Wildlife Poaching Threatens Economic, 

Security Priorities in Africa

6 September 2013 
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Wildlife Poaching Threatens Economic, 

Security Priorities in Africa 

Key Points 

Increased demand for ivory and rhino horn in Asia stems from a rapidly expanding wealthy class that 

views both commodities as luxury goods that enhance social status as well as a growing number of ready 

buyers within Africa who serve as dealers to clients in Asia. Increased demand for ivory and rhino horn 

triggered rapid upticks in poaching in Africa in 2011 and 2012, with similar trends predicted for 2013. 

Criminal elements of all kinds, including some terrorist entities and rogue security personnel, often in 

collusion with government officials in source countries are involved in poaching and movement of ivory 

and rhino horn across east, central, and southern Africa. We assess with high confidence that traffickers 

use sophisticated networks and the complicity of public officials in order to move ivory and rhino horn 

from relatively remote areas to markets and ports of export, perpetuating corruption and border insecurity 

in key eastern, central and southern African states. We judge some of these networks probably are the 

same or overlap with those of other illicit goods such as drugs and weapons. 

Poaching presents significant security challenges for militaries and police forces in African nations (e.g. 

Kenya, Tanzania, Congo-Kinshasa, South Africa, and others), which are often outgunned by poachers 

and their criminal and extremist allies. Corruption and lack of sufficient penal and financial deterrents are 

hampering these governments’ abilities to reduce poaching and trafficking. 

Material and training, legal, and diplomatic support probably could have a significant impact on the 

trajectory of the illicit rhino horn and ivory trades, and would also represent a relatively cost-effective way 

to gain new insights into the behavior of implicated criminal groups and associated trafficking networks. 

However, the widespread complicity of military and government officials in the trade hinders potential 

partnerships. 
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Uptick in Demand For Ivory and Rhino in Asia Fueling Rise in Poaching 

Increased demand for ivory and rhino horn in Asia stems from a rapidly expanding wealthy class 

that views both commodities as luxury goods that enhance social status as well as a growing 

number of ready buyers within Africa who serve as dealers to clients in Asia. Increased demand for 

ivory and rhino horn triggered rapid upticks in poaching in Africa in 2011 and 2012, with similar trends 

likely for 2013. Wildlife trafficking has doubled since 2007 and is now “the fourth-largest transnational 

crime in the world,” with yearly revenues reaching an estimated $17 billion, according to Al Jazeera, the 

English-language news service of the influential pan-Arab news channel Al-Jazirah. The UN Environment 

Program (UNEP) reported on 6 March that elephant poaching has doubled in the last decade. 

• China’s rapid economic development and a sharp rise in private consumption, have increased 

demand for ivory. Chinese customers often believe that they are purchasing legal ivory and are often 

unaware that elephants were killed in order to obtain their ivory.

• In China and Vietnam, rhino horn is widely regarded as an effective traditional medicine, and it has 

recently become trendy among young urbanites as a hangover cure. 

• The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) estimates that out of the 

approximately 472,000 elephants living in Africa, 25,000 were killed in 2011, and the organization 

expects that the total for 2012 was even higher, according to a 19 February article by French news 

agency Agence France Presse (AFP). Rhinos are also under increasing poaching threat—the 

number poached for their horns in South Africa grew from 13 in 2007 to 668 in 2012, according to the 

African Wildlife Foundation (AWF). 

• The Tanzanian government is concerned that the country’s elephants would be gone in seven years if 

current poaching rates continue. The number of elephants killed by poachers in Kenya increased 

eight times from 47 in 2007 to 387 in 2012 according to an 11 May report in the Daily Nation, the 

widely circulated Nairobi-based independent newspaper. 

Poachers and Facilitators Are Armed Actors and Military Personnel 

Demand for rhino horn and ivory so outpaces supply, and is so lucrative, that criminal elements of 

all kinds, including some terrorist entities and rogue military officers, are becoming involved in 

countries across east, central, and southern Africa. Once smallscale enterprises, operations are 

increasingly sophisticated, targeting and killing animals with weapons including semiautomatic guns and 

rocket-propelled grenades, that threaten not only the animal populations in the region but civilian 

populations as well. 

• Parks in central Africa have been heavily poached in the recent past. Militia elements have been 

implicated alongside military forces. 

• Armed actors move ivory in exchange for arms and use existing smuggling operations to facilitate the 

movement of ivory throughout central Africa. Militia forces may offer ivory to local officials in 

exchange for the guarantee of safe refuge in the region. 
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• South Africa has seen a steep rise in rhino poaching in recent years, reportedly organized by armed 

crime syndicates who pay and arm local hunters. While South Africa is not yet a significant source 

market for ivory—even though it is recognized as a major export hub on the continent, with seizures 

being made in the Western Cape and Cape Town harbor—officials expect to see growth in elephant 

poaching, especially as rhino numbers dwindle. 

Networks Use Common Facilitation Routes 

Traffickers use sophisticated networks and the complicity of public officials in order to move 

ivory and rhino horn from relatively remote areas to markets and ports of export, perpetuating 

corruption and border insecurity throughout Africa. These networks probably are the same or 

overlap with those of other illicit goods such as drugs and weapons. 

• Air and sea shipments of illegal wildlife, in particular, are difficult to detect given the opportunity for 

alterations to shipping documents, which often obscure the African origin of the containers as well as 

their true contents. Criminal syndicates arguably take advantage of this lack of oversight and 

inspection of containerized shipping when trafficking illegal wildlife products. 

• Criminal syndicates likely take advantage of the high volume of maritime containerized cargo for 

trafficking wildlife products. The primary reason for lax oversight and inspection is a lack of resources 

and corruption at African and East Asian ports. 

Exacerbating Insecurity, Undermining African Economies 

Poaching presents significant security challenges for militaries and police forces in African 

nations, which are often outgunned by poachers and their allies. Corruption and lack of sufficient 

penal and financial deterrents, in addition to lack of trained, funded and staffed wildlife protective services 

are hampering these governments’ abilities to reduce ivory poaching and trafficking. 

The illicit ivory and rhino horn trade is enabled by systemic corruption, but also exacerbates 

corruption by introducing high-value illegal products to influential individuals along the supply 

chain, from rangers to customs officers, police, and military. In their participation, these players 

actively subvert government controls, resulting in further reduction in government effectiveness, less civil 

society engagement, and the deterioration of civilian trust in the state. By inducing widespread 

movement of armed poachers and traffickers, the ivory and rhino horn trade also exacerbates border 

insecurity, particularly across porous borders. 

• Poachers have begun using increasingly sophisticated weapons and equipment, including rocket 

launchers, M-16 rifles, and night vision goggles, according to an April 2013 report prepared by 

environmental NGOs including the World Wildlife Fund. This has led rangers and armed forces to 

use more aggressive tactics to combat poachers, thereby increasing the risk of casualties to 

themselves, poachers, and surrounding communities. 

• The price of rhino horn has increased to around $60,000 per kilogram in Vietnam—twice the value of 

gold and platinum, but penalties for trafficking rhino horn are minor in comparison. 
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• In Tanzania, collusion between criminal syndicates and government officials who purportedly defend 

Tanzania’s wildlife is extensive and has helped enable the killing of roughly 10,000 of the country’s 

elephants annually, according to a statement by the chairman of Tanzania’s natural resources 

committee in December 2012. 

The illicit ivory and rhino horn trade arguably weakens macroeconomic and fiscal stability, deters 

investment, contributes to income inequality, and hinders growth at all levels of an economy. 

Tourism revenues are particularly threatened by unmitigated poaching. 

• In January 2013, the Kenya Association of Tour Operators petitioned their government to adopt a 

stronger wildlife bill, referring to the growth in elephant and rhino poaching as “economic sabotage.” 

Several other countries with substantial wildlife tourism industries, including legal hunting, are 

similarly affected—for example, Gabon, Cameroon, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and 

South Africa. 

• According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators data for 2011—the most recent year for 

which data are available—tourism revenue (classified as an export by the World Bank) represents 

approximately 5.5 percent of Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 6.2 percent of Tanzania’s 

GDP, and 5.8 percent of Uganda’s GDP. 

Opportunities Depend on Transparency of Host Governments, Awareness Campaigns for End 

Users 

Material and training, legal, and diplomatic support probably could have a significant impact on the 

trajectory of the illicit rhino horn and ivory trades, and would also represent a relatively cost-effective way 

to gain new insights into the behavior of implicated criminal groups and associated trafficking networks. 

However, the widespread complicity of local civilians as well as security forces and government officials in 

the trade hinders potential partnerships. 

Protection 

International assistance—possibly via military and various aid channels—could help to improve the 

effectiveness of anti-poaching initiatives in Africa as well as investigation capacities throughout the ivory 

and rhino horn supply chains. 

• Material and traning support requested by African states to improve counter-poaching operations 

include overhead infrared, night vision goggles, communications equipment, and investigation kits. 

Furthermore, enabling more rigorous and coordinated forensic analysis, including DNA testing, 

across source, transit, and consumer countries would result in better information on the age and 

origin of confiscated rhino horn and ivory, and therefore a more accurate understanding of trade 

networks. 

• Customs controls and container-search tactics at ports and airports in key consumer, transit, and 

source countries are significantly lacking. International efforts to assist host governments with 

improved security procedures and protocol at ports probably would also have the added benefit of 

streamlining port operations at some of the most congested ports in Africa. 
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Legal Systems 

Existing legal infrastructure throughout the ivory and rhino horn supply chain falls far short of what is 

needed to curtail the trade, and African nations have very few bilateral agreements on penalties and 

jurisdiction for prosecuting poachers and traffickers. International assistance to support strengthening the 

judiciary in key countries in Africa and Asia could improve prosecution and protection efforts. 

• Improved surveillance and law enforcement in consumer countries like China, Vietnam, and Thailand, 

where inspections and interdictions of cargo from Africa may have increased could increase the 

likelihood that wildlife traffickers will use alternative ports and mechanisms to evade detection.