UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

MULLIGAN, FEBBO, and WOLFE 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Staff Sergeant TIMOTHY D. WORLDS 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20150134 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Alaska 

Samuel A. Schubert, Military Judge 

Colonel Erik L. Christiansen, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Colonel Mary J. Bradley, JA; Major Christopher D. Coleman, JA; 

Captain Joshua G. Grubaugh, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Courie III, JA; Major Michael E. Korte, JA 

(on brief). 

22 September 2017 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

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This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

FEBBO, Judge: 

This case is before us for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant 

raises three assignments of error, two of which merit a brief discussion, none merit 

relief. 

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

contrary to his pleas, of aggravated assault and five specifications of assault 

consummated by battery in violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of Military 

Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The military judge sentenced 

appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for twenty-three months, and 

reduction to E-1. The military judge awarded appellant 400 days of pretrial 
WORLDS-ARMY 20150134 

2 

confinement credit.1

 The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence and 

appellant’s 400 days of pretrial confinement. 

BACKGROUND 

On 1 August 2014, appellant was placed into pretrial confinement. On 18 

August 2014, appellant was charged with multiple offenses to include assaulting his 

spouse and assaulting a non-commissioned officer. After the initial preliminary 

hearing officer was replaced due to a re-assignment, the Article 32(b) hearing was 

scheduled for 15 September 2014. The government requested a delay of the hearing 

until 18 September and the defense requested a delay until 23 September 2014. 

 

On 22 September 2014, based on appellant’s diagnosis of Graves Disease, the 

special court-martial convening authority (SPCMCA) ordered an inquiry into the 

mental capacity and mental responsibility of the accused (sanity board) pursuant to 

Rule for Courts-Martial [hereinafter R.C.M.] 706.2 The SPCMCA ordered the sanity 

board to be completed as soon as possible but no later than 24 November 2014. 

Appellant ultimately waived the Article 32(b) hearing on 29 September 2014. 

On 26 November 2014, the findings of the sanity board were completed and 

released. Prior to the release of those findings, appellant’s defense counsel 

submitted four requests for speedy trial and asked for the case to be referred prior to 

the conclusion of the sanity board. 

On 9 December 2014, appellant’s case was referred to a general court-martial. 

On 11 December 2014, the trial court received the referred charges. On 15 

December 2014, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charges and specifications 

with prejudice “pursuant to Article 10, Uniform Code of Military Justice . . . for 

violation of the speedy trial requirements of R.C.M. 707(c)(2) and the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution.” On 17 December 2014, the 

SPCMCA signed a Memorandum for Record (MFR) explicitly approving the pretrial 

 

1

 In addition to appellant’s 145 days of pretrial confinement, the parties stipulated to 

an additional 255 days of Article 13, UCMJ confinement credit for appellant’s 

conditions while in a civilian confinement facility. 

2

 We note that the SPCMCA’s memorandum requesting the sanity board only listed 

appellant’s Graves Disease as a basis for the mental inquiry. In the stipulated 

chronology, the parties include Traumatic Brain Injury and Post Traumatic Stress 

Disorder, along with Graves Disease as prompting the government request for the 

mental inquiry. Graves Disease is an autoimmune disease that, the parties 

stipulated, can result in “uncontrollable mood swings.” 
WORLDS-ARMY 20150134 

3 

delay for the time it took to conduct the sanity board. On 23 December 2014, 

appellant was arraigned and the military judge released him from pretrial 

confinement. 

The military judge scheduled trial to begin 20 January 2015. Appellant’s 

defense counsel requested a continuance until 11 February 2015. The government 

did not oppose the request and the military judge granted the defense request for a 

continuance. The chronology below was stipulated to by the parties. After 

reviewing the record, we likewise adopt this chronology; however we find that the 

speedy trial clock stopped on 11 December 2014.3 

 

Date Action Day # 

01-Aug-14 Accused ordered into pretrial confinement 0 

02-Aug-14 Speedy trial clock begins 1 

18-Aug-14 Preferral of charges 17 

22-Sep-14 R.C.M. 706 Board appointed at Government request 56 

26-Nov-14 R.C.M. 706 Board findings released 117

29-Nov-14 Speedy trial clock @ Day 120 without excluding 

delay 

120

09-Dec-14 Referral of case to General Court-Martial 130

11-Dec-14 Military Judge receives referred charges 132

15-Dec-14 Defense motion to dismiss (Art. 10 and R.C.M. 707) 136

17-Dec-14 SPCMCA approves delay for R.C.M. 706 board 138

23-Dec-14 Appellant arraigned 144

23-Dec-14 Speedy trial clock stops 144

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

A. Speedy Trial 

“The conclusion whether an accused received a speedy trial is a legal question 

that is reviewed de novo . . . .” United States v. Wilder, 75 M.J. 135, 138 (C.A.A.F. 

2015)(quoting United States v. Leahr, 73 M.J. 364, 367 (C.A.A.F. 2014)). The 

military judge’s ruling on a R.C.M. 707 speedy trial motion is reviewed under an 

 

3

 The trial court received the referred charges on 11 December 2014. For speedy 

trial purposes, once the trial court receives the referred charges from the convening 

authority, the trial court is responsible for time between receipt of the referred 

charges and arraignment. United States v. Hawkins, 75 M.J. 640 (Army Ct. Crim. 

App. 2016). 
WORLDS-ARMY 20150134 

4 

abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Lazauskas, 62 M.J. 39, 41-42 

(C.A.A.F. 2005) (citing R.C.M. 707 (c)). This court is “bound by the facts as found 

by the military judge unless those facts are clearly erroneous.” United States v. 

Cooley, 75 M.J. 247, 259 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (quoting United States v. Cossio, 64 M.J. 

254, 256 (C.A.A.F. 2007)). 

Appellant avers the government violated his right to a speedy trial by taking 

131 days to refer his case to trial and an additional 14 days for arraignment. 

Appellant posits that the 65 days it took to complete the sanity board was not 

properly excluded by either the SPCMCA or the military judge. At trial and on 

appeal, appellant emphasizes that he did not request the sanity board, did not agree 

to any excludable delay for the sanity board, and sent four speedy trial requests to 

the government. Appellant also requested that the convening authority refer 

appellant’s charges and specifications prior to completion of the sanity board. 

The military judge adopted the parties stipulated chronology as outlined 

above. Since the parties stipulated to the chronology and facts, the military judge’s 

use of the chronology in forming his factual findings was not clearly erroneous. 

After reviewing the record, this court also adopts the stipulated chronology; however 

as discussed previously, we find that the speedy trial clock stopped on 11 December 

2014. 

As a starting point, R.C.M. 707(c) allows for the exclusion of pretrial delay 

when approved by a military judge or convening authority. Further, the decision to 

grant or deny such a delay is left to the sole discretion of the person authorized to 

grant it. Enumerated in the discussion as a reason to grant a delay includes “time to 

allow examination into the mental capacity of the accused.” R.C.M. 707(c) 

discussion. That is exactly what happened in this case. The SPCMCA ordered an 

inquiry into the mental capacity of the accused on 22 September 2014. Being fully 

cognizant of the importance of time, he deliberately wrote “[t]ime is of the essence,” 

and ordered the completion of the board “as soon as possible... no later than 24 

November 2014.” The completion of the sanity board necessarily required pretrial 

delay, a delay granted by the very convening authority authorized to grant 

excludable delay. It is axiomatic this delay is excludable. 

Appellant contends that the SPCMCA improperly excluded the 65 days for the 

sanity board after referral. Appellant points to the SPCMCA’s 17 December 2014 

MFR as proof that the 65 days pretrial delay for the sanity board was improperly 

authorized after referral. It matters not on what date the MFR was written, or that it 

was written at all. The SPCMCA was authorized to both order a sanity board and 

grant excludable delay for that purpose. It is evident that is what he did. The MFR 
WORLDS-ARMY 20150134 

5 

simply reduced to writing, to clarify for the record and motions hearing, the 

aforementioned facts. 

Appellant contends the military judge also erred in his ruling by not himself 

excluding the 65 days pretrial for the sanity board, which he was authorized to do. 

In the military judge’s written ruling, he did not specifically exclude the 65 days it 

took to complete the sanity board. Instead, the military judge concluded that 

although the more than two months was not “optimum,” the government acted 

reasonably in waiting between 22 September 2014 and 26 November 2014 for 

completion of the R.C.M. 706 sanity board. Overall, in analyzing pretrial delay 

prior to arraignment, the military judge found that the government acted reasonably 

between 1 August 2014 and 11 December 2014 when the court received the referred 

charges. After receiving the charges on 11 December 2014 and considering the 

transportation of appellant from the Joint Base Lewis-McChord Joint Confinement 

Facility to Alaska, the military judge found that appellant’s arraignment was timely 

and denied appellant’s motion to dismiss for violating speedy trial. 

 

In reviewing the record, we also conclude that appellant was not denied his 

right to a speedy trial. The delay for completion of the sanity board was reasonable 

and is an authorized reason for a delay under R.C.M. 707. United States v. Denner, 

24 M.J. 731 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 1987) (time limits “could have a tendency to 

limit proper mental examinations of patients who have been charged with offenses.”) 

Therefore, we find 65 days of pretrial delay is excludable for completion of the 

sanity board. The court also finds 7 days of pretrial delay is excludable for the 

defense request to delay the Article 32(b) hearing (between 15 September 2014 and 

the SPCMCA’s 22 September 2014 sanity board request). After excluding 65 days 

for the sanity board process and the 7 days pretrial delay for the Article 32(b) 

hearing, this court finds it took 60 days for the government to bring appellant to 

trial.4

 We also note that after arraignment, appellant requested a continuance of the 

trial date. Appellant was not denied his right to speedy trial. 

 

B. Dilatory Post-Trial Processing 

Appellant asserts there was dilatory post-trial processing of appellant’s case. 

Since appellant did not request any delays to submit R.C.M. 1105 matters, the entire 

330 days between trial and the convening authority action is attributable to the 

government. The record in this case consists of ten volumes, and the trial transcript 

 

4

 There were a total of 132 days between 2 August 2014 and 11 December 2014 (less 

65 days excludable delay for the sanity board results and 7 days of defense delay for 

the Article 32(b) hearing). 
WORLDS-ARMY 20150134 

6 

is 781 pages. The government took 76 days to transcribe the record of trial and to 

serve the record for authentication. 

 

Although we find no due process violation in the post-trial processing of 

appellant’s case, we must still review the appropriateness of the sentence in light of 

the post-trial processing. UCMJ art. 66(c); United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 224 

(C.A.A.F. 2002) (“[Pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, service courts are] required to 

determine what findings and sentence ‘should be approved,’ based on all the facts 

and circumstances reflected in the record, including the unexplained and 

unreasonable post-trial delay.”). See generally United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 

353, 362-63 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Ney, 68 M.J. 613, 617 (Army Ct. 

Crim. App. 2010); United States v. Collazo, 53 M.J. 721, 727 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 

2000). 

Considering the seriousness of the charges for which he was found guilty, 

appellant’s sentence is appropriate. Furthermore, during the 120 days between 

appellant being served the authenticated record of trial and Staff Judge Advocate 

Recommendation (SJAR) and appellant’s submission of R.C.M. 1105 matters, 

appellant did not request speedy post-trial processing. Based on all the facts and 

circumstances reflected in the record of trial, to include appellant’s choice to take 

120 days to submit R.C.M. 1105 matters, we do not find the post-trial processing of 

appellant’s case renders the approved sentence inappropriate. Thus, we find relief is 

not appropriate under the facts of this case. 

 

CONCLUSION 

 The findings of guilty and the sentence are AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: