s citation to, and discussion of, this statement 

from Morgan in the Court of Appeals’ Sasek opinion is misplaced and misleading 

within the context of reviewing the good cause requirement of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f).

In the present case, the dissent has also succumbed to this miscalculated reliance on 

the concept of “reasonable efforts,” while erroneously and curiously claiming that the 

statute requires a demonstration of both reasonable efforts and good cause, when 

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f) doesn’t mention “reasonable efforts.” The Court in Morgan, in 

referencing the “reasonable efforts” undertaken by the State to conduct the revocation 

hearing earlier, referred to this Court’s decision in Bryant. Morgan, 372 N.C. at 618 

(citing Bryant, 361 N.C. at 104). Bryant, in turn, analyzed the version of N.C.G.S. § 

15A-1344(f) which was existent at the time, and which explicitly required a trial court 

to find “that the State has made reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to 

conduct the hearing earlier.” 361 N.C. at 102 (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 

15A-1344(f)(2) (2005)). However, the Legislature unequivocally eliminated the trial 

court’s necessity to consider the State’s reasonable efforts to conduct the hearing at 

an earlier time with the passage of Session Law 2008-129, which replaced the one

“reasonable effort” finding earlier required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(2) with two

findings which presently must be determined by a trial court: N.C.G.S. § 15A1344(f)(2) requires a finding that the “probationer did violate one or more conditions 
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of probation prior to the expiration of the period of probation” and N.C.G.S. § 15A1344(f)(3) requires a finding of “good cause shown and stated that the probation 

should be extended, modified, or revoked.” 2008 N.C. Sess. Law 129, § 4; N.C.G.S. § 

15A-1344(f) (2021). Therefore, Morgan does not stand for the proposition, as argued 

by defendant, that the reasonable efforts undertaken by the State to hold the 

probation revocation hearing at an earlier date must be shown to, or found by, the 

trial court as a prerequisite to the trial court exercising its jurisdiction in extending, 

modifying, or revoking a defendant’s probation after the term of probation has 

expired.

III. Conclusion

¶ 16 The trial court complied with the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f) and 

therefore possessed the jurisdiction to revoke defendant’s probation after his term of 

probation had expired. Specifically, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3), the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in determining that good cause existed for the 

revocation of defendant’s probation after his term of probation had expired. We 

therefore affirm the Court of Appeals decision for the reasons stated herein, and the 

trial court’s judgments revoking defendant’s probation are given full force and effect. 

AFFIRMED.
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Justice EARLS dissenting.

¶ 17 The majority here holds that because the trial court “complied with N.C.G.S. § 

15A-1344(f)(3),” it has jurisdiction to revoke defendant’s probation 399 days after it 

expired and did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause for the delay. Because 

I disagree on both points and conclude that the majority’s decision provides 

inadequate guidance to trial courts, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 18 Though trial courts are rightfully afforded a high degree of discretion in 

making certain fact-intensive determinations, that discretion must be exercised 

within clear and consistent boundaries in order to safeguard fundamental 

constitutional principles of due process. These boundaries are particularly important 

in criminal law, in which a trial court’s discretionary rulings—like those involving 

the revocation of probation and institution of a term of active incarceration—can 

directly and severely impact basic personal liberties. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 

U.S. 778, 781 (1973) (observing that “the loss of liberty entailed [in probation 

revocation] is a serious deprivation” thus requiring the protections of due process).

¶ 19 Below, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is “no specific set of factors that 

must be considered in evaluating whether ‘good cause’ exists [for post-expiration 

probation revocation] under [N.C.G.S.] 15A-1344(f)(3).” State v. Geter, 267 N.C. App. 

377, 2021-NCCOA-98, # 14. In my view, that ruling untethers the trial court’s 
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discretion from “fixed legal principles,” thereby running afoul of constitutional 

protections against statutory vagueness and inviting inconsistent applications of the 

law. Shankle v. Shankle, 289 N.C. 473, 483 (1976). Further, it is the proper role of 

appellate courts to provide lower courts with certain minimum guidance regarding 

the contours of these constitutional guardrails. While the majority observes that 

there are some general limits on a trial court’s discretion, it does not state those limits 

with sufficient specificity to avoid unconstitutional vagueness and inconsistency in 

future determinations of “good cause” for probation revocation under N.C.G.S. § 15A1344(f)(3).

¶ 20 Although the relevant statute plainly gives trial courts significant discretion 

in making this determination, the legislature could not have given trial courts the 

kind of virtually unreviewable discretion to trial courts the majority confers here, nor 

did it intend to do so. Such discretion will lead to unpredictable application of the 

“good cause” standard across the state; as a result, defendants will have little notice 

of what constitutes “good cause” to warrant revocation of probation after their 

probationary period has expired and no real idea how any given trial court will treat 

their case. 

¶ 21 It is the function of appellate courts to interpret broad legislation that is 

susceptible to multiple meanings and provide guidance for trial courts tasked with 

applying statutes in the first instance. See, e.g., State v. Starr, 365 N.C. 314, 319 
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(2011) (“We pause to provide guidance to trial court judges” regarding how to 

“exercise [their] discretion” in order “to ensure compliance with N.C.G.S. § 15A1233(a).”); In re J.F., 237 N.C. App. 218, 227 (2014) (“We briefly address this 

jurisdictional issue to provide guidance to trial courts faced with similar situations in 

the future.”). Here, the text and purpose of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) demonstrate 

that there are limits to a trial court’s discretion under these circumstances. Trial 

courts must make express findings of fact demonstrating that there is “good cause” 

to revoke probation. “Good cause” is not just whatever a trial court thinks reasonable 

on a given day; “good cause” necessarily incorporates an assessment of whether the 

State made reasonable efforts to hold the revocation hearing before the probationary 

period ended. Moreover, while delaying a probation revocation hearing to allow for 

the disposition of underlying charges may sometimes be “good cause” for a delay, that 

is true only when the outcome of those charges has some impact on a trial court’s 

“good cause” determination. The State may not require defendants to wait years for 

their revocation hearings under the guise that the disposition of their new charges 

will be relevant, then proceed with revocation even though those charges have been 

dismissed. Under these circumstances, the delay is without purpose and cannot 

constitute “good cause.” Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

I. Background
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¶ 22 Jaquan Stephon Geter began serving eighteen months of supervised probation 

on 29 August 2016. During his probation, the State charged Mr. Geter with new 

criminal offenses after a SWAT-team illegally searched Mr. Geter’s home and found 

drug paraphernalia, a pistol with ammunition, and cash, $40 of which had been used 

to purchase contraband pursuant to the investigation. On 22 February 2019, a trial 

court determined the evidence the SWAT-team obtained during the search had to be 

suppressed because they obtained it pursuant to an illegal warrant. The State 

subsequently dismissed these charges against Mr. Geter.

¶ 23 The State had no obligation to wait until those new charges were disposed

before seeking to revoke Mr. Geter’s probation. See, e.g., State v. Crompton, 380 N.C. 

220, 2022-NCSC-14, ¶ 11 (noting that the trial court “found that the defendant had 

violated the condition of his probation to ‘commit no criminal offense’ ” based on its 

determination that he committed new offenses and charges were pending). Although 

the State was aware of these new charges—as well as other violations of his 

probation, such as Mr. Geter’s failure to complete his assigned community service 

hours and his GED—the State did not file probation violation reports immediately. 

Instead, the State waited 387 days after the alleged criminal conduct to file violation 

reports and an additional 399 days after Mr. Geter’s probation expired to hold his 

revocation hearing. In total, 806 days elapsed between the alleged criminal conduct 

and Mr. Geter’s probation revocation.
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¶ 24 Mr. Geter’s probation hearing occurred over a year later on 4 April 2019. At 

that hearing, the State presented the illegally obtained evidence to support 

revocation. The trial court revoked Mr. Geter’s probation but failed to make a finding 

of “good cause” for revoking his probation after the expiration of the probationary 

period. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s revocation 

because (1) the trial court had failed to make a finding of “good cause,” and (2) it was 

ambiguous whether the court impermissibly revoked Mr. Geter’s probation for a class 

three misdemeanor. State v. Geter (Geter I), No. COA19-846, 2020 WL 3251033 (N.C. 

Ct. App. June 16, 2020).

¶ 25 At his second revocation hearing on 15 July 2020, Mr. Geter argued that 

because the State could have held the revocation hearing prior to the disposition of 

the underlying drug charges, the State did not have “good cause” to revoke his 

probation after the probationary period had expired. The State, although 

acknowledging that it did have the ability to hold revocation hearings prior to 

disposition, emphasized that it delays proceedings in “every single case” involving 

allegations of new criminal conduct. Otherwise, the State argued, “we would be 

having hearings all the time.” Additionally, the State noted that Buncombe County 

only holds one criminal session per week and probation hearings once every two 

weeks and that “99 percent of the time, if the underlaying evidence is suppressed or 

charges dismissed, the [S]tate does not pursue the revocation.” The State contended 
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that it “allowed the probation matter to be continued to afford Mr. Geter an 

opportunity to have his trial.” After hearing these arguments, the trial court found 

that “it is clear to the [c]ourt that the State waited until disposition of the underlying 

offenses alleged before proceeding with the probation violation. The [c]ourt would find 

that this would constitute good cause.”

¶ 26 Mr. Geter again appealed, arguing that the trial court erred because (1) “the 

record did not contain evidence the State made reasonable efforts to hold the hearing 

prior to expiration of probation” and (2) the idea that waiting for underlying criminal 

offenses to be resolved is “good cause” was expressly rejected by the Court of Appeals 

in” State v. Sasek, 271 N.C. App. 568 (2020). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 

court’s revocation order, concluding that “review of caselaw and our General Statutes 

has revealed no specific set of factors that must be considered in evaluating whether 

‘good cause’ exists under N.C.[G.S.] § 15A-1344(f)(3).” State v. Geter (Geter II), 276 

N.C. App. 377, 2021-NCCOA-98, ¶ 14. According to the Court of Appeals, Sasek was 

inapplicable to Mr. Geter’s case because the trial court in his case did make a finding 

of “good cause.” Id. ¶ 12. This Court allowed Mr. Geter’s petition for discretionary 

review on 10 August 2021. 

II. Standard of Review

¶ 27 “[A]n ‘ultimate finding is a conclusion of law or at least a determination of a 

mixed question of law and fact’ and should ‘be distinguished from the findings of 
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primary, evidentiary, or circumstantial facts.’ ” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 76 (2019) 

(quoting Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491 (1937)). In contrast to abuse 

of discretion review, appellate courts reviewing ultimate findings ask whether the 

trial court’s “evidentiary facts reasonably support the trial court’s ultimate finding.” 

State v. Fuller, 376 N.C. 862, 2021-NCSC-20, ¶ 8 (concluding that a determination of 

whether a defendant “is a danger to the community” should be reviewed as an 

“ultimate finding”). But when there is no “rational connection between the basic facts 

. . . and the ultimate fact,” State v. White, 300 N.C. 494, 504 (1980) (cleaned up), or 

the evidentiary findings do not “adequately address” the legal conclusions, In re 

N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 78, the ultimate fact is not binding on appeal.

III. Analysis

¶ 28 Statutory interpretation begins with the text. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f) 

enumerates three prerequisites that must be present before a trial court can revoke 

a defendant’s probation after expiration of the probationary period. The statute 

provides that a court

may extend, modify, or revoke probation after the 

expiration of the period of probation if all of the following 

apply:

(1) Before the expiration of the period of probation 

the State has filed a written violation report with the 

clerk indicating its intent to conduct a hearing on 

one or more violations of one or more conditions of 

probation.
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(2) The court finds that the probationer did violate 

one or more conditions of probation prior to the 

expiration of the period of probation.

(3) The court finds for good cause shown and stated 

that the probation should be extended, modified, or 

revoked.

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f) (2021). As the majority notes, this version of the statute omits 

language appearing in a prior version providing that revocation was permitted if the 

“State has made reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to conduct the hearing 

earlier.” Act of July 28, 2008, S.L. 2008-129, § 4, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 499, 503. That

version of the statute read:

(f) Revocation after Period of Probation. — The court may 

revoke probation after the expiration of the period of 

probation if:

(1) Before the expiration of the period of probation 

the State has filed a written motion with the clerk 

indicating its intent to conduct a revocation hearing; 

and

(2) The court finds that the State has made 

reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to 

conduct the hearing earlier.

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f) (2007). Notably, the commentary to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344 did 

not change when the statute was revised: It provides that “probation can be revoked 

. . . if a violation occurred during the period and if the court was unable to bring the 

probationer before it in order to revoke at that time.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344 Official 

Commentary. 
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¶ 29 This case raises two important questions regarding how to interpret this 

provision of the JRA. First, does N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) require the trial court to 

enter any evidentiary findings in support of its ultimate determination that good 

cause exists? Second, does N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) require the State to have made 

“reasonable effort . . . to conduct the hearing earlier” prior to seeking post-expiration 

revocation, as the previous version of the statute required? See N.C.G.S. § 15A1344(f)(2) (2007). The majority answers no to both of these questions. I disagree. 

¶ 30 In my view, the “shown and stated” language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) 

requires both that the State meet its burden that “good cause” exists and that the 

trial court state the reasons for which “good cause” exists, rather than simply making 

an express finding. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) (2021). Furthermore, although the 

legislature omitted the “reasonable effort” language in the current statute, trial 

courts must still consider “reasonable effort” by the State to hold the revocation 

hearing earlier in determining if “good cause” to revoke exists. The “good cause” 

language subsumes “reasonable effort” and grants trial courts greater, but not 

boundless, discretion to consider other factors. This interpretation closely follows the 

text of the statute and the legislative intent of the Justice Reinvestment Act, which 

was to limit the ability of trial courts to revoke probation after expiration and to 

restrict spending on incarceration so that the state could instead invest those

resources in community programs to decrease crime.
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A. The “shown and stated” language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) requires 

trial courts to include findings illustrating why “good cause” exists to 

revoke probation after expiration.

¶ 31 The majority holds that the trial court’s “good cause” determination is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion. This ignores the nature of the good cause inquiry and the 

statutory text. The JRA provides that trial courts may revoke probation after the 

probationary period has expired if “[t]he court finds for good cause shown and stated” 

that it is appropriate to do so. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3). There are two potential 

readings of the “shown and stated” language. The first gives meaning to all language 

in § 15A-1344(f)(3). Revoking probation after expiration requires (1) “[t]he court 

finds” that the State “show[ed],” and thus met their burden, that “good cause” exists; 

and (2) the court “state[s]” the reasons supporting its determination that “good cause” 

exists. This reading gives full effect to the statute. 

¶ 32 The second reading, which the majority adopts only requires the trial court to 

find “good cause” without explaining why good cause exists. This reading renders the 

prefatory language “[t]he court finds” duplicative with the subsequent “shown and 

stated” language. To read “[t]he court finds” and “shown and stated” as identical 

conflicts with the principle that statutes “should not be interpreted in a manner 

which would render any of its words superfluous.” Coffey, 336 N.C. at 417. Instead, 

the State must show that good cause exists by meeting its burden of demonstrating 
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good cause at the revocation hearing and the trial court must state its explanation by 

entering findings in support of its ultimate finding that “good cause” exists to revoke 

after expiration. The statute requires evidentiary findings in support of the ultimate 

findings of “good cause.” Thus, the legislature intended the “shown and stated” 

language to require trial courts to not only find “good cause” but also to state the 

reasons why “good cause” exists for revocation. 

¶ 33 This Court has previously held that trial courts must make an express finding 

that “good cause” exists to revoke probation after expiration. State v. Morgan, 372 

N.C. 609, 613 (2019). A trial court order does not satisfy this requirement simply 

because evidence exists in the record from which a court may infer “good cause.” Id. 

at 616. Instead, we explained that the language of § 15A-1344(f) clearly mandates 

that the trial court find both that “the probationer did violate one or more conditions 

of probation” and that there is “good cause shown and stated.” Id. at 614 (quoting 

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f) (2017)). 

¶ 34 Further, requiring specific findings of fact in “good cause” determinations 

aligns with the broader purpose of the JRA. The primary goal of the JRA is to “reduce 

. . . [state] spending on corrections and . . . reinvest the savings in community-based 

programs” to decrease crime. State v. Moore, 370 N.C. 338, 343 (2017) (quoting James 

M. Markham, The North Carolina Justice Reinvestment Act 1 (2012)). Probation 

revocations account for the largest percentage of North Carolina prison admissions 
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each year. See N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Fiscal Year 2019–2020 Annual Statistical 

Report 11, https://files.nc.gov/ncdps/FY-2019-20-Annual-Statistical-Report.pdf. An 

interpretation of the act that would allow trial courts to revoke probation whenever 

they deem fit would be in tension with the JRA’s goals. By contrast, interpreting the 

JRA to require evidentiary findings to support a good cause determination ensures 

that courts allow post-expiration revocations only in circumstances where they are 

truly warranted. Interpreting § 15A-1344(f)(3) in this way also ensures an adequate 

record for appellate review. By contrast, in concluding that a trial court may simply 

state that “good cause” exists to revoke, the majority introduces a standard that is 

virtually unreviewable and enables the State to potentially abuse calendaring of 

revocation hearings at the expense of defendants. The “shown and stated” language 

in the statute requires trial courts to illustrate why good cause exists, imposing a 

necessary guardrail protecting against unnecessary revocations after expiration of 

the probationary period. 

B. Trial courts must consider whether the State made “reasonable effort” 

to conduct the hearing prior to revocation in order to determine if 

“good cause” exists for post-expiration revocation.

¶ 35 Concluding that trial courts must include findings illustrating why “good 

cause” exists calls for this Court to give meaning to “good cause.” Establishing factors 

grounded in the interpretation and legislative intent of § 15A-1344(f) will enable trial 

courts to apply the statute uniformly in a way that provides defendants notice as to 
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what constitutes “good cause.” The statute does require the State to show and the 

trial court to state that the State made “reasonable effort” to hold the hearing earlier. 

Finally, because the legislature did broaden the statutory language from “reasonable 

effort” to “good cause,” trial courts are also free to consider other relevant factors or 

scenarios. “Good cause” subsumes, but is not limited to, a “reasonable effort” analysis. 

¶ 36 When a trial court fails to make an express finding of “good cause,” a reviewing 

court will vacate an order revoking probation unless the record includes sufficient 

evidence that may enable a court to conclude “good cause” exists on remand. Morgan, 

372 N.C. at 618. And the Court of Appeals concluded in Sasek that “the record [must] 

contain[ ] sufficient evidence to permit the necessary findings of ‘reasonable efforts’ 

by the State to have conducted the probation revocation hearing earlier” to warrant 

remand. 271 N.C. App. at 575 (quoting Morgan, 372 N.C. at 618). Although Sasek is 

not binding on this Court, Sasek interpreted the latter version of the statute—the one 

at issue here—and we did not allow further review of that case. At a minimum, Sasek

indicates that as of 2020, the Court of Appeals believed that the new version of the 

JRA incorporated its predecessor’s requirement that the State undertake “reasonable 

effort” for a good cause determination to be warranted. 

¶ 37 Creating factor tests to guide trial courts in applying the law is often necessary 

to give effect to criminal statutes in a manner that comports with the rights of 

criminal defendants and avoids vagueness. In North Carolina, a statute is void for 
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vagueness where “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning 

and differ as to its application.” In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 531 (1969). Additionally, 

the language of the statute must provide a defendant with sufficient notice as to what 

criminal conduct the statute seeks to punish. State v. Elam, 302 N.C. 157, 162 (1981). 

¶ 38 The Court of Appeals’ ruling potentially conflicts with the foundational 

constitutional principles of due process and equal protection by approving statutory 

vagueness. If there is “no specific set of factors that must be considered” within a trial 

court’s “good cause” determination, then trial courts enjoy functionally unbridled 

discretion to make this determination “on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 

attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 

109.

¶ 39 Indeed, the circumstances here illustrate the potential for inconsistent or 

arbitrary applications of the “good cause” requirement absent further guidance. The 

State conceded at the revocation hearing that it made no effort to hold the hearing 

earlier, instead opting to “wait and see” what happened to the underlying charges. At 

first glance, this explanation seems reasonable enough: a conviction on the 

underlying charges would likely support the State’s case for probation revocation, 

while a dismissal or acquittal of these charges would weigh against probation 

revocation. The trial court acknowledged this approach when it stated that “it is clear 

to the [c]ourt that the State waited until disposition of the underlying offenses alleged 
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before proceeding with the probation violation.” The trial court likewise relied upon 

this “wait and see” approach in its “good cause” determination: It found “that this 

does constitute good cause in that . . . if for whatever reason the State had opted to 

dismiss the charges, that it would have had a direct impact on the later hearing of the 

probation violation.” (Emphasis added). 

¶ 40 But this finding is squarely contradicted by what actually happened here: The 

State did dismiss the underlying charges against Mr. Geter, but the dismissal had no

impact on the later hearing of the probation violation. That is, despite the dismissal

of the underlying charges that supposedly influenced the State to “wait and see,” the 

State nevertheless forged ahead with seeking the post-expiration revocation of 

Geter’s probation. Under this “heads I win, tails you lose” framework approved by the 

majority opinion today, the mere fact of pending underlying charges against a 

defendant could always constitute “good cause,” regardless of the outcome of those 

charges. This result is prohibited by the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f) 

itself, which enumerates the “good cause” determination required by subsection (f)(3) 

as a separate and distinct prerequisite from the mere fact “that the probationer did 

violate one or more conditions of probation prior to the expiration of the period of 

probation” required by subsection (f)(2). Finally, if, as the majority opinion observes, 

the State “likely felt confident that the same evidence, deemed excluded at 

defendant’s criminal trial, could very well satisfy the trial court that defendant had 
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committed new criminal offenses while on probation under a less demanding 

standard,” then the State would have absolutely no reason to delay defendant’s 

probation revocation hearing until after the underlying charges were resolved; it 

could have presented that evidence to the trial court independently of the trial on the 

underlying charges. Instead, Geter’s probation revocation hearing was delayed until 

399 days after his probation expired, constituting a “significant and unadvisable 

[delay] in the administration of justice.” Geter, 2021-NCCOA-98, # 15.

¶ 41 These inconsistencies illustrate why, contrary to the ruling of the Court of 

Appeals below, there must be some “specific set of factors that must be considered in 

evaluating whether ‘good cause’ exists under [N.C.G.S.] § 15A-1344(f)(3). The 

responsibility for establishing those factors falls on the shoulders of this Court. While 

the majority opinion generally acknowledges that a trial court’s discretion in this 

matter must not be exercised arbitrarily but only in accordance with fixed legal 

principles, it stops short of addressing the Court of Appeals’ sweeping ruling and 

providing the necessary, more specific guidance about what “fixed legal principles” a 

trial court must consider. In my view, the high stakes of post-expiration probation 

revocation and the language of N.C.G.S. § 15A1344(f)(3) require this Court to do so.

Indeed, “where a statute is ambiguous or unclear in its meaning, resort must be had 

to judicial construction to ascertain the legislative will, and the courts will interpret 
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the language to give effect to the legislative intent.” In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239 

(1978).

¶ 42 As Mr. Geter correctly notes, this Court has established multifactor tests to 

give meaning to criminal statutes on numerous occasions, thus avoiding vagueness 

and providing defendants with sufficient notice. Such instances include State v. 

Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 368 (1976), where we adopted factors to determine if a defendant 

should be shackled at trial; State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 339 (2002), which 

announced voluntary confession factors; and State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 118 (2003), 

which established speedy trial factors. By creating factors that trial courts may 

consider in determining “good cause,” we can ensure uniform and clear applications 

of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) consistent with all constitutional requirements. 

¶ 43 Specifically, the statutory text, structure, purpose, and context, as well as 

foundational constitutional principles dictate that a trial court engaging in a “good 

cause” determination under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) consider within its discretion: 

(1) the State and the court’s ability or inability to hold the probation revocation 

hearing in a timely manner; (2) the length of the delay between the alleged act 

warranting probation revocation and the subsequent hearing; and (3) the efforts 

made by the State or the court to conduct an earlier probation hearing. In my view, 

requiring consideration of these factors would properly honor the statutory text, 

purpose, and constitutional limitations while still affording the trial court broad and 
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necessary discretion in making this fact-intensive determination. Indeed, in addition 

to criminal defendants and the State, trial courts themselves could also benefit from 

this guidance by gaining statutory and constitutional landmarks to orient their 

discretionary ruling. Without providing this guidance, and without establishing any 

“specific set of factors that must be considered,” this Court allows trial court 

discretion to functionally undermine the statute’s purpose and foundational 

constitutional principles.

¶ 44 Establishing a “good cause” requirement that does not mandate finding 

substantive content such as “reasonable effort” effectively invalidates § 15A-1344(f) 

for vagueness. Adopting the majority’s position that “good cause” must simply be 

written and neither illustrated nor explained by finding that the State made 

“reasonable effort” to hold the revocation hearing earlier grants trial courts 

unreviewable discretion and does not put probationers on notice as to what 

establishes “good cause.” Trial courts’ application of the statute may vary widely, 

effectively preventing defendants from anticipating what may constitute “good cause” 

and from building arguments that “good cause” does not exist. Recognizing that the 

current version of the Justice Reinvestment Act incorporates the “reasonable effort” 

framework into its “good cause” requirement establishes workable guidelines for trial 

courts and clarifies the statutory requirements of § 15A-1344(f). 
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¶ 45 Interpreting “good cause” as subsuming “reasonable effort” aligns with the 

official commentary to § 15A-1344. The exact language states: “probation can be 

revoked . . . if a violation occurred during the period and if the court was unable to 

bring the probationer before it in order to revoke at that time.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344 

Official Commentary. Because the legislature preserved the commentary, we must 

construe it as applicable to the “good cause” requirement. See Wing v. Goldman Sachs

Tr. Co., N.A., 382 N.C. 288, 2022-NCSC-104, ¶ 54 (“When the legislature explicitly 

instructs the revisor of statutes to print the commentary with the statute, such 

reliance appears particularly appropriate.” (citation omitted)). The clear language of 

this guidance implies that the trial court should find the State could not bring in the 

defendant prior to revocation. 

¶ 46 The “reasonable effort” factor analysis also makes sense of the Court of Appeals 

ruling in Sasek. Although the opinion is not binding on this Court, is important 

because the Court of Appeals concluded that, in order for a reviewing court to remand, 

it must hold “sufficient” evidence exists in the record “to permit the necessary 

findings of ‘reasonable efforts’ by the State to have conducted the probation 

revocation hearing earlier.” Sasek, 271 N.C. App. at 575 (quoting Morgan, 372 N.C. 

at 618). Moreover, Sasek suggests that the crucial question in determining “good 

cause” is whether the State made reasonable effort to conduct the hearing earlier. If 

appellate courts review the record for “reasonable effort” in deciding whether to 
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vacate or remand, trial courts should be required to establish such findings in their 

order to support “good cause.” 

¶ 47 “Good cause” must encompass, but is not limited to, the “reasonable effort” 

analysis. The previous version requires that the court “finds that the State has made 

reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to conduct the hearing earlier.” Act of 

July 28, 2008 § 4. Although the majority and the State are correct that the legislature

omitted the “reasonable effort” language in the updated statute, this omission cannot 

grant trial courts unlimited discretion because the legislature also added the “good 

cause” requirement. Replacing the “reasonable effort” language with “good cause” 

does widen what trial courts may consider in determining “good cause,” but it is still 

a limit on when trial courts can revoke after expiration. The legislature intended the 

statute and the Justice Reinvestment Act to limit the possibility of revocation after

expiration, limit the activation of sentences, and thus limit state spending on 

incarceration. “Good cause” should be read in accordance with this intent as requiring 

the State to show and for the trial court to state a finding that the State made 

“reasonable effort” to bring the probationer in earlier.

C. Remand is necessary to determine if delaying Mr. Geter’s probation 

revocation hearing until after the disposition of his underlying criminal 

charges constitutes “good cause.” 

¶ 48 Interpreting “good cause” as subsuming “reasonable effort” but leaving room 

for additional considerations in a trial court’s determination enables defendants to 
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still have the option of acquiescing or delaying their probation revocation hearing 

until the disposition of their underlying charges. However, the disposition of those 

charges should affect the outcome of the probationary hearing. If a Court finds “good 

cause” shown and stated because the State and the defendant both agreed to wait 

until the disposition of the underlying charges, that disposition must affect the trial 

court’s exercise of discretion. Otherwise, there is no true “good cause” for delaying the 

hearing. 

¶ 49 Although waiting to proceed with a revocation until after the disposition of 

underlying charges would ideally limit the number of total revocations, a blanket 

policy, like that of Buncombe County’s, has the potential to harm defendants, such as 

Mr. Geter, whose underlying charges have been dismissed or acquitted and yet are 

still the subject of revocation hearings. Simply put, trial courts cannot allow for the 

delay of probation revocation hearings until after the disposition of underlying 

charges only to revoke probation despite the dismissal or acquittal of those charges 

and still rule within the limiting parameters of the “good cause” requirement and the 

Justice Reinvestment Act. 

¶ 50 Our precedents provide some context regarding what constitutes sufficient 

evidence of “reasonable effort” by the State sufficient for remand to be appropriate. 

In Morgan, this Court was “unable to say from our review of the record that no 

evidence exists that would allow the trial court on remand to make a finding of ‘good 
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Earls, J., dissenting

cause shown and stated.’ ” Morgan, 372 N.C. at 618. Evidence to support our holding 

included a notice of revocation hearing with a scheduled date before the expiration 

period and remarks from the defendant’s counsel addressing the defendant’s 

significant mental health issues and inability to comply with terms of probation or 

appear in court. Id. at 611. Bryant suggests that neither a “failed scheduling effort 

alone” nor a defendant’s medical condition causing difficulty in scheduling is 

sufficient “to support a finding of reasonable efforts.” Bryant, 361 N.C. at 104. Finally, 

the Court of Appeals holding in Sasek suggests that when the record shows there was 

a hearing initially scheduled prior to expiration but does not explain why it did not 

take place, the matter does not warrant remand. Sasek, 271 N.C. App. at 576. 

¶ 51 Buncombe County’s blanket policy of delaying probation revocation hearings 

until after the disposition of underlying charges alone cannot constitute “good cause.” 

The policy does not demonstrate that the State made “reasonable effort” to hold the 

hearing earlier. In fact, it supports the notion that the State purposefully wanted to 

delay the proceeding simply because it was inconvenient to the State to hold it earlier. 

In the trial transcript, the State noted that it is typical practice to wait until the 

disposition of underlying charges because if they “tried to hold hearings before 

probation expired, ‘we would be having hearings all the time.’ ” The State’s inability 

to accommodate probation hearings adequately and fairly in a timely manner cannot, 
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Earls, J., dissenting

on its own, be held against defendants facing the possibility of revocation after the 

expiration of the probationary period. 

¶ 52 However, in Mr. Geter’s case, there is enough evidence in the record that the 

State made “reasonable effort” to conduct the hearing earlier to warrant remand for 

the trial court to determine if “good cause” exists. Unlike in Bryant and Sasek, the 

State’s testimony suggests Mr. Geter acquiesced or potentially agreed for the 

“probation matter to be continued to afford [him] an opportunity to have his trial.” 

Additionally, there was significant restraint on the State’s ability to hold Mr. Geter’s 

revocation hearing earlier, which explains the failed scheduling efforts and further 

delays: Buncombe County only holds one criminal session per week and probation 

hearings only once every two weeks. In tandem with Mr. Geter’s agreement to delay 

the revocation hearing, the State’s calendaring restrictions support a remand; 

however, the latter would be likely insufficient alone. See Bryant, 361 N.C. at 104 

(holding a “failed scheduling effort alone” does not constitute sufficient evidence to 

warrant remand). 

¶ 53 On remand, this case warrants serious consideration of two facts to determine 

if “good cause” existed to revoke Mr. Geter’s probation. First, despite the State’s 

statements that “99 percent of the time, if the underlying evidence is suppressed or 

charges dismissed, the [S]tate does not pursue the revocation,” the State still 

pursued, and the trial court granted, the revocation of Mr. Geter’s probation. The 
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Earls, J., dissenting

delay to allow Mr. Geter the “opportunity to have his trial” had zero impact on his 

revocation hearing and should not constitute “good cause.” Second, Mr. Geter had 

violated other conditions of his parole, such as completing required community 

service hours and his GED, for which the State could have pursued modification or 

extension of his probation, yet the State instead pursued revocation on the basis of 

criminal conduct. The State had every opportunity to extend, modify, or revoke Mr. 

Geter’s probation prior to expiration, yet decided to wait 806 days total to do so. 

¶ 54 Ultimately, if the State, with a defendant’s agreement, waits to proceed with 

revocation until after disposition of underlying charges, the disposition should have 

an impact on the trial court’s determination of “good cause.” Asking defendants to 

wait until well after their probationary period expires and then revoking their 

probation regardless of the fact that their underlying charges have been dismissed or 

acquitted is “significant and unadvisable in the administration of justice.” Geter II, ¶ 

15.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 55 Requiring trial courts to make express findings of fact that demonstrate why 

“good cause” exists to revoke probation after expiration will limit such instances of 

extreme delay. This requirement is consistent with the text of § 15A-1344(f) and the 

purposes of the Justice Reinvestment Act. The majority errs by failing to enforce the 

statutory guardrails, such as requiring trial courts to illustrate why “good cause” 
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exists, and to consider the factor of “reasonable effort” by the State to conduct the 

hearing earlier, which impose a crucial limit on the ability of trial courts to revoke 

probation after expiration of the probationary period. Because there is evidence in 

the record of this case to suggest “reasonable effort” by the State exists, this matter 

should be remanded. 

Justice HUDSON joins in this dissenting opinion.