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EXTREMIST MADRASSAS, GHOST SCHOOLS, AND

U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN: ARE WE MAKING THE

GRADE ON THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

CARD?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 9, 2007

Serial No. 110–17

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.oversight.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSISGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

TOM LANTOS, California

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

——— ———

PHIL SCHILIRO, Chief of Staff

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

DAVID MARIN, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE TURK, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on May 9, 2007 ................................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Kojm, Christopher, president of the 9/11 Public Discourse Project and

Deputy Director, 9/11 Commission; Samina Ahmed, South Asia project

director for the International Crisis Group; Lisa Curtis, senior research

fellow, South Asia, Asian Studies Center, the Heritage Foundation;

and Craig Cohen, deputy chief of staff, and fellow, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, International Security Program, at the Center for

Strategic and International Studies ............................................................ 15

Ahmed, Samina ......................................................................................... 23

Cohen, Craig .............................................................................................. 41

Curtis, Lisa ................................................................................................ 32

Kojm, Christopher ..................................................................................... 15

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Ahmed, Samina, South Asia project director for the International Crisis

Group, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 26

Cohen, Craig, deputy chief of staff, and fellow, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, International Security Program, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, prepared statement of ............................... 43

Curtis, Lisa, senior research fellow, South Asia, Asian Studies Center,

the Heritage Foundation, prepared statement of ....................................... 35

Kojm, Christopher, president of the 9/11 Public Discourse Project and

Deputy Director, 9/11 Commission, prepared statement of ...................... 18

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 13

Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts, prepared statement of ................................................... 6

(1)

EXTREMIST MADRASSAS, GHOST SCHOOLS,

AND U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN: ARE WE MAKING THE GRADE ON THE 9/11 COMMISSION

REPORT CARD?

WEDNESDAY, MAY 9, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Lynch, Higgins, Yarmuth,

Braley, McCollum, Van Hollen, Welch, Shays, Platts, Westmoreland, McHenry, and Foxx.

Staff present: Leneal Scott, information systems manager; Dave

Turk, staff director; Andrew Su, professional staff member; Davis

Hake, clerk; Andy Wright, counsel; A. Brooke Bennett, minority

counsel; Grace Washbourne, minority senior professional staff

member; Nick Palarino, minority senior investigator and policy advisor; Benjamin Chance, minority clerk; and Dawn Hu, minority intern.

Mr. TIERNEY. Good morning. A quorum is present and the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs’ hearing entitled, ‘‘Extremist Madrassas, Ghost Schools, and U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Are We Making the Grade on the 9/11 Commission Report

Card’’ will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking

member make an opening statement. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open

for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the following written statement be

placed into the hearing record: Professor Husain Haggani, director

of the Center for International Relations and associate professor of

international relations at Boston University, as well as the former

Pakistan ambassador to Sri Lanka. Without objection, so ordered.

With all that business out of the way, good morning to our witnesses, and thank you for your participation and your assistance

here today, Mr. Shays.

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America awoke to a new and terrible chapter in our history on

September 11, 2001. We watched in horror as the Twin Towers disintegrated, as a Pentagon wing collapsed in flames, and as a Pennsylvania field smoldered with wreckage. Every American knows

with clarity where he or she was on that morning.

Today, more than 51⁄2 years later, the National Security Subcommittee begins a series of hearings asking whether the United

States has an effective, long-term strategy for confronting international terrorism.

We will begin with the 9/11 Commission, whose report cautioned

us of a ‘‘generational struggle’’ whose ‘‘long-term success demands

the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence,

covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public

diplomacy, and homeland defense.’’

The 9/11 Commission also warned that ‘‘[i]f we favor one tool

while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken

our national effort.’’ The Commission stressed the importance that

any offensive efforts ‘‘be accompanied by a preventative strategy

that is as much, or more, political as it is military.’’

So let’s now ask the question: how are we doing.

Today we are going to explore U.S. policy toward Pakistan, its

radical religious schools known as madrassas, and its dysfunctional

education system and what impact this has on long-term national

security.

The 9/11 Commission had some specific advice with regard to

Pakistan, stressing ‘‘[i]t is hard to overstate the importance of

Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism,’’ pointing out

that ‘‘[a]lmost all of the 9/11 attackers’’ spent some time in Pakistan and ‘‘traveled the north-south nexus of Kandahar-Quetta-Karachi,’’ and warning of Pakistan madrassas that ‘‘have been used

as incubators of violent extremism.’’

The 9/11 Commission urged the U.S. Government to ‘‘support

Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a

comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for

better education, so long as Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to

make difficult choices of their own.’’

In December 2005, the 9/11 Commission’s Public Discourse

Project issued a report card that is reflected on the screen to the

sides of the room. As you can see, we got a C+ for our efforts in

supporting Pakistan against extremists. The report card notes:

‘‘U.S. assistance to Pakistan has not moved sufficiently beyond security assistance to include significant funding for education efforts. Musharraf has made efforts to take on the threat of extremism, but has not shut down extremist-linked madrassas or terrorist camps. Taliban forces still pass freely across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and operate in Pakistani tribal areas.’’

This, despite the fact that President Musharraf has repeatedly

promised to crack down on extremist madrassas. In 2003 he stated,

‘‘We must finish off religious extremism. . . . We must not use the

mosques to spread hatred.’’ In January 2005, he said, ‘‘[t]he use of

mosques and seminaries as producers of hate and extremism must

be stopped.’’ And in August 2005, President Musharraf said, ‘‘[W]e

will not let any madrassa harbor terrorists or teach extremism and

militancy.’’ But the madrassas remain to this day.

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Here is a clip of a recent Frontline show entitled, ‘‘Return of the

Taliban.’’

[Film clip shown.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Last month, I led a congressional delegation to

Pakistan and Afghanistan with subcommittee members Betty

McCollum and Patrick McHenry, as well as the Education and

Labor Chairman George Miller. In Afghanistan, senior United

States, NATO, and Afghan military officials told us of their forces

being continually attacked by Taliban foes who plan and stage

their insurgent operations in Pakistan before pouring across the

border to kill our troops.

But if we think these Pakistani breeding grounds of terror only

threaten Afghanistan, we need to think again. The 2005 London

subway terrorist bombings involved at least one British national

trained in a Pakistani madrassa.

And just last week terrorists were convicted in the United Kingdom in a conspiracy to conduct an attack there with fertilizer-based

bombs. Five of the seven men tried attended either madrassas or

training camps in Pakistan. Yet, these extremist madrassas remain

open for business.

This is a picture of a madrassa that is just outside of Islamabad.

As we sit here in this hearing room today, madrassas affiliated

with the Red Mosque in Islamabad continue to flout Pakistani national laws by squatting on national land. They harbor foreign terrorists. They move large numbers of burga-clad women into the

compound as protection. They establish religious vigilante raids on

shopkeepers and assault and kidnap indecent—or what they term

indecent—women.

These madrassas have threatened a campaign of suicide bombings if they don’t get their way.

This picture of the Red Mosque madrassa students burning

books, CDs, and DVDs was taken just 2 days after our Congressional delegation left Pakistan. During our stay we were told of

women in Islamabad having acid doused on their faces for failure

to wear burgas and harassment of women who were just driving

cars. And we saw first-hand, billboards in which women’s facial images had been ripped away because of their so-called immodesty.

The extremists once confined to the outer reaches of Pakistan are

bringing their venom right into the heart of Pakistan’s manicured

capital. Last week our own State Department concluded ‘‘Pakistan

remains a major source of Islamic extremism and a safe haven for

some top terrorist leaders.’’

Extremism and Jahadi curriculum in madrassas is only one side

of the problem, however, as Pakistan’s public school system has utterly failed to provide a viable alternative for millions of poor Pakistani families.

In December 2005 the 9/11 Commission gave the U.S. Government a D grade for not doing enough to support secular education

in Muslim countries. The report card warned; ‘‘The U.S. has no

overarching strategy for educational assistance and the current

level of education reform funding is inadequate.’’

The United States also received a D for funding educational and

cultural exchange programs designed to foster mutual understandVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Aug 16, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\37093.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ing between the United States and Muslim countries. The grade

specifically notes recent closures of American libraries in Pakistan.

There is a bar chart that we would like to show at this time. This

chart compares our Pakistan education assistance aid versus our

military support. I know it is hard to see the bar for education

funding because it is 15 times less than what we are spending on

military funding.

Remember that the 9/11 Commission spoke of the need to use all

the tools in our toolbox, and of the need in Pakistan specifically for

a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support

for better education.

But in its latest budget submission the administration has requested a 33 percent funding cut for Development Assistance to

Pakistan, a category that includes funding for basic education programming.

Here is the scope of the problem that we are up against:

UNICEF estimates that some 13 million 5 to 9 year old children,

out of 27 million total are not enrolled in school at all. That is

nearly half of all Pakistani kids. And of those students who are enrolled, approximately half of them will drop out before completing

primary education.

Looking at the scope of the problem, the 9/11 Commission’s Vice

Chairman Lee Hamilton characterized our education aid level as a

‘‘drop in the bucket.’’ A recent Washington Quarterly article co-authored by one of today’s witnesses put it this way: The United

States is spending a scant $1.16 per child per year for more than

55 million school-aged Pakistani children.

Pakistan, itself, only spends a minuscule 2 percent of its gross

domestic product on education. The United Nations Educational,

Scientific and Cultural Organization recommends at least 4 percent. Untrained, unmotivated, and absenteeism-plagued teachers

have led to the phenomenon of the so-called ‘‘ghost schools,’’ where

a building sits idle and filled with students chaperoned by minders

instead of educators.

All of us hope to support Pakistan and its people in their efforts

to achieve for themselves a stable, prosperous, and free nation, but

our national security interests and the future of Pakistani children

is still more acute. Will we be safe over the next 5, 10, or 15 years

as thousands—and perhaps millions—more children learn Jihad at

extremist madrassas instead of learning real-world skills to become

productive citizens in their own communities?

The Pakistani people are treading water during a rising tide of

extremism; a tide that threatens their society and their children’s

futures; a tide that exposes our soldiers in Afghanistan to attack;

and a tide that threatens us here at home to a gathering, new

generational wave of terror.

In recent polling that has taken place, the view of the current

U.S. Government by Pakistanis was viewed 15 percent favorably

and 67 percent unfavorably. They thought that the United States

was seeking to control world events and seeking to weaken and divide Islam and to spread Christianity at the expense of Islam. If

you go on down into the different polling levels, you see the

misperceptions exist in great number.

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As the 9/11 Commission warned in a world of great mobility and

even greater weapons: ‘‘the American homeland is the planet.’’ We

simply must follow the 9/11 Commission’s sage advice to use all the

elements of our power—including military might, of course, but

public diplomacy, intelligence capabilities, and developmental assistance—to ensure that waves of terror never build and never

crash again on our shores. That should be our job that is facing all

of us here today.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding

this hearing, and to our witnesses.

Today the subcommittee examines education reform in Pakistan,

as our chairman has pointed out. On the surface this may seem far

removed from the corners of this subcommittee, but it is not. The

government of Pakistan’s success overriding the persuasion of Islamic extremism in its educational system directly affects national

and international security. But as we go into this inquiry we must

keep in mind the inherent limitations of U.S. policy and U.S. aid

affecting dramatic cultural change.

Education reform in Pakistan takes on two meanings: one,

strengthening of the educational institutions; and, two, having influence over Islamic schools better known as madrassas. Both

Presidents Bush and Musharraf have stated success in eradicating

terror cannot be accomplished without dramatic improvement in

Pakistan’s education system.

The problems affecting public education in Pakistan range from

the lack of qualified teachers to the limited number of school buildings. In some of the less-developed regions, teachers serve as child

minders or sitters, not educators. At the other end of the spectrum,

in the earthquake-ravaged and economically depressed areas, there

are no physical structures to accommodate school-aged children. An

entire generation in Pakistan is suffering from inadequate public

education opportunities. This void and, in some instances, financial

hardship has led some families to send their children to one of the

12,000 tuition-free madrassas in Pakistan. The vast majority of

these madrassas teach the fundamental tenets of Islam, but in

many cases they lack a curriculum for science, math, and English.

A minority of these madrassas are indoctrinating students with

anti-western, pro-Islamic fundamentalist messages. It is these

madrassas and Islamic extremists they beget which pose a serious

threat to regional and international security. This is the life cycle

of the terrorists. The first step is Islamic indoctrination. The next

step is graduation to terror training camps, many of which have

connections with Al Qaeda or Taliban. Next, they move across the

porous Pakistan-Afghan border into Afghanistan to raid Jihad

against Coalition forces.

But that is not the only front for these Jihadists. The products

of terrorist training camps have effected their terror in western

venues, as well. It is known that terrorists responsible for the London underground bombing and the disrupted United Kingdom fertilizer bomb plot had links to or were trained in madrassas and terror training camps in Pakistan.

Which cities and which innocent civilians will be the next victim

of this terrorism?

Pakistan has taken meaningful steps toward educational reform.

After 9/11, President Bush and President Musharraf said education

reform in Pakistan is a key to stemming the rise of Islamist extremism and the rise of global terrorism. President Musharraf is the

first Pakistani leader in recent decades to take an unpopular stand

against schools and the camps used to indoctrinate Pakistani youth

with the principles of Islamist fundamentalism.

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In 2002, President Musharraf laid out a three-prong approach:

one, requiring registration and inspection of these religious facilities; two, excluding foreigners from their religious schools; and,

three, requiring madrassas accept National Education Board testing standards. But these reforms have been difficult to implement,

not only because of a lack of governance capacity and oversight, but

also because of institutional resistance by the religious sector.

Critics say President Musharraf has done nothing to prevent the

proliferation of the madrassas and effect meaningful reform. Other

critics believe President Musharraf has provided lip service to the

meaningful reforms he promised and has bowed to political pressure from Muslim political parties. And still others say Musharraf

will continue to do the bare minimum to ensure continued unrestricted financial support from the United States.

The bottom line is educational reform in Pakistan is happening.

Neither President Musharraf’s success in strengthening the education sector nor the successes of the U.S. Agency for International

Government Lead Projects can or should be overlooked; however,

substantial advancement still lies ahead, and our role as legislators

is to assess this reform honestly, letting the chips fall where they

may, and to determine where the United States must apply pressure to ensure successful and complete reform.

We should not forget we need Pakistan’s help in fighting terrorism. President Musharraf has accepted that mission. While there

are great questions about President Musharraf’s ability to confront

madrassas, we must remain Pakistan’s partner as it struggles to

reform the one sector which assures the advancement and survival

of their society: education.

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely congratulate you and your staff on

holding today’s hearing. It is an opportunity for us to learn from

our esteemed witnesses the status of Pakistan’s education system,

what accomplishments have been achieved, and the prognosis and

path to eliminating the teachings of Islamist intolerance and fundamentalism.

I thank our witnesses for being here today and look forward to

their testimony. I also want to thank the U.S. Embassy in

Islamabad, especially Charge d’Affaires, Peter Bodde, for making

Ms. Ahmed’s video testimony today possible.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

The subcommittee will now receive testimony from the witnesses

that are with us here today. I want to begin by introducing those

witnesses.

Mr. Christopher Kojm is the president of the 9/11 Public Discourse Project and was a Deputy Director of the 9/11 Commission.

Dr. Ahmed, I don’t know if you can see us. I know our technology

was having some bumps earlier, but we really are grateful for you

to join us. It is 9 hours difference in time between here and your

evening schedule over there. We really do appreciate your joining

us via videoconference from Islamabad, Pakistan.

We have Ms. Lisa Curtis, who is a senior research fellow for the

Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation.

And we have Mr. Craig Cohen, who is the deputy chief of staff

and fellow for the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Thank all of you for your work on the subject and for sharing

your expertise today.

It is our policy on the subcommittee to swear in witnesses before

they testify, so we are going to ask you to please rise and raise

your right hands, as well as any persons who might be assisting

you in your testimony and testifying today.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The record will please reflect that the witnesses all

answered in the affirmative, including Dr. Ahmed. Thank you very

much.

We have 5 minutes allotted for each of the statements. Obviously, we are not going to hold you exactly, strictly to the 5-minutes, but we do ask you to generalize your statements. Your statements will be placed in the record by unanimous consent in their

entirety, and we do want to get to questions and answers, so if you

would please proceed on that basis, I think we are going to start

with Mr. Kojm.

STATEMENTS OF CHRISTOPHER KOJM, PRESIDENT OF THE 9/

11 PUBLIC DISCOURSE PROJECT AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 9/

11 COMMISSION; SAMINA AHMED, SOUTH ASIA PROJECT DIRECTOR FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP; LISA

CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, SOUTH ASIA, ASIAN

STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION; AND CRAIG

COHEN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, AND FELLOW, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, AT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER KOJM

Mr. KOJM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Shays, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you this

morning.

I believe I can be brief, because the chairman has been eloquent

in outlining the work of the Commission and the Public Discourse

Project.

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Governor Kaine and Mr. Hamilton have observed that all the

Commission’s recommendations, those relating to education, have

really received the least amount of attention; therefore, they are especially grateful for the work of this subcommittee in shining a

bright light, and they asked me to convey to you their deep appreciation for your leadership, including the leadership of Chairman

Shays in the 109th Congress and the leadership of Chairman

Tierney with the ambitious series of hearings he has outlined for

this Congress.

The chairman has mentioned that the Commission felt strongly

that you cannot use just one tool of American foreign policy; you

need to use all the tools.

Former Secretary Rumsfeld on this point has been especially eloquent. He said 4 years ago, ‘‘Are we capturing, killing, or deterring

and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and

the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against

us?’’ The answer is no. The threat to us today is not great armies,

it is an ideology, the ideology that propelled 19 young men and is

propelling so many others to take their own lives in the desire to

harm us.

It is important to go after Bin Laden and those who support him,

to kill and capture them, but even more important are the tens of

millions of young Arabs, the hundreds of millions of young Muslims

who sympathize with this ideology. They represent in the long term

the true threat to us. They are the wellspring to refresh the doctrine of hate and destruction.

Therefore, the Commission felt strongly that the United States

has to define for itself a positive image in the Islamic world, a message of hope, a message of economic and educational opportunity.

Education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs is a key element in any

global strategy to eliminate Islamic terrorism.

For this reason, as the chairman has outlined, the Commission

made the recommendations it did: three important recommendations on education to combat the threat from terrorism.

Those have been outlined, so I will just speak briefly as to what

has been achieved with respect to them.

On secular education, the Congress, in the December 2004, Intelligence Reform Act, did authorize the creation of an international

youth opportunity fund; however, the President has not requested

funds. Congress has not appropriated funds for such an endeavor.

There are educational efforts underway through the Middle East

Partnership Initiative, the work of USAID, but they simply are not

adequate for the task.

Our country needs a strategy for educational assistance that is

part of our overall foreign policy strategy for this part of the world,

and we need to fund it. We are just not funding it at any level that

is appreciable that can make a difference.

On scholarship, library, and education programs, I think the important point here is that, by and large, we are moving backward.

We are closing posts. We are limiting access. Much of this, of

course, relates to security, but security cannot trump American national interests.

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The most important part of public diplomacy is the last three

feet. In the conversation between our people and the people of host

countries, TV and radio is useful. I don’t want to criticize it. But

what really matters is building human ties and contacts. You can’t

influence people if you don’t meet with them.

And what has happened in our libraries, we have closed them

and we have substituted Web sites, we have substituted so-called

America’s Corners in libraries. That is not good enough. You need

the human contact. Our libraries are not for just books or magazines; it is for building relationships and getting young people interested, many of them, in coming to the United States and developing education and careers.

The hardest thing in public diplomacy is funding scholarship and

exchange programs, because in 1 year you can’t see any impact. In

5 years you can’t see much impact. But in the course of a generation there is nothing more important in public diplomacy than

what we invest in scholarship and exchanges, because you shape

attitudes for a generation, for the leadership of Pakistan and other

countries, that they know the United States, they know how to

work and relate with us, and, as we hit rough patches, as we always will in our relationship, at least we have interlocutors who

have a sensible understanding of what we are trying to achieve,

even if they don’t agree with us.

Finally, the overall judgment of the Commission with respect to

our relationship, Pakistan is important to us. Of course it is. We

must have a relationship with Pakistan. President Musharraf has

done a great deal in terms of apprehending bad guys. On the other

hand, the Commission and the Public Discourse Project noted, as

the chairman has, that there is still so much that needs to be done,

especially along the frontier, in terms of better cooperation.

Turning to madrassas, the Public Discourse Project, frankly, was

disappointed. The rhetoric has been good; the actions have not been

fulfilled with respect to educational reform, either by Pakistani

leaders or by the United States.

Let me just close by saying that Chairman Kaine and Vice Chair

Hamilton understood that we cannot solve the problems of this

part of the world. They are too great and our resources, no matter

how much we bring to bear, can’t address the problem comprehensively. Yet, it is critically important that people in the Arab world,

people across the Islamic world need to know that America is on

their side, that we stand for political participation, personal freedom, rule of law, economic, and, above all, educational opportunity.

Secular education opens doors to a better future. America’s support for education sends a powerful message. It is a message of

hope.

Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to your

questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kojm follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Kojm. I appreciate your remarks.

Now we are going to see if the committee really has the technology down. We are going to go to Dr. Samina Ahmed and ask for

her remarks.

Doctor, please.

STATEMENT OF SAMINA AHMED

Ms. AHMED. Mr. Chairman, vice chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you so very much for this privilege

of testifying on behalf of the International Crisis Group.

My testimony will focus on the state of Islamic radicalism in

Pakistan, because we have to look at the overall picture and then

look at the madrassas in that context.

President Musharraf joined the United States as an ally in the

war on terror. He has been the beneficiary of billions of dollars of

assistance. He has also been the beneficiary of enormous U.S. diplomatic support. But we, the Crisis Group, give him an F grade in

dismantling Jihadi and violent sectarian groups, in regulating the

madrassas that sustain them, which were, after all, key commitments that he had made to the United States as a partner in the

war on terror.

Yes, he has banned a number of Islamic radical groups, but they

are still operating freely with their infrastructure intact, including

those that have been declared terror organizations by the United

Nations and the United States.

The Jihadi madrassas, as the chairman talked about in some detail, are one of our greatest concerns, as well as that of the United

States, with good reason. It is these Jihadi madrassas or these extremist madrassas that provide and train recruits for local, regional, and international Jihads.

The chairman talked about the Red Mosque Complex, which is

in Islamabad, itself. We have seen, since January 2007, the Jihadi

managers of the two madrassas associated with this complex taking on the state, taking on the citizens, launching a reign of terror,

but the government’s response has been to cave in to their demands instead of enforcing rule of law, instead of protecting Pakistani citizens.

The demands that they have caved in, for example, are that the

illegally constructed madrassas on state land will be reconstructed.

These were demolished because of good reason, but caving in to

their demand means that other Jihadi madrassas will now be encouraged, use force, and then the state will cave in.

But the president of the ruling party, Musharraf’s ruling party,

has also said that the government will accept yet another demand,

which is to enforce the [foreign word], Islamic law.

These are not the kinds of signals that should have been sent to

Jihadis who are challenging the right of the state and who are, in

fact, a threat to international security.

Other Jihadi madrassas are also flourishing, and if you talk

about madrassa reform, one of the things you have to remember is

that underpinning any madrassa reform is the legislation. The legislation enacted by this government is imperfect to the extreme. If

you actually look at the legislation, which is an amended act of

1860, it provides no reliable statistics, even on the number of

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madrassas. The government says there is something like 13,800.

Independent observers believe there could be anywhere between

20,000. Even if 10 to 15 percent of these madrassas are extremist

madrassas, we have a serious problem on our hands.

Because of this imperfect nature of the legislation, we don’t know

how many students are in those madrassas. Even more so, it is extremely disconcerting that the religious, the Jihadi, the tiering content of the curriculum has not been addressed in this endeavor to

actually reform the curriculum of the madrassas. Until that is addressed in a meaningful fashion, extremist madrassas will keep on

preaching the Jihad, will keep on indoctrinating young people. The

extremist madrassas are still distributing Jihadi material. They

are still no ways of telling in any meaningful way the means of

funding, the donors of these madrassas, how many foreign students

are there. And even the madrassas that are linked to the banned

Jihadi groups are still flourishing.

There is good reason that the State Department said, as you, Mr.

Chairman, have alluded, that Pakistan is a major source of Islamic

extremism and a safe haven for terrorist leaders, the reason being

that these Jihadi madrassas provide recruits to the extremist organizations, the homegrown terrorist organizations. And, as we have

seen since 2002, these homegrown terrorist organizations, many of

them with links to Al Qaeda, are still flourishing.

There has been no meaningful activity on the part of the government to make sure that these organizations don’t operate under

changed names, don’t operate under fronts. What are the compulsions of the regime? Is it because they don’t have the capacity? It

seems much more so that there isn’t a political will.

Let’s not forget that President Musharraf has a formal alliance

with the Jamaat-i-Islam. This is the pro-Taliban party, the religious party, the largest party in the religious alliance that forms

the government of Balochistan. You talked at Quetta? Well, Quetta

is the provincial capital of Balochistan. The reason for this alliance

relationship is because of regime constraints, because of the need

to reach [foreign word], to marginalize his main civilian opponents,

the moderate parties, the largest moderate parties being the PPP

and the Muslim League that still retain the vast majority of popular support in a country where people are, for the very large part,

moderate Muslims.

There are new opportunities that are now arising, and let’s see

if the United States takes up these opportunities in making sure

that this reform project that has been put on hold is actually given

new life. It is absolutely essential that, as we are in 2007, an election year, that the United States decides—another witness referred

to rule of law and how important that is to the United States. Rule

of law and constitutionalism should be central. A free and fair election and a democratic transition should be central to U.S. policy,

because it is then when the moderate parties will come into their

own. The religious extremists and the extremist madrassas will

face a real challenge.

I am told when I have said this many times before, before members of various branches of the U.S. Government, what then happens? Can a moderate government, democratically elected government control the military, which is essential to any cooperation in

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the war on terror? I think it is absolutely essential that the United

States does not give the military a blank check. There needs to be

now clear benchmarks, benchmarks on reform of the madrassas, including a demand that the Jihadi madrassas must be closed down.

There need to be benchmarks also for a democratic transition and

a clear signal sent that the United States will not accept the military once again intervening to stop a moderate government from

implementing the reforms that would stabilize Pakistan, that could

benefit Afghanistan, and that would work in U.S. national security

interests.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ahmed follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Dr. Ahmed. We appreciate it. We are

most grateful that the technology is working on that, as well.

Ms. Curtis.

STATEMENT OF LISA CURTIS

Ms. CURTIS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, and

members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here

today to discuss U.S. assistance programs to Pakistan’s education

sector and the role of madrassas in contributing to extremism and

militancy.

I will briefly summarize my written statement and ask that my

full statement be included in the hearing record.

Achieving a strong and effective education system in Pakistan is

essential to promoting stability, moderation, and prosperity, and

should be a top priority for Washington in its relations with

Islamabad. Lack of adequate education opportunities in Pakistan

has contributed to development of extremist ideologies that have

fueled terrorism and sectarian tensions, as well as stifled economic

growth.

Pakistan’s public education system has suffered tremendously

over the last several decades. The overall adult literacy rate is

about 43 percent, with the female literacy rate as low as 32 percent. With the population growth rate well over 2 percent, Pakistan

will add about 100 million people to its population over the next

25 years. Pakistan must implement significant education reforms

and raise literacy rates and skill levels so that the Pakistani youth

of today will play a productive role in the future economy.

U.S. assistance to primary education and literacy in Pakistan more than doubled, from $28 million in fiscal year 2004 to $66 million in fiscal year 2005. The impact of the findings of the 9/11 Commission report issued in July 2004, which emphasized the importance of educational opportunity in uprooting terrorist ideology, as

well as increased congressional oversight of USAID programs to

Pakistan contributed to the increase in education spending.

The fiscal year 2008 State Department congressional budget request includes $52 million for general education programs and an

additional $50 million for earthquake reconstruction of schools and

health facilities.

USAID education programs focus on empowering the local community by fostering partnerships between parents and teachers

that improve accountability for the children’s education. I had the

opportunity to visit a USAID-funded school outside of Islamabad in

late 2005. I met the students, teachers, and parents, and saw first

hand the pride they took in their school and their appreciation for

the USAID support. Through a grant of only $1,500, USAID had

helped establish a school for 500 children and built community support for the teachers and the maintenance of the school facilities.

Washington also needs to encourage the Pakistan government to

follow through on its own reforms, including limiting corruption

and inefficiency within the education system.

The Musharraf government launched its education sector reforms

in January 2002, but has yet to fulfill its pledge to raise the education budget to 4 percent of GDP, in line with UNESCO recommendations.

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The United States and other international donors should be careful not to repeat the mistakes made in the World Bank social action program implemented during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Although

billions were spent on this program, it failed to meet basic objectives like increasing school enrollment and bringing education to

remote parts of the country. Some experts believe the program

failed because it did not address the problems of corruption and inefficiency within the Pakistan education bureaucracy.

The role of the madrassa in Pakistan and its contribution to Islamic militancy has been the subject of intense debate in U.S. academic and policy circles. Observers have argued over the actual

numbers of madrassas and madrassa students in Pakistan. Recent

statistics from the government of Pakistan indicate there may be

around 12,000 madrassas and between 1.5 to 2 million madrassa

students; however, the number of madrassas is not particularly relevant to assessing their link to terrorism. Many of the older

madrassas have well-established reputations for producing serious

Islamic thinkers, while others provide welfare services to the poor

through free religious education, lodging, and food.

Most madrassas in Pakistan are not turning out terrorist foot

soldiers; however, there are a handful of seminaries that do promote anti-west, pan-Islamic, and violent ideologies, and it is on

these few madrassas where U.S. policymakers and the Pakistan

authorities should focus their attention. Some of these dangerous

madrassas are in the Northwest Frontier Province, including the

semi-autonomous areas bordering Afghanistan. Some are in southern Punjab, and others are in major cities like Lahore, Islamabad,

and Karachi.

Some of these madrassas have contributed to sectarian tensions

in Pakistan, while others have close institutional links with the

Taliban. The recently jailed leader of a fertilizer bomb plot in England, Omar Khyam, was reportedly inspired and trained by Pakistan-based terrorists connected with the Kashmir militancy. In addition, one of the suicide bombers that carried out the July 7, 2005,

bombings of the London transport system reportedly spent time at

a Pakistani madrassa.

Washington should press Pakistan to crack down on those

madrassas that continue to promote extremism and sectarian policies that lead to terrorism and destabilization of Pakistani society.

The Pakistani authorities should be encouraged to clean house and

any madrassa found to have links to international terrorist incidents. Islamabad should also make clear that individuals who provide protection or safe haven to Al Qaeda or like-minded terrorist

groups will be held to account.

We have to use skillful diplomacy to persuade the Pakistan government to shut down completely all militant groups and to reform

or close down those madrassas promoting violence and extremism.

After 9/11, Pakistan did a 45-degree turn in ending official support

to the Taliban. In early 2004, Pakistan did another 45-degree turn

in sending troops to Wazirastan to combat Al Qaeda and Taliban

elements there. However, now we need the government to complete

the turn and end the permissive environment for all militant

groups, including those that operate in Kashmir.

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The United States should avoid, however, getting involved in

Pakistan’s broader madrassa reform efforts and accept that many

of the traditional madrassas serve a useful purpose in educating Islamic intellectuals and providing shelter and food for impoverished

youth. While a few Pakistani madrassas represent an international

terrorist threat and deserve American scrutiny, most madrassas do

not pose a threat.

The United States should also program more funds for specific

education and development projects, rather than continue to provide the bulk of our economic assistance in the form of a direct

cash transfer to the Pakistan government. Since 2004, the United

States has provided $200 million annually to Pakistan in the form

of direct budgetary support. We have established a consulting

mechanism with Pakistan to try to ensure a portion of this money

is spent on health and education; however, we cannot fully ensure

that the U.S. taxpayer money is contributing to economic and

human development in Pakistan.

The United States also reaps little public diplomacy benefits with

the broader Pakistani population from this type of direct aid, which

most Pakistanis view as benefiting the Musharraf regime, not the

average Pakistani citizen.

The U.S. Congress should require that at least two-thirds of our

total economic support fund [ESF], assistance be in the form of

USAID project assistance related to education, health, and economic and democratic development.

To conclude, the development of a strong and effective education

system is central to promoting moderation, tolerance, and economic

development in Pakistan, and should, therefore, be a key plank in

our relationship with Islamabad. Convincing the Pakistani government to take firm action against the handful of madrassas supporting violent extremism also is necessary, not only for the future stability of Pakistan, but to prevent future incidents of international

terrorism.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ms. Curtis.

Mr. Cohen.

STATEMENT OF CRAIG COHEN

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, I want to thank

you and your distinguished colleagues for the opportunity to testify

before you today. It is with great humility that I do so.

I am here because I am leading a CSIS study with Rick Barton

on U.S. assistance to Pakistan since 9/11. It is a study about the

U.S. Government approach to large aid recipients like Pakistan.

We spent the last year asking experts here in the United States

and in Pakistan: What are U.S. goals? Is there a coherent strategy?

How much are we spending, and on what? And what has been the

impact of our aid?

We have a report that is due out later this week, and with your

permission we would like to submit it for the record.

Mr. TIERNEY. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. COHEN. The conclusion we reached from these conversations

is that the current U.S. Pakistan relationship is the legacy of a

deal made after 9/11: U.S. assistance in return for Pakistan cooperation on counter-terrorism and the war in Afghanistan. This

may well have been the right deal to make after 9/11, but it has

run its course.

There are three main reasons why this is so.

First, we have put all our eggs in one basket, and that basket

may well be breaking. Musharraf’s position is quickly weakening,

and recent protests may signal the beginning of his political end.

Second, by most accounts, Pakistan is failing to deliver on the

key U.S. foreign policy goal, denying Taliban safe haven on the

western border. U.S. soldiers are dying in Afghanistan, and the reconstruction project is under threat due to these cross-border raids.

Third, we are not doing enough to help shape the Pakistan that

will emerge 10 to 20 years down the road. By 2030, Pakistan will

have 250 million people. It will be the largest Muslim population

in the world, and more than half of this population will be below

the age of 18.

There have been some genuine gains in the last 5 years of cooperation on intelligence, on economic growth, on a throng of relations with India, but too many in Washington and Pakistan still

see this as an alliance of convenience.

Our current assistance package has reinforced this notion that

America stands primarily behind Musharraf and the Pakistani

military rather than the Pakistani people.

Our research has shown that the United States has provided

Pakistan with over $10 billion worth of military, economic, and development assistance in the past 6 years since 9/11. The majority

of this money, close to 60 percent, has gone toward reimbursing the

Pakistani military for its assistance in the war on terror through

Coalition support funds.

Roughly 15 percent has gone to security assistance. The vast majority of this money has gone to purchase major U.S. weapons systems which are better suited for military confrontation with India,

rather than against Al Qaeda or the Taliban.

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Another 15 percent has gone to direct budget support, a cash

transfer to the government of Pakistan, based on loosely worded

shared objectives with few real accountability mechanisms built in.

This leaves about 10 percent for long-term development and

short-term humanitarian assistance, including our response to the

October 2005, earthquake. Education, which the 9/11 Commission

rightly said was critical to making a long-term commitment to

Pakistan, comes in at only 3.4 percent of total U.S. spending. We

encourage the government of Pakistan to spend 4 percent of its

GDP on education, but we don’t even do this with our own aid.

The United States is spending $64 million a year for over 30 to 50 million school-aged children in Pakistan. That is a little over $1

to $2 per child per year.

U.S. objectives far outstrip our means of achieving them in Pakistan. We all know the scale of the problem, and we have heard it

here today: women’s literacy under 30 percent, school enrollment

under 30 percent, teachers who lack skills and incentives and fail

to show up for work, more Pakistanis avoiding public schools and

being drawn to madrassas.

Let me close by making three recommendations. First, let’s become the country that provides opportunity for young Pakistanis

rather than a country that is at war with Islam, which is how we

are perceived today. We can’t sacrifice our short-term security, but

our long-term security may well depend on such a shift.

Second, education reform requires governance reform. The dominant view is that the Pakistani military is the only effective institution in the country, but rather than reinforce this through our

assistance we should be supporting the long-term civilian institution building and democratic processes.

Finally, rather than trying to gain leverage by conditioning aid,

which is unlikely to work, Congress ought to take a harder look at

what we are spending now in Pakistan and consider a different mix

of assistance and greater accountability mechanisms. We need to

trust, but we also need to verify.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Cohen, and thank all of the witnesses for their thoughtful testimony, as well as their reports.

We are going to get to our question and answer period here. With

everybody’s indulgence, I am going to start with a couple of questions.

Dr. Ahmed, I noted the last thing that Mr. Cohen mentioned is

that education reform requires government reform, as well. In your

testimony you said, ‘‘The choice that Pakistan faces is not between

the military and the mullahs, as is generally believed in the west,

including the United States; it is between genuine democracy and

a mullah military alliance that is responsible for the religious extremism that poses a threat to Pakistani, regional, and international security.’’ Would you elaborate on that for us, especially

with respect to our policy and what it should be coming up with

the elections due in the fall.

Ms. AHMED. It is, I think, going to be the most crucial issue there

is in terms of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, because this opportunity

is here now. It is not going to last forever.

In 2007 you have an election approaching, in fact, two elections

approaching, one for the presidency, President Musharraf’s reelection bid; the second for the national parliament that will actually

form a government if these elections are free and fair by going by

all electoral records. If you actually look at the entire history of

Pakistan, the mullahs on their own have never managed to get

more than perhaps 5 percent of the vote. The first time they have

actually managed to get more than that and to form two of the

state governments of Pakistan was under General Musharraf. In

2002 a rigged election allowed the mullahs the advantages of state

support, deprived the moderate parties and marginalized them in

the process of an even playing field, and, again, through a bargaining process between the military and the mullahs, you saw the

mullahs taking over even the position of leader of the opposition,

which is the government awaiting in a parliamentary system in the

Federal parliament.

This happened because of the military support and because of

Musharraf said basically it was a necessity to sideline and to

marginalize his main civilian opposition.

Despite the rigged election, you saw the two moderate parties,

the Pakistan People’s Party and Muslim Icnavas, gaining the largest segment of the popular ward. The Muslim Icnavas came in a

fairly respectable third or fourth.

If there was an even playing field, then I think we would see the

outcome of the 2002 election reversed. The mullahs would lose.

They would shrink back to their 5 percent. The moderate parties,

one of the two, a center left party, a center right party, would form

a government. For that, however, if the military intends to retain

power, it will have to rely on the mullahs. They are the only reliable civilian partners, given the fact that the opposition comes from

the largest moderate parties.

In a rigged election what would we see? This is why I say this

is a crucial year. The JUI, the party that is, was in some ways the

creation of the Taliban, which remains a greater supporter of the

Taliban, and which is still a party that has the largest network of

the madrassas that produce the Taliban recruits coming back into

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power with the military support in those two crucial provinces that

were mentioned, Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province.

If we actually see what has happened in Afghanistan and where

the threat comes from, it comes from recruits in these two provinces. It comes from Taliban command and control structures in

these provinces. It comes from, in actual fact, state support because

of the provincial governments, the state governments are providing

support to the Taliban, then it means the Pakistani state is.

With a democratic transition, you would see that change, but for

the first step to a democratic transition obviously has to be a free

and fair election.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much for that answer.

The other panelists I would like to ask, I hear very clearly that,

obviously, the fact that somebody has a madrassa doesn’t mean

that it is a Jihadist or extremist madrassa, that as much as we

have religious schools in this country, whether they be Catholic or

protestant or Jewish or whatever they might be, that exists in

Pakistan, but sometimes those schools may not teach secular

courses to the extent they should, and some—too many, I would

argue—are probably teaching extremism on that.

How would we condition our aid? Mr. Cohen, you mentioned at

the end that you wouldn’t necessarily put conditions on the money

that we do send as aid to Pakistan, but you said something about

not conditioning it but allocating it differently, and, Ms. Curtis, you

also mentioned that. Would each of you address how you think the

United States ought to change its aid package? If not conditioning

the money that goes to the Pakistani government, how would we

distribute it?

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. I think this is an important point that really

the terrorist problem, the extremism problem is coming from a

handful of madrassas in Pakistan. This goes at the issue of the

U.S. needing to demonstrate clearly that our fight against global

terrorism is for protection of international security and it is not a

fight against Islam as a religion. So, in particular, when we are

talking about madrassas in Pakistan I think it is very important

for us to be clear that we are not against, obviously, religious education and schools that promote Islamic thought, etc.

I think this is really key, and that is why I had raised in my testimony the importance of really honing in on those madrassas that

are feeding the militant groups. They have an interdependent relationship with the militant groups. The militant groups draw recruits from these particular madrassas and the madrassas, in turn,

receive armed protection from the militant groups. So it is these

few madrassas that we need to be focusing our efforts on.

In terms of our aid programs, as I mentioned in my oral re- marks, I think we should really look seriously at this $200 million

direct cash transfer that we have been delivering to the Pakistanis

over the last several years and look at that and determine whether

we can projectize more of that assistance so it is more under U.S.

control in terms of what we are doing to help in education, democracy, health, and all of those issues.

So those are the issues that we need to be looking at.

And then, in terms of shutting down those madrassas that are

dangerous, of course, we are working with, you know, the

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Musharraf government, and he has his own struggles within his

own government and within the Pakistani establishment, itself, I

think there is still debate on how much they are interested in

cracking down, particularly in groups they have supported in the

past in the Kashmir militancy. So that is the key problem.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Cohen, I am going to give you a chance, with the indulgence

of the committee members, but, just very quickly, I think it might

be helpful to the committee, is everybody on the panel in agreement that there are a handful of madrassas that might be extremists? Dr. Ahmed.

Ms. AHMED. I wouldn’t say that 10 to 15 percent, which is what

we were told by the authorities that should know about the subject

in Pakistan. When we did our madrassa reports, 10 to 15 percent

of maybe 20,000 madrassas is not a handful.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Mr. Kojm, what is your understanding

of that?

Mr. KOJM. Well, I think the witness who has just testified, she

has the most up-to-date information on it, and I am in no position

to state otherwise. I would simply make the observation from the

Commission that in the ideal world there would be secular education that could reach most, if not all, the population. That can’t

be done, so you have to prioritize the problems you address, and

so it has to be those madrassas that are truly identified as those

that contribute to extremism and you have just got to go at them

one after another. My impression is that it certainly does not exceed what has already been mentioned.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

And Mr. Cohen?

Mr. COHEN. I don’t have information that contradicts what Ms.

Ahmed said.

I could speak to your aid question, if you would like.

Mr. TIERNEY. My apology to you. It has to be brief, if you would,

just how the distribution would go.

Mr. COHEN. OK. I think on the distribution you need a better

balance between short and long-term and between what goes to the

state and what actually reaches the people of Pakistan.

Mr. TIERNEY. Directly more than through the state?

Mr. COHEN. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. All right. Thank you.

I thank the members of the panel for their indulgence on that.

Mr. McHenry.

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I begin my questions, I want to thank the chairman for

leading a co-del to Pakistan and Afghanistan before Easter, and,

along with my colleague from Minnesota, Ms. McCollum, it was a

very good trip, very well put together, and it was a very good bipartisan trip. We met with Dr. Ahmed there, which was an absolutely

fascinating discussion, and thank you for your time.

I also want to thank the chairman for putting together that trip,

and very, very sincerely I thank you for your hard work on this.

The fruits of that trip are here today.

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I want to commend your staff, as well, Andy Wright on your

staff, and on the minority staff A. Brooke Bennett, for their work.

Thank you.

Dr. Ahmed, you mention in your statement that there is a link

that the madrassas and the Jihadist groups depend on each other

in some way, shape, or form. Can you expand on that? I think it

is a very important point.

Ms. AHMED. Thank you.

The reason why we stress the need to tackle the issue of Islamic

extremist madrassas is just that: the recruitment for the homegrown terror groups comes from, the recruits come from these

madrassas. The indoctrination process takes place in these

madrassas.

Just think of what these children are being taught. They are

being taught Jihad is acceptable. They are being taught, even as

the chairman mentioned the madrassa of the Red Mosque complex,

that an anti-western Jihad in Afghanistan is what you should be

striving for. You have the managers of these madrassas indoctrinating these young people to actually go out and join the terror

groups.

But then what you also have is a nexus between these terror

groups, which are homegrown terrorists, with cross-national terror

organizations, which is Al Qaeda, or regional terror groups, such as

the Taliban.

So there is then an organized input from the madrassas systematically turning out Jihadis from the Jihadi madrassas, of course,

to the homegrown terror groups, to the Taliban, and also to terror

organizations within Pakistan that are affiliated with Al Qaeda or

believe in Al Qaeda’s ideology.

Mr. MCHENRY. Dr. Ahmed, could you, as a followup to this, is

our current policy, the U.S. current policy toward Pakistan in our

long-term best interest?

Ms. AHMED. The United States has to decide at this point in time

what does it want to see Pakistan become another 5 years from

now or 10 years from now. Pakistan can only become what the

United States would, I think, want to see—a democratic, moderate

country—if the democratic process is allowed to proceed now, if

there is a democratic transition now.

If you have another 5 years of indirect or direct military rule,

then I think you will see the moderate forces in Pakistan

marginalized to the extent that they will find it difficult to make

a comeback.

What we have seen, Congressman, in the past 2 weeks is something that I think should be encouraging for the United States:

Pakistani citizens, civil society, political parties, NGO’s rising up to

talk and defend rule of law, to defend what they see as the central

integral element to a democratic framework, which is independence

of the judiciary. That is the vast majority, and I think U.S. policy

should shape itself to engage with that process.

Short-term benefits, which certainly the United States to some

extent has out of its engagement with this government, don’t translate into long-term benefits for the United States so long as you

still have these dynamics at work, which is the moderate majority

sidelined and the extremists benefiting from military rule.

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Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Ahmed.

Ms. Curtis and Mr. Cohen, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, along with

Pakistan, are the only countries in the world that receive a direct

budget support from us, and it is almost a check for them to do

whatever they would like with it, as you mentioned in your testimony, Mr. Cohen. What is your suggestion to this committee on

how the United States can apply pressure to Pakistan under this

arrangement? I mean, you mentioned 3.4 percent of our support

goes to education. Give me some recommendations. Flesh that out

for us on how we can use what we have at our disposal to, in essence, push aside madrassas and not make them a central part of

society.

Mr. COHEN. My view is that it has to start with a more honest

dialog, that there is a mechanism in place for a strategic dialog but

it hasn’t been taken advantage of to the extent possible. I think

that if we are more honest with what we are looking for, I think

what happens now, what we have heard from many, many experts

here in town and in Pakistan is that different parts of the U.S.

Government have different priorities. Some may be most interested

in the Taliban. Some may be most interested in Al Qaeda. Others

might be pushing for democracy. I think this sends mixed messages, to some extent, and there is not a clear strategy for what

it is we are looking for in return. So I think it has to start there.

I think Ms. Curtis’ idea of trying to shift the money that goes to

budget support to education is a good idea. I think getting better

accountability, both for the Coalition support funds and for the

budget support—at present the Pentagon’s Comptroller’s office has

oversight of the Coalition support funds, and the Government,

OMB, as well, does oversight of the economic support funds. But

I think Congress could play a greater role here, as well.

Mr. MCHENRY. Ms. Curtis, could you just finish out? And thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. Just to repeat, I have a fairly clear recommendation for the Congress to require that a portion of that direct budgetary assistance not be provided directly but be

projectized, so that would require changing the makeup of the aid

budget, but I think this falls under congressional authority.

I think one of the problems—and Mr. Cohen mentioned it—is

about transparency in our relationship with Pakistan. This is a difficult issue. We are cooperating with Pakistan at different levels,

counter-terrorism. President Musharraf is under some pressure. He

receives a lot of criticism from the Pakistani population for being

seen as an American lapdog and for cooperating too much with us.

So it is a difficult issue, but, to the extent that the transparency

on what we are actually doing with Pakistan and why the aid is

so important I think would be very helpful, if some of this transparency could be brought to the surface.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. McHenry.

Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

There is so much to try to cover here in 5 minutes, especially

having had the opportunity, as it was pointed out by both Chairman Tierney leading the delegation, I found Pakistan a wonderful

55

country, beautiful, industrious people, and full of energy, and really

wanting to move forward in a very positive way. But there are

some challenges, as has been pointed out, and I don’t know that

the United States is doing its best and trying to put its best foot

forward in the way that we are working with Pakistan to address

these challenges.

I am going to lure a few things out and leave it open to a discussion, maybe starting with the good doctor.

From the limited reading I did, and listening to people, it is my

understanding that, if we had public schools that were well

equipped, with teachers, and parents felt confident that their children were going to receive a good education there, the madrassas

might be facing some competition. Competition for the madrassas,

the ones that still function in a way that do not preach hate and

violence between people in other parts of the world, those

madrassas would start competing to keep their students by offering

more math, more science, more history, more of a balanced curriculum. So that would be one thing I would like to maybe hear some

speculation on.

We know that there is a youth bulge, so it would seem to me that

if we are really about peace and stability for the long haul for the

region, for the world, for ourselves, we wouldn’t be putting a drop

in the bucket toward reaching the future leaders and the future

leaders’ parents in that part of the world. We wouldn’t be just putting 10 percent into supporting families, communities which lead

to a healthier nation.

So I would like maybe discussion on that.

The issue—and it has been touched on quite a bit—of Presidentto-President support, rather than people-to-people, country-to-country, family to-family support, is very alarming and it doesn’t speak

to we are really going to be there for the long term to work in partnership.

One of the things that I heard—and maybe the doctor could tell

me if I heard this right—from people is they were fearful that the

United States was going to walk away. I don’t think they were

fearful that the United States was going to walk away from not

supplying the military. Maybe the military is concerned about it,

the military guns and weapons, but that the United States wasn’t

going to be there to be partners in what I felt from them their desire to be more economically successful, to have more opportunities

for education, more opportunities for engagement with the world.

So, with this, I am going to, especially to our U.S. testifiers, with

what is going on currently with the State Department, with the realignment with USAID, with more focus on targeted specific Presidential programs—and some of them I support, like Pat Barr—are

we showing a commitment to our partners that we are going to be

there as the youth bulge rose for a more sustainable, peaceful, coexistent world that starts person-to-person?

With that, Mr. Chair, I would just like people to jump in as they

can, maybe starting with our good friend in Pakistan.

Ms. AHMED. Thank you, ma’am.

What you said was, I think, very, very important. I think being

a functioning public school system that provided people the kinds

of skills that would give them employment at the job market, had

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the state supported that, the madrassas wouldn’t have been not

even a third choice. Most of these madrassas would have literally

withered on the vine.

We have said, Crisis Group has said repeatedly in all our reports—and we have done a report on public education, and we

found abysmal conditions there. But, more than that, its actually

not just the issue of ghost schools, in many areas there were no

schools at all. What could parents do? The madrassas is a social

net. We should justify that goal. It is the responsibility of the state.

By the way, it is the constitutional duty of the Pakistani state to

provide education to its children.

For the state to abdicate its duty and its responsibility to its

child to the madrassas sector and then say, you know, it plays a

social function, etc.

The fact is that what we found in our research, most parents

would prefer to send their children to a public school which is affordable and provides a good education. We have also for that reason strongly stressed that international dollars and, in particular,

the United States should not fund madrassa reform. It is absolutely essential they don’t get into the business of actually financing the madrassa sector.

The United States should focus its attention on the form of the

public education sector because that would pay dividends to the

Pakistani child and to the United States.

In terms of the engagement between societies, American society

and Pakistani society, unfortunately I would have to agree with

you. There is deep concern amongst a number of Pakistanis in civil

society that once the war on terror loses its importance for the

United States the military won’t be important, so it will also disengage from Pakistani civil society.

I think that is where that commitment needs to be made now

and the message that should be a clear one: that the United States

is there for the long haul for the right reasons, which is to

strengthen that partnership between peoples in the interest of the

United States and the Pakistani people and, frankly speaking, of

the global community.

Thank you.

Mr. KOJM. In response to Representative McCollum’s comments

and Dr. Ahmed’s, I think all I can say is that the members of the

9/11 Commission would agree wholeheartedly and completely with

your key observation about building a long-term relationship with

the people of Pakistan. That is where America’s national interests

are and will be for the next generation. Yes, a relationship with the

president is important. The Commission doesn’t gainsay that. But

our national interests are with the long-term relationship.

Ms. CURTIS. I had some further comments to Congresswoman

McCollum’s comments, as well.

I think you are absolutely right that we are dealing with a trust

deficit here, because of the cutoff of assistance in 1990 and the fact

that the U.S. turned its back on Pakistan and Afghanistan after

the Soviets left Afghanistan. I think we still deal with that mistrust among the Pakistani people. It is very deep-rooted. That is

why I think it is dangerous when we talk about cutting assistance

or even conditioning assistance, as has been raised in H.R. 1 in legVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Aug 16, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\37093.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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islation before this body. I think we have to really think twice

about going down this path, because we do risk losing support from

the broader Pakistani population for the overall U.S.-Pakistan relationship. That is why I have talked about, rather than cutting or

conditioning, looking at how we allocate the assistance and, instead

of taking away, just ensuring that there is more of a people-to-people feel to the assistance and more of an American touch at the

grassroots of society.

And the second point I wanted to make, I think the Pakistan

government has realized the need to expand the curriculum in the

madrassas. Before 9/11, in August 2001 the Musharraf government

promulgated the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board, an ordinance of 2001, and tried to establish three model madrassa institutions in three different cities, which would include English, math,

and other subject areas. So there is a recognition within the Pakistan government about this problem of having too narrow of a focus

within some of the madrassas, but they have just not been able to

get the steam behind the efforts. There has been resistance from

the madrassas, from the religious parties, and the government has

not taken those entrenched interests on as of yet.

The third point I wanted to make is getting back to this question

of whether it is a handful. Sir, I don’t know the exact numbers of

Pakistani madrassas that are teaching terrorist hatred ideology.

My point is to say let’s not throw out the baby with the bath water.

Let’s not further alienate the Pakistani population or send out a

signal that somehow our fight against terrorism is against the religion of Islam, because certainly it is not, and we have to be very

careful when we deal with these sensitive religious issues. So that

was my point.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. I thank you for that, and your point is well taken.

I don’t think it is missed by anybody up here. Handful means different things to different people, and I think we have to get an idea

of what the scope of the issue is and then deal with it in the context which you set forth. I think you are right on that.

Mr. Cohen, I am not going to give you an opportunity unless you

have something entirely compelling to say that can’t be missed.

Mr. COHEN. You can go ahead, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your attention to this issue.

As a followup to Mr. McHenry’s question, Ms. Curtis, you just

kind of referenced it about throwing the baby out with the bath

water. With the direct funding, the last 4 years I chaired a different subcommittee of the Oversight and Government Reform

Committee dealing with financial management, and very much focused on internal controls and accountability, how we spend the

taxpayer funds.

Given the amount of money we are giving Pakistan and appreciate the importance of better, greater transparency and better accountability with that, what impact do you think it will have on

our relations with Pakistan if we start putting more strings on that

money? And then I guess in the past we withdrew some funding

58

because of their nuclear pursuit and the consequences then, that

in doing what normally would be the right thing, more accountability, controls on that money, that could result in, you know, worsening our relationship, which ultimately hurt us in the war on terror.

Ms. CURTIS. Yes, I think this is a sensitive issue. Obviously we

want U.S. taxpayer money to be, you know, spent efficiently and

to meet our objectives that we have with our international security

policies with Pakistan, and weighing that with the idea that we do

have this historical relationship of having withdrawn a huge aid

program. We had thousands of USAID workers throughout the

1980’s serving in Pakistan, building up goodwill between the

United States and Pakistani people, and when we withdrew our aid

program we lost all that. So we need to pay attention to that history and realize that when we talk about conditioning or cutting

assistance we are touching on some very raw nerves. But at the

same time, obviously we need to encourage transparency, we need

to make sure that our assistance is reaching the people, that the

people of Pakistan know that it is U.S. assistance and that they

don’t see that we are just trying to prop up the government or provide a payoff, so to speak.

Mr. PLATTS. For you or for all the panelists, how confident are

you today that the money is reaching the intended purpose, or, you

know, achieving intended purpose and not being funneled to somebody’s pocket, you know, given the current level of transparency?

Ms. CURTIS. Well, it is difficult to say. I think the problem is not

so much the money that is programmed is not having an impact,

because I think that it is. I haven’t probably visited as many

schools as Dr. Ahmed, but, you know, I have seen some of the program in action, so I think that is not the real question. I think the

question is: is there enough going to the assistance? As Mr. Cohen

pointed out, only 3.4 percent or something of our total assistance

to Pakistan is going toward education, which is actually lower than

what we are asking the Pakistani government to commit as a percentage of their GDP to education.

So I think the assistance that is programmed, the USAID assistance that is programmed, which, as I indicated, about $50 million

is being requested for the education sector in this budget, I think

that is probably making a difference, but the question is: is it

enough, or do we need to be increasing that level?

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you. Do any of the other panelists want to

comment?

Mr. COHEN. I would just agree with Ms. Curtis and say that you

can have 1,000 successful projects but it could add up to one collective failure.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Ahmed, I thought I heard you trying to kick

in, as well.

Ms. AHMED. Yes. I would actually like to follow this up because

I think it is a very important issue. It is not just the U.S. taxpayers’ money, but you do want to make sure that it is used in a

way that will have the most impact on Pakistani public opinion, as

much as on the government’s own interest. It is that balance which

is the problem issue, not just the issue of transparency and accountability, which I think is absolutely essential, as well. Every

cent that is spent in Pakistan is badly needed, whether it is needed

59

for health or any other sort of sector. But there is an imbalance between the economic and the military. That was one of the issues

touched upon.

I would also like to say here that I think I disagree with this

issue of conditionalities. Without any conditionalities, without any

strings there is no accountability of assistance given.

In the Pakistani context, it is now one of the largest recipients

of U.S. military assistance, for example, not just economic but also

military assistance. If there are no conditionalities, if H.R. 1 language is thrown away because it is considered as well a signal sent

that might not be well received, the signal won’t be sent at all. I

think that is part of the problem that the United States had in engaging with this particular government. In the past, unfortunately,

and Lisa pointed that out, it was economic assistance cut. That was

not the thing to do. It should never have been done in that manner.

But certainly at this point in time if there are no conditionalities

put at all on assistance, in particular military assistance, then

there is no signal sent that the United States really does want to

see that kind of reform on the ground.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Platts.

Mr. Welch.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cohen, I just want to try to summarize to see if I understand

this.

First of all, on these madrassas—and, Ms. Curtis, you, too—there

is a question of whether there is foot dragging by the Musharraf

government or political weakness, so that even if they wanted to

do something could they. I mean, what is your conclusion, each of

you, on that?

Mr. COHEN. I think that what we are seeing is the Pakistani government employs a hedging strategy, essentially, where he is a

friend but he is a friend with a lot of problems at home and there

are a lot of stakeholders in his government that he has to cater to.

Mr. WELCH. Right, but the reason I asked this question is this:

if it is foot dragging, then obviously more pressure from Washington may be advisable; if it is political weakness, then it will be

counterproductive. We have to have some of our own evaluation of

which it is. Which do you think it is?

Mr. COHEN. I mean, it has been 5 years and, despite the rhetoric,

he hasn’t taken any action that he said he had, so——

Mr. WELCH. OK. Ms. Curtis.

Ms. CURTIS. Sir, you may not like the answer, but I think it is

a little bit of both. I think you are looking at a situation where it

is really a strategic decision. As I mentioned in my oral remarks,

we saw a 45-degree change after 9/11. Pakistan ended its official

support to the Taliban. We saw another 45-degree change in 2004

when the Pakistan military spent troops up to fight in Waziristan.

But we need the full turn. We need a complete crackdown on all

militant groups, including those who have fought militancy in

Kashmir, including the Taliban. And we have not gotten there yet,

and there are many challenges to getting there. But I think President Musharraf deserves our support. He has shown himself to be

an ally in the war on terrorism and we need to continue to work

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within that framework. But certainly I think skillful diplomacy,

carrots, sticks—I think in the past we have not been as willing to

use the sticks as perhaps we should have been, and that could be

something that we could sharpen our diplomacy a bit on.

Mr. WELCH. Well, you know, I don’t know what that means specifically. I mean, what would that mean the Secretary of State did

tomorrow? But let me just ask, if I understand it, if there is some

consensus. Right now our aid is about $10 billion. My understanding is that about 75 percent of that is military, direct military, $6

billion, and about $15 billion is for other security interests and the

sales of weapons systems. Is it the general view that you have that

may be upside-down or that it has to be supplemented so that we

are actually trying to build or help build an educational infrastructure, No. 1, and, No. 2, move aggressively into regional trade stability and promote trade and not just leave that to China?

Mr. COHEN. That is my view, sir. I mean, we are referred to often

as a fair weather friend, China as an all weather friend. China has

had 22 trade deals with Pakistan in 2005.

Mr. WELCH. OK. Mr. Kojm, how about you?

Mr. KOJM. I would agree with your observation. We need balance. We don’t have balance. There is severe imbalance in the nature of our assistance. We need a broader relationship that must

include the economic components.

Mr. WELCH. All right. Doctor, how about you?

Ms. AHMED. It is that imbalance that really in some ways is adversely affecting American perceptions in Pakistan. Most people

here see the assistance coming but they see it go directly to the

military.

Mr. WELCH. Right.

Ms. AHMED. The impact on the ground, and those figures were

given in comparative terms per citizen per year, how much of it is

effective enough. Trade, absolutely. I think that is a very important

relationship that has been neglected and perhaps should be focused

on.

But again let me say this: it doesn’t matter how much the balance is changed, it does matter who it goes to. If it goes to President Musharraf not to the Pakistani people, it is not going to have

an impact.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

I yield my time.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Welch.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. In 5 minutes I would like to accomplish three tasks.

One, I would like to share my concern about national security. My

sense is that a greater U.S. presence in Pakistan is not one that

would be appreciated and that, because of a lack of real law and

order, our folks are at risk.

Another issue I want to get to is, Dr. Ahmed, you are basically

responsible for my view that, whereas I thought Musharraf was

trying to push people and the government away from being religious, that he actually overthrew a non-religious government. At

least that was my interpretation of what you had said to me before.

I would like to speak about that. I would like all of you to comment.

61

And my third concern relates to religious freedom. I find it somewhat ironic that, you know, in our country where we have religious

freedom we are telling them in their schools and so on what they

can teach and so on. I mean, I realize why, but it seems to me that

it would be highly offensive to them to say you stay out of our culture and you stay out of what we teach in our church schools and

so on.

So if you could talk to security, if you could tell me why I should

like Musharraf and want to see him stay and want to prop him up,

and if you could speak to the issue of security.

We will start with you, Dr. Ahmed.

Ms. AHMED. Thank you, sir.

Starting off with the issue of security, you are absolutely right,

it is very difficult right now, given the circumstances, for American

nationals to walk outside a few cities. You know, it is really important to remember this: that in 1999, when the coup took place,

there were no such constraints. U.S. nationals could travel freely,

work anywhere. Why is it that since October 1999, the coup, and

now that we have seen the internal security situation change from

a country that was moderate to a country where there are major

extremist threats, major terror threats, and that under a government that claims to have effectively taken every possible action it

can in the war on terror, which leads me to your second question,

which is that did the military overthrow a non-religious government.

It overthrew not just a government that was cooperating with

the United States in the war on terror. In fact, this was a government that actually agreed to let the United States target Osama

Bin Laden. It had also taken action against sectarian terror groups,

not because of the United States saying so but because it thought

in its own interest. Was it a secular government in the American

sense of the term? I don’t think it was. It was moderate. It is a center right party. It is socially conservative.

But here’s the thing: it was an elected government. It had support and it could take those political risks. A military government

depending on the mullahs can’t.

That takes me to your third question, which is: how do you actually restructure this relationship, as well as look at the cultural

sensitivities of the people? Let me tell you, sir, that there are laws

in Pakistan against hate speech. Those laws are not applied. What

the extremist Madrassas preach is something which is against the

law of the land. It is not something that the United States needs

to tell Pakistan to do. All the Pakistan government needs to do is

apply its own laws. Jihad, violence, sectarian hatred—these folks

are breaking the law every day.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. Why don’t we go right down

the line here as quick as we can, and maybe you can just pick one

or two of those questions.

Mr. KOJM. I will just pick two here. The focus of the Commission’s work really has been on secular education, creating secular

educational alternatives, and did not speak to reform of madrassas

in any detail except to stop the violence.

Now, in terms of the future leadership of Pakistan, the Commission spoke about enlightened moderation. These are the words of

62

the president, President Musharraf. In the Commission’s understanding of that, that means free, fair, and open elections. That is

the stated policy of the United States. That is what the Commission believes. That is what the Government of the United States

in the coming year should act upon and carry out.

Ms. CURTIS. I think we have seen, through the recent demonstrations over the dismissal of the Supreme Court Justice that there

is definitely a hunger for democracy, more democracy in Pakistan.

I commend to you a recent IRI poll which shows that the PPP, the

Pakistan People’s Party, commands more grassroots support than

any other political party in the country, contrary to the belief or

thought here that perhaps a free and fair election might bring the

religious parties to power. I think that if you just look at the grassroots support numbers, the mainstream secular PPP still commands the most grassroots support.

So it seems to me there has to be a transition back to democracy,

and this may take some time but the United States needs to be encouraging in this process. Given some of the recent threats that we

have seen from anti-state radicals—this is the Taliban elements in

the Northwest Frontier Province—which are increasingly using the

threat of violence to close down girls’ schools, to close down CD

book shops, etc., as well as what we are seeing in the heart of

Islamabad, this is even more reason for the Musharraf government

to find a way to develop a conciliatory relationship with the mainstream parties that have his same vision for an enlightened, moderate Pakistan.

You are right that the Musharraf government, its reliance on the

religious parties has actually strengthened them over the last few

years, so we need to give that some thought.

And, just to emphasize Dr. Ahmed’s point about enforcing the

rule of law, this has not been done with regard to militant groups.

There has been an ambivalent attitude toward how to handle these

groups. Sometimes the groups are picked up, detained, they are released a few weeks later, so there is still this permissive environment for militant groups, particularly those related to Kashmir,

that the government does need to begin enforcing the rule of law.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Cohen, next time we are going to go right to left,

but I do want to give you an opportunity for a brief statement.

Mr. COHEN. I think that we actually have to bear more risk. The

U.S. Government can’t hunker down behind a fortress of an embassy. We all bear risks when we visit. You do when you visit. I

think we could do better on that.

Mr. SHAYS. Could I just say, Mr. Chairman, I have to go and

speak on the House floor but I do want to come back, and I appreciate your holding this hearing. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Shays.

Mr. Braley is gone. Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding

this hearing, and thank you to all our witnesses this morning.

Mr. Kojm, thank you for your service on the 9/11 Commission

and keeping some focus on the recommendations. As you mention,

some of those recommendations seem to be either forgotten recommendations, like we are addressing this morning. I think they

are very important that we follow through, and I agree with your

63

conclusion in your testimony that, unfortunately, with this set of

recommendations we have not had much success to date.

I would just like to pick up a little bit on the conversation Mr.

Shays was having, because, as Dr. Ahmed said in her testimony,

General Musharraf has managed to present himself in the west as

the one thing that is really standing between stability and extremism in Pakistan, and that we need to make sure that we support

him at all costs or we risk having religious extremists take over.

But the testimony this morning is pretty clear, and Dr. Ahmed is

unambiguous in her statement that he relies in many ways on the

religious parties. Just to quote from Dr. Ahmed’s testimony, ‘‘Lacking a civilian constituency, Musharraf remains dependent today on

the religious parties.’’

So it does get at this question really that we started to talk

about in response to the last questions about really being insistent,

from the U.S. perspective, on free and fair elections coming up and

insisting that we allow greater participation in the political process.

I agree with what you said, Ms. Curtis, about it was a huge mistake in the 1980’s for the United States to withdraw essentially

from Pakistan its assistance, but I guess, in terms of sending the

signals now—and this goes to the question of conditioning the assistance—Dr. Ahmed suggests that we condition assistance to Pakistan on free and fair elections. The signal I understand from her

testimony that would then be sent to the Pakistani people is not

that we are interested in withdrawing, but that we want to be a

partner with you in open and free elections and making sure someone cannot be the head of the military and at the same time the

head of the civilian government.

So if you could speak a little bit more to that issue, because it

goes to the sort of global question about whether or not greater

openness in the political process will lead to greater participation,

will actually lead to less influence from religious parties if their

overall influence in the population is actually less than sometimes

appears, and allow voices of moderation to come to the fore, and

maybe in the longer run that is the best strategy, because you said,

Ms. Curtis, we have to stand behind Musharraf, and sometimes

people interpret that I think is at all costs. In other words, he is

the last thing standing between stability and extremism in Pakistan. And he has used that sort of sense effectively, and some of

the testimony here today suggests that is really not an accurate

presentation of the situation.

I am interested in people’s perspective on conditioning aid or

other ways we can really send a strong message this time that we

are serious about free and fair elections in Pakistan. Having been

born in Pakistan, I have a little interest in this.

Mr. TIERNEY. The question to Ms. Curtis?

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. It is for everybody. We will start with Ms. Curtis.

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. I just wanted to clarify, I absolutely agree with

you that it is not accurate to say that President Musharraf is the

only thing that stands between a stable and radicalized Pakistan.

You are absolutely correct about that. And what I have indicated

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ernment did make the right decision right after 9/11. They have

handed over several senior Al Qaeda leaders, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed just to name one. Who knows how many more acts of violence would have been perpetrated internationally had he not been

arrested.

That said, as I indicated, we are seeing this growing hunger for

democracy in Pakistan. I think, you know, we shouldn’t underestimate the vibrant civil society that is in Pakistan, sophisticated

politicians that are there. There is more to Pakistan, obviously,

than one military leader, and we need to recognize that. That is

why we are seeing, I think, a productive stance for the U.S. Government would be to encourage President Musharraf to move toward democracy, realizing the process may take some time, but we

really do need to begin thinking about that and not being afraid

that free and fair elections will somehow lead to radicalized regime

coming to power. Pakistan is not Lebanon. It is not Egypt. It is not

the Palestinian territories. The situation is a lot different. So I

think the more people understand that and understand the situation in Pakistan, that we will see that we do not need to fear democracy and, in fact, in the long run it is going to help in terms

of turning Pakistan into a moderate, prosperous state.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Does anyone have an overwhelming comment

to make? We would be happy to hear it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Cohen, you have been shut out before. I would

like to give you the opportunity and then we will go to Dr. Ahmed.

Mr. COHEN. I will just say that military leaders in Pakistan have

a shelf life. That is what history has shown. So if we are not willing to encourage an opening of the democratic process now, then

we have to at least prepare for a more difficult or violent transition.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Ahmed, are you getting ready to comment?

Ms. AHMED. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a very important

issue that was raised, one of timing. For us to say now the coup

took place in October 1999, the elections will take place in 2007,

that the military still needs time and there should still be a gradual transition that, I think, is not the way to go. This is an election

year. For the United States now not to be supportive of the process

of a free and fair election would send the signal that the United

States is not interested in a democratic transition in Pakistan. It

is way too long a time to say well, let it be gradual.

The first step, as I said in my testimony, as well, to a democratic

transition is a free and fair election, and it is not going to be another 8 years from now. I think the opportunity will be lost.

The electoral time table is now before this country, before Pakistan, and it is also before the United States of America. There are

two choices for the United States right now. It can either stay outside the process—in other words, it will not support the process or

it will support the process of a democratic position. The fence-sitting period I think is coming to an end. The United States has to

decide its own interests, to see a moderate democratic Pakistan

and to back a process of free and fair elections, or else, as I said,

the opportunity in some ways will be lost.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. Van

Hollen.

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Mr. Higgins.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want

to take it to a more macro level with respect to the Arab Muslim

world.

I think one thing that is profound is the demographics of the

Arab Muslim world. I think it is a common strand through the 9/

11 Commission’s report that there seems to be a disproportionate

focus on the here and now and not enough focus on the future. You

know, when you look at 170 million people in Pakistan, disproportionately very, very young, the literacy rate is less than 50 percent.

Males are twice as literate as females in that society.

When you look at the situation in Iraq, you know, 50 percent of

the population is under the age of 18. Places like Iran, 75 percent

of the population is under the age of 25. Despite the leadership of

a lot of these countries transitioning and more permanent, the populations are very vulnerable to influences. I think the profound

failure of American diplomatic policy in the Middle East is not to

focus more attention on the future and those young people who are

very susceptible.

When you look at the conflict that has pervaded the Middle East,

you know, most of these families are fatherless or they are disproportionately fatherless. So what these young Arab Muslim populations are looking for is a paternal influence, so it is either going

to be positive or negative, and I think our role as a Nation has to

be to promote not only a strong military presence but also a generous spirit consistent with American military policy in the aftermath of World War II, and helping these countries evolve. Much

easier said than done, but my concern is for, you know, cultural violence that has been perpetrated on young Arab Muslims, and obviously it is in our best interest to find a way through education,

through cultural exchange, and through economic development to

change the direction there.

So I think it is true, as the 9/11 Commission said, it is military

struggle versus the war of ideas. It is not Bin Laden any more; it

is those who sympathize with him. It is not Al Qaeda; it is Al

Qaedaism. And I think the very narrow and myopic focus of the administration has been, you know, as Donald Rumsfeld had said, the

measure and the success of the war on terrorism, are we stopping

more terrorist activity than is being created every single day, or so

I paraphrase.

I think the answer is I think we are losing a larger struggle,

which speaks profoundly and urgently to the need for a more strategic diplomatic strategy with both friend and foe in the Arab Muslim nations, and particularly focused on the emerging generations

who will serve the basis for the leadership in those nations, as

well.

I know it is more of a general comment, but I think it is profoundly important. I would just like your thoughts on it.

Mr. KOJM. Congressman, since you started with the Commission

I think I should at least start the answer here.

Thank you for your generous comments about the Commission

report.

I think your points are exactly on the mark. If you look at Pakistan, itself, which we have talked so much about today, where has

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the United States had the greatest influence in shaping popular

views? There is no question about it. It is the assistance we provided in the aftermath of the terrible, terrible earthquake in Kashmir. American helicopters delivering aid, the wonderful logistics capacity of our young people in the military made a difference in people’s lives. This changes people’s views. It is emblematic of the nature of the relationship that the United States should have across

the board in terms of making a difference in people’s lives, education, economic opportunity, hope for the future.

Ms. CURTIS. Just building on those comments, yes, we did receive

a lot of appreciation from the Pakistani people after our robust and

rapid response to the horrible earthquake which occurred in October 2005 in Pakistan. Unfortunately, a few months later there

was—not unfortunately, but what happened as a result of an operation that was aimed at targeting al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda No. 2, was

that there were civilian casualties in that strike, and a lot of the

goodwill that had been built up by our earthquake assistance dissipated.

So we do have a problem, and it is a challenge that we have to

live with, in that there are people who hate us and who are not

going to change and who are plotting the next 9/11 who we need

to target and we need to handle a certain way.

On the other hand, we need to show, as you said, our generous

spirit to the large majority of the population, you know, that

doesn’t support violence against Americans. There has been a new

poll out by worldpublicopinion.org that came out just about 2 weeks

ago which shows the majority of Pakistanis do not support violence

against the United States, but they do sympathize with some of the

goals of Al Qaeda.

So I think what I am trying to say is there is really a dual approach, and I agree totally with you that we need to focus more resources on these kind of people-to-people exchanges, assistance

issues, because we do see that it does make a difference in people’s

opinion of America when we act out of sheer goodwill and demonstrate our interest in the betterment and development of the people, themselves.

Mr. COHEN. I would just add that the poll that Ms. Curtis cited

also said that only 2 percent of Pakistanis who were surveyed believed Al Qaeda was behind 9/11, and if that is the premise of our

posture there is that we are there and we are giving the assistance

because of 9/11, then we start to see the problem.

I think after 9/11 America began exploiting fear and anger, and

we need to get back to exploiting optimism.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.

I want to thank all of our witnesses.

Do any of the Members wish to ask a followup question at all?

I don’t want to shut anybody off. But, failing that, I would just like

to close with one group of thoughts.

Obviously I think we have all seen the importance of education

and ramping up our attitude about educational aid to Pakistan and

trying to make sure that we do that in an appropriate way that

doesn’t try to interfere with the reform of the madrassas so much

as make sure we put up good viable public institutions as an alterVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Aug 16, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\37093.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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native and make sure that the Musharraf government does take

action against the more radical extremist madrassas on their own.

The other aspect of that is, of course, we need free and fair elections, and how do we go about making sure the U.S. position is

consistent and clear on that.

I would like to ask Dr. Ahmed just one last question on that. If

we are going to assist in free and fair elections, does that necessarily mean that they have to insist on the return to Pakistan

of the leaders of two of the major parties, Ms. Bhutto and Mr.

Sharif, both of whom have outstanding legal matters against them,

and I think some people might see that as interference of the

United States in domestic matters, or will a free and fair election

be possible without their return? Can you give us a little perspective on that?

Ms. AHMED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On that particular issue of an even playing field for all the political parties, if there are legal matters against that would hamper

the return of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, well, the Pakistan

government has to deal with those legal matters. But for the

United States to say that we will not support the participation of

major party leaders in an electoral exercise would also be problematic. By just specifically supporting a level playing field for all the

political parties—in other words, the removal of all restrictions on

freedoms of association and expression—that, alone, I think sends

a clear enough message to the Pakistan government.

I would say, though, that the United States is already engaged

with the Pakistan government as far as the election process is concerned, but not quite in an effective way, because it appears at the

moment the only engagement goal taking place through USAID is

with the Election Commission of Pakistan, which is, after all, not

autonomous and not independent. So there are already mixed messages being sent, which is why the necessity, as you said, very

clearly of clarity of that message, that the United States will support a free and fair process.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. Lynch, would you like to ask some questions before we close?

Mr. LYNCH. I would, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Five minutes.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your having

this hearing.

I, like several members of this committee, have just returned

from an area that is seeing a lot of activity from the Taliban right

on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border near Waziristan.

I have a couple of questions. One is sort of a long-term question

and it deals with some of the situations we are seeing with the

Taliban-connected Madrassas and other radical Islamic madrassas.

Is there right now an honest broker or an entity that we could support? Let’s face it, the United States has lost any credibility that

it has had in that part of the world, so our opportunity to go in

and offer a competing model to the madrassas right now openly

would be very difficult. I am just wondering if there is an entity

or a movement within Pakistan that we could support either openly

or clandestinely that would offer a competing model to the more

radical madrassas. I feel we have probably already lost the youngVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Aug 16, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\37093.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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est generation in Pakistan already because we really haven’t had

a strong competing model and we have been beaten to the punch.

So that is the first half of my question. I would just like to get

a sense of what the panel thinks.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Cohen, why don’t we start with you.

Mr. COHEN. Well, it is not a political organization, but I think

the rural support development programs that exist there succeed

for the same reasons the madrassas do, which is they have local

knowledge and people see that they are part of the community.

From what I have seen—maybe others can comment—they have

been successful.

Mr. LYNCH. I am sorry? Can you repeat that again?

Mr. COHEN. Sure. There is a rural support development network

which has Pakistani mobilizers in communities, and they do building schools, building roads, very grassroots types of activities, but

they are spread out through a fair swath of the country, and people

are from those communities and that is what gives them credibility.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Would the gentleman yield for a second? Who sponsors those people? I mean, who are they?

Mr. COHEN. They get funding from a number of donors, including

USAID, including the World Bank, Asia Development Bank, so it

is an indigenous organization, though, I believe.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Ms. CURTIS. I had the opportunity when I was in Pakistan several years ago to meet with the Baluchistan rural support program

which he was talking about, and they are doing good grassroots

work. The Aga Khan Foundation is another private foundation that

is doing a lot of good work on the education front.

I think one thing we have to look at is the overall government

effort, as well. As I indicated in my testimony, there is need for

major reform of the sort of overall education bureaucracy in Pakistan. As I mentioned, the World Bank spent billions on Pakistan

in the 1980’s and 1990’s without substantially increasing enrollment rates, literacy rates, etc. So we need to think very carefully

about the organizational setup of the education system and think

about the good work that is being done at the local level, and how

could we sort of organize that and bring that together so that it is

a more systematized setup rather than having, you know, a bunch

of diverse private efforts.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

Mr. Kojm.

Mr. KOJM. Thank you. I would really defer to my colleagues on

the panel, especially Dr. Ahmed, on the best local institutions for

us to work with.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Dr. Ahmed.

Ms. AHMED. There are any number of local citizen-run initiatives

in Pakistan where that model we were talking about is already

being applied with huge success in some of the poorest of cities. I

give you one example, which is called the Citizen’s Foundation

School System. It is actually run in the poorest of slum areas

where the children would be more susceptible to either being taken

in by the madrassa managers because their parents can’t support

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them, or to those kinds of influences. These schools, by the way,

are as good as some of the best American schools, run in the slum

areas of Pakistan.

So it is not as though the madrassa don’t exist, but I agree with

Lisa. I think it is really important that the public school sector is

where the focus needs to be. The state needs to reform the public

school sector. It needs to make that, because that is where the largest number of children will go. It needs to make that more viable,

more sustainable, to give the children a sense of direction but also

skills so that they can be productive citizens in the work force.

I would want to add that I don’t think you should be so despondent about the youth of Pakistan. You would be surprised that the

vast majority, despite the poverty and despite the bad winters, the

vast majority of Pakistanis, barring a tiny fringe radical element,

are moderate, democratic, and support all the ideals that the

United States also believes in.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, if I could, just one final question for Dr. Ahmed.

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure.

Mr. LYNCH. Dr. Ahmed, you note in your testimony that, ‘‘The

choice that Pakistan faces is not between the military and the

mullahs, as is generally believed in the west, including the United

States; it is between genuine democracy and a mullah military alliance that is responsible for the religious extremism that poses a

threat to Pakistani, regional, and international security.’’

Could you talk about this point? This is hitting the nail on the

head right here about what the alternatives are and who we can

make our alliances with. I would just like to hear your remarks on

that.

Ms. AHMED. Thank you, Congressman, because I think that is

where the problem lies in U.S. policy at this point in time, not

quite understanding that it isn’t the military as the only partner

in the war on terror, but actually if the United States was to adopt

the right policy directions now, or at least tweak its policy directions, it will be the Pakistani people. Why I say that is simply this:

what we have seen in the past 8 years, really, under General

Musharraf is the mullahs come into their own, not the mullahs

being sidelined by the military. What we have seen is the moderate

parties being sidelined by the military.

As a result of this partnership between the military and the

mullahs, two out of the four state governments of Pakistan—unprecedented, by the way, in this country’s history—are in the

hands of the mullahs. Are we then saying that we want to keep the

status quo or change it? How can we change it, and what are the

most reliable partners the United States can find? Trust me, Congressman, it is the Pakistani people who are the most trusted partners, for a very simple reason: if they want free and fair elections,

they would vote for the moderate parties who would have the best

partnership, largely because they would, A, have legitimacy; B, the

support of their constituents; and, C, share the same goals.

There is a Charter of Democracy signed between the two major

parties, and I would suggest that perhaps you should have a look

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at it. These are the two major parties that would, in a free and fair

election, form a government and be the largest party in opposition.

The charter specifically says that they will fight extremism and

terrorism in Pakistan’s national interest, and that is exactly what

the United States should be looking for, not a quid pro quo, we will

give you so you will give us, but a commitment to eliminating terrorism and radicalism in a strategic country, which is absolutely

essential if the war on terror is to succeed.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Lynch, we have copies of that charter if you

or any other Member would like to have a look at it, as well.

I want to thank all of our witnesses today for their time and for

the valuable testimony. I think it was certainly a help to all of the

Members.

I also want to thank the U.S. Mission in Pakistan for assisting

our videoconferencing of Dr. Ahmed to the hearing, our friend

Zharzhay Peter Boney for his cooperation in that.

I want to say one last thing. The subcommittee invited representatives of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for

International Development to participate in today’s hearing, specifically invited Mr. John Anthony Gastright, Jr., the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs at the State Department

and Mr. Mark S. Ward, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator of

Asia and the Near East at USAID.

These officials were invited to testify, but the State Department

and USAID declined our invitation. It seems that these agencies

expressed an unwillingness to address any issue raised by the first

panel in close proximity to the first panel’s offerings. We find that

highly questionable and unacceptable, but rather they insisted on

testifying first. We are not in the habit of having the administration or anybody else set the schedule of the agenda for our hearings. We think it was important to hear what today’s witnesses had

to offer and then to hear from people in the State Department and

USAID as to what they were doing in contrast to the comments we

heard.

So after this hearing I will talk to other members of the subcommittee to determine whether we are going to give a second opportunity for those individuals to testify at some later hearing on

that.

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Again I

thank all of our witnesses and participants today.

Dr. Ahmed, thank you for joining us long distance.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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