United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Congressional 

Committees 

MILITARY TRAINING

Actions Needed to 

More Fully Develop 

the Army's Strategy 

for Training Modular 

Brigades and Address 

Implementation 

Challenges 

August 2007 

 

GAO-07-936 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

August 2007

MILITARY TRAINING

Actions Needed to More Fully Develop 

the Army’s Strategy for Training Modular 

Brigades and Address Implementation 

Challenges 

Highlights of GAO-07-936, a report to 

Congressional Committees 

The Army considers modular force 

transformation its most extensive 

restructuring since World War II. 

The Army has estimated that 

restructuring units from a divisionbased force to a more agile and 

responsive modular brigade-based

force will require a significant 

investment through fiscal year

2011. To facilitate this 

transformation, Public Law No. 

109-163 Section 353 directs the 

Army to develop and implement a 

training strategy for the modular

brigades. This law also directs GAO 

to report on the implementation of

the strategy. This report discusses 

(1) the extent to which the Army’s 

training strategy addresses the five

elements specified in the public

law and (2) the actions the Army 

has taken to implement its training

strategy and the implementation

challenges it faces. To address 

these objectives, GAO reviewed

Army training strategy 

documentation and interviewed

Army training personnel. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Army

(1) take a series of actions to 

improve its ability to assess unit 

training and identify funding needs 

for training by clarifying specific

goals, metrics, and its funding 

model and (2) revise the training 

strategy, clarify capacity, and 

complete testing of the exportable

training capability. In commenting 

on a draft of this report, the 

Department of Defense generally

concurred with four 

recommendations and did not 

concur with two. 

While the Army’s training strategy addresses each of the five elements 

specified in the public law to some extent, additional work needs to be done 

to fully develop the strategy. Section 353 of Public Law No. 109-163 requires

the Army’s training strategy for modular brigades to include five elements: 

(1) purpose; (2) performance goals, including specific performance goals for 

live, virtual, and constructive training; (3) metrics; (4) a reporting process; 

and (5) a funding model. GAO’s analysis indicated that the Army articulated 

the purpose of its strategy, but the remaining elements require further 

development. While an overarching performance goal has been established, 

the Army has not completed development of specific goals for live, virtual, 

and constructive training. Moreover, neither constructive training events nor 

the goals for them are clearly articulated. The Army also has not developed 

objective metrics to measure performance against its goal, but relies on a 

commander’s professional experience to make a subjective assessment. In 

addition, the reporting process does not provide detailed collective training 

status and the funding model does not realistically estimate training costs. 

Until the Army fully develops the required elements in its training strategy, it

will not be in a sound position to assess if it can achieve the long-term 

institutional benefits of having a consistently trained force, measure how 

well units have been trained, and accurately determine training costs. 

The Army has taken some actions to implement its training strategy, but key 

implementation challenges remain, such as the availability of forces, limited 

capacity of the Army’s training centers, and the availability of training 

personnel. While the Army is developing guidance to implement its strategy, 

commitments to ongoing operations have limited the availability of forces to

train as envisioned. The strategy is designed to support a model built on the 

assumption that a third of the Army’s active duty brigade combat teams are

deployed at one time; however, almost half of these brigades are deployed. 

Moreover, units are currently spending much less than the 2 years in training

between deployments envisioned in the model, and training is focused on 

mission rehearsal instead of full spectrum operations. To support the model 

the Army’s combat training centers must provide 36 combat training 

rotations for brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2010; however, the centers

can only accommodate 28 rotations. While the Army is developing an 

exportable training capability to supplement the number of rotations 

conducted at the centers, the concept has not been tested and its costs are 

unclear, even though the Army has identified funding needs for fiscal year 

2009. Personnel short falls at the combat training centers also hamper 

implementation of the strategy. Without developing a plan to address the 

challenges of current commitments and limited capacity, the Army will not 

know if it will be able to meet its training strategy goals. Moreover, until the 

Army completes the testing of the exportable training capability, it will be 

unable to verify that the concept is the most appropriate approach to meet 

its training requirements or what funding is required to establish the 

capability. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-936.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Sharon Pickup 

at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 7

Army’s Training Strategy Provides Purpose, but Other Elements 

Required to Support the Strategy Need Further Development 12 

Actions Taken to Implement the Army Training Strategy, but Key 

Implementation Challenges Remain 18 

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 27 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 31 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 33 

Tables 

Table 1: Details of Army Force Generation Readiness Pools 9 

Table 2: The Army’s Combat Training Centers 11 

Table 3: Army Chief of Staff Guidelines for the Transformation of 

Army Training 12 

Table 4: Status of Master Plans 20 

Figures 

Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Brigades 8 

Figure 2: ARFORGEN Training Cycle 10 

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Page i GAO-07-936 Military Training 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

August 6, 2007 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

In 2004, the Army began its modular force transformation to restructure 

itself from a division-based force to a more agile and responsive modular 

brigade-based force—an undertaking it considers the most extensive 

reorganization of its force since World War II. According to Army 

estimates, this initiative will require a significant investment through fiscal 

year 2011, at a time when the Army is fully engaged in operations in 

Afghanistan and Iraq supporting the Global War on Terrorism. 

Transformation is guided by the Army Campaign Plan, which provides 

guidance about basing, restructuring specialties in the Army, increasing 

Page 1 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
the length and stability of tours in the United States, and training. The 

Army is expanding its operational force from 33 existing combat brigades 

to 42 modular combat brigades in the active force and creating 28 National 

Guard modular combat brigades. Support units will also be reorganized 

into functional support brigades to provide independent support to several 

brigade combat teams during combat operations. The Army expects to 

complete reorganization of the force by the end of fiscal year 2011. In 

addition to transformation, the Army plans to increase in size from 512,400 

to 547,000 personnel over the next 5 years. 

To help manage its personnel and equipment, coordinate training, and 

prioritize resources, the Army developed a force rotation model called 

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). Under this model, active and 

Guard units will progress through a series of three stages, called readiness 

pools—reset/train, ready, and available. Active duty brigades will spend 

approximately 1 year in each pool over a 3-year cycle and Guard units will 

train under a 6-year cycle spending approximately 4 years in reset/train 

and 1 year each in the ready and available pools. Units will progress from 

the reset/train pool to the ready pool and from the ready pool to the 

available pool based on their commander’s assessment following 

completion of an exercise at one of the Army’s combat training centers.1

Once a brigade is assigned to the available pool, it is considered fully 

mission ready and available to deploy. 

Because of the magnitude and associated costs of the Army’s 

transformation, Congress directed the Army to develop and implement a 

training strategy for brigade-based combat teams and functional 

supporting brigades to ensure their readiness. Public Law No. 109-163 

Section 353 directs the Army to develop and implement a training strategy

that includes the following five elements: (1) purpose; (2) performance 

goals, which should include specific goals for live, virtual, and 

 1

The Army’s combat training centers enable commanders, their staffs, and units to execute 

advanced training under a variety of conditions that approximate actual combat as closely 

as possible. The combat training centers include the Battle Command Training Program at

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which focuses on computer-assisted battle commander-centric

training exercises at the Joint Task Force, Army, corps, division, and brigade levels, and the 

maneuver combat training centers—the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels,

Germany; the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the National 

Training Center at Fort Irwin, California—which conduct brigade-sized live training 

exercises. 

Page 2 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
constructive training;2

 (3) metrics; (4) a reporting process; and (5) a 

funding model.3

Public Law No. 109-163 Section 353 also directs GAO to report on the 

status of the Army’s implementation of this training strategy. In February 

2007, the Army issued a three-page report to Congress responding to the 

legislative requirement to report on its development of a training strategy.

4

This brief Army document touches on each of the five elements as 

directed, but does not provide a great deal of detail. Specifically, the report 

briefly discusses certain elements of the strategy, such as performance 

goals, training ranges, and funding requirements, and indicates that the 

Army has begun implementing its strategy. According to Army officials, 

the overall training strategy, however, is an integrated collection of 

documents reflecting the Army’s guidance, strategies, models, systems, 

and processes that must work together to develop a trained and ready 

force. In addition, Army guidance, including the Army’s Chief of Staff 

Memorandum on Army training transformation5

 and the Army’s 2007

Posture Statement,6

 states that this training strategy directly supports the 

Army’s Force Generation model. For this report, we focused our analysis 

on this broader collection of documents in addition to the three-page 

report. Specifically, we assessed the (1) extent to which the Army’s 

training strategy addresses the five elements specified in the public law 

and (2) actions the Army has taken to implement its training strategy and 

identify challenges it faces in implementing the training strategy. 

In conducting this analysis, we used the language of Public Law No. 109-

163 Section 353, relevant Army regulations, and the Government 

Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)7

 as criteria for determining 

 2

Live training is that which is conducted in a physical environment. Virtual simulation 

training provides crews, leaders, and units with realistic training experiences using 

sophisticated simulators. Constructive simulation training is the use of computer models 

and game-type simulations. 

3

National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2006 (2006). 

4

Department of the Army, Report to Congress, Subject: Army Training Strategy for 

Brigade Based Combat Teams and Functional Supporting Brigades (Washington, D.C.:

December 2006). 

5

Army Chief of Staff Memorandum, Transformation of Training (Washington, D.C.: May 9,

2006). 

6

Army Posture Statement 2007, February 14, 2007. 

7

Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

Page 3 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
how the elements of the Army training strategy address the five elements 

specified in the public law and to what degree further development is 

needed. In order to determine the extent to which the Army’s training 

strategy addressed the five specified elements and actions taken to 

implement the strategy, we reviewed the Army’s Report to Congress on the 

Army Training Strategy and Army Training Strategy documents, guidance,

and funding plans. We performed content and data analysis on this 

material to determine if the elements identified by the Army met the 

requirements of the mandate and what implementing instructions and 

guidance have been developed. We also examined the extent to which 

funds and resources have been expended or programmed to support the 

strategy. Additionally, to determine the challenges facing implementation, 

we interviewed Army personnel responsible for developing and 

implementing the Army training strategy at the Department of the Army, 

National Guard Bureau, three of the Army’s combat training centers, Army 

Training Doctrine Command, Army Forces Command, and the United 

States Army, Europe. We then compared the reports and testimony of 

officials in the field with the Army Training Strategy documents, guidance,

and funding plans provided by Army headquarters to identify possible 

constraints. We conducted our review from August 2006 through June 

2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

While the Army’s training strategy addresses each of the five elements 

specified in the public law to some extent, additional work needs to be 

done by the Army to fully develop the strategy. The purpose of the Army’s 

training strategy is clearly articulated in the Chief of Staff’s strategic

direction and in the 2006 Strategic Training Guidance. However, the 

performance goals, metrics, reporting process, and funding model require 

further development. A performance goal—as defined in GPRA—should 

be a target level of performance expressed as a tangible, measurable 

objective, against which actual achievement can be compared. The Army 

has established an overall performance goal for brigades in the modular 

force to be “fully mission capable” when they are available for 

deployment. In addition, the Army has developed specific performance 

goals for live and virtual training for all of the brigade combat teams and 

some of the functional supporting brigades. However, the use of these 

goals to guide training is not mandatory, and neither constructive training 

nor the goals for it are clearly articulated in the templates that units use to 

plan training. In addition, the Army’s training strategy currently lacks 

metrics that can objectively measure achievement against its stated 

overarching performance goal. To measure achievement of fully mission 

Results in Brief 

Page 4 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
capable status, the Army relies on a commander’s professional 

assessment—a subjective evaluation on whether he or she believes a unit 

is fully capable of completing its mission. Additionally, while the Army has 

characterized two types of metrics it collects as measures of training 

performance, none of the metrics collected objectively determines fully 

mission capable status. Furthermore, the reporting systems the Army uses 

to support the new training strategy do not provide enough information. 

For example, the Army’s reporting system, the unit status report, provides 

an overview of training status, but does not provide detailed information 

about the status of collective training. The Army intends to use a “new” 

Department of Defense (DOD) system to capture unit collective training 

information as part of the unit status report by the end of fiscal year 2008.

Moreover, the Army’s current funding model does not realistically estimate 

the costs associated with achieving the overall performance goal of being 

fully mission capable. Specifically, the model calculates costs for all of the 

training events identified in the planning templates, even though they are

not mandatory or tied to the overall performance goal. Until the Army fully 

develops the required elements in its training strategy, it will not be in a 

sound position to assess if it can achieve the long-term benefits of having a 

consistently trained force, measure how well units have been trained, and 

accurately determine the costs of training. To improve the Army’s ability 

to assess unit training and identify funding needs for training, we 

recommend that it clearly identify constructive training events and the 

total activity goals associated with them, develop metrics that can 

objectively and reliably measure achievement against the Army’s stated 

performance goal, and revise its methods—including a funding model—to 

better estimate the costs associated with achieving the performance goal. 

In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendations to develop metrics and revise its methods to estimate 

costs. However, DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the 

Army establish milestones for developing constructive training goals. DOD 

stated that the Army has documented these goals. To support this position, 

Army officials provided us with additional evidence. After reviewing this 

evidence, we have modified our recommendation to emphasize the Army’s 

need to clearly identify constructive training and the goals associated with

it in the planning templates. 

The Army has taken some actions to implement the training strategy, but

key implementation challenges remain, such as the availability of forces, 

the capacity of the Army’s training centers, and personnel shortages. Our 

analysis of the Army’s implementation planning documents shows that the 

Army has developed guidance, such as training templates and instructions, 

for implementing the training strategy; however, actual implementation 

Page 5 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
has been hindered by current operational commitments. The Army’s 

overall training strategy was designed to support ARFORGEN, which is 

built on the assumption that one-third of the Army’s active duty brigade 

combat teams are deployed at one time; however almost half of these 

brigades are currently deployed. Because of the pace of operations, active 

duty units cannot spend the 2 years in training expected by the model; in 

fact, units are spending much less time in training before being deployed 

again.8

 Training objectives for recent combat training center rotations are 

focused on mission rehearsal exercises to prepare troops for ongoing 

operations; they do not cover all the combat skills needed for fullspectrum operations. According to Army officials, implementation of the 

training strategy, which includes building full-spectrum operational skills, 

cannot occur until operational commitments decrease and forces are 

available to enter into the phased ARFORGEN cycles. The Army has not 

adjusted its training strategy to account for conducting the current high 

level of operations. Furthermore, the Army’s combat training centers do 

not currently have the capacity to support ARFORGEN requirements. For 

example, to support the model, the Army estimates that its three maneuver 

combat training centers must provide 36 combat training rotations for 

modular brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2010. However, the centers 

can accommodate only 28 combat training rotations,9 and there are no 

plans to increase the capacity of the fixed site combat training centers in 

light of the planned increase in the Army’s end strength. Instead, the Army 

is developing an exportable training capability to supplement the number 

of rotations that can be conducted at the centers. This capability is 

intended to create a combat training center-like event for brigade combat 

teams at their home stations. While the Army has developed plans for 

establishing two organizations—one in the United States and one in 

Germany—to conduct this exportable training, the concepts have not yet 

been tested and it is unclear how much it will cost, even though budget

documents show that the Army plans to request funding for building the 

exportable training capability in the United States in fiscal year 2009. 

Furthermore, it is unclear what adjustments may or may not be needed in

order to fulfill existing training commitments in Germany. Implementation 

of the training strategy has also been hampered by a lack of personnel 

available to fill combat training center instructor slots because of other 

operational commitments. For example, the Army’s training center for 

functional support brigades and theater brigades cannot execute training 

 8

Specific information about the length of time spent in training is classified. 

9

 The centers can surge to accommodate 32 rotations a year. 

Page 6 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
exercises because of a shortage of staff. The Army does not have a plan to

address this challenge. Without developing a plan to address the 

challenges associated with the Army’s current operational commitments, 

the Army will not know if it will be able to achieve its goals of having fully 

mission capable trained forces to conduct full-spectrum operations. 

Moreover, until the Army completes its testing of the exportable training 

capability, it will not know what resources—such as funding—are needed 

to implement the strategy or if the concept is the most appropriate 

approach for addressing the limited capacity of the existing combat 

training centers. To address the challenges facing the implementation of 

the strategy, we recommend revising or adjusting the training strategy to 

account for current operations and complete the proof of principle test for

the exportable training capability, to verify that it can support increasing 

capacity requirements and use the results to guide future funding requests. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to revise or adjust the training 

strategy and to establish milestones for the proof of principle test. DOD 

did not concur with our recommendation that the Army clarify the 

capacity needed at the combat training centers. DOD stated that the Army 

has been continuously identifying and updating capacity demands, leading 

the Army to recently decide it needed additional exportable training 

capability. As a result, we have revised our recommendation to emphasize 

that the proof of principle should be completed in order for DOD to verify 

whether the capability is the most appropriate approach for meeting its 

future capacity demands and to adjust its fiscal year 2009 request, and 

future funding requests, accordingly.

The Army’s conversion to a modular force encompasses the Army’s total 

force—active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve—and 

directly affects not only the Army’s combat units but related command and 

support organizations. A key to the Army’s new modular force design is 

embedding within combat brigades reconnaissance, logistics, and other 

support units that previously made up parts of division-level and higherlevel command and support organizations, allowing the brigades to 

operate independently. The Army is also organizing support forces into 

functional supporting brigades. These brigades will continue to provide 

high-level support, such as aviation, rocket artillery, or large-scale 

logistics, as part of the brigade-based force. By fiscal year 2011, the Army 

plans to have reconfigured its total force into the modular design. The 

foundation of the modular force is the modular brigade combat teams that 

will have a common organizational design and are intended to increase the 

rotational pool of ready units. Modular combat brigades (depicted in fig. 1) 

Background 

Page 7 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
will have one of three standard designs—heavy brigade, infantry brigade,

or Stryker brigade. 

Figure 1: Standard Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker Brigades

Sources: GAO analysis of Army data and National War College, National War College, and U.S. Army (images left to right). 

Standard modular combat brigade designs

Heavy brigade

3,700 soldiers

Equipped with Abrams tanks

and Bradley Fighting vehicles

Infantry brigade

3,300 soldiers

Dismounted infantry

Stryker brigade

3,900 soldiers

Equipped with

Stryker vehicles

Abrams tank Infantry soldier Stryker vehicle

The Army plans to use a force rotation model—ARFORGEN—to manage

the modular force. Under the model, active, reserve, and Guard units 

progress through a series of readiness pools. The Army uses these pools—

reset/train, ready, and available, which are described in table 1—and 

mission requirements to prioritize resources and coordinate training, 

personnel, and equipment. 

Page 8 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
Table 1: Details of Army Force Generation Readiness Pools 

Readiness pool

Tasks being

conducted Available for 

Move to next pool

when 

Reset/train 1. Receiving

personnel and 

equipment 

2 Individual and 

collective training on 

core tasks 

1. Homeland security 

2. Humanitarian and 

disaster relief 

Unit successfully 

completes combat 

training center-level 

collective training 

event 

Ready Collective training on 

theater-specific tasks 

Mobilization for fullspectrum operations Unit successfully 

completes theaterfocused combat 

training center-level 

collective training 

event 

Available 1. Deployed in

operational mission 

2. Standby for 

immediate 

deployment as 

required 

1. Conducting active 

operations 

2. Mobilization for fullspectrum operations 

Unit returns to home 

station 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data. 

Units will transition through these pools based on the commander’s 

assessment of unit capability levels following a combat training centerlevel collective training event, validated by the next higher commander 

and monitored by United States Army Forces Command, as shown in 

figure 2. Army guidance, including the Army’s Chief of Staff Memorandum 

on the transformation of Army training and the Army’s 2007 Posture 

Statement, states that the Army’s training strategy, from initial entry 

training to unit combat training center rotations, directly supports 

ARFORGEN.

Page 9 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
Figure 2: ARFORGEN Training Cycle

In addition to training at the home station, the modular force trains at the 

Army’s combat training centers. These centers allow brigades to perform 

advanced training under a variety of conditions that approximate actual 

combat as closely as possible, enabling units to assess and build upon 

Page 10 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
skills learned at the home station using a combination of live, virtual, and 

constructive training. The Army maintains four combat training centers, as 

shown in table 2. The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), the 

Joint Readiness Training Center, and the National Training Center are 

collectively referred to as the maneuver combat training centers. 

Table 2: The Army’s Combat Training Centers 

Name Location Element trained Focus

Battle Command 

Training Program 

Fort Leavenworth, 

KS 

Corps, division, and 

brigade staff 

Full-spectrum operations 

in a joint, interagency, 

intergovernmental, and 

multinational 

environment 

Joint Multinational 

Readiness Center 

Hohenfels, 

Germany 

Brigade combat

team, selected 

division maneuver 

and support units, 

special operations 

forces, and 

selected brigade 

support elements. 

Full-spectrum operations 

in a joint, interagency, 

intergovernmental, and 

multinational 

environment 

Joint Readiness 

Training Center

Fort Polk, LA Brigade combat

team, selected 

division maneuver 

and support units, 

special operations 

forces, and 

selected brigade 

support elements. 

Full-spectrum operations 

in a joint, interagency, 

intergovernmental, and 

multinational 

environment 

National Training 

Center 

Fort Irwin, CA Brigade combat

team, selected 

division maneuver 

and support units, 

special operations 

forces, and 

selected brigade 

support elements 

Full-spectrum operations 

in a joint, interagency, 

intergovernmental, and 

multinational 

environment 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data. 

Page 11 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
While the Army’s training strategy addresses each of the required five 

elements to some extent, additional work needs to be done to fully 

develop these elements in the strategy. Section 353 of Public Law No. 109-

163 requires the Army’s training strategy for brigade-based combat teams 

and functional supporting brigades to include five elements: (1) purpose; 

(2) performance goals, which should include specific goals for live, virtual, 

and constructive training; (3) metrics; (4) a reporting process; and (5) a 

funding model. The Army has fully articulated the purpose of the strategy, 

but the remaining elements needed to manage training require further 

development. Although the Army has established an overarching 

performance goal, the specific goals for live, virtual, and constructive 

training are either incomplete or not mandatory. Moreover, the Army does 

not have an objective method of measuring performance against its stated 

overarching performance goal. In addition, the current reporting and 

funding systems do not provide the level of detail necessary to achieve the 

Army’s stated performance goal. Until the Army fully develops the 

required elements in its training strategy, it will not be in a sound position 

to assess if it can achieve the long-term benefits of having a consistently 

trained force, measure how well units have been trained, and accurately

determine the cost of training. 

The Army has clearly articulated the purpose of training for its brigade 

combat teams and functional supporting brigades. The purpose is stated in 

the Army Chief of Staff’s strategic direction memorandum of May 9, 2006,

and the Strategic Training Guidance dated June 26, 2006. The overall

purpose of the Army’s training strategy is to train to win the current war 

while developing leaders for the next war using ARFORGEN. In order to 

achieve this purpose, the Chief of Staff of the Army established the 

guidelines for training, which are shown in table 3. 

Army’s Training 

Strategy Provides 

Purpose, but Other 

Elements Required to 

Support the Strategy 

Need Further 

Development 

Purpose of the Strategy Is 

Fully Articulated 

Table 3: Army Chief of Staff Guidelines for the Transformation of Army Training 

Guidelines

Retain the Warrior Ethos as training foundations 

Train to support the ARFORGEN 

Synchronize the modular transformation of units 

Appropriately resource the training base with equipment 

Improve home station training

Achieve full-spectrum capability with full-spectrum training 

Focus on defeating improvised explosive devices 

Page 12 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
Guidelines

Assimilate future combat systems 

Stay current and relevant 

Build the bench (develop decision making at the lowest level) 

Remain a values-based Army built on standards and discipline while embracing a culture 

of innovation 

Preserve combat power by reducing accidents 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data. 

Furthermore, the Strategic Training Guidance identifies the processes, 

skills, and technologies needed to meet the Army’s goals and objectives. 

For example, among the issues the guidance explains are ARFORGEN for 

training units; the development of military and civilian leaders through 

training and education; the various training methods, such as institutional 

training (e.g., schoolhouse training) and operational training (e.g., home 

station and the combat training centers); and the systems and technologies 

present in the Training Support System. Our analysis of these documents, 

guidelines, and guidance showed that they defined the purpose of a 

strategy, which GPRA identified as necessary, such as including a 

description of the operational processes, skills and technology, and the 

human capital, information, and other resources required to meet goals 

and objectives. 

Overarching Performance 

Goal Established, but 

Supporting Goals Are Not 

Complete or Mandatory 

Our review of training strategy documentation reveals that the Army has 

identified one overarching performance goal for its modular brigades. 

However, the specific supporting performance goals for live, virtual, and 

constructive training required by the mandate10 are neither complete for all 

the brigades nor are units required to execute the training the goals 

measure. The Army has identified progression through the ARFORGEN 

readiness cycle to achieve fully mission capable status as the overarching 

performance goal for the modular brigade-based combat teams and 

functional supporting brigades. To achieve fully mission capable status, 

units must progress first from the reset pool to the ready pool and then 

from the ready pool to the available pool. To pass through each pool, 

brigade combat teams must undergo (1) a maneuver combat training 

center-level training event and (2) a commander’s assessment. Functional

 10 Pub. L. No. 109-163 § 353 (a) (2) (B) (2006). 

Page 13 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
supporting brigades complete a command and staff training exercise at the 

Battle Command Training Center and a commander’s assessment. 

The Army is developing planning templates that identify supporting 

activity goals for live and virtual training. These planning templates list 

training events with recommended frequencies and associated activity 

levels for each live and virtual training event. While the templates include

constructive training exercises, they are not clearly identified. In addition, 

the templates do not clearly articulate total activity goals for constructive 

training, as they do for live and virtual training. According to Army 

officials, commanders can use these planning templates to develop 

training programs for their units, and the Army can also use the total 

activity goals as indicators of readiness. In addition, the Army has not 

completed the planning templates for all the functional supporting 

brigades, although Army officials stated that they intend to complete them 

during fiscal year 2007. Army officials stated that preparing the templates 

for combat units had priority and they focused on completing those 

planning templates first. 

In addition, according to Army officials, execution of the planning 

templates is not mandatory. Instead, commanders may opt to conduct 

different training events, or decide to train to activity levels that are higher 

or lower than those specified in the planning templates. Army officials 

stated they do not want to take away the commanders’ flexibility in 

training their units by making the planning templates mandatory. Because

achievement of the supporting activity goals is not required by the Army, 

they are not effective performance goals. By GPRA standards, effective 

performance goals are target levels of performance expressed as a 

tangible, measurable objective against which actual achievement is 

compared. Without requiring units to achieve these goals, units may be 

conducting different levels of live, virtual, and constructive training, and 

the Army will not be able to determine if units are trained consistently. 

Army Lacks Metrics That 

Objectively Measure 

Achievement of 

Performance Goal

Our analysis of the Army’s training strategy shows that it currently lacks 

metrics that can objectively measure achievement against its stated 

overarching performance goal. The mandate requires that the Army’s 

training strategy include metrics that measure training performance 

against the strategy’s performance goals.11 The Senate committee report on

 11 Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 353 (a) (2) (B) (2006). 

Page 14 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
GPRA states that performance indicators (metrics) are used to measure 

whether a goal is being achieved, and GAO standards identify clarity, 

objectivity, and reliability as key attributes of successful indicators.12

However, the Army has decided to continue to rely on the subjective

assessment of the commander to determine the readiness progression of 

its units in order to provide commanders with more flexibility in their 

training plans—just as it did before the development of the current 

training strategy. Units move through the ARFORGEN operational 

readiness cycle based on the commander’s assessment. The commander 

bases the assessment on personal observations, feedback from training 

events, and external evaluations. The Army has not developed a set of 

uniform standards or parameters to guide the commander’s development 

of the assessment; instead, the assessment is the commander’s subjective 

evaluation of the unit’s ability to complete its mission based on the 

commander’s professional experience. Consequently, the achievement of 

the overarching performance goal is not being objectively measured, 

making it difficult to evaluate training to a single Army standard across 

units. 

The Army’s report to Congress also characterizes two systems as 

providing metrics to quantify training performance against the 

performance goals specified by the strategy: (1) the unit status report and 

(2) the training resource model (TRM). However, the metrics collected by 

these systems do not objectively determine fully mission capable status.

The Army’s unit status report enables a commander to determine and 

report his or her unit’s overall level of readiness to accomplish its 

designed wartime mission based on the unit’s equipment, personnel, and

training levels. The training component of the unit status report allows 

commanders to report their evaluation of their unit’s proficiency in its 

mission-essential tasks. While the unit status report includes objective 

measures—in the areas of equipment and personnel—training levels are 

determined based on the commander’s subjective evaluation of their unit.

In addition, the Army uses TRM to collect data on training activity. TRM 

determines operational funding requirements for unit training based on a 

unit’s activity level, measured in terms of miles driven—tank-miles—or 

hours flown—flight-hours. Army officials stated that tank-miles and flighthours are indicators of estimated readiness, although driving large 

 12 See GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season 

Performance Measures, app. I, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002). 

Page 15 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
numbers of tank-miles does not necessarily indicate high readiness while 

failing to drive a required number of tank-miles does not automatically 

equate to low readiness. Instead, the activity measurements are weighed 

against a commander’s assessment of unit readiness. Therefore, while 

units report their activity levels to the Army on a regular basis, these 

reports do not provide a basis for determining if units pass through the 

pools of the ARFORGEN cycle and reach fully mission capable status. 

In using the unit status report and TRM to meet the requirements of the 

mandate, the Army is relying on systems and metrics that are not directly 

linked to the new overarching performance goal. To measure units’ 

progress in achieving the strategy’s overarching performance goal, the 

Army continues to rely on a subjective commander’s assessment. As a 

result, the Army is using metrics that are not able to objectively quantify

actual training performance against the performance goals currently 

specified by the strategy. Until the Army develops metrics that can 

objectively measure achievement of its performance goals, it will not be 

able to objectively measure how well its forces have been trained and 

achieve the long-term benefit of having a consistently trained force. 

Reporting System and 

Funding Model Do Not 

Provide Enough 

Information 

Current reporting systems and funding models do not provide all the 

information needed to manage the training progression of units through 

ARFORGEN. The mandate requires that the Army’s training strategy 

incorporate a process to report the status of collective training13 for 

monitoring the training performance of modular brigade-based combat 

teams and functional supporting brigades.14 While the Army’s unit status 

report provides an overview of unit training, our analysis shows that it 

does not provide specific details on unit collective training performance. 

By fiscal year 2008, the Army is scheduled to use a new system called the 

Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army15 that is intended to establish 

new performance indicators to evaluate the ability of units to execute their 

 13Collective training is training that is conducted within a unit and focused on preparing the 

unit to perform its assigned missions. 

14Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 353 (a) (2) (D) (2006). 

15In June 2002, DOD issued a directive establishing the Department of Defense Readiness 

Reporting System. This system is intended to measure and report on the readiness of 

military forces and the supporting infrastructure to meet missions and goals assigned by

the Secretary of Defense. All DOD components are required to align their readiness 

reporting processes in accordance with the directive. 

Page 16 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
mission-essential tasks as part of the unit status report. In addition, the 

system is intended to support the implementation of ARFORGEN by 

requiring commanders to submit a detailed assessment of their units’ 

collective training, which ties directly to the mission-essential tasks. 

Moreover, the Army has developed an additional system, the Digital 

Training Management System, that allows commanders at brigade and 

lower levels to plan collective training, incorporate theater-specific tasks, 

and integrate lessons learned. It also allows their supervisors to monitor 

the progress of units as they complete training events and upgrade their 

collective training status. However, this system is not linked to the unit 

status report. 

In addition, the Army’s funding model (TRM) for estimating training costs 

does not fully estimate the costs required to achieve the Army’s stated 

performance goals. The mandate requires that the Army’s training strategy

include a model to quantify and forecast the operation and maintenance 

funding required for each fiscal year to attain the performance goals 

specified in the strategy.16 In its report to Congress, the Army identifies 

two types of costs needed to support the training of its brigade combat 

teams and functional supporting brigades: (1) operational unit costs, 

which include the resources required to conduct and support unit training, 

maintain unit equipment, and sustain day-to-day unit operations, and (2) 

costs to support the Training Support System, which include all of the 

training support products, training facilities, and services required to 

enable the execution of training. TRM is part of a broad process used to 

calculate institutional, operational, and Training Support System 

requirements. According to DOD, this process, which includes models and 

cost estimates based on expert judgment, is reviewed and validated by

officials on the Army operations staff. 

Army officials use TRM to forecast the operational unit costs for the 

training of active component and reserve component units. The estimated

cost per tank-mile/flight-hour and the level of activity associated with 

recommended training events are generated by TRM. TRM uses reported 

activity data—the actual past costs of training, maintenance, and routine 

operations—from units to generate these estimates. TRM estimates costs 

based on the full execution of all of the training events and activity goals 

detailed in the planning templates. However, TRM activity goals represent 

recommended, not required, training events and frequencies. As a result, 

 16Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 353 (a) (2) (E) (2006). 

Page 17 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
the estimates generated by TRM do not necessarily reflect the cost of the

actual amount of training that a unit will conduct. Moreover, TRM 

forecasts the greatest cost for training because it includes training that is 

not required to be completed. Because the Army has not standardized 

what training is necessary for all units to complete to become fully mission

capable, it cannot link training costs to the achievement of its performance 

goals. 

In using TRM to meet the requirements of the mandate, the Army is 

forecasting the costs of implementing the new training strategy with a 

funding model that does not realistically estimate the cost of achieving the 

overarching performance goal of the strategy. As a result, the Army risks 

not having enough information to determine the level of funds needed to 

fully train its units and risks investing funds in training that has not been 

tied to units achieving performance goals. 

The Army has taken some actions to implement its training strategy, but

key implementation challenges remain. Our analysis of the Army’s 

implementation documents, current training curriculum, and event 

training objectives show that the Army is developing guidance, such as 

training templates and instructions, to implement the training strategy. 

However, implementation of the strategy has been limited because the 

Army’s current ongoing operational commitments limit the availability of

forces as needed to fully execute the strategy and training is focused on 

mission rehearsal instead of full-spectrum operations. In addition, capacity 

at the Army’s combat training centers is currently inadequate to support 

the requirements of ARFORGEN. While the Army intends to address 

combat training center capacity by developing an exportable training 

capability, this capability has not been tested. Furthermore, 

implementation is challenged by the limited availability of training 

personnel and the Army’s current lack of a plan to deal with the issue. 

Without developing a plan to address the challenges associated with the 

Army’s current operational commitments and the limited capacity of the 

existing combat training centers, the Army will not know if it will be able

to achieve its goals of having fully mission capable trained forces to 

conduct full-spectrum operations. Moreover, until the Army completes its 

testing of the exportable training capability, it will not know what 

resources—such as funding—are needed to implement the strategy or if 

the concept will meet its needs. 

Actions Taken to 

Implement the Army 

Training Strategy, but 

Key Implementation 

Challenges Remain 

Page 18 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
The Army is developing guidance, such as training templates and 

instructions, to implement its training strategy. As required by the 

mandate,17 the Army is developing and attempting to implement a strategy

for training brigade-based combat teams and functional supporting 

brigades. As part of this effort, the Army developed one-page training 

templates that illustrate ARFORGEN core tasks and reporting criteria for 

each type of brigade combat team and functional supporting brigade to 

help commanders design unit training plans. This is in addition to the 

previously mentioned planning templates that list possible training events 

and associated activity goals. 

Army Is Developing 

Guidance for 

Implementing the Strategy 

In addition to creating the training templates, the Army is developing 

instructions that will provide the Army training community with a road 

map to execute the training strategy. The Army’s June 2006 Strategic 

Training Guidance indicates that these instructions, or master plans, will 

turn guidance into actions that support modular brigade training. 

Specifically, these instructions will provide planning guidance for several 

Army training entities, including the combat training centers, home station 

training, the training support system, deployed training, and institutional 

training as detailed in table 4. 

 17Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 353 (a) (1) (2006). 

Page 19 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
Table 4: Status of Master Plans 

Name Purpose Status

Combat Training Center Master Plan Articulates the current state of the 

combat training centers and 

identifies resourcing requirements 

and outlines a road map to adapt the 

combat training centers to support 

the Army transformation/Army 

Campaign Plan efforts. 

Complete/issued for fiscal years 2008-2013. Fiscal 

years 2010-2015 draft being staffed for publication with 

an issuance date of no later than the end of December 

2007. 

Home Station Master Plan Addresses modular force operational 

and organizational concepts and 

doctrine, and describes the training 

support capabilities required at home 

station during reset/train and ready 

force pools. 

Complete/under review at Department of the Army. 

Training Support System Master Plan Captures what resources are needed 

and are available to support training 

on all major U.S. Army installations. 

Under development/estimated issuance November 

2007. 

Institutional Instructions Integrates soldiers into units 

preparing for deployment and

determines what skills can be

learned hands-on or through 

distributive learning at other 

locations including home stations 

and deployed bases. 

Will not be formally issued/concepts have been 

incorporated into current institutional training.

Deployment Instructions Addresses deployment training for 

units as a component within the 

Training Support System Master 

Plan. 

Will not be formally issued/incorporated into Training 

Support System Master Plan.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data. 

Although our review identified that the Army has developed preparation 

tools, such as templates and instructions, to implement the training 

strategy, the Army still faces many challenges in its implementation that 

these tools do not account for. 

Ongoing Operational 

Commitments Limit the 

Availability of Forces 

Needed to Fully Implement 

the Training Strategy 

While the Army’s overall training strategy is designed to support 

ARFORGEN by training units through a series of phases, the Army has not 

fully implemented the model because ongoing operational requirements 

have prevented troops from being available for the required amount of 

time to complete the training phases. Army guidance, including the Army’s 

Chief of Staff Memorandum on the transformation of Army training and 

the Army’s 2007 Posture Statement, states that the Army’s training 

strategy, from initial entry training to unit combat training center 

rotations, directly supports ARFORGEN. However, our analysis indicates 

Page 20 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
that the Army’s current operational commitments preclude ARFORGEN 

from reaching its steady state. 

ARFORGEN as described in the Army Campaign Plan assumes that only 

one-third of the Army’s combat brigades are deployed at any one time. 

However, because of the Army’s current operational demands, almost half 

of the Army’s active duty combat brigades are deployed. According to 

Army officials, ARFORGEN normally provides combatant commanders 

with 18 to 21 combat brigades to support operations. While the number of 

combat brigades needed to support the Army’s operational commitments 

varies over time, as of April 2007, the number of combat brigades needed

to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan exceed those provided by

the model. To meet these demands, the Army has reduced the time that 

units spend in ARFORGEN’s rotation pools, revised its reserve 

mobilization policy, and extended active unit deployments from 12 months 

to 15 months. Furthermore, under ARFORGEN, active duty units are 

expected to spend 2 years resetting and training in between deployments; 

however, brigades are currently spending much less time in training before 

being deployed again.18

Additionally, the Army currently focuses training on preparing units for 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which does not necessarily include the 

development and maintenance of skills for full-spectrum operations, such 

as preparing for a wide range of scenarios from low-intensity combat to 

high-intensity combat. Our analysis of past and recent unit training plans 

and discussions with Army training officials indicate that unit commander 

training plans have focused solely on preparing for their unit’s assigned 

mission instead of moving progressively from preparing for core missions 

to training for full-spectrum operations, as described in ARFORGEN. Since 

February 2004, all combat training rotations conducted at the Army’s 

National Training Center have been mission rehearsal exercises to prepare 

units for deployments, primarily to Iraq and Afghanistan. Army officials we 

spoke with indicated that until the Army’s operational commitments 

decrease, ARFORGEN will not reach its steady state, and because the 

Army’s training strategy is designed to support ARFORGEN, it cannot be

fully executed until that time. The Army has not adjusted its training 

strategy to account for conducting the current high level of operations. In 

addition—as stated in the Army’s guidance—until ARFORGEN reaches its 

steady state, other programs essential to providing combat training to 

 18Specific information about the length of time spent in training is classified. 

Page 21 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
units such as functional brigades may be curtailed. According to the 

Army’s ARFORGEN implementation guidance, until the Army fully 

executes ARFORGEN, its ability to train units for continuous full-spectrum 

operations may be at risk. Without revising the training strategy so that it

includes a plan to support full-spectrum training while maintaining a high 

level of ongoing operations, the Army may not train the force to meet the 

full range of possible threats. 

Army Faces Challenges in 

Expanding Capacity at Its 

Combat Training Centers 

The Army faces challenges in implementing its training strategy because 

the current capacity of the combat training center programs cannot fully 

support the training requirements described by ARFORGEN and the model 

does not reflect the planned increase in Army end strength. While steps 

are being taken to expand the program—such as developing a mobile 

combat training center called the Exportable Training Capability (ETC)—

these efforts are not yet fully developed or tested, and may be affected by 

a variety of existing training commitments. Moreover, the operations 

groups at the Army’s combat training centers are not fully staffed because

of ongoing commitments. 

Capacity at the Army’s three maneuver combat training centers is 

currently inadequate to support the requirements of ARFORGEN. 

ARFORGEN requires that combat brigades complete two combat training 

center-level events—one at the end of the reset/train pool and another 

during the ready pool—prior to entering the available force pool. While the 

Army has identified the increased resources needed to train the modular 

brigade combat teams as part of its Combat Training Center Way Ahead

process, currently the Army’s combat training centers only have the 

capacity to accommodate up to 28 combat training rotations per year.19

However, by fiscal year 2010, the Army must conduct 36 combat training 

center rotations to support the modular force structure and the 

implementation of ARFORGEN. 

Current Combat Training 

Center Capacity Does Not 

Support ARFORGEN 

Requirements 

The Army determined its combat training center capacity needs with the 

assumption that under ARFORGEN it would have to train a rotational pool 

of 70 combat brigades. However, the Army intends to increase the size of 

 19 According to an Army official, the maneuver combat training centers could surge to

conduct additional rotations—adding one each at the National Training Center and the 

Joint Readiness Training Center and two rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness 

Center for a total of 32 combat training rotations per year. 

Page 22 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
its active force from 512,400 to 547,000 over the next 5 years.20 The Army 

intends to accomplish this by establishing 6 new combat brigades, 

resulting in a rotational pool of 76 combat brigades. As of June 2007, Army 

officials identified a requirement for 40 combat training center rotations 

per year to support the Army’s increased end strength. 

The Army plans to meet the increased demand for combat training 

rotations required under ARFORGEN by developing a mobile combat 

training center, the ETC. The ETC includes the essential combat training 

center support, including a fully equipped operations group with personnel 

and vehicles; an instrumentation system; and an opposing force, to 

conduct brigade-level training exercises. The Army intends the ETC to 

travel to training areas such as unit home stations to provide combat 

training center-level exercises. Normally, the ETC will conduct training 

events to units in the reset/train phase of ARFORGEN; however, in some 

circumstances the ETC may provide training events to units in lieu of a 

combat training rotation at a one of the current maneuver training 

centers. 

Exportable Training Capability 

Not Fully Developed or Tested 

The ETC concept, however, has not been fully developed or tested. While 

the Army has created an organizational and operation concept for the ETC 

and has conducted mobile combat training exercises before, it has not 

conducted these exercises on the magnitude the proposed ETC concept 

will employ. For example, Army officials at the National Training Center

stated that the National Training Center has provided home station 

mission rehearsal exercises at three Army installations located in the 

United States, but these exercises were on a smaller scale than those 

conducted at the center. In addition, the Army’s JMRC in Germany 

currently hosts a mobile training capability it calls the Expeditionary 

Training Capability. JMRC uses this capability to assist with joint training 

with allied forces based in Europe and to expand the capability of JMRC

by providing combat training center capabilities to existing German and 

allied ranges. According to JMRC officials, the capability currently has the 

capacity to support the training of one battalion-size element. This is 

substantially different from the Army’s ETC concept, which is intended to 

support an entire brigade. As this testing has not been completed, it is 

unclear how the Army identified $19.3 million in fiscal year 2009 for the 

 20 Secretary of Defense, Testimony on Iraq to the House Armed Services Committee

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 11, 2007). 

Page 23 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
establishment of the continental U.S.-based ETC in its fiscal year 2008 

budget submission.21

The Army currently plans to establish two ETCs, one based in Germany at 

JMRC and another based in the continental United States at the Joint 

Readiness Training Center. However, current operational commitments—

such as surging brigades to Iraq and Afghanistan and JMRC’s multinational 

support role—interfere with the Army’s ability to develop and test the ETC 

concept needed to support the Army’s fiscal year 2010 combat training 

center requirements. The Army planned to conduct a proof of principle of 

the capability in fiscal year 2007 using JMRC’s Expeditionary Training 

Capability; however, the proof of principle was delayed because units 

were not available to conduct the training because of operational 

commitments. Subsequently, the proof of principle has been rescheduled 

for August 2008. The Army indicated that past mobile training events 

provide it with the basis to determine what is needed to establish the ETC 

and that the proof of principle test will enable it to refine its concept for 

the ETC. Without this testing, the Army does not have an accurate picture 

of the instrumentation, training facilities, and personnel requirements 

needed or the insight to determine if this capability is the most appropriate 

approach to meet its future training requirements. 

In addition, officials at JMRC stated that they may be unable to provide the 

number of ETC rotations required by ARFORGEN because of a variety of 

commitments. The staff supporting the Expeditionary Training Capability 

is drawn from the staff supporting combat training center operations on 

the ground at JMRC. Therefore, the Expeditionary Training Capability and 

JMRC cannot operate at the same time. Moreover, the Army intends for 

JMRC to provide 4 of the 12 ETC rotations required each year to support 

ARFORGEN. However, officials at JMRC indicated that their role in 

Europe is not limited to providing combat training center rotations to 

brigade combat teams in Europe and conducting training rotations in the 

United States; JMRC is also involved in training with U.S. allies in Europe 

and supporting company- and battalion-level training for the brigade 

combat teams and functional supporting brigades. Furthermore, to 

accomplish both of JMRC’s missions it would require precise coordination

between combat brigade commanders and officials at United States 

Forces Command and United States Army Europe in order to efficiently 

 21Department of the Army, Fiscal Year (FY) 2008/2009 Budget Estimates, Operation and 

Maintenance, Army, Justification Book (Washington, D.C.: February 2007). 

Page 24 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
schedule training events. Army officials stated that ideally, given the 

logistical and cost challenges associated with bringing JMRC’s 

Expeditionary Training Capability to the United States, the proposed 

training events would need to be scheduled consecutively, which may not 

be possible given the uncertainty caused by current operations and 

JMRC’s existing commitments. 

In addition to the challenges mentioned above, the Army’s initial plans to

develop the ETC may require revision to accommodate the proposed 

increase in the number of the Army’s combat brigades. The Army designed

the ETC based on an assumption that the Army would have a total of 70 

combat brigades. Based on that assumption, the Army identified that in 

order to support ARFORGEN, it would have to provide 12 combat training 

center rotations each year through the ETC. However, as discussed earlier 

the Army intends to expand the size of its force, resulting in an additional 

six combat brigades. The Army has identified that the proposed increase 

will require the establishment of a second U.S.-based ETC and is 

developing plans for establishing it, but as of June 2007 these plans have

not been approved. Without the additional capacity, the Army projects it 

will not be able to accommodate the number of combat training rotations 

required to carry out its training strategy. 

The operations groups at the Army’s combat training centers are not fully 

staffed because of ongoing commitments that require the assignment of 

officers and noncommissioned officers to operational units. According to 

Army Regulation 350-50,

22 the primary purpose of the Army’s combat 

training centers is to develop leaders and soldiers with a joint 

expeditionary mindset and to train units for full-spectrum joint operations. 

The Army authorizes each of the combat training centers with the number 

of personnel needed to support the training of brigade or larger-sized 

units. However, because of the ongoing commitments, the combat training 

centers are experiencing staffing issues, such as personnel shortfalls at the 

Army’s Battle Command Training Program. 

Operations Groups at the 

Army’s Combat Training 

Centers Not Fully Staffed 

The Battle Command Training Program is the Army’s capstone combat 

training center. The center is currently staffed at 85 percent of its 

authorized level, but this level does not reflect the requirements of 

supporting ARFORGEN. The Army has expanded its Battle Command 

 22 Army Regulation 350-50, Combat Training Center Program, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 

2003). 

Page 25 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
Training Program from corps, division, and National Guard brigade 

combat teams to include training for the active duty brigade combat 

teams—conducted by one reorganized and expanded operations group—

and has created two new operations groups specifically to provide training 

exercises for the functional and theater brigades. When the center’s 

staffing levels are compared to this expanded structure, the center only 

has 51 percent of the personnel required. Until the two new operations 

groups are fully staffed, they may be able to plan and conduct seminars, 

but cannot conduct the full-spectrum staff training exercises needed to 

support ARFORGEN. Based on ongoing operational requirements, an 

Army official stated that the Army’s Human Resources Command 

indicated that it will not fill all of the positions for the Battle Command 

Training Program until the first quarter of fiscal year 2009. 

While personnel shortages are most critical at the Brigade Command 

Training Program, the operations groups at the maneuver combat training 

centers are staffed at an average of from 70 to 80 percent of their current 

authorization. Army officials stated that the personnel needed to fill 

observer/controller positions are not available because of the increase in 

the length of combat tours, the number of combat brigades needed to 

support the surge, the increase in the number of combat brigades, and the 

need for advisors for Afghan and Iraqi forces. These specific demands 

draw personnel from the same group of experienced officers and 

noncommissioned officers needed to staff the combat training centers. 

While Army officials told us that the staffing levels at the maneuver 

combat training centers have not degraded the centers’ ability to train 

leaders and soldiers to Army standards, officials indicated that this staffing 

level is not optimum. 

The Army faces numerous administrative and operational challenges 

during current operations. These include—but are not limited to—the 

transformation to the modular brigade-based force, an increase in size, 

large operational commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and shortened 

training cycles at home stations. Nevertheless, the Army recognizes that it

must continue to train its forces to meet the challenges at home and 

abroad. To this end, the Army’s current leadership has identified an 

overarching training goal to be achieved in its strategic guidance. 

However, without clearly stated training events and goals, fully developed 

objective performance measures, and a training resource management 

process—including funding models—that realistically estimates its 

funding needs, the Army may not be able to achieve the long-term benefits 

of having a consistently trained force, measuring how well units have been

Conclusions 

Page 26 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
trained, and accurately determining the cost of training. While we fully 

acknowledge the Army’s need to focus on its current operational 

priorities, these priorities call for units to spend less time in training and to

focus on specific mission rehearsal exercises instead of full-spectrum 

operation training. The Army has not adjusted its strategy to take these 

factors into account. When forces are available to fully execute the 

training program as envisioned, the Army recognizes that the current 

combat training center capacity may not be adequate to provide the 

necessary rotations to train its current modular force structure. The Army 

has a plan to develop the ETC to meet the training capacity requirements 

for its current modular force, but has not yet tested the concept to 

determine its costs or its viability as a solution to meet the requirements of 

ARFORGEN and the proposed increase in the number of combat brigades. 

By further developing and refining its training strategy, the Army will be 

able to provide consistent training across the force and remain ready to 

confront the full range of threats around the world. 

To improve its ability to assess unit training and identify funding needs 

while preparing the modular force and taking advantage of the long-term 

institutional benefits of the information provided by a fully developed 

strategy, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary

of the Army to take the following three actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• modify the planning templates to clearly identify constructive training 

and the goals associated with it, 

• develop metrics that support the Army’s training strategy by objectively 

and reliably measuring achievement against the Army’s overall 

performance goal, and 

• review and revise the funding model to more realistically estimate the 

costs associated with achieving the Army’s performance goals. 

To address the challenges facing the implementation of the strategy, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army 

to take the following three actions: 

• revise and adjust the training strategy to account for the current high 

level of operations so that it includes a plan to support full-spectrum 

threat training when most of the force is deployed; 

• clarify the capacity needed at the combat training centers to support 

the expanded modular force; and 

• complete the proof of principle for the ETC to verify that it is the most 

appropriate approach to meet the additional capacity requirements for 

Page 27 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
both ARFORGEN and the proposed expanded number of brigades and

use the results to adjust the Army’s fiscal year 2009 and future funding 

requests as appropriate.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with 

four of our recommendations and did not concur with two. 

DOD did not concur with our recommendation to establish milestones for 

developing constructive training goals for modular brigade combat teams 

and functional supporting brigades. DOD stated that the Army has 

documented these goals. Specifically, DOD officials provided us with 

additional evidence on the establishment of specific constructive goals for 

the brigade combat teams and the functional supporting brigades. While 

we agree that the Army Training Strategy and ARFORGEN planning 

templates include some constructive training events, they are not clearly

identified as constructive training. In addition, unlike live and virtual 

training, no total activity goals are established for constructive training. 

Consequently, we revised our recommendation to direct the Army to 

modify the planning templates to clearly identify which events are 

constructive training and the goals associated with it. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD concurred with comments to our recommendation that Army 

develop metrics that support the Army’s training strategy by objectively 

and reliably measuring achievement against the Army’s overall 

performance goal, but noted that it currently uses a combination of 

objective and subjective metrics to measure unit readiness. However, as 

stated in our report these objective metrics—such as the number of 

personnel, equipment, and the status of the equipment—do not relate 

directly to training. Training is subjectively evaluated based on the 

professional judgment of the unit commander. We recognize that the Army 

continues to adapt and refine the metrics used to evaluate unit readiness, 

however we continue to believe our recommendation to increase the 

objectivity and reliability of training metrics has merit. 

DOD concurred with comment to our recommendation that the Army 

review and revise the funding model used to support the Army’s training 

strategy so that it captures all of the costs associated with achieving the 

Army’s performance goals. DOD stated that its TRM captures the Army’s 

operations tempo requirements, but does not include training 

infrastructure requirements. DOD explained that these other costs are 

quantified and forecasted by the training resource management process, 

which incorporates data and estimates from multiple sources, and the 

Page 28 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
outputs of which are reviewed, validated, and approved by Army staff. We 

have modified our report to recognize that the model is part of a broader

process for estimating these costs. However, we continue to believe that

the model DOD uses to estimate operations and maintenance costs does 

not provide a realistic estimate of training costs since it is based on the full

execution of the planning templates, even though units are not required to

complete all the events identified in the templates, and have clarified our 

recommendation accordingly. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Army revise and adjust 

its training strategy to account for the current high-level of operations so 

that it includes a plan to support full-spectrum threat training when most 

of the force is deployed. The Army is currently revising its strategy to

recognize that it needs the capability to respond to a full-spectrum threat. 

This revised strategy is scheduled to be presented to Army leadership for a 

decision in fall 2007. 

DOD did not concur with our recommendation to clarify the capacity

needed at the combat training centers to support the expanded modular 

force. In its written response, DOD noted that the Army has continuously 

identified and updated the throughput and capacity demands required of 

its combat training centers to support the brigade combat team modular 

force. It noted that this process led the Army to identify the need to 

establish the ETC that is intended to increase training capacity through an

ARFORGEN synchronization process, which prioritizes and allocates 

training rotations. In June 2007, the Army updated its capacity evaluation 

to support its increased end strength. DOD stated that by establishing two 

ETCs in the United States and an ETC in Germany to augment its existing 

three maneuver combat training centers, the Army will be able to meet the 

requirements of the 76 brigade combat team force. While we have not yet

conducted a detailed analysis of the Army’s evaluation, we believe this 

evaluation complies with the intent of our recommendation. In addition,

the Army’s analysis of its capacity requirements would be enhanced by

completing the proof of principle testing for the ETC. The results of this 

testing will provide the Army with the insight needed to determine if the 

capability is the most appropriate approach to meet its future capacity 

demands and to develop resource requirements for the ETC. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish milestones for 

conducting the proof of principle testing and stated that the Army plans to 

conduct the test in August 2008. However, we note that the Army will not 

have the results of this testing before submitting its fiscal year 2009 budget 

request. As such, we revised our recommendation to stress the need to 

Page 29 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
complete this testing, validate its concept, and use the results to adjust its 

fiscal year 2009 and any future funding requests as needed. 

DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided 

technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief 

of Staff of the Army, and the Director of the Office of Management and 

Budget. We will also make copies available to other interested parties 

upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202)-512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are Laura Durland, 

Assistant Director; Vincent Balloon; Renee S. Brown; Natasha Ewing; 

Kevin Handley; John W. Lee; Lonnie J. McAllister II; and Tamika 

Weerasingha. 

Sharon L. Pickup 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 30 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 31 GAO-07-936 Military Training 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

In conducting this review, we first examined the language of Public Law 

No. 109-163 Section 353, which directs the reporting of the Army’s 

implementation of its training strategy. On the basis of this mandate, we 

assessed the extent to which the strategy addresses the five elements 

specified in the public law by reviewing relevant regulations and by using 

as a model the principles embodied in the Government Performance and 

Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). We identified criteria for the Army’s training 

strategy in the mandate language and in GPRA and the guidance for 

implementing GPRA. We used these criteria to evaluate how the strategy 

addressed the elements and to what degree further development is 

needed. Furthermore, we reviewed the Army’s report to Congress on the 

Army training strategy to assess how the Army says it meets the 

requirements of the mandate. Moreover, we performed content and data

analysis to determine if the elements identified by the Army met the 

requirements of the mandate, and to determine what implementing 

instructions and guidance have been developed. We also examined the 

extent to which funds and resources have been expended or programmed 

to support the strategy.

In order to determine how the five elements are adapted into the training 

strategy and to obtain information about the current status of the Army 

training strategy, we interviewed Army personnel at the Department of the 

Army, National Guard Bureau, three combat training centers, Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, Army Forces Command, and the United

States Army, Europe responsible for developing and implementing the 

training strategy. Specifically, we interviewed various officials at the 

Department of the Army Office of the G-3/5/7 to discuss the details and 

status of the training resource model and the training strategy’s master 

plans. Additionally, we reviewed documentation provided in the meetings 

to further assist our analysis. To ensure that we did not overlook the 

National Guard’s perspective, we spoke with the National Guard regarding

the effect of the Army’s overall training strategy and its implementation. 

Additionally we visited two of the Army’s three maneuver combat training 

centers—the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, 

and the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California—as well as the 

Battle Command Training Program combat training center in Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas. During these visits, we spoke to Army officials in 

charge of training to obtain an understanding of the training processes at 

the centers and to assess the implementation of the training strategy into 

their specific processes. Furthermore, to identify the constraints that may 

prevent the Army from implementing its training strategy and the potential 

impact on implementation, we reviewed the Army’s strategy and schedule 

for implementation. Additionally, we spoke with training leaders to obtain
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

their perspectives on the challenges we identified, what they recognized as 

challenges, and how they felt these challenges will affect the 

implementation of the strategy. Finally we compared the Army training 

strategy with the reports and testimony of the Army’s training leaders in 

the field to identify and verify the possible constraints. 

We conducted our review from August 2006 through June 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 32 GAO-07-936 Military Training 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-07-936 Military Training 

 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-07-936 Military Training 

 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-07-936 Military Training 

 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-07-936 Military Training 

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