//' 6 

1. 

AN APPLICATION OF JACTICAL_ENGAGEMENT / 

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SIMULATION FOR UNIT PROFICIENCY -J 

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I -- I ~EASUREMENT , I /1 ~ l p (; 7 /, I 

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~- ~aziekner e~bert J.fBootl -

h Institute tAr ~ ( / .;.(_ r; / ~ ; Behavioral an Sosiat Sc iences ""---f_q 2__.! 

ILl d and 

~ L TCt L£ry ~ k Q!d I 

Office, TRAOtJ'e sY'§'R?ms Manager, 0 Tactical Engagement Simulation 

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ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION TECHNICAL AREA 

[~llLi] 

U. S. Army 

' 

~j Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

July 1979 

¢.Lc;i Approved lor publoc releaae ; diltrobution unlimited. 

- ,, 
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Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 

JOSEPH ZEIDNER 

Technical Director 

NOTICES 

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Commander 

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~ 5 UM t

~ I 

~~ I lUI~ U P~U BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1 REPORT NUMBER V 2. GOVT ACCESSION NQ. 3. RECIPIENT S CATALOG NUMBER

Techn ical Paper 381

6. TITL E (,d $ ablS,l.) 5. TYPE OF REPORT C PERIOD COVERED

AN APPLICATION OF TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT Interim

SIMULATION FOR UNIT PROFICIENCY MEASURE MENT _____________________________

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR(s) S. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(S)

C. Mazie Knerr , Robert T. Root , and -- Larry E. Word

I. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAM E AND ADDRESS tO. PROGRAM ELEMENT . PROJE CT , TASK

U.S. Army Research In stitute1for the Behavioral A REA C WORK UNIT NUMBERS

and Social Sciences 2Q7 63743A773

5001 Eisenhowe r Avenue , Alexandria , VA 22333

It. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE

TRADOC System Mqr for Tactical Engagement July 1979

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IS. SUPPL EMENTARY NOTES

IS. KEY WORDS (Conilnu. on ,.v.r. . aid• If n.c.a. y ond Id.nUfy by block numb.r)

Engagement simulation Training systems

Tactical training Armored cavalry

REALTRAIN Performance measurement

F Simulation techniques

20. All A T ( Cf ~~~i. ,.vsr~~ side ft Id.nt$ty by block nomb.v)

he need for methods of measuring team and unit proficiency , and the

lack of knowledge in this area are widely recognized. Team performance

measurement difficulties are fundamental problems in unit proficiency diagnosis and training evaluation , in both military and civilian settings.

Existing Army combat unit performance measurement techniques depend largely

on judgmental data .

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(Continued)

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Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAOE(CR i 0.4. 1a4.i,~ )

item 20 (Continued)

tactical training system , called tactical engagement simulation (ES),

uses objective , accurate casualty assessment that offers a potential means

of measuring team performance in combat training. Objective casualty assessment provides the prim ary measures of team proficiency , such as casual ty

exchange ratios and mission accomplishmant.

This report reviews application of ES to unit measurement, with emphasis

on lessons learned while validating ES procedures for armer units and while

developing ES for armored cavalry units.

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Ij nclassi fied

SECURITY CLASSIF ICATION OF Ti4i S PAGE(071.n (I.e. FnI.r .d’

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Technical Paper 381

AN APPLICATION OF TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT

SIMULATION FOR UNIT PROFICIENCY

MEASUREMENT

C. Mazie Krierr and Robert T. Root

Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences

and

LTC Larry E. Word

Office , TRADOC Systems Manager.

Tactical Engagement Simulation

Submitted by: Frank J. Harris. Chief

ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION TECHNICAL AREA

Approved By;

A H. Birnbaum, Acting Director

ORGANIZATIONS AND SYSTEMS

RESEARCH LABORATORY

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria , Virginia 22333

Office , Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

July 1979

Army Prolect Number Tactical Skill Acquisition A Retention

20?63743A773

Approved for public rilsese; distribution unhinet.d.

i i i

— ______ _____ ____________ —~~~ —— -

~~~~~~
ARt Research Reports and Technical Papers are intended for sponsors of 

R&D tasks and other research and military agencies. Any findings ready for 

implementation at tht! time of publica tion are presented in the latter part of 

the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task, formal recommen· 

dations for official action normally arc conveyed to appropriate military 

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form. 

i v 
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FOREWORD

Learning tactical skills on the battlefield is costly ; learning

tactical skills short of a real combat environment is difficult. Yet

this is precisely the Army ’s training mission--training troops in tactical skills and constantly improving the effectiveness and efficiency

of that training .

In 1971 the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences CAR l) with the Army ’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC )

initiated research which led to development of a tactical training

method now known as tactical engagement simulation training (ES). Two

tactical engagement simulation training techniques have been implemented

Army—wide : SCOPES (Squad Combat Operations Exercises Simulation) for

infantry squad training and REALTRAIN for armor , antiarmor , and combined arms training .

Engagement simulation training was designed to require the same

tactical behaviors as does actual combat . The REALTRAIN model is based

on a number of learning principles that have been demonstrated to be important for effective training . Probably most important is that the

competitive nature of REALTRAIN exercises provides motivation to learn ,

an elemen t often lacking in Army training.

The potential of engagement simulation training has been demonstrated. For this potential to be realized fully, further research

has been required to refine current engagement simulation training techniques to make them more effective and to extend these techniques to

other applications. This report describes the use of tactical engagement simulation for the measurement of unit proficiency , with emphasis

on the objective , ra ther than subjective, performance assessmen ts that

can be made using ES.

This research was part of a larger research proqram which is responsive to the requirements of Army Project 2Q763743A773 and the

TRADOC System Manager for Tactical Engagement Simulation of the U.S.

Army Training Support Center , Fort Eustis , Va.

echnical Director

V

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~~~~ : - S
~~- -

~ --— 

AN APPLICATION OF TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION FOR UNIT

PROFICIENCY MEASUREMENT

BRIEF

Requirement :

To develop techniques for objectively measuring the combat proficiency of Army units and teams.

Product :

The training system called tactical engagement simulation (Es)

also assesses the training results objectively, using casualty exchange

ratios and mission accomplishment data as “product measures .” Armorantiarmor exercises , for instance, use records of casualties, time ,

and mission accomplishment to measure the total skills of the units.

ES training and assessment procedures have been developed for infantry

and armor—antiarmor units and are under development for other types of

unit and mission .

“Process measures” to assess performance and skills during a mission are also necessary , to help diagnose problems and explain product

data , and to assess noncasualty-producing missions . For instance , the

performance of armored cavalry , whose primary mission is reconnaissance

and security , must be judged entirely by process measures . The records

and observations of process measurement also provide a way to note and

evaluate external factors such as weather that affect the mission .

Utilization :

Difficulties in meac~. ~g team performance using existing judg— • mental techniques t ....’e een a fundamental problem in diagnosing pro—

ficiency. ES measures may aid the situation greatly.

vii

—— —.__——--___-— . 

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—a
AN APPLICATION OF TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION FOR

UNIT PROFICIENCY MEASUREMENT

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION 1

PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT 2

OBJECTIVE MEASURES 4

ARMORED CAVALRY ENGAGEMENT SIMU LATION 9

PROCESS MEASURES 11

DISCUSSION 14

REFERENCES 17

DISTRIBUTION 19

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Platoon missions by exercise 9

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Percentage of OPFOR casualties: armor test 5

2. Effects of training and test on destruction of

tested unit weapon systems as a function of

time in the attack 6

3. Percentage of successful missions : armor test . . . . 7

H 4. Indirect fire data form 8

5. Exercise narrative 10

6. Army Training and Evaluation Program for armored

cavalry (adapted from ARTEP 17-55) 12

7. Map sketch is

ix 

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AN APPLICATION OF TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION

FOR UNIT PROFICIENCY MEASURE MENT

INTRODUCT ION

The need for methods of measuring team and unit proficiency and

the lack of knowledge in this area are widely recognized . Difficulties

in measuring team performance are fundamental problems in unit profi—

ciency diagnosis and training evaluation in both military and civilian

settings (Blunt & Nay lor , 1968; Defense Science Board , 1975). Existing

combat unit performance measurement techn iques depend largely on jud g—

mental data and often do not evaluate the unit’s ability in the field

(Hayes et al., 1977). Researchers must solve these measurement problems

before they can substantially improve unit training.

A tactical training system , called engagement simulation (ES), uses

objective , accurate casualty assessment that offers a potential means of

measuring team performance in combat training . Objective casualty assessment provides the primary measures of team proficiency , such as casualty exchange ratios and mission accomplishment . Recent advances in ES

procedures have further improved its uses for assessing tactical performance . This paper reviews application of ES to unit measurement , with

emphasis on lessons learned while validating ES procedures for armor

units and developing ES for armored cavalry units .

ENGAGE MENT SIMULATION

ES techniques provide realistic tactical training under conditions

that simulate the complex modern battlefield. In addition to casualty

assessment, characteristics that contribute to the realism of ES are

the use of two-sided , free-play tactical field exercises and simulation

• of weapons effects and signatures.

• Objective casualty assessment is achieved when a soldier , looking

through a 6X-power telescope mounted on his rifle , correctly reads a

3-inch , two-digit number on the helmet of an opposing unit member. The

telescope power and helmet number size have been calibrated to produce

hit/kill probabilities realistic for the weapon ’s lethality. When the

soldier fires a blank cartridge and correctly identifies the opposing

helmet number , a casualty is assessed . A controller with the fire team

radios the helmet number to a controller with the opposing team , who

informs the “hit” soldier (U.S. Army Infantry School , 1975) .

Analogous objective casualty assessment , weapons effects, and

• signature simulation pr,ocedures have been established for infantry ,

armor , and antiarutor elements , including these weapons systems : M60

tank main gun ; mines; hand grenades ; machineguns ; and light (LAW) ,

medium (DRAGON), and heavy (POW) antitank weapons. For longer range

1

A • • • • — —• —.-——-- -•
w~~ poiis than the rifle , the contro.llei is equipped with optLc s to sight

individua l he~.me t numbers and numbeis on panels attached to vehicles. • In the tank , fot example , the cont r

~~l icr ’s telescope is mounted in the

br eech of the main gun . When the controller in the t ank determines

that the gun is cen t e~ ed on a tarqet at the t ime of simulated round

impact , he assesses a casualty. The controll er t hen zadios the numbe r

of the hit to the controller with the opposing team .

• The radio net over which cont iollers announce the casualties is

used by seniot controllers to administer the exeicise and is monito: e

~1

by pers onnel who i ecord the hits. The mon :t ors write the t ime , target

number , and firer n umbet on a net control sheet , and they check that

the hit was contirme d by the controller in the target vehicle.

All ES systems provide some way of identify i ng casualties. The

REALTRAIN system uses telescopes and numbers , a system that has been

used fot t r a i n i ng with opposing forces as large as reinforced platoons .

A Muit iple Integrated Laser Engagement System ( M iLES) has been developed to achieve tactical real ism in larger units . MILES uses low—power ,

eye—sate laser transmitters mounted on each weapon . Each target (vehicle or soldier) has solar cell detectors that rece i

~~ the laser sig-

• nra]. as either a hit or a near miss. Hits act iv at e a bu.~~er on the tar—

get , which can be silenced by deactivat nnq the tar-get ‘s laser transmitter.

The lasers are pulse coded to differentiate weapons ’ effects ( e.g.,

rifles can kill individuals but cannot destroy tanks). Use ot the lasers

reduces the need for human controllers hut also reduces the amount ot

data available on tactical act i vitie s .

ES d i f f er s from some of the more common simulation techn i ques , su ch

as bo.tn ~

i games and computer simulations , in that it is conducted in the

field with a full complement of soldiers and equipment. ~ ithou gh ES

Uses tactical equipment , it emphasizes human behavior : It is manascendan t rather than machine-ascendant. ES emphasizes t actical

dec isions——react ions to events that emerge during competition with a

motivated , tntellig ent adversary . The cue s to which soldiers must re—

spend are similar to those to which t hey respond in battle , and the

s i t uat i o n changes as a result of their actions. Thus , the situation J

is emergent rather than prespeci f it’d , hrohlv predictable, or amenable

to analytic solution (Bogus law & Porter , l

~~

t

~t’)

PERF~ RMANCE ASSESSMENT

The obiective casualty assessment in ES provides some , but not

all , of the necessary performance measures. Casualties (target , firer ,

and t ime ) are the primary crite ri a , but relying solely on c.isualt ics

makes it di tficult to dete: mine why they occurred . Add i t t onal obser—

vat nous or measures of active performance , are re~ uired when the fitia l

out come is not an ad& ~uate index of skill (t ’r~’ l ~a~ h , l~ t’~~ . Measures

of processes or intermediate task and t r a i n i ng object ive p c r t o rm an& - t’

assist in training diagnosis and explanation of product data . 
An example is the detection and engagement of the enemy at the

max imum possible range during de fensive missions. P a r t i c u l ar l y at company leve l and below , there is little recognition of the importance of

observation posts to provide exact and t imely information about the

enemy . In exercises between relativel y untraine d units , most cn itical

decisions and actions occur along the forward edge of the battle area.

As the units bec~~i

~

e more sophisticated , leaders in the defensive unit

spend more effort on select ~ng observation j ust posit ioc~~, planning

communications and indire ct fire , and positionirn~ long—range , direct—

fire weapons. As a result , detect ion and ef f ect ive eniqag e n ncnrt r ansnt ’s

mid ease.

Tact ical outcomes depend upon several factors it her than t lit proficiency of the units : i nter ~n ct ion s among force mix , missions , weat her ,

and terrain can influence tactical resulti . F~ i example , weather j f ltei —

acts with force mixes , since poor visibility f avors dismounted troops

to the disadvantage or long—range weapons . If vis ibility improves during the tactical action , then the advanta~;e reverts to the long—range

weapons . Because of such intetact i ons , the outcome does not necessarily

indicate the ~elat ive proficiency of the opposing forces. The impact of

external factors must be considered in evaluating the results of an

exercise .

Problems arise in both recording behavior (active performance or

processes) and encoding the environment (such as the external factors~ Thus , observational field research needs a system for detecting , measuring, and recording the events arid the pertinent factors (Sells , 1966) -

Literature on ratings and observutional performance assessment

techniques in criterion development offers suggestions for improving • field measurement (Blum & Naylor , l~

)6S; Goldstein , l’-

~

74; Cuilford ,

1954; Simon , 1969; Wherry , 1952) . Observations and ratings of behavior

can suffer from unreliability and inaccuracy due to a variety of error

sources. First , the performance itself is variable , since people perform better at some t imes than at others . This is especially true in

• emergent situations , where a given behavior may not be required in a

specific instance or may be altered to suit the situation . Second ,

detection or observation of behavior is unreliable. An observer may

n -tot detect a given behavior , and different ohservers may perceive and

assess behavior differently . Third , the recording of behavior intro—

• duces error , depending on the type of record . For example , teco rdinq

events as they occur reduces error by decreasing recall or memory effects. Despite these error sources , observations and other judgment al

measures continue to be the most t requentl y used type for performance

cri teria (Blum & Nay lom , 1968)

Impr~

wed measurement can be achieved when the researcher (a) speci—

fies and defines as concretely as possible the behaviors to he observed ,

(b) requ ires data collection personnel to observe but not to iudqe the

behavior , (c) trains the observers fully, and (d) requizes observers to

3

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• • 

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record their observations immediately on clear , concise , easy-to—use

forms. The following sections discuss how we applied these principles

and used observational techniques in conjunction with objective measures.

OBJECTIVE MEASURES

The use of casualty , time , and mission accomplishment data is demonstrated by results from the validation of armor REALTRAIN (Scott et

al., 1978). Teams composed of tanks , heavy antitank weapons (TOWs) , -•

and artillery forward observers were pretested against a similarly cornposed opposition force (OPFOR) . Half of the tested team s then had a

week of REALTRAIN training , while the others had conventional tactical

field training . The teams were posttested against the OPFOR. Casualty

data show that the teams were similar in pretest performance (each bar

in Figure 1 represents 52 vehicles) . Posttest data showed that REALTRAIN

teams improved in terms of casualties inflicted on the OPFOR, whereas

conventionally trained teams did not.

Temporal distributions of the casualties during an exercise provide additional insight into changes in tactical performance . When the

cumulative percentage of tested unit casualties is plotted against the

elapsed time , it appears that fewer casualties were sustained early in

the exercises af ter REALTRAIN training , in contrast to heavy early losses

before training (Figure 2). Conventionally trained units sustained heavy

early casualties both before and after training . Time data , in association wi th other objective data such as casualties , can be used to measure

what went on during an exercise and what may have led to successful (or

unsuccessful) mission accomplishment .

Mission accomplishment results showed the sane patterns of REALTRAIN effectiveness as did the casualties. To accomplish its attack

mission , a unit had to clear an objective of OPFOR elements and occupy

the objective . To accomplish its defense mission , it had to preven t

the OPFOR from occupying the objective for 60 minutes. Figure 3 shows

mission accomplishment data for both attack and defense missions ; each

bar represents eight exercises. REALTRAIN teams improved in their

ability to accomplish missions successfully, whereas conventionally

trained teams did not .

Other object ive da ta , such as artillery fire planning and use ,

are also recorded . Personnel in the fire direction center complete an

indirect-fire data form indicating the number of rounds fired , time

distribution , and casualties inflicted . The example in Figure 4 shows

that “jeep 28” was hit by six rounds early in the exercise , bu t tha t

no other indirect fire missions for this team were ef fective in this • exercise. Inclusion of these data further clarifies explanation of

the overall results.

4
100

75

4’ C

j50 ~~ 

_

31

25- 19

15 12

1111 __ _______

RT CV RT CV

Pretest Posttest

Figure 1. Percentage of OPFOR casualt ies: armor test .

____________ ___ _____
100

90-

- RT PRETEST

I CV PRETEST

60- I

- 

_________

,

~~

...r’ ~~1

1_r~

J CV POSTrEST

40- rM ____ 

Ri POSTrEST 1

20 60 100 120 140 160

MINUTES SINCE TESTED UNITS HAVE CROSSED LINE OF DEPARTURE

Figure 2. Effects of trainin g and test on destruction of tested unit weapon

systems as a function of ti me in the attack.

—- — - -- - — .- 

-— ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ • • _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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~ 

—

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

___—--—~~~~~~~~~~~— - ____________

100

I

75-

62

4’ C

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0.

25 25-

RT CV RT 

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~1

Pretest Posttest

Figure 3. Percent age of successful missions: armor test .

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F —- •

PREPLANNED FIRES

Trisi ~o. CA 14 Test X IS’ 1. 092723 •. ______

24 MARCH 78 Tr.In$ng _______ “ 2. 074704 S. _______

UnIt 1.0. TEAM A Slioot-Ofl ______ 3. - 7. ______

Nenis SP/4 DOUGLAS CAT ________ 4. ______ S. _______

h 

I I .

Request ~~~ Loc.tlon/ O.T Splesh RDS ~ Tim. i! Adjustment Azimuth Time Fired ~ Casualties

~~~ .1.p a dsstroy.d Ip.~

.on.

10:08 092723 10:14 6 SIm — ~ p131d TIC VS cw,imc

• 47 2 p.r sonl

FFE 10:16 100 3200 10:20 6 Sim No Ccc.

10:22 ~~~~~~~~~~ 

NONE - —

Yellow

Bd. 10:35 1 Sirn -

~~~ ~peat 10.30 091729 10:34 1 Sim -

~~~ DUD — No Cci.

W36 R~~ ______ _____ ~

:

~

:: ~~~~~ 

No Cci. 

—

10:44 NONE -

Blue

10:44 10:53 6 Ssm — No Css.

10:54 __ ___ 

M~~S NO

~~ __ 

-

A B C D EF G HI J K

Figure 4. Indirect fire date form.

H

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ARMORE D CAVALRY ENGAGEMENT S IMULAT ION

Unlike other ES applications, armored cavalry ES cannot rely on

casualties as performance data. “Cavalry ’s basic tasks are reconnaissance and security” (Department of the Army , 1977); cavalry may not

produce casualties . The armored cavalry platoon gathers and reports

information. When reconnaissance units withhold fire (e.g., to avoid

disclosing their positions) r tactical events may not lead to casualties.

In developing ES procedures for cavalry units , the problem was to develop a realistic training environment for the reconnaissance functions, while maintaining the objectivity and credibility of the casualtyproducing ES exercises. Thus, the cavalry ES research focused on process

measures and external factors.

An armored cavalry ES training program was designed with aid from

training personnel from the supporting unit of the 3d Armored Cavalry

Regiment, Fort Bliss , Tex. Research results have been reported previously (Knerr , Hamill , & Severino, 1978 ; Knerr , Stein , Hamill , & Severino,

1978).

Only 2 weeks were available for the program , so it was not feasible to test all combinations of missions, force structures, and force

ratios. The armored cavalry force was a regimental cavalry platoon

containing scout , light armor, infantry , and mortar sections. The OPFOR

was a combined arms team composed of tank, TOW , and infantry sections, -

with simulated indirect—fire support. For each mission , the OPFOR

composition was varied to enhance realism and provide reasonable opposition . The missions selected were reconnaissance (area, route , and

zone) and delay (Table 1).

Table 1

Platoon Missions by Exercise

Exercise Cavalry platoon mission OPFOR platoon mission

1 Zone reconnaissance Delay

2 Route reconnaissance Screen

3 Flank guard Route reconnaissance

4 Area reconnaissance Delay

5 Route reconnaissance Attack

6 Delay/defend in sector Zone reconnaissance

9

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In these exercises, weather and terrain had strong effects on mission accomplishment. The weather was clear and sunny, providing optimal

visibility. The terrain was flat desert , alt 1

~~ugh there were sand dunes

that could hide vehicles and soldiers. Moving vehicles were quickly

detected by exhaust smoke and dust clouds from the tracks. The force

assigned an attack mission or any moving mission was at a disadvantage

under these conditions.

Relative combat power interacted wi th other external factors. Results of an attack with a 3:1 force ratio differ from results with 6 to 1

odds. If the opposing force is too strong or too weak , differences between the units may not emerge because of “ ceiling” effects. During

the first .

~ days , the cavalry had reconnaissance missions and the OPFOR

had a strong composition (main battle tanks , TOW , and i n f a n t r y) . After -

•

being hit hard on the first day , the cavalry moved so slowly on the

second day that it made little progress. It did send reports of enemy

strength to the commander, and it did not move forward in a “sui cide ”

mission against the heavy , long—range weapons it detected. On subsequent

day s, the ~

)PFOR was reduced in size , and the cavalry was given missions

more sui table for reconnaissance act ivi ty.

External factors (missions , terrain , weather , force mix ) must be

considered in interpreting mission outcomes as measures of unit proficiency in tactical situations. Figure 5 shows the outline of a data

form used to describe the exercise . The record starts with a description

of the exercis e lane (usually augmen ted by a map or sketch) , weather ,

qeneral tactica l situation , missions, force structures , and other external factors. Next are notes of the pla toon leaders ’ plans and orders t o

the vehicle commanders. Complete notes of the tactica l activities are

then recorded , along with the mission outcomes. These notes on plans ,

orders , and tactical activities provide an overview ot processes (i.e.,

act i ve performance) occurring during the exercise .

Location

Te rra in des cr iption

Date Exercise number

i~~

een team Brown team

Elements Elements

Mission Mission

Plan Plan

Outcome

Discussion

Figure 5. Exercise narrative.

1 i-~

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PROCESS MEASURES -

Process measurement in the armored cavalry ES deve lopment was based

on the principles described earlier for the improvement ot observational

measurement : train observers, specify the behavior to be observed as

precisely as possible, and record during the act ion . Observet r oceiv~ d

initial training during 3 days of small—scale exercises that preceded

the lull—scale pla toon exercises. These small exercise ’s a lso familiarized the observers with the terrain , equipment , maneuvers , and dat a col —

lection forms . Observers were thoroughly briefed each day on the exe t —

cise scenario , operat ions orders, and ant icipated tactical events.

In the first exercise , the cavalry platoon had a zone reconnaissance

mission . To clarif y the behavior to be observed and recorded , more detail was needed t han is siiveii in the cavalry Army Training and Evaluat ion

Program (ARTEP) (Figure t

~~; Department of the Army , l’)7e’) . To perform

effectively, the commander needed to know the locat ion and status ~~ friendly forces and the locat ion and strengths of enemy torces . The

reconnaissance elements had to learn the importance of detect i ng the

enemy at the maximum possible t anqe and repot tinq the jut orma t ion to

the commander. For examp le , they had to provide exact and t ime ly r e—

ports on enemy activity to use’ indirect fire effect ivcly .

To support these training objectives , the operat ions orde’i~ tot t he

first exercise assigned the cavalry platoon a .

~one recotmaissance mis—

s ion that ~

1 ire’cted the platoon to provide earl y warning , occupy an object ive by a ‘i iven t ime , and prepare to defend . Their ass i qnfltent pl o—

vided spt’ci tic elements ot intel 1 iqence’ arid cootd itta t lug inst ruct ions .

Essential elements of intelligence included enemy left in the area , enemy

strong point s • and enemy ability to move’ t ot ward . tn the cootdi nat nq

instruct ions , the unit was told to hold at phase lines and equt’st Pt’ I —

mission to cross , and to bypass pockets of res i st .mc~’ . They were under

weapons—hold status , in which they could ti re’ only with permission ot

the commander. Thus , the’ general requ i remt’nts in t he’ ARTEP mission wOit ’

stated more :;peci fica I ly, and observable act ivi t ies were defined .

The general si tuat ion described in the operat ions ot det-s was real—

istic for a weapons—hold situation . As a r esult of I hi s s t at us , the’

veh tc le commander s frequent iy reported enemy in to Lmat ion , a! en~ wi th

repeated requests for release from weapons—hold status and ot1st’

~

luent

permission to fire . They used their teport s to build a convincing to— • quirement to fire ’. The weapons—hotel st at us , applied in the highly

mot ivat mc i ES envi ronme’nt , appea red to ci c t concent rated recotina t

reporting .

Establishing t he reporting t equ i remen t and to tnt ot ci nq t hem using

the weapons—hold status , made’ t act i cal ee~nmun i cat ions a va I u al’ It’ dat a

collection vehicle. The re’por t s con t a med t into and locat ion in forma t iou

for both friend ly and enemy elements. The’ qua ! t y of the dat a was a

problem , in terms of both accuracy and complet e’ness , because ot a~lio

i i

— ---- - 

- - -

• •
Training and Evaluation

Unit : Armored Cavalry Troop

Mission : 1-7. Zone Reconnaissance

Rating

Task Conditions Training/evaluation standards S U Remarks

Elements conduct movement according to troop commander ’s task—

organization.

Elements maintain OPSEC (see

mission 0—15)

-7-6 .

ross LD. Troop commander designates Elements cross LD on time .

the LD passage points, latest

time to return through Elements cross LD at designated

friendly lines, and other passage points in specified

control measures in OPORD. task organization and begin

zone recon .

-—7—7.

teconnoiter Troop commander specifies Recon elements report on Threat

lesignated task organization, command forces, key terrain and routes

:one . control , and boundaries in timely and within specified

OPORD. tolerances .

Elements conduct zone reconnaissance using proper movement

technique s (FM 17-95) .

Elements thoroughly search for

Threat forces throughout zone .

Figure 6. Army Training and Evaluation Program for armored cavalry (adapted from ARTEP 17-55).

- - . ____ -- ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - - - 
— 

Rating

~

ask Conditions Training/evaluation standards S U Remarku

L 7—8.

lake contact . Threat force engages elements Overwatch elements lay down sup—

of troop. pressive fire and request indirect fire support.

Bounding elements deploy to

cover and return fire.

Elements observe and report.

Report includes type and nuzuber of vehicles in Threat force

within 80% accuracy.

Elements in contact request permission to bypass Threat force.

Detached element watches Threat

force while remainder of troop

continues zone reconnaissance .

Figure 6 (Continued)

——-——- ———

~

——--.-—.-------.-- - -.-.—‘.‘————— .L
- - -.

~~~~~ 

- -

I

problems and reliance on tactical participants’ skills in location

reporting.

The two senior controllers checked the accuracy of the location —

information provided by the participants. They evolved a system of

radio coordination so that each controller knew where all his personnel

were and what the tactical effects would be if any element had permission to fire . This communication procedure also gave the two senior

controllers a comprehensive picture of what was occur ring in the simulated ba tt lefield, which was useful in leading the discussion in the

after action review that followed the exercise .

Report data could be corroborated in many instances by their relation to objective data . In the second exercise , for example , conditions were established to create kn own situations , which served as

probes to test reconnaissance capability.

Items of intelligence interest--an abandoned armored personnel

carrier , some weapons , and an enemy soldier (represented by a mannequin) --were placed at three known locations, as shown on the map sketch

used to brief the observer (Figure 7). Reports from one of the rifle

squads early in the exercise indicated that the squad was not where it

should have been , and there was no way to be sure of the actual location . However , when the squad reached the abandoned vehicle and correctly reported its REALTRAIN number , it was certain that they had

followed the wrong road .

The mannequin “enemy soldier ” also enabled observers to record

the location of tactical events. The controller recorded the times

and places that the platoon leader dismounted to conduct ground reconnaissance. These estimates were verified when the vehicle reached

the known location of the mannequin and “took dummy prisoner at 1255.”

The observational data were thus anchored to a known location . In

general , the known locations clarified records of tactical performance .

DISCUSSION

Often in performance assessment situations , there is a strong

tendency to measure what is easy to measure . For example , the Army

Training Tes ts , which preceded the current ARTEPs , relied heavily on

subjective checklists concerning the planning , coordination , prepara—

tion , and movement phases of tactical operations . ARTEPs emphasize the

importance of analyzing critical aspects of missions. The major tasks

differentiated for each mission in the ARTEP reflect fundamentals of

land combat more accurately than did the earlier Army Training Tests.

However , extensive training experience with tactical ES has demonstrated

that further improvement can be made in selecting training objectives

and measuring their attainment.

14 

- 

‘ - -- 

-~~~----~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ 
COBJ SNOWD

FIRE

TEAM

-~~~~~~~~~ 

---

TANK

P1 I /

MOUND - 1

~

i FIRE

1

1 TEAM \!

—i I D P

C) ABANDONED

1 Dc1) APC MAN 1 o

D ~ I

~~~I

RAIN~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~WEAPON 90

LD~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (

~~ 

30H —

Figure 7. Map Sketch

1 )

______ .-

~~ - -~~~~- ~~~ - -- -~~~~~~~ 

—-

~~ 

--—

~~~~~~

- -
______ ~~~~~~~~~~~~—--—---~~-.-- - -- — -—-- - -~~~~~~~- ------ --- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ — -

~~~~~- - ~~~- —~ - - -~~-- - --

This report has focused on the nature of tactical data attainable

during ES exercises to acquire objective data and method s of enhancing

the accuracy of data. ARI is also working on the improvement of data

collection and analysis , using an Automated Tactical Operations Measurement System (ATOMS) with contractual support from Human Sciences lutegrated . ATOMS is comprised of data collection instruments, assoc iated

data collection and reduction procedures , and a software package for

summary descriptive statistics from which further analyses may be made

(Epstein , 1978; Root , Knerr , Severino , & Wo rd , 1978).

The inherent difficulty of measuring complex human performance in

a f ield environment is one reason for the shor tage of sa tisfac tory

methods for unit performance measurement (Wagner , Hibbits , Rosenbla tt ,

& Schulz , 1977). The methodology described here depends on a detailed

statement of train ing objectives , objective observation and recording ,

analysis, a:id explanation in sufficient detail to show how and wh y

ouLcome s such as mission accomplishment (or lack of accomplishment)

occurred.

I ~‘

I
_ - .- ----- ~~~--- ~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- -- - -_

--

~~~~~

---

~~~~~~~

- - 7

RE FERE NCES

Slum, M. L., & Nay lor , James C. Industrial Psychc’~ ogy . New York :

Harpe r & Row , 1968.

Boguslaw , R., & Porter , E. H . Team Functions and Training . In R. M .

Gagne & A. W . Melton (Eds.) , Psychological Principles in System

Development. New York: Holt , Rineh~~i t , and Winston , 1966 .

Cronbach , Lee J. Essentials of Psychological Testing . New York :

Harper & Row , 1960.

Defense Science Board. Report of the Task Force on Training Technology,

Chapter 8. Crew, Group, Unit Training, Washington , D.C.: Office

of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering , Depa rtmen t of

Defense, May 1975.

Department of the Army . Army Training and Evaluation Program for Armored Cavalry Squadron and Armored Cavalry Troop (ARTEP 17-55) .

Fort Knox , Ky .: U.S. Army Armor School , June 1976.

Department of the Army . Field Manual No. 17—95 , Cavalry, Washington ,

D.C., 1 July 1977.

Epstein , K. I. Automated Tactica l Oper ations Measurement 5ystent--ATOM.~.

Paper presented at the Military Operations Research society 41st

Symposium , Washi ngton , D.C., July 1978.

Goldstein , Irwin L. Training Program Development and Evaluation.

Mon terey , Calif .: Brooks/Cole , 1974.

Guilford , J. P. Psychometric Methods. New York : McGraw—Hill , 1954.

Hayes , R. F., Davis , P. C . , Hayes , 3. 3., Abolfa thi , F., Ha rvey, B., &

Keynon , G. Measurement of Combat Effectiveness in Marine Corp~ In fantry Battalions. Arlington , Va .: Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency , October 1977.

Knerr , C. S., Hainill , B. W., & Severino , A. A. Engagement Simulation

for Armored Cavalry : Initial Test. ARI Research Problem Review

78—5 , August 1978.

Knerr , C. S., Stein , F. S., Hamill , B. W., & Severino , A . A . Developmen t and Evaluation of Armored Cavalry Enqagement Simulation .

Paper presented at the Sixth Psychology in the DOD Sympos ium,

U.S. Air Force Academy , Cob ., Apr il 1978.

Root , R. T., Knerr , C. S., Severino , A . A. , & Word , L. E. Tactical

Engagement Simulation Training : A Method for Learning the Realitie s of Combat . Paper presented at the American Educational

Research Associa tion Annual Meeting, Toronto, Canada . March 1978.

17

I
_ — - - .

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -- 

Scott , T. C., Meliza , L. L., Hard y, G. D., & Word , L. F. RFI\tTRAIN

Validation for Armor/Anti-Armor Teams. ARI Research Report 1204,

March 1978.

Sells , S. B. Ecology and the Science of Psychology. Multivariate Be—

havioral Research, 1966 , 1, 131—144.

Simon , J ulian L. Basic Research Methods in Social Science. New York :

Random House , 1969.

U.S. Army Infantry School , Squad Combat Operations Exercise (Simulation),

Training Circular St 7—2—172 , 1975.

Wagner , H ., Hi bbi ts , N., Rosenbla tt , R. D., & Schulz , R. Team Traini~~ and Evaluation Strategies: State of the Art. HumRRO Technical

Report 77— 1 , February 1977.

Wherry , R . J. The Control of Bias in Ratings : VII. A Theory of Rat—

m g . PRB Report 922. Columbus , Ohio: The Ohio State University

Research Founda t ion , 1952.

18

_ _ _ _
--

DISTR IeUTION

AR) (hstritrtit.riii (j,t

4 OASD )M&RA ) 7 FIOUSACOEC . Ft Ord , ATTN: LEtwefy

1 HUDA )I)AM ) CSZ) I ))OusAcoEc , Ft Or,), ATTN. ATEC- - FX F Hun. FacIor~ )il)OA Q)AP) P13 111 7 USAEEC , Ft Ben)arn.n HMrltorr . ATTN L.tvsy

I iOI)A II)AMA AR ) 1 LISAPACDC Ft fler.i,trnr.i lIar, son , AT IN Al Ce HR

I HODA )DAPI HHF I’U) I USA Com m--Elm - I 5db , Ft Monurtouth , AT TN ATSN IA

I HUDA IS(,R() to 1 USAEC , Ft Mor.rn.r.oh, ATTN AMSEL Cl HOP

I Fi(fl )A U.)AM I t)OT (‘I 1 USAFC , Ft Mo~mouth , ATTN . AMSEL -PA P

I HUDA (DAPC PM! A) 1 USAEC , Ft Monmot itir , ATTN AMSEL SI -CR

I HOOA IDAC)) P3’ ’ A) 1 USAEC , Ft Monmout), ATTN C, lie) Dew Br

I H(M)A IDAF’I FIRE) 1 USA Matv r.a)sSy. Aria ) Agey. At*.de.n, ATTN AMXSY - P

I HODA (OAPE MPL) C) 1 Ed~~

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I HOOA )OAPF I)W ) I USA O d cit & Sen. Al*,d~en, ATTN: ATS I- TEM - C

I lInDA (DAPE HRL) 2 USA F-In n En~ Lab , AIr.qik.eri. ATTN Iitwar y lfl rr

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I HOOA )DAPC PAS A) I IJSASMA . Ft Bk,,, ATTN ATSS I BC

I HODA ILIUSA OR) I USA Air Del Sc)., Ft B) ,s , Al TN- ATSA CID Ml

I b o A )DAMU HURl 1 USA Air flirt Scit , Ft H).,s , ATTN l’ech Liii

ii O)IA )I)Ah(~) I USA Air Del Bd Ft Bu st , ATTN F)LES

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1 M,I Ass i H.,,. Il~s. UFMtH &I - 041) 11 &t S) I (ISA Cord & Girt,,.) StI CoIh.qe , F, I,.v,.nwo,t h , Al TN Al SW-S F

I IL) )ISAI1AI AP() 5’ , rt, u. ’ 4TTN AF1 A CP H I USA Coil A Ggner.) SIt Co)kia’ , F~ Lrav..nw ntlt i , ATTN Fri Adviso r

I HO F tnt Atr r ry, A T TN. Al l.A (1) TI I USA C ’,i,)iiiied Ar ms (:rr rtiI Dcv Ar t . Ft Le.svr ’rrwo.th , ATTN DepCri.

1 HO F fit. A,my Ft Sa.rr HoustO n 1 USA Combined Arm , Cnsbt Dew Act . Ft Leavenwo rth , ATTN: CCS

I Sir Aimy Sti Studi es Ole ATTN OAVCSA DSP) I USA Combined Arm s C.v~~t Dew Act. Ft Leavenwor th. ATTN: ATCASA

I Ut. Ch.,I .1 Sr I . ‘

.t,,,ii’~ itt1 I (ISA Cumhjoed Arm s Cmli) Dv’s At -I , Ft Leave nwo rt h, ATTN; ATCACO —l

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x.qnapt..i Lab , Ft Betvouv , AIIM: III TO -S

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(1541 Ii ’ lit I .iy iii. A I IN It li MI) A I lISA t.rh ’IIv l-rre. ’ Ci, A Sd., 1, I-Irijr:hr ,i ... ATTN CII) MS

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I USAIMA , Ft B..et.i, At TN Mjirt,,.,t t , t r I (ISA trltell ii tencv ’ Ct, & Sc)., Ft Huiwh irca , ATTN ATSI - IF

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I )r.t ,’t lrqe nc . Mat,’, - .11 Di’s Ott - , EWL , Ft H,’Iâlmd 1 LISA In.te)).q.nc. CIt A 5.-In , Ft Huachut’a, Al TN ATSI CII’) CS

I LISA SE Siit ’r,il cu I r G,,i,i,ni t ATTN AlSO I A I LISA IrrIr’Ik qencr Cti & Sc)., Ft Huiehuc., ATTN OAS/SRI)

I LISA Ch,ri’i,.,,i Cr. & Sr -I. III).,, ,, tin., . ATTN AISC IF RI) I (ISA ).itel)irt’ nte Ctr & Sc)., Ft Huach..,,,. ATTN ATSI TIM

1 USA I SO) F ’ I i tt,. A tIN (.3,,. - A,)v ,tr ,, I LiSA I irtt ’)Irqcn ce Cr & Sc)’ . Ft Huieh.,ca , A T IN I lea.

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WI-lAI R, Ni -iii. ’i’ ~~’ ), - .,Ii ., lIru 7 COR USA E)ictrniiri ~~Pvvrj Crc) , ATTN Sh IP MT S

I 03I ~ 504 M,,. I,’r, ’~ I HO. TCATA , ATTN Teds Litw at y

I lISA Cor nr’ r.irl A n al A.Ir’t Rei hesila , ATTN . MOC A MR I HO, TCATA . ATTN AT CAT-OP-a , Ft I4rit ~ I

I LISA Coin.r t rl Anal Aqcy Hv’t hesdâ , ATTN ; MOCAJI I USA R.c,u.IingCmd , Ft Sheridan , ATTN IJSARCPM P

I ()SA Ar c t ,- (ml CI, APt ’) St ilt) .’ . AT IN STFAC P1, MI I Si’rnor Army A4v.. USAFA GOD/TA C . EIIJrrn Al A~ , lId Nit 9

I (ISA Arct ic Test (‘Ir AP USeatt ir’ . ATTN . AMSTL PL T5 I HO, USARPAC , OCSPFR, APO SF 9655$. AT IN: GPPL SI

I (ISA Arm ament EmnI R.d~ton. Arterial , ATTN ATSK-T IM 1 Sirm iorn Lib, Academy of Health Sc4nee,, Ii S.n. Hns,,tnn

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I FAA NAF IC . AII.,nti. CrIt . ATTN Library I HO, USMC, Commandant, AITN: Code MIMI

I FAA NM I I ’ AIl,, irt,i City ATTN Human I r.qv Br I HO. USMC . Commandant , ATTN Code PAP) 20 ~

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II AA Ae,nr,a,it.,-al Ct . (*)alntwna City . AITN: AAC 440 2 LJSC C, Academy , New L ondon . ATT N: Admrss,on

2 USA F Id Ar ty Sch, It Sill . AT TN I ihre,y 2 LISC G Academy , New London, ATTN L m ary

I liS A A,rtn, rr S.Ir II K r,r r ~ ATTN LIlliat y IIISCG Trai ning Ct~, NV , ATTN- CO

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~~Ctt , NV , AT TN Ettuc Svc Ole

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I USA Anti,., Sib . ft F .” ’.. A IIN ATS R CL) All I HOM.t I Ranqe Br , MC Del. Ouant,co, ATTN PPvSOiv

19 

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B USAIRADOC, Ft Monroe , ATTN MPH AD I M.lilaerpvykologrtk T~enewte , Cupeislsitiews

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I (IS Mibtaty As-autc, ny Wr’st P,slnl , ATTN. MALlS’)

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1 01⁄4 of Naval Bach Ar II Igloin . ATTN Code 452

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I US Dept of ,Ii,,I,c,’ , DC, A nN- Drug Intore. Admi r,

I Nat Ni.’ uI Slarslanilt , DC. ATTN Comput er Iril~ Section

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I Dejiver Fejtnoel Cii , I akewood, AIIM: BIM

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