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FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR HOMELAND

SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING: ROLE OF THE

INFORMATION SHARING PROGRAM MANAGER

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

INFORMATION SHARING AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 8, 2005

Serial No. 109–55

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut, Chairman 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

PETER T. KING, NEW YORK (Ex Officio) 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Nevada, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 

Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment .......................................................... 1

The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the State 

California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, 

Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 2

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Opening Statement .............................................................................. 4

The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 12

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 17

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 48

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York .......................................................................................................... 14

The Honorable Curt Weldon, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 40

WITNESSES

Mr. William Crowell, Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security 

in the Information Age: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 27

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 36 

The Honorable Lee Hamilton, Vice Chairman, 9/11 Public Discourse Project: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 21

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 23

Mr. John Russack, Information Sharing Program Manager, Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5

(1)

FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR HOMELAND 

SECURITY: ROLE OF THE INFORMATION 

SHARING PROGRAM MANAGER 

Tuesday, November 8, 2005

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION

SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Rob Simmons [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Simmons, Weldon, Dent, Lofgren, 

Lowey, Jackson-Lee, and Langevin. 

Mr. SIMMONS. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the 

state of homeland security information sharing to review the 

progress of the federal government’s information sharing efforts 

and to explore the relationship between the Information Sharing 

Program Manager and the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Chief Intelligence Officer. 

We will hear from two panels today. Our first witness will be Mr. 

John Russack, Information Sharing Program Manager in the Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence. 

Our second panel of witnesses will be the Honorable Lee Hamilton, vice chairman of the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, and Mr. 

William Crowell, from the Markle Foundation’s Task Force on National Security in the Information age. And I thank them all for 

being here today. 

Prior to being named Information Sharing Program Manager, 

our first witness, John Russack, was previously the Energy Department’s intelligence director and served as deputy chief of external 

operations and cover division for counterintelligence. He was the 

deputy assistant director of central intelligence for collection, was 

the military deputy director of the DCI’s Nonproliferation Center 

and was deputy to the associate director of central intelligence for 

military support. In other words, he is a seasoned intelligence professional who brings years of experience to the job. 

Preventing future terrorist attacks must be the primary goal of 

our homeland security efforts, and the ability to share relevant terrorist-related information is key to prevention. The Information 
2

Sharing Program Manager is the designated individual responsible 

for information sharing across the federal government and was 

given government-wide authority to ensure that all government 

agencies at the federal, state, local, tribal levels, as well as the private sector, share information about terrorists and terrorism. 

The Program Manager, in consultation wit the Information Sharing Council, is responsible for developing, monitoring and managing the information sharing environment, or ISE, which will provide the means for sharing terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local and tribal entities, as well as the private 

sector. 

Establishing an information sharing environment is a difficult 

and complex undertaking and will require a concerted effort at all 

levels of government. 

We look forward to hearing your views on the current status of 

your efforts and your thoughts about the road ahead. I am especially interested in how your relationship with the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Chief Intelligence Officer is progressing and 

whether or not you feel that you have the resources that you need 

and the authority that you need to get the job done. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking minority member, the 

gentlelady of California, Ms. Lofgren, for any comments she might 

make. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will put my full 

statement into the record. But I do want to celebrate the fact that 

we are having this hearing. Probably, as I think about it, we 

should have had this hearing maybe before the last hearing we had 

since we need to understand the ISE, which is central to any effective government-wide information sharing effort. 

As the Markle Foundation has noted, the ISE should not be limited to promoting communications between the various agencies 

that comprise the intelligence community. We have all the shared 

intelligence in the world. If we don’t get it out to the state, local 

and tribal law enforcements, we are not going to achieve our goal. 

And I am pleased that I believe that Mr. Russack certainly understands that, and it is our job here to try and assist him in getting 

that accomplished. 

I would note that we are way behind in what we need to do. I 

am very concerned that Mr. Russack’s office is not yet properly 

funded or properly staffed. I think if we are going to ask him to 

lead the tough job that we have given to him, that we need to 

make sure he has the budgetary support to accomplish the task. 

I also want to note that four years after 9/11 and more than a 

year after the issuance of the 9/11 Commission report, we are 

aware that federal departments and agencies are still using arguments based on interpretation of their authority prior to the Intelligence Reform Act to protect their turf. We need to work with our 

administrative leadership to correct this situation. I think this 

hearing is a part of that effort but certainly not all that will be 

asked of us. 

And I yield back and will submit the rest of my statement for 

the record.
3

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ZOE LOFGREN

Good afternoon. I, too, am very pleased that this Subcommittee is turning its attention to the critical issue of government-wide information sharing. I would like to 

extend a warm welcome to Mr. Russack, who I had the opportunity to meet last 

week, as well as Bill Crowell of the Markle Foundation and Lee Hamilton, former 

Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission. 

This hearing builds upon our July information sharing hearing when we explored 

how well federal agencies were communicating with state, local, and tribal law enforcement authorities and the private sector. 

This hearing, by contrast, will focus on how well federal agencies are communicating with each other. 

For several reasons, this hearing probably should have happened first. 

The Information Sharing Environment (ISE)—initiated as part of last year’s Intelligence Reform Act—is central to any effective government-wide information sharing 

effort. Accordingly, the ISE is an important starting point—in fact, THE starting 

point—for any coordinated information sharing effort involving the federal government. 

As the Markle Foundation has noted, however, the ISE should not be limited to 

promoting communications between the various agencies that comprise the Intelligence Community. On the contrary, all the shared intelligence in the world is not 

worth a thing if it is not disseminated to those who can actually use it—namely, 

the men and women of state, local, and tribal law enforcement who are most likely 

to encounter terrorists in the communities they protect and serve. 

An ISE that incorporates not only the federal Intelligence Community but also 

our hometown law enforcement authorities holds great promise. 

In many respects, this is old news. What we need now is action. 

I am saddened to report that while the establishment of the ISE is a step in the 

right direction, its implementation continues to be plagued by inaction and a lack 

of cooperation. 

How can we expect to have an effective, fully functional ISE if we haven’t properly 

funded or staffed Mr. Russack’s office? Indeed, how can Mr. Russack do his job if 

he doesn’t have a budget? 

Mr. Russack testified this summer that he had been staffed with only one fulltime employee and two contractors to assist him with his work. Indeed, the Markle 

Foundation recently reported that Mr. Russack’s office still needs more full time employee positions and still has key leadership positions open. 

While I know from Mr. Russack that he is diligently attempting to fill those 

spaces, a dedicated funding stream for his office will go a long way to attracting 

the best and brightest minds to his effort. 

At the same time, if we don’t foster a greater sense of urgency in terms of implementing and operationalizing the ISE, how can we effectively thwart terrorist plans 

that are being developed by our enemies? 

I note that it was only two weeks ago that the President actually issued Executive 

Order 13388 establishing the Information Sharing Council—an entity that is supposed to bring all intelligence agencies to the table to work out their differences. 

The Council is getting started 11 months after Congress provided for its creation 

and six months after Mr. Russack was appointed. 

I question how much they can realistically accomplish together during the 18 

months remaining in their terms. 

Moreover, if the various agencies that comprise the Intelligence Community can’t 

or won’t agree on how to share information with each other as part of the ISE, how 

can we expect them to communicate homeland-security information with law enforcement officers in the field? Likewise, if the Intelligence Community resists the 

efforts of the Program Manager to create an ISE that requires compliance with a 

common set of rules and regulations for information sharing, how can we assure 

those officers that they will receive a consistent, coherent message from their federal partners? 

The Markle Foundation recently reported that four years after 9/11 and more 

than a year after the issuance of the 9/11 Commission’s report, federal departments 

and agencies are still using arguments from interpretations of their authority prior 

to the Intelligence Reform Act to protect their turf. 

Finally, even if Mr. Russack succeeds in developing rules and procedures designed 

to ensure effective information sharing, what good will they be if—at the end of the 

day—they can’t be enforced? 

Although the Director of National Intelligence has assumed administrative responsibility for the Program Manager, he must also assume responsibility for the 

success of Mr. Russack’s office. That success will manifest itself only when we have 
4

a clear and consistent information sharing policies and procedures that apply to all 

intelligence consumers as well as clear and decisive consequences—financial or otherwise—for noncompliance. 

These are all critical questions that I hope the witnesses will address and the 

Members present here today will explore. I look forward to all of the testimony 

today.

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the ranking member for her statement. I 

state, for the record, that all members of the subcommittee or the 

members of the committee who attend can insert opening statements for the record.

PREPARED OPENING OF HON. BENNIE G. THOMPSON

I am very pleased that this Subcommittee is turning its attention to the issue of 

government-wide information sharing, and more specifically, the progress that is 

being made—or not being made—with the development of the Information Sharing 

Environment (ISE). 

Congress initiated the ISE last year as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. 

The ISE was intended it to be a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated system for sharing terrorism information among intelligence and law enforcement 

agencies at all levels of government. 

In its hoped-for state, the ISE will be a combination of policies, procedures, and 

technologies linking people, systems, databases, and information across government 

and the private sector in order combat terrorism more effectively. 

Congress intended the ISE to achieve this function in a way that not only promotes national security but also respects privacy and civil liberties. 

Things are moving on all these fronts—but slowly. 

To get to where we need to be, we must have everybody on the same page. 

Put simply, our intelligence agencies, law enforcement entities, and the private 

sector must operate under a common set of guidelines and policies for acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using information. 

The Intelligence Community, moreover, must be answerable to a single authority 

to coordinate this effort. 

That is where our first witness—Mr. John Russack, the Program Manager of the 

Information Sharing Environment—comes in. 

As former 9/11 Co-Chairman Lee Hamilton recently stated, ‘‘The place where it 

all comes together is in Mr. Russack’s position. . . . He’s the fellow that has to see 

that we get all this information shared. And if you don’t . . . you are not going to 

have the most effective means of fighting terrorism.’’

Several things are for certain. Mr. Russack won’t be effective if he doesn’t have 

the resources he needs; 

He won’t be effective if he doesn’t have the cooperation from the Intelligence Community he needs; 

And he won’t be effective if he doesn’t have ‘‘buy in’’ from all participants. 

The Markle Foundation recently warned the President that ‘‘risk aversion and bureaucratic resistance to change continue to hamper the carrying out of the Information Sharing Environment and the policies that support it.’’

I therefore look forward to Mr. Russack’s testimony and that of our second panel 

witnesses—including Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Bill Crowell of the Markle Foundation 

Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. 

I am certain that Mr. Russack, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Crowell all have unique 

perspectives on the Markle Foundation’s concerns as well as other challenges in this 

critical area. 

Thank you all for joining us today.

Mr. SIMMONS. I now would like to welcome Mr. Russack to the 

subcommittee to remind him that his entire statement will be introduced into the record and that if he is able to limit his oral testimony to around 5 minutes, that will leave an opportunity for questions. 

Mr. Russack, thank you for being here. 
5

STATEMENT OF JOHN RUSSACK, INFORMATION SHARING 

PROGRAM MANAGER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. RUSSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ms. 

Lofgren. It is a pleasure to be here. 

I would, first of all, like to state that I agree with everything the 

chairman and the ranking minority member have said about the 

importance of information sharing to national security. I would also 

like to say that I care. When I was asked if I would consider doing 

this job, I said, ‘‘Yes,’’ and the reason I said, ‘‘Yes,’’ is because I believe that information sharing in our nation—and, again, I emphasize the fact that this is a national issue, it is not a federal issue, 

it is not a state and local issue, it is everybody’s issue—information 

sharing in our nation is seminally the most important thing we can 

do to ensure our national security. 

And what I intend to do is execute the tasks that the Congress 

has laid out for me in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. We have already turned in a deliverable. That was due 

to the Congress on the 15th of June. In that, I talked about the 

impediments to information sharing, and I would like to point out 

at the onset that technology is not an impediment. 

Oftentimes, people tend to talk about information sharing in 

terms of technology or chief information officers, and many would 

draw the conclusion that these are technological issues, not that 

aren’t technological issues because there are, but technology is an 

enabler. It is not an impediment. 

Most of the time, there are technical solutions to solve many 

problems. Once we have identified problems in policy, law, culture 

in the business model and once we define the business rules, technologically, we can build a system that will in fact enable us to 

share information. 

So I care deeply about this issue. The intention of myself and my 

staff is to in fact make the existing information sharing environment better. Depending upon where you sit or where you stand and 

what you do, the scorecard for today’s information sharing system 

would be, if we took a positive side, flawed, doesn’t work perfectly. 

And if we took the negative side, some would argue that it doesn’t 

work at all. 

I think post-9/11, across the federal government, we in fact are 

sharing information. It is not a perfect sharing. We need to do 

much better. We need to make sharing much more robust, and I 

think we need to redefine the business rules. I think an awful lot 

of the problems have to do with roles, missions, responsibilities and 

authorities in terrorism. If I look at the state, local, tribal and private sector, I think that is where we really need to do a much better job. 

And when I talk to people at the state, local, tribal and private 

sector, people representing those sectors, most of them are unhappy with the quality of information sharing. And I think if we 

are going to protect America, we need to do better at the federal 

level, and, clearly, we must do a whole lot better when we deal 

with state, local, tribal and the private sector. 

Protection of sources and methods is an issue; however, clearly, 

we can share information in a better way, in a much more effective 
6

way, and we can add context and perspective to the information we 

give to state, local, tribal and the private sector. 

We also need to do business specifically for state, local, tribal and 

the private sector and across our nation. We need to do more business at the unclassified level. 

Today, in the 21st century, there are many, many sources of information beyond intelligence. Most large companies and businesses that I know of have their own intelligence organizations. 

Where do they get their information—Open source. 

There is an awful lot of information that is out there at the open 

source level. If we take that information and combine the information derived from national, technical means, the classified stuff, we 

ought to be able to do a good job, a great job, a much more adequate job of protecting America. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Russack follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN A. RUSSACK

INTRODUCTION 

Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, I consider it an honor to be here today to update you on my efforts 

to implement the recommendations that Congress prescribed in section 1016 of the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. We need not 

look far to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, to understand that we have significant work remaining to fully implement an information-sharing environment 

that more effectively supports our national counterterrorism mission. I believe there 

is not an issue more seminal to the security of our nation than information sharing. 

I accepted this responsibility because I am committed to doing something about it. 

This task is too large and much too important for me to do it alone, which is why 

Congress must remain fully engaged in this effort and provide its leadership, support, and necessary guidance to transform our current capabilities into a better, 

more effective Information Sharing Environment (ISE). 

In August of 2004, the President issued Executive Order 13356 to ensure that terrorism information is shared broadly among federal agencies; state, local, and tribal 

governments; and the private sector. Then in response to the IRTP A, on April 15, 

2005, the President designatedme as the Program Manger (PM) for the Information 

Sharing Environment, and on June 2nd, the President directed that the PM be part 

of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). 

On June 15th, I submitted a preliminary report to the President and Congressthe first deliverable mandated by IRTP A. This report identified five broad issues 

affecting information sharing that will largely define the agenda for my office over 

the next two years. On October 25th, the President issued EO 13388 establishing 

the Information Sharing Council (ISC), and I now have an approved charter authorizing the ISC to assist and advise the President and myself in carrying out our duties as described in section 1016 of IRTPA. On October 27th, Ambassador 

Negroponte sent a letter to Department Secretaries and Agency Directors requesting 

representatives to the ISC. While the institutional foundations are in place to allow 

us to make significant progress in the way we share terrorism information, a number of hurdles that exist that will require hard work and leadership to surmount. 

Weare committed to identifying and removing all impediments that prevent us from 

providing the best possible information to decision makers, at whatever level. 

In fact, significant efforts have been made to meet Congress’ intent in making information sharing a priority. In consultation with the ISC, and state, local, and private sector representatives, I will formulate policies and guidelines to enable broader sharing of terrorist information, develop an ISE concept of operations and architecture, and prepare for the President an implementation plan for the Information 

Sharing Environment. Once the plan is adopted, my office will manage, support, 

monitor, and assess ISE implementation by Federal departments and agencies, and 

regularly report my findings to Congress. 

I have organized my office around three major priorities: policy, technology, and 

business process, and I have recruited and staffed senior positions for each of these 

key areas. My office is currently staffed with 11 Federal employees, with eight more 

in the hiring process; we are further augmented with six on site contractors. The 
7

quality of personnel now onboard is outstanding, and is representative of all of the 

agencies and departments of the Federal govemment--not just the Intelligence Community (IC). I am on track to obtain additional Federal Government employees and 

achieve our established personnel goal of twenty-five. 

The following are representative accomplishments associated with the stand-up of 

my office: 

• I distributed a Request For Information (RFI) to industry on August 18, 2005, 

to develop an Electronic Directory Service (EDS) or the functional equivalent required by section 1016(b) of the IRTPA. Forty-eight responses were received 

from potential developers, and are now being analyzed. These inputs may provide the basis for a Request for Proposal (RFP). 

• The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) has been under contract to my office 

since July 2005 to perform a comprehensive review of the existing ISE. The resulting December 2005 report will serve as a key point of departure for implementing the ISE. 

• In October, I established three ISE steering groups: (1) Information Access, 

Search, and Exploitation; (2) ISE Governance and Collaboration; and (3) Security and Privacy. The ISC and I will look to these groups to be the primary focal 

points for integrating all work in their respective issue areas. The steering 

groups will leverage and track ongoing work to avoid duplication, integrate results, and report progress to myself and the ISC. In addition, they will identify 

any issues not being addressed, assign priorities, and propose options for resolving them. 

• My office is engaged in identifying a number of promising information sharing 

technology pilot programs, including two particularly promising projects—one 

with the New York Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Field Office on a Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) technology demonstration; the other a project 

with our Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories, to leverage both 

analytic and technical expertise to counter the potential for nuclear terrorism.

ROLE OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER 

The ISE will be a national information-sharing environment enabling frictionless 

terrorism information access. It is a combination of policies, procedures, and technologies linking the resources (people, systems, databases, and information) of Federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector to facilitate information 

sharing, access, and collaboration among users to combat terrorism more effectively. 

The IRTP A required the President to designate a program manager (PM) ‘‘responsible for information sharing across the Federal Government,’’ with government-wide authority. Section 1016(f) outlines the duties and responsibilities that 

were assigned to me as the Program Manager: 

• Plan for and oversee the implementation of, and manage, the Information 

Sharing Environment; 

• Assist in the development of policies, procedures, guidelines, rules and standards as appropriate to foster the development and proper operation of the Information Sharing Environment; and 

• Assist, monitor, and assess the implementation of the Information Sharing 

Environment by Federal departments and agencies to ensure adequate 

progress, technological consistency and policy compliance; and regularly report 

the findings to Congress. 

Since September 11, 2001, significant progress has been made to improve the Nation’s ability to access, integrate, and share terrorism-related information. Legislative changes and executive orders have reduced some of the barriers to sharing. 

New organizations such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and 

state and local intelligence fusion centers have bolstered our national effort to collect, analyze, and disseminate information. My office will build on these collective 

capabilities. The ISE that exists today must be more robust and interconnected to 

ensure our national security. Policies, rules, architectures and systems, which support specific individual missions, must be adjusted to enhance frictionless, rapid information access. One of the functions of my office will be to coordinate these individual efforts so that they are uniformly directed towards a single collective effort 

to share information throughout the mission space. 

The ISE of the future must transform, integrate and connect existing elements 

into a cohesive framework by providing common polices, guidelines, systems, and architecture. Leveraging existing initiatives will be critical to getting this task done 

in an expedited manner. The challenge herein is that terrorism information is not 

limited to intelligence. The counterterrorism mission will require the integration of 

information from homeland security, private sector, law enforcement, financial, and 
8

bio-surveillance, to name a few. Each of these classes of information possesses its 

own unique legal requirements, business rules, technical architectures, standards, 

and capabilities. Therefore, coordinating this effort will be a critical function of my 

office. 

Creating an ISE that effectively facilitates the flow of information across agency, 

jurisdictional, and domain boundaries must be enabled by technology. It is key to 

note that technology is not the solution but an enabler, and technologies currently 

exist to meet this challenge. Rewriting the business rules for this new ISE will require that we address all the impediments to sharing—policy, culture, and roles, 

missions and responsibilities. Critical to this effort is leadership. One of my roles 

is that of a catalyst in implementing the ISE, creating the conditions necessary to 

optimize information sharing. Ultimately Federal agencies and all of our non-federal 

partners will each have to share the responsibility and provide the necessary leadership to make the ISE we need. The success of this effort will be directly related to 

the commitment that each agency makes to change its culture from the need-to-protect to the need-to-share. 

STATE, LOCAL. TRIBAL GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 

We must better support the key new partners in our counterterrorism efforts: the 

state, local, and tribal governments, and private sector. I intend to fully support the 

efforts currently underway at the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Defense (DaD) to provide actionable 

information to their customers. 

The current federal system (processes, protocols and technology capabilities) that 

supports the sharing of terrorism-related information and intelligence between Federal, state, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector is not cohesive and 

has led to the development of an ad-hoc patchwork of informal and formal networks 

to facilitate the sharing of information among local partners. These ‘‘networks’’ include a variety of organizational structures and processes for gathering, analyzing, 

and sharing terrorism-related information and intelligence. Most states have begun 

to establish statewide intelligence fusion centers to serve as central hubs to facilitate statewide efforts to gather and analyze terrorism-related information, blend it 

together, and then produce and disseminate intelligence products used to support 

homeland security related prevention, response and recovery activities (operational 

and planning). 

I recognize that statewide and major urban area information fusion centers have 

the potential to be a critical part of the ISE. Thirty states have information ‘‘fusion’’ 

centers and 11 more are being developed. Identifying best practices with regard to 

establishing a fusion capacity within the state and local information-sharing environment will significantly contribute to the ISE implementation. I further support 

the efforts by the DHS, DOJ, and other relevant Federal entities to coordinate their 

domestic information and intelligence efforts with these fusion centers. 

Effectively engaging state, local, tribal, and private sector authorities in the ISE 

development process will require overcoming significant frustration by local entities 

over the perceived ‘‘lack of progress’’ in establishing a national terrorism information sharing system. I know that Members regularly hear from their local law enforcement entities, first responder groups, and the private sector on the continuing 

lack of coordination among federal entities. We must work together more seamlessly 

at the Federal level in order to better leverage the capabilities that the state, local, 

and tribal entities bring to the counterterrorism effort. 

Our ISE planning efforts will take into account that: • Counterterrorism-related prevention, response and recovery efforts carried 

out at the state, local, and tribal levels must be integrated into their ‘‘all-crimes, 

all-hazards’’ approach to homeland security; 

• In addition to supporting investigations, terrorism-related intelligence is used 

at the state, local, and tribal levels to support a broad array of activities, including: completion of jurisdictional risk assessments; allocation of fiscal resources; 

response and recovery planning efforts; and critical infrastructure protection; 

and 

• State, local, tribal, and private sector authorities need more unclassified information and intelligence, and the traditional Federal emphasis on producing 

and disseminating classified information impedes the effective use of that information to support multi-disciplinary prevention, response, and recovery efforts. 

Another important initiative that I will continue to expand is the use of information access pilot programs at the state and local levels. We currently have two pilot 

programs that involve the FBI and DOE. The FBI New York Office’s Special Operations Division currently utilizes handheld wireless devices for field operations. In 
9

addition to emails and alerts, the devices can be used to access various databases. 

The objective of the FBI pilot project is to facilitate enhanced communications 

among counterterrorism personnel and provide rapid wireless access to SBU data 

sources. The DOE is sponsoring a pilot project that will apply technical analytic expertise to intelligence pertaining to nuclear terrorism. The project has established 

a core group of nuclear expert analysts across five DOE national laboratories, focused on providing both long-term, strategic analysis of the supply-side of nuclear 

terrorism and better short-term tactical intelligence, with an additional objective of 

improving potential collection opportunities. Central to the success of this effort is 

the sharing of all relevant sensitive reporting with these national laboratories. Pilot 

programs provide valuable end-user input to the technical development of the ISE, 

and significant buy-in that will be crucial for cultural change in the informationsharing environment. 

ELECTRONIC DIRECTORY SERVICES 

I am required to provide an electronic directory service (EDS) or a functional 

equivalent that meets the requirements and objectives of the IRTP A, based on a 

community-wide, enterprise architecture, to focus on a broad range of threats. The 

EDS must accommodate increasing numbers of sources, and be implemented utilizing existing technologies and ongoing EDS and collaboration efforts. The EDS will 

provide a set of capabilities to inform ISE users of the resources available for collaboration, including professionals from across the IC, Federal, state and local governments, as well as private industry, academia and allied countries. Capabilities, 

such as people and organizational information, will be made available on a realtime 

basis to all ISE users, employing traditional search and drill-down functionality. 

The EDS implementation will be achieved through a three-phased approach. The 

first phase will start small by leveraging existing IC counterterrorism directory 

services such as Intelligence Community Full Service Directory (IC FSD) and the 

National Counterterrorism Center Online (NOL) directory. 

The second phase will include people/organization listings from Federal organizations such as use of capabilities of the Department of Justice—Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Regional Data Exchange (R–DEx), Law Enforcement Online (LEO), the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) and the Department 

of Homeland Security—Transportation Security Administration Operating Platform. 

The third phase will include state/local governments, private sector, academia and 

Allied countries. The use of capabilities such as the Department of Homeland Security Regional Information Exchange System (HSIN), state fusion centers and New 

York State Directory Service (NYSDS) would provide immediate initial capability. 

SUMMARY 

I believe there is no higher priority for our national security than the issue of information sharing. Congress has provided us the mandate through legislation; the 

President has provided us the leadership and further guidelines; now we must finalize the work of transforming our information-sharing environment into one that 

works more effectively for all. Thousands of men and women work tirelessly to protect this nation from terrorist threats. It is important for us to provide them and 

other decision makers with the best possible information to do their job to protect 

the people and interests of the United States against another terrorist attack. 

It is important to emphasize that my function in all of this is to serve as an enabler for better access and collaboration. Each department and agency with a 

counterterrorism mission will retain their current roles. Our collective task is to 

lead the effort to better clarify these roles, missions, and responsibilities, and implement an ISE that better supports their efforts. 

In closing, I would like to leave you with some key priorities in establishing the 

Information Sharing Environment: 

• It is absolutely essential that information flow in two directions. The ‘‘environment’’ we create needs to provide better access to Federal terrorism information at the state and local levels—however, and of equal importance, it must 

also provide mechanisms to allow valuable information gathered by state and 

local officials to be used by Federal agencies. 

• The Intelligence Community no longer serves as the single source for information, particularly where terrorism information is involved. Customers can and 

do get their information elsewhere. Consumers of terrorism information demand 

expertise; are substance oriented; and require each of us engaged in countering 

terrorism to operate in a ‘‘fast forward, value added mode.’’

• While it’s true that some in the Intelligence Community have historically regarded protection of intelligence sources and methods as more important than 

sharing the information, it’s an impediment that must be overcome. Protection 

and sharing of information are not mutually exclusive. We can and will share 
10

the information we collect and analyze, while protecting our most sensitive 

sources and methods. 

• I recognize that there are potentially serious issues affecting privacy, civil liberties and the equities of state and local governments that will need to be addressed before we achieve the two-way flow of information. Close collaboration 

between officials at all levels will be essential to develop the policies and processes we need. Although some terrorism information must always be classified, 

our goal has to be that we provide as much as possible at the unclassified level. 

• One of my responsibilities is to identify any impediments to effecti ve information sharing and to remove them. Consumers of terrorism information must 

receive all the information they need from us, quickly and free of unnecessary 

restrictions. 

My office, under the leadership of the DNI, is committed to creating an effective 

ISE that extends beyond the Intelligence Community. This task will include the development of nationwide policies that will enable individual Federal agencies and 

key partners to begin to adopt practices that reflect effective information sharing 

capabilities and procedures. Our state, local, and tribal governments and private 

sector entities must be full partners in this effort 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to provide this subcommittee an update on the activities of the Program Manager’s Office and look forward to your 

questions. Thank you.

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you, Mr. Russack, for your testimony. 

I would like to make note of your preliminary report on the creation of the information sharing environment. This was your first 

deliverable, I believe, and you list several issues in here. One is the 

issue of current authorities and policies, governing rules and responsibilities are in some cases ambiguous and conflicting. 

But the second one intrigues me the most: Organizations do not 

fully trust one another when sharing information. 

You served in the intelligence community, you have been part of 

what I call the secrecy system. I spent 10 years in the CIA and 

over 30 years in military intelligence. The idea of intelligence information sharing was culturally anathema. You might share information with your colleagues, you might run information up and 

down your stovepipe, but you certainly were very reluctant to share 

it across the community for several reasons. One, your source 

might be jeopardized; two, somebody else might take some credit 

for what you were doing. And so there is an issue of trust. 

There is an issue of whether or not a series of little intelligence 

bureaucracies can see clearly the national security advantages to 

sharing with others in a real-time and virtual environment. And 

this cultural change is very, very difficult to accomplish. 

How can you, as a single individual, somehow persuade this 

large collection of entities who up until recent years have pretty 

much operated on their own and without sharing, how can you 

break through this traditional culture and establish as a priority 

and a need and as a goal for everybody that we need to share this 

information? 

Mr. RUSSACK. Mr. Chairman, let me say, first of all, that you 

said me, as a single individual. Clearly, me, as a single individual, 

I am not going to be able to affect the cultural change you describe 

by myself. So I am going to need the help of the president, the Congress, the executive branch, the entire legislative branch and the 

heads of the various departments, agencies in our federal government. 

And let me take that even into a larger group. All of us that comprise our nation need to demand that people share. We need to 

incentivize sharing. We need to reward sharing as opposed to re-
11

ward protecting. It is obviously going to be iterative. We are not 

going to make fundamental changes in bureaucracy and culture 

overnight. We have to inculcate this, I think, in our training programs across the federal government and the nation, and I think 

only then will we be able to overcome concerns about trust. 

I would also say that leaks do not help. I mean, oftentimes, or 

many times, the federal government does share information, and 

there have been several instances of sharing and requesting that 

that information be kept confidential or be kept at a sensitive level, 

and we find that information above the fold or below the fold on 

the front page of newspapers and transmitted, broadcast across our 

country by satellite dishes and the broadcast media. 

So trust, I think, is key. I think you pointed that out very, very 

accurately. Culture has an awful lot to do with this, but we have 

to train people when we share information that is in fact sensitive 

to keep it sensitive. And, clearly, we have not done an adequate job 

in that area. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you for that answer. I have got the yellow 

light. Maybe we will get to a second round. 

The chairman recognizes the ranking member. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you. 

Mr. Russack, I appreciate your reaching out to the committee 

and your spirit of cooperation with us. I see us as your allies in 

your mission. And, pursuant to that, I am going to ask you a question I hope that you are able to answer, which is about the budget 

that you are working with. 

We are asking you to implement the information sharing environment, and I want to know the budget that you are working 

with, from where it is sourced, and what are your needs going to 

be on an ongoing basis? 

Mr. RUSSACK. The budget I am working with, let me go back to 

fiscal year 2005, and in fact let me go back to December of 2004 

when the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was 

signed. That bill says that $20 million is authorized over the next 

2 years to implement the information sharing environment, or 

words to that effect. 

In 2005, I actually received $9.6 million was appropriated for me 

to start standing up the office and to get going. In 2006, I do not 

have a budget line item. So I want to make sure I explain this correctly. 

I work for the president through the director of national intelligence. The director of national intelligence is working on a budget 

for me. I do not have a budget line item anywhere in an appropriations bill. Before I came to this committee, I actually did my homework today before I came to this hearing, and said I know that I 

don’t officially have any money. Obviously, I now have a staff. It 

is not as large as it is going to be. It is going to be a very small 

staff once it is stood up. But I need, to answer your question, I 

think, based on what I intend to do, about $30 million a year. 

And to answer your question about the budget right now and fiscal year 2006, the answer is, I am working with the director of national intelligence and his staff to actually come up internal to his 

budget with a line item. Again, I am looking for about $30 million 
12

to do my job. I think I am going to need $30 million a year to do 

a job, as a minimum. 

Will I get that much money? I truly don’t know. I have a feeing I am going to get at least $20 million to do my job. I don’t know 

what the exact number will be, but between the appropriation and 

some reprogramming done within the DNI’s authority to do reprogramming, and in fact if we add supplementals, I will be shooting to get $30 million. I would like to have a line item that had 

the $30 million figure in it. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, I will just say that if you could actually accomplish the information sharing environment mission, that would 

be well worth the investment. It seems to me, the country would 

be considerably safer. 

I will just ask you one quick question before I am out of time. 

Bill Dawson, the Deputy Intelligence Community Chief Information 

Officer, was quoted at an information sharing symposium last summer, not this summer but the summer before this, that the DCI 

had established a mandatory write to release policy and that there 

was going to be an enforcement mechanism that program funding 

would be taking away from those who didn’t comply. 

Are you or the DNI proposing a write to release policy that will 

be applicable to the entire intelligence community, and will you 

have that kind of enforcement that was discussed last year? 

RUSSACK; Let me, first of all, address the write to release policy. There is already in effect a write to release policy. I think, 

DCID 8/1, and the DCID is a DCI directive. Those in fact have 

been renamed something else now that we have a DNI. I do not 

know what the new name is. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Neither do I. 

Mr. RUSSACK. But that directive that Bill Dawson talked about 

last year does in fact talk about write for release, and it does mandate that people producing intelligence write to release. So that 

policy is in effect. And I think people are writing for release. 

But I think one of the things that we need to do within the intelligence community is remind people, educate people. Their customers are in fact not just in the intelligence community. The customer base for intelligence includes people in the state, local, tribal 

and the private sectors, and many of those people don’t have security clearances. So, as I said in my opening statement, we need to 

do more business at the unclassified level. 

We need to do a better job with tear lines. Tear lines we issue 

at the unclassified level do need to contain context and perspective. 

They need to contain enough information for people to make decisions to take action and to base action on to protect our country. 

Your question regarding are we in fact enforcing that or penalizing in some way people who don’t write for release, I would like 

to take that as a question for the record, and I will get back to you. 

Ms. LOFGREN. All right. That is fair enough. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Russack, good afternoon. As you know, the president recently 

signed an executive order creating the Information Security Coun-
13

cil. It appears that there are no representatives of any state or 

local governments on this Council. Doesn’t this effectively freeze 

out states from having any say in what they need from DHS from 

an intelligence standpoint? 

And how can the Council effectively serve the needs of first responders and local homeland security authorities when the states 

and local authorities are not even invited to participate? 

And you have acknowledged that we are not doing as good a job 

between federal down to state and local officials, so I would like 

you to answer those questions. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Sir, the Information Sharing Council was established about 2 weeks ago, and I am sure that is what you are referring to. 

Mr. DENT. Yes. 

Mr. RUSSACK. I chair the Information Sharing Council, and I can 

assure you that we will include—there is nothing in that executive 

order that precludes the DNI, the director of national intelligence, 

from reaching out and including state, local, tribal and the private 

sector in that Council. It is my intention to do exactly that. 

I mean, I agree with the thrust of your question. We cannot create an information sharing environment without taking into account the needs of state, local, tribal and private sector people. 

My intention is, as the Information Sharing Council—by the way, 

the first meeting will be a week from this coming Friday—and we 

will, based on what the discussion items and the issues we are attacking and teeing up for resolution are, reach out and have representatives from state, local, tribal and the private sector help us 

frame those issues for resolution and help is frame options to solve 

problems. 

Mr. DENT. Well, I am glad to hear you said that. I know it wasn’t 

in the executive order, but I am glad to hear that you are going 

to include them. But you also acknowledged during your opening 

comments that many state and local authorities have complained 

about intelligence or information sharing. I have heard that quite 

loudly from some of the folks in my home state, and the complaint 

I often hear is that the products that are disseminated by DHS are 

either irrelevant or untimely or both. 

What suggestions do you have to make DHS better able to suit 

the needs of these local authorities? Because, as you know, they are 

the ones who are going to be tasked with responding to assessments that DHS is supposed to be providing. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Let me say, first of all, that my deputy—I am 

going to have two deputies. One of my deputies is here today, Sue 

Reingold, the lady on my far right. Sue Reingold is from the Department of Homeland Security. She will be a detailee to the Program Manager’s staff. Sue comes from the state and local government portion of the Department of Homeland Security. Sue is going 

to help me in our task of providing state, local, tribal and the private sector with the information we need. 

DHS recently selected Charles Eugene Allen, Charlie Allen, to be 

the assistant secretary for information analysis. I was Charlie’s 

deputy for 2.5 years of my life. He trained me, to some degree. I 

hope I trained him to some degree also. 
14

But I can assure you that the relationship between my office and 

the Department of Homeland Security—and we can’t leave out the 

Department of Justice or the FBI when we talk about state, local, 

tribal and the private sector. We are going to be a team, and we 

are in fact going to do a better job. 

I think all the people who head those agencies—and I mentioned 

Charlie Allen. I can assure you that he and I had lunch a week ago 

and we talked about ways in which we would in fact positively affect the way we share information with the customers you describe, 

and we are going to do it, sir. 

Mr. DENT. Well, I am glad to hear you mention Charlie Allen. 

That was one of my questions, so I am glad to see that that is moving forward well. 

But, finally, I just want to suggest one thing. When you do sit 

down with state and locals, I have some people I think who could 

you give some guidance as to what types of assistance that you 

could provide to them, how you can be more helpful to them. And 

I have some very good contacts. I represent a large state, Pennsylvania, and I think it would be useful to talk to those people about 

how you go about what you are doing here. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Thank you, sir. I look forward to discussing this 

at greater length with you and getting those names, and I look forward to meeting with those people and finding out what their 

needs and working as a team to solving them. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Thank you. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The chair recognizes the distinguished lady from 

New York who has been a great leader in homeland security, Ms. 

Lowey. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, and I want to thank the chairman and 

the ranking member for calling this hearing, because it is so important. 

And as my colleagues have mentioned several times, I hear about 

this all the time. And we do hear that it is getting better, but it 

is just not good enough. So I thank you very much for your testimony. 

As you said, it is clear that long-held attitudes and procedures 

pose a great challenge, which is probably the most understated 

statement we have made today. And I agree wholeheartedly with 

the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission with respect to providing incentives for information sharing between government 

agencies and state and local authorities. 

It seems to me it is simply not enough to say, ‘‘We support or 

encourage information sharing, this is tough, it is hard to do, every 

department has its own procedures in place and they don’t want 

to share.’’ It seems, based upon all the information we have received, there needs to be a comprehensive system of carrots and 

sticks to ensure that it happens. 

Now, according to testimony that we will hear later on in this 

hearing, the former 9/11 commissioners have indicated that there 

has been minimal progress toward implementation of this recommendation. So if you could follow up your previous comments 

and describe your progress toward instituting concrete incentives to 

encourage information sharing, I would be most appreciative. 
15

I guess what most of us are pretty concerned about is 9/11 is in 

the past, we have been hearing about information sharing a long 

time, we have been hearing about the barriers between various officials that don’t want to share information. What are you really 

doing about it and could you describe the progress toward that 

end? 

Mr. RUSSACK. Certainly. Let me, first of all, say that when you 

ask about concrete incentives, I am going to walk backwards a little bit and say that—

Mrs. LOWEY. I would rather say, you were appointed by the 

president. He says, ‘‘Do it,’’ and that should be enough for any 

member of the administration, ‘‘Just do it.’’ But since that doesn’t 

seem to happen, that is why I am talking about concrete incentives. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Mr. Dent mentioned a moment ago the Information Sharing Council. I think the establishment of this Council goes 

a long way to actually helping us, we the nation, achieve concrete 

examples of what we are going to do to solve the information sharing problem. 

Most of the problems, as I stated before, are not technical problems. They are roles, missions, responsibilities, authorities, problems, policies that we need to change or modify to enable the information sharing. 

In June, when I testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 

I had myself and one other person on my staff. Right now, I have 

a dozen, and we should be up to about 25 by the end of this month. 

The Information Sharing Council did not exist until a week ago. 

That is up. The first meeting will be a week from Friday. 

I can’t really talk in real terms, concrete terms about what my 

staff has done beyond a few things. The staff has stood up the Information Sharing Council, required by law stood up. Working pilots. I am working two pilot programs right now. I would like to 

be working 10 or a dozen. 

I have a pilot program with the FBI field office in New York City 

on information sharing where we are taking intelligence community information via the National Counterterrorism Center and getting sensitive but unclassified information to FBI special agents in 

the field. That has proven to be very, very useful and very, very 

valuable to them. 

I have a plan to export that, not only to the FBI field office in 

New York City but also to the FBI field office in Washington, D.C. 

I would like to also get New York City police involved in this pilot 

program, as well as the Metropolitan Washington, D.C. police involved in that program. 

That is one example of a pilot program, something tangible that 

we are doing. When you do a pilot like that, first of all, it is very 

cheap, relatively speaking; it does cost money. That is one of the 

things I would like to put more money into and expand that to 

some major cities across the country and major police departments. 

But when you do a pilot like that, immediately or very quickly 

after you establish the pilot, you actually are seeing information 

being shared at a much better level, a much higher level. We are 

sharing information with them, we are sharing pictures on 

handheld devices in the field that aids in identification of individuals coming into our country. 
16

Another pilot that we are working is with the Department of Energy and the DOE National Laboratories. It is a pilot that is focused on nuclear terrorism. It is focused on security of fissile material, and it is focused on getting the advantage of the DOE National Laboratories over many people is they have probably the national treasure trove in nuclear expertise. They are the people that 

build the U.S. government’s weapons, they maintain the nuclear 

stockpile. 

So what we are doing is leveraging the DOE National Laboratories and providing them information sharing, information access, 

providing them with more information with which to help us assess 

the terrorist threat and to do validation of reporting and in fact to 

try and get them to help targeting of collection. 

So that is two concrete examples of just pilots. And what I would 

like to do is run 10 or 12 pilots by the end—I can’t say the end 

of the year, we are getting there pretty quickly, but over the next 

360 days. If I come back and talk to you a year from now, I would 

like to tell you about 10 information sharing pilots that we are 

working, that in fact are giving, providing better information, better quality information to first responders, to state, local, tribal and 

the private sector. 

And at the same time we are giving them information, we are 

fleshing out policy issues. For example, in the New York City pilot 

with the FBI, we are actually seeing directives and policy issues 

that need to be changed to enable a better flow of information. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, the red light is blinking away. Let me thank 

you, and I look forward to hearing progress, especially with the 

New York City pilot, because, as you probably know, after 9/11, the 

New York City Police Department ended up developing its own 

counterterrorist intelligence unit. They have people all over the 

world, because of the lack of appropriate information sharing and 

accurate information sharing. 

So if there is progress, I am really pleased, and I look forward, 

Mr. Chairman, in getting continuing updates. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. SIMMONS. And just for the information of the subcommittee, 

we have done a classified briefing on the New York transit issue, 

and the Chief Information Office, the Department of Homeland Security attended that, as did other officials. And so we have been 

doing quite a bit of work in focusing on information sharing relative to that incident. And I believe there will be additional visits 

to New York City in the future to work that dimension of the problem. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Chairman, if I may just thank you, because I 

attended one of the meetings and because of a conflict I couldn’t 

attend the second one. But I thought the Department of Homeland 

Security’s response was totally inappropriate and out of order, and 

I do believe that was the view of almost every member of this committee who attended that meeting. 

If they had a beef with New York City—and I will tell you, if I 

had to depend on—I won’t contrast it. Let me just say I have tremendous confidence in Commissioner Ray Kelly, and I think if the 

Department of Homeland Security thinks they know more and 

knows different, it shouldn’t have been aired on the front pages of 
17

the paper. But we will leave it at that, and thank you for following 

up. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Absolutely. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. 

Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Russack, I want to thank you for being here. I appreciate 

your testimony. I have a couple questions, a follow-on to a question 

that Mr. Dent had first raised in relation to this, anyway. 

It is my understanding that the president has assigned you the 

responsibility for completing guidelines describing how the intelligence community should convert classified intelligence information to a sharable format for use by state, local and tribal law enforcement officers, an obligation imposed in the Intelligence Reform 

Act. Those guidelines were due on September 13, 2005 but apparently were delayed because of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

So my question is, have the guidelines been completed, and if 

not, why not? And when can we expect them? And if you would like 

to comment further, you did, I guess, answer the question of to 

what extent the Department of Homeland Security’s Chief Intelligence Officer, Charlie Allen, has been involved in this process. 

You could expand upon that, if you would, and, again, state his role 

in the development of those guidelines. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Let me, first of all, address the second part, Charlie Allen’s involvement in the guidelines. Charlie hasn’t been at the 

Department of Homeland Security, as you know, sir, very long, I 

think probably about 3 or 4 weeks at this point. 

The Department of Homeland Security, the process for establishing the guidelines, writing the guidelines was that there is an 

Information Sharing PCC. PCC is a Policy Coordinating Committee. It is chaired by a representative, a senior director, from the 

Homeland Security Department as well as by a senior director from 

the National Security Council. 

The Information Sharing PCC, along with the members of the 

PCC—I am a member of the PCC, the DNI’s CIO, chief information 

officer, is a member, most of the federal departments and agencies 

are members of that PCC. We as a group drafted guidelines, and 

we drafted guidelines for White House staffing. The Department of 

Homeland Security was very much involved in the drafting of those 

guidelines, as were all departments and agencies. 

To answer your question on, basically, where are they, the guidelines were drafted and I think—again, I am not an expert on where 

they stand at the present time, but I know we asked for an extension, we the federal government—I am speaking for the big ‘‘we’’ 

here—the administration asked for an extension and actually 

talked to various committees on the Hill because of the hurricanes 

that you mentioned. And the guidelines are in final staffing. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. When can the committee expect them? 

Mr. RUSSACK. Can I take that for the record, sir, because I am 

not sure I am in a position to really answer that. I will have to get 

back to the people who are actually staffing those and get you an 

answer. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That would be fine. The committee, I know, 

would appreciate it and look forward to hearing from you on that. 
18

Mr. RUSSACK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, the other question I have is, could you describe, basically, your key successes thus far in helping to implement the information sharing environment? And to what extent 

does success depend on cooperation from various agencies that comprise the intelligence community? In fact, further, are there any 

members of the intelligence community that are not effectively cooperating with you? 

Mr. RUSSACK. Let me go in reverse again, if I can. I think all 

members of the intelligence community are in fact cooperating, and 

I can assure you that the director of national intelligence is insisting that they cooperate. And when people don’t cooperate with me, 

I tell my boss. My immediate boss of the DNI, and he is more than 

happy to pick up the phone or to talk to someone about any lack 

of coordination. So there is cooperation. 

And I can assure you that the DNI wants to share. And I can 

assure you, as I said earlier today, that we can and will protect 

sensitive sources and methods, ad we will share the information 

people need to base decisions on to protect America. 

So there is a desire to share, there is in fact the leadership mandating sharing. 

Key successes, I think the two pilots I mentioned to the gentle 

congresswoman from New York are pilots that are going and they 

will be, I think, very successful. I would like to have, as I said earlier, about 10 or 12 of these pilots operating over the next year. 

The fact that we have an Information Sharing Council that, as 

Congressman Dent mentioned and asked good questions about how 

we were in fact going to take into account the needs of state, local, 

tribal and the private sector, the fact that this Council, we have 

the names of the representatives across our federal government. 

We are going to reach out through global justice, through the National Association of Governors and through other mechanisms. We 

are going to reach out to people in the state, local and the private 

sector. We are going to in fact find out what is not working the way 

it should work, what information is not being shared, what information do they need, what are their requirements, and we are 

going to in fact develop options that will allow information to be 

shared, allow people to have access to information that they need. 

So my staff and my achievements thus far, I mean, I would like 

to be further ahead of where I am at the present time. As I said 

earlier, back in June, I had a staff of two. Now, I have a dozen. 

I have a dozen really good people. I have been offered as many as 

50 or 100 people. I have talked to a lot of people. I have not taken 

anyone on my staff that I have not personally hand selected with 

the skill sets, the passion, the motivation to get the job done. 

So concrete examples of where I am, we have an Information 

Sharing Council—first meeting will be a week from Friday—we 

have some pilots in operation. I am working hard on the 

deliverables I owe to the Congress. The president and I, in conjunction with this Information Sharing Council, are to make a report 

to you, Members of Congress, by the 17th of June on more specificity on what this new information sharing environment is going 

to be, how will it work? That is what we are working on. 
19

Right now, we have three working groups, actually steering 

groups, in place. Those steering groups are actually getting their 

arms wrapped around existing federal, state, local, tribal, private 

sector programs that exist, that mandate and foster information 

sharing. 

The steering groups are in fact trying to get their arms around 

all the working groups that various departments have that are ongoing. For example, inside the DNI’s world, there is an entity 

called, ‘‘The Information Sharing Working Group.’’ And then there 

is the Information Sharing Working Group–L, which deals with foreign liaison. We are taking into account all the things that are 

going on and getting our arms wrapped around that. 

I have a contract with an FFRDC to help me baseline the existing information sharing environment. And one exists now. As I said 

earlier, it is flawed. 

Mr. SIMMONS. For the record, FFRDC, for the record? 

Mr. RUSSACK. Federally funded research and development activity. Those are think tanks that are not for profit, sir. I took data 

that was given to me by the Office of Management and Budget and 

turned that over to this FFRDC, and I said, ‘‘Help me baseline the 

existing environment. Help me get my arms wrapped around what 

existing federal programs various departments have.’’

So what they have done is they have come back to me with a preliminary report, I got it last week, and the four major federal agencies that play in information sharing, the first one being the entire 

intelligence community, they have given me a preliminary report 

on what the IC is doing in information sharing, what systems are 

being used. 

The next one is the Department of Homeland Security, what they 

are doing in information, what systems are being used; the Department of Defense, same for them; and also Justice, Department of 

Justice, and the FBI. 

So that is probably all I can really say in response to your question on something concrete that we have done thus far. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, I see my time is expired, but you have 

painted obviously a picture of a very aggressive and comprehensive 

agenda. Perhaps a bit rosy picture you have presented, but I certainly wish you well, and the committee will be looking forward to 

hearing more from you on the progress that you are making. Thank 

you. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentleman. 

I see that our second panel has arrived, but before I introduce 

them, I would like to make one comment. You mentioned open 

sources of intelligence as an important adjunct to the classified 

side, and, clearly, open sources of intelligence obviate the problems 

of information sharing. And I think that that is an important capability that we need to think about in the future. 

I also note that issue one in your report regarding current authorities concludes that it is not clear at this point whether statutory changes will be required to clarify these governance issues. I 

would urge you and your staff to notify us of statutory changes are 

necessary, and this subcommittee would be more than happy to 

consider those and move those forward on an urgent basis, because 
20

we feel that information sharing is critically important to our national security. 

I also note that there are several major reports and guidelines 

that are coming due in the coming months, and we encourage you 

to work hard to meet those deadlines, again, because of the importance of these issues. 

On the issue of money, the $20 million or $30 million, the ranking member and I will take that issue under advisement and we 

will do our best effort here to address that issue in the coming 

weeks and months in a bipartisan fashion. 

That being said, on behalf of the subcommittee, I want to thank 

you for your testimony, but, more important, I want to thank you 

for taking on a job that is not easy, that involves breaking a little 

glass, that involves moving our intelligence capabilities in a direction that previously was very difficult to move, and we hope that 

you will consider this subcommittee to be a co-partner in the enterprise. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SIMMONS. And thank you very much. 

Mr. RUSSACK. Thank you. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The chair now calls the second panel to the table. 

The Honorable Lee Hamilton, vice chairman of the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, and Mr. William Crowell from the Markle Foundation’s Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. 

The Honorable Lee Hamilton is the director of the Center on 

Congress at Indiana University and also serves as president and 

director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 

here in Washington, D.C. 

He served from 1965 to 1999 as the U.S. Representative from Indiana. During his tenure, he served as chairman and ranking member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and was also chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 

He served as vice chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, or the 9/11 Commission, 

and is now vice chairman of the 9/11 Public Discourse Project. 

Welcome, Mr. Hamilton. 

And now I would like to yield to the ranking member for the introduction of Mr. Crowell. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is nice to split up 

the introductions. 

Bill Crowell, until recently a constituent of mine, is an independent consultant, also director and chairman of the Board of 

BroadWare Technology, director of ArcSight and director of NARS. 

He was appointed in 2003 to the Unisys Corporate Security Advisory Board to address emerging security issues and best practices. 

And in September 2003, he joined the Advisory Board of 

ChoicePoint, a data aggregation company. 

Bill Crowell served as president and chief executive officer of 

Cylink, a leading e-business security solution company until it was 

acquired in February 2003 by SafeNet. 

Prior to all of this, and when I first met him, Mr. Crowell served 

for nearly 4 years as deputy director of the National Security Agency where he had held a series of senior positions, including deputy 

director of operations. He also, in 1999, was appointed to the Presi-
21

dent’s Export Council and chaired the PEC Subcommittee on 

Encryption where he did good work. And in March of 2001, the secretary of defense appointed him to the Federal Advisory Committee 

that conducted a comprehensive review of the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System. 

As you have noted, Mr. Chairman, he served on the Markle 

Foundation Task Force since 9/11, and I would say, really, Bill in 

his entire professional career as well as a volunteer has spent his 

life trying to make sure our country was safe, for which we thank 

him and also welcome his testimony today. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes the Honorable Lee Hamilton. Welcome. 

Thank you for being here. Good to see you again. We look forward 

to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE LEE HAMILTON, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, 9/11 PUBLIC DISCOURSE PROJECT 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here, 

Chairman Simmons and Ranking Member Lofgren and the distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

The first point I want to make, simply, is an expression of thanks 

to you for your efforts on oversight of the intelligence sharing, information sharing problem. I think it is enormously important that 

that be done and that you keep close track of it, and I am pleased 

that you are doing that. 

And I think the view of all the commissioners no single step is 

more important than information sharing in our efforts to strengthen the intelligence community and thereby ensure the safety and 

security of the American people. 

In our view, it was poor information sharing that was the single 

greatest failure of our government in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks. And it was a contributing factor to the government’s 

missteps in understanding and responding to the threat of alQa’ida. 

If you looked at the missed opportunities, and we laid them out 

in our report, they are a good many of them, almost all of them 

involved in some way or the other the failure to share information. 

The second point I want to make is with regard to the 9/11 Commission recommendations. We really made two in this area. One is 

that information procedures have to provide incentives for sharing 

to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge. 

That is not easy to do, we recognize that, but it is essential. And, 

secondly, the second recommendation was that the president has to 

lead the government-wide effort to bring major national security institutions into the information revolution. He only is the person 

that can coordinate and do it. 

You have now, of course, enacted into law the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, and I will give you a quick 

view of how we look at the progress under that act thus far. 

Despite the enactment of the statute, despite the creation of the 

Program Manager Office, it is our view that we have really made 

minimal progress toward establishing a seamless information sharing system. You can change the law, you can change the tech-
22

nology, you still have to change the culture, and you need to motivate institutions and individuals to share information. 

We commend Mr. Russack and his small team. We think they 

are demonstrating a very strong commitment to the whole concept 

of information sharing. Congress has authorized but not yet, as I 

understand it, appropriated funding for the Program Manager’s Office, and he and the Information Sharing Program need a lot of 

support. 

It is our view that agencies still want to control the information 

they produce. They view it as their property, rather than the property of the entire government and the property of the American 

people. And for information sharing to work, of course, the right 

people have to get the right information at the right time. 

We are particularly concerned about the poor information sharing with state and local authorities. We are troubled by a number 

of stories. We have heard about that. I will not go into that in detail unless you want to on the questions. 

Let me just conclude my remarks by saying that we think there 

are several important steps that need to be taken. One, to press 

the Congress to ensure that the Program Manager gets the funding 

and the resources and the personnel he needs to carry out his very 

important mission. If that is not done, you will not get good flow 

of information. 

Second, the Program Manager will need very strong support from 

the president and direct engagement of the senior leadership of the 

Homeland Security Council. 

Third, to press the executive branch to produce the information 

sharing reports that are already required by law. I was listening 

to the testimony a moment ago and it is encouraging, but what 

struck me about is just the few minutes I was sitting here is that 

it is very future-oriented. 

The important thing is what are the capabilities now? What can 

they do right now? The terrorists are not going to wait. We have 

to have these capabilities in place now. And when I hear this testimony, not just from the Program Manager but others, I just don’t 

have a sense that they have a sense of urgency about this problem. 

It is kind of a business as usual approach. 

So these reports are required by law. The September guidelines 

from the president to the executive agencies are late already. The 

December report is a crucial report, and I urge the committee, the 

subcommittee here, to make completion of the report and its implementation a very high priority. 

Fourth, I believe this committee should revisit the question as to 

whom the Program Manager reports to. He reports now to the DNI, 

but his responsibilities with regard to information sharing inside 

the intelligence community go beyond that, include information 

sharing for other federal agencies for state and local, tribal authorities in the private sector, and I think you ought to consider very 

carefully whether or not he would be more effective if he were 

placed in the executive office of the president with direct line authority from the president. 

So to conclude, we need to change from a system in which the 

originating agency of classified information is the sole arbiter of 

which other agencies are allowed to see the information. That is 
23

the deeply routed culture in the intelligence community, and that 

is far too restrictive for the kind of information flow you need in 

a good counterterrorism strategy. The right information must be 

made available instantly at all levels of government and to the private sector, and that requires a change in the culture. 

The actions of those who would do us harm are not under our 

control, but our system of information sharing is under our control. 

It demands urgent attention. We can fix it. There certainly will be 

no excuse if we fail to do it. 

Thank you very much for the attention you are paying to this 

critical problem. All of us on the Commission, former commissioners, are grateful to you, and we look forward to your continued 

oversight of this very important matter. 

[The statement of Mr. Hamilton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment: It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the important issue of 

government-wide counterterrorism information sharing and the role of the Program 

Manager. 

At the outset, I want to commend you for holding this hearing. Information sharing across our government benefits directly from the focus you bring to it. Those 

who are charged with improving information sharing need your oversight and support. 

The guidance you provide will help break down barriers to information sharing 

among the authorities in our federal, state, and local levels of government. 

It is my firm belief that no single step is more important than information sharing as a way to strengthen our intelligence and thus ensure the safety and security 

of the American people.

I. What the 9/11 Commission Found 

Poor information sharing was the single greatest failure of our government in the 

lead-up to the 9/11 attacks. The failure to share information adequately, within and 

across federal agencies, and from federal agencies to state and local authorities, was 

a significant contributing factor to our government’s missteps in understanding and 

responding to the growing threat of al-Qa’ida in the years before the 9/11 attacks. 

There were several missed opportunities to disrupt the 9/11 plot. Most of them involved the failure to share information. 

The 9/11 Commission found that the biggest impediment to all-source analysis—

to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots—is the human or systemic resistance 

to sharing information. We believe the ‘‘need-to-share’’ principle must be accorded 

much greater weight in the balance with the longstanding ‘‘need-to-know’’ principle 

of information protection. 

Given the changes necessary across the government, it is clear to us that no single agency can bring about these changes alone. Only presidential leadership, with 

robust congressional oversight, can bring about the necessary changes in information sharing.

II. Recommendations to Improve Information Sharing 

The 9/11 Commission made two recommendations to improve information sharing: 

First, ‘‘Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a 

better balance between security and shared knowledge.’’ (The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 417) 

Second, ‘‘The president should lead the government-wide effort to bring the major 

national security institutions into the information revolution. He should coordinate 

the resolution of the legal, policy, and technical issues across agencies to create a 

‘‘trusted information network.’’ (The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 418)

III. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

Last December, President Bush signed into law the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The Act drew upon the 9/11 Commission’s 

recommendations and created a program manager for information sharing. Specifically, Section 1016 directs the program manager to ‘‘facilitate information sharing 
24

between Federal departments and agencies and State, tribal, and local governments 

. . . and the private sector.’’ 

In April the President selected Mr. John Russack for that important post. An executive order placed Mr. Russack’s office under the new office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

The Act also called for the establishment of an Information Sharing Council (ISC). 

On October 25, President Bush issued an executive order creating the ISC, which 

will bring together the heads of at least 12 federal agencies to provide advice on 

how to share information about potential terrorist activity. The President has asked 

these top officials to assist the program manager to ensure that counterterrorism 

information is broadly shared across the federal government and among state and 

local authorities, and the private sector.

IV. Information Sharing Still Far from Optimal 

Despite the enactment of the statute, and the creation of the office of Program 

Manager, we have made minimal progress toward the establishment of a seamless 

information sharing system. You can change the law, you can change the technology, but you still need to change the culture; you still need to motivate institutions and individuals to share information. 

We commend Mr. Russack and his small team: they are demonstrating a strong 

commitment to enhancing information sharing. Congress has authorized, but not yet 

appropriated, funding for the Program Manager’s office. The Information Sharing 

Program Manager needs strong congressional oversight and support so that it can 

accomplish its important mission. 

We note that the National Counterterrorism Center has implemented a system in 

which analysts have access to streams of information from 26 different systems. 

Representatives of those agencies involved in counterterrorism have access to this 

pool of information within the NCTC. This is a positive development at the federal 

level but this is too narrow. 

Agencies still control the information they produce. They view it as their property, 

rather than the property of the entire government, and the property of the American people. For information sharing to work, the right information must get to the 

right person at the right time. Moreover information sharing with state and local 

authorities has only marginally improved.

V. Poor Information Sharing with State and Local Authorities 

Frankly, my fellow Commissioners and I are troubled by stories we have heard 

from federal, state, and local officials with knowledge of the state of information 

sharing. They tell us they do not get the information they need from the federal 

government. Communication and collaboration between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and state homeland security officials nationwide is not what 

it should be. Communication between the FBI and local law enforcement also falls 

short. 

Historically, federal law enforcement agencies have been unwilling to share information with their state and local counterparts. Distrust continues to exist between 

federal and local partners. State and local officials, for their part, traditionally have 

kept information to themselves, and have been frustrated by the lack of a system 

into which to feed their information. Federal authorities need to build confidence 

with state and local officials by developing systems on which they are trained, a 

broad concept of operations they understand, and a standard reporting procedure 

that they know how to use. 

Federal agencies cannot expect state and local officials to cooperate with them if 

they do not provide reliable and consistent leadership. The recent controversy over 

the credibility of a threat to New York City’s subway system is a case in point. On 

October 6, the New York Police Department reacted to information from the FBI 

which suggested the system was at risk of being attacked in the next few days. 

DHS, however, took a different position, and evaluated the information as less than 

credible. 

I believe the NYPD acted responsibly, based on the information it was given. But 

clearly in a dynamic situation such as this, there needs to be far better coordination 

between federal and local authorities. Action cannot wait until final analysis of intelligence is made. But the federal government needs to do a better job in sending 

a consistent message to local officials as a situation develops, both in how the threat 

is evaluated and acted upon. 

Relationships with state and local authorities need to be strengthened. State and 

local authorities need to know that the information they provide to DHS will be 

properly integrated and not ignored. They need to know that DHS will provide the 

necessary information to them in return. 
25

We hear reports that the FBI does not recognize clearances granted by DHS to 

state and local authorities. A police chief could not visit his own officers detailed 

to an FBI Joint Terrorist Task Force, because his clearances did not come through 

the FBI. 

State and local officials have been unable to get secure telephones for conversations with federal officials about sensitive information. Therefore, necessary conversations take place late if they take place at all. 

Understandably, state and local officials resent being cut out of the information 

loop. 

The information sharing provisions of Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act, which are intended to implement common standards and bring feuding federal, state, and local agencies together, are still a long, long way from being implemented. Given the urgency of the threat, this is unacceptable. We must do better. 

And we must do it sooner rather than later.

VI. Scorecard on Information Sharing 

On October 20, the former 9/11 Commissioners issued a scorecard evaluating 

progress the government has made in implementing the Commission’s recommendations concerning institutional reform in the aftermath of 9/11. Here’s what we said 

with respect to our two recommendations on information sharing:

INCENTIVES FOR INFORMATION SHARING 

‘‘Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better 

balance between security and shared knowledge.’’ (p. 417)

Grade: MINIMAL PROGRESS 

What has happened: According to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (PL 108–458), the President shall require the heads of federal 

departments and agencies to promote a culture of information sharing by both reducing disincentives and providing affirmative incentives for sharing information. 

The DNI also has responsibility for establishing policies and procedures to ensure 

the maximum availability of, and access to, intelligence information within the intelligence community. A program manager has been designated by the President as 

responsible for information sharing across the federal government. This office is still 

a start-up. So far, if there have been changes in incentives, in favor of information 

sharing, they have been negligible. 

Why this is still important: The 9/11 story included numerous examples of how 

a mentality of limiting information sharing to those with a ‘‘need to know’’ in fact 

kept information from getting to the right people at the right time. Cultures will 

not change without policies in place that actively encourage such change, and without the sustained implementation of those policies. 

What needs to be done: The President and the DNI need to make change in 

the culture of information sharing a priority through clear and visible support. They 

need to develop positive incentives for information sharing to balance the many disincentives on the books. Personnel should be evaluated on how well they share information rather than how well they hoard it. Agency leaders should be evaluated 

on how well they create an environment that promotes sharing. Information sharing 

must be improved not only across the federal government but with state and local 

authorities. 

PRESIDENT SHOULD LEAD NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS 

INTO THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION 

‘‘The president should lead the government-wide effort to bring the major national 

security institutions into the information revolution. He should coordinate the resolution of the legal, policy, and technical issues across agencies to create a ‘trusted information network.’ ’’ (p. 418)

Grade: MINIMAL PROGRESS 

What has happened: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004 (PL 108–458) required that the President create an information sharing environment to provide and facilitate the means for sharing information through the use 

of policy guidelines and technologies. Within the intelligence community, the DNI 

has all necessary support and authorities from the President to ensure maximum 

availability of and access to intelligence information. Outside the intelligence community, a program manager has been designated by the President as responsible 

for information sharing across the federal government, yet there are few signs of 

the actual implementation of a ‘‘trusted information network.’’ The program manager does not yet have the personnel and resources necessary to assert authority 

across the federal government. 
26

Why this is still important: Only with White House leadership can legal and 

policy obstacles be overcome to bring our national security institutions into the information revolution. 

What needs to be done: The President needs to make information sharing a priority. Designating officials to be in charge is not enough; they need resources and 

active presidential backing to change the information systems that enable information sharing, the policies and procedures that compel sharing, and the systems of 

performance evaluation so that personnel are appraised on how they carry out information sharing. 

We noted that the Director of National Intelligence needs to be a driving force 

to improve information sharing but that he must be given strong support by the 

President. Ten months have passed under the new law. Progress is minimal. To his 

credit, the DNI is seized with the issue of information sharing, but the horses are 

barely out of the gate. He must press the issue and press it very hard. We said that 

the DNI will be judged in part on information sharing. His customers are not just 

in the federal government; they are state and local officials as well.

VII. Next Steps 

Mr. Russack, who has one of the most difficult jobs in government, will need 

strong support as he seeks to resolve the legal, policy, and technical problems that 

impede information sharing. 

I urge the Homeland Security Committee to do the following: 

First, to press the Congress to insure that the Program Manager gets the funding, 

resources and personnel he needs to carry out his mission. 

Second, the Program Manager will need strong support from the President and the 

direct engagement of senior leadership of the Homeland Security Council. 

Third to press the Executive branch to produce the information sharing reports required by law. The September guidelines from the President to the Executive agencies are late. The December report is a crucial report—spelling out an Information 

Sharing Environment for the entire government. This report is the implementation 

plan for information sharing. I urge this Committee to make the completion of this 

report—and its implementation—a high priority. 

Fourth, I believe this Committee should revisit the question as to whom the Program Manager reports. Currently, he reports to the DNI, but his responsibilities go 

beyond information sharing inside the intelligence community and include the facilitation of information sharing for other federal agencies, state, local and tribal authorities, and the private sector. 

Information sharing is not just a federal problem, it’s a national problem. The 

Program Manager should be placed in charge of the policy committees that are 

charged with improving information sharing across the government. Congress 

should consider whether he would be more effective if he were placed in the executive office of the president with direct line authority from the president.

VIII. Conclusions 

Mr. Chairman, we need to change from a system in which the originating agency 

of classified information is the sole arbiter of which other agencies (federal, state, 

or local) is allowed to see the information. This is far too restrictive for the flexible 

adversary we face. Information collected by any federal agency is the property of the 

federal government and by extension the property of the American people. 

The right information must be made available instantly, at all levels of government and to the private sector, to those men and women who have both the mission 

and the means to act against our enemies before they can act against us. 

Success requires that the flow of information be not just a one-way street. Federal, state and local agencies must exchange intelligence, and cooperate in planning 

and executing joint operations. 

The actions of those who would do us harm are not under our control. But our 

system of information sharing is under our control. It demands urgent attention. We 

can fix it. There will be no excuse for a future failure if we do not. 

I commend this Committee for its important attention to information sharing. I 

look forward to working with you, and would be pleased to answer your questions.

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you for that testimony. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Crowell. 
27

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM CROWELL, MARKLE FOUNDATION 

TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION 

AGE 

Mr. CROWELL. Chairman, Congressman Lofgren and distinguished members, thank you very much for allowing me to be here 

and testify before this subcommittee. 

I have had the privilege of being a member of the Markle Task 

Force on the National Security in the Information Age since its inception in March of 2002, and it was created specifically to focus 

on how best to mobilize information and intelligence resources to 

improve security, while still protecting privacy and civil liberties. 

The Markle Foundation has issued two reports. Both of those reports have stressed the importance of a decentralize network of information sharing and analysis that achieves security, while at the 

same time protecting our civil liberties. And it has also stressed the 

need to have clear and understandable rules and business practices 

on collection and sharing of information that is permissible and 

that which is not permissible. And I will stress that point a couple 

of times in my opening remarks. 

On September 6 of this year, co-chairman Jim Barksdale and Zoe 

Baird, sent a letter to the president on behalf of the task force and 

our thoughts on the progress of the information sharing environment. The letter is attached to my testimony, along with the response from the White House. 

In addition, Zoe Baird testified to the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Oversight in an open hearing on October 19, 2005, 

and my remarks today largely parallel and mirror the letter and 

the subsequent testimony. 

I really recognize that John Russack has a very, very difficult 

job, but I would like to try and outline five points that we, in the 

Markle Foundation, believe are important to getting on with the 

task. 

The first one is to reestablish a sense of urgency to share information. To the earlier point made, we have a lot of information 

today and we can share it today. We don’t have to wait till tomorrow to begin doing that. 

So getting the information sharing business right will pay dividends not just for preventing terrorism attacks but also for dealing 

with natural disasters as well. And so consistent and persistent 

leadership is needed in order to put all of the well-meaning people 

on the right path to getting this done. 

The second point is to empower the Program Manager with the 

resources and statute he needs to create the information sharing 

environment. John now has 12 people, according to his earlier testimony. He obviously needs many more than that. He needs a budget 

and budget line item that he can depend on and be able to plan 

against. And I think, by the way, that giving him the position of 

chair of the Information Sharing Policy Coordinating Committee 

would go a long way toward increasing this statute and getting this 

job done. 

Third point is, translate the law and executive orders into government-wide consistent guidelines. What we have today is an 

agency-by-agency interpretation of what they can and cannot do, 

and it varies widely, both in the areas of security and in the area 
28

of privacy, which is an impediment to getting on with this job. So 

new laws and executive orders have not yet been translated into 

new practices and guidelines. And it is business as usual. Nothing 

has really changed. 

So the ambiguities in the lines of responsibility are actually impeding people’s agreement to move toward a vision of sharing information. 

So we need guidelines that will establish uniform rules and procedure for the security of information and for protection of privacy 

and civil liberties. We need to update the U.S. person rule, which 

in many agencies restricts the flow of information when the information was lawfully collected in the first place, but restricts it for 

reasons that are not clear in terms of protecting personal privacy. 

We need to change the classification procedure. This is a crucial 

topic, as has already been mentioned. Many agencies believe they 

own the information. They express that ownership in the form of 

originator-controlled information, and that should be used very judiciously. And the rules regarding classification should clearly distinguish between information that is actionable and the sources 

and methods from which that information came from. 

We should ensure policy compliance oversight and dispute resolution structures that keep the policies viable. I can’t emphasize 

enough the need to have dispute resolution structures, because people are going to want to break crockery in getting actionable information to state, local and tribal and private sectors. 

John’s comment on technology was appropriate. It is not an impediment; it is a path and an enabler. But I would point out that 

the acquisition of new technology must be streamlined, and new 

legislation that has given agencies the flexibility they need to buy 

needed IT systems are not being used or not being used effectively 

by those agencies. 

Fourth point, we need to adopt a risk management approach to 

information sharing. We are not advocating that all information be 

shared with everyone. We suggest, though, that when information 

has real actionable value, the way should be found to share that 

information. 

And perfect information security in this trusted system is not 

going to be possible, and the cost of getting it might be too high. 

The current approach does not consider risk from failing to share, 

and I don’t think you can connect dots that you can’t get access to. 

Finally, the fifth item, we think we need to focus on establishing 

trusted information sharing relationships, particularly with the 

state, local, tribal organizations and private sector, rather than on 

continuous reorganizations of the manner in which we address this. 

Many state and local officials and the private sector feel 

disenfranchised, and the community of intelligence and law enforcement needs to treat them as partners. 

The final comment I would make has to do with responsibility 

and accountability. The law and executive order now gives responsibility for creating the ISE to the director of national intelligence, 

and this creates a particular problem for the Program Manager as 

he tries to reach out to the other components that are outside the 

DNI. He cannot really look to DNI resources for the law enforce-
29

ment and for some of the other activities that he will be involved 

in, and that poses and interesting but certainly solvable problem. 

My conclusion is this is all about leadership. It is about a common vision, a vision of sharing information in order to protect the 

American public. It is about a common strategy, how to get there, 

and it is about accountability, and I would urge that this committee continue to review the progress. It is a very important area 

for the nation. 

And, once again, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. 

[Information follows:]
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[The statement of Mr. Crowell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM P. CROWELL

MARKLE TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION 

AGE 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Honorable Members of the Committee, thank 

you for the invitation to appear today. I appreciate the opportunity to speak on 

progress made towards building an Information Sharing Environment.

Key Task Force Recommendations 

More than a year ago, the President issued Executive Orders to create an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and in December 2004, Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 specifying the attributes of such an Information Sharing Environment. In particular, Section 1016 

on Information Sharing tasks the President with creating an ‘‘information sharing 

environment for the sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent with 

national security and with applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil 

liberties’’. The IRTPA also designates the new position of Program Manager to plan 

and oversee the implementation of the ISE. Responsible for terrorism information 

sharing across the Federal government, the Program Manager is tasked to develop 

policies, rules, and procedures to govern the operation of the ISE in consultation 

with the Information Sharing Council. On October 25th, 2005 the President signed 

Executive order 13388 creating the anticipated Information Sharing Council as required by the Act. 

While there has been some progress, we still have a long way to go to implement 

this law. The government-wide direction and accountability anticipated in both the 

Executive Orders and the Act should today be a major priority for the DNI. Without 

effective information sharing, information collection remains stovepiped and the importance of information held by different agencies or at different levels of government cannot be understood.

My statement centers on the following five recommendations suggested 

by the Markle Task Force on National Security in the Information Age: 

• Re-establish a greater sense of urgency to share information; 

• Empower the ISE Program Manager; 

• Translate law and executive orders into government-wide consistent guidelines; 

• Adopt a Risk Management Approach to Information Sharing 

• Focus on establishing trusted information sharing relationships, including 

those with state, local, tribal organizations and the private sector, rather than 

structural reorganization.

Perspective 

I have had the privilege to participate as member in the Task Force on National 

Security in the Information Age since its creation in March 2001. The Task Force 

which is co-chaired by Zoe ̈ Baird and Jim Barksdale, is comprised of leading national security experts from the administrations of Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, 

Clinton and Bush, as well as widely recognized experts on technology and civil liberties, and was created to focus on how best to mobilize information and intelligence 

to improve security while protecting privacy and civil liberties. 

My own background includes having been a former Deputy Director of Operations 

and then Deputy Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) during the intelligence draw-downs of the early 1990’s. After retiring from NSA I became CEO of 

a public company in Silicon Valley that was focused on securing cyberspace for industry and government customers. After my company was acquired in early 2003 

I became an independent consultant in security and intelligence systems and serve 

on a variety of boards of technology companies. My remarks today are based on an 

outside look at progress made by government. 

The Markle Task Force has issued two reports: ‘‘Protecting America’s Freedom in 

the Information Age’’ (October 2002) and ‘‘Creating a Trusted Information Network 

for Homeland Security’’ (December 2003). Both have stressed the importance of creating a decentralized network of information sharing and analysis that achieves security while at the same time protects our civil liberties. We need to create an Information Sharing Environment that fundamentally changes the way we think about 

the business of national and homeland security. It requires clear and understandable rules and business practices on collection and sharing of data that is permis-
37

sible and that which is prohibited. We believe that the Executive Branch and the 

Congress must both assume leadership for this task to succeed.

Creating an Information Sharing Environment 

On September 6th of this year, Co-Chairmen Jim Barksdale and Zoe ̈ Baird sent 

a letter to the President on behalf of the Task Force with our thoughts on the 

progress of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE). The letter is attached and 

is available on Markle’s website (www.markle.org), as is the response from the 

White House. In addition Zoe ̈ Baird testified to the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Oversight at an Open Hearing on the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on October 19, 2005. My remarks today largely parallel and mirror the letter and subsequent testimony.

Timeline—Greater Sense of Urgency Needed 

Many first steps have been taken in the right direction, but much more needs to 

be done and the pace needs to be accelerated. We recognize the competing demands 

of an ongoing military engagement abroad and back-to-back catastrophic natural 

disasters, but getting information sharing right will pay dividends not only in preventing terrorist attacks, but in dealing with natural disasters as well. National and 

homeland security are based on many of the same concepts. It is time to stop applauding first steps and to raise our expectations for progress. 

The nation must move to implement an effective ISE with much greater urgency. 

There are many initiatives that can be taken immediately, and many policies that 

must be adopted to empower government officials and provide assurance of privacy 

protections. The same sense of urgency and focused attention exercised by our military and intelligence men and women in the battlefield must be applied to reforming how government agencies work together to understand and prevent the threats 

to our nation. 

Well-motivated people throughout the government are having a hard time adjusting to the new realities. In our letter to the President, we urged him to reiterate 

to Cabinet officers and all U.S. Government officers that they should interpret applicable laws and regulations to enable information sharing and not use old interpretations as an excuse to protect prior approaches. Any ambiguities as to authorities 

and lines of responsibility should be construed in favor of sharing and against turf 

battles. We still hear too many stories of departments and agencies using rigid interpretations of their authority prior to the change in the law in order to protect 

their turf. Constructive congressional oversight is needed here and the White House 

staff should itself take a more active role. The Intelligence Community should embrace rather than resist these changes and realize that change is not a rejection of 

the past, but a path to the future. 

This process will take continuous commitment and persistence from the leadership and all stakeholders. The issues are tough. We are aware of several individual 

agency initiatives that show good promise. Some examples include: 

—The FBI has developed the FBI Intelligence Information Report Dissemination 

System (FIDS); FBI officers are being trained and issuing more intelligence reports 

that are shared with the intelligence community; 

—The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is enhancing collaboration 

across the foreignintelligence/domestic information divide that was so detrimental to 

our efforts before 9/11.

Program Manager for Information Sharing 

Now that the DNI has the administrative responsibility for the Program Manager, 

we believe he must assume the responsibility for the success of that office. The DNI 

must also recognize that the Information Sharing Environment extends beyond the 

Intelligence Community into the DHS, Federal law enforcement, and State and 

Local public safety arenas. Further, the Program Manager’s office should immediately be staffed with the appropriate talent and given the resources needed to get 

the job done. More full-time government employees (FTE) positions must be provided. The Deputy Director of National Intelligence testified in July that they were 

striving to have the Program Manager’s key leadership positions filled by mid-August. Obviously the priority response to Hurricane Katrina may have delayed the 

formation of the office, yet it is now mid-October and not much has changed.

New Guidelines and Policies 

High-level direction and sweeping change is needed to remove any pre 9/11 confusion about information sharing. We have emphasized the immediate need for clear, 

new government-wide policies and guidelines for dramatically increasing information sharing, while protecting our civil liberties and protecting sensitive information. 

Regrettably, any confusion created about how to reconcile new legislation and executive orders with prior laws governing agencies and departments have not been re-
38

solved by the Department of Justice, the DNI or other responsible parties designated by the President. A single set of policies across the government, with some 

additional rules depending on agency-specific missions, should end confusion and 

interagency battles about whose rules apply in particular situations. 

We believe the DNI’s office must take responsibility for ensuring that the changes 

mandated in legislation and executive orders result in changes in practice. We assume that the President is looking to the DNI to exercise such responsibility.

These new guidelines should at a minimum include: 

• Clear and enforceable rules and procedures that ensure information is 

accessed, shared, handled and retained in a manner that meets operational efficiency and security, while protecting our nation’s privacy and civil liberties. 

• Updated policies on the U.S. Persons rule: Since at least 1981, access to and 

sharing of intelligence information collected by U.S. Government agencies has 

been controlled by two factors: (1) whether information was collected within the 

territory of the United States or overseas; and (2) whether information involved 

a U.S. Person (U.S. Citizen or Permanent Resident Alien). These distinctions remain relevant for the collection of intelligence, but we believe they should no 

longer be the basis for controlling access to and sharing of intelligence information lawfully collected by the government. While there is broad recognition that 

these rules must change in the post 9/11 world, there also is justifiable concern 

that they be replaced with easily understandable rules that serve the same goal 

of protecting our civil liberties. In the next several months, our Task Force will 

propose a new approach to these issues that we believe can initiate a necessary 

dialogue about how to move beyond these outmoded rules while enhancing both 

civil liberties and operational success. 

• New classification procedures: Executive Order 13356 specified that originator 

control (ORCON) be used very judiciously. Information sharing should not be 

impeded because of excessive classification rules that classify information according to sensitive intelligence collection sources and methods even when it 

could have been acquired by less sensitive means. Furthermore, we must work 

to extinguish the belief that those who collect information own it. The President 

clearly stated that standards be developed ‘‘requiring terrorism information be 

shared free of originator controls, including, for example, controls requiring the 

consent of the originating agency prior to the dissemination of the information 

outside any agency to which it has been made available, to the maximum extent 

permitted. . . .’’

• Technical and organization mechanisms for policy compliance, oversight, and 

timely dispute resolution are needed to minimize and adjudicate failures to 

share information. There should also be a mechanism to turn disputes into policy. This will reduce risk aversion by government officials who might be concerned about the personal impact of wrong decisions in a new environment. 

• A comprehensive and independent assessment of the value being created by 

the Information Sharing Environment.

A Risk Management Approach to Information Sharing 

We realize that many in the Intelligence Community have concerns that the increased focus on information sharing creates a greater risk of damaging security 

breaches. What the Task Force has recommended—and I believe is critical—is that 

a distributed information sharing system like the ISE contain policy, procedural, 

and technical protections including robust access controls that reduce the risk of unwanted disclosure and promote trust. We are not advocating that all information be 

shared with everyone; we suggest that information must be accessible to those users 

who need it to successfully perform their assigned missions and are authorized to 

see it. This will require leadership by the DNI to determine legitimate user needs 

and innovative cross-agency teams of people working problems together. 

Sophisticated technology exists to secure and protect information and we must 

take full advantage of it. However, the government must recognize that perfect information security is not possible and that the costs of seeking it are too high. There 

are security risks not only from information falling into the wrong hands, but also 

from information failing to find its way into the right hands. The risk of release and 

sharing should be balanced with the risk of not sharing. The government’s current 

approach to protecting classified information does not recognize this risk from failing to share. As wrenching as it is, the government must move to a risk management approach to protecting classified information that balances the risks of failing 

to connect critical information and adopts flexible and creative mechanisms for mitigating risks on both sides. You cannot connect dots that you cannot access.
39

Privacy and Civil Liberties 

As change in the intelligence community is being furthered, privacy and civil liberty interests must be considered consistently. Both the Congress and the Executive 

Branch must demonstrate that privacy is a priority. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board in the Executive Office of 

the President have not been confirmed and the Board has never met. We hope the 

members have begun to be briefed so that, if confirmed, they are ready to assume 

their responsibilities immediately. It is critical that these oversight mechanisms established by law and executive order become operational immediately and get engaged as policies and guidelines are developed. 

Furthermore, the position of the Chief Privacy Officer at the Department of 

Homeland Security must be filled again quickly.

Acquisition Procedures for New Information Technology 

We cannot afford to lose the innovation race to the terrorists who are aggressively 

using technology like the Internet to connect and train recruits as well as plan and 

execute operations. Our government must be much more flexible and adaptive, taking full advantage of new technologies as they become available. 

A Request for Information (RFI) was issued recently by the Program Manager 

seeking vendors to provide Electronic Directory Services (EDS) to ‘‘enable authorized 

participants to locate and access information, organizations, services and personnel 

in support of their respective mission requirements for terrorism information.’’ We 

have recommended that a directory service is a critical element of an effective Information Sharing Environment, but it is not clear the Program Manager has the resources or authority to implement such a system. The technology is available to get 

this done, but it must be introduced quickly using an incremental approach. Attempting to seek a perfect solution will paralyze the effort—just as we have seen 

in other programs.

State, local, tribal and private sector 

Our last concern has to do with an aspect of information sharing where very little 

progress has been made. Yes, it is true that more intelligence information is being 

shared with state and local officials and even with the private sector. However, the 

nature of the terrorist threat requires that we harness all resources available and, 

within guidelines that protect privacy and civil liberties, we develop two-way engagement with key organizations outside the federal government. Because terrorists 

are presumably living and working among us, some of the best intelligence may 

come from non-traditional and unclassified sources. 

Meetings with state and local officials and the private sector have led us to believe that the federal government has not yet realized the value of information identified by state and local entities. A system to integrate this information has not been 

developed. Much more attention must be paid to this gap, because we as a government are ignoring a critical component of national security. This must be done jointly with the Department of Homeland Security because it is partly the reason why 

that department was created. We know this is one of the toughest challenges facing 

the federal government, but it must be done.

Recommendations 

The Task Force will be announcing some proposals over the next months, but we 

offer a few specific recommendations to the Committee as you consider priority actions. These recommendations are in addition to the underlying point that the administration must get on with fully establishing and empowering the Program Manager. 

• Government-wide guidelines to promote information sharing as called for in 

the Act and Executive Order should be established as soon as possible; 

• The Program Manager should act quickly on the RFI issued to establish electronic directory services; this is a critical step toward better information sharing; 

• Working with the Congress, the Executive branch should support the Program Manager in sponsoring some pilots which demonstrate information sharing between federal agencies, state, local, tribal and the private sector; 

• Establish a panel of experts, primarily from industry, to review and advise 

the program manager, DNI, DoD, DHS, and Justice on architecture and system 

design (particularly important given the number of failed IT and information 

sharing programs between those four organizations); 

• Congress should move quickly to act on key positions that are pending confirmation, and if they are not confirmed the President must quickly nominate 

others (the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Chairman and ViceChairman have not been confirmed, and neither has a General Counsel to the 
40

DNI, a particularly important position given the legal barriers and confusion 

cited by many as preventing implementation of the ISE);

Conclusion 

Our nation has now reorganized the intelligence community as called for in many 

earlier reports. For this to address the significant challenges of the future, we must 

train government employees to work in new ways, develop our civil liberties guidance, sponsor research on new technologies and methods, and create systems that 

manage information in smarter and more cost-effective ways, while providing real 

security improvements and accountability. Any future intelligence failures will not 

rightly be blamed on legal constraints that prevent sensible information collection 

and sharing. The authorities to collect and share information exist; we must 

thoughtfully exercise them. 

Finally, we must work toward improving our national security without eroding 

privacy and civil liberties. Our task force has expressed concern that if another 

major attack were to take place on our homeland, the immediate reaction could 

cause the pendulum to swing toward measures that impinge on our privacy and civil 

liberties in ways in which none of us would support given time for thoughtful consideration and debate. We have the opportunity now and we should seize it. 

Thank you again for the invitation to appear before you, and I welcome any questions you may have.

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you both for your testimony. 

Normally, I would take my 5 minutes of questions at this point, 

but I see the distinguished vice chairman of the full committee has 

come in, and I suspect that it would be intelligent to extend to him 

the courtesy of taking my time, because I know how busy it is. 

So the chairman yields to the distinguished vice chairman, the 

gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. WELDON. I thank my good friend and chairman for yielding 

and for his leadership, along with the distinguished ranking member. 

I thank our witnesses for coming in today and would like to say 

that this hearing is perhaps one of the most important subjects 

that we have to focus on relative to protecting the homeland from 

any emerging threats. And it is an issue that is not new to this 

Congress. 

It was this Congress that created the Gilmore Commission and 

the four reports of the Gilmore Commission, chaired by former 

Governor Jim Gilmore, that issued three reports before 9/11. And 

in each of those reports, you will find references to this very issue. 

So the Congress was in fact on the lead in the need for information sharing when it comes to information sharing, both vertically 

and horizontally, and the need to tear down the firewalls with the 

stovepipes of the 33 classified systems managed by 15 different 

agencies. 

In fact, it as the Congress that had language in three successive 

bills, in 1999, 2000, and 2001, that mandated, at least from DOD’s 

standpoint, where I sit as the vice chairman, that we push toward 

integration. Unfortunately, on November 4 of 1999, in spite of John 

Hamre encouraging such an initiative to create a national collaborative environment, the CIA and the FBI, after attending a meeting with John Hamre in my office, said publicly, ‘‘We don’t need 

that capability.’’

Well, we have now learned some other important information 

that troubles me, and that is why I am here, Mr. Chairman, because we can’t move forward unless we understand the lessons of 

the past. And I wish I didn’t have to come to this hearing for this 
41

purpose, but I am here for this purpose, because I have not yet received any responses. 

Approximately June of this year, I learned the details of a top 

secret military program called, ‘‘Able Danger.’’ My first contact was 

to call the staff director of the 9/11 Discourse Project to ask if they 

had looked at ‘‘Able Danger’’ because there was no mention of it at 

all, even a footnote in the 9/11 Commission report. My chief of staff 

got the response the next day that, ‘‘Well, we looked at it, but we 

decided not to go down that route,’’ and they were the terms that 

were used, ‘‘not to go down that route.’’

I then met with Tim Roemer a week later and I said, ‘‘Tim, were 

you ever briefed on Able Danger?’’ He said, ‘‘No, Curt, never heard 

of it, never briefed.’’ I said, ‘‘A top secret program that was ordered 

by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the command 

of General Schoomacher at SOCOM and you were never briefed, 

and it was specifically against al-Qa’ida?’’ He said, ‘‘Never.’’

So I called John Lehman and had lunch with him, and John Lehman told me at lunch he had never been briefed either. And when 

I told him the details of ‘‘Able Danger,’’ he was livid. I said, ‘‘What 

do I do, John?’’ He said, ‘‘You have got to pursue it.’’

So I went to the floor of the House and did a 45-minute speech. 

Of course, nobody pays attention to 45-minute speeches. During the 

month of July, I went to our committee chairs—Armed Services, 

Homeland Security, Intelligence, Oversight of Appropriations—and 

The New York Times picked the story up the first week of August 

with a front page story above the fold on Tuesday. 

The response by the 9/11 Commission was that they denied that 

there was ever a briefing on ‘‘Able Danger.’’ The New York Times 

ran a story the second day. And they said, ‘‘Well, there was a briefing but there was never a mention of Mohamed Atta.’’ The New 

York Times ran a story a third day. The 9/11 Commission said, 

‘‘Well, there was a brief, and, yes, Mohamed Atta’s name was mentioned, but it wasn’t until July, one week before our report was 

done, and we determined it wasn’t historically significant.’’ In fact, 

they used the terms, ‘‘historically insignificant.’’

Mr. Chairman, we have now determined, not through 9/11 Commission work, and I supported the 9/11 Commission with my vote 

and my voice, at least five professional employees of DOD have 

publicly stated that Mohamed Atta was identified before 9/11. And 

it wasn’t just done by the Army’s legal. 

We now know, thanks to no help of the 9/11 Commission, that 

there was a separate massive data mining effort that was conducted down in Garland, Texas of the officers of the Raytheon Corporation, and guess who, Mr. Chairman, the head of that was? The 

9/11 Commission doesn’t have a clue because they never interviewed the guy. It was Sam Johnson’s son, one of most dedicated 

members. And Sam Johnson’s son, Dr. Bob Johnson, is now ready 

to testify, along with the other military folks, on the record, that 

he too identified Mohamed Atta before 9/11. 

Now, we have two separate data mining operations that are 

ready to come public and testify. They both identified Mohamed 

Atta by name and in one case by photo before 9/11. 

Now, this is not about a chart, as people have tried to say. In 

fact, we know there was 2.5 terabytes of data collected about al-
42

Qa’ida, specifically ordered by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. Now, 2.5 terabytes of data is equal to one-fourth of all the 

printed material in the Library of Congress. That is historically insignificant, I might add. 

And now we also know on the record, and the Senate Judiciary 

Committee has taken these statements and I have been there witnessing it, that there was an attempt made in September of 2000 

to transfer information about the Brooklyn cell of al-Qa’ida to the 

FBI three times. The FBI employee who set up those meetings up 

will state that under oath, which he did to the Senate Judiciary 

Committee. 

And you know what? Those meetings were canceled. Not one 

mention of this in the 9/11 Commission report. We now know that 

there was a 3-hour briefing providing for the chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff in January of 2001. 

And now where do we see the response? We are here to talk 

about sharing information and public knowledge and accountability. We see this administration and the 9/11 Commission not 

willing to talk about it on the record. 

Now, that is outrageous, Mr. Chairman, and I am not here to 

criticize just any Democrat, I am here to criticize this administration, which I supported. They have gagged the witnesses that will 

come forward. 

Now, I sent a letter to the 9/11 Commission on August 10. I have 

yet to receive a response. This is November 8. Now, I got a letter 

congratulating me for my work on the frequency spectrum allocation issue but not a response to my letter about what is in fact the 

most important information prior to 9/11 that Louis Freeh, Louis 

Freeh, Mr. Chairman, on national TV 2 weeks ago, when he was 

questioned by Tim Russert, said, ‘‘That is the kind of tactical intelligence,’’ meaning ‘‘Able Danger,’’ that would make a difference in 

stopping a hijacking. We are very interested in what the 9/11 Commission didn’t do with respect to ‘‘Able Danger.’’ And that is Louis 

Freeh, FBI director when 9/11 occurred. 

Mr. Chairman, there is something wrong here. There is something wrong. When we are supposed to be getting the facts for the 

3,000 families, and I was with the families up in Harvard University with my good friend Jane Harman just a few weeks ago and 

they pleaded with me to get the information. 

When we now know that there was information 2 days before the 

attack on the USS Cole that could have stopped the crew from the 

USS Cole from losing 17 of their sailors, and I had the captain of 

that ship in, Commander Kirk Lippold 2 weeks ago, who said, ‘‘If 

I would have had the information that they had, I wouldn’t have 

taken my ship into port.’’

So I say, Mr. Chairman, ‘‘What is going on here?’’ We are talking 

about sharing information. Am I hearing it that no one really 

wants to share information? We want to spin things? Let the truth 

come out. Right now, the Defense Intelligence Agency is destroying 

the career of Lieutenant Colonel Tony Shaffer, and I am not going 

to allow that to happen. I haven’t heard a peep out of the 9/11 

Commission to ask for more information, not a response to my letter. 
43

Mr. Chairman, I am a little bit upset, because we don’t know the 

information about what happened prior to 9/11. This is not about 

a chart of one person. It is about 2.5 terabytes of data, collected 

by two separate data banks, neither of whom were talked to by the 

9/11 Commission. It looks to me like a cover-up, Mr. Chairman. 

That is what it looks like. 

And so I have two questions. 

Mr. Hamilton, when can I expect a response to my letter of August 10, which was sent to you and Mr. Keane? And, number two, 

will you join in calling for a full and open hearing to allow all ‘‘Able 

Danger’’ people, and that is 6 individuals—there weren’t 80 involved, there were 20 total, 6 are willing to come forward—are you 

willing to call for a public hearing, allowing them all to testify and 

also to have Dieter Snell testify under oath about his interview of 

Scott Philpot in July of 2004? 

Thank you. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Weldon. First of all, 

with regard to the response, we are operating, as you may know, 

with a very skeleton staff. We no longer have the 80-some staff 

members that we had under the 9/11 Commission. We will respond 

to you, we should, and we will try to get a response promptly to 

you. 

Secondly, we understand on the Commission that we were writing the first draft of history, if you would. We understand that information will be coming forth probably for the next century about 

what happened on 9/11, and we, in the Commission, must remain 

open to new information. 

Now, let me tell you why we did what we did. The Commission 

based its report, first, on facts that were obtained by, supported by 

documentary evidence and, second, by witnesses who had direct 

firsthand knowledge of documents they produced and the events 

they described. Those persons that now make the claim about 

Atta’s name on the chart cannot produce the chart. They did not 

do the analysis and they cannot reproduce the analysis. 

Many serious questions have to be addressed to these people, and 

I think, so far as I personally am concerned, Mr. Weldon, I can’t 

speak for all commissioners, I am perfectly willing to support a 

hearing with regard to these witnesses, because I think there are 

serious questions that need to be addressed to them. 

We interviewed General Schoomacher. He was the Commander 

of the Special Operations Command at the time ‘‘Able Danger’’ was 

created. We interviewed General Hugh Shelton, who was chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Scott Frye, General Gregory Newbold, 

all successive directors of operations for the Joint Staff. We interviewed Brian Sheridan, the assistant secretary for special operations in low intensity conflict during the period that ‘‘Able Danger’’ was in existence. 

We also interviewed several other senior and mid-level managers 

of the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Program. 

Despite direct questions for any information relevant to the 9/11 

attacks, none of them mentioned such a chart. They mention nothing about identifying Mohamed Atta, even in response to questions 

about the ‘‘Able Danger’’ Program. 
44

We interviewed Mr. Stephen Hadley for 3 hours. He responded 

to questions from the Joint Congressional Inquiry. He mentioned 

nothing about that chart, mentioned nothing about the name of 

Mohammed Atta (ph being on the chart. 

We interviewed his boss at the time, Condoleezza Rice, for over 

4 hours. She said nothing about a chart and mentioned nothing 

about the name of Mohamed Atta on the chart. 

We interviewed her boss, President Bush, for nearly 3 hours. 

Neither he nor the vice president said anything about a chart or 

the name of Mohamed Atta on a chart. The White House has not 

confirmed the existence of the chart. There is, so far as I know, no 

evidence to document that such a chart ever existed. 

Now, one other point I would make here, even if everything that 

you say is correct about Mohamed Atta, I don’t think it would 

change the Commission’s recommendations in any way. We documented in great detail many examples of the failure to share information, and we made that recommendation across the board, and 

action on those recommendations, we believe, is still necessary. 

Now, I might point out that you, Mr. Weldon, in your book wrote, 

‘‘On September 25, 2001, just 2 weeks after 9/11, I met in the 

White House with Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security 

advisor to the president. I presented him with a two by three chart 

I had been given in the aftermath of 9/11. The chart was developed 

in 1999 as part of a Defense Department initiative dubbed, ‘‘Able 

Danger.’’ It diagramed the affiliations of al-Qa’ida and showed 

Mohamed Atta and the infamous Brooklyn cell.’’ Hadley’s response 

was, ‘‘I have to show this to the big man.’’

We have not yet seen that chart, and we are open to receiving 

it. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Recovering my time, the chairman now recognizes 

the ranking member. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to get 

back to questions on the testimony. 

First, I would like to thank you both for being here, obviously, 

and for all that you do, and I would like to ask Mr. Crowell a couple of quick questions. 

First, the Markle Foundation has called electronic directory services a critical step toward better information sharing, and, as you 

have referenced in your comments, it is important, both in terms 

of outlining what we need to collect but also what we don’t need 

to collect, in terms of privacy and civil liberties. 

What would be your best advice to Mr. Russack about how to establish the electronic directory services? I don’t think it exists yet, 

unless I am wrong. 

Mr. CROWELL. It doesn’t exist yet. I believe he issued an RFI, a 

Request For Information, to industry regarding directory services. 

What the Markle Foundation postulated was the need for directory services to be the pointers to information wherever it resided 

for several reasons. One was for policy reasons, in order to preserve 

the policy about how the information was used with the information when it actually got transferred. So that if there were privacy 

implications or if there were restrictions on the use, they would be 

part of the record that gets transferred. 
45

The second was for freshness. One of the problems with transferring information among stovepipes in the U.S. federal government, 

in particular, is that the information has no—there is no way for 

the information to get updated. So if information is transferred 

that is either wrong or that is later changed, those changes don’t 

follow the transfer of the information to other agencies. 

But by using directory services and pointers to the information, 

as opposed to actually moving the information wholesale, there is 

an opportunity to, with technology, solve this problem of keeping 

the information accurate, fresh and updated by the people who actually have that responsibility. 

Ms. LOFGREN. And also to make sure only those who need—that 

people get only what they are permitted to get. 

Mr. CROWELL. That is exactly right. And also that you control 

things like can it be printed, can it be sent to further distribution 

lists and so on, which would go a long way toward increasing the 

trust that people have in the system that is going to be used to 

share. 

Ms. LOFGREN. But do you envision—just thinking about this, and 

maybe this is incorrect—that the implementation of such a system 

might actually solve the need or go a long way toward solving the 

need of a government-wide consistent guidelines that you referenced in your testimony? 

Mr. CROWELL. Well, it certainly would become a facilitator for 

moving consistent guidelines across organizational borders. It won’t 

remove the need for someone to sit down and decide what some of 

those guidelines will be. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Let me ask, if I could, just two quick questions 

that you mentioned in your testimony. One, the need for a dispute 

resolution mechanism as well as the lack of use of the streamlined 

systems we have for IT acquisition. We are woefully behind in very 

many parts of the government in our IT area. 

Do you have advice for this committee and how we might promote changes in those two areas? 

Mr. CROWELL. Well, on the first one, dispute resolution, the importance of that, particularly in the beginning of a change in the 

culture, is to try and move the inevitable disputes that will occur 

about whether information is too classified to be sent to particular 

users or whether it can be declassified or sanitized, to move those 

disputes quickly up to policy makers who in turn then can move 

the disputed policies back down as new policies and incorporate the 

disputes into the evolving policies and guidelines that would become important. 

With regard to IT modernization, the best way I can phrase that 

is I won’t mention the particular agency but I know of one agency 

where the analysts are prohibited from going home and doing any 

work from home, but they have better tools at home—

Ms. LOFGREN. Right. 

Mr. CROWELL. —than they do at work. That is a pathetic situation. I mean, at home, I have access to blogs, to databases, to all 

kinds of information. Every day I get a terrorism report that is several megabytes in size from a private source that isn’t even associated with the government, and I can use that information to review 
46

what is happening worldwide, with a little Googling, on a very positive basis. 

And that kind of technology is not expensive, but it is not being 

deployed very rapidly in some cases because of security concerns 

and security constraints and other cases, just because it opens up 

the process too much. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Let me follow up with Mr. Hamilton on that point. 

It has been a frustration to me. I have been on the Judiciary Committee for 11 years and we have yet to have an oversight hearing 

on the FBI. Thinking about just the technology aspect of the FBI 

and the Trilogy Program, which we found out in March of this 

year, after $157 million, basically was scrapped. 

As far as I know, and, Mr. Hamilton, you may know from your 

service on the 9/11 Commission, we still don’t have a comprehensive or working solution for sharing information internally within 

the FBI. 

And my question is, how are they going to be partners in information sharing across agencies as well as out into our private sector and local and state government allies if they can’t even share 

information internally? Can you give us any information on that? 

Maybe we should have a hearing on that since Judiciary apparently doesn’t want to exert their jurisdiction. We have concurrent 

and might be able to move this forward. 

Maybe the Commission didn’t go too heavily into that, but if you 

can give us an wisdom, it would be much appreciated. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Congressman Lofgren, I, among other things, 

now serve on an Advisory Board to the director of the FBI, and 

they are, I believe, finally, seized this issue, and they recognize the 

failure of their past efforts, I might say costly failure, but I do believe that they are now trying very hard to improve the information systems within the FBI. 

Now, I don’t think they are there yet, by a long shot. They have 

brought in a lot of highly trained technical people to deal with this 

problem, and I think there is a very strong emphasis on it now to 

improve it. 

So your oversight here is terribly important because of all the 

changes that are necessary in the FBI, and you appreciate the director’s trying to change the whole culture of the institution, from 

law enforcement to—

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, I am an admirer, actually, of the director, 

but I have to note that we have got a problem here. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, the question is, can he do it, and can he 

change the culture, and I have no doubt at all about, number one, 

his ability, nor, number two, his intent. He is a top flight person, 

but it is a formidable challenge, and I just think you and all of us 

need to bear down on the FBI, make sure we are fully supportive 

of what they are trying to do, because that change is critical. 

If you change the FBI’s focus from law enforcement to prevention 

of terrorism, what that means is that intelligence becomes the area 

of the FBI’s work that drives the entire FBI, because it is intelligence that tells you about possible terrorist activity. So the intelligence effort and the information sharing and the information 

technology involved in that intelligence effort is just crucial in 

order for the FBI to carry out its new function well. 
47

Ms. LOFGREN. I see my time has expired. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania with 

the hope that he can yield me some of his time. 

Mr. WELDON. I will, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I just want to respond to some of Mr. Hamilton’s comments, just for the record. 

And, again, we are trying to spin instead of getting to the facts. 

Mr. Hamilton, I have had respect for you, we served together for 

a number of years. I have never criticized you publicly. But I am 

absolutely outraged at what is happening here in the lack of aggressiveness in wanting to get to the bottom of this story. 

You brought up the fact, alluding that somehow Steve Hadley 

didn’t acknowledge. Well, why don’t you talk to Chairman Dan 

Burton who chaired the Government Operations Oversight Committee, who went with me to that meeting? Why don’t you talk to 

Chris Shays, the chairman of the Government Operations Oversight Committee for National Security, who went with me to that 

meeting? There were three of us in the room with Hadley, not one. 

If you have a problem with what Hadley said, you ought to—he 

told me he was misquoted. The fact was—and it is not about a 

chart. Don’t try to spin this about a chart. We have a 23-year Navy 

veteran who has risked his entire career to tell the truth, that in 

January of 2000 he identified Mohamed Atta and three terrorists. 

He had to seek you out to give you that information in July of 

2004, and this was the response of the person who debriefed him 

who I want to put under oath, Dieter Snell. 

After he was questioned, he said to—and this is a direct quote 

from Commander Scott Philpot. He said, after Scott gave him the 

information, Dieter Snell said, ‘‘What do you want us to do with 

this information? We go to print in 10 days.’’ Is that the legacy of 

the 9/11 Commission, that we go to print in 10 days; therefore, we 

don’t even mention ‘‘Able Danger’’ as a footnote in your book? This 

was not ordered by some Johnny Come Lately off the street. 

And you say you interviewed Schoomacher, you interviewed—you 

didn’t question him about ‘‘Able Danger’’ in detail. I talked to them. 

You didn’t question the people that were involved in the operation 

of ‘‘Able Danger.’’ Talk to Scott Philpot, as I have 20 times, who 

has risked his career. You have never talked to him personally. 

You have never talked to Tony Shaffer personally, who is having 

his career destroyed right now. 

You didn’t play this kind of role when you were in Congress. You 

were aggressive at oversight. And I am not going to sit by while 

a man’s career is destroyed because we don’t want them to be able 

to tell the truth. And it is going to embarrass this administration, 

the Bush administration, but I don’t care. 

That was the job of the 9/11 Commission. I voted for it, I supported it. I tried to meet with you all. Tom Keane gave me a 5-

minute phone call. I hand delivered information at the hearing 

when George Tenet was at the witness stand and the questions 

were never asked. We gave a packet of follow up. You never proceeded to interview me. It is not about me. It is about the 3,000 

families that had their lives ruined and the 17 sailors on the Cole. 
48

We are going to get to the bottom of this, Lee, I will guarantee 

you, and there is going to be egg on the faces of people when the 

truth comes out, because in the end, the truth provides the justice. 

I yield you the rest of my time. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I think I should have the opportunity to respond to that. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Absolutely. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Weldon, we want that truth to come out, and 

I don’t wan to try to block the truth, and I will stand with you to 

try to get the truth out. Now, we are not trying to spin the chart. 

Where—

Mr. WELDON. It is not about a chart. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Where is the chart? 

Mr. WELDON. The chart was destroyed, I guess, by Hadley. It is 

not about a chart. It never was about a chart. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, it was in your book. 

Mr. WELDON. My book mentions it in one sentence. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Would the gentleman—

Mr. HAMILTON. And when those people met with our investigators in Afghanistan, they talked about a chart with Mohamed 

Atta’s name on it. 

Mr. WELDON. Come to my office, I will show you a chart. 

Mr. HAMILTON. With Mohamed Atta’s name on it, I would like 

to do that. Look, that is a very—

Mr. SIMMONS. Reclaiming my time, the gentleman at the witness 

table is recognized by the chair. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I am not sure it benefits us here to go further, but I will say that that chart is an enormously important 

piece of information. 

We did not have any information, Mr. Weldon, that prior to 9/

11 that the government knew the name of Mohamed Atta. Now, 

when our investigators talked to your people—well, the people you 

have identified today, when they talked to those people in Afghanistan, they said there was a chart with Mohamed Atta’s name on 

it. 

Now, at that point in the investigation, which this was in the 

year 2003, we certainly knew the name of Mohamed Atta, and anybody in a meeting that heard the name of Mohamed Atta, that 

would have been like ringing a fire bell. None of our three investigators, the White House lawyer did not recall a chart, did not recall mention of Mohamed Atta. 

Now, if the chart exists, let’s see it, and we will give it due 

weight. 

And let me join you in saying that we don’t want to destroy anybody’s career. We want to get the information. Just give us the documentary information. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 

Texas, Ms. Jackson-Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. I thank the chairman very much. 

And I apologize, was delayed with some other meetings, Mr. 

Hamilton and Mr. Crowell, and would have gotten here sooner if 

I had known how much excitement you all were having in this 

hearing. 

[Laughter.] 
49

But let me thank you for your service and the previous witness 

who is now going to be our new Manager of Intelligence and important, I think, position in our Department. 

If I might, I will make a statement that will look for solutions, 

and that is that I do think that we are still making a journey toward securing the homeland. There is much debate as to whether 

or not we are any more secure today than we were on September 

10. I think the 9/11 Commission report has been a great road map 

and directive, and we have put in place many very positive aspects, 

and I think that puts us in a step in the right direction. 

But I have several points that I would like to bring up, and I 

would engage Mr. Crowell as well on these questions. 

First of all, with respect to the Information Sharing Manager, do 

you think that we have an effective position that can generate intelligence down to our federal, state and local sharing, meaning 

that we can generate or translate information down into the state 

and local jurisdictions and whether they can translate? Do we have 

an appropriate vehicle for that and they can translate information 

to us? 

Use as a backdrop, and I don’t want to be coy, but use as a backdrop the recent incident with New York. I have a great respect for 

Commissioner Kelly, I know him well, but I am hoping that it was 

not tainted by politics and local elections. Did we do that right and 

is that an example of sharing information in the right way? If you 

are taking notes, I would appreciate it, because I would like to be 

able to—on the questions, I would like to be able to finish my questions and then yield to both of you. 

In particular, Mr. Hamilton, I know your great work, and we 

worked very closely, so many of us, around the 9/11 report. I was 

pleased to have been on the Select Committee, the committee before this one on Homeland Security and sort of worked closely with 

the work that you all were doing. 

But maybe we should have hearings. Ms. Lofgren has said something very insightful and also indicting and that is that there have 

not been oversight hearings over the FBI. I know the chairman of 

this committee is very astute about these issues. And maybe we 

should have, moving aside the recent occurrences of politics and in 

and out indictments and other types of activities. 

I have always said that the American people need to have the 

ultimate truth. I think it would be appropriate to hold hearings 

anew—and they have always said, ‘‘Well, they belong in the Intelligence Committee;’’ I think it is appropriate in the Homeland Security Committee—on the trail of intelligence that led us to the 

state of war. 

The reason why I say that is it is more woven around the question of terrorism. And, therefore, if it is woven around that question, then that is the jurisdiction of the Homeland Security. Let us 

track the trail and all the pieces that might not have been addressed by the 9/11 Commission, your task was monumental, and 

I think the work that you did we will be forever grateful that we 

got a road map. But we are now seeing the missing links. 

Should we not convene hearings, oversight hearings, transparent 

hearings that will engage representatives from the White House, 

engage the proponents of information to find out how the trail of 
50

information either gave us information about those terrorists that 

might be engaged or did not? 

And I yield to the gentleman for what was a very lengthy questioning, but I think you can detail about three of them. There are 

about three questions. One happened to be longer than the others. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me begin to respond, and then Mr. Crowell 

will pick it up. 

First of all, with regard to Mr. Russack’s job as the Program 

Manager, it has been said several times here it is an enormously 

important job. He becomes now the key official in implementing information sharing, which is the key aspect of better intelligence 

with regard to counterterrorism. There is nothing this committee 

can do that would be more important, I believe, than to stay on top 

of the progress that he is making and maybe not making and try 

to provide guidance to him. 

And to the extent that you have hearings to that effect, then I 

would certainly applaud them. 

You have to make sure he has the authority that he needs, and 

if he doesn’t have it, you should give it to him. You have to make 

sure he has the resources and the personnel that he needs, and if 

he doesn’t have it, you should make sure he has it. And you have 

to keep your focus on this particular office, I believe, to see that 

if functions. And if this office does not function, then your 

counterterrorism effort is going to be severely hampered. 

Now, with regard to the New York situation, I know there has 

been some controversy about that. The positive side of it is that information was shared from the DHS to the city of New York. And 

on October 6, the New York Police Department reacted to information that came to them from the FBI, and that information suggested that their system, their transportation was at risk of being 

attacked in the next few days. 

The DHS gave a different interpretation to that information than 

the New York officials did, but keep in mind they have got very different responsibilities. If you are the mayor of that city and you 

have this information coming to you, you are going to act in such 

a way that will protect the city. 

You also have to keep in mind that the information here keeps 

developing. You don’t get a finished product at 10 o’clock in the 

morning. What you get is an initial intelligence assessment, which 

is refined over a period of many hours, but the mayor has to act 

right away if he is going to protect the system. So you would have 

a very different perspective here. 

I believe that the New York mayor and the New York Police Department acted responsibly based on the information that was 

given to them, but it is a dynamic situation, and I can understand 

why the DHS people had a different interpretation of the information than the mayor did. 

All of this has to say is that we have got to work harder to get 

this right. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. That is right. 

Mr. HAMILTON. So that there is a consistent message flowing 

from Washington to the local officials as the situation develops. 

And we all know it is a crisis situation, and it is very, very hard 

to do. 
51

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Would you just—I know he has to answer—

would you also comment on further hearings to sort of determine 

whether or not we had some faulty intelligence leading us to where 

we were in terms of the war? And not so much the war but interpreting whether there were terrorist threats that would lead us to 

go to war. Whether further hearings would be appropriate. 

Mr. HAMILTON. That is really outside the mandate of the 9/11 

Commission. We did not look at the Iraq war. We acted on the 

basis of the statutory mandate you gave us, and that told us to do 

two things: To tell the story of 9/11 as accurately as we could, and, 

number two, to make recommendations to the American people on 

how to better protect themselves from a terrorist attack. We did 

not have the statutory authority to look into the questions of the 

war. That is an all together different? 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. If you had it, you obviously would have pursued it. If we have it, do you think we should pursue it? 

Mr. HAMILTON. That is a judgment you have to make. And as a 

person testifying on behalf of the 9/11 Commission, I can’t really 

comment on that. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. And I appreciate your consistency with your 

testimony. 

Mr. Crowell? 

Mr. CROWELL. I certainly agree with all of the comments that 

Mr. Hamilton made with regard to the information sharing environment. I would add, though, that his job is not really framed 

around the notion that he will have a responsibility for interpreting 

or moving information form any of the players—federal, state, 

local—but, rather, that he will assist in the development of the 

policies, the guidelines, technology, the systems, the training, the 

environment, if you will, that will allow that to happen within the 

agencies that have that responsibility today. 

In that regard, without the necessary resources and without the 

necessary oversight to see that he is getting the resources and 

doing the job, I think we run some risk that this very tough job 

won’t get done. 

So I would applaud any efforts by the committee to continue to 

review what he is doing and what he has to work with in order to 

get it done. I know he will put a personal effort into it. Will he get 

the support that he needs from everyone? 

With regard to the New York City thing, there is not much that 

I really can add since I am not currently involved in any reviews 

that relate to that. And it is certainly not something that Markle 

looked at. 

I just would say that in the case of information sharing, the principal concern is to make sure that the people who have responsibility for taking action, in this case New York City, have all the 

information. I have no way of judging whether or not they had all 

the information or not, but the whole purpose of this effort to develop the information sharing environment is to make sure they 

know whether or not they got all the information and that there 

is an audit, if you will, of the process that gets that information 

to them. 

Clearly, your question on the hearings with regard to the trail 

of information are well outside of my responsibilities in the Markle 
52

Foundation or the Markle’s current focus, so I won’t make any comment on that. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Thank you. 

I thank Mr. Chairman. I will just self-testify and would think 

that both Mr. Crowell and Mr. Hamilton, as good Americans, would 

want us to find out the truth. And so any appropriate hearings that 

would help us do so in this whole chain of intelligence sharing as 

well as the allegations that surround us might be helpful in this 

committee, so I hope maybe we will look into that. 

And I yield back, and I thank the chairman and the ranking 

member. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you for your comments on the issue of sharing information. Again, we have had some substantial inquiries 

into that issue, and I think it is fair to say that sometimes two 

groups of people can have the same information but draw different 

conclusions. And in particular, sometimes a trained intelligence analyst will be able to make an assessment based on more information that might place the source of information in question, whereas a non-trained individual might interpret more information as 

being a better and better source, if that makes sense. And that is 

why two groups looking at the same information can draw divergent conclusions. 

And so the information sharing system has to be sufficiently sophisticated that it takes into account the various backgrounds of 

the people involved. 

That being said, if our witnesses could bear with us for just a few 

more minutes, we might do a second round, if that is agreeable. I 

don’t know what your time constraints are. Is that agreeable? 

Thank you very much. 

Asking my questions, Mr. Hamilton, a few years ago, in the 

eighties, we had a lot of excitement here on Capitol Hill focused 

around the Boland amendment and something called Iran–Contra. 

I happened to be on the Senate side at the time in a staff position. 

I believe you were actively involved in oversight on the House side. 

And what we discovered in that situation was that there was a culture of secrecy that even extended from the intelligence community 

to the oversight agencies of Congress. 

Fast forward 20 years into the post-9/11 situation. That culture 

of secrecy has broken down somewhat. Information sharing is a 

buzzword on everybody’s lips. But, as you have said, it is still a 

question of changing the culture. 

And how optimistic are you that we can actually change this culture or do we in fact need to add additional sources of information 

to the equation, namely open sources of intelligence, which are not 

as highly protected by the secrecy system and the secret bureaucracies and which lend themselves to sharing? 

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I am glad you didn’t press me on 

Iran–Contra. That is too far back for me to remember very well. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I won’t press you on anything. I just want your 

opinion. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I think? 

Mr. SIMMONS. You have been pressed enough today. 
53

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. I think you have got it very well analyzed, 

and no one can say at this point in time whether you are going to 

be able to break down that culture. 

I think the important thing to recognize is that the need to know 

principle, which, as you know from your background, is sacrosanct 

in the intelligence community, or has been for many years, probably served us very well for many years and was kind of the abiding principle during the Cold War period. 

But as you suggest in your question, times have changed an 

awful lot now, and that principle must not be relinquished but it 

has to be balanced against the principle of need to share so that 

you have both principles operating. Sometimes need to know is 

going to prevail, sometimes need to share. 

I think Mr. Crowell put it very well in his testimony when he 

identified the risk of failing to share. The concentration has always 

been on the risk of elite or the risk of information getting to the 

wrong person. That is a real risk. You don’t want to deny that. But 

what we found, I think, over and over again was that the risk is 

greater in terrorism of failing to share information. 

Look, the govern develops, as you well know, millions of bytes of 

data every minute, all kinds of languages, and we collect mountains of data, which 99.999 percent of it is irrelevant. The task is 

to pick out those nuggets and to put them together to analyze, collect them and you don’t get intelligence information that says, ‘‘We 

are going to hit the World Trade Towers at 9 o’clock on Tuesday 

morning.’’ You get all kinds of hints, and so putting that all together is difficult. Information sharing is critical. 

I am reasonably optimistic that if you give us enough time, we 

can put it together. 

And your final comment about open sources is critically important. Here, again, the intelligence community, as you may know 

better than the rest of us, has had a kind of disdain for open 

sources. 

If you look back on 9/11 and you trace what happened in the 

World Trade Towers and the embassy bombings and the USS Cole 

and the Fatwas from Osama bin Laden, everything was public—everything. We all knew it, we just didn’t get it. And so open sources 

are just as valuable as the secret sources, I believe, and I like your 

emphasis on adding information from open sources. I think it is 

critically important. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. 

Mr. Crowell, you work for the National Security Agency, or NSA, 

which at one point was referred to as NSA, ‘‘No Such Agency.’’ 

Twenty years ago when James Bamford did his book, ‘‘The Puzzle 

Palace,’’ Director Lincoln Faurer tried to prevent publication because it was the first book ever written on, ‘‘No Such Agency.’’ So 

this is an organization with quite a reputation for secrecy, even the 

cables dating back to the Gulf of Tonkin incident have only just recently been disclosed. 

How can ‘‘No Such Agency’’ involve itself in information sharing 

in any useful way? 

Mr. CROWELL. Well, I will go back to the earlier comments I 

made about leadership and its importance in all of this, and I think 

that if you examine some of the records of the past, you will see 
54

that information has willingly been surrendered by agencies like 

NSA and others as a contribution to history. I cite, for example, the 

release of the VENONA papers in 1995. 

During my tenure as deputy director, 25 million records were declassified and sent to the archives for use by the American public 

and by scholars who would study what really happened and return 

all of that investment to the American people. 

So it can be done. It is a matter of culture, not just of secrecy 

but it is a matter of having a commitment to history and to the 

importance of information and understanding that history. 

You know, during the Cold War, the need to know principle 

worked primarily because we had a very focused enemy, and we in 

fact did know who needed to know. I mean, I knew by name the 

individuals who were responsible for Soviet long-range air and the 

military officers who were going to respond to any of those threats 

and attacks. And I talked to them on a regular basis. 

This is a different world. It is no longer one in which I would be 

able to personally divine who needs to know about an arrest of 

Mohamed Atta on a Virginia roadway. I mean, it is just a different 

kind of situation. 

You talked about analysis and how people can come to different 

conclusions. I used to tell my young analysts that any two pieces 

of information would not give you any conclusion. As a matter of 

fact, I can draw an infinite number of circles through two points 

on a board. But with three, I begin now to define something that 

I can say with certainty but maybe one of those thoughts is misplaced, and so the more information I get, the more important it 

is. 

I believe that we are missing a point about terrorism as it relates 

to how we go after these targets. Now, I am talking well beyond 

my Markle experience. You are drawing upon my other experience. 

Terrorism has a process. That process includes target selection, 

planning, recruitment, training and then execution or command 

control. 

The earlier we can get into that process, the most chance we 

have of preventing terrorism. And I, for one, do not want to have 

a system that is just going to forensically document what they did 

to us. I would prefer to put our efforts into this whole plethora of 

processes that they are going to be involved in. And that is why 

members of the Markle Task Force began focusing on information 

sharing very, very early in our process of deliberation on what 

needed to be done to make things better. 

So the experience of the people in Markle who have served previous presidents and previous administrations in intelligence positions, in law enforcement positions that led us to believe that this 

new world is not about need to know, it is about sharing information that allows us to know more and come to conclusions earlier 

in the game. Rather long answer but important question. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Very discrete. 

The chair recognizes the gentlelady from California. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this has been 

a very helpful hearing and just a couple of further questions. 

Mr. Crowell, you mentioned in your initial testimony that there 

was an issue relative to involving law enforcement so long as Mr. 
55

Russack reporting to the DNI. Do you have a proposed solution to 

that? 

Mr. CROWELL. Well, there are two possible paths that you can go 

down. One is that you accept the fact that he is now in the DNI’s 

Office and the president and those involved in the cabinet in other 

departments come to some agreement about how they are going to 

cooperate at a high level with the DNI in meeting the needs across 

the entire government. 

The other possibility, of course, is to either reassign him or dual 

hat him so that he has a reporting chain that gets him closer to 

these other organizations that must be supported, specifically the 

Department of Homeland Security and the law enforcement activities of Justice and FBI. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Ms. Lofgren, if I may interject, I think this problem of information sharing with state and local authorities is a formidable problem. I know you have been in touch with your state 

and local officials and they really complain a lot. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Yes, they do. 

Mr. HAMILTON. And it is a question of building a relationship 

and building confidence. And it is a two-way relationship. I mean, 

the DHS and the DNI and all the rest of them have to pay attention to these local officials and the information they are gathering 

with regard to terrorism. But they also have to impart the information. These relationships cannot be quickly developed. They have to 

be developed over time. Confidence is the key, building the confidence in those relationships. 

And, of course, it is a very formidable problem for the federal authorities because they are dealing with so many municipalities and 

states across the country. It cannot be expected to be done quickly. 

Ms. LOFGREN. And the level of expertise varies widely among the 

groups. 

Mr. HAMILTON. That is exactly right. There are some municipalities that have expertise that matches that federal government and 

maybe even exceeds it in areas, and there are others that are very 

rudimentary. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I wonder, Mr. Crowell, you mentioned—or maybe 

you didn’t—the Markle Foundation, in any case, suggests, I believe, 

in the letter to the president that Mr. Russack should chair both 

the Information Sharing Council and the Information Sharing Policy Coordinating Committee. Is that because there is a lack of coordination between the two bodies? Why is that suggestion being 

made? 

Mr. CROWELL. I am not really an expert on how those two organizations function today, and they are just standing up, but I think 

it is because the Policy Coordinating Committee in fact is able to 

set guidelines and policies across the entire federal structure, and 

it is not just a coordinating body. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I see. 

A final question for Mr. Hamilton. I have followed for several 

years now the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and it is 

late, we had a November 2 deadline for public comment, and I 

guess the final plan is supposed to be released in February of next 

year. 
56

Have you had an opportunity to review the draft plan? And if so, 

do you have any thoughts for us on it? 

Mr. HAMILTON. I have not seen the draft plan but I do have some 

thoughts. 

Ms. LOFGREN. All right. 

Mr. HAMILTON. Look, it is a question of priorities. You have got 

thousands and thousands of targets out here, 85 percent of them 

in the private sector. What do you decide to protect and what do 

you decide what not to protect? And the secretary in his confirmation hearing spoke about making hard choices. Well, that is exactly 

right. 

And I understand and you understand how difficult it is to make 

these choices, because if you choose to protect this chemical plant 

and not protect this one over here, and then this one over here is 

the one that is hit, you look pretty bad, you have made the wrong 

guess. 

Therefore, policymakers are very reluctant to make the hard 

choices on priorities. What I think you have to force the policy people to do is to make those choices as best they can. Otherwise, you 

are trying to protect everything and you will protect nothing very 

well. So I think the policymaker has an exceedingly tough job here, 

but it is a job that a policymaker must do. He has got to decide 

what infrastructure needs protecting. 

A chemical plant in southern Indiana is not going to cause the 

kind of damage if it is attacked than a chemical plant in the heart 

of New York City. You have got to make the choice. 

Ms. LOFGREN. If I can, I realize my time is up, I understand 

what you are saying, and it is hard to disagree with that. I think, 

though, we are far from even that situation where we are mixing 

in supermarkets and a miniature golf course, in the case of my district, with infrastructure in telecommunications. It is simply never 

been included. 

Mr. HAMILTON. You have to make these judgments on the basis 

of the best intelligence you have and on the risks that are involved, 

the vulnerabilities that are involved and the consequences that are 

involved. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, I do want to state for the record, because I 

did ask, that there is nothing to base the miniature golf course inclusion. People should not be fearful of playing miniature golf in 

the 16th Congressional District. 

And with that, I would like to thank both of these witnesses for 

their excellent testimony. It has been very helpful. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the ranking member for all of her assistance and participation. 

We have been joined again by the gentlelady from Texas. Did she 

have a final comment that she wished to make? 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. I wanted to pose the question regarding the 

October 20 report, Mr. Hamilton, from the Public Discourse Project. 

The project noted various impediments to the operations of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Whenever I think of intelligence, I am always concerned about—or the gathering of intelligence, privacy and civil liberties, and of course the board was a 

creature of the Intelligence Reform Act. 
57

I would like to get your sense of what the ongoing problems with 

the board that you may be aware of and what role should the board 

play with regard to information sharing issues we are examining 

today. Sharing suggests questions dealing with privacy and civil 

liberties, and I hope that we could track, deface and secure our 

civil liberties. And what should Congress be doing to address the 

shortcomings of the 9/11 Public Disclosure Project that has been 

identified with the board? 

Mr. HAMILTON. I think it is very important to recognize that 

when you have an elaborate counterterrorism strategy, you are 

greatly expanding the role of government. You are spending a lot 

more money, you are hiring a lot more people, and government is 

becoming much more intrusive. 

Now, all of those things may be necessary in the current climate, 

and apparently most people think they are, because we are doing 

it. But what we said was that in this environment—and I appreciate very much your question—you have to set up a Privacy and 

Civil Liberties Board that has power to look into these things 

across government, not just the FBI, not just the CIA but all across 

the government. 

The Congress obviously agreed with that. You put that into the 

law that was passed. 

Now, our concern at this point is that we don’t see much urgency 

here. The president has named the members of the board. The 

nominees for the chair and the vice chair of the board have not yet 

been confirmed by the Senate. So far as I know, there is no funding 

available, no meetings have been held, no staff has been named, no 

work has been outlined, and no work has begun, no office has been 

established. So this is, incidentally, 10 months now after the establishment of the board by statute. So I think there is a real urgency 

here to get a board in place that is a robust board to protect privacy and civil liberties. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Let me thank you very much. That is a very 

forceful response. 

And, Mr. Crowell, let me acknowledge and thank you for your 

testimony. Didn’t know if you wanted to comment on that. If you 

desire to do so, be happy to receive your comments. 

Mr. CROWELL. Well, as I mentioned earlier, the Markle Foundation has always considered privacy to be a major part of our entire 

study. We believe very strongly that wit the right mechanisms, an 

oversight board, the right policies, guidelines and some technology 

to help audit and enforce those policies, that we do not have to 

compromise our right to privacy in order to attain a higher degree 

of security in this fight on terrorism. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Then let me thank both of you for your testimony. 

Let me thank the chairman and the ranking member, and may 

I pile on to both your plates possibly an oversight hearing regarding this board, why it hasn’t been energized, if you will. We don’t 

have confirmation rights or privileges, as the Senate does, but it 

would be important to ask the administration and others why we 

have not moved forward and whether or not we can help expedite—

when I say, ‘‘we,’’ they can help expedite and encourage the confirmation of their appointees and as well establishing, as Mr. Ham-
58

ilton said, an office, a mission, resources and staff I think might 

be a good parallel to the work we are doing on this committee. 

And with that, I thank them, and I yield back. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, gentlemen, both for your long and very distinguished 

careers in service to the United States of America. Thank you for 

bringing the distilled wisdom of those careers as well as your recent activities to the table to benefit this subcommittee and this 

Congress. We thank you both very much. 

The hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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