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i 

96–239 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–48] 

OPTIMIZED FLEET RESPONSE PLAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Vice Chair 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

CRAIG COLLIER, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ............................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Harley, RADM Jeffrey A., USN, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 

for Operations, Plans, and Strategy (OPNAV N3/5B); and CAPT Thom 

Burke, USN, Director, Fleet Readiness (N43) ................................................... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Harley, RADM Jeffrey A., joint with CAPT Thom Burke ............................. 29 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 43 

Mr. Courtney ..................................................................................................... 43 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

OPTIMIZED FLEET RESPONSE PLAN 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 10, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:01 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J. Wittman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. WITTMAN. I call to order the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Readiness. 

I want to welcome folks to our hearing this morning, on the Optimized Fleet Response Plan. I want to thank our witnesses for being 

here with us this morning, Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley and 

Captain Thom Burke. 

And as I said, I especially want to thank Rear Admiral Jeffrey 

Harley, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, for Operations, Plans and Strategy, and Captain Thom Burke, Director of 

Fleet Readiness, for being here today. Thank you for joining us 

here at this hour of the morning. 

We are looking forward to hearing about the Navy’s Optimized 

Fleet Response Plan [O–FRP], and we have heard about the stress 

that recent and current operations have put on our fleet. And I 

look forward to hearing the Navy’s plan to address these issues. 

I would now like to turn to my ranking member, Ms. Madeleine 

Bordallo, for her opening comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Good morning, and thank you very much, Mr. 

Chairman. And I thank the witnesses—and I like calling this hearing so early in the morning. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I enjoy it. Today we will discuss the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan, which is a new readiness construct 

that should enable the Navy to provide a predictable deployment 

schedule for our sailors, and support the growing operational tempo 

for the fleet and growing mission requirements across the globe. 

The O–FRP is a readiness construct that arises from significant 

strains on the force that pose challenges for the Navy’s continued 

readiness. 
2 

The O–FRP has been developed to respond to current day requirements, and is intended to endure into the future. The O–FRP 

is certainly a solid plan to address readiness challenges, but questions remain about its viability into the future. 

This subcommittee has been tracking development of the O–FRP, 

and directed the GAO [Government Accountability Office] to review 

the plan to get greater fidelity on the plan’s ability to adapt to 

changing circumstances that are beyond anyone’s control. 

For example, what would significant delays in shipbuilding or 

ship maintenance availabilities do to the O–FRP, and how would 

forces be generated without disrupting dwell time and predictability for our sailors? 

Further, I hope our witnesses can touch on how they are ensuring the readiness of logistics and support vessels in the Military 

Sealift Command [MSC] fleet to support the carrier strike groups 

[CSGs]. 

A key component of the O–FRP is to ensure that our Navy remains forward deployed, and the MSC is critical to supporting that 

effort. The O–FRP does a good job in outlining the deployment 

cycle for carrier strike groups, but I would like to get better fidelity 

on MSC ship maintenance and repair to support the carrier strike 

groups. 

And further, this level of fidelity would be welcomed by the shipyards, so that they have even more predictability to support the 

readiness of the fleet. 

I also hope our witnesses can touch on the value of having shipyards or robust ship repair capabilities in forward locations to truly 

support a forward deployed Navy. 

As our witnesses have indicated and news articles have highlighted, full implementation of the O–FRP will take years and 

years. So, it is important to fully explore the plan and make sure 

that it works, not just for today’s requirements, but enduring into 

the future. 

So, I look forward to a robust discussion about the plan and how 

it will endure, as well as how we overcome unforeseen challenges. 

And again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. 

We will now go to our witnesses, Admiral Harley and then Captain Burke, for your opening comments. 

STATEMENT OF RADM JEFFREY A. HARLEY, USN, ASSISTANT 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, 

PLANS, AND STRATEGY (OPNAV N3/5B); AND CAPT THOM 

BURKE, USN, DIRECTOR, FLEET READINESS (N43) 

Admiral HARLEY. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member 

Bordallo, distinguished members of the subcommittee, Captain 

Burke and I are honored to be here today to discuss the Optimized 

Fleet Response Plan, known as O–FRP. 

O–FRP is the Navy’s sustainable readiness generation model, 

and it is how we will maintain and train our ships to deploy in support of our national security interests. It provides a force that is 

ready for any challenge, from a high-end conflict against a peer 

competitor to humanitarian operations. 
3 

We would like to begin this statement by providing an overview 

of O–FRP, and then some highlights of how O–FRP will balance 

global presence with warfighting readiness and the long-term 

health of the force. 

Our Navy has managed force generation using the Fleet Response Plan since it was adopted in 2003 and fully implemented in 

2007. This cyclic process was designed to synchronize periodic deep 

maintenance and modernization necessary to readiness with the 

training of the fleet, to achieve global force management allocation 

plan forward presence objectives and provide contingency response 

capacity. 

The reality of the past decade has seen a smaller fleet, along 

with continuing employment of our contingency response capacity 

to generate increased presence. This drove up maintenance requirements and in turn, compressed the time available to complete required maintenance and training. 

In testimony over the last several years, the Navy has described 

this practice as unsustainable. 

This prolonged period of high operational tempo resulted in a 

loss of scheduled predictability, personnel gaps, deferred maintenance and modernization, and overall reduction in the health of the 

force. 

From 2008 to 2011, carrier strike group deployments averaged 

about 6.5 months in length. From 2012 to 2014, this increased to 

an average of 8.2 months as the Navy extended deployment lengths 

to meet global commitments to the combatant commanders. 

More recently, Nimitz and Harry S. Truman completed 8.5- 

month deployments in fiscal year 2014. George H.W. Bush completed a 9-month deployment, Carl Vinson completed a 9.5-month 

deployment, and Theodore Roosevelt will complete an 8.5-month deployment this year. 

Maintenance is the key factor to the health of the force. To meet 

national tasking, we have extended deployment lengths, which increased the wear on our ships, and resulted in additional maintenance and repairs that lengthened planned maintenance availabilities. 

Operational schedule changes to meet combatant commander requirements, funding shortfalls, shipyard loading constraints, late 

modernization adds, and other factors led to inefficient maintenance and modernization planning, contracting, and completion. 

Given these increased maintenance demands and shipyards, we 

should have been hiring more workers. Instead, because of the continuing resolution and sequestration-driven hiring freeze and overtime restrictions through much of fiscal year 2013, we were losing 

people to other employment opportunities or to retirement, without 

replacement. 

We are still hiring to try to recover that shortfall. But we have 

to train those workers who do not have the requisite skills. This 

lack of skilled shipyard labor has further impacted performance 

and completion timelines. These operational and budget decisions 

directly contributed to the maintenance challenges that we now 

face. 

The pace of operations, and providing ‘‘just in time’’ readiness to 

deploy, also affected our people, our sailors—including a number of 
4 

last-minute ‘‘cross-deck’’ moves, which means pulling sailors off one 

ship and putting them onto another just in time for the next deployment. 

Consequently, we were challenged to retain our best sailors due 

to uncertain schedules and increased time away from home, and 

the attendant loss of stability for sailors and their families. We are 

now paying the price for the prolonged high operational tempo experienced these last few years. We have testified to the 

unsustainability of that operational tempo. 

Combatant commander requirements, meanwhile, continue to 

grow and although we have historically sourced to our capacity we 

are routinely asked to surge additional forces or to extend forces 

on station. In these cases we are not so much generating new readiness as we are consuming the future presence and future surge capacity. 

This year, the Navy began implementation of the O–FRP to try 

to reset in stride, to address these challenges. Designed to stabilize 

maintenance schedules and provide sufficient time to maintain and 

train the force while maximizing employability, O–FRP also aligns 

supporting processes and resources to improve the overall health of 

the force. Importantly, it will provide a more predictable schedule 

for our sailors and their families. 

We will continue O–FRP implementation across the Future 

Years Defense Program with a goal of full implementation by 2020. 

The CNO’s [Chief of Naval Operations] overarching guidance was 

to establish a balanced, sustainable and predictable force readiness 

generation cycle that would maximize the employability of our force 

structure. 

O–FRP is intended to deliver several specific outcomes. First, O– 

FRP will permit us to preserve the time necessary for maintenance 

and training. We need to protect maintenance time to preserve the 

long-term health of the force. 

Delaying or deferring maintenance plans places equipment at increased risk and increases the risk of equipment casualties at sea 

when we need those equipment the most. Disruptions to maintenance planning also increases cost, reduces public shipyard productivity, and increases the risk to the private ship repair industrial 

base. 

Furthermore, stable and predictable maintenance and modernization supports our warfighting readiness and interoperability. 

If we don’t complete maintenance on time, we can’t start training 

on time. If we have to compress training to meet global presence 

requirements, this negatively impacts our full-spectrum readiness 

over the long term. 

The improvements in maintenance will lead to overall greater 

operational availability. Greater operational availability means less 

likelihood of lengthened or multiple deployments in the same cycle. 

O–FRP will also improve the quality of work and enhance the 

quality of life for our sailors. O–FRP will lead to enhanced quality 

of life through more predictable schedules for our sailors and their 

families. Stabilized manning also reduces the likelihood of lastminute cross-deck personnel actions and will result in fewer operational holds of sailors who have already served their time at sea. 
5 

O–FRP will provide standardized manning, training, equipping, 

and alignment of operational and tactical headquarters. It will provide a consistent chain of command throughout the O–FRP cycle. 

Ultimately, these factors are interrelated. For the investment in 

maintenance and training, an increased period of operational availability supports both forward presence commitments and recovering our contingency response capability. 

Our transition, as noted, to O–FRP will occur over several years. 

Carrier strike group and amphibious ready group [ARG] transitions 

are already in progress. We project the last CSGs and ARGs will 

enter O–FRP in fiscal year 2018. We have approved and are implementing O–FRP cycles for our remaining units, including ships 

homeported overseas, attack submarines, maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, and our expeditionary forces such as explosive ordnance disposal, coastal riverine forces, and naval construction forces. 

For our ships and submarines, completing maintenance availabilities on time is essential to reducing deployment durations. Maintenance delays may result in other ships completing extended deployment to meet global commitments. 

The fiscal year 2016 President’s budget [PB–16] made a significant investment to increase available naval shipyard and aviation 

depot capacity. We have moved some submarine work to the private sector and increased the size of the workforce. 

Navy is making significant investments in workforce training to 

improve worker productivity. The combination of these improvements will reduce the number of availabilities that exceed scheduled end dates. 

Additionally, in support of O–FRP implementation, we have synchronized carrier and surface combatant maintenance periods, 

standardized the training of our headquarters staffs, and consolidated and streamlined inspection processes. 

We have made significant progress in ensuring our ships are 

properly manned prior to commencing the training cycle. We are 

continuing to work to ensure maintenance and modernization periods are completed on time. 

For the progress we have made, we must be prepared to address 

potential roadblocks to O–FRP implementation. We will need to 

fund O–FRP to the right standards for manpower, maintenance 

and training, and across all readiness pillars. 

PB–16 does that, but a return to Budget Control Act levels will 

certainly disrupt O–FRP implementation. 

We need to meet not only the numbers for manpower fit and fill, 

but ensure the quality of the fit is correct, ensuring a trained sailor 

with the right skills arrives at the right time. 

We need to closely manage ship schedules and alignment of surface combatant and amphibious ships with the aircraft carriers and 

big-deck amphibious ships. 

This is complex because it involves coordinating maintenance 

and modernization schedules across numerous shipyards. 

We need to invest in increasing shipyard capacity by addressing 

workforce manning and training requirements. We will have to 

execute the planned PB–16 investment to increase available naval 

shipyard capacity by moving submarine work to the private sector 
6 

and increasing the shipyard workforce to 33,500 full-time equivalents by fiscal year 2017. 

Finally, responding to emerging crises with surge or extended deployments will disrupt schedules and could further delay O–FRP 

implementation. 

We are carefully managing the O–FRP implementation and execution and will be prepared to adjust course as necessary. 

Lastly, I would like to talk about the risks we face if we do not 

implement O–FRP. We cannot continue doing business as usual 

and expect to maintain an operational and tactical advantage over 

our adversaries. If we do not implement O–FRP, our challenges 

will continue to grow. 

We will be unable to retain our best sailors due to high operational tempo and schedule unpredictability. Through the cumulative effect of high operational tempo and maintenance challenges, 

we also will be unable to reach the expected service life of our 

ships, submarines, and aircraft. 

Additionally, degraded material readiness leads to reduced warfighting readiness, ineffective training, and increased safety risks. 

We will be unable to preserve the required industrial support base. 

We will continue to have inefficient maintenance/modernization 

planning and scheduling, which will lead to unacceptable and unaffordable cost overruns, training entitlement impacts, and deployment delays. 

Lastly, we continue to consume our contingency surge capacity 

for routine operations. It will be more challenging to meet Defense 

Strategic Guidance objectives of the future. 

Ultimately, this is a ‘‘pay me now or pay me later’’ discussion. 

If we are not given time to reset the force through O–FRP, and are 

forced to source beyond sustainable levels, we will remain challenged in all of these areas. 

So in conclusion, after years of operating above sustainable levels, we remain challenged to meet the necessary surge capacity in 

quantity and readiness across a wide array of forces. Moreover, a 

return to Budget Control Act authority levels will further challenge 

our maintenance, readiness, training, and risks reversing recent 

gains. 

Your great Navy will continue to man, train, and equip combatcredible forward naval presence—being where it matters, when it 

matters—as well as supporting our commitment to allies and partners. Our naval functions—deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and all-domain access—remain essential to 

our strategy. 

But we cannot sustain the health of the force indefinitely without 

adopting and fully implementing O–FRP as our sustainable force 

generation model. We thank the subcommittee for your continued 

support and we look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Harley and Captain 

Burke can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral Harley, thank you. Thank you for that 

comprehensive overview about O–FRP and what it means and the 

challenges that we face ahead. I appreciate you putting your perspective, too, what Congress’s obligation needs to be to make sure 
7 

that we create that readiness and make sure that we are creating 

it faster than we are consuming it. Great—great perspectives. 

What I will do is begin with just a single question, and then I 

want to make sure we go to the members here and then I will come 

back. 

You spoke at length about making sure that there is proper capacity there, both in the private yards and the public yards, increasing staffing there. One of the things we look at as far as maintenance availabilities, as you so eloquently stated, the maintenance 

availabilities have backed up based on deployment schedules from 

2012 through 2014. 

So now we have this bow wave of maintenance availabilities that 

have to be taken care of, getting those ships to the yard. That also 

creates a bow wave, as you said, in capacity in our yards. The key, 

though, is to make sure that we maintain that capacity moving forward past taking care of the bow wave that comes in and getting 

these ships maintained. 

How does O–FRP make sure we are not in this roller coaster ride 

again where we have all this work that goes to the yards and then 

all of a sudden the need for that capacity now goes away? So we 

ramp up to that 33,000 staffing level in the yards, both public and 

private, and then once that work is done, you know, we drop off 

and the demand is not there. 

So give us a perspective about how O–FRP, you know, keeps that 

certainty for all of our yards to make sure, as you have talked 

about, and we have seen this where we lose people from the yards 

because the work goes away and then we scramble to get folks back 

and those skills never return. And when we do have to hire folks, 

as you know, it takes a significant amount of time for them to develop the skills to be effective and for efficiencies to be found in the 

yard. 

So give me an idea about how as we go into 2015, 2016, and 

2017, and then obviously into 2018, how do you manage those 

peaks and valleys? 

Admiral HARLEY. And sir, I will let Captain Burke provide more 

detail, but what you are really addressing is this ideal of providing 

predictability for our industrial base. And that same predictability, 

if we can get to a place where the maintenance ends on time, that 

predictability translates over into our ability to generate force employability to meet our obligations for our global force presence. 

That predictability is the—underpinned by exactly that, by having that industrial base capable of generating the maintenance outcomes that we absolutely need for our program. 

Captain BURKE. Sir, good morning. That is a fantastic question. 

It is right on the point. And so I think what O–FRP is helping us 

do is there is a subset of O–FRP, which is this new master plan 

we are creating to give our process sustainability, discipline, and 

stability. And so our plan is to try and look out much further into 

the future with this disciplined process and be able to see 9 years 

out, this is when this ship is going to be in availability. 

So it should allow us to do a much better job of placing a trajectory on the size of the shipyards throughout the country, both public and private, and what our private demand would even be, and 

be able to put a more level load throughout that long cycle. 
8 

Now as we transition, there is churn there. Because we do it— 

we have a lot of work to do, to hire folks, which we are doing pretty 

well at, but getting those folks trained and getting them to perform 

at the journeyman level takes a few years. They are not going to 

show up as experts. 

So the transition is going to be—is a big challenge for us. But 

once we get there, we will be able to look much further into the 

future and look at what the load is across our yards so we are not 

causing those ups and downs. Absolutely right, yes, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. As well as talking, obviously, with the folks in the 

public yards, are you having conversations with folks in the private 

yards to make sure you work with them so they can work with you 

and maintaining for them that certainty, but also helping them 

manage the workforce so we are not on that roller coaster ride? 

Captain BURKE. Yes, sir. And I think we are doing it in better 

ways than we have ever done in the past, honestly. It is more of 

a challenge. We don’t have the fidelity we have with our public 

yards of exactly what skill sets we have available. We have great 

fidelity in our public yards. 

In the private yards, folks are more inclined to say they will take 

the work no matter what, so we have to be—we have to be honest 

partners with each other and understand what the realities are so 

that we are not causing them a lot of churn, yes, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a couple of questions, real quick questions. Admiral, for 

you, where along the O–FRP timeline does the most risk lie? Who 

is responsible for enforcing it and who has the authority to disrupt 

it? 

Admiral HARLEY. Most of the risk within the 36-month timeline 

for the Optimized Fleet Response Plan is the maintenance cycle 

itself. There are a number of unknowns within the maintenance 

cycle. Things get discovered that need repair. 

One of the examples is the Dwight D. Eisenhower’s maintenance 

cycle was supposed to be significantly shorter, ended up to be twice 

as long, a function of a major system casualty that was discovered 

once they got into the discovery phase in preparation for the maintenance. 

So there are things that place the maintenance portion particularly at risk. 

The deployments are scheduled years in advance. It is part of our 

force offering adjudicated by the Secretary of Defense. And what 

our global force presence will be allocated with the capacity that 

we can offer. 

The shock absorber for that becomes the training cycle, and it is 

why the CNO has testified that there are maintenance backlogs 

and training backlogs that impact the ability to execute the Fleet 

Response Plan and now have potential to disrupt the Optimized 

Fleet Response Plan. 

It is why so much effort is going into ensuring the predictability 

and the completion of the maintenance cycles. The force generation 

models, the readiness generation model that is described in the Optimized Fleet Response Plan is obviously a Chief of Naval Oper-
9 

ations responsibility, under his title 10 authorities of manning, 

training, and equipping. 

However, the commander of Fleet Forces Command is the executive agent for delivering the readiness of the fleet. That is the person who can disrupt, modify, re-organize the Fleet Response Plan 

and its goals under the auspices of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Admiral, for your direct 

answers to my questions. 

Now can you detail how the O–FRP implementation sequences 

MSC or other logistics and support vessel maintenance over the 

coming years? Again, I want to stress, the plan for the carrier 

strike groups is pretty straightforward, but it is not—but it is unclear how this would work for MSC. 

Admiral HARLEY. The O–FRP has nine lines of effort and one of 

those is MSC support. But the Military Sealift Command ships are 

not part of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan’s methodologies. 

They are funded to a certain level of readiness, a certain number 

of days. They are certified to Coast Guard standards and civilian 

maintenance standards. 

So they play a significant role in supporting the rest of the fleet 

through their readiness, through their support of the ships and assets that are going through the Optimized Fleet Response Plan. 

But in terms of the processes, the alignment of manning the 

training and logistics, it is not a driver for the Military Sealift 

Command ships and platforms. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. 

We will now go to Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, the best of managers, whether they are in the public 

sector or the private sector, can’t be efficient if they don’t know 

what their budget is in a timely manner. Do you know what your 

budget will be for your fiscal year that starts October 1? 

Admiral HARLEY. We actually don’t, sir. I think it depends on the 

decision as to whether the Presidential budget is approved or 

whether there is a continuing resolution [CR]. And even within the 

continuing resolution, there is significant discussion as to the lowest levels, whether it would be a House number or Senate number. 

And there is a significant difference between what could potentially be a gap of something like $3.6 billion or even up to a gap 

of $16.5 billion. 

We can certainly get you more details, but you are absolutely 

right—it creates an uncertainty and an unpredictability that has 

the potential to destabilize our naval execution of the Fleet Response Plan and the Optimized Fleet Response Plan. 

Mr. SCOTT. And just for the record, Mr. Chairman, for people 

who may be watching this, it is September 10, so we are 20 days 

from the new fiscal year. And Admiral, I majored in risk management. Forgive me for the question, but is it possible to calculate the 

additional risk and cost to our country in both dollars and national 

security with the uncertainty that is surrounding the appropriations for the DOD [Department of Defense]? 

Admiral HARLEY. I think we have calculated the risk in testimony, particularly in January with the Chief of Naval Operations 
10 

and the service chiefs discussing and testifying to the impacts of 

sequestration. 

Naval assets are somewhat different, I would suggest, than so 

many other assets and programs. The maintenance cycles are very 

long. The ability to produce readiness is an extensive period of 

time. We absolutely rely on the predictability of that funding. 

Continuing resolution would have impacts of its own if we end 

up there, even for a short period of time. We are likely to have to 

start deferring some maintenance because of the lack of predictability. 

And this has a daisy chain effect of repercussions throughout the 

maintenance schedule, a daisy chain effect in terms of our ability 

to provide global presence required to support and defend our allies 

and to meet our commitments in accordance with the Defense Strategic Guidance. 

Mr. SCOTT. I agree with you, Admiral. The only thing that a continuing resolution is better than would be a shutdown and the additional uncertainty that would come from that. 

The House passed a Defense Appropriations measure June 11 by 

a vote of almost 2 to 1. I would just like to point that out. And now 

here we are 20 days from the end of the fiscal year and we don’t 

have anything to tell you. 

One last comment I would make—if I wanted to destroy the 

United States, if I was their enemy, I would force their fleet to stay 

at sea longer than their maintenance schedules allow for, to allow 

us, if you will, to dilapidate the fleet. 

One of the greatest advantages that we have had over any of our 

adversaries is our ability to do depot and maintenance work and 

the industrial workforce that we have. Could you speak to the impact that this is having, the uncertainty has, and the damage that 

we have done to that workforce with furloughs and other budget 

maneuvers that have happened in the past? 

Captain BURKE. Sir, specifically talking about the workforce and 

the furloughs, I think it is a pretty important point. And the uncertainty associated with it can really cause some serious damage. 

The shutdown, for example, that we had resulted in not only 

some furloughs and sequester results in some furloughs, but then 

they resulted in a hiring freeze. And that was actually more damaging because for 8 or 9 months afterwards we couldn’t hire. And 

so, for example, in our air depots, with our aircraft, we just this 

summer got back to the level of folks working in those depots, the 

level we had in 2013. So we just got back to where we used to be. 

And we know that capacity isn’t enough to handle the amount 

of aircraft we need as throughput right now. And you can make the 

same—exactly the same statement for the shipyards, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Captain, I represent Robins Air Force Base. We will 

be happy to rebuild those Navy planes for you if you need us to. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield the remainder of my time and I appreciate the opportunity and gentlemen I appreciate your service. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

We will now go to Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 

both the witnesses this morning. 
11 

Admiral, I just want to get a little more clarification on some 

numbers that you just recited in terms of the impact of a CR and 

sequestration. You mentioned a $3 billion gap between the President’s budget and one of those scenarios and up to $16.5 billion between the President’s budget and one of those scenarios. 

Could you just say—is the $3 billion if we do a CR? And the 

$16.5 is a sequestration number? Is that—— 

Admiral HARLEY. Sir, the difference between those numbers is 

the difference between the inclusion of OCO [overseas contingency 

operations] funding and the lowest common base and whether you 

would take the House number or the Senate number. And I understand it is one of the issues that is being discussed and it would 

still have to be adjudicated between the Senate and the House. 

But it is a significant difference for us. And we have argued that, 

you know, the President’s budget is what we need to execute our 

missions. A continuing resolution would obviously place us at some 

number less than the President’s budget. 

And as we look at those numbers, depending on whether it is a 

House version or a Senate version that included what could be— 

what could include a construct of the lowest base number for that 

funding, it could be a significant difference between those two numbers that I offered. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And does the OCO sort of strategy, does that— 

can that be applied towards this program, or is that just not considered, you know, within OCO’s reach? You know what I am saying? 

Admiral HARLEY. Sir, I don’t know. And I can get that back to 

you. I know—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. I would appreciate that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 43.] 

Admiral HARLEY. As we look at how we include the overall funding. Our goal is to reach the ultimate numbers provided within the 

President’s budget. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. The other question—I just wanted to 

follow up, as long as we are talking about gaps, is the carrier gap. 

That is the way it is referred to in the media. 

And it looks like we are about to encounter a carrier gap, both 

in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific. Is that something that, again, 

is just episodic, that is because there was that delay in some of the 

carrier repairs that you referred to earlier? 

Or is that sort of going to be a structural, recurring phenomenon, 

because of O–FRP? 

Admiral HARLEY. Sir, first I would talk to the idea that we really 

ought to talk about capability gaps and not platform gaps. 

So, much has been said in the press about how we are not going 

to have an aircraft carrier in the Arabian Gulf for certain periods 

of time. And the truth is, what the Navy offers is what we can 

produce. We tell the Secretary of Defense, that given our readiness 

generation model, we can produce this amount of carrier presence. 

Based on global threats, the Secretary of Defense allocates where 

those resources go. And sometimes it results in a carrier not being 

assigned in the Central Command area of responsibility. Or some-
12 

times it results in not being assigned in the Pacific Command area 

of responsibility, let alone all of the other combatant commanders. 

This phenomenon of not having a carrier present has happened 

many times in the past; six times since 1991 for Central Command, 

eight times since 1991 for the Pacific Command. And appreciating 

the significant value that a carrier brings to a fight and to things 

like deterrence, the idea of discussing capabilities really is important. 

Because when the carrier goes, the Joint Staff, working with the 

combatant commanders, finds methodologies by which they can 

mitigate that presence lack of the carrier. 

And to that end, they are able to mitigate and provide the capabilities that are required for that duration of time, until a carrier 

can be provided in accordance with our presence constructs. 

Mr. COURTNEY. A number of us were over in Pearl Harbor last 

week. And Admiral Harris and Admiral Swift sort of walked us 

through that point. 

I guess the question I still would like to understand is that, is 

this something, though, that is going to be recurring with O–FRP? 

Admiral HARLEY. So, first I would say that O–FRP is not the creator of gaps. O–FRP is a model that generates the optimal employability of the—for the number of ships that we have. Our goal, as 

stated by the CNO is to have two carriers deployed and a surge capacity of three other carriers. 

Where those two carriers are allocated is decided based on 

threats, and determined by the Secretary of Defense, but through 

the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Will there be gaps—so-called 

gaps in the future? Well, I would say that the capabilities, we find 

ways to mitigate that through adding additional fighter aircraft as 

a representative example. 

But our goal is to get to a sustainable generation model for the 

highest levels of readiness, that are then offered to the Secretary 

of Defense, and he makes that allocation. 

Will there be shortages of carrier presence in the future? I would 

say, most likely, because of the number of demands and global 

threats throughout the world. 

Mr. WITTMAN. We will now go to Mrs. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I was wondering, how does the delay of the USS Gerald R. Ford 

impact the O–FRP and the operational availability of the Navy’s 

carrier strike group? 

Admiral HARLEY. The delay of the Gerald R. Ford is a function 

of desiring to do shock trials to support the optimal understanding 

of the safety parameters, before we deploy that aircraft carrier. 

It does modify our ability to restore our plus-three surge capacity 

by a designated period of time that is still under review by Fleet 

Forces Command. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So, you don’t have an idea right now what that 

looks like? You are still reviewing when it will be available? 

Admiral HARLEY. Well, we know, without talking through classified schedules that it represents about a 2-year delay in being able 

to deploy that carrier. And consequently, it means that we won’t 
13 

get back to 11 carriers able to deploy for about an additional 2-year 

period. 

We are looking at ways to mitigate our presence requirements to 

get back to our two carriers deployed and three surge-capable, but 

it does have a significant impact. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What is the relationship now between public and 

private maintenance in the shipyards? 

How much of it is done in public, how much is done in private? 

And how would you rate the capability, as well as the economic feasibility of doing that? Is it cost-effective or beneficial to have more 

private than public, or vice versa, or how do you view that? 

Captain BURKE. Ma’am, the relationship is—essentially the—sort 

of straightforward roll-up is that our nuclear work is done in our 

public shipyards. Our kind of highest skill set, highest standard 

work is done in our public yards. 

And then the work for our cruisers and destroyers, our amphibious fleet, is done in our private—is done in the private yards, is 

sent out to those yards, contracted out. 

And then there is some work that is contracted out that is done 

on what we call top-side work, not in the propulsion plans, that 

kind of thing, in our public yards. 

So, the relationship is crucial to O–FRP being successful that we 

have the balance between both our public sector and our private 

sector understood. We have—as the chairman was talking about in 

his question as well, that we have a trajectory to the future, we understand what the loading is across those yards, so that we are not 

throwing major wrenches into either the public sector or the private sector, because it really screws up the planning. 

And that is a big part of why we are trying to take this breath, 

and get O–FRP, which really isn’t that big a change, really. It is 

just trying to deliberately fence the time for maintenance, so that 

we can get these ships back up where they belong. And then we 

have time to offer that post-deployment sustainment, and really 

offer that surge capability again, which we kind of lost in our 

scramble to just be present over the last several years. Because our 

numbers were higher than we could sustain. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Certainly, predictability is important in industry 

and—you are talking employing, and training and all of the aspects. So, that certainly makes sense. 

What measures does the Navy use to track the performance of 

its shipyards to ensure that it is meeting its maintenance goals? 

Captain BURKE. The big roll-up measures, ma’am, are all about 

cost and schedule. Those are the key parameters that we use, and 

we have a number of ways to measure the trajectory of how we are 

doing on cost and how we are doing on schedule, beyond the big 

roll-ups. 

So, from a business standpoint in the shipyard, that is what they 

are worried about. How long is this supposed to take to change this 

out? Is it a 5-day job? Why did it take 7 [days]? That sort of thing. 

Why did it cost extra, et cetera? That is what we focus on. 

From a fleet perspective, they are more focused on operational 

days, the time that that ship is available at sea. We call that metric ‘‘lost operational days.’’ If a ship is supposed to be out there and 

able to be used by the fleet commander, and it wasn’t available, 
14 

that is an X. That is a bad thing. So, we want to minimize the 

number of lost operational days. 

So, we roll up all those metrics to see how we are doing. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. In the initial contract, is there a penalty for the 

private contractor if they go beyond the time that they were originally allotted to have the maintenance done? 

Captain BURKE. There can be. And it depends in the contracting 

strategy. In the private side, we are changing contracting strategies to go to a more firm, fixed-price type of strategy, which will 

have more of those kinds of incentives, or if you will, disincentives 

in the contract. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Hartzler. 

We will now go to Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for joining us today. 

I wanted to follow up a little bit with that—with some of those 

questions. How are we catching up? Because I think that the tracking is critical, and we know that reducing the maintenance backlogs, it just snowballs, as you all know, in terms of how long the 

fleet has to—is active, and corrosion issues in terms of the ships. 

I mean, there are so many things that are causing many of the 

concerns that you have. And some of those are not necessarily to 

the sequestration that we have experienced, but longstanding. 

So, how are we catching up with that? I mean, what are the 

strategies that are working and those which are not? 

Captain BURKE. That is absolutely the right question, ma’am. 

So, the things I can say now are—there are a couple of good 

news stories, and then there are a couple of—we are still looking 

ats. So, the good news is the metric I just mentioned, lost operational days. How many days are those ships available to the fleet 

commanders? 

That has been coming down all of the last 4 years, the number 

of lost days were had for our ships at sea. So, that is a good thing. 

We have got a good method now to show that we are resetting 

the fleet. So we have been very concerned about the fact that we 

were trying to fix the bicycle as we rode it over the last number 

of years, and we decided we really needed to try and more deliberately capture how far we were off of the class maintenance plan 

for our ships. Sort of the warranty manual for your car throughout 

the life cycle. Are we on that plan? Or are we off that plan? 

So we have a way to capture that now and show that we are putting more effort against that plan and we are actually putting 

maintenance above—doing maintenance above the plan to catch 

back up. And so we can track that metric now. Those are the good 

news stories. 

The worrisome side is what we—is what I talked about earlier, 

with all these new folks we are hiring. All these new faces. We got 

to get them trained and we have got to get them up and performing 

effectively. And that is not going to happen overnight so we have 

to work through that over the next few years. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Admiral Harley, you know the problems that we are 

facing now is that they didn’t just occur, we know that they have 

been going for some time. Is there—what is it that—I think the 
15 

role of the Congress obviously is critical in this and how we respond. Where do we fit into that? 

As specifically—I mean it is obviously the sequestration and 

whether it is a continuing resolution. But I wonder if you could expand a little bit more on that? Where else do you see the role? 

Admiral HARLEY. Yes ma’am, we appreciate the great partnership with Congress and congressional leadership in so many of 

these areas. As you know Admiral Greenert, our Chief of Naval Operations, released his maritime strategy in March in which he 

talked to force design construct and the things that our great Navy 

needs to be able to meet the five naval functions. There are things 

that are needed to support the O–FRP and I have outlined some 

of them. 

We do use the optimization of the existing Fleet Response Plan 

to achieve a better alignment within training, within manning, 

within maintenance; to create those kinds of maintenance efficiencies. As we move into the long term, Congress can help us with 

ensuring the wholeness of our programs. We do that through looking at the logistics, through the parts, through the ordnance. 

Probably the most critical factor is being able to provide predictable and stable funding because of the differences. Because of the 

inherent difference in our Navy long-term processes that need that 

stability; with a predictability that goes to your industrial base. A 

predictability of the product; of the readiness that is going to be 

provided to the combatant commanders. 

All of those things is what the optimization of the Fleet Response 

Plan will offer. But it is the dialogue with Congress, it is the strategic underpinning, and it is particularly the stability of the funding is I think what the enhanced role of Congress would be. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I was a little concerned though in the discussion 

with Representative Courtney that in terms of trying to really help 

members see where this gap is because there is a concern about 

how—what is included in OCO and how we move forward? How we 

have an understanding of that. 

So I think to the extent that we can really look at that a little 

clearer would be helpful. 

Thank you. 

Admiral HARLEY. Yes ma’am, we can certainly set up a briefing 

for you or your staff. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Davis, we will now go to Ms. 

Stefanik. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentlemen for your testimony today. I wanted to build on Mr. Courtney’s 

previous line of questioning. I represent Fort Drum, home of the 

10th Mountain Division and engaged from the 10th Mountain Division are brigades currently forward deployed in Afghanistan and 

Iraq. And on a recent CODEL [congressional delegation] with 

Chairman Wittman to Top Gun, I was able to see the significance 

and the critical role that the Navy has in providing close air support for troops on the ground, specifically for the 10th Mountain 

Division. 
16 

Can you explain to me how the implementation of O–FRP restricts, impedes, or helps the Navy’s ability in a joint environment, 

and in particular in the Middle East AO [area of operations]? 

Admiral HARLEY. I would say that O–FRP actually optimizes our 

readiness to support not only naval functions and missions but optimizes our ability to participate as a joint partner. For over a decade we have fought wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing things 

like close air support. We are currently engaged in operations now 

against ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] providing air 

support to enable our objectives in that fight as well. 

When you look at jointness, we are a joint force. We certainly 

have maritime mission tasks that we execute, critical missions 

tasks to support maritime security over the globe, the underpinning of the global economy. But we operate frequently in joint exercises and joint forces. It is part of our DNA now to be able to do 

that. 

So we can optimize the readiness that delivers the global presence that enables the joint force excecution of missions like those 

in Afghanistan. And the Fleet Response Plan is simply that, it is 

a readiness generator. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan simply 

optimizes the existing plan that we have. 

We are also using the Optimized Fleet Response Plan to reset 

our stride, to get back to our ability to provide the global force 

presence that we need as well as a surge capacity. It is going to 

take several years to get there but it is absolutely critical for our 

ability to maintain global requirements in terms of presence, but 

also the ability to respond to crises. 

Ms. STEFANIK. My second question—I am sorry go ahead, Captain. 

Captain BURKE. I wanted to just add—I would just like to thank 

you for saying that. I think a lot of people don’t really realize how 

busy the Navy has been supporting our troops on the ground, in 

the Middle East especially. I had the privilege of spending 5 

months out there while I was CO [commanding officer] of the USS 

Ronald Reagan. 

We took great pride in the fact that we never missed a sortie 

that was going over land to go support our troops on the ground. 

We always had the section that whatever it was—the package that 

was flying to go check in was ready to support those troops on the 

ground. 

So I think a lot of folks don’t really understand that. This is, 

‘‘Well that is the Navy, they are not busy doing this ground fight,’’ 

and we sort of let it sneak up on us, our collective understanding 

of how much we were stressing our force to be able to provide that; 

that air cover, that air presence, and all the ships associated with 

providing from the sea support. So I really appreciate you mentioning that. 

Thank you. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Well, we certainly are grateful and I know the soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division that I represent are grateful 

for that support. 

My second question, which deals with a different topic, has to do 

with retention. As you know, retaining the best and the brightest 

soldiers is a huge issue and it is at the top of the priority list for 
17 

the Army right now. And you touched on this a bit, Admiral, in 

your opening statement. 

Can you please elaborate on why and how the O–FRP helps retain sailors and any impact on their quality of life and more stability for their families? 

Admiral HARLEY. Absolutely, so one of the dilemmas that our 

people face under the demands of global presence in the past has 

been a lack of predictability. Deployments get extended, people get 

surged early. Because we haven’t been able to align our manpower 

systems, you will be pulled off of one ship and put onto another. 

The ships suffer in readiness in terms of what we call fit and fill, 

having the right person with the right skills. And this translates 

into not being—not having the resources that you need to do your 

job. And so it leads to a frustration that probably culminates in reduced retention. 

We have settled in the O–FRP on a 7-month deployment. It is 

the optimal deployment length that meets the ability to enable the 

transit distances of the globe to get where we need to be, to be 

where it matters when it matters, and yet at the same time, we 

don’t want those deployments to be too long. There are physical 

things that start to happen around the 8-month point on ships. 

And we have done the rigorous analysis to show that extended deployments have impacts on retention. 

So what the Optimized Fleet Response Plan will do is not only 

giving you better tools of fit and fill, it should give our sailors and 

their families a predictability that we haven’t had in the past. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Stefanik. 

We will now go to Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panelists. Thank you for your service and your leadership. 

My questions are going to really follow up on the previous one 

and Mr. Courtney. And in particular, with regard to the Global Response Force, I will be interested in your personal assessments as 

to the processes we have in place right now. 

Certainly very detailed and informative commentary this morning in terms of the Navy’s aspects and impacts on operations and 

on deterrents. 

The Global Response Force put a lot of focus on that over the last 

several years as a means of really empowering our diplomats, really revitalizing deterrence, having agility in the American response. 

And I am interested in your assessment from the vantage point of 

the Navy of how we are doing as far as a joint force using the Global Response Force construct. 

Oftentimes in the media we hear reports of a carrier strike group 

is, you know, in the Central Command or—and so obviously very 

important, but as you have earlier stated this morning, I mean, 

this is all part of a joint force. 

How satisfied are you that the Pentagon is putting enough emphasis on this, especially given the war that we have been fighting 

for so long and, you know, in terms of impacts of meeting current 

requirements for the war on terror? 

And then how we are doing in relation to that? And in some 

cases taking risk in revitalizing the Global Response Force— 
18 

what—and so, towards that end, your assessment, what recommendations would you have for us, the Congress, that might enhance or improve our ability to model and simulate, participate in 

a meaningful way in exercises that all work toward revitalizing the 

Global Response Force? 

Admiral HARLEY. Sir, the Optimized Fleet Response Plan is designed as a readiness generation model, as I have said. Another 

way of articulating that is it creates employability. It creates predictable and sustainable employability. 

So by that I mean the CNO has testified of his goal to be able 

to achieve a two-plus-three construct, which is really getting to the 

issue of a response force. It is more than the one carrier ready to 

respond. It is creating a vision where we have three carriers in a 

surge capacity ready to respond, on top of the two-plus presence 

that is already being provided globally. 

So when you talk about providing a response force, that is really 

what we are talking about, is the ability to surge to crises or to 

areas of responsibility in the event of a conflict or in the event of 

a humanitarian disaster, as an example. 

CNO has stated this goal. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan 

builds towards that goal. We have lost that surge capacity as a 

function of the overuse of our ships and platforms these last several years. We testified that it would be unsustainable. It has proven to be so. And now we are dealing with the consequences of that. 

We are resetting in stride to get back to that surge capacity so 

that we can best enable the accomplishment of our Defense Strategic Guidance requirements. 

In terms of its interoperability with the joint force, we operate 

as a joint force frequently. We do joint exercises to make sure that 

we ensure our tactical and operational prowess. The AirSea Battle 

concept, soon to be the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in 

the Global Commons, is simply an extension of a joint synergy and 

operational capability that will ensure all-domain access. 

In terms of where I think the Congress can fit into this process, 

it is through enhancing your knowledge of how these joint capabilities fit together, participating in some of the special trips that you 

have done recently up to the Naval War College to see the extraordinary modeling, the extraordinary war-gaming that goes on, the 

joint interfaces and connections. 

Getting—receiving briefs, out briefs, on the major joint exercises 

that take place, as well as the real world operations that take place 

at the joint level in support of the ongoing conflicts that still continue. 

And again, I would be remiss if I didn’t say the biggest role I 

think is being able to provide that stability for us, for that funding 

that goes to not only the ability to meet our maritime functions but 

our joint functions. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, Admiral. My time has expired. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gibson. 

Admiral Harley, the Optimized Fleet Response Plan is a great 

model to integrate decision making, to create the balance between 

maintenance, between training and deployment. And you talk 

about those metrics we want to make sure we maintain, and that 

is to keep ships on schedule to be maintained, make sure sailors 
19 

get enough training, make sure deployment schedules are at 7 

months. 

You talk about predictability and sustainability. 

The challenging part of that is the world we live in is not predictable. Whether it is Congress and what happens in the funding 

stream or whether it is what our adversaries do, that predictability 

in that realm is what you have to deal in. 

So the question then becomes, of the metrics that you speak of, 

which ones do you say are so important that you have to adjust 

others to move in order to compensate for let’s say staying on a 7- 

month deployment cycle, or saying that we will not skip a maintenance availability in the yard because we know what then happens 

to the fleet down the road? 

Give us a perspective about how when you meet those unpredictable elements, the contingencies that invariably come up, give us 

a perspective because we have seen what happens in the past when 

those situations happen and how certain things throw an O–FRP 

out of whack, and then we find ourselves back in what do we do 

to compensate for that. 

So give me your perspective as you face this contingency or that 

uncertainty, what—how the O–FRP would respond to that. 

Admiral HARLEY. Sir, the O–FRP is designed to be a sustainable 

model. And what you are talking about are things that can throw 

the timing and the sequence of events out of line, whether it is 

global events or some significant maintenance discovery that results in a very extensive maintenance for a particular carrier, as 

an example. 

In terms of providing that perspective, the O–FRP is tracked 

through a master O–FRP production plan, which outlines the alignment of all these different programs, manpower, logistics, personnel, parts, ordnance, to create that wholeness in readiness for 

a specific strike group, as an example. 

Real world events will cause changes to the production planning. 

If somebody’s maintenance gets extended beyond our ability to absorb it within the shock absorber that is built into the Optimized 

Fleet Response Plan, we would have to adjust accordingly and modify the schedules to be able to do that. 

We have the capacity to do that. We have picked a 7-month deployment in particular to give us flexibility if we really had to go 

to 8 months. It is not optimal. It is not what we want to do for all 

the reasons that are described today. But it is one of the options 

available to us. 

Another option is to reduce our global input as to what we can 

provide for a designated period of time and to mitigate that presence, that carrier presence, in some other way, using our joint partners, using joint aircraft to cover a gap in time where we may not 

actually have a carrier present. 

But we do have methodologies, we do have tools that we can use 

to deal with real world contingencies. Now our hope, of course, and 

because probably the most pressing of the issues that you identified 

is if there is a real world contingency that requires. Of course we 

have the Global Response Force and its ability to respond. 

We track daily the ability of being able to surge aircraft carriers 

and all other platforms and how quickly they can respond to a cri-
20 

sis. Our desire is that our global force offering as adjudicated by 

the Secretary of Defense will be adequate. 

But your Navy maintains a readiness to respond to all of those 

issues. Our desire is to be able to reset in place, to reset in stride 

so that we can get to a place where that two-plus-three surge capacity is the norm and not merely a goal. 

Captain BURKE. And sir, if I could just add briefly, the world is 

not predictable, as you very correctly said, but maintenance should 

be. So if we get a disciplined process in place and we get back to 

predictable maintenance and we build back the surge capacity, as 

the Admiral said, well, there—once we build back that surge capacity, there is a lot of sustainment time for our ships after they come 

back from deployment. 

That gives you a lot of flexibility. But we need to get—we need 

to get back to a disciplined maintenance schedule, get it done—get 

these ships out on time, build back that surge and then you are 

going to see a lot of flexibility. But it is going to take a little while. 

Mr. WITTMAN. One thing, too, that doesn’t get mentioned in O– 

FRP, to have another tool to buffer this unpredictability in the 

world around us is the total number of ships in our fleet. And looking at what ship construction takes us to in the future. And as we 

know, we put more and more pressure on our sailors, on our ships, 

if the number of ships in our fleet are static. 

So Admiral Harley and Captain Burke, give me your perspective, 

too, on how important it is to make sure that we get to that fleet 

number, whatever it may be, 311 is I guess the most recent number—tell me how important it is to make sure not only that we 

stay on track to do the maintenance, but that new ship construction stays on schedule? 

Admiral HARLEY. Sir, the CNO has testified and has placed in 

his maritime strategy the need for at least 300 ships to be able to 

execute all of the missions within the Defense Strategic Guidance. 

Reduced numbers of ships make achieving all of our mission sets 

certainly more difficult. 

So I am sure the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval 

Operations and probably every naval officer would testify to the 

fact that we need to get to the designated number of ships as rapidly as possible. It gives us greater flexibility, greater agility, our 

ability to meet our Defense Strategic Guidance. 

Captain BURKE. And sir, as you alluded to, the cheapest ship we 

have out there is one we already have. We have just got to take 

care of it and make sure that it lasts for its full expected service 

life. So that is step one. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just have a couple of quick questions here. Captain, maybe— 

I think you may be able to answer this one. I am concerned about 

the continued degradation of the workforces in some private shipyards. The lack of consistent work has created challenges across 

the country, including my own district of Guam. 

So I do appreciate the efforts to address the challenges we have 

regarding the ship repair capabilities on Guam, but there are 

broader issues. 
21 

What actions is the Navy taking to address the challenges at 

public and private shipyards that could affect the Navy’s ability to 

complete ship maintenance on schedule? 

Captain BURKE. So a very important question, ma’am. And we 

are trying to make sure that we—by using O–FRP, we are looking 

out on a longer timeline and so we are able to tell those private 

yards, give them a sense much earlier than we have in the past 

of when we are going to want that ship to come into the yards so 

they can have their business model correct and their shipyard sized 

appropriately to bid for the work effectively and get it. 

Because we want them all to succeed, right? We want them to 

come into the yards and not throw them curve balls. We have been 

throwing them a lot of curve balls. Bringing—having ships come in 

out of cycle, having one ship go long, causing another ship’s availability to be delayed or canceled or significant parts of it deferred. 

And then we are throwing all kinds of curve balls at both our 

public and our private yards and asking them to somehow succeed. 

And that hasn’t been effective for us. So we are trying to stop chasing our tail and get this disciplined plan in place that allows everybody to execute to a schedule and breathe easier. 

And once we get it in place we will have a lot of flexibility to deal 

with the real world. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Okay. So they would be part of the plan then—— 

Captain BURKE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO [continuing]. To give them time to get ready for 

whatever is coming to their shipyard. 

Admiral, how many ship maintenance availabilities were on time 

in fiscal year 2014, and how many are on schedule in the current 

fiscal year? The Captain, I guess—— 

Captain BURKE. Ma’am, the—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. 2013. 

Captain BURKE [continuing]. Roll-up—the roll-up metric we have 

for that, is that we want to be on cost and on schedule with 60 percent of our availabilities. 

It is not honestly a great metric, because it doesn’t tell you if you are 5 days late on availability or 50 days late, $1 million over or 

$10 million—it doesn’t give you much sense of things. 

But our goal is 60 percent. We haven’t met that in 21⁄2 years. 

So in my mind— 

Ms. BORDALLO. What is the percent then? 

Captain BURKE. Right now? It is probably—I could get back to 

you for the record, ma’am, but it is probably in the 40s. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 43.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. I was going to say, under 60. Maybe 40. 

Captain BURKE. Yes, ma’am. That is right. And it has been a few 

years—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Is that 2013? 

Captain BURKE. It has been a few years since we have been able 

to get to 60 percent. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I see. 

Captain BURKE. So that, I think, is the primary driver that drove 

Admiral Gortney and Fleet Forces to say, ‘‘Hey, we gotta do something to—spend some more time for maintenance to start getting 
22 

the maintenance done,’’ because he was seeing that impact, and he 

was also, of course, seeing compressed training cycles and other 

things that O–FRP is working on. 

But in my mind, the main driver for O–FRP is—it is all about 

maintenance. It is all about fencing the time to do maintenance effectively. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So Captain, between 2013 and 2014, it still remains about the same on a percentage scale? 

Captain BURKE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. 

Now we go to Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I have got basically two last points I would like to 

have answered if you could help me with them. 

One is, we talked a lot about the workforce. What are the tradeoffs between using U.S. shipyards, whether they be public or private, and overseas maintenance and the potential to degrade our 

industrial capacity if we begin to rely too heavily on the work that 

is done overseas? 

Captain BURKE. Well, we rely on work done overseas when we 

need to, and that—we do that in case we have ships forward deployed overseas, and it just makes sense to be able to keep that 

ship in the operating environment it is supposed to be in, forward 

deployed, present, to do work over there. So that is when we do it. 

In general, all the work is done in the United States unless we 

have some reason that it really needs to be done elsewhere. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. So what we are doing overseas is a small percentage, and it would basically all be necessary maintenance—— 

Captain BURKE. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, and in some cases, our nuclear 

maintenance, for example, we send our people overseas to do the 

work, so we are still having our folks do the work. 

Mr. SCOTT. One last question, especially with regard to aircraft, 

for example, a radar system doesn’t necessarily need to be maintained at a Navy facility if it can be done more affordably somewhere else. 

What institutional or statutory barriers do we face with regard 

to the ability to leverage our other services’ capabilities in areas 

where they are more efficient? 

Captain BURKE. We do that as a matter of course. 

The Secretary of Defense’s Office has an office that does what we 

call depot source of repair [DSOR]. The DSOR process decides that 

a particular service is more economical for a particular function 

and looks to streamline and put that business, if you will, towards 

the most effective agency to do it. 

And so Navy has work done with the Army and the Air Force 

and vice versa in a variety of ways. 

Mr. SCOTT. And there are no statutory barriers? 

Captain BURKE. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. All right. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for coming to join us today and 

for your perspective on O–FRP. We know that our job is to make 

sure we supply you with that predictability and sustainability to 
23 

help you do your job. That is our job, and as Mr. Scott pointed out, 

as well as other members, we have our work cut out for us here. 

But thanks again for what you do. Please continue to stay in 

touch with us, too, on things that we can do to make sure that we 

are gaining your perspective so decisions made up here coincide 

with what you are charged to do under O–FRP. 

So thanks again for your testimony today, and thanks for your 

service to our Nation. 

[Whereupon, at 9:15 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 

(29) 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 

(43) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Captain BURKE. 13 of the 59 (22%) Fiscal Year 2014 CNO availabilities completed 

on time or early. In Fiscal Year 2015, 19 of 52 (36%) completed on time or are still 

in progress tracking to complete on time. This includes both naval shipyards and 

private ship repair facilities. [See page 21.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY 

Admiral HARLEY. OCO is essential to OFRP execution because 20% of baseline 

ship depot maintenance requirements are paid by OCO, as are some non-deployed 

steaming days. However, OCO is not a remedy for baseline shortfalls caused by sequestration or a continuing resolution. The FY 2016 President’s Budget, which is 

a combination of baseline and OCO funding, reflects the balanced readiness program required to generate trained forces to meet the Navy’s worldwide commitments to the regional Combatant Commanders, while at the same time executing 

the maintenance required to preserve the long term health of the force. [See page 

11.] 

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