U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

94–097 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–10] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

HOW IS DOD RESPONDING TO EMERGING 

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE? 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KATIE SENDAK, Professional Staff Member 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL TEHRANI, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Breedlove, GEN Philip M., USAF, Commander, Supreme Allied Command 

Europe and U.S. European Combatant Command ............................................ 5 

Wormuth, Christine E., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Breedlove, GEN Philip M. ............................................................................... 57 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 48 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ ............................................................... 47 

Wormuth, Christine E. ..................................................................................... 50 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mrs. Davis ......................................................................................................... 87 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 87 

Ms. McSally ....................................................................................................... 88 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. O’Rourke .................................................................................................... 94 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 91 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 91 

Mr. Zinke ........................................................................................................... 94 

(1) 

HOW IS DOD RESPONDING TO EMERGING SECURITY 

CHALLENGES IN EUROPE? 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 25, 2015. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. Let me welcome 

our members, witnesses, and guests for this hearing on how the 

Department of Defense [DOD] is responding to emerging security 

challenges in Europe. 

In a world and a time full of complex threats facing the United 

States, it seems to me the situation in Europe poses peril on several levels; one is naked aggression of conquest. We have seen this 

before in Europe many times in the past and it seems to me if history has taught us anything, it is that aggression unchallenged in 

its early stages leads to greater costs and greater misery when it 

must be confronted. 

A second element is—what I believe is an attempt to undermine 

the rules-based international system that has existed since the end 

of World War II. I am among those who are convinced that President Putin is working to undermine that system in order to replace 

it with one that is more of his liking, and, unfortunately, he has 

some unsavory allies in that effort. 

A third challenge is the tactics that the Russians are using in 

Ukraine. We have heard a lot about ‘‘little green men,’’ but the various efforts Russia is using to undermine Ukrainian security forces, 

as well as to pull a facade over its own involvement, presents a 

number of challenges to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and to the United States. We tend not to deal with naked lies 

and subversion and other forms of subterfuge very easily. 

I am pleased to be supporting Mr. Smith’s legislation that would 

provide defensive lethal assistance to Ukraine. It seems to me that 

any people ought to be able to defend themselves and their country. 

But beyond the immediate crisis, part of what this committee 

needs to think about as we consider funding, organizing, and equipping our troops, is how well we are prepared to deal with this sort 

of threat in Europe and elsewhere. 
2 

As Europe and NATO grapple with this crisis, as well as the 

growing threat of jihadi terrorists, the world is watching and will 

draw conclusions about what course they will take in response. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, obviously, that is the 

game-changing issue of the European Command, Russia and President Putin’s aggressiveness in the Ukraine, and I think the chairman summed it up fairly well. 

What Mr. Putin is trying to do is fundamentally alter the postWorld War II construct in terms of how the world is organized. And 

it is very unfortunate. You know, when the Soviet Union broke up 

and the Cold War ended, there was a real opportunity to integrate 

Russia into that world order which has worked reasonably well. 

And Russia would have been a great partner and, you know, history can be written about why that didn’t work out. 

The bottom line is Russia is now attempting to set up again a 

bi-polar world. They see it as a zero-sum game. What is good for 

the West is not good for them and they are attempting to reestablish their power and break away as many people as possible from 

Western influence. And that is bad enough. Worse is that they are 

aggressive militarily in how they go about trying to do that. 

We have seen it in Crimea, we have seen it in Eastern Ukraine, 

and the real concern is you read about how Russia’s top leadership 

looks at this issue. There is really not much reason to believe that 

they are going to stop. They believe this sort of aggression has been 

rewarded. That they have been able to take territory. That they 

have been able to reestablish themselves as a legitimate power on 

the world stage. 

So confronting that threat is the number one biggest issue, and 

it is not easy to confront. We do not want to start another war. We 

want to figure out some way to stop this aggression in a peaceful 

means. And we have to work with our NATO and European partners in order to achieve that. And, yet, that is not always an easy 

process either. 

But it does also raise questions about something I think this 

committee had long assumed, was that we could afford to substantially draw down our presence in Europe in order to focus whether 

it was on the pivot to Asia or to focus on the rising tide of Islamic 

extremists in various countries in confronting the terrorist threat 

that that presents. 

Now we realize that our presence in Europe is more important 

than it used to be. So be interested to hear how are we properly 

positioned in Europe to confront this threat. How are we aligned 

with our European allies to, hopefully, you know, maximize our assets and theirs, put them together in the best way possible? And 

what is the most logical way to confront Putin’s aggression. I think 

that is the fundamental and central question that we face in Europe. I look forward to the testimony. 
3 

I apologize, I may have to leave a little early. I am still, as I said, 

I am in between hip surgeries. Good news is my left hip is getting 

a lot better. Bad news is my right hip is getting a lot worse. But 

the surgery is coming so sitting for extended periods of time is not 

something I can do so I may not be here for the whole hearing, but 

I do look forward to testimony and questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We are pleased to welcome Ms. 

Christine Wormuth, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and 

General Philip Breedlove, Commander, Supreme Allied Command 

Europe and U.S. European Combatant Command. Thank you all 

for being here. 

Without objection, your full written statement will be made part 

of the record. And we would invite you to make what oral statements you would like at this point. 

Ms. Wormuth. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, UNDER SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, and 

Ranking Member Smith and distinguished members of the committee. I very much appreciate the opportunity to be with you all 

today to talk about the security situation in Europe and our relationship with allies and partners in the region. 

As both of you have noted, in the last 18 months the security situation in Europe has changed quite significantly. But despite these 

challenges, Europe is a cornerstone of our engagement with the 

rest of the world and a catalyst for our global cooperation. 

Time and again, Europe and NATO have proven to be our indispensable strategic partners. We believe that will continue to be 

true and, for these reasons, U.S. engagement in Europe is and will 

remain a vital element of our national security strategy. 

It has been almost a year since Russia’s occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea. Since that time, we have seen Russia funding and arming separatists in Eastern Ukraine. We have 

seen direct Russian participation in the fighting. These actions, 

coupled with Russia’s continued support of frozen conflicts elsewhere, and violations of its obligations under numerous treaties, 

are undermining European stability. 

Russia’s actions to undermine the sovereignty of a neighboring 

country and to attempt to change borders and to change the international order even, but certainly to change borders by force, are 

unacceptable. 

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine challenges our vision of a 

Europe whole and free, which is what we have been working so 

hard on since the end of the Cold War. It changes Europe’s security 

landscape, it is causing instability, obviously, on NATO’s borders, 

and we are steadfast as a nation in opposing Russia’s destabilizing 

actions. 

To do that, we have been working closely with Europe and other 

partners and allies; first and foremost, to impose real costs on Russia for its aggressive actions. This has included diplomatic isolation 
4 

and economic sanctions which, combined with falling oil prices, are 

having a substantial and mounting impact on Russia’s economy. 

We are also taking visible, concrete measures to reassure our allies and partners in Europe and to deter further Russian aggression. For example, since May 2014, NATO has been reassuring allies and deterring Russia by maintaining a continuous land, air, 

and maritime presence and increasing military activity particularly 

in the eastern part of the NATO Alliance. These measures are defensive, they are proportionate, and they are fully in line with our 

obligations as NATO members regarding allied defense. 

We are also, as part of our strategy, providing substantial support to Ukraine as it is dealing with simultaneous economic and 

military crises. Since the start of the crisis, we have increased our 

security-related assistance to Ukraine significantly, to both its military, its national guard, and its border guard services. And, together, next year, in fiscal year 2015, DOD and the State Department will be providing $120 million to Ukraine as part of the European Reassurance Initiative. 

But it is, I think, important to also remember that NATO and 

our European allies are also on the frontlines of the fight against 

ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]. There the United 

States has been leading a coalition of over 60 nations across multiple lines of efforts ranging from military contributions to humanitarian assistance. 

As part of the coalition military campaign, Europe has been stepping up to fill critical roles, particularly in denying ISIL safe haven 

in Iraq and Syria, and helping us build the capacity of partners to 

take the fight to ISIL, including by actively striking ISIL targets. 

The threat we see of foreign fighters going into Iraq and Syria 

remains a significant concern for us and for our European allies. 

We are drawing on all forms of our intelligence to understand and 

address the flow of foreign fighters and we are working closely with 

our NATO allies and other partners to have an international effort 

to try to combat this complex problem. 

In addition to the threat of ISIL, it is also, I think, important to 

note that there is significant instability in the Middle East and 

North Africa that also affects NATO’s security, especially for those 

allies that are on the southern flank of the Alliance. The movement 

of thousands of migrants to the shores of southern Europe can 

bring instability and sometimes violence, particularly because of 

the transnational criminal networks that are involved in human 

trafficking. 

Finally, as we look beyond Europe, it is also useful to reflect on 

the true strategic partners we have in our European NATO allies 

for a host of challenges that are well outside of NATO’s boundaries. 

In particular, I just wanted to note how effectively we work together with NATO allies in Africa to be part of the international 

community’s response to the Ebola crisis. 

Under Operation United Assistance, the Department has supported the USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development]-led 

effort to break the back of the Ebola outbreak, with the United 

States focusing primarily in Liberia. This mission isn’t complete 

and many lives have been lost but I think we can be proud as part 

of the international community with the strong roles that we have 
5 

played and that European allies have played to successfully mobilize all of our capabilities to address the emergency. 

Also, in Afghanistan, NATO allies remain our steadfast partners 

in the effort to try to help bring civility and security to that country. The Resolute Support Mission, which we launched at the beginning of this year, focuses the efforts of our NATO allies and 

other partners on training, advising, and assisting the Afghan security institutions at both the ministerial and institutional level. 

Twenty-six of our allies and 16 partners are providing forces to the 

Resolute Support Mission, and our allies there have also committed 

to providing sustainment funding to the Afghan National Security 

Forces through 2024, which is going to be critical to locking in the 

gains that we are making there. 

Finally, to do all of this together with our NATO allies and to 

be able to work effectively, it is essential to have a robust force posture in Europe. Our U.S. footprint in Europe gives us the capability 

to defend our security interests, to enhance trans-Atlantic security, 

to reassure allies and deter aggression which, again, we certainly 

see in a very marked way in recent times. 

In a time of limited resources, however, the United States has to 

be more innovative and explore new posture arrangements by increasing our flexibility, our adaptability, and our readiness. 

If sequestration returns, and this is something I am very personally concerned about—our ability to sustain our posture in Europe 

is going to be at significant risk. If sequestration returns, our ability to continue to invest in the capabilities we need and to maintain the readiness levels we need to be able to effectively respond 

to crises is going to be at significant risk. 

This is a very serious concern. I know it is one that many of you 

share and we look forward to working with this committee and 

with Congress more broadly to try to find solutions to these budgetary pressures so that we can maintain the U.S. military as the 

world’s finest military force. 

Thank you very much for your time today, and I look forward to 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Wormuth can be found in 

the Appendix on page 50.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, COMMANDER, SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE AND U.S. 

EUROPEAN COMBATANT COMMAND 

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify today. 

It is an honor to appear before you representing the dedicated 

soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and our civilians of U.S. European Command [EUCOM]. Thank you for all you do to support 

them as they serve our Nation. 

I am particularly happy to be here today with Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy Christine Wormuth. 

Compared to just one year ago, Europe faces a very different and 

much more challenging security environment. Our top concern is a 
6 

resurgent Russia. A Russia attempting to exercise power and influence through the use of force and intimidation. Russia is blatantly 

challenging the rules and principles that have been the bedrock of 

European security for decades. The challenge is global, not regional, and enduring, not temporary. 

Russian aggression is clearly visible in its illegal occupation of 

Crimea and in the continued armed conflict in the Donbass, or 

Eastern Ukraine. 

The best way to bring the conflict in Ukraine to an acceptable 

lasting solution is through a political settlement, one that respects 

state sovereignty and territorial integrity. But what we have seen 

recently and, frankly, over the course of the whole conflict, gives 

us cause for concern. 

Russian forces have supplied separatists with heavy weapons, 

training and mentoring, command and control, artillery fire support, tactical and operational-level air defenses; more than 1,000 

pieces of Russian military equipment have been transferred into 

Ukraine, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery pieces, and other military vehicles and equipment. 

And in a number of cases, when the separate offensive or operations were stalled or were threatened, Russian regular forces 

themselves intervened to right the course. Just this month, Russian forces fought hard to change the facts on the ground just before the cease fire was scheduled to take effect. 

These are not the actions of a good faith negotiating partner. Actions matter much more than words, and what we see in the fight 

on the ground and in the diplomatic efforts designed to resolve it, 

is a revanchist Russia that does not play by international rules or 

norms. 

The crisis in Ukraine affects more than just Ukraine. Russian activities are destabilizing to neighboring states and to the region as 

a whole. Russian illegal actions push instability closer to the 

boundaries of NATO. As President Obama has clearly stated, the 

United States will uphold its Article 5 commitments under the 

Washington Treaty. 

In turn, Russia is learning lessons from our responses to their 

actions. If they feel rewarded by the outcomes, this might embolden 

them to try them again elsewhere. And the rest of the world, states 

and non-state actors alike, are also keeping eyes on how these 

events unfold. 

For the longer term, it makes sense to aim for a new Russia-U.S. 

relationship and a new NATO-Russia relationship that are based 

on mutual respect and shared interest. A Europe whole, free, at 

peace, and prosperous, is a vision that would benefit everyone. And 

it would offer the best possible long-term protection of U.S. national security interests. 

At the time same, Europe also faces a surge of violent extremism. The executions and other brutal actions that ISIL has carried out show their total disregard for human life. European nations are rightly worried about foreign fighters returning home to 

Europe from the fight in Syria and Iraq with new skills and with 

malign intent. Attacks like those in France, Belgium, and Denmark 

are only likely to become more frequent. 
7 

Foreign fighters are part of a much broader pattern of insecurity 

in Europe’s south, with its roots in the Middle East and North Africa, with flows of migrants and criminal transit routes. The spread 

of instability into Europe and the reach of transnational terrorism 

could have a direct bearing on the national security and the U.S. 

homeland. These challenges are transnational. To solve them, nations need to work together and our civilian and military institutions are and need to continue to cooperate. 

EUCOM is working with European nations bilaterally and supporting NATO Alliance initiatives to meet and counter this new 

and more complex security environment. 

Based on the decisions made at NATO’s Wales Summit last year, 

the Alliance is adapting in order to improve its readiness and responsiveness. The Readiness Action Plan, or RAP, is well underway. Our allies are stepping up, making contributions and investments that give them a real stake in the outcome. 

The United States will have a key and sustained role to play 

supporting and enabling these changes, especially in critical areas 

that are the hardest for our allies to provide like lift, sustainment, 

and enablers such as ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]. At the same time, our own U.S. efforts in Europe remain 

utterly essential, more important now than at any time in recent 

history. With Russian troops illegally occupying Crimea, soldiers 

from the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Europe deployed to the Baltic 

States in Poland with only 96 hours’ notice to reassure our allies 

and our Air Force began flying missions out of Poland within 18 

hours of notice. 

The reason that we could respond so quickly is that we were 

there forward and ready. There is simply no substitute for our forward force presence in Europe. It is the bedrock of our ability to 

assure our allies, to deter real and potential adversaries, and to act 

in a timely way should deterrence fail. 

That forward force presence ensures that EUCOM can play a full 

array of essential supporting roles for other combatant commands 

from neighboring AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] and CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] to STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] and TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command]. And it 

supports all the other critical facets of EUCOM’s mission, including, very importantly, fulfilling our commitment to the defense of 

Israel. 

Rotating presence is no substitute for permanent forward presence in the building of relationships or signaling of our commitment. But genuine and fully funded rotational presence can play a 

very important role in helping to meet requirements in our theatre 

if it is heel-to-toe and fully resourced. 

The budgetary challenges and resourcing tradeoffs that we face 

now, based on the Budget Control Act, have already forced 

EUCOM to assume risk. Our timelines are longer, our preparations 

are less robust, and our fundability to deter and defeat in a timely 

and effective manner is less sure than it could be. The security 

challenges in and around Europe are only growing sharper and 

more complicated at the same time. 

Your support of EUCOM’s mission and your efforts to chart a 

longer-term path toward properly resourcing defense are critical 
8 

steps to ensuring the ability of EUCOM to protect and defend its 

nation and do its mission. 

Thank you for your time and your attention, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Breedlove can be found in 

the Appendix on page 57.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you both for your testimony. 

General Breedlove, you heard me mention at the beginning that 

I support Mr. Smith’s legislation that would require defensive lethal assistance be provided to the Ukrainians. Have you provided 

options to the administration for various kinds of weapons and 

equipment that could be provided to the Ukrainians that would 

make a significant difference in their ability to defend themselves 

and, part b, is if a decision were made, how long would it take to 

get it to them? 

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman, thank you for the question. And 

these are important things, especially the second part as it relates 

to how this would play out. 

So what we have seen across the last year in discussing these 

issues with Ukraine is a very consistent picture of the things that 

they tell us they need to move forward in their struggle. 

Additionally, the U.S. European Command has had a series of 

broad and deep conversations across all of the aspects of military 

business with the Ukrainian military and their defense ministry. 

And what we have observed about Ukraine is very consistent with 

what Ukraine was telling us about Ukraine. 

And so, Chairman, I have advised to my chain of command those 

things that we have learned in these discussions and talked about, 

categories of things that the Ukrainians would need. 

All of these options have timelines. Some timelines are short and 

some are longer. It is pretty straightforward. Small arms and some 

of the other things that you might consider are a very short 

timeline. Longer, more sophisticated capabilities take training, 

they take delivery, et cetera, so there is a mixed bag, I think is the 

best way to answer your question, of not only delivery, but training 

required to bring things to fruition. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I appreciate the point about training. Obviously, that takes some time. I am also—remember that in this 

room just a couple weeks ago we had the King of Jordan who said 

that he is incredibly frustrated when equipment and weapons he 

has requested have been approved but our own bureaucracy still 

takes so long to actually get the things delivered. And so my offer 

to you is that I hope a decision is made one way or another soon. 

If there is something that we can do to speed delivery once that 

decision is made, whether we force it or the President decides on 

his own, then we want to do that. 

Ms. Wormuth, let me just ask you briefly. This administration 

probably before your time made a big deal about a reset of Russia—of relations with Russia. Even the policy folks in the administration admit that didn’t really work out very well, right? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Chairman, what I would say is the reset 

policy did bear some fruit. For example, we were able to successfully negotiate with the Russians at that time the New START 

[Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty which was very much in 
9 

our interest as well as being very much in Russia’s interests, and 

they are continuing to comply with that treaty. 

We also were able to cooperate with them to maintain the Northern Distribution Network which we very much needed to achieve 

our objectives in Afghanistan. But I would certainly say that at 

this time, we are much more in a posture of needing to reassert 

the importance of deterrence and our Article 5 obligations with 

NATO vis-a-vis Russia. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate it. I think, as you know, we 

will have continuing conversations about whether Russia is meeting its arms control obligations across the board, and I think there 

is considerable doubt about that. But that is for another time. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, both of 

the witnesses, for being before us. 

I was just in for a NATO parliamentary meeting and I was in 

Turkey with Mr. Turner and Colonel Cook, so I won’t ask a lot of 

questions. But I do have a couple of them. 

The first one is this whole issue of trying to counter ISIS [Islamic 

State of Iraq and Syria] recruiting through the social media, especially to the young people who we see going. What is the military 

and what—you know, how are we working with our European allies, in particular, to ensure that this recruitment isn’t going on, 

not just in the United States but, of course, in Europe. 

And then my second questions would be with respect to Turkey 

who we know at this point is a key NATO ally, has been for a 

while. We have had our ups and downs in that relationship. It is 

alarming to see recent reports of the Turkish government turning 

a blind eye to arming some of the extremist groups like al-Nusra 

and—some of these reports even suggest that they help groups to 

capture Syrian towns from the Syrian army with the use of artillery to move in and out across the Turkish border, et cetera. 

So while we are all concerned about ISIS and its great cancer in 

the region, groups like al-Nusra and its allies are not far behind 

from that. So can either of you comment about what we are seeing 

there on the ground and what we intend to do about it? Thank you. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congresswoman, on the issue of ISIL recruiting and their very effective use of social media, it is certainly—ISIL has been remarkable in its effective use of social 

media and we are working very hard, as a whole-of-government effort, to try to be more agile in countering that. 

And it really is—first and foremost, the center of gravity on that 

really needs to come from within the region and come from figures 

that have credibility with the Muslim community. And so, in many 

cases, the Department of Defense is playing more of a supporting 

role in trying to counter those recruiting efforts. 

But what we are trying to do—I mean, a lot of what makes ISIL 

effective with its recruiting, unfortunately, is its very barbaric ideology and the fact that they have been, up until recently, able to 

demonstrate progress on the battlefield and they have sort of used 

that momentum to make themselves attractive to potential recruits. 

To try to counter that in the Department, we are working already, but want to do a better job of being able to show the suc-
10 

cesses that the coalition and the Iraqi forces are having on the 

ground, again, to try to counter ISIL’s message that they have the 

momentum. And the fact that the Kurdish forces in Kobane, for example, were able to defeat ISIL. 

You know, we were able to make very good use of that, for example, and again, in some of the recent operations in northern Iraq, 

where we have seen the Peshmerga, in particular, make progress, 

we want to try to leverage that, from the military perspective, to 

try to blunt the effectiveness of ISIL’s use of social media for recruiting. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Right. And that might require maybe an off the 

side conversation at some point about what we are really doing. 

The last question, of course, General, Turkey, these other groups, 

slippery border armies—I have some of my constituents of Turkish 

decent coming in with pictures of ISIL-type people with armaments 

stamped Turkish Army. What is going on there? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congresswoman, thank you. 

I am not personally aware of what you have talked about, but 

what I will do is go back and take a hard look at this and offer 

to come to you in a classified engagement. 

I would tell you that—you and I have actually talked about this 

before; Turkey is a great mil-to-mil ally and that is where I am focused. Our mil-to-mil relationship is as good as it has ever been 

and I think you are aware we have had a few successes this week 

in things that we have asked of them to move forward, both in 

Syria and Turkey. 

But allow me to take the real meat of your second question and 

come back to you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Madam Secretary, General Breedlove, thank you for being 

here and your service to our Nation. 

Madam Secretary, you were mentioning in some of your comments about sequestration and we have heard this before, from 

outside think tanks who have testified, as well as military and administration officials like yourself. 

I think we all know that we are looking at some major, major 

decisions forthcoming. My concern is that it is almost like we know 

that we have a problem, but we are not willing to deal with the 

problem. 

General Breedlove, I have great respect for all of our military 

services. I know the stress you all have been under, as it relates 

to budgets, and this brings me to the point I am trying to make. 

First of all, Madam Secretary, has this administration brought in 

inspector generals, like John Sopko, to talk about the waste, fraud, 

and abuse in Afghanistan? 

You made mention in your comments that things in Afghanistan; 

we are going to be there to 2024. That is the agreement that the 

President signed with the Afghan government. And yet, the waste, 

fraud, and abuse continues to go on and on. Well, that takes away 

from the military and their needs. 

I have said many times that I just do not see how this country 

can continue to do what is necessary to maintain a strong military, 
11 

unless there is some debate in the Congress about a war tax, because I don’t know where the money is going to come from. 

If we don’t level with the American people in this very unsafe 

world that we live in, if we want to win the war or protect Americans then we cannot continue to go into deficit situations. And this 

committee is probably tired of hearing me saying it, but we are 

$18.1 trillion in debt. 

And every time I have been told that we—bomb in Iraq for about an hour is $300 million an hour. So, I mean, at some point in time, 

I think the administration has got to say to Congress, we have got 

to pay for this war. And it is unfair for the American people not 

to have a Congress that is willing to do what is necessary to rebuild and strengthen our military. 

I would like to know your—excuse me; your feelings, as well as 

General Breedlove’s, because you can’t do the job if you don’t have 

the armaments. If you can’t afford to buy the bombs, you can’t 

bomb. And that is where I am concerned, not just for these few 

months in front of us, but for the years, to 2024, using the time 

in Afghanistan. Any comments? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, let me to try to address some 

of the points you raised in sequence. 

First, just to clarify, because I certainly don’t want to have misled the committee; our NATO allies and other partners in Afghanistan have committed to financially continue to help sustain the Afghan National Security Forces through 2024. 

As I think you all are very aware, President Obama has made 

clear that our military forces will be drawn down to a Kabul-centric 

footprint by the end of 2016. So I don’t want to imply that we are 

contemplating keeping our military there through 2024. That is 

just an issue of providing funding to try to help the Afghans pay 

for the security forces they need. 

We are very much in contact with, for example, John Sopko, the 

Special Investigator for Afghanistan. General Campbell and he 

work very closely together. We take the concerns that he raises and 

look into them very deeply and where there is clearly, for example, 

waste or fraud or abuse, we do everything we can to try to address 

that. 

I think your point about how we pay for the military we need is 

well-taken and I think you will hear, when Secretary Carter comes 

up here I think in the near future, to talk about the overall budget 

request for fiscal year 2016, he is going to be emphasizing that, 

just as we come to come to Congress and ask you all to support our 

Defense budget request, we have a responsibility to do everything 

we can to reform how the Department of Defense operates so that 

we are making the best use of those Defense dollars. 

And we have been trying to do that, for example, with some of 

the proposals we have made to try to adjust our compensation, for 

example, or requesting authority for base closure. But Secretary 

Carter and his team; we are very aware that reforming how we do 

business is a key part of making sure that we are able to spend 

the resources that we have in an effective way. 

The CHAIRMAN. Time of the gentleman is expired. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
12 

And thank you to the witnesses. 

General, in your opening remarks, you used the term resurgent 

Russia, which—I would just like to explore that with you for a 

minute. 

I mean, obviously, a big part of the resurgence is more investment in military spending by the Russian government. I just wonder if you could sort of walk us through what capabilities and 

forces have been the focus of that change. 

General BREEDLOVE. Thank you, Congressman. 

And what we don’t want to do is overstate. You know, that has 

happened in the past, that we used to talk about a 10-foot-tall Russia. But what Russia has done, over the past 5 years, has steeply 

ramped up their investment in their military, period. 

We see a strong commitment to their nuclear forces in upgrading 

their nuclear forces, making them more survivable and then making the bench deeper. So a strong emphasis on their nuclear forces. 

And then, what they have learned through the years. As you 

know, when they went into Georgia, it didn’t go real well for them 

and they learned some tough lessons. And so they have addressed 

those lessons in their conventional forces and they have invested 

in their mobility, their readiness; they are training them to a higher level and they are outfitting them with new equipment to make 

them more capable when they take the field. 

So it is sort of a bifurcated path, strong emphasis on nuclear 

weapons, and then the kind of money that you would smartly invest in order to bring up the readiness and capability of their conventional forces. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So, you didn’t mention naval arena and I—you 

know, obviously, there have been news reports about, you know, 

them sort of showing up near U.K. [United Kingdom] and you 

know, our Scandinavian allies and some talk about, you know, 

boosting their shipyard capacity. 

I was wondering if you [could] talk about that a little bit. 

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, sir. 

I am sorry; I lumped air, land, and sea into conventional. And 

to make the point, they have invested in all three. They have made 

strong investment in their land forces, which is what you see playing out on the border of Ukraine now. 

They have made strong investment in their aviation capability 

and they are doing the same thing with aircraft that they are doing 

with their naval forces. The investment in the naval forces is, 

again, sort of split; a good emphasis on their submarine forces and 

their nuclear submarine forces, as well as their conventional forces. 

But what we see with the more surface navy is just bigger, better, exercises, training, more out-of-area operations, as you saw the 

Kuznetsov carrier go all the way into the Eastern Med [Mediterranean] and have about a 30-day rotation in the Eastern Med. 

Haven’t seen that in a long time; so they are investing there. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And you know, part of the events with the Crimean takeover was that they actually, at least for some short period of time, seized a number of Ukrainian naval vessels. What is 

the status of that? Did they return any of those or did they just 

enlarge their force by keeping them? 
13 

General BREEDLOVE. Several were kept. Several of the very— 

lesser-capable vessels were given back. At least one, maybe two 

were scuttled, in order to block the entrance and exit from the harbor in Sebastopol. 

The main combatant that was retained by Ukraine is their flagship, which actually was out of area on a NATO operation during 

the time. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And so, in terms of our response and our NATO 

allies’ response, in terms of, you know their naval forces; can you 

talk about that a little bit, in terms of what is happening right 

now? 

General BREEDLOVE. So, as a part of the assurance measures 

that we have done that the Under Secretary talked about, we have 

upped our presence in the north and in the south in our naval presence, so our standing naval group and our standing naval mine 

group showing a stronger presence in the Baltic Seas. 

And then, in the south, we have had, not a constant presence, 

but almost constant presence in the Black Sea. Originally, in the 

beginning, by U.S. forces, and now NATO forces are folding in with 

us, so that we keep a NATO or U.S. presence in the Black Sea. 

We have done several exercises in the Black Sea, with the navies, our NATO navies there, and Ukraine has participated in 

those exercises. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And, Ms. Wormuth, a few weeks ago, the chairman put together 

a round table with some of the best defense planners and strategists in the country and they all concurred that it would be fair to 

categorize Mr. Putin as opportunistic. 

That means he would see an opportunity like Ukraine, move in 

there, then evaluate it, based on the responses, for his next movement; that the Chinese were long-term strategists, but that the 

United States has become more reactionary, and they felt that one 

of the biggest weaknesses we had now was a lack of strategy. 

When I listen to the chairman correctly talking about the need 

to perhaps give defensive [lethal] assistance, weapons and equipment, to the Ukraine now—Ukraine government, I am concerned 

because, for the longest time, this administration would not even 

allow our military to give information, which is kind of the baby 

step before you do anything else, to the people in Ukraine. 

We couldn’t tell them about Russian troop movements, capabilities, locations, all of those kinds of things. In hindsight, was that 

an incorrect strategy? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I think at the time, we made 

decisions about what kind of support to provide and what kind of 

intelligence to share, based on the situation on the ground at the 

time. 

We are—for several months, certainly, have been providing considerable intelligence to Ukraine. 
14 

Mr. FORBES. But what was your strategy, for so long, not giving 

them that information; in fact, prohibiting that information from 

being given? 

Secretary WORMUTH. We were giving them information we 

thought would be useful to them and would help them respond—— 

Mr. FORBES. You didn’t think that the location of where the Russian troops and the size of the troops and those kind of things 

would be important to the Ukraine government? 

Secretary WORMUTH. To my knowledge, Congressman, we were 

providing intelligence. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you check that and verify that for us? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Yes. 

Mr. FORBES. Please give it back to us on the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 87.] 

Mr. FORBES. Second thing is talk about this resurgent Russia. 

Many of us were concerned when the Russians asked us to pull our 

missile defense systems out of Europe and this administration said 

sure, we will do that. 

Two questions; in hindsight, was that a bad strategy? And secondly, where did you put the additional resources to fill that gap? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, the European Phased Adaptive Approach that we have for missile defense in Europe is a very 

strong approach to deal with the missile defense threats that we 

face, which are primarily from North Korea, with their nuclear program, and to posture us to be able to prevent or defend against a 

potential future Iranian threat. 

We have made the investments needed to support that program—— 

Mr. FORBES. Can you tell me where you made those investments? 

And if you don’t have them now—— 

Secretary WORMUTH. Certainly. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Would you supply that, because I 

haven’t seen where you put those dollars. We put it on the back 

of the Navy, but we continue to wait for when you are going to give 

those additional resources to do it. 

Maybe you could just—if you would, just supply it for the record. 

And again, if you would tell us what your strategy was; whether 

or not a gap has been left because you have done that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 87.] 

Mr. FORBES. And then, General, the question I would ask for 

you, in follow-up to Mr. Courtney’s question about the Navy, you 

know, Europe used to be a hub for our Navy and over the last decade, maybe two decades, we have allowed our naval presence to decline considerably. 

Based on what we see with Russia now, where do you see us 

going forward? Is there going to be a new level of demand, perhaps, 

that our Navy has? And if so, can you give us a little bit of definition of what you think that might look like? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, as you know, this is one of 

the places where our force structure in Europe is growing. 

We have received two of the Aegis destroyers that will go into 

Rota and we have two more that are on schedule to come to us. 
15 

They will be a multi-mission ship, but they will also be dedicated 

to missile defense, because that is their core capability. So the U.S. 

presence in Europe is growing. 

But you rightly question that—are we taking all the right steps 

and here is what I would say. We are making a strong push with 

our NATO allies to better cooperate and bring them into these assurance measures and the changes that we are making to NATO, 

because you are—— 

Mr. FORBES. General, I would just point out; if we are going to 

do this so-called pivot to the Asia-Pacific area and if we see this 

increase in Europe then we are going to have to increase our naval 

presence if we are going to be able to do that. 

And on the ships we are talking about, we really didn’t add resources to that. We just shifted ships around, which is a big difference than adding resources. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ranking Member. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The big concern with Russia is what would they do next. I mean, 

obviously, we are focused on the Eastern Ukraine right now, but 

most of the speculation is that, unchecked, this leads to further 

problems. 

What would they do next? What are you guys most fearful of? 

Where might they try their little-green-men strategy next, if Eastern Ukraine were to be resolved in their—yes; in their favor? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I think we have probably 

two primary areas of concern, in terms of where might Russia go 

next. 

First is they might go to countries who are not part of NATO; 

for example, Montenegro, some of the smaller countries, and try to, 

again, create some instability to try to use some of the information 

operations; techniques that we have seen them use very effectively 

in Ukraine. 

And we are working through the European Reassurance Initiative, for example, to provide support to countries like that, to be 

able to help them to resist those kinds of activities. 

Similarly, we also have concerns about the potential for Russia 

to try to destabilize actual NATO member countries, particularly, 

I think, the Baltics or—because, again, those countries have sizable 

ethnic Russian populations. 

So, again, we have been very, very clear and I think Putin understands that we are completely committed to upholding our Article 

5 obligations and that to cross that line would be an extremely substantial step. 

But we are working in a variety of ways to try to help countries, 

whether inside of NATO or whether partner countries, be able to 

resist that kind of destabilizing activity. 

Mr. SMITH. And at this moment, of those possibilities, are there 

hints that he is moving in one direction to implement one of them 

or is it just pretty much, at this point, speculation or have there 

been active steps that Russia has taken that give you concern 

about one of those specific examples that you mentioned? 

Secretary WORMUTH. From what I have seen, we don’t have— 

there are not significant active steps. I have not seen anything, for 
16 

example, in intelligence that would indicate that, but I would ask 

General Breedlove to comment. 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, I would just step back. 

I know that your question was really next after Ukraine, but 

think we also need to think about next inside Ukraine, because I 

don’t think any of us are sure that he has accomplished his objectives inside Ukraine next and so that would be my first next. 

And then there might be some revisits. For instance, we start to 

see a more Western-leaning Moldovan government and Russian 

troops in Transnistria are there to keep Moldova from leaning to 

the West and so there may be some revisit in Moldova. 

And I think what we should do is watch first where we see 

strong information campaigns picking up. And that is happening in 

Moldova and other places now. 

Mr. SMITH. Understood. And how do we change this mindset of 

Russia? Part of the—you know, reason for the chairman and I, you 

know, doing the bill that we did to give Ukraine greater position 

to defend themselves is to sort of up the military cost. 

I mean, obviously, if, you know, the Russian military decides to 

go, you know, full-force, no matter what we do, you know, they 

are—Ukraine is no match for them. But the higher the cost, the 

less likely, in my way of thinking, that he would try this in the future. And yet, the administration has been a little reluctant to 

cross that line and do that. 

And I understand, you know, we don’t want to, you know, escalate, but on the other hand, if it was more costly, if it did mean 

that Russia would have to, you know, commit more troops, more 

weaponry, lose more of their soldiers; wouldn’t that be a discouragement for them to do something in Moldova or in Montenegro or 

any of these other places that you have talked about? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I think that is exactly right, 

in the sense that we are—a key part of our strategy vis-a-vis Russia right now is to impose costs on them, diplomatic costs, economic 

costs, and then also to provide support to Ukraine. We are—as you 

know, I mean the President said, I think just before the Munich 

Security Conference or just after, considering all options. 

We don’t want to take options off the table and there is discussion of providing defensive lethal assistance, in an effort to, again, 

raise costs on Russia; not, I think—not from the perspective at all 

of being able to fundamentally alter the military balance between 

Ukraine’s military and Russia’s military, but to try to give Ukraine 

more ability to defend itself against the separatist aggression. 

The Minsk agreements have now been signed and we very much 

want to see those upheld. Obviously, experience to date gives us, 

I think, pause, and actions are going to speak much more loudly 

than words. 

So, as we watch whether those agreements are going to be 

upheld in the coming days, if we see continued violation and continued aggressions—pardon? 

Mr. SMITH. I see no reason to for a second believe that they will 

be upheld. 

Isn’t it rather clear at this point that Putin’s strategy is to use 

that negotiation to neutralize Europe from, you know, fully engag-
17 

ing and helping, meanwhile continuing to do exactly what he wants 

to do? 

I mean, is there any counterargument to that interpretation? 

Secretary WORMUTH. We are very concerned and I think skeptical of whether this agreement will be upheld. And if it is not, we 

will again look at measures to impose additional costs. So I think 

we—that conversation is still ongoing and is very active. 

Mr. SMITH. I think we can pretty much count on it not being 

upheld, so we should start planning. 

Because—it is part of the strategy. It is sort of slow-rolling it, 

you know, keeping them at bay as he moves through the Eastern 

Ukraine as he sees fit, so that is something we are going to have 

to do. 

Thank you. I am going to yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Breedlove, good to see you. Thank you for your comments before the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Munich 

Security Conference. 

You have been a great voice of trying to give us clarity in this 

time period of what you have described as hybrid warfare, where 

we see ambiguity that Russia is trying to create on their actions, 

which makes it more difficult for people to formulate policy and 

then address that policy with having clarity, so thank you for the 

clarity. 

Ms. Wormuth, I have a few questions for you, because also, when 

your position is policy, what we don’t want to have is issues of ambiguity of things that are true or not true: facts. 

We can disagree as to policy, but facts are those things that we 

shouldn’t allow ourselves to degrade to ambiguity, as Vladimir 

Putin tries to get us to do in hybrid warfare. 

Phased Adaptive Approach; you will not deny that Phase 4 of the 

Phased Adaptive Approach was canceled, would you not? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, we made a different decision; that is 

correct. 

Mr. TURNER. So that would be a yes. You canceled Phase 4 of the 

Phased Adaptive Approach. 

The Phased Adaptive Approach was the portion of Phase 4 that 

was to actually protect the continental United States. You said we 

have a strong commitment to the Phased Adaptive Approach; not 

so strong, since it is canceled. 

And I do want to give a footnote here; that we are all aware that 

the fourth phase of Phased Adaptive Approach, which you cited as 

being a strong commitment, was canceled after the election, prior 

to the—with the President having had a prior conversation with 

Medvedev in an open mike situation, where he said to him, after 

the election I will have more flexibility with respect to the Phased 

Adaptive Approach, in what many people, including myself, refer to 

as the secret deal, then has the appearance of the President making a deal with Russia and subsequently canceling the Phased 

Adaptive Approach, which, again, underscore, would have protected 

the mainland of the United States. 
18 

And let’s refer to START. You cited START. You would not deny, 

right, that the United States, under START, cut our deployed nuclear weapons, correct? 

Secretary WORMUTH. The New START negotiations lowered the 

number of nuclear weapons in our arsenal; yes. 

Mr. TURNER. Great. You will also not deny that it did not require 

Russia to cut any of their deployed nuclear weapons. In fact, they 

have had the ability to increase the number of their deployed nuclear weapons; correct? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman—— 

Mr. TURNER. Correct; right? Yes, no; it is a numbers game. These 

are not ambiguity issues. These are not policy for us to have a disagreement. Doesn’t the numbers in START not require Russia to 

cut any of their nuclear deployed weapons and actually would permit them to increase them? 

Secretary WORMUTH. The New START treaty protects our interests. 

Mr. TURNER. Yes? No? It is yes/no. Please don’t give me ambiguity. Please don’t have, right where we are here in the middle of 

this hearing, a question answered where you leave people with an 

impression other than the truth. The truth is under START we cut 

our deployed nuclear weapons, they don’t. Correct? 

Secretary WORMUTH. We cut our nuclear weapons but not to a 

level to which we couldn’t provide a very strong nuclear deterrent. 

Mr. TURNER. I didn’t ask that. Under the numbers under New 

START, they have the ability to increase, we had to cut. Correct? 

I mean, you have to know this. Don’t leave us with the impression 

that perhaps you don’t know the circumstances. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Correct. 

Mr. TURNER. Correct. Thank you for giving me that correct. 

Now Russia, at the time of the discussions with us on the New 

START agreement, was violating the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] treaty. Correct? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, we raised Russia’s violation 

of the INF treaty in 2013. 

Mr. TURNER. I am not asking you what you raised. I am asking 

you a correct or not correct. During the New START negotiations 

with the United States, Russia was, at that time, in violation of the 

INF treaty. Correct? 

Secretary WORMUTH. We had concerns that they were in violation. We know now that they were. 

Mr. TURNER. I am not asking you what your concerns at the time 

were. We now have information, we know it clearly. So—— 

Secretary WORMUTH. Yes, we know now that they were in violation. 

Mr. TURNER. Russia was violating the INF treaty at the same 

time that we were negotiating START. Correct? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Correct. We know that now. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Now you started to say you had concerns, so you knew that it 

was—that there was a possibility that they were violating the INF 

treaty at the time of New START [Treaty]. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, we had not determined that 

they were in violation. 
19 

Mr. TURNER. No, no. I am asking you. I am not asking we; I am 

asking you. 

Secretary WORMUTH. I was not in a portfolio at that time to personally be aware but—— 

Mr. TURNER. Did you have concerns of the information—did you 

receive information that gave you concerns about their possible violation of the INF treaty? 

Secretary WORMUTH. At that time, we had not determined that 

they were not compliant. 

Mr. TURNER. You had—you personally had no concerns? You personally had no concerns? 

Secretary WORMUTH. At that time, I was not involved in that 

particular issue, Congressman. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Could you please tell me why the President 

of the United States refuses to acknowledge that Ukraine has been 

invaded by Russia, when they have invasion forces on the ground? 

What is the term invasion that causes difficulty with the administration? I mean, Ukraine’s territorial integrity has been violated. 

Russian troops are there. Why can’t we call it an invasion? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I think we have been more 

focused on what is happening as opposed to what you call it. Russia has absolutely violated Ukraine’s territorial integrity and has 

attempted to unlawfully annex Crimea. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Breedlove, if we arm Ukraine, what will Russia do? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, it is a great question. It is 

one that we are all working very hard on now. Clearly, we don’t 

know what Mr. Putin will do. What we need to do is look at what 

is on the ground, the capabilities and capacities that he is building, 

and make inference from those capability and capacities. Right 

now, we are not arming the Ukrainians with lethal weapons. 

And what we see is Russia continues to build their force, continues to provide capability to the Eastern Ukrainians. And so no— 

the fact that we are not doing now is not changing their path forward. So I think that we have to be cognizant that if we arm the 

Ukrainians, it could cause positive results, it could cause negative 

results, but what we are doing now is not changing the results on 

the ground. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. But bottom line, I take your answer to be we do 

not know what Russia will do should we arm Ukraine. 

And Ms. Wormuth, would that be your answer, as well? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, certainly, we don’t know 

with certainty how Russia would respond. And I also would add 

that in addition to thinking about whether to provide defensive lethal assistance, we also—there are other measures we can take to 

try—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I understand, but the proposal on the table in 

terms of arming Ukraine should beg the question what will Russia 

do, then what are our options when Russia does any number of different things and what are the second, third, fourth, fifth order of 

consequences of arming Ukraine. That is what I am trying to get 
20 

to. I understand some of those considerations probably should not 

be discussed here, but I think, bottom line, we don’t know what 

Russia will do. 

The information I have shows that we spend a little under 4 percent of our GDP [gross domestic product] on our Armed Forces; Estonia, 1.9 percent, Latvia, 1 percent, Lithuania, .8 percent, France, 

a little over 2 percent. Are we not, Ms. Wormuth, creating a moral 

hazard for Europe and especially for these Baltic States? What are 

you doing, what is the administration doing to get our NATO allies 

to spend a more significant percent of their budgets on military so 

that we are not asking our taxpayers to do their job? 

Secretary WORMUTH. That is a great question, Congressman, and 

we—a couple things I would say there. First, at the Wales Summit, 

all of the allies agreed to a defense investment pledge to work towards providing 2 percent GDP as the standard. So that is an important step. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Two percent by when and what are the consequences if they don’t reach it? 

Secretary WORMUTH. I don’t know if we put a by when on it. But 

what I would say is—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. It is pretty urgent right now. Considering everything that we just discussed, 

Secretary WORMUTH. I absolutely agree. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I would think there would be a date certain that 

you are going to commit if you want to make sure that we are 

going to be there for you. You have got to carry your weight. So 

there is not a date certain or we just don’t know what that is right 

now? 

Secretary WORMUTH. We think it may be 2020, Congressman, 

but let me check and get back to you on the specific details. 

Couldn’t agree with you more that it is essential that our European allies invest more in defense, and this has been a longstanding challenge that we have had, frankly, with our NATO allies. Many Secretaries have raised this. 

I do think that with everything that is happening vis-a-vis Russia right now, but also the threats posed by ISIL, our European 

friends have a greater appreciation for what they are truly facing 

and some of them are revisiting in their own parliaments and governments how much they are investing. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. So I will just ask that you—I appreciate that but 

I will ask that you give us a definite answer to that. You know, 

I certainly would like that and I think my colleagues would like to 

know that as well. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Certainly. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. My last question, for General Breedlove, what 

lessons do you take from the 2008 Russian/Georgia war that we 

could apply to what we are seeing today? 

General BREEDLOVE. So the lessons are not good ones. As I mentioned just a little earlier in one of my comments, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 was accomplished but it was not a very 

clean operation for them. They lost aircraft. They lost lives. It was 

a tough slog for them, and I don’t think they expected it to be a 

tough slog. 
21 

And what we have seen is they have been a very learning and 

adaptive force. They have completely cleaned up the issues that we 

saw in Georgia as they went into Crimea. I would love to offer you 

a classified briefing to show you the depth and breadth of the way 

they have corrected their problems, their military issues, the way 

they ran the military piece into Crimea. And then just from Crimea 

to Donbass, or the eastern part of Ukraine, they have corrected 

problems there as well. So—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. I will take you up on your offer. 

I yield back. Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Chairman, Mr. Turner pursued my line of questioning 

with Ms. Wormuth and he did a much better job than I would have 

done. So if it is alright, I am just going to suggest that some of us 

were very concerned about the New START because we saw it 

allow Russia to build up a stockpile of strategic weapons and for 

us to be required to build down. 

And it did not take into consideration the tactical capability of 

Russia, especially in Europe. And in retrospect, it appears to me 

that this Russia reset has been a startling failure. And that is a 

sincere conclusion, and I know it doesn’t really probably track with 

your own perspective. 

So I am going to, if I could, switch over to General Breedlove 

here. 

And General, you know, every time you come here I try to say 

something nice about you because I think you—people like you that 

stand out there and give your whole lives for the cause of freedom 

are the noblest among us. And I am just wondering how he keeps 

carrying those stars he keeps—they keep putting on him here. It 

is starting to be pretty good thing for such an old guy, you know? 

But I say that having been in an F–16 with him during a 360- 

degree loop, so I had a lot of confidence in him at that time. 

But the EPAA [European Phased Adaptive Approach] Phase 2 

was set fully to be implemented this year. Can you just discuss the 

need for increased missile defense capability in your AOR [area of 

responsibility]? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, thank you for that. EPAA 

Phase 2 is on track for delivery capability in 2016 to be ready. We 

see all of the actions on the ground doing well. The budget is going 

well. We may be a month or so behind in the construction but we 

think we are ready to deliver on time for that. We see the authorities and everything that we need shaping up there. And we also 

see that the progress on starting the next phase in Poland is tracking as well. 

Mr. FRANKS. Let me ask you now, the Department has requested 

a multi-year procurement authority for the SM–3 IB [missile] and 

that hopefully would achieve critical cost savings and production 

stability. Can you speak to that request and its significance or importance? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, my facts agree with yours 

that the proposed way to go forward on purchasing these missiles 

now will save us, I think the number is 14 percent across the first 
22 

buy, and that is significant. And it also addresses some of the longlead-term items, issues that a company would be working in to deliver those missiles. 

More importantly to me is that the capability inherent in that 

SM–3 IB is important to the mission that we need to do in both of 

these sites, the site in Romania and the site in Poland. And so we 

hope to stay on track with delivery of the capabilities that that 

missile brings. 

Mr. FRANKS. I will just ask two last questions and they are a little bit eclectic and just give you the time to elaborate as you will. 

Given your area of expertise with the whole situation happening in 

Crimea and Ukraine, number one—first question is what would 

you suggest would be the most important policy or strategic initiative we should pursue to contain that problem the best that we 

can, given the circumstances. 

And then number two, completely different subject, related to the 

danger of ISIS and Islamist terrorism in the world. What do you 

consider, as a general, to be the most significant, at least strategic 

approach, that we might have? I know tactically we have engaged 

them very effectively, but strategically, what do you think is the 

most important thing that we are missing here, and how significant do you think the failure to approach—to address that is? 

General BREEDLOVE. If you will allow me, I will lightly remark 

to the policy and strategy piece, and I might ask the Secretary to 

remark to that. Let me start with ISIS because I don’t want to run 

your time out. As we understand the problem of ISIS, one of the 

main things that I think we need to focus on is their legitimacy. 

This caliphate draws to it those who would want to come and fight 

for the caliphate. 

And the incredible information campaign that they have out 

there and other things that just transmits the legitimacy of this caliphate, we need to attack it. We understand, and I won’t go into 

it here, it would take all your time, those elements that make the 

caliphate real to those who would follow it, and I think we attack 

them in detail. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here, for your service. 

You know, we have had a discussion about just the question 

what would Russia do, and I wanted to just be certain and clarify 

there are, obviously, proposals about providing more than nonlethal support to Ukraine and that does trigger our thinking about 

their using conventional, perhaps even tactical weapons at some 

point. Can you tell us some more about, you know, how that calculation is and sort of the response of the Congress and what you 

would like to see? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congresswoman, in terms—again, we don’t 

know with certainty what Russia would do if we were to provide 

defensive lethal assistance. I think what needs to be weighed is, 

again, providing that those kinds of systems, for example, might 

well strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, be more effective 

against Russian tanks, for example. But the potential concern that 

has to be weighed is does Russia then double-down and provide 
23 

even more heavy equipment and just escalate the violence, cause 

more human suffering and continue to sort of prosecute its campaign. 

So part of, I think, what we have to look at is whether there are 

other tools that might also impose costs on Russia and cause Russia to pause and reevaluate where it is going, and do the pros and 

cons of those other tools, for example, such as economic sanctions 

or other steps that could be taken in the financial domain, would 

they potentially be more effective and have fewer downsides. So I 

think those are some of the issues that we need to be weighing as 

we think it through. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I think I am asking, too, about how the discussions 

here in the Congress are read in terms of what we would anticipate 

or what we would like to see. I don’t know, General, if you want 

to weigh in on that. 

General BREEDLOVE. Ma’am, first, I would echo what the Secretary has said and that I think that the important—the discussion 

of defensive lethal aid is very important. It is one of the tools. We 

talk about DIME, diplomatic, informational, military and economic, 

and I think that these need to be worked—all worked at the same 

time. Mr. Putin is putting intense diplomatic pressure in Kiev. The 

information campaign is quite impressive. And the—I call it the 

disinformation campaign is quite impressive. Clearly, Mr. Putin is 

all in when it comes to the military element. 

And then he is attempting to put economic pressure through energy and recalling loans early, et cetera, on Ukraine. And so I 

think that the discussion about the military element is incredibly 

important, but we also have to continue to bring the pressure on 

all fronts in—across these four areas. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. 

We have talked about our allies providing more defensive support. And just going back to your numbers, General, about the military personnel at EUCOM, you mentioned 65,000 as a—how much 

are—does that include allied personnel? 

General BREEDLOVE. No, Congresswoman. That is our U.S. personnel in European Command. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And so allied personnel is where in that? 

General BREEDLOVE. That is more—we talk about them more in 

terms of the NATO Alliance and how—what they bring to that Alliance. And clearly, the depth and breadth of all of the nations of 

NATO and their militaries is quite significant, but the readiness 

and capability are the things that we are working on together to 

raise that capability in our NATO allies. 

Mrs. DAVIS. So the fact that you are working on that in terms 

of readiness doesn’t necessarily mean that they are ready to deploy 

alongside U.S. troops at this time or in—— 

General BREEDLOVE. Ma’am, I would say that they have some of 

the same problems that we have in our military. They have forces 

that are capable and ready right now and others that are at a more 

increased responsiveness. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there a number that you would be more comfortable with when you think about adequately staffing EUCOM 

for our current global missions? 
24 

General BREEDLOVE. Ma’am, I would like to come back to you on 

that. I didn’t come prepared to talk about growing my command. 

Right now, we are just working on the mission that we have, but 

I would love to come back and talk to you about that. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. I was going to turn really quickly to Afghanistan as well because Secretary Carter is now talking about slowing 

the withdrawal. Do we have the support, again, with our partners, 

in being able to do that? And we can take that later for the record. 

Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 87.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

It occurs to me that we—nobody can know for certain how Putin 

would respond to us providing weapons. What we can know for certain is how he has responded without us providing weapons and 

that hasn’t gone very well. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Wormuth, General Breedlove, thank you for joining us. 

I want to ask, so far, the administration’s strategy to counter 

Russian aggression is focused on sanctions. We heard senior Russian officials, though, say that Russians will eat less food and use 

less electricity. Just this past Saturday, Secretary Kerry said the 

administration is exploring additional sanctions on Russia. Give me 

your perspective. 

How effective to this point have sanctions been? Will they be 

more effective in the future in changing the Russian calculus? And 

what military options have you suggested to the administration to 

counter Russian aggression in Ukraine? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, on the sanctions and their 

effectiveness, you know, the sanctions that we and the Europeans 

have put in place on Russia are having a very significant effect on 

their economy and that—and those effects are growing over time. 

But I think we would all agree that it hasn’t changed what Russia 

has been doing on the ground. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Give us some specifics about what those effects 

are. I mean, that is a general terminology, they are affecting their 

economy. Tell me, how is it affecting the economy? The lives—the 

daily lives of Russians, it is really hurting them? Give us some perspective on what that is. 

Secretary WORMUTH. I will try to do that. The value of the ruble, 

for example, has fallen substantially. They are—they have very 

large strategic financial reserves but they are having to draw those 

down to be able to provide fluidity in their economy. So the size 

of those financial reserves are shrinking substantially and will continue to do that. 

And I think, you know, we will see that effect happen over time, 

and sort of have a cumulative effect. But again, I think, you know, 

we would agree that despite the significant economic costs that are 

starting to have effects on the Russian population and on the 

oligarchs. You know, we are hearing, for example, more dissatisfaction of the oligarchs who to date have been very supportive of 

Putin. They are concerned about the impact it is having on their 

businesses, on their own financial holdings. 
25 

But it has not changed so far what Russia has been doing on the 

ground. And that is the great concern we have, and that is where 

there is a need to again look at the overall package of cost-imposing strategies towards Russia, and also support to Ukraine, to see 

if we can change the calculus going forward. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Breedlove. 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, on the military options to 

date, I will talk just briefly to U.S. and to our allies. Both U.S. and 

allies have brought primarily non-lethal aid to the table to help the 

Ukrainian military, and these are well known, everything from 

medical capabilities, food, to probably on the high end, our countermortar radars that we have delivered to them, which are defensive 

in nature, to allow the Ukrainians to understand when they are 

under attack, et cetera. 

And the change now is that while we are considering, and you 

are deliberating, possibilities of lethal aid, now nations are beginning to also do what for nations outside of the U.S., I would categorize as training. You recently heard both Canada and U.K. announce that they are going in to do training in various things. 

In the United States, we have a deep relationship with the 

Ukrainians that was already underway before this all started. And 

we are doing coaching and mentoring. You probably have heard 

and seen reported in the paper today that we have a team going 

in to do medical coaching and mentoring now. 

So, we have non-lethal aid; nations doing training; U.S. forces 

doing coaching and mentoring. And then, of course, our Nation is 

deliberating the next step. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. General Breedlove, let me ask you this, 

from your perspective. Do you believe that Vladimir Putin’s strategy is to undermine the credibility of NATO as it relates to its Article 5 obligations to protect NATO nations? And if so, do you believe 

that his next move might be to Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, and 

trying to destabilize that region? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, I think that the main goal of 

Mr. Putin is to divide the West in general; in EU [European Union] 

terms, economically, as you see him try to build his own economic 

union; and also militarily to divide NATO; to try to find those 

cracks, live in them, expand them, and try to bring dissent to the 

conversation. 

So I absolutely believe that is his number one goal. If he divides 

NATO, he gets Ukraine. It would happen. 

As to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, I am not sure that would be the 

next targets. He understands what Article 5 means. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Breedlove, I am interested in whether you think that we 

have essentially exhausted our means of supporting Ukraine with 

non-lethal aid at this point? And whether that, therefore, lethal aid 

is the next logical step? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, no, I don’t think we have exhausted the options in non-lethal aid, but I don’t think that is directly tied to should lethal be the next step. 

Mr. MOULTON. I agree. 
26 

General BREEDLOVE. I mean, there is much more that we can 

continue to do. But that doesn’t preclude, then, should we also consider lethal. 

Mr. MOULTON. No, I agree with that point. I am just curious 

whether we have exhausted those options. 

I am also interested in what both from the OSD [Office of the 

Secretary of Defense] perspective and from your perspective, would 

be other avenues of escalation. And I understand that some of this 

may be classified, but if you can speak to that for a minute, I 

would appreciate it. 

General BREEDLOVE. So, Congressman, thank you for that. There 

are other—as we just talked about a few minutes ago. We are focused on the military piece of the four pieces of—four types of 

power that a nation has. But diplomatic efforts can continue and 

we can step those up. Informational work—we are frankly well behind the Russians in this area. Their disinformation campaign is 

very impressive. 

And then as you know, the debate about will there be further 

economic tools used. That continues to be talked about. So, I completely agree that we need to go back at Russia across all four elements of national power. 

Mr. MOULTON. Great. Ms. Wormuth, do you have anything to 

add to that? 

Secretary WORMUTH. No. I think that is a very good elucidation 

of what we are trying to do. 

Mr. MOULTON. Okay, great. 

Could you just take a minute to comment for a second on your 

view as to whether the New START was in our national security 

interests or not? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Certainly, Congressman. Thank you. 

The New START treaty was in our interest. We were able to negotiate with the Russians and come to an agreement as to the size 

of both arsenals. We would not—I mean, fundamentally, the only 

reason to pursue negotiated arms control treaties is to do it if it 

is in the interests of the United States from our perspective, for example. 

So, our view was very much that through New START, in addition to looking at the overall size of the strategic arsenal, it gave 

us a verification regime. It allowed us to go in and have transparency to the Russian arsenal; to have predictability in terms of 

understanding what they are doing with that part of their nuclear 

arsenal. And all of that adds to strategic stability. 

So I think the administration’s view is very much that the New 

START treaty was in our interest. 

Mr. MOULTON. Right. But could you just explain that a bit more? 

Because Mr. Turner raised the question that if the overall number 

of Russian weapons goes up and ours stays the same or goes down, 

it doesn’t seem to the sort of casual observer that that would be 

a favorable agreement. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, again, in terms of the overall levels 

of our arsenal versus the Russian arsenal, there are, you know, we 

do not have exact strategic parity in terms of down to the very last 

number. But what we negotiated through New START was a level 
27 

for both sides that provided for the, basically the fundamental 

soundness of our strategic deterrent. 

So, you know, and it is fair to say that the tactical nuclear weapons that Russia had were outside of that agreement. But from a 

strategic nuclear force perspective, the levels that we have are ones 

that very much allow us to provide the kind of nuclear deterrent 

that we need to have. 

Mr. MOULTON. Given that—given Mr. Putin’s new ambitions in 

Europe, would you say that leaving tactical nuclear weapons out of 

that agreement is a greater concern now? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I don’t think it is a greater 

concern necessarily. I mean, the—you know, it would be desirable 

certainly to convince Russia to be able to reduce its overall amount 

of tactical nuclear weapons. They have a very large number. But 

a country has to be willing to do that. 

That disparity existed before the situation we have now. I don’t 

think there is a need to be more concerned about it before. I mean, 

again, I think fundamentally we have to make sure that we have 

the full range of military capabilities to deter Russia effectively. 

And we do that through a combination of our conventional force 

posture and our nuclear force posture. 

Mr. MOULTON. I think 10 years ago, we didn’t expect this kind 

of movement on behalf of Russia. 

Secretary WORMUTH. That is certainly true. 

Mr. MOULTON. Do you think that we should consider expanding 

our tactical nuclear arms? 

Secretary WORMUTH. I think the nuclear deterrent we have today 

very much protects our national security interests. I don’t—— 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Important questions we will dig deeper into in 

the future. 

Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Appreciate the panelists being here today. 

First, a question about Lieutenant Nadiya Savchenko. I am interested in what we know about her current health and about release. 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, we don’t know as much as 

we would like to know. What we do hear is that she is well cared 

for. It is not an arduous affair. But that is clearly what we are 

being told. We have no indications one way or the other. 

And this is a strong point of constant contact as Ukraine negotiates forward. 

Mr. GIBSON. I am following that situation very closely and appreciate your attention to that as well. 

Question now is really more one of a whole-of-government. So 

Ms. Wormuth, I am interested in your insights with regard to your 

actions in the interagency. And specifically here I am asking about 

the status of political-military cohesion and unity within Ukraine 

and across Ukraine, and the status of civil-military relations inside 

Ukraine. Because really the focus, the thrust of the question is: 

How are we doing as far as helping Ukraine strengthen itself? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Congressman, for that question. 
28 

I think we are working very hard across a range of fronts to try 

to help Ukraine strengthen itself. And I think the DIME construct 

is a good way to try and talk about that. So, you know, for example, the State Department is engaging at all levels, from Secretary 

Kerry and President Poroshenko, down to the level of our ambassador. And we are very much, you know, working with them and 

talking with them about their political situation. 

In terms of, you know, as I have said earlier, we have significantly increased our security assistance to the Ukrainian military. 

And as General Breedlove mentioned, we are providing training. 

We have something called the Joint Commission with Ukraine’s 

military that we have used to talk with them about what their requirements are both in the near term, but also over the long term 

as they try to professionalize their military. 

On the economic front, we are working to—through the IMF 

[International Monetary Fund] to try to secure additional economic 

assistance. Because obviously, Ukraine has a very difficult economic situation as well. 

So I think across all fronts, we are doing a lot to try to help 

Ukraine strengthen itself and be better able to determine its own 

path as a sovereign country. 

Mr. GIBSON. So then, more specifically, what I am concerned 

about is certainly the reports that I read and from my constituents. 

I have strong Ukrainian-American communities in upstate New 

York, Kerhonkson and other places, and so I often hear of, at 

times, different approaches in different parts of Ukraine. 

So now, I have a geographic question, and how are we interacting that maybe helps strengthen and unifying some of the geographic differences of opinion as it relates to political-military. And 

then, of course, that question is still on the table: Do you have any 

concerns on the civil-military relations inside Ukraine? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I don’t have significant concerns about the civil-military situation in Ukraine. I would certainly ask General Breedlove if he wants to elaborate on that. But 

I saw our ambassador to Ukraine when I was in Munich just a few 

weeks ago, and the report I had from him was that those relationships are pretty strong. 

I was also struck in talking with him about his sense that when 

you drive throughout all different parts of Ukraine, if anything, the 

Russian aggression in most areas has strengthened Ukrainian nationalism and—which, you know, again, I think gives the lie to the 

whole idea that somehow this is an indigenous movement that is 

coming out of Ukraine and that there are individuals who feel that 

their, you know, rights are at risk. 

I think—you know, he talked about how roads, farmland, fences 

were painted blue and yellow, again, as an expression of their 

strong nationalism. 

General BREEDLOVE. I will just jump on that a little bit, and that 

was a vignette I was going to use. Post-Crimea, prior to Donbass, 

this nationalism was very, very high. I think that you would find 

east of the Dnieper River that it is probably a little strained now 

because of what they have seen. I don’t think we have targeted any 

geographic unity, but what we do know is that Mr. Putin is trying 
29 

to drive a wedge in the government, and we are trying to help 

them to fight that. 

Mr. GIBSON. That is an encouraging report. And I will continue 

to watch very closely. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My quick assessment is 

that, for Russia on the economic front, they care about what is 

going on and they can care more. Diplomatically, they don’t care 

what people think, and militarily, the West has to find a way to 

get them to care more. And right now, we are not, because backing 

diplomacy with nothing is going to continue to get us—you know, 

we will have Minsk III and Minsk IV and Minsk V and still no action out of Russia, in my view. 

General, I want to ask you a question. I was asking you, or somebody, at the NATO PA [Parliamentary Assembly], and it is simple. 

I mean, do you think Russia understands the difference between a 

NATO country and a non-NATO country? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, the short answer is yes. I believe they do understand what Article 5 means and I think they do 

respect that. But that does not mean that they will not reach out 

to those dense Russian-speaking populations that might be in a 

couple of our border NATO nations to see if there is a way to raise 

and foment unrest there. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. And do you think a—would a lack of quick 

NATO consensus on a specific action to counter an Article 5 violation would preclude any one NATO ally from acting to defend Article 5? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, I would just say that I was 

at Wales and I have been at every meeting since Wales. And one 

of the things that was most striking to me is that while we have 

lots of tough conversations—as you know, NATO is not only facing 

Russia to the north and east, but there is a growing concern about 

the south, what is coming across the Med from Africa, what is coming out of the Levant and Syria and Iraq. So there are lots of 

things that sort of cause us to have conversations about where we 

should focus. 

But what I was struck by in every meeting since Wales is the 

iron-clad commitment to Article 5 responsibilities and defense. 

Mr. LARSEN. Ms. Wormuth, what do you think has been the primary objective of Russia’s military modernization? 

Secretary WORMUTH. I think, Congressman, the primary objective of military—of Russia’s military modernization is to demonstrate its vision of itself, which is to be a global power on the 

world stage. And, you know, in the wake of the Cold War, Russia’s 

military declined to a significant degree, and Putin has very methodically, as General Breedlove outlined, gone about rebuilding in 

many ways the conventional and nuclear sides of the Russian force. 

And I think Putin sees that strong military as an important tool 

in his ability to function in his own mind as a global power and 

to be able to protect what he sees as Russia’s rightful sphere of 

influence. 

Mr. LARSEN. Well General, talk a little bit about that rightful 

sphere of influence because in your testimony, although you didn’t 

cover it in your oral, in your written, you discussed the Russian in-
30 

vestment in infrastructure in the Arctic, and the United States actually chairs the Arctic Council starting in April of this year. And 

Commandant Papp, former Commandant of the Coast Guard, is the 

State Department’s designee to that. 

Russia is a member of the Arctic Council. I don’t imagine that 

is going to get in the way of the Arctic Council doing whatever it 

needs to do. But there is this issue of the Arctic opening up, more 

water days per year, and then you have this heavy investment, it 

seems, from Russia in the Arctic. Can you talk a little bit about 

that? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, just to agree with much of 

what you said, that there is this opening and changing way that 

we might be able to use the Arctic. And frankly, one would hope 

that we could see that as an opportunity and a place that we might 

cooperate. But there are concerns by the NATO nations who are 

along the Arctic—or all of the eight nations of the Arctic really are 

watching what is going on up there, and some have more concern 

than others. 

Clearly, as you state, the Russians are changing the nature and 

capabilities of their infrastructure in the Arctic. This could either 

be for good or not. 

Mr. LARSEN. You know what? I have got a question, but I don’t 

want to get tapped down by the chairman, so I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the gentleman’s consideration. With 

the largest committee in the Congress, we have got to stay on time. 

Gotcha. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ma’am, General 

Breedlove. General, thank you for joining me at Robins Air Force 

Base a couple of weeks ago. We have picked up all the Georgia 

Tech stickers and tags that we handed out prior to your arrival, 

but should you choose to come back, we will be more than willing 

to hand them out again. And I hope you will. I hope you will join 

us at Robins or at Moody, but I know you are busy. 

And I want to talk about one of the platforms that flies out of 

Robins Air Force Base right now, if I can, and that is the JSTARs 

[Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System]. We have worked 

to recapitalize that program over the last several years. The Air 

Force has asked for that. Certainly, want to continue that. 

The new budget submission provides funding to keep the five additional E–8Cs [JSTARS] that were scheduled for divestment to recapitalize the fleet. And just like to hear the battle management 

command and control capabilities of that system, how they have 

benefited in the current fights that we are in, that you are directly 

in control of and that capability. 

And then again, making sure that—understanding the needs of 

that platform. We are going to continue with the recapitalization 

of it to get that ISR platform that—not only us, but our allies’ 

needs in these fights. 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, thanks for that. And I will 

refrain from the Georgia-Georgia Tech discussion. 

Clearly, the capabilities of this aircraft are key and essential to 

everything that we do. The ability not only to have some command 

and control capability aloft but the other part of the mission and 

looking at the ground, et cetera, et cetera. So we are—as I would 
31 

say that every COCOM [combatant commander] that sits here in 

front of you would tell you that these are capabilities we need into 

the future to be able to do not only our ISR business, but our command and control. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you consider it urgent? Would that be an appropriate word to use with regard to—— 

General BREEDLOVE. I think that the demonstration of how 

fiercely we compete to have that capability in our theater points to 

how needed it is. It is a requirement we need. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I look forward to working with you to expand 

that capability. And thank you for your support of Robins. 

Ma’am, I want to talk about our NATO allies for a second. One 

of my primary concerns as a husband and a father is that when 

I look at our overall budget picture, within 5 years the net interest 

on our national debt will exceed what we spend on national security. And I look at what our NATO partners are committed to contribute towards what I would consider global security, and I look 

at what they are contributing and they are not living up to their 

end of the bargain, if you will. 

What do we need to do differently to explain to them that while 

we as the United States want to be a good partner, we are perfectly 

willing to take the lead, we are perfectly willing to, on a dollar 

share, put more in because our economy is stronger, but we can’t 

carry all of the weight. How do we get our NATO partners to put 

in what they committed to put in? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, that is a great question. And 

I share your concern, I share concern as a taxpayer and as a parent. I have two daughters and was trying to explain to them last 

night what sequestration is. So it is a very good question to ask 

what do we need to do differently, or what more can we do, because 

this conversation about defense investment with our NATO allies 

has been a long-standing conversation. 

And I—you know, I think what we can do is take steps like we 

did at the Wales summit where we got NATO allies to sign up to 

a defense investment pledge. The hard work, though, is going to be, 

going forward, making sure that they do live up to that. But what 

we can do and what we are doing is both raising it at the highest 

levels—this is something that when Secretary Hagel met with the 

German MOD [Minister of Defense] a few months ago, he raised 

it with her. Secretary Carter will be raising this with his counterparts. 

But we also can be having very serious conversations, I think, 

with the Europeans about the very real and serious security 

threats that they are facing and how to be able to have the capabilities they need to be able to be interoperable with us, they simply have to make those investments. And part of the defense investment pledge was to say that 20 percent of their defense budget 

should go to investment in major equipment systems—— 

Mr. SCOTT. M’aam. 

Secretary WORMUTH [continuing]. And more R&D [research and 

development]. 

Mr. SCOTT. I am out of time. If I could finish with one statement, 

Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me. We can push whoever we 

need to out of a territory. We, as the United States with our allies. 
32 

But at some point somebody has got to hold that territory. It is a 

big world. We can’t hold it all. And if our NATO allies aren’t putting in their share so that they can hold their own territory—and 

I recognize the Ukraine is not NATO, with us, but they have to be 

able to hold their own territory. We can’t hold every country for 

them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Breedlove, I 

am wondering if you can talk to the unconventional tactics being 

used by Russia, specifically what is being done to counter those? 

You know, when we look at Ukraine, everyone is—obviously recognizes that there is no head-to-head or tank-to-tank battle that is 

possible between Ukraine and Russia. So I am wondering what is 

being done, whether it is done by the U.S. or done by other countries, to assist Ukraine. 

We have talked about lethal assistance but also, with regards to 

training assistance for them to counter these unconventional tactics 

with unconventional tactics and to begin to exact a toll on the Russian military that becomes more evident to the Russian people beyond the toll that is there from the sanctions. 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, thanks. And if I could just 

open the question a little bit, too. We talk a lot about the unconventional tactics in the military side but I think we have to remember that they are being unconventional in diplomatic, incredibly 

unconventional in the information sphere, and then they are using 

those sort of tough tools in the economics, as well. So, the ‘‘D’’ [diplomatic], the ‘‘I’’ [intelligence], and the ‘‘E’’ [economic] of DIME are 

all in unconventional operations for the Russians. And so we need 

to help our partners to be able to work that. 

Broadly, then, in the military piece, there are three things we 

are helping all of our nations and this is work we are doing in the 

Baltics right now even more so than in Ukraine, to preclude this 

problem in the future, and that is to give our nations the ability 

to understand it is more than military, it is normally almost more 

a ministry of interior problem to develop the capabilities to do 

three things: Recognize that we have unconventional warfare going 

on; characterize it as unconventional as opposed to just normal 

issues, political issues in the populace; and then attribute it to an 

aggressor nation if it is being imposed. 

So recognize, characterize, and attribute. And, then, when we can 

do that, we can have other nations to be more involved in how we 

fight that battle. So we are developing right now capabilities inside 

these nations to take those steps and get their laws and authorities 

right inside their own nations to be able to attack this when it occurs to them. 

Ms. GABBARD. I have another question with regard to the EU but 

I think that is an issue that I and others on the committee would 

like to hear more about specifically because Ukraine is where 

things are happening and then also how the other Baltic States 

and NATO allies are also preparing. 

With regards to the traffic of foreign fighters and the flow between Syria and through Turkey, what is the EU doing and what 

role are you playing in working with them to address that issue 

and the fact that their ability to or their willingness to cross-ref-
33 

erence names on terror watch lists, for example, and to track people who are coming through those porous borders in between these 

EU nations, how is that being addressed and improved given these 

weaknesses have been identified? 

General BREEDLOVE. Do you want me to take this one? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Oh, I can. Congresswoman, that is a great 

question. One of the major lines of effort in our counter-ISIL strategy is trying to address the foreign fighter network problem. There 

are I think at the last that I read as many as 20,000 foreign fighters flowing from more than 90 countries into Iraq and Syria. So it 

is an extremely significant challenge. 

We are working with the countries in the European Union to try 

to help them—I mean, much as combating some of these unconventional tactics to try to help them strengthen their laws that govern 

their border security, that govern their travel regulations. We are 

working with them to try to help them strengthen their intelligence 

organization’s ability to identify these networks and to identify 

where the facilitators are. 

There is more work to be done but this is a major prong in our 

strategy. It has to be a truly international effort because if you only 

address it in a particular region or within the context of Europe, 

you know, the water—— 

Ms. GABBARD. But wouldn’t you say a majority of those numbers 

that you threw out are, though, within that region at this juncture? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Many of them are coming from European 

countries. 

Ms. GABBARD. Right. 

Secretary WORMUTH. That is certainly true. We also see them 

coming from places like Indonesia—— 

Ms. GABBARD. Right. 

Secretary WORMUTH [continuing]. And elsewhere in Asia. 

Ms. GABBARD. But I am—since we are talking about this region 

right now, is Turkey on board? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Turkey has been steadily improving. There 

is more work to be done though. Turkey is one of the transit points 

that we are most concerned about. They are getting better. They 

have put more people on their watch list. But there is more work 

to be done with Turkey. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bridenstine. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Breedlove, 

I would like—I think there are a lot of people that don’t understand the important relationship between U.S. European Command 

and the nation of Israel. Could you brief us on some of our commitments to Israel? Maybe some of our mil-to-mil exercises, that kind 

of thing. How important is what you do to the nation of Israel? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, thank you. Some I can discuss here, others I would be glad to come talk to you in a classified 

environment. 

U.S. European Command has been given the mission of assisting 

in the defense of Israel. The most—probably the most visible piece 

of that is our joint work in ballistic missile defense and how we 

would help Israel to do that because of their, as you know, strategic 
34 

depth is not something that Israel has and so being able to help 

them defend that. 

And that is—we have a series of exercises that are some of the 

best that we do in this ballistic missile business. We have great exercises in the air defense, Air Force across the board. And I think, 

at that point, I would defer to a more classified conversation. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Well, I appreciate that. And another question 

I had is—and maybe this is for you, Ms. Wormuth. If we were to 

go continue through the sequestration process, maybe you could 

help us understand a little bit about how that would impact the nation of Israel and European Command and maybe, General 

Breedlove, you could highlight as well, too, because we are about 

to go through a budget process here in the U.S. Congress and I, 

for one, believe we need to get beyond sequestration, especially as 

it relates to our defense forces. And we hear all the time about the 

increased risk. Can you guys quantify that for us? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Thank you, Congressman. Let me try to answer your question there. I think if we return to sequestration levels of funding, it will have a profound impact—a profound negative 

impact, I would argue, on what we are trying to do in European 

Command and that in the Europe AOR, but also globally. 

You know, at the current level of funding that the President has 

requested, we are able to execute our strategy at a manageable risk 

level, I would argue, but we are already now at the point where 

we don’t really have a margin. 

You know, I think you have heard General Breedlove say, for example, he is showing American presence through a rotational approach as opposed to permanent presence in some cases. And under 

sequestration, we would be forced to look at choices between the 

size of our Army, our Air Force. We would be, just as we did in 

2013, we would be having to eliminate exercises with countries in 

Europe, for example, potentially Israel. We would be facing some 

very difficult choices. 

And in terms of speaking to the risk in a little bit more concrete 

way, you know, the way I think about it is part of what we do is 

to try to prevent crises from arising and we do that through our 

forward presence. We do that through our engagement. Under sequestration, we will have a smaller military that will make it difficult for us to maintain that presence. We will have a military that 

will be less ready and less able to respond to crises. If we were to 

get in a major conflict, that conflict would extend far longer than 

we want it to be, it would be higher casualties, so there are very 

substantial, real-world implications to that kind of risk. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And, General, I can tell you would like to answer this as well, but I would like to move on to one last question 

with my one remaining minute. We know that, you know, Iran is 

continuing with an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] program. We know that Hamas and Hezbollah are reconstituting their 

missile capabilities. ISIS, of course, is in the region. My question 

is this. What did the administration go through as far as a process 

to determine in its budget request that it was appropriate to cut 

$150 million from missile defense for Israel? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, I don’t have the figures at 

my fingertips in terms of what level of cuts we made. As General 
35 

Breedlove indicated, we are supporting Israel very robustly 

through programs like Iron Dome, David Sling, the Arrow program 

and—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Just real quick, with my 23 seconds, Arrow was cut, I think $45 million, David’s Sling was cut $100 million 

from appropriated levels last year. Any comments on that? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Well, we are making very difficult choices, 

you know, over—since 2012, we have absorbed almost a trillion dollars in reductions to planned defense spending over a 10-year period and, in that context, we are having to make difficult choices 

already. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being 

here. General Breedlove, in your opinion has Russia achieved an 

operational capability of its INF Treaty-violating ground-launch 

cruise missile? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, I would really like to talk to 

you about that in a classified environment. And I would—I will get 

on your calendar to do that. 

Mr. ROGERS. I would appreciate that. Let me ask this, do you 

agree with Chairman Dempsey that Russia’s INF systems pose a 

threat to our deployed forces in Europe? 

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. ROGERS. And what is your best military advice about the response most likely to assure our allies and to prevent Russia from 

attaining military advantage from these actions? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, there are a series of things 

that we can do and some of those were discussed by some of our 

senior leaders in the past days. We need to first and foremost signal that we cannot accept this change and that, if this change is 

continued, that we will have to change the cost calculus for Russia 

in order to help them to find their way to a less bellicose position. 

Mr. ROGERS. A little while ago one of our—my predecessors on 

the dais up here asked you about what would Russia do next, in 

your opinion, if it continues unopposed across Ukraine, and they 

specifically asked if you thought that the Baltics, Estonia, Lithuania, would be the next target and you stated that you felt that 

Vladimir Putin fully understood Article 5. So what is your professional opinion as to what might be the next concern that we would 

have in that region? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, it is a tough question and 

there are several options available. As I mentioned before, I think, 

first and foremost, Mr. Putin has not accomplished his objectives 

yet in Ukraine, so next is probably more action in Ukraine. 

We do see the seeds of issues in Transnistria and Eastern 

Moldova. We do see, as you know, continued pressure being put on 

Georgia and Gagauzia. So there are several places where pressure 

is being brought on these nations to keep them from leaning West 

and so there are options there. 

I do, as I have said already today, believe that Mr. Putin understands Article 5 but I do not believe that that would preclude Mr. 

Putin from taking some actions in reaching out to the disparate 

Russian-speaking populations that are in some of our easternmost 

nations in NATO. 
36 

Mr. ROGERS. Is it your opinion that if we don’t—and I am asking 

your opinion, I don’t want to be leading in this question. But if lethal aid is not provided by the United States, does your best military opinion that the Ukrainian military can, in fact, stop the 

progress of the Russian troops across their country? Or can they 

not? 

General BREEDLOVE. Congressman, in the current configuration, 

I do not think that the Ukrainian forces can stop a Russian advance in Eastern Ukraine. And to the degree that we can supply 

help, I am not sure that they could stop a Russian advance in Eastern Ukraine even if we supply aid. I think that our—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Lethal aid? 

General BREEDLOVE. Lethal aid, that is correct. Congressman, I 

think that what we are talking about is changing the calculus of 

the decisions that Mr. Putin has to make and the cost to him in 

his internal environment more than the external environment. 

Mr. ROGERS. You are talking body bags? 

General BREEDLOVE. That is right. I think we should talk about 

raising the cost for Russia in many dimensions, yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Wormuth—thank you, General. In reading your 

opening statement I was concerned that you made no reference at 

all to INF Treaty violations by Russia, given that Secretary Carter 

right out of the gate has made it clear. This is a big problem that 

we are facing and he takes it seriously. Why did you not think it 

was worthy of mentioning in your opening statement? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congressman, that was an—excuse me. I 

don’t want to be yelling at you. The fact that it wasn’t mentioned 

in my written statement was not an indication that we are not 

deeply concerned about it. They are in violation. It is a problem. 

We have been raising this with them since 2013, making clear that 

their violation is unacceptable, and we are quite concerned about 

it as General Breedlove said. We want to continue to try to bring 

them back into compliance, but if they do not do that, we do not 

want them to have a military advantage over us and will look at 

what responses are appropriate to take. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for your testimony today. General Breedlove, I wanted to talk to you a little bit 

about truth in disclosure. I was part of a team to stand up Africa 

Command back in 2007 and 2010. And you mentioned the 65,000 

assigned to you that includes forces that are dual-hatted, components to Africa Command and also forces assigned to you as a staff 

officer. 

Great frustration that, you know, we did not have the forces required to include crisis response forces. So I haven’t been there in 

a while so just wanted to get your perspective on especially with 

the increasing activity in your theater and responsibilities, how is 

that working and do you see if there is a crisis where you need a 

crisis response team in your theater but we also have a Benghazilike situation in Africa Command, how does that work? Have you 

seen any shortfalls where you haven’t been able to fill missions? 

And, also, as we are looking for places to gain savings, I have 

heard some of my colleagues talk about how Africa Command can 
37 

just roll back into EUCOM again and, having been a part of that, 

with all you have on your plate, adding another 53 countries in Africa and the ungoverned spaces and the terrorism threat and 

everything we are doing there, I strongly disagree with that. So I 

wanted to hear your perspectives on that proposal as we move forward. Thanks. 

General BREEDLOVE. So there has been some very good news 

since you left in that, as you may or may not heard, we have been 

given the authority at the combatant commander and deputy combatant commander level between EUCOM and AFRICOM to move 

forces back and forth without going through the DEPORD [deployment order] book process in the Pentagon. So when—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. There is a conflict there. How do you have two crises at once, something has got to get a priority, right? 

General BREEDLOVE. There is no doubt about that and that priority would probably be adjudicated. But what happens is that Rod 

Rodriguez and I can make these decisions now very quickly and 

move the forces back and forth and you had it right, almost all the 

force is in EUCOM, there are some small crisis response—forces in 

AFRICOM but we are free to share at a very quick and easy way. 

I completely agree with you about Africa Command and EUCOM 

but for a different reason. In Africa, the growing mission—the 

growing problem with radicals and with terrorists and ungoverned 

spaces in these nations, the focus that AFRICOM is able to bring 

on that is unique to the fact that there is a combatant commander 

assigned to focus on that. And I don’t think that where the next 

problem really is going to be would be the place that we would 

want to lose focus. 

Ms. MCSALLY. No, I do agree for the same reasons. Next question 

is we closed down the squadron of A–10s [Thunderbolt II aircraft] 

at Spangdahlem [Air Base] a couple years ago, and the squadron 

that I commanded at Davis-Monthan just deployed over to Spangdahlem. You can’t make this stuff up. So we are in a situation 

where we are closing down A–10s in Europe and then we are deploying A–10s from CONUS [continental United States] to Europe. 

Can we walk through kind of a logic behind that and the cost? 

Maybe you don’t have that but maybe for the record later, the 

cost of deploying units forward versus having kept them there in 

the first place, and are you seeing value with that deployment? 

And you certainly can’t have the squadron from Davis-Monthan full 

time but in a future discussion hindsight, should we have just kept 

a squadron of A–10s at Spang [Spangdahlem]? 

General BREEDLOVE. I would defer to the Under Secretary for 

some of the policy piece of that. I would like to say that it is clear 

that the capabilities that these aircraft bring is needed. You already know, I think, in the military as a combatant commander we 

try not to prescribe the tool. We ask for a capability, and in an 

anti-armor capability certainly the A–10s bring a great capability 

forward to Spang. 

I have often said that I favor forward-stationed forces. When the 

budget changes and precludes and forces are cut or brought down, 

then it is important that we have the ability to bring rotational 

forces. Rotational forces are only good if they have solid fiscal backing in order to be able to deploy. 
38 

Secretary WORMUTH. Congresswoman, I would just again go back 

to the figure I cited before, where we, you know, we have absorbed 

just a very, very large set of reductions from what we planned just 

a few years ago. And as General Welsh has testified, the A–10 is 

a great platform and all other things being equal, we would like 

to keep that. 

But in order to modernize the Air Force, which is in desperate 

need of recapitalization, we have had to make some tough choices. 

I think that is what you are seeing. 

Ms. MCSALLY. And my time is expired, but I just say I would like 

a cost analysis of keeping a squadron at Spang versus the cost of 

sending them TDY [temporary duty], which potentially could be 

more costly in the long run. So if we are gaining savings, let’s 

make sure we are actually gaining savings. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 88.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you General 

Breedlove and Ms. Wormuth for being here. Just a follow-up on the 

A–10 issue, and we all know that it is more than just armor that 

it can devastate. Having sons that actually saw the use of A–10s 

on unconventional forces and the fear factor that placed upon them 

was huge. So I would just, once again, I happen to like the A–10s 

because my kids, who called upon them to protect them when danger was close, was phenomenal. 

But getting past that and we’ve talked about Russia, I think, and 

a lot of this needs to be in a classified setting, I agree. But when 

you talk about ISIS, and particularly forget about ISIS but talk 

about the Islamic extremism that is rampant across this world, I 

start to worry that, you know, we try to isolate—you know, we 

have got European Command, what goes on within Europe. Then 

we have, you know, Africa Command, which is under-resourced, obviously. One of my sons actually did a tour down in Africa training 

up Ghanaian soldiers. 

But when you look at the threat, and we had King Abdullah 

here, that really gave us, I think, a very enlightened aspect in regards to, you know, the fight is within Islam itself. And until I 

think we identify the fact that is where the fight is, that is problematic on strategy. 

But he was saying, and I tend to agree, is that it needs to be a 

coordinated attack across the broad spectrum, and I don’t know 

that we have the ability to have a coordinated fight brought to the 

Islamic extremists when you have them parceled out by Africa 

Command, European Command, and what goes on in PACOM [U.S. 

Pacific Command]. 

Is there a way to coordinate all of that? Because I worry that we 

are not—and he was talking about that coordinated approach in 

particular. 

General BREEDLOVE. I will allow the Secretary to talk to the 

larger part of the question, but let me assure you that we are not 

doing disparate attacks. I just literally came from Kuwait, where 

all of the leaders, to include our new Secretary of Defense, came 

together to talk about just your issue, of how we stay coordinated. 
39 

That area of the world, where CENTCOM, AFRICOM, and 

EUCOM comes together, Rod Rodriguez and Lloyd Austin and I 

work this personally all the time to not allow seams. Again, witnessed by what we just did in Kuwait. I will turn the rest of the 

question over to the Secretary. 

Secretary WORMUTH. I was basically going to say the same thing, 

Congressman. You see we are also trying to do things like have 

conferences with the chiefs of defense from all of the different countries. We have John Allen, who is working to bring together all of 

the coalition countries. So while it is certainly true that the membership of the coalition crosses EUCOM’s AOR, CENTCOM’s AOR, 

AFRICOM’s AOR, we have a number of mechanisms in place to 

make sure that we are working together and that we are seeing it 

holistically and comprehensively and not through a soda straw. 

General BREEDLOVE. A two-second pile-on. An example. To stay 

unclassified, I won’t name the base. So we take off an ISR asset 

and that ISR asset may change two or three times in the same mission, who it is really supporting as we gather on targets. So this 

is an extremely well-orchestrated dance. 

Mr. NUGENT. And I think that was the biggest concern that we 

have as a committee in regards to what is the strategy. And I think 

that we have been somewhat reluctant in regards to the strategy. 

We are going to hear, you know, on AUMF [authorization for use 

of military force] and what is the real strategy going forward. And 

it is not just ISIS. This is a much broader issue of Islamic extremism. 

And until I think the administration actually drills down and 

says the words, it kind of diminishes. And what you don’t want to 

do is give credence to the caliphate or ISIL or whatever. I think 

that just creates a bigger problem for us when we add legitimacy 

to that. 

And lastly, just on Ukraine, I would just say—and I agree with 

the chairman—it hasn’t worked so far. And I understand what happens when we ratchet up and we give lethal aid to the Ukrainians. 

But I had a meeting last night with some Ukrainians in an off setting and they are absolutely concerned about their loved ones that 

are still there and what is going to happen to them. And these 

folks are U.S. citizens concerned about what is going to happen. 

And so I would think that we have not been very successful in 

predicting Mr. Putin’s actions, but I think our inaction is more of 

an appeasement than it is of showing leadership. 

And I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I don’t want to try y’all’s patience too 

long. I do have just a handful of things I would like to ask about 

briefly. Several people asked about NATO defense budgets, Wales 

summit sets a goal 2 percent. General, I know you have these conversations with your counterparts all the time in NATO. 

So far do you see anybody heading up, and who is? 

General BREEDLOVE. Mr. Chairman, it is a great question and I 

would like to answer it in two ways. Yes, we have seen nations, including some of the Baltics that were mentioned earlier, who have 

made a pledge and showed a plan on how they will attain their 2 

percent spending. Now they are very motivated. Other nations also 

are in the same boat. 
40 

We also, in truth, have seen a couple of nations whose administrations have changed. Remember this was national leaders that 

made this commitment and those national leaders have changed 

and we see a little regression in a couple. 

Let me not try to pump sunshine but point out a few good things, 

and that is, separate from the 2 percent, also important is that 

their militaries step up to the mission we need to do. Defense 

starts at home. And as we have made these three basic changes in 

NATO as a function of the Readiness Action Plan, RAP, we are 

standing up the Very High Readiness Task Force. We needed three 

or four nations to be center brigades for that task force. We got six 

volunteer nations to step up to that in our recent defense 

ministerials. 

As we stand up these six new units in our easternmost nations, 

they are NATO Force Integration Units—we jokingly call them 

nephews—they will be receiving an onward moving capability of 

NATO nations in these countries. And we have strong pledges, 

again, for the manning and standing up those units. 

And then last but not least, the fundamental change in what we 

are going to expect from the Multinational Corps Northeast in 

Stechin, Poland, which will take on that Article 5 responsibility in 

the east and the north, strong manning conference and a strong 

pledge by the three framework nations, including us, the United 

States, stepping up our participation in that headquarters to bring 

it to capability. 

So I painted a long picture, but the bottom line is we also ask 

them to step up with their forces, and to this point they are answering, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is helpful. Thank you. One issue that I 

don’t believe has come up today is the threat of Islamic infiltration 

through the Mediterranean. So we all saw or knew of this horrible 

beheading of Coptic Christians on the coast of Libya. There is 

clearly an ISIS presence there. I read that the Italians are quite 

concerned about what is going to come up from the south. 

Is NATO considering naval patrols of some sort to deal with this 

threat? Or is it a real threat, I guess? 

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman, it is a real threat and it is one 

of the primary concerns of our southern NATO nations. I think you 

heard me mention a little bit earlier that coming out of Wales and 

every meeting since we have had a strong recognition that we have 

to adapt NATO to be able to react to the north and east and the 

problem with a revanchist Russia, but we also have to look to the 

south because we have a multifaceted problem in the south. From 

migration flows, organized crime, terror, all the problems that are 

occurring in the ungoverned spaces in northern Africa are bleeding 

across the Mediterranean in the south. 

And as a part of the tasking I was given in my other hat as the 

Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, we have to deliver a plan 

for addressing that. We will deliver that on the 31st of March. We 

delivered first the plan to address the north and the east, and next 

we will deliver our papers to look at the south threat as well. And 

you are right, Chairman, this is a multifaceted approach to include 

naval applications. 
41 

The CHAIRMAN. If I were in some of those nations, I would be 

concerned about how long that is taking to get a plan because these 

folks seem to move really quickly. I think you may have answered 

this, but other than budgetary considerations, your preference 

would be to have a permanent stationing of forces in Eastern Europe rather than a rotational one, is that correct? 

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman, yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. And it would be those Eastern European countries’ preference as well. 

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman, if I could back up and clarify 

what I just said. I am in favor of permanent stationed forces in Europe. I think that the discussion of in our easternmost nations this 

is a different discussion for all of the reasons that you understand. 

Does that answer? 

The CHAIRMAN. We need to go country by country as to their 

preferences. That makes sense. 

Ms. Wormuth, lots of discussion about arms control and tactical 

nukes and so forth. But isn’t it true that the Russian public doctrine is evolving to include the potential use of tactical nuclear 

weapons against even conventional forces? So that this potential 

danger by these tactical nukes that were not included in New 

START is taking on a little bit of a different enhanced meaning? 

Secretary WORMUTH. Chairman, I think it is fair to say that Russia is in the process of evolving its doctrine in some very important 

ways. I would prefer to talk to you about that in a classified session 

and would be happy to do that, but I think it is fair to say in an 

open hearing that they are making some doctrinal changes that are 

concerning to us and that we need to take into account as we look 

to how we are going to deter Russia going forward. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am just referring to some of the things 

they are publishing openly. Now obviously there are other conversations to have as well. Last question I have got: General, you 

mentioned in answer to one of the questions that—talking about 

what the Russians learned from the Georgian invasion, and you 

said the Russians are a learning and adaptive force. 

My question is, are we? And especially as we see these hybrid 

tactics and all that in this theater Russia is using to advance their 

national interest, seems to me it presents us some really difficult 

challenges. And from where you sit, are we learning and adaptive 

to deal with these new challenges that try to strike at some of our 

weaknesses? 

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman, I would like to assure you that, 

yes, we are learning and adaptive. And I am encouraged by some 

of the things that even our young people have helped us to understand and how do we approach some of these hybrid challenges we 

see. 

There is a lot of mystique around this word ‘‘hybrid warfare.’’ All 

it really is is a different way to use tools that we have known about 

forever. The things that they bring to the table and use in a 

more—in a way that creates ambiguity. 

And so how we address those ambiguities are very important. 

And so that I don’t give away some of the more, I would say very 

ingenious ways that our young folks have worked, we will make 
42 

those available to you. But the bottom line is, yes, sir, we are a 

learning and adaptive force. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I hope we are in a timely way. Because it 

is whether we are talking about the threat from terrorism, whether 

we are talking about what the Russians are doing, or a number of 

other threats around the world, adversaries seem to be moving 

very quickly, looking for those asymmetric advantages that they 

can gain against us and looking for our weak spots. 

And one of our weak spots is we don’t do very well with somebody who lies and cheats and does all the things that we have seen 

coming out of the Russians. But that is the world we live in and 

we have to adapt. 

Thank you both. We have touched on a lot of subjects today. I 

very much appreciate your being here and appreciate the seriousness of the issues which confront each of you as well as this committee. 

And with that the hearing will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015 

(47) 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015 

(87) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Secretary WORMUTH. Yes, we are providing Ukraine intelligence. I am happy to 

provide greater fidelity in a classified setting. [See page 14.] 

Secretary WORMUTH. The U.S. missile defense systems previously planned by the 

President Bush Administration for deployment in Europe, and the systems now 

planned and being deployed to Europe, were never designed or intended to defend 

against threat missiles launched by the Russian Federation. 

The ten Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) that were planned for deployment to 

the Republic of Poland and the long-range discrimination radar that was planned 

for deployment to the Czech Republic, the combination of which was known as the 

‘‘Third Site,’’ were never intended or designed to counter Russian strategic systems. 

In 2009, we replaced the Third Site with the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

(EPAA), which is intended to be phased to match advances in our missile defense 

technology and to be adaptive to changes in the threat. There are three phases 

planned for EPAA. Phase 1 has been operational since 2011. It consists of an AN/ 

TPY–2 radar in Forward-Based Mode that is deployed to Turkey; a multi-mission, 

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable Aegis ship in the eastern Mediterranean, 

which is forward-deployed to Rota, Spain; and the Command-and-Control Battle 

Management and Communications (C2BMC), which is the command-and-control 

network for the BMD system. Phase 2 is on track for completion by the end of 2015. 

It will add an Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu Base, Romania, equipped with the SM– 

3 Block IB missile to the current Phase 1 systems. Phase 3 will be completed in 

2018 and will provide coverage for all of NATO Europe. It will add an Aegis Ashore 

site in Rzedikowo, Poland, and also consists of software and hardware upgrades to 

the existing Aegis Ashore site in Romania and the deployment of a new variant of 

the SM–3 missile, the Block IIA. [See page 14.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS 

General BREEDLOVE. Since last appearing before the committee, the United States 

has chosen to slow its withdrawal of troops from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and partner nations 

are currently staffing the options internally and are waiting on the associated detailed plan for the U.S. drawdown in 2016 in order to make an informed decision 

on their way forward. While we won’t have any assurances, national force contributions are confirmed in June 2015. We believe the majority of nations will continue 

to follow our lead as they have done for the past several years. However, several 

of our Allies and partners are reliant on the unique enablers that we provide in Afghanistan, and their commitments to stay longer could be contingent upon these 

enablers remaining. Some of these countries are also reliant upon distinctive authorities provided by Congress such as the Coalition Readiness Support Program, 

Global Lift and Sustain, and section 1207 to deploy into theater and sustain interoperability with United States and NATO forces. The early U.S. decision on continued troop levels in Afghanistan will assist the U.S. and NATO to work with the 

Framework Nations and the force generation process to resource and stabilize troop 

levels in calendar year 2016. 

It’s important to mention that in no other region of the world does the United 

States find more willing, capable, and reliable partners for global military operations than in Europe. Some specific points highlighting this commitment include: 

Historically, European Allies and partners have contributed 88 percent—92 percent of non-U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan. 

Since 2003, European Allies and partners have contributed more than 275,000 

personnel to operations in Afghanistan. These very significant troop contributions 

reduce operational demands on U.S. forces and enhance the legitimacy and credibility of U.S.-led military operations. 

In particular, some of our newer Allies and partners have consistently shown the 

political willingness and military capability to fight alongside U.S. forces. Unfortunately, our increased shared security requirements are occurring while our security 

cooperation efforts such as Foreign Military Financing have been dramatically re-
88 

duced. These countries reliance on former Soviet-era equipment further exasperates 

our ability to effectively sustain these very strategic partnerships. 

European Allies and partners account for 36 of the 41 troop contributing nations 

to the RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission (RSM) and over 5,000 personnel (as of April 

2015), which comprises 92 percent of non-U.S. forces in RSM. 

European Allies and partners provide critical capabilities to RSM, including leadership of Train, Advise, Assist Commands, Afghan National Army/Police training 

teams, and special operations forces that conduct counter-insurgency operations.

[See page 24.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. McSALLY 

General BREEDLOVE. This is a complicated question that is very difficult to quantifiably answer. European Command (EUCOM) has reached out to the U.S. Air 

Force to get their help in answering this question as they the services maintain the 

costing data to answer this question. The RAND Corporation addressed a similar 

question in their Congressionally mandated, Overseas Basing of U.S. Military 

Forces report in which they concluded, ‘‘If the sending base is closed (greatly increasing the savings), substituting full rotational presence (12 months out of the 

year) for permanent presence sometimes saves money, sometimes costs money, and 

sometimes roughly breaks even, depending on the service, unit type, region, frequency and length of rotations, and equipment policy options (transporting versus 

prepositioning unit equipment). In particular, achieving extensive presence through 

high-frequency, short rotations would greatly increase costs, leaving longer rotations 

as the only option that enables some savings or avoidance of increased costs while 

maintaining high presence. If only partial, rotational presence is substituted for permanent presence, then, depending upon the rotational design, savings can be more 

substantial. In other words, we found no single, definitive comparison for permanent 

versus rotational presence. Each case must be examined individually.’’ We agree 

with the RAND report—there are numerous factors in determining the cost of permanently stationed forward-based force against a rotational force. [See page 38.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015 

(91) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. General Breedlove, Poland, Germany, and Turkey are all considering PATRIOT for their Air and Missile Defense requirements, Congress recognizes 

that in the United States, selection of PATRIOT would send a strong signal of transAtlantic commitment from our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. 

General, how would Poland, German, Turkey selection of PATRIOT be perceived 

in your area of responsibility? 

General BREEDLOVE. The United States maintains a Global Response Force, including PATRIOT missile units, which is capable of rapidly deploying to respond to 

a range of worldwide contingencies. These United States forces, along with the capabilities of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, provide flexible options 

to defend our NATO Allies in the event of an imminent threat. 

Heavy global Combatant Command demand for ballistic missile defense forces has 

the U.S. Patriot force stretched to capacity. Thus, the future acquisition of these 

forces by our Allies will address critical shortfalls in NATO capability, alleviate the 

burden on overstretched U.S. PATRIOT forces, send a clear signal of cooperation, 

recognize the need to generate modern defense capabilities, and demonstrate a commitment to protect our strategic interests. 

Current proposals for PATRIOT systems are being reviewed by the Governments 

of Poland and Turkey, and European Command (EUCOM) is working with the Department of State and the Department of Defense to advocate for the selection of 

PATRIOT. In the context of Turkey and Poland, the level of technology transfer to 

improve domestic industrial capabilities, the participation by those nations in the 

continued development of PATRIOT technology and the long term commitment of 

the United States to continue development of the PATRIOT system are critical considerations. Turkey and Poland are important regional partners for EUCOM, and 

hold significant influence in regional security. Acquisition of Patriot by these nations would be an important signal to their regional partners and other NATO Allies 

that could lead to additional, potentially multilateral, acquisition of a similar or 

complementary capability. With regard to Germany, they are currently equipped 

with PATRIOT and are ably employing this weapon system alongside the United 

States and Spain in NATO’s Operation ACTIVE FENCE. 

All acquisitions of capable and interoperable air and missile defense systems work 

to strengthen the collective defensive capability available to the Alliance to defend 

NATO populations, territory, and forces. This growing capacity should give pause 

to those who would potentially use air and missile systems against members of the 

Alliance. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. The United States manufactures a number of weapons systems that 

our allies in Europe can utilize to offset the military advantages of Russia. Countries like Poland are increasingly looking to proven weapons systems, such as the 

PATRIOT Air and Missile Defense System, which are maintained and modified 

right here in America at Letterkenny Army Depot in my district. In light of this, 

how do you believe we can best utilize our organic industrial base to assist allies 

our allies in the region? 

Secretary WORMUTH. The United States has a strong domestic industrial base 

that is a global leader in the development of advanced technology and is well-placed 

to assist Allies and partners in Europe with emerging requirements. Once specific 

needs are established, the Department of Defense works with industry and the potential customer to develop a responsive and competitive offer that leverages our 

unique capabilities. As with all cases, any weapon systems cooperation efforts with 

our Allies and partners will consider the best use of U.S. domestic shipyards, depots, 

and arsenals to maintain and modify those systems, and also must comply with national laws and regulations. We are committed to doing all we can to continue supporting our defense industrial base. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Ms. Wormuth, how would you characterize U.S.-Russian relations? 

Would you call President Obama’s ‘‘reset’’ policy a success? 

Secretary WORMUTH. The Russian Federation’s military capabilities and modernization, coupled with its ongoing violations of its neighbors’ sovereignty, are un-
92 

dermining stability and security in Europe and threatening the international order. 

Russia’s actions of concern include the ongoing occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, its occupation of the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 

Georgia, and violations of its international obligations under nuclear and conventional arms control agreements. 

The Administration’s reset policy netted positive results before Russia chose its 

current course. Under the reset policy, we cooperated on the Northern Distribution 

Network, a series of logistics arrangements connecting Baltic and Caspian ports 

with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus; agreed to reduce nuclear weapons and their proliferation with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and a 123 Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy; obtained Russian 

cooperation in the United Nations for our actions in Libya; and jointly agreed to 

eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles. 

Mr. SHUSTER. In response to continued Russian violations of the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter recently stated ‘‘U.S. 

responses must make clear to Russia that if it does not return to compliance, our 

responses will make them less secure than they are today.’’ How do you think the 

United States should best respond to these violations, and do you believe that the 

United States should continue to abide by the treaty if the Russians will not? 

Secretary WORMUTH. The Department of Defense continues to support efforts to 

convince the Russian Federation to return to compliance with the Intermediaterange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty while protecting the security interests of the 

United States and our allies and partners. The security of the United States and 

its allies is not negotiable. 

The INF Treaty benefits the security of all of the Treaty parties, including the 

United States and the Russian Federation. The INF Treaty also benefits our allies 

and partners in Europe and Asia. For that reason, we are continuing to comply with 

the INF Treaty while we determine whether we can convince Russia to return to 

compliance with it. However, our patience is not without limits, and we are considering an array of responses that would seek to ensure that Russia gains no significant military advantage from its violation. 

If Russia does not come into compliance, it will ultimately require the United 

States to take action to protect our interests and security along with those of our 

allies and partners. Those actions will make Russia less secure. Some of those options are INF Treaty-compliant, and some are not. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Ms. Wormuth, the United States continues to reinforce our commitment to our NATO allies through the use of Operation Atlantic Resolve, which increased United States military rotational deployments, and the European Reassurance Initiative, which provided $1 billion to reassure and build partner capacities. 

Should our support to the region expand beyond our NATO partners to countries 

at risk of illegal occupation and if so, what should be the extent of our assistance? 

Secretary WORMUTH. OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR) is a demonstration of our continued commitment to the collective security of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and dedication to the enduring peace and stability in the region, in light of the Russian intervention in Ukraine specifically. In 

meeting our global security commitments, the United States must have strong, committed, and capable Allies, which is why we have fought, exercised, and trained with 

our European Allies for the past 70 years. Aided by the European Reassurance Initiative, OAR will remain in place as long as the need exists to reassure our Allies 

and deter Russia from further aggressive actions. 

In keeping with our goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, our support should 

and does extend beyond our NATO Allies. For example, we plan to sustain a significant level of security assistance to Ukraine throughout this year. Congress appropriated $118 Million for fiscal year 2014 for Department of Defense activities in 

Ukraine, and in fiscal year 2015, Congress appropriated at least an additional $75 

Million for Ukraine. We are also providing additional funds for security assistance 

to Georgia and the Republic of Moldova to support their independence, sovereignty, 

and territorial integrity in light of recent aggressive Russian actions. 

The Department of Defense continues to monitor the evolving security situation 

in Europe, particularly along the southern and eastern regions, and is prepared to 

adjust the level of assistance necessary to reassure NATO Allies and partners in the 

region of our commitment to collective security. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Last week, German broadcaster ‘‘ARD’’ broke the story that German soldiers made an effort to disguise their lack of arms by painting wooden 

broomsticks black and attaching them to their armored vehicles during a NATO exercise last year, in an effort to make them look like heavy machine guns. Media reports have also indicated that 41 percent of German soldiers lack pistols they would 

carry in a genuine rapid deployment situation; and 31 percent of their MG3 general- 
93 

purpose machine-guns are absent. Given this information, do you still believe our 

NATO allies in the region are prepared to honor their Article 5 obligation in the 

face of major threats such as Russia? 

General BREEDLOVE. I fully believe that every North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) Ally is prepared to honor Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, 

the general decline in defense spending by many NATO Allies is threatening their 

ability to generate the right forces, capabilities, and readiness levels to respond to 

a changed European security environment highlighted by Russian aggression. As 

spelled out in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, every nation has a requirement 

to be capable of its own defense. Increased defense spending on the right capabilities, forces, and readiness is an unmistakable signal that NATO is fully prepared 

for any situation and provides a road map to meet our current strategic dilemma 

in responding to aggression in Europe. At the September 2014 NATO Summit in 

Wales, Allied leaders committed to raise and maintain defense spending minimum 

of 2 percent of gross domestic product. Several major European nations have announced significant increases in defense spending, and Germany itself announced it 

will increase defense spending by 6.2 percent per year for each of the next four 

years. However, we must remain engaged across the board with all our Allies to encourage them to abide by their pledge made in Wales. 

Mr. SHUSTER. You state in your written testimony ‘‘After years of force structure 

and other personnel reductions, fewer than 65,000 U.S. military personnel remain 

permanently stationed in Europe . . . the size of our military presence forces difficult 

decisions daily on how to best use the limited resources we have to assure, stabilize, 

and support.’’ In your estimation, how many personnel do you believe would be optimal to have permanently stationed in Europe given the array of threats the region 

currently faces? 

General BREEDLOVE. The answer is not necessarily how many personnel are required but rather what capabilities are needed to meet the threats we currently 

face. United States European Command (EUCOM) requires, at minimum, the deferral of previously planned force reductions and an increased presence of U.S. forces 

in Europe through stepped-up rotations. These actions close the capacity gap in 

steady-state operations, enable building partner capacity and interoperability, provide a tangible measure of reassurance to the North American Treaty Organization 

(NATO) allies and partners, and demonstrate through unambiguous actions that the 

security commitment to Europe remains unshakable. Subject to the Global Force 

Management allocation process, the Army would augment presence through the rotation of continental United States (CONUS)-based units from an Armored Brigade 

Combat Team which is allocated to the NATO Response Force. The U.S. Navy could 

expand its presence in the Black and Baltic Seas as would the Marine Corps via 

its Black Sea Rotational Force. The U.S. Air Force would sustain its current air superiority force by rotating CONUS-based Air Forces squadrons to participate in Theater Security Package training and exercise events along NATO’s Eastern Flank, 

and rotating C–130s in support of Mobility Air Force missions. Special Operations 

Forces would expand its presence to increase partnership activities in Central and 

Eastern Europe. Dedicated analytic support at EUCOM’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center and NATO Intelligence Fusion Center would provide timely indications and warnings and enhanced exercise planning. With the exception of the aforementioned naval forces, these initiatives are currently nested and implementing the 

President ’s European Reassurance Initiative. 

Mr. SHUSTER. General Breedlove, you state ‘‘Russia uses energy as a tool of coercion.’’ Last month the House passed the LNG [liquid natural gas] Permitting Certainty and Transparency Act, which expands export opportunities for the natural 

gas industry to send energy to nations like the Ukraine. America is blessed with 

an abundance of energy resources, including massive natural gas reserves such as 

the Marcellus shale, which is estimated to hold about 141 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas reserves. In what other ways do you believe the 

United States can offset Russia’s energy coercion with our own resources? 

General BREEDLOVE. As the primary energy supplier to Ukraine and the Baltic 

states, the Russian Federation has the ability to unilaterally control the energy 

market in those countries, and has demonstrated on several occasions its willingness to do so. As voiced by Secretary of State Kerry, energy must not be used as 

a political weapon, and by opening those markets to U.S. natural gas suppliers at 

a competitive prices, Russia’s stranglehold will be meaningfully weakened. 

More broadly, we should consider a whole of government approach—in collaboration with the Department of State and the Department of Energy, for instance— 

to expand Ukrainian access to energy supplies less vulnerable to Russian influence 

as well as provide technical expertise for improving power generation and distribution efficiency. 
94 

(1) Optimize domestic energy production. The United States and the European 

Union have extensive expertise in both coal and nuclear plant optimization and 

could help Ukraine maximize efficiency from existing plants. Recent developments 

in clean coal technologies would be particularly useful in an already sizeable 

Ukrainian coal market. 

(2) Build-up renewable energy. Ukrainian officials are already calling for investment in green technologies to take advantage of the abundant natural resources in 

the country, particularly hydro, solar, and biomass. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. O’ROURKE 

Mr. O’ROURKE. During the hearing, you stated that our NATO allies have pledged 

to bring their defense spending up to 2 percent of gross domestic product, in line 

with NATO requirements, following the Wales Summit in September 2014. When 

must other NATO members reach this benchmark to be compliant with the Wales 

Summit deal, and what are the consequences if they do not meet this goal? 

Secretary WORMUTH. The pledge states that Allies will seek to increase defense 

spending in real terms as gross domestic product grows; and to move towards the 

2 percent guideline within a decade. More significantly for the near term, Allies 

spending less than 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense undertook to halt 

any further decline in defense spending. Allies agreed that progress would be reviewed at least annually and discussed at future Ministerials and Summits. This 

is the first time such a commitment has been made at the level of Heads of State 

and Government. It will empower Defense Ministers within European coalition governments to fight more effectively for adequate funding, with the support of the 

United States and other Allies. While there are no defined consequences for failing 

to meet the goals of the pledge, I will ensure allies who are in danger of falling into 

this category and fully understand the importance the United States puts on the 

pledge’s fulfillment, and the high standard to which we hold members of the NATO 

Alliance. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ZINKE 

Mr. ZINKE. Would you argue that a major leverage point against Russia is its economic frailty, and to what regard do you think the U.S. exporting liquefied natural 

gas (LNG) to European markets will have on Russia’s economy and influence in the 

region. Please give describe both short term implications (from the time the LNG 

is being exported) and long term implications. 

Secretary WORMUTH. Although the Department of Defense does not have responsibility for liquefied natural gas (LNG) market issues, I agree that LNG market diversification in Europe would help to limit the leverage the Russian Federation has 

over European customers who are heavily reliant on Russian gas supplies, as well 

as provide alternative sources for European nations to ensure they are not reliant 

on a single supplier for their gas needs. 

The United States, in coordination with the European Union and other partners, 

has used targeted sanctions, including in the energy sector, to raise the costs to 

Russia for its actions in Ukraine over the past year, and this has had a sharp impact on the Russian economy. Over the long-term, Russia’s failure to diversify and 

over-reliance on hydrocarbon sales would also have negative consequences, providing an important point of leverage on Russia. 

Mr. ZINKE. Would you argue that a major leverage point against Russia is its economic frailty, and to what regard do you think the U.S. exporting liquefied natural 

gas (LNG) to European markets will have on Russia’s economy and influence in the 

region. Please give describe both short term implications (from the time the LNG 

is being exported) and long term implications. 

General BREEDLOVE. The diversification of European energy sources and supply 

routes is a longstanding priority of U.S. energy diplomacy. Even before the current 

crisis in Ukraine, the Russian Federation has deftly used natural-gas supplies as 

leverage in pursuing long-term goals in the former Soviet space and in Europe as 

a whole. Growing availability of liquid natural gas has given Europe greater leverage in negotiations with Russia, and we should continue working with our partners 

on diversifying Europe’s supply sources. 

Æ