[Cite as Chuma v. Patterson, 2023-Ohio-1128.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

PICKAWAY COUNTY 

LAURA A. CHUMA, : 

: Case No. 21CA12 

Plaintiff-Appellant- : 

Cross-Appellee, : 

:

v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

: ENTRY 

KRISTOPHER D. PATTERSON, et al., : 

:

Defendants-Appellees- :

Cross-Appellants. : RELEASED: 03/31/2023

 

APPEARANCES:

James R. Kingsley, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Brian S. Stewart, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

 

Wilkin, J.

{¶1} Appellant/cross-appellee, Laura A. Chuma, and appellee/crossappellant, Kristopher D. Patterson, appeal the Pickaway County Court of 

Common Pleas judgment entry denying Chuma’s claim for reasonable rental 

value and denying Patterson’s claims for breach of contract and unjust 

enrichment. Chuma and Patterson jointly purchased a house and resided 

together from September 2015 to February 2017, and again from January 2018 

to March 2018. Chuma physically assaulted Patterson on two occasions that 

resulted in her conviction for assault and the issuance of a protection order

preventing her from having any contact with Patterson. As a result, Patterson 

had exclusive use of the house until July 2020. 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 2

{¶2} Chuma filed a partition claim in January 2019 that resulted in the 

parties’ home being sold at auction in July 2020. The sale proceeds were just 

sufficient to pay the remaining mortgage balance and all associated fees. There 

were no proceeds left to divide between the parties. After the sale, Chuma and 

Patterson filed the above referenced claims against each other. 

{¶3} The trial court denied all claims finding that “ ‘according to the justice 

and equity of the case,’ neither party should prevail against the other party.” 

Based on the specific circumstances of the case, we affirm the trial court’s 

decision and overrule Chuma’s single assignment of error and Patterson’s two 

assignments of error. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS

{¶4} Chuma and Patterson began a romantic relationship back in 2010.

Shortly after dating, Chuma and Patterson resided together as a couple and in 

2014 had their daughter. In September 2015, they jointly purchased a house in 

Orient, Ohio, for $189,000. Chuma made the down payment of over $8,000.

{¶5} Prior to purchasing the house, Chuma and Patterson reached a 

verbal agreement that the mortgage payment would be equally divided between 

them. The parties abided by the agreement until November 2016. According to 

Chuma, the agreement was modified in November 2016, with Patterson agreeing 

to pay the full mortgage payment when he encouraged Chuma to quit her job and 

stay at home with their child. Patterson disputes that the agreement was 

modified, and testified that he did encourage Chuma to resign but with the 

understanding she would obtain other employment. 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 3

{¶6} When Chuma and Patterson were equally paying for the mortgage, 

Chuma was issuing the full payment from her bank account with Patterson giving 

her cash for his half of the payment. But then in November 2016, Patterson 

provided Chuma with his bank account information in which she set up the 

mortgage payment to be automatically taken from his account. Patterson made 

the full mortgage payment from November 2016 until March 2019, without any 

contribution from Chuma. 

{¶7} In February 2017, Chuma physically assaulted Patterson and was 

arrested. As a result, Chuma pleaded guilty to assault, a misdemeanor in the 

first degree, and was sentenced to probation with the condition that she has no 

contact with Patterson. Chuma’s probation was for 12 months, but prior to the 

termination of her probation, Chuma and Patterson reconciled and again resided 

together in January 2018. 

{¶8} Less than two months later, in March 2018, Chuma again physically 

assaulted Patterson and was charged with domestic violence. The charges were 

ultimately dismissed, but while the criminal proceeding was pending, Chuma was 

ordered to have no contact with Patterson. Patterson also obtained a civil 

protection order in May 2018 which expired in November 2018. The protection 

order against Chuma required her not to have contact with Patterson and that 

she must be accompanied by law enforcement when retrieving her personal

belongings from the residence. 

{¶9} Consequently, Patterson had exclusive possession of the jointlyowned house from March 2018 until July 2020, when he vacated the premises. 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 4

Patterson, however, stopped paying the mortgage in March 2019 after Chuma 

initiated partition proceedings. 

{¶10} In January 2019, Chuma filed a complaint in partition asking for the 

jointly-owned house to be partitioned or sold and the proceeds to be divided 

according to equitable interests. The trial court granted an order of partition 

finding that Chuma and Patterson “are tenants in common, each owning an 

undivided one-half interest” of the house. The trial court appointed realtor Julie 

Dickey as commissioner to appraise the value of the house. Realtor Dickey 

completed and filed her report with the court in January 2020, estimating the 

value of the residence at $230,000. The trial court appointed a private selling 

officer to auction the house, and ordered that the house be sold for not less than 

$151,800. 

{¶11} In November 2020, the trial court confirmed the sale of the house at 

auction for $206,000 that occurred in July 2020. The trial court ordered the sale 

proceeds to be distributed as follows: $190,873.25 to mortgage company; 

$5,244.99 for court costs; $500 to realtor Dickey; $118.34 for county treasurer; 

$1,267.60 for new buyer for prorated property taxes; and $7,995.82 to Chuma’s 

attorney. The trial court also ordered that any home insurance refund returned to 

Patterson must be deposited with the court as a joint asset that needs to be 

divided. Within this order, the trial court also granted leave to the parties to “file 

amended pleadings setting forth claims of co-tenants, including payment of rent 

and other incidental damages relating to occupancy.” 

{¶12} Chuma filed an amended complaint and in the first claim requested 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 5

half of the rental value of the months Patterson exclusively resided at the house. 

In the second claim, Chuma asserted Patterson committed, or allowed to be 

committed, substantial waste to the house that lowered its value. Within this 

second claim, Chuma also maintained that Patterson’s failure to pay the 

mortgage while residing at the house from March 2019 until July 2020, lowered 

the proceeds that were divided among them after the house was sold. 

{¶13} Patterson filed a counterclaim also presenting two claims. The first 

was breach of contract based on Chuma’s failure to pay half of the mortgage 

payment as verbally agreed upon by the parties. Alternatively, Patterson averred 

a second claim for unjust enrichment in which Chuma benefited from Patterson 

paying her share of the mortgage. 

{¶14} On May 14, 2021, a full hearing was held in which realtor Dickey, 

Chuma and Patterson testified. After trial, Chuma and Patterson submitted 

proposed findings of fact. 

{¶15} The trial court denied Chuma and Patterson’s claims. The trial court 

made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Prior to purchasing the Property, Chuma and Patterson 

agreed that each would be responsible for paying one-half (1/2) of 

each monthly mortgage payment. Chuma made an $8,168.00 down 

payment from her separate funds. The Court finds that Patterson 

reimbursed Chuma one-half of the down payment from his separate 

funds.

The agreement between the parties appears to have worked 

through November 2016 when Chuma began refusing to pay her 

one-half (1/2) share of the monthly payments, and never made a 

payment from that point forward. 

The Court finds that from November 2016 through March 

2019 Patterson made each mortgage payment for a total of 

$37,584.00 in mortgage payments made by Patterson over the 

course of those 29 months. Patterson stopped making the mortgage 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 6

payment upon the advice of counsel. Plaintiff filed her partition 

complaint on January 31, 2019. The parties were already in default 

on the mortgage when Chuma filed her complaint. The property sold 

at Sheriff’s Sale on July 23, 2020 for $206,000.00. The Court finds 

that neither party committed any waste towards the property. 

Evidence revealed that the parties started having domestic 

problems in February of 2017. * * * Lastly, on May 16, 2018 a 

Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order was granted to Patterson 

against Chuma in Pickaway County Common Pleas Court case 

number 2018CPO0021. The Order required Chuma to vacate the 

Property and was effective for six (6) months.

* * * Chuma argues she is entitled to rents for the period of 

time after expiration of the restraining orders prohibiting her 

occupation of the Property. Thus, Chuma claims she is entitled to 

one-half the fair market value of $2,000.00 per month for 23 months 

or $23,000.00. * * * For the record, the Court notes that Chuma was 

prohibited from coming onto the Property per the civil protection 

order that expired on November 16, 2018 and thus she was excluded 

20 months and not 23 months. 

* * * The Court is of the opinion that simply because there 

“were no funds to account for” does not automatically remove this 

case from the equitable dictates of R.C. §5307.21[.] 

* * * 

This Court finds that “according to the justice and equity of the 

case,” neither party should prevail against the other party. The Court 

finds that Patterson never received any “rents or profits” from the 

Property. While Chuma tries to lessen her criminal conduct by 

claiming rents “only” for the periods of time she was not under a 

restraining order, the Court is nevertheless convinced that awarding 

her any rent for any of the time she was absent from the Property 

would not do justice and equity to the case. Plaintiff’s claim for

$20,000.00 for fair rental value is DENIED. Likewise, awarding 

Patterson judgment for one-half ($18,793.00) the mortgage 

payments he made would not do justice to the case since he had 

exclusive use of the property. Lastly, there is no unjust enrichment 

to Chuma by virtue of Patterson making the monthly payments. The 

Property sold for basically what was owed on it. Patterson’s payment 

of the mortgage for 29 months only decreased the mortgage payoff 

and resulted in little actual equity in the Property. Thus, there is no 

unjust enrichment. Patterson loses on his claim of unjust enrichment.

In conclusion, Plaintiff loses on her claim and Defendant loses 

on his counterclaim. 

{¶16} Chuma and Patterson appeal the trial court’s denial of their claims. 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 7

{¶17} Chuma designates one assignment of error for review:

I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN 

IT FOUND FOR KRISTOPHER D. PATTERSON AND AGAINST 

LAURA CHUMA UPON HER CLAIM FOR RENT AND WASTE.1

{¶18} Patterson presents two assignments of error for review:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS JUNE 24, 2021 DECISION 

AND ENTRY BY FAILING TO FIND FOR KRISTOPHER 

PATTERSON ON HIS CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 

AGAINST LAURA CHUMA. 

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS JUNE 24, 2021 DECISION 

AND ENTRY BY HOLDING THAT LAURA CHUMA WAS NOT 

LIABLE TO KRISTOPHER PATTERSON FOR UNJUST 

ENRICHMENT.

I. Chuma’s Rent Claim

{¶19} Chuma asserts that the trial court failed to apply R.C. 5307.21, and 

ignored the Supreme Court’s decision in Cohen v. Cohen, 157 Ohio St. 503, 106 

N.E.2d 77 (1952). According to Chuma, the statutory provision and the Supreme 

Court decision mandate that she was entitled to her share of the reasonable 

rental value of the house when Patterson was exclusively occupying it. This is 

because Patterson wrongfully prohibited her from residing at the house, and he 

occupied it exclusively and resided rent free for several months before the house 

was sold. 

{¶20} Chuma further argues that it is irrelevant that no rent was actually 

paid since the benefit was conferred to Patterson by him exclusively occupying 

1 At the lower court, Chuma claimed Patterson committed substantial waste to the residence 

causing the value to decrease. The trial court denied the claim. On appeal, Chuma does not 

advance any argument challenging the trial court’s denial of her claim that Patterson committed 

waste that lowered the value of the residence. Accordingly, Chuma has abandoned this claim. 

See State ex rel. Omni Energy Grp., L.L.C. v. Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Res., Div. of Oil & Gas Res. Mgmt.,

164 Ohio St.3d 470, 2020-Ohio-5581, 173 N.E.3d 1148, ¶ 23. 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 8

the house. Chuma maintains that after the civil protection order expired, 

Patterson wrongfully excluded her from residing at the house. She admits that 

she is not entitled for the period of time that she caused her own exclusion, but is 

entitled to rent for the period after the expiration of the protection order. 

According to Chuma, the monthly rental value is $2,000 based on realtor 

Dickey’s testimony.

{¶21} Patterson disagrees with Chuma’s overbroad reading of R.C. 

5307.21 and argues Cohen was wrongly decided. Under equity principles, 

Chuma is not entitled to any rent money as she failed to pay her half of the 

mortgage, no one was living with Patterson, he did not receive any rent money, 

and moreover, Chuma was excluded based on her own criminal conduct. 

Further, Patterson challenges realtor Dickey’s reasonable rental value of $2,000 

per month. Patterson maintains the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Chuma’s request for rent money. 

{¶22} In response, Chuma for the first time argues Patterson committed 

ouster by obtaining a protection order and threatening to call law enforcement 

after the restraining order expired. Chuma maintains ouster is not subject to 

equitable weighing and the precedent as set forth in Cohen should be applied in 

which Chuma is entitled to half of the rental value during the period Patterson 

had exclusive possession of the house. Finally, Chuma asserts realtor Dickey 

was qualified and her valuation of the reasonable rental value of $2,000 is 

admissible and should be applied. 

A. Law and Analysis
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 9

{¶23} In 1952, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued the decision in Cohen v. 

Cohen, in which the Court held that “a tenant in common of land and a residence 

and buildings thereon, who lives in, occupies and has sole possession of the 

premises, is liable to account to his cotenants for their share of the reasonable 

rental value of such occupancy, possession and use.” 157 Ohio St. 503, 106 

N.E.2d 77 (1952), syllabus. The holding in Cohen was later codified in R.C. 

5307.21 which states that

One tenant in common, or coparcener, may recover from 

another tenant in common, or coparcener his share of rents and 

profits received by such tenant in common or coparcener from the 

estate, according to the justice and equity of the case. One 

coparcener may maintain an action of waste against another 

coparcener. No coparcener shall have any privileges over another 

coparcener, in any election, division, partition, or matter to be made 

or done, concerning lands which have descended.

{¶24} This court reiterated the statutory provision and held that “[a] 

cotenant out of possession is entitled to his share of the reasonable rental value 

of the property exclusively used by the other cotenant[,]” and that the burden is 

on the Plaintiff to “establish the reasonable rental value of the property in 

question.” Burchfield v. Whaley, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 00CA02, 2001-Ohio-2659, 

*3. 

{¶25} In the matter at bar, the trial court denied Chuma’s claim for 

reasonable rental value finding as follows:

The Court finds that from November 2016 through March 

2019 Patterson made each mortgage payment for a total of 

$37,584.00 in mortgage payments made by Patterson over the 

course of those 29 months. * * * 

Evidence revealed that the parties started having domestic 

problems in February 2017. Specifically, Chuma pled guilty to 

assaulting Patterson in Circleville Municipal Court Case No. 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 10

CRB1700224(A) in February 2017. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10). Chuma 

was arrested again on March 18, 2018 for felony domestic violence 

against Patterson (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 11). Lastly, on May 16, 2018 a 

Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order was granted to Patterson 

against Chuma in Pickaway County Common Pleas Court case 

number 2018CPO0021. The Order required Chuma to vacate the 

Property and was effective for six (6) months.

For the record, the Court notes that Chuma was prohibited 

from coming onto the Property per the civil protection order that 

expired on November 16, 2018 and thus she was excluded 20 

months and not 23 months.

* * * The Court is of the opinion that simply because there 

“were no funds to account for” does not automatically remove this 

case from the equitable dictates of R.C. §5307.21[.] 

* * *

This Court finds that “according to the justice and equity of the 

case,” neither party should prevail against the other party. The Court 

finds that Patterson never received any “rents or profits” from the 

Property. While Chuma tries to lessen her criminal conduct by 

claiming rents “only” for the periods of time she was not under a 

restraining order, the Court is nevertheless convinced that awarding 

her any rent for any of the time she was absent from the Property 

would not do justice and equity to the case. Plaintiff’s claim for 

$20,000.00 for fair rental value is DENIED.

{¶26} Chuma challenges the trial court’s application of R.C. 5307.21 

“according to the justice and equity of the case” and determination that her claim

fails. Courts “must apply a statute as it is written when its meaning is 

unambiguous and definite.” Portage Cty. Bd. Of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio 

St.3d 106, 2006-Ohio-954, 846 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 52, citing State ex rel. Savarese v. 

Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 1991-Ohio-291, 660 

N.E.2d 463. Chuma does not claim R.C. 5307.21 is ambiguous, rather, she 

disputes the trial court’s factual findings and its failure to apply Cohen. 

{¶27} In Cohen, “the only issue presented, being whether, under the 

circumstances, defendants are entitled to recover anything from plaintiff for her 

continued sole occupancy of the Caplin Place premises.” (Emphasis added). 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 11

Cohen, 157 Ohio St. 503, 106 N.E.2d 77 (1952), syllabus. The Supreme Court 

then reviewed the facts of the case. The trial court here, similarly reviewed the 

specific circumstances of the case. We therefore construe Chuma’s assignment 

of error as contesting the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶28} The civil manifest weight standard of review is the same standard 

that is applied in criminal cases. See Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 

2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 17. In determining whether the trial court’s 

denial of Chuma’s claim is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must 

review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether in resolving conflicts 

in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice warranting reversal. Douglas v. Boughton, 4th Dist.

Lawrence No. 13CA7, 2014-Ohio-808, ¶ 19. “Judgments supported by some 

competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will 

not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.” C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Const. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 

578 (1978), syllabus.

{¶29} We hold that the trial court’s decision finding it is not in the interest 

of justice and equity for Patterson to pay half of the reasonable rental value of the 

house to Chuma is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. This is 

because Chuma was mandated to vacate the premises based on her conduct of 

physically assaulting Patterson on two separate occasions. Contrary to Chuma’s 

claim, Patterson did not oust her by calling law enforcement and obtaining a 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 12

protection order to secure his physical safety. Chuma’s assault on Patterson led 

to the order for her to leave the premises. Further, it is not in the interest of 

justice to expect Patterson to jeopardize his physical safety by allowing Chuma to 

reside with him again. Chuma did not present any evidence that she requested 

for Patterson to vacate and for her to exclusively reside at the house and take on 

the mortgage payments. To the contrary, Chuma testified that she could not

afford even half of the mortgage payment after obtaining different employment in 

June 2017. The evidence submitted was Patterson informing Chuma that while 

he is residing at the house, she cannot be there.

{¶30} Additionally, Chuma should not benefit from her wrongdoing of 

physically assaulting Patterson. See Martindale v. Martindale, 4th Dist. Athens 

No. 18CA17, 2019-Ohio-3028, ¶ 55, quoting Brockmeier v. Brockmeier, 91 Ohio 

App.3d 689, 693, 633 N.E.2d 584 (1st Dist.1993), quoting Williams v. Williams, 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 92AP-438, 1992 WL 246020, *1 (Sept. 24, 1992) 

(applying “ ‘the fundamental and equitable principle that wrongdoers ought not 

benefit from their wrongdoing.’ ”)

{¶31} Chuma also could have filed the partition proceedings back in 

February 2017 when Patterson began exclusively residing at the house. Chuma 

instead, waited until January 2019—two months after the protection order 

expired. Finally, we find Chuma’s reliance on the holding in Cohen is misplaced 

as Chuma disregards the factual distinctions in that case. In Cohen, Lena 

Cohen, the former step-mother of the defendants, had one-half interest in the 

house and defendants each had a one-tenth interest. Cohen, 157 Ohio St. at
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 13

504, 106 N.E.2d 77 (1952). The defendants’ father passed away and Lena 

continued to reside at the home exclusively, and after several years, defendants 

demanded rent money. Id. at syllabus. 

{¶32} Unlike the case at bar, the defendants did not conduct themselves 

in a manner that resulted in their immediate removal from the house or had an 

order from a court to stay away from Lena. Id. Further, during the period of 

Lena’s sole occupancy of the house, the defendants paid the taxes and 

premiums on the insurance. Id. Chuma, on the other hand, assaulted Patterson, 

was ordered to vacate the premises, and did not make any contribution to the 

mortgage payment since November 2016.

{¶33} We conclude, under the specific circumstances of the case, that 

Chuma is not entitled to half of the reasonable rental value of the house during 

Patterson’s exclusive use. The trial court’s decision is affirmed and Chuma’s 

assignment of error is overruled. 

II. Patterson’s Breach of Contract Claim

{¶34} Patterson does not dispute the trial court’s factual findings that 

Chuma was responsible for half of the mortgage payments and failed to abide by 

the agreement. Patterson, however, disagrees with the trial court’s application of 

equity principles and argues the trial court failed to apply the principles of 

contract law. Patterson argues the trial court did not address his breach of 

contract claim and instead confused his claim with his alternative claim of unjust 

enrichment. Patterson maintains that by paying Chuma’s share of the mortgage 

payment, he suffered a financial set back of over $18,000. 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 14

{¶35} Chuma similarly asserts that the trial court did not address 

Patterson’s breach of contract claim, but argues the trial court did not err in 

concluding she did not owe half of the mortgage payments. Chuma maintains 

that the initial agreement to equally pay for the mortgage was modified with 

Chuma staying home with the parties’ daughter and Patterson making the full 

mortgage payment. Further, Chuma declares that it is not fair for her to pay for 

half of the mortgage while Patterson excluded her from residing at the house. 

{¶36} In response, Patterson reiterates that the trial court found that the 

parties had an agreement to split the mortgage payment and that Chuma 

breached the agreement by failing to pay her share. 

A. Law and Analysis

{¶37} Generally, “[l]egal issues involving contract interpretation are subject 

to a de novo standard of review.” S.P. Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Cooper’s 

Excavating, L.L.C., 4th Dist. Adams No. 17CA1058, 2019-Ohio-55, ¶ 14. But 

great deference is given to the trial court’s factual findings supporting its legal 

conclusions. Id. Thus, the trial court’s decision will be upheld “if some 

competent, credible evidence exists to support them.” Id. Accordingly, “we do 

not review the trial court’s factual findings under an abuse of discretion standard, 

but rather, we look to see if those facts and the resulting judgment are both 

supported by the weight of the evidence.” Id., citing Patton v. Patton, 4th Dist. 

Adams No. 01CA712, 2001-Ohio-2599. “ ‘[W]e are required to uphold the 

judgment so long as the record, as a whole, contains some evidence from which 

the trier of fact could have reached its ultimate factual conclusions.’ ” Bumgarner 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 15

v. Bumgarner, 4th Dist. Highland No. 09CA22, 2010-Ohio-1894, ¶ 20, quoting 

Bugg v. Fancher, 4th Dist. Highland No. 06CA12, 2007-Ohio-2019, ¶ 9.

{¶38} A contract can be verbal and may be enforceable provided there is 

“sufficient particularity to form a binding contract[.]” Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio 

St,3d 1, 2002-Ohio-2985, 770 N.E.2d 58, ¶ 15. “The burden of proof on one 

seeking to enforce an oral contract requires that party to prove the existence of 

the contract by clear and convincing evidence.” Bumgarner at ¶ 20, citing 

Nofzinger v. Blood, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-02-014, 2003-Ohio1406, ¶ 53. 

Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of 

proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ 

but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a 

reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the 

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts 

sought to be established.

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of 

the syllabus. 

{¶39} In order to prevail on a breach of contract claim, “ ‘a party must 

prove the existence of a contract, the party’s performance under the contract, the 

opposing party’s breach, and resulting damage.’ ” Martin v. Jones, 2015-Ohio3168, 41 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 36 (4th Dist.), quoting DePampei v. Santabarbara, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101163, 2015-Ohio-18, ¶ 20. 

As this Court explained in Martin at ¶ 38, “[c]ourts recognize 

three types of contracts: express, implied in fact, and implied in law.” 

Citing Legros v. Tarr, 44 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 540 N.E.2d 257 

(1989); Spectrum Benefit Options at ¶ 26. “ ‘In express contracts the 

assent to its terms is actually expressed in offer and acceptance.’ 

” Legros at 6; quoting Hummel v. Hummel, 133 Ohio St. 520, 525, 

14 N.E.2d 923 (1938). By contrast a contract implied in fact is “ ‘a 

contract that the parties presumably intended, either by tacit 

understanding or by the assumption that it existed.’ ” State ex rel.
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 16

R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 98 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-6716, 780 N.E.2d 

998, ¶ 31; quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 322 (7th Ed.1999). Finally, 

contracts implied in law are not true contracts, but liability is imposed 

based on quasi or constructive contract. Legros at 7. As we further 

explained in Martin, “[t]he primary difference between express 

contracts and contracts implied in fact is one of proof—the former is 

proven by words (oral or written) and the latter is proven by acts, 

conduct, and circumstances.” Martin at ¶ 40; citing J.S. Keate & Co.

v. Barnett's Car Wash, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C–920895 and 

A–8903768, 1994 WL 10650, *3 (Jan. 19, 1994); citing Weinstein v.

Newman, 89 Ohio App. 301, 101 N.E.2d 772 (1st Dist.1951).

In order for it to be enforceable, a contract must be both 

definite and certain. Martin at ¶ 42; citing Rayess v. Educational

Comm. for Foreign Med. Graduates, 134 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio5676, 983 N.E.2d 1267, ¶ 19.

S.P. Drilling Servs., Inc., 4th Dist. Adams No. 17CA1058, 2019-Ohio-55, ¶ 16-17. 

“The words and conduct of the parties disclose the intent to contract and the 

terms of the oral agreement.” Maddali v. Haverkamp, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C210358, 2022-Ohio-3826, ¶ 21. 

{¶40} In the matter at bar, the trial court denied Patterson’s breach of 

contract claim finding that: 

Prior to purchasing the Property, Chuma and Patterson 

agreed that each would be responsible for paying one-half (1/2) of 

each monthly mortgage payment. * * * 

The agreement between the parties appears to have worked 

through November 2016 when Chuma began refusing to pay her 

one-half (1/2) share of the monthly payments, and never made a 

payment from that point forward.

The Court finds that from November 2016 through March 

2019 Patterson made each mortgage payment for a total of 

$37,584.00 in mortgage payments made by Patterson over the 

course of those 29 months.

* * * 

For the record, the Court notes that Chuma was prohibited 

from coming onto the Property per the civil protection order that 

expired on November 16, 2018 and thus she was excluded 20 

months and not 23 months.

* * * 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 17

This Court finds that “according to the justice and equity of the 

case,” neither party should prevail against the other party. * * * 

Likewise, awarding Patterson judgment for one-half 

($18,793.00) the mortgage payments he made would not do justice 

to the case since he had exclusive use of the property.

{¶41} The record supports the trial court’s finding that Chuma and 

Patterson had an express contract to equally contribute to the mortgage 

payment. Both testified that they jointly purchased the house with the intent to 

reside together as a couple and had agreed to contribute equally toward the 

mortgage payment. But then in November 2016, the circumstances changed 

with Chuma quitting her job with Patterson’s encouragement, Patterson providing 

Chuma his bank account information, and the full mortgage payment directly 

withdrawn from Patterson’s bank account.2 

{¶42} In February 2017, Chuma physically assaulted Patterson and again 

changed the circumstances surrounding the parties 2015 express contract to 

reside together and equally share the mortgage payment. Chuma’s conduct 

resulted in her immediate removal from the residence until January 2018, and 

again in March 2018. Although the trial court found that there was an express 

contract between Chuma and Patterson, it nonetheless applied the principles of 

equity. We find no error because the specific circumstances of the case at bar 

demonstrate there was no meeting of the minds after November 2016. “When a 

contract fails for a lack of ‘meeting of the minds,’ equity should be imposed to 

2 There is conflicting evidence on whether the change in circumstance was agreed upon and formed 

a new agreement between Chuma and Patterson. The trial court factually found that Chuma 

refused to pay. We are mindful that deference is given to the findings of the trial court as “the trial 

judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice 

inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” 

Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984).
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 18

prevent unjust enrichment.” Myers v. Good, 4th Dist. Ross No. 06CA2939, 2007-

Ohio-5361, ¶ 12, citing Hailey v. MedCorp., Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1238, 

2006-Ohio-4804, ¶ 17-18. 

{¶43} Patterson therefore failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing 

evidence that after November 2016, he and Chuma continued their express 

agreement to equally share paying the mortgage. 

{¶44} Finally, we reject Patterson’s position that we follow the holding of 

the Fifth District Court of Appeals decision in Ruedele v. Kiefer, 5th Dist. Licking 

No. 93 CA 3, 1993 WL 438787 (Oct. 8, 1993). Patterson’s reliance on Ruedele

is misplaced as that case is factually distinguishable from the case at bar in an 

important way. 

{¶45} In Ruedele, the parties jointly purchased real estate and agreed to 

pay equally on the mortgage. Id. at *1. Ronald Ruedele, however, was unable to 

contribute an equal share and became indebted to Joan Kiefer including 

agreeing to pay her interest for the monies he owed. Id. Ruedele assaulted 

Kiefer and vacated the home informing Kiefer he would not contribute to the 

residential expenses. Id. Several months later, Kiefer obtained a civil protection 

order. Id. Part of the order mandated Ruedele to pay half of the mortgage 

payment. Id. Ruedele initiated a partition claim and Kiefer counterclaimed 

alleging Ruedele breached the agreement between them by failing to pay half of 

the mortgage. Id. at *2. After a bench trial, the trial court granted Kiefer’s claim 

for breach of contract. Id. 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 19

{¶46} The Fifth District affirmed and gave deference to the trial court’s 

factual findings which were supported by the record. Id. at *3-4. The Fifth 

District held that the parties agreed to equally share in paying the mortgage and 

there was no contingency to deviate from the agreement if “one party moved out 

of the house.” Id. at *3. The Fifth District concluded that Ruedele “could have 

ended his duty to pay such expenses by pursuing a partition action 

earlier. Appellant cannot now claim that appellee prevented him from completing 

the agreement by refusing to voluntarily sell.” Id. at *4.

{¶47} Unlike the facts in Ruedele, where he agreed to repay Kiefer for his 

portion of the mortgage payment with interest, here, on the other hand, there was 

no evidence presented that Patterson questioned Chuma as to why beginning in 

November 2016, she stopped contributing toward the mortgage payment. 

Additionally, Patterson’s protection order did not include a condition that Chuma 

contribute to the mortgage payment. Finally, after living apart for several months, 

there was no discussion on what contribution Chuma would make after she and 

Patterson reconciled and began living together again in January 2018. During 

the reconciliation period, Patterson made the full mortgage payment. 

{¶48} We hold that Patterson failed to meet his burden to warrant relief. 

The trial court’s decision is affirmed and Patterson’s first assignment of error is 

overruled. 

III. Patterson’s Unjust Enrichment Claim
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 20

{¶49} For the unjust enrichment claim, Patterson maintains that Chuma 

benefited from him making the full mortgage payment in that the house was not 

foreclosed upon and the loan balance was decreased. Patterson argues the trial 

court erred by applying the equity principle in R.C. 5307.21 and not the correct 

unjust enrichment factors. 

{¶50} Chuma insists that Patterson was the one who benefited by having 

exclusive use of the house. Additionally, there were no proceeds in excess of 

the loan and fees to be divided so there was no financial benefit to anyone. 

A. Law and Analysis

{¶51} Unjust enrichment “is an equitable claim based on a contract implied 

in law[.]” Bunta v. Superior VacuPress, L.L.C., __ Ohio St.3d __ , 2022-Ohio4363, __ N.E.3d __ , ¶ 36. “[T]he purpose of which ‘is not to compensate the 

plaintiff for any loss or damage suffered by him but to compensate him for the 

benefit he has conferred on the defendant[.]’ ” Id., quoting Hughes v. 

Oberholtzer, 162 Ohio St. 330, 335, 123 N.E.2d 393 (1954). In order to prevail 

on an unjust enrichment claim, it must be established that “(1) a benefit was 

conferred by the plaintiff on the defendant, (2) the defendant had knowledge of 

the benefit, and (3) the defendant retained the benefit under circumstances in 

which it was unjust to do so without payment.” Id. Unjust enrichment must be 

proven by the preponderance of the evidence. Pickaway County Ross-Co Redi 

Mix Co., Inc. v. Steveco, Inc., 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 95CA3, 1996 WL 54174, *3 

(Feb. 6, 1996).

“ ‘[A] preponderance of evidence means the greater weight of 

evidence. * * * The greater weight may be infinitesimal, and it is only 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 21

necessary that it be sufficient to destroy the equilibrium.’ ” (Ellipsis 

sic.) State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 102, 512 N.E.2d 598 (1987), 

quoting Travelers’ Ins. Co. of Hartford, Connecticut v. Gath, 118 Ohio

St. 257, 261, 160 N.E. 710 (1928).

State v. Nicholas, __ Ohio St.3d __ , 2022-Ohio-4276, __ N.E.3d __ , ¶ 29. 

{¶52} But “Ohio law does not permit recovery under the theory of unjust 

enrichment when an express contract covers the same subject matter.” Id. “It is 

generally agreed that there cannot be an express agreement and an implied 

contract for the same thing existing at the same time.” Hughes at 335. 

{¶53} The trial court denied Patterson’s unjust enrichment claim

concluding:

Prior to purchasing the Property, Chuma and Patterson 

agreed that each would be responsible for paying one-half (1/2) of 

each monthly mortgage payment. 

* * * The parties were already in default on the mortgage when 

Chuma filed her complaint.

* * * 

This Court finds that “according to the justice and equity of the 

case,” neither party should prevail against the other party. * * * 

Likewise, awarding Patterson judgment for one-half ($18,793.00) the 

mortgage payments he made would not do justice to the case since 

he had exclusive use of the property.

Lastly, there is no unjust enrichment to Chuma by virtue of 

Patterson making the monthly payments. The Property sold for 

basically what was owed on it. Patterson’s payment of the mortgage 

for 29 months only decreased the mortgage payoff and resulted in 

little actual equity in the Property. Thus, there is no unjust 

enrichment. Patterson loses on his claim of unjust enrichment.

{¶54} As we previously held, Chuma and Patterson had an express 

contract to equally contribute to the mortgage payment, but based on the parties’ 

conduct, Chuma and Patterson no longer had a meeting of the minds after 

November 2016 when Chuma stopped contributing to the mortgage payment. 

Therefore, it was proper for the trial court to address Patterson’s alternative claim 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 22

of unjust enrichment. The trial court’s denial of Patterson’s unjust enrichment 

claim was based on his failure to demonstrate, by preponderance of the 

evidence, that he conferred a benefit on Chuma which under the circumstances 

was unjust to do so without payment. We agree with the trial court’s factual and 

legal conclusion. 

{¶55} The record of the case demonstrates, with the exception of January 

2018 to March 2018, that Patterson resided at the jointly-owned house

exclusively from February 2017 until it was sold in July 2020. Patterson testified 

that he made the full mortgage payments without any contribution from Chuma 

from November 2016 until March 2019. According to Patterson, by keeping the 

mortgage current during that period, Chuma benefited by avoiding a foreclosure

action. Additionally, Patterson argues that his payments reduced the mortgage

balance so that there was no deficit that Chuma had to pay when the house was 

sold at auction. But the benefits Patterson asserts are conferred on him as well. 

And as we previously held, “a plaintiff to an unjust enrichment action cannot 

recover more than the benefit to the defendant.” Burchfield v. Whaley, 4th Dist. 

Hocking No. 00CA02, 2001-Ohio-2659, *3, citing Sankin & Melena Co., L.P.A. v. 

Zaransky, 83 Ohio App.3d 169, 176 (8th Dist.1992). 

{¶56} The house not being foreclosed upon benefited both Chuma and 

Patterson, but afforded Patterson the additional benefit of allowing him to 

continue to reside at the house exclusively until it was sold—including more than 

a year without making any mortgage payments. The benefit of having no fees to 

pay out after the house was sold benefited both. Moreover, Patterson has failed 
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 23

to provide a definite amount that Chuma retained under circumstances in which it 

was unjust to do so without payment. 

{¶57} Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision and overrule 

Patterson’s second assignment of error. 

CONCLUSION

{¶58} We overrule Chuma and Patterson’s assignments of error and affirm 

the trial court’s decision denying Chuma’s claim for reasonable rental value, and

Patterson’s claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. 

 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Pickaway App. No. 21CA12 24

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and the parties shall split 

the costs.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the 

date of this entry.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

P.J., Smith and J., Abele: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

 For the Court,

BY: ____________________________

 Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the 

date of filing with the clerk.