alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANUEL SANCHEZ-MENDOZA, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 15-73387 

Agency No. A200-245-305 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 7, 2022**

Pasadena, California

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and GRABER and BEA, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner, Manuel Sanchez-Mendoza, petitions for review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his claim for withholding of removal. 

“We determine our own jurisdiction de novo.” Ruiz-Morales v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 

1219, 1221 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “A petitioner’s failure to raise an issue 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 13 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

before the BIA generally constitutes a failure to exhaust, thus depriving this court of 

jurisdiction to consider the issue.” Sola v. Holder, 720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 

2013) (per curiam). For the following reasons, we dismiss the petition. 

The BIA held that Sanchez-Mendoza made no assertion of clear error in the 

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) adverse credibility finding and, therefore, the issue was 

deemed waived. Sanchez-Mendoza argues, however, that the IJ did not make an 

explicit adverse credibility finding, so he did not need to raise the issue before the 

BIA. “[T]he law of this circuit does not permit implicit adverse credibility 

determinations.” Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1074 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). An IJ

must identify specific, cogent reasons supporting an adverse credibility 

determination. Perez-Arceo v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 1178, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Here, the IJ made an explicit adverse credibility finding. In a separate section 

titled “Analysis and Findings,” the IJ included a subsection titled “Credibility.” In 

the “Credibility” section, the IJ stated that, “[a]fter considering the totality of the

evidence, the Court is no[t] satisfied that [Sanchez-Mendoza] has provided credible 

testimony.” The IJ pointed to Sanchez-Mendoza’s inconsistent testimony 

concerning his departures from the United States and multiple reentries. The IJ 

further noted the inconsistencies in Sanchez-Mendoza’s testimony concerning when 

and how he was threatened in Mexico. Accordingly, the IJ made an adverse 

credibility finding and provided specific and cogent reasons supporting the 
3 

determination. Id. at 1186–87. Because the IJ made an adverse credibility finding, 

Sanchez-Mendoza was required to challenge the finding before the BIA in order to 

exhaust his claim for withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Sola, 720 F.3d 

at 1134. Sanchez-Mendoza failed to do so. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review 

the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. Sola, 720 F.3d at 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(dismissing petition for lack of jurisdiction). 

PETITION DISMISSED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
STANLEY FURNITURE COMPANY, INC.
ARTICLE 5
FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE
FOR PERIOD ENDING MARCH 30, 1997
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-30-1997
<CASH>                                            6748
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    26364
<ALLOWANCES>                                      2059
<INVENTORY>                                      43539
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 78891
<PP&E>                                           81007
<DEPRECIATION>                                   29270
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  145496
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            33230
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         91000
<OTHER-SE>                                       64403
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    145496
<SALES>                                          49631
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 49631
<CGS>                                            37170
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    44297
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    69
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    90
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 756
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   4509
<INCOME-TAX>                                      1737
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               2772
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      2772
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .55
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .55
        

</TABLE>
#### Wilson *v.*The State.

*Violating Prohibition Law.*

(Decided February 3, 1914.

64 South. 509.)

*Jury; Rig hi to Trial by; Waiver.*— Where a defendant is prosecuted for violating the prohibition law, he waives his right to a jury trial by failing to demand it in the manner provided by section 32, Acts 1909, p. 92, which is made generally applicable to such cases.

*157Appeal from Andalusia City Court.

Heard before Hon. E. T. Albritton.

P. O. Wilson was convicted of violating the prohibition law, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

A. Whaley, for appellant.

The lower court erred in refusing to grant defendant a trial by jury. — Sec. 5, art. 1, sec. 11, art. 1, sec. 45, art. 4, Constitution; 12 Enc. P. & P. 241; Local Acts 1911, 327, sec. 12. On these same authorities the court erred in finding that the jury had been waived. The Fuller Bill does not embrace in its title the matter of trial by jury as to its criminal features, and is therefore violative of section 45, Constitution 1911.

B. C. Briokell, Attorney General, and W. L. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

The appellant was indicted for an offense unknown to the common and to the statutory laws existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1901, and hence, was not entitled to call to his aid section 11 of such *Constitution.*— Tims *v.*State, 26 Ala. 165; *Boring v. Williams,*17 Ala. 510; *Thomas v.*Bibb, 44 Ala. 721. Unless a jury is demanded within five days it is waived. Sec. 32, Acts 1909, p. 327. The court has declared the Fuller Bill *constitutional.*— Alford *v.*State, *ex reí,*170 Ala. 178.

WALKER, P. J.

Section 32 of the act of August 25, 1909, entitled “An act to further suppress the evils of intemperance,” etc. (Acts of Ala. Sp. Sess. 1909, p. 63), specifies the time and manner of the defendant’s making a demand for a tidal by jury when he is prosecuted for any violation of the-state’s liquor laws in a court in which jury trials are provided for. As to such *158prosecutions, the provision is made generally appli*cable.-*— Moss *v. State,*3 Ala. App. 189, 58 South. 62. The provision of section 12 of the act “To create and establish the Andalusia city court of law and equity” that “in all cases of all misdemeanors the defendant may waive a trial by jury” (Local Acts of Ala. 1911, pp. 315, 327) does not purport to and does not supersede the above referred to provision of the general law as to the time and manner of the defendant’s making a demand for a trial by jury in such a case as the instant one. The defendant waived the right to a trial by jury by failing to demand it in the manner provided by the statute applicable in such a case. The court did not err in so holding.

There is no error in the record.

Affirmed.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-25,679-37

IN RE ARTHUR DAVID LOWE, Relator

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CAUSE NO. 1025 IN THE 110 DISTRICT COURT TH

FROM BRISCOE COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Relator has filed a motion for leave to file a writ of mandamus pursuant to the original

jurisdiction of this Court. In it, he contends that he is assisting his fellow prisoner, Rene R. Leal, to

prepare an Article 11.07 application for a writ of habeas corpus. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483

(1969). He alleges that the District Clerk of Briscoe County has requested that relator be restricted

from sending or receiving any mail to or from the District Clerk, including legal mail and mail

relating to the purchase of court documents. In re Bonilla, 424 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014). 

Relator includes a document purporting to be an internal TDCJ “Negative Mail” letter
2

informing relator and the mailroom supervisor on his prison unit that “Bena Hester, Briscoe County

and District Clerk has been placed on your negative mailing list at her request. You will not be

allowed to send or receive mail from this individual.”

In these circumstances, additional facts are needed. Respondent, the District Clerk ofBriscoe

County, is ordered to file a response addressing whether she requested that Relator be barred from

corresponding with her office. If so, her response should include the rationale for this request and

include any supporting documents, as necessary. 

Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Office of the General Counsel is ordered to file a

response to Relator’s claims and its policies applicable to, among other things, “Negative Mail” and

legal mail. 

Such responses shall be submitted within 30 days of the date of this order.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Office of

General Counsel, and Rene Ramiro Leal, TDCJ #00754733.

Filed: July 24, 2019

Do not publish
§ 1261.316 Policy. ( a ) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration may indemnify a present or former NASA employee, who is personally named as a defendant in any civil suit in state or Federal court, or in an arbitration proceeding or other proceeding seeking damages against that employee personally, for any verdict, judgment, appeal bond, or other monetary award which is rendered against such employee, provided that the conduct giving rise to the verdict, judgment, appeal bond, or award was taken within the scope of his or her employment and that such indemnification is in the interest of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as determined by the Administration or designee.
( b ) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration may settle or compromise a personal damage claim against a present or former NASA employee by the payment of available funds, at any time, provided the alleged conduct giving rise to the personal damage claim was taken within the employee's scope of employment and that such settlement or compromise is in the interest of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as determined by the Administrator or designee.
( c ) Absent exceptional circumstances as determined by the Administrator or designee, the agency will not entertain a request either to agree to indemnify or to settle a personal damage claim before entry of an adverse verdict, judgment, or award.
( d ) A present or past NASA employee may request indemnification to satisfy a verdict, judgment, or award entered against that employee. The employee shall submit a written request, with appropriate documentation including copies of the verdict, judgment, appeal bond, award, or settlement proposal to the General Counsel, who shall make a recommended disposition of the request. Where appropriate, the agency shall seek the views of the Department of Justice. The General Counsel shall forward the request, the accompanying documentation, and the General Counsel's recommendation to the Administrator for decision.
( e ) Any payment under this section either to indemnify a National Aeronautics and Space Administration employee or to settle a personal damage claim shall be contingent upon the availability of appropriated funds of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
[53 FR 27482, July 21, 1988]
#### § 1216.301 Applicability.

This subpart applies to all organizational elements of NASA.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3782 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3782

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To modify the amount authorized for commitments for 7(a) loans, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Small Business Lending Continuity 
Act of 2020''.

SEC. 2. COMMITMENTS FOR 7(A) LOANS.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the amounts authorized 
for commitments for general business loans authorized under section 
7(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 636(a)) under the heading 
``business loans program account'' under the heading ``Small Business 
Administration'' under title V of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2020 (Public Law 116-93; 133 Stat. 2475) shall apply with respect to 
loans made under such section 7(a), other than loans made under 
paragraph (36) of such section 7(a), on and after the date of enactment 
of this Act.

            Passed the Senate May 20, 2020.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
116th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                S. 3782

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

To modify the amount authorized for commitments for 7(a) loans, and for 
                            other purposes.
```
# Official Journal C 271A/18 A

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 271A |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5818 August 2015 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 271A

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5818 August 2015

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | Corrigenda |
| 2015/C 271A/01 | Corrigendum to notice of open competitions — Conference interpreters (AD 5/AD 7) — EPSO/AD/311/15 — Czech-language (CS) — EPSO/AD/312/15 — Croatian-language (HR) — EPSO/AD/313/15 — Lithuanian-language (LT) — EPSO/AD/314/15 — Maltese-language (MT) ( OJ C 224 A, 9.7.2015 ) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

Corrigenda

2015/C 271A/01

Corrigendum to notice of open competitions — Conference interpreters (AD 5/AD 7) — EPSO/AD/311/15 — Czech-language (CS) — EPSO/AD/312/15 — Croatian-language (HR) — EPSO/AD/313/15 — Lithuanian-language (LT) — EPSO/AD/314/15 — Maltese-language (MT) ( OJ C 224 A, 9.7.2015 )

( OJ C 224 A, 9.7.2015 )

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

---

Corrigenda

| 18.8.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CA 271/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CA 271/1

---

Corrigendum to notice of open competitions

Conference interpreters (AD 5/AD 7)

EPSO/AD/311/15 — Czech-language (CS)

EPSO/AD/312/15 — Croatian-language (HR)

EPSO/AD/313/15 — Lithuanian-language (LT)

EPSO/AD/314/15 — Maltese-language (MT)

(
  Official Journal of the European Union C 224 A of 9 July 2015
  )

(2015/C 271 A/01)

On page 1:

for:

‘
  Deadline for registration: 11 August 2015 at 12.00 (midday), Brussels time
  ’,

read:

read:

‘
  Deadline for registration: 18 August 2015 at 12.00 (midday), Brussels time
  ’;

on page 5:

for:

for:

‘WHEN AND WHERE CAN I APPLY?

Apply online on the EPSO website http://jobs.eu-careers.eu by:

11 August 2015 at 12.00 (midday), Brussels time.’,

read:

read:

‘WHEN AND WHERE CAN I APPLY?

Apply online on the EPSO website http://jobs.eu-careers.eu by:

18 August 2015 at 12.00 (midday), Brussels time.’.

---
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HAROLD D. HARDEN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

DWIGHT NEVEN, Warden; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-15755 

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02008-JAD-VCF 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 15, 2017**

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

Nevada state prisoner Harold D. Harden appeals pro se from the district 

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional 

claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. 

Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (summary judgment for 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 20 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-15755 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County 

of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (cross-motions for summary 

judgment). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. 

Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on 

Harden’s retaliation and excessive force claims because Harden failed to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted his available 

administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, or 

whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. See Woodford v. 

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . 

means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the 

agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)); Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (a prisoner who does not exhaust 

administrative remedies must show that “there is something particular in his case 

that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively 

unavailable to him”); Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(“[A] grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which 

redress is sought.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Summary judgment for defendants on Harden’s access-to-courts claim was 

proper because Harden failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to 
3 17-15755 

whether defendants caused an actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 

348-49, 354-55 (1996) (setting forth elements of an access-to-courts claim and 

actual injury requirement).

We do not consider issues not specifically and distinctly raised in the 

opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 23

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

The
Board of Directors
Cardinal Financial Corporation:

We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement No. 333-157183 on Form S-3 and the registration statements
(Nos. 333-106694, 333-111672, 333-111673, 333-127395, 333-134923 and 333-134934) on Form S-8 of
Cardinal Financial Corporation of our report dated March 15, 2010, with respect to the consolidated statements of condition of Cardinal Financial Corporation as of December 31, 2009 and
2008, and the related consolidated statements of income, comprehensive income, changes in shareholders' equity and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended
December 31, 2009, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2009, which appears in the December 31, 2009 annual report on
Form 10-K of Cardinal Financial Corporation.

KPMG LLP

McLean,
Virginia
March 15, 2010

---



QuickLinks
Locatable Minerals

Alternative C

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Locatable Withdrawals are processed by Lands

and Realty; as a result Locatable Withdrawals section

is identical to the Lands and Realty Withdrawals section.

R29E

R93W

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

Billings & Pompeys Pillar 

National Monument RMP / EIS

Wyoming

Legend

Location Map

Montana

Billings

Field 

Office

Ü

Map scale 1:900,000

Map generated by the Billings Field Office in July 2011

Albers Equal Area, NAD83 Projection

This map is intended for display purposes. No warranty is made by the Bureau of

Land Management as to the accuracy, reliability or completeness of the data for

individual or aggregate use with other data, or for purposes not intended by BLM. 

This map may not meet National Map Accuracy Standards. This product was

developed through digital means and information may be updated without notification.

State Border

Planning Area Boundary

Locatable Minerals Closed

Locatable Minerals Open

Interstate

Highway

^ Towns

Public Lands Survey System

94

90

90
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Principal Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350 (Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)

I, John Labate, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Golden Star Resources Ltd., certify, to the best of my knowledge, based upon a review of the
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2008 of Golden Star Resources Ltd. that:

(1) The Annual Report on Form 10-K fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) The information contained and
incorporated by reference in the Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Golden Star Resources Ltd.



|                                                 
|-------------------------------------------------
|/s/ John A. Labate                               
|John Labate                                      
|Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|February 25, 2009
§ 161.209 Requirements for proposal changes. ( a ) Each airport operator shall promptly advise interested parties of any changes to a proposed restriction, including changes that affect noncompatible land uses, and make available any changes to the proposed restriction and its analysis. Interested parties include those that received direct notice under § 161.203(b), or those that were required to be consulted in accordance with the procedures in § 161.211 of this part, and those that have commented on the proposed restriction.
( b ) If there are substantial changes to the proposed restriction or the analysis during the 180-day notice period, the airport operator shall initiate new notice following the procedures in § 161.203 or, alternatively, the procedures in § 161.211. A substantial change includes, but is not limited to, a proposal that would increase the burden on any aviation user class.
( c ) In addition to the information in § 161.203(c), new notice must indicate that the airport operator is revising a previous notice, provide the reason for making the revision, and provide a new effective date (if any) for the restriction. The effective date of the restriction must be at least 180 days after the date the new notice and revised analysis are made available for public comment.