' EATTOKNEY GENERAL 

OF TEXAS 

December 19, 1951 

Han* Homer Garrison, Jr+, Director 

Texas Department of Public Safety 

Austin, Texas Opinion No. V-l 380 

Re: Applicability of Texas 

Motor Vehicle Safety 

Responsibility Act, 

House Bill 219, Acts 

52nd Leg., R.S. 1951, 

(Article 67Olh. V&S,) 

to operators of publicDear Colonel Garrison: ly owned motor vehicles. 

Your request for an opinion in connection with the abovecaptioned matter states: . . 

“Reference is made to Section 33, Article VI, H-B. 

No. 219, 52nd Texas Legislature, the ‘Texas Motor 

Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act.’ 

“The first portion of Section 33 of the Act referred 

to provides : 

” ‘This Act shall not apply with respect to any 

motor $ehicle owned by the United States, the 

State ofTexas or any pc@ical subdivision of 

this state or municipality therein; * * *‘, 

“H.B1 219, in effect, provides that under certain conditions (an accident involving property damage of a 

certain sum, under certain conditions, and upon conviction of certain offenses) the operator or owner of 

the motor vehicle involved shall be required to furnish proof of financial responsibility. If proof of 

financial responsibility is not, furnished within the required time the Department is required to suspend ’ 

the license of the operator and the registration of 

the owner of the motor vehicle involved ‘in the acci-, 

dent, 
Hon, Homer Garrison, Jr., page 2 (V-1380) 

“Let us assume that a motor vehicle owned by the 

State of Texas, or a political subdivision of the State, 

or a municipality within the State is involved in an 

‘accident in which somuona is killed, or s,erlously 

injured’,or in which thaw is gr,eat property damage* 

Under the excepUons referred to we cannot suspend 

the registration on the vbhicle involved. Would the 

operator of the vahiele referred to above be required 

to furnish proof of financial responsibility within the 

period provided by law? If your answer is yes, and 

such proof is net furnished, are we required to revoke his drtvere license and suspend the registration 

on all motor vehicles pcrsonally owned by him? 

“Also let us assum,a that the operator of a ctty garbage truck is convicted of d,riving a city truck on a 

public street while intoxicated, or failure to stop end 

render aid, or some other offense for which hia.litense to operate ,a motor veh~ek must be suspended 

or revoked, and said truck driver does-not then give 

end thereafter&aintain proof of financiai rasponcib,Uity with respect to all vehicles registered by him 

as an individual, should the registration on motor vehicles privately owned by him be suspended? Could 

he register s new vehicle without furnishing proof of 

fhencisl responsibility? (See See, 17 of the Act.) 

Wfftcere of polfttcal subdfvisioar of the state are asking us about the status of their drivers under the Act. 

We have told th+m that there ham been nQ court opinions 

on the newly enbckrd,iaw and that we are asking you for 

ea opinion on thu matter,” 

You prcrent for our determination two questions, as follows: 

1. 1s the operator of a motor vehicle owned by 

the United States, the State of Texas. a political subdivision of the State or a municipality of the State, required to furnish proof of financial responsibility under the provisions of House BUl 219, Actr 52nd Leg., 

R,S, 1951. ch, 498, p. 1210 (Article 6701h, V,C&)? 

2. ;tt the above question is answered in the afffrrnetive. then ir the Department of Public Safety, 

in the event of an accident by the operator of a publicly 
. 

Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 3 (V-1380) 

owned vehicle under the conditions set out in the 

act, required to revoke the operator’s driver’s license and suspend the registration of his privately 

owned vehicles 7 

Article 6701h, V.C.S., the “Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-’ 

Responsibility Act” (H.B. 219. Acts 52nd Leg., H.S. 1951, ch. 498, 

p, 1210) is designed to compel owners and drivers of motor vehicles 

to maintain ability to satisfy claims for injury and damage orising out of accidents involving motor vehicles. Financial responsibility is nowhere required absolutely by the act, but is merely 

a condition to the continued privilege to drive or use a vehicle 

under certain circumstances. Ability to satisfy claims may be 

established under various circumstances by several methods, 

including maintenance of insurance against such claims, payment, or discharge from or satisfaction of such claims in designated ways and within the time specified, 

Section 33 of the act provides in pa@ as follows: 

“This Act shall not apply with respect to any 

motor vehicle owned by the United States, the State 

of Texas or any political subdivision of this State :,, 

or any municipality therein; . . .” 

You have correctly stated that the question presented 

with reference to the above quoted provision has not been answered 

by the courts of this State. On the other hand, this question has 

been decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in City of St.Paul 

v. Hoffman, 25 N.W.2d 661 (Mina Sup. 1946). under a provision of 

the laws of that State, which, in so far as pertinent here, is in almost the identical language as Section 33 of our act. There it was 

contended that the provisioru of the Minnesota act providing that 

it Udoes not apply with rempect to any motor vehicle owned and 

operated by the United States, this State or any political subdivision of this State or any municipality therein” did not have the effect of exempting from the provisions of the drivers’ responsibility law an operator of a city-owned vehicle,. The court in refusing 

such a construction said: 

“The controversy here arises over the proper 

construction of Minn. St. 1945 and M.S.A. 5 170.51, 

which is L. 1945, c. 285 g 31, and reads as follows: 

‘Sec. 31. This act does not apply with respect to any 

motor vehicle owned and operated by the United 
Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr,, page 4 (V-1380) 

States, this state or any political subdivision of this 

state or any munirtpality therein.’ 

.I 

. . . 

“It is the contention of the city that its drivers 

are by virtue of the quoted section exempt from the 

provisions of the safety responsibility act, The state 

very earnestly contends that ths act applies to such 

drivers and that the commissioner may ,auapelPd thair 

drivers’ licenses as in the case of other drivers. 

“Just how 6 31 came into L. 1945, c. 285, is not 

disclosed by legislative history. The Minnesota State 

Bar Association, as amicus curiae, states in its brief 

that the law as enacted is in the exact form proposed 

by its committee, and it earnestly contends that drivers 

of city vehicles are not excluded from the act. We must 

interpret the language as it was enacted ‘by the legislature, 

and we cannot accept the authors’ construction of its import unless that construction Is consistent with the legislative intent as evidenced by the language ussd. Taking 

the act as a whole, we can discover no purpose in f 31 

except to exempt the city’s drivers from suspension of 

their licenses under the operatton of the act, Since the 

act operates exclusively by suspension of licenses to 

operate motor vehicles and not against the vehicles themselves, the exclusion of the city’s vehicles from the application of the act must have been intended to exempt the 

city’s drivers. The purpose of the act~was to effect financial responsibility to injured persons. The city is 

liable for injuries inflicted by negligent acts performed 

in the disch8rge of its corporate or proprietary functiona. 

Boye Y. Ctty of Albert Lea, 74 Miun. 230. 76 N.W. 1131; 

Freeman v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Mtnn. 202, 17 N. W. 

2d 364. In cases involving the proprietary functions of 

citiee, it would, ba futile to require additional s’eturity 

to the public. City employes are personally liable for 

their negligence when engaged in the performance of the 

city’s governmental functions. Florio v. Jersey City, 

101 N.J.L. 535, 129 A. 470, 40 A.L.R. 1353. and annotdoa; 

Miller v. Joe&es, 224 N.C. 783, 32 S.E.Zd 594. The city is 

authorized by statute, but not required, to cover its employes against liability in such cases. Minn. St. 1945 and 

M.S.A. fg 471.42. 471.43. B seems qutte obvious to AS 
Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr,,, page 5 (V-1380) 

that fi 31 was inaerted in the act to relieve municipalities, and others that are exempted, from embarrassment in the performance of their functions by 

finding the discharge of such functtona hampered by 

the:lack of licensed drivers. 

“Xf the lew is to complete&y ‘achieve ite avowed 

pnrpoaea, the legialetute couN:either waive gevernmental immunity from suit in negligence cases as the United 

Stetea has dons in the Federal Tort Claims Act, Public Law, 6Ol,.Title N, 79th CMylreaa, 28 U.&CA. 8 

921, which the Lcgialature tou&d do not only in behalf 

of ths atebe but of cities and other governmental aubdivisions, or it could require such municipalities or 

subdivisions to cover their drivers with insurance. 

We tbarefore hold that the trial court -was right in 

holding the drivers of vehiclaa owned and operated by 

the city exempt from the proviabna of the act.” (Emphasis added.) 

The above decision ia the only one we have been ebla to 

find conatruing such a provision in a drivers’ reaponaibility act, 

end in view of the fact that the Texas act, as well as that of ‘Minnesota, was modeled after the Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, we feel compelled to follow the above conatructton. The Attorney General of California has reached a similer 

conclusion, See Att’y Gea. Op. 48/205 (Cal. 1949). 

You are, therefore, advised that the operetor of e motor 

vehicle owned by the United States, the State of Texas, a political 

subdivision of the State or a municipality of the State is exempt 

from the provisions of Article 67Olh. V.C.S., while lawfully engaged 

1~ the operation of such publicly owned vehicle, 

Our answer to your first question makes unnecessary an 

answer to.your second question, 

SUMMARY 

Section 33 of Article 6701h, V.C.S.. the Texas 

Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act, providing 

that the “act shall not apply with respect to any motor 

: 

,“j. 
. . 

Hon. Homer Garrison, Jr., page 6 (V-1380) 

vehicle owned by the United States, the State of 

Texas or any political subdivision of this State or 

any municipality therein” has the effect of exempting from the provisions of the act the operator of a 

publicly owned vehicle while lawfully engaged in the 

operation of such vehicle. 

APPROVED: 

C. K, Richards 

Trial & Appellate Division 

Yours very truly, 

PRICE DAMLEL 

Attorney General 

E. Jacobson 

Reviewing Assistant 

Price Daniel 

Attorney General 

By &g&.,&J 25. rr)d=w 

Charles I). Mathews 

Fwt Asatstant