J-S14025-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC DEBOOTH

Appellant No. 798 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 21, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0003129-2011

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 07, 2016

Appellant, Eric DeBooth, appeals from the order entered April 21, 

2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, which denied his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act1(“PCRA”). We affirm.

On October 21, 2013, Appellant entered a guilty plea to third degree 

murder. That same day the trial court sentenced Appellant to 91⁄2 to 20 years 

in prison. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. On April 16, 2014, Appellant 

filed a pro se “Motion to Cease and Desist” which sought to enjoin the 

Department of Corrections from deducting 20% of his earnings from his 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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inmate account to pay for fines and costs (so called “ACT 84” deductions).2

The trial court denied Appellant’s motion on May 6, 2014.

On February 21, 2015, Appellant filed pro se an “Initiation of 

Petitioner’s First P.C.R.A. Pursuant to Pa.R.Cri.Pro. 901,” which again 

requested that the Department of Corrections be enjoined from deducting 

money from his inmate account. On April 17, 2015, the PCRA court denied 

Appellant’s petition. Appellant filed a timely pro se appeal. On July 17, 2015, 

this Court issued a per curiam order directing the PCRA court to either 

appoint counsel for Appellant or permit him to proceed pro se. Following a 

hearing, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant. 

Appointed counsel, Lara Glenn Hoffert, Esquire, did not file an amended 

PCRA petition and relied upon Appellant’s pro se Concise Statement of Errors 

on Appeal in the appellate brief prepared in this matter. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review.

A. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in dismissing Appellant’s pro 

se PCRA [p]etition where [Appellant’s] sentence is illegal as 

fines, costs, and restitution were imposed out of court?

B. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in dismissing Appellant’s pro 

se PCRA [p]etition where the PCRA [c]ourt did not provide 

Appellant with appointed counsel for his first PCRA [p]etition?

C. Whether Appellant’s plea counsel was ineffective for failing to 

advise Appellant that he would be subjected to the imposition 

of fines, costs, and restitution?

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

____________________________________________

2 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728. 
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“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of 

review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are 

supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 

Edmiston v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 639 (2013). “[Our] scope of review 

is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA court 

level.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 (Pa. 2012) (citation 

omitted). “[T]his Court applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA 

court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 259 (Pa. 

2011) (citation omitted).

Before we address the merits of a PCRA petition, however, we must 

first consider the petition’s timeliness. “The PCRA timeliness requirements 

are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a court cannot hear untimely 

PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489, 509 (Pa. 

2004) (citation omitted). A petitioner must file a PCRA petition within one 

year of the date that his judgment becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, 

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on November 

20, 2013, thirty days following the imposition of sentence when the time for 
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filing a direct appeal expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 903. Thus, Appellant’s petition 

filed February 21, 2015, is patently untimely. Appellant has not asserted 

that his petition falls within any of the timeliness exceptions provided in the 

PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). He argues, however, that the 

lower court should have treated his “Motion to Cease and Desist” filed April 

16, 2014, as a timely first PCRA petition and appointed counsel. We 

disagree, as the claims raised in that Motion are not cognizable under the 

PCRA.

In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence 

arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). 

“Pennsylvania Courts have repeatedly held that the PCRA contemplates only 

challenges to the propriety of a conviction or a sentence.” See 

Commonwealth v. Masker, 34 A.3d 841, 843 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) 

(string citation omitted; emphasis added).

As discussed previously, Appellant’s “Motion to Cease and Desist” 

sought to enjoin the Department of Corrections from making Act 84 

deductions from his prison account. In Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 

A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. 2003), a state inmate filed a motion with the court of 

common pleas apparently under the caption of his original criminal case to 

stop Act 84 deductions from his inmate account, and the motion was denied 

on its merits. On appeal, we held that the trial court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction because Danysh’s claim was, in reality, a civil action against an 
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agency of the Commonwealth, the DOC. Therefore, the Commonwealth court 

enjoyed exclusive original jurisdiction for such a claim, pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a). 

Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc), the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in 

a state correctional facility, plus costs and restitution. The DOC began 

deducting 20% of his earnings from an inmate account. The defendant filed 

a pro se petition to stop the DOC from taking deductions. The trial court 

denied the petition, finding it did not have jurisdiction to consider the 

defendant’s petition. On appeal, an en banc panel of this court applied the 

rationale in Danysh and affirmed the trial court’s determination.

Applying the principles of Danysh to the instant case, the trial court 

did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Act 84 claims raised in 

Appellant’s “Motion to Cease and Desist.”3 Those claims did not challenge 

Appellant’s underlying sentence and, therefore, are not cognizable under the 

PCRA. See, Masker, supra. Therefore, Appellant’s claim that the trial court 

should have treated his “Motion to Cease and Desist” as a timely first PCRA 

petition is without merit. 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant should have sought relief to stop the DOC from withdrawing 

funds from his inmate account before the Commonwealth Court via a 

petition for review of governmental action. See Danysh, supra, at 153-

154.
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Based on the foregoing, Appellant has failed to establish an applicable 

exception to the PCRA time bar. Accordingly, neither the lower court nor this 

Court has jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s request for relief.4 See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/7/2016

____________________________________________

4 We note that even had we addressed Appellant’s claims, they would not 

have warranted relief. As discussed, Appellant’s challenge to the Act 84 

deductions is not cognizable under the PCRA. Appellant’s remaining two 

issues were not included in his PCRA petition. It is well settled that the 

“[f]ailure to state ... a ground [for relief] in the [PCRA] petition shall preclude 

the defendant from raising that ground in any proceeding for post-conviction 

collateral relief.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B); see also Commonwealth v. Elliott, 

80 A.3d 415, 430 (Pa. 2013).