Docket No. 92473–Agenda 12–May 2002.

JOHN H. STROGER, JR., et al., Appellees, v. THE REGIONAL  								TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed September 19, 2002.

	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

	In February 2000, plaintiffs, John H. Stroger, Jr., and Bernard

Scavella, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County for

declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, the Regional

Transportation Authority (RTA), the commuter rail division of the

RTA (METRA), and the suburban bus division of the RTA

(PACE). The complaint alleged that the statutory procedures

contained in the Regional Transportation Authority Act (Act) (70

ILCS 3615/1.01 et seq. (West 1998)) for appointment of the board of directors of RTA, METRA, and PACE violate the Illinois

Constitution of 1970. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary

injunction prohibiting defendants from making any further

appointments to the boards of directors under the provisions of the

Act. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant

to section 2–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS

5/2–615 (West 1998)), alleging failure to state a claim as a matter

of law. The Attorney General was granted leave by the circuit

court to intervene for the purpose of defending the constitutionality

of the Act. The Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint pursuant to section 2–619.1 of the Code (735 ILCS

5/2–619.1 (West 1998)), incorporating the allegations of

defendants’ section 2–615 motion and, in addition, alleging that

plaintiffs’ complaint was barred by laches because the Act had never been challenged on the grounds raised in the complaint. After

briefing and argument on the motions, the circuit court denied

plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and dismissed their

complaint on the basis that they had failed to state a cause of action

upon which relief could be granted. The appellate court reversed

the dismissal of the complaint and remanded for further

proceedings. 324 Ill. App. 3d 970. We granted defendants’ petition

for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

BACKGROUND

	In 1973, the General Assembly enacted the Act, creating the

RTA for the counties of Cook, Du Page, Kane, Lake, McHenry,

and Will. The Act’s purpose was to “provide for, aid and assist

public transportation in the northeastern area of the State *** by

providing for the creation of a single authority responsive to the

people and elected officials of the area and with the power and

competence to provide and facilitate public transportation ***.” Ill.

Rev. Stat., 1973 Supp., ch. 1112⁄3, par. 701.02(b). The Act provided for a board of directors for the RTA (RTA board),

comporised of nine directors. Four directors were to be appointed

by the mayor of Chicago, two directors were to be appointed by

members of the Cook County board elected from that part of Cook

County outside of Chicago, and two directors were to be

appointed by the chairmen of the county boards of the counties in

the metropolitan region outside Cook County. The chairman of the

RTA Bboard was to be chosen by the other eight directors. Ill. Rev.

Stat., 1973 Supp., ch. 1112⁄3, pars. 703.01(a) through (d). The Act required that the voters in the metropolitan region to be served by

the RTA approve its establishment in a special referendum election.

Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973 Supp., ch. 1112⁄3, par. 701.05. In Hoogasian v. Regional Transportation Authority, 58 Ill. 2d 117 (1974), this court upheld the validity of the referendum that was conducted in

March 1974 and upheld the constitutionality of the Act against

certain challenges.

	In 1983, the General Assembly amended the Act in response

to “[s]ubstantial, recurring deficits in the operations of public

transportation services subject to the jurisdiction of the Regional

Transportation Authority and periodic cash shortages” that had

occurred and which could bring about a loss of public

transportation services throughout the metropolitan region. 70

ILCS 3615/1.02(b)(i) (West 1998). The amendment provided for

additional state financial assistance and created METRA (70 ILCS

3615/3B.01 (West 1998)) and PACE (70 ILCS 3615/3A.01 (West

1998)), and established boards of directors for these new entities.

The amendment also changed the composition of and selection

process for the RTA Bboard. Currently, there are 13 directors of the

RTA Bboard, chosen as follows:

			“(a) Four Directors appointed by the Mayor of the City

of Chicago, with the advice and consent of the City

Council of the City of Chicago, and a fifth director who

shall be the Chairman of the Chicago Transit Authority.

Each such Director shall reside in the City of Chicago

except the Chairman of the Chicago Transit Authority may

live outside the City of Chicago.

			(b) Four Directors appointed by the members of the

Cook County Board elected from that part of Cook

County outside of Chicago, or, in the event such Board of

Commissioners becomes elected from single member

districts, by those Commissioners elected from districts, a

majority of the electors of which reside outside Chicago.

In either case, such appointment shall be with the

concurrence of four such Commissioners. Each such

Director shall reside in that part of Cook County outside

Chicago.

			(c) Two Directors appointed by the Chairmen of the

county boards of Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will

Counties, with the concurrence of not less than a majority

of the Chairmen from such counties, from nominees by the

Chairmen. Each such Chairman may nominate not more

than 2 persons for each position. Each such Director shall

reside in a county in the metropolitan region other than

Cook or DuPage Counties.

			(d) One Director shall be appointed by the Chairman of

the Board of DuPage County with the advice and consent

of the County Board of DuPage County and shall reside in

DuPage County.” 70 ILCS 3615/3.01(a) through (d)

(West 1998).

	Section 3.01(h) (70 ILCS 3615/3.01(h) (West 1998)) of the

Act provides in relevant part:

			“(h) The Board of Directors shall be so appointed as to

represent the City of Chicago, that part of Cook County

outside the City of Chicago, and that part of the

metropolitan region outside Cook County on the one man

one vote basis. After each Federal decennial census the

General Assembly shall review the composition of the Board and, if a change is needed to comply with this

requirement, shall provide for the necessary revision by

July 1 of the third year after such census.”

	The METRA board has seven directors. The appointments are

made by the mayor of Chicago (one appointment), suburban Cook

County commissioners from suburban-majority districts (three

appointments), Du Page County chairman (one appointment), and

chairmen of the other collar county boards (two appointments). 70

ILCS 3615/3B.02 (West 1998). The PACE board has 12 directors.

Appointment authority is allocated to the suburban Cook County

commissioners from suburban-majority districts (six appointments)

and to each of the chairmen of the collar county boards (five

appointments). Each PACE board member must be a chief

executive officer of a municipality within one of six regions

specified by the statute. The chairman of the PACE board is chosen

by a majority of the chairmen of the collar county boards and

members of the Cook County board elected from suburban-

majority districts. 70 ILCS 3615/3A.02 (West 1998).

	Plaintiff Stroger is president of the Cook County board of

commissioners and represents the fourth district of Cook County.

Plaintiff Scavella is a registered voter residing in Calumet City in

the fourth district. In count I of their complaint, plaintiffs alleged

that, because the Act removes the power to appoint directors from

the Cook County board’s chief executive officer and places it in the

legislative members of that board, the appointment provisions of

the Act relating to Cook County violate the separation of powers

doctrine contained in article II, section 1, of the constitution (Ill.

Const. 1970, art. II, §1). In count II of the complaint, plaintiffs

alleged that the transfer of appointment power from the Cook

County board president to certain legislative members of that board

constituted an unconstitutional change in the form of Cook County

government without a referendum, in violation of article VII,

section 6(f), of the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(f)).

Count III of the complaint alleged that the appointment provisions

of the Act violate the “"one person, one vote”" guarantee of the

constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2; art. III, §3), because

commissioners elected from Cook County districts where the

majority of residents reside inside Chicago (which is the case in the fourth district) are precluded from voting to appoint directors to

the RTA board. Thus, according to plaintiffs, only Cook County

board members from districts 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 may vote

for directors of the RTA board. Plaintiffs alleged that this

effectively disenfranchised Scavella and approximately 226,000

other voters, giving them no voice in the appointment of directors

to the RTA board.

	 The circuit court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The appellate court did not address plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments,

instead finding that the circuit court’s dismissal of the complaint

was premature. The court noted that section 3.01(h) of the Act

specifically requires that appointments be made on the one person,

one vote basis and that plaintiffs had alleged in their complaint that

the directors are not in fact so appointed. The court found it

unclear whether plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action. The

court noted that, at oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel had argued

that the appointment scheme had become “inequitable” since 1994

when Cook County board members began to be elected from

single- member districts. The court noted that this issue was not

addressed in the circuit court and “perhaps merits discussion.”

Therefore, the appellate court remanded the cause to the circuit

court for a hearing on the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint. 324

Ill. App. 3d at 979.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

	When the legal sufficiency of a complaint is challenged by a

section 2–615 motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded facts in the

complaint are taken as true and a reviewing court must determine

whether the allegations of the complaint, construed in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish a cause of action

upon which relief may be granted. Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 490 (1996). The question to be determined is

whether sufficient facts are contained in the pleadings, which, if

established, may entitle the plaintiff to relief. Urbaitis v. Commonwealth Edison, 143 Ill. 2d 458, 475 (1991). The appropriate standard of review is de novo. Neade v. Portes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 439 (2000).

II. Constitutional Principle of “One Person, One Vote”

	Despite the appellate court’s failure to address their

constitutional arguments, the parties argue, and we agree, that the

record is sufficient to permit this court to determine the

constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Act.

		“Legislation challenged in this court benefits from a

presumption of constitutionality. [Citation.]. Courts

examining the constitutional validity of a statute will

ordinarily apply the rational basis test. [Citation.]. Under

this test, a statute will be upheld if it bears a rational

relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose and is

neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. [Citation.].

 			Where challenged legislation implicates a fundamental

constitutional right, however, such as the right to vote, the

presumption of constitutionality is lessened and a far more

demanding scrutiny is required. [Citation.]. When the

means used by a legislature to achieve a legislative goal

impinge upon a fundamental right, the court will examine

the statute under the strict scrutiny standard. [Citation.].

Under a standard of strict scrutiny, the court must

conclude that the means employed by the legislature to

achieve a stated goal were necessary to advance a

compelling state interest. [Citation.]. In addition, the

statute must be narrowly tailored, that is, the legislature

must use the least restrictive means consistent with the

attainment of the legislative goal. [Citations.].” Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 304-05 (1996).

	We review de novo a circuit court’s decision regarding the constitutionality of a statute. People v. Jung, 192 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (2000).

 	The constitutional principle of “one person, one vote” derives

from two articles of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Article I,

section 2, provides that “[n]o person shall be *** denied the equal

protection of the laws.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2. Article III,

section 3, states that “[a]ll elections shall be free and equal.” Ill.

Const. 1970, art. III, §3. As this court has stated:

			“The principle of the one-man, one-vote doctrine, as

exemplified by Reynolds v. Sims, (1964), 377 IU.S. 533, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 84 S. Ct. 13623 [citation] , and the decisions stemming

from it, is that when a public office must be filled by

election, whether because of a constitutional mandate or

a legislative enactment, the method used shall be

reasonably designed to achieve the objective that the ‘vote

of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of

any other citizen in the State.’ ” ([Reynolds, [citation] 377 U.S. 533, 579, 12 L.

Ed. 2d 506, 537, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1390.). From this it

follows that when the determinative vote is to be cast by

electoral districts these must be ‘as nearly of equal

population as is practicable.’  377 U.S. 533, 577, 12 L. Ed.

2d 506, 536, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1390.” Eastern v. Canty, 75 Ill. 2d 566, 577-78 (1979)., quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 536, 84 S. Ct. at 1390.

	Defendants argue that the one person, one vote principle

applies only to elected officials. They rely on Eastern, in which this court rejected an argument that the one person, one vote principle

applied to a sanitary district board whose directors were appointed,

noting that the United States Supreme Court had never held that

appointed offices must be selected on the one person, one vote

principle. Rather, the Supreme Court had recognized the

constitutionality of filling offices by appointment, rather than

election, in such decisions as Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 18 L. Ed. 2d 650, 87 S. Ct. 1549 (1967), and Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 17 L. Ed. 2d 330, 87 S. Ct. 446 (1966). Eastern, 75 Ill. 2d at 578. Accordingly, this court concluded that no constitutional requirement exists that an appointed governing

body of a district be so constituted that a majority of its members

represent the more populous regions comprising the district.

Eastern, 75 Ill. 2d at 585.

	In Sailors, Michigan electors challenged the method of selecting members of the county school board. Voters elected

members of the local school boards, but the county school board

was chosen by delegates from the local school boards. Each local

board received one vote in the selection of the county board,

regardless of population or wealth. Plaintiffs argued that this

method of selection violated the principle of one person, one vote. Sailors, 387 U.S. at 106-07, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 652, 87 S. Ct. at 1551. The Supreme Court concluded that no constitutional reason

existed why state or local officers of a nonlegislative character may

not be chosen by appointment, rather than through election. The

court noted that while the Michigan county school boards

performed important functions, they were primarily administrative

in nature and, therefore, were not legislative in the “classical

sense.” Sailors, 387 U.S. at 108-110, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 653-54, 87 S. Ct. at 1552-53.

	 In Fortson, the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a provision of the Georgia constitution providing that

if no gubernatorial candidate received a majority of votes at a

general election, the Georgia legislature was to select the governor

by majority vote from the two candidates receiving the highest

number of popular votes. The court noted that the method chosen

by Georgia had been employed both before and since the

Revolutionary War. Fortson, 385 U.S. at 233-34, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 332-33, 87 S. Ct. at ___448.

	Plaintiffs argue that this court applied the one person, one vote

principle to an appointed body in Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54 (1990). In that case, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Chicago School Reform Act,

which decentralized the Chicago school system by creating local

school councils that were responsible for each grammar school and

high school. Each council was comporised of the principal of the

school and 10 elected members. The elected members were to

consist of: (1) six parents of children currently enrolled at the

school; (2) two community residents residing within the school’s

attendance center; and (3) two teachers employed at the school

served by the council. Each local school council elected one

member to sit on a subdistrict council. The statute set forth voter

eligibility requirements for participation in local school council

elections. Only parents of students enrolled at the school served by

the local school council could vote for the parent members of the

council; only school staff could vote for the teacher members; and,

only community residents residing within the school’s attendance

center could vote for the community members of the local school

council. However, with respect to community residents to be elected to the local school council of a multiarea school, the statute

provided that only the parents of students enrolled at that multiarea

school, the principal and the school staff could vote for the

community residents to be elected to the local school council for

that multiarea school. Accordingly, community residents who lived

in a multiarea attendance center and who did not have children

enrolled at the school could not vote for any local school council

members. In addition, community residents in single district

attendance centers could vote for only two members of the local

school council, while parents with children enrolled in the school

could vote for six members. Fumarolo, 142 Ill. 2d at 71-72.

	The plaintiffs in Fumarolo advanced an equal protection argument, asserting that the statute’s voter eligibility requirements

violated the one person, one vote principle. We concluded that the

local school councils were essential units of educational

governance, making important decisions regarding the Chicago

school system. Fumarolo, 142 Ill. 2d at 81. Thus, the statute’s voter eligibility provisions must satisfy the strict scrutiny test, i.e., they must be necessary to advance a compelling state interest and

must be narrowly tailored to achieve that end. We determined that

the restrictions on voting for local school council members were

not necessary to effect its purpose and were not the least restrictive

means of attaining the state’s goal. Fumarolo, 142 Ill. 2d at 90-934.

	The plaintiffs further argued in Fumarolo that because the local school council voting scheme violated the equal protection

clause, the method of selecting the board of education was also

unconstitutional. Under the statute, the mayor of Chicago

appointed members of the board of education, after receiving

recommendations from a nominating commission. The nominating

commission was comporised of five mayoral appointees and one

member from each of the 11 subdistrict councils. Among the

defendants’ arguments was that the nominating commission need

not be selected on the basis of one person, one vote because it was

an appointed body and not an elected body. Fumarolo, 142 Ill. 2d at 94-95. This court distinguished its Eastern decision and the decision of the Supreme Court in Sailors, noting that, in both those cases, there was no question that the members of the bodies

responsible for making the appointments were constitutionally selected. However, the subdistrict councils and the nominating

commission were comporised of and selected by the local school

councils, which were unconstitutionally elected bodies. Thus, the

members of the nominating commission who were selected by

members of the subdistrict councils were not properly selected.

Fumarolo, 142 Ill. 2d at 99.

	Plaintiffs attempt to apply Fumarolo to the instant case by arguing that the commissioners who make appointments to the

RTA board constitute a distinct appointing body and, like the local

school councils in Fumarolo, those commissioners must be elected on the one person, one vote basis. While plaintiffs do not dispute

that each member of the Cook County board of commissioners is

constitutionally elected by the voters of his or her district, they

argue that it is not the Cook County board of commissioners that

appoints the RTA directors but, rather, a subgroup of seven

commissioners who have the authority to make appointments on

behalf of all suburban Cook County voters, including plaintiff

Scavella. Plaintiffs argue that the RTA board exercises broad and

general governmental powers throughout its jurisdiction, making

important budgetary and administrative decisions that affect the

entire region served by the RTA. Thus, they reason, it must be

appointed by a body that is itself constitutionally elected.

	We reject plaintiffs’ contention that the Act creates an

additional unit of government in the seven commissioners

empowered to make appointments to the RTA board. Fumarolo does not support this argument. In that case, the statute specifically

created three separate entities–local school councils, subdistrict

councils, and the nominating commission. Only members of the

local school councils were to be elected by voters. In contrast, the

Act does not create a separate body within the Cook County board

of commissioners. It provides for appointment of RTA board of

directors based upon the proportional population of the region to

be served by the RTA. It is true that not all commissioners

participate in the appointment of directors to the RTA board.

However, they do not, simply due to that fact, constitute a

separate, recognizable entity under the Act that must be elected on

the one person, one vote basis. Plaintiffs have cited no persuasive

authority in support of their argument. Each of the members of the Cook County board of commissioners is, as plaintiffs have

conceded, constitutionally elected. Thus, the appointment

provisions of the Act do not abridge plaintiffs’ fundamental

constitutional right to vote.

	Because the appointment provisions here neither affect a

fundamental right nor involve a suspect classification, the

appropriate standard for our review of plaintiffs’ constitutional

challenge is the rational basis test. Under this test,“[a] legislative

classification must be upheld if any set of facts can reasonably be

conceived which justify distinguishing the class to which the statute

applies from the class to which the law is inapplicable.” Miller, 196 Ill. 2d at 59. Whether the course chosen by the legislature to

achieve a desired result is wise or is the best means available is not

a proper subject of judicial inquiry. Garcia v. Tully, 72 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1978).

	Prior to enactment of the Act, public transportation in

northeastern Illinois was in a shambles. Receipts from fares were

inadequate to sustain services. The Chicago Transit Authority

announced that it would have to either raise fares or cut services.

The suburban bus companies were about to cease business because

of inadequate funds to meet payrolls and pay for fuel. The

commuter railroads had requested substantial fare increases from

the Illinois Commerce Commission. There was a consensus that

something had to be done. While agreement existed that the agency

to be responsible for transportation should cover the six-county

area of northeastern Illinois, other issues remained. As one

commentator phrased it:

			“Besides financing, other differences of opinion centered

on the structure, powers and control of the proposed

agency. Would it be an operations type of agency or

would it be an ‘arm’s length’ unit of government which

would provide funding but not the operations staff to be

involved in day-to-day operations? Would it represent

truly regional interests and do so from a consumer-

oriented perspective? What kind of powers would be

delegated by the legislature? Would it be a strong agency

or a weak agency? How would the City of Chicago,

suburban Cook and the five outlying counties be represented on the Board of Directors? What types of

checks and balances could be utilized to maintain control

of the Board in a balance reflecting the diverse political,

ethnic, social and economic interests found in the six-

county region?” J. Tecson, The RTA in Northeastern Illinois, Part I, Chi. cago B B.ar Rec.ord 318, 334 (JulyMay-June-August  1975). 

	The composition of and selection process for the RTA board

was the General Assembly’s response to the need to balance the

varying interests of the diverse region to be served by the RTA.

We cannot say that the appointment provisions of the Act are not

rationally related to the legitimate state interest of providing safe,

efficient, and affordable public transportation in the northeastern

region of Illinois. While it is true that the Cook County board of

commissioner elected by Scavella does not have the power to

appoint any directors to the RTA board, the interests of Scavella

and the 226,000 others identified by him are nonetheless served by

those directors on the RTA board who are appointed by other

commissioners, a majority of whose constituents reside in suburban

Cook County. Accordingly, we conclude that the appointment

provisions of the Act satisfy the rational basis test and we reject

plaintiffs’ constitutional argument.

III. Statutory “One,  Person, One Vote” Provision

	Plaintiffs argue that, even if the constitutional principle of one

person, one vote does not apply to appointments to the RTA

board, the statute itself requires that those appointments be made

on a one person, one vote basis. Plaintiffs refer us to section

3.01(h) of the Act, quoted above.

	The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to

the intent of the legislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used

in the statute itself and that language must be given its plain and

ordinary meaning. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177. The statute should be construed as a whole and, if possible, in a manner such that no

term is rendered meaningless or superfluous. Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998). Where the meaning of a statute is unclear from a reading of its language,

courts may look beyond the language of the statute and consider the purpose of the law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and the

legislative history behind it. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 542-43 (1997).

	Plaintiffs argue that the plain meaning of this statutory

provision is that the appointments to the RTA board are to be

made on the one person, one vote basis. Otherwise, according to

plaintiffs, the provision would have no meaning. Defendants

contend that the plain meaning of this provision requires the

General Assembly to determine after each federal decennial census

whether the board appointment process needs to be adjusted to

account for population shifts within the region to be served by the

RTA.

	The one person, one vote provision of the Act has existed

since the Act’s inception in 1973 (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973 Supp., ch.

1112⁄3, par. 703.01(g)). In addition, the Act has always contemplated that Cook County may adopt single member districts,

stating that, in the event this occurs, the directors of the RTA

board allocated to that part of Cook County outside of Chicago

shall be appointed by those commissioners elected from districts,

a majority of the electors of which reside outside Chicago. Ill. Rev.

Stat., 1973 Supp., ch. 1112⁄3, par. 703.01(b)). We disagree with plaintiffs’ contention that, unless the one person, one vote

provision is applied as they urge, it would have no meaning. The

area served by the RTA consists of three core constituencies:

Chicago, the Cook County suburbs, and the collar counties. The

appointment scheme for the RTA board reflects the proportional

population of those regions. Thus, Chicago has five appointments,

the Cook County suburbs have four, and the collar counties have

three. Section 3.01(h) simply directs the General Assembly to

review the appointment provisions after each federal decennial

census to ensure that the representation on the RTA board for each

of the RTA’s three regions remains proportional to the population

of those regions. The statute does not require that the RTA board

itself be appointed on the one person, one vote basis. 

IV. Separation of Powers

	Plaintiffs contended in their complaint that the appointment

provisions of the Act violate the separation of powers doctrine found in article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution. That

section provides that the legislative, executive, and judicial

branches of government are separate and that no branch shall

exercise powers properly belonging to another. Ill...inois Const. 1970,

art. II, §1. The basis for plaintiffs’ argument is that the Act

deprives the president of the Cook County board of his “inherent

appointment authority.”

	Article VII, section 4(a), of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.

Const. 1970, art. VII, §4(a)) provides for the election by each

county of a chief executive officer, who shall have the duties and

powers provided by law and by county ordinance. Pursuant to

Aarticle VII, section 4(b), the president of the Cook County board

shall be elected from the county at large and shall be the chief

executive officer of the county. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §4(b).

	Plaintiffs argue that the office of Cook County board president

is similar to the office of Governor and that, therefore, the powers

of the two offices are equivalent. However, plaintiffs overlook the

fact that article V, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.

1970, art. V, §9(a)) specifically grants to the Governor the power

to “nominate and *** appoint all officers whose election or

appointment is not otherwise provided for.” The constitution

contains no provision setting forth the powers of the president of

the Cook County board. Plaintiffs also argue that the president of

the Cook County board has inherent, executive authority to

appoint members of the RTA board. They contend that this

authority derives from the fact that the president is a constitutional

officer. However, the precedent they cite does not support their

argument. At issue in Dunne v. County of Cook, 164 Ill. App. 3d 929, 936 (1987), were ordinances in which Cook County

commissioners gave themselves the right to hire and fire members

of their personal staffs. A statute gave the board president power

to appoint all officers and employees of Cook County except those

whose election or appointment was otherwise provided for by law.

The circuit court held these ordinances an unconstitutional attempt

to change the form of county government without a referendum in

violation of the home rule provision of the Illinois Constitution.

The appellate court affirmed, noting that appointment of the employees in question was not governed by any law and, thus, the

appointment power belonged to the president of the board.

	People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Beck, 54 Ill. 2d 561 (1973), involved a challenge to the authority of the Cook County board to

transfer certain functions from the county clerk to the newly

created office of county comptroller. The plaintiff argued that the

county clerk was a constitutionally created office and, as such, was

protected from elimination. This court held the transfer lawful,

noting that the duties sought to be transferred were not derived

from common law or constitutionally delegated to the office of

county clerk. Beck, 54 Ill. 2d at 566-67. People ex rel. Hansen v. Phelan, 255 Ill. App. 3d 113 (1993), also cited by plaintiffs, is not precedential because this court vacated the circuit and appellate

court judgments in that case (People ex rel. Hansen v. Phelan, 158 Ill. 2d 445 (1994)).

	It is well settled that the method of appointment, other than of

constitutional officers, is a matter solely within the discretion of the

legislative branch. Betts v. Village of Calumet Park, 20 Ill. 2d 524, 526 (1960). “[T]he power to appoint to office is not inherent in the

executive department unless conferred by the Cconstitution or the

Llegislature ***[.] *** [T]he creation of officers, the delegation and

regulation of the powers and duties of officers and the prescribing

of the manner of their appointment or election are legislative

functions, which are restrained only by the Constitution.” People ex rel. Gullett v. McCullough, 254 Ill. 9, 16 (1912). Thus, this court has upheld statutes providing for appointment authority in

persons other than a chief executive. See, e.g., Betts, 20 Ill. 2d 524 (statute providing for appointment of village officers by village

board of trustees upheld against separation of powers challenge); People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 Ill. 77 (1945) (statute requiring approval by mayor of Chicago of gubernatorial

appointments to legislatively created transit authority upheld

against separation of powers challenge); People ex rel. Dunham v. Morgan, 90 Ill. 558 (1878) (separation of powers challenge rejected where statute provided for appointments to board of park

commissioners by circuit judge).

	As stated, our constitution does not confer on the president of

the Cook County board any specific powers. Thus, the Act does not deprive the president of any inherent appointment powers to

the RTA board. We hold that the appointment provisions of the

Act do not violate the constitutional principle of separation of

powers.

V. Change of Cook County Government Without Referendum

	Plaintiffs argue that the Act’s appointment provisions violate

the provisions of article VII, section 6(f), of the Illinois

Constitution. Article VII sets forth the powers of home rule units.

Section 6(f) states that a home rule unit may, subject to approval

by referendum, adopt, alter, or repeal a form of government

provided by law. Plaintiffs contend that the Act “effectively

removes the power to appoint RTA board members from the chief

executive and transfers that power to a subgroup of the legislative

arm of the Board of Commissioners.” However, as we have already

held, the president of the Cook County board has no inherent

power to appoint directors of the RTA board. The legislature was

within its authority to establish the RTA and provide for its

governance.

	We further note that article VII, section 6(f), provides that a home rule unit has the power to adopt, alter, or repeal a form of government. This language, which is clear on its face, applies only

to actions taken by home rule units, not to acts of the General

Assembly. Plaintiffs point to no authority holding to the contrary.

We therefore conclude that the appointment provisions of the Act

do not contravene article VII, section 6(f), of the constitution.

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the

appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.

	J	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.