# Official Journal C 13/2020

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 13 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6315 January 2020 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 13

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6315 January 2020

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| | OPINIONS |
| | European Commission |
| 2020/C 13/01 | COMMISSION OPINION of 14 January 2020 relating to the plan for the disposal of radioactive waste arising from the decommissioning and dismantling of parts of the Neckarwestheim GKN-II nuclear power plant located in the land of Baden-Württemberg, Germany | 1 |

Contents

page

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

OPINIONS

European Commission

2020/C 13/01

COMMISSION OPINION of 14 January 2020 relating to the plan for the disposal of radioactive waste arising from the decommissioning and dismantling of parts of the Neckarwestheim GKN-II nuclear power plant located in the land of Baden-Württemberg, Germany

1

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| | II   Information |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2020/C 13/02 | Initiation of proceedings (Case M.9409 — Aurubis/Metallo Group Holding) (
  1
  ) | 3 |

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2020/C 13/02

Initiation of proceedings (Case M.9409 — Aurubis/Metallo Group Holding) (
  1
  )

1

3

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| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | Council |
| 2020/C 13/03 | Notice for the attention of the persons, groups and entities included on the list subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, as updated by Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/20, and to Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/19 | 4 |
| 2020/C 13/04 | Notice for the attention of the data subjects included on the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, as updated by Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/20, and to Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/19 | 6 |
| | European Commission |
| 2020/C 13/05 | Euro exchange rates — 14 January 2020 | 7 |
| 2020/C 13/06 | Commission Decision of 12 December 2019 on notifying the Republic of Panama of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing | 8 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Council

2020/C 13/03

Notice for the attention of the persons, groups and entities included on the list subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, as updated by Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/20, and to Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/19

4

2020/C 13/04

Notice for the attention of the data subjects included on the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, as updated by Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/20, and to Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/19

6

European Commission

2020/C 13/05

Euro exchange rates — 14 January 2020

7

2020/C 13/06

Commission Decision of 12 December 2019 on notifying the Republic of Panama of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

8

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| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
| | Cedefop |
| 2020/C 13/07 | Open call for proposals – GP/DSI/ReferNet_FPA/001/20 ReferNet – Cedefop’s European Network of Expertise in Vocational Education and Training (VET) | 16 |
| | European Commission |
| 2020/C 13/08 | Call for expressions of interest for the selection of a member of the European Fiscal Board | 18 |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2020/C 13/09 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.9594 — CMA CGM/CIMC Neocontainer/JV) Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  ) | 21 |

V   Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Cedefop

2020/C 13/07

Open call for proposals – GP/DSI/ReferNet_FPA/001/20 ReferNet – Cedefop’s European Network of Expertise in Vocational Education and Training (VET)

16

European Commission

2020/C 13/08

Call for expressions of interest for the selection of a member of the European Fiscal Board

18

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

2020/C 13/09

Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.9594 — CMA CGM/CIMC Neocontainer/JV) Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  )

1

21

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance. |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance.

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

OPINIONS

European Commission

| 15.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 13/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 13/1

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COMMISSION OPINION

of 14 January 2020

relating to the plan for the disposal of radioactive waste arising from the decommissioning and dismantling of parts of the Neckarwestheim GKN-II nuclear power plant located in the land of Baden-Württemberg, Germany

(Only the German text is authentic)

(2020/C 13/01)

The assessment below is carried out under the provisions of the Euratom Treaty, without prejudice to any additional assessments to be carried out under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the obligations stemming from it and from secondary legislation (1).

On 6 December 2018 the European Commission received from the Government of Germany, in accordance with Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, General Data relating to the plan for the disposal of radioactive waste (2) arising from the decommissioning and dismantling of parts of the Neckarwestheim GKN-II nuclear power plant.

On the basis of these data and additional information requested by the Commission on 29 January 2019 and provided by the German authorities on 3 September 2019, and following consultation with the Group of Experts, the Commission has drawn up the following opinion:

| 1. | The distance between the site and the nearest border with another Member State, in this case France, is 69 km. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The distance between the site and the nearest border with another Member State, in this case France, is 69 km.

| 2. | During normal decommissioning and dismantling operations of the Neckarwestheim GKN-II nuclear power plant, the discharges of liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents are not liable to cause an exposure of the population in another Member State that would be significant from the point of view of health, in respect of the dose limits laid down in the Basic Safety Standards Directive (3). |
| --- | --- |

2.

During normal decommissioning and dismantling operations of the Neckarwestheim GKN-II nuclear power plant, the discharges of liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents are not liable to cause an exposure of the population in another Member State that would be significant from the point of view of health, in respect of the dose limits laid down in the Basic Safety Standards Directive (3).

| 3. | Solid radioactive waste is temporarily stored on site before shipment to licensed treatment or disposal facilities located in Germany.
  Non-radioactive solid waste and residual materials in compliance with clearance levels will be released from regulatory control for disposal as conventional waste or for reuse or recycling. This will be done in compliance with the criteria laid down in the Basic Safety Standards Directive. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Solid radioactive waste is temporarily stored on site before shipment to licensed treatment or disposal facilities located in Germany.

Non-radioactive solid waste and residual materials in compliance with clearance levels will be released from regulatory control for disposal as conventional waste or for reuse or recycling. This will be done in compliance with the criteria laid down in the Basic Safety Standards Directive.

| 4. | In the event of unplanned releases of radioactive effluents that may follow the accidents of the type and magnitude considered in the General Data, the doses likely to be received by the population of another Member State would not be significant from the point of view of health, in respect of the reference levels laid down in the Basic Safety Standards Directive. |
| --- | --- |

4.

In the event of unplanned releases of radioactive effluents that may follow the accidents of the type and magnitude considered in the General Data, the doses likely to be received by the population of another Member State would not be significant from the point of view of health, in respect of the reference levels laid down in the Basic Safety Standards Directive.

In conclusion, the Commission is of the opinion that the implementation of the plan for the disposal of radioactive waste in whatever form, arising from the decommissioning and the dismantling of parts of the Neckarwestheim GKN-II nuclear power plant, located in the land of Baden-Württemberg, Germany, both in normal operation and in the event of the accidents of the type and magnitude considered in the General Data, is not liable to result in a radioactive contamination, significant from the point of view of health, of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State, in respect of the provisions laid down in the Basic Safety Standards Directive.

Done at Brussels, 14 January 2020.

For the Commission

Kadri SIMSON

Member of the Commission

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(1)  For instance, under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, environmental aspects should be further assessed. Indicatively, the Commission would like to draw attention to the provisions of Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU; to Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, as well as to Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora and to Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy.

1

(2)  The disposal of radioactive waste in the meaning of point 1 of Commission Recommendation 2010/635/Euratom of 11 October 2010 on the application of Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty (OJ L 279, 23.10.2010, p. 36).

2

(3)  Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation (OJ L 13, 17.1.2014, p. 1).

3

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 15.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 13/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 13/3

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Initiation of proceedings

(Case M.9409 — Aurubis/Metallo Group Holding)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2020/C 13/02)

On 19 November 2019, the Commission decided to initiate proceedings in the above-mentioned case after finding that the notified concentration raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market. The initiation of proceedings opens a second phase investigation with regard to the notified concentration, and is without prejudice to the final decision on the case. The decision is based on Article 6(1)(c) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1).

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their observations on the proposed concentration to the Commission.

In order to be fully taken into account in the procedure, observations should reach the Commission not later than 15 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.9409 — Aurubis/Metallo Group Holding, to the following address:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Council

| 15.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 13/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 13/4

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Notice for the attention of the persons, groups and entities included on the list subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, as updated by Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/20, and to Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/19

(2020/C 13/03)

The following information is brought to the attention of the above-mentioned persons, groups and entities listed in Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/20 (1) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/19 (2).

The Council of the European Union has determined that the reasons for including the persons, groups and entities on the abovementioned list subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (3) on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and to Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 (4) on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, are still valid. Consequently, the Council has decided to maintain those persons, groups and entities on the list.

Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 provides for a freezing of all funds, other financial assets and economic resources belonging to the persons, groups and entities concerned and that no funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be made available to them, whether directly or indirectly.

The attention of the persons, groups and entities concerned is drawn to the possibility of making an application to the competent authorities of the relevant Member State(s) as listed in the Annex to the Regulation in order to obtain an authorisation to use frozen funds for basic needs or specific payments, in accordance with Article 5(2) of that Regulation.

The persons, groups and entities concerned may submit a request to obtain the Council’s statement of reasons for maintaining them on the above-mentioned list (unless the statement of reasons has already been communicated to them). Any such request should be sent to the following address:

| Council of the European Union (Attn: COMET designations) |
| --- |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Council of the European Union (Attn: COMET designations)

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Email: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

The persons, groups and entities concerned may at any time submit a request to the Council, together with any supporting documentation, that the decision to include and maintain them on the list should be reconsidered, to the address provided above. Such requests will be considered when they are received. In this regard, the attention of the persons, groups and entities concerned is drawn to the regular review by the Council of the list according to Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. In order for requests to be considered at the next review, they should be submitted by 20 March 2020.

The attention of the persons, groups and entities concerned is also drawn to the possibility of challenging their designation before the General Court of the European Union, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 263(4) and (6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

---

(1)  OJ LI 8, 14.1.2020, p. 5.

(2)  OJ LI 8, 14.1.2020, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93.

(4)  OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 70.

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| 15.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 13/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 13/6

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Notice for the attention of the data subjects included on the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, as updated by Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/20, and to Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/19

(2020/C 13/04)

The attention of data subjects is drawn to the following information in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1).

The legal basis for this processing operation are Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (2), as updated by Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/20 (3) and Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 (4), as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/19 (5).

The controller of this processing operation is the Council of the European Union represented by the Director-General of RELEX (Foreign Affairs, Enlargement, Civil Protection) of the General Secretariat of the Council and the department entrusted with the processing operation is RELEX.1.C that can be contacted at:

| Council of the European Union |
| --- |
| General Secretariat |
| RELEX.1.C |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

RELEX.1.C

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Email: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

The purpose of the processing operation is the establishment and updating of the list of persons subject to restrictive measures in accordance with Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, as updated by Decision (CFSP) 2020/20, and Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, as implemented by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/19.

The data subjects are the natural persons who fulfil the listing criteria as laid down in Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001.

The personal data collected includes data necessary for the correct identification of the person concerned, the statement of reasons and any other data related thereto.

The personal data collected may be shared as necessary with the European External Action Service and the Commission.

Without prejudice to restrictions pursuant to Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, the exercise of the rights of the data subjects such as the right of access, as well as the rights to rectification or to object will be answered in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.

Personal data will be retained for 5 years from the moment the data subject has been removed from the list of persons subject to the restrictive measures or the validity of the measure has expired, or for the duration of court proceedings in the event they had been started.

Without prejudice to any judicial, administrative or non-judicial remedy, data subjects may lodge a complaint with the European Data Protection Supervisor in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.

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(1)  OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39.

(2)  OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93.

(3)  OJ LI 8, 14.1.2020, p. 5.

(4)  OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 70.

(5)  OJ LI 8, 14.1.2020, p. 1.

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European Commission

| 15.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 13/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 13/7

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Euro exchange rates (1)

14 January 2020

(2020/C 13/05)

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,1115 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 122,32 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4731 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,85618 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 10,5248 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,0767 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | 137,20 |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 9,8920 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 25,155 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 332,77 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,2219 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,7795 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 6,5448 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,6110 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,4528 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 8,6447 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,6803 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,4981 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 285,74 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 16,0274 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 7,6536 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,4450 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 15 219,55 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,5288 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 56,242 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 68,2418 |
| THB | Thai baht | 33,624 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 4,6056 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 20,9406 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 78,7285 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,1115

JPY

Japanese yen

122,32

DKK

Danish krone

7,4731

GBP

Pound sterling

0,85618

SEK

Swedish krona

10,5248

CHF

Swiss franc

1,0767

ISK

Iceland króna

137,20

NOK

Norwegian krone

9,8920

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

25,155

HUF

Hungarian forint

332,77

PLN

Polish zloty

4,2219

RON

Romanian leu

4,7795

TRY

Turkish lira

6,5448

AUD

Australian dollar

1,6110

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,4528

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

8,6447

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,6803

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,4981

KRW

South Korean won

1 285,74

ZAR

South African rand

16,0274

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

7,6536

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,4450

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

15 219,55

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,5288

PHP

Philippine peso

56,242

RUB

Russian rouble

68,2418

THB

Thai baht

33,624

BRL

Brazilian real

4,6056

MXN

Mexican peso

20,9406

INR

Indian rupee

78,7285

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

---

| 15.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 13/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 13/8

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COMMISSION DECISION

of 12 December 2019

on notifying the Republic of Panama of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

(2020/C 13/06)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 1447/1999 (1), and in particular Article 32 thereof,

Whereas:

1.   INTRODUCTION

| (1) | Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (hereinafter ‘the IUU Regulation’) establishes a Union system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (hereinafter ‘the IUU Regulation’) establishes a Union system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

| (2) | Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation lays down the procedure with respect to the identification of non-cooperating third countries in fighting against IUU fishing, the démarches in respect of countries identified as non-cooperating third countries, the establishment of a list of non-cooperating third countries, the removal of those countries from that list, the publicity of the list of non-cooperating countries and any emergency measures. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation lays down the procedure with respect to the identification of non-cooperating third countries in fighting against IUU fishing, the démarches in respect of countries identified as non-cooperating third countries, the establishment of a list of non-cooperating third countries, the removal of those countries from that list, the publicity of the list of non-cooperating countries and any emergency measures.

| (3) | Pursuant to Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to identify the third countries that it considers as non-cooperating countries in fighting against IUU fishing. A third country may be identified as a non-cooperating third country if it fails to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Pursuant to Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to identify the third countries that it considers as non-cooperating countries in fighting against IUU fishing. A third country may be identified as a non-cooperating third country if it fails to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

| (4) | The identification of non-cooperating third countries under Article 31 of the IUU Regulation is to be based on the review of all information as set out under Article 31(2) of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The identification of non-cooperating third countries under Article 31 of the IUU Regulation is to be based on the review of all information as set out under Article 31(2) of that Regulation.

| (5) | Prior to identifying third countries as non-cooperating under Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to first notify third countries of the possibility of being identified as non-cooperating countries in accordance with Article 32 of that Regulation. This notification is of a preliminary nature. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Prior to identifying third countries as non-cooperating under Article 31 of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is to first notify third countries of the possibility of being identified as non-cooperating countries in accordance with Article 32 of that Regulation. This notification is of a preliminary nature.

| (6) | The notification of third countries of the possibility of being identified as non-cooperating countries is also to be based on the criteria laid down in Article 31 of the IUU Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The notification of third countries of the possibility of being identified as non-cooperating countries is also to be based on the criteria laid down in Article 31 of the IUU Regulation.

| (7) | In addition, the Commission is to take into account all the démarches set out in Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to the notified third countries. In particular, the Commission is to include in the notification information concerning the essential facts and reasons for the identification as well as to provide the third countries concerned with the opportunity to respond and provide evidence refuting the identification or, where appropriate, a plan of action to improve and the measures taken to rectify the situation. The Commission is to give to the third countries concerned adequate time to answer the notification and a reasonable time to remedy the situation. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In addition, the Commission is to take into account all the démarches set out in Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to the notified third countries. In particular, the Commission is to include in the notification information concerning the essential facts and reasons for the identification as well as to provide the third countries concerned with the opportunity to respond and provide evidence refuting the identification or, where appropriate, a plan of action to improve and the measures taken to rectify the situation. The Commission is to give to the third countries concerned adequate time to answer the notification and a reasonable time to remedy the situation.

| (8) | In accordance with Article 33 of the IUU Regulation, the Council is to decide on a list of non-cooperating third countries. The measures set out, inter alia, in Article 38 of the IUU Regulation apply in respect of those identified countries. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

In accordance with Article 33 of the IUU Regulation, the Council is to decide on a list of non-cooperating third countries. The measures set out, inter alia, in Article 38 of the IUU Regulation apply in respect of those identified countries.

| (9) | Pursuant to Article 20(1) of the IUU Regulation, the acceptance of catch certificates validated by a third flag State is subject to the condition that the Commission has received a notification from the flag State concerned certifying that it has in place arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by its fishing vessels. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Pursuant to Article 20(1) of the IUU Regulation, the acceptance of catch certificates validated by a third flag State is subject to the condition that the Commission has received a notification from the flag State concerned certifying that it has in place arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures which must be complied with by its fishing vessels.

| (10) | In accordance with Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is, where appropriate, to cooperate administratively with third countries in areas pertaining to the implementation of the catch certification provisions of that Regulation. |
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(10)

In accordance with Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission is, where appropriate, to cooperate administratively with third countries in areas pertaining to the implementation of the catch certification provisions of that Regulation.

2.   PROCEDURE WITH RESPECT TO THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA

| (11) | The Republic of Panama (hereinafter ‘Panama’) submitted its notification as a flag State pursuant to Article 20 of the IUU Regulation to the Commission on 3 February 2010. |
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(11)

The Republic of Panama (hereinafter ‘Panama’) submitted its notification as a flag State pursuant to Article 20 of the IUU Regulation to the Commission on 3 February 2010.

| (12) | In the context of the administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, from 21 June 2010 to 15 November 2012, the Commission cooperated with the authorities of Panama to verify information concerning Panama’s arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures, which had to be complied with by its fishing vessels, and measures taken by Panama in order to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing. |
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(12)

In the context of the administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation, from 21 June 2010 to 15 November 2012, the Commission cooperated with the authorities of Panama to verify information concerning Panama’s arrangements for the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures, which had to be complied with by its fishing vessels, and measures taken by Panama in order to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing.

| (13) | Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of Panama as flag, port, coastal or market State. For the purpose of this review, the Commission took into account the parameters listed in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation. |
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(13)

Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of Panama as flag, port, coastal or market State. For the purpose of this review, the Commission took into account the parameters listed in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation.

| (14) | After examining all the factual elements gathered and all the statements made by the country, the Commission established, pursuant to Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation, that Panama had failed to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law, in particular in relation to compliance with international rules as well as to ensure compliance with regulations and conservation and management measures by its vessels. |
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(14)

After examining all the factual elements gathered and all the statements made by the country, the Commission established, pursuant to Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation, that Panama had failed to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law, in particular in relation to compliance with international rules as well as to ensure compliance with regulations and conservation and management measures by its vessels.

| (15) | Accordingly, by virtue of the Commission Decision 2012/C 354/01 of 15 November 2012, Panama was notified of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country in the fight against IUU fishing. (2) |
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(15)

Accordingly, by virtue of the Commission Decision 2012/C 354/01 of 15 November 2012, Panama was notified of the possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country in the fight against IUU fishing. (2)

| (16) | Panama was invited to cooperate with the Commission on the basis of a proposed action plan to rectify the shortcomings identified. |
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(16)

Panama was invited to cooperate with the Commission on the basis of a proposed action plan to rectify the shortcomings identified.

| (17) | In the framework of the bilateral dialogue that followed on from the Commission Decision 2012/C 354/01, Panama submitted oral and written comments that were taken into account by the Commission. The Commission continued to seek and verify all information it deemed necessary. |
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(17)

In the framework of the bilateral dialogue that followed on from the Commission Decision 2012/C 354/01, Panama submitted oral and written comments that were taken into account by the Commission. The Commission continued to seek and verify all information it deemed necessary.

| (18) | Panama introduced the necessary measures for the cessation of IUU fishing activities in question and their prevention, rectifying any act or omission leading to the notification of the possibility of being identified as non-cooperating country in fighting IUU fishing. |
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(18)

Panama introduced the necessary measures for the cessation of IUU fishing activities in question and their prevention, rectifying any act or omission leading to the notification of the possibility of being identified as non-cooperating country in fighting IUU fishing.

| (19) | As a result, by notice dated 15 October 2014, the Commission decided to conclude the démarches
  vis-à-vis Panama pursuant to the provisions of Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to the discharge of its duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State and their actions to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. (3) |
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(19)

As a result, by notice dated 15 October 2014, the Commission decided to conclude the démarches
  vis-à-vis Panama pursuant to the provisions of Article 32 of the IUU Regulation with respect to the discharge of its duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State and their actions to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. (3)

| (20) | The Commission, however, emphasised that the termination of démarches did not preclude any subsequent step by the Commission or the Council in the future, in case factual elements would reveal that Panama would fail to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. |
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(20)

The Commission, however, emphasised that the termination of démarches did not preclude any subsequent step by the Commission or the Council in the future, in case factual elements would reveal that Panama would fail to discharge the duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

| (21) | From 29 January to 1 February 2019, the Commission conducted a visit to Panama in the context of the administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation. |
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(21)

From 29 January to 1 February 2019, the Commission conducted a visit to Panama in the context of the administrative cooperation provided for in Article 20(4) of the IUU Regulation.

| (22) | This visit covered issues pertaining to the national arrangements in place for the verification of catch certificates, the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures, which must be complied with by Panamanian vessels. It also covered assessment of the effective implementation of the measures taken by Panama in order to rectify the shortcomings that led to the notification referred to in paragraph (15) above. |
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(22)

This visit covered issues pertaining to the national arrangements in place for the verification of catch certificates, the implementation, control and enforcement of laws, regulations and conservation and management measures, which must be complied with by Panamanian vessels. It also covered assessment of the effective implementation of the measures taken by Panama in order to rectify the shortcomings that led to the notification referred to in paragraph (15) above.

| (23) | From 15 to 19 July 2019, the Commission carried out a second visit to Panama to follow up on the measures taken by Panama since the previous mission. |
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(23)

From 15 to 19 July 2019, the Commission carried out a second visit to Panama to follow up on the measures taken by Panama since the previous mission.

| (24) | These two visits and their follow-up entailed exchange of oral and written comments where the Commission sought and verified all information deemed necessary concerning the measures taken by Panama in order to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing. |
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(24)

These two visits and their follow-up entailed exchange of oral and written comments where the Commission sought and verified all information deemed necessary concerning the measures taken by Panama in order to implement its obligations in the fight against IUU fishing.

| (25) | Panama is a State party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), (4) the Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks (UNFSA) and the Agreement on Port State Measures to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (PSMA). Panama has also transposed into its national legislation the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU). (5) |
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(25)

Panama is a State party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), (4) the Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks (UNFSA) and the Agreement on Port State Measures to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (PSMA). Panama has also transposed into its national legislation the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU). (5)

| (26) | Panama is a Contracting Party of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the Commission for the Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). Panama is a Cooperating Non-Contracting Party to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) and the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). |
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(26)

Panama is a Contracting Party of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the Commission for the Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). Panama is a Cooperating Non-Contracting Party to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) and the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC).

| (27) | In order to evaluate the compliance of Panama with its international obligations as flag, port, coastal or market State as set out in the international arrangements referred to in paragraph (26) above and established by the relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), the Commission sought, collected and analysed all necessary information required for the purpose of this exercise. |
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(27)

In order to evaluate the compliance of Panama with its international obligations as flag, port, coastal or market State as set out in the international arrangements referred to in paragraph (26) above and established by the relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), the Commission sought, collected and analysed all necessary information required for the purpose of this exercise.

3.   POSSIBILITY OF PANAMA BEING IDENTIFIED AS A NON-COOPERATING THIRD COUNTRY

| (28) | Information gathered by the Commission during the period that followed its decision to conclude the démarches
  vis-à-vis Panama in 2014 and the shortcomings identified during the 2019 visits to Panama prompted the Commission to consider the possibility of identifying Panama as a non-cooperating third country in the fight against IUU fishing. |
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(28)

Information gathered by the Commission during the period that followed its decision to conclude the démarches
  vis-à-vis Panama in 2014 and the shortcomings identified during the 2019 visits to Panama prompted the Commission to consider the possibility of identifying Panama as a non-cooperating third country in the fight against IUU fishing.

| (29) | Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of Panama as flag, port, coastal and market State. For the purpose of this review, the Commission took into account the criteria laid down in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation. |
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(29)

Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed the duties of Panama as flag, port, coastal and market State. For the purpose of this review, the Commission took into account the criteria laid down in Article 31(4) to (7) of the IUU Regulation.

3.1.   Measures taken in respect of recurrence of IUU fishing activities and IUU trade flows (Article 31(4) of the IUU Regulation)

| (30) | In accordance with Article 31(4)(a), the Commission analysed the measures taken by Panama with respect to any recurrent IUU fishing activity carried out or supported by fishing vessels flying its flag or by its nationals, or by fishing vessels operating in its maritime waters or using its ports. |
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(30)

In accordance with Article 31(4)(a), the Commission analysed the measures taken by Panama with respect to any recurrent IUU fishing activity carried out or supported by fishing vessels flying its flag or by its nationals, or by fishing vessels operating in its maritime waters or using its ports.

| (31) | On the basis of publically available information and information provided by the relevant authorities of Panama, the Commission established that the national authority in charge of the Panama Ship Registry, the Panama Maritime Authority (AMP), registered vessels that had declared that they would not engage in fishing activities, but that later engaged in such activities. This entailed Panama-flagged vessels engaging in fishing activities without the mandatory licence from the national fisheries authority, the Aquatic Resources Authority of Panama (ARAP), and therefore engaging in fishing activities not subject to any form of monitoring, control and surveillance by the competent authority. This also prevented the establishment of a consolidated list containing all fishing vessels and vessels used for and equipped to be used for fishing-related activities, flying the flag of Panama, which in turn, indicated that Panama does not exercise an adequate control over its vessels. |
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(31)

On the basis of publically available information and information provided by the relevant authorities of Panama, the Commission established that the national authority in charge of the Panama Ship Registry, the Panama Maritime Authority (AMP), registered vessels that had declared that they would not engage in fishing activities, but that later engaged in such activities. This entailed Panama-flagged vessels engaging in fishing activities without the mandatory licence from the national fisheries authority, the Aquatic Resources Authority of Panama (ARAP), and therefore engaging in fishing activities not subject to any form of monitoring, control and surveillance by the competent authority. This also prevented the establishment of a consolidated list containing all fishing vessels and vessels used for and equipped to be used for fishing-related activities, flying the flag of Panama, which in turn, indicated that Panama does not exercise an adequate control over its vessels.

| (32) | This absence of control by the competent authority resulted in serious breaches of the applicable laws, regulations and conservation and management measures. Carrier vessels that were registered as general cargo vessels were effectively used in the transport of fishery products without a licence from ARAP and without any other type of control from ARAP or the AMP. As an example, in 2016 two carrier vessels flagged to Panama conducted transhipments in the SPRFMO area whereas they were not on the SPRFMO Record of Vessels authorised to fish in the Convention Area. |
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(32)

This absence of control by the competent authority resulted in serious breaches of the applicable laws, regulations and conservation and management measures. Carrier vessels that were registered as general cargo vessels were effectively used in the transport of fishery products without a licence from ARAP and without any other type of control from ARAP or the AMP. As an example, in 2016 two carrier vessels flagged to Panama conducted transhipments in the SPRFMO area whereas they were not on the SPRFMO Record of Vessels authorised to fish in the Convention Area.

| (33) | Moreover, a carrier vessel under the name of SUMMER REFER (previous name: OKAPI MARTA, IMO No 7816472) was registered in Panama from June 2018 to February 2019 as a general cargo vessel although this vessel is on the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) IUU vessel list since 2016. The AMP did not consult ARAP before registering this vessel although it is a vessel equipped for the transport of fish and hence could have engaged in fishing-related activities. It is worth noting that the deregistration of this vessel did not relate to the fact that the vessel was listed as an IUU vessel. |
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(33)

Moreover, a carrier vessel under the name of SUMMER REFER (previous name: OKAPI MARTA, IMO No 7816472) was registered in Panama from June 2018 to February 2019 as a general cargo vessel although this vessel is on the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) IUU vessel list since 2016. The AMP did not consult ARAP before registering this vessel although it is a vessel equipped for the transport of fish and hence could have engaged in fishing-related activities. It is worth noting that the deregistration of this vessel did not relate to the fact that the vessel was listed as an IUU vessel.

| (34) | In addition, the NIKA (IMO No 8808654), a fishing vessel that was registered in Panama as a general cargo vessel since June 2018, was found to be engaged in IUU fishing activities in the first half of 2019 in an area covered by the CCAMLR Convention without a licence from ARAP. |
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(34)

In addition, the NIKA (IMO No 8808654), a fishing vessel that was registered in Panama as a general cargo vessel since June 2018, was found to be engaged in IUU fishing activities in the first half of 2019 in an area covered by the CCAMLR Convention without a licence from ARAP.

| (35) | Furthermore, in June 2019 at its 23rd session, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) adopted a list of vessels presumed to have carried out IUU fishing in the IOTC area of competence that includes the XING HAI FENG (previous name: OCEAN LION, IMO No 7826233), a vessel flagged to Panama. |
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(35)

Furthermore, in June 2019 at its 23rd session, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) adopted a list of vessels presumed to have carried out IUU fishing in the IOTC area of competence that includes the XING HAI FENG (previous name: OCEAN LION, IMO No 7826233), a vessel flagged to Panama.

| (36) | Contrary to paragraphs 36 and 42 of the IPOA-IUU, the procedures in place prior to the registration of vessels do not include a comprehensive verification of the history of the vessels to avoid the registration of fishing vessels with a dubious background or compliance profile as well as vessels listed in the IUU vessel list adopted by RFMOs. |
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(36)

Contrary to paragraphs 36 and 42 of the IPOA-IUU, the procedures in place prior to the registration of vessels do not include a comprehensive verification of the history of the vessels to avoid the registration of fishing vessels with a dubious background or compliance profile as well as vessels listed in the IUU vessel list adopted by RFMOs.

| (37) | The basic legal framework establishing a monitoring, control and surveillance scheme is the Executive Decree 161 of 2013. The current fishing licence and authorisation scheme is based in the Executive Decree 162 of 2013. The adoption of these decrees, along with the Executive Decree 160 on sanctions, was decisive for the conclusion of the démarches vis-à-vis Panama, in October 2014, pursuant to the provisions of Article 32 of the IUU Regulation as described in paragraph (19) above. However, the Commission identified that these decrees are not being duly implemented. |
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(37)

The basic legal framework establishing a monitoring, control and surveillance scheme is the Executive Decree 161 of 2013. The current fishing licence and authorisation scheme is based in the Executive Decree 162 of 2013. The adoption of these decrees, along with the Executive Decree 160 on sanctions, was decisive for the conclusion of the démarches vis-à-vis Panama, in October 2014, pursuant to the provisions of Article 32 of the IUU Regulation as described in paragraph (19) above. However, the Commission identified that these decrees are not being duly implemented.

| (38) | As an example, in relation to the carrier vessels authorised by ARAP to engage in transhipment operations of fishery products, the Commission found that Panama did not monitor the compliance of those vessels with national provisions governing transhipments activities, such as the obligation to submit a transhipment pre-notification and a transhipment declaration. As an example, a carrier vessel was able to operate during 2018 off the West African coasts without submitting any transhipment pre-notification. It should be noted that the failure to comply with these obligations is considered, under the national legislation of Panama, as a serious infringement. In addition, this has resulted in recent SPRFMO and WCPFC compliance reports underlining serious issues with transhipments by Panama-flagged vessels. (6) |
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(38)

As an example, in relation to the carrier vessels authorised by ARAP to engage in transhipment operations of fishery products, the Commission found that Panama did not monitor the compliance of those vessels with national provisions governing transhipments activities, such as the obligation to submit a transhipment pre-notification and a transhipment declaration. As an example, a carrier vessel was able to operate during 2018 off the West African coasts without submitting any transhipment pre-notification. It should be noted that the failure to comply with these obligations is considered, under the national legislation of Panama, as a serious infringement. In addition, this has resulted in recent SPRFMO and WCPFC compliance reports underlining serious issues with transhipments by Panama-flagged vessels. (6)

| (39) | The Commission also gathered information that show that Panama is not properly monitoring and controlling the catching activities of Panama flagged fishing vessels. For instance, a fishing vessel was able to operate in the Indian Ocean while its licence was only valid for the Pacific Ocean. Likewise, another vessel engaged in fishing activities in the area known in IATTC as ‘El Corralito’ during the period when this area was closed to fishing. This was in contravention of the IATTC Resolution C-17-02. |
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(39)

The Commission also gathered information that show that Panama is not properly monitoring and controlling the catching activities of Panama flagged fishing vessels. For instance, a fishing vessel was able to operate in the Indian Ocean while its licence was only valid for the Pacific Ocean. Likewise, another vessel engaged in fishing activities in the area known in IATTC as ‘El Corralito’ during the period when this area was closed to fishing. This was in contravention of the IATTC Resolution C-17-02.

| (40) | With regard to the information mentioned above, the Commission concluded that Panama failed to fulfil its responsibilities as flag State to prevent its fleet from engaging in IUU fishing activities in the high seas. This is in breach of Article 94(1) and (2) of UNCLOS, which provides that every State shall effectively ensure its jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag. It is also not in line with paragraph 24 of the IPOA-IUU which provides for the obligation to undertake comprehensive and effective control of fishing activities. |
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(40)

With regard to the information mentioned above, the Commission concluded that Panama failed to fulfil its responsibilities as flag State to prevent its fleet from engaging in IUU fishing activities in the high seas. This is in breach of Article 94(1) and (2) of UNCLOS, which provides that every State shall effectively ensure its jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag. It is also not in line with paragraph 24 of the IPOA-IUU which provides for the obligation to undertake comprehensive and effective control of fishing activities.

| (41) | Pursuant to article 31(4)(b) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission examined the measures taken by Panama in respect of access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market and subsequent trade flows. |
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(41)

Pursuant to article 31(4)(b) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission examined the measures taken by Panama in respect of access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market and subsequent trade flows.

| (42) | After analysing documentation and other information relating to import controls as well as vessel monitoring and control procedures, the Commission considers that Panama cannot ensure that fishery products entering its market and processing plants do not stem from IUU fishing. The authorities of Panama were not able to demonstrate they are collecting and verifying all the necessary information required to control the legality of fish entering their market, transiting or processed in Panama. |
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(42)

After analysing documentation and other information relating to import controls as well as vessel monitoring and control procedures, the Commission considers that Panama cannot ensure that fishery products entering its market and processing plants do not stem from IUU fishing. The authorities of Panama were not able to demonstrate they are collecting and verifying all the necessary information required to control the legality of fish entering their market, transiting or processed in Panama.

| (43) | The Commission notably identified significant inconsistencies in the information reported by the processing plant the Commission visited in July 2019. As an example, records of the plant were mentioning reception of fish caught by a vessel which, on that day, was still at sea and had not yet arrived at the landing pier. The same plant was also unable to provide any of the ICCAT swordfish statistical documents, which should have accompanied the 24 imports of swordfish from the ICCAT area that the plant had done in 2019. None of these issues had been detected by Panamanian authorities. |
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(43)

The Commission notably identified significant inconsistencies in the information reported by the processing plant the Commission visited in July 2019. As an example, records of the plant were mentioning reception of fish caught by a vessel which, on that day, was still at sea and had not yet arrived at the landing pier. The same plant was also unable to provide any of the ICCAT swordfish statistical documents, which should have accompanied the 24 imports of swordfish from the ICCAT area that the plant had done in 2019. None of these issues had been detected by Panamanian authorities.

| (44) | Added to this problem, Panama validates catch certificates without properly verifying the information provided in those certificates. Prior to the first visit that the Commission conducted in 2019, the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) carried out an analysis of a sample of catch certificates validated by Panama in 2018. EFCA identified numerous mistakes, such as missing fields, inaccuracies in the catch areas, mistakes in the quantities, confusion on the vessel master name, that led to the conclusion that verifications prior to the validation of catch certificates are of a superficial nature. Dubious logbook information was also detected by the Commission whilst verifying the information supporting certain catch certificates. |
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(44)

Added to this problem, Panama validates catch certificates without properly verifying the information provided in those certificates. Prior to the first visit that the Commission conducted in 2019, the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) carried out an analysis of a sample of catch certificates validated by Panama in 2018. EFCA identified numerous mistakes, such as missing fields, inaccuracies in the catch areas, mistakes in the quantities, confusion on the vessel master name, that led to the conclusion that verifications prior to the validation of catch certificates are of a superficial nature. Dubious logbook information was also detected by the Commission whilst verifying the information supporting certain catch certificates.

| (45) | The Commission concluded that the information related to the origin and traceability of the fishery products that enter and leave the country, or caught by Panama-flagged vessels, was not accurate and reliable. Panama has failed to enforce rules to ensure traceability of fish or fishery products through the market in accordance with paragraphs 67 to 69 and 71 to 72 of the IPOA-IUU. |
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(45)

The Commission concluded that the information related to the origin and traceability of the fishery products that enter and leave the country, or caught by Panama-flagged vessels, was not accurate and reliable. Panama has failed to enforce rules to ensure traceability of fish or fishery products through the market in accordance with paragraphs 67 to 69 and 71 to 72 of the IPOA-IUU.

| (46) | The Commission also identified three cases where ARAP determined the amount of the fines imposed to three Panamanian vessels fishing in the waters under Panama’s national jurisdiction for committing serious infringements to national conservation and management measures (CMMs) without taking into consideration the range of pecuniary sanctions as established by Panama’s legislation. As a result, the amounts imposed were actually much lower than the minimum amount laid down in Panama’s legislation, and therefore considered not adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations and deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities, as required by Article 19(2) of the UNFSA. |
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(46)

The Commission also identified three cases where ARAP determined the amount of the fines imposed to three Panamanian vessels fishing in the waters under Panama’s national jurisdiction for committing serious infringements to national conservation and management measures (CMMs) without taking into consideration the range of pecuniary sanctions as established by Panama’s legislation. As a result, the amounts imposed were actually much lower than the minimum amount laid down in Panama’s legislation, and therefore considered not adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations and deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities, as required by Article 19(2) of the UNFSA.

| (47) | Furthermore, a review of the information available on board of a foreign-flagged vessel, which had already been inspected and authorised to land its catches in one of the designated ports in Panama, allowed the Commission to establish that this vessel had actually engaged in fishing activities without a licence in the waters of a third country, and that this evidence had not been detected by the inspectors who authorised the landing in Panama. |
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(47)

Furthermore, a review of the information available on board of a foreign-flagged vessel, which had already been inspected and authorised to land its catches in one of the designated ports in Panama, allowed the Commission to establish that this vessel had actually engaged in fishing activities without a licence in the waters of a third country, and that this evidence had not been detected by the inspectors who authorised the landing in Panama.

| (48) | In view of the considerations presented in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the competent authorities of Panama, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3),(4)(a) and (4)(b) of the IUU Regulation, that Panama fails to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal and market State in respect of IUU vessels and IUU fishing carried out or supported by fishing vessels flying its flag or by its nationals, and to prevent access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market. |
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(48)

In view of the considerations presented in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the competent authorities of Panama, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3),(4)(a) and (4)(b) of the IUU Regulation, that Panama fails to discharge its duties under international law as flag, port, coastal and market State in respect of IUU vessels and IUU fishing carried out or supported by fishing vessels flying its flag or by its nationals, and to prevent access of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market.

3.2.   Failure to cooperate and to enforce (Article 31(5) of the IUU Regulation)

| (49) | Under Article 31(5)(a) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed its collaboration with Panama to see if the authorities had effectively cooperated in responding to questions, providing feedback or investigating matters related to IUU fishing and related activities. |
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(49)

Under Article 31(5)(a) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed its collaboration with Panama to see if the authorities had effectively cooperated in responding to questions, providing feedback or investigating matters related to IUU fishing and related activities.

| (50) | In preparation of and after the 2019 Commission’s first visit, the authorities of Panama have been generally cooperative in responding and providing feedback to requests for information. However, during the period between the termination of the démarches vis-à-vis Panama as described in paragraph (19) above and before the Commission contacted Panama to organise the 2019 first visit, Panama had not replied to several requests for information sent by the Commission or by EU Member States during the period between 2015 and 2018. |
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(50)

In preparation of and after the 2019 Commission’s first visit, the authorities of Panama have been generally cooperative in responding and providing feedback to requests for information. However, during the period between the termination of the démarches vis-à-vis Panama as described in paragraph (19) above and before the Commission contacted Panama to organise the 2019 first visit, Panama had not replied to several requests for information sent by the Commission or by EU Member States during the period between 2015 and 2018.

| (51) | In accordance with Article 31(5)(b), the Commission analysed existing enforcement measures to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. |
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(51)

In accordance with Article 31(5)(b), the Commission analysed existing enforcement measures to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

| (52) | The current sanctioning system is based on the Executive Decree 160 of 2013. The adoption of this legal instrument, together with the other two Executive Decrees mentioned above, was crucial for the termination of the demarches vis-à-vis Panama in October 2014. However, Panama has not duly implemented the Executive Decree 160. |
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(52)

The current sanctioning system is based on the Executive Decree 160 of 2013. The adoption of this legal instrument, together with the other two Executive Decrees mentioned above, was crucial for the termination of the demarches vis-à-vis Panama in October 2014. However, Panama has not duly implemented the Executive Decree 160.

| (53) | The information gathered by the Commission and the exchanges with the authorities of Panama revealed that the sanctions imposed to vessels engaging or supporting IUU fishing activities, activities listed in the Executive Decree 160 as serious, are not effective and deterrent. |
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(53)

The information gathered by the Commission and the exchanges with the authorities of Panama revealed that the sanctions imposed to vessels engaging or supporting IUU fishing activities, activities listed in the Executive Decree 160 as serious, are not effective and deterrent.

| (54) | For instance, according to the said Executive Decree, the range of pecuniary sanctions is 10 001 to 1 000 000 balboas (10 001 to 1 000 000 USD) — the equivalent of 9 123,23 to 912 231,49 EUR. Nevertheless, 80 % of the fines imposed on serious infringements during the period between 2014 and 2018 were below 12 000 balboas and only two fines were higher than 20 000 balboas. Therefore, sanctions imposed by the authorities of Panama are hardly commensurate with the value of the catches and benefits incurred from serious infringements and not adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage further violations. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

For instance, according to the said Executive Decree, the range of pecuniary sanctions is 10 001 to 1 000 000 balboas (10 001 to 1 000 000 USD) — the equivalent of 9 123,23 to 912 231,49 EUR. Nevertheless, 80 % of the fines imposed on serious infringements during the period between 2014 and 2018 were below 12 000 balboas and only two fines were higher than 20 000 balboas. Therefore, sanctions imposed by the authorities of Panama are hardly commensurate with the value of the catches and benefits incurred from serious infringements and not adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage further violations.

| (55) | As mentioned above, the Commission identified three cases where ARAP determined the amount of the fines imposed to three Panamanian vessels fishing in the waters under Panama’s national jurisdiction for committing serious infringements to CMMs without taking into consideration the range of pecuniary sanctions as established by the Executive Decree 160. The amounts imposed were actually much lower than the minimum amount provided for in this instrument. In these three cases, ARAP imposed pecuniary sanctions of 3 792,50 balboas, 3 652,00 balboas and 3 652,00 balboas while the minimum amount that can be imposed, according to the said Executive Decree, is 10 001,00 balboas. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

As mentioned above, the Commission identified three cases where ARAP determined the amount of the fines imposed to three Panamanian vessels fishing in the waters under Panama’s national jurisdiction for committing serious infringements to CMMs without taking into consideration the range of pecuniary sanctions as established by the Executive Decree 160. The amounts imposed were actually much lower than the minimum amount provided for in this instrument. In these three cases, ARAP imposed pecuniary sanctions of 3 792,50 balboas, 3 652,00 balboas and 3 652,00 balboas while the minimum amount that can be imposed, according to the said Executive Decree, is 10 001,00 balboas.

| (56) | The actual level of sanctions imposed clearly fails to ensure the deterrence of the sanctioning scheme and does not reflect Article 19(2) of the UNFSA, which provides that sanctions applicable in respect of violations shall be adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever they occur and shall deprive offender of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. Moreover, paragraph 21 of the IPOA-IUU advises that States should ensure that sanctions for IUU fishing by vessels and, to the greatest extent possible, by nationals under its jurisdiction, are of sufficient severity to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from such fishing. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

The actual level of sanctions imposed clearly fails to ensure the deterrence of the sanctioning scheme and does not reflect Article 19(2) of the UNFSA, which provides that sanctions applicable in respect of violations shall be adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever they occur and shall deprive offender of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. Moreover, paragraph 21 of the IPOA-IUU advises that States should ensure that sanctions for IUU fishing by vessels and, to the greatest extent possible, by nationals under its jurisdiction, are of sufficient severity to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from such fishing.

| (57) | In addition, the enforcement proceedings are affected by the existence of very significant delays both in the opening of the procedures against vessels allegedly involved in IUU fishing activities as well as in the imposition of sanctions. In most cases, proceedings take several years to be concluded. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In addition, the enforcement proceedings are affected by the existence of very significant delays both in the opening of the procedures against vessels allegedly involved in IUU fishing activities as well as in the imposition of sanctions. In most cases, proceedings take several years to be concluded.

| (58) | In light of the information gathered on the legal framework and the ongoing enforcement proceedings to establish infringements and impose consequent sanctions, the Commission concluded that Panama failed to implement Article 19(2) of the UNFSA. This provision establishes that all investigations and judicial proceedings shall be carried out expeditiously and that sanctions applicable in respect of violations shall be adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever they occur and shall deprive offender of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In light of the information gathered on the legal framework and the ongoing enforcement proceedings to establish infringements and impose consequent sanctions, the Commission concluded that Panama failed to implement Article 19(2) of the UNFSA. This provision establishes that all investigations and judicial proceedings shall be carried out expeditiously and that sanctions applicable in respect of violations shall be adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage violations wherever they occur and shall deprive offender of the benefits accruing from their illegal activities.

| (59) | In view of the considerations presented in this Section, and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission, as well as all the statements made by the authorities of Panama, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (5) of the IUU Regulation, that Panama failed to discharge its duties under international law with respect to cooperation and enforcement. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

In view of the considerations presented in this Section, and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission, as well as all the statements made by the authorities of Panama, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (5) of the IUU Regulation, that Panama failed to discharge its duties under international law with respect to cooperation and enforcement.

3.3.   Failure to implement international rules (Article 31(6) of the IUU Regulation)

| (60) | In accordance with Article 31(6)(a) and (b) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed Panama’s ratification or accession to relevant international fisheries instruments and its status as a contracting party to RFMOs or its agreement to apply conservation and management measures adopted by them. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

In accordance with Article 31(6)(a) and (b) of the IUU Regulation, the Commission analysed Panama’s ratification or accession to relevant international fisheries instruments and its status as a contracting party to RFMOs or its agreement to apply conservation and management measures adopted by them.

| (61) | Panama ratified UNCLOS in 1996 and acceded to UNFSA in 2008. Panama also acceded to the PSMA in 2016. In addition, Panama transposed the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the IPOA-IUU in 2009. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Panama ratified UNCLOS in 1996 and acceded to UNFSA in 2008. Panama also acceded to the PSMA in 2016. In addition, Panama transposed the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the IPOA-IUU in 2009.

| (62) | The current fisheries legal framework is provided by the Executive Decrees of 2013 mentioned above and the transposition of standards laid down in international instruments related to fisheries into the national legislation of Panama. The Fisheries Law currently in force dates back to 1959 and it is not yet aligned with the contemporary relevant international instruments to which Panama is a party and with other international standards related to fisheries that Panama has agreed to apply. Panama is still in the process of revision of the Fisheries Law, although Panama had been requested to update its Fisheries Law. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The current fisheries legal framework is provided by the Executive Decrees of 2013 mentioned above and the transposition of standards laid down in international instruments related to fisheries into the national legislation of Panama. The Fisheries Law currently in force dates back to 1959 and it is not yet aligned with the contemporary relevant international instruments to which Panama is a party and with other international standards related to fisheries that Panama has agreed to apply. Panama is still in the process of revision of the Fisheries Law, although Panama had been requested to update its Fisheries Law.

| (63) | In relation to the PSMA, information gathered by the Commission demonstrates that Panama has poorly implemented the provisions of this agreement. On July 2018, the VLADIVOSTOK 2000 (previous names: DAMANZAIHAO, LAFAYETTE, IMO No 7913622), a fish factory vessel listed in the SPRFMO IUU vessel list since 2015, was able to receive bunker supply in Panama. This is contrary to the PSMA and confirms that there is a lack of adequate implementation of the PSMA to effectively prevent IUU vessels from receiving port services in Panama. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In relation to the PSMA, information gathered by the Commission demonstrates that Panama has poorly implemented the provisions of this agreement. On July 2018, the VLADIVOSTOK 2000 (previous names: DAMANZAIHAO, LAFAYETTE, IMO No 7913622), a fish factory vessel listed in the SPRFMO IUU vessel list since 2015, was able to receive bunker supply in Panama. This is contrary to the PSMA and confirms that there is a lack of adequate implementation of the PSMA to effectively prevent IUU vessels from receiving port services in Panama.

| (64) | The Commission also found that inspectors are only present in one of the designated ports (Port of Vacamonte) and that inspections conducted in that port are not carried out properly. A review of the information available on board of a foreign-flagged vessel, which had already been inspected and authorised to land its catches, allowed the Commission to establish that this vessel had actually engaged in fishing activities without a licence in the waters of a third country, and that this evidence had not been detected by the inspectors who authorised the landing in Panama. Moreover, the Commission identified calls by foreign-flagged fishing vessels that were not included in the list foreign fishing vessels calling at port provided by Panama. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Commission also found that inspectors are only present in one of the designated ports (Port of Vacamonte) and that inspections conducted in that port are not carried out properly. A review of the information available on board of a foreign-flagged vessel, which had already been inspected and authorised to land its catches, allowed the Commission to establish that this vessel had actually engaged in fishing activities without a licence in the waters of a third country, and that this evidence had not been detected by the inspectors who authorised the landing in Panama. Moreover, the Commission identified calls by foreign-flagged fishing vessels that were not included in the list foreign fishing vessels calling at port provided by Panama.

| (65) | As described in paragraph (26), Panama is a member of the IATTC, ICCAT and CCAMLR and a cooperating non-contracting party to the WCPFC, the SPRFMO and the NEAFC. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

As described in paragraph (26), Panama is a member of the IATTC, ICCAT and CCAMLR and a cooperating non-contracting party to the WCPFC, the SPRFMO and the NEAFC.

| (66) | In accordance with Article 31(6)(c), the Commission analysed any act or omission by Panama that may have diminished the effectiveness of applicable laws, regulations or international conservation and management measures. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

In accordance with Article 31(6)(c), the Commission analysed any act or omission by Panama that may have diminished the effectiveness of applicable laws, regulations or international conservation and management measures.

| (67) | With regard to the fulfilment of Panama’s obligations as a Contracting Party or a Cooperating Non-Contracting Party in the RFMOs mentioned above, the Commission found that Panama has not been able to ensure that rules established in the framework of those RFMOs are complied with by its vessels. As mentioned in paragraph (39) above, a vessel engaged in fishing activities in the area of IATTC, known as ‘El Corralito’, during the period when this area was closed to fishing. This was in breach of the IATTC Resolution C-17-02. Moreover, as stated in paragraph (32) above, in 2016 two carrier vessels flagged to Panama conducted transhipments in the SPRFMO area whereas they were not on the SPRFMO Record of Vessels authorised to fish in the Convention Area. Furthermore, as mentioned in paragraph (34) above, a fishing vessel that was registered in Panama as a general cargo vessel since June 2018 was found to be engaged in IUU fishing activities in the first half of 2019 in an area covered by the CCAMLR Convention without a licence from ARAP. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

With regard to the fulfilment of Panama’s obligations as a Contracting Party or a Cooperating Non-Contracting Party in the RFMOs mentioned above, the Commission found that Panama has not been able to ensure that rules established in the framework of those RFMOs are complied with by its vessels. As mentioned in paragraph (39) above, a vessel engaged in fishing activities in the area of IATTC, known as ‘El Corralito’, during the period when this area was closed to fishing. This was in breach of the IATTC Resolution C-17-02. Moreover, as stated in paragraph (32) above, in 2016 two carrier vessels flagged to Panama conducted transhipments in the SPRFMO area whereas they were not on the SPRFMO Record of Vessels authorised to fish in the Convention Area. Furthermore, as mentioned in paragraph (34) above, a fishing vessel that was registered in Panama as a general cargo vessel since June 2018 was found to be engaged in IUU fishing activities in the first half of 2019 in an area covered by the CCAMLR Convention without a licence from ARAP.

| (68) | In view of the considerations presented in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the authorities of Panama, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (6) of the IUU Regulation, that Panama has failed to discharge all the duties incumbent upon it under international law with respect to international rules, regulations and conservation and management measures. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

In view of the considerations presented in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as all the statements made by the authorities of Panama, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(3) and (6) of the IUU Regulation, that Panama has failed to discharge all the duties incumbent upon it under international law with respect to international rules, regulations and conservation and management measures.

3.4.   Specific constraints of developing countries (Article 31(7) of the IUU Regulation)

| (69) | According to the United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI), (7) in 2018 Panama was considered a high human development country ranked 66 out of 189 countries. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

According to the United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI), (7) in 2018 Panama was considered a high human development country ranked 66 out of 189 countries.

| (70) | Account taken of the above UNHDI ranking and observations during the 2019 visits, no evidence suggests that the failure of Panama to discharge its duties under international law is the result of low levels of development. No tangible evidence exists to correlate shortcomings in fisheries legal framework, monitoring, control and surveillance, and traceability systems, with poor capacity and infrastructure. The Commission has responded positively to the requests made by Panama for support in the revision of the fisheries legal framework. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Account taken of the above UNHDI ranking and observations during the 2019 visits, no evidence suggests that the failure of Panama to discharge its duties under international law is the result of low levels of development. No tangible evidence exists to correlate shortcomings in fisheries legal framework, monitoring, control and surveillance, and traceability systems, with poor capacity and infrastructure. The Commission has responded positively to the requests made by Panama for support in the revision of the fisheries legal framework.

| (71) | In view of the considerations presented in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(7) of the IUU Regulation, that the development status and overall performance of Panama with respect to fisheries management are not impaired by its level of development, |
| --- | --- |

(71)

In view of the considerations presented in this Section and on the basis of all factual elements gathered by the Commission as well as the statements made by the country, it could be established, pursuant to Article 31(7) of the IUU Regulation, that the development status and overall performance of Panama with respect to fisheries management are not impaired by its level of development,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Sole Article

The Republic of Panama shall be notified of the possibility of being identified by the Commission as a non-cooperating third country in the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.

Done at Brussels, 12 December 2019.

For the Commission

Virginijus SINKEVIČIUS

Member of the Commission

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(1)  OJ L 286, 29.10.2008, p. 1.

1

(2)  OJ C 354, 17.11.2012, p. 1.

2

(3)  OJ C 364, 15.10.2014, p. 2.

3

(4)  https://treaties.un.org/

4

(5)  International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2001.

5

(6)  WCPFC TCC14 of September 2018 and SPRFMO CTC5 of January 2018.

6

(7)  http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update/download

7

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V Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Cedefop

| 15.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 13/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 13/16

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OPEN CALL FOR PROPOSALS – GP/DSI/ReferNet_FPA/001/20

ReferNet – Cedefop’s European Network of Expertise in Vocational Education and Training (VET)

(2020/C 13/07)

1.   Objectives and description

With the objective of establishing a European network of expertise in VET – ReferNet –, this call aims at selecting one applicant from Belgium, Czechia, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands with which Cedefop will conclude a 46-month framework partnership agreement (from 13 March 2020 to 31 December 2023), and at concluding with each successful applicant a specific grant agreement for a work plan to be carried out in 2020.

Founded in 1975 and based in Greece since 1995, the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) is an agency of the European Union (EU). Acknowledged as an authoritative source of information and expertise on VET, skills and qualifications, its mission is to support European vocational education and training (VET) policy development and contribute to its implementation.

ReferNet is Cedefop’s European network of expertise on VET. The mission devoted to ReferNet is to support Cedefop by reporting on national VET systems and policy developments and by raising the visibility of VET and Cedefop’s products. It comprises 30 members known as ReferNet national partners from EU Member States, Iceland and Norway. ReferNet national partners are key institutions involved in VET or labour market policies in the country they represent.

Framework partnership agreements are implemented through annual specific grant agreements. Therefore, applicants shall not only submit a proposal for the 46-month framework partnership (which, if successful, will lead to the signature of a Framework Partnership Agreement for the years 2020 to 2023, starting on 13 March 2020) but also the grant application for the 2020 action (which may lead to the signature of a Specific Grant Agreement for 10 months of the year 2020). The applicant must demonstrate its capacity to carry out all the activities foreseen over the 46-month period and ensure adequate co-financing for the implementation of the requested tasks.

2.   Budget and project duration

The estimated budget available for the four year duration of the framework partnership agreements amounts to EUR 4 000 000, depending on the annual decisions of the Budgetary Authority.

The total available budget for the 2020 annual work plan (project duration: 12 months) will be EUR 980 000 for the 30 partners (from the 28 EU Member States, Iceland and Norway).

The grant varies according to the country population and is awarded for carrying out an annual work plan. The total available budget for the 2020 work plan will be distributed on the basis of three country groups based on country population:

| — | Country group 1: Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Iceland. Maximum grant amount: EUR 23 615. |
| --- | --- |

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Country group 1: Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Iceland. Maximum grant amount: EUR 23 615.

| — | Country group 2: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and Norway. Maximum grant amount: EUR 33 625. |
| --- | --- |

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Country group 2: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and Norway. Maximum grant amount: EUR 33 625.

| — | Country group 3: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom (1). Maximum grant amount: EUR 43 620. |
| --- | --- |

—

Country group 3: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom (1). Maximum grant amount: EUR 43 620.

Since the annual action for ReferNet partners in Belgium, Czechia, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands is to last less than 12 months in 2020, the relevant grant as awarded will be lower than the above maximum per country during that year and will amount to EUR 33 258.

The Union grant is a financial contribution to the beneficiary’s (and/or co-beneficiaries’) costs which must be supplemented by own financial contribution and/or local, regional, national and/or private contributions. The total Union contribution shall not exceed 70 % of the eligible costs.

Cedefop reserves the right not to award the total budget available.

3.   Eligibility criteria

To be eligible, applicants should meet the following requirements:

| (a) | be a public or a private organisation, with a legal status and legal personality (natural persons, i.e. individuals, are not eligible); |
| --- | --- |

(a)

be a public or a private organisation, with a legal status and legal personality (natural persons, i.e. individuals, are not eligible);

| (b) | have their seat registered in a country where the grant is applied, i.e. in one of the following:






  — | EU-28 (Belgium, Czechia, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands). |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

have their seat registered in a country where the grant is applied, i.e. in one of the following:

—

EU-28 (Belgium, Czechia, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands).

4.   Deadline

Applications for the framework partnership agreement must be submitted at the latest on 14 February 2020.

5.   Further information

The detailed specifications of the call for proposals, the application form and its annexes will be available as from mid-January 2020 on Cedefop’s website at the following address:

http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/about-cedefop/public-procurement

Applications must comply with the requirements set out in the full text of the call and be submitted using the official forms provided.

The evaluation of proposals will be based on the principles of transparency and equal treatment.

All submitted applications will be evaluated by a committee of experts against the eligibility, exclusion, selection and award criteria defined in the full text version of the call.

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(1)  If the United Kingdom withdraws from the EU during the grant period without concluding any agreement with the EU ensuring in particular that British applicants continue to be eligible, these will cease to receive EU funding and be required to discontinue the project on the basis of Article II.17.2.2 q of the Framework Partnership Agreement, which shall be terminated.

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European Commission

| 15.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 13/18 |
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15.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 13/18

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Call for expressions of interest for the selection of a member of the European Fiscal Board

(2020/C 13/08)

1.   Background

On 21 October 2015, the Commission decided to establish an independent European Fiscal Board (‘the Board’) (1). The decision was taken in response to the recommendations of the ‘Five Presidents’ Report — Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. The Board is composed of a Chair and four Members. Its mission is to contribute in an advisory capacity to the exercise of the Commission’s functions in the multilateral fiscal surveillance of the euro area as set out in Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

One position of Member of the Board is vacant.

2.   The Board’s tasks

The Board is mandated to carry out the following tasks:

| (a) | It provides to the Commission an evaluation of the implementation of the Union fiscal framework, in particular regarding the horizontal consistency of the decisions and implementation of budgetary surveillance, cases of particularly serious non-compliance with the rules, and the appropriateness of the actual fiscal stance at euro area and national level. In this evaluation, the Board also makes suggestions for the future evolution of the Union fiscal framework. |
| --- | --- |

(a)

It provides to the Commission an evaluation of the implementation of the Union fiscal framework, in particular regarding the horizontal consistency of the decisions and implementation of budgetary surveillance, cases of particularly serious non-compliance with the rules, and the appropriateness of the actual fiscal stance at euro area and national level. In this evaluation, the Board also makes suggestions for the future evolution of the Union fiscal framework.

| (b) | It advises the Commission on the prospective fiscal stance appropriate for the euro area as a whole based on an economic judgment. It advises the Commission on the appropriate national fiscal stances that are consistent with its advice on the aggregate fiscal stance of the euro area within the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Where it identifies risks jeopardising the proper functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, the Board accompanies its advice with a specific consideration of the policy options available under the Stability and Growth Pact. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

It advises the Commission on the prospective fiscal stance appropriate for the euro area as a whole based on an economic judgment. It advises the Commission on the appropriate national fiscal stances that are consistent with its advice on the aggregate fiscal stance of the euro area within the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Where it identifies risks jeopardising the proper functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, the Board accompanies its advice with a specific consideration of the policy options available under the Stability and Growth Pact.

| (c) | It cooperates with the national fiscal councils as referred to in Article 6(1)(b) of Council Directive 2011/85/EU (2). The cooperation between the Board and the national fiscal councils aims particularly at exchanging best practices and facilitating common understanding on matters related to the Union fiscal framework. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

It cooperates with the national fiscal councils as referred to in Article 6(1)(b) of Council Directive 2011/85/EU (2). The cooperation between the Board and the national fiscal councils aims particularly at exchanging best practices and facilitating common understanding on matters related to the Union fiscal framework.

| (d) | On the request of the President of the Commission, the Board provides ad hoc advice. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

On the request of the President of the Commission, the Board provides ad hoc advice.

3.   Independence

The members of the Board are acting independently and shall neither seek nor take instructions from the Union’s institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body.

The Board has its own Secretariat for analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support. The Secretariat consist of the Head of Secretariat and other members that are attached, for administrative purposes, to the Secretariat-General of the Commission. The members of the secretariat take instructions only from the Board.

The members of the Board shall disclose any potential conflict of interest with respect to a particular assessment or opinion to the Chair, who shall take any appropriate measure, and may decide that the Member concerned shall not participate in the preparation and adoption of that assessment or opinion.

4.   Job description

Board Members contribute actively to the Board’s work and participate in its executive sessions. A Member will report to the Chair regarding her/his individual contribution. In particular, Board Members will:

| — | ensure the achievement of objectives and tasks for the successful delivery of the mandate entrusted to the Board while adhering to the highest qualitative and ethical standards, |
| --- | --- |

—

ensure the achievement of objectives and tasks for the successful delivery of the mandate entrusted to the Board while adhering to the highest qualitative and ethical standards,

| — | contribute to determining the priorities for the Board’s strategic planning, |
| --- | --- |

—

contribute to determining the priorities for the Board’s strategic planning,

| — | contribute to the development and improvement of analytical tools necessary to deliver the Board’s mandate. |
| --- | --- |

—

contribute to the development and improvement of analytical tools necessary to deliver the Board’s mandate.

Board Members are appointed for a period of three years, renewable once. The successful candidate will be appointed as Special Adviser (3) and remunerated on a per diem basis based at an AD 14 basic salary for the Members. It is expected that the Member dedicates around 40 full days per year to her/his respective responsibilities.

Travel and accommodation expenses incurred by the Member shall be reimbursed by the Commission upon claim with supporting documents in accordance with the provisions in force within the Commission. In addition, a daily allowance will be provided to cover other costs such as meals.

Expenses shall be reimbursed within the limits of the available appropriations allocated under the annual procedure for the allocation of resources.

5.   Eligibility criteria

To be considered for the selection phase, candidates must fulfil the following formal criteria by the closing date for applications:

| — | Professional experience (4): have at least 15 years’ post-graduate experience acquired after the qualification referred to below was obtained. |
| --- | --- |

—

Professional experience (4): have at least 15 years’ post-graduate experience acquired after the qualification referred to below was obtained.

| — | Relevant professional experience: of the 15 years of professional experience, to have acquired at least 10 years’ experience in domains relevant to area of macroeconomic policies, especially in the domain of fiscal policy and budgetary management. |
| --- | --- |

—

Relevant professional experience: of the 15 years of professional experience, to have acquired at least 10 years’ experience in domains relevant to area of macroeconomic policies, especially in the domain of fiscal policy and budgetary management.

| — | University degree or diploma:






  — | a level of education which corresponds to completed university studies, attested by a diploma, where the normal period of university education is four years or more, or |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

University degree or diploma:

—

a level of education which corresponds to completed university studies, attested by a diploma, where the normal period of university education is four years or more, or

| — | a level of education which corresponds to completed university studies, attested by a diploma, and appropriate professional experience of at least one year, where the normal period of university education is at least three years (this one year’s professional experience cannot be included in the post-graduate professional experience required above). |
| --- | --- |

—

a level of education which corresponds to completed university studies, attested by a diploma, and appropriate professional experience of at least one year, where the normal period of university education is at least three years (this one year’s professional experience cannot be included in the post-graduate professional experience required above).

| — | Languages: have a thorough knowledge of one of the official languages of the European Union and an adequate knowledge of at least another of these languages (5). |
| --- | --- |

—

Languages: have a thorough knowledge of one of the official languages of the European Union and an adequate knowledge of at least another of these languages (5).

| — | Nationality: be a citizen of a Member State of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

—

Nationality: be a citizen of a Member State of the European Union.

6.   Selection criteria

The following criteria will be taken into account when assessing applications:

| — | Proven and relevant competence and experience of the applicants demonstrating that they are respected international experts as regards macroeconomics, public finances, fiscal policy and budgetary management, |
| --- | --- |

—

Proven and relevant competence and experience of the applicants demonstrating that they are respected international experts as regards macroeconomics, public finances, fiscal policy and budgetary management,

| — | Deep understanding of the EU fiscal framework and its role for the functioning of the EU and EMU, |
| --- | --- |

—

Deep understanding of the EU fiscal framework and its role for the functioning of the EU and EMU,

| — | Proven and relevant competence and experience with economic policy making; preferably gained from work in policymaking institutions, policy-advising institutions or academia, |
| --- | --- |

—

Proven and relevant competence and experience with economic policy making; preferably gained from work in policymaking institutions, policy-advising institutions or academia,

| — | Knowledge of the EU institutions and EU decision-making processes and the role of the European Commission, |
| --- | --- |

—

Knowledge of the EU institutions and EU decision-making processes and the role of the European Commission,

| — | Experience in carrying out economic analysis from a horizontal, cross-country perspective would be an asset, |
| --- | --- |

—

Experience in carrying out economic analysis from a horizontal, cross-country perspective would be an asset,

| — | Ability to develop and implement a strategic vision, |
| --- | --- |

—

Ability to develop and implement a strategic vision,

| — | Outstanding sense of responsibility, resolve, initiative and integrity, and |
| --- | --- |

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Outstanding sense of responsibility, resolve, initiative and integrity, and

| — | Excellent oral and written communication skills in order to liaise, communicate and cooperate efficiently with internal and external stakeholders. Good knowledge of English will be essential. |
| --- | --- |

—

Excellent oral and written communication skills in order to liaise, communicate and cooperate efficiently with internal and external stakeholders. Good knowledge of English will be essential.

In the selection process the Commission will also endeavour to strike a balance in terms of representativeness of applicants, gender and geographical origin, taking account of the specific tasks of the European Fiscal Board and the type of expertise required.

7.   Application procedure

Each application must be completed in one of the official languages of the European Union, must clearly indicate the applicant’s nationality and include the necessary documentation.

Interested applicants are required to submit their applications in electronic format to the European Commission at the following address: EFB-Secretariat@ec.europa.eu

An application will be deemed admissible only if it is sent by the deadline and includes the documents referred to below. Supporting documents may be requested at a later stage.

Deadline for applications

Deadline for applications: 14 February 2020, midnight.

The Commission reserves the right to extend the closing date of this call for expression of interest by publication in the Official Journal of the European Union only.

Supporting documents

Each application shall include the following supporting documents:

| — | A cover letter explaining the motivation for answering this call, |
| --- | --- |

—

A cover letter explaining the motivation for answering this call,

| — | A curriculum vitae, |
| --- | --- |

—

A curriculum vitae,

| — | A statement listing possible conflicts of interest resulting from membership in the EFB with regard to other occupations held by the candidate. |
| --- | --- |

—

A statement listing possible conflicts of interest resulting from membership in the EFB with regard to other occupations held by the candidate.

8.   Selection procedure

The selection procedure will consist of an assessment of the applications against the criteria set out above, followed by the establishment of a list of most fitting applicants. Applicants considered most suitable may be invited for an interview before appointment decisions are made.

9.   Equal opportunities

The EFB will apply the policy of equal opportunities policy and will take care to avoid any form of discrimination in its recruitment procedures.

10.   Tentative timeline

It is envisaged to hold selection interviews in February 2020 and the estimated starting date is in May 2020.

For additional information please send an email to EFB-Secretariat@ec.europa.eu or call the Secretariat at the following number: +32 22962851.

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(1)  OJ L 282, 28.10.2015, p. 37 and OJ L 40, 17.2.2016, p. 15.

(2)  Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 41).

(3)  Article 3(5) of Commission Decision C(2015) 8000 provides that ‘the Chair and the Members of the Board shall be appointed as Special Advisors, whose status and remuneration are defined pursuant to Articles 5, 123 and 124 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants’.

(4)  Professional experience will be counted from the date on which the applicant acquired the minimum qualification for access to the profile in question.

(5)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:01958R0001-20130701&qid=1408533709461&from=EN

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PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

| 15.1.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 13/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.1.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 13/21

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Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.9594 — CMA CGM/CIMC Neocontainer/JV)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2020/C 13/09)

1.

On 7 January 2020, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1).

This notification concerns the following undertakings:

| — | CMA CGM S.A. (‘CMA CGM’, France), |
| --- | --- |

—

CMA CGM S.A. (‘CMA CGM’, France),

| — | China International Marine Containers Neocontainer Logistics, |
| --- | --- |

—

China International Marine Containers Neocontainer Logistics,

Limited (‘CIMC Neocontainer’, China).

CMA CGM and CIMC Neocontainer acquire(s) within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and 3(4) of the Merger Regulation joint control of the newly created joint venture (the ‘JV’).

The concentration is accomplished by way of purchase of shares in a newly created company constituting a joint venture.

2.

| — | for CMA CGM: a player in container liner shipping activities and port terminal services. CMA CGM is also active, through its wholly owned subsidiary CEVA Logistics, on the market for freight forwarding and contract logistics services, and provides a limited range of ancillary supply chain management services through its wholly owned subsidiary CMA CGM Inland Services, |
| --- | --- |

—

for CMA CGM: a player in container liner shipping activities and port terminal services. CMA CGM is also active, through its wholly owned subsidiary CEVA Logistics, on the market for freight forwarding and contract logistics services, and provides a limited range of ancillary supply chain management services through its wholly owned subsidiary CMA CGM Inland Services,

| — | for CIMC Neocontainer: a logistics company owned by CIMC Group, a comprehensive logistics service provider for logistics services and equipment operation services, |
| --- | --- |

—

for CIMC Neocontainer: a logistics company owned by CIMC Group, a comprehensive logistics service provider for logistics services and equipment operation services,

| — | for the JV: provision of services in container storage management, container handling and container repair, exclusively in Tianjin port in China. |
| --- | --- |

—

for the JV: provision of services in container storage management, container handling and container repair, exclusively in Tianjin port in China.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

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4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. The following reference should always be specified:

M.9594 — CMA CGM/CIMC Neocontainer/JV

Observations can be sent to the Commission by email, by fax, or by post. Please use the contact details below:

Email: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

Fax +32 22964301

Postal address:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

1

(2)  OJ C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.

2

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