2023 IL App (1st) 231770

No. 1-23-1770B 

Opinion filed December 12, 2023 

Sixth Division

___________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

___________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

CARLOS CLARK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

of Cook County. 

No. 2023200138301 

The Honorable 

Anthony Calabrese, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 Justice C.A. Walker concurred in the judgement and opinion. 

Justice Tailor dissented, with opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Timing is everything in life and law. The State timed the filing of its petition to detain 

Carlos Clark to coincide with the effective date of article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 

of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 

1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act. But the Code strictly limits the timing of 

these petitions, notably when the State already agreed that the trial court should set bail. 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 2 - 

¶ 2 At the first appearance, the State secured an ex parte order permitting Clark’s possible 

release by setting a bail amount. This earlier choice rendered its later petition to detain too late. 

We reverse the trial court’s order detaining Clark and remand for the trial court to reinstate its prior 

conditions of release. We express no opinion on a future ruling by the trial court if properly 

presented under the Code on whether to detain Clark. 

¶ 3 Background 

¶ 4 At the State’s behest, about a month before the Pretrial Fairness Act became effective, the 

trial court signed an order permitting Carlos Clark’s arrest and fixing his bail at $100,000 D. See 

Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4 n.1 (noting neither “Safety, Accountability, Fairness and 

Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act” nor “Pretrial Fairness Act” are “official” names but common 

shorthand for the sequence of public acts). The trial court had acted in response to the State filing

a felony complaint that day charging Clark with aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-

4(a)(1)) (West 2022). 

¶ 5 The name of an assistant state’s attorney appears on the felony complaint, as does the 

signature of the judge who found probable cause to arrest Clark. Although not legible, a 

prosecutor’s signature also appears alongside the trial court’s signature on the order permitting 

Clark’s arrest and setting bail. The felony minute sheet, filed the same day as the complaint and 

trial court order, additionally laid out the alleged facts of three more possible offenses, unlawful 

restraint, aggravated fleeing, and retail theft. (The dissent overlooks this portion of the record when 

asserting “we do not know what evidence was presented” to the trial court. Infra ¶ 37.) The felony 

minute sheet also noted Clark’s then-current custody in McHenry County. 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 3 - 

¶ 6 About three weeks later, the State executed the Cook County arrest warrant. Two days after 

that, on the Act’s effective date, the State petitioned to detain Clark. The trial court held a hearing 

that day, with Clark appearing for the first time. 

¶ 7 Clark objected to the hearing. In his view, the Code did not permit the State to petition to 

detain him. He contended the Code permitted him, and only him, to seek review of the set 

conditions of release and offered no grounds for the State to now petition for his detention. In 

response, the State objected to having “no opportunity to file any conditions on this case[.]” The 

State contended that the Code permitted it to move to detain Clark during Clark’s first appearance 

before the trial judge, so its petition was proper. 

¶ 8 The trial court, the second judge to preside over this case, found: 

I don’t know what was or was not said to [the first judge] at the time of the issuance 

of the warrant. A warrant was issued for defendant’s arrest in the amount of $100,000 D. I 

can’t speak to what happened then. I believe that the issuance of the warrant is a mechanism 

by which the defendant is compelled to appear before a court. 

Typically, what happens is once those warrants are executed and defendants appear 

in front of me, I then make a determination as to whether probable cause exists. I listen and 

review the case in its entirety for purposes of setting a fair bond that includes setting any 

conditions that might be relevant, any concern, and it includes an in-depth consideration of 

all the factors from both sides, then I’ll be able to have an opportunity to make an 

appropriate decision in this case.
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 4 - 

Before today’s date no hearing has been held. This is the first time the defendant is 

appearing. There is no opportunity for conditions to be filed and for an assessment to be 

able to be made as to what is or isn’t an appropriate condition of release for the defendant.

I believe the State is well within their right given these unique circumstances on the 

first appearance after the issuance of a warrant and appearance off that warrant to be able 

to go forward with the [] Act and have a determination made as to whether or not the 

defendant should be detained, so over the Defense’s objection, I am going to allow the 

detention hearing. 

¶ 9 The trial court held the detention hearing, denied pretrial release, and issued a written order. 

¶ 10 Analysis 

¶ 11 Clark contends the Code, as amended by the Pretrial Fairness Act, offers the State no 

grounds for petitioning to detain those like him, whom the trial court ordered released at the start 

of the prosecution and before the Act’s effective date. The State responds that the Code permitted

what it did: petition to detain Clark during his first appearance before trial court.

¶ 12 The parties’ dispute requires us to interpret a statute, presenting legal questions that we 

review de novo. People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 13. We read the statute in full, not 

piecemeal. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 13. We determine the statute’s meaning by discerning the 

plain and ordinary meaning of its words. Id. And we do not add exceptions, limitations, or 

conditions that would contradict the legislature’s intent. Id.

¶ 13 The parties agree their dispute turns, in part, on section 110-6.1(c), which controls the 

timing for filing petitions to detain. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c) (West 2022). The parties focus on the 

meaning of the phrase “the first appearance before a judge,” as that phrase appears in subsection 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 5 - 

110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022). Clark contends that phrase includes ex parte hearings at which the 

State initiates the prosecution and seeks bail. The State argues that phrase excludes hearings at 

which only the State appears and thus requires the defendant to appear as well. 

¶ 14 We begin with the full text of section 110-6.1(c), which contains two subsections, and 

italicize its use of the word appearance. Under subsection (c)(1), 

A petition may be filed without prior notice to the defendant at the first appearance before 

a judge, or within the 21 calendar days, except as provided in Section 110-6, after arrest 

and release of the defendant upon reasonable notice to defendant; provided that while such 

petition is pending before the court, the defendant if previously released shall not be 

detained.

The State reads this section as “at the [defendant’s] first appearance before a judge.” Under 

subsection (c)(2), 

Upon filing, the court shall immediately hold a hearing on the petition unless a continuance 

is requested. If a continuance is requested and granted, the hearing shall be held within 48 

hours of the defendant’s first appearance if the defendant is charged with [certain class 

offenses], and within 24 hours if the defendant is charged with [other class offenses]. The 

Court may deny or grant the request for continuance. If the court decides to grant the 

continuance, the Court retains the discretion to detain or release the defendant in the time 

between the filing of the petition and the hearing. 

Read together, section 110-6.1(c) uses two different phrases, suggesting a distinction between the 

terms “the first appearance before a judge” (subsection (c)(1)) and “the defendant’s first 

appearance” (subsection (c)(2)).
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 6 - 

¶ 15 The State rejects any distinction, contending it properly petitioned to detain Clark under 

subsection (c)(1) because “first appearance * * * refers to the first time a defendant appears before 

a judge[.]” (Emphasis in original.) The State argues this court has “recently and repeatedly held” 

“ the plain language of this subsection [permits it to] file a petition to detain at the time of the 

defendant’s first appearance before a judge.” (Internal quotation omitted.) (citing People v. 

Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 16 and People v. Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 10). 

We disagree.

¶ 16 The State’s reading limits subsection (c)(1)’s reach by adding the word “defendant’s” to 

the phrase “the first appearance before a judge.” We may not add terms that contravene legislative 

intent. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 13. Here, the legislature envisioned a process where the State 

and trial court need not wait for a defendant’s appearance before considering whether to detain 

that person without setting bail. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022). This process may occur 

“without prior notice to the defendant[.]” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022). As Clark 

suggests, this process tracks the longstanding practice of seeking a “no bond arrest warrant” for 

certain defendants. See 725 ILCS 5/110-4 (superseded by Act). 

¶ 17 Under subsection (c)(1), “the first appearance before a judge” includes, as here, an ex parte

appearance by the State to begin the prosecution by filing a felony complaint and then seek an 

order setting bail. Generally, “appearances” include parties to the litigation. See APPEARANCE, 

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “appearance” as “coming into court as a party 

or interested person, or as a lawyer on behalf of a party or interested person”). The State points to 

nothing in the text of the Code supporting an interpretation of “appearance” that excludes the 

State’s actual appearance before a trial judge to begin the prosecution and seek bail.
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 7 - 

¶ 18 Nor do the State’s citations to Vingara and Rios persuade us otherwise. Contrary to the 

State’s assertions, neither Vingara nor Rios “held” that the State’s reading of the Code was correct. 

Both defendants in Vingara and Rios personally appeared when the trial courts set their bails

(People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 3; People v. Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 

3). Moreover, neither opinion analyzed subsection (c)(1)’s application to ex parte bail hearings at 

the beginning of the prosecution. 

¶ 19 Indeed, in dicta, the panels in Vingara and Rios asserted without analysis that 

subsection(c)(1)’s text, “the first appearance before a judge,” meant the defendant’s first 

appearance before a judge. People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 16 (“Under the plain 

language of this subsection, the State may file a petition to detain at the time of the defendant's 

first appearance before a judge; no prior notice to the defendant is required.”); People v. Rios, 2023 

IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 10 (“The plain language of this section sets forth the deadline for the State 

to file a petition to detain. The State may file a petition to detain at the time of the defendant's first 

appearance before a judge; no prior notice to the defendant is required.”). For the reasons we gave, 

we reject the idea that the “plain language” of subsection (c)(1) further excludes ex parte hearings 

where the State begins the prosecution and seeks bail.

¶ 20 The State’s petition to detain was untimely under section 110-6.1(c) for two reasons. First, 

as noted, the State did not seek to detain Clark when it began this prosecution at the first 

appearance. The State instead sought bail of $100,000 D. Second, the State could not avail itself 

of the Code’s 21-day extension, having failed to provide “reasonable notice” of its intent to detain. 

The State petitioned to detain Clark the same day he first appeared, and the court immediately 

overruled Clark’s objection to proceeding. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022). Even more 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 8 - 

essential, Clark has remained in custody since his arrest. Thus, no “arrest and release” has triggered 

the 21-day extension. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c) (1) (West 2022). 

¶ 21 As this matter stands, the State improperly petitioned to detain Clark, and he remains 

entitled to the conditions of bail the trial court set when the State began this prosecution. We 

express no opinion on the merits to detain Clark if the State properly raises it (see 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(c)(1) (West 2022) (permitting State 21-day extension to file petition to detain)), or the trial 

court properly considers it, (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b), 5(e) (West 2022) (permitting trial court to 

“reopen the conditions of release hearing to determine what available pretrial conditions exist that 

will reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as required, the safety of any other person, 

and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release”)). 

These other opportunities, which the dissent overlooks to assert this opinion will leave the State

“powerless” (Infra ¶¶ 36-37), could result in Clark’s pretrial detention. 

¶ 22 Reversed and remanded.

¶ 23 JUSTICE TAILOR, dissenting: 

¶ 24 The majority holds that because the trial court set bond when it issued an arrest warrant for 

Clark on the State’s ex parte application three weeks before the Pretrial Fairness Act became 

effective, the State was precluded from seeking Clark’s detention when he appeared in court on 

the warrant for the first time on September 18, 2023, the day the change to the Code went into 

effect. I respectfully disagree.

¶ 25 On August 23, 2023, a felony complaint was filed in this case alleging that Clark committed 

the offense of aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(1) (West 2022) on August 6, 

2023, when he “knowingly took a motor vehicle, a 2009 Honda CRV * * * from the person of 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 9 - 

[victim 1], a person 60 years of age or over, by the use of force. All occurred in the State of Illinois, 

County of Cook, Village of Northbrook.” The complaint was signed and sworn to by Detective 

Ochab, and was also signed by Judge Gemskie, who found probable cause to arrest. On the same 

day, Judge Gemskie issued a warrant for Clark’s arrest and set bond at $100,000 D. The felony 

minute sheet states that the sole charge against Clark is aggravated vehicular hijacking and recites 

a narrative of the incident. The half sheet from that day also shows the only charge against Clark 

was aggravated vehicular hijacking and includes the notation, “FPC (G). WTI $100,000D.” 

Presumably, the acronym “FPC” stands for “finding of probable cause,” “(G)” stands for 

“granted,” and the acronym “WTI” stands for “warrant to issue.”

¶ 26 Clark had been arrested by the Crystal Lake police department on August 9, 2023, and was 

being held in McHenry County on an unrelated offense. Clark was arrested in this case on 

September 16, 2023. On September 17, 2023, the day before Clark appeared in court on this case, 

two additional complaints were sworn to by Illinois State police Trooper Sanchez, one for 

aggravated fleeing, (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1 (West 2022)), and the other for unlawful restraint (720 

ILCS 5/10-3-A (West 2022)). One complaint alleged that Clark committed the offense of 

aggravated fleeing on August 6, 2023, when he was “the driver or operator of a vehicle, who have 

[sic] been given a visual or audible signal by a peace officer, to wit: ISP, directing him to bring his 

vehicle to a stop, failed to obey such direction[,] increased his speed or otherwise attempted to 

elude the officer” in violation of section 5/11-204.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-

204.1 (West 2022)). The other complaint alleged that on August 6, 2023, Clark committed the 

offense of unlawful restraint in that he “knowingly and without legal justification detained [victim 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 10 - 

2]” in violation of section 5/10-3-A of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/10-3-A (West 

2022)). 

¶ 27 On September 18, 2022, when Clark appeared in court, the public defender was appointed 

to represent him. The two additional complaints sworn to by ISP Trooper Sanchez were filed with 

the court. The State also moved to amend the complaint for aggravated vehicular hijacking. Clark 

waived “re-swearing and re-verification of the complaints as amended.” The court then informed 

Clark of the allegations in the complaint filed against him for aggravated vehicular hijacking on 

August 23, 2023, and the complaints for aggravated fleeing and unlawful restraint filed on 

September 18, 2023. Clark indicated that he understood. 

¶ 28 The State then filed a petition for pretrial detention. Defense counsel objected to the 

petition and argued that Judge Gemskie already set bond at $100,000 when she issued the warrant 

on August 23, 2023. According to Clark, the Pretrial Fairness Act did not allow the State to seek 

review of the previously imposed conditions of release–the $100,000 D bond–which was set when 

the warrant was issued on August 23, 2023, on the State’s complaint for aggravated vehicular 

hijacking. The State argued that the Pretrial Fairness Act allowed it to move to detain Clark during 

his first appearance in court without prior notice and that the bond set in conjunction with the 

warrant was solely to secure Clark’s first appearance in court to answer the charges against him.

¶ 29 The court rejected Clark’s argument and allowed the hearing to proceed “given the unique 

circumstances on the first appearance after the issuance of a warrant.” The court reasoned that, 

“[b]efore today’s date no hearing has been held. This is the first time the defendant is appearing. 

There is no opportunity for conditions to be filed and for an assessment to be able to be made as 

to what is or isn’t an appropriate condition of release for the defendant.” The State then asked the 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 11 - 

court for Clark to be detained and for pretrial conditions and read a proffer containing the following 

specific facts of each alleged offense into the record.

 “At approximately 6:25 p.m. on August 6th, Victim 1 who is a 67-year-old female 

parked her silver Honda CRV in the shared parking lot outside of CVS located at 936 

Willow Road. Victim 1 locked her car, but left her window slightly ajar before entering the

store. When Victim 1 returned, she noticed something in the back seat of the Honda. As 

she unlocked the vehicle and opened the driver’s side door, the Defendant Carlos Clark 

moved from the back seat to the front seat and grabbed Victim 1’s car key from her hand. 

The Defendant then attempted to grab Victim 1’s purse as well. The Defendant told Victim 

1 that he would shoot her if she did not give him her purse. Victim 1 continued to fight 

back and the defendant eventually gave up, reentered Victim 1’s vehicle without the purse 

and drove away. 

Victim 1 immediately returned to the CVS and notified the cashier what happened 

and called the police.

 * * * 

At approximately 8:08 p.m. on August 6th, the Defendant entered the back of a BP 

gas station located at 43rd and Wentworth in Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, in Victim 1’s 

silver Honda CRV. The defendant started speaking to individuals about selling them 

cologne and perfume. Victim 2 works at the BP gas station and walked over to the 

Defendant to ask about the colognes he was selling. 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 12 - 

The Defendant told Victim 2 that he had additional products in his vehicle and 

invited Victim 2 to look. Victim 2 entered the vehicle and closed the door. The Defendant 

then entered the driver’s seat and sped away with Victim 2 in the vehicle.

 There were ISP squad cars in the parking lot when the Defendant pulled away. 

These events are recorded on surveillance video.

The Defendant proceeded onto the highway while violating numerous traffic 

control devices while being pursued by ISP troopers including a right turn on red without 

stopping at the intersection of 43rd and Wentworth, two lane violations over solid white 

lines, speeding upwards of 110 miles per hour in a marked 55 miles per hour zone. Victim 

2 repeatedly begged the defendant to pull over and let him out, but the Defendant refused 

telling Victim 2 to be quiet or he would kill him while gesturing towards his waistband. 

The Defendant ran a red light at 71st Street and Lafayette which caused an accident 

where the vehicle was struck by oncoming traffic. 

The Defendant exited the vehicle and ran off on foot making good on his escape. A 

critical search was done based on surveillance which revealed that the defendant was on 

Electronic Monitoring for a possession of stolen motor vehicle out of the District 5. The 

Electric Home Monitoring GPS placed the Defendant at the ULTA, CVS, and BP gas 

station at this [sic] times reported.

The Defendant was arrested by Crystal Lake PD on August 9th, 2023, for a retail 

theft. Fingerprints were taken from the stolen motor vehicle and the boxes of perfume 

which came back to the defendant.

 Photo lineups were provided to Victim 1 and Victim 2 on August 15th, 2023. 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 13 - 

Both Victim 1 and Victim 2 identified the defendant.”

¶ 30 The court then heard from a pretrial services representative who went over their 

assessments and informed the court that Clark was a “six” on a scale of one to six for new criminal 

activity. On the failure to appear scale of one to six, Clark was a “five.” The court noted the 

assessment showed seven aggravating factors including Clark’s age, prior failures to appear in 

court, prior felony convictions, and pending charges at the time of these offenses. 

¶ 31 The majority concludes that the detention hearing was improper. It finds that when the 

State filed a criminal complaint and obtained a warrant for Clark’s arrest that set a bond on August 

23, 2023, an ex parte detention hearing was held, effectively releasing Clark “at the start of the 

prosecution and before the Act’s effective date.” Supra, ¶11. Based on this finding, the majority 

has determined that the State improperly petitioned to detain Clark on September 18, 2023, 

because the petition was untimely under section 5/110-6.1(c). 

¶ 32 Section 5/110-6.1(c)(1), which went into effect on September 18, 2023, the day Clark first 

appeared in court in this case, states in relevant part: “A petition may be filed without prior notice 

to the defendant at the first appearance before a judge ***.” (emphasis added). 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(c)(1) (West 2022). Subsection (c)(2) then states that, “[u]pon filing, the court shall immediately 

hold a hearing on the petition unless a continuance is requested. If a continuance is requested and 

granted, the hearing shall be held within 48 hours of the defendant’s first appearance ***.” 

(emphasis added). Id. 110-6.1(c)(2) (West 2022). 

¶ 33 Drawing on the difference in the “appearance” language in subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2), 

the majority concludes that the “first appearance before a judge” language in subsection (c)(1) 

encompasses the State’s initial ex parte appearance before the court to obtain a warrant for Clark’s 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 14 - 

arrest, where the court also set bond at $100,000D. Therefore, according to the majority, the State 

could not petition the court under subsection (c)(1) to detain him when Clark first appeared in 

court on the warrant on September 18, 2023. 

¶ 34 Two principals of statutory construction inform the resolution of this appeal. First, when 

interpreting a statute, courts should consider a statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it 

addresses and the legislature’s apparent objective in enacting it. People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 

135 (2002). Second, the primary objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the 

legislature’s intent, presuming the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient or 

unjust results. In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 372 (2005). 

¶ 35 When subsection (c)(1) is read in conjunction with subsection (c)(2), the most reasonable 

construction of the “first appearance before a judge” language in subsection (c)(1) is that it means 

the first appearance before a judge at which the defendant is present. See People v. Vingara, 2023 

IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 16 (“Under the plain language of this subsection [5/110-6.19(c)(1)], the 

State may file a petition to detain at the time of the defendant’s first appearance before a judge; no 

prior notice to the defendant is required”); People v. Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 10 (“The 

State may file a petition to detain at the time of the defendant’s first appearance before a judge; no 

prior notice to the defendant is required”). Prior to Clark’s arrest on the warrant, there would have 

been no reason for the State to file a petition to detain him. Thus, subsection (c)(1) authorized the 

State to petition the Court to detain Clark on his first appearance after his arrest without providing 

him with notice of the petition. 

¶ 36 Moreover, when the State applied for a warrant for Clark’s arrest, it obviously did not file 

a petition under subsection (c)(1) to detain him because the change to the Code had not yet gone 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 15 - 

into effect. Cf. People v. Houts, 2023 IL App (5th) 230715-U, ¶ 13 (The State’s petition to detain 

pursuant to section 110-6.1 after the Act went into effect was untimely because the State did not 

file the petition to detain at defendant’s first appearance four months earlier when the defendant 

was present and bond was set). Therefore, the majority’s conclusion that the State exhausted its 

one opportunity under subsection (c)(1) to detain Clark without notice when it obtained ex parte a 

warrant for his arrest that set a bond is flawed. I would presume that the legislature did not intend 

to create this absurd result and therefore would find that the State’s petition to detain was not 

untimely under section 5/110-6.1(c)(1). 

¶ 37 Even assuming that the majority’s interpretation of section 5/110-6.1(c)(1) is correct, the 

untimeliness of the petition to detain is not grounds for reversal in this case. Under the majority’s 

interpretation, the State would be powerless to seek detention on a defendant’s first appearance in 

court when a warrant had been previously issued and bond been set, in this case or any other, 

regardless of what occurred between the time the court issued the arrest warrant and set bond and 

the defendant first appeared in court. The trial court correctly recognized that we do not know what 

evidence was presented to Judge Gemskie or how she arrived at the $100,000 D bond set in the 

warrant. We do not know whether Judge Gemskie was equipped with the necessary information 

to engage in the fulsome analysis that a detention hearing demands. Presumably Judge Gemskie 

did not have before her a representative from pretrial services and did not know that Clark scored 

a “six” on a scale of one to six for assessment of new criminal activity and a “five” out of six for 

assessment of failure to appear. What we do know is the only felony complaint before her at the 

time was for aggravated vehicular hijacking, which was subsequently amended on September 18, 

2023, the day Clark appeared in court after being arrested on the warrant. The additional felony 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 16 - 

complaints for aggravated fleeing and unlawful restraint were sworn to on September 17, 2023, 

and filed in the circuit court the following day. The unlawful restraint complaint involved a 

different alleged victim. We know that Judge Gemskie did not consider these charges when she 

set bond on August 23, 2023. We also know that the hearing on August 23, 2023, had none of the 

hallmarks of a detention hearing because, among other reasons, Clark was not present and was not 

given the opportunity to testify, present witnesses, or offer information by proffer or otherwise.

See American Bar Association, Standard 10-5.10 (prescribing detailed procedures for pretrial 

detention hearings, judicial orders for detention, and appellate review). Under the majority’s view, 

the State could not seek Clark’s detention when he first appeared in court even though no detention 

hearing had previously been held and Clark had been charged with new offenses that were not 

considered by the court on August 23, 2023, when the warrant was issued and bail was set on the 

aggravated vehicular hijacking complaint. 

¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial court. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
No. 1-23-1770B 

- 17 - 

People v. Clark, 2023 IL App (1st) 231770

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 23200138301; 

the Hon. Anthony Calabrese, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys

for

Appellant:

Sharone R. Mitchell Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Rebecca 

Cohen, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant. 

Attorneys

for

Appellee:

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Jessica R. Ball, 

Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.