IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Victor Gurvich, : 

 Appellant : 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

Board of Property Assessment Appeals : 

and Review of Allegheny County, : No. 717 C.D. 2022 

Pennsylvania : Submitted: April 6, 2023 

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge 

 HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge 

 HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge 

 

OPINION NOT REPORTED 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: August 3, 2023 

 Victor Gurvich (Gurvich), pro se, appeals from an order of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) that rejected Gurvich’s 

challenges to the tax reassessment of his real property. Gurvich asserts that the 

decision of the Board of Property Assessment Appeals and Review of Allegheny 

County (Board) increasing the assessed value of his property following his 2019 

purchase of the property, without also increasing the assessments of his neighbors’ 

properties, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment1 of 

1

 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: 

Sec[tion] 1. [Citizens of the United States.] All persons born or 

naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
2 

the United States Constitution and the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution2 and discriminated against him based on his Russian national origin in 

violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.3 Upon review, we affirm the 

trial court’s order. 

I. Background 

In 2019, Gurvich purchased real property in Shaler Township, 

Allegheny County (County), for $245,000.00. Original Record (O.R.), Item #11 at 

1. In the County’s 2013 countywide reassessment, using 2012 as the base year4 for 

valuations, the property had been assessed at $164,300.00. Id. The Shaler Area 

School District (School District) appealed that assessment after Gurvich purchased 

the property. Following a hearing, the Board assigned a new assessed value of 

they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 

nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 

without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 

U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1. 

2

 Article VIII, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, entitled “Uniformity of taxation,” 

provides: “All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits 

of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” Pa. Const. 

art. VIII, § 1. 

3

 Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963. 

4

 Section 8802 of the Consolidated County Assessment Law (Assessment Law), 53 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 8801-8868, defines “base year” as “[t]he year upon which real property market values are based 

for the most recent countywide revision of assessment of real property or other prior year upon 

which the market value of all real property of the county is based for assessment purposes.” 53 

Pa.C.S. § 8802. 
3 

$211,200.00, calculated by applying the County’s then-current common level ratio 

(CLR)5 of 86.2% to Gurvich’s purchase price. Id.; O.R., Item #8 at 3. 

Gurvich challenged the reassessment before the Board, which 

transferred the matter to the trial court. O.R., Item #11 at 1-2. Gurvich argued that 

his property’s reassessment was not uniform with those of surrounding properties 

because those properties were still assessed at their 2012 base year values while 

Gurvich’s property alone had been subjected to reassessment.6 Id. at 2. Gurvich 

also argued that the reassessment discriminated against him because he was born in 

Russia. Id.

After a hearing, the trial court issued a memorandum and order on 

March 15, 2022. O.R., Items #11 & #12. The trial court rejected Gurvich’s 

uniformity challenge, finding that applying the CLR to the sale price was “the most 

fair method of reassessing the property . . . .” Id., Item #11 at 4. The trial court also 

rejected Gurvich’s discrimination claim, finding that such a claim was better left to 

the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC)7 and that, in any event, 

Gurvich failed to show any discrimination. Id. at 2-4. 

5

 The CLR is “[t]he ratio of assessed value to current market value used generally in the 

county and published by the State Tax Equalization Board on or before July 1 of the year prior to 

the tax year on appeal . . . .” In re Appeal of Springfield Sch. Dist., 101 A.3d 835, 838 n.2 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2014), overruled in part on other grounds by Valley Forge Towers Apartments N, LP v. 

Upper Merion Area Sch. Dist., 163 A.3d 962, 975 (Pa. 2017). 

6

 At the outset of its memorandum opinion of March 15, 2022, the trial court described 

Gurvich’s argument as a challenge to the constitutionality of the county’s “system of real property 

assessment . . . .” Original Record (O.R.), Item #1 at 1. Gurvich insists this characterization 

constitutes reversible error because he is not challenging the entire system of property assessment, 

but merely the reassessment of his property. However, as discussed below, the trial court’s initial 

description was, at most, harmless error. 

7

 Gurvich did file a discrimination complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations 

Commission, but that agency dismissed the complaint. The agency’s case closure form indicated 
4 

Gurvich appealed the trial court’s decision to this Court. The School 

District moved to quash the appeal, asserting that the trial court’s order was 

interlocutory because the trial court had not made a final determination of the correct 

reassessed value. By order dated June 1, 2022, this Court remanded the matter to 

the trial court for further proceedings. Gurvich v. Gd. Of Prop Assessment Appeals 

& Rev. of Allegheny Cnty. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 323 C.D. 2022, filed June 3, 2022) (per 

curiam). The trial court held another hearing, after which it issued an order dated 

June 30, 2022, setting the assessed value of Gurvich’s property at $211,000.00 for 

2020, $236,250.00 for 2021, and $251,410 for 2022. O.R., Item #20. This appeal 

by Gurvich followed.8

II. Issues 

On appeal,9 Gurvich raises several interrelated issues for review, which 

we reorder, consolidate, and summarize as follows. Gurvich asserts that the Board’s 

reassessment improperly failed to use the 2012 base year assessment for his property 

and that, as a result, the reassessed value of his property is not uniform with the 

assessments of his neighbors, in violation of state and federal constitutions. He also 

maintains that the trial court mischaracterized his reassessment argument as a 

challenge to the County’s entire reassessment system and thereby failed to consider 

the case was untimely, the agency lacked jurisdiction, or the complaint was frivolous on its face. 

O.R., Item #21 at 30.

8

 Gurvich’s appeal of the final order also included the previous interlocutory order. Sunoco 

Partners Mktg. & Terminals, L.P. v. Clean Air Council, 219 A.3d 280, 295 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) 

(explaining that “an appeal of a final order subsumes challenges to previous interlocutory 

decisions”) (quoting Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 54 (Pa. 2012) (additional quotation 

marks omitted)). 

9

 Our review of a trial court’s decision in an assessment appeal is limited to determining 

whether the trial court committed an error of law or reached a decision not supported by substantial 

evidence. Jackson v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of Cumberland Cnty., 950 A.2d 1081, 1085 n.4 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). 
5 

his actual uniformity challenge. In addition, Gurvich reiterates his assertion that the 

reassessment of his property constituted discrimination based on his national origin. 

III. Discussion

At the outset, we observe that Gurvich has not organized the argument 

section of his brief to correspond to his statement of the questions involved as 

required by Rule 2119(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). As a result, this Court has had some difficulty determining which 

portions of the argument are intended to address which questions for review. In 

addition, Gurvich has not cited any legal authority in support of any of his arguments 

as contemplated by Rule 2119(a). Nonetheless, we address Gurvich’s arguments to 

the extent that they are sufficiently developed to allow meaningful appellate review. 

See Hillside Villas Condo. Ass’n v. Bottaro Dev. Co., 177 A.3d 456, 465 n.9 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2018) (“declin[ing] to find waiver of arguments that contain no legal 

citations but are otherwise sufficiently developed to allow meaningful appellate 

review”).10

A. Uniformity 

Gurvich does not present any developed argument challenging either 

the specific assessed value assigned to his property or the accuracy of the CLR. 

10 However, this Court cannot develop Gurvich’s arguments for him. Skytop Meadow 

Cmty. Ass’n v. Paige, 177 A.3d 377, 384 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). The trial court noted that it advised 

Gurvich “on more than several occasions” that he should retain an attorney, but he did not do so. 

O.R., Item #11 at 2 n.1. As we have repeatedly observed, “[w]hile this Court is sympathetic to the 

difficulty facing all pro se parties, it is axiomatic that a party seeking to represent himself assumes 

the risk that his lack of legal knowledge might prove to be his undoing.” Commonwealth v. Geatti, 

35 A.3d 798, 800 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (citing Hinds v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor 

Vehicles, 740 A.2d 1217 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). Accordingly, to the extent that any arguments 

Gurvich may have intended to raise are not identified and addressed herein, such arguments are 

not sufficiently developed to allow meaningful appellate review and are waived. See Lerch v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 553 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018); Hill v. Kilgallen, 108 

A.3d 934, 943 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). 
6 

Rather, the essence of Gurvich’s uniformity argument appears to be simply that 

increasing the assessed value of his property without also increasing the assessments 

of surrounding properties was unconstitutional. Gurvich cites no legal authority in 

support of this assertion. The law is to the contrary. 

Section 8855 of the Assessment Law grants a school district or other 

taxing body “the right to appeal any assessment within its jurisdiction in the same 

manner, subject to the same procedure and with like effect as if the appeal were taken 

by a taxable person with respect to the assessment.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 8855 (emphasis 

added). Section 8855 does not restrict the method by which a school district 

determines which assessments to appeal. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of 

Revenue Appeals of Northampton Cnty., 225 A.3d 212, 219 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020). 

Nonetheless, in selecting properties for assessment appeals, the school 

district’s methodology must fit within constitutional boundaries. Bethlehem, 225 

A.3d at 219. The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution provides 

that no state or governmental entity may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction 

the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Pennsylvania 

Constitution’s Uniformity Clause requires that “[a]ll taxes shall be uniform, upon 

the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the 

tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” Pa. Const. art. VIII, § 1. 

It is well-settled law that the acts of a governmental entity are presumed 

constitutional. GM Berkshire Hills LLC v. Berks Cnty. Bd. of Assessment, 257 A.3d 

822, 829 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 290 A.3d 238 (Pa. 

2023)11 (citing Bethlehem Area, 225 A.3d at 218). Accordingly, a taxpayer asserting 

11 Where our Supreme Court is equally divided, the effect of the split is to affirm the 

intermediate appellate court decision. Borkey v. Twp. of Ctr., 847 A.2d 807, 814 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2004). 
7 

a constitutional uniformity challenge to a tax assessment bears the burden of proving 

that the taxing authority engaged in constitutionally prohibited conduct. GM 

Berkshire, 257 A.3d at 829 (citing Bethlehem Area, 225 A.3d at 218). 

In GM Berkshire, this Court considered issues and arguments closely 

analogous to those asserted by Gurvich in this matter. The school district in GM 

Berkshire calculated that whenever the sale price of a property, reduced by the 

applicable CLR, resulted in a potential assessed value of at least $150,000.00 more 

than the current assessed value, an assessment appeal would be cost-effective. Id. at 

825. The property at issue had recently been sold for millions of dollars more than 

its then-current assessed value. Id. Accordingly, the school district appealed the 

assessment. Id. 

Like Gurvich here, the property owner in GM Berkshire argued that the 

school district’s choice to appeal the assessments of recently sold properties based 

on their sales prices violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment and the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Uniformity Clause. Id. at 827. 

The property owner insisted that the school district could not selectively seek 

reassessment of properties based on their recent sales prices without also appealing 

the assessments of unsold properties that might be similarly underassessed. Id. The 

property owner argued that the school district’s selective assessment appeals would 

tax new owners unfairly compared to owners of similar properties that had not 

recently been sold, and therefore would violate constitutional uniformity 

requirements. Id. 

This Court rejected the property owner’s arguments. We specifically 

explained that assessment appeals based on recent sales prices and use of a monetary 

threshold to determine the cost-effectiveness of appeals do not violate constitutional 
8 

principles of uniformity, provided the selection criteria are not based on distinctions 

in property type or classification, such as appeals limited to commercial properties. 

GM Berkshire, 257 A.3d at 830-31; see also Valley Forge Towers Apartments N, LP 

v. Upper Merion Area Sch. Dist., 163 A.3d 962, 978 (Pa. 2017) (explaining that 

taxing bodies may not select properties for assessment appeals based solely on 

classifications such “as commercial, apartment complex, single-family residential, 

industrial, or the like”). 

The School District here, like that in GM Berkshire, selected properties 

for assessment appeals based on recent sale prices that, after adjustment by the CLR, 

would offer potential tax revenue increases sufficient to justify the costs of pursuing 

the appeals. The County’s most recent countywide reassessment occurred in 2013 

and used 2012 as the base year for valuations. At that time, the property Gurvich 

later purchased had an assessed value of $164,300.00. Gurvich bought his property 

for $245,000.00 in 2019. In that year, the CLR was 86.2%. Using the $245,000.00 

sale price of the property as the then-current fair market value and applying the CLR 

of 86.2% yielded a potential assessed value (rounded to the nearest $100.00) of 

$211,200.00.12 The School District’s policy was to appeal the assessment of any 

recently sold property where the sale price adjusted by the CLR would result in an 

assessed value $20,000.00 or more higher than the 2012 assessed value. O.R., Item 

#8 at 6; Tr. of Proceedings, Feb. 15, 2022, at 39-40. Applying that formula, the 

potential increase in assessed value of Gurvich’s property was approximately 

$46,700.00,13 so the School District filed an assessment appeal. Id. at 53. The 

12 $245,000.00 x .862 = $211,190.00. The trial court, without explanation, apparently 

further rounded the assessed value to $200,000.00. See O.R., Item #20. 

13 $211,000.00 – $164,300.00 = $46,700.00. 
9 

School District appealed the assessments of a total of 392 properties for the 2019 tax 

year based on the same formula. Id. at 48; see also O.R., Item #11 at 3. Consistent 

with our analysis and holding in GM Berkshire, we likewise find no uniformity 

violation here. 

Gurvich also insists that “the law of Allegheny County published in the 

County official web site . . . forbids a reassessment based solely on the sale of the 

property . . . .” Gurvich Br. at 21. This assertion is without merit. The web page 

cited by Gurvich sets forth the limited circumstances in which the County may 

unilaterally choose to reassess a property during the period between countywide 

reassessments. O.R., Item #8 at 23. However, a separate page on the County’s 

website discusses tax assessment appeals and expressly states that “[t]he assessed 

value of a property may be appealed annually, by the owner, school district or 

municipality”14 (emphasis added). Here, the School District properly exercised its 

legal right to file an assessment appeal regarding Gurvich’s property. 

Finally, Gurvich maintains that the trial court mischaracterized his 

reassessment argument as a challenge to the County’s entire reassessment system, 

rather than simply a challenge to the reassessment of his specific property. Gurvich 

asserts that the trial court therefore failed to consider his actual uniformity challenge. 

We disagree. Although the trial court described Gurvich’s constitutional claim as 

relating to the County’s reassessment system, it nonetheless addressed the claims 

Gurvich raised alleging lack of uniformity. Any error in labeling Gurvich’s claim 

was harmless. 

14 ALLEGHENY CNTY., ANNUAL APPEALS, HOW TO APPEAL AN ASSESSED VALUE, 

https://www.alleghenycounty.us/real-estate/assessment-appeals/annual-appeal.aspx (last visited 

August 2, 2023). Courts may take judicial notice of information made publicly available by 

government entities, including on their websites. See Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 

205 n.16 (3d Cir. 2017). 
10 

B. Discrimination Based on National Origin 

In his second argument, Gurvich maintains that the increased tax 

assessment discriminated against him unlawfully based on his national origin, as he 

was born in Russia. The trial court suggested that he should pursue that claim before 

the PHRC. However, the trial court also rejected Gurvich’s discrimination claim, 

finding that the evidence did not support that claim. O.R., Item #11 at 4. We discern 

no error in that finding.15

The trial court posited that the only record evidence of discrimination 

was one reference to Gurvich as a Russian-speaking person. O.R., Item #11 at 4. 

Our review of the record reveals that the statement the trial court referenced was in 

the hearing officer’s notes from the School District’s assessment appeal, which 

stated, in full: 

SCHOOL DISTRICT SEEKING CMV[16] OF $245,000 

THE SALE PRICE. THEY [sic] PRESENTED THREE 

SIMILAR COMPS CLOSE TO THE SUBJECT. HO[17]

CALLED THE OWNER AND HE SAID THE CMV 

SHOULD STAY THE SAME. HE JUST GOT HIS 

CITIZENSHIP IN 2010. HE IS FROM RUSSIA AND 

DIDN’T UNDERSTAND WHAT HE SHOULD DO. HE 

DID SEND A LETTER, BUT NO EVIDENCE. HO 

RECOMMENDS THAT THE CMV BE $245,000. 

O.R., Item #8 at 26. 

The trial court, as the finder of fact, was free to believe all, some, or 

none of the evidence presented, to make all credibility determinations, and to resolve 

15 We note that the parties have not addressed the question of whether Gurvich has properly 

pleaded a discrimination claim by raising it in the context of a tax assessment appeal. For purposes 

of this opinion, we assume, without deciding, that the claim was properly asserted. 

16 Presumably “CMV” refers to the current market value. 

17 Presumably “HO” refers to the hearing officer. 
11 

all conflicts in the evidence. Boro Constr., Inc. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 992 A.2d 208 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). This Court is bound by the findings of the trial court that have 

adequate support in the record, so long as those findings do not reflect capricious 

disregard of competent and credible evidence. Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478 (Pa. 2002). Capricious disregard occurs 

only when the fact-finder deliberately ignores relevant, competent evidence. Id. 

Here, the trial court found the evidence insufficient to carry Gurvich’s 

burden of proving discrimination based on national origin. The hearing officer’s 

note, the only record evidence cited by Gurvich, can easily be interpreted as 

explaining Gurvich’s failure to offer evidence in the School District’s tax assessment 

appeal rather than as suggesting discrimination by the hearing officer. In any event, 

it was the trial court’s province to determine what inference to draw from that 

evidence. We cannot say that the trial court capriciously disregarded competent and 

credible evidence in finding the hearing officer’s note insufficient to support 

Gurvich’s discrimination claim. 

IV. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the trial court’s order. 

 

 __________________________________ 

 CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge 

Judge Dumas dissents.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Victor Gurvich, : 

 Appellant : 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

Board of Property Assessment Appeals : 

and Review of Allegheny County, : No. 717 C.D. 2022 

Pennsylvania : 

O R D E R 

 AND NOW, this 3rd day of August, 2023, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County dated June 30, 2022 is AFFIRMED. 

 

 __________________________________ 

 CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge