U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

www.cops.usdoj.gov

Understanding Risky 

Facilities

by

Ronald V. Clarke and John E. Eck

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Solving Tools Series

No. 6
www.PopCenter.org

Got a Problem? We’ve got answers!

Log onto the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing web site at 

www.popcenter.org for a wealth of information to help you deal 

more effectively with crime and disorder in your community, 

including:

• Web-enhanced versions of all currently available Guides

• Interactive training exercises

• Online access to research and police practices

• Online problem analysis module.

Designed for police and those who work with them to address 

community problems, www.popcenter.org is a great resource in 

problem-oriented policing.

Supported by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing
Understanding Risky 

Facilities 

Ronald V. Clarke and John E. Eck

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 

#2004CKWXK002 by the Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions 

contained herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily 

represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

References to specific companies, products, or services should 

not be considered an endorsement of the product by the author 

or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are 

illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.

www.cops.usdoj.gov

ISBN: 1-932582-75-4

March 2007

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

Problem-Solving Tools Series

Guide No. 6

About the Problem-Solving Tools Series i

About the Problem-Solving Tools Series

The problem-solving tool guides are one of three series of 

the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police. The other two are the 

problem-specific guides and response guides. 

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police summarize knowledge 

about how police can reduce the harm caused by specific 

crime and disorder problems. They are guides to preventing 

problems and improving overall incident response, not 

to investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. 

The guides are written for police—of whatever rank or 

assignment—who must address the specific problems the 

guides cover. The guides will be most useful to officers who:

• understand basic problem-oriented policing principles and 

methods

• can look at problems in depth

• are willing to consider new ways of doing police business

• understand the value and the limits of research knowledge

• are willing to work with other community agencies to find 

effective solutions to problems.

The tool guides summarize knowledge about information 

gathering and analysis techniques that might assist police at 

any of the four main stages of a problem-oriented project: 

scanning, analysis, response, and assessment. Each guide:

• describes the kind of information produced by each 

technique 

• discusses how the information could be useful in problemsolving 

• gives examples of previous uses of the technique

• provides practical guidance about adapting the technique to 

specific problems
ii Understanding Risky Facilities

• provides templates of data collection instruments (where 

appropriate)

• suggests how to analyze data gathered by using the 

technique

• shows how to interpret the information correctly and 

present it effectively

• warns about any ethical problems in using the technique 

• discusses the limitations of the technique when used by 

police in a problem-oriented project

• provides reference sources of more detailed information 

about the technique

• indicates when police should seek expert help in using the 

technique. 

Extensive technical and scientific literature covers each 

technique addressed in the tool guides. The guides aim to 

provide only enough information about each technique to 

enable police and others to use it in the course of problemsolving. In most cases, the information gathered during a 

problem-solving project does not have to withstand rigorous 

scientific scrutiny. Where police need greater confidence in 

the data, they might need expert help in using the technique. 

This can often be found in local university departments of 

sociology, psychology, and criminal justice. 

The information needs for any single project can be quite 

diverse, and it will often be necessary to use a variety of data 

collection techniques to meet those needs. Similarly, a variety 

of analytic techniques may be needed to analyze the data. 

Police and crime analysts may be unfamiliar with some of the 

techniques, but the effort invested in learning to use them can 

make all the difference to the success of a project. 
Acknowledgments iii

Acknowledgments

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police are produced by the 

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, whose officers are 

Michael S. Scott (Director), Ronald V. Clarke (Associate 

Director) and Graeme R. Newman (Associate Director). 

While each guide has a primary author, other project team 

members, COPS Office staff and anonymous peer reviewers 

contributed to each guide by proposing text, recommending 

research and offering suggestions on matters of format and 

style. 

The project team that developed the guide series comprised 

Herman Goldstein (University of Wisconsin Law School), 

Ronald V. Clarke (Rutgers University), John E. Eck (University 

of Cincinnati), Michael S. Scott (University of Wisconsin Law 

School), Rana Sampson (Police Consultant), and Deborah 

Lamm Weisel (North Carolina State University.) 

Members of the San Diego; National City, California; and 

Savannah, Georgia police departments provided feedback on 

the guides’ format and style in the early stages of the project.

Cynthia E. Pappas oversaw the project for the COPS Office. 

Research for the guide was conducted at the Criminal Justice 

Library at Rutgers University under the direction of Phyllis 

Schultze. Stephen Lynch edited this guide.

v

Contents

About the Problem-Solving Tools Series. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

What are Risky Facilities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

How Widespread are Risky Facilities?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

How is the Concept of Risky Facilities Different from Hot Spots and 

Repeat Victimization? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

How Can the Concept of Risky Facilities Assist Problem-Oriented Policing Projects?. . 13

How Can Risk be Measured? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

How is the Concentration of Risk among Facilities Calculated?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Why Do Facilities Vary in Risk?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

How are Risk Factors Identified for a Particular Group of Facilities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

How Can Risk be Reduced? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Recommended Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Contents

Introduction 1

Introduction

In any large city just a handful of bars give the police far more 

trouble than all the rest put together. The same is true of many 

other types of establishments, such as schools, convenience stores, 

and parking lots. In each case, just a few produce far more crime, 

disorder, and calls for police assistance than the rest of the group 

combined. This phenomenon—called “risky facilities”—has 

important implications for many problem-oriented policing projects. 

In particular, it can help police focus their energies where they 

are needed most and can help in selecting appropriate preventive 

measures. This guide serves as an introduction to risky facilities and 

shows how the concept can aid problem-oriented policing efforts by 

providing answers to the following key questions.

What are risky facilities? 

How widespread are risky facilities? 

How is the concept of risky facilities different from hot spots 

and repeat victimization? 

How can the concept of risky facilities assist problem-oriented 

policing projects? 

How can risk be measured? 

How is the concentration of risk among facilities calculated? 

Why do facilities vary in risk? 

How are risk factors identified for a particular group of 

facilities? 

How can risk be reduced? 

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

What are Risky Facilities? 3

What are Risky Facilities?

We open with a definition of facilities and provide some 

examples. We then discuss risky facilities and explain how this 

concept is related to other crime concentration theories. 

Facilities

Facilities are places with specific public or private functions, 

such as stores, bars, restaurants, mobile home parks, bus 

stops, apartment buildings, public swimming pools, ATM 

locations, libraries, hospitals, schools, parking lots, railway 

stations, marinas, and shopping malls. 

Facilities vary greatly in the crimes they experience. Medical 

facilities, for example, are likely to have different types and 

levels of crime than do police booking facilities. In addition, 

there is likely to be a great variation within any broad category 

of facility. For example, although both are medical facilities, 

dental offices are likely to have different levels and types of 

crime than are emergency rooms. Because such distinctions 

are critical to the success of risky facility analyses, it is 

important to begin by carefully defining the type of facility 

that is to be examined; only then proceed to an examination 

of the type and frequency of crime that the particular type of 

facility experiences.
4 Understanding Risky Facilities

Risky Facilities

One important principle of crime prevention holds that 

crime is highly concentrated among particular people, places, 

and things; as this principle suggests, focusing resources on 

these concentrations is likely to yield the greatest preventive 

benefits. This principle has spawned a number of related 

concepts that are routinely used by police in problem-solving 

projects, including:

repeat offenders (individuals who commit a 

disproportionate amount of crime) 

hot spots (areas and places where many crimes occur) 

repeat addresses (locations with many crimes—a form 

of hotspot) 

repeat victims (individuals who suffer a series of crimes 

in a short time span) 

hot products (items that are stolen more often than 

other products). 

Risky facilities is another recently described theory of crime 

concentration that holds great promise for problem-oriented 

policing.1 The theory postulates that only a small proportion 

of any specific type of facility will account for the majority of 

crime and disorder problems experienced or produced by the 

group of facilities as a whole. 

As a rule of thumb, about 20 percent of the total group will 

account for 80 percent of the problems. This is known as the 

80/20 rule: in theory, 20 percent of any particular group of 

things is responsible for 80 percent of outcomes involving 

those things.2 The 80/20 rule is not peculiar to crime and 

disorder; rather, it is almost a universal law. For example, a 

small portion of the earth’s surface holds the majority of life 

•

•

•

•

•
on the planet; a small proportion of earthquakes cause most 

earthquake damage; a small number of people hold most 

of the earth’s wealth; a small proportion of police officers 

produce the most arrests; and so forth. In practice, of course, 

the proportion is seldom exactly 80/20; however, it is always 

true that some small percentage of a group produces a large 

percentage of any particular result involving that group. Later 

in the guide we will show you how to determine whether the 

80/20 rule holds true for any particular group of facilities. 

The 80/20 rule can be a useful initial assumption: when 

confronting a problem, start by assuming that most of the 

problem is created by a few individuals, places, or events. 

Although this first approximation is not always correct, it is 

probably correct more often than assuming that the problem 

is spread evenly across individuals, places, or events. Careful 

analysis can then test whether this starting assumption is 

correct.

How Widespread are Risky Facilities 5

How Widespread are Risky Facilities? 7

§ Not every study provided clear 

evidence that a small proportion of 

the facilities accounted for a large 

proportion of the crime, disorder, or 

misconduct. Rather, some reported 

differences between facilities in 

crime numbers or rates; for example, 

Matthews, Pease, and Pease (2001) 

reported that “4 percent of banks 

had robbery rates four to six times 

that of other banks.” Although 

consistent with the concept of risky 

facilities, these figures do not satisfy 

a key component of the definition: 

they do not demonstrate that a 

small number of high-risk banks 

accounted for a large part of the 

robbery problem. However, this does 

not mean that risks for the facilities 

studied were not highly skewed. 

Rather, it only means that the data 

did not allow the distribution of risk 

to be examined. 

How Widespread are Risky Facilities?

The first paper to discuss the concept of risky facilities 

identified nearly 40 studies of specific types of facilities that 

included data about variations in the risks of crime, disorder, 

or misconduct.3 These studies covered a wide range of 

facilities and many different types of crime and deviance, 

including robbery, theft, assault, and simple disorder. All the 

studies showed wide variations in risk in the facilities studied 

and in many there was clear evidence of high concentrations 

of risk consistent with the definition of risky facilities.§ Here 

follow a few examples. 

Convenience stores. A national survey found that 6.5 

percent of U.S. convenience stores experience 65 percent 

of all convenience store robberies.4

Bars and taverns. Around 30 percent of the 1698 

taverns in Milwaukee, Wisconsin experienced about 80 

percent of violent incidents reported between 1986 and 

1990.5 Similarly, 3 of the 15 (20 percent) bars in Shawnee, 

Kansas, accounted for 62 percent of calls for police 

service between 2002 and 2004.6

Gas stations. Ten percent of Austin, Texas gas stations 

accounted for more than 50 percent of calls for drive-offs 

and drug crimes between 1998 and 1999.7

Schools. Eight percent of schools in Stockholm, Sweden 

experienced 50 percent of the violent crimes reported in 

1993 and 1994.8 In another study, researchers found that 

18 percent of Merseyside schools in North West England 

reported 50 percent of calls for burglary and criminal 

damage.9

•

•

•

•
8 Understanding Risky Facilities

Payphones. A 1998 study found that 20 percent of 

hoax calls to the fire brigade made from public telephone 

kiosks in Merseyside came from just 3 percent (33 out of 

1189) of the phones.10

Bus routes and bus stops. Another study in Merseyside 

showed that about 4 percent of bus routes experienced 

80 percent of all reported crime incidents on bus routes 

and that about 5 percent of bus stops experienced nearly 

30 percent of vandal attacks. Similarly, a study of 38 bus 

stops located within a high crime area of Los Angeles, 

California showed that 20 percent of the stops suffered 

about half the crime at all these bus stops.11

Shops. A national survey undertaken in 2000 found 

that 1 percent of 4315 small businesses in Australia 

experienced 66 percent of all crimes reported in the 

survey.

12 Similarly, a study of shoplifting in 78 stores 

in Danvers, Massachusetts found that 20.3 percent of 

the stores experienced 84.9 percent of the shoplifting 

incidents (see Table 2).13

Although the studies in this list are just a few of those 

that have produced evidence of risky facilities, such results 

make it clear that this form of crime concentration is quite 

widespread.

•

•

•
How Widespread are Risky Facilities? 9

A Low Cost Motel: The risk of crime varies a 

great deal among facilities of the same type.

John Eck

When analysts plot the number of crimes at each facility 

under investigation, they almost always create a graph with a 

reclining-J shape. This can be seen in the example in Figure 

1, based on the work of crime analysts in Chula Vista, 

California. In that study, all parks over two acres in Chula 

Vista were ranked from the most crime (on left) to the least. 

The heights of the bars show the number of crimes in each 

park. As can be seen, three parks had far more crime than any 

of the rest and most parks had very little crime.

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z AA AB

Paris (ranked from highest to lowest)

Adapted from: J. Stedman (2005).

Figure 1: CRIME RISK IN CHULA VISTA PARKS (over 2 acres)

Violent/Disorder Calls per Acre per Year

How is the Concept of Risky Facilities Different from Hot Spots and Repeat Victimization? 11

How is the Concept of Risky 

Facilities Different from Hot Spots 

and Repeat Victimization?

Risky facilities can show up as hot spots on a city’s crime 

map. Indeed, specific hospitals, schools, and train stations are 

often well-known examples. But simply treating these facilities 

as hot spots misses an important analytical opportunity: 

comparing the risky facilities with other like facilities. Such a 

comparison can reveal important differences between facilities 

that can account for the differences in risk, thereby providing 

important pointers to preventive action. 

 

In addition, risky facilities are sometimes treated as examples 

of repeat victimization. However, this can create confusion 

when it is not the facilities that are being victimized, but 

rather the people who are using them. Thus, a tavern that 

repeatedly requests police assistance in dealing with fights 

is not itself being repeatedly victimized, unless it routinely 

suffers damage in the course of these fights or if members 

of staff are regularly assaulted. Even those participating in 

the fights may not be repeat victims, as different patrons 

might be involved each time. Indeed, no one need be 

victimized at all, as would be the case if the calls were 

about drugs, prostitution, or stolen property sales. Calling 

the tavern a repeat victim can be more than just confusing, 

however, because it might also divert attention from the role 

mismanagement or poor design plays in causing the fights. 

By keeping the concepts of repeat victimization and risky 

facilities separate, it may be possible to determine whether 

or not repeat victimization is the cause of a risky facility and 

thereby to design responses accordingly.

How Can the Concept of Risky Facilities Assist Problem-Oriented Policing Projects? 13

How Can the Concept of Risky 

Facilities Assist Problem-Oriented 

Policing Projects?

The concept of risky facilities can be helpful in two types 

of policing projects. First, the concept can be useful in 

crime prevention projects that focus on a particular class 

of facilities, such as low rent apartment complexes or 

downtown parking lots. In the scanning stage, the objective 

is to list the facilities involved along with the corresponding 

number of problem incidents in order to see which facilities 

experience the most and which the fewest problems. This 

might immediately suggest some contributing factors. For 

example, a study of car break-ins and thefts in downtown 

parking facilities in Charlotte, North Carolina revealed that 

the number of offenses in each parking lot was not merely a 

function of size.14 Rather, it was discovered that some smaller 

facilities experienced a large numbers of thefts because of 

some fairly obvious security deficiencies. This finding was 

explored in more depth in the analysis stage by computing 

theft rates for each facility based on its number of parking 

spaces. The analysis found that the risk of theft was far 

greater in surface lots than in parking garages, a fact that had 

not been known previously. Subsequent analysis compared 

security features between the multilevel and surface lots and 

then within the members of each category in an effort to 

determine which aspects of security (e.g., attendants, lighting, 

security guards) explained the variation. This analysis guided 

the selection of measures that were to have been introduced 

at the response stage; and had these been implemented as 

planned (which was not the case), the assessment stage would 

have examined, not merely whether theft rates declined 

overall, but whether those at the previously riskiest facilities 

had declined most. Obviously, this type of analysis can be 

conducted within any group of facilities.
14 Understanding Risky Facilities

Second, risky facilities analysis can be helpful to crime 

prevention efforts that focus on a particular troublesome 

facility. In this sort of analysis, the scanning stage consists of 

comparing the problems at a particular facility with those at 

similar nearby facilities. For example, in a project that won the 

Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-oriented 

Policing in 2003,15 police in Oakland, California discovered 

that a particular motel experienced nearly 10 times as many 

criminal incidents as did any other comparable motel in the 

area. Although in this case the analysis convinced Oakland 

police to address the problems at the motel in question, in 

other cases analysis might reveal that some other facilities 

have far greater problems than the one which was the initial 

focus of the project. Comparing the facility being addressed 

in the project with other group members can also be useful in 

the analysis, response, and assessment stages described above. 
How Can Risk be Measured? 15

§ Many of these data problems are 

also encountered when studying 

hot spots and repeat victimization. 

For further information see 

Deborah Weisel, Analyzing Repeat 

Victimization, Problem Solving 

Tools Series No. 4.

How Can Risk be Measured?

Police reports and calls for service data are the most common 

sources of information about crime and disorder events. 

However, using these data can lead to errors if care is not 

taken to check for some of the following potential problems.§

1. Underreporting. Not all incidents of crime and disorder 

are reported to the police. In fact, reporting practices can 

vary considerably from facility to facility, which can seriously 

distort estimates of risk concentration. For example, a facility 

that always reports crimes to the police will appear to suffer 

more incidents of victimization than will a similar facility 

that experiences the same number of incidents but reports 

fewer to police. Such distortions can be difficult to discover, 

which is why it can be important to ask facility managers 

about their reporting policies or to ask beat officers whether 

the recorded crime rates match their own perceptions of the 

crime problems at the facilities in question. In some cases, 

administrative records kept by a regulatory agency or the 

facilities themselves might be more accurate. For example, 

records of vandalism repairs kept by schools or other public 

facilities might be more accurate than police records of 

vandalism. However, these administrative records can be 

difficult to compare among facilities. Sometimes, it might 

be feasible to survey facility managers to obtain estimates 

of the number of incidents and at the same time to gather 

information about management practices (see below). 

However, surveys can be expensive and difficult to conduct if 

they are to provide reliable information. 

2. Incomplete address matching. When using police 

records, it can sometimes be difficult to determine whether 

two different events occurred at the same facility. There are 

several reasons for this.
16 Understanding Risky Facilities

a) Precise address information is sometimes unavailable 

for large facilities, such as parks, parking lots, or sports 

venues. 

b) Some facilities have multiple addresses, including different 

street addresses.

c) Police sometimes record offense locations as intersections 

or hundred-block addresses, which can make it difficult 

to determine whether an event occurred at a particular 

facility. 

d) Police data sometimes fail to distinguish between 

residential and commercial addresses or fail to make 

important distinctions between types of residential 

properties, such as apartment blocks or single-family 

dwellings. 

Incident reporting forms and police records can be revised to 

improve geographical information gathering; moreover, the 

increased use of geocoding for crime reports will gradually 

help resolve some of these difficulties.

3. Mixed use locales. Sometimes, multiple facilities are 

situated at the same location. For example, some buildings 

with ground floor retail establishments have apartments on 

the floors above; hotels not only contain guest rooms, but 

also bars and restaurants. In addition, use may vary by time of 

day or day of week, at the same place. For example, a building 

that functions as a church on Sundays might house a daycare 

center or soup kitchen during the week. Although it can be 

difficult to determine which facility is responsible for which 

crime, such distinctions are crucial to determining which type 

of response to apply.
How Can Risk be Measured? 17

4. Infrequent events. Where specific crime or disorder 

events are common, it is relatively easy to describe the 

distribution of crimes per facility. However, this can be 

more difficult for rarer events, such as homicide or rape, 

because short period estimates are unlikely to show a crime 

distribution that is distinguishable from a random variation. 

As a consequence, it may be necessary to analyze many 

years worth of data before any meaningful patterns become 

apparent.

5. Long time periods. Studying facilities over long time 

periods can produce results that are confounded by changes 

in the facilities themselves; for example, some may go out of 

business, others may come into being, and yet others may be 

altered, both physically and managerially.

6. Facilities with no events. Facilities that experience 

none of the events in question may be invisible if police data 

are the sole source of information, because police data only 

show locations with one or more events. Excluding such 

facilities can distort the assessment of the 80/20 rule. If a 

regulatory authority licenses the facilities under study (for 

example, locations that serve alcohol), then data from the 

regulatory agency can be compared to police data to estimate 

the number of facilities that experience no events. Remember, 

however, that it can be difficult to get accurate counts of 

facilities that are not required to register with some authority.
18 Understanding Risky Facilities

7. Small numbers of facilities. Some facilities are more 

common than others. In a moderate sized city, for example, 

there will be few hospitals. Given at least two facilities, it 

is likely that one will have more crime than will the other. 

Although this can have some very practical consequences, 

the population may be too small to make any meaningful 

comparison. In such cases, analyzing data from a larger region 

may be more productive.

8. Random variation. It is possible to find random 

concentrations of crime, although this is more likely to occur 

when only a few facilities with only a few incidents are being 

examined. In such cases, try checking the same facilities for a 

different time period. If the rank order of incidents is roughly 

the same in both periods, then it is probable that the variation 

is not random. Box 1 provides an example.
How Can Risk be Measured? 19

Box 1: Testing for random variation in risk

A study in England in 1964 found that absconding rates for residents 

in 17 training schools for delinquent boys ranged from 10 percent 

to 75 percent. To determine whether this variation was random, 

researchers reexamined the absconding rates two years later (1966) to 

see if the variation was much the same. They found that by and large 

the variation was consistent between the two years. For example, 

School 1 had the lowest absconding rate and School 17 the highest 

rate in both years (see the table below). In fact, the correlation was 

0.65 between the two years.§ Because the variation was relatively 

stable and because very few boys would have been residents in both 

years, researchers determined that the variation was probably due to 

differences in management practices rather than to differences in the 

student populations.

 Training School Absconding Rate 

 

 1964 1966 

 

1 10% 10% 

2 13% 38% 

3 14% 14% 

4 21% 18% 

5 21% 23% 

6 22% 14% 

7 22% 21% 

8 24% 29% 

9 25% 33% 

10 26% 37% 

11 27% 25% 

12 28% 47%

13 29% 45%

14 32% 43%

15 34% 26%

16 46% 27%

17 75% 50%

§ Correlation coefficients can be 

calculated quite simply from an 

Excel spreadsheet. 

Source: Clarke and Martin (1975)

How is the Concentration of Risk among Facilities Calculated? 21

How is the Concentration of Risk 

among Facilities Calculated?

Once a satisfactory measure of the problematic events for a 

defined group of facilities has been obtained, the following 

six-step procedure can be used to determine whether the 

80/20 rule applies.

1. List the facilities alongside a count of the number of 

relevant events (e.g. thefts, assaults, calls for service) at 

each facility. Remember, it is important to verify that each 

facility on the list is of the type being investigated and that 

every crime attributed to each facility did in fact occur at 

that facility. (See Box 2 for a discussion of creating such a 

list and verifying its content.) 

2. Rank the facilities according to the number of events 

associated with each, from highest to lowest. (Table 1, 

page 23, is a list of hypothetical pubs along with the 

associated number of reported assaults.)§ Determine 

whether there is something that differentiates the facilities 

at the top of the list from those in the middle or at the 

bottom. For example, are the pubs at the bottom of the 

list popular evening entertainment spots for young people? 

Are they all located in a downtown entertainment district? 

Are they all owned by the same company? If so, then 

these similarities might account for the problem. If there 

are clear and obvious differences, then divide this list into 

meaningful categories, with separate ranked lists for each. 

Each category may pose a distinct problem. For each 

separate category, continue with Step 3. (For this example, 

assume that there are no important differences.) 

§ Reproduced with permission from 

Clarke and Eck (2003).
22 Understanding Risky Facilities

3. Calculate the percentage of events that each facility 

contributes. For example, in Table 1 there are a total of 

121 assaults. The first pub, the White Hart, contributed 31 

of these. So the White Hart accounts for 25.6 percent of 

the problem. The third column shows the percentage. 

4. Cumulate the percentages, starting with the riskiest 

facility. This shows the proportion of events associated 

with each percentile (i.e., worst 10 percent, worst 20 

percent, and so on, up to 100 percent). The fourth column 

shows what is called the cumulative percentage; that is, the 

percentages from the third column are added starting with 

the White Hart and going down. 

5. Calculate the proportion of the facilities that each 

single facility represents. In our example, there are 30 

pubs, so each represents 3.3 percent of the pubs. Then 

cumulate these percentages in the same direction as in 

Step 4 (top down in column 5). 

6. Compare the cumulative percentage of facilities 

(column 5) to the cumulative percentage of events 

(column 4). This shows how much the riskiest facilities 

contribute to the overall problem. 
How is the Concentration of Risk among Facilities Calculated? 23

Box 2: Defining and Listing Facilities

In order to analyze crime concentrations, it is first necessary to 

define the type of facility to be examined; only then is it possible 

to create a list of facilities that meets that the definition. Ideally, 

all places that fit the definition and that are in the area of study 

will be on the list once and only once. In addition, facilities that 

do not fit the definition will not be on the list. The further the 

list departs from this ideal, the more likely it is that the results 

will be misleading.

Identifying all facilities of a particular type in any given area 

can be troublesome: not only can it sometimes be difficult 

to develop an appropriate working definition of the type of 

facility at issue, but problems can also arise in regard to the data 

management practices of relevant public and private agencies. 

Here is an example of creating a list of facilities that illustrates 

these points. A research team at the University of Cincinnati, 

Ohio wanted to determine why a few bars had numerous 

violent incidents, whereas most of the others had none or only 

a very few. To do this, they needed a definition of “bar” and a 

list of facilities that met this definition.

Researchers defined “bar” as a place that met four conditions: 

(1) it had to be open to the general public, rather than restricted 

to members or rented out to private parties; (2) it had to serve 

alcohol for onsite consumption; (3) some patrons had to come 

to the place for the primary purpose of consuming alcohol; and 

(4) there had to be a designated physical area within the place 

that served as a drinking area. Locations that did not meet all 

four conditions were excluded from the study.
24 Understanding Risky Facilities

To obtain a list of locations meeting this definition, researchers 

began by consulting records from the Ohio Division of 

Liquor Control. These records showed that 633 places within 

the city limits were licensed to serve hard liquor. Based upon 

their personal knowledge, researchers were able to exclude a 

number of locations from consideration, reducing the list to 

391 possible bars. To isolate the real bars, researchers then 

compared the remaining locations to the most recent bar guide 

in a local weekly tabloid that catered to young adults, which 

contained both a brief written description of the locations and 

numerous commercial advertisements. The tabloid information 

revealed that at least 198 of the 391 places fit the definition 

used. The tabloid list was incomplete, however, as there were 

an unknown number of city bars that were not reviewed 

by the tabloid staff. A check of the online Yellow pages 

verified several more bars. Private fraternal organizations 

were eliminated from consideration because they were not 

open to the general public. For most of the remaining places, 

researchers phoned or visited the sites, examining the physical 

locations and interviewing owners and employees. Onsite visits 

revealed several restaurants had areas that looked like bars, but 

these were eventually eliminated from consideration when it 

became clear from interviews that they were more decorative 

than functional or that they were used for other purposes (e.g., 

to hold carryout orders for customer pickup or to provide 

overflow seating where customers could eat). Ultimately, 

researchers identified 264 facilities that fit the definition of bar. 

These then became the subjects of the study.
How is the Concentration of Risk among Facilities Calculated? 25

Table 1:

The Distribution of 121 Assaults in 30 Pubs

 

 

 No. of % Cumulative Cumulative

 Assaults Assaults % assaults % pubs

White Hart 31 25.6 25.6 3.3

Union 17 14.0 39.7 6.7

Feathers 13 10.7 50.4 10.0

Wellington 11 9.1 59.5 13.3

Black Prince 8 6.6 66.1 16.7

Angel 7 5.8 71.9 20.0

George & Dragon 6 5.0 76.9 23.3

Cross Keys 6 5.0 81.8 26.7

Saracen’s Head 4 3.3 85.1 30.0

White Bear 4 3.3 88.4 33.3

Mason’s Arms 3 2.5 90.9 36.7

Cock 3 2.5 93.4 40.0

Badger 3 2.5 95.9 43.3

Hare & Hounds 1 0.8 96.7 46.7

Red Lion 1 0.8 97.5 50.0

Royal Oak 1 0.8 98.3 53.3

George 1 0.8 99.2 56.7

Cross Hands 1 0.8 100 60.0

Rose & Crown 0 0 100 63.3

King’s Arms 0 0 100 66.7

Star 0 0 100 70.0

Mitre 0 0 100 73.3

Dog and Fox 0 0 100 76.7

Griffin 0 0 100 80.0

Plough 0 0 100 83.3

Queen’s Head 0 0 100 86.7

White Horse 0 0 100 90.0

Bull 0 0 100 93.3

Swan 0 0 100 96.7

Black Bear 0 0 100 100

Why Do Facilities Vary in Risk? 27

Why Do Facilities Vary in Risk?

Because there is no single reason why facilities vary in risk, it 

is important to determine which reasons are in operation in 

each particular case. The most important sources of variation 

in risk follow.

1. Variations in Size. Facilities of the same general type 

can vary quite markedly in size; other things being equal, 

one would expect larger facilities to report more problematic 

incidents than smaller ones. Of course, examining variations 

in the number of incidents without controlling for size can 

sometimes be important. For example, if you were to discover 

at the scanning stage that the great majority of incidents 

occurred in just a few facilities, irrespective of size, you would 

know where to concentrate your efforts in order to bring 

about the maximum reduction in the overall problem. For 

some analyses, however, it can be important to control for 

size. There are various ways to estimate size. For example, 

acreage might be appropriate for parks, number of spaces for 

parking lots, shelf footage for self-service stores, number of 

students for schools, number of rooms and occupancy rates 

for hotels and motels, and so forth. One example of such 

an analysis comes from a study of shoplifting in Danvers, 

Massachusetts. The store with the most shoplifting incidents 

in Danvers was one of the largest in the city. But this was not 

the whole story, however, because when size was taken into 

account by calculating the number of shoplifting incidents per 

1000 square feet (see the final column of Table 2), the riskiest 

store turned out to be the one that had been ranked 15th on 

the list before the outcome was corrected for size. 
Table 2

Reported Shopliftings by Store, Danvers, Massachusetts 

October 2003 to September 2004

Store Shopliftings Percent of 

Shopliftings

Cumulative 

Percent of 

Shopliftings 

Cumulative 

Percent of 

Stores

Shopliftings 

per 1000 

Sq. Ft.

1 78 26.2 26.2 1.3 1.54

2 42 14.1 40.3 2.6 0.70

3 28 9.4 49.7 3.8 0.22

4 16 5.4 55.0 5.1 0.24

5 15 5.0 60.1 6.4 0.28

6 12 4.0 64.1 7.7 0.31

7 11 3.7 67.8 9.0 0.09

8 11 3.7 71.5 10.3 0.16

9 9 3.0 74.5 11.5 0.28

10 7 2.3 76.8 12.8 2.82

11 5 1.7 78.5 14.1 0.16

12 5 1.7 80.2 15.4 0.10

13 4 1.3 81.5 16.7 0.35

14 4 1.3 82.9 17.9 0.12

15 3 1.0 83.9 19.2 3.32

16 3 1.0 84.9 20.5 0.90

17 3 1.0 85.9 21.8 0.02

7 stores with 

2 incidents 14 4.7 90.6 30.8 0.08

28 stores with 

1 incident 28 9.4 100.0 66.7 0.06

26 stores with 

0 incidents 0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.00

Total stores = 78 298 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.15

28 Understanding Risky Facilities
Why Do Facilities Vary in Risk? 29

Unfortunately, it is not always easy to obtain the data needed 

to correct for the size of the facilities under study. For 

example, a study of downtown parking lot thefts in Charlotte, 

North Carolina was impeded when the city was unable to 

provide data about the number of spaces in each lot.16 As 

a result, police officers had to visit each lot and count the 

spaces by hand.

2. Hot products. A risky facility that does not have a large 

number of targets might have targets that are particularly 

desirable. For example, Store 15 in Table 2, which had 

the highest rate of shoplifting in the city per 1000 square 

feet, specialized in selling small, high value electronic items 

that meet the CRAVED criteria, i.e. they are Concealable, 

Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable, and Disposable.§

3. Location. It only makes sense that facilities that are 

located in high crime areas are likely to be at a greater risk for 

crime. However, why this is so is the subject of much debate. 

One theory holds that habitual offenders tend to live in high 

crime areas and that such offenders prefer not to travel too far 

to commit crime. One way of testing this theory is to study 

facilities that are located in close proximity to each other. If 

all nearby similar facilities have similar levels of crime, but the 

crime levels in these nearby facilities are different from similar 

facilities located in other neighborhoods, then proximity to 

offenders might be the explanation. However, if crime levels 

at similar facilities vary within the neighborhood itself, or 

if crime levels are similar across neighborhoods, then you 

might do well to look for a different cause. Another way of 

testing this theory would be to examine the addresses of 

the offenders who commit crimes in these facilities: if those 

who offend in high risk facilities live near such facilities, then 

location might explain the heightened risk of victimization; 

and conversely, one would expect those who offend in low 

risk facilities to have traveled a greater distance to do so. On 

the other hand, if offenders travel about the same distances 

§ See Clarke, Ronald (1999). Hot 

Products. Police Research Series. 

Paper 112. London: Home Office. 

(Accessible at www.popcenter.org) 
30 Understanding Risky Facilities

to both types of facilities, or if no clear pattern emerges, then it 

may be that the proximity of offender populations to potential 

targets is a less than useful explanation. For example, when the 

Chula Vista Police Department looked at the locations of motels 

they found that all of them—high and low crime—were located 

in high crime areas.17

4. Repeat victimization. Because some places attract people 

who are particularly vulnerable to crime, it can sometimes be 

useful to compare the individuals who have been victimized 

in risky and non-risky facilities. If re-victimization rates are 

different, then repeat victimization may be the cause of the 

elevated risk. On the other hand, facilities that cater to different 

populations that have different vulnerabilities may themselves 

vary in risk. For example, an apartment building with a large 

number of domestic violence calls might have many repeat 

domestic violence households, whereas a building with few calls 

might have no repeat domestic violence incidents. 

5. Crime attractors. Facilities that draw in large numbers 

of offenders are crime attractors. Crime attractors have high 

numbers of offenders and high offense rates. For example, 

some bars have a reputation for attracting unruly crowds; 

some even include this ability to attract a rough crowd in their 

advertising. Such facilities are likely to experience a high rate 

of victimization. For example, an investigation of corner drug 

markets in Cincinnati, Ohio suggested that some corner grocery 

stores catered to the drug trade in a number of ways, thus 

attracting offenders.18 Diagnostic checks can involve analyzing 

arrest records and other information containing offender names. 

6. Poor design and layout. For any group of facilities, there 

are important design features that can improve security. For 

example, users of ATMs are less likely to be robbed if the 

machine is located in an enclosed vestibule that requires a cash 

card for entry, if the vestibule has windows, if surveillance 
Why Do Facilities Vary in Risk? 31

cameras are installed, and so forth.§ Similarly, there are a number 

of design standards that can reduce shoplifting, including 

reducing the number of store exits, eliminating blind corners and 

recesses, creating clear sight lines in aisles, reducing the height of 

displays, placing goods away from exits, and carefully deploying 

mirrors and lighting.§§ When design guidelines are not followed, 

the risk of crime increases. 

7. Poor management. When management does not exercise 

proper control over its establishment, a risky facility can develop. 

If high crime facilities have few rules, lax enforcement, poor 

security, or other features or omissions that help offenders detect 

targets, commit crimes, and get away, then poor management 

may be an important factor in the rate of victimization. Similarly, 

if high crime facilities have many targets or more highly desirable 

targets (either hot products or repeat victims), but managers 

fail to enhance target protection, management must bear some 

responsibility for the crime problem. The important role of 

management is illustrated in Box 3, which shows how crime 

greatly increased in certain low rent apartment buildings after 

they were acquired by a notorious slumlord. 

A Sign Outside a Bar: How managers regulate 

patron conduct can have a big influence on crime 

risk.

John Eck

§ See Mike Scott, Robbery at 

Automated Teller Machines, Problem 

Specific Guide No. 8 (Washington, 

D.C.: Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, U.S. Department 

of Justice, 2001).

§§ See Ronald Clarke, Shoplifting, 

Problem Specific Guide No. 11 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of 

Community Oriented Policing 

Services, U.S. Department of Justice, 

2002).
32 Understanding Risky Facilities

Box 3: Slumlords, Crime in Low Rent Apartments and 

Neighborhood Blight

In every large city, a few low-cost rental apartment buildings make extraordinary demands 

on police time. These “risky facilities” are often owned by slumlords — unscrupulous 

landlords who purchase properties in poor neighborhoods and who make a minimum 

investment in management and maintenance. Building services deteriorate, respectable 

tenants move out, and their place is taken by less respectable ones — drug dealers, pimps, 

and prostitutes — who can afford to pay the rent but who cannot pass the background 

checks made by more responsible managements. In the course of a problem-oriented 

policing project in Santa Barbara, California, Officers Kim Frylsie and Mike Apsland 

analyzed arrests made at 14 rental apartment buildings owned by a slumlord, before and 

after he had purchased them. The table clearly shows a large increase in the number of 

people arrested at the properties in the years after he acquired them. There was also some 

evidence that the increased crime and disorder in these properties spilled over to infect 

other nearby apartment buildings — a finding that supports the widespread belief that 

slumlords contribute to neighborhood blight.

 Property Year No. of Average Yearly Arrests

 Acquired Units Pre-Owning Post-Owning 

 1 1977 4 0 1.6

 2 1982 15 0 16.9

 3 1983 8 0 2.3

 4 1985 8 0 4.5

 5 1985 10 0.1 6

 6 1986 16 0.2 27.9

 7 1986 6/8 0 3.4

 8 1987 5 0 8.3

 9 1987 12 0 11.3

 10 1988 6 0.4 8.1

 11 1991 10 0.2 9.3

 12 1991 10+ 2.3 21.8

 13 1992 4+ 1.1 0.7

 14 1992 4 0.2 10.7

Source: Clarke, Ronald and Gisela Bichler-Robertson (1998). “Place Managers, Slumlords and Crime in Low 

Rent Apartment Buildings”. Security Journal, 11: 11-19.
Why Do Facilities Vary in Risk? 33

§ For additional information on 

CPTED principles see Using Crime 

Prevention through Environmental Design 

in Problem Solving Response Guide No. 6.

Table 3

Responses to Risky Facilities

Cause Description Responses 

Size

Hot 

Products

Location

Repeat 

Victims

Crime 

Attractor 

Poor 

Design

Poor 

Management

Facility is large 

and attracts many 

users, some of 

whom become 

victims.

Facility contains 

a large number 

of things that 

are particularly 

vulnerable to theft 

or vandalism.

Facility may be 

located in close 

proximity to 

offenders.

Facility contains a 

few victims who 

are involved in a 

large proportion 

of crimes.

Facility attracts 

many offenders 

or a few high rate 

offenders.

Physical layout 

makes offending 

easy, rewarding or 

inducing risk. 

Management 

practices or 

processes enable 

or encourage 

offending.

If the number of crimes 

per user is very small 

compared to most other 

facilities, then one option is 

to do nothing. Alternatively, 

identify those most likely 

to become victims and the 

circumstances associated with 

their victimization, then focus 

on these individuals and 

circumstances.

Remove hot products. Provide 

additional protection to hot 

products. 

Hire additional security. Tailor 

management practices to the 

peculiarities of the area.

Provide victims with the 

information or inducements 

they need to make behavioral 

changes that will reduce their 

likelihood of victimization. 

Provide information or 

protection to victims so that 

they are not victimized again.

Remove offenders through 

enforcement and incapacitation 

or rehabilitation. Deny access to 

repeat offenders.

Change the physical layout in 

conformity with principles 

of Crime Prevention through 

Environmental Design 

(CPTED).§

Change management 

procedures, paying particular 

attention to practices that 

influence repeat victimization.

How are Risk Factors Identified for a Particular Group of Facilities? 35

How are Risk Factors Identified for a 

Particular Group of Facilities?

There is no single reason that explains why some facilities 

have far more crime than other facilities of the same type. 

Rather, the full explanation usually involves a combination 

of the seven factors discussed above; remember though, 

that the relative contribution of each will vary from case 

to case. In many problem-oriented projects it might not be 

possible to explain completely the variations in risk between 

facilities, because such analysis is usually only possible after 

detailed research that can take weeks or months to complete. 

However, it is usually possible to get some idea of how each 

of the seven factors contributes to the problem by comparing 

high and low crime facilities. We previously explained how 

to do this when we discussed the various ways of testing 

the influence of location, hot products, repeat victimization 

and crime attractors. In some cases, quantitative data such 

as facility size will be readily available. In others, it might 

be necessary to survey the facilities to discover the relevant 

information. For example, in the project mentioned above 

that focused on thefts from cars in Charlotte’s downtown 

parking facilities, police surveyed the lots to gather 

information about hours of operation, attendants, fencing, 

lighting, and other security measures. This provided many 

ideas for reducing crime in the riskiest facilities. In another 

Charlotte study, a police survey found that the theft of 

household appliances from construction sites was much lower 

when builders delayed installation until the homes were ready 

for occupancy.19
36 Understanding Risky Facilities

Direct observation and discussions with managers and police 

familiar with the facilities (see Box 4) can yield valuable 

insights into the reasons for variations in risk between 

facilities. In addition, interviews with apprehended offenders 

can reveal how they evaluate the difficulties, rewards, and 

risks of preying upon the facilities in the sample.§ Similarly, 

interviews with victims—particularly repeat victims—can be 

revealing.

Box 4: Identifying drug markets in privately-owned 

apartment complexes 

In Newark, New Jersey, a project funded by the U.S. Department 

of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

(the COPS Office) focused on drug dealing in low cost private 

rental apartment complexes.20 During the scanning stage, 22 

possible sites for intervention (out of a total of 506 private 

apartment complexes) were identified through an analysis of 

police data and interviews with officers in the Newark Police 

Department’s Safer Cities Task Force and Special Investigations 

Unit. Subsequent interviews with district commanders revealed 

a special problem with four apartment complexes located close 

to entry and exit ramps for Interstate 78, which provided outof-town buyers with easy access to drug markets. The buyers 

could briefly enter the city, purchase drugs at the complexes, 

drive around in a loop and quickly exit again. Authorities 

implemented a traffic management plan that disrupted the loop 

by creating one-way streets and dead-ends. The traffic plan was 

reinforced with additional enforcement at the four sites and 

will eventually dovetail with a long-term project by the state to 

rebuild the ramps to route traffic away from residential areas. 

§ See Scott Decker, Using Offender 

Interviews to Inform Police Problem 

Solving, Problem Solving Tools Series 

No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Office 

of Community Oriented Policing 

Services, 2005).
How are Risk Factors Identified for a Particular Group of Facilities? 37

Your ability to understand the reasons for the variations in 

risk will be greatly assisted where there is an existing ProblemOriented Policing Guide that deals with the facilities that are 

the focus of your own project. Although it will not tell you 

which factors are important in your sample, it will provide 

more specific suggestions than are provided by the general 

discussion above. 

As of June 2006, ten guides focused on problems within 

specific types of facilities.§

Assaults in and Around Bars (No. 1) 

Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes 

(No. 4) 

Robbery at Automated Teller Machines (No. 8) 

Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities (No. 10) 

Shoplifting (No. 11)

Bullying in Schools (No. 12)

Burglary of Retail Establishments (No. 15)

Disorder at Budget Motels (No. 30)

Bomb Threats in Schools (No. 32)

School Vandalism and Break-Ins (No. 35)

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

§ New guides are constantly being 

added; a list of those in preparation 

is available at www.popcenter.org.

How Can Risk be Reduced? 39

How Can Risk be Reduced?

Although there are many ways to reduce risk (see Table 3), it 

is important to focus on those that are most likely to succeed. 

For example, it is usually impossible to do anything about the 

size and location of specific facilities. Similarly, changing a 

facility’s physical design can be difficult or costly and would 

only be justified in an extreme case. On the other hand, it 

may be easier to change business practices that facilitate or 

encourage crime and disorder; this, however, cannot be done 

without the full cooperation of those who own or manage 

the facilities, as they are usually the ones who must implement 

and pay for the measures. Before moving on to a discussion 

of the various ways of convincing facility managers to make 

the changes necessary to reduce crime or disorder, it is 

important to understand some of the reasons why they might 

not have done these things on their own. The reasons can 

include the following.

1. If high crime facilities face different circumstances 

than low crime facilities, even following the same 

practices as at the latter may not be effective in reducing 

problematic incidents at the former. Under these 

circumstances, special crime prevention efforts may be 

needed at the high crime facilities. 

2. Managers of high crime facilities might not know 

what to do to remedy the situation. This sometimes 

occurs because of poor communication between 

managers and owners. Training programs that transfer 

information from knowledgeable low crime facilities to 

high crime facilities can help under these circumstances. 
3. High crime facilities might face higher prevention 

costs than low crime facilities, especially if the former are 

located in older structures that are more costly to adapt to 

modern crime prevention standards. For example, older 

structures sometimes contain lead pipes, asbestos, and 

other materials that are costly to handle. Newer structures 

do not contain these materials, making renovation easier 

and cheaper. Similarly, where high crime facilities spend 

less on prevention than do newer low crime facilities, the 

failure to implement preventive measures might merely be 

a way of reducing operating expenses. This is most likely 

where the cost of crime falls more heavily on customers 

and patrons than it does on owners and management. 

Lowering costs can help in these circumstances. Examples 

include subsidized toxic waste removal, low interest loans, 

extra police protection, and other similar efforts. 

 

4. Some businesses profit from criminal activity. At 

the extreme, owners or employees are directly involved 

in criminal activity. In other cases, however, businesses 

might simply feed off deviant activity, without any direct 

involvement by owners and employees. For example, 

dealers and buyers might make up a disproportionate 

share of the customers at a convenience store located in 

an area where drug trafficking is frequent. In such a case 

the store owner might ignore the illegal activities because 

the offenders are her best customers. 

5. Managers and owners of high crime facilities 

sometimes believe that police bear the sole responsibility 

for reducing crime. Consequently, their crime prevention 

efforts consist exclusively of complaining to the police 

and trying to get them to do more to prevent crime at 

their facilities. 

40 Understanding Risky Facilities
How Can Risk be Reduced? 41

Although it always best to assume that managers and owners 

want to reduce crime and disorder in their facilities and that 

they will be open to working with the police and others to 

implement the necessary changes, the list above suggests that 

they will sometimes resist implementing remedial measures. 

Consequently, it will sometimes be necessary to exert a certain 

amount of coercion, either directly or indirectly. There are 

several ways that this can be done.§

1. Publicity. The greater risk of using a particular facility can be 

made known to the public. Publishing statistics regarding calls 

for service from local motels or crimes in local parking lots 

can shame managers into acting or force them to act to avoid 

losing business.

2. Sanctions. Local governments can use civil enforcement 

procedures to shut down facilities that are persistent trouble 

spots. There is considerable evidence that the threat of civil 

sanctions is quite effective in coercing owners to address 

victimization problems.21 Sanctions can range from fines to 

license revocation and facility closure.

Demolition of a Former Bar and Drug Dealing Hot 

Spot: Removing a very risky facility can be the best 

way to reduce crime.

John Eck

§ For a more extensive discussion 

of obtaining cooperation see Mike 

Scott and Herman Goldstein, 

Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for 

Public Safety Problems, Problem-Oriented 

Response Guide No. 3 (Washington, 

D.C.: Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, U.S. Department 

of Justice, 2005). 
42 Understanding Risky Facilities

3. Certification programs. Police and local authorities can certify 

premises and facilities for their security. These certification 

programs can be voluntary or compulsory. For example, 

police in the United Kingdom operate a voluntary safe car 

parks scheme of this type.22

4. Voluntary codes of practice. Managers or owners of specific 

types of facilities in a particular region or locality can agree to 

follow certain practices designed to reduce crime. An example 

of this would be the accords made between the managers 

of pubs and clubs in entertainment districts in Melbourne, 

Surfers Paradise, Geelong, and elsewhere in Australia to 

reduce drink-related violence.23 

5. Performance Standards. Recently, the Chula Vista Police 

Department has been experimenting with the use of 

performance standards.24 Based on an analysis of crime 

frequency and negation, a maximum number of crimes is 

established for facilities of a particular type. This standard 

can be expressed as a rate, to account for size. Facilities that 

exceed the performance standards are sanctioned. Along 

the same lines, the Oakland Police Department entered into 

an agreement whereby a motel chain agreed to attempt to 

reduce crime and disorder at one of its problem motels.25

This agreement was guaranteed by a performance bond that 

required the chain to pay $250,000 to the city if the goal was 

not reached within two years. It was left to the motel chain 

to decide which security measures to introduce; it decided 

to upgrade lighting and fencing, replace the managers and 

security guards, conduct pre-employment background checks 

on all new employees, establish strict check-in procedures, 

maintain a list of banned individuals, and prohibit room 

rentals of more than 30 days. Crime was greatly reduced 

by this initiative (see Table 4), which earned the Herman 

Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing 

for 2003.
How Can Risk be Reduced? 43

Table 4

Calls for Police Service

Oakland Airport Motel

 Calls for Service

 1998 197

 1999 212

 2000 242

 2001 38

 2002 1

 2003 3*

 *Through March 2003

In practice, a combination of approaches—both a carrot 

and a stick—might be the most effective strategy. Because 

business owners can be politically powerful, it may be far 

easier to reduce crime if management is induced to cooperate 

without engaging in a political battle. In this regard, it is 

important to recall the guiding principle of this guide, the 

80/20 rule: most of the problem is likely to be the result 

of a few facilities. So it might be that enlisting the support 

of the majority of facility owners and managers—whose 

contributions to the problem are minor—to change the 

behavior of the few—whose contributions to the problem are 

major—can aid police in winning the political struggle. This 

can also reduce costs by focusing resources where they are 

needed most, which can aid in tailoring responses to particular 

settings, thereby increasing the chances that interventions will 

be effective.

Endnotes 45

Endnotes 1

 Eck, Clarke, and Guerette (2007).

2

 Kock (1999).

3

 Eck, Clarke, and Guerette (2007).

4

 National Association of Convenience Stores (1991).

5

 Sherman, Schmidt, and Velke (1992).

6

 Eck, Clarke, and Guerette (2007).

7

 La Vigne (1994).

8

 Lindstrom (1997).

9

 Bowers et al. (1998).

10 Hirschfield and Bowers (1998).

11 Newton (2004); Loukaitou-Sideris and Eck (in press). 

12 Perrone (2000).

13 Eck, Clarke, and Guerette (2007).

14 Clarke and Goldstein (2003).

15 Oakland Police Department (2003).

16 Clarke and Goldstein (2003).

17 Chula Vista Police Department (2004).

18 Madensen et al. (2005).

19 Clarke and Goldstein (2002).

20 Zanin et al. (2004).

21 Eck (2002).

22 Smith, Gregson, and Morgan (2003).

23 Homel et al. (1997); Felson et al. (1997).

24 Chula Vista Police Department (2004).

25 Oakland Police Department (2003).

References 47

References

Bowers, K., A. Hirschfield and S. Johnson (1998). 

“Victimization Revisited: A Case Study of NonResidential Repeat Burglary in Merseyside.” British Journal 

of Criminology 38(3): 429-452.

Chula Vista Police Department. Chief ’s Community Advisory 

Committee (2004). The Chula Vista Motel Project. Chula 

Vista (California): Chula Vista Police Department.

Clarke, R.V. (1999). Hot Products: Understanding, Anticipating and 

Reducing Demand for Stolen Goods. London: Home Office, 

Research Development and Statistics Directorate.

—– (2002). Shoplifting, Problem Specific Guide No. 11. 

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Series. Washington, 

D.C.: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 

U.S. Department of Justice. 

Clarke, R.V., and G. Bichler-Robertson (1998). “Place 

Managers, Slumlords and Crime in Low Rent Apartment 

Buildings.” Security Journal 11: 11-19.

Clarke, R.V., and J.E. Eck (2003). Become a Problem-Solving Crime 

Analyst: In 55 Small Steps. London: Jill Dando Institute 

of Crime Science.

Clarke, R.V., and H. Goldstein (2002). “Reducing Theft at 

Construction Sites: Lessons from a Problem-Oriented 

Project.” In N. Tilley (ed.), Analysis for Crime Prevention, 

Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 13. Monsey (New York): 

Criminal Justice Press.
48 Understanding Risky Facilities

—– (2003). “Thefts from Cars in Center-City Parking 

Facilities: A Case Study in Implementing ProblemOriented Policing.” In J. Knutsson (ed.), Problem-Oriented 

Policing: From Innovation to Mainstream, Crime Prevention 

Studies, vol. 15. Monsey (New York): Criminal Justice 

Press.

Clarke, R.V., and D. Martin (1975). “A Study of Absconding 

and Its Implications for the Residential Treatment of 

Delinquents.” In J. Tizard, I. Sinclair and R.V. Clarke 

(eds.), Varieties of Residential Experience. London: Routledge 

and Kegan Paul.

Decker, S. (2005) Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem 

Solving, Problem Solving Tools Series No. 3. Problem-Oriented 

Guides for Police Series. Washington, D.C.: Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department 

of Justice.

Eck, J. E. (2002). “Preventing Crime at Places.” In L.W. 

Sherman, D. Farrington, B. Welsh and D.L. MacKenzie 

(eds.), Evidence-Based Crime Prevention. New York: 

Routledge.

—– (2003). “Police Problems: The Complexity of Problem 

Theory, Research and Evaluation.” In J. Knutsson (ed.), 

Problem-Oriented Policing: From Innovation to Mainstream, Crime 

Prevention Studies, vol. 15. Monsey (New York): Criminal 

Justice Press.

Eck, J., R.V. Clarke and R. Guerette (2007). “Risky Facilities: 

Crime Concentration in Homogeneous Sets of Facilities.” 

Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 21. Monsey (New York): 

Criminal Justice Press.
References 49

Felson, M., R. Berends, B. Richardson and A. Veno (1997). 

“Reducing Pub Hopping and Related Crime.” In R. 

Homel (ed.), Policing for Prevention: Reducing Crime, Public 

Intoxication and Injury, Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 7. 

Monsey (New York): Criminal Justice Press.

Hirschfield, A., and K. Bowers (1998). “Monitoring, 

Measuring and Mapping Community Safety.” In A. 

Marlow and J. Pitts (eds.), Planning Safer Communities. Lyne 

Regis: Russell House Publishing.

Homel, R., M. Hauritz, G. McIlwain, R. Wortley and R. 

Carvolth (1997). “Preventing Drunkenness and Violence 

Around Nightclubs in a Tourist Resort.” In R.V. Clarke 

(ed.), Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies (2nd 

ed.). Guilderland (New York): Harrow and Heston.

Kock, R. (1999). 80-20 Principle: The Secret to Success by Achieving 

More with Less. New York: Doubleday.

La Vigne, N. (1994). “Gasoline Drive-Offs: Designing a Less 

Convenient Environment.” In R.V. Clarke (ed.), Crime 

Prevention Studies, vol. 2. Monsey (New York): Criminal 

Justice Press.

Lindstrom, P. (1997). “Patterns of School Crime: A 

Replication and Empirical Extension.” British Journal of 

Criminology 37: 121-130.

Loukaitou-Sideris, A., and J.E. Eck (in press). “Crime 

Prevention and Active Living.” American Journal of Health 

Promotion.
50 Understanding Risky Facilities

Madensen, T., M. Skubak, D. Morgan and J.E. Eck (2005). 

Open-Air Drug Dealing in Cincinnati, Ohio: Executive 

Summary and Final Recommendations. Cincinnati, Ohio: 

University of Cincinnati, Division of Criminal Justice. 

Available at www.uc.edu/criminaljustice/ProjectReports/

FINAL_ RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf).

Matthews, R., C. Pease and K. Pease (2001). “Repeat Bank 

Robbery: Theme and Variations.” In G. Farrell and K. 

Pease (eds.), Repeat Victimization, Crime Prevention Studies, 

vol.12. Monsey (New York): Criminal Justice Press.

National Association of Convenience Stores (1991). 

Convenience Store Security Report and Recommendations. 

Alexandria (Virginia): National Association of 

Convenience Stores.

Newton, A. (2004). Crime and Disorder on Busses: Toward an 

Evidence Base for Effective Crime Prevention. Ph.D. diss., 

University of Liverpool, Liverpool.

Oakland Police Department (2003). “The Oakland Airport 

Motel Project.” Submission for the Herman Goldstein 

Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing.

Perrone, S. (2000). Crimes Against Small Business in Australia: 

A Preliminary Analysis. Canberra: Australian Institute for 

Criminology.

Scott, M. (2001). The Problem of Robbery at Automated Teller 

Machines, Problem Specific Guide No. 8. Problem-Oriented 

Guides for Police Series. Washington, D.C.: Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department 

of Justice. 
References 51

Scott, M., and H. Goldstein (2006). Shifting and Sharing 

Responsibility for Public Safety Problems, Response Guide Series 

No. 3. Problem-Oriented Guides for Police. Washington, 

D.C.: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 

U.S. Department of Justice. 

Sherman, L., J. Schmidt and R. Velke (1992). High Crime 

Taverns: A RECAP Project in Problem-Oriented Policing. 

Washington, D.C.: Crime Control Institute.

Smith, D., M. Gregson and J. Morgan (2003). Between the Lines: 

An Evaluation of the Secured Park Award Scheme. London: 

Home Office Research, Development and Statistics 

Directorate.

Stedman, J. (2005). “Alcohol Issues in City Parks.” 

Unpublished presentation to the Chula Vista City Council. 

Chula Vista (California): Chula Vista Police Department 

(November).

Weisel, D. (2005) Analyzing Repeat Victimization, Problem 

Solving Tools Series No. 4. Problem-Oriented Guides for 

Police. Washington, D.C.: Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. 

Zanin, N., J. Shane and R.V. Clarke (2004). “Reducing Drug 

Dealing in Private Apartment Complexes In Newark, 

New Jersey.” A final report to the U.S. Department of 

Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 

on the field applications of the Problem-Oriented 

Guides for Police project. Washington, D.C.: Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department 

of Justice. Available at www.popcenter.org.

About the Authors 53

About the Authors

Ronald V. Clarke

Ronald V. Clarke is a University Professor at the School of 

Criminal Justice, Rutgers University. He previously headed 

the British government’s criminological research department, 

where he had a significant role in developing situational crime 

prevention and the British Crime Survey. Clarke is the founding 

editor of Crime Prevention Studies, and his publications include 

Designing Out Crime (HMSO 1980, with Pat Mayhew), The 

Reasoning Criminal (Springer-Verlag 1986, with Derek Cornish), 

Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies (Criminal Justice 

Press, 1997), Superhighway Robbery (Willan Publishing, 2003, 

with Graeme Newman) Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers (U.S. 

Department of Justice, 2005, with John Eck) and Outsmarting 

the Terrorists (Praeger 2006, with Graeme Newman). Since 1998, 

he has chaired the selection committee for the annual Herman 

Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. 

Clarke holds a doctorate in psychology from the University of 

London.

John E. Eck

John Eck is professor of criminal justice at the University 

of Cincinnati. He has contributed to the development of 

problem-oriented policing since 1984 when he studied the 

first full-scale attempt to implement the concept in the United 

States at Newport News, Virginia. He helped to develop a 

number of now standard techniques in problem-oriented 

policing, including the SARA model and the problem analysis 

triangle. Dr. Eck is an affiliate member of the Center for 

Problem-Oriented Policing. He is a judge for the Tilley Award 

for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. Dr. Eck was a 

member of the Committee to Review Research on Police Policy 

and Practice (2000-2003) of the National Academy of Sciences.

Recommended Readings 55

Recommended Readings

• A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their 

Environments, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This 

guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners 

to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying 

public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It 

provides guidance on whether and how to conduct costeffective surveys.

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An 

Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers,

by John E. Eck (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). This guide 

is a companion to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. 

It provides basic guidance to measuring and assessing 

problem-oriented policing efforts.

• Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel 

(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with 

accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic 

pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The 

document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs.

• Crime Prevention Studies, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 

(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of 

volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing 

opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of 

initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems.

• Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 

1999 Herman Goldstein Award Winners. This 

document produced by the National Institute of Justice 

in collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum 
56 Understanding Risky Facilities

provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the 

annual award program that recognizes exemplary problemoriented responses to various community problems. A 

similar publication is available for the award winners from 

subsequent years. The documents are also available at www.

ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.

• Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime 

Reduction, by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office 

Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and 

describes the factors that make problem-solving effective 

or ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in 

England and Wales.

• Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory 

for Crime Prevention, by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. 

Clarke (Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98, 

1998). Explains how crime theories such as routine activity 

theory, rational choice theory and crime pattern theory 

have practical implications for the police in their efforts to 

prevent crime.

• Problem Analysis in Policing, by Rachel Boba (Police 

Foundation, 2003). Introduces and defines problem 

analysis and provides guidance on how problem analysis 

can be integrated and institutionalized into modern 

policing practices.

• Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein 

(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990). 

Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented 

policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses 

how a police agency can implement the concept.
Recommended Readings 57

• Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention, 

by Anthony A. Braga (Criminal Justice Press, 2003). 

Provides a thorough review of significant policing research 

about problem places, high-activity offenders, and repeat 

victims, with a focus on the applicability of those findings 

to problem-oriented policing. Explains how police 

departments can facilitate problem-oriented policing by 

improving crime analysis, measuring performance, and 

securing productive partnerships.

• Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the 

First 20 Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of 

Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 

2000). Describes how the most critical elements of 

Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have 

developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes 

future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report 

is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

• Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in 

Newport News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman 

(Police Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the 

rationale behind problem-oriented policing and the 

problem-solving process, and provides examples of 

effective problem-solving in one agency.

• Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing 

Crime and Disorder Through Problem-Solving 

Partnerships by Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott 

Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. (U.S. 

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, 1998) (also available at www.cops.usdoj.

gov). Provides a brief introduction to problem-solving, 

basic information on the SARA model and detailed 

suggestions about the problem-solving process.
58 Understanding Risky Facilities

• Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case 

Studies, Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 

(Harrow and Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and 

methods of situational crime prevention, and presents over 

20 case studies of effective crime prevention initiatives.

• Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: 

Case Studies in Problem-Solving, by Rana Sampson 

and Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available 

at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective 

police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder 

problems.

• Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook 

for Law Enforcement, by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S. 

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction for 

police to analyzing problems within the context of 

problem-oriented policing.

• Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement 

Managers, Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G. 

LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains 

many of the basics of research as it applies to police 

management and problem-solving.
Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 59

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police

Problem-Specific Guides series:

1. Assaults in and Around Bars, 2nd Edition. Michael S. 

Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-00-2

2. Street Prostitution, 2nd Edition. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 

ISBN: 1-932582-01-0

3. Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-02-9

4. Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes. 

Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-03-7

5. False Burglar Alarms. Rana Sampson. 2001. 

ISBN: 1-932582-04-5

6. Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001.

ISBN: 1-932582-05-3

7. Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-06-1

8. Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 

2001. ISBN: 1-932582-07-X

9. Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-08-8

10. Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V. 

Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-09-6

11. Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-10-X

12. Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002. 

ISBN: 1-932582-11-8

13. Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-12-6

14. Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-13-4

15. Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. 

ISBN: 1-932582-14-2

16. Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs, 2nd Edition.

Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-15-0

17. Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 

2002. ISBN: 1-932582-16-9

18. Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 

2002. ISBN: 1-932582-17-7
60 Understanding Risky Facilities

19. Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002.

ISBN: 1-932582-18-5

20. Financial Crimes Against the Elderly.

Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-22-3

21. Check and Card Fraud. Graeme R. Newman. 2003. 

ISBN: 1-932582-27-4

22. Stalking. The National Center for Victims of Crime. 

2004. ISBN: 1-932582-30-4

23. Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders. 

Anthony A. Braga. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-31-2

24. Prescription Fraud. Julie Wartell and Nancy G. La Vigne. 

2004. ISBN: 1-932582-33-9

25. Identity Theft. Graeme R. Newman. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-35-3

26. Crimes Against Tourists. Ronald W. Glensor and 

Kenneth J. Peak. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-36-3

27. Underage Drinking. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-39-8

28. Street Racing. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 

2004. ISBN: 1-932582-42-8

29. Cruising. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-43-6

30. Disorder at Budget Motels. Karin Schmerler. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-41-X

31. Drug Dealing in Open-Air Markets. Alex Harocopos 

and Mike Hough. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-45-2

32. Bomb Threats in Schools. Graeme R. Newman. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-46-0

33. Illicit Sexual Activity in Public Places. Kelly Dedel 

Johnson. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-47-9

34. Robbery of Taxi Drivers. Martha J. Smith. 2005. 

ISBN: 1-932582-50-9

35. School Vandalism and Break-Ins. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 

2005. ISBN: 1-9325802-51-7
36. Drunk Driving. Michael S. Scott, Nina J. Emerson, Louis 

B. Antonacci, and Joel B. Plant. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-57-6

37. Juvenile Runaways. Kelly Dedel. 2006. 

ISBN: 1932582-56-8

38. The Exploitation of Trafficked Women. Graeme R. 

Newman. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-59-2

39. Student Party Riots. Tamara D. Madensen and John E. 

Eck. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-60-6

40. People with Mental Illness. Gary Cordner. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-63-0

41. Child Pornography on the Internet. Richard Wortley 

and Stephen Smallbone. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-65-7

42. Witness Intimidation. Kelly Dedel. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-67-3

43. Burglary at Single-Family House Construction 

Sites. Rachel Boba and Roberto Santos. 2006. 

ISBN: 1-932582-00-2

44. Disorder at Day Laborer Sites. Rob Guerette. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-72-X

45. Domestic Violence. Rana Sampson. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-74-6

46. Thefts of and from Cars on Residential Streets and 

Driveways. Todd Keister. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-76-2

47. Drive-By Shootings. Kelly Dedel. 2007. 

ISBN: 1-932582-77-0

Response Guides series:

• The Benefits and Consequences of Police 

Crackdowns. Michael S. Scott. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-24-X

• Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime: Should 

You Go Down This Road? Ronald V. Clarke. 2004. 

ISBN: 1-932582-41-X

• Crime Prevention Publicity Campaigns.

Emmanuel Barthe. 2006 ISBN: 1-932582-66-5

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 61
62 Understanding Risky Facilities

• Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety 

Problems. Michael S. Scott and Herman Goldstein. 2005.

ISBN: 1-932582-55-X

• Video Surveillance of Public Places. Jerry Ratcliffe. 

2006 ISBN: 1-932582-58-4

Problem-Solving Tools series: 

• Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory 

Guide for Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002. 

ISBN: 1-932582-19-3

• Researching a Problem. Ronald V. Clarke and Phyllis A. 

Schultz. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-48-7

• Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem 

Solving. Scott H. Decker. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-49-5

• Analyzing Repeat Victimization. Deborah Lamm 

Weisel. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-54-1

Understanding Risky Facilities. Ronald V. Clarke and 

John E. Eck. 2007. ISBN: 1-932582-75-4

Upcoming Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides

Abandoned Vehicles

Bank Robbery

Bicycle Theft

Drive-By Shootings

Crowd Control at Stadiums and Other Entertainment Venues

Child Abuse

Crime and Disorder in Parks

Pedestrian Injuries and Fatalities

Robbery of Convenience Stores

Traffic Congestion Around Schools

Transient Encampments

•
Problem-Solving Tools

Designing a Problem Analysis System

Displacement

Implementing Responses to Problems

Using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in 

Problem Solving

Partnering with Community Developers to Address Public 

Safety Problems

Response Guides

Enhancing Lighting

Sting Operations

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for 

Police series and other COPS Office publications, please call 

the COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770 or visit 

COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 

Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 63
www.cops.usdoj.gov

For More Information:

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the

COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770

Visit COPS Online at the address listed below.

e02071462 Date: March 2007

ISBN: 1-932582-75-4