COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges McCullough, Huff and Senior Judge Haley 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

JEROME CLAY CALFEE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 0625-13-1 JUDGE JAMES W. HALEY, JR. 

 MAY 13, 2014 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 

John W. Brown, Judge 

 M. Colston Jones, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the Public 

Defender, on brief), for appellant. 

 Lauren C. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Jerome Clay Calfee, appellant, appeals his conviction for grand larceny in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-95. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the receipt 

created by Walmart store employees to demonstrate the value of the items allegedly stolen. He also 

argues the evidence was insufficient to establish he had the intent to deprive Walmart of all the 

property contained in the shopping cart. We affirm the decision of the trial court. 

Jacklyn Hyater worked as an asset protection associate at Walmart. At about 11:10 p.m. 

on August 26, 2012, she saw appellant pushing a shopping cart containing merchandise. Hyater 

testified that appellant drew her attention because his shopping cart contained “several different 

kinds of laundry detergent, several different kinds of beer, [and] several different kinds of 

tissue.” Hyater followed appellant throughout the store as appellant put additional items into the 

cart. Hyater saw appellant remove a plastic Walmart bag from his pocket and place some of 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
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items from the shopping cart into the bag. Hyater testified that, after he placed some of the 

merchandise into the Walmart bag, appellant pushed the shopping cart throughout the store. He 

passed a closed cash register, and he passed the last point of sale as he walked toward the exit of 

the store. 

Hyater approached appellant when he was in the vestibule area near the exit of the 

building. She identified herself as an asset protection officer, and she asked appellant to 

accompany her back into the store. Appellant followed Hyater. Hyater testified appellant acted 

“a little jittery” when they arrived at the office door. He then fled without taking the 

merchandise. Hyater pursued appellant, and appellant encountered a police officer near the door 

of the store. The police officer saw Hyater was chasing appellant and he asked appellant to stop, 

but appellant tried to run past him. The officer apprehended appellant by taking him “to the 

ground.” 

 Hyater testified she took the shopping cart to a cash register and watched the customer 

service representative “ring up” the merchandise from the cart by scanning the UPC codes on the 

items. In response to a question from the trial court, Hyater agreed that the UPC is the 

“methodology” used by Walmart to identify items and the price of each item. 

 Hyater obtained the receipt from the cash register, and she photographed the items in the 

cart. The receipt showed the total value of the items in the shopping cart and in the Walmart bag 

was $249.52. Hyater testified she did not personally know the price of each of the items in 

appellant’s shopping cart. 

 At trial, appellant objected to the trial court’s admission of the cash register receipt into 

evidence, arguing that a proper foundation for the admission of the receipt had not been 

established because Hyater was not sufficiently familiar with the price of the items. The trial 

court overruled appellant’s objection and admitted the receipt. 
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 At the end of the trial, appellant argued the evidence was insufficient to prove he had 

formed the intent to permanently deprive Walmart of all of the merchandise. The trial court 

found that appellant’s conduct of concealing some of the items in the plastic bag, walking into 

the vestibule without paying for the items, and his attempted flight from the scene supported the 

conclusion that appellant intended to steal the items and he committed grand larceny. 

 Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. 

 Appellant argues the trial court erred by admitting the cash register receipt into evidence 

because Hyater did not have sufficient familiarity with the prices of the merchandise and the 

accuracy of the price information reflected on the receipt. 

 “The admissibility of evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a 

ruling on appeal will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” Blain v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988). The Supreme Court of Virginia 

“recognized an exception to the hearsay rule in shoplifting cases permitting the admission into 

evidence of price tags regularly affixed to items of personalty offered for sale or, in substitution, 

testimony concerning the amounts shown on such tags when . . . there is no objection to such 

testimony on best evidence grounds” in order to establish the value of the items. Robinson v. 

Commonwealth, 258 Va. 3, 10, 516 S.E.2d 475, 479 (1999) (involving employee testimony 

regarding value based on employees’ observations of amounts they observed on price tags 

affixed to stolen items). 

 Appellant relies on Twine v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 224, 629 S.E.2d 714 (2006), 

in support of his argument. In Twine, the defendant was convicted of grand larceny for 

shoplifting various items from a grocery store. Twine argued the trial court erred when it 

admitted into evidence a receipt that was generated by scanning the bar codes of the various 

items Twine was accused of stealing. Twine, 48 Va. App. at 226, 629 S.E.2d at 715. A cashier 
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from the grocery store testified she observed the items scanned and the receipt generated by the 

cash register. She testified “the name and price of the items listed on the cash register receipt 

corresponded with her ‘recollection and understanding of what was rung up.’” Id. at 228, 629 

S.E.2d at 716. She further stated that, although she could not recall the exact prices of the items 

she saw scanned, she was “‘familiar with the prices’ of the stolen items and each item listed on 

the receipt appeared to have the right price listed next to it.” Id. 

 Appellant argues the instant case is distinguishable from Twine because, here, Hyater 

testified that she was not personally familiar with the actual prices of the items. Although the 

cashier in Twine testified she was “familiar with the prices” of the items listed on the receipt and 

the receipt appeared to have the correct prices, the Court’s decision in the case did not turn on 

that testimony. Rather, this Court found, “[b]ecause, when scanned, they disclose to the cashier 

and the customer the current pricing information for the items being purchased, the bar codes on 

products are, . . . ‘the price tags’ for those items.” Id. at 234, 629 S.E.2d at 719. “It is the receipt 

generated by scanning the bar codes at a cash register that summarizes the purchase prices of the 

items in a form that is comprehensible to the fact finder at trial.” Id. at 233, 629 S.E.2d at 719. 

“Plainly, such a receipt is no less inherently trustworthy and reliable than the testimonial 

valuation summaries admitted into evidence in Robinson.” Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, the 

Court held “the price tag exception to the hearsay rule in shoplifting cases recognized by the 

Supreme Court in Robinson permits the admission into evidence of a cash register receipt 

generated by scanning the bar codes on the stolen items of merchandise . . . .” Id. at 234, 629 

S.E.2d at 719. 

Furthermore, Hyater was present when the customer service manager scanned the bar 

codes of the items in appellant’s cart and Hyater photographed the items in the cart. The trial 

judge noted that the cash register receipt contained thirty-seven items, and he counted 
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thirty-seven items depicted in the photographs. The trial judge also stated that he reviewed a 

number of the items listed on the cash register receipt and “every item I looked at on the 

Walmart cash register receipt was, in fact, pictured.”1 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by admitting the cash register receipt into evidence. 

 Appellant also argues the evidence was insufficient to establish his “intent to deprive 

Walmart of all of the property contained in the shopping cart, as opposed to the items concealed 

within the Walmart shopping bag.” 

 “On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth, 

26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 

438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)). 

The specific intent to commit [a crime] may be inferred from the 

conduct of the accused if such intent flows naturally from the 

conduct proven. Where the conduct of the accused under the 

circumstances involved points with reasonable certainty to a 

specific intent to commit [the crime], the intent element is 

established. 

Wilson v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 101, 452 S.E.2d 669, 674 (1995) (citation omitted). 

 We ask only “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In doing so, we are 

mindful that “great deference must be given to the fact finder who, having seen and heard the 

witnesses, assesses their credibility and weighs their testimony.” Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 

Va. 422, 426, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1988). 

 1

 Moreover, as explained in Twine, “‘[w]hile such evidence, when admitted, would 

suffice to make out a prima facie case of an item’s value, the accused would retain full 

opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to present rebutting evidence on the issue of 

value.’” Id. at 234, 629 S.E.2d at 719 (quoting Robinson, 258 Va. at 10, 516 S.E.2d at 479). 
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 The evidence showed that while appellant was inside the store, he placed numerous items 

into a shopping cart and he concealed some of those items in a plastic Walmart bag he removed 

from his pocket. Appellant continued to push the shopping cart containing all of the items, not 

just the items he had concealed in the Walmart bag. He pushed the cart past a closed cash 

register, past the other points of sale, and into the vestibule area located near the exit doors. 

Appellant was in the vestibule area of the store when Hyater stopped him. He acted “jittery” 

while he was in the presence of Hyater, and he attempted to flee from both Hyater and the police 

officer. “Flight following the commission of a crime is evidence of guilt . . . .” Clagett v. 

Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 93, 472 S.E.2d 263, 271 (1996). 

 From the evidence of appellant’s conduct throughout the incident, the trial court could 

infer that appellant intended to steal all of the items in the shopping cart, not just the bagged 

merchandise. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

appellant committed grand larceny. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s conviction. 

 Affirmed.