J-S80001-18

2019 PA Super 85

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: B.G.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.R.R. AND M.F.R., II

No. 2625 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered August 8, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2017-A0100

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and NICHOLS, J.

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 21, 2019

S.R.R. (Adoptive Mother) and M.F.R., II (Adoptive Father) (collectively 

Adoptive Parents) appeal from the August 8, 2018 order that granted E.A.W.’s 

(Birth Mother) petition to enforce the Post Adoption Contact Agreement 

(PACA), which was entered into by the parties in regard to E.S.R. (Child),1

born in April of 2017. After review, we affirm. 

This matter involves a private voluntary adoption of Child that was 

coordinated by Haven Adoptions. Child was placed with Adoptive Parents 

when she was two days old. Following the submission of the proper consents, 

the trial court issued the final decree confirming consents on July 31, 2017. 

Although a motion was filed to stay the adoption with corresponding 

preliminary objections, these documents were withdrawn and, following a 

hearing on the adoption petition, the adoption was finalized and the PACA was 

executed. The parties acknowledged that they entered into the PACA 

____________________________________________

1 E.S.R. was formerly known as B.G.W. 
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voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The relevant portions of the PACA 

provide:

(2) Visitation: Visits shall occur at least THREE (3) times per 

year, with one of the visits to take place around the time of []

[C]hild’s birthday. Visits shall be arranged by and between the 

Adoptive Parents and [Birth Mother]. The visits shall be for at 

least 2 hours until [] [C]hild is 3 years old, unless the parties agree 

to an alternative time period. ... Unless otherwise agreed, all 

visits shall occur within Montgomery County, PA. 

(3) ... All [p]arties will conduct themselves appropriately during 

visitation and will not engage in any disputes or harsh language. 

No [p]arty shall ever speak negatively about any other [p]arty to 

this agreement (or any relatives who are not [p]arties to the 

agreement) to [] [C]hild or allow any other person to do so while 

in the presence of [] [C]hild. All parties recognize and support the 

concept that a good relationship between them and their families 

is certainly best for [] [C]hild. Appropriate behavior, given all the 

issues involved for a child who joins a family through adoption, 

shall be utilized by all parties at all times. Should any negative or 

inappropriate behavior occur, then in that event, for that 

particular visit, the Adoptive Parents may terminate that particular 

visit. It is anticipated that all parties will put [] [C]hild’s welfare 

and best interest first and all parties will engage in appropriate 

behavior. 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 9/20/18, at 2 (quoting the PACA at 4-5). 

Based upon the testimony provided at the hearing held on August 8, 

2018, in response to Birth Mother’s petition, the trial court set forth factual 

findings in its opinion, stating:

The first visit following the execution of the PACA occurred 

April 29, 2018. The visit occurred at an agreed upon location 

called The Little Pod in North Wales, Pennsylvania. Adoptive 

[P]arents were present with [Child] as well as [B]irth [M]other and 

her mother.

Two days later, [B]irth [M]other wrote a letter to the [c]ourt 

requesting enforcement of the PACA based upon events that 

occurred during this visit. This letter was filed with the
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Montgomery County Orphans’ Court as a Petition. A Rule to Show 

Cause Why the PACA Should Not Be Enforced was entered for June 

19, 2018. See, 23 Pa.C.S. §[]2738(a). Thereafter, this [c]ourt 

scheduled a one-half day hearing to hear Petition To Enforce the 

PACA on August 8, 2018.

During the August 8

th hearing, [B]irth [M]other testified that 

she and her mother arrived at the Little Pod first and waited near 

the food area. [Adoptive Father] completely ignored [B]irth

[M]other when he walked into the building and took [] [C]hild to 

the play area. [Adoptive Mother] approached [B]irth [M]other 

[and] told them ‘they were going to play over there’ and walked 

away. Birth [M]other followed [Adoptive Mother] to the play area 

and approached [Adoptive Father,] who was holding the child. As 

she reached out to say hello and touch [Child], the [A]doptive 

[F]ather pulled [] [C]hild away and said that ‘there would be no 

direct contact; there will be no touching; we are concerned for her 

safety’. When asked what the safety concerns were, [A]doptive 

[F]ather would just repeat 'we are concerned for her safety’ and 

then told [Birth Mother] that he did not have to explain himself to 

[her] and he was the parent and what he said went. NT, 8/8/18, 

p. 8-9; 35-42. Whenever [B]irth [M]other tried to approach []

[C]hild, [A]doptive [F]ather would continually block her with his 

body or would pick [] [C]hild up and move her away from [B]irth 

[M]other. The only time [B]irth [M]other was able to approach []

[C]hild was when [Adoptive Father] was not present. Birth 

[M]other testified that out of the two (2) hour visit, she had

approximately forty (40) minutes of interaction with [] [C]hild. 

NT, 8/8/18, p. 10.

[Adoptive Father] did not dispute [B]irth [M]other’s 

testimony. He maintained that he kept [] [C]hild from [B]irth 

[M]other out of safety concerns for [] [C]hild. When asked 

repeatedly what these safety concerns were, he would simply cite 

concerns of [] [C]hild falling or getting hurt to justify not allowing 

[] [B]irth [M]other to have physical contact with [] [C]hild. NT, 

8/8/18, p. 31-42.

The following are excerpts of [Adoptive Father’s] testimony 

while being questioned by counsel for [B]irth [M]other[,] which 

this [c]ourt found significant: 

By Counsel: ... So in that belief and in the 

maintenance of the relationship, wouldn’t it make 
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sense that these visits include physical contact and 

interaction?

[Adoptive Father]: Interaction, yes. Physical contact, 

no. I am not going to force it on my daughter. I am 

not going to force someone to kiss or hold or touch 

her. I don’t believe that’s appropriate. 

Counsel: I am not asking you whether to force it. But

rather would you find it acceptable that in a visit if my 

client was to extend her hand to your daughter and 

touched that hand, is that appropriate?

[Adoptive Father]: That’s fine and that occurred. 

Counsel: And so physical touch, if my client was - or 

your daughter was to walk up to my client and 

approach my client and my client picked her up, that 

would be appropriate?

[Adoptive Father]: No.

Counsel: Why is that not appropriate? 

[Adoptive Father]: Again, going back to her safety. 

You know, there is certain [sic] when you are around 

infants and things like that and toddlers, you know, 

you need to be very careful how you pick them up and 

know what you are doing. 

NT[,] 8/8/18, pp. 34-35.

Counsel: So if my client is being able to interact and 

touch her [Child] and she is accepting of that, what is 

the harm to her? What is the harm to [Child]?

[Adoptive Father]: Again, I need a specific. I don’t 

know what you mean by interaction. Give me an 

example. If she is running around and she wants to, 

you know, pick her up or [Child] is stumbling, what 

are you talking about? You are asking me for a yes or 

no answer, but there is not an example of what you 

are speaking of. That’s why I am confused....
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Counsel: Let me say that if my client extends her hand 

out to your daughter and your daughter extends her 

hand and hops up in her lap, is that going to be 

harmful to your daughter?

[Adoptive Father]: Potentially, sure.

Counsel: And how is that?

[Adoptive Father]: What if she hops up and falls off? 

A lot of ifs can happen. Anything is potential. I don’t

know what else to say.

NT, 8/8/18, p. 41-42.

[Adoptive Father] simply failed to provide any reasonable or 

logical explanation as to what safety concerns he has with [B]irth

[M]other having physical contact with [Child]. Interestingly, 

[Adoptive Father] acknowledged in his testimony that prior to the 

finalization of the adoption and the execution of the PACA, he and 

his wife would allow [B]irth [M]other] to hold [Child]. NT, 8/8/18, 

p. 31. Yet, [Adoptive Father] insisted his behavior was justified 

during the April 29th visit and he was compliant with the terms of 

the PACA. NT, 8/8/18, p. 48-49.

TCO at 3-5. 

The trial court further explained that its resulting order, enforcing the 

PACA, directed “that the visits involve interaction and communication, 

including touching.” Id. at 5. The court also ordered “that the next visit shall 

be supervised by a neutral third party....” Id. Additionally, the court stated

that although the PACA did not include this specific language, such behavior 

was implicit in the agreement, particularly, because that behavior was 

acceptable prior to the parties’ entering into the PACA. The court concluded 

that 
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[t]hese visits between [B]irth [M]other and [Child] should not be 

likened to a prison visit, where touching and physical interaction 

is prohibited, as analogized by counsel for [Adoptive Father]. NT, 

8/8/18, p.46. More appropriately, this [c]ourt cannot imagine an 

ongoing relationship with [B]irth [M]other that does not include 

communication and physical interaction. The fact that this [c]ourt 

must spell this out to [] [A]doptive [F]ather is troubling. 

Id. at 6. 

Following the entry of the August 8, 2018 order, Adoptive Parents filed 

the instant appeal to this Court, and now raise three issues for our review: 

A. Did the [c]ourt err and abuse its discretion by defining visits 

between [] [C]hild and [] [Birth mother in its August 8, 2018 

[o]rder as to include “touching” when the [PACA] did not 

specify touching? 

B. Did the [c]ourt err and abuse its discretion by deeming 

[Birth Mother’s] May 1, 2018 correspondence[,] which 

specifically requested a modification of the [PACA] to 

eliminate [A]doptive [F]ather from the visits and requested 

a supervisor in the visits as constituting a request for 

enforcement of the [PACA]? 

C. Did the [c]ourt err and abuse its discretion by adding in its 

August 8, 2018 [o]rder a direction that the next visit needed 

to be supervised by a neutral third party, which was the 

modification [Birth Mother] requested where the statute, 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2737(a), specifically states that only adoptive 

parents or children can request modification? 

Adoptive Parents’ brief at 8. 

Although this appeal does not involve either a termination of parental 

rights or a dependency action, we recognize that the following excerpt from 

In re C.M.C., 140 A.3d 699 (Pa. Super. 2016), provides guidance for the 

application of a proper standard of review. 
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[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., ... 9 A.3d 1179,

1190 ([Pa.] 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law

or abused its discretion. Id.; [In re:] R.I.S., ... 36 A.3d 567, 572

([Pa.] 2011) (plurality opinion)[]. As has been often stated, an

abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing

court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also

Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., ... 34 A.3d 1, 51

([Pa.] 2011); Christianson v. Ely, ... 838 A.2d 630, 634 ([Pa.]

2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an

abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., ... 9 A.3d at

1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite

result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases,

an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial

court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;

instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual

findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal

conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of

discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, ... 650 A.2d 1064, 1066

([Pa.] 1994). 

In re C.M.C., 140 A.3d at 704. 

Furthermore, the In re C.M.C. decision set forth the following in regard 

to a revocation of consent to adoption in connection with a voluntary 

relinquishment of parental rights: 
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When reviewing a decree entered by the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt, this 

Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error 

and the court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence. 

Because the [o]phans’ [c]ourt sits as the fact-finder, it determines 

the credibility of the witnesses, and on review, we will not reverse 

its credibility determinations absent an abuse of discretion.

Id. at 705 (quoting In re K.G.M., 845 A.2d 861, 863 (Pa. Super. 2004)). 

Accordingly, we conclude that these provisions apply to the present situation. 

Initially, we note that Adoptive Parents’ argument section of their brief 

discusses the issues they have raised in a different order than the issues as 

they are listed in their statement of questions involved. We will address the 

issues in the order that they are presented in Adoptive Parents’ argument 

section of their brief. 

Therefore, we begin with Adoptive Parents’ contention that the court 

erred by characterizing Birth Mother’s letter/petition sent to the court as a 

request for enforcement of the PACA rather than a modification when asking 

that Adoptive Father not be present at the visits and that a social worker or 

mediator attend. Adoptive Parents cite the following pertinent sections of the 

Adoption Act:

§ 2737. Modification of agreement

(a) General rule.—Only the adoptive parent or a child who is 

12 years of age or older may seek to modify an agreement by 

filing an action in the court that finalized the adoption. 

. . . 

§ 2738. Enforcement of agreement
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(a) General rule.—Any party to an agreement, a sibling or a 

child who is the subject of an agreement may seek to enforce an 

agreement by filing an action in the court that finalized the 

adoption.

(b) Remedies.—Any party to an agreement, a sibling or a child 

who is the subject of an agreement may request only specific 

performance in seeking to enforce an agreement and may not 

request monetary damages or modification of an agreement. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2737(a) and § 2738(a), (b). 

With reliance on these sections of the Act, Adoptive Parents argue that 

Birth Mother’s letter/petition requested modification, not enforcement, of the

PACA, and that Birth Mother did not have standing to request modification. 

Rather, they contend that only they may request modification of the PACA. 

Moreover, Adoptive Parents point out that although a pro se litigant’s filings 

shall be liberally construed, Birth Mother “is not entitled to any particular 

advantage because she lacks legal training.” Adoptive Parents’ brief at 19 

(citing O’Neill v. Checker Motors Corp., 567 A.2d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 

1989)). Adoptive Parents also assert that “any layperson choosing to 

represent [herself] in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, 

assume the risk that [her] lack of expertise and legal training will prove [her] 

undoing.” Id. (citing Vann v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 

Review, 494 A.2d 1081, 1086 (Pa. 1985)).2 

____________________________________________

2 Although Birth Mother wrote the letter/petition sent to the trial court herself 

without the aid of counsel, she was represented by counsel at the August 8, 

2018 hearing and throughout this appeal. However, during the negotiations 

relating to the creation of the PACA, she was acting pro se. 
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In response, Birth Mother asserts that Orphans’ Court Rule 1.2 (O.C.R.) 

directs that the applicable rules “shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 

timely and efficient determination of every action or proceeding to which they 

are applicable” and that “[t]he court at every stage of any action or proceeding 

may disregard any error or defect of procedure that does not affect the 

substantive rights of the parties in interest.” Based on this language, Birth 

Mother contends that the court “liberally construed Birth Mother’s letter as a 

pleading seeking enforcement of the PACA regardless of Birth Mother’s choice 

of the word ‘modify.’” Birth Mother’s brief at 6. Moreover, Birth Mother

identifies the following language from the PACA upon which she contends she 

reasonably relied: 

The Parties hereby understand and acknowledge that they may 

have a right pursuant to the Adoption Act, to seek to modify, 

enforce, and/or discontinue this Agreement. Such rights are as 

set forth in the Adoption Act of Pennsylvania. Should any Party 

make a request to the court to modify or enforce this Agreement, 

then any changes made or approved by the [c]ourt in response, 

would thereafter also be legally enforceable. 

PACA at § B.2.

Essentially, Birth Mother believes that she had the right to request that 

the court assist her and require the Adoptive Parents to comply with the 

dictates of the PACA. She also directs this Court’s attention to the absence of 

an objection raised by Adoptive Parents to Birth Mother’s standing, an issue 

that they never raised below. Therefore, Birth Mother claims that Adoptive 

Parents waived this issue.
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With regard to the sole remedy of specific performance, Birth Mother

contends that her letter/petition centered on Adoptive Father’s actions at the 

April 29, 2018 visit. Therefore, she claims that the thrust of her description 

of what occurred at the visit supported her request to the court for specific 

performance of the PACA by requiring that Adoptive Father not attend future 

visits or require a third party to attend the visits or that Adoptive Parents be 

required to act appropriately. Lastly, Birth Mother asserts that she was not 

asking that the language of the PACA be changed, only that the Adoptive 

Parents’ actions be in compliance with the PACA as written. 

Following our review of the record in this case, we first conclude that 

Adoptive Parents waived this issue in that they did not object to Birth Mother’s 

standing in the court below. See Pa.R.A.P. 302 (“Issues not raised in the 

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 

Even if waiver is not the outcome as to this issue, Adoptive Parents’ position 

does not convince us that the court erred in its determination that Birth Mother 

was requesting enforcement, not modification. The single use of the word 

“modify” in Birth Mother’s letter/petition does not override the three-page 

description of what occurred at the visit. Moreover, within the bounds of our 

standard of review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

or err as a matter of law in its interpretation of the letter/petition, particularly,

after hearing testimony at the August 8, 2018 hearing. It is evident that the 

court’s order was an attempt to require Adoptive Parents to comply with the 
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PACA, which the parties had entered into voluntarily. Adoptive Parents are 

not entitled to relief pursuant to this argument. 

Adoptive Parents’ next issue centers on the trial court’s determination 

that the next visit must include a neutral third party to supervise the actions 

of the parties. Again, Adoptive Parents contend that the court order requiring 

the presence of a third party to supervise the visit was requested by Birth 

Mother and results in a modification of the PACA that can only be requested 

by them. This argument mirrors Adoptive Parents’ position presented in the 

first issue, that Birth Mother cannot request a modification. Having concluded 

that the court did not err by finding that Birth Mother was requesting 

enforcement, we determine that this argument does not provide them with 

relief. 

Additionally, the court heard testimony from the parties and found that 

Adoptive Father’s responses to questions posed to him were evasive. TCO at 

5. Specifically, the court explained that “[g]iven the evasive and unfounded 

nature of [Adoptive Father’s] responses, this [c]ourt felt it was necessary to 

spell out what is to occur during these visits to avoid the parties returning to 

court again.” Id. This statement explains the basis for the court’s credibility 

determinations and is clearly supported by the evidence of record. Therefore,

we conclude that the court had the discretion to order supervision of the next 

visit for the best interest of Child. Moreover, the language of the PACA does

not prohibit such action. 
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Adoptive Parents’ final argument centers on the court’s determination 

that the visits between Birth Mother and Child would include “touching” when 

the PACA did not specify that this conduct was allowed. To support their 

position, Adoptive Parents contend that contract principles apply and that to 

interpret the language of the PACA, “the intention of the parties is a 

paramount consideration.” Adoptive Parents’ brief at 23 (quoting Profit Wize 

Marketing v. Wiest, 812 A.2d 1270, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2002)). They also 

note that words in a contract, if not defined, are to be “construe[d] in 

accordance with their natural, plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 24 (quoting 

Codero v. Potomac Ins. Co., 794 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa. Super. 2002)). 

Moreover, they argue that a court can “not modify the plain meaning of words 

under the guise of interpretation....” Id. (citing Meeting House Lane, Ltd. 

V. Melso, 628 A.2d 854, 857 (Pa. Super. 1993)). 

Relying on this caselaw, Adoptive Parents contend that when the parties 

negotiated the terms of the PACA, they could include the terms they desired 

with appropriate definitions. Although they acknowledge that the parties did 

not define the term visit, they did not contemplate that the visits would include 

touching. Adoptive Parents’ discussion then provides definitions of the term 

“visit,” explaining it means to see a person or thing. Based on this definition, 

they argue that the court did not merely interpret the term “visit,” but 

modified its meaning to include “touching,” which they contend interferes with 

their personal choice in matters of family life and their decision relating to the 
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protection and safety of their child. Thus, Adoptive Parents assert that the 

trial court abused its discretion by defining the term “visit” to include touching. 

We disagree. As noted previously, the court found that although the 

PACA did not include the specific term touching, “such interaction is implicit in 

the agreement given that the behavior was acceptable prior to the PACA and 

both [Adoptive Parents] and [B]irth [M]other agreed, by signing this PACA, 

that it was in [] ‘[C]hild’s best interest to have an ongoing relationship with 

[B]irth [M]other.’” TCO at 5-6. We conclude that this interpretation of the 

language of the PACA is reasonable and that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in ordering that touching was to be considered a part of the visits. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/19