U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

59–011 2007

110th Congress, 1st Session – – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 110–58 

IRAQ BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT 

MESSAGE 

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRANSMITTING

THE SECOND OF TWO REPORTS THAT ASSESSES THE STATUS OF 

EACH OF THE 18 IRAQI BENCHMARKS, CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 1314 OF THE U.S. TROOP READINESS, VETERANS’ CARE, 

KATRINA RECOVERY, AND IRAQ ACCOUNTABILITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 2007, PUB. L. 110–28 

SEPTEMBER 17, 2007.—Message and accompanying papers referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, and ordered to be 

printed 


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To the Congress of the United States: 

Consistent with section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110–28) (the ‘‘Act’’), attached is a report that assesses the status of each of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks 

contained in the Act and declares whether satisfactory progress toward meeting these benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved. 

The second of two reports submitted consistent with the Act, it 

has been prepared in consultation with the Secretaries of State and 

Defense; the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq; the United 

States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander, United States 

Central Command. 

GEORGE W. BUSH. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 14, 2007. 


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BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT—SEPTEMBER 14, 2007 

This report is submitted consistent with Section 1314 of the U.S. 

Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110–28) (the 

‘‘Act’’). It includes an assessment of how the sovereign Government 

of Iraq is performing in its efforts to achieve a series of specific 

benchmarks contained in the Act, as well as any adjustments to 

strategy that may be warranted in light of that performance. This 

is the second of two reports to be submitted consistent with the Act 

and has been prepared in consultation with the Secretaries of State 

and Defense; Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq; the United 

States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander, United States 

Central Command, consistent with Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the Act. 

This assessment complements other reports and information about 

Iraq provided to the Congress and is not intended as a single source 

of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy 

of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq. 

Introduction 

Section 1314 of the Act states that the President is to submit to 

Congress two reports assessing the status of each of the 18 benchmarks contained in the Act and declaring whether, in the President’s judgment, satisfactory progress is being achieved with respect to those 18 benchmarks. These benchmarks relate to Government of Iraq actions believed to be important to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, to improve the security of the Iraqi population, to provide essential services to the population, and to promote its economic well-being. Iraqi Government efforts to achieve 

these benchmarks complement other U.S. and Iraqi collaborative 

actions as part of the New Way Forward. 

Current U.S. strategy: New Way Forward 

Current U.S. strategy—the New Way Forward—recognizes that 

the fulfillment of commitments by both the U.S. and Iraqi Governments will be necessary to achieving our common goal: a democratic Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and be an 

ally in the War on Terror. The building of a strong strategic partnership with the Iraqi Government will be an important part of the 

effort to achieve this end state, which remains a long-term goal, 

and requires the application of all elements of national power, including especially diplomatic, economic, political, and military 

power. 

Our overarching strategy continues to emphasize a transition of 

responsibility to the Iraqi Government and its security forces. The 

New Way Forward recognized that, in response to the upsurge in 

sectarian violence in 2006, it was necessary for Coalition Forces to 

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rity Forces, in securing the Iraqi population. This is not meant to 

replace Iraqi efforts to provide security but to help provide the necessary time and space with which the Iraqi Government can continue to build its own capacity; can intensify efforts against the 

accelerants of the violence, especially al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and 

some segments of the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM); and can meaningfully 

address the all-important issue of reconciliation among the various 

segments of Iraqi society. The strategy recognizes that the levels of 

violence seen in 2006 undermined efforts to achieve political reconciliation by fueling sectarian tensions, emboldening extremists, 

and discrediting the Coalition and the Iraqi Government. Amid 

such violence, it became significantly harder for Iraqi leaders to 

make the difficult compromises necessary to foster reconciliation. 

At the same time, we have increased our efforts to help build the 

capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Relying on lessons 

learned from our experience in training and equipping the ISF, we 

have significantly enhanced our training and mentoring commitment. We will continue this commitment through a combination of 

partnering Coalition units with Iraqi Army and Police organizations and embedding transition team personnel with the majority 

of ISF units. U.S. commanders are committed to helping the Iraqi 

government expand the size of the ISF to make it a more capable 

counterinsurgency force. 

We are also increasing our efforts to build Iraqi governmental capacity not just at the national level, but at the provincial and local 

levels as well. Most notably, this has required an expansion of our 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program with 15 new civilian PRTs paired with Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), and giving 

PRT leaders and BCT commanders additional authorities, resources, and personnel. These leaders are charged with supporting 

moderate elements against extremists in their areas of responsibility and launching projects that have an immediate impact in 

areas cleared of terrorists and insurgents. 

As the President explained in January, all of these efforts, together with a new diplomatic offensive in the region, are designed 

to set the conditions for U.S. troops to begin coming home, without 

risking a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, sanctuaries for international terrorist networks, or a broader regional conflict that 

would threaten U.S. national security interests for generations. 

(The strategy is explained in greater detail at http://www. 

whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategyqv011007.pdf). While 

all of those conditions have not yet been met, and the new strategy 

is still in its early stages, there are encouraging signs that point 

the way to a more normalized and sustainable level of U.S. engagement in Iraq—with a decreasing number of U.S. combat forces increasingly focused on a core set of tasks, such as counterterrorism 

operations, and training, equipping, and supporting Iraqi forces. 

The next phase: Building on success 

In the coming months, the United States will continue to operate 

along four lines of operation—security, political, economic, and diplomatic—to advance our objectives of protecting the Iraqi population while degrading terrorist and extremist networks; advancing 

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ing economy; and expanding international support for Iraq. On the 

security side, General Petraeus has recommended to the President, 

and the President has accepted, that beginning in December 2007, 

we can transition to the next phase of our strategy. During this 

phase, U.S. forces will gradually transition from surge operations 

and transfer responsibility for population security to Iraqi forces— but only in a manner that preserves security and builds on success. 

Any adjustments in the missions of U.S. forces or transitions to 

Iraqi forces will vary based on local conditions. This approach 

stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency strategy incorporated in the New Way Forward—but with Iraqis increasingly 

shouldering more of the load. 

In this next phase and based on the Government of Iraq’s request, we will also begin to develop the framework for an enduring 

relationship between Iraq and the United States—based on common principles. Iraqi leaders from all communities share the vision 

for a reduced American presence as soon as conditions allow and 

in a manner that sustains the gains seen over the course of 2007. 

They also understand that their success requires U.S. political, economic, diplomatic, and security engagement beyond January 2009, 

and they have asked to begin defining a long-term relationship between our two countries. We anticipate that the elements of this 

relationship will set the foundation for an enduring American commitment to Iraq—encompassing strong security, economic, and diplomatic ties—which is in the mutual interests of both the Iraqi people and the American people. 

As part of the next phase in our strategy, the President has directed General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to update their 

joint operation plan for Iraq and to adjust our military and civilian 

resources accordingly. The President has also directed General 

Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to provide a fresh assessment to 

the American people and to the Congress in March 2008 on the situation in Iraq and any adjustments that may be needed to our 

strategy based on changing conditions. This assessment will address: 

• An analysis of mission progress—including security, economic, diplomatic, and political—from September 15, 2007; 

• Recommended adjustments to military resources in Iraq, 

including further force adjustments; 

• Recommended adjustments to economic assistance for 

Iraq, including a status report on the performance of Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams and governmental capacity-building programs; 

• An assessment of regional and international contributions 

to Iraq and efforts to enhance those contributions; 

• An assessment of ‘‘bottom-up’’ political and security initiatives, and whether the national government is supporting 

them; 

• An assessment of ‘‘top-down’’ political and security initiatives, including national reconciliation initiatives; and 

• An assessment of institutional adjustments within the 

United States Government to better support the civilian and 

military missions in Iraq as we transition to a longer-term posture. 


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The opening statements of General Petraeus and Ambassador 

Crocker—as delivered to the Congress on September 10 and September 11, 2007—are attached to this report as Appendices 1 and 

2. These documents provide additional detail on the situation in 

Iraq as assessed by our experts on the ground and elements of the 

next phase of our strategy. 

Summary of achievements and shortfalls 

This report provides, consistent with the Act, an assessment of 

how the Iraqi Government is performing on 18 specified benchmarks, rather than the effects being generated. Some of the benchmarks may be leading indicators, giving some sense of future 

trends; but many are more accurately characterized as lagging indicators, and will only be achieved after the strategy is fully underway and generates improved conditions on the ground. Still other 

benchmarks do not fully measure the political accommodations that 

actually affect violence in Iraq and the direction that country is 

headed. For example, local political accommodations have dramatically improved conditions in what had been some of Iraq’s most violent areas, and we are deploying our resources to help ensure that 

these trends continue and spread. It will take time, however, for 

improved conditions locally to translate into broader political accommodations at the national level; what is important is the overall trajectory, which, under our present strategy, has begun to stabilize and turn upward, compared to the deteriorating trajectory 

seen over the course of 2006. Thus, the assessments in this report 

should be viewed in a larger context: the discussion below provides 

a snapshot of achievements and shortfalls that can round out the 

picture given in the detailed assessment section of this report. 

Security: Iraq faces daunting challenges: a complex security situation whose main elements include a communal struggle for power 

and resources between the Shi’a majority and Sunni, Kurd, and 

other minorities. Al-Qaida in Iraq extremists continue to act as 

accelerants for ethno-sectarian violence, and Iranian lethal support 

to Shi’a militants clearly intensifies the conflict. Foreign support to 

extremists in Iraq continues to exacerbate the security challenges 

and frustrate efforts to encourage political reconciliation. 

The tempo of military actions to defeat al-Qaida increased in 

June as the final U.S. surge brigades arrived in Iraq. The surge effort has been complemented by carefully selected counter-terrorist 

targeting of key leaders of al-Qaida and other extremist groups. 

Tribal-based anti-terrorist initiatives have also augmented Coalition efforts to combat al-Qaida. Coalition efforts to secure the population against al-Qaida and other terrorists and extremists in 

Baghdad and other provinces across Iraq show signs of progress, 

but much hard work and tough fighting remain. Al-Qaida and Iranian-supported extremist groups have not been defeated, though 

we have made strong progress. 

The number of attacks on Coalition forces has been on a downward trend since the middle of June. High-profile attacks (by car 

bombs, suicide car bombs, and suicide vests) have declined by over 

one-third since March of 2007. Coalition and Iraqi forces, along 

with Iraqi tribal elements, have pushed al-Qaida out of several 

former safe havens. Coalition forces have killed or captured nearly 


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100 key leaders and over 2,500 rank and file al-Qaida members in 

the past 7 months. As a result, al-Qaida’s ability to coordinate its 

activities and conduct simultaneous attacks in multiple regions has 

been reduced. Nonetheless, sporadic high-profile attacks by alQaida continue to cause high civilian casualties, demonstrating alQaida’s intent to use civilian casualties to provoke additional sectarian violence, shape public opinion, and destabilize the Government of Iraq. 

Coalition forces report that murders and executions assessed to 

be ethno-sectarian in nature have declined significantly both in 

Baghdad and nationwide from their high in December 2006. However, the increase in ethno-sectarian deaths in July and August of 

2007—largely a function of three sizable car bomb attacks in 

Kirkuk and Ninewa provinces—demonstrates the challenge that 

ethno-sectarian violence continues to pose for Iraq, particularly in 

rural locations that have light security force presence. 

Sunni tribal groups have turned against al-Qaida in al-Anbar 

and Diyala provinces as well as in the Baghdad-area neighborhoods 

of Ameriyah, Abu Ghraib, Adhamiya, and Arab Jabour. They are 

cooperating with Coalition and Iraqi forces in expelling al-Qaida 

from their areas. Attacks in al-Anbar are now less than one-quarter the rate in January, and al-Qaida’s sanctuaries have been 

greatly reduced. The trend of tribal engagement with the Coalition 

and the Government of Iraq continues to expand to other areas of 

Iraq. More than 40,000 concerned Iraqi citizens have volunteered 

to support local security initiatives since the start of the surge— and that number is growing daily. Prime Minister Maliki is personally involved in decisions to reconcile with these Sunni tribes and 

citizens willing to fight al-Qaida. He has directed the Government 

of Iraq to take steps to incorporate them into local security forces— a clear demonstration of the potential of ‘‘bottom-up’’ reconciliation 

that has occurred since January 2007. In fact, Prime Minister 

Maliki recently approved hiring approximately 12,000 Sunnis in alAnbar, and 1,735 local men—including former insurgents—in Abu 

Ghraib. These events illustrate the growing sense among Iraqis 

that they need to overcome their natural trepidation and make 

some form of accommodation with former opponents. 

Iran continues to supply Shi’a extremist groups with training, 

funding, and weapons, including rockets, mortars, and particularly 

explosively-formed projectile devices, which account for an increasing percentage of U.S. combat deaths. Coalition and Iraqi operations against these groups, combined with a growing rejection of 

Shi’a violence by top Government of Iraq officials, have led to some 

progress in reducing violent attacks from Shi’a extremists. 

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to make progress, but 

development of their capabilities in some areas has been slower 

than hoped. Progress by the Iraqi Army has exceeded that of both 

the national and local police. ISF performance has generally met 

or exceeded expectations when units are partnered with Coalition 

forces in combined operations or in tactical overwatch—a potential 

model for the future. There are still challenges in developing Iraqi 

institutions to sustain existing forces, delays in obtaining required 

equipment, persistent ethno-sectarian influences and political interference, a limited pool of trained officers and non-commissioned 


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officers (NCOs), and attrition from combat. The Prime Minister’s 

initiative to expand the ISF will eventually provide additional necessary forces, but the expansion will further strain the institutions 

that develop, train, and equip Iraqi forces. Despite these challenges, the ISF are increasingly engaged in providing security for 

the Iraqi population. They are in the fight. Over the last 18 months 

Iraqi forces suffered combat deaths three times the number of combat deaths of Coalition forces. We have been further encouraged by 

the recent downturn in anti-Coalition attacks in Baghdad and 

southern Iraq since the early September announcement of a standdown in Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) operations. Time will tell whether 

this has a lasting effect. 

Political Reconciliation: Reconciliation in a society marked by 

nearly four decades of dictatorship will not be linear and will take 

time, patience, and support from the international community. The 

Iraqi leadership (and the United States) has sought to set a metric 

for national reconciliation through a series of laws to be enacted 

through Iraq’s Council of Representatives. Moving these laws forward depends on deal-making among major players in a society divided along sectarian, ethnic, and other lines—and navigation of a 

nascent democratic system with checks and balances that, while 

protecting minority groups, also slows legislative progress. For 

these reasons, most of the major political benchmarks identified in 

the Act may prove to be lagging indicators of whether or not the 

strategy is succeeding. 

While key national legislation has not yet passed, the objectives 

of such laws are in some ways already being achieved. For example: there is no revenue sharing law, and yet significant oil revenues are being distributed by the central government to the provinces in an equitable manner. There is no provincial powers law, 

and yet the provincial governors and councils are making decisions 

on budget expenditures through engagement with the central government and ministries and are providing essential services for 

their constituents. There is no amnesty law, and yet immunity is 

being granted to many former insurgents, who in turn are being recruited to join legitimate security institutions. There is no deBa’athification reform law, and yet more than 45,000 former 

Ba’athist members of the old armed services have been granted 

pensions or even restored to active duty or Iraqi government service. Amnesty or de-Ba’athification laws were assumed necessary to 

drive a wedge between nationalist elements of the largely Sunni insurgency and al-Qaida. In fact, Sunnis in record numbers are turning against al-Qaida, reclaiming their communities, and turning towards the central government for additional resources. These are 

precisely the ‘‘effects’’ the benchmarks were intended to produce, 

even if the formal benchmarks themselves have not been met. In 

the coming months, our strategy will increasingly focus on helping 

the Iraqis knit together this new ‘‘bottom-up’’ progress with the 

‘‘top-down’’ political process. It will still remain vital for Iraq’s national government to codify what is happening in practice through 

formal legislation over time. 

On that point, political progress at the national level has still 

been disappointing. The natural tension between groups has been 

exacerbated by political blocs threatening to withdraw support 


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from the government. These threats were not fully carried out in 

most cases, but they have contributed to an environment of mistrust and gridlock. It became clear in July that the fundamental 

problem at the national level was not the failure to pass legislation 

but that the principal political groups—Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurd— could not agree on a set of decision-making processes and power 

sharing arrangements. Consequently, Iraq’s leadership (represented by the Prime Minister, Presidency Council, and the President of the Kurdish Region) met in Baghdad in August to address 

these more fundamental issues of executive branch decision-making. 

These leaders on August 26—following 8 days of meetings—announced a basic agreement on key benchmarks legislation on provincial powers and de-Ba’athification. They also formalized the use 

of the ‘‘3 plus 1 group’’, or the Prime Minister and the three-member Presidency Council, for collective decision-making on sensitive 

and strategic matters. The leaders agreed to streamline executive 

branch activities to facilitate swift decision-making through an 

‘‘inner-cabinet’’ consisting of core ministers, including Oil, Electricity, Defense, and Interior. And, for the first time, they ‘‘affirmed 

the necessity of a long-term relationship with the United States’’ based on common interests for the future of Iraq. The communique ́

issued by these leaders has not solved Iraq’s serious problems at 

the national level, but it does represent an important step forward 

in the ongoing struggle to overcome the fear and mistrust now dividing Iraq’s ethnic and religious communities. The leaders’ August 

26 agreement is a necessary building block to meaningful political 

progress—which begins with all major communities coming together for dialogue on resolving key differences. 

Diplomatic Engagement: Since the interim Benchmarks report in 

mid-July, there has been significant diplomatic activity with a 

focus on working with Iraq’s neighbors to address problems in Iraq, 

especially security problems. In late July, after two trilateral meetings at the ambassador level, the United States, Iraq, and Iran 

formed a Security Subcommittee which met for the first time on 

August 6, 2007 in Baghdad. The Security Subcommittee has focused on curtailing the activities of militias and foreign terrorists 

in Iraq and developing ways to increase control over Iraq’s borders. 

Despite these efforts, the Iranian government has shown no signs 

of curtailing their destructive activities inside Iraq—including the 

direct provision of lethal munitions and training to Shi’a extremist 

groups that are attacking Coalition forces and Iraqis. Indeed, attacks by the most dangerous roadside bombs—explosively-formed 

projectiles (EFPs)—have been on an upward trajectory this year, 

reaching a high of more than 90 attacks in July. 

We have encouraged the Government of Iraq to engage in discussions with the Government of Syria to express its serious concerns 

about foreign terrorists, especially suicide bombers. In early August, the United States participated in a Border Security Working 

Group meeting in Damascus as part of the Neighbors Process. The 

participants discussed the issue of foreign terrorists continuing to 

use neighboring territories as a main transit route to Iraq and 

agreed to establish an experts’ group to work on specific border 

control measures. Prime Minister Maliki followed up with a sepaVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:06 Sep 18, 2007 Jkt 211002 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HD058.XXX HD058

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rate visit to Syria later in August, during which the Syrian Government committed to implementing border control measures. Although there has been some improvement, it remains too early to 

determine whether these Syrian actions have been effective in reducing foreign fighter flows into Iraq, which account for many of 

the high-profile terrorist attacks in Iraq aimed at instigating sectarian violence. Moreover, Syria continues to provide safe-haven to 

Ba’athist insurgents and financiers, and may be providing support 

to extremist political elements who are opposed to political reconciliation. 

In addition to his visit to Syria, Prime Minister Maliki traveled 

to Turkey and Iran in August 2007 for discussions on security, energy, and other bilateral issues. Several other senior Iraqi government officials have traveled in the region as Iraq continues to increase its economic and diplomatic relations with neighboring 

states. For the first time in years, Iraq is exporting oil through 

Turkey. Iraq is nearing agreement on a commercial deal for Kuwait 

to supply critically needed diesel fuel. Jordan issued a statement 

welcoming the Iraqi leaders August 26 communique ́. Saudi Arabia 

is planning to open an Embassy in Baghdad—its first since the fall 

of Saddam. 

The International Compact with Iraq, an initiative jointly sponsored by the United Nations and the Government of Iraq, was 

signed on May 3, 2007 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. The following 

day the Expanded Neighbors ministerial conference took place and 

was attended by the Permanent Five members of the U.N. Security 

Council, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference, 

and the G–8. Both events helped provide more international and 

regional support for Iraq. Plans are underway to create a standing 

secretariat for the Neighbors Process and a second ministerial-level 

conference is scheduled for late October in Turkey. 

On August 10, the United Nations Security Council unanimously 

adopted UNSCR 1770, extending the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The renewed UNAMI 

mandate provides an expanded role for the U.N. in advising, supporting, and assisting the Government of Iraq. UNAMI is also empowered to assist in the provisions for resolving disputed internal 

borders. 

These international developments may appear independent of 

one another, but they are in fact part of an interrelated effort to 

establish a new international framework for supporting Iraq. This 

framework will take time to develop and mature, but its three primary components—the Expanded Neighbors Process, the International Compact, and the expanded Security Council mandate for 

UNAMI—provide promising new platforms for drawing the international community closer to Iraq with the full support and assistance of the Iraqi government. 

Economics and Essential Services: The economic picture in Iraq 

continues to improve, though very significant challenges remain. 

Key macroeconomic indicators paint a modestly improved picture—

non-oil real growth is projected to be 5 percent in 2007, non-fuel 

inflation has further abated (year-on-year core inflation has declined to 16 percent and overall inflation to 30 percent in July 

2007, while 2007 year-to-date inflation is 5 percent), and the unemVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:06 Sep 18, 2007 Jkt 211002 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HD058.XXX HD058

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ployment rate appears to be easing. Government revenue remains 

above target due to high oil export prices. 

A national investment commission head has been appointed to 

promote increased private sector activity and legal and regulatory 

reform. Idle yet viable state-owned factories have signed loan 

agreements to restart operations. Reopening these factories will 

create new private business opportunities for suppliers located near 

the factories. An auction of the cell phone spectrum in August netted the Government of Iraq a better-than-expected sum of $3.75 

billion. However, lack of adequate security remains the largest impediment to increased private economic activity, and a major economic turnaround remains unlikely until the security picture improves. 

The provision of essential services at the provincial level is generally improving. However, provincial government performance remains mixed, with those provinces experiencing continued violence 

and kinetic operations finding it more difficult to provide services. 

On average, the provinces are obligating funding for essential services and infrastructure projects at a rate faster than in 2006. The 

improvements are most dramatic in provinces such as al-Anbar, 

where security gains have, for the first time since 2003 created an 

environment conducive to delivery of government services. At the 

national level, the Ministry of Oil has finally begun the process of 

investment spending, but much higher rates of investment are still 

necessary to promote growth, fund future investment, and contribute to better quality of life. 

Iraq has maintained satisfactory performance on its International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand-by Arrangement. The IMF 

Executive Board completed a successful review of the program on 

August 1 and extended the program until December 2007. IMF Executive Board members praised the Iraqi authorities for their commitment to implementing difficult economic reforms in a dynamic 

political and security environment. Iraq will negotiate a new program with the IMF before the end of the year. 

The Government of Iraq remains similarly committed to the 

International Compact with Iraq, which provides a reform framework for Iraq to become financially self-sufficient within 5 years. A 

semiannual review of the Compact occurred at the U.N. on July 20, 

during which Iraq presented a report on key developments since 

the Compact was signed on May 3, 2007. Of Iraq’s 262 actionable 

benchmarks under the Compact, 169 are in progress and on track. 

Delegates from the international community praised the report and 

welcomed Iraq’s efforts to implement its reform commitments. Several participants also called for greater assistance for Iraq, especially through faster progress on concluding debt relief agreements. 

Congressional benchmarks 

Broad context is necessary for assessing the performance of the 

Iraqi government with respect to the 18 benchmarks identified in 

the Act. Iraqi leaders face a daunting challenge, and they and their 

families take great risks daily. We continue to encourage and press 

them to achieve established benchmarks, since we believe that 

those efforts will contribute over time to Iraq’s stability, to its ability to provide for its own security, and to the international effort 


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to counter violent extremism. Nonetheless, our efforts in Iraq extend far beyond these benchmarks, as the recent testimony of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus explained in more detail. 

Every day, our Embassy and military officials work with the Iraqis 

to establish the strategic environment in which security and meaningful reconciliation can develop and take root—in ways not easily 

measured by benchmarks based heavily on adopting legislation. 

Standard of Measurement: Section 1314(b)(2)(A) states: ‘‘The 

President shall submit an initial report to Congress, not later than 

July 15, 2007, assessing the status of each of the specific benchmarks established above, and declaring, in his judgment, whether 

satisfactory progress toward meeting these benchmarks is, 

or is not, being achieved.’’ Section 1314(b)(2)(D) further provides that ‘‘[t]he President shall submit a second report to 

the Congress, not later than September 15, 2007, following 

the same procedures and criteria outlined [in the paragraphs] above.’’ 

To make this judgment (i.e., whether ‘‘satisfactory progress * * * 

is, or is not, being achieved’’), we have carefully examined all the 

facts and circumstances with respect to each of the 18 benchmarks 

and asked the following question: As measured from a January 

2007 baseline, do we assess that present trend data demonstrate a 

positive trajectory, which is tracking toward satisfactory accomplishment in the near term? If the answer is yes, we have provided 

a ‘‘Satisfactory’’ assessment; if the answer is no, the assessment is ‘‘Not Satisfactory.’’ Where benchmarks contain more than one element we have provided assessments for each element. As a result, 

some benchmarks show mixed progress, with some elements assessed satisfactory and other elements judged not satisfactory. Two 

benchmarks could not be fully assessed at this time because the 

preconditions for achieving them have not been reached. For benchmarks receiving a not satisfactory assessment, we have explained 

what, if any, strategic adjustments may be required to improve the 

present trajectory. 

The current assessment indicates additional progress has occurred since the initial report of July 2007. In that report, the Iraq 

government made satisfactory progress on eight benchmarks and 

eight benchmarks were assessed as unsatisfactory, including two 

with mixed progress. Today’s report is based on data available as 

of September 1 and reflects that the Iraqis have made satisfactory 

progress since January 2007 on nine benchmarks, including on deBa’athification reform which in July was assessed as unsatisfactory. In addition, while the current report assesses seven benchmarks as not satisfactory, this includes four benchmarks with 

progress on some aspects while not on others. In both the July report and today’s assessment, two benchmarks are not rated because the necessary preconditions are not yet present. 

It is important to note that the metric used in this report differs 

from that employed by the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) in its August 2007 report. Legislation mandating this GAO 

report required a determination of whether or not the Government of Iraq has met or not met each benchmark and the status of achievement of these benchmarks. Additionally, the GAO report took account of information only through July 31, 2007. This 


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report takes account of information through September 1, 2007 and 

evaluates whether the Iraqi government has made satisfactory 

progress on each benchmark. 

The present analysis and assessment of the 18 benchmarks follows. 


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ASSESSMENT OF THE BENCHMARKS

Section 1314 (b)(2)(A) The President shall submit an initial report, in classified and unclassified format, to the Congress, not later 

than July 15, 2007, assessing the status of each of the specific 

benchmarks * * * and declaring, in his judgment, whether satisfactory progress toward meeting these benchmarks is, or is not, being 

achieved. 

Section 1314 (b)(2)(C) If the President’s assessment of any of the 

specific benchmarks established above is unsatisfactory, the President shall include in that report a description of such revisions to 

the political, economic, regional, and military components of the 

strategy, as announced by the President on January 10, 2007. In 

addition, the President shall include in the report the advisability 

of implementing such aspects of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, 

as he deems appropriate. 

Section 1314 (b)(2)(D) The President shall submit a second report 

to the Congress, not later than September 15, 2007, following the 

same procedures and criteria outlined above. 

Section 1314 (b)(I)(A) The United States Strategy in Iraq, hereafter, shall be conditioned on the Iraqi Government meeting benchmarks * * * including: 

(i) Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then 

completing the constitutional review. 

The Council of Representatives (COR) formed the Constitutional 

Review Committee (CRC) on November 15, 2006, and constitutional review is underway. The CRC, in a May 2007 interim report, 

offered a range of amendments for COR consideration and in addition highlighted the need to resolve outstanding issues concerning: 

(i) Presidential powers, (ii) the powers of the regions vs. the central 

government, and (iii) the status of Kirkuk (Article 140 of the Constitution). 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward forming a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) and then completing the constitutional review. 

The Embassy has engaged the CRC Chairman and the COR Speaker and Deputy Speakers on the need to develop a well-defined plan 

for the COR debate on the recommendations of the interim report. 

Despite the COR’s August adjournment, the CRC continued to 

work on the three additional unresolved constitutional issues described above. 

(ii) Enacting and implementing legislation on deBa’athification reform. 

De-Ba’athification reform is potentially the most emotional issue 

being discussed by the Government of Iraq. Legislation necessary 

to reform and implement certain de-Ba’athification programs involves competing concepts of justice, accountability, reconciliation, 

and economic compensation. The public discussion of these issues 

tends to polarize Iraqis even as many of the proposed changes take 

place on the ground. For example, former Ba’ath party members 

who served in the army have been granted pensions. While the deBa’athification legislation is debated at the highest levels in Baghdad, more than 45,000 former army personnel have been granted 

pensions or reinstated to active duty. 


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In Recommendation 27, the Iraq Study Group emphasizes the 

need for United States Government support of reintegration of 

former Ba’athists and Arab nationalists into civic life, and the New 

Way Forward strategy makes de-Ba’athification reform an integral 

part of the United States Government’s Iraq policy. The Embassy 

has pressed hard on all political elements to move forward. 

On August 26 the leaders of Iraq’s five major political groups announced an agreement had been reached on, inter alia, draft deBa’athification legislation. While the agreed-upon draft still must 

pass the hurdles of debate and adoption in the Council of Representatives, the work accomplished by the leaders on this legislation is a significant sign of progress. 

Even in the absence of legislation, limited political accommodation remains possible, particularly when pursued through outreach 

by local political leaders. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing legislation 

on de-Ba’athification reform. The fact that legislation has not 

yet passed the COR should not diminish the significance of the 

agreement reached by the leaders or the re-integration of former 

Ba’athists taking place on the ground. The overarching goal of deBa’athification reform is political accommodation between the Shi’a 

and Sunni communities. The leaders’ agreement combined with the 

return of former Ba’athists to civic life is a significant step in that 

regard. Debate on this draft law in the COR is an integral part of 

developing the broad political acceptance needed to promote real 

reconciliation. 

(iii) Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the 

equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources to the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure 

that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi’a 

Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner. 

The Hydrocarbon Framework Law and the companion Revenue 

Sharing Law are fundamentally important to defining federalism 

in Iraq. If adopted, they would: catalyze new sources of investment 

capital and technology for the oil and gas sector; facilitate substantial near term increases in government revenues which could be 

used for the benefit of Iraq’s people; and serve as a vehicle for political reconciliation between regions and communities. 

Iraq’s political leaders continue to be actively engaged in developing these laws. 

The United States has provided technical advice, both to the 

Government of Iraq and to the Kurdish Regional Government 

(KRG), and has encouraged all parties to approve the draft laws 

and submit them for consideration to the full COR. 

The Hydrocarbon Framework Law was approved by the Council 

of Ministers in February 2007 and reviewed by the Shura Council 

(a legal body) in the spring. Two versions of the law were submitted to the COR in July. The companion Revenue Management 

Law was agreed to by Kurdish and Shi’a Arab political parties in 

June 2007 and in July was submitted to the Shura Council for review. The Revenue Management Law must be approved by the 


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Council of Ministers (COM) before submission to the COR. Discussions among Iraqi political leaders are ongoing, and this legislation 

remains a primary focus for political party leaders. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon 

revenue. Passage of the national laws remains a high priority for 

the United States and the Government of Iraq and could be accomplished relatively quickly if a consensus in support can be constructed. Many Sunni leaders (and some Shi’a as well) continue to 

disagree on the appropriate balance between national and regional 

control of hydrocarbon exploration and production. Meanwhile, the 

Kurdish Regional Government has sought to reinforce its own position on the national law by passing a new hydrocarbons licensing 

regime through its regional parliament. Given the fluid nature of 

the Iraqi political process, it is difficult to predict what further 

progress might occur once the COR reconvenes. Despite this uncertainty, the Government of Iraq is already distributing significant 

oil revenue on an equitable basis to the provinces and KRG 

through the Iraqi budget. 

(iv) Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures 

to form semi-autonomous regions. 

In line with the Iraqi constitution, the COR enacted a ‘‘Regions 

Law’’ in October 2006 that establishes procedures for the formation 

of federal regions in Iraq. The legislation delayed the effective date 

of implementation for a period of 18 months after enactment, which 

means no steps can be taken to form federal regions before April 

2008. The United States Government encouraged Iraqi political 

parties to reach a compromise on this law and believes that the 18- 

month delay in implementation was in the interests of Iraq and the 

United States, given current political conditions in Iraq. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing legislation 

on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions. The COR 

passed the Regions Law with a delayed effective date. Implementation of this legislation could take place after provincial elections are 

held and after the passage of an updated elections law. 

(v) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an 

Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections. 

On January 23, 2007, the COR passed the Independent High 

Electoral Commission (IHEC) Law, which the Presidency Council 

(the President and two Deputy Presidents) signed into law on February 27, 2007. On April 28, 2007, the COR appointed the nine 

IHEC Commissioners in a process that the U.N. deemed fair and 

transparent. The Commissioners have completed appropriate training and are in the process of selecting representatives to oversee 

elections in the provinces. 

The mid-August high-level meetings produced agreement among 

the leaders of Iraq’s five major parties on a draft law delineating 

provincial powers. Draft legislation is expected to be submitted to 

the COR shortly. This law lays out the authorities of provincial 


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governments and their relationship to the national government in 

Baghdad. 

In Recommendation 29, the Iraq Study Group emphasizes the 

need for provincial elections at the earliest possible date. Iraqi officials said in August that a provincial powers law was a prerequisite for setting a date for provincial elections, and therefore 

they await movement from the COR. The United States Government and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) 

are strongly encouraging the Government of Iraq to set a date for 

provincial elections. Additionally, the United States Government is 

working with Iraq Security Forces to ensure that they are adequately prepared to provide security for free and fair elections 

when a date is set. 

Assessment: There are multiple components to this benchmark, 

each deserving its own assessment. 

• Establishing the IHEC Commission: The Government of Iraq 

has made satisfactory progress toward establishing an IHEC Commission. 

• Elections Law: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing a provincial elections law. 

• Provincial Council Authorities: The Government of Iraq has 

made satisfactory progress toward establishing provincial council 

authorities, which are encapsulated in the Provincial Powers law. 

• Provincial Elections Date: The Government of Iraq has not 

made satisfactory progress toward establishing a date for provincial 

elections. 

There remains no mechanism to address the marked under-representation of Sunnis on four provincial councils. Nevertheless, in 

some places, such as al-Anbar, local authorities appointed additional provincial council members in November 2006 to ease problems of a lack of representation through non-electoral means. In 

passing an expanded mandate for UNAMI on August 10, the 

United Nations Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to assist the IHEC prepare for the next round of elections. This situation does not necessitate a revision to our current plan and strategy, and positive action on this issue is one of our highest priorities. 

(vi) Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty. 

The preconditions for a general amnesty do not yet exist. That 

said, the Government of Iraq established a high-level Reconciliation 

Committee to support and oversee efforts by groups that want to 

oppose al-Qaida in Iraq and other extremist elements. This committee is working with a joint U.S. Embassy/MNF–I group that is 

facilitating such actions in coordination with other anti-terrorist efforts on the ground. In the absence of legislation, the Government 

of Iraq—at the direction of the Prime Minister—has initiated a program of limited immunity for individuals who have turned away 

from supporting al-Qaida and have now pledged support to the government. While this program may not meet the requirement for enacting and implementing legislation, on-the-ground programs of 

limited immunity are accomplishing some of the desired effects of 

this benchmark. 


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Assessment: No assessment can be made until the necessary preconditions have been reached for implementing a 

general amnesty. However, a process of local accommodation and 

limited immunity has been developed and effectively implemented 

in al-Anbar province, Abu Ghraib, and other locations where local 

volunteers, including some Shi’a, have been approved for hire by 

the Minister of Interior or Defense while awaiting completion of the 

reconciliation committee’s screening. Although the Government of 

Iraq has not enacted or implemented amnesty legislation, these 

local programs may be creating preconditions for future amnesty 

legislation. The Embassy continues to engage the Government of 

Iraq at the highest levels on questions of amnesty. 

(vii) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a 

strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the constitution of Iraq. 

The necessary preconditions for a Disarmament, Demobilization, 

and Reintegration (DDR) program in any post-conflict society are 

steep, and key elements such as political reconciliation and security 

provided by the government do not yet exist, despite considerable 

efforts by the Government of Iraq, MNF–I, and the United States 

Embassy. Although a DDR Committee has been established, there 

is limited momentum toward developing and implementing a comprehensive disarmament program for militia members while Iraq 

faces a combination of sectarian violence, terrorist attacks, and a 

continuing insurgency. However, there are signs that certain programs and projects designed at the local level to re-integrate certain individuals and small groups back into the population are 

achieving some modest success. In general, these projects include 

education-based programs for former detainees. 

The 2007 budget of the Government of Iraq includes $150 million 

for DDR. However, the funds will not be released until the Government of Iraq enacts legislation and establishes a satisfactory program for implementation. 

In Recommendation 38 and 39, the Iraq Study Group proposes 

that neutral international experts act as advisors to the Government of Iraq and that the United States Government fund and support a single office to provide assistance to these experts. The study 

also notes that ‘‘solving the problem of militias requires national 

reconciliation’’ and states that, as a party in the conflict, the 

United States Government should not be directly involved in a 

DDR program’s implementation. 

Consequently, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1710 expanded UNAMI’s mandate to include ‘‘advise, support, and 

assist * * * the Government of Iraq at an appropriate time and in 

connection with progress on reconciliation efforts, on planning, 

funding, and implementing reintegration programs for former 

members of illegal armed groups.’’

Assessment: No assessment can be made until the necessary preconditions have been reached for implementing a 

strong militia disarmament program. However, the Government of Iraq has initiated a process that reintegrates former militia members into the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior 


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architecture. In effect, this may be facilitating the necessary conditions for a future DDR program. 

(viii) Establishing supporting political, media, economic, 

and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security 

Plan. 

Through its February 2007 establishment of the Executive Steering Committee (ESC) and related subcommittees, the Government 

of Iraq has established supporting political, media, economic, and 

services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan (Operation Fardh Al Qanoon). The United States Embassy and MNF–

I will remain intensively engaged with the ESC to continue to improve its effectiveness and ensure that the subcommittees fulfill 

the purpose for which they were created. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing supporting political, 

media, economic, and services committees in support of the 

Baghdad Security Plan. Since the July 2007 assessment period, 

the ESC and related subcommittees have continued to meet weekly 

in their efforts to coordinate and synchronize policies, services, and 

other non-kinetic aspects of Operation Fardh Al Qanoon with security operations. 

(ix) Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to 

support Baghdad operations. 

The Ministry of Defense has generated a total of eight Iraqi 

Army Brigade Headquarters and 27 Iraqi Army Battalions to support Baghdad operations. These units are actively involved in joint 

and independent operations throughout Baghdad and the Baghdad 

belts. The Government of Iraq provided the number of units required, and they were trained to the proper individual and collective baseline. As unit manning and composition issues were identified, the Government of Iraq addressed them. For example, in 

order to compensate for the number of soldiers absent during Operation Fardh Al Qanoon for leave or other reasons, the Government 

of Iraq expanded combat unit manning to 120 percent of authorization, thus achieving higher present for duty strength. Current 

present for duty rates are now 75 percent of authorized strength, 

which is within Iraqi Army standard. 

Some of these units have performed exceptionally well, voluntarily extending their deployments up to 270 days and raising their 

operational readiness ratings. Over the past 2 months the units 

serving with Coalition forces in the Baghdad Area of Operations 

—the 6th and 9th Iraqi Army Divisions—have conducted almost 

400 combined operations, 700 independent operations, and more 

than 7,000 independent patrols. Some units have been less impressive, suffering from a variety of issues related to a lack of leadership and equipment to support their assigned missions. 

Overall, Coalition ground commanders who work side by side 

with these units are generally pleased with their performance and 

are witness to their continual development and growing confidence 

as they gain experience in the counterinsurgency effort. That said, 

Iraqi Security forces are not yet able to assume responsibility for 

security throughout the country. Placing that burden on the Iraqis 

before they are ready risks sacrificing the gains we have made. The 


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ISF will require additional training, equipping, and logistical support. 

It was an impressive achievement for the Government of Iraq to 

provide the equivalent of three additional trained and ready brigades to Baghdad. Programs are in place to ensure they remain capable of sustaining this level of effort through scheduled rotations 

and a robust training pipeline. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward providing three trained and ready 

Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations. 

(x) Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to 

execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders, without political intervention to include the authority to pursue all extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. 

The Prime Minister has provided Iraqi commanders the necessary authority to conduct security operations and continues to reaffirm his commitment to support these authorities. ISF continue 

to prosecute targets across Iraq, including in operations throughout 

Baghdad and in provinces that have already been turned over to 

Provincial Iraqi Control. The Prime Minister and senior commanders increasingly recognize the threat to long-term security 

posed by Shi’a militia extremists and continue to support targeting 

such elements. In late August, the Prime Minister removed the 

Shi’a commander of the Karbala Operations Command, ordered the 

arrest of three prominent Shi’a militia extremists who were in 

Karbala for the 12th Imam Commemoration, ordered an Iraqi Special Forces raid on key JAM cells in Karbala, and the strong response from the Iraqi government—as well as the public outrage 

at the violence—appears to have led to Muqtada al-Sadr’s call for 

his extremist militia to halt all attacks against Coalition forces. 

The Iraqi Army as an institution continues to appear more nationally oriented and less susceptible to political interference than 

the Iraqi National Police or local forces, although some reform of 

the National Police has occurred. The degree of JAM influence 

within police forces is largely dependent upon the region or city. 

Within Baghdad, Iraqi Police in Sadr City and parts of 

Kadhamiyah are complicit with JAM activity. JAM influence is also 

strong in the cities of Al Amarrah, Hussaniyah, and Diwaniyah due 

to heavy infiltration of JAM members. Police activities in those 

areas that have been cleared and retained by Coalition and Iraqi 

forces appear to be the most even-handed. 

Coalition military leaders who work closely with their Iraqi counterparts to plan and conduct security operations have seen uneven 

progress on efforts to reduce political interference in military decisions. Where Iraqi security forces are fighting alongside Coalition 

Forces or manning joint security stations, ISF tactical commanders 

generally act on mission orders from their established chains of 

command. 

There are no reported instances of political interference in operations directed against Sunni insurgents. However, there is evidence of political officials attempting to limit the effectiveness of 

independent Iraqi operations against Shi’a extremists. Political interference typically emanates from individuals in the Government 


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of Iraq below the level of the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister has taken actions to limit such interference. For example, the 

Prime Minister was recently provided evidence of arrest lists for 

Sunni targets generated by an office below him that bypassed operational commanders. The Prime Minister responded by reorganizing and reducing the size of the office. As far as we can determine, any previous restrictions on targeting certain sects are no 

longer present. 

There also is still evidence of political interference with ISF operations from both the Ministry of Interior and the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC). Questionable judicial warrants by the 

OCINC have been used to try to replace Sunni officers who demonstrated effectiveness against Jaysh al-Mahdi operations in Baghdad and in southern provinces. In Muthanna province, there is evidence that Ministry of Interior officials have used deBa’athification laws to replace effective Sunni police officers with 

Shi’a officers. JAM-associated Ministry of Interior officials continue 

to exert such a significant influence over the Basra Police that the 

new Basra Provincial Director of Police raised this issue at a meeting with the Ministerial Council on National Security. 

There is strong evidence of efforts to remove sectarian commanders in the National Police. Since the start of this year, all Division Commanders, all Brigade Commanders, and 17 of 27 battalion commanders in the National Police were relieved of duty due 

to allegations of sectarian activity. In addition, a former Police Division Commander reassigned due to serious allegations has since 

been removed from his follow-on assignment as well. This is a signal that the Government of Iraq is committed to taking action with 

regard to sectarian bias. 

While the recent interventions by the Prime Minister and other 

government officials to curb sectarian bias are encouraging, the 

fear of being replaced for political or sectarian reasons remains and 

continues to influence commanders’ decisions on which operations 

to undertake. Given the importance of this issue, we will need to 

continue monitoring the activities of government officials for signs 

of interference with ISF commanders’ abilities to make tactical and 

operational decisions. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi commanders with all 

authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and 

operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders, to include the authority to pursue all extremists. 

However, there has not been satisfactory progress towards 

eliminating political intervention by leaders throughout the 

chain of command. The historical prejudices inherent to Iraq remain a challenge that will only be fully solved by time and the experience of democratic government. 

(xi) Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing 

even-handed enforcement of the law. 

Individual Iraqi Army and National Police units that work closely with Coalition Forces generally act responsibly. The achievements of the 30 joint security stations and 31 Coalition outposts 

throughout Baghdad neighborhoods provide clear evidence that the 

Iraqi police and army are capable of fairly administering the rule 


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of law under a partnering construct. The actions of many individual Iraqi commanders demonstrate that they independently act 

in a fair and professional manner. For example, operations against 

insurgent cells seem to be even-handed—targeting both Sunni and 

Shi’a elements. In the last week of August, Coalition and Iraqi Special Forces jointly killed or captured more than 100 cell members, 

about one third of whom were JAM members who had committed 

criminal actions. 

Education and training have been key ingredients in improving 

enforcement of the law. Under the National Police Transformation 

plan, eight of the nine National Police brigades have completed a 

month-long training course on the rule of law, professionalism, and 

policing techniques. The latest class of 1,800 National Policemen 

just graduated from the Numaniyah National Police College on 20 

August. Initial indications show that even seasoned units perform 

better after completing such a ‘‘re-bluing’’ program. Similar programs are also used for local police. Still, some police units operating outside of close Coalition supervision tend to gravitate to old 

habits of sectarianism. In late August, the Minister of Interior had 

to issue an arrest warrant for a police company commander and 

several in his command for sectarian behavior. This indicates both 

the persistence of the problem and a genuine desire by the leadership to clean up the image and performance of the police force. 

Improvements within the Iraqi legal system are providing the 

Government of Iraq with new ways to handle rule of law issues. 

The government introduced a new military justice system, trained 

16 judges and 4 prosecutors, and established a unit training program for Commanders and Disciplinary Officers that is administered by almost 100 trained legal advisors assigned across all Iraqi 

Army divisions. Within the past month, high-profile and high-ranking offenders within the ISF—both Sunni and Shi’a—have been arrested and are currently under investigation, pending trial for their 

sectarian-based crimes. Judges in the secure Rusafa Rule of Law 

Complex have already shown their determination to impose tough 

justice on both Sunni and Shi’a members of sectarian death squads. 

Since the start of the year they have sentenced roughly equal numbers of Sunni and Shi’a criminals to death. 

Through continued mentoring and partnership, additional training of ISF units, and increased emphasis by the Government of 

Iraq, even-handed enforcement of the law may increasingly become 

the norm, even in the absence of Coalition oversight. We expect 

Government of Iraq actions, not Coalition oversight, to hold the ISF 

to a high standard in the future. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress in ensuring that the Iraqi Army is providing 

even-handed enforcement of the law, though much remains 

to be done in this area. However the Iraqi Police has not 

made satisfactory progress, as some elements still act with 

a sectarian bias. The replacement of 28 National Police Commanders, as well as the ‘‘re-bluing’’ training for National Police Brigades, should produce improvements in this area over the coming 

months. 

(xii) Ensuring that, as President Bush quoted Prime Minister Maliki as saying, ‘‘the Baghdad Security Plan will not 


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provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] 

sectarian or political affiliation.’’ In accordance with the promise made by Prime Minister Maliki, 

the Government of Iraq has allowed Coalition forces to conduct operations in all areas of Baghdad. 

Almost 3 months into surge operations, the coordinated offensive 

operations of ISF and Coalition forces have made significant 

progress against terrorist and extremist elements, particularly in 

Baghdad, the surrounding ‘‘belts,’’ and Diyala. In Baghdad, the 

focus of operations has been along the fault lines between Sunni 

and Shi’a neighborhoods, where economic and social conditions 

make the population most susceptible to extremism. Our 

counterinsurgency strategy relies on establishing joint security stations in troubled neighborhoods, continuous joint ISF and Coalition 

Force security operations, Coalition outposts to expand the reach of 

Coalition forces, and reconstruction programs to restore quality of 

life. These actions have resulted in a steady improvement in population security, increasing trust of Baghdad residents, and a decrease in the number of areas where terrorists and extremists can 

operate. In late March 2007, only about 10 percent of Baghdad 

neighborhoods were secured by Iraqi and Coalition forces. By the 

end of August more than three-quarters of the city’s neighborhoods 

had been cleared and now benefit from the continued presence of 

security forces. 

Prior to clearing operations in Baqubah, Coalition operations 

were plagued by IED attacks and had difficulty locating insurgent 

cells and weapons caches. Once Coalition and Iraqi forces established a permanent presence in the city, weekly IED and indirect 

fire attacks dropped by 75 percent, and local citizens began pointing out booby-trapped houses, buried IEDs and weapons caches. 

Total attacks against civilians, ISF, and Coalition forces for all of 

Diyala province have decreased in 7 of the past 10 weeks. In the 

past month alone more than 140 IEDs and 61 weapons caches have 

been cleared, in great part due to tips from local residents. 

Even in places like Sadr City, Coalition and Iraqi forces have 

pressured militia extremists and criminals. Since January, more 

than 80 operations have been conducted, spanning each sector of 

Sadr City and capturing or killing many insurgent and militia cell 

leaders. In contrast to the perception that Sadr City is a safe haven 

for extremists, Coalition and Iraqi patrols operate there and continue to disrupt cells that plant IEDs or launch mortar attacks in 

Baghdad. Reconstruction projects continue in Sadr City with hospital renovations 94 percent complete, three new water system 

projects completed in July and at least four ongoing medical clinic 

projects. 

The Government of Iraq and Coalition elements are exploiting 

improved security by revitalizing economic and social programs, 

thereby preventing the reappearance of conditions that would promote a return of extremists. The Baqubah Flour Mill just received 

a shipment of 560 tons of grain—its first in over a year. This mill 

will now employ 200 local workers. In Amariyah, Ghazaliyah, 

Yusifiyah, Adhamiyah, and Abu Ghraib, tribal initiatives against 

al-Qaida are gaining momentum and have garnered the increased 

support of the Government of Iraq. In Adhamiyah alone, 1000 


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Iraqis volunteered to help the ISF and Coalition forces bring security to their neighborhood. Overall, operations in Baghdad have 

made an impact, but work remains to be done, especially in the 

Sadr City area of Baghdad and in Kadhamiyah. These neighborhoods remain some of our bigger challenges. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward ensuring that the Baghdad Security 

Plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation. 

(xiii) Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and 

eliminating militia control of local security. 

Ethno-sectarian violence is incited by a variety of motivations 

and methods, making it difficult to measure and control. Coalition 

and Iraqi partners are working hard to break the vicious cycle of 

provocation and retaliation that was at the heart of last winter’s 

surge in casualties and displacement from troubled neighborhoods. 

After considering a number of indicators developed from both host 

nation and Coalition reports, there are promising signs that we 

may be succeeding in breaking this cycle. 

While there are still millions of Iraqis who have been displaced 

from their homes by intimidation and violence, some small groups 

are beginning to return to areas where violence has been reduced. 

By both our estimate and those of the national intelligence community, the number of ethno-sectarian attacks and deaths nationwide 

has fluctuated somewhat over the past several months, but they 

are now less than half of the December 2006 levels. Ethno-sectarian attacks in the Baghdad districts have fallen even more 

sharply, down to roughly one-quarter the levels of December 2006. 

Total attacks on civilians across Iraq have declined in 13 of the 

past 18 weeks. Unfortunately, total civilian casualties did not fall 

as significantly over the same period, as al-Qaida launched several 

high-casualty vehicle IED attacks in Baghdad and the northern 

provinces in an attempt to provoke greater sectarian violence. However, in a sign of progress, Iraqis did not respond to these attacks 

with widespread sectarian-based retaliation, allowing for an underlying downward trend in civilian casualties. Overall, these trends 

have been achieved through increased Coalition and Iraqi presence 

in Baghdad, operations in the Baghdad belts, and an increase in 

the number of national leaders who have publicly renounced sectarian violence and called for restraint in the wake of high-profile 

IED attacks. 

Despite these gains, progress against militia extremists is mixed. 

Operations conducted since May have significantly contributed to 

eliminating militia control of local security in areas that Coalition 

forces have cleared and now hold. In some cities such as Baghdad, 

Ramadi, Abu Ghraib, and Baqubah, local militia members are formally joining the local Iraqi security forces and providing effective 

community security, as well as valuable tips on caches and the location of extremist leaders. Despite the recent assassination of the 

elected governors in Qadisiyah and Muthanna, we believe that discrete offensive operations against militia extremist leaders in the 

central southern provinces offer the opportunity for larger gains 

against the militias. However, militias are still acting outside the 

law in the uncleared parts of Baghdad and the southern provinces 


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1 A unit is an Iraqi Army combat battalion or an Iraqi Army combat brigade headquarters 

or an Iraqi Army combat division headquarters. 

of Karbala, Basra, Qadisiyah, and Maysan. In these areas, militia 

members have either infiltrated Iraqi Security Forces or brokered 

deals with the local ISF or civilian leadership. 

The national government continues its efforts to curb militia control of Iraqi Security Forces by its selection of leaders and key arrests, but they remain one step behind the problem. It is too early 

to be optimistic about statements by Muqtada al-Sadr, though the 

increasing number of Shi’a and Sunni tribal sheikhs reaching out 

to become part of the solution is a promising sign. We will continue 

to provide guidance and support to the Government of Iraq in negotiations, reconciliation, military operations, and legal action to address this issue. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward reducing sectarian violence. Where 

ISF and Coalition forces have conducted clear and hold operations, militia control has been significantly reduced. 

However, satisfactory progress has not been made toward 

eliminating militia control of local security in other areas, 

as evidenced by continued militia influence of certain Baghdad neighborhoods and other areas across Iraq. 

(xiv) Establishing all of the planned joint security stations 

in neighborhoods across Baghdad. 

Nearly all of the planned joint security stations, Coalition outposts, and other patrol bases have been established across Baghdad 

and the surrounding area. As of August 31, 2007, 30 of 33 planned 

joint security stations were operational and 31 Coalition combat 

outposts had achieved operational capability. Joint security stations provide an around-the-clock security presence in most of 

Baghdad and are particularly effective as they merge Coalition 

partnering with Iraqi presence and action. There are numerous examples where Iraqi presence has facilitated a lower application of 

force and a more positive result. Other stations are being established in outlying areas where interaction with the local people can 

have a direct impact on the reduction of violence within the city. 

This increased interaction with the local population should continue to suppress crime and sectarian violence as well as provide 

valuable intelligence to support economic growth, political accommodation, and counterinsurgency operations. 

Joint security stations are also being successfully employed in alAnbar province and numerous other locations across Iraq. Coalition 

leaders will continue to consult with the Baghdad Operational Center and national leadership to determine additional emplacements. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad neighborhoods. 

(xv) Increasing the number of Iraqi Security Forces units 

capable of operating independently. 

Iraqi Army, Air Force, and Police units1 continue to grow in size. 

The Iraqi Army has expanded greatly since December 2006, when 

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opment. Since March 2007, there has been a 14 percent increase 

in the number of independent Iraqi Army operations, including 20 

units operating independently as part of Fardh Al-Qanoon and 10 

units assuming the lead role in their areas of responsibility. While 

only a small percentage of battalions are rated as capable of completely independent counterinsurgency operations (Operational 

Readiness Assessment Level One), over 75 percent are capable of 

planning, executing, and sustaining operations with some Coalition 

support and of making significant contributions to combat operations. The greatest constraints on independent operations are a 

shortage of trained leaders and immature logistics capability. 

Iraqi Security Forces recently demonstrated their improved ability when they independently planned, rehearsed, and executed security for the annual pilgrimage in commemoration of the death of 

the Seventh Imam. This event, which included a march of a million 

Shi’a pilgrims to Baghdad’s Kadhamiyah Shrine, had been marred 

by significant violence each of the last 3 years, including 1,000 people who were killed in a stampede in 2005 when they feared a car 

bomb attack. This year’s event had no violence and was a great 

tribute to the Iraqi Security Forces and the government. The ISF 

planning and execution of the 12th Imam celebration in Karbala in 

late August 2007 was marred by JAM-instigated violence, but the 

Iraq security forces protected the shrines and defeated JAM attacks. Rapid reaction by the Government of Iraq—led by the Prime 

Minister personally—contained the violence and demonstrated another step toward eventual independent security capability. 

The Iraqi Police continues to grow in size, particularly in newly 

cleared population centers where the increased demand for officers 

is often well-supported by local volunteers and the Government of 

Iraq. Police forces in the seven provinces under Iraqi control operate independently. Police capabilities in the remaining provinces 

show improvement that has been enhanced by local militias and 

concerned citizens joining the fight against al-Qaida. The use of additional local security forces has significantly increased the number 

of tips, resulting in a 50 percent increase in the number of caches 

found nationwide and a doubling of caches found in Baghdad. The 

increased number of tips has also led to the capture or killing of 

al-Qaida and irreconcilable militia leaders. 

Although not yet capable of independent operations, three Air 

Force flying squadrons are progressing satisfactorily, doubling the 

amount of cargo and passengers flown since the start of the year. 

They have also conducted joint infrastructure security operations 

with the Iraqi Army and energy ministries and recently stood up 

an Iraqi Air Operations Center. 

The growing size of Iraqi Security Forces and the need to increase the manning levels of existing units continues to present the 

Government of Iraq with force management challenges, particularly in the areas of leaders and logistics. For the present time, Coalition partnership and support remains necessary for most ISF operations. The Coalition is assisting the Government of Iraq as it develops a more mature ISF force structure that is capable of providing institutional sustainment. Again, we should be wary of placing too much strain on this force until we are comfortable it can 


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2To aid interpretation, a terminology guide from Baghdad Cable 2541 follows: 

—Government of Iraq ‘‘Spending Plan/Budget Allocation’’: Budgetary authority to a Government of Iraq unit, in accordance with the Budget Law, with sub-allocations deferred by the Minmeet the challenges posed by our determined common enemies in 

Iraq. 

Assessment: Although there is progress in the development and operation of the Iraqi Security Forces, the Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward 

increasing the number of Iraqi Security Force units capable 

of operating independently. Many units have made considerable 

progress in their ability to conduct combat operations, but the 

number of units earning Operational Readiness Assessment Level 

One ratings has not increased as much as desired. However, we 

should not understate the marked increase in ISF capability to conduct combat operations successfully, including clearing and holding 

neighborhoods, planning and conducting operations, defending 

themselves, protecting the population, and responding to contingencies on short notice. 

(xvi) Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties 

in the Iraqi legislature are protected. 

Article 37 of the Iraqi Constitution guarantees all Iraqis freedom 

to form and join associations and political parties. Minorities are 

guaranteed equal access to and participation in elections for the 

COR. The COR elected in December 2005 includes representatives 

from the Shi’a, Sunni, Kurdish, Turkmen, Chaldo-Assyrian Christian, and Yazidi communities. The Rules of Procedure for the COR 

guarantee the ability of its members to express their opinions, regardless of political party or affiliation, helping to ensure the full 

participation of all its members, and COR leaders have followed 

these rules in practice. COR rules permit groups as small as 10 

members out of 275 to propose legislation. 

The United States Mission is fully engaged with the Iraqi parliament to ensure appreciation for the concern attached by the 

United States to representation of women and minorities and a role 

for minority parties. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward ensuring that the rights of minority 

political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected. (xvii) Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis. 

While it is too soon to tell by how much budget execution will 

improve by the end of 2007, there is no doubt that the Government 

of Iraq is overcoming many of the problems it faced in 2006. Indeed, 2007 capital budget execution is already on par with last 

year’s total level, and the full $10 billion capital budget has been 

allocated. Given the long-term nature of some capital projects, 

some of the 2007 capital funds will not be disbursed until later 

years. The Government of Iraq has also launched its 2008 budget 

process, which will ensure the progress in 2007 continues to move 

forward. 

Both the central government and the provincial governments are 

becoming more effective at allocating and spending their capital 

budgets for reconstruction and the delivery of essential services.2


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istry of Finance (MOF.) This equates to a United States Government ‘‘commitment’’ or an internal reservation of funds for a particular purpose. —Government of Iraq ‘‘Release’’: Equates to United States Government apportionment; release of funds from MOF (OMB has this responsibility in the United States Government) to a 

spending unit based on project needs or cash flow. Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MOPDC) reviews and approves the spending unit’s request for release, and the MOF 

confirms consistency with the approved budget allocation and liquidity needs of the spending 

unit. 

—Government of Iraq ‘‘Commitment’’: Equates to a United States Government obligation, 

i.e.,the spending unit awards a contract or other binding agreement. 

—Government of Iraq ‘‘Disbursed’’: Equates to United States Government expenditures or outlays. Two types of expenditures are often used interchangeably: (1) funds disbursed to a nonGovernment of Iraq entity (e.g., contractor) resulting in a net outlay; and (2) disbursements from 

one Government of Iraq account to another. 

The 2007 Iraqi budget represents the first time in modern Iraqi 

history that provincial governments have been able to formulate 

and implement their own capital budgets. The Government of Iraq 

ministries are already exceeding their 2006 levels of budget execution. The ability to allocate and spend a capital budget effectively 

is a necessary first step for a functioning government to meet the 

needs of its people. Government of Iraq and provincial officials 

across the country have shown by their actions that budget execution is, indeed, a focal point as they continue to improve governance and move toward self-reliance. 

In 2006, the Government of Iraq spent roughly 22 percent of its $6.2 billion non-provincial capital budget. Lack of technical capacity, security issues, and, in many cases, fear of prosecution for corruption effectively paralyzed much of the Government of Iraq’s 

spending. In 2007, an intense focus and training on budget execution at the highest levels of the Government of Iraq bolstered technical capacity and encouraged action, though capacity constraints 

persist. As a result, according to Ministry of Finance (MOF) data 

through mid-July 2007, total Government of Iraq ministries have 

already spent approximately 24 percent of their 2007 capital budgets. 

Ministerial allocation and spending are also moving ahead, with 

the most successful ministries being key service providers, such as 

Oil, Electricity, Housing, Municipalities and Public Works, Planning, and Education. These select ministries have all spent at least 

21 percent of their 2007 capital budget, with some committing as 

much as 57 percent. Some ministries remain challenged in the face 

of capacity constraints and problems associated with lack of security and will continue to be monitored appropriately. 

Provincial Reconstruction Team data indicate that provincial 

governments have committed over 47 percent of their 2007 capital 

budgets. Provinces also continue to spend their remaining 2006 

funds and are estimated by the MOF to have committed 100 percent of these funds, most of which were received in late December 

2006. 

The province of al-Anbar exemplifies the improvement in provincial budget execution. On June 4,2007, the Anbar Provincial Council approved its province’s capital budget. It then issued a call for 

tenders, analyzed the bids, and signed the first 17 contracts in a 

public ceremony on August 13, 2007. Over half of the remaining 

contracts to spend the rest of the provincial budget are ready for 

signature, bringing al-Anbar’s spending commitments to $25 million as of mid-August. 


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Assessment: The Government of Iraq is making satisfactory progress in allocating funds to ministries and provinces. The full $10 billion capital budget is allocated, although 

spending units will not be able to spend all these funds by the end 

of 2007 given the long-term nature of some capital projects. The 

Ministry of Planning Development and Cooperation and the Ministry of Finance have released 30 percent of 2007 budgeted capital 

funds to Iraqi government ministries, as well as 24 percent of 2007 

budgeted capital funds to regions and provinces. Processing of Letters of Credit has improved, benefiting the Ministry of Electricity 

and other ministries that rely on international procurement. The 

Ministry of Planning Development and Cooperation is demonstrating leadership on procurement policy and technical assistance. 

Despite these efforts and its stronger performance relative to last year, the Government of Iraq is unlikely to spend its entire $10 billion capital budget by the end of 2007. Nevertheless, it should be 

highlighted that both ministries and provinces are executing a 

greater percentage of much larger capital budgets, which significantly increases ministry and provincial expenditures on an absolute dollar basis. 

(xviii) Ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not 

undermining or making false accusations against members 

of the ISF. 

Progress is clearly being made in this area, though the overall 

effect is difficult to accurately assess. The maturing of the inspectors general system and the continued education of commanders at 

all levels are positive signs. The Council of Representatives’ approval of the Military Justice Law and improvements in the judicial system have helped to institutionalize the rule of law and 

stand in marked contrast to the legacy of former regime practices. 

Sectarian bias is not limited to Shi’a officials, as some Sunni politicians have made baseless claims against ISF officials who are 

Shi’a. It appears from anecdotal evidence that some Iraqi authorities may not be pursuing some of these allegations. It is difficult 

to determine whether these accusations result from actual misconduct, inaccurate reporting, or the sectarian-bias of Iraqi political 

authorities. We continue to challenge the Government of Iraq to investigate each one and take action, as appropriate. 

The Prime Minister and his ministerial council are trying to curb 

this problem. We will push for improvements, although the key to 

success will be our ability to institutionalize the rule of law in government practices. At the same time we will continue to press Iraqi 

political leaders to investigate and then confront those who make 

baseless accusations against ISF leaders for sectarian and political 

gain. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress in ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities 

are not undermining or making false accusations against 

members of the ISF. Though there is weekly evidence of a more 

determined effort by the Government of Iraq to address these 

issues and seek resolution, there remains much work to be done in 

this benchmark. The historical challenge inherent in Iraq, compounded by the damage done by sectarian violence following the 


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Samarra Mosque bombing, remains a challenge that will only be 

fully solved by education and time. 


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APPENDIX I 

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE SITUATION IN IRAQ, GENERAL DAVID

H. PETRAEUS, COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE—IRAQ, 10–

11 SEPTEMBER 2007 

Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, Members of the Committees, 

thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently provided to my chain of command for the way forward. 

At the outset, I would like to note that this is my testimony. Although I have briefed my assessment and recommendations to my 

chain of command, I wrote this testimony myself. It has not been 

cleared by, nor shared with, anyone in the Pentagon, the White 

House, or Congress. 

As a bottom line up front, the military objectives of the surge 

are, in large measure, being met. In recent months, in the face of 

tough enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, Coalition and 

Iraqi Security Forces have achieved progress in the security arena. 

Though the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in 8 of the 

past 12 weeks, with the numbers of incidents in the last two weeks 

at the lowest levels seen since June 2006. 

One reason for the decline in incidents is that Coalition and Iraqi 

forces have dealt significant blows to Al Qaeda-Iraq. Though Al 

Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq remain dangerous, we have taken 

away a number of their sanctuaries and gained the initiative in 

many areas. 

We have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the 

head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Special 

Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran’s activities in Iraq. 

Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-sectarian violence, as well, bringing down the number of ethno-sectarian deaths substantially in Baghdad and across Iraq since the 

height of the sectarian violence last December. The number of overall civilian deaths has also declined during this period, although 

the numbers in each area are still at troubling levels. 

Iraqi Security Forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the load, albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns 

about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks. In 

general, however, Iraqi elements have been standing and fighting 

and sustaining tough losses, and they have taken the lead in operations in many areas. 

Additionally, in what may be the most significant development of 

the past 8 months, the tribal rejection of Al Qaeda that started in 

Anbar Province and helped produce such significant change there 

has now spread to a number of other locations as well. 


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Based on all this and on the further progress we believe we can 

achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able 

to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams 

by next summer without jeopardizing the security gains that we 

have fought so hard to achieve. 

Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains 

complex, difficult, and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, 

though doing so will be neither quick nor easy. 

Having provided that summary, I would like to review the nature 

of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the surge, describe 

the current situation, and explain the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the way ahead in Iraq. 

THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition 

among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. 

This competition will take place, and its resolution is key to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether 

the competition takes place more- or less-violently. This chart 

shows the security challenges in Iraq. Foreign and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminals all push the 

ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Malign actions by 

Syria and, especially, by Iran fuel that violence. Lack of adequate 

governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and various 

forms of corruption add to Iraq’s challenges. 

THE SITUATION IN DECEMBER 2006 AND THE SURGE

In our recent efforts to look to the future, we found it useful to 

revisit the past. In December 2006, during the height of the ethnosectarian violence that escalated in the wake of the bombing of the 

Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, the leaders in Iraq at that 

time—General George Casey and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad— concluded that the coalition was failing to achieve its objectives. 

Their review underscored the need to protect the population and 

reduce sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad. As a result, General Casey requested additional forces to enable the Coalition to accomplish these tasks, and those forces began to flow in January. 

In the ensuing months, our forces and our Iraqi counterparts 

have focused on improving security, especially in Baghdad and the 

areas around it, wresting sanctuaries from Al Qaeda control, and 

disrupting the efforts of the Iranian-supported militia extremists. 

We have employed counterinsurgency practices that underscore the 

importance of units living among the people they are securing, and 

accordingly, our forces have established dozens of joint security stations and patrol bases manned by Coalition and Iraqi forces in 

Baghdad and in other areas across Iraq. 

In mid-June, with all the surge brigades in place, we launched 

a series of offensive operations focused on: expanding the gains 

achieved in the preceding months in Anbar Province; clearing 

Baqubah, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining sanctuaries in Anbar Province, and important areas in the so-called 

‘‘belts’’ around Baghdad; and pursuing Al Qaeda in the Diyala 

River Valley and several other areas. 


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Throughout this period, as well, we engaged in dialogue with insurgent groups and tribes, and this led to additional elements 

standing up to oppose Al Qaeda and other extremists. We also continued to emphasize the development of the Iraqi Security Forces 

and we employed nonkinetic means to exploit the opportunities 

provided by the conduct of our kinetic operations—aided in this effort by the arrival of additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 

CURRENT SITUATION AND TRENDS

The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi counterparts has, as I noted at the outset, been substantial. While there 

have been setbacks as well as successes and tough losses along the 

way, overall, our tactical commanders and I see improvements in 

the security environment. We do not, however, just rely on gut feel 

or personal observations; we also conduct considerable data collection and analysis to gauge progress and determine trends. We do 

this by gathering and refining data from coalition and Iraqi operations centers, using a methodology that has been in place for well 

over a year and that has benefited over the past seven months 

from the increased presence of our forces living among the Iraqi 

people. We endeavor to ensure our analysis of that data is conducted with rigor and consistency, as our ability to achieve a 

nuanced understanding of the security environment is dependent 

on collecting and analyzing data in a consistent way over time. Two 

U.S. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology, and 

they concluded that the data we produce is the most accurate and 

authoritative in Iraq. 

As I mentioned up front, and as the chart before you reflects, the 

level of security incidents has decreased significantly since the 

start of the surge of offensive operations in mid-June, declining in 

8 of the past 12 weeks, with the level of incidents in the past two 

weeks the lowest since June 2006 and with the number of attacks 

this past week the lowest since April 2006. 

Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes, have also 

declined considerably, by over 45% Iraq-wide since the height of 

the sectarian violence in December. This is shown by the top line 

on this chart, and the decline by some 70% in Baghdad is shown 

by the bottom line. Periodic mass casualty attacks by Al Qaeda 

have tragically added to the numbers outside Baghdad, in particular. Even without the sensational attacks, however, the level of 

civilian deaths is clearly still too high and continues to be of serious concern. 

As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths, 

an important subset of the overall civilian casualty figures, has 

also declined significantly since the height of the sectarian violence 

in December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the top line on this chart, the 

number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by over 55%, and 

it would have come down much further were it not for the casualties inflicted by barbaric Al Qaeda bombings attempting to reignite 

sectarian violence. In Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by some 80% since 

December. This chart also displays the density of sectarian incidents in various Baghdad neighborhoods and it both reflects the 


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progress made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence in the Iraqi 

capital and identifies the areas that remain the most challenging. 

As we have gone on the offensive in former Al Qaeda and insurgent sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly supported our efforts, we have found a substantially increased number of arms, ammunition, and explosives caches. As this chart shows, we have, so 

far this year, already found and cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly 

1,700 more than we discovered in all of last year. This may be a 

factor in the reduction in the number of overall improvised explosive device attacks in recent months, which as this chart shows, 

has declined sharply, by about one-third, since June. 

The change in the security situation in Anbar Province has, of 

course, been particularly dramatic. As this chart shows, monthly 

attack levels in Anbar have declined from some 1,350 in October 

2006 to a bit over 200 in August of this year. This dramatic decrease reflects the significance of the local rejection of Al Qaeda 

and the newfound willingness of local Anbaris to volunteer to serve 

in the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service. As I noted earlier, we 

are seeing similar actions in other locations, as well. 

To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq, 

as is shown by this chart depicting violence levels in several key 

Iraqi provinces. The trend in Nineveh Province, for example, has 

been much more up and down, until a recent decline, and the same 

is true in Sala ad Din Province, though recent trends there and in 

Baghdad have been in the right direction. In any event, the overall 

trajectory in Iraq—a steady decline of incidents in the past three 

months—is still quite significant. 

The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in each of the past 5 months, from a high of some 175 in 

March, as this chart shows, to about 90 this past month. While this 

trend in recent months has been heartening, the number of high 

profile attacks is still too high, and we continue to work hard to 

destroy the networks that carry out these barbaric attacks. 

Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress 

against Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq. As this chart shows, in 

the past 8 months, we have considerably reduced the areas in 

which Al Qaeda enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized 5 

media cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of Al Qaeda-Iraq, and 

killed or captured nearly 100 other key leaders and some 2,500 

rank-and-file fighters. Al Qaeda is certainly not defeated; however, 

it is off balance and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively. Of note, as the recent National Intelligence Estimate on 

Iraq explained, these gains against Al Qaeda are a result of the 

synergy of actions by: conventional forces to deny the terrorists 

sanctuary; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to 

find the enemy; and special operations elements to conduct targeted raids. A combination of these assets is necessary to prevent 

the creation of a terrorist safe haven in Iraq. 

In the past six months we have also targeted Shia militia extremists, capturing a number of senior leaders and fighters, as well 

as the deputy commander of Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, 

the organization created to support the training, arming, funding, 

and, in some cases, direction of the militia extremists by the Iranian Republican Guard Corps’ Qods Force. These elements have asVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:06 Sep 18, 2007 Jkt 211002 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HD058.XXX HD058

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sassinated and kidnapped Iraqi governmental leaders, killed and 

wounded our soldiers with advanced explosive devices provided by 

Iran, and indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the International 

Zone and elsewhere. It is increasingly apparent to both Coalition 

and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Qods Force, 

seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force 

to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state 

and coalition forces in Iraq. 

The most significant development in the past six months likely 

has been the increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting Al Qaeda and other extremists. This has, of course, been 

most visible in Anbar Province. A year ago the province was assessed as ‘‘lost’’ politically. Today, it is a model of what happens 

when local leaders and citizens decide to oppose Al Qaeda and reject its Taliban-like ideology. While Anbar is unique and the model 

it provides cannot be replicated everywhere in Iraq, it does demonstrate the dramatic change in security that is possible with the 

support and participation of local citizens. As this chart shows, 

other tribes have been inspired by the actions of those in Anbar 

and have volunteered to fight extremists as well. We have, in coordination with the Iraqi government’s National Reconciliation 

Committee, been engaging these tribes and groups of local citizens 

who want to oppose extremists and to contribute to local security. 

Some 20,000 such individuals are already being hired for the Iraqi 

Police, thousands of others are being assimilated into the Iraqi 

Army, and thousands more are vying for a spot in Iraq’s Security 

Forces. 

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

As I noted earlier, Iraqi Security Forces have continued to grow, 

to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burden of 

providing security for their country. Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and supporting institutions, 

and an insufficient number of qualified commissioned and non-commissioned officers, Iraqi units are engaged around the country. 

As this chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army, National Police, and Special Operations Forces Battalions in the fight, 

with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support. Beyond that, all of Iraq’s battalions have been heavily involved in combat operations that often result in the loss of leaders, soldiers, and equipment. These losses are 

among the shortcomings identified by operational readiness assessments, but we should not take from these assessments the impression that Iraqi forces are not in the fight and contributing. Indeed, 

despite their shortages, many Iraqi units across Iraq now operate 

with minimal coalition assistance. 

As counterinsurgency operations require substantial numbers of 

boots on the ground, we are helping the Iraqis expand the size of 

their security forces. Currently, there are some 445,000 individuals 

on the payrolls of Iraq’s Interior and Defense Ministries. Based on 

recent decisions by Prime Minister Maliki, the number of Iraq’s security forces will grow further by the end of this year, possibly by 

as much as 40,000. Given the security challenges Iraq faces, we 

support this decision, and we will work with the two security minVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:06 Sep 18, 2007 Jkt 211002 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HD058.XXX HD058

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istries as they continue their efforts to expand their basic training 

capacity, leader development programs, logistical structures and 

elements, and various other institutional capabilities to support the 

substantial growth in Iraqi forces. 

Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more on its security forces than it will receive in security assistance from the 

United States. In fact, Iraq is becoming one of the United States’ larger foreign military sales customers, committing some $1.6 billion to FMS already, with the possibility of up to $1.8 billion more 

being committed before the end of this year. And I appreciate the 

attention that some members of Congress have recently given to 

speeding up the FMS process for Iraq. 

To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving, and 

Iraqis’ elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for 

protecting their citizens. Innumerable challenges lie ahead; however, Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces have made progress toward achieving sustainable security. As a result, the United States 

will be in a position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months 

ahead. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Two weeks ago I provided recommendations for the way ahead 

in Iraq to the members of my chain of command and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. The essence of the approach I recommended is captured in its title: ‘‘Security While Transitioning: From Leading to 

Partnering to Overwatch.’’ This approach seeks to build on the security improvements our troopers and our Iraqi counterparts have 

fought so hard to achieve in recent months. It reflects recognition 

of the importance of securing the population and the imperative of 

transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces 

as quickly as possible, but without rushing to failure. It includes 

substantial support for the continuing development of Iraqi Security Forces. It also stresses the need to continue the 

counterinsurgency strategy that we have been employing, but with 

Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load. And it highlights the 

importance of regional and global diplomatic approaches. Finally, 

in recognition of the fact that this war is not only being fought on 

the ground in Iraq but also in cyberspace, it also notes the need 

to contest the enemy’s growing use of that important medium to 

spread extremism. 

The recommendations I provided were informed by operational 

and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that: 

• military aspects of the surge have achieved progress and generated momentum; 

• Iraqi Security Forces have continued to grow and have slowly 

been shouldering more of the security burden in Iraq; 

• a mission focus on either population security or transition 

alone will not be adequate to achieve our objectives; 

• success against Al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-supported militia 

extremists requires conventional forces as well as special operations forces; and 

• the security and local political situations will enable us to draw 

down the surge forces. 


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My recommendations also took into account a number of strategic considerations: • political progress will take place only if sufficient security exists; • long-term U.S. ground force viability will benefit from force reductions as the surge runs its course; • regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success; and • Iraqi leaders understandably want to assume greater sovereignty in their country, although, as they recently announced, 

they do desire continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq in 2008 

under a new U.N. Security Council Resolution and, following that, 

they want to negotiate a long term security agreement with the 

United States and other nations. 

Based on these considerations, and having worked the battlefield 

geometry with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno to ensure that we 

retain and build on the gains for which our troopers have fought, 

I have recommended a drawdown of the surge forces from Iraq. In 

fact, later this month, the Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed as 

part of the surge will depart Iraq. Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, that unit’s departure will be followed by the 

withdrawal of a brigade combat team without replacement in midDecember and the further redeployment without replacement of 

four other brigade combat teams and the two surge Marine battalions in the first 7 months of 2008, until we reach the pre-surge 

level of 15 brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008. 

I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer. 

Force reductions will continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008; however, 

in my professional judgment, it would be premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, 

our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far 

into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even 

hazardous. The events of the past six months underscore that 

point. When I testified in January, for example, no one would have 

dared to forecast that Anbar Province would have been transformed the way it has in the past 6 months. Nor would anyone 

have predicted that volunteers in onetime Al Qaeda strongholds 

like Ghazaliyah in western Baghdad or in Adamiya in eastern 

Baghdad would seek to join the fight against Al Qaeda. Nor would 

we have anticipated that a Shia-led government would accept significant numbers of Sunni volunteers into the ranks of the local police force in Abu Ghraib. Beyond that, on a less encouraging note, 

none of us earlier this year appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq’s leaders all 

now have greater concern. 

In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission 

adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-March of 

next year. We will, no later than that time, consider factors similar 

to those on which I based the current recommendations, having by 

then, of course, a better feel for the security situation, the improvements in the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy 

situation. I will then, as I did in developing the recommendations 


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I have explained here today, also take into consideration the demands on our Nation’s ground forces, although I believe that that 

consideration should once again inform, not drive, the recommendations I make. 

This chart captures the recommendations I have described, showing the recommended reduction of brigade combat teams as the 

surge runs its course and illustrating the concept of our units adjusting their missions and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis, 

as the situation and Iraqi capabilities permit. It also reflects the 

no-later-than date for recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer and provides a possible approach we have considered for the future force structure and mission set in Iraq. 

One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq 

is to change the MNF–I mission from one that emphasizes population security, counterterrorism, and transition, to one that is 

strictly focused on transition and counterterrorism. Making that 

change now would, in our view, be premature. We have learned before that there is a real danger in handing over tasks to the Iraqi 

Security Forces before their capacity and local conditions warrant. 

In fact, the drafters of the recently released National Intelligence 

Estimate on Iraq recognized this danger when they wrote, and I 

quote, ‘‘We assess that changing the mission of Coalition forces 

from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent AQI trom establishing a safe haven would erode 

security gains achieved thus far.’’

In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note 

again that, like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq’s problems will 

require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions. And though we both believe this effort can succeed, it will 

take time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of 

recognizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely 

have devastating consequences. 

That assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August Defense Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a rapid 

withdrawal of US forces trom Iraq. Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in 

the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and 

produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of 

disintegration of the Iraqi Security Forces; rapid deterioration of 

local security initiatives; Al Qaeda-Iraq regaining lost ground and 

freedom of maneuver; a marked increase in violence and further 

ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows; alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain 

advantages over their rivals; and exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran. 

Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment and believe that the best way to secure our national interests and avoid 

an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our operations on securing the Iraqi people while targeting terrorist groups 

and militia extremists and, as quickly as conditions are met, 

transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements. 


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CLOSING COMMENTS

Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your 

support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The Soldiers, 

Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen with whom I’m 

honored to serve are the best equipped and, very likely, the most 

professional force in our nation’s history. Impressively, despite all 

that has been asked of them in recent years, they continue to raise 

their right hands and volunteer to stay in uniform. With three 

weeks to go in this fiscal year, in fact, the Army elements in Iraq, 

for example, have achieved well over 130% of the reenlistment 

goals in the initial term and careerist categories and nearly 115% 

in the midcareer category. All of us appreciate what you have done 

to ensure that these great troopers have had what they’ve needed 

to accomplish their mission, just as we appreciate what you have 

done to take care of their families, as they, too, have made significant sacrifices in recent years. 

The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and individual equipment; in munitions; in command, control, and communications systems; in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; in vehicles and counter-IED systems and programs; and in manned and unmanned aircraft have proven invaluable in Iraq. The capabilities that you have funded most recently—

especially the vehicles that will provide greater protection against 

improvised explosive devices—are also of enormous importance. 

Additionally, your funding of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program has given our leaders a critical tool with which to 

prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, we appreciate 

as well your funding of our new detention programs and rule of law 

initiatives in Iraq. 

In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier again in 

Iraq with America’s new ‘‘Greatest Generation.’’ Our country’s men 

and women in uniform have done a magnificent job in the most 

complex and challenging environment imaginable. All Americans 

should be very proud of their sons and daughters serving in Iraq 

today. 

Thank you very much. 


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APPENDIX II 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, UNITED STATES

AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ, BEFORE A JOINT HEAR- ING OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE COM- MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SEPTEMBER 10, 2007 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, 

Thank you for the opportunity to address Congress this week. I 

have considered it a privilege and an honor to serve in Iraq at a 

time when so much is at stake for our country and the people of 

the region—and when so many Americans of the highest caliber in 

our military and civilian services are doing the same. I know that 

a heavy responsibility weighs on my shoulders to provide the country with my best, most honest assessment of the situation in Iraq 

and the implications for the United States. 

Americans, in this chamber and beyond, are looking for more 

than an update on the latest events. They want to know the answers to some key questions. Are our objectives realistic? Is it possible that Iraq will become a united, stable country with a democratic government operating under the rule of law? What is the trajectory—is Iraq, on the whole, moving in the right direction? Can 

we expect more and under what time frame? Are there alternative 

courses of action for our country which are superior? 

These are sensible questions to be asked by a nation investing 

in and sacrificing for another country and people. In asking these 

questions, however, we must not lose sight of the vital interests the 

United States has in a successful outcome in Iraq. 

My intention today is to give you an assessment of political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq. In doing so, I will not 

minimize the enormity of the challenges faced by Iraqis, nor the 

complexity of the situation. Yet at the same time, I intend to demonstrate that it is possible for the United States to see its goals realized in Iraq and that Iraqis are capable of tackling and addressing the problems confronting them today. A secure, stable democratic Iraq at peace with its neighbors is attainable. In my judgment, the cumulative trajectory of political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq is upwards, although the slope of that 

line is not steep. The process will not be quick, it will be uneven, 

punctuated by setbacks as well as achievements, and it will require 

substantial U.S. resolve and commitment. There will be no single 

moment at which we can claim victory; any turning point will likely only be recognized in retrospect. 

This is a sober assessment, but it should not be a disheartening 

one. I have found it helpful, during my time in Iraq to reflect on 

our own history. At many points in the early years, our survival 

as a nation was questionable. Our efforts to build the institutions 


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of government were not always successful in the first instance. And 

tough issues—such as slavery, universal suffrage, civil rights, and 

state rights—were resolved only after acrimonious debate and 

sometimes violence. 

Iraq is experiencing a revolution—not just regime change. It is 

only by understanding this that we can appreciate what is happening in Iraq and what Iraqis have achieved, as well as maintain 

a sense of realism about the challenges that remain. 

CONTEXT

Evaluating where Iraqis are today only makes sense in the context of where they have been. Any Iraqi under 40 years old—and 

that is the overwhelming majority of the population—would have 

known nothing but the rule of the Ba’ath party before liberation 

four and a half years ago. Those 35 years were filled with crimes 

against humanity on every scale. Saddam Hussein ruled without 

any mercy, not hesitating to use lethal force and torture against 

even those in his inner circle. His genocidal campaign against the 

Kurds and savagery toward southern Shi’a are well known. But he 

also used violence and intimidation as tools in the complete 

deconstruction of Iraqi society. No organization or institution survived that was not linked in some way to regime protection. He created a pervasive climate of fear in which even family members 

were afraid to talk to one another. 

This is the legacy that Iraqis had as their history when Saddam’s 

statue came down on April 9, 2003. No Nelson Mandela existed to 

emerge on the national political scene; anyone with his leadership 

talents would have not survived. A new Iraq had to be built almost 

literally from scratch, and the builders in most cases were themselves reduced to their most basic identity, ethnic or sectarian. 

Much progress has been made, particularly in building an institutional framework where there was none before. But rather than 

being a period in which old animosities and suspicions were overcome, the past 18 months, in particular, have further strained Iraqi 

society. The sectarian violence of 2006 and early 2007 had its seeds 

in Saddam’s social deconstruction and it had dire consequences for 

the people of Iraq as well as its politics. Extensive displacement 

and widespread sectarian killings by al-Qa’ida and other extremist 

groups have gnawed away at the already frayed fabric of Iraqi society and politics. It is no exaggeration to say that Iraq is—and will 

remain for some time—a traumatized society. 

NATIONAL POLITICS

It is against this backdrop that developments in Iraq must be 

seen. Iraqis are facing some of the most profound political, economic, and security challenges imaginable. They are not simply 

grappling with the issue of who rules Iraq—but they are asking 

what kind of country Iraq will be, how it will be governed, and how 

Iraqis will share power and resources among each other. The constitution approved in a referendum in 2005 answered some of these 

questions in theory, but much remains uncertain in both law and 

practice. 

Some of the more promising political developments at the national level are neither measured in benchmarks nor visible to 


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those far from Baghdad. For instance, there is a budding debate 

about federalism among Iraq’s leaders and, importantly, within the 

Sunni community. Those living in place like al-Anbar and 

Salahaddin are beginning to realize how localities having more of 

a say in daily decision making will empower their communities. No 

longer is an all-powerful Baghdad seen as the panacea to Iraq’s 

problems. This thinking is nascent, but it is ultimately critical to 

the evolution of a common vision among all Iraqi leaders. 

Similarly, there is a palpable frustration in Baghdad over the 

sectarian system that was used to divide the spoils of the state in 

the last few years. Leaders from all communities openly acknowledge that a focus on sectarian gains has led to poor governance and 

served Iraqis badly. And many claim to be ready to make the sacrifices that will be needed to put government performance ahead 

of sectarian and ethnic concerns. Such ideas are no longer controversial, although their application will be. 

Finally, we are seeing Iraqis come to terms with complex issues 

not by first providing a national framework, but instead by tackling 

immediate problems. One such example is how the central government has accepted over 1700 young men from the Abu Ghurayb 

area west of Baghdad, including former members of insurgent 

groups, to be part of the Iraqi security forces. Another is how the 

government, without much public fanfare, has contacted thousands 

of members of the former Iraqi army, offering them retirement, return to the military, or public sector employment. So without the 

proclamation of a general amnesty, we see amnesty being granted, 

and deba’athification reform in advance of national legislation. In 

both instances, the seeds of reconciliation are being planted. 

Our country, however, has come to associate progress on national 

reconciliation as meaning the passage of key pieces of legislation. 

There is logic to this, as the legislation we are urging the Iraqis 

to produce does—in one way or another—have to do with the question of how to share power and resources among Iraq’s many communities. This legislation also has to do with the vision of the future Iraqi state. The oil and revenues sharing laws, for instance, 

deal with deeper issues than simply whether Iraqis in oil producing 

areas are willing to share their wealth with other Iraqis. What is 

difficult about the oil laws is that they take Iraq another step down 

the road toward a federal system that all Iraqis have not yet embraced. But once again, we see that even in the absence of legislation there is practical action as the central government shares oil 

revenues through budget allocations on an equitable basis with 

Iraq’s provinces. 

In many respects, the debates currently occurring in Iraq are 

akin to those surrounding our civil rights movement or struggle, 

over states rights. With deba’athification, Iraqis are struggling to 

come to terms with a vicious past. They are trying to balance fear 

that the Ba’ath party would one day return to power with the recognition that many former members of the party are guilty of no 

crime and joined the organization not to repress others but for personal survival. With provincial powers, they are grappling with 

very serious questions about what the right balance between the 

center and the periphery is for Iraq. Some see the devolution of 

power to regions and provinces as being the best insurance against 


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the rise of a future tyrannical figure in Baghdad. Others see Iraq, 

with its complex demographics, as in need of a strong central authority. 

In short, we should not be surpised or dismayed that Iraqis have 

not fully resolved such issues. Rather, we should ask whether the 

way in which they are approaching such issues gives us a sense of 

their seriousness and ultimate capability to resolve Iraq’s fundamental problems. Is the collective national leadership of Iraq ready 

to prioritize Iraq over sectarian and community interests? Can and 

will they come to agreement about what sort of Iraq they want? 

I do believe that Iraq’s leaders have the will to tackle the country’s pressing problems, although it will take longer than we originally anticipated because of the environment and the gravity of the 

issues before them. Prime Minister al-Maliki and the other Iraqi 

leaders face enormous obstacles in their efforts to govern effectively. They approach the task will a deep sense of commitment 

and patriotism. An important part of this positive judgment was 

the effort made by the leaders this past summer. After weeks of 

preparatory work and many days of intensive meetings, Iraq’s five 

most prominent national leaders from the three major communities 

issued a communique ́ on August 26 that noted agreement on draft 

legislation dealing with de-ba’athification and provincial powers. 

This agreement by no means solves all of Iraq’s problems. But the 

commitment of its leaders to work together on hard issues is encouraging. 

Perhaps most significantly, these five Iraqi leaders together decided to publicly express their joint desire to develop a long-term 

relationship with the United States. Despite their many differences 

in perspectives and experiences, they all agreed on language acknowledging the need for a continued presence by the multinational forces in Iraq and expressing gratitude for the sacrifices 

these forces have made for Iraqis. 

PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL POLITICS

At the provincial level, political gains have been more pronounced, particularly in the north and west of Iraq where the security improvements have been in some places dramatic. In these 

areas, there is abundant evidence that the security gains have 

opened the door for meaningful politics. 

In al-Anbar, the progress on the security side has been extraordinary. Six months ago, violence was rampant, our forces were 

under daily attack, and Iraqis were cowering from the intimidation 

of al-Qa’ida. But al-Qa’ida overplayed its hand in al-Anbar and 

Anbaris began to reject its excesses—be they beheading school children or cutting off peoples’ fingers as punishment for smoking. Recognizing the Coalition could help eject al-Qa’ida, the tribes began 

to fight with us, not against us, and the landscape in al-Anbar is 

dramatically different as a result. Tribal representatives are on the 

provincial council, which is now meeting regularly to find ways of 

restoring services, developing the economy, and executing a provincial budget. These leaders are looking for help to rebuild their cities and talking of attracting investment. Such scenes are also unfolding in parts of Diyala and Ninewa, where Iraqis have mobilized 

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Qa’ida from their communities. The world should note that when 

al-Qa’ida began implementing its twisted vision of the Caliphate in 

Iraq, Iraqis, from al-Anbar to Baghdad to Diyala’, have overwhelmingly rejected it. 

Shi’a extremists are also facing rejection. Recent attacks by elements of the Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi on worshipers in the 

holy city of Karbala have provoked a backlash and triggered a call 

by Muqtada as-Sadr for Jaysh al-Mahdi to cease attacks against 

Iraqis and coalition forces. 

A key challenge for Iraqis now is to link these positive developments in the provinces to the central government in Baghdad. Unlike our states, Iraqi provinces have little ability to generate funds 

through taxation, making them dependent on the central government for resources. The growing ability of the provinces to design 

and execute budgets and the readiness of the central, government 

to resource them are success stories. On September 5, Iraq’s senior 

federal leadership traveled to al-Anbar where they announced a 

70% increase in the 2007 provincial capital budget as well as $50 

million to compensate losses in the fight against al-Qa’ida. The 

support of the central government is also needed to maintain hardwon security in areas like al-Anbar through the rapid expansion of 

locally-generated police. The Government of Iraq has placed some 

21,000 Anbaris on police roles. 

ECONOMICS AND CAPACITY BUILDING

Iraq is starting to make some gains in the economy. Improving 

security is stimulating revival of markets, with the active participation of local communities. War damage is being cleared and 

buildings repaired, roads and sewers built and commerce energized. 

The IMF estimates that economic growth will exceed six percent 

for 2007. Iraqi ministries and provincial councils have made substantial progress this year in utilizing Iraq’s oil revenue for investment. The 2007 governmental budget allocated $10 billion (nearly 

one-third Iraq’s expected oil export revenue) to capital investment. 

Over $3 billion was allocated to the provinces and the Kurdish Region for spending. The latest data show that spending units (national ministries, and provincial councils) have proceeded to commit these funds at more than twice the rate of last year. Doing the 

best are the provincial authorities, in the process gaining experience with making plans and decisions, and running fair tenders. In 

so doing, they are stimulating local business development and providing employment. Over time we expect the experience with more 

responsive local authorities will change Iraqi attitudes towards 

their elected leaders, and of the provinces towards Baghdad. 

At two conferences in Dubai in the last two weeks, hundreds of 

Iraqi businessmen met an equal number of foreign investors newly 

interested in acquiring shares of businesses in Iraq. An auction of 

cell phone spectrum conducted by Pricewaterhouse Coopers netted 

the Government a better-than-expected sum of $3.75 billion. The 

Minister of Finance plans to use the funds, along with all the country’s oil revenue, to apply to its pressing investment and current 

expenditure needs. 


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Overall, however, the Iraqi economy is performing significantly 

under potential. Insecurity in the countryside raises transport costs 

and especially affects manufacturing and agriculture. Electricity 

supply has improved in many parts of the country, but is woefully 

inadequate in Baghdad. Many neighborhoods in the city receive 

two hours a day or less from the national grid, although power supplies for essential services such as water pumping stations or hospitals are much better. The Minister of Electricity said last week 

that it would take $25 billion through 2016 to meet demand requirements, but that by investing the $2 billion a year the Ministry 

is now receiving from the government’s budget, as well as private 

investment in power generation, that goal could be met. 

We are deploying our assistance funds to make a difference to ordinary Iraqis and to support our political objectives. Military units 

are using Commanders Emergency Response (CERP) funds to ensure that residents see a difference when neighborhood violence declines. USAID Community Stabilization Funds provide tens of 

thousands of jobs. With the recent apportionment of 2007 Supplemental funds, we are putting ‘‘Quick Response Funds’’ in the hands 

of our Provincial Reconstruction Team leaders to build communities and institutions in post-kinetic environments. Vocational 

training and microfinance programs are supporting nascent private 

businesses. And in Baghdad, we are increasing our engagement 

and capacity building efforts with ministries. 

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS

There is expanding international and regional engagement with 

Iraq. In August, the UN Security Council, at Iraq’s invitation, provided the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) with 

an expanded mandate through UNSCR 1770. The work of the 

International Compact with Iraq moves forward, jointly chaired by 

Iraq and the UN. Seventy-four countries pledged support for Iraq’s 

economic reform efforts at a Ministerial Conference in May. The 

UN has reported progress in 75% of the 400 areas Iraq has identified for action. Later this month, the Iraqi Prime Minister and the 

UN Secretary General will chair a ministerial-level meeting in New 

York to discuss further progress under the Compact and how 

UNSCR 1770 can be most effectively implemented. 

Many of Iraq’s neighbors recognize that they have a stake in the 

outcome of the current conflict in Iraq, and are engaging with Iraq 

in a constructive way. A neighbors’ ministerial in May, also attended by the P–5 and the G–8, has been followed by meetings of 

working groups on security, border issues, and energy. An ambassadorial level meeting just took place in Baghdad, and another 

neighbors’ ministerial will be held in Istanbul in October. 

Against the backdrop of these new mechanisms, the business of 

being neighbors is quietly unfolding. For the first time in years, 

Iraq is exporting oil through its neighbor, Turkey, as well as 

through the Gulf. Iraq and Kuwait are nearing conclusion on a 

commercial deal for Kuwait to supply its northern neighbor with 

critically needed diesel. Jordan recently issued a statement welcoming the recent leaders’ communique and supporting Iraqi efforts at reconciliation. And Saudi Arabia is planning on opening an 

Embassy in Baghdad—its first since the fall of Saddam. 


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Syria’s role has been more problematic. On one hand, Syria has 

hosted a meeting of the border security working group and interdicted some foreign terrorists in transit to Iraq. On the other hand, 

suicide-bombers continue to cross the border from Syria to murder 

Iraqi civilians. 

Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq 

in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state. In doing so, the 

Iranian government seems to ignore the risks that an unstable Iraq 

carries for its own interests. 

LOOKING AHEAD

2006 was a bad year in Iraq. The country came close to unraveling politically, economically, and in security terms. 2007 has 

brought improvement. Enormous challenges remain. Iraqis still 

struggle with fundamental questions about how to share power, accept their differences and overcome their past. The changes to our 

strategy last January—the surge—have helped change the dynamics in Iraq for the better. Our increased presence made besieged 

communities feel that they could defeat al-Qa’ida by working with 

us. Our population security measures have made it much harder 

for terrorists to conduct attacks. We have given Iraqis the time and 

space to reflect on what sort of country they want. Most Iraqis 

genuinely accept Iraq as a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian society—it 

is the balance of power that has yet to be sorted out. 

Whether Iraq reaches its potential is of course ultimately the 

product of Iraqi decisions. But the involvement and support of the 

United States will be hugely important in shaping a positive outcome. Our country has given a great deal in blood and treasure to 

stabilize the situation in Iraq and help Iraqis build institutions for 

a united, democratic country governed under the rule of law. Realizing this vision will take more time and patience on the part of 

the United States. 

I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. I do believe, as I have described, that it is attainable. I am certain that abandoning or drastically curtailing our efforts will bring failure, and the consequences of such a failure must be clearly understood. An Iraq 

that falls into chaos or civil war will mean massive human suffering—well beyond what has already occurred within Iraq’s borders. It could well invite the intervention of regional states, all of 

which see their future connected to Iraq’s in some fundamental 

way. Undoubtedly, Iran would be a winner in this scenario, consolidating its influence over Iraqi resources and possibly territory. The 

Iranian President has already announced that Iran will fill any 

vacuum in Iraq. In such an environment, the gains made against 

al-Qa’ida and other extremists groups could easily evaporate and 

they could establish strongholds to be used as safehavens for regional and international operations. Our current course is hard. 

The alternatives are far worse. 

Every strategy requires recalibration as time goes on. This is 

particularly true in an environment like Iraq where change is a 

daily or hourly occurrence. As chief of mission in Iraq, I am constantly assessing our efforts and seeking to ensure that they are 

coordinated with and complementary to the efforts of our military. 


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I believe that, thanks to the support of Congress, we have an appropriate civilian posture in Iraq. Over the coming year, we will 

continue to increase our civilian efforts outside of Baghdad and the 

international zone. This presence has allowed us to focus on capacity building, especially in the provinces—units which are likely to 

grow in influence as more power devolves from Baghdad. The number of Provincial Recanstruction Teams has grown from ten to 25 

this year. In support of these goals, we will be asking Congress for 

additional economic assistance including additional quick response 

funds for capacity building. We will also seek support for two significant proposals that hold the prospect of creating permanent jobs 

for thousands of Iraqis. One would be the establishment of an 

‘‘Iraqi-American Enterprise Fund,’’ modeled on our successful funds 

in Poland and elsewhere in Central Europe. Such a fund could 

make equity investments in new and revamped firms based in Iraq. 

The second would be a large-scale operations and maintenance facility based on our Highway Trust Fund. On a cost-sharing basis, 

such a fund would train Iraqis to budget for and maintain important public sector infrastructure (power plants, dams, roads). Over 

time, the cost-sharing would phase down and out, leaving behind 

well-trained professionals and instilling the habits of preventative 

maintenance. 

We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis in the pursuit of national reconciliation, while recognizing that progress on this front 

may come in many forms and must ultimately be done by Iraqis 

themselves. We will seek additional ways to neutralize regional interference and enhance regional and international support. And we 

will help Iraqis consolidate the positive developments at local levels 

and connect them with the national government. Finally, I expect 

we will invest much effort in developing the strategic partnership 

between the United States and Iraq, which is an investment in the 

future of both countries. 

Æ 


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