[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-15161

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

Agency No. A216-030-925

HERNAN ADRIANO MEZA, 

 Petitioner,

 versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(October 18, 2019)

Before JILL PRYOR, ANDERSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Hernan Adriano Meza, through counsel, petitions for review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)

denial of his motion to suppress his passport and to terminate his removal 

proceedings. Meza’s petition for review raises three arguments: (1) that the 

immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings because his 

notice to appear (“NTA”) did not indicate the time and date of his removal hearing, 

citing Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018); (2) that the 

agency improperly denied his motion to suppress; and (3) that the IJ violated his 

due process rights by denying his request to subpoena two ICE agents. After 

review, we deny Meza’s petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

A. Meza’s Detention by ICE Agents

Before 6:00 a.m. on June 29, 2017, two officers approached Meza while he 

was walking in the parking lot of his apartment complex on his way to work. 

Unbeknowst to Meza, the officers were ICE agents. The agents blocked Meza’s 

path with two cars, one in front and one in back. One of the agents grabbed Meza 

by the shoulder, put Meza’s hand behind his back, and slammed Meza against a 

car. Meza does not allege, however, any injuries from this brief encounter. The 

ICE agents, who were wearing police vests and guns, told Meza they were police 

and that they were looking for a specific person. Meza, who was afraid, 

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volunteered his name and admits he voluntarily got out his Georgia identification 

card to show the agents he was not the person for whom they were looking. 

The agents said, “let’s go,” and escorted Meza back to his apartment.1 Once 

at Meza’s apartment door, the agents asked Meza whether he had a gun, and Meza 

said no. The agents also asked him how many people were inside, and Meza told 

them his family was inside. The agents asked Meza to open the door. Meza took 

out his own key and unlocked and opened the door. Meza explained that he felt 

threatened by the agents, who were tall and big and were wearing guns, and that he 

did not feel free to leave. Meza admitted, however, that the agents did not force 

him to open the door or take their guns out of the holsters. Moreover, when 

pressed, Meza would not state that the agents actually threatened him, saying 

instead only that he “felt pressure, because [he] had nowhere else to go.” Meza 

explained that when he opened the door, he felt afraid, but he also thought, “they

say they’re police, they are going to check me out, we are clean, we have no 

record.” Meza also does not claim that the agents handcuffed him or touched him 

at the apartment or that the agents were inside the apartment for a long period of 

time.

1

Meza’s declaration stated that the agents walked him back to his apartment. Later, Meza

testified at his removal hearing that the agents placed him in a car and drove him to the 

apartment. But Meza also admitted he did not tell the agents his address and could not explain 

how the agents in the car knew where to go. 

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After Meza opened the door, the agents entered the apartment and checked 

each room, waking up Meza’s family members. Meza testified that one agent said,

“the passport, the passport.” Meza retrieved his passport from a book inside a 

closet and gave it to the agents. It is this passport that is the subject of Meza’s 

motion to suppress. The passport shows that Meza is a citizen of Peru.2

 

B. Notice to Appear

Also on June 29, 2017, while Meza was still in ICE custody, the Department 

of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Meza with an NTA, which alleged that 

Meza (1) was not a citizen or national of the United States; (2) was a native and 

citizen of Peru; (3) arrived in the United States at an unknown place on an 

unknown date; and (4) was not admitted or paroled after inspection by an 

immigration officer. The NTA charged that Meza was removable under INA 

§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the United 

States without being admitted or paroled. 

The NTA specified that Meza was ordered to appear before an IJ at the 

Immigration Court in Atlanta, with the date and time “[t]o be set.” Approximately 

two weeks later, on July 13, 2017, Meza was served with a hearing notice ordering 

him to appear before the IJ on July 25, 2017, at 8:30 a.m. 

2

There is no claim that the passport in the record is not a valid Peruvian passport or that 

Meza committed fraud as to the passport. 

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Meza and his attorney appeared at the July 25, 2017 hearing and also at a 

subsequent master calendar hearing on September 19, 2017. At the master 

calendar hearing, Meza denied the factual allegations in the NTA, and his attorney 

indicated that Meza intended to move to suppress his passport on the ground that it 

was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The IJ set a removal 

hearing for October 26, 2017. 

C. Motion to Suppress

Meza filed a motion to suppress the passport and terminate his removal 

proceedings, arguing that the passport was obtained in violation of Meza’s Fourth 

Amendment rights. Meza attached his declaration describing his interactions with 

the ICE agents on June 29, 2017 and argued that the ICE agents’ conduct 

established a “prima facie case” of an egregious constitutional violation. Meza 

asked for an evidentiary hearing on his suppression motion and later requested that 

the IJ subpoena the ICE agents to appear at the October 26, 2017 removal hearing. 

The DHS opposed Meza’s suppression motion. The DHS argued that the 

Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not apply to civil deportation 

proceedings, citing I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050, 104 S. Ct. 

3479, 3489 (1984). Alternatively, even assuming the exclusionary rule would 

apply to egregious violations, Meza had not established a prima facie case that the 

ICE agents’ conduct was an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

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D. Removal Hearing

At the October 26, 2017 hearing, Meza renewed his request to suppress the 

passport and to subpoena the ICE agents. To determine whether Meza had made a 

showing of a prima facie case of egregious conduct, the IJ heard testimony from 

Meza, as recounted above, describing how the ICE agents stopped him, escorted 

him to his apartment, and entered his apartment after he used his key to open the 

door, and how Meza gave the ICE agents his passport. 

In his oral decision, the IJ denied Meza’s motion to suppress and terminate 

removal proceedings. The IJ concluded that Meza’s evidence and testimony, when 

given full weight and accepted as true, did not show that the ICE agents acted 

egregiously. The IJ found that: (1) the officers stopped Meza because they were 

looking for someone else; (2) once Meza offered his Georgia identification card, 

the officers realized Meza was not the person they were looking for; (3) the 

officers instructed Meza to walk to his apartment; (4) Meza opened the door to his 

apartment because the officers told him to do so and Meza was fearful; (5) Meza 

did not give the officers permission to search his apartment, but he “did allow the 

officers to go into the apartment”; and (6) Meza gave the officers his passport. 

From these facts, the IJ concluded that Meza “was never forced or coerced 

into doing anything,” but rather voluntarily opened his apartment door and gave 

the officers his passport. The IJ explained that while Meza was fearful because the 

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officers carried guns, the officers were required by their profession to do so and 

“[t]here was no evidence the officers pointed a gun at [Meza] or forcefully opened 

his door, knocked it down or pointed a gun at any of the occupants in the 

apartment.” 

Because Meza had not met his burden to show a prima facie case of 

egregious conduct, the IJ determined it was unnecessary for the ICE agents to 

testify. The IJ concluded there was insufficient reason to grant Meza’s motion to 

suppress, and, in light of the passport, found that Meza was from Peru. The IJ 

stated that the burden shifted to Meza to show time and manner of entry and that, 

in the absence of such a showing, Meza was removable from the United States 

under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). 

E. BIA Appeal

In his counseled appeal, Meza challenged the IJ’s denial of his motion to 

suppress and his request to subpoena the ICE agents.3 On appeal, Meza never 

claimed that he was in the United States legally and does not challenge his removal 

on that basis. Rather, he wants to suppress the passport in order to claim the 

government did not prove he was from Peru.

3

Meza also argued that the IJ violated his due process rights by not requiring the DHS to 

authenticate the passport, but he does not raise that issue on appeal and, thus, has abandoned it. 

See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005).

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The BIA dismissed Meza’s appeal. The BIA pointed out that in LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050, 104 S. Ct. at 3489, “the Supreme Court held that the 

balance between the costs and benefits weighs against applying the exclusionary 

rule in removal proceedings.” The BIA, however, concluded that, based on LopezMendoza, the exclusionary rule applies where the alien shows that the 

circumstances of the arrest or interrogation “would render the use of the evidence 

‘fundamentally unfair’ so as to violate due process requirements of the Fifth 

Amendment.” The BIA explained that the fact that the evidence was obtained 

from a search and seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment “d[id] not 

necessarily mean that using the evidence in immigration proceedings is 

fundamentally unfair,” and that “exclusion is limited to egregious violations.” The 

BIA concluded that Meza’s declaration and hearing testimony had not met this 

burden. 

The BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s fact findings that: (1) ICE agents did 

not engage in coercive behavior; (2) their brief questioning of Meza in the parking 

lot and in his home was standard agency procedure; (3) Meza volunteered his name 

and identification to the ICE agents in the parking lot; and (4) Meza voluntarily 

unlocked the door, let the ICE agents into his home, and gave them his passport. 

Accordingly, the BIA concluded the ICE agents did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. 

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Alternatively, the BIA concluded that, assuming a Fourth Amendment 

violation had occurred, that violation “was not so egregious as to render the 

proceedings fundamentally unfair.” The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Meza’s 

motion to suppress and terminate proceedings, and “[g]iven the foregoing, . . . 

conclude[d] that the [IJ] did not violate [Meza’s] Fifth Amendment right to due 

process.” 

II. DISCUSSION

A. NTA Omitting Date and Time of Hearing

On appeal and for the first time, Meza argues that the immigration court 

lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings because his NTA did not indicate 

the time and date of his removal hearing. In support of his jurisdictional argument, 

Meza cites Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).4

 

This Court recently rejected the same argument Meza raises here. In PerezSanchez, the alien, relying on Pereira, argued that the IJ “never had jurisdiction 

over his removal case,” because his NTA “did not include either the time or date of 

his removal hearing.” Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., ___ F.3d ___, ___, No. 

18-12578, 2019 WL 3940873, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 21, 2019). This Court 

determined that the alien’s NTA was defective under INA § 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 

4

“We review subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 

1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).

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§ 1229(a)(1), because it did not include the hearing’s date and time. Id. at ___, 

2019 WL 3940873, at *4. However, this Court then concluded that the defect did 

not deprive the agency of jurisdiction over the alien’s removal proceedings because 

the “time-and-place requirement” in INA § 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1), does 

not “create a jurisdictional rule.” Id. at ___, 2019 WL 3940873, at *4.5

 

In so holding, this Court joined eight other Circuits that have rejected the 

argument that Pereira pronounced a broad jurisdictional rule and have concluded 

that the omission of the time and place of the removal hearing from an NTA does 

not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction over removal proceedings. See

Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 689-90 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Cortez, 

930 F.3d 350, 363-65 (4th Cir. 2019); Nkomo v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129, 133-34

(3d Cir. 2019); Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2019); Ortiz-Santiago v. 

Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 958, 962-64 (7th Cir. 2019); Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 

101, 105, 110-12 (2d Cir. 2019); Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160-61

5

In a provision entitled “Initiation of removal proceedings,” the INA requires that an alien 

in removal proceedings be given a written notice to appear specifying certain information about 

the proceedings, including, among other things, the “nature of the proceedings,” the “legal 

authority under which the proceedings are conducted,” the “charges against the alien,” and that 

the alien may secure his or her own representation (and include a current list of available pro 

bono counsel the alien may contact). INA § 239(a)(1)(A)-(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(A)-(G). 

The notice to appear must also include the “time and place at which the proceedings will be 

held.” INA § 239(a)(1)(G)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). But this provision of the INA does 

not speak in terms of vesting jurisdiction.

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(9th Cir. 2019); Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 314-15 (6th Cir. 

2018).

The Perez-Sanchez Court also agreed with the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh 

Circuits that the agency’s regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14,6 “despite its language, 

sets forth not a jurisdictional rule but a claim-processing one.” ___ F.3d at ___, 

2019 WL 3940873, at *5-6 (explaining that “an agency cannot fashion a 

procedural rule to limit jurisdiction bestowed upon it by Congress”); see also

Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 691-93; Cortez, 930 F.3d at 358-62; Ortiz-Santiago, 924 

F.3d at 963-64. Having determined that “the IJ and the BIA properly exercised 

jurisdiction over [the alien’s] removal hearing based on the authority conferred 

upon them by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1),” this Court denied the alien’s “petition for 

review as to his Pereira claim.” Perez-Sanchez, ___ F.3d at ___, 2019 WL 

3940873, at *7. To the extent the alien argued he was entitled to a remand 

6

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14, entitled “Jurisdiction and commencement of proceedings,” 

“[j]urisdiction vests, and proceedings before an Immigration Judge commence, when a charging 

document is filed with the Immigration Court by the Service.” Id. § 1003.14(a). The regulations 

define “[c]harging document” as a “written instrument which initiates a proceeding before an

Immigration Judge.” Id. § 1003.13. The three documents given as examples of a “charging 

document” are “a Notice to Appear, a Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge, and a Notice of 

Intention to Rescind and Request for Hearing by Alien.” Id. The regulations list the information 

the Service must include in the notice to appear, such as the nature of the proceedings, the legal 

authority under which the proceedings are conducted, and the charges against the alien. 

However, this list does not include the time and place of the initial hearing. Id. § 1003.15(b). 

Rather, the regulations require the Service to “provide in the Notice to Appear, the time, place 

and date of the initial removal hearing, where practicable.” Id. § 1003.18(b) (emphasis added). 

However, “[i]f that information is not contained in the Notice to Appear, the Immigration Court 

shall be responsible for scheduling the initial removal hearing and providing notice to the 

government and the alien of the time, place, and date of hearing.” Id. 

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“because his NTA violated the agency’s claim-processing rules,” the Court 

dismissed the alien’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, explaining that the alien 

“failed to exhaust the claim before the agency.” Id.

Here, under Perez-Sanchez, the IJ had jurisdiction over Meza’s removal 

proceedings upon the filing of the initial NTA, despite the fact that the NTA did 

not specify the time and date of the first hearing. Accordingly, we deny Meza’s 

petition as to his Pereira claim. To the extent Meza argues that the NTA is 

defective under the agency’s claim-processing rules, we dismiss his petition for 

lack of jurisdiction because Meza, like the alien in Perez-Sanchez, did not exhaust 

this issue before the BIA.

In any event, we note that the subsequent notice of hearing Meza received 

two weeks later did specify the date and time of his next hearing at the 

Immigration Court in Atlanta, and Meza and his attorney in fact appeared at that 

hearing and all subsequent hearings throughout his removal proceedings. The 

subsequent prompt notice of hearing cured the defect and made the defect 

harmless. See, e.g., Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 690-91 (concluding that a 

subsequently sent notice of hearing containing the time and place of the removal 

hearing cures any defect in the NTA); Banegas Gomez, 922 F.3d at 112 (same); In 

re Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441, 447 (BIA 2018) (same).

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B. Motion to Suppress

In Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule 

generally does not apply to removal proceedings. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 

1050, 104 S. Ct. at 3489. The Supreme Court explained that in determining 

whether the exclusionary rule extends to proceedings other than criminal 

proceedings, it must “weigh the likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully 

seized evidence against the likely costs.” Id. at 1041, 104 S. Ct. at 3484. The 

Supreme Court concluded that the costs of excluding “concededly reliable 

evidence from a deportation proceeding” outweighed the likely benefits. Id. at 

1042, 104 S. Ct. at 2485. The Supreme Court noted that in the deportation context, 

the deterrence value of the exclusionary rule was difficult to assess and

significantly reduced by several factors. Id. at 1042-45, 104 S. Ct. at 2485-87. On 

the other hand, the “social costs of applying the exclusionary rule . . . are both 

unusual and significant,” including, among other things, that the rule would 

“require the courts to close their eyes to [aliens’] ongoing violations of the law” 

and “clearly frustrate the express public policy against an alien’s unregistered 

presence in this country. Even the objective of deterring Fourth Amendment 

violations should not require such a result.” Id. at 1045-47, 104 S. Ct. at 3487-88.

However, a plurality of the Lopez-Mendoza Court suggested in dicta, and 

other circuits have since held, that suppression might be warranted in the case of 

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“egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress 

notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence 

obtained.” See id. at 1050-51; see, e.g., Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 

448-50 (4th Cir. 2015); Oliva-Ramos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 274-75 (3d 

Cir. 2012); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 777-78 (8th Cir. 2010); GutierrezBerdin v. Holder, 618 F.3d 647, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2010); Almeida-Amaral v. 

Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234-35 (2d Cir. 2006); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 

1441, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Similarly, the BIA has indicated that the exclusionary rule may apply in 

immigration cases where the circumstances surrounding how the evidence was 

obtained would render the use of the evidence fundamentally unfair. See Matter of 

Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319, 320-21 (BIA 1980); Matter of Barcenas, 19 I. & N. 

Dec. 609, 611 (BIA 1988). In immigration proceedings, the party challenging the 

legality of the evidence must produce evidence “establishing a prima facie case 

before the [DHS] will be called on to assume the burden of justifying the manner 

in which it obtained the evidence.” Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 611. 

This Court has not addressed in a published decision whether evidence of 

alienage (i.e., Meza’s valid passport from Peru) obtained from an egregious 

violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded in removal proceedings. 

However, we need not decide that question in this case because here Meza has not 

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shown that the IJ and the BIA erred in finding that Meza failed to make a prima 

facie showing of such an egregious violation.7

According to Meza’s version of events, the two ICE agents who stopped him 

in the parking lot were looking for a specific person. After Meza showed 

identification, the agents told Meza to take them to his apartment, which Meza did. 

While Meza said the agents escorted him, he did not describe any further physical 

contact with the agents. When the three men arrived at Meza’s apartment, Meza 

explained to the agents that his family members were inside and assured them that 

he did not have a gun in the apartment. The agents told Meza to open the door, 

which he did, and the agents walked inside. One agent said, “the passport, the 

passport.” Meza then took his passport from a book inside his closet and gave it to 

the agents. 

Although Meza said that he was fearful of the agents because they were big, 

tall, and wearing guns, he admitted the agents did not draw their guns, force the 

door open, or force him to open the door. Also, while Meza said he felt threatened 

by the agents, he did not say the agents actually threatened him. Nothing in 

Meza’s recounting indicates that he was subjected to abuse, coercion, racial 

7

Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s 

decisions. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). We review legal 

determinations of the agency de novo, and we review administrative fact findings under the 

deferential substantial evidence test. Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 

2006). We review de novo an alien’s constitutional challenges. See Lonyem v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

352 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). 

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profiling, or other misconduct rising to the level of an egregious Fourth 

Amendment violation. Thus, even assuming arguendo that an egregious Fourth 

Amendment violation would warrant suppression of Meza’s passport, Meza’s 

evidence, accepted as true, does not establish such a violation occurred here. 

We recognize Meza makes an independent due process argument as to the 

IJ’s denial of his request to subpoena the two ICE agents. To prevail on a Fifth 

Amendment due process claim in removal proceedings, an alien must demonstrate 

that he was “deprived of liberty without due process of law, and that the asserted 

errors caused [him] substantial prejudice.” Lonyem v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 352 F.3d 

1338, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2003). To establish substantial prejudice, an alien “must 

demonstrate that, in the absence of the alleged violations, the outcome of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 

1143 (11th Cir 2010); Ibrahim v. I.N.S., 821 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1987).

Here, Meza failed to establish that any prejudice arose from the IJ’s denial 

of his request to subpoena the two ICE agents who stopped him on June 29, 2017. 

Meza failed to explain how the outcome of his proceedings would be different if 

the ICE agents had testified, which was his burden. See Lapaix, 605 F.3d at 1143. 

In fact, in this case, the IJ credited Meza’s assertions and still found that he failed 

to allege sufficient facts to support the contention that the ICE agents engaged in 

an egregious violation of his Fourth Amendment rights such that his passport 

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should be suppressed. Furthermore, on appeal, Meza has not contested the validity 

of his passport.

Therefore, the IJ did not err in denying Meza’s motion to suppress the 

passport, to subpoena the two ICE agents, and to terminate proceedings. 

PETITION DENIED.

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