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iii

v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS:

A BRIEF SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTAL, 

OPERATIONAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES

Jeffrey L. Caton

December 2015

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

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public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
vi

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ISBN 1-58487-718-9
vii

FOREWORD

Stories about unmanned vehicles now appear regularly in the national news—and not always in good 

ways. Within the last 2 years, privately-owned drones 

have crashed on the White House lawn, surveilled the 

U.S. Embassy in Paris, and buzzed German Chancellor Angela Merkel. When used in military operations, 

autonomous weapon systems (AWS) have the potential to save lives as well as apply lethal force across 

land, sea, and air. 

In this Letort Paper, Mr. Jeffrey Caton posits that 

the development of AWS policy and doctrine should 

characterize autonomy not as a discrete property of 

a given system, but rather as a function that varies in 

its strategic, operational, and tactical context and mission application. Further, he argues that AWS design, 

planning, and operations should be tempered with 

the purposeful consideration of human judgment 

and control as well as legal and ethical standards that 

foster international credibility. 

Through its current military operations, the United 

States is setting both overt and tacit precedents for the 

world with regard to the appropriate use of AWS. This 

Paper provides readers with background information 

crucial to the full understanding of the complex challenges facing the future development and operation of 

AWS across the full range of military operations.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JEFFREY L. CATON is President of Kepler Strategies 

LLC, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, a veteran-owned small 

business specializing in national security, cyberspace 

theory, and aerospace technology. He is also an Intermittent Professor of Program Management with Defense Acquisition University. From 2007-12, he served 

on the U.S. Army War College faculty including Associate Professor of Cyberspace Operations and Defense 

Transformation Chair. Over the past 7 years, Mr. Caton 

has presented lectures on cyberspace and space issues 

related to international security in the United States, 

Sweden, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Kazakhstan, 

and the Czech Republic supporting programs such as 

the Partnership for Peace Consortium and the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence. He served 28 years in the 

U.S. Air Force working in engineering, space operations, joint operations, and foreign military sales including command at the squadron and group level. 

His current work includes research on cyberspace and 

autonomous weapons issues as part of the External 

Research Associates Program of the Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College. Mr. Caton is also a 

member of the Editorial Board for Parameters magazine. Mr. Caton holds a bachelor’s degree in chemical 

engineering from the University of Virginia, a master’s degree in aeronautical engineering from the Air 

Force Institute of Technology, and a master’s degree 

in strategic studies from the Air War College.

xi

SUMMARY

The use of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) in 

warfare is not a new concept. One could argue that the 

development and integration of such systems have 

evolved over the last century and accelerated significantly after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on 

the U.S. homeland. AWS will likely continue to grow 

in both capabilities and numbers. This growth of unmanned systems is not limited to the U.S. military or 

even the United States; it is an international phenomena that includes government and commercial applications in all domains—air, land, and sea. Commercial 

endeavors for unmanned systems are at the forefront 

of many technologies and their proliferation will 

likely outnumber military use in the future.

What does the Department of Defense hope to gain 

from the use of AWS? This Letort Paper explores a diverse set of complex issues related to the developmental, operational, legal, and ethical aspects of AWS. It 

will briefly explore the recent history of the development and integration of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems into traditional military operations. It 

will examine anticipated expansion of these roles in 

the near future as well as outline international efforts 

to provide a context for U.S. use of the systems. These 

topics are well-documented in many sources, thus this 

Paper serves as a primer for current and future AWS 

operations to provide senior policymakers, decisionmakers, military leaders, and their respective staffs an 

overall appreciation for existing capabilities and the 

challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with 

AWS across the range of military operations. Emphasis is added to missions and systems that include the 

use of deadly force.
Discussion is limited to unclassified and open 

source information; any classified discussion must occur at another venue. Despite the goal of using precise 

language, the following terms may be used somewhat 

interchangeably due largely to the variety of source 

material cited in this Paper: autonomous weapon system; robot; drone; unmanned system; unmanned vehicle; unmanned platform. 

 After providing background information on the 

meaning of autonomy and its contemporary applications, the Paper establishes a dialogue in four main 

sections: 

 1. Developmental Issues Related to Autonomous 

Systems. This section explores two questions: How 

should the United States develop autonomy-related 

applications for use across the range of military operations? What technologies are imperative to the development of AWS? It addresses these questions first 

by describing the current state-of-the-art for Army 

unmanned ground vehicle systems, then by examining technology issues across the scope of application 

of autonomy, and ends with a brief analysis of the federal budget trends for AWS development. 

 2. Operational Issues Related to Use of Autonomous Systems. This section addresses two questions 

related to a vision of fully integrated AWS operations: 

What can be achieved via autonomy within the range 

of military operations? What missions can be enhanced by incorporating AWS? The resulting discussion considers the role of mission parameters, efforts 

toward AWS integration into force structure, doctrinal requirements, international efforts, and strategic 

geopolitical challenges. 

 3. Legal Issues Related to Use of Autonomous 

Systems. This section examines the legally acceptable 

xii
xiii

uses of autonomous weapon systems within the range 

of military operations. It first looks at existing international legal conventions including the Law of Armed 

Conflict, then reviews recent assessments by the United Nations, next it focuses on the concept of human 

control and judgement as it applies to AWS. Finally, it 

reviews current vignettes as well as consider potential 

trends for the future.

 4. Ethical Issues Related to Use of Autonomous 

Systems. What should be the ethically acceptable and 

advisable uses of AWS within the range of military 

operations? What moral principles should form the 

foundation of AWS development and operation? This 

section explores these questions by first reviewing the 

ongoing work for developing ethical frameworks for 

AWS, then considering the varying cultural views that 

AWS applications may evoke, as well as analyze the 

potential reduction or proliferation in warfare that 

widespread use of AWS may introduce. Finally, it 

looks toward the future and contemplates potential 

long-term effects on national security.

1

AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS:

A BRIEF SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTAL, 

OPERATIONAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES

The use of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) in 

warfare is not a new concept. One could argue that the 

development and integration of such systems have 

evolved over the last century and accelerated significantly after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on 

the U.S. homeland. AWS will likely continue to grow 

in both capabilities and numbers. This growth of unmanned systems is not limited to the U.S. military or 

even the United States; it is an international phenomena that includes government and commercial applications in all domains—air, land, and sea. Commercial 

endeavors for unmanned systems are at the forefront 

of many technologies and their proliferation will 

likely outnumber military use in the future.

BACKGROUND 

Before examining issues related to autonomous 

weapon systems, it is important to establish a broad 

context and lexicon for the subject. This section explores the meaning of autonomy and establishes the 

definition for use in this Paper. It also provides a 

context for discussion through a brief look at the history of autonomous systems as well as contemporary 

applications.

What is Autonomy?

The intellectual dialogue among philosophers regarding autonomy in human interactions goes back 

over 300 years.1 There is no universally accepted defini-
2

tion for autonomy for applications involving humanmachine systems. This should not be a surprise, given 

the complex nature and implications of anonymous 

systems, and such a lack of basic terminology is not 

unique (e.g., consider the vastly different meanings of 

the term “cyberspace” in contemporary culture). There 

appears to be a general consensus within the ongoing 

discourse on the topic that autonomy is best characterized not as a discrete property of an object or system, 

but rather as a relationship between a system and its 

operator that may vary across the spectrum of different degrees of system autonomy. In simple terms, this 

spectrum progresses from controlled operations (“human in the loop”), to supervised operations (“human 

on the loop”), to fully autonomous operations (“human out of the loop”).2

 Thus, the use of machine autonomy is a common experience in daily life when one 

considers such systems as automobile cruise control, 

aircraft autopilot, or digital video recorders. 

When one considers the use of autonomy in 

weapon systems, the need for more precise language 

is required, especially for systems that may involve 

the potential application of lethal force. Toward this 

end, the United States is one of the few countries in 

the world to have an openly published government 

policy in this area.3 Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, not only 

establishes policy and organizational responsibilities, 

but it also “establishes guidelines designed to minimize the probability and consequences of failures in 

autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems 

that could lead to unintended engagements.”4 In addition to “autonomous” and “semi-autonomous,” the 

directive also defines “human-supervised” as a category of autonomous weapon systems. Figure 1 pro-
3

vides the definitions of these categories of autonomy 

with their correlated common names. The definitions 

are arranged in increasing level of autonomy with 

an intentional overlap between the graphic borders 

around each definition. These intersecting areas provide conceptual clarity since a given system may have 

subsystems operating in different modes of autonomy 

during different parts of a mission. For simplicity, this 

Paper will use the term “autonomous weapon system” or AWS to describe any DoD system that fits the 

definitions shown in this Figure.

Figure 1: Spectrum of Autonomy in Weapon 

Systems.5
4

It is important to note that DoD clearly distinguishes a difference between autonomy and remote control. 

Thus, when considering unmanned aircraft, their rule 

is “when the aircraft is under remote control, it is not 

autonomous. And when it is autonomous, it is not 

under remote control.”6 This distinction implies that 

any remote control of an unmanned aircraft7 negates 

any consideration of autonomy. However, in a complex system-of-systems design, the operator may be 

remotely controlling a sensor while the aircraft is on 

autopilot—essentially, the aircraft is flying itself and 

should be considered autonomous. The implications 

for a more nuanced model of autonomy are discussed 

later in this Paper. 

While DoD Directive 3000.09 applies to AWS 

that involve “the application of lethal or non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic, force by autonomous or 

semi-autonomous weapon systems,” it specifically 

excludes: 

cyberspace systems for cyberspace operations; unarmed, unmanned platforms; unguided munitions; 

munitions manually guided by the operator (e.g., laser- or wire-guided munitions); mines; or unexploded 

explosive ordnance.8

This distinction of applicability may introduce a disconnect into DoD policy with respect to “unarmed, 

unmanned platforms” since they may still inflict injury or collateral damage to individuals and property if 

they malfunction. For example, an automated convoy 

vehicle that runs amok due to a system malfunction 

may injure a person or cause damage that is similar in 

effect to collateral damage from an errant AWS.

A vital theme in DoD Directive 3000.09 is the requirement for AWS to “be designed to allow com-
5

manders and operators to exercise appropriate levels 

of human judgment over the use of force.”9 Responsibility to meet this mandate is shared among many 

facets of the development and procurement process, 

to include rigorous hardware and software testing, 

safety and information assurance precautions, operator procedures and training, and legal review. The 

section of this Paper on operational uses will discuss 

issues related to these obligations in more detail.

Historical Context.

The use of AWS in warfare is not a new concept. 

One could argue that the development and integration of such systems has evolved over the last century. 

While a comprehensive exploration is beyond the 

scope of this work, some famous examples include the 

Kettering “Bug” Aerial Torpedo (circa 1917)10 as well 

as Soviet “Teletank” units (two battalions), and German “Goliath” remote-control mini-tanks (over 7,500 

produced) used during World War II.11 Evolutionary 

system milestones that may be of significant interest 

to modern AWS include the first launch of a Maverick 

missile from an Air Force target drone in December 

197112 and the introduction in 1972 of the British Morfax Wheelbarrow, the first unmanned ground vehicle 

(UGV) used for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).13

Looking exclusively at UGVs, Douglas Gage of the 

Naval Ocean Systems Center has written about technical aspects of the early days of these ground-based 

AWS.14 Gage’s account characterizes the efforts as 

largely focused on research and development in the 

1960s through the 1980s, with work led by the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and 

prestigious technical universities. Various programs 
6

experimented with various forms of locomotion, sensing, navigating, and decisionmaking as well as the 

ability to manipulate tools to perform a specific mission. In the 1980s, research programs emerged that 

were more focused on potential military applications. 

Among them were the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive 

Command (TACOM) and DARPA work on the Advanced Ground Vehicle Technology and the Naval 

Ocean Systems Center work on Ground Surveillance 

Robot (GSR) for the Marine Corps. The GSR was not a 

small system; it used the 7-ton M-114 armored personnel carrier as its foundation. Other efforts during this 

time period used dune buggies and the High Mobility 

Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) as their 

chassis.15 Development of robotic systems in the 1980s 

also included some of the early armed UGVs such as 

the Grumman Robotic Ranger (demonstrated remote 

missile firing) and the RDS PROWLER (demonstrated 

missile and machine gun firing) as well as several 

prototypes of potentially autonomous security robots 

with lethal weaponry.16

In 1990, a congressionally-mandated joint program 

office was established to better coordinate UGV development efforts among the Army and the Marine 

Corps, a relationship that is part of the overall Joint 

Ground Robotics Enterprise (JGRE) construct.17 Into 

this century, after the 9/11 attacks, the use of UGVs 

saw a rapid expansion for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

(OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in 

response to warfighter urgent needs for systems such 

as PackBot, TALON, and MARCBot.18 The evolution 

of these systems will be discussed in more detail in the 

developmental issues section of this Paper.
7

Contemporary Applications.

The current master plan to coordinate DoD unmanned system efforts is described in considerable 

detail by the Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, 

FY2013-2038, a document approved by two key leaders 

within DoD acquisition—Admiral James Winnefeld, 

Jr., the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and 

Frank Kendall, the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)). 

This comprehensive plan addresses strategic planning 

and policy, technologies, operating environments, logistics and sustainment, training, and international 

cooperation for unmanned systems applications in 

the domains of air, land, and sea.19 Table 1 provides 

the description of domain-based unmanned systems 

per the Integrated Roadmap. It is interesting to note 

that, consistent with the emphasis on air systems, 

only the term UAS is explicitly defined in current joint 

doctrine.20

Table 1. DoD Domain-Based Unmanned System 

Descriptions.21

unmanned aircraft system 

(UAS)

A system whose components include the necessary equipment, 

network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft.

unmanned ground system

(UGV)

A powered physical system with (optionally) no human operator 

aboard the principal platform, which can act remotely to accomplish assigned tasks. UGS may be mobile or stationary, can 

be smart learning and self-adaptive, and include all associated 

supporting components such as operator control units (OCU).

unmanned maritime system 

(UMS)

UMS comprise unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs), which 

include both unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned 

undersea vehicles (UUVs), all necessary support components, 

and the fully integrated sensors and payloads necessary to accomplish the required missions.
8

Interest in unmanned systems is by no means limited to the U.S. military. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted numerous studies 

that examine not only the use of such systems among 

government departments and agencies, but also the 

implications of exporting commercial versions of some 

unmanned systems (or their related technologies).22 In 

a July 2012 report, GAO examined the issue of worldwide proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 

noting that in only 7 years, “the number of countries 

that acquired an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system nearly doubled from about 40 to more than 75.”23

Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of the magnitude of the worldwide situation, with shaded portions 

of the map indicating countries that operate UAVs.

Figure 2. Countries with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

(as of December 2010).24
9

Contributing to this proliferation is the explosion 

of the domestic UAS market. The Association for 

Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), 

an industry advocacy group, claims that the current 

global commercial market (manufacturers and applications) for unmanned systems is comprised of 2,400 

platforms and 900 companies for air systems; 880 platforms and 340 companies for ground systems, and 810 

platforms and 340 companies for maritime systems.25

The economic potential is huge for a UAV industry if 

and when it is fully integrated into U.S. airspace. An 

AUVSI report from March 2013 projects the potential 

for 70,000 new jobs within the first 3 years of integration with an economic impact of more than $13.6 

billion, and this is further projected to grow to over 

100,000 new jobs with $82 billion benefit by 2025.26 As 

with many high-technology products, unmanned vehicles may have dual-use potential for both commercial and government purposes. 

Now that we have a better appreciation for the diverse and dynamic context of unmanned systems in 

general, let us now examine some of the opportunities 

and challenges associated with their military applications. Consistent with DoD guidance, the use of AWS 

in any part of the range of military operations must 

include the opportunity for appropriate human judgment, but this responsibility also extends to those who 

design and develop the systems.27 The next section addresses some of the key issues facing the community 

that takes a given AWS through the processes from 

an initial requirement or concept up to being a fully 

capable field asset. 
10

DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES RELATED 

TO AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

What does DoD hope to gain from the use of AWS? 

The Integrated Roadmap contends that: 

unmanned systems will be critical to U.S. operations 

in all domains across a range of conflicts, both because of their capability and performance advantages 

and because of their ability to take greater risk than 

manned systems.28

Further, it cites three primary forces driving DoD efforts: (1) military utility of unmanned systems as demonstrated in combat operations in Southwest Asia; 

(2) anticipated budget constraints that require more 

affordable technical solutions; and (3) changing international security environment, especially the strategic 

shift to Asia-Pacific Theater and the resulting anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges.29 Summing it all 

up, the vision of the roadmap states simply, “DoD will 

develop and field affordable, flexible, interoperable, 

integrated, and technologically advanced unmanned 

capabilities.”30

Toward this vision, this section explores two questions: How should the United States develop autonomy-related applications for use across the range of 

military operations? What technologies are imperative to the development of AWS? The section addresses these questions first by describing the current 

state-of-the-art for Army UGV systems. It then examines technology issues in decreasing scope of application—from those for unmanned systems in general, to 

those related to the use of autonomy, to those specifically related to UGV purposes. The section ends with 

a brief analysis of the federal budget trends for AWS 

development.
11

Current DoD and Army Developmental State 

of the Art in Autonomous Systems.

In a 2012 report, the Defense Science Board (DSB) 

examined the role of autonomy in DoD systems and 

concluded that, despite the proven usefulness of unmanned systems in operation, “autonomy technology 

is being underutilized as a result of material obstacles 

within the Department” that include “poor design 

[and] lack of coordination of research and development (R&D) efforts.”31 Further, the report argues that 

recent development of unmanned systems was largely evolutionary, moving forward based on combat 

experience and experimentation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report does argue that the concept of armed 

UAVs, which combine the strike and intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions into 

a single platform, is a revolutionary new capability. 

In both cases, the main impetus behind the systems 

was an operational pull to support missions to defeat 

improvised explosive devices and to eliminate highvalue targets.32

The push to acquire UGV system rapidly to support OIF/OEF urgent needs led to widespread purchase of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment. 

Eventually, over 7,000 UGV of many different designs 

were purchased, mostly using Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) funding.33 Table 2 depicts the evolution in functional focus of ground robotics in combat from 162 systems in 2004 to over 7,000 by 2012.34
12

Table 2. Evolution of Ground Robotics in Combat.35

In parallel to the ad hoc procurement of UGVs for 

OIF/OEF, a methodical and coordinated effort to incorporate unmanned systems was ongoing as part of 

the Future Combat System (FCS). Initially envisioned 

by General Eric Shinseki in 1999, FCS was the huge program ($200 billion) that integrated 18 systems around 

Year Number of Ground 

Robot Systems Functional Focus

2004 162

- No single vendor could produce 162

- Five vendors, multiple configurations

- Joint effort, EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] focused

2005 1,800

- Robot’s proven ability to save lives

- Expansion beyond EOD mission (Countermine, Security)

- Agreements with AMC [Army Materiel Command] and REF 

[Rapid Equipping Force]

2006 4,000

- Engineers and Infantry

- Route clearance, Explosive detection & Weaponization 

development

2007 5,000

- Special Forces robot applications assessed

- Route clearance, Explosive detection & Weaponization on 

battlefield

2008-09 6,000

- Range extension

- CBRNE [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives] detection

- Persistent surveillance

- RC [Remote Control] HMMWV

- More capable payloads

- Maneuver elements

2010-12 7,000

- Military Police

- Smaller platforms

- Enhanced battery life

- Commonality

- More capable payloads

2013-14 >7,000

- “Plug & play” capabilities

- Limited autonomy

- Weaponization

- Increased agility and dexterity

- Interoperability
13

a central network. Of the original 18 systems, 10 were 

to be unmanned: four different classes of UAV; three 

different types of UGVs; and three other unmanned 

ground systems that included a vertical missile launch 

system. Although the program achieved its Milestone 

B of the DoD acquisition framework in 2003, FCS was 

reduced in scope and eventually cancelled in June 

2009. Little of the decade-long development effort was 

salvaged.36

As OIF/OEF closed out, the Army Deputy Chief 

of Staff, Operations and Plans (G-3/5/7) directed a 

bridging strategy to sustain select existing COTS systems (primarily Talon and Packbot families) for up to 

8 years until UGVs are available via traditional acquisition program of record methodology.37 This includes 

resetting and sustaining almost 1,500 COTS robots 

while working to incorporate interoperability, chassis 

commonality, and payload modularity into systems 

being developed.38 The anticipated strategic environment for this unmanned system development is largely derived from capstone DoD studies such as the 

Quadrennial Defense Review as well as priorities from 

the President and Congress. Per the Integrated Roadmap, the explicit strategic trends and environmental 

characteristics are:

• Reduction in federal budgets;

• Operational issues will be more complex;

• U.S. military forces will be rebalanced toward 

the Pacific;

• Violent extremism will continue to threaten 

U.S. interests;

• Unmanned technologies will continue to improve; and,

• Cyber domain will be a conflict environment.39
14

The Integrated Roadmap also addresses potential implication of adversary use of unmanned systems, 

especially in support of A2/AD missions:

Enemy unmanned systems will complicate air, ground, 

and maritime operations by adding new low-altitude, 

ground, and amphibious threats to the force that must 

be countered. This concern will require the development of friendly countermeasures, including tactics, 

techniques, procedures, and training that enable the 

force to operate in the emerging environment.40

Given these myriad challenges, what are the key technologies necessary to support the development of 

future unmanned systems?

Key Technologies for Unmanned Systems.

Determination of the technology foci for unmanned systems should be informed by the expected 

capabilities that such systems will fulfill in the range 

of military operations. The framework of Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) is utilized by DoD to help organize 

and manage this process. Currently, there are four 

JCAs envisioned for unmanned systems to support: 

battlespace awareness, force application, protection, 

and logistics.41 While many of the basic requirements 

of locomotion, sensing, navigation, and connectivity 

were solved at the prototype level in the 1980s and 

1990s, and further refined through combat experience 

in the 21st century, there remain significant technological challenges for AWS development. The Integrated 

Roadmap narrows this to nine technology areas that 

are presented in Table 3 along with summaries of the 

proposed objectives and activities for each area.
15

Table 3. DoD Key Areas for the Technological 

Advancement of Unmanned Systems.42

Technology Areas Objectives and Activities

Interoperability and 

Modularity

- Develop and stabilize standard information exchange requirements (IERs) with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partners

- Meet interoperability requirements such as those specified in DoDD 5000.01 and CJCSI 

6212.01F

- Create interoperable components, subsystem, and payload interface to enhance modularity 

and reduce life cycle cost 

Communication

 Systems, Spectrum, 

and Resilience

- Pursue platform agnostic command, control, communications, and computers (C4) infrastructure

- Simplify plug-and-play payload interfaces to lower costs and enhance ability to update, 

modify, upgrade, and link

- Utilize globally available C4 enterprise capabilities (such as data centers and distribution 

nodes)

Security: Research 

and Intelligence/

Technology

Protection (RITP)

- Use layered application of protective measures to prevent compromise of critical information and technology

- Assess system vulnerabilities and threats as early as reasonable in the development 

process

- Provide unmanned systems with the ability to remotely and autonomously render data at 

rest unrecoverable by an adversary

- Create classification guidelines that transcend organizational cultures and build trust 

between Intelligence Community agencies and mission partners

Persistent Resilience - Reduce the size, weight, and power consumption of unmanned systems

- Achieve reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) performance sufficient for longduration missions (such as single unmanned vehicle ISR for periods exceeding 24 hours)

- Utilize active warning and self-protection subsystems as well as passive measures to 

enhance survivability

- Pursue advanced structures, material, and propulsion solutions

Autonomy and 

Cognitive Behavior

- Move unmanned systems from executing preprogrammed plans to performing missions 

with dynamic tasks

- Develop ability for unmanned systems to modify strategies and self-directed behavior 

necessary to achieve a human-directed goal

- Incorporate key enablers such as dynamic mission planning, precise position, navigation, 

and timing (PNT), and appropriate machine rules of engagement for utilizing processed 

information and mitigating lost links

Weaponry - Develop and standardize weapons specifically designed for use on unmanned systems

- Design weapons with multiple modes of operation that include the ability for scalable effects (similar in concept to nuclear “dial-a-yield”)

- Utilize advanced weapons materials and nanoenergetics to increase performance and 

reduce weight
16

Tackling these technologies in a concerted fashion 

may yield dramatic improvements that facilitate mission performance, endurance, reliability, and synchronization at reduced levels of human risk and logistics 

burden. When considering development of lethal 

AWS, the areas of weaponry and autonomy and cognitive behavior merit further insight. The evolution of 

weaponized AWS has been largely an ad hoc process 

that adapted unmanned platforms to use available 

munition systems. This has been proven effective for 

combinations such as Hellfire missiles on Predator 

UAVs. But there is great potential for optimization 

at the system-of-systems level if the weaponry is designed specifically for unique features of a given unmanned platform. In this way, the munition system 

may be better suited to operate within the unmanned 

systems’ environment (including optimized size and 

shape), to exchange mission data, and to be interchangeable within classes of unmanned systems.43

For autonomy and cognitive behavior, the aim can 

be stated simply as “the future of autonomous systems is characterized as a movement beyond autonomous mission execution to autonomous mission performance.”44 In other words, unmanned systems should 

strive to emulate appropriate cognitive behavior in 

the battlespace, just as the brain of a military operator must adapt to the inevitable changes that transpire 

as they move from the planning cell to “boots on the 

ground” as well as anticipate future change.45 Pursuing the concept of autonomy requires its own subset 

of supporting technologies. 
17

Technologies that Facilitate Autonomy.

How does one break down the complex concept of 

autonomy into practical elements that can be realized 

through use of the proper technology? A framework 

developed by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) examines how varying levels of autonomy may be required to enable mission accomplishment as part of an 

iterative process that exercises an AWS ability to form 

a world model, the ability to reason, and the ability to 

alter actions. When actions are altered by the AWS, 

the world model changes and the cycle repeats.46 In an 

unrelated effort, in a 2012 task force report, the DSB 

identified “six key areas in which advances in autonomy would have significant benefit to the unmanned 

system”47 that are summarized in Table 4. These six 

areas correlate well to the ONR framework, with perception technology linked to determining a world 

model; planning and learning technologies linked to 

the ability to reason; and human-robot interaction, 

natural language understanding, and multi-agent coordination linked to the ability to alter actions. The 

DSB study also examined the state of the art of each 

of these six areas and provided an assessment of gaps 

that should be addressed to improve the application 

of autonomy for DoD systems. 
18

Table 4. DSB Key Areas for Advancement 

in Autonomy to Benefit Unmanned Systems.48

Technology Areas Application for Autonomy in Unmanned Systems

Perception

Perception is essential for autonomy, for enabling the unmanned vehicle to achieve reach (e.g., 

navigate through environments and manipulate obstacles) and for using reach to meet mission 

objectives, either for a platform (e.g., collecting sensor data, applying kinetic weapons, defeating IEDs) or for the battlespace.

Planning

Planning is the process of computing a sequence or partial order of actions that change the 

world from the current state to a desired state, or in DoD terminology, a plan is a course of action designed to achieve mission objectives while minimizing resource utilization. The process 

relies on two key components: 1) a representation of actions, descriptions of conditions in the 

world and objectives/resource optimization criteria and 2) algorithms for computing action 

sequences and assigning resources to the actions so as to conform to the hard constraints of 

the problem (e.g., vehicle limitations in terms of terrain and speed) while optimizing the soft 

constraints (e.g., minimizing the total mission time or personnel use).

Learning

Machine Learning has become one of the most effective approaches to developing intelligent, 

autonomous systems. Automatically inducing knowledge from data has generally been found to 

be more effective than manual knowledge engineering. Development of state-of-the-art systems 

in computer vision, robotics, natural language processing and planning now rely extensively on 

automated learning from training data. Mining large amounts of real-world data to find reliable 

patterns, generally results in more accurate and robust autonomous systems than manual 

software engineering. This also allows a system to automatically adapt to novel environments 

from actual experience operating in these situations.

Human-Robot 

Interaction

Human-robot interaction (HRI) is a relatively new, multi-disciplinary field that addresses how 

people work or play with robots versus computers or tools. This is a subset of the larger field of 

human-system interaction, as the focus is on bi-directional, cognitive interactions in which the 

robot is a physically situated agent operating at a distance from the user, versus a computer or 

autopilot, thus leading to significant distinctions. In order to be consistent with the scientific literature, the term HRI will be used generally, but UxV [unmanned vehicle] will serve to describe 

the specific form of robot.

Natural Language 

Understanding

Natural language is the most normal and intuitive way for humans to instruct autonomous 

systems; it allows them to provide diverse, high-level goals and strategies rather than detailed 

teleoperation. However, understanding human language is difficult since it is inherently ambiguous, and context must be used to infer the intended meaning. Therefore, building autonomous 

systems that can follow English instructions as well as human speech is a very difficult technical challenge. Therefore, traditional graphical user interfaces (GUIs) are frequently a more 

effective approach to communicating with computing systems. However, in many situations 

(e.g., when the user’s hands are otherwise engaged), language is a very desirable mode of 

communication.

Multi-agent 

Coordination

Multi-agent coordination is a term that is broadly applied to accomplishing a task that is 

distributed over multiple robots, software agents or humans. Each agent is considered to have 

some degree of individual autonomy, and the coordination may either emerge from the agents 

interacting or negotiating with each other directly (distributed coordination) or be explicitly 

directed by a planner (centralized coordination). Regardless of the coordination scheme, the 

distribution of an activity across multiple agents implies that coordination schemes must address synchronization of the agents with each other and to dynamically changing aspects of the 

environment or mission.
19

In practical terms, any AWS that embraces the 

technologies in Table 4 in its design must also meet 

strict operational effectiveness and suitability test parameters as certified by the Director of Operational 

Test and Evaluation.49 For Army-specific applications, 

UGVs will need to support the traditional “shootmove-communicate” technique of ground forces, but 

they must do so in “environments [that] could include 

being thrown or launched, climbing hills or stairs, 

and hopping and landing upright.”50 Independent of 

the DSB findings, the Army science and technology 

(S&T) community identified the need for enhanced 

capabilities in five areas: adaptive tactical reasoning; 

focused situational awareness; safe, secure, and adaptive movement; efficient proactive interaction with 

humans; and interaction with the physical world.51

To pursue these capabilities, the Army Research 

Laboratory formed the Robotics Collaborative Technology Alliance (RCTA) as a consortium of nine government, industrial, and academic institutions to address research and development relevant to future 

military unmanned ground vehicles.52 The RCTA 

Program Plan simplified the title of the five enhanced 

capability areas to: think-look-move-talk-work. Table 

5 summarizes the vision and challenges of each capability area. The RCTA plan goes on to identify five 

primary cross-cutting technical barriers which are 

compared across the think-look-move-talk-work paradigm to identify the fundamental research thrusts 

that the consortium will pursue.53
20

Table 5. Research and Development Focus for 

Military UGVs.54

Enhanced 

Capability Area

Vision and Challenges

Adaptive Tactical 

Reasoning

- Vision: robots understand the concept of a mission or task, including stages of progress and 

measures of success.

“Think”

- Adaptive tactical reasoning requires both declarative and procedural knowledge with which to 

reason. Neither exists in current systems, which generally have no data structures for mission 

level information. Tactical reasoning also requires some kind of model of the other members 

of the team, both human and robot, so that reasonable predictions of expected behavior can 

be made.

Focused Situational 

Awareness

- Vision: future autonomous ground systems maintain situational awareness (SA) that is 

relevant to the current task and the larger mission.

“Look”

- Focused SA, requires a semantic/cognitive description of the robot’s environment that 

current systems do not have. SA also requires a sense of salience, what is important based 

on a shared understanding among teammates. Better learning is needed to develop a more 

human-like hierarchical understanding of object categories in the first place as well as to refine 

perception capabilities in the field.

Efficient Proactive Interaction with Humans- Vision: robots interact with each other and especially with Soldiers in an efficient and proactive 

way relevant to the evolving situation.

“Talk”

- Existing robotic systems are notoriously opaque and distrusted. They cannot explain what 

they are doing, primarily because they do not have meta-cognition; in other words, they do not 

have a model of their own behavior. Current systems also lack the ability to understand human 

(i.e., semantic) communication of orders or other information

Safe, Secure, and 

Adaptive Movement

- Vision: robots that move on orders or their own initiative from one tactical position to the 

next with little or no reliance on metric inputs such as GPS. They can move, as Soldiers do, to 

semantically described locations (e.g., “third building on the left after the next intersection”).

“Move”

- Current systems have insufficient descriptions, or models, of the world in which the robot is 

moving. Useful movement is also hampered by the lack of task or mission context so that a 

robot may persist in trying to reach a particular location that is not needed for the mission. 

Robots also need to be able to move in crowded and unpredictable environments, where existing algorithmic approaches are probably intractable but new learning approaches may work.

Interaction with the 

Physical World

- Vision: robots are able to observe objects at close quarters to enable 3D interaction with them. 

They pick-up and move objects, either upon semantic direction or their own initiative.

“Work”

- The above four capabilities (think-look-move-talk) largely enable the performance of the 

main goal of the mission – the “work” the robot is to do. The work most often involves direct 

physical interaction with the world: entering and searching a building or vehicle, loading and 

delivering supplies, inspecting a suspected IED, etc. There is generally great uncertainty about 

the objects with which the robot is attempting to interact.
21

The fact that the ONR, DSB, and Army S&T studies 

identified similar sets of technology areas and goals for 

AWS provides confidence that their efforts are in the 

right direction and that they can support each other. 

However, any plan to implement technology comes 

with a price tag that must compete in an increasingly 

contentious federal budget.

Budget Resources.

The DoD Integrated Roadmap included a projection of unmanned systems budgets from Fiscal Year 

(FY) 2014 to FY 2018 based on information available 

at its publication, included herein as Figure 3. Clearly, the budget heavily favors air-based systems with 

their projected portions accounting for 94.2 percent of 

the total development costs and 91.5 percent of total 

procurement costs. Of course, some of these costs include unmanned air systems for the Army, Navy, and 

Marines as well as for the Air Force. In stark contrast 

is the lesser budget priority for unmanned ground 

systems, which account for less than 1 percent of total development costs and less than 2 percent of total 

procurement costs. 
22

Figure 3. DoD Unmanned Systems Funding per 

Integrated Roadmap.

55

While there is insufficient information to reproduce the method by which Figure 3 was tabulated, 

we can compare some of its projected values to those 

recently submitted as part of the FY 2016 DoD budget 

request. Procurement of UAV dominates the requests 

for unmanned systems and it includes $960 million for 

research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) 

as well as $1.87 billion for procurement. The procurement funding buys 51 UAVs: 15 MQ-1 Gray Eagles 

(based on Predator) for the Army; 29 MQ-9 Reapers 

for the Air Force; 3 MQ-4C Tritons (based on Global 

Hawk) for the Navy; and 4 RQ-21 Blackjacks (based 

on Shadow) for the Marine Corps.56 The Army uses 

the Gray Eagle as “a dedicated, assured, multi-mis-
23

sion Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) fielded to all 

ten Army Divisions to support the commander’s combat operations.”57

Funding for various unmanned system program 

elements are spread through the Army’s FY 2016 budget request, and it is beyond the scope of this Paper 

to delve into all the details therein. However, in addition to the UAV and related costs already identified, 

there are two noteworthy items for unmanned ground 

systems. First is the request for $40.4 million RDT&E 

in support of the Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle 

(Program Element 0604641A) which is described as 

“man-packable, miniature (<25-lbs), highly mobile, 

unmanned robotic system with advanced sensors/

mission modules for dismounted Soldiers.”58 The program element includes the ability to evaluate readily 

available hardware such as COTS to support emerging 

warfighter requirements as part of the Robot Enhancement Program.59 Second is an indication of the Army’s 

intent to pursue ground AWS that can apply lethal 

capabilities listed under Program Element 0603827A, 

Soldier Systems-Advanced Development, Project S54, 

Small Arms Improvement: 

FY16 New Start Armaments for Robots: Will initiate 

the intelligence/networking and weapons design and 

functions for a man-in-the-loop, small caliber defensive armaments system on an unmanned ground vehicle including the Warfighter/Robot interface.60

No further details are available, but this would appear to support the intent of the Integrated Roadmap 

technology area of weaponry development specific to 

unmanned platforms.

The budget challenges are significant as FY 2016 

and beyond must deal with the loss of OCO funding 

as well as possible impacts from sequestration. Spend-
24

ing for UGVs must support the bridging strategy to 

divest older systems and limit sustainment costs on 

the systems selected to remain in the inventory. This 

will leave little funding available to develop, procure, 

and deploy future unmanned systems, thus it is important to understand how these systems may be used 

in military operations to ensure investments are made 

with prudence. 

OPERATIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO USE OF 

AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

One could argue that the operational use of AWS 

thus far has been viewed largely as an ends to a means 

focused on a specific mission, such as UGVs supporting counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) efforts. But the Army Research Laboratory RCTA overview brief offered a different vision for unmanned 

systems—“A Paradigm shift—from Tool to Team 

Member”61 This section addresses two questions related to such a vision: What can be achieved via autonomy within the range of military operations? What 

missions can be enhanced by incorporating AWS?

Mission Parameters.

The parameters for potential mission areas for 

AWS can be found in each of four JCAs identified in 

the Integrated Roadmap. For battlespace awareness, 

AWS may extend mission endurance and provide 

persistent ISR in all operational domains that could be 

readily shared with similar systems to further enhance 

their effectiveness. Force application capabilities have 

already been proven in combat by UAVs conducting 

offensive operations against high-value targets. UGVs 
25

are also projected to have lethal applications, such 

as armed reconnaissance, as well as nonlethal operations, such as crowd control. For protection capabilities, unmanned systems can assume risky missions, 

such as firefighting and decontamination, as well as 

continue to refine methods for handling sophisticated 

high explosives. For logistics, unmanned systems can 

facilitate transportation and resupply tasks as well as 

support routine maintenance, such as inspections and 

refueling.62

Regarding future UGV missions, the DSB assesses 

that both the Army and Marine Corp are interested 

in achieving lower risk to humans; accessibility to 

areas not suitable for humans; enhanced sensor capability and mobility; and battle formations that purposely combine warfighters with AWS units.63 In the 

same study, the DSB asserted that the application of 

unmanned systems this century has been ad hoc in 

nature:

Due to the understandable pressures of war, unmanned systems were often fielded before CONOPS 

were fully developed or understood; deployment 

support structures (sustainment, service structures, 

etc.) were immature; and the lack of understanding 

or validating (testing) maturity to support tactical and 

operational challenges in remote theaters have further 

complicated progress.64

To address the warfighter needs for unmanned systems that better integrate into the full range of military 

operations, let us consider a more deliberate approach 

to their integration into existing force structures.
26

Integration into Force Structure.

DoD Directive 3000.09 requires commanders of the 

combatant commands to integrate AWS into their operational mission planning and also charges them to 

“identify warfighter priorities and operational needs 

that may be met by” AWS through established procedures overseen by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff.65 The Integrated Roadmap posits that this mandate can lead to systems that perform beyond mere 

substitution for manned systems, thus allowing new 

formations and tactics that are more agile and maneuverable. It also suggests that unmanned systems could 

be used as low-cost disposable assets that expect attrition, a concept that reverses the current focus on 

procuring complex and expensive systems that often 

require risk-adverse planning.66 But how does one determine the best types of unmanned systems to procure? And what is the best way to blend these systems 

with human warfighters into a cohesive force?

As discussed earlier, FCS was the Army’s modernization program until its cancellation in 2009. But in 

the years prior to this, the program made significant 

strides toward answering these force integration questions. The FCS Test Master Plan addressed not only 

the individual capabilities of its eight manned and 

10 unmanned vehicles, but also how the entire family of systems worked together to accomplish a given 

mission.67 Also, the FCS program formed a unique 

Evaluation Brigade Combat Team at Fort Bliss, Texas, 

to support early operational assessments and testing 

of FCS elements as well as the complete system comprised of soldiers working together with manned and 

unmanned platforms on the ground and in the air.68
27

Currently, the Army UGV Campaign Plan for 

modernization organizes systems into four classes of 

vehicles (CoV): Soldier transportable, vehicle transportable, self-transportable, and appliqué.69 The descriptions of the CoV and system types within each 

category are presented in Table 6. Even during modernization, some traditions remain and the Army practice of using mules is updated with the Common Mobility Platform/Multi-Mission UGV envisioned “as 

vehicles to serve as robotic ‘mules’ to take on multiple 

soldiers’ loads.”70 The top priority for technology areas to support the UGV Campaign Plan was assessed 

to be autonomy, with envisioned mission applications 

for: 

area clearance, route clearance (marks and detects), 

convoy, soldier follower, manned/unmanned teaming, situational awareness and navigation in a [global 

positioning system] denied environment. Also for 

route detection, planning, and maneuver capabilities 

over soldier passable terrain.71

Emphasizing autonomy development would help 

mitigate two of the primary challenges assessed by 

the DBS for UGVs in combat operations: “negotiating 

terrain and obstacles on the battlefield, and performing kinetic operations within the Rules of Engagement 

(ROE).”72
28

Table 6. Army Unmanned Ground Vehicle 

(UGV) Campaign Plan.73

Class of Vehicles (CoV) CoV Description and System Types

Soldier Transportable

- UGV system with weight not exceeding 35 pounds and with forms that allow them to 

be carried by Soldiers or Marines for extended periods of time over varying terrains.

- The majority of soldier transportable systems are used for surveillance, reconnaissance missions, and standoff IED detection and defeat.

- Continued advancements in antenna design, autonomy, miniaturization, power 

sources, and control mechanisms are required in order for these capabilities to be 

fully realized.

- System types: Crew Served Bot ; Small Bot; Micro Bot ; Nano Bot

Vehicle Transportable

- Vehicle transportable unmanned systems are heavier and require a prime mover for 

transportation to and from a mission.

- Future requirements for vehicle transportable systems are expected to include more 

advanced, reliable and autonomous area and route clearance robotic vehicles as well 

as humanoid like systems.

- Continued advancements in autonomy (to include intelligence understanding and 

decision making), power systems, and enhanced mine detection and neutralization 

techniques and methods are needed.

- System types: Mounted or Towed; Armed; Humanoid 

Self Transportable

- Self transportable systems can move under their own power, up to road march 

speeds, without assistance from a prime mover or other sources.

- Self transportable systems are not manned systems with appliqué kits applied, rather 

they are systems that have been developed explicitly as unmanned vehicles.

- Continued advancements in autonomy, sensors and sensor fusion are required in 

order for these capabilities to be realized.

- System types: Soldier Follower—Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT); Medium 

Wingman—Striker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT); Heavy Wingman—Heavy Brigade 

Combat Team (HBCT); Squad Member.

Appliqué

- Appliqué COVs are systems that can be used to convert fielded and future manned 

systems into unmanned systems.

- These systems are envisioned as ‘kits’ that include all the hardware (sensors, cables, 

actuators, control station, etc.) and software required to fully operate and monitor the 

selected vehicle remotely.

- Key advancements are required in the areas of autonomy, processing, size, weight 

and power (SWaP), sensor development, and sensor fusion for this CoV to be fully 

matured.

- System types: Remote Operation; Supervised Autonomy; Full Autonomy; Exoskeleton
29

The DoD Roadmap (2013) makes it clear that force 

integration for unmanned systems must not be confined to single-domain applications. Rather, it promulgates the development of Manned-Unmanned 

Systems Team (MUM-T) as an essential part of the 

strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region. The MUM-T 

force would be smaller and more agile, thus providing 

key capabilities to address A2/AD challenges such as: 

• Defeating explosive ground surface, sub-surface (tunnel), and sea hazards from greater 

standoff distances;

• Assuring mobility to support multiple points of 

entry;

• Enabling movement and maneuver for projecting offensive operations;

• Establishing and sustaining the shore lines of 

communications required to follow forces and 

logistics;

• Protecting austere combat outposts;

• Providing persistent surveillance to detect and 

neutralize threats and hazards within single- to 

triple-canopy and urban terrain.74

To develop and refine the MUM-T concept, the 

Army’s Program Executive Office-Aviation established the Manned Unmanned Systems Integration 

Capability (MUSIC) Exercise program. The first exercise, MUSIC I, was conducted in September 2011 at 

Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. In addition to MUMT capabilities, the exercise also tested ground control 

stations and remote video terminals. Lessons learned 

from MUSIC I were used by the product office to help 

improve usability, reliability, integration, and configuration control of future systems.75
30

Success in the MUM-T force depends not only on 

the interactions between human and machines, but 

also on the interoperability among the machines. As an 

example of ongoing effort to improve interoperability, 

consider the DoD Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task 

Force (UAS TF) that was established in April 2010 in a 

charter signed by USD(AT&L) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense to address many issues in this area.76

The UAS TF is divided into four principal integrated 

product teams (IPTs): Interoperability; Airspace Integration; Frequency and Bandwidth; and Logistics 

and Sustainment. The Task Force also has Advisory 

Groups for Research and Development and Payloads 

and Sensors.77 For the critical area of interoperability, 

the Interoperability-IPT “continues to address the 29 

prioritized Joint interoperability capability gaps identified in the approved Unmanned Interoperability Initiative (UI2) Capability Based Assessment (CBA).”78

Doctrine.

DoD Directive 3000.09 mandates the development 

of doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(TTPs) for AWS applications as well as their periodic 

review to ensure they are appropriate for changes in 

realistic operational conditions. It emphasizes that the 

doctrine and tactics must “have demonstrated the capability to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment in the use 

of force” as well as meet all legal and safety rules.79

Ideally, the development and promulgation of doctrine should receive high priority among warfighters, 

but this is not always the case. 

In his book Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution 

and Conflict in the Twenty-first Century, author P. W. 
31

Singer devotes a chapter to examining how the United 

States might fight with robots. He cited a survey of U.S. 

military officers that “identified developing a strategy 

and doctrine [for using robots in combat] as the third 

least important aspect to figure out.”80 His observation 

provides some insight into the ad hoc applications of 

AWS in combat thus far despite policy that dictates a 

more informed approach.

What should AWS doctrine address? Perhaps a 

good starting point is to embrace a mission-focused 

autonomy vision crafted by the ONR: “Develop autonomous control that intelligently understands and 

reasons about its environment relative to its objectives 

and independently takes appropriate actions.”81 However, these actions in a mission will result from human 

direction in two broad teamwork styles: remote presence or taskable agents. As its name implies, remote 

presence allows humans to perceive and act through 

unmanned systems at a distance, while taskable 

agents allows the unmanned system to autonomously 

complete a human-directed mission task.82

Starting with the foundation of remote presence 

and taskable agents, there are numerous doctrinal nuances that must be addressed concerning how these 

principles are applied in operations of increasing 

complexity. What is the primary operational entity for 

a given mission? Are humans the supported force element, or are they supporting the unmanned system? 83

Do these roles change at different phases in the mission? How autonomous are AWS allowed to operate when factoring not only inherent capability, but 

also commander’s intent, laws of war, and rules of 

engagement? 

Probably the best attempt at addressing such AWS 

doctrine issues thus far occurred at Fort Bliss, Texas, 
32

as part of the operational assessment of fledging FCS 

operations.84 But these experiments were limited to 

few soldiers and unmanned systems. However, as we 

move toward more of a MUM-T structure, it may become common or a single soldier or system to operate 

multiple AWS simultaneously; an extreme application 

of this would be swarming. 

The DSB report on autonomy discussed two possible types of swarming coordination: cooperation and 

collaboration. Cooperation may emulate swarming 

behavior seen in nature among large numbers of animals executing simple tasks based on instinct, such as 

ants foraging for food. Cognitive and communication 

abilities for cooperation are basic and may be reduced 

to a small number of stimulus-response commands. 

Collaboration is a more intentional form of teamwork 

that requires more sophisticated sensing and communication as well as cognitive understanding of other 

members of the swarm.85 Using AWS in swarms may 

provide greatly enhanced mass and maneuver capabilities as well as allow for the use of lower cost systems 

in large enough numbers to account for attrition and 

possibly overwhelm any traditional defenses. However, to be successful it is likely that such formations 

will communicate and react at speeds and complexity 

beyond human comprehension; this introduces a limitation that doctrine should address. 86

Doctrine must also address how U.S. human/

AWS teams interact with external parties. Such interaction may involve coalition teaming efforts, adversary countermeasures, and incidental contact with 

innocent noncombatants.87 To better understand 

the possible implications of such interaction, let us 

now examine AWS applications in the international 

environment.
33

International Efforts.

The global proliferation of UAVs as depicted in 

Figure 2 and discussed earlier applied to all forms of 

aviation. The Bard Center for Study of the Drone reports that by 2013, 87 countries are either developing 

or acquiring military drones.88 Filtering this number 

down, a 2014 RAND Corporation report found 23 

countries are potentially developing armed UAVs, 

of which eight countries are working on systems that 

would meet Category I criteria of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—a range of at least 300 

kilometers with a payload of at least 500 kilograms. Of 

these eight countries, three are MTCR members (Russia, Turkey, and the United States) and five are not 

members (China, India, Iran, Taiwan, and the United 

Arab Emirates). 

Of note is that Israel, the largest exporter of UAVs 

(to over 42 countries), is not an MTCR member. Israel 

is assessed as developing MTCR Category II UAVs—

the same range criteria as Category I, but with less 

payload.89 Israel also exports ground systems like the 

Guardium unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), a semiautonomous system designed primarily for routine 

patrols, but also able “to autonomously react to unscheduled events, in line with a set of guidelines specifically programmed for the site characteristics and 

security doctrine.”90 China is also an exporter of AWS, 

according to the DSB which noted that after their initial marketing at the Zhuhai air show in 2007, “now 

every major manufacturer for the Chinese military has 

a research center devoted to unmanned systems.”91

Other countries of interest for exporting AWS include 

Russia and Iran.92
34

Given the crowded international environment for 

military unmanned systems, how does the United 

States extend its force integration of AWS to include 

allies, coalition partners, and friends? DoD Directive

3000.09 allows for the “international sales or transfers 

of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems” in accordance with existing U.S. law.93 Chapter 

8 of the Integrated Roadmap identifies three primary 

methods of international cooperation for unmanned 

systems: international agreements for joint RDT&E; 

foreign military sales; and direct commercial sales. It 

also provides details regarding the rigorous control 

processes established by Congress to ensure proper 

arms export control, technology transfer, and foreign 

disclosure of sensitive information.94

An example of international cooperation is the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance 

Ground Surveillance (AGS), a system that uses the 

U.S. Global Hawk UAV to give NATO commanders 

comprehensive ground situational awareness. It was 

used successfully to help protect civilians in Libya 

during NATO operations there in 2011.95 The DoD FY 

2016 budget includes $198 million for RDT&E efforts 

for the AGS.96

Individual countries have benefited from U.S. 

partnerships with AWS as well. High-demand systems such as the RQ-1 Predator and MQ-1 Reaper 

UAVs built by General Atomics have been purchased 

by many countries, including NATO allies Canada, 

France, Germany, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, and 

UK.97 The Australian Army acknowledged the benefits of procuring “capabilities such as the Switchblade system (an armed, disposable micro-UAV)” to 

provide “opportunities for the [Australian] Army to 

enhance the individual lethality of its soldiers in an 

austere budget environment.” 98
35

How is NATO approaching the implementation of 

AWS into future operations? A series of workshops 

and seminars led by NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation have focused on the 

objective “to improve awareness and understanding 

of autonomous systems, promote interoperability and 

provide guidance for the development of, use of, and 

defence against, autonomous systems.”99 Their work 

includes recommendations to adopt precise language 

when dealing with AWS, specifically the introduction 

of “autonomous functioning” as reference to “the ability of a system, platform, or software, to complete a 

task without human intervention, using behaviours 

resulting from the interaction of computer programming with the external environment.”100 Accordingly, 

the report recommendations include “rather than 

emphasising the fact that a system employs autonomous functions, focus should be placed on the level 

of human control and accountability and the type of 

decision being autonomised.”101 Such clarification appears to be in concert with the DoD policy guideline 

to ensure the exercise of appropriate levels of human 

judgment when using AWS.102

The challenges of integrating U.S. military unmanned systems into operations with other governmental entities are not limited to international military 

forces. There are also issues that DoD must consider 

related to military AWS operations in the continental 

United States and bordering countries. For example, 

a 2012 GAO report examined the use of UAVs by the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to support 

national security operations along the U.S. southwest 

border. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

granted DHS authority to fly such missions, but were 

concerned about safety in the national airspace, since 
36

the UAVs had limited capabilities to avoid other 

aircraft.103

The January 2013 USD(AT&L) report to Congress 

on unmanned systems acknowledges that “current 

DoD UAS lack the same capabilities as manned aircraft to safely and efficiently integrate into the National Airspace System (NAS).”104 The DoD UAS Task 

Force includes an integrated product team dedicated 

to address this problem:

The Airspace Integration IPT (AI-IPT) seeks to improve airspace access for UAS operations and training 

requirements in support of homeland defense, homeland security, and defense support of civil authorities. 

The AI-IPT reviews and assesses operational requirements; identifies and develops acquisition solutions; 

assists in the development of UAS technical standards; and recommend straining and policy changes 

necessary to integrate UAS into necessary classes of 

airspace.105

The current process allows the FAA to issue a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) for government entities that desire to fly a UAS in civil airspace 

for purposes such as law enforcement, firefighting, 

border patrol, disaster relief, search and rescue, and 

military training. The FAA evaluates the COA request 

for safety and, if approved, defines the allowed airspace and any special provisions. The numbers of 

COAs granted has risen from 146 in 2009 to 609 in 

2014.106 To further complicate the situation, as of May 

2014, 35 states have introduced legislation to restrict 

the use of drones by government; 12 state legislatures 

have actually some formal measures.107 Returning full 

circle back to the international environment, it is important to note that the European Union (EU) is also 
37

considering airspace management restrictions for 

unmanned air systems.108 Also, a March 2015 GAO 

report compares the evolution of airspace restrictions for UAS operation amongst the United States, 

Australia, Canada, France, and UK.109

Strategic Geopolitical Challenges.

What long-term strategic effects on American national security policy are likely to result from increased 

use of military AWS? When examining this question, 

one must ask if the AWS are simply an evolution of 

warfare, or whether they may represent a revolution 

in military affairs.110 The 2014 report from NATO Allied Command Transformation recommends serious 

study regarding the impact of autonomous system to 

the character of war, specifically “the potential of autonomous technologies to impact the nature and conduct of war.”111 Consistent with this theme, the report 

concludes that one of the study’s most important findings is the need to consider the proper balance of human control versus machine control. Toward this end, 

the report recommends this be done at policy levels 

and include the following factors:

• The type of decision being transferred to the 

machine;

• The command relationship between human 

and machine;

• The type of operating environment;

• The type of risk incurred if the machine makes 

the wrong decision; and,

• The particular military benefit of autonomization of certain functions (e.g. precision performance, faster decisionmaking, reduction of risk 

to personnel).112
38

In his study of the effectiveness of recent armed 

drone strikes, author James Walsh considers the longterm implications and asks “How will other countries 

and insurgent organizations respond to the use of 

drones as a U.S. tool of counterinsurgency?”113 Use of 

drones can be seductive, since such operations require 

fewer “boots on the ground” and thus diminish the 

risk of U.S. casualties. However, a 2014 RAND Corporation report notes that this reduced fear of loss may 

“change the calculus for the employment of force” to 

lower the threshold of intervention and warns that 

“as armed UAVs spread, other countries may be more 

likely to intervene in similar circumstances.”114 A 

2014 study of future warfare by the Australian Army 

echoed the need for carefully examining the potentially profound changes that autonomous technology 

may have in future wars. The report singles out armed 

AWS, stressing that “significant questions remain concerning the ethics and legality of arming autonomous 

platforms and empowering these systems to use lethal 

force.”115

On the domestic political front, Walsh poses a question that would please Clausewitz: “How the reliance 

on drone strikes will influence perceptions on the part 

of the American public of the acceptability and desirability of the use of force.”116 Certainly, the administration of President Obama has greatly escalated the 

use of armed drones in the application of U.S. force, 

including use “over at least 475 decisions to carry out 

lethal force in nations beyond the ones where U.S. 

military forces are deployed on the ground.”117 An apparent side effect to this increased use is reduced operational and political costs at home, a trend that may 

make the decision to use force easier in the future. 

Many respected government experts have questioned 
39

if the authorities granted by such measures as the War 

Power Act have been interpreted too liberally in these 

operations. To address such concerns, let us examine 

the related legal issues. 

LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO USE OF 

AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

What are legally acceptable uses of autonomous 

weapon systems within the range of military operations? To examine this, we will first look at existing 

international legal conventions including the Law of 

Armed Conflict (LOAC). We will then review recent 

assessments by the UN LOAC. Next, we focus on the 

concept of human control and judgement as it applies to AWS. Finally, we shall review some current 

vignettes as well as consider some potential trends for 

the future. 

International Law and LOAC.

Although the widespread use of AWS in warfare 

is still in its infancy, there have been serious concerns 

raised regarding the legality of their application. What 

forms the legal foundation for the use of AWS in warfare? DoD Directive 3000.09 explicitly assigns responsibility to the General Counsel of DoD (GC, DoD) to 

“provide for guidance in and coordination of legal 

reviews of weapon systems submitted in accordance 

with” provisions of the directive.118 This includes review of the Law of War (often called law of armed 

conflict, or LOAC) per the provisions of DoD Directive 

2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, which:

encompasses all international law for the conduct of 

hostilities binding on the United States or its indi-
40

vidual citizens, including treaties and international 

agreements to which the United States is a party, and 

applicable customary international law.119

To address the growing controversy regarding 

drone attacks, internationally recognized legal expert 

Michael Schmitt published a detailed legal analysis 

that examined both the jus as bellum (right to war) 

and jus in bello (international humanitarian law) principles. In general, he concluded “that there is little 

reason to treat drones as distinct from other weapons 

systems with regard to the legal consequences of their 

employment.”120 He also addressed the debate over 

U.S. drone attacks over countries whose government 

did not grant permission, such as Pakistan. Schmitt 

summarized the U.S. justification as one derived from 

Article 51 of the UN Charter (inherent right of self-defense), stating that “the victim state [the U.S.] may act 

militarily in self-defense, including the use of drones, 

to put an end to the unlawful activities” that the territorial state (Pakistan) fails to stop.121 Schmitt’s analysis 

included two other interesting concepts related to the 

use of drones. First, because of their capabilities for 

long duration loiter and precision strike, drones may 

in some cases be the most legally responsible choice of 

force application. Second, drone operators located in 

the United States remain legitimate targets of enemy 

attack.122

When considering the use of armed UAVs to target specific individuals or groups, the Bard College’s 

Center for Study of the Drone assessment resonated 

with Schmitt’s arguments. Specifically, the Center 

surmises that: 

under international humanitarian law, the United 

States may use lethal force against individuals outside 
41

of an active war zone, but only if these individuals are 

actively involved in hostilities that pose an imminent 

threat to the United States or its interests.123

Recent military doctrine of UK also echoed Schmitt’s 

observation that AWS may in some cases be the most 

responsible choice. They offer the argument regarding 

the Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) 

employed in Afghanistan that “the potential damage 

caused by not using C-RAM in its automatic mode justifies the level of any anticipated collateral damage.”124

Assessments by the United Nations. 

Thus far, the discussion has focused on legal issues limited to AWS in the air domain; a more general 

discussion of armed AWS in all domains is necessary 

to properly assess the legal implications. Toward this 

objective, the UN has sponsored two meetings, in May 

2014 and April 2015, under provisions of its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) focused on “questions related to emerging technologies 

in the area of lethal autonomous weapons [LAWS].”125

The May 2014 Meeting of Experts on LAWS was attended by representatives from 87 countries as well 

as over 25 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 

and academe. In addition to discussing legal aspects 

of LAWS, the agenda included sessions on technical 

issues, ethics and sociology, and operational and military aspects. Since this was the inaugural UN meeting on LAWS, it generally focused on identifying the 

myriad issues and working toward a common lexicon 

to guide future discussion toward solutions. 

The final report of the May 2014 meeting indicated 

that many of the delegates were trying to consider the 
42

balance between “the potential for rapid technological 

developments in autonomous weapons to radically 

transform the nature of warfare” and “the necessity 

of recognizing the significance of the peaceful uses 

of autonomous technologies in the civilian field.”126

While there was no agreement on any significant issue, several themes emerged in the technical sessions, 

to include “the notion of meaningful human control 

could be useful to address the question of autonomy” 

as well as “the concept of human involvement in design, testing, reviews, training and use” of LAWS.127

The sessions on legal aspects revealed diverse views 

on the possibility for LAWS to comply with international humanitarian law as well as the adequacy of 

existing international law to address potential uses 

of LAWS. Another provocative issue regarded how 

responsibility for the use of LAWS would be determined and whether there may be an “accountability 

gap” that requires an examination of responsibilities 

for not only LAWS users, but also for those involved 

with the design and manufacturing.128

Based on the progress of their 2014 meeting, CCW 

leadership organized a second meeting to continue 

the dialogue on LAWS. In preparation for this meeting, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) 

published a primer for delegates of the second meeting based in part on key issues raised in the first meeting. The primer encourages that “States should follow 

these [LAWS] discussions with a more focused examination of the strategic stability issues surrounding 

LAWS, perhaps in the form of a working group.”129

The issues listed by CNAS included: the current existence of LAWS; the legality, morality, and predictability of LAWS; how LAWS affect human dignity 

and ethics; and stabilizing and destabilizing nature of 
43

LAWS in warfare. They also highlighted the concept 

of “meaning human control” as an important part of 

addressing the other challenge areas and proposed a 

working definition:

There are three essential components of meaningful 

human control:

1. Human operators are making informed, conscious 

decisions about the use of weapons.

2. Human operators have sufficient information to ensure the lawfulness of the action they are taking, given 

what they know about the target, the weapon, and the 

context for action.

3. The weapon is designed and tested, and human operators are properly trained, to ensure effective control over the use of the weapon.

These standards help ensure accountability, moral 

responsibility, and the ability to safely control the 

weapon.130

The second Meeting of Experts on LAWS was held 

April 13-17, 2015, and included delegates from over 

90 countries as well as from the EU and 15 NGOs. 

Observers at the proceedings noted that there was 

positive discussion, but still no true consensus on 

any significant issues. At the most fundamental level, 

there remains some disagreement as to what constitutes LAWS, especially with regard to existing systems, such as armed drones. There was also discussion of the dilemma surrounding the dual-use nature 

of autonomy and the concern that a universal ban on 

LAWS-related technologies may inadvertently outlaw 

some beneficial applications as well.131

While the formal report on the 2015 meeting is 

still being written and reviewed within UN channels, many of the written statements of contributing 
44

countries have posted on the CCW website. As one 

might expect, both meetings included representatives 

from the five permanent members of the UN Security 

Council (China, France, Russian, UK, and the United 

States), any of which could wield veto power over 

enactment of any eventual LAWS-related security 

resolutions. The opening statement by the UK clearly 

established their viewpoint: “From our perspective, 

to discuss LAWS is to discuss means and methods of 

warfare. As such, international humanitarian law provides the appropriate paradigm for discussion.”132

The U.S. delegation clarified the U.S. position that 

the conference discussion should only involve future 

systems and “emerging technologies,” and that for the 

purposes of the meeting, “we are not referring to remotely piloted aircraft, which as their name implies 

are not autonomous weapons, or other existing weapons systems.”133 The statement included “The United 

States has a process in place, applicable to all weapon 

systems, which is designed to ensure weapons operate safely, reliably and are understood by their human 

operators”134 and further noted that DoD Directive 

3000.09 imposes additional scrutiny for any potential LAWS, but “neither encourages nor prohibits the 

development of such future systems.”135

Human Control and Judgment.

In his closing remarks at the 2015 LAWS meetings, 

Paul Scharre of CNAS commented “There seems to be 

an emerging consensus that human control and judgment is needed. And most seem to agree that there 

should be a necessary quality to that control, just as 

there is with the use of weapons today.”136 Although 

one might dismiss this as a self-fulfilling prophecy 
45

facilitated by the CNAS primer, it is clear the issue of 

human control and judgment is an essential element 

to include in any deliberations of AWS. For example, 

the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 

held an Expert Meeting of Autonomous Weapon Systems in March 2014, the results of which informed 

the LAWS meetings.137 The ICRC meeting included 

representatives from 21 countries and 13 NGOs and 

their findings included “recognition of the importance 

of maintaining human control over selecting and attacking targets, although there is less clarity on what 

would constitute ‘meaningful human control’.”138 To 

help explore this conceptual ambiguity, presentations 

given at the meeting included topics on Human Supervisory Control; Distinction, Proportionality, and 

Precaution; and Accountability and Responsibility. 

Pointing to ethical considerations beyond legal factors, the report notes “it is argued that the manner 

in which people are killed matters, even if they are 

lawful targets.”139

The 2014 NATO Allied Command Transformation 

report also addresses the importance of considering 

human control, and notes in general terms “the necessary level of human control depends on the particular 

situation, applicable legal constraints, and the level of 

tolerable risk.”140 For unarmed AWS, risk assessment 

may be based on the potential for collateral damage 

based on the size of the system and the possible kinetic energy if it crashed.141 The report further notes the 

more severe restriction case of LAWS application and 

concludes, “The idea that autonomous systems could 

be autonomously deciding on the use of lethal force 

against humans, is perceived by some as being incompatible with the dictates of public conscience.”142
46

Toward the Future.

Despite the insistence of the U.S. delegation to the 

recent UN meeting that armed drones are not associated with LAWS issues, it may be prudent to consider 

the opinions of the rest of the world. The first openly 

acknowledged successful use of an armed U.S. UAV 

was a Predator in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.143

The legal justification for the attack was based in large 

part on the “Authorization for Use of Military Force” 

passed as a joint resolution by Congress following the 

9/11 attacks.144 A report by the RAND Corporation 

found that since that first use, there have been eight 

other conflicts in which the United States used armed 

UAVs. Per the report’s assessment of these conflicts, 

three did not occur in a recognized war zone (Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia), and three did not have 

clear congressional authorization (Yemen, Libya, and 

Somalia). Also, the report posited that: 

the greatest concerns about U.S. use of armed UAVs 

appear to arise from operations outside active war 

zones, less-transparent operations, lack of clarity 

about congressional authorizations, and targeting of 

those not clearly identified as combatants or al Qaeda 

leaders.145

In a Parameters article, W. Andrew Terrill explored 

the use of drones over Yemen in further detail and 

noted that: 

despite their successes, the use of US drones is deeply 

unpopular with many Yemenis, and anger over their 

employment is one of the primary drawbacks to using these systems. One of the most important reasons for Yemeni anger is a concern about national 

sovereignty.146
47

Terrill noted the resulting reluctance of (former) 

President Ali Abdullah Saleh to publicly acknowledge 

Yemen cooperation with the United States for drone 

strikes. Even with the 2012 election of President Abed 

Rabbu Hadi and a more openly cooperative relationship with the United States, Terrill recommended that 

“US leadership correspondingly needs to avoid viewing its drone program as a panacea for Yemen’s terrorism and insurgency problems.”147 In a rather prophetic 

conclusion, Terrill asserted: 

In sum, drones are on probation with the Yemeni public, and even a friendly Yemeni president can still be 

pressured to disallow drone strikes. Drones can help 

manage instability but they cannot, by themselves, 

create stability in Yemen.148

Since the publication of the Parameters article in 2013, 

the government of Yemen has devolved into civil war 

in March 2015 with rebel forces backed by Iran forcing President Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia.149 Granted, 

the dynamics in Yemen go far beyond a simple causeand-effect equation with armed UAVs, and the eventual benefit, or detriment, of their use requires further 

study.

But even in a legitimate conflict with the support 

of local government, commanders and operators of 

AWS need to minimize collateral damage. The 2014 

Australian Army Future Land Warfare Report notes 

that “the increasing difficulty of discriminating between combatants and noncombatants is likely to 

require more extensive targeting preparation and an 

increased need for target audience analysis.”150 Thus, 

governments need to be attuned to public awareness 

of battlespace operations and any implicit promise of 

war without casualties. Enabled by ubiquitous social 
media, the report suggests “the gap between perceptions of bloodless precision and the reality of close 

combat will be difficult to bridge.”151

It will be even tougher to develop appropriate artificial intelligence for AWS to discriminate targets for 

application of lethal force. The challenge is so great 

and the implications so severe that the European Parliament has called on EU member states to consider 

to “ban the development, production, and use of fully 

autonomous weapons which enable strikes to be carried out without human intervention.”152 But even if 

these countries and the United States impose such 

restrictions, potential adversaries may not follow constraints. The 2014 Australian Army report sums this 

up well: “Legal, moral or ethical constraints, which 

are deemed to uphold the legitimacy and legality of 

Western military operations, are unlikely to restrict 

the actions of potential adversaries.”153

The path forward for the United States will continue to be watched closely by the rest of the world. 

As a 2014 report for the Council for Foreign Relations 

cautions: 

Given that the United States is the lead actor and exemplar of drone use, its interpretation of international 

law, public articulation of its position, and future behavior will set a precedent on which other countries 

are like to base their own behavior.154

These strategic decisions will have implications for 

the future of all AWS, not just UAVs. Rather than focusing exclusively on the myriad tactic legal details 

involved with AWS and LAWS, perhaps the United 

States should also promulgate a broader vision of 

ethical behavior that can help promote a culture of 

responsible use of force. Rebecca Crootof of Yale Law 

48
49

School studied international law for autonomous 

weapons in the context of LOAC and beyond. Her recommendation is straightforward: “Given that we do 

not yet fully understand the benefits and risks posed 

by autonomous weapons systems, developing flexible 

codes of conduct may be preferable to negotiating a 

treaty.”155 Indeed, developing such codes of conduct 

requires a dialogue that extends beyond the low bar of 

the interpretation of laws and considers the relevant 

ethical issues.

ETHICAL ISSUES RELATED TO USE OF 

AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 

What should be the ethically acceptable and advisable uses of autonomous weapon systems within the 

range of military operations? What moral principles 

should form the foundation of AWS development and 

operation? We explore these questions by first reviewing the ongoing work for developing ethical frameworks for AWS. We then consider the varying cultural views that AWS applications may evoke. Next, 

we analyze the potential reduction or proliferation in 

warfare that widespread use of AWS may introduce. 

Finally, we look toward the future and contemplate 

potential long-term effects on national security. 

Ethical Frameworks.

The report of the 2014 LAWS Expert Meeting included a section that summarized a session held to 

examine ethical and sociological aspects. Several noteworthy themes were identified for future discourse 

centered on the inherent deficiencies of inculcating 

ethics into machines. Many agreed that “the possi-
50

bility for a robotic system to acquire capabilities of 

‘moral reasoning’ and ‘judgment’ was highly questionable.”156 Some of the perceived difficulties in this 

endeavor would include the pragmatic task of writing software with appropriate values and ethics that 

could be exercised in complex and dynamic environments. The report also questioned how autonomous 

systems might respond to moral dilemmas. Finally, 

even if these challenges were surmounted, could 

humans fully trust such systems and would they be 

acceptable to society writ large? 

Internationally recognized organizations that have 

dedicated efforts to examine the ethics involved with 

LAWS include the Human Rights Watch and the International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC), part of the 

Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School. Since 

November 2012, these groups joined to publish three 

reports on the dangers posed by “killer robots,” which 

they define as fully autonomous weapons that “possess the ability to select and engage their targets without meaningful human control.”157 Their first report, 

Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots (November 2012) builds a case for the possibility of killer 

robots becoming reality within 20 to 30 years as well 

as an urgency for their recommendation for appropriate national and international measures “to prohibit 

the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons.”158 The second report, Shaking the 

Foundations, The Human Rights Implications of Killer Robots (May 2014) emphasizes the ethical concepts of human dignity and right to life. Its conclusion includes:

Finally, as machines, fully autonomous weapons could 

not comprehend or respect the inherent dignity of human beings. The inability to uphold this underlying 
51

principle of human rights raises serious moral questions about the prospect of allowing a robot to take a 

human life.159

The third and most recent report, Mind the Gap: The 

Lack of Accountability for Killer Robots (April 2015) focuses on a very direct premise: “Because these robots 

would be designed to kill, someone should be held 

legally and morally accountable for unlawful killings 

and other harms the weapons cause.”160 The report argues that existing immunity granted to military operators and contractors represent gaps in accountability 

and that such failure to uphold responsibility “add to 

the moral, legal, and technological case against fully 

autonomous weapons and bolster the call for a ban on 

their development, production, and use.”161

Two of the positions endorsed by Human Rights 

Watch and IHRC complement earlier discussions in 

this Paper. First is their participation in the UN LAWS 

Meetings of Experts and specifically their recognition 

of the role of human control. In their opening statement at the 2014 meeting, their representative, Steve 

Goose, noted “The key to success this week will be 

the beginning of the emergence of a consensus that 

there should always be meaningful human control of 

the targeting and kill decisions in any individual attack on other humans.”162 Second is a recommendation from the first killer robot report that proposes a 

worthwhile initiative for those involved in the development of AWS:

To Roboticists and Others Involved in the Development of Robotic Weapons

• Establish a professional code of conduct governing 

the research and development of autonomous robotic weapons, especially those capable of becoming 
52

fully autonomous, in order to ensure that legal and 

ethical concerns about their use in armed conflict are 

adequately considered at all stages of technological 

development.163

The March 2014 ICRC Expert Meeting Report included summaries of three speakers focused specifically on ethical issues surrounding AWS. Professor 

Ronald Arkin of the Georgia Institute of Technology 

addressed the concept of ethical restraint of LAWS. He 

introduced several root causes of war crimes attributable to human motives (such as revenge, dehumanization, immaturity, frustration, and pleasure) that 

could be improved by the use of automated systems. 

However, he admitted that autonomous measures 

may also have negative impacts on squad cohesion as 

well as relations with local populations. In the end, he 

argued that noncombatants could benefit “though the 

judicious deployment of these robotic systems, if done 

carefully and thoughtfully, particularly in those combat situations where fighters have a greater tendency 

or opportunity to stray outside IHL.”164

Dr. Peter Asaro of The New School, USA, provided 

an excellent overview of seminal works of ethics and 

philosophy that inform the dialogue on AWS. He noted the foundations set forth by the Martens Clause to 

evaluate not only a new weapon system’s compliance 

with IHL but also its adherence to matters of humanity and public conscience. He also explained some of 

the moral frameworks that define this, such as the UN 

Declaration of Human Rights (1948) as well as Western 

philosophical tradition, such as rights-based (Kantian) 

theories and virtue ethics. Based on this, he posited 

that “in giving over the responsibility to make targeting decisions to machines, we fundamentally change 

the nature of the moral considerations involved in 
53

the use of violent force.”165 He concluded by pondering the implications of allowing AWS to take human 

lives, asking “As we give over the decisions of life and 

death to technological systems, are we diminishing 

the value of human life?”166

Finally, Dr. Peter Lee of the University of Portsmouth (UK) posited that “such a thing as a fully autonomous, cognisant, self-reasoning weapon system does 

not exist [yet]” and thus the current dialogue about 

future AWS “is necessarily shaped by two things: 

perceptions of the nearest equivalents (drones, currently remotely piloted), and the influence of science 

fiction and the Hollywood effect” and therefore “any 

ethical analysis is subject to contestation and lacking 

demonstrable ‘facts’.”167 He also outlined “the moral 

calculus of oversight and accountability” by comparing the evolution of the “kill chain” from World War 

II bombings, to Reaper armed drones, and then to 

possible AWS operations. He concluded by arguing 

that the LAWS debate will need to continue for years 

since “ethical assessments of autonomous weapons 

are currently as limited as the technological, military 

and political assumptions they are based upon.”168 Dr. 

Lee noted the potential impact that popular science 

fiction may have on perceptions surrounding AWS 

ethical issues; what other cultural influences impact 

this discourse? 

Cultural Views.

Greg Kennedy in a 2013 Parameters article examined some of the cultural views of other countries regarding war by proxy. He observes that, even though 

U.S. drone attacks may have military success, they may 

also increase animosity among the population that 
54

actually can increase attacks on a besieged government 

that the United States is attempting to bolster. Even 

though much of the resentment may be anti-American, 

unfortunately, “feelings of hostility are often visited 

on the most immediate structures of authority [of the 

local government].”169 More troubling are the broader 

implications “regarding the legality, ethicality, and 

operational legitimacy of those [U.S.] acts to deter opponents.”170 Kennedy concludes that evolution from 

limited covert operations to widespread use of armed 

drones exacerbates “the apparent gap between stated 

core policies and values and the ability to practice targeted killings appears to be a starkly hypocritical and 

deceitful position internationally.”171

Two additional articles from the same issue of Parameters delve into some of the nuances of Kennedy’s 

article. Jacqueline L. Hazelton examined how the use 

of drone strikes compare to other tools of the state. 

She argues that strikes against assets that are planning 

an imminent attack on the U.S. homeland present different moral questions than strikes targeting individuals that may be acting suspiciously. Thus, she posits 

that leaders must consider the full political context 

when pondering the use of drone strikes, including 

“for example, theaters where the United States is at 

war, theaters in which it is not, theaters in which the 

United States has national or international permission 

to strike, theaters in which it does not, and so on.”172

In his article, Alan W. Dowd contends further that the 

current context for U.S. decisionmakers should take 

into account how “the brewing international backlash 

against the drone war reminds us that means and 

methods matter as much as ends.”173

An example illustrating Dowd’s observation regarding the means and methods can be found in 
55

French author Grégoire Chamayou’s book, Théorie 

du drone (Drone Theory) in the chapter titled “Ethos et 

psyche” (“Ethos and psyche”). There he mulls over 

the unit morale patch used by some U.S. Reaper UAV 

operators that depicts an image of the Grim Reaper 

holding a bloody scythe under a heading “USAF 

MQ-9 Reaper” and a tab with the motto “That Others 

May Die.”174 While the message behind the image may 

not win favor amongst international audiences, they 

may be even more dismayed to find out that the patch 

is a lampoon of the U.S. Air Force Pararescue force 

which uses a patch of the same design, but with an 

angel instead of the Grim Reaper and the motto, “That 

Others May Live.”175

The 2014 NATO Allied Command Transformation 

report exploring policy guidance for use of autonomy 

also addressed ethical issues and recommended transparency for policymakers as they consider potential 

benefits and concerns related to AWS technology. 

However, the scope of their recommendation went beyond those of LAWS to include the review of “levels of 

responsibility for the intended and unintended consequences of tasks performed by autonomous systems,” 

and it admonishes that considerations “should not 

neglect nonlethal tasks performed autonomously.”176

Warfare: Reduction or Proliferation?

If AWS use becomes widespread, how will it affect 

the frequency and intensity of conflict and the application of force? Despite the anticipated improvements in 

lethality and precision in future AWS that may better 

deter aggression, many argue that the threshold for 

use of force may actually be lowered. Thomas Cowan 

explored the impact of robots on warfare using the 
56

Clausewitz model of war—the trinity of primordial 

violence (depicted as the people), chance (depicted 

as the military), and reason (depicted as the government)—as the lens for his analysis. He posited that the 

use of “robots will significantly increase the potential 

for future conflicts” for three primary reasons. First, 

there will be fewer people directly involved as they 

are replaced by machines; second, friction will be reduced as the robots do not suffer from human physical or mental frailties; and third, the government may 

operate with less constraint since the probability of 

creating friendly casualties is reduced.177

In a 2002 Parameters article, D. Keith Shurtleff expounds on the notion of how increasing technology 

may diminish warfighters’ humanity. He examines the 

concept of disengagement, often facilitated through 

video recordings such as “the luckiest man in Iraq”—

a man in a video that drove a truck across a bridge just 

before a precision bomb destroyed the bridge. General 

Norman Schwarzkopf used this moniker as a punchline during an Operation DESERT STORM press conference as many others have done in a similar manner 

since. Shurtleff sums up the dilemma as: 

what we must deal with now is how to accept, even 

embrace, technologies that make war safer, and yet 

somehow counter the trend that such technologies 

have to disengage us, to make war more acceptable or 

potentially more ubiquitous.178

An interesting phenomenon that runs counter to 

Shurtleff’s thesis that robots may reduce our basic 

humanity involves situations where soldiers in OEF/

OIF personified “their” robots and wanted them fixed 

because of their “loyalty.” This was the case of a badly 

damaged EOD PackBot named “Scooby-Doo” as told 

in Singer’s Wired for War.

179
57

In contrast, in his 2013 Parameters article, Dowd 

cautions against the possible development of a “Jupiter Complex” by national leaders—a condition coined 

during World War II to describe “the notion of the 

Allies as righteous gods raining retributive thunderbolts on their wicked enemies.”180 The promises of increased combat effectiveness at reduced costs can be 

seductive. 

UCAVs take the logic of the Jupiter Complex to its 

ultimate conclusion—maximum use of economic and 

technological resources with zero manpower losses 

and zero risks—all buffered by the virtual-reality nature of the delivery system.181 

How can the U.S. leadership steer clear of such 

temptations?

Toward the Future.

A report on AWS under International Law by the 

Geneva Academy points to the need for leaders to consider the balance between advantages and disadvantages of using AWS for a given mission. Possible advantage include “the absence of emotions such as fear, 

vengeance, or self-interest [that] may lead to outcomes 

that overall are less harmful.” But lack of feelings may 

be a disadvantage in certain situations since “autonomous weapon systems lack positive human emotions, 

such as compassion or mercy.”182 Dowd notes further 

that “they [UAS] remove the unique characteristics 

humans bring to the battlespace: deliberation, doubt, 

fear, gut instinct, and judgment.” 183

So then, how should leaders resolve the tension 

between these perspectives? Perhaps a good starting 

point is a group of questions sent to representatives of 
58

the 2015 UN LAWS Meeting as “Food-for-thought” to 

prepare for the dialogue.

Military rationale for autonomous functions in weapon 

systems.

(a) What is the military rationale for pursuing 

autonomy in specific functions of weapons systems? 

What would be the reasons for limiting the autonomous capabilities of weapon systems? 

(b) In what situations are distinctively human 

traits, such as fear, hate, sense of honor and dignity, 

compassion, and love, desirable in combat? In what 

situations do machines that lack emotions offer distinct advantages over human combatants?

(c) International humanitarian law indicates how a 

party to a conflict should behave in relation to people 

at its mercy, how would machines comprehend such 

situations?

(d) Given the volume and complexity of available 

information, what advantages do autonomous processes offer? Do these make a machine more, or less 

reliable than a human decisionmaker?

(e) Are there scenarios in which autonomy might 

help to protect the lives of civilians and combatants? 

For example, more precise targeting, preventing collateral damage and lower response time to attacks?

(f) What are the specific opportunities and concerns 

for developing and deploying autonomous weapons 

in the context of land, sea, and air operations?184

Sources of recent studies and literature that support thoughtful deliberation of these questions can be 

found at the website of the CNAS Ethical Autonomy 

Project (this includes an extensive online bibliography 

as public education resource).185 With such deliberate 
59

and continuous examination of the ethical issues in 

addition to those of mission effectiveness and legality, we can hopefully escape the fate offered in a final 

warning from Dowd: “It would be ironic if the promise 

of risk-free war presented by drones spawned a new 

era of danger for the United States and its allies.”186

RECOMMENDATIONS 

This Paper explores a diverse set of complex issues 

related to the developmental, operational, legal, and 

ethical aspects of AWS. Many of these issues are already on the agendas of competent government, nongovernment, and industry organizations, with mixed 

progress toward full understanding and resolution. 

The section offers recommendations to facilitate the 

best evolutionary path for the future of some of the 

key issues affecting the use of AWS to enhance U.S. 

national security. 

Policy.

Current DoD policy appears to address the big 

issues being raised internationally in such venues as 

those sponsored by the UN and the ICRC. The next iteration of AWS policy in DoD Directive 3000.09 should 

expand to include unarmed, unmanned platforms 

that are capable of causing damage to individuals or 

property if they malfunction or if their command and 

control link is lost. 

DoD should abandon discrete definitions that pigeonhole systems into categories of autonomy and 

instead consider the recommendations of the DSB 

regarding the characterization of autonomy. Accordingly, DoD should develop a framework which con-
60

siders the autonomous functions of a system and how 

they may change during the course of a given mission. 

Thus, it is more important to clearly identify when 

autonomous functioning of the unmanned system is 

planned to occur (intentionally autonomous) as well 

as how and when it can occur unintentionally (either 

through normal malfunction, interference, or attack by 

adversary on the system or its links). Existing frameworks to consider include ones proposed by CNAS 

(that examines human-machine command and control, complexity of machine, and type of decision)187

and by the DSB (that examines cognitive echelon, mission timelines, and human-machine trade space).188

DoD and the Army need to evaluate the budget for 

unmanned ground vehicle development to assess the 

realism of its ability to achieve any serious evolution 

of capability and integration into the ground forces 

writ large. Any such review should attempt to justify 

resource allocation based on the operational merits of 

UGV systems and not emphasize dubious claims of 

cost savings.189

Maintaining Humanity.

DoD policy should continue to require measures 

that allow the exercise of human judgment and control in AWS operations. Further, this requirement 

should expand to include greater emphasis for commanders and planners to consider how the scope of 

such human control may vary during a given mission 

as well as the potential strategic implications of any 

fully autonomous mission segments. Also, the AWS 

development community should also emphasize how 

autonomy and human control may vary during operations and design fault-tolerate systems that incor-
61

porate “fail safe” modes for all mission segments, not 

just those designated to be intentionally autonomous. 

The development community should also establish 

and promulgate an ethical code of conduct for work 

on AWS similar in nature to that proposed by Human 

Rights Watch and IHRC.

All parties involved with the development and operation of AWS need to ensure the human dimension 

is explicitly emphasized and monitored in doctrine, 

organizations, and processes. Leaders and planners 

need to be vigilant to guard against any form of the 

“Jupiter Complex” that may emerge at the strategic 

level. Developers and operators need to guard against 

any unhealthy disengagement at the tactic and operational levels.190

Strategic Implications.

The mainstream discussions regarding military 

unmanned systems and AWS are dominated by issues 

related to the use of armed drones. Popular media focuses on the exploits of UAVs, from possible package 

delivery vehicles to platforms that invade privacy. 

Government and commercial investors are pursuing 

the development and integration of driverless cars 

into the nation’s highway system. Many of these efforts involve regulations that cut across government 

departments, but there is no clear consideration for 

how these efforts are preceding writ large. 

The long-term implications for current tactical and 

operational use of existing unmanned systems are setting de facto rules of engagement and expectations domestically and internationally. It is unlikely that any 

practical and authoritative strategy and governance 

will emerge that can embrace the full scope of current 
62

autonomous systems, let alone keep pace with future 

developments. With this in mind, the onus of considering the broader context and strategic implications is 

best practiced by individual stakeholders for the near 

future. Responsible stakeholders should act cooperatively and proactively as frameworks of compliance 

and best practices are formulated and formalized in 

the coming decades. 

Additional Issues to Explore.

The scope of this Paper necessarily excludes many 

significant AWS issues, but two merit special attention 

for future studies. First, there needs to be serious dialogue regarding how AWS principles apply to systems 

that operate in the domains of space and cyberspace. 

Cyberspace systems are explicitly excluded from current DoD policy on AWS, but these systems not only 

facilitate the operation of AWS in other domains, but 

they may also act as autonomous software agents in 

operations limited to the cyberspace domain. Second, 

the use of autonomy and its anticipated proliferation 

need to be included in dialogues regarding hybrid 

warfare by state and nonstate actors.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The evolution of autonomous weapon systems 

accelerated significantly after the 9/11 attacks on the 

U.S. homeland, and they will likely continue to grow 

in both capabilities and numbers. This growth of unmanned systems is not limited to the U.S. military or 

even the United States; it is an international phenomena that includes government and commercial applications in all domains—air, land, and sea. Currently, 
63

air-based systems dominate all aspects of AWS—budget, development, and operations. Unmanned ground 

systems receive much lower priority and are largely 

relegated to niche applications vice being seriously 

considered as part of an integrated future land force. 

Commercial endeavors for unmanned systems are at 

the forefront of many technologies and their proliferation will likely outnumber military use in the future.

As the U.S. military moves forward with the development of AWS doctrine that spans the full range of 

military operations, it may be well served to characterize autonomy not as a discrete property of a given 

system, but rather as a function that varies in its strategic, operational, and tactical context and mission 

application. When can the system be autonomous? 

When is it planned in a given mission to do so? When 

can it do so by accident or failure? Efforts that address 

such questions should be tempered with the purposeful consideration of human judgment and control as 

well as legal and ethical standards that foster international credibility. In many of the challenges related 

to autonomous weapon systems, the United States is 

setting both overt and tacit precedents for the world—

will we be able to live up to them if they are applied 

to us?

ENDNOTES 

1. Jenay M. Beer, Arthur D. Fisk, and Wendy A. Rogers, “Toward a Framework of Levels of Robot Autonomy in Human-Robot Interaction,” Journal of Human-Robot Interaction, Vol. 3, No. 2, 

2014, pp. 74-99.

2. Paul Scharre and Michael C. Horowitz, An Introduction to 

Autonomy in Weapon Systems, Working Paper, Washington, DC: 

Center for a New American Security, February 2015, available 
64

from www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/Ethical%20Autonomy%20Working%20Paper_021015_v02.pdf, accessed on June 2, 

2015. This publication offers concise insight into three fundamental questions with regard to autonomous weapon systems: “What 

is autonomy”; “How is autonomy used in weapons today?”; and 

“What is an ‘autonomous weapon’?”

3. Report of the ICRC Expert Meeting on Autonomous weapon systems: technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects, 26-28 March, 

2014, Meeting Highlights, Geneva, Switzerland: ICRC, May 9, 2014, 

available from https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2014/expert-meeting-autonomous-weapons-icrc-report-2014-05-09.pdf, accessed June 

10, 2015. This report states that only the United States and UK 

“are known to have developed national policy on autonomous 

weapon systems.” (p. 10).

4. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense 

Directive (DoDD) 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 21, 2012, p. 1. The 

Definitions section of this directive, p. 15, defines “unintended 

engagement” as:

The use of force resulting in damage to persons or objects 

that human operators did not intend to be the targets of U.S. 

military operations, including unacceptable levels of collateral damage beyond those consistent with the law of war, 

ROE, and commander’s intent.

5. Ibid. Definitions in Figure 1 are verbatim from the definitions in Part II (pp. 13-15) of this document. 

6. James A. Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, and Frank Kendell, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Unmanned Systems Integrated 

Roadmap, FY2013-2038, Reference Number 14-S-0553, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013, p. 15. 

7. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department 

of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 8, 2010 (as 

amended through June 15, 2015), p. 254. This document contains 

the following definitions:
65

unmanned aircraft — An aircraft that does not carry a human 

operator and is capable of flight with or without human remote 

control. Also called UA. (JP 3-30)

unmanned aircraft system — That system whose components include the necessary equipment, network, and personnel 

to control an unmanned aircraft. Also called UAS. (JP 3-30)

8. DoDD 3000.09, pp. 1-2.

9. Ibid., p. 2.

10. “Kettering Aerial Torpedo ‘Bug’,” Fact Sheet, National 

Museum of the U. S. Air Force website, April 7, 2015, available 

from www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/MuseumExhibits/FactSheets/

Display/tabid/509/Article/198095/kettering%ADaerial%ADtorpedo%

ADbug.aspx, accessed August 12, 2015. According to the fact sheet, 

the “Bug” was an early UAV with a 180-pound payload of explosives that used pneumatic and electrical controls to guide it to a 

target. Its range was 75 miles and, although 50 were built by the 

Dayton-Wright Airplane Company before World War I ended, 

none were ever used in combat. 

11. Arthur Holland Michel and Dan Gettinger, “Out of the 

Shadows: The Strange World of Ground Drones,” New York: 

Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, November 3, 

2013, available from dronecenter.bard.edu/shadows-strange-worldground-drones/, accessed June 2, 2015.

12. Richard Whittle, “Hellfire Meets Predator: How the drone 

was cleared to shoot,” AirSpaceMag.com, March 2015, available 

from www.airspacemag.com/flight-today/hellfire-meets-predator180953940/?no-ist, accessed July 30, 2015. The article noted 

on p. 2 that:

By firing a Maverick from a modified Firebee on December 

14, 1971, at Edwards Air Force Base in California, the Air 

Force’s 6514th Test Squadron claimed a place in aviation 

history: the first launch of an air to ground missile from 

a remotely piloted aircraft. None was put into operation, 

though, and with the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, 

Air Force interest in drones evaporated.
66

13. Michel and Gettinger, “Out of the Shadows,” p. 2.

14. Douglas W. Gage, “UGV History 101: A Brief History of 

Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) Development Efforts,” Unmanned Systems Magazine, Vol. 13, No. 3, Summer 1995, posted as 

DTIC Report ADA422845, available from oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb

=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA422845, accessed 

January 28, 2015.

15. Gage, “UGV History 101,” pp. 2-4. Joint Army-Marine 

Corps projects included the Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle 

(TUGV) as well as other development vehicles such as the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Ground Equipment (SARGE), the 

Technology Test-Bed (TTB0, and the GECKO for semi-autonomous vehicle driving evaluation).

16. Ibid., pp. 5-6. On p. 5, Gage points out the historical significance of the ROBART 1 robot:

What is generally regarded as the world’s first autonomous 

security robot, ROBART I, was developed in 1981 at the 

Naval Postgraduate School (Everett, 1982). While rich in 

collision avoidance sensors, this research platform had no 

sense of its absolute location within its indoor operating environment, and was thus strictly limited to navigating along 

reflexive patrol routes defined by the relative locations of 

individual rooms, while periodically returning to a recharging station by homing on an IR beacon. 

17. Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013-2038, p. 7. 

18. Bryan J. McVeigh, “Robotics Portfolio Overview,” briefing 

to the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Robotics 

Division, Warren, MI: Program Manager Force Projection, December 4, 2014, slides 2-4, available from www.ndia.org/Divisions/

Divisions/Robotics/Documents/McVeigh.pdf, accessed May 6, 2015.

19. Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013-2038, 

pp. iii-xiv.

20. JP 1-02.
67

21. Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013-2038, pp. 

4-8. The definitions presented in Table 1 are taken verbatim from 

this source.

22. For a list of GAO reports related to unmanned aerial 

systems (drones), see www.gao.gov/key_issues/unmanned_aerial_

systems/issue_summary, accessed May 29, 2015.

23.“Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and EndUse Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports,” Report 

GAO-12-536, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability 

Office, July 2012, p. 1.

24. “Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports,” Report GAO-12-536, p. 10. Figure 10 of this report lists the 76 countries that had acquired UAVs 

by December 2011 as follows: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech 

Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, 

Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, 

New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 

Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, UK, and 

United States. 

25. “Unmanned Systems and Robotics Directory,” Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) website, available from roboticsdatabase.auvsi.org/home, accessed July 

30, 2015.

26. Darryl Jenkins and Bijan Vasigh, The Economic Impact 

of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the United States, 

Arlington, VA: AUVSI, March 2013, available from https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AUVSI/958c920a-7f9b-4ad2-

9807-f9a4e95d1ef1/UploadedImages/New_Economic%20Report%20

2013%20Full.pdf, accessed July 30, 2015.
27. DoDD 3000.09, pp. 7-8.

28. Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013-2038, p. 14. 

29. Ibid., p. v.

30. Ibid., p. 1. DoD’s vision is for unmanned capabilities 

that will:

• Prevail in the full range of contingencies and in all operating domains, including cyberspace (Defense Strategic 

Guidance 2012);

• Enable decisive force effectiveness in Joint and coalition operations;

• Be critical to future success;

• Emphasize missions according to strategic guidance from 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); counterterrorism; counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 

and operations required to operate across all environments, 

including anti-access and area denial (A2/AD);

• Protect the homeland; and,

• Be able to surge and regenerate forces and capabilities.

31. Defense Science Board (DSB), Task Force Report: The Role of 

Autonomy in DoD Systems, Washington, DC: Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

July 2012, p. i.

32. Ibid., pp. 56-57. The report finds both evolutionary and 

revolutionary aspects in the recent use of unmanned systems:

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan provided an operational pull for unmanned systems—particularly air and 

ground vehicles—that resulted in the deployment of many 

prototype or developmental systems. Once in theater, the 

demands of combat, combined with the ingenuity of the 

troops that operated the systems, resulted in unmanned systems being used extensively. This operational experimentation led to the employment of the systems in unanticipated 

ways with great benefits. The key missions that drove the 

evolution of unmanned systems were ISR, the defeat of improvised explosive devices and the pursuit and elimination 

of high value targets (HVTs). (p. 56)

68
69

The most important development for the HVT mission was 

arming UAVs, combining ISR and strike on the same platform to reduce the reaction time and shorten the kill chain. 

The fleeting, often without warning, window of opportunity against an HVT required both the long-term persistent 

observation provided by an ISR UAV enabling target confirmation and rapid strike without hand-off delays. This 

functionality was enabled by arming the platform. The operational concepts for most manned systems separated the 

ISR and strike functions. Consequently, the combination of 

strike and ISR on a single platform was essentially a revolutionary new capability. (p. 57)

33. Glenn Baca, “An Analysis of U.S. Army Unmanned 

Ground Vehicle Strategy,” Civilian Research Project, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2012, pp. 3-4.

34. McVeigh, “Robotics Portfolio Overview,” slide 4.

35. Ibid., slide 4.

36. Christopher G. Pernin et. al., Lessons from the Army’s Future 

Combat Systems Program, Santa Monica, CA: Arroyo Center, The 

RAND Corporation, 2012, pp. 1-4, 197, available from www.rand.

org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1206.pdf, 

accessed on August 3, 2015.

37. Jeffrey Jaczkowski, “Unmanned Ground Vehicle Update,” 

Warren, MI: Robotics Systems Joint Program Office, June 2012, 

slide 3, available from www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/Robotics/

Documents/Quarterly%20Meetings/14%20June%202012/Mr.%20

Jeff%20Jaczkowski.pdf, accessed May 6, 2015.

38. McVeigh, “Robotics Portfolio Overview,” slide 5. See also 

Jeff Child, “Upgrades and Autonomy Improvement Lead UGV 

Technology Advance,” COTS Journal Online, April 2013, available from www.cotsjournalonline.com/articles/view/103307, accessed 

June 25, 2015.

39. Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013-2038, p. 10. 

The expanded description of the unmanned technologies bullet is:

• Unmanned technologies will continue to improve in many 

different capability areas.
70

• Competitors are catching up in unmanned technology.

• Increasingly data-intensive multisensor/multi-mission capabilities are evolving.

• Unmanned technology innovations are rapidly increasing.

40. Ibid., p. 10.

41. Ibid., p. 23-25.

42. Ibid., pp. 26-79. In essence, Table 2 provides a concise outline of Chapter 4 of the Roadmap; the objectives and activities in 

the table were derived from the text. Specific goals for each area 

of technology are explicitly presented in three time frames: nearterm (2013-17); mid-term (2018-21); and long-term (2022-2030+). 

See figures 11, 12, 18, 19-23, and 30 of the Roadmap for details. 

43. Ibid., pp. 73-76.

44. Ibid., p. 66.

45. Ibid., p. 67.

46. Bobby Junker, “ONR 101 & Navy Autonomy Issues and 

Needs,” NDIA Ground Division Quarterly Meeting, Arlington, 

VA: Office of Naval Research, June 16, 2011, available from www.

ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/Robotics/Documents/ONR%20101%20

and%20Autonomy%20to%20NDIA%20robotics%20conference%20

6-16-2011-Bobby%20Junker.pdf, accessed May 6, 2015, slide 8.

47. DSB, The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, p. 31.

48. Ibid., pp. 31-55.

49. DoDD 3000.09, pp. 6, 10.

50. Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013-2038, p. 87.

51. Ibid., p. 69. 

52. Robotics Collaborative Technology Alliance (RCTA), FY 

2012 Annual Program Plan, Adelphi, MD: Army Research Laboratory, March 2012. In addition to the Army Research Laboratory, 
71

member of the RCTA are Boston Dynamics, Carnegie Mellon University, Florida State University, General Dynamics Robotic Systems, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, QinetiQ North America, 

University of Central Florida, and University of Pennsylvania. 

The program announcement (February 2, 2009), which solicited 

proposals from perspective team members, “identified four key 

technology areas expected to be critical to the development of future autonomous systems, namely: Perception, Intelligence, Human-Robot Interaction (HRI), and Dexterous Manipulation and 

Unique Mobility (DMUM).” (p. 1)

53. Ibid., p. 5. The five cross-cutting technical barriers are:

Simplistic/Shallow World Model. Existing autonomous 

systems fall into two categories: either they have a world 

model that is at only a metric level, thus precluding any 

cognitive reasoning, or they have a model that exists at only 

a cognitive level without physical grounding in the metric 

world. Neither approach is sufficient for our vision where 

robots must behave cognitively while interacting in the 

physical world.

Lack of Semantic Understanding. In existing systems, objects in the world are perceived primarily or only as mobility 

regions, not as discrete objects of semantic and cognitive importance. Thus, one cannot tell a robot, “Go block the back 

door of this building” and expect it to do anything useful.

Scripted and Brittle Planning. Robots are almost always 

tele-operated or, at best, only perform simple scripted behaviors. Scripting all needed behaviors is not tractable and 

does not allow for learning new or alternative behaviors. 

Planning algorithms in robots work well only when the 

planning space is both small and certain enough, but the real 

world is fraught with uncertainty and high dimensionality. 

The inability to reason in complex and uncertain environments means that users must intervene frequently in robot 

operations and are trapped at a close level of “supervised 

autonomy.”

No Shared Understanding of Missions and Roles. Robots 

now are opaque and distrusted and cannot explain what 

they are doing. Not only do they not know what they are doing, but also they do not understand what their teammates 

are doing or what the expectations for roles and communication are. Consequently, current systems must use tedious 
72

OCUs to bridge the enormous cognitive gap between humans and robots.

Missing or Shallow Learning Capability. Robots now 

must be explicitly programmed to do tasks, so producing 

the needed scope of behavior is intractable. Existing learning capability is shallow and lacks generalization. Thus, we 

cannot retrain robots without bringing engineers to the field 

or sending the robots back to the developer.

54. Ibid., pp. 2-4.

55. Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013-2038, p. 3. 

For the chart’s abbreviations: RDTE = Research, Development, 

Test and Evaluation; Proc = Procurement; and OM = Operations 

and Maintenance.

56. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/

CFO, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, Fiscal Year 2016 

Budget Request, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2015, pp. 1-1 through 1-5. 

57. DoD FY 2016 President’s Budget Submission: Army Justification Book of Aircraft Procurement, Army, Washington, DC: Department of the U.S. Army, February 2015, p. 25. The full description 

for P-1 Line Number A00005, p. 25, MQ-1 UAV is:

Gray Eagle provides Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target 

Acquisition (RSTA), command and control, communications relay, Signals Intelligence (SIGINIT), battle damage assessment, and manned-unmanned teaming capability. Gray 

Eagle is a dedicated, assured, multi-mission Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) fielded to all ten Army Divisions to support the commander’s combat operations. The Army Special Operations Aviation Command (ARSOAC) Gray Eagle 

units and Aerial Exploitation Battalions (AEB) Gray Eagle 

units are self-contained Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities teamed with organic Processing, 

Exploitation and Dissemination that are a global rapidly deployable force and contribute to the Department of Defense 

Global ISR mission. A Gray Eagle unit consists of either 9 

or 12 Aircraft, Universal Ground Control equipment, Standard Equipment Package and Payloads to include: ElectroOptical/Infrared Laser Range Finder/Laser Designator, 
73

synthetic aperture radar/ground moving target indicator, 

communication relay, and up to 4 HELLFIRE Missiles.

58. DoD FY 2016 President’s Budget Submission: Army Justification Book of Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Army RDT&E 

– Volume II, Budget Activity 5a, Washington, DC: Department of 

the U.S. Army, February 2015, p. 214. The mission description for 

the Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle includes: 

CRS-(I) is a man-packable, miniature (<25lbs), highly mobile, unmanned robotic system with advanced sensors/mission modules for dismounted Soldiers. The program is the 

result of collaboration between Director, Army Capabilities 

Integration Center (DIR ARCIC), United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC 

CD&I), Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) dated 19 Sep 

2012. Thus the CRS-(I) program has been jointly developed 

by the Army and USMC incorporating Army capability 

requirements, USMC Engineering Squad Robot (ESR) and 

USMC Tactical Robotic Controller (TRC) capabilities into 

one program.

The CRS-(I) capability contributes to the essential Joint 

Operational Concepts (JOC) of: Major Combat Operations 

(MCO); Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR); Homeland Support and 

Civil Defense and Joint Functional Concepts (JFC) of: Force 

Application and Protection. The CRS-(I) contributes directly 

to Situational Awareness, Detect, Protect and Neutralize by 

providing a standoff hazards interrogation, detection, confirmation and neutralization capability employed to support 

a wide spectrum of mobility missions for current and future 

forces by providing required standoff capability across the 

Warfighting Functions. This capability allows commanders 

to make more informed decisions and plans, to use their 

forces more effectively and efficiently to produce desired 

outcomes, and to conduct focused operations for high-risk 

missions or selected missions that best satisfy the requirement without the limitations and vulnerabilities of manned 

systems. The CRS-(I) capability provides commanders the 

ability to persistently monitor the operational environment 

(OE) while protecting and sustaining the force at standoff 

distances from the threat. The CRS-(I) complements the 
74

Joint Integrated Warfighting Force by providing standoff to 

the Warfighter during Major Combat Operations, stability 

operations, and homeland security. The CRS-(I) provides 

Warfighters the capability to find and identify targets of interest in the operational environment.

59. Ibid., p. 214, includes further details on the use of COTS 

and other similar resources:

In support of emerging requirements, the Robot Enhancement Program (REP) uses a ‘buy, try and inform’ methodology to evaluate Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS), Government Off The Shelf (GOTS) and Non-Developmental Items 

(NDI) products that have the potential to enhance Soldier 

combat effectiveness. Hardware quantities will be limited 

to available REP funds. Evaluation results obtained will 

be used to inform emerging requirements documents and 

Cost-Benefit Analyses to support future Army decisionmaking actual operational user feedback.

60. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President’s 

Budget Submission: Army Justification Book of Research, Development, 

Test & Evaluation, Army RDT&E−Volume II, Budget Activity 4, 

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2015, p. 324.

61. Jon Bronstein and Bob Mitchell, “Robotics Collaborative 

Technology Alliance—Foundations of Autonomy for Ground 

Robotics,” program overview briefing, Adelphi, MD: Army Research Laboratory, April 26, 2012, slide 2, available from www.

arl.army.mil/www/pages/392/OverviewBriefingRoboticsCTA.pdf, 

accessed on May 6, 2015.

62. Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013-2038, 

pp. 23-25.

63. DSB, The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, p. 92.

64. Ibid., p. 19.

65. DoDD 3000.09, p. 12.

66. Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013-2038, 

p. 18. The benefits of integrating unmanned systems into existing 

force structure include: 
75

Unmanned systems open up new avenues for pursuing systems that are smaller, lighter, faster, and more maneuverable and that take more risk than equivalent manned platforms. In particular, the ability of unmanned assets to take 

risks that would not be taken with manned assets opens up 

new CONOPS, such as low-cost, expendable systems that 

trade armor and stealth for quantity. In other words, a fleet 

of low-cost, disposable platforms could survive through attrition rather than through expensive, exquisite capabilities.

67. Pernin et. al., Lessons from the Army’s Future Combat Systems 

Program, pp. 236-238.

68. Ibid., p. 43.

69. Robotics Systems JPO, Unmanned Ground Systems Roadmap, pp. 41-43.

70. Ibid., p. 43.

71. Ibid., p. 44.

72. DSB, The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, p. 16. The 

report provides further details on the challenge of creating an 

autonomous system that can follow complex instructions in a 

dynamic environment: 

Terrain negotiation and obstacle avoidance are driven by 

mechanical capabilities coupled with pattern recognition 

and problem solving skills. Operations within the ROE, 

however, represent a higher order, biomimetic cognitive 

skill that must fall within the commander’s intent. Going 

forward, development efforts should aim to advance technologies to better overcome these challenges. Particularly 

in the latter case, the development of autonomous systems 

that allow the operator/commander to delegate specific 

cognitive functions, that may or may not change during the 

course of a mission or engagement, would appear to be an 

important milestone in evolution from remotely controlled 

robotics to autonomous systems.

73. Robotics Systems Joint Project Office, Unmanned Ground 

Systems Roadmap, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 
76

2011, p. 41-43. Appendix A (pp. 56-71) of this roadmap provides 

descriptions and specifications for the systems and programs 

overseen by the Robotics Systems Joint Program Office at that 

time. They were:

Anti-Personnel Mine Clearing System, Remote Control 

(M160)

PackBot Family of Systems

Mini-EOD [explosive ordnance disposal]

TALON Family of Systems

MARCbot

Common Mobility Platform (CMP)

XM1216 Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV)

XM155 Autonomous Navigation System (ANS)

74. Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013-2038, p. 19. 

A more detailed description of the MUM-T concept is included in 

Appendix E: 

The concept of MUM-T is to combine the inherent strengths 

of manned platforms with the strengths of UAS, with product synergy not seen in single platforms. MUM-T combines 

robotics, sensors, manned/unmanned vehicles, and dismounted soldiers to achieve enhanced situational awareness, greater lethality, improved survivability, and sustainment. Properly designed, MUM-T extends sensor coverage 

in time and space and provides additional capability to 

acquire and engage targets.

The pilot can use the sensor on the UAS, just as a sensor 

would be used aboard an aircraft, except that the position of 

the UAS sensor can be up to 80 km ahead from the aircraft. 

The MUM-T capability provides an unprecedented standoff 

range from threat weapons and acquisition systems. MUM 

systems largely depend on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, 

time, and civil considerations. The transfer of sensor data 

between the UAS and the manned system reduces risk to 

both platforms and increases the mission effectiveness and 

survivability rates of friendly forces. Environmental conditions affect the efficiency of MUM-T employment. (p. 139)

75. Ibid., p. 139-141.

The MUSIC exercises showcase to the soldier and Army 

community the progress being made in unmanned interop-
77

erability and emerging technologies through common interfaces. Exercises also act as a strategic planning tool by 

driving integration and test of the various platforms to a 

common hardware and software baseline.

Overview. The objective for the MUSIC I Exercise was to 

showcase interoperability progress and emerging technologies in accordance with the 2.x series of the Army UAS IOPs. 

The exercise took place in Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, 

at the UAS Rapid Integration & Acceptance Center on 16 

September 2011. Weeks of pre-ground and -flight checks 

culminated into a live two-hour demonstration to a group 

of media, contractors, and Army officials. The audience 

witnessed real-time video feeds from the unmanned and 

manned payloads, screen captures from the GCSs, video 

feeds from within the shelter, and visual aids through an 

operational scenario to help demonstrate the capabilities 

and achieve a better understanding of how they benefit the 

soldier. Successful execution of the MUSIC exercise provided the product office with a wide range of lessons learned 

across multiple areas, including system usability, reliability, 

integration, and configuration control. (p. 139)

76. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, Report to Congress on Addressing Challenges for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 2010, p. 3. The UAS TF Charter identified goals for the organization as:

1. Coordinate and evaluate DoD UAS requirements, remaining constantly conscious of technology, cost, schedule, jointness, and interoperability imperatives;

2. In coordination with key UAS stakeholders, increase the 

operational effectiveness of DoD UAS by promoting the 

development and fielding of interoperable systems and networks;

3. Shape DoD UAS acquisition programs to prioritize joint 

solutions which guarantee interoperability, efficient production, lower unit costs, decreased support costs, and increased 

capability;

4. Serve as the DoD’s advocate for shaping the regulatory 

policies, procedures, certification standards, and technology 

development activities that are critical to the integration of 

Department UAS into the national airspace system to fulfill 

future operational and training requirements; and
78

5. Serve as the Department’s lead activity for the development and promulgation of the Unmanned Systems Roadmap. (pp. 3-4)

77. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, Report to Congress on Addressing Challenges for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2013, p. 2. The goals for UAS TF integrated product teams are:

The [Interoperability] I-IPT continues to lead the DoD effort championing more efficient acquisition policies and 

practices, promoting Joint standards and architectures, and 

influencing common practices that enhance manned and 

unmanned interoperability across the Joint, Interagency, 

Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) domains. (p. 1)

The Frequency and Bandwidth IPT (FB-IPT) is tasked to develop DoD spectrum and bandwidth guidance for improving UAS operational effectiveness and mission capability 

for large, medium, and small platforms via new technical 

capabilities; operational TTPs; and regulatory actions. The 

FB-IPT represents DoD and upholds the U.S. frequency 

and bandwidth policies and guidance associated with UAS 

around the world. (p. 12)

The goal of Logistics and Sustainment IPT (LS-IPT) is development of affordable DoD-wide approaches for longterm sustainment of UAS capabilities that support systems’ 

readiness objectives. The LS-IPT provides a forum to discuss 

common issues and opportunities for synergies between 

programs aimed at assisting UAS programs and the Military Departments in the development of UAS sustainment 

strategies by leveraging experience from existing programs, 

organizations, disciplines, and processes to identify best 

practices and lessons learned. (p. 15)

78. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, Report to Congress on Addressing Challenges for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2013, p. 1.

79. DoDD 3000.09, pp. 7-8. Enclosure 3, paragraph 1.b. includes: b. Before fielding, the USD(P), USD(AT&L), and CJCS 

shall ensure: 
79

(1) System capabilities, human-machine interfaces, doctrine, 

TTPs, and training have demonstrated the capability to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment in the use of force and to employ 

systems with appropriate care and in accordance with the 

law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, 

and applicable ROE. 

(4) Adequate training, TTPs, and doctrine are available, periodically reviewed, and used by system operators and commanders to understand the functioning, capabilities, and 

limitations of the system’s autonomy in realistic operational 

conditions. 

(5) System design and human-machine interfaces are readily understandable to trained operators, provide traceable 

feedback on system status, and provide clear procedures 

for trained operators to activate and deactivate system 

functions.

80. P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and 

Conflict in the Twenty-first Century, New York, NY: The Penguin 

Press, 2009, p. 210. 

81. Junker, “ONR 101 & Navy Autonomy Issues and Needs,” 

slide 10.

82. DSB, The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, p. 45.

83. Junker, “ONR 101 & Navy Autonomy Issues and Needs,” 

slide 3.

84. Brian P. Bedell, “Small Ground Robot’s Effectiveness and 

Acquisition Strategy,” Civilian Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 2010, p. 84.

85. DSB, The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, p. 50. The report provides more detail on the concepts of cooperation and 

collaboration: 

Synchronization is often, but not universally, referred to 

as cooperation by multi-agent systems researchers, with 

cooperation being either active (such as in robot soccer) 

or non-active (such as the foraging behavior seen in ants). 

Collaboration is related to cooperation but is treated as a 
80

distinct topic as it assumes that the agents have a cognitive understanding of each other’s capabilities, can monitor 

progress towards the goal, and engage in more human-like 

teamwork. Multi-agent coordination and human-robot interaction are related fields of inquiry, but in general, multiagent coordination research focuses more on cooperation 

schemes for different types of configurations of distributed 

agents and human-robot interaction focuses more on cognition in collaboration.

86. Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY: Preparing 

for War in the Robotic Age, Washington, DC: Center for a New 

American Security, January 2014, p. 29. A follow-up to this report provides greater detail on possible methods to use swarms 

of unmanned systems to provide advantages in mass, speed, coordination, and effectiveness on the future battlefield. See Paul 

Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm, Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, October 2014. 

In the report, the author asserts the benefits of swarms in future 

combat: 

The power of swarming lies in more than just greater numbers, however. Today’s modern military forces fight as a 

network, with interconnected human-inhabited platforms 

passing surveillance and targeting data across great distances. Future military forces will fight as a swarm, with greater 

coordination, intelligence and speed. Autonomous and 

uninhabited systems will be networked and cooperative 

with the ability to autonomously coordinate their actions in 

response to events on the ground. Swarming, coordinated 

action can enable synchronized attack or defense, more efficient allocation of assets over an area, self-healing networks 

that respond to enemy actions or widely distributed assets 

that cooperate for sensing, deception and attack. Harnessing the power of swarming will require new command-andcontrol models for human supervision of large swarms. This 

will mean moving beyond existing paradigms where humans directly control a vehicle’s movements to one where 

human controllers supervise the mission at the command 

level and uninhabited systems maneuver and perform various tasks on their own. (p. 6)

Networked, cooperative swarms of unmanned systems 

that can maneuver and engage targets collectively also 

have the potential to achieve reaction times much faster 
81

than that of human operators. Intelligent swarms can overwhelm adversary defenses, autonomously jamming, spoofing and employing non-lethal disruptive weapons such as 

high-powered microwaves, while relaying the position of 

enemy targets to human controllers who can authorize lethal engagements. Human controllers, safely removed from 

harm’s way, would provide mission-level control over the 

swarm, but the leading edge of the battlefront across all 

domains would be unmanned, networked, intelligent and 

autonomous. The resulting reconnaissance-strike swarm could 

achieve speed, synchronization and coordination of maneuver far surpassing that possible with manned platforms, 

rendering previous methods of warfare obsolete. (p. 29)

87. Bedell,“Small Ground Robot’s Effectiveness and Acquisition Strategy,” p. 11. The author contrasts the unique challenges 

facing unmanned grounds systems: 

The main question on policy is how to apply self-protection 

or anti-handling capability to small ground robots. The 

ground battlespace is much more complex than the air domain and one of the critical complications ground robots 

will face is the direct contact with the enemy and the enemy’s use of ―innocents as surrogates to impede the operational use of the ground robots.

88. Dan Gettinger et. al., The Drone Primer: A Compendium of 

the Key Issues, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Center for Study of the 

Drone, Bard College, 2014, p. 8. 

89. Lynn E. Davis et. al, Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and 

U.S. Security, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2014, 

pp. 8-10. The 23 countries listed as potentially developing armed 

drones are: MTCR Category I-capable (8): China, India, Iran, Russia, Taiwan, Turkey, UAE and U.S.; MTCR Category II-capable 

(3): Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa; not MTCR capable (12): 

France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, North Korea, South 

Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, and UK. Eleven of 

these 23 countries are currently not members of the MTCR: China, 

India, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, North Korea, Pakistan, Switzerland, 

Taiwan, Tunisia, and UAE. The report defines “armed drone” as: 

UAVs designated in the (open source) databases as attack 

systems, precision strike systems, ‘hunter-killer’ systems, 
82

unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), UCAV demonstrators, and/or systems described as a ‘suicide UAV,’ or for 

use as a cruise missile. (p. 9)

90. Guardium UGVTM Fact Sheet, Yokneam, Israel: G-NIUS 

Unmanned Ground Systems, available from g-nius.co.il/pdf/brochures/GuardiumUGV.pdf, accessed on June 2, 2015.

91. DSB, The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems, p. 69. The report 

characterizes Chinese efforts in the development of unmanned 

systems as aggressive:

The latest pictures and models of unmanned systems from 

China show a reconnaissance truck with a joined wing and 

tail that could considerably increase range and payload and 

produce better handling at high altitudes. Roughly the same 

size as the General Atomics Avenger, and powered by a 

single turbofan engine, this new UAV is the most advanced 

Chinese design seen to date and is the largest joined wing 

aircraft known to have been built. Much of China’s efforts 

remain secret, but the large number of unmanned systems 

displayed at recent exhibitions, and very recent revelations 

on development and operational efforts underscore not only 

China’s determination to catch up in this sector, but also its 

desire to sell this technology abroad. (pp. 69-70)

After many years of displaying unmanned systems models 

at international air shows, and recent evidence of prototype 

and operational systems, it is clear that China is moving 

rapidly to catch up—and perhaps ultimately overtake—the 

West in this rapidly growing and increasingly important 

sector of aerospace and defense. In this defense-dominated 

field, China cannot look (openly) to the West for technical expertise and experienced suppliers, as it has done in 

the commercial airliner sector, and therefore it is evident 

the Chinese are copying other successful designs to speed 

their development of unmanned systems and rapidly apply 

lessons learned. (p. 71)

92. For information with examples regarding Russian and 

Iranian unmanned system programs, see the following: David 

Hambling, “Russia Wants Autonomous Fighting Robots, and 

Lots of Them,” Popular Mechanics online, May 12, 2014, available from www.popularmechanics.com/military/a10511/russia-wants-
83

autonomous-fighting-robots-and-lots-of-them-16787165/warsonline.

info/bronetechnika/boevoyrobotizirovanniykompleksargo.html, accessed June 2, 2015. Also see, Dan Gettinger, “Drones Are Not 

Toys: The Russian Program,” New York: Center for the Study of 

the Drone at Bard College, March 5, 2014, available from dronecenter.bard.edu/drones-toys-russian/ accessed June 2, 2015; and Arthur 

Holland Michel, “Iran’s Many Drones,” New York: Center for the 

Study of the Drone at Bard College, November 25, 2013, available 

from dronecenter.bard.edu/irans-drones/, accessed June 2, 2015.

93. DoDD 3000.09, p. 9. Enclosure 4, paragraph 1.d. states 

the USD(P)’s role in foreign military sales of AWS: “Approve the 

DoD position on international sales or transfers of autonomous 

and semi-autonomous weapon systems in accordance with existing technology security and foreign disclosure requirements and 

processes.”

94. Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, FY2013-2038, 

pp. 113-119.

95. Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), NATO Fact Sheet, 

September 2014, available from www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/

assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140901-Factsheet-AGS_en.pdf, accessed July 30, 2015. A more complete description of AGS:

NATO is acquiring the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) 

system that will give commanders a comprehensive picture 

of the situation on the ground. NATO’s operation to protect civilians in Libya in 2011 showed how important such 

a capability is. A group of Allies is acquiring five Global 

Hawk remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and the associated 

command and control base stations that make up the AGS 

system. NATO will then operate and maintain them on behalf of all 28 Allies. 

The AGS system is being acquired by 15 Allies (Bulgaria, 

Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, 

Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United States), and will be made available to the Alliance in the 2017-2018 time frame. All Allies 

will contribute to the development of the AGS capability 

through financial contributions covering the establishment 

of the AGS main operating base, as well as to communications and life-cycle support of the AGS fleet. Some Allies 
84

will replace part of their financial contribution through ‘contributions in kind’ (national surveillance systems that will 

be made available to NATO).

96. Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, FY 2016 Budget 

Request, p. 1-4.

97. Predator RQ-1/MQ-1/MQ-9 Reaper UAV, United States 

of America,” Fact Sheet on airforce-technology.com, available 

from www.airforce-technology.com/projects/predator-uav/, accessed 

August 14, 2015.

98. Australian Army Headquarters, Future Land Warfare Report 2014, Canberra, Australia: Directorate of Future Land Warfare, April 2014, available from www.army.gov.au/~/media/Army/

Our%20future/Publications/Key/FLWR_Web_B5_Final.pdf, accessed 

May 6, 2015. The report envisions a future operating environment 

characterized by five meta-trends: (1) a crowded environment; (2) 

a connected environment; (3) a lethal environment; (4) a collective 

environment; and (5) a constrained environment (pp. 7-21). “The 

environment in which the land force will operate will most likely 

be the urban littoral, characterised by the meta-trends identified 

in this report.” (p. 23).The report noted that: 

The changing global environment continues to challenge 

our common assumptions, accelerating technologies in 

which information and precision dominate, and making it 

increasingly difficult for the Army to marry this technology 

with its core tasks in what is an increasingly cost-conscious 

Australian Defence Force. (p. 3) 

Like U.S. goals, the Australian report offers use of AWS as 

part of a solution to budget limits (p. 15): 

Capabilities such as the Switchblade system (an armed, 

disposable micro-UAV), recently deployed operationally 

by the United States Marine Corps, offer cheap, precise 

lethality and similar systems will potentially populate the 

inventories of many nations. These types of low-cost capabilities also offer opportunities for the Army to enhance 

the individual lethality of its soldiers in an austere budget 

environment.
85

99. Artur Kuptel and Andrew Williams, Policy Guidance: Autonomy in Defence Systems, Multinational Capability Development 

Campaign (MCDC) 2013-2014, Focus Area “Role of Autonomous 

System in Gaining Operational Access,” Norfolk, VA: Supreme 

Allied Commander Transformation HQ, October 29, 2014, p. 5, 

available from https://innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/u4/Po

licy%2520Guidance%2520Autonomy%2520in%2520Defence%252

0Systems%2520MCDC%25202013-2014%2520final.pdf, accessed 

June 9, 2015. Details on the membership and organization of the 

study are: 

This document is a final product from the Autonomous 

Systems focus area, led by NATO Headquarters Supreme 

Allied Commander Transformation (HQ SACT), and conducted under the auspices of the Multinational Capability 

Development Campaign (MCDC) 2013-14—a collaborative 

programme between 19 nations, NATO and the European 

Union. The Autonomous Systems project team adopted a 

guiding problem statement for the project: ‘Coalitions need 

to improve awareness and understanding of autonomous 

systems, promote interoperability and provide guidance 

for the development of, use of, and defence against, autonomous systems.’

The project conducted five studies: a definitional study led 

by HQ SACT focusing on the meaning of autonomy; a legal study led by Switzerland, which examined legal issues 

mainly concerning weapon systems with autonomous capability; a human factors and ethical study co–led by the 

United States and HQ SACT, which explored future ethical, 

organisational and psychological implications; a military 

operations study led by HQ SACT, describing operational 

benefits and challenges, and lastly; a technology study led 

by the Czech Republic, which summarised key technological developments and challenges. These study findings and 

records from the various workshops and seminars are published separately in an MCDC Autonomous Systems Proceedings report, available from the MCDC Secretariat [email 

address:] MCDC_Secretariat@apan.org.

100. Ibid., p. 11. The report expands and clarifies their proposed definition of “autonomous functioning” as follows: 
86

Tasks or functions executed either by a platform, or distributed between a platform and other parts of the system, 

may be performed using a variety of behaviours, which may 

include reasoning and problem solving, adaptation to unexpected situations, self-direction, and learning.

Which functions are autonomous, and the extent to which 

human operators can direct, control or cancel functions, is 

determined by system design tradeoffs, mission complexity, external operating environment conditions, and legal or 

policy constraints.

This can be contrasted against automated functions, which 

although require no human intervention, operate using a 

fixed set of inputs, rules, and outputs, whose behaviour is 

deterministic and largely predictable. Automatic functions 

do not permit dynamic adaptation of inputs, rules, or outputs.

101. Ibid., p. 12.

102. DoDD 3000.09, p. 7. 

103. “Observations on Costs, Benefits, and Challenges of 

a Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border,” Report GAO-12-657T, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, April 2012, p. 10. 

104. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, Report to Congress on Addressing Challenges for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2013, p. 9.

105. USD(AT&L), Report to Congress for Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems, p. 9.

106. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Fact Sheet, 

Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration, February 

15, 2015, available from www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story 

cfm?newsId=18297, accessed August 1, 2015.

107. Gettinger et. al., The Drone Primer, p. 29.
87

108. Kuptel and Williams, Policy Guidance: Autonomy in 

Defence Systems, p. 9.

109. “Unmanned Aerial Systems: Status of Test Sites and International Developments,” Report GAO-15-486T, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 2015. 

110. See Steven Metz, “The Next Twist of the RMA,” Parameters, Vol. XXX, No. 3, Autumn 2000, pp. 40-53. 

111. Kuptel and Williams, Policy Guidance: Autonomy in Defence Systems, p. 30. The report recommends that “Strategic-level 

research should be encouraged on the potential of autonomous 

technologies to impact the nature and conduct of war. In addition, 

study is required on the likely change in military tactics that new 

concepts such as swarm operations and joint human-machine 

teaming will bring.”

112. Ibid., p. 14.

113. James Igoe Walsh, The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in 

Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Campaigns, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 

2013, p. 51.

114. Davis et. al., p. 15.

115. Australian Army Headquarters, Future Land Warfare 

Report 2014, p. 21. The full text from the report reads: 

Restrictions based on ethical or evolving legal norms are different to the predominately technical limitations discussed 

earlier. At present, autonomous technology is in its infancy; 

in time the effect of these systems on the conduct of future 

war is likely to be profound. Significant questions remain 

concerning the ethics and legality of arming autonomous 

platforms and empowering these systems to use lethal force. 

The land force will require a detailed understanding of these 

issues before any decision to acquire such systems is made.

116. Walsh, The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes, pp. 42, 53.
88

117. Laura A. Dickinson and Peter W. Singer, “Ask Your 

2016 Candidate These Questions on Drone Warfare,” Defense 

One online, May 18, 2015, available from www.defenseone.com/

ideas/2015/05/ask-your-2016-candidate-these-questions-dronewarfare/113098/, accessed June 18, 2015.

118. DoDD 3000.09, pp. 7, 10.

119. General Counsel for the Department of Defense, DoDD 

2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, Washington, DC: Department 

of Defense, May 9, 2006 with Change 1, November 15, 2010, p. 2. 

120. Michael N. Schmitt, “Drone Attacks under the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Clearing the ‘Fog of Law’,” Chapter 9, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law–2010, M. N. Schmitt, L. Arimatu, and T. McCormack, eds., The Hague, The Netherlands: T. 

M. C. Asser Press, p. 313. 

121. Ibid., p. 316. 

122. Ibid., pp. 323-324. Schmitt explains the potential mandate 

to use drones in some cases as follows: 

If use of a drone, because it is a relatively precise weapon 

system and its loiter capability often affords a longer window of opportunity within which to strike, would likely result in less collateral damage than use of other systems (such 

as a manned aircraft, artillery or ground attack), and if such 

drone use is militarily feasible, the drone must be employed 

as a matter of law. Conversely, other systems must be used 

in lieu of a drone when doing so is feasible and their use will 

lessen collateral damage without forfeiting military advantage. Since the use of a drone presents no risk to the operator 

and in light of its unique capabilities, such circumstances 

will be rare.

123. Gettinger et al., The Drone Primer, p. 10. The report further 

noted that there were cases of application of force similar to that 

of the U.S. armed drone attacks: 

The term ‘targeted killing’ was first used to describe Israel’s 

campaign against the leaders of Hamas in the early-2000s. 

The Israeli Defense Forces–and, in 2006, the High Court of 
89

Israel—defended the practice, arguing that Israel was engaged in a state of war with Hamas and that the Palestinian 

Authority had failed to apprehend terrorists who posed a 

direct threat to Israel.

124. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Note 

2/11, The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Swindon, 

Wiltshire, UK: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 

March 30, 2011, available from www.gov.uk/government/uploads/

system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33711/20110505JDN_211_UAS_

v2U.pdf, accessed July 29, 2015. This report includes the following 

definition for “Autonomous System:”

An autonomous system is capable of understanding 

higher level intent and direction. From this understanding and its perception of its environment, such a system 

is able to take appropriate action to bring about a desired 

state. It is capable of deciding a course of action, from a 

number of alternatives, without depending on human 

oversight and control, although these may still be present. Although the overall activity of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will be predictable, individual actions may 

not be.

125. UNOG-The United Nations Office at Geneva, “2015 

Meeting of Experts on LAWS,” website available from www.unog.

ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6CE049BE22EC75A2C1257C8D0

0513E26?OpenDocument, accessed June 2, 2015.

126. Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel, Report of the 2014 informal 

Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), 

document CCW/MSP/2014/3, Geneva, Switzerland: United 

Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), 

June 11, 2014, p. 3, available from daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/048/96/PDF/G1404896.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 

August 4, 2015.

127. Ibid., p. 4.

128. Ibid., pp. 4-5. The summary paragraphs of the sessions on 

legal aspects were:
90

26. The session examined the question of compatibility and 

compliance of LAWS with existing international law, in particular the principles of international humanitarian law (distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack), as well 

as with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Martens Clause, 

and customary law. 

27. Delegations and experts reaffirmed the necessity for any 

development and use of LAWS to be in compliance with 

international humanitarian law. There were various views 

on the possibility of LAWS being able to comply with such 

rules.

28. The adequacy of existing international law was also discussed with different views expressed. Some interventions 

noted that a potential definition of LAWS, and especially 

the definition of autonomy and the level of predictability of 

such systems, could have a significant impact in this area.

29. The necessity for legal reviews was stressed, especially 

when developing new weapons technologies. The question 

of transparency and information exchange on best practices 

in reviews was raised. The implementation of weapons reviews, including Article 36 of Additional Protocol I (1977) 

to the 1949 Geneva Conventions was suggested as an area 

where more discussions could be valuable.

30. A number of interventions questioned whether an accountability gap was created by the possible use of LAWS. 

In particular, the issue of responsibility was mentioned as 

an area to be further explored, including the possibility of 

engaging responsibility at the State level or at an individual 

level.

31. The discussions focused on whether one could establish responsibility for violations of international law and 

whether such cases incurred the responsibility of subordinates, programmers or manufacturers. The notion of negligence was also mentioned as an area which could be further 

explored.

32. Issues related to human rights law by the possible development and use of LAWS were also deliberated on, in 

particular the right to life, human dignity, the right to be 
91

protected against inhuman treatment and the right to a fair 

trial.

33. Regarding the possible impact of the development and 

use of LAWS on jus ad bellum, the question as to whether 

LAWS could change the threshold of use of force was raised.

129. Paul Scharre, Michael C. Horowitz, and Kelley Sayler, 

Autonomous Weapons at the UN: A Primer for delegates, Washington, D.C: Center for a New American Security, April 2015, p. 4, 

available from www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/Autonomous%20Weapons%20at%20the%20UN_040615_FINAL.pdf, 

accessed June 2, 2015.

130. Ibid., p. 3. 

131. Kelley Sayler, “Postgame: the U.N. Debate on Lethal Robots,” New York: Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, April 24, 2015, available from dronecenter.bard.edu/postgamedebate-on-lethal-robots/, accessed on June 2, 2015.

132. “Statement to the Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Representative of United 

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional 

Weapons (CCW), April 13, 2015, available from www.unog.

ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1CBF996AF7AD10E2C1257E

260060318A/$file/2015_LAWS_MX_United+Kingdom.pdf, accessed 

August 16, 2015.

133. Michael W. Meier, “U.S. Delegation Opening Statement, 

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), April 13, 2015, p. 1, available 

from www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8B33A1CDB

E80EC60C1257E2800275E56/$file/2015_LAWS_MX_USA+bis.pdf, 

accessed August 16, 2015.

134. Ibid., p. 1.

135. Ibid., p. 2. 
92

 136. Paul Scharre, “CNAS Statement on Way Ahead,” comments to 2015 Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Convention 

on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), April 17, 2015, p. 2, 

available from www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/121

4FD2D92C405ADC1257E2F0056BCC8/$file/CNAS+closing+stateme

nt+17+Apr+2015.pdf, accessed June 2, 2015. 

137. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Autonomous weapons: ICRC addresses meeting of experts,” Geneva, 

Switzerland: ICRC, May 13, 2014, pp. 1-2, available from https://

www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2014/05-13-autonomous-weapons-statement.htm, accessed August 5, 2014. This ICRC 

meeting informed the first UN LAWS meeting, and posed six key 

questions for the UN meeting:

1. What should be the scope of the discussions about autonomous weapon systems?

2. What is ‘meaningful human control’?

3. What lessons can be drawn from autonomy in existing 

weapon systems?

4. What are the implications, for compliance with IHL, of 

increasing autonomy?

5. Are autonomous weapons systems necessary?

6. Are autonomous weapon systems ethically and morally 

acceptable?

138. ICRC, Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, 

Legal and Humanitarian Aspects, Expert Meeting, 26-28 March, 2014, 

Geneva, Switzerland: ICRC, November, 2014, p. 8, available from 

https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting-autonomousweapon-systems-26-28-march-2014, accessed June 10, 2015.

139. Ibid., p. 9.

140. Kuptel and Williams, Policy Guidance: Autonomy in 

Defence Systems, p. 14.

141. William Rauch, “A Risk-Based Approach for the Classification of UAS,” Knowledge at AUVSI blog article, June 

30, 2014, available from knowledge.auvsi.org/blogs/williamrauch/2014/06/30/a-risk-based-approach-for-the-classification-of-uas, 

accessed on August 17, 2015. 
93

142. Kuptel and Williams, Policy Guidance: Autonomy in 

Defence Systems, p. 19.

143. Davis et al., pp. 18, 19. This RAND reports argues that: 

The greatest concerns about U.S. use of armed UAVs appear to arise from operations outside active war zones, lesstransparent operations, lack of clarity about congressional 

authorizations, and targeting of those not clearly identified 

as combatants or al Qaeda leaders. (p. 19)

144. 107th Congress, “Joint Resolution to authorize the use of 

United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.” Public Law 107-

40, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 

18, 2001, available from www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/

pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf, accessed August 1, 2015. The text of this 

very short piece of legislation includes:

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES 

ARMED FORCES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—That the President is authorized to use 

all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 

organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred 

on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 

persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 

terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

(b) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.—Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the 

Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute 

specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Nothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the 

War Powers Resolution.

145. Davis et al., pp. 17-19. The eight conflicts identified by 

RAND are: (1) Afghanistan (2001-present); (2) Pakistan (2004-present); (3) Iraq No-Fly (2002-2003); (4) Iraq Combat (2003); (5) Iraq 
94

COIN (2004-2011); (6) Yemen (2002 and 2010); (7) Libya (2011); 

and (8) Somalia (2011-present).

146. W. Andrew Terrill, “Drones over Yemen: Weighing Military Benefits and Political Costs,” Parameters, Vol. XXXXIII, No. 1, 

Spring 2013, pp. 21.

147. Ibid., p. 23. Terrill also notes that: “Moreover, engaging 

in such strikes without Yemeni government permission is not an 

option since the United States is attempting to support the Hadi 

government and not undermine it.”

148. Ibid., p. 23.

149. Stephanie Nebehay, “Yemen ‘crumbling’ from war, 

sieges causing starvation: aid groups,” Reuters, August 11, 2015, 

available from www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/11/us-yemen-security-redcross-idUSKCN0QG0OY20150811, accessed on August 

17, 2015.

150. Australian Army Headquarters, Future Land Warfare 

Report 2014, p. 20.

151. Ibid., p. 21.

152. Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law 

and Human Rights, Academy Briefing No. 8: Autonomous Weapon 

Systems under International Law, Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva 

Academy, November 2014, p. 5. 

153. Australian Army Headquarters, Future Land Warfare 

Report 2014, p. 21.

154. Micah Zenko and Sarah Kreps, Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation, Council Special Report No. 69, New York, NY: Council 

on Foreign Affairs Center for Preventative Action, June 2014. 

155. Rebecca Crootof, “The Varied Law of Autonomous 

Weapon Systems,” in Autonomous Systems: Issues for Defence Policy 

Maker, Andrew Williams and Paul Scharre, eds., Norfolk, VA: 

NATO Allied Command Transformation, Fall 2015, available 

from papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2569322, accessed 

June 9, 2015.
95

156. Simon-Michel, Report of the 2014 Meeting of Experts on 

LAWS, p. 4.

157. Human Rights Watch and the International Human 

Rights Clinic (IHRC), Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for Killer Robots, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, April 

2015, p. 1.

158. Human Rights Watch and the International Human 

Rights Clinic (IHRC), Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, November 2012, p. 5.

159. Human Rights Watch and the International Human 

Rights Clinic (IHRC), Shaking the Foundations, The Human Rights 

Implications of Killer Robots, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 

May 2014, p. 25. 

160. Human Rights Watch and IHRC, Mind the Gap, p. 37.

161. Ibid., p. 37.

162. Steve Goose, “Statement by Human Rights Watch To 

the Convention on Conventional Weapons Informal Meeting 

of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Geneva, 

Switzerland: United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), May 13, 2014, p. 2, available from www.

unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/6CF465B62841F177C12

57CE8004F9E6B/$file/NGOHRW_LAWS_GenStatement_2014.pdf, 

accessed August 17, 2015.

163. Human Rights Watch and IHRC, Losing Humanity, p. 5.

164. ICRC, Autonomous Weapon Systems Expert Meeting, p. 37. 

Professor Arkin offers interesting insights into the causes of war 

crimes that the use of autonomy might mitigate:

Potential explanations for the persistence of war crimes 

include: high friendly losses leading to a tendency to seek 

revenge; high turnover in the chain of command leading 

to weakened leadership; dehumanization of the enemy 

through the use of derogatory names and epithets; poorly 

trained or inexperienced troops; no clearly defined enemy; 
96

unclear orders where intent of the order may be interpreted 

incorrectly as unlawful; youth and immaturity of troops; 

external pressure, e.g. for a need to produce a high body 

count of the enemy; and pleasure from the power of killing or an overwhelming sense of frustration. There is clearly 

room for improvement and autonomous systems may help 

address some of these problems. (p. 33)

165. Ibid., p. 50. 

166. Ibid., p. 52.

167. Ibid., p. 53.

168. Ibid., p. 55. 

169. Greg Kennedy, “Drones: Legitimacy and Anti-Americanism,” Parameters, Vol. XXXXIII, No. 1, Spring 2013, pp. 25-28.

170. Ibid., p. 27.

171. Ibid., p. 28. 

172. Jacqueline L. Hazelton, “Drones: What are They Good 

For?” Parameters, Vol. XXXXIII, No. 1, Spring 2013, p. 32.

173. Alan W. Dowd, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” 

Parameters, Vol. XXXXIII, No. 1, Spring 2013, p. 15.

174. Grégoire Chamayou, Théorie du drone (Drone Theory), Paris, France: La Fabrique éditions, 2013, pp. 132-133. The original 

description in French of the Reaper unit patch and a translation 

by the monograph author follows:

Original: 

Au 21e siècle, le livre des images de la mort représentait un 

guerrier en armes luttant contre un squelette — la mort ellemême. allégorie d’une lutte dérisoire, vanité d’en combat 

perdu d’avance, car la mort, elle, ne meurt jamais. Elle a le 

temps pour elle, et les yeux du soldat qui l’affronte semblent 

déjà vides.
97

Les opérateurs de drones reprennent aujourd’hui volontiers 

à leur compte cette imagerie classique. L’écusson du drone 

<<MQ 9 Reaper>> figure la faucheuse, rictus inquiétant et 

perles de sang sur sa lame, avec sa devise: <<Que les autres 

meurent>>.

Translation: 

In the 21st century, the books with images of death may 

show an armored warrior fighting against a skeleton — 

death itself. An allegory of a ridiculous fight; a fight for vanity; a losing battle, because death, she never dies. She keeps 

her own time, and the eyes of the soldier who confronts her 

already seem empty.

UAV operators today willingly propagate this classic imagery. The crest of the MQ 9 Reaper drone shows the Grim 

Reaper figure, with a disturbing grin and blood beads on his 

blade, and with its motto “That Others May Die.”

175. See www.pararescue.com. 

176. Kuptel and Williams, Policy Guidance: Autonomy in 

Defence Systems, p. 25. 

177. Thomas H. Cowan, Jr., “A Theoretical, Legal and Ethical 

Impact of Robots on Warfare,” USAWC Strategy Research Project, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 30, 2007.

178. D. Keith Shurtleff, “The Effects of Technology on Our 

Humanity,” Parameters, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 106.

179. Singer, Wired for War, pp. 337-338. See also Meghan Neal, 

“Are Soldiers Getting Too Emotionally Attached to War Robots?” 

Motherboard, September 18, 2013, available from motherboard.

vice.com/blog/are-soldiers-getting-too-emotionally-attached-to-warrobots, accessed August 20, 2015.

180. Dowd, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” p. 13.

181. Ibid., p. 13.

182. Geneva Academy, Autonomous Weapon Systems under 

International Law, pp. 4-5.
98

183. Dowd, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” p. 11.

184. “Lethal autonomous weapons systems Food-for-thought 

for the informal meeting of experts on lethal autonomous weapons 

systems Geneva, April 13-17, 2015,” document CCW/MSP/2015/

WP.2, submitted by Germany (Ambassador Michael Biontino), 

Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Convention on Certain 

Conventional Weapons (CCW), March 20, 2015, pp.1-2, available 

from daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/061/30/PDF/

G1506130.pdf?OpenElement, accessed on July 18, 2015. 

185. The CNAS Autonomy Project website is available from 

www.cnas.org/ethicalautonomy. The CNAS Ethical Autonomy Project Bibliography is available from www.cnas.org/research/defensestrategies-and-assessments/20YY-Warfare-Initiative/Ethical-Autonomy/bibliography.

186. Dowd, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” p. 16.

187. Scharre and Horowitz, An Introduction to Autonomy in 

Weapon Systems, pp. 5-6.

188. DSB, The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems.

189. Kuptel and Williams, Policy Guidance: Autonomy in Defence 

Systems, p. 12. This report refutes the claims of that unmanned 

systems will significantly lower operational costs: “While cost 

savings are often claimed as a benefit of increasing autonomy, or 

of unmanned systems more generally, there is currently very little 

rigorous cost-benefit analyses on which to draw robust conclusions about potential savings.”

190. Thomas K. Adams, “Future Warfare and the Decline of 

Human Decisionmaking,” Parameters, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, Winter 

2001-2002, pp. 57-71. In his article, Adams raises cautions about 

certain aspects of disengagement facilitated by technology:

Automated systems can certainly reduce the pressure of information saturation and eliminate conflicts, but at a price. 

Essentially, they do so by creating a series of information 

‘filters’ that establish priorities and eliminate marginal data, 

reconcile the remaining information conflicts, and present 
99

a consensus picture of the situation. All of this is invisible 

to the ultimate consumer, out of his or her control and very 

likely not well understood. This means that the commander 

is receiving a picture of the battlefield that is designed to 

emphasize certain things while de-emphasizing others. Still 

other factors are omitted entirely. (p. 62)

In sum, this approach results in the development of systems 

that take the operator ‘out of the loop,’ shifting the role of 

the human operator from that of an active controller to that 

of a supervisor who serves in a fail-safe capacity in the event 

of system malfunction. Unfortunately, the role of passive 

monitor seems to be a task for which humans are poorly 

suited. (p. 64)

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

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