NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

R. JEAN BLANSETTE CRUGER

, Plaintiff/ Appellee,

v.

BRADLEY BLANSETTE

, Defendant/ Appellant

.

No. 1 CA

- CV 21

- 0649

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2020

- 005924

The Honorable Richard F. Albrecht

, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Bradley Blansette, Scottsdale Defendant

/Appellant

Sacks Tierney, PA

, Scottsdale By Randy Nussbaum, Michael J. Harris

C ounsel for Plaintiff

/Appellee FILED 9-8-2022CRUGER v. BLANSETTE

Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

C A M P B E L L

, Judge:

¶1 In this forcible detainer action, Bradley Blansette challenges the superior court’s entry of judgment in favor of R. Jean Blansette Cruger, in her capacity as trustee of the R. Jean Blansette Cruger Living Trust, dated October 17, 2018 (the T rust) . For the following reasons, we affirm

.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Cruger is Blansette’s mother. In 2004, Cru ger recorded a warranty deed documenting her purchase of certain real property (the

P roperty) , in her individual capacity, as her sole and separate property. Since 2004, Blansette lived at the P roperty. Although no written lease
agreement govern ed the terms of his occupancy, Blansette initially paid the Property’s mortgage but ceased making payments in 2006. In 2018, Cruger conveyed record title to the P roperty to the T rust via a warranty deed.

¶3 In 2019, Cruger, as trustee of the T rust

, notified B lansette through a certified letter that his right to occupy the P roperty would terminate effective December 31, 2019. After Blansette refused to move out, Cruger filed a forcible detainer action to evict him from the P roperty. In response, Blansette denie d the existence of a landlord

- tenant relationship

between him and Cruger and instead claimed an ownership interest in t he

P roperty

- asserting , as co

- owner, he needed no “permission” to reside on the premises. 1

¶4 At an initial hearing, Blansette pled not guilty and requested a jury trial. The superior court denied his request for a jury trial and set the

matter for a bench trial at a later date.

¶5 Shortly thereafter , Crug e r moved for summary judgment, attaching the reco rded warranty deeds and the termination of tenancy letter as supporting documents

. The superior court denied the motion for

1 Blansette also filed a quiet title action, but the sole subject of this appeal is the forcible detainer action.CRUGER v. BLANSETTE

Decision of the Court

3 summary judgment, c iting Crug e r’s failure to submit a declaration or affidavit, a nd proceeded to a forcible detainer bench trial. Af ter the parties elicited sworn testimony from the witnesses and admitted evidence into t he record, the superior court issued a ruling finding Blansette guilty of the

forcible detainer.

¶6 Blansette timely appealed that judgment, challenging the superior cour t’s denial of his request for a jury trial. Cruger v. Blansette

, 1 CA

- CV 20

- 0391, 2021 WL 2671919 , at *1, ¶ 7 (Ariz. App. June 29, 2021) (mem. decision). While noting t hat t he right to a jury trial “is not violated when there are simply no genuine issues o f fact for a jury to consider

, ” this court vacated the forcible detainer judgment because the superior court failed to make an express finding regarding the existence of disputed facts.

Id. at *2, ¶ ¶ 9

– 11 (internal quotations omitted). In remanding the matter for further proceedings , th is court explained that Cruger “[wa]s free to renew her motion for summary judgment

. . . and the superior court remain[ed] free to grant a forcible detainer judgment withou t a jury” if it found no material facts in dispute. Id

. at ¶ 12.

¶7 On remand, Cruger again moved for summary judgment. In support of her motion, Cruger again submitted the warranty deeds and termination of tenancy letter but also attached a signed declaratio n and a signed judgment in her favor from the parallel quiet title action. In response, Blansette reasserted his claim of an ownership interest in the

P roperty and argued that Cruger obtained the warranty deeds by fraud

.

¶8 Upon review of the parties’ motions and exhibits, the superior

court granted the motion for summary judgment, expressly finding that the “undisputed material facts” established that Cruger “has a right of superior possession as a matter of law.” Blansette timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Citing United Effort Trust Plan v. Holmes , 209 Ariz. 347, 3 50

– 51, ¶ 21 (App. 2004), and Phoenix

- Sunflower Industries, Inc. v. Hughes

, 105 Ariz. 334, 336 (1970), which held that the forcible detainer statutes apply only when the parties have a landlord

- tenant relationship, Blansette contends that a genuine factual dispute concerning the existence of a landlord

- tenant relationship preclude d entry of summary judgment in this forcible detainer

action

. Denying the existence of such a relationship

, Blansette claims that he and Cruger purchased the Property as part of “a real estate partnership

, ” granting him “a life

- estate interest” in the Prop erty.CRUGER v. BLANSETTE

Decision of the Court

4 ¶10 In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in the light most

favorable to the non

- moving party. Normandin v. Encanto Adventures

, LLC

, 246 Ariz. 458, 460, ¶ 9 (2019). “We determin e de novo whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the [superior] court correctly applied the law.” Diaz v. Phx

. Lubrication Serv

. , Inc. , 224 Ariz. 335, 338

, ¶ 10 (App. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

¶11 A forcible detainer action “ is a statutory proceeding, the object of which is to provide a summary, speedy and adequate means for obtaining possession of premises by one entitled to actual possession.” Heywood v. Ziol , 91 Ariz. 309, 311 (1962). Accordingly, challenges to the validity of title can neither be raised nor resolved in such a proceeding, though “the fact of title may be proved as a matter incidental to showing right of possession by an owner.” Andreola v. Ariz. Bank , 26 Ariz. App. 556, 557 (1976); A.R.S. § 12

- 1177(A) (“On the trial of an action of forcible entry or forcible detainer, the only issue sh all be the right of actual possession and the merits of title shall not be inquired into.”). We review the superior court’s application of the relevant statutes de novo. See City of Tucson v. Pima County , 190 Ariz. 385, 386 (App. 1997).

¶12 It is undisputed that: (1) Cruger recorded a warranty deed in 2004 reflecting her acquisition of the Property as her sole and separate property; (2) Blansette resided in the Property from 2004 to 2022; (3) no written agre ement governed Blansette’s occupancy of the Property, but he initially made the Property’s mortgage payments and ceased making payments in 2006; (4) Cruger conveyed title to the Property to the Trust in

201 8 ; (5) Cruger, on behalf of the Trust, mailed Blan sette a certified letter notifying him that his tenancy terminated effective December 31, 2019; and (6) Blansette remained in possession of the Property after the termination

date

.

¶13 To defend against the motion for summary judgment

, Blansette submitted a si gned statement from Cruger acknowledging that he provided one

- half of the earnest money deposit for the Property (“in the amount of approximately $18,350”) and made several mortgage payments for the Property ( “for at least the first 15 but not more than 24 month s”). But contrary to Blansette’s apparent contention

, his initial contribut ion to the Property’s earnest money deposit and subsequent payments on the Property’s mortgage do not negate the uncontroverted evidence that Cruger (now as Trustee of the Tru st) is the Property’s owner of record.CRUGER v. BLANSETTE

Decision of the Court

5 Stated differently , Blansette’s claim that he holds an ownership interest in the Property and Cruger defrauded him by failing to name him on the 2004 warranty deed challenge s the merits of title to the Property , not t he right to actual possession of the Property , and therefore must be resolved in a
separate quiet title action. 2 See Curtis v. Morris , 184 Ariz. 393, 398 (App. 1995) (“Because [a forcible detainer] action does not bar subsequent proceedings between the parties to determine issues other than the immediate right to possession, those issues are better resolved in proceedings [other than forcible detainer actions].”).

¶14 “A person is guilty of . . . forcib le detainer . . . if he [w]ilfully and without force holds over any . . . real property after termination of the time for which such . . . real property were let to him . . . , after demand made in writing for the possession thereof by the person entitled to such possession.” A.R.S. § 12

- 1171(3). “There is a forcible detain er if [a] tenant

. . . by sufferance . . . whose tenancy has been terminated retains possession after his tenancy has been terminated or after he receives written demand of possessio n by the landlord.” A.R.S. § 12

- 1173(1). A tenancy by sufferance

is created when a person who initially lawfully possessed property continues to hold possession after his right to possession has been

terminated. See Andreola , 26 Ariz. App. at 558 (“To cons titute a tenancy by sufferance there need not have been any prior contract of letting; all that is necessary is that the tenant should have entered into possession of the premises lawfully and shall continue to hold after the termination of his right.”) (q uotation omitted).

¶15 The parties do not dispute that Cruger permitted Blansette to reside at the Property from 2004 through 2019. 3 The record also clearly

2 We note that the superior court resolved the quiet title action in Cruger’s favor, concluding Blansette held no ownership interest in the Property.

3 Relying on A.R.S. § § 12

- 522 and

- 526 , Blansette contends that Cruger ’s forcible detainer claim is time

- barred, but neither statute applies

to this case. Section 12

- 522 imposes a two

- year limitation on a property owner seeking to recover property from another who has claimed the property “by right of possession only,” and A.R .S. § 12

- 526 precludes a

landowner from bringing an action to recover property that has been adversely possessed by another for more than ten years. While Blansette seemingly argues that his claim to the Property “by right of possession” and

“ adverse posse ssion ” began when he ceased making the mortgageCRUGER v. BLANSETTE

Decision of the Court

6 reflects that Cruger sent Blansette a certified letter notifying him that his right to occupy the P rop erty terminated on December 31, 2019 . Despite having received the written demand, Blansette failed to vacate the premises. By remain ing on the premises after the termination date

, Blansette became a tenant by sufferance and committed forcible detainer.

¶16 Finally, t o the extent Blansette challenges the superior court’s denial of his request for a jury trial, we find no error. While A.R.S. § 12

- 1176 liberally confers a jury trial right to litigants in a forcible d etainer action, A.R.S. § 12

- 1176 (B) (“If the plaintiff does not request a jury, the defendant may do so on appearing and the request shall be granted.”), Rule of Procedure for Eviction Actions 11( e ) directs the superior court, when presented with a jury t rial request, to “inquire and determine the factual issues to be determined by the jury.” If no question of fact exists, “the matter shall proceed to a trial by the judge alone regarding any legal issues or may [be] disposed of by motion or in accordance w ith the[] rules, as appropriate.” Id

. Read together, the statute and rule provide that a defendant in a forcible detainer action who requests a jury trial is entitled to one insofar as the court determines that factual issues exist for a jury to

decide. Se e Hornbeck v. Lusk , 217 Ariz. 581, 583, ¶ 6 (App. 2008) (explaining courts consider related statutes and rules in conjunction with one another and harmonize them when possible). In the event no factual issues exist, however, the court alone may decide the legal matters by trial or motion. See Montano v. Luff

, 250 Ariz. 401, 406

– 07, ¶¶ 1 5

– 17 (App. 2020). Because the defense improperly challenged the merits of Cruger’s title and no genuine dispute of material fact existed , the superior court did not err by de nying
Blansette’s request for a jury trial and summarily entering judgment in Cruger’s favor. 4

payments in 2006 , he has not cited, and our review of the record has not revealed, any evidence that he challenged Cruger’s title to the property ten years, or even two years, before Cruger filed the forcible detainer complaint

in this action

. See Leon v. Byus , 115 Ariz. 451, 453 (App. 1977) (“As a general rule, a possession in its inception permissive, or otherwise not hostile, does

not become hostile without a clear disclaimer of the true owner’s title and a claim of adverse right

. . . . ”).

4 In his opening brief, Blansette alleges in passing that the superior court judge demonstrated “significant bias” against him. By failing to develop the argument beyond a single, fleeting statement or cite rel evant supporting authority, Blansette waived this claim. See Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz

. ,CRUGER v. BLANSETTE

Decision of the Court

7 CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the forcible detainer judgment. Both parties request attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal, citing
A.R.S. §§ 12

- 34 1,

- 341.01, and

- 349. Blansette was not represented by counsel on appeal, and we deny his request for attorney ’s fees and other unspecified fees, punitive damages, and property damages. Under A.R.S.
§ 12

- 341.01(A), a court may award attorney s’ fees to the prevailing party in a dispute that arises out of a contract. A forcible detainer action against a tenant by sufferance , however, does not arise out of contract. Bank of New

York Mellon v. Dodev , 246 Ariz. 1, 11

– 12, ¶ 38 (App. 2018); Carrington Mortg.

Servs. LLC v. Woods , 242 Ariz. 455, 457, ¶ 14 (App. 2017). Therefore, A.R.S.
§ 12

- 341.01 provides no basis for an attorneys’ fees award in this case.

Section 12

- 349, on the other hand, authorizes a sanction

- based award of attorneys’ fees. While un successful, we do not conclude that Blansette’s claims are wholly groundless or otherwise made in bad faith

, and therefore deny Cruger’s attorneys’ fees request on that basis. As the prevailing party on appeal, we nonetheless award Cruger her costs, condit ioned upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

214 Ariz. 489, 491, ¶ 6 n.2 (App. 2007) ( explaining an appellant’s failure to develop and support an argument waives the issue on appeal).