### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 00 58 -C R

______________________________ AL BERT RAND OL PH, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appea l from the 114th J udicial District Court

Smit h County , Texas Trial Court No. 114-2075- 07

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice MoseleyOrig inally appea led to the Twe lfth Court of Appea ls, this ca se was transfe rre d to this C ourt 1 by the Texas Supreme Court pursua nt to its docket equalization e ffor ts. See T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 73.001 (Ve rnon 2005). We ar e unaw are of any conflict between prece dent of the Twe lfth Court of Appe als and that of this Court on any rele vant issue. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 41.3. Section 12.42(c) (2)( B) (v) of the Texas Penal Code provides for e nhance ment of a se ntence 2 to l if e imp ri so nme nt w he n th e re ha s b e e n a pr ior c on vic tio n " un de r t

he laws of

ano the r s ta te containing elements that a re substantially

simi l ar to the elements of a n offe nse" of ce rtain pena l violations, including Section 22.021 of the T exas Penal Code, the crime with which Randolph was char g ed. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 12.42(c) (2)( B) (v) ( Ver non Supp. 2008), § 22.021. 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Charg ed with sexual assault of a child, Albert Randolph elec ted t o be tried before the trial

c ourt and no t by a jur y . H e wa s c on vic te d a

nd his se nte nc e wa s e nh anc e d by a pr ior c on vic tio n to lif e imp ri so nme nt. I n this appeal, Randolph does not contest the c onvicti o n ; rather, he c ontends that the 1 previous off

ense w as improper ly

used t o enhanc e his punishment. As the basis for that contention, he maintains that the prior conviction in anothe r State wa s not substantially simil ar to a

Texas offe nse. Th e bas is for the e nh anc e me nt w a s a 19 93 c on vic tio n in

Minne so ta

fo r w hat th a t st a te descr ibed as the f

elony offe nse of c riminal sexual c onduct, for which he had been se ntence d to a teny ear probation. He argues that the e vidence was leg ally and factually insufficient to establish that the (Minnesota) prior off

ense w as substantially simil ar to a ny Texas offense , and thus, the trial cour t

err ed by using it to enha

nce punishment in this prosecution. 23

Randolph corr ectly

points out t hat in his circumstanc e, the Te x as statute re quires that ther e be so me pr oo f t

hat th e e le me nts of

the e nh anc e me nt c on vic tio n a re su bs tanti a lly

sim ila r t o s ome

o ffense listed in Section 12.42(c)( 2)(B ) of the T exas Penal Code. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 12.42(c) (2)( B) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). I n this case, the r ecor d shows that Randolph was convic ted under Chapte r 609 of the Minne sota statutes; the trial c o u rt fo u n d that the Minnesota off ense of criminal sexual conduct was substantially simil ar to a n offe nse listed in Section 12.42(c) (2)( A)(i)

. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 12.42(c) (2)( A)(i) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). Statutory interpre tation is a question of l aw to be determined by the trial cour

t. See Kuhn v

. Sta te , 45 S.W .3d 207, 209 (Tex. A pp.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref ' d). There fore , the trial cour t was require d to, and did, take jud i ci al n o t i ce of the Minnesota statute a nd make a

finding that the Minnesota offe nse is substantially simil ar to one of the off enses discusse d above. Se e Cro ss v . S tat e , 114 S.W .3d 92, 100 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003), aff' d in part & rev'd in part on other grounds , 144 S.W .3d 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The State posits that Section 609.342 of the Minnesota statute, e nti t l ed "Criminal Sexual Conduct in the First De g ree " is substantially simil ar to Sec tion 22.0 2 1 o f t h e Te x as Penal Code (ag g rav at ed sex ual assault). See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 22.021 (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). The Minne so ta jud g me nt state s that he wa s f ound g uil ty of c ount 1 , f ir st- de g re e c ri min a l se xua l c on du c t. The c ase disposition sheet indicates that the specific char g e for t h e first count wa s under Sec tion 60 9. 34 2, su

bd ivi sio n 1 (a ). Th a t se c tio n, in 1 99 3, re a d a s f oll ow s:4

Sub di v i s i o n1

. C r i m e d e f i n e d

. A p e r s o nw h o e n g a g e s i ns e xu a l p e n e t r a t i o nw i th another person is gu i l t y o f cr iminal sex ual conduc t in the first deg ree if any of the fo llo wi ngc ir c ums tanc e s e xists : (a) the co mp la in an t i s u n d e r 1 3 y e a r s o f a g e an d th e a c to r is mo r e th an36 months older than the complaina nt . . . . M I NN . S TAT . ANN . § 609.342(a) (1993) ( amende d 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2005, and 2007). I n compar ison, Section 22.021 provides (amongother thing s) that a pe rson commits the of fe ns e of a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult if the pe rs on

c a us e s the pe ne tr a tio n of the se x o rg an or mouth of a c hil d und e r t

he a g e of fo ur te e n b y any me ans . We have pr evious l y d et er m ined that the trial c ourt' s determination on this issue is to be revie wed de novo by us, as we would any ruling on a question of law. Ha rd yv . S tat e , 187 S.W .3d 232, 236 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. re f' d). Our revie w of the statutes set out above shows that the stated e lements of the o ffenses ar e indee d substantially simil ar. Thus, w e af

firm the trial court' s d eter

mination that the elements of the pr ior offe nse ar e substantially simil ar to one of the offe nses listed in Section 12.42(c)( 2)(A) (i). Randolph also argues t hat i nsufficie nt evidenc e was prese nted by the S tate to allow the cour t to e ve n k no w the c on te nts of

the Minne so ta

sta tut e . T he re c or d d oe s n ot sh ow th at the St a te provided a copy of t he applicable statute to the c ourt. Howe ver, at the sentenc ing pr ocee ding, the trial court state d that it had allowed the parties the opportunity to revie w the per tinent statutes and that " [t]he C ourt

ha s a nd do e s ta ke jud ic ia l no tic e of

the Minne so ta

statut e s und e r t

he Minne so taCounsel did not complain about any failure to revie w a copy of the a ctual statute. I f such 3 was the case, such an objection could have been raised under the languag e of Rule 202 of the Texas Rul e s o f E vid e nc e , w hic h p ro vid e s th a t a pa rt y re qu e sti ngthat ju dic ia l noti c e be take n o f a statut e of ano the r state sh a ll fu

rn ish the c ourt " su ff

ic ie nt inf or ma tio n to e na

ble it p ro pe rl y

to c omp ly

wi th th e req ues t. " T EX . R. E V ID . 202. 5 Codes" ( specify

ing c erta in sections), and then stating that it was taking judicia l notice of the e ntire Chapter 609. 3 I n addition to the review of the statutory

materia l by

the trial cour

t, the State prese nted testimony from B ridg et Cleary , the custodian of r ecor ds for the H ennepin County , Minnesota, Sheriff' s Depa

rtment. Alt h o u gh i t was not shown that a pe rson holding the office of custodian of

rec ords made Clea

ry an expert conc erning t h e laws of Minnesota, she was pe rmitted to testify without obje c ti o n

a s to the meaningof the doc uments her testimony authenticated. She authenticated the do c ume nts int

ro du c e d a s p ro of

of the c on vic tio n, te sti fi e d b ri e fl y a bo ut t he nat ur e of

a fi rs tdeg ree sexual assault c harg e as set out in Chapter 609 of Minnesota law a nd stated that this ty

pe of prosec ution unde r the laws of Minnesota involved the sexual pe netration of another person. Clea

ry

we nt f ur the r t o e xpla in t

he g e ne ra l na

tur e of the ty pe of pr os e c uti on

inv olved in the M inn e so ta offe nse—sexual assault involving pene tration. Randolph also argues that the documents do not show a convic tion for such a n offe nse. He takes the position that the re cords introduced show that he w as plac ed on probation. Randolph appar ently

relies on the long -standing rule that " a p ro bated se ntence is not a final conviction for enh ancem ent pu rpo ses un les s i t i s revo ked ." Ex parte Langley , 8 33 S.W. 2d 14 1, 14 3 ( Te x. Cr im.6

App. 1992) (c iting Ex part e M urchison , 560 S.W .2d 654, 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). That statement is at le ast partially corr ect. Howeve r, Cleary , in e x plaining the vag arie s of Minnesota law, testified that the docume nts revea led that Randolph had be en con victed of the offe nse, plac ed on probation, had violated the terms of his re lease , and bee n there afte r re turned to jail to answer for " an

arr e st a nd de te nti on warrant. " She fu rt he r t e sti fi e d th a t th e do c ume nts int ro du c e d w e re po stconviction documents. Cleary ' s opinion testim ony reg ardingthe finality

of the c onviction after Randolph had bee n place d on probation is rathe r we ak proof of the finality

of the c onviction. Never theless, the trial

c ourt wa s n ot f or c e d to re ly

on that e vid e nc e in u sin g the pr ior c on vic tio n f

or e nh anc e me nt p ur

po se s. Section 12.42(g )(1) of the Texas Pena l Code specific ally states that for the pur poses of subsec tion (c) (2) of that same statute,

a defe ndant has been previously convicted of an offe nse listed under S u b s ection (c) (2)( B) if the def

endant wa s adjudg ed g uilty of the off

ense or enter ed a plea of g uilty or nolo contende re in re turn for a g rant of de fer

red a djudication, reg ardle ss of whether the s entenc e for the offense was ever imposed or whe ther the se ntence was pr ob a te d a

nd the defendant w a s su bs e qu e ntl y

dis c ha rg e d f ro m c omm

un ity supervision . . . . T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 12.42(g )(1) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). As a result of that part of the statute, " a prior f oreig n conviction for a

n offe nse conta ining elements that a

re substa n t ially

simil ar to the e lements of an of fense listed under subsec tion 12 .4 2( c )( 2) (B ) m ay

be us e d to e nh anc e punis hme nt in Te xas u nd e r s ub se c tio n 1 2. 42 (c )( 2) , e ve n if7

th e sen ten ce fo r t hat con vi cti on was pro bat ed an d t he p rob ati onwas no t r evo ked ." Ex pa rteW hit e , 211 S.W .3d 316, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Error has not bee n shown. We aff irm the judg ment.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: Dec ember 1, 2008 Date D ecide d: Dec ember 2, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh