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Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
About the CCRP

The Command and Control Research Program

(CCRP) has the mission of improving DoD’s

understanding of the national security implications of

the Information Age. Focusing upon improving both

the state of the art and the state of the practice of

command and control, the CCRP helps DoD take full

advantage of the opportunities afforded by emerging

technologies. The CCRP pursues a broad program

of research and analysis in information superiority,

information operations, command and control

theory, and associated operational concepts that

enable us to leverage shared awareness to improve

the effectiveness and efficiency of assigned

missions. An important aspect of the CCRP program

is its ability to serve as a bridge between the

operational, technical, analytical, and educational

communities. The CCRP provides leadership for the

command and control research community by:

• articulating critical research issues;

• working to strengthen command and control

research infrastructure;

• sponsoring a series of workshops and

symposia;

• serving as a clearing house for command and

control related research funding; and

• disseminating outreach initiatives that include

the CCRP Publication Series.
This is a continuation in the series of publications

produced by the Center for Advanced Concepts and

Technology (ACT), which was created as a “skunk

works” with funding provided by the CCRP under the

auspices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(C3I). This program has demonstrated the

importance of having a research program focused

on the national security implications of the

Information Age. It develops the theoretical

foundations to provide DoD with information

superiority and highlights the importance of active

outreach and dissemination initiatives designed to

acquaint senior military personnel and civilians with

these emerging issues. The CCRP Publication

Series is a key element of this effort.

Check our Web site for the latest CCRP activities and publications.

www.dodccrp.org
DoD Command and Control Research Program

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)

&

CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

Mr. John P. Stenbit

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)

Dr. Linton Wells, II

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASD(C3I)

&

DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND STRATEGIC PLANNING

Dr. David S. Alberts

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within

are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the

views of the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government

agency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without

further permission, with credit to the DoD Command and Control

Research Program, Washington, D.C. Courtesy copies of reviews

would be appreciated.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Big Issue : Command and Combat in the Information Age (A View

from Upavon) / edited by David Potts.

p. cm.

ISBN 1-893723-10-0 (pbk.)

1. Great Britain. Army. 2. Military doctrine--Great Britain. 3. Operational

art (Military science) 4. Military art and science--Great Britain. 

5. Information warfare. 6. Command and control systems--Great Britain.

I. Potts, David. II. Title.

UA649.B49 2003

355.02--dc21

2003000263

February 2003
THE BIG ISSUE: 

COMMAND AND COMBAT 

IN THE INFORMATION AGE

EDITED BY

DAVID POTTS

Information Age Transformation Series
Photographs

All of the photographs used in this publication were

drawn from the Royal Navy, Army, and Royal Air

Force picture libraries, or were provided courtesy of

UK Joint Force Headquarters, or the Media

Operations Group in Headquarters Land

Command.

* * *

Reprint Information

This work was originally developed and released as

SCSI Occasional Paper Number 45 (March 2002)

and was designed and typeset by

The British Army Review, 

Published by the

Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 

Printed in the United Kingdom under arrangements

of Astron Document Services.
i

Table of Contents

1. Introduction.......................................................1

Part One: Philosophy

2. Tomorrow’s War - an analysis of the nature of

future conflict. 

David Potts.........................................................9

3. No Revolutions Please, We’re British - a

consideration of the nature of the contemporary

Revolution in Military Affairs and the innate

British reluctance to embrace it. 

David Potts and Jake Thackray .......................29

4. The Holy Grail - the anticipated benefits of the

application of information age technology to

military command and control systems. 

Jake Thackray..................................................43

5. Neo Heroic Command - the ‘mask of command’

in the information age. 

David Potts.......................................................59

6. A Command Philosophy for the Information

Age - the continuing relevence of mission

command. 

Jim Storr...........................................................77

7. The Commander as Expert - harnessing

intuitive judgement. 

Jim Storr...........................................................95
Part Two: Possibilities

8. The Commander-Centric Approach -

philosophical principles for command structures

fit for the information age. 

Jake Thackray ................................................115

9. Beyond Interoperability: Part 1 - new

imperatives and challenges at the tactical level. 

Tim Blad and David Potts ..............................139

10. Beyond Interoperability: Part 2 - information

sharing post 11 September. 

Paul Lefever.................................................151

11. The Divine Threads - the intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance ‘system of

systems’. 

Graham Le Fevre.........................................167

12. 3D Vision - exploiting the third dimension. 

Graham Le Fevre.........................................177

13. The Case for Manned Reconnaissance.

Graham Le Fevre and John Thornton .........189

14. The Delilah Factor – new vulnerabilities in the

information age. 

David Potts...................................................199

ii
Part Three: Prognosis

15. Tactical Combat with the New C4ISTAR.

David Potts ...................................................211

16. Whither the Close Battle?

Richard Cousens..........................................229

17. Asymmetric Warfare - the new face of warfare

in the 21st Century. 

John Russell.................................................243

18. Once Upon a Time in the Future - a fictional

account of a possible future conflict. 

Jake Thackray..............................................267

* * *

Afterword - the Imperative for new thinking.

David Potts ....................................................315

Glossary of Acronyms .....................................321

About the Authors............................................329

iii
1

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

By David Potts

This Occasional considers command and combat

in the information age. It is an issue that takes us

into the realms of the unknown. Defence thinkers

everywhere are searching forward for the science

and alchemy that will deliver operational success.

They must reconcile the tantalising possibilities of

technology with the enduring nature of the most

demanding aspects of combat, framed by post-Cold

War strategic realities. A small team in the British

Army's conceptual 'think tank', the Directorate

General Development and Doctrine, located at

Upavon on Salisbury Plain, has been working

together on this issue for some 18 months. Whilst

nobody has any certain answers, their views

represent some of the current forward thinking within

the British Army. 

They argue that the information age will be defined

as much by the blossoming of regional conflict and

global terrorism as by the technology. However, the

technology offers us the potential to change the way

we choose to fight and this notion lies at the core of

the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. But, by

delivering a military hegemony to the United States,

the RMA may have acted as a catalyst for even

deeper and more fundamental change. Stronger
forces may be at work, which will, in a genuinely

revolutionary way, redefine the nature of war and

consequently the capabilities required to wage it.

Either way, the facts are inescapable - the age we

live in demands Armed Forces characterised by new

thinking, new concepts, new doctrine, new tactics

and new organisations, fired by committed

leadership and enabled by state of the art

information age technology. 

Part One addresses a range of philosophical issues.

in the opening scene, Tomorrow's War, the editor

explores the nature of future conflict and the fragility

of many of our current assumptions. He also

provides some insights into the nature of tactical

engagements in the information age. In No

Revolution Please, We're British, he and Jake

Thackray analyse the nature of RMAs and the innate

British reluctance to acknowledge or embrace them.

This has a potentially incalculable opportunity cost

that we have paid dearly once or twice in our military

history. Jake then goes on to describe The Holy Grail

of a fully digitised and networked command system

and the potential benefits it could yield. 

John Keegan argued that the 'mask of command' in

the Cold War, nuclear age was 'Post-heroic', in Neoheroic Command the editor picks up on this theme

and examines the mask of command in the

information age. Jim Storr then rounds off this

section with two pieces. The first on Command

Philosophy argues that Mission Command is

enduring and is indeed a pre-requisite for the

successful exploitation of information age command

systems. In the second he stresses the importance

2 The Big Issue
of seeing the Commander as Expert decision-maker.

He analyses how decisions are actually made and

argues the importance of harnessing and developing

intuitive judgement. 

Part Two highlights the possiblities and some of the

challenges. Jake Thackray opens by describing A

Commander-centric Approach to future command

structures and investigates a range of issue such as

span of command, hierarchies, the evolution of

echelons, deputies, and the impact of reaching back

to the home base to draw on support there. 

Tim Blad then discusses issues that take us Beyond

Interoperability at the tactical level, including the

disparity that will exist between digitised and nondigitised forces and the inherent frictions of multinationality. In a related piece, Paul Lefever

examines information-sharing post-11 September

and considers the issues this raises at the strategic

inter-governmental level. 

In The Divine Threads Graham Le Fevre exposes

the architecture and command and control (C2)

arrangements required to exploit our investment in

new Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition

and Reconnaissance assets. He then offers an

exciting 3D Vision of the potentially revolutionary

impact that aerial surveillance systems will have on

how we understand the battlespace. This leads into

The Case for Manned Reconnaissance, co-authored

with John Thornton, in which the continuing

requirement for manned reconnaissance is

explained and asserted. 

Chapter 1 3
The last morsel in this section is The Delilah Factor,

an editorial piece on the new vulnerabilities that

reliance on digital systems will bring and some of the

challenges posed by Network-centric Warfare.

Part Three offers a prognosis for the future - if the

visions expounded in Part Two materialise and the

challenges are substantially overcome, what then?

Tactical Combat with the new C4ISTAR depicts the

profound impact these new systems might have on

how we will fight and offers insights for the future of

land force and joint tactical combat. In Whither the

Close Battle, Richard Cousens examines the British

love affair with the close battle and concludes that

this aspect of combat will change fundamentally in

ways that will impact upon the very structure of the

Army. John Russell then offers an immensely

important and thought provoking piece on

Asymmetric Warfare, which he argues is the true

face of battle in the 21st Century. Jake Thackray

rounds off with Once Upon a Time in the Future, a

fictional narrative of a future conflict. It is not a flight

of fancy, as Jake has tried to depict capabilities that

will actually be in-service in 10 years or so. Inevitably

some will find the scenario conservative, others

unlikely, but Jake has succeeded in bringing

together many of the threads of argument in the

preceding pieces in a lively, imaginative and

interesting way.

Finally, the short Afterword challenges conventional

wisdom and underscores the imperative for new

thinking. The Big Issue can be dipped into, or read

from cover to cover. There is something for

everyone, whether an armchair theorist, a planner,

4 The Big Issue
capability developer, 'warfighter', technocrat,

bureaucrat, academic, or interested layman. It soars

through strategy and policy and swoops down on

relevant tactical and procedural detail. Think of it as

a ball - it has now been passed to you - if you run

with any of the ideas herein, the pass will have been

worth the making. 

Chapter 1 5
PART ONE

Tomorrow’s War

No Revolutions Please, We’re

British

The Holy Grail

Neo-heroic Command

A Command Philosophy for the

Information Age

The Commander as Expert
CHAPTER 2

TOMORROW’S WAR

By David Potts

‘There was black dust along the roadway from

the bridge onwards and it grew thicker in Fulham.

The streets were horribly quiet....I saw altogether

about a dozen [dead bodies] in the length of the

Fulham Road....the black powder covered over

them...one or two had been disturbed by dogs’. 

H G Wells1

Who has seen tomorrow’s war? No one.

However, we have had glimpses of its various

scenes, acted out on a global stage and etched into

the public imagination by an all-pervasive media.2 Its

manifestations have taken many forms in its varied

appearances from the Gulf to Rwanda, Somalia, the

Balkans, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, Palestine and

now Afghanistan. But amid scenes of chaos,

barbarism and traditional courage – the defining

characteristic of warfare in the information age is the

real-time coordination of numerous weapons over

great distances, creating an unprecedented combat

capability – something that has been unimaginable

prior to the emergence of information age

technology. But although technology can confer

great advantage, it cannot of itself determine the

nature, course or outcome of war. There is no easy

9
formula for war now or in the future – ‘there are in

warfare no constant conditions’.3

But what of the events of 11 September – a blip, or

the face of wars to come? For a moment it seemed

that the fatal hijackings and coincident anthrax

attacks threatened to catapult the world into some

ghastly synthesis of the information age and the

plague ridden middle ages? Perhaps they are simply

the manifestation of so-called ‘asymmetry’4 –

essentially unconventional forces, tactics and

techniques applied against our vulnerabilities and to

obviate our strengths? The short answer is that we

do not know – yet. Time will tell, as John Updike

observed in the immediate aftermath – we will only

really understand the true significance of 11

September when we look back on it from some

years in the future.5 Stock prices have recovered

remarkably quickly, much more quickly than after

Pearl Harbour, to which 11 September is inevitably

compared. Perhaps even more remarkable is the

speed with which the US, with a little help from some

friends, not least the Northern Alliance, has brought

down the Taleban regime in Afghanistan – a country

most would have imagined was beyond its effective

strategic reach, in view of its position in central Asia

and the unhappy experience there of Britain and the

Soviet Union. If nothing else, the events of 11

September have brought into sharp focus a

reminder of the horrors of war – the unthinkable is

possible, no contingency is too awful to envisage

and no home base is inviolate. 

But the threats and challenges defence forces faced

on 10th September have not gone away. There will

10 The Big Issue
be no clearly definable, two-dimensional battlefield –

there will be a battlespace. It is potentially truly

global: it stretches from wherever our forces are

deployed, back through their lines of communication

to the home base of all participants and embraces

anywhere abroad where we have interests and

vulnerabilities that can be attacked or exploited by a

ruthless adversary. It encompasses the land, the

high seas, the ocean depths, airspace, space, cyberspace, the electro-magnetic spectrum, and the

minds of men. Consequently, military operations

have become infinitely more complex, but they have

also retained many enduring features. 

The ‘spectrum of conflict’ is no longer (if it ever was)

a neat, easily comprehended linear escalator – with

peace at one end and war at the other – it is a

continuum within which lie a range of military and

non-military conflict prevention, conflict and post

conflict activities.6 The distinction between these is

blurred and it is possible to conduct all three forms of

operation simultaneously in the same theatre of

operations. Such a view is coherent with Krulak’s

vision of the 3-Block War7 – in which we find

humanitarian, peace keeping and warfighting

operations being conducted at the same time and in

the space of three city blocks. Some now question

whether conventional force on force warfighting is

likely to be a reality in the future. The answer is a

resounding yes, but it will be very different and is

highly likely to include the elements of the 3-Block

War and asymmetry, mixed together and spread like

a bloody jam. The implied polarity in some British

military thinking that distinguishes between

warfighting and other operations as alternatives is

Chapter 2 11
misleading: they will occur simultaneously, in the

same theatre of operations, or in different, but linked

theatres as part of the same conflict and in wholly

unpredictable circumstances. Vietnam is an

indicative model with force on force warfighting and

revolutionary guerrilla warfare occurring

simultaneously. However, the difference post 11

September, is that we must expect our enemies to

also attack our home base and our friends and

interests around the world in horrific and novel ways

and on a scale that we are only beginning to imagine

– some Chinese writings describe this as

‘Unrestricted Warfare’.8

Unrestricted Warfare is actually a very wide

concept that goes beyond violent action and can

occur outside the moral boundaries the West has

set for the conduct of its wars. It encompasses

‘non-military war operations’ to embrace cyber

attack, economic, monetary, social, political,

cultural, psychological and ecological dimensions

as well as ‘new terror war’ (the synthesis of

maniacal terrorism and weapons of mass

destruction). It transcends all boundaries and

limits. It is, paradoxically, the logical response to

the US military hegemony delivered by the socalled Revolution in Military Affairs. The West’s

seeming invincibility in symmetric ‘conventional’

combat means that any canny foe (and we must

assume they are all canny) will seek to fight us on

terms of his, rather than our, choosing and that this

will include a range of techniques that will be as

appalling as they are effective and unforeseen. 

12 The Big Issue
However, while some potential adversaries will

operate without constraint, legal and moral

constraints have had, rightly, an increasing influence

on the conduct of operations by Western forces. But,

warfare has now become constrained in a somewhat

ritualistic construct in which almost no one is to get

killed. Collateral damage, the killing of innocent third

parties (usually civilians) or the destruction of

schools, hospitals and other humanitarian icons is

strictly taboo, while avoiding the loss of lives

amongst own forces has become, in some cases, an

obsession that constrains commanders. Most

bizarrely of all is an increasing squeamishness at the

idea of killing the enemy – examples of this moral

confusion abound from reactions to the sinking of

the Belgrano, to the Gibraltar killings and the Basra

Highway. All this barely a generation after the US

and UK carpet bombed German cities and the US

dropped a uranium bomb on Hiroshima and a

plutonium bomb over Nagasaki.9

The current web of rules of engagement and the

expectation of near-bloodless conflict are merely

manifestations of mankind’s eternal struggle to

impose some rules and order on the most terrible of

all human activity. These rules vary from generation

to generation and are, inevitably the product of many

factors: the art of the possible offered by the

available means, the moral basis of the cultures

engaged in the conflict and, crucially, the stakes –

the higher the stakes, the less constrained we

become. Our own antecedents have acted outside

accepted boundaries on many occasions. In the

middle ages, for example, a code of chivalry

regulated the conduct of knights and the treatment

Chapter 2 13
they could expect from their enemies. The code was

shattered by the unchivalrous10 use of massed

archers by the English from Crecy onwards and,

later at Agincourt, slaying, rather than ransoming,

captured French knights. While in their War of

Independence the American rebels’ use of ambush

and hit and run tactics placed them entirely beyond

the Pale at that time.11

We cannot assume that our enemies will abide by

our own moral codes, indeed we should assume the

contrary and expect them to ruthlessly exploit our

own constraints and sensibilities. Nor can we

assume that our current legalistic construct will

endure – faced with a clear and recognised threat of

sufficient proportions it is quite conceivable that the

West would adapt or break its own rules. Despite the

civilising influence of the Ottawa convention, other

horrific weapons will remain, or appear, in the

arsenals of many conventional and unconventional

forces – laser damage weapons optimised to blind

opponents, chemical and biological weapons, flame

and fuel/air explosives to name but a few. With or

without rules, the information age battlespace will be

a terrible place to be. 

Causes of war abound today and will do so in the

future, barring the realisation of some Utopian

vision. An increasing world population will, inevitably,

continue to battle for decreasing natural resources –

whether water, oil, minerals, or any of the other

elements necessary to sustain industrial or postindustrial economies and with hideously inequitable

consumption. The great question of our century will

be ‘what to do about Lazarus?’. We can no longer

14 The Big Issue
throw him scraps from our table. In the information

age, even the poorest peoples access information

and know that we in the West are enjoying a most

sumptuous banquet. Without a seismic shift in

wealth, education and opportunity towards the

developing world, the scope for genuine grievances

escalating to conflict, and the exploitation of those

grievances by ruthless maniacs, will abound.12

Beyond the potential for conflict between the ‘haves’

and the ‘have-nots’, other, equally significant issues

exist: religious conflict, the battles for national and

cultural identity, tribalism, rogue states, terrorist

states13 and criminal states14 will all be actors on the

diverse stage of conflict in the information age.

Nuclear states will become an increasingly painful

hangover from the Cold War, especially those states

possessing both nuclear weapons and the seeds of

conflict – India and Pakistan being topical examples. 

Against this backdrop, many countries around the

world will continue to fund and man large standing

Armies of varying quality, with many unsavoury

countries equipping themselves with Western

Chapter 2 15

Orphanage, Kigali, Rwanda
armaments or former Eastern Block equipment

brought up to a formidable specification by the

insertion of Western technology. If the UK wishes to

act in its national interests abroad, and meet the

obligations incumbent upon it as a P5 nation, it must

field and maintain balanced forces capable of

conducting the whole range of operations described

above. We must be able to prevail against localised,

highly capable conventional threats and to escalate

rapidly as the situation dictates. Losing our

conventional force on force warfighting capability –

one possible, though so far improbable reaction to

11 September, – would mean that form of warfighting

itself could become our asymmetric threat – ie the

threat to which we had no credible response. Such

an approach would be like cancelling one’s fire

insurance in response to a flood. This does not

mean that the nature and balance of our

conventional capabilities will not change, on the

contrary, they must change, or we risk defeat by

more adaptive adversaries. 

If we accept that hypothesis, what kind of

battlespace do we imagine conventional Western

forces inhabiting when they are deployed on the

inevitable expeditionary operations and what might

tactical actions look like? 

These tactical actions will occur in the

multidimensional, limitless and ill-defined

battlespace already described. Ground terrain will

range from desert and mountain to jungle and

sprawling urban areas – it is an increasingly, even

bewilderingly, complex place to be. There will be

coalitions, possibly shifting in composition during the

16 The Big Issue
course of operations and alliances too, but these are

likely to be replaced in the battlespace by coalitions

of the willing. All of the national contingents deployed

to any conflict scenario will bring with them a range

of capabilities, agendas and interoperability issues

(technical, doctrinal and cognitive). Other actors in

the battlespace will include Non-Governmental

Organisations, Other Government Departments,

supranational, national and local agencies, as well

as contractors servicing and supporting various

parties to the conflict.15

We will operate, of course, within the rules that

pertain at the time, but also in accordance with our

doctrine. This will continue to be predicated on the

Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command,

which allows subordinate commanders at all levels

the freedom to use their own initiative to achieve

their commanders’ intent. Manoeuvrism is not

merely physical manoeuvre: it is conceptual and is

about exploiting enemy weaknesses with the aim of

shattering his will and cohesion. But it always has

been about a careful balance between attrition and

manoeuvre – in Sun Tzu speak, it is about the

judicious application of Cheng ‘normal’ and Chi

‘extraordinary’ force in infinite combinations.16

Successful forces in the information age will

continue to have the capabilities to apply both,

indeed the most successful forces will be those that

can combine a range of capabilities in the most

effective way. However, although attrition will be

necessary in certain circumstances and is to be

expected and catered for, it is the application of

‘extraordinary’ force to break the will of the enemy

Chapter 2 17
that is ‘the acme of skill – to subdue the enemy

without fighting is the supreme excellence’.

17 

Information superiority will be at the kernel of the

application of both extraordinary and normal force.

In itself, this is not new. Commanders have always

sought the best possible information on their own

forces, allies and their enemies, as they sought to

peer through the ‘fog of war’. But information has

sometimes added to, rather than diminished the fog

– as Clausewitz observed, ‘Great part of the

information obtained in war is contradictory, a still

greater part is false and by far the greatest part is of

doubtful character’.

18 However, in the information

age, space-based, aerial and remote sensors,

harnessed to digital processing and

communications, supplemented by more traditional

capabilities, will provide commanders with

unprecedented knowledge of their battlespace. The

information age commander will be able to routinely

do what Wellington always wished to do – ‘see the

other side of the hill’. The classic ‘reverse slope

position’19 of the Cold War era will be as observable

in detail as it would be if it were on a forward slope

or a flat plain. 

Nevertheless, the battlespace will continue to be a

place of immense danger, violence and chaos. As

well as striving to regulate activities within it through

Rules of Engagement and to operate in accordance

with our doctrine (which must be developed and

adapted as circumstances change), we will also

seek to impose some order and structure on the

otherwise chaotic and indefinable whole – as

Norman Mailer would have it ‘Keys in the left pocket,

18 The Big Issue
change in the right’. To this end there will continue to

be some form of framework of operations, currently

characterised by deep, close and rear operations –

a conceptual tool to think with, rather than a spatial

construct. As we move into the future this framework

might begin to seem tired and quaint, but for the

moment it serves as a useful means to categorise

and describe actions in the battlespace and how

they might change as we proceed further into the

information age. 

Deep operations are not simply about geography;

they expand the battlespace conceptually and in

both space and time. More significantly, deep

operations are about attacking the enemy’s

vulnerabilities, shattering his cohesion and crushing

his will to fight as well as – or even instead of –

destroying his combat forces. Attack helicopters

were shown to be able to do both brilliantly in the

Gulf, but were, for a variety of reasons, impotent in

Kosovo and played a limited part in Afghanistan. But

neither are deep operations simply about long-range

precision fire or air manoeuvre by combinations of

attack helicopters and heliborne troops.20 They are

much more about the simultaneous attack of the

enemy throughout the depth of the battlespace and

on multiple levels – destruction, psychological

attack, military support to economic embargo and so

on. But precisely focused on his key vulnerabilities –

isolating him, confusing him, degrading and

overloading his command system and denying him

options and opportunities. 

Information operations will therefore play a major

part in deep operations, in destabilising and deChapter 2 19
coupling the enemy from his support at home and

abroad and in both shaping his perceptions and

undermining his will. Combat operations may occur

in support of information operations as well as

information operations supporting action by combat

forces. Indeed, in certain circumstances information

operations may prove decisive. For example in

Sierra Leone, British forces under (then) Brigadier

David Richards conducted highly successful

information operations that brought the

Revolutionary United Front21 to heel and included a

range of actions, embracing, inter alia, the

demonstration of force and the will to employ it. 

Effective, long-range links between sensor, decider

and shooter along with truly integrated firepower are

20 The Big Issue

Sierra Leone - Beach assault in support of info ops
already a battlewinning reality. The media has

explained in great detail, to the widest of audiences,

how unmanned aerial vehicles over Afghanistan

acquired targets that were processed in Tampa,

Florida, and attacked by missiles launched from the

Indian Ocean, or by bombs dropped from aircraft

based in continental USA, or the Middle East and, in

some cases, guided onto target by Special Forces.

This is the contemporary reality of deep operations

in the information age. 

Today, our doctrine talks about deep operations as

shaping the conditions for successful close

operations, but, as we move into the future, deep

operations themselves will be increasingly decisive.

Nevertheless, close operations will continue to be

required in some form – it is all too easy, for

example, to overlook the importance of the role

played by the surrogate local ground forces in

Afghanistan, who were needed to eject the Taleban

from their various strong-holds and to alter the

dynamics of the situation on the ground. 

As the information age progresses, the nature and

prosecution of close operations will change. The

focus for this form of combat, in the terms of our

current structures, will be the brigade level and

below. But even at this level, high quality, relevant

information will soon be provided by operational and

strategic level assets, which, when combined with

locally gathered information, will give brigade

commanders and their subordinates an undreamed

of information advantage over their adversaries. This

will enable rapid decision-making and action and the

application of appropriate and timely effects –

Chapter 2 21
including joint firepower. In conventional ‘force-onforce’ armoured warfare, platforms will be more

dispersed, commanders will manoeuvre with greater

confidence and precision and there will be a shift in

emphasis from direct to smart indirect fire. The third

dimension will be exploited to the full, with

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) providing a range

of capabilities. Even at the lowest tactical levels,

short range and micro UAVs, linked to smart indirect

fire systems, will soon provide battlegroups with

lethal organic indirect firepower that has the

potential to supersede direct firepower as the

decisive weapon of choice. The future infantryman

will become much more of a ‘sensor’ or a caller for

effect than the deliverer of firepower through crew

served or hand held direct fire weapons. There will

also be fewer infantry, possibly operating in smaller,

more isolated teams. Tanks will be increasingly

lethal and will continue to be important in some

operations, not least from a force protection

perspective and as a powerful statement of intent,

but their predominance will fade as attack

helicopters and UAVs proliferate with deadly links to

a range of lethal indirect fire capabilities. Massed

armour, by our enemies against us, will be a thing of

the past – consigned to history on the Basra

Highway and lost in the mythology of Cold War

exercises on the Hanover Plain. In offensive

operations, we can expect to engage dispersed, well

concealed and protected targets – and this will have

implications for our own equipment, organisation

and tactics.

But the kind of armoured warfare described will not

occur in isolation. It might be the manoeuvrist

22 The Big Issue
exploitation of conditions created by the use or

threatened use of long range firepower, enabled by

combinations of special forces, light forces and

rapidly deployable light armour. It might also be a

highly localised occurrence as part of the ‘3-Block

War’, occurring alongside, and enmeshed with,

humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Or it

could occur in a defined time and space in order to

change the dynamics of a situation, which would be

exploited by other lines of operation, especially at

the political level. It is much less likely to be seen

again as mass on mass manoeuvre warfare in which

the fielded land force of one antagonist is pitched

against that of the other in order to decide an issue

of strategy or policy. 

There will also be enemies against whom we must

fight, who will operate below the lowest threshold of

our more technical warfighting capabilities and in

terrain, especially urban terrain (Mogadishu and

Grozny) but also jungle and swamps (Sierra Leone),

where our advantages are minimised. Against such

enemies, close combat will be essential. But even in

such circumstances, information age technologies

Chapter 2 23

British tanks in Kosovo
must harness strategic and operational level assets

to provide tactical commanders with the best

possible information, actionable options and a

decisive advantage. Even basic developments such

as automatic positioning data, for example, will pay

real dividends in scenarios such as Mogadishu,

where one of the most vexing challenges was

locating friendly forces in order to extract them from

the maze of threatening streets. 

Rear Operations are not just about what is going on

behind us. The battlespace will be much less clearly

defined in terms of linearity and geography. Rear

operations can be defined as those that provide the

commander with the freedom to act unhindered by

the enemy and which sustain and protect his force. 

The prevalence of cheap, but effective UAVs, for

example, will provide new priorities for Ground

Based Air Defence, which will need to be ubiquitous

– perhaps leading to a revival of All Arms Air Defence

capabilities with numerous platforms being able to

switch into air-defence mode. They might also

operate under the threshold of the air superiority

fighters in which the West is currently investing

$billions. NBC detection, protection and

decontamination capabilities will be enduring and

crucial elements of force protection. Forces will be

required, whose specific task will be to defend

against the asymmetric attack of vulnerable rear

areas, headquarters and logistics. 

Information age technologies, particularly in the

fields of asset tracking, remote diagnostics and

predictive data will revolutionise logistics. It will

24 The Big Issue
become much more focussed toward actual

requirements with resources targeted or directed to

match need, rather than over-insurance through

inundation. This will allow reduced logistic drag and

a smaller logistic footprint, while increasing flexibility

and the ability to sustain expeditionary operations. 

Increasingly, rear operations may embrace a wide

range of mission support functions carried out in the

home base – including intelligence, legal support,

course of action analysis and operational analysis as

well as rear-based logistics. At the strategic level,

once a major expeditionary operation is underway,

rear operations might also embrace operations,

defensive or pre-emptive, to protect the Home Base

and our interests abroad outside the immediate

theatre of operations. But clearly such actions can

constitute an operation in their own right and may

even become the pre-eminent form of operation. 

In summary, warfighting and conflict in general will

be inevitable, and its characteristics will be enduring:

bloody and complex with no immaculate warfare

panacea or technological silver bullet that will allow

this to be done without misfortune and loss of human

life. Secondly, many of the old frictions and

vulnerabilities will exist alongside new ones in a

complex, ill-defined battlespace in which multiple

forms of conflict will occur simultaneously. Thirdly

and most importantly of all, there are new

opportunities (technical, conceptual and

organisational) that we must seize, if we are to

successfully prosecute warfare, in all its forms, in the

information age.

Chapter 2 25
NOTES

1 H G Wells, The War of the Worlds, Penguin Books 1946,

‘Dead London’, p 174. The terrible imaginary scenes of

devastated London that Wells describes were the work of

Martians, but potentially they could be the work of any

enemy whose alien moral values dehumanise innocent

victims – indeed, only a few years before publication of

Wells’ book, similar horrors had been visited upon London

by the Luftwaffe and V-weapons.

2 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, Peoples’ Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing

House, Beijing, February 1999, pp 84 and 116.

3 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Wordsworth Editions 1993,

Chapter 6, ‘Void and Actuality’, p 113.

4 This has been widely envisaged as a form of conflict by

numerous Western military think-tanks, although none

would be so arrogant as to suggest that they predicted the

precise form, timing or targets of Bin Laden’s attacks on

the US.

5 Interview for the BBC Today programme.

6 Christopher Bellamy, Spiral Through Time: Beyond

‘Conflict Intensity’ SCSI Occasional Paper No 35, 1998.

7 ‘In one moment in time, our Service members will be

feeding and clothing displaced refugees – providing

humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be

holding two warring tribes apart – conducting

peacekeeping. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal

mid-intensity battle. All in the same day, all within three city

blocks. It will be what we call the three block war.’ General

Charles C Krulak, USMC.

8 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, op cit, pp 8 and 33 where

they argue that understanding this concept has genuine

revolutionary significance in terms of mankind’s

perception of war.

9 The Japanese surrendered 6 days after Nagasaki, but the

impact of allied bombing on German war production and

on the will of the German people and their leadership

remains debatable.

10 See in particular M Knox and W Murray, The Dynamics of

Military Revolution, 1300–2050, Chapter 2, ‘England’s

14th Century RMA; J F C Fuller, Decisive Battles of the

Western World, Volume 1, Grenada Publishing, London,

1970 (first published 1954), pp 295-319; and John

Keegan, The Face of Battle, Jonathan Cape, London,

26 The Big Issue
1976, pp 107–112 where Henry V’s orders to kill of the

prisoners is discussed (downplayed and justified).

11 The Americans engaged the British in View 1 and View 2

warfare simultaneously, using both fielded armies and

guerrilla tactics as well as attacking the UK home base

with privateers (notoriously, Paul Jones, who, for example,

attacked and captured the Drake off the Copeland Islands

near Belfast Lough on 13 April 1778). At Lexington and

Concord 800 British regulars were harassed from the

cover of trees, hedges and buildings, resulting in 273

casualties. J Fortescue, The War of Independence, The

British In North America, Greenhill Books, London, 2001

(first published 1911), pages 213-232 describes Morgan

and Sumter’s effective guerrilla operations in South

Carolina. Page 93 raises the issue of the mistreatment of

British prisoners after Saratoga – officers were separated

from men and many were never seen again.

12 Former US President Bill Clinton, Dimbleby Lecture, The

Struggle for the Soul of the 21st Century, 14 December

2001. “We have to make a world where there are fewer

terrorists, where there are fewer potential terrorists and

more partners. And that responsibility falls primarily on the

wealthy nations, to spread the benefits and shrink the

burdens”. 

13 There is a view that state sponsored terrorism will decline

and cease to be a real threat, as states respond to the 11

September wake-up call and side with their economic

vested interest as part of the world community, rather than

risk reproach and isolation.

14 Ironically, even bizarrely, the nineteenth century Opium

War, fought against the Qing Dynasty, forced the Chinese

to accept the importation of opium and marks Britain as

the world’s first narcostate. An earlier example of British

state-sponsored crime is Drake’s privateering –

underwritten by ‘Letters of Marque’ from his monarch at

the time.

15 It is conceivable, that at some point in the future,

commercial companies will deliver support services to

forces on both sides in a conflict – perhaps in the future we

will need to give more thought to how we will treat

contractors supporting our enemies with services and

materiel.

16 Sun Tzu, op cit, Chapter 5, ‘The Posture of an Army’, Page

109.

17 Ibid, Chapter 3, ‘Offensive Strategy’, Page 105.

18 Carl Von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 1832, translation

published by Penguin Classics 1982, Page 162.

Chapter 2 27
19

20 The complexities inherent in commanding and controlling

such a capability across the boundaries of the Air, Land

and Maritime components is not to be underestimated.

21 Information Operations in Sierra Leone included a

helicopter lift of light guns that were flown across the

beach, the overt movement and deployment of highly

capable forces and maintaining a tough ‘come and get it’

attitude in the local media. 

28 The Big Issue

Enemy HILL Reverse Slope
29

CHAPTER 3

NO REVOLUTIONS

PLEASE, WE’RE

BRITISH

By David Potts and Jake Thackray

‘There is no weightier problem common to the

General Staffs of all peaceably-minded countries

in modern times than the decision for what year

to plan the reequipment of its forces with a new

armoury.’

Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 

“US Forces are gradually incrementing

themselves towards failure.” 

Adm William Owens, USN (Retd), from an address

to the Australian Land Warfare Conference,

November 2001 

Nowadays we do not have revolutions, we’re

British - we have a constitutional monarchy and

a form of democracy that has evolved over some

one thousand years. Revolutions, from the

contemporary British perspective, are foreign

inventions that result in the likes of Robespierre,

Lenin, Stalin, Mugabe and other such grotesque

and unforeseen outcomes. It is therefore wholly

consistent with British national and military culture
that Liddell Hart and Fuller’s thoughts and writings

on the potential of armoured warfare would be slow

to catch on in the UK, but would be seized upon

elsewhere to devastating effect and to our very

great cost. 

Historical Perspective 

But it was not always thus. The 14th Century saw a

distinctly British Revolution in Military Affairs.1 The

longbow was the technology,2 but it was not the only

factor. In fact the English army at Bannockburn in

1314 was probably substantially composed on

longbow-men and this defeat may have prompted a

review of organisation and tactics.3 The massed

archers (11,000 at Crecy4

) worked in close cooperation with dismounted men-at-arms, whose

chargers were used for pursuit after the battle was

won. Crucially, the knights in the English army were

paid by the King, while the French maintained the

feudal model of Lords bringing large retinues of

men-at-arms in discharge of feudal obligation. He

who pays the piper calls the tune and so this was a

key factor underpinning unity of command in the

English army. The French could perhaps have taken

refuge behind their city walls, but the countryside

was laid waste in a deliberate stratagem to force

them to come to battle on English terms. 

The victories brought by this RMA were breathtaking

– invariably outnumbered by around two to one, the

English inflicted huge losses on their enemies at

relatively little cost to themselves. In 1346 at Crecy,

sixteen charges by French knights left 1,500 of them

dead for minimal English losses. At Agincourt, 68

30 The Big Issue
years later, Henry V’s force of about 6,000 defeated

a French force of 25,000, inflicting 5,000 casualties,

including 500 noblemen at a cost of some 200

English casualties. A key ingredient in these

astounding successes was leadership – leadership

in battle, coupled with the leadership to develop and

employ new weapons with new tactics and new

organisations. In modern parlance, the English

weaponry, organisation, strategy and tactics could

be described as asymmetric.5 In terms of timescale,

which is also instructive, the RMA can be seen to

span about a hundred years. 

Other RMAs have occurred from time to time – the

progress of musketry is particularly insightful. The

17th Century RMA was precipitated by the

matchlock musket and arguably began with the

Dutch victory over the Spanish at Nieuwpoort in

1600. But it was not until the end of that century that

pikemen disappeared from the order of battle to be

replaced entirely by the flintlock fusil and the

bayonet. Hardly a revolution in timescale, especially

when one considers that musketry had been used to

great effect in the Italian wars of the 16th Century –

the Duke of Alba, for example, had introduced

musketeers into virtually every unit in the 1550s.6

However, the late 16th Century saw new

organisations and tactics emerge from the ‘Dutch

School’7 with great rectangular battalions of pikemen

being replaced by extended lines which gave greater

flexibility to the use of cavalry, infantry and artillery

and allowed more effective and sustained use of

firepower by successive ranks alternating between

firing and loading their muskets. These ideas were

Chapter 3 31
developed further by Gustavus Adolphus, who

introduced a shorter pike and a lighter musket that

could be reloaded more quickly and did not require

the support of a traditional forked rest. He also

employed lighter artillery that could be moved about

the battlefield and concentrated onto the enemy’s

most vulnerable points, coupled to new tactics for

the offensive use of cavalry. The Swedes typically

concentrated musketry and artillery against the

opposing infantry, after which cavalry charges

opened up the holes in the enemy lines and were

followed up by the pikemen. These tactics

underpinned victories for Gustavus Adolphus and

his successors at Breitenfeld, Lützen, Wittstock and

Jankow and gave Sweden a period of hegemony in

Eastern and Central Europe. 

But here again, if this period in the early 17th

Century can be viewed as an RMA, we see a

combination of innovations in technology,

organisation, tactics and, crucially, leadership to

envision, realise and employ effectively. The other

striking similarity with the 14th Century RMA is the

long timescale – more evolutionary than

revolutionary – perhaps the modality is one of

evolutionary timescale, but delivering a

revolutionary outcome. 

As we turn to our own era, when we think of an

RMA in the information age we must ask where it

all began. The seeds may have been sown in

Bletchley Park, where the codebreakers gave the

allies an information edge of strategic significance

– but it was in America, not Britain, that that the

further development of the code-breaking

32 The Big Issue
technology led to the computer age. Realistically,

however, when we talk of the current RMA, we

think of precision weapons, digital communications

technology, satellites and micro-processing –

which have combined to provide the technical

impetus to an RMA.

The Current RMA

The possibilities offered by information age

technology are tantalising. In the commercial arena

those businesses that succeed have a developed

understanding of how to exploit technology to

commercial advantage in their field.

Characteristically they innovate and adopt new

business organisation and procedures without

achieving the consensus to do so from every vested

interest group. 

But 80 – 90% of information technology projects fail

to meet their performance goals. 80% of all such

projects are delivered late and over budget.8

Commercial companies who make poor information

technology investment decisions are liable to be

placed at a competitive disadvantage: ultimately,

they lose business and either go bankrupt or are

taken over. Defence planners can ill-afford to be

placed in similar circumstances. Against this

backdrop, the reluctance of defence organisations to

adopt wholesale, revolutionary change from

platform- to network-centric warfare concepts is

understandable. Military capability improvement has

instead been largely dependent on incremental

change to structures, processes and people in order

to gain benefits from new technology, particularly

Chapter 3 33
within defence organisations perceived as being

successful at what they do (largely, those

organisations successful in their last major conflict).

Change models developed for business structures

have a similar relevance for military capability. The

Yetton9 model, for example, can be adjusted from

business to military terms:

Fig 1 – The Yetton Model for Planned Incremental Change

to Military Capability

In this case it can be seen that a description of

military capability (such as, for example, that

described in the SDR) leads to analysis and redesign of the structure which provides that capability.

This re-structuring leads to change in the processes

carried out within different parts of the structure,

which in turn leads to a requirement for the

recruitment, training and retention of people to carry

out these new processes. New technology is then

used to allow these people, processes and

structures to provide the capability described. As

such technology is introduced, user experience

34 The Big Issue
allows for continued refinement of the processes,

but only within the existing structure. A truly

revolutionary change in military capability, however,

based on emergent technology, requires the model

above to be spun on its axis: 

Fig 2 – The Yetton Model for Revolutionary Change to

Military Capability 

In this case, the existence of emergent technology

forces the recruitment, training and retention of

people able to envisage an entirely new structure

which might allow most benefit to be drawn from it.

Adoption of this new structure, just as before, forces

adoption of new processes. This time, however, the

capability produced has not been pre-described, and

can therefore properly be considered revolutionary

in nature. An historical example of such a change

might be the development by the Wehrmacht of the

concept of blitzkrieg.10

In this example, despite the fact that the British

were the first to put tanks into the field (in 1916)

and to establish a formation devoted to the

Chapter 3 35
development of armoured warfare techniques, the

Experimental Mechanised Force of 1927-28, a lack

of resources and of commitment in the 1930s led to

British capability in this area dropping badly behind

in the runup to WWII. In Germany, however,

Guderian’s concepts, developed from Fuller’s and

described in his ‘Achtung Panzer’ were seized

upon by Hitler. Under Hitler’s patronage, Guderian11

was able to ensure the formation of three panzer

divisions by October 1935. Process invention and

refinement followed – careful and rigorous analysis

of lessons from training and experimentation and

from operations (Austria, Czechoslovakia and

Poland) to continually innovate and develop.12

Vindication of this revolution in warfare came with

the fall of France over six weeks during May and

June of 1940. Consideration of this historical

example, moreover, indicates why such

revolutionary change is difficult to achieve in

successful military organisations. The impetus to

36 The Big Issue

Fig 3 – The Yetton Revolutionary Change Model applied

to the Development of Blitzkrieg 
the development of all the elements of blitzkrieg

was the defeat and humiliation of World War One

and the size and capability restrictions placed upon

the German Army by the Versailles treaty.

Technology-based revolutionary change was a

catalyst in a complex environment that included

racist ideology, expansionist strategic intent and a

military command culture of ‘Auftragstaktik’. Again,

as with earlier RMAs, we see a dynamic synthesis

of innovative exploitation of technology, allied to

new doctrine, organisations, tactics and

outstanding leadership. Similar circumstances did

not prevail in either the French or British Armies,

neither of which had the added impetus of recent

national defeat and humiliation. 

From the above analysis, therefore, it is evident that

true revolutionary change in military capability

cannot be planned for, but merely envisioned by

forward-thinking theorists and developed towards

over time, possibly decades. By and large,

successful military organisations during periods of

relative peace do not make large-scale shifts in

funding and investment based on the musings of

theorists: instead, proven technologies are used to

allow incremental change. If Network Centric

Warfare concepts are to be developed in order to

better assess the revolutionary claims of their

adherents, therefore, some method must be found of

bearing the enormous costs of such development. 

One European nation, for example has taken a

conscious decision to let go (literally sell off) legacy

capabilities that have no utility in the NCW concepts

emerging for the information age, in order to be able

Chapter 3 37
to invest adequately in more future-proof

capabilities. The consequent defence spending

profile is illustrated below: 

But is the choice really that stark? What is NCW? Is

it just American jargon, or is there substance to the

concept that demands our attention? 

Martin van Creveld, for example, mapped out the

development of command into broad stages.13 He

postulated a long ‘Stone Age’ period – everything

pre-dating the Napoleonic system. Thereafter, he

maps out progress with relatively rapid technological

advance: the telegraph (American Civil War and

Wars of German Unification), wire (World War One),

radio (World War Two) and finally computers and

helicopters of the Vietnam era. It might be tempting

to imagine that digital technology primarily

constitutes the next stage in the evolution of

command. That its exploitation in the military

38 The Big Issue
environment is essentially a communications,

information system or staff process issue – the

substantive outcome of which will be a more

effective command and control system – and that it

can be left primarily to those responsible for

developing our command and control systems. This

is emphatically not the case. Information age

technology will allow us to fight in an entirely

different way, if that is what we chose to do. 

A robustly networked force will be integrated

vertically by the network, through all command

echelons – strategic to tactical and down to the

lowest tactical level. It will also be integrated

horizontally across all functions and components.

The network will abolish constraints of geography,

enabling robust integration throughout a theatre of

operations and between theatres of operations – this

will become especially important as enemies

increasingly seek to operate outside the

compartments we would wish to set for the

battlespace. Finally, the network, through the

immediacy of information, abolishes time delay

between an event and knowledge of it, giving

everyone the same ‘event horizon’ in time

regardless of distance. 

Over time, information age technology will allow

effects based operations in a single integrated joint

battlespace. The emphasis will be on exploiting

networked capabilities to apply integrated joint

effects to precise effect – which is not to be confused

with precision, because an area weapon might be

necessary, depending upon the desired effect!

Potentially, any combination of means could be

Chapter 3 39
brought together at will at any time and place in the

battlespace in order to achieve a specific effect.

There will be greater emphasis on connectivity

between sensors, weapon platforms and C2 nodes

and less emphasis on numbers of weapon

platforms. As the balance of capability shifts from

reliance on mass (platform centric) to reliance on

effective integration and connectivity it becomes

‘network centric’. 

The diagram on page 41 could be argued ad

absurdum; it would clearly be nonsensical to imply

that only tiny numbers of networked weapons and

sensors are required. On the contrary, significant

numbers are required and they are expensive. There

is therefore a fundamental balance of investment

shift required in every equipment project. In a

‘platform centric’ environment the determinant is to

ensure that the platform being procured is the best

possible – that it has the best gun, ammunition,

protection, engine and other platform specific

features. The second determinant is to acquire as

many of these platforms as can be justified and

afforded. In a ‘network centric’ environment the

primary consideration becomes acquiring ‘networkready platforms’ that can be networked with other

weapons and sensors and C2 nodes. By being part

of the network the platform is more effective than

either intrinsic platform capability or absolute

numbers would provide. 

This shift in emphasis is of such fundamental

importance that it needs to be mandated as

acquisition policy in any armed force that is serious

about exploiting NCW and related concepts.

40 The Big Issue

NOTES

1 C J Rogers, in Knox and Murray Ed, The Dynamics of

Military Revolution 1350-2050, Cambridge University

Press, 2001, Pages 15-34, of which this paragraph is a

short précis.

2 Cannons were also used at Crecy (10 of them), but their

effectiveness is not known.

3 The Flemish victory at Courtrai is widely recognised the

genesis of the idea that, suitably organised, dismounted

men-at-arms could defeat mounted knights.

4 At Crecy, the English fielded 3,900 knights, 5,000 men-atarms and 11,000 archers. The French fielded 12,000

mounted knights, 6,000 Genoese cross-bow men and

some 20,000 local militia and footsoldiers, plus a ‘division’

of cavalry under King John of Bohemia.

5 This is asymmetry within force on force warfare, as

opposed to asymmetric warfare – a wider concept

explored in Chapter XVII.

6 S J Lee, The Thirty Years War, Routledge, London, 1919,

p 43.

7 Maurice of Orange, William Louis and Count John II of

Nassau.

8 OASIG/DTI report to the Economic & Social Research

Council UK, Jan 96.

9 Professor Philip Yetton of the Australian Graduate School

of Management has written widely on leadership style,

decision-making and information technology. 10 This

historical example and the factors surrounding the

development of Blitzkrieg have been much simplified in

order to make this particular point concisely. Nonetheless,

the tank was the cornerstone equipment of Blitzkrieg, and

Guderian both its chief architect and executant. See, for

example, Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill, 2nd Ed,

Cassell & Co Ltd, 1951.

11 Guderian was a career Signals officer.

12 Murray and Knox, op cit, pp 154-174.

13 Martin van Creveld, Command in War, Harvard University

Press, Cambridge MA, 1985. 

42 The Big Issue
43

CHAPTER 4

THE HOLY GRAIL

By Jake Thackray

As it begins to ‘digitise’ its command and control

systems, the British Army will enter the

information age. The benefits of this investment will

pervade every aspect of military effectiveness; some

potential benefits have yet to be imagined. There will

be improved decision-making (better decisions

faster), resulting in improved combat effects and,

consequently, more advantageous outcomes in

battlespace engagements. Initially, we will be better

at operating in the way we do now, but over time,

new concepts will become possible. This chapter

therefore considers the initial benefits of digitising

command and control systems and then looks

ahead to longer-term possibilities. 

Doing Things Better

To begin with, to aid understanding, it is necessary

to think of the potential benefits of digitizing

command systems in the context of the terms of

reference within which we understand command and

control now. In order to exercise command

effectively, commanders at all levels must make

timely decisions and take appropriate action. The

outcome of digitizing the command system must be

to inform, make, disseminate and act upon better
decisions faster. In terms of our present

understanding of decision making models, the

benefits sought for decision making and action can

be understood with reference to the decision-action

cycle – Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act – (the so

called OODA Loop1

). The outcome should be an

accelerated and qualitatively improved

Decision/Action cycle, resulting in a significant,

although as yet unquantified, capability

enhancement to combat forces.

• Observe is primarily concerned with the

collection of information on enemy forces and

the environment. It requires a robust mix of

ISTAR sensors on a variety of platforms,

ranging from space-based systems through

aerial to terrestrial systems.

• Orientation has two aspects. The first is the

processing (collation, evaluation, analysis and

dissemination) of the information provided by

the ISTAR systems, including turning

information into intelligence. This requires

robust and effective C4I. The second aspect is

the collection and processing of information on

the status of own, friendly and neutral forces

and agencies. The integration of both aspects =

situation awareness (the understanding of the

operational environment in the context of the

commander’s mission).

• Deciding requires the time and ability to think,

plus the effective presentation of accurate,

timely and relevant information, the capacity to

seek supplementary information and freedom

44 The Big Issue
from information overload through effective

Information Management (IM) techniques.

• Act includes the rapid formulation and

dissemination of orders and instructions through

robust and effective C4I. Digitization should

greatly enhance the commander’s freedom of

action by giving him greater scope in time and

space and enabling the more rapid and effective

focusing of integrated combat power. 

The OODA loop model has limitations, not least of

which is that it could be argued that it really begins

with decide - decide what to look for, or at. It also has

limitations as a model for C2 in the information age,

when collaborative planning occurs simultaneously

across functions and in several layers of the

command structure. Similarly, the idea of

competitive OODA loops breaks down in Other

Operations, where the modality can be to spend a lot

of time considering what to do and then having

decided, chose one’s moment to act in the most

opportune circumstances. Some of these limitations

of the OODA loop are returned to later. 

Nevertheless, it is envisaged that these anticipated

improvements to the decision-action cycle will in turn

yield improved combat effects – specifically tempo,

surprise and survivability, leading to better tactical

outcomes. For example:

• Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to

a conventional, symmetric enemy. The effective

exploitation of situational awareness will enable

better and faster decision-action relative to that

of such an enemy allowing a commander to ‘get

Chapter 4 45
inside the enemy decision-action cycle’ – a key

objective of mission command – by exploiting

information and acting upon it before the enemy

has time to react. Linked to this, simultaneity

seeks to overload the enemy commander, who

is attacked or threatened from so many angles

at once that he is denied the ability to

concentrate on one problem at a time, or even

establish priorities between problems. This can

be achieved through better collaborative

planning between components and levels of

command and by the improved execution of coordinated action throughout the battlespace.

Improved tempo is one of the single most

important dividends from digitising the command

system, consequently any attributes of a

digitised force (platforms, structures, tactics)

that inhibit tempo should be eschewed and

those that enhance tempo should be embraced. 

• But while increased tempo is the key benefit,

other wide-ranging and linked benefits include:

surprise, increased lethality and survivability.

Surprise can be achieved through improved

integration and more timely dissemination of

intelligence, which will enhance situation

awareness and tempo, enabling timely preemptive action and the apparently sudden

massing of effects. Improved tactical agility in

theatre will be based on situational awareness,

greater tempo, quicker reaction and adaptable

Combat Service Support. Lethality will be

improved through the integration of ISR and

firepower, including robust and effective

sensor/decider/shooter links, better weapon

46 The Big Issue
selection, rapid fire-planning and reduced speed

of engagement timings. The emphasis will be on

massing effects for the minimum decisive period

through better synchronisation of indirect fire,

direct fire, Close Air Support, Aviation and

offensive EW. Longer-range precision

engagement of targets will be enabled by new

weapon and ISTAR capabilities entering service.

Survivability will be improved through superior

situational awareness, effective Combat ID,2

increased tempo, improved C4I redundancy and

resilience to command and control warfare. This

will allow superior risk management, greater

dispersion and hence reduced losses of both

equipment and personnel. 

These benefits can be said to flow from an overriding condition, described variously as information

superiority, knowledge superiority, decision

superiority or cognitive dominance. This is a

condition where superior decisions and consequent

battlespace actions are allied to superior information

operations and perception management to create

conditions where the adversary is frozen out of all

options at all levels and is reduced to a condition of

decision paralysis, cognitive inferiority and near

perpetual surprise. The enemy is unable to manage

the tempo of operations, or to effectively anticipate

and proactively counter one’s actions and he is

psychologically isolated in the battle for perceptions

both abroad and in his domestic constituency.

Chapter 4 47
Doing Better Things

As we build on the initial introduction of digital

technology, we will deepen our understanding of the

technology and the challenges and opportunities it

presents. In the US, the move toward entirely new

C2 processes and structures has been described

within the concept of Network-Centric Warfare. The

key elements of the NCW Concept are: that a

robustly networked force improves information

sharing; that information sharing enhances the

quality of information and shared situational

awareness (SA); that shared SA enables

collaboration and self-synchronization, and

enhances sustainability and speed of command; and

that, finally, all these in turn dramatically increase

mission effectiveness.3 Adherents to NCW concepts

have recognised that these do not yet represent a

fully-developed warfighting capability; indeed,

embodiment of these concepts has been described

as ‘...(a) monumental task (which) will span a

quarter century or more’.

4 The risk inherent in

attempting to embody these concepts, during a

period of static or contracting defence budgets and

competing priorities, is obvious. The cost, and loss in

short-term capability required for any future shift in

investment away from traditional areas (which NCW

theorists have described as platform-centric

capabilities), would be significant. Furthermore, such

costs would be borne merely in order to explore the

new capabilities which NCW might offer. Military

planners are largely conservative by nature: a logical

response to the unlimited potential consequences of

their failure. Given that a revolution cannot, by

48 The Big Issue
definition, be planned for nor achieved in stages, it

appears highly unlikely that the truly revolutionary

concepts envisaged within the theories of NCW will

be achieved in the timeframe, unless some method

of developing these within existing resource

constraints is achieved. This is, arguably, the key

research and development challenge facing modern

military forces over the next two decades. 

Unless a significant level of disruptive

experimentation takes place, the coherent

development of equipment capabilities to enable

NCW will not occur. It is now widely understood that

a properly planned and resourced joint

experimentation strategy will be essential, otherwise

we confine ourselves to the realms of hypothesis.

Warfighting experiments will be essential to support

the development of networked capabilities. The US

experience with large-scale experiments suggests

that the expense involved in establishing networks

above the critical mass required prevents such

establishment on a sufficiently regular basis to allow

for assured conclusions to be reached. The UK

experience, in merely attempting to establish a

‘digitization focus’ within an existing deployable

brigade demonstrated the difficulties inherent in

resourcing experimental forces by the dual-hatting

process. Multinational co-operation might offer one

solution to this problem and in any event must be

part of any effective experimentation strategy in an

era of multinational expeditionary operations. 

Much of that written about NCW hitherto has

focussed on the use of information-age capability

packages to improve existing military

Chapter 4 49
effectiveness: in other words, process

improvement, rather than process invention. The

process improvements described make obvious

good sense: few military theorists or practitioners

would debate the value of greater situational

awareness, allowing for better collaboration

between disparate force elements, contingents

and components, and thus increasing tempo. It is

the wider, unproven assertion of the NCW

theorists – that greater integration of C4ISR

across time, space, function and echelon will

allow for self-synchronization5 and thus the

potential for a fundamental re-assessment of how

the chain of command is used to direct military

activities – that might truly be considered

revolutionary in nature. The combat power

delivered by forces, so networked, will be greater

than the sum of the parts. This assertion appears

revolutionary precisely because it makes little

sense to military organisations defined by their

existing hierarchical processes. 

At the heart of the so-called NCW revolution is an

emerging recognition by its adherents that the

OODA Loop, used above to define the C2 process in

military hierarchies, is not a model best suited to

describe this process in the Information Age. The

OODA Loop is too simple to model correctly the

differing C2 processes, both in terms of function and

timescale, which are carried out by HQs at differing

levels of command. As a result, the assertion

continues, the capabilities and functions managed at

each of these levels are stovepiped and largely

uncoordinated. An information age approach to

50 The Big Issue
C4ISR, however, allows for the model6 in Figure 1 to

be adopted. 

Fig 1 – The Information Age C2 Process7

In the model, three domains define military activity:

the physical domain, consisting of the operating

environment (all battlespace entities outside

C4ISR processes and systems), the information

domain (the C4ISR processes and systems

themselves), and the cognitive domain (the minds

of the participants – where perceptions,

awareness, understanding, beliefs and values

reside, and where, as a result of sensemaking,

decisions are made). Within these domains, the

Chapter 4 51
C2 process is adaptive, and consists of a number

of interacting elements:

• Battlespace Monitoring. In the physical

domain, monitoring systems of all kinds provide

reports on the environment, friendly, enemy and

neutral forces. These reports are then fused

(either automatically or manually), transmitted,

received, stored and displayed by systems in

the information domain.

• Awareness. Awareness is the quality that the

cognitive domain brings to the information

provided by battlespace monitoring. It is a

filtration of this information by the cognitive

process – by previous knowledge and beliefs

about the current situation.

• Understanding. Understanding follows

awareness. It is a recognition of what the

filtered information presented actually means –

in essence, it is the ability of the brain to ‘lift the

fog of war’: to correctly perceive the current

situation and to understand its significance.

• Sensemaking. Once understanding has been

achieved (and the amount of understanding

required will be subjective, and dependent on

the time available for cross-referencing

information with other sources) sensemaking

takes place. This is the process by which an

understanding of the current situation is allied

to a sense of how the situation might develop,

how such development will impact on the endstate required, and what activity must take

place if the required end-state is to be

52 The Big Issue
reached. The completion of the sensemaking

process is the making up of one’s mind –

arriving at a decision. 

• Command Intent. Command intent is the

outcome of sensemaking. It usually consists of

a communication from commander to

subordinates concerning the current situation,

the end-state required and the steps needed to

achieve it.

• Battlespace Management. Battlespace

management is the process by which

command intent – its first element – is

translated into activity in the physical domain

by force elements. It consists of action in the

cognitive and information domains to pass

instructions, directives, plans and orders to

subordinate formations.

• Synchronization. Synchronization completes

the process. Force elements, aware of what

they are to achieve and supported by

appropriate enablers, attempt to achieve the

end-state described. 

NCW terminology apart, there is, arguably, little to

differentiate between the above model and the

OODA Loop. Adoption of this model, however, and

the richer concepts it contains, allows for a better

understanding of the capability improvement offered

if an information age C4ISR network is

superimposed upon it (next page). 

Chapter 4 53
Fig 2 – Networked Information Age C2 Process8

The imposition on the above model of an

information-age C4ISR network has the effect of

‘squeezing’ the activities in the cognitive domain – ie

those activities which must take place before

effective battlespace monitoring (now achieved

through an ISR system of systems) is translated into

effective battlespace management (now achieved

through a seamless information grid). This means

far less time is spent in preparing force elements for

synchronization, because the C2 elements in these

very units are privy to the same quality of information

(and through collaborative working techniques the

same decision-making processes), as their superior

HQs. Effectively, they are able to prepare

54 The Big Issue
themselves for action before being ordered to do so.

Ultimately, as ISR capabilities and those of the

information grid increase, this ‘squeezing’ effect

would result in the battlespace monitoring and

battlespace management ovals merging, allowing

for immediate self-synchronization. Such selfsynchronization would imply that the understandingsensemaking-command intent oval would now be

superfluous at that particular level of command, thus

allowing for removal of that level. This is a

revolutionary concept. 

This improved understanding of the higher

commander’s intent and a more developed and

widely shared understanding of the operational

situation at all levels of command should, it might

be argued, provide the conditions in which

mission command should flourish. It should also

enable a force to achieve an unprecedented

tempo of operations and effectiveness of

manoeuvre and engagement.

Martin van Creveld and others believe that those

who propound such revolutionary concepts are

self-delusional. He argues that technologicallyadvanced command systems have never lived up

to their promise of producing greater

battlefield(space) certainty. Firstly, because

warfare and the human activities within it are as

often irrational as they are otherwise; and secondly,

because warfare consists at its heart of a clash of

wills, each with relatively unconstrained freedoms

of action. Finally, he points out the self-defeating

dilemma – that more information takes more time to

process, meaning that at some stage in the

Chapter 4 55
decision-making process intuitive judgement takes

over (even if this is the intuitive capability to know

when ‘enough is enough’). 

Fig 3 – Self-Synchronization and Command De-Layering

If, however, we are to believe that a technological

revolution has taken place, and that van Creveld’s

views pre-date it,9 then NCW and its underlying

concepts such as self-synchronization must be

further investigated and developed. Candidate

technologies include, but are not limited to:

asymmetric communications methods (in order to

allow for rapid dissemination of battlespace

monitoring and management information); adaptive,

self-managing networks (in order to allow force

elements to quickly transit between ‘superior’

entities in order to seize fleeting opportunities

whenever they occur); a range of novel

56 The Big Issue
communications bearers, antennas and electronic

warning and defensive systems (to provide the

ubiquitous information grid required for selfsynchronization); and artificially-intelligent decision

support systems.

The resultant command system will be characterised

by a robust network of weapons, sensors and

decision nodes. This in turn will lead to a networked

combined joint force operating with agility and

fleetness of foot, through delegation of execution

within the command intent to the lowest practicable

level. The entire combat power of the force will

potentially be at the fingertips (pressel switch) of

every individual soldier. This is the antithesis of the

centrist ‘long screw driver’ so many fear will be the

outcome of digitizing the command system. But it is

in the realisation of concepts such as selfsynchronisation that the benefits of information age

technology lies. This has particular relevance to the

increasing emphasis on medium and small-scale

operations in the prevailing strategic environment. 

Experimentation will be the key to successful

innovation and the key to successful

experimentation, like all good things, will be to do it

a little and often. Large-scale occasional binges will

also be required, but the conditions for success

should be set by a preceding series of smaller more

focussed events to address specific issues. The

potential impact of NCW might, therefore, be

revolutionary, but the approach to realising it must

be evolutionary and will take some time. Equally,

however, we will also fail if we remain in our

intellectual comfort zone and do not attempt to grasp

Chapter 4 57
some of the more challenging concepts and

possibilities that require us to ‘think out of the box’.

This means that some disruptive largescale

experimentation will be required that has little or no

current training value because the capabilities and

organisations envisaged in the experiment are not in

being. We need to be open to envisaging entirely

new ways of doing things and to rise to the doctrinal,

organisational and cultural challenges thereof.

NOTES

1 The OODA Loop was derived from Lt-Col Boyd’s

observations on his own decision/action cycle as a USAF

fast jet pilot fighting MIG-15s in the Korean War. It remains

a useful tool but its limitations need to be understood.

2 Combat ID lessens the potential for fratricide. It is

achieved through a combination of Tactics, Techniques

and Procedures (TTP), Target Identification (TID), and

Situational Awareness.

3 NCW Report to the US Congress, US DoD, Jul 01.

4 Ibid.

5 ‘Synchronization’ in UK parlance, might be described as

‘integration’: the ability of disparate force elements to

better support the activities of others, and in doing so

create a synergistic effect.

6 This is a summary of the issues explored in more detail in

Alberts, Garstka, Hayes & Signori Understanding

Information Age Warfare, CCRP, Aug 01. (Download from

dodccrp.org).

7 By kind permission of Dr David Alberts.

8 By kind permission of Dr David Alberts.

9 Command in War was written in 1985, well before NCW

and the current RMA had been identified.

58 The Big Issue
59

CHAPTER 5

NEO HEROIC

COMMAND

By David Potts

It was not the Legions that crossed the Rubicon,

but Caesar. 

Napoleon

...he doth bestride the narrow world

Like a Colossus; and we petty men

Walk under his huge legs and peep about

To find ourselves dishonourable graves.

William Shakespeare

Julius Caesar, I, ii, ll 134-7

John Keegan described commanders in the Cold

War nuclear age as ‘Post Heroic’1

– the

imperatives of Mutually Assured Destruction and the

static command infrastructure required commanders

who were the very antithesis of the heroic

Alexandrine model. An exception, arguably, was

president Kennedy, a charismatic Commander-inChief in the heroic mould. However, it is doubtful

whether the general public could name even a

handful of senior military men from this era – in the

US, Al Haig perhaps, but more so for his role as

Secretary of State than as SACEUR; MacArthur of

course for Korea and Westmoreland for Vietnam.

From a British Army perspective, during the Cold
War there was a stove-piped UK national chain of

command to Corps level and thence to the Northern

Army Group, which was commanded by a UK 4-Star.

In the UK today, the odd Cold War era GOC

Northern Ireland might be remembered – Harry Tuzo

for example, and others who commanded

adventures outside the Cold War mainstream

(Woodward and Thompson in the Falklands), but

generations of senior British, NATO commanders

have vanished into obscurity. 

However, the end of the Cold War has heralded a

new era of expeditionary operations that have

imposed enormous challenges on our senior

commanders, catapulting them into chaotic and

dangerous situations in distant corners of the world2

and, through television, into the homes of the

nation. It is the synthesis of these special

circumstances with the impact of information

technology that defines the nature of command in

the information age. 

General Schwarzkopf heralded this new model –

both he and the war he commanded were portents

of what was to come. Whilst remaining more or less

in his ‘bunker’ in Riyadh, he nevertheless galvanised

his forces, the Middle-east region and the coalition,

while astonishing the world with Patton-like orations,

illustrated by videos of the latest precision strike and

beamed to a global audience his predecessors could

never have imagined reaching. He commanded the

last cavalry charge of its millennium and at the same

time lifted the curtain on a new way of warfare for the

21st century. 

60 The Big Issue
British armour in the Gulf War 

Although there have been a number of notable

exceptions, the forces taking part in contemporary

operations have been characteristically multinational

in nature, usually ‘coalitions of the willing’. Coalitions

must be built and maintained, capitals consulted,

policy influenced, governments and heads of state in

the theatre of operations assuaged and cajoled and

a kaleidoscopic variety of military capabilities,

cultures and agendas forged together. This brings

special challenges for commanders today, and in the

future, requiring what can only be described as ‘viceregal’ commanders3 in the mould of the long British

tradition exemplified by Marlborough at Blenheim,

Wellington at Waterloo, Mountbatten in the Far East

and Alexander in Italy. 

This chalice is not just passed to senior

commanders, but, in the UK Armed Forces, is

routinely passed to one-star officers, either as

commanders of the standing Joint Force

Headquarters, or to formation commanders whose

headquarters are now routinely tasked to take on

Chapter 5 61
the JFHQ role. In Sierra Leone, for example,

Brigadier David Richards4 and his one-star

successors there worked alongside the UK

Ambassador in direct support of the Sierra Leone

government, while shoring up the UN forces and

commanding a UK joint force that fluctuated to

some 5,000 personnel. As the commander on the

spot, his actions shaped the strategic outcome of

this national expeditionary operation. His progress

could be followed daily by his political masters and

by an interested viewing public. Even this

apparently national operation had a fundamentally

international flavour with UN involvement and the

keen interest of Sierra Leone’s neighbours. 

Gen Sir Rupert Smith (DSACEUR)

(right) with Lt Gen Reith, Task Force

North, Albania 

Leadership of the Allied Command

Europe Rapid Reaction Corps

(ARRC) has given UK

commanders the opportunity to

command expeditionary

operations in a NATO non-Article

V context (General Walker in Bosnia and General

Jackson in Kosovo). But we have also provided

senior commanders to major UN (Generals Rose

and Smith in UNPROFOR) and OSCE (Maj Gen

Drewienkiewicz in the Kosovo Verification Mission)

operations. This is unsurprising – as a nexus power5

the UK is uniquely placed to perform a coalitionbuilding role, providing both the political and military

leadership for coalition operations. The UK’s

position, in geographic, linguistic and historical

terms make it well-placed to play a leading role in

62 The Big Issue
multinational military effort, and it is the central pier,

both physically and intellectually, in the Atlantic

bridge. International legitimacy will continue to be a

political imperative for most operations, and as long

as the political advantage offered by multi-nationality

outweighs the military friction inherent within it, such

operations are expected to be the norm in the future.

This places especially demanding challenges on our

commanders, who will require more than a touch of

ambassadorial diplomacy, saintly perseverance and

Churchillian strength of character. 

Brig David Richards, Joint Task Force Commander, with

the UK Ambassador to Sierra Leone and political and

civil affairs advisors

Contemporary and future conflict will bring

commanders some relatively new challenges and

frictions, including political and legal constraints,

media interest and the immediacy of information.

This applies to any military involvement in all forms

of conflict, whether undertaken on a national or

multinational basis. War is an instrument of policy.6

Forces will be deployed on operations, of whatever

scale and intensity, to achieve a political purpose.

Political control and involvement is therefore both

inevitable and legally necessary7 – interference and

Chapter 5 63
involvement from the highest level in tactical issues

is to be expected.8 Developments in communications

now allow open video links between capitals and

Theatre headquarters; Ministers, senior officers and

officials will want to use them, and to speak to

commanders, not their senior staffs. This may also

apply to those in alliance or coalition capitals – the

demands on the commander’s time and attention

are obvious. Commanders will need to be

remarkably astute to avoid the innumerable political

bear traps. 

Gen Sir Michael Rose at Gorazde 

Nevertheless, a commander should receive his

formal political control from the international body

under whose auspices the operation is being

conducted. This could be from, for example, the

UN, OSCE, NATO, EU or an ad hoc coalition – with

each organization having a widely different

capability to focus the political intent of its

membership into the kind of guidance military

commanders need. As one COMARRC observed,

‘Political guidance can be really helpful – if you get

64 The Big Issue
it’.

9 Decisionmaking can be tardy at the strategic

level: KFOR, for example, did not receive a NATO

ACTORD until 10 Jun 99, by which time they were

largely deployed in Macedonia, under national

funding arrangements. Continued efforts are

required to mature the Pol/Mil interface and C2

capability of international organizations, especially

the UN,10 so that they can provide the kind of

guidance military commanders need.

Commanders will be required to operate in

circumstances where the situation on the ground is

complex, even chaotic, and the political guidance

received is unclear. This calls for great wisdom

and perspicacity. 

Other Operations are increasingly multifunctional,

and not necessarily dominated by a military

agenda.11 Diverse friendly and neutral actors are

present on such operations. These agencies

become additional points of contact for the

commander, placing additional demands on his time

and attention, and can have a significant impact on

military planning and the outcome of key aspects of

an operation. Commanders should be prepared for

this impact, both by pre-deployment and

institutionalised training, and supported by the better

integration into multinational HQs of military or

deployable civilian staff with expertise in these

areas. More importantly, the complexity of Other

Operations requires an ‘integrated’ approach to the

political, diplomatic, military, civil, legal, humanitarian

and economic lines of operation. Commanders need

to be able to think and operate across the full

breadth of all lines of operation, creating unity of

effort amongst all those involved. 

Chapter 5 65
Contributing nations, in both warfighting and other

operations, will have their own national perceptions

and political agendas. The commander of multinational forces will need to be alert to this and will

have a key role in promoting coalition cohesion and

‘keeping everyone on-board’ – this is, in a sense, a

classic ‘rear operation’. Timely liaison will be

required with troop contributing nations’ capitals, by

the commander personally and by people with first

hand knowledge of the operational circumstances.

However, in pursuing coalition cohesion, a

commander must not lose sight of his mission.

Coalition cohesion will be the multi-national force’s

centre of gravity – opposing forces will realize this

and are likely to adopt tactics to attack it: for

example; Iraq’s Scud attacks on Israel were

probably intended to produce a reaction which might

fracture the international coalition. Commanders

need to recognise threats to coalition cohesion and

develop proactive plans to counter them. 

The realities observed in Bosnia by one UN

commander will undoubtedly persist: 

‘Every troop contributing nation had its own

national command structure within the main UN

staff, and each nation had its own political

agenda as well as a chief of contingent who held

the national red card.’ 12

The need to achieve consensus on political and

military strategic issues can create friction in the

operational planning process and hinder the

commander in allocating tasks and responsibilities to

his force elements. Generating an effective and

66 The Big Issue
Chapter 5 67

harmonious headquarters takes time and

commanders need to devote their own time and

considerable personal energy to bilaterals with

National Contingent Commanders and to building a

close relationship with them. But however vexing

modern command arrangements might be, they are

unlikely to be as taxing as those in the Schellenberg

campaign of 1704, which obliged Marlborough and

the Margrave Lewis of Baden, as the pre-eminent

national contingent commanders, to take turns as

commander of the allied force on alternate days.13 

Senior officers from five contingents working together 

It is apparent, therefore, that the commander’s time

and energy will need to be directed towards dealing

with the political level in various capitals and

international bodies, building cohesion within the

force through his personal efforts, interfacing with an

increasing range of agencies and players in the

battlespace and rising above the pressures of the

media. Ever-increasing demands on their time and

attention will challenge commanders to prioritise

their own activities on matters additional to the
‘normal’ military business of operational command.

Additionally, for linguistic and other reasons,

subordinate national contingents may also need

more time than is usual to comprehend and act upon

their orders. This means the commander may have

less time than he would expect for his own decisionmaking and planning; HQ ARRC, for example,

operate on a 1

/4 – 3/4 rule rather than 1/3 – 2/3.

14

1st Bn Coldstream Guards, Vitez. 1993

A key challenge for commanders of multi-national

forces is that of forging a common purpose across

the breadth of outlook, training and capability found

in the coalition. A number of tensions and frictions

add complexity to the already daunting task of

achieving unity of effort. Commanders must mesh

different national doctrines, weapon systems,

logistics and degrees of military expertise together,

ensuring equality of risk and suffering across the

coalition, playing to the strengths of the national

contingents to make best use of expertise,

capabilities and command states. They must also,

somehow, ensure that the excellent performance of

68 The Big Issue
some contingents is not seen in relation to underperformance by other contingents. 

Operations are also inherently joint in nature.

Operational Level commanders will be faced with an

especially complex task of integrating multinational

joint capabilities. C2 tempo and culture will vary

significantly between services within individual

contingents. There may also be widely varying

degrees of ‘jointery’ with some contingents being in

stove-piped components, and this could impact on

the commander’s ability to conduct truly joint

campaigns and thereby generally add to the frictions

of command. 

Arguably, in political terms, the importance of an

operation will be directly proportional to the level of

media interest, rather than to the scale of the

operation. Operations will be conducted under the

full and real time glare of the world’s media –

particularly when offensive operations are underway,

casualties are taken, or setbacks occur.

Commanders must be able to handle the

international media directly and through appointed

staff. This can be a matter of personal style, in that

some commanders (General Smith) have preferred

a staff interface, whilst others (General Rose)

appeared to favour direct personal engagement with

the media. Regardless of personal style, the battle

for public opinion may mean added pressure for the

commander himself to interface with media, rather

than leaving it to a spokesman; but preparing

properly for a press conference or interview can be

tedious and time consuming. All commanders in

expeditionary operations will require a responsive

Chapter 5 69
and comprehensive media operations capability,

including staff, communications and IS.15 It will

continue to be vital to transmit information rapidly to

the strategic and political levels of command in order

to counter potentially adverse near-real-time media

reporting. The use in media briefings of imagery

from the theatre of operations is now common. The

burgeoning demands of Information Operations

Campaigns may also be expected to increase in the

future. This vital requirement brings with it the added

pressure of ensuring that all constituencies –

including multinational contingents – in the Area of

Operations are addressed appropriately. 

Targeting can be a highly political activity. From our

own national experience, the sinking of the Belgrano

stands out as a stark example with political

resonance nearly 20 years later. Involvement of the

political level in targeting is to be expected and

catered for in circumstances where the attack of the

selected target, or the means chosen to attack it, can

be expected to have a political impact. The less

intense the operation, the more likely that the

political level will be able to involve itself in targeting

– and the discernible trend is very much toward less

intense operations than were envisaged in the Cold

War or witnessed in the Gulf. The process and

procedural, including media and evidential, issues

that this implies can be assisted greatly by modern

communications and information technology. The

most challenging aspect is the degree of implicit

transparency, conflicting as it will with operational

security, timeliness and other operational factors.

Commanders need to be supported by staff who can

70 The Big Issue
handle the political and inter-linked media

dimensions of targeting and its outcome. 

Peace Support Operations pitch commanders

against each other intellectually and face to face. In

warfighting, one could postulate that commanders,

particularly senior ones, tend to sit on top of a

military chain of command and direct the lower level

commanders who then take the action that impacts

directly upon the enemy. Commanders, in a sense,

fight each other through the medium of the forces

under their command. In Peace Support Operations,

opposing commanders and leaders at all levels tend

to deal with each other face to face. The emphasis is

on personal interaction in talks and negotiations.

This is backed up by knowledge of the capabilities at

each others’ disposal, an understanding of each

others’ willingness and capacity to use those

capabilities effectively, and a profound awareness of

the political significance of the dialogue and its

impact on other factions and actors - in the theatre

and outside it. Commanders will be personally

tested to see how they and their troops react to

specific, sometimes well orchestrated, incidents.

Thus, whilst command in Peace Support Operations

has innumerable similarities with command on all

other forms of operation, there are subtle differences

that need to be understood and prepared for.

Commanders will require prenegotiation information

and knowledge of their adversary’s intentions,

second and third agendas, options, state of mind

and even the advice they have been given. 

At the lower tactical level, the Balkan ‘road block’ is

of course the classic example of this sort of scenario.

Chapter 5 71
British forces often joke that the ambition of every

Serb youth was to run his own ‘road block’. In the

Kosovo campaign, Pristina airport was, in a sense,

General Jackson’s ‘road block’. General Clarke has

subsequently accused General Jackson of failing to

see the strategic picture and of viewing the issue

from the narrow perspective of an operational

commander.16 In General Clarke’s view, action by

troops on the ground to confront the Russians was

essential, both for the success of the mission and to

put the Russians in their place, thereby determining

the basis of NATO’s relationship with Russia

thenceforth. Arguably, this approach is indicative of a

Cold War, or warfighting mind-set. General Jackson

saw no merit in confronting the Russians on the

ground – the airport had no role to play in his plans

and the situation could easily escalate unpredictably,

from confrontation to conflict. Instead, he

established a direct personal relationship with the

Russian commander on the ground and thereby

altered the dynamics of the whole situation. This

approach is indicative of the crucial importance of

commander-to-commander personal relationships in

multi-faceted PSO. Arguably, General Jackson’s

tactics, far from being overly focussed at the

operational level, had real strategic impact and

helped shape a more co-operative relationship with

Russia that has paid dividends in Afghanistan and

been a milestone on the road to NATO’s new

relationship with its old adversary. 

However, the recent warfighting phase of the

Afghanistan conflict has given us a quite different

insight into the nature of command in the information

age. General Franks has orchestrated the military

72 The Big Issue
campaign in central Asia from his headquarters on

the other side of the world in Tampa, Florida –

surrounded, even cocooned, by literally thousands

of supporting staff. His role has appeared to be

closer to that of a coordinating maestro than

anything recognizable as command in the heroic

mould. His media appearances, initially infrequent

and uncertain, became more confident as the

operation unfolded and more recently he has been

posing easily for the cameras with his Commander

in Chief, confirming his status as the man of the

moment. His command modality may exhibit many

Post-heroic traits, but he could not truly be described

as a Post-heroic commander – because he waged

offensive operations, projecting the combat power of

a super power into the heart of a far away continent.

This is the antithesis of Post-heroic command. But

above all else, he has exhibited the defining

characteristic of all great generals – he delivered

victory. He might also be illustrative of a new

command paradigm for the information age – he saw

and he conquered, without personally going there. 

But the war also saw a more familiar, direct and

tangible command and leadership style provided by

others. At the tactical level, General Dostum and his

fellow khans and warlords provided a kind of

medieval command and leadership to their tribal

armies. Junior commanders of US and British

Special Forces and Marines will have undoubtedly

had their leadership tested in the most challenging of

circumstances. While at the strategic level, Mr Blair’s

presidential tour de force of personal diplomacy

appeared to galvanise the coalition. Finally, as the

emphasis in the conflict switched rapidly from

Chapter 5 73
warfighting to nation building, Major General John

McColl arrived in Kabul in circumstances he could

not have imagined only a few months previously.

Maj Gen John McColl in Kabul 

In ancient Greece a hero was a

man of superhuman strength,

courage or ability, favoured by

the Gods. These are, in a

sense, the qualities we demand

of our commanders in the

information age. Superhuman

strength of character to face the

immense challenges of contemporary operations

and to rise above the daily frustrations and the

political and media exposure. Courage to do what

needs to be done in the face of critics and doubters

and despite the inevitable setbacks and mishaps.

Ability founded on demonstrable expertise – a track

record of successful command at relevant levels in

the widest possible range of operational

circumstances. And favoured by the Gods – as

Napoleon said when he heard favourable reports of

the young Ney, ‘Yes, he might be good, but is he

lucky?’ From a military perspective, the information

age will be defined as much by the passing of the

Cold War and the resultant blossom of conflict and

terrorism around the world, as by the technology.

The mask that command will wear in this era is

forming as the era unfolds, but the indications are

that it is already displaying many qualities that could

be fairly described as ‘Neo-heroic’.

74 The Big Issue
NOTES

1 John Keegan, The Mask of Command, Random House,

London, 1999 (first published 1987), pp 311 – 351.

2 Some not so distant – witness Brig Alec Birtwhistle in

Cumbria winning the admiration of the nation in the Foot

and Mouth battle!

3 Although historically in the UK, with the notable exception

of Wellington, we seem to retire them from public life at the

apex of their powers.

4 Now Major General Richards.

5 The UK is a member of the UN P5, G8, NATO, EU, OSCE

and Commonwealth and is the nexus of these

organisations.

6 Carl von Clausewitz et al.

7 For the UK, ‘the authority of the Crown is represented by

the Government of the day and in mechanisms

established by law and the Royal Prerogative. A range of

powers is vested by Statute and Letters Patent in the

Defence Council under the chairmanship of the SofS for

Defence’, British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01), 5.11.

8 Goose Green is perhaps the most controversial example

in recent British history – a battle, in particular its timing,

fought at the behest of politicians to show early military

success to a wavering world, rather than out of military

expediency.

9 Taken from an after-dinner speech given by General Sir

Mike Jackson, published in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey

Till (Eds), The Challenges of High Command in the 20th

Century, SCSI Occasional Paper No 38, based on

proceedings of SCSI/JSCSC/Dept of War Studies RMA

Sandhurst Joint Conference, Bracknell, Oct 1998.

10 ‘The UN Secretariat is not structured to fulfil the role of

what could be described as a strategic or operational level

HQ’ – ‘Command, Control, Cohesion and Coherence in

Peace Support Operations’ in Sheffield and Till, op cit.

11 Ibid.

12 Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace, Harvill Press,

London, 1998, Page 106.

13 See for example, F Taylor, The Wars of Marlborough,

Oxford, 1921, pp 147-185 and F W O Maycock,

Marlborough’s Campaigns, Allen and Unwin, 1913, pp 34-

47.

14 This means the superior HQ uses 1

/4 of the time available,

allowing 3/4 of the time for subordinate HQs to conduct their

Chapter 5 75
planning – a 1

/3 to 2/3 ratio would be a norm in UK national

operations.

15 Media management is a wider issue than the provision of

media advisers in HQs. The UK’s Media Operations

Groups, which may be tailored to meet the requirements of

different operations, and can include Mobile News Teams,

provide commanders with the ability not just to manage

the reporting of news, but to create and transmit their

‘own’ media reports.

16 Wesley Clarke, Waging Modern War, Public Affairs, New

York, 2001, pp 397-403.

76 The Big Issue
77

CHAPTER 6

A COMMAND

PHILOSOPHY FOR THE

INFORMATION AGE:

THE CONTINUING

RELEVANCE OF

MISSION COMMAND

By Jim Storr

Introduction

British Military Doctrine espouses Mission

Command, a philosophy of decentralised

command based on trust and initiative. Its origins

can be traced at least as far back as the Napoleonic

Wars, although not necessarily in British practice. Its

more immediate provenance lies in German practice

in both World Wars. It was adopted formally by the

British Army in 1987 and subsequently became a

cornerstone of British Defence Doctrine.1, 2 

The twenty-first century brings new challenges, new

perspectives and perhaps also new opportunities.

There must be some doubt as to whether a
command philosophy born in high-intensity warfare

and adopted in the closing years of the Cold War

retains its relevance. This chapter considers the

nature and origins of mission command, discusses

some of the challenges facing it, and then discusses

whether it is still valid as a doctrine for British forces

in the first decades of the twenty-first century.

The Nature of Mission Command

Mission Command is fundamentally a decentralised

style of command, relying on initiative, the

acceptance of responsibility and mutual trust. Its key

elements are: 

‘timely decision making, the importance of

understanding the superior commander’s

intention and, by applying this to one’s own

actions, and a clear responsibility to fulfil that

intention. The underlying requirement is the

fundamental responsibility to act, or in certain

circumstances to decide not to act, within the

framework of the commander’s intent’.3

The key elements are those of responsibility, intent

and the contract of trust. The responsibility of

commanders of all ranks is well understood and

established. The responsibility to act as bid is not

new either; it is, in effect, duty. The identification of

the commander’s intent per se is relatively new, and

‘intent’ is perhaps an issue that still requires further

analysis. However, put simply, commanders have

long expressed their intent in the orders they give. 

78 The Big Issue
What is perhaps novel is the identification of a

contract of trust. The superior trusts his subordinate

to act; to act within the commander’s intent; and to

act sensibly in the circumstances he finds himself,

which are not necessarily those the superior

envisaged when composing his orders.

Consequently the subordinate may act in a way the

commander did not envisage, but which the

commander would endorse were he aware of the

circumstances. Conversely the subordinate trusts

that the superior has given him the direction and

resources appropriate to the job, and that the

superior will support him in exercising his initiative. 

The existence of a contract of trust is important.

Under Mission Command superiors should state a

minimum of control measures, so as not to constrain

subordinates’ freedom of action.4 This grants the

subordinate considerable latitude. In an environment

of trust and initiative, such latitude also speeds the

production, dissemination and comprehension of

orders, thus increasing tempo. Mission Command is

intended to avoid the production of long and detailed

orders, and to allow initiative and the seizure of

fleeting opportunities. It can only work where both

parties trust each other to act appropriately. 

Mission Command is endorsed doctrine. This does

not imply that it is ‘right’ nor ‘wrong’; but that it is

agreed, is authoritative, and is taught. It implies that

the Services collectively wish their commanders to

act in accordance with its tenets where appropriate.

Importantly, it is espoused behaviour: the way the

Services wish their commanders to act. Similarly it is

doctrine, not dogma; hence guidance, not

Chapter 6 79
instruction. It acknowledges that there may be

situations where a commander does not employ

Mission Command and (for example) issues long

and detailed orders which tell the subordinate

exactly how to act. There is a risk that such a

possibility may become an excuse for not employing

Mission Command at all. That eventuality would

illustrate a difference between espoused and

enacted behaviour.

The Origins of Mission Command

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were the

first conflicts in which large bodies routinely

manoeuvred separately off the battlefield, but

combined to fight at the same time and place. The

concept of the ‘corps d’armée’ was made to work

across significant distances, up to several hundred

miles, with only rudimentary communications.

Although campaigns might be planned in detail in

advance, once corps were on the move only

occasional dispatches carried on horseback could

guide the actions of their commanders. Yet corps

could be manoeuvred to meet on the battlefield or,

perhaps more importantly, to fix or delay an enemy

until sufficient strength was assembled to bring

about his defeat. 

Trust was clearly a key issue. Commanders-in-chief

trusted their corps commanders in part because they

had to. Armies were too big to move en bloc, and

generals learnt to act in concert not least through

hard experience. Analogous circumstances also

obtained at sea. Nelson wrote to Collingwood: 

80 The Big Issue
‘I send you my plan of attack, as far as a man

dare venture to guess at the very uncertain

position of the enemy may be found in; but it is to

place you perfectly at ease respecting my

intentions, and to give full scope to your

judgement for carrying them into effect’. 

Nelson’s only signals at Trafalgar were, firstly, his

inspirational ‘England expects ...’; secondly, an

instruction to anchor after the engagement (ie, not to

break into a general pursuit) and, thirdly and finally,

‘Engage the enemy more closely’. Having expressed

his intent in conference prior to the battle, Nelson

clearly expected his ‘band of brothers’ to get on with

it. And his intent was quite categoric: ‘No captain

shall do very badly who lays his ship alongside that

of an enemy’. Mission Command is anything but an

exclusively land concept. 

The provenance of Mission Command can be

followed most easily in Prussian and subsequently

German Army practice. Scharnhorst had taught at

Staff College in 1809-14 that the French successes

of 1806-7 had been won by the 

‘complete and aggressive responsiveness of

French commanders to the will of Napoleon ...,

even without orders, and miles distant’.5

Moltke the Elder observed the sheer difficulty of

controlling armies of 200,000 men or more in the

mid-nineteenth century and considered that

commanders should be 

‘assigned general missions, related to

fundamental, clearly understood objectives, and

Chapter 6 81
then instructed to accomplish those missions by

carrying the fight aggressively to the enemy’.6

After the Franco-Prussian war Moltke wrote that 

‘a favourable situation will never be exploited if

commanders wait for orders. The highest

commander and the youngest soldier must be

conscious of the fact that omission and inactivity

are worse than resorting to the wrong

expedient’.7

The First World War eventually saw decision making

decentralised down to the lowest possible levels.

The infiltration tactics which were the German

response to the conditions of trench warfare relied

on the section commander, and possibly even the

individual soldier, acting on his own initiative in

support of the commanders’ intent. On the 21st

March 1918, the first day of the Spring Offensive, a

German stormtrooper was captured after

penetrating nearly as far as a British brigade HQ. On

questioning as to his orders he said simply ‘so

weiter, so beßer’ – ‘the further, the better’. A more

concise statement of intent would be hard to

formulate. He and his comrades worked in an

environment of trust: trust that his superiors would

support and reinforce any penetration that they

made (although in his particular case, something

clearly didn’t quite work). 

The effectiveness of the Wehrmacht at the tactical

level is almost legendary. That effectiveness, if

sometimes perhaps more legendary than real, is the

product of many factors. Nonetheless it seems

reasonable that the Wehrmacht’s command style –

82 The Big Issue
‘Auftragstaktik’ or ‘mission command’ – was one

such factor. The Wehrmacht’s ability to generate ad

hoc battlegroups from fragments of units, to

counterattack strongly even before the precise

nature of a threat had been identified, and the tempo

its units often demonstrated all indicate a loose,

flexible and decentralised command philosophy.

That philosophy is very much at odds with the

stereotype of the inflexible and dogmatic German

officer portrayed in films.8

It is perhaps a truism that the victor learns least in

war; or at least that the loser learns most. It does

appear that post-war British and US practice

adopted little from the Wehrmacht. Indeed it was not

until a generation of officers who had no personal

experience of the Second World War came to power

in the British Army that issues such as command

philosophy even began to be considered.9 As

Commander 1st British Corps and subsequently

Commander NORTHAG (and CinC BAOR), General

Sir Nigel Bagnall studied both Wehrmacht and

Israeli command philosophies.10 The introduction of

Mission Command into British Army practice and

subsequently British joint doctrine flowed directly

from General Bagnall’s work in the late 1970s and

early 1980s. 

Challenges in the Early Twenty-First

Century

We can identify five challenges to the doctrine of

Mission Command in the early part of the twenty-first

century. They lie in the areas of the spectrum of

Chapter 6 83
future operations; the information revolution;

asymmetric threats; blame culture and litigation; and

the need to sustain the human quality of the British

armed forces.

If Mission Command was born in high-intensity

warfare there must be a question as to its relevance

to a wider spectrum of operations. The question is

whether decentralised decision making, trust,

responsibility, and shared intent, supporting highertempo operations, is relevant or appropriate in

Peace Support Operations (PSO), not least because

of the possibility that actions at tactical levels can

have operational or even strategic impact. This

possibility has been described as the concept of the

‘strategic corporal’. 

The answer must be an emphatic ‘yes’. The strategic

corporal in PSO may be required to think just as

quickly, and his action may have equally momentous

consequences, as if he were being shot at. Indeed,

on occasion, he may be shot at. Arguably what

makes today’s scenarios different is not the range of

possible operations so much as the possibility of

immediate and direct communications from

government to section commander: a consequence

of the information revolution. 

The time and space aspects of the information

revolution require consideration. It may be

technically possible for a government minister to

communicate directly with a section commander: but

only one at any one time. All the other section

commanders deployed in that and other theatres,

and their commanders, have a job to do 24 hours a

84 The Big Issue
day. Governmental involvement may be appropriate

in some instances (a topic to be considered later),

but across a whole expeditionary force it is simply

not practical. For most commanders most of the

time, the established chain of command will be their

normal source of direction. Evidence from PSOs

suggests that armies which are obliged to refer all

tactical decisions back to national capitals cannot

display the flexibility and tempo which their less

constrained peers enjoy. 

This is the domain of the ‘long handled screwdriver’;

the ability of the senior commander, or perhaps more

worryingly the government minister, to closely

monitor and direct low-level activities in a faraway

theatre from his desk in his capital city. In part this

issue arises because ‘he can’. Not only does modern

IT allow it, but the relatively low level of activity in

PSO (compared with war) gives him a relatively

limited range of incidents to get involved with at any

one time. Therefore he can involve himself with the

one roadblock, the one shooting, the one targeting

decision that is happening when his attention falls

that way. When conflict becomes more intense his

ability to get involved in all such incidents decreases. 

This might be called the Province of the Five ‘Ins’:

Interest, Involvement, Influence, Intervention and

Interference. Governmental interest in military

activities is a sine qua non. It is highly desirable to

have some ministerial involvement. Ministerial

influence in military operations is normal, and not

least transmitted through CDS’ Directive to the

Joint Force Commander. In a democracy the

possibility for ministerial intervention must always

Chapter 6 85
exist, not least when things start to go wrong.

However, at what point do all these become

ministerial interference? Is it merely when the

minister insists on something with which the tactical

commander disagrees? 

A more reasoned view is that managing the political

interface (the Sixth ‘In’, which encompasses the

other five) is the operational commander’s job.11

Increasingly, not least through formal measures

such as attendance at the UK Higher Command and

Staff Course, senior commanders are learning to

manage such political involvement. In some cases it

may be a case of gently educating the ministers

involved. That is far from suggesting that the

problem will go away, and never recur. But it does

suggest that Mission Command can, and should be

allowed to, prosper. To do so senior military

commanders must manage the Five Ins, allowing

junior commanders to do their jobs whilst ministers

do theirs. 

Asymmetric threats are a further issue. Much of the

high-intensity warfare in which Mission Command

evolved was broadly symmetric. Can we extrapolate

from there to highly asymmetric threats? Again, the

answer is probably ‘yes’. Arguably, to a major

western democracy, the chief concern raised by

asymmetry is that of surprise. Given warning,

western nations can deploy their sophisticated

intelligence services to identify and investigate the

threat. Their defence scientific bases can develop

technical counters, and their sophisticated industrial

capabilities can manufacture them. They have highly

trainable armed and police forces with which to

86 The Big Issue
respond, once the appropriate response has been

developed. However, taken by surprise,

considerable damage can be done before the

counters are developed and deployed. If surprise

occurs, the best defence is rapid and appropriate

counteraction. The commander on the spot must act

quickly and appropriately; probably in a novel

manner, but one which supports his superiors’

overall intent. That will only happen in a command

environment in which he is trusted to use his

initiative and act effectively. In other words, all the

requirements of Mission Command remain valid. 

A further threat to Mission Command lies in the twin

areas of blame culture and litigation. Their combined

effects are insidious and potentially corrosive. On

the one hand, if something goes wrong, somebody is

usually blamed. There is a ‘fall guy’, not least

because the Media, with their need for immediate

but often simplistic messages, want someone to be

seen to be blamed. Mission Command only works in

an environment of mutual trust. One important

element of that trust is acceptance by the superior of

well-intentioned mistake. Maintaining that element

requires that the superior shoulders any blame

himself if necessary. A further element of trust is

loyalty upwards. If a superior makes a wellintentioned mistake the subordinate can sometimes

act to mitigate its consequences (if he understands

the overall intent). In both cases, for either party to

blame the other erodes trust and hence the social

fabric of Mission Command. 

The prevalence and the fear of litigation are similarly

corrosive. If a commander feels that he may be

Chapter 6 87
taken to court as a consequence of his actions, he

will tend to be highly conservative; to plan in great

detail; to allow subordinates little freedom of action.

He will tend to seek precise direction from superiors.

Conversely, in some circumstances a superior might

deliberately be so vague that he cannot be held

accountable for what his subordinates actually do

(‘...ah, but, I didn’t tell him to do that.’) In both these

cases the social fabric of Mission Command is once

again torn. 

The prevalence of litigation in modern society makes

the fear of it insidious: it is reflected in articles by

junior officers.12 Overcoming that concern requires,

firstly, that it be recognised. Secondly, it requires the

chain of command to take visible steps to support

those at risk (in the courts if necessary), and

possibly a review of legislation to identify if and

where such risks occur. It may be that new

legislation is required to protect junior commanders

engaged in legitimate and well-intentioned activities

which do not yet enjoy protection under the law.13

A further issue is the need to sustain the human

quality of our armed forces. Mission Command

requires initiative. If we are to retain high-calibre

people capable of thinking and acting quickly and

effectively under stress, we need to retain a doctrine

or philosophy (such as Mission Command) that

supports those characteristics. If we do not, the good

will leave and only the obedient, subservient and

unimaginative will stay. 

There is here however an element of circular

argument: we see those who display initiative and

88 The Big Issue
can think and act quickly as good; and we promote

a doctrine that supports those characteristics. This is

not actually a problem: it suggests that our basic

values, evolved over centuries of conflict around the

World, are accurately reflected in a doctrine that we

have enunciated only recently. 

Continuing Relevance

The relevance of Mission Command to the twentyfirst century can be considered from a number of

directions. Firstly, it is a sensible response to an

environment which is seen to be increasingly

complex. Complexity theory suggests that the most

effective way of managing highly interrelated and

dynamic problems is by the decentralisation of

decision making and action to close to the source of

the complexity.14 War and armed conflict of any

nature is hugely complex, dynamic, adversarial and

human. If anything, it will become even more

complex and dynamic as IT allows greater and more

immediate connectivity between people. Thus

decentralising decision making to close to the

people who are at the seat of the conflict is the best

long-term strategy. 

Complexity has another aspect which the

information revolution exacerbates. Complex

problems generate huge amounts of information.

That information, which can often be dealt with

adequately near to the source of complexity, risks

that the local actor responds inappropriately from a

global context. One response to this is to ensure that

the actor understands the overall intent. That is,

Mission Command once again. The other alternative

Chapter 6 89
is to centralise by passing all the information

upwards. Unfortunately, the amount of information

passed between a group of people increases

roughly with the square of the number involved (a

consequence of many-to-many information

strategies), whilst their ability to deal with it only

increases linearly. Thus increasing the number of

people dealing with complex situations (for example,

by increasing staff sizes in HQs) is flawed in the long

run. This is a somewhat simplistic explanation; and

IT can and does assist the transmission, handling

and storage of information; but it highlights a

significant issue. Decentralisation and local flexibility

within the overall intent are the best options. 

Pragmatism is a further issue. Pragmatically,

Mission Command seems to work, with caveats. It

may have taken the British Armed Forces a long time

to enunciate, but it does seem to reflect what they

have learnt that does actually work in practice.

Pragmatism is a peculiarly Anglo-Saxon virtue.15, 16

Although armed forces have often been charged

with excessive conservatism (which might explain

the British Army’s seeming reluctance to adopt

doctrine at all in the 1980s), it is perhaps fairer to say

that, fundamentally, they tend to be pragmatic.

Realising that what works in conflict is institutionally

neither easily learnt nor easily remembered, they err

towards caution. Since Mission Command seems to

work, the British Armed Forces would be justified in

being very reluctant to abandon it. 

However, there are caveats. Firstly, armed forces

must practice what they preach. Espoused and

enacted behaviour are rarely identical. The latter,

90 The Big Issue
when observed objectively, tends to be a fairer

reflection of deeply-held values than the former.

Research and substantial anecdotal evidence

indicates that, in the Army at least, there have been

occasions where commanders talked Mission

Command, but in practice allowed their subordinates

little freedom of action. There may be many reasons

for this, but it is a matter for concern. 

Secondly, Mission Command requires a certain

minimum standard of training. There is no point in

giving subordinates freedom of operation when

they simply don’t know what to. It can sensibly be

argued that the highly orchestrated plan for the

Battle of the Somme was at least in part a

recognition that many of the Kitchener Divisions in

the BEF were relatively untrained, and capable of

little more. The results speak for themselves. The

deduction is to reinforce the need for thorough

training. That may be a valid long-term objective,

but may not help in immediate circumstances. 

Thirdly, not least because Mission Command

requires a contract between both parties, it can be

problematic when working with other forces or with

the forces of other nations. Not only must both

parties accurately understand the overall intent, but

their understanding of Mission Command must be

reasonably similar. There have been well-described

(if slightly sensitive) examples of where forces from

other nations have simply not comprehended the

freedom of operation which the British practice of

Mission Command affords. Conversely this author

(for one) has been more than mildly surprised by the

Chapter 6 91
ruthlessly literal interpretation of Mission Command

displayed by the Bundeswehr, for example. 

As we have seen, Mission Command empowers

people. This might sound a trite managerial

sound-bite, but it has real value. People who are

allowed to exercise their own judgement are

generally well-motivated compared with those

who are not. They tend to make better

subordinates, better superiors in due course, and

where appropriate learn from their mistakes

because they have (within reason) been allowed

to make them. A subordinate who is never allowed

to make decisions may never make mistakes, but

equally surely will never learn from them. 

Mission Command and SelfSynchronisation 

Finally, as we introduce information-age command

systems we should see an improved understanding

of the higher commander’s intent. We should also

see a more developed and widely shared

understanding of the operational situation at all

levels of command. These are the conditions in

which mission command should flourish. 

Moving beyond our contemporary understanding of

mission command, is the US concept of selfsynchronisation – an essential element of Network

Centric Warfare. This envisages commanders and

even section level teams and individuals, armed with

the commander’s intent and highly developed

situational understanding, doing what needs to be

done without traditional orders.17 The nomenclature

92 The Big Issue
jars somewhat and gives the concept, to British ears,

an air of improbability. But in essence, this idea is not

new. German doctrine in the 1930s stated that ‘the

emptiness of the battlefield requires fighters who

think and act on their own and can analyse any

situation and exploit it decisively and boldly’.

18 The

German system demanded that when necessary

artillery, infantry and other supporting [arms] should

co-ordinate and act together without direction from

above.19 Self synchronisation involves the

broadening and deepening of such a developed

form of Mission Command throughout every level

and across every functional area of a Combined,

Joint Force. 

The paradox, therefore, is that while many will fret

that the information age spells the end of mission

command, it actually creates conditions where such

a command philosophy is the essential bedrock for

success. We can therefore look forward to a

renaissance of Mission Command.

NOTES

1 Design for Military Operations – The British Military

Doctrine, Army Code 71451, 1989, pp 41 and 49.

2 The British Defence Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication 0-

01, 1996, pp 4.8-9.

3 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Volume 2 Command, Army Code 71564, April 1995, Paragraph 0210.

4 Idem, Paragraph 0210d.

5 A Genius for War. The German Army and the General

Staff, 1807-1945. T N Dupuy, London 1977, p 35.

6 Idem, p 67.

7 Idem, p116.

8 Idem, p 10.

9 FM Sir Nigel Bagnall was commissioned in February 1946

and commanded an Armoured Division from 1975 to 1977.

Chapter 6 93
He and his peers were the first divisional commanders to

have had no personal experience of WW2.

10 Deterrence and the Defence of Central Europe: The

British Role from the Early 1980s to the End of the Gulf

War. Sangho Lee, PhD Thesis, King’s College London,

August 1994, pp 80-83.

11 Interviews with General Sir Rupert Smith, Admiral Sir John

Woodhouse, Major General David Richards and

Commodore Christopher Craig, May–July 2001.

12 ‘Attack!!! Attack... Attack ???’ James Coote, Army

Doctrine and Training News (ADTN) 14, Winter 2000-1, p

41.

13 ‘Tempo and the Minimisation of Casualties’, J P Storr,

ADTN 15, Spring 2001, pp 20-1. 

14 Coping with the Bounds. Speculations on Non-Linearity in

Military Affairs. Tom Czerwinski, Institute for National

Strategy Studies, Washington, 1998, pp79-95.

15 Philosophy, Richard H Popkin and Avrum Stroll,

Heinemann, London 1989, p235.

16 The 17th Century Philosophers: The Age of Reason. Stuart Hampshire, New American Library, New York, 1984.

pp 17 and 20.

17 The disruption caused by the fuel tanker strike in the UK

during winter 2000 is an example of selfsynchronisation.

Lacking any national leadership or formal organisation, but

armed with an intent to move the government on the fuel

tax issue, and informed by mass media, telecoms and the

internet, disparate groups acted in concert to create

havoc. Another non-military example is the international

anti-capitalism movement, which appears leaderless and

unorganised, but does produce concerted anarchic action.

18 ‘Truppenführung’, published in 1933, in Knox M and

Murray W, The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300 –

2050, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p 159.

19 Idem, p 160.

94 The Big Issue
95

CHAPTER 7

THE COMMANDER AS

EXPERT

By Jim Storr

British military doctrine describes the three

functions of a commander as leadership,

decision making and control of assigned

subordinates.1 Good commanders are seen as

expert decision makers, in addition to any qualities

as leaders and directors of their forces. Tactical

decision making may take place in situations that are

dangerous, dynamic, confusing, unclear and

possibly overloaded with information. It is in that

environment that good commanders are required to

be expert decision-makers. 

Digitization is intended to support commanders, and

hence support (and possibly assist the development

of) expert decision-makers. This suggests a need to

understand how decision makers become expert.

That would allow us to help commanders become

expert decision-makers, and in the longer term

improve the quality of tactical decision making in the

Army. This is primarily a mental and not a

technological issue. Information Technology (IT)

may, or may not, assist the process. 

This chapter considers how decision makers

become expert, in order to establish implications for
training future commanders. It starts by considering

how armies currently train commanders to make

decisions. It then discusses how commanders

actually do make decisions and compares the two. It

considers how decision-makers develop expertise,

and makes deductions for training and learning.

Rational Choice Strategies

Most Armies have a methodology for decision

making that has been described as traditional,

theoretical, predominantly prescriptive. They

provide a procedure for ‘how to do it’.

2 The standard

method for making decisions, typical to many

armies and businesses, is to decide on an aim,

consider all the relevant options, define all the

important evaluation criteria, weight the importance

of each criteria, evaluate each option on each

criterion, and select the winner. They can de

described as ‘Rational Choice Strategies’ (RCS);

the Estimate is one such process.3

However, rational choice strategies are not

necessarily the best suited to tactical decision

making. Such strategies should be reliable (all things

being equal, they should give good and consistent

results); they can support quantitative analysis; they

inform novices of things they do not know; they are

rigorous; and they are very widely applicable. They

are useful in teams, since they allow all members to

come to a common understanding of the advantages

and disadvantages of each option. However,

observation of exercises shows that there is rarely

time or information to make rational choice

strategies work as well as they should. Research

96 The Big Issue
indicates that they do not ensure that novices make

good choices (although it does help them describe

their choices subsequently), and they are usually not

helpful for experienced decision-makers. The latter

are often frustrated at being shackled to a process,

when they already know what they intend to do.4

Indeed there is evidence that if people are forced to

use rational choice strategies they make worse

decisions, not better.5

Naturalistic Decision-making

There is extremely strong scientific evidence that

most decision makers do not use rational choice

strategies as taught, and that expert decision

makers should not do so.6, 7 The relevant field of

research is called Naturalistic Decision-Making

(NDM). It addresses the way that people actually

make decisions in natural or realistic situations.

There is a large body of research in this area and a

number of overlapping acronyms. NDM theory is an

alternative view to rational choice strategy. It

counters many traditional theories of decision

making. It attempts to understand how individuals

and teams actually make decisions in complex

environments, and is particularly applicable to expert

decision-makers.8 This chapter will use the term

‘naturalistic methods’ to refer to the methods that

decision-makers normally use in tactical situations.9 

Naturalistic methods apply to ill-structured

problems in uncertain, dynamic environments in

which the goals are shifting, competing or illdefined. Those situations also have action or

feedback loops, are time-pressured, have high

Chapter 7 97
stakes, multiple players, and organisational goals

and norms. Naturalistic methods are highly

appropriate to many tactical situations.10

Rather than generating and comparing alternative

courses of action (COAs), as in rational choice

strategies, naturalistic methods depend on the

recognition of a situation as being similar to, or

typical of, situations with which the decision maker is

already familiar. The decision maker can then

envisage a solution to the problem which, based on

his experience, is probably ‘about right’. With further

thought, that ‘about right’ solution can be developed

into a highly suitable plan. ‘Recognition’ and

‘envisaging’ are not entirely conscious: decisionmakers frequently become aware of a problem and

‘just know what to do’. Sometimes they are not even

aware that they have actually made a decision. 

Naturalistic methods therefore only consider one

solution, until and unless the decision-maker

realises that that working solution won’t work. That

realisation then prompts the identification of a

subsequent solution, and so on. This is a very short

description of naturalistic methods, and does not

necessarily do justice to their power and value.11

None of these aspects should be seen as criticisms:

the next section describes how NDM and RCS

compare in appropriate circumstances. It is

important to stress that NDM is an effective

description of how the human brain appears to

actually work, even when engaged in rational choice

strategies (for example, when conducting an

estimate). In using rational choice methods, the

decision-maker often becomes aware (and often

98 The Big Issue
quite early) of what his intended solution will be. He

then spends considerable time justifying the choice

he has in practice already made – ‘situating the

appreciation’. To that extent rational choice

strategies as taught have been described as a

charade or even a pantomime.12 That is not to say

that rational choice strategies are not useful. Their

use is discussed in the next Section.

An understanding of naturalistic methods helps us

understand intuition, or at least intuitive decision

making. Contrary to assumption, intuition is probably

not inherited (there is no evidence that one is ‘born

with it’13) nor is it necessarily the preserve of senior

officers. Indeed it is entirely possible that some

senior officers will never develop it.

Intuition depends on the use of experience to

recognise key patterns that indicate the dynamics of

the situation.14 It is largely subconscious: the

decision-maker ‘just knows what to do’. Since it is

largely based on experience of similar

circumstances, one can see how some senior

commanders, with the appropriate experience, may

have intuition that works in those circumstances.

However, some types of people are more likely than

others to reflect on their experiences, and perhaps

more likely to develop intuition than others. People

who do not reflect are perhaps unlikely to develop

intuition, even if they are quite experienced. Some

senior officers may fall into that group.

Chapter 7 99
Comparisons

Naturalistic methods may describe what decisionmakers actually do, but that does not imply that it is

the most appropriate approach in all circumstances.

On some occasions it will not be. Naturalistic

methods will be suited to situations of greater time

pressure, where the decision maker is more

experienced, where the situation is dynamic, and

where goals are ill-defined. Conversely, rational

choice strategies are better suited to situations

where the selection of COA must be justified; where

conflict of opinion within decision-making teams

must be resolved; where the best possible solution

must be obtained; where time is not at a premium;

and where greater computational complexity is

required or (perhaps) is simply available.15

Note that there is some evidence that in tactical

decision making the best possible solution is not

necessarily the most desirable: the ‘80% solution

now’ may well be more effective than the best

possible solution obtained some time later.16

Critically, however, 

‘Recognitional strategies [that is, naturalistic

methods] that take advantage of experience are

generally successful, not as a substitute for the

analytical method [ie, rational choice strategies]

but as an improvement on them. The analytical

methods [ie, RCS] are not the ideal; they are the

fallback for those without enough experience to

know what to do.’17

100 The Big Issue
This is highly significant, and has several major

implications:

• Firstly, although some rational choice methods

must be taught to novice decision makers, after

an initial introduction, training for decision

making should concentrate not on the methods

of decision-making but, on the building up of

relevant experience.

• Secondly, in the appropriate circumstances

experienced decision makers will make better

decisions when they use naturalistic methods

and, in due course, rely on their intuition. There

are pitfalls to naturalistic methods (for example,

prior experience may be misleading), but there

are ways of training decision makers to

recognise and account for them much of the

time.18 And just because naturalistic methods or

intuition sometimes provide a wrong solution,

there is no guarantee that rational choice

strategies used in the same circumstances

would have produced a better solution.

• Thirdly, naturalistic methods can give solutions

that are just as detailed as rational choice

strategies, if the decision maker has a

sufficiently rich bank of experience.

However, enthusiasm for naturalistic methods must

not be allowed to overtake all use of rational choice

strategies. One does not develop the requisite

experience without exposure; there are

circumstances when naturalistic methods are not

appropriate; and the cry of ‘intuition’ does not excuse

sloppy decision making. 

Chapter 7 101
It is perfectly reasonable to expect, and allow,

commanders to use naturalistic decision making

methodologies in the right circumstances. Given

those circumstances, they will tend to make

decisions that are equally good or better, and be

able to make them quicker, than when using rational

choice strategies.

Experts and Expertise

Experienced decision-makers, using naturalistic

methods, are highly likely to generate good first

decisions without having to develop and evaluate

several options. They can do so under extreme time

pressure.19 It is not that they refuse to consider

alternative courses of action; they don’t have to.20

Thus not only can they decide well using naturalistic

methods; in many occasions they should and will.

Research into naturalistic methods has allowed an

understanding of how decision makers become

expert. The decision-maker engages in deliberate

practice, and each opportunity for practice has a

goal and evaluation criteria. By doing so repeatedly,

he compiles an extensive bank of experience. In

doing so he must obtain accurate, diagnostic and

timely feedback. He also enriches his experiences,

by reviewing past situations, in order to derive new

insights and lessons from mistakes.21

A very few people appear to be able to generalise

and abstract enormously, and become highly expert

based on very little personal experience. However,

biographies seem to suggest that expert battlefield

decision-makers become so largely because they

consciously reflected on their experience. Patton,22, 23

102 The Big Issue
Manstein,24 Rommel25 and possibly Zhukov26 are

particular examples. There are a few historical

exceptions. Napoleon appears to have been a highly

rational thinker (he excelled at maths and sciences

at school27), but also seems to have been

exceptionally (and possibly giftedly) intuitive.28 So

although he pored over maps and returns for long

hours, he does not appear to have consciously

reflected on past experience to any great degree.

Instead, typically, he would ride out onto the

battlefield before dawn and his battle plan would

come to him. He would ‘just know what to do’.

Conversely, some experienced commanders may

never become expert decision-makers. If they lack

the predisposition to reflect on their experiences,

those experiences will afford them little advantage.

To become expert, decision-makers must build up a

library of relevant experiences. The gifted few need

relatively little experience, because (subconsciously

or consciously) they can extrapolate and learn much

from relatively little experience. Veterans will often

be expert decision makers in situations within their

past experience. However, not least because this

process is partly subconscious, they may not be able

to explain why they would make certain decisions;

they ‘just know what to do’. This would suit them

well, but hinder the process of passing on expertise

to subsequent generations.

Thus not only is it entirely sensible to allow and

encourage commanders to use naturalistic decision

making methods, but it is necessary to do so if we

hope to make most of them into expert decision

makers. Expert decision-makers do use naturalistic

Chapter 7 103
methods in the appropriate circumstances, and tend

to reflect consciously on their experiences.

Training and Learning

The implications for training future commanders

stem directly from an understanding of how decision

makers become expert. It is important to repeat that

there is evidence that if people are forced to use

rational choice strategies they make worse

decisions than if they are allowed to use naturalistic

methods.29 It is also important to note that training in

rational choice strategies does not make expert

decision-makers. On the contrary, that risks slowing

the development of decision-making skills.30

The sheer number of instances of decision-making

in relevant situations will be a key driver in

producing expert decision-makers. The need is for

more, not longer, instances of decision making. A

training exercise which requires a commander to

make one decision laboriously, being forced to use

rational choice strategies, will be of much less value

than one which requires him to make several

decisions about a raft of similar situations in

succession. This has major implications for the

training of commanders. 

Rational choice strategies allow the novice to

expose his thinking to his instructor, which is often

seen as an advantage. However, it is arguably

irrelevant, since training in rational choice strategies

does not make novices into expert decision makers.

It is relatively unimportant that a novice explain how

he has made a particular decision. What is more

104 The Big Issue
important is feedback as to whether or not it was an

appropriate decision. There are three deductions:

• Firstly, feedback is crucial, and it must be timely,

relevant and informative.

• Secondly, extensive feedback as to method is

virtually irrelevant. The criticism that a novice

did not perform a particular step in an Estimate

does not help him become a better decision

maker. What is important is that the decision

maker becomes aware of the key aspects of

the situation which prompted the decision.

Such ‘cues’ are what allows him to recognise

an appropriate solution: hence ‘Recognition

Primed Strategies’.

• Thirdly, the decision maker should become

increasingly aware of how he actually makes

decisions. This is a highly individual issue, but it

is a key aspect of developing expertise.

Teaching decision-making methodologies should

move away from process-related towards outputrelated assessment. Furthermore, part-task teaching

of decision-making methodologies is only of value to

the absolute novice, because one of the key issues

of any decision making is the integration of all

aspects of the situation.31

Feedback is important, but so is an environment

which tolerates well intentioned mistake. If junior

commanders are to be encouraged to make rapid,

naturalistic, possibly intuitive and ‘about right

(‘80%’)’ decisions, then those decisions they get

wrong should be seen not as failures but as valuable

Chapter 7 105
opportunities from which to learn. Tolerance of wellintentioned mistakes is also an important feature of

Mission Command. Tactical Exercises Without

Troops (TEWTs) are an easy way of allowing junior

commanders to make decisions in a benign

environment. In a TEWT the consequences of ‘right’

or ‘wrong’ are equally imaginary. 

There is a serious risk in employing naturalistic

methods that the feedback provided will teach false

lessons, which will in effect be a template for

subsequent decisions. That is a valid and relevant

criticism, but three counter-arguments can be raised.

• Firstly, given solutions that are believed to be

valid, naturalistic methods constitute a better

way of teaching decision making than rational

choice strategies. The key is the identification of

valid solutions in the first place, not the

decision-making methodology employed.

• Secondly, naturalistic methods allow for a wider

range of potential situations to be experienced

within a given amount of time, because more

situations can be considered than when using

(and debriefing) rational choice strategies. Thus

training using naturalistic methods is more likely

to result in the selection of a valid solution in a

subsequent decision, because the decision

maker has a wider library of experience.

• Thirdly, much of the concern over teaching false

lessons reflects the fact that many instructors,

themselves taught using rational choice

strategies, are not particularly experienced

decision makers (whatever else they may be).

106 The Big Issue
In practice, instructors who themselves are

exposed to a larger number of solutions from

their students learn from that exposure

themselves. Systemically, training using

naturalistic methods would benefit both the

students and the instructors in the middle to

long term.32

Tactical decision making is relatively difficult,

important and infrequent for many commanders. It

may become frequent on operations, but the issue is

how to prepare them for operations prior to

deployment. Difficulty, Importance and Frequency

(DIF) analysis is a standard tool of training design.33

In general, a skill that is difficult, important and

infrequent should be over-taught. Long training

courses and in-barracks training should give

repeated opportunity for decision making, in the

knowledge that skill fade will occur. Training for

tactical decision making should concentrate on a

large number of instances, give immediate feedback

as to output not process, and be permissive of wellintentioned error. 

In summary, to train commanders to become expert

decision makers requires a revised approach. The

first few steps, perhaps in the first term or two as an

officer cadet, will be to teach the mechanics of

rational choice strategies. Thereafter training should

concentrate on exposing him to a large number and

wide range of problems, and give him feedback as to

the outcome of his solution. The trainee should be

encouraged to reflect on his decision, and what

features of the situation prompted the given solution.

He should not be criticised on his decision making

Chapter 7 107
methodology, but rather on the suitability of the

solution to the problem as presented. 

Relevance to the Information Age

A potential challenge to the use of naturalistic

methods arises from the advent of battlefield

digitization. The argument is that IT will allow a

commander a better understanding of the

battlespace on which to base his decisions, and

more time to make them. Judgmentally,

commanders will not need to rely on ‘hunches’ and

‘guesses’ because they will be at liberty to do things

‘properly’. To use a strong analogy, before

digitization, command is like stud poker: you know

what some, but not all, of your own cards are, and

have little idea what cards the opponent holds. With

digitization, command is like chess: you can

(potentially) see all the pieces. What remains largely

unknown is the opponent’s intentions.34 Grand

Masters are expert decision makers, and routinely

employ naturalistic methods. Even in major matches

they can make moves as fast as once per six

seconds, not least because they practice a lot.35

However, although chess is adversarial and

dynamic, the consequences of taking longer to make

a better decision are not critical in most matches,

whereas operational (hence decision making) tempo

is a major factor on the battlespace. Digitization is

intended either to allow them to have a better

understanding of the situation, or allow them to

make decisions even earlier; or possibly both (ie,

better decisions faster). Furthermore, the benefit of

better understanding of the situation is not the ability

108 The Big Issue
to make a better decision, but to be more confident

that his chosen solution is the right one (because it

fits the real situation). We should design IT to

support expert decision makers and enable a

competent decision maker to become expert.

Rational choice strategies do support situations

where greater computational complexity is required

or, perhaps, is available.36 However, that suggests

that we should adopt rational choice strategies

because they support the use of IT. The real object

is to have IT support decision makers in the art of

making a decision, rather than primarily supporting a

decision making process managed for a commander

by his supporting staff. This suggests a need to use

IT to allow commanders to fight a large number of

engagements in varying scenarios in different

environments. It could also allow them to use

experience captured in an online record as well as

from memory. 

The formal military decision making process for the

information age must also support naturalistic

decision making. Steps are being made in this

direction by the ongoing development in the Army,

for example, of a new effects-based process37

framed around the way in which it is believed

commanders actually approach tactical problems. In

the Joint arena, as our understanding of EffectsBased Operations matures an effects based

approach to campaign planning will follow. As this

occurs, it will be important not to snare commanders

in staff-managed, computer-supported processes,

but to develop methodologies to support the

commander in exercising his intuitive judgement and

Chapter 7 109
to exploit the depth of experience and expertise

embodied in his persona. 

If the information revolution delivers anything to our

commanders, it must free them up to think about

problems and to exercise their judgement.38

NOTES

1 Army Doctrine Publication Volume 2 Command, Army

Code 71564, April 1995, Paragraphs 0107-0110 and

Figure 1.1.

2 ‘Towards Better Knowledge: a Fusion of Information,

Technology and Human Aspects of Command and

Control.’ Kallmeier et al, Journal of Battlespace

Technology Volume IV Number 1, March 2001. ISSN

1440-5113, pp 34-43.

3 This Paper will generally avoid the use of the acronym

‘RCS’ in order to assist readability. On occasions its use

will be appropriate.

4 Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Gary

Klein, MIT Press, London 1998, pp 28-9.

5 Idem, p 34, quoting Wilson and Schooler.

6 ‘Evidence of Naturalistic Decision Making in Command

and Control’. Raphael Pascual and Simon Henderson, in

Naturalistic Decision Making, Caroline E Zsambok and

Gary Klein ed, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New

Jersey. ISBN 0-8058-1873-1, 1997, pp 217-66.

7 Klein op cit p103.

8 Kallmeier loc cit.

9 The acronym NDM will, like RCS, generally be avoided:

see Footnote 3 above.

10 Kallmeier loc cit.

11 For a fuller (and very readable) description, see Klein,

Chapters 1-3.

12 Coping with the Bounds. Speculations on Non-Linearity in

Military Affairs. Tom Czerwinski, Institute for National

Strategy Studies, Washington, 1998, p152.

13 Klein p 31.

14 Ibid. Italic throughout original.

15 Klein, p 95 and table 7.1.

16 J P Storr, ‘Real People, Real Decisions: Designing HQs to

win Wars.’ British Army Review Edition123, Winter 2000.

110 The Big Issue
17 Klein p 103. Italics added.

18 Klein describes a particular methodology known as

Recognition-Primed Decision Making.

19 Klein p 167.

20 Idem p 17.

21 Idem p 104.

22 George S Patton Jr, War as I Knew It, Riverside Press,

Cambridge MA, 1944, passim.

23 Martin Blumenson, Patton – The Man Behind the Legend

William Morrow, New York 1985, passim.

24 Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, Presidio, Novato,

California, 1994, passim.,

25 David Fraser, Knight’s Cross, A Life of FM Erwin Rommel, Harper Collins, London 1993, passim.

26 Aaron Lieberwitz, Zhukov: Man of Legend, Presidio,

Novato, California, 1974, passim.

27 Richard Holmes (ed), The Oxford Companion to Military

History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. pp 620-1.

28 Professor Richard Holmes, personal communication.

Professor Holmes wrote the entry at Footnote 27.

29 See above, and Footnote 4.

30 Klein op cit p 30.

31 Idem pp168-9.

32 Major Jim Ball, US Army Exchange Officer, (British) Army

School of Training Support, personal communication. The

Author is grateful to Major Ball for his input into this

section.

33 Ibid.

34 Marc Widdowson, [VEGA plc], Lecture: The Principles of

War in the Information Age. RMCS Shrivenham, Sep

2000.

35 Klein, op cit p 273.

36 See above and Footnote 15.

37 Developed at the Combined Arms Staff Trainer (North) in

Catterick.

38 The Author is grateful to Mrs Liz Wheatley and Dr Simon

Henderson of the QinetiQ Centre for Human Sciences for

their most helpful comments on this paper.

Chapter 7 111
PART TWO –

POSSIBILITIES

The Commander-centric

Approach

Beyond Interoperability: Part 1

Beyond Interoperability: Part 2

The Divine Threads

3D Vision

The Case for Manned

Reconnaissance

The Delilah Factor
CHAPTER 8

THE COMMANDERCENTRIC APPROACH

TO MODERNISING

COMMAND

STRUCTURES

By Jake Thackray

In the British System, a field commander is

supported. Period. That is the rule. A field

commander is given mission-type orders, not

detailed and continuing guidance. It is a

wonderful, traditional approach, one that

embodies trust in the commander and

confidence in his judgement as the man on the

scene. The American military has always aspired

to this model, but has seldom seemed to attain it. 

Gen Wesley K Clark

Waging Modern War

Introduction

General Clark’s observation was made in

reference1 to his well-publicised disagreement

with General Mike Jackson during the Kosovo

campaign. It is tempting to react to it with a degree

115
of self-satisfaction: it does, after all, coincide

exactly with current British defence doctrine. It

should instead, perhaps, be taken as a salient

warning. It is an observable truth that the

introduction of our digitised command technologies

is largely a response to the US concept now widely

known as Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) and

their various army programmes of change, now

under the banner headline of Transformation. We

must be, and are, grateful to our American

colleagues for their continued generosity and

willingness to share with us their experiences and

ideas of their ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’. But the

wholesale adoption of procedures which suit their

way of commanding and controlling operations

might possibly constrain ours, leaving us less,

rather than more, capable.2 It is therefore

imperative that we modernise our command

structures in ways that suit our command culture

and way of operating with the planned capabilities

that will actually be available to our commanders. 

The Commander-centric Approach

The purpose of a command structure is to enable the

commander to exercise effective command, through

leadership and decision making and to access and

co-ordinate rapidly a range of organic and

supporting capabilities to achieve his intent. In

essence, therefore, command – comprising

leadership and decision making – is enabled by

Command and Battlespace Management, one of

whose products is the co-ordination of Joint effects.

All of this is underpinned by Command Support,

116 The Big Issue
comprising Communications and Information

Systems, and life support. The UK ‘style of

command’ places significant emphasis on the

qualities of individual leaders, imbued with intuitive

decision making skills developed through training

and experience, supported by staffs whose role is

more mechanistic in nature. Such a style can be

described as ‘Commander-Centric’ and gives rise to

three premises: 

• Leadership. Leadership is a personal quality,

and any future command structure should be

adaptable to different leadership styles. The

appropriate style will also vary with the level of

command. The key is for the structure to

provide the commander with as many command

options as possible, to allow maximum flexibility

within affordable limits. The training and

development of leaders to populate the

structure must also be seen as an integral part

of the overall command system.

• Decision Making. Commanders need timely

and relevant information in a form that

supports their personal decision making

process, including their intuitive judgement.

Intimate support must be provided from only

those staff whose role is to provide such

information and directly support decision

making; others do not require close physical

contact with the commander.

• Co-ordinating Capability. The command

structure must enable the commander to access

and co-ordinate rapidly a range of organic and

Chapter 8 117
supporting capabilities to achieve his intent.

This is a ‘control’ function that is carried out by

the staff on behalf of the commander, though

the commander must retain an element of

control to deal with major changes to the

situation, thus allowing him to carry out

continuous mission analysis.

The Span and Levels of Command

The span of command is the number of subordinate

organisations given to one commander to command

directly. Factors acting to increase the span of

command include: an increased rate of information

processing, increased delegation of authority to

subordinates, increased freedom of action of

subordinates and a greater availability of information

and intelligence in which the commander has

confidence. Arguably, these may all be delivered by

information age digitized technologies. Other factors

might include a more benign operational

environment or the close mutual understanding and

bond of trust between commanders and their

subordinates that has developed through working

together over a long period of time.

Conversely, a greater complexity of tasks and forces

(multinationality for example), increased battlespace

dynamics and a range of physical, psychological and

interpersonal stressors3 on commanders all conspire

to narrow the span. Other factors acting to narrow

the span include the complexity and demands of the

chain of command in which the commander finds

himself operating – for theatre commanders in

multinational PSO, the arrangements can be

118 The Big Issue
bewilderingly complex. The number of points of

contact is another factor and could include, for

example, local police, government authorities,

agencies, Non-government organisations and any

one of a number of other in-theatre actors or

factions. Added to which are the demands of the

media and the need to visit and ‘glad-hand’ multinational contingents. All of these factors reduce the

time available for the commander to ‘command’ and

consequently constrain his span of command. 

Therefore, although it is recognised that in benign

environments, certain types of operation allow for a

widening of the span of command, there are real

world imperatives counterbalancing the weight

digitization may lend to arguments for its widening

on a universal basis.

For UK forces, it is also difficult to envisage how

digitized command and control capabilities would

sensibly enable the removal of a level of command

during the next decade. Whilst information could

flow freely up and down a chain of command, it

would not necessarily add to ‘knowledge’ at each

level if it is not interpreted in some way to draw out

the relevant factors. But, as the flow of information

improves and as collaborative planning tools begin

to enable multiple layers of command to contribute

simultaneously to the development of a plan, it is

likely that levels of command will become more

porous. Nevertheless, levels of command exist in

part to provide a hierarchy of manageable spans,4

but, more crucially, they exist because different

functions are carried out at each level – functions

that would need to be aggregated either up or down

Chapter 8 119
the hierarchy if de-layering took place. Brigade level

HQs are, essentially engaged in the close battle. At

the divisional level we see deep operations taking

pre-eminence, rear operations coming into play and,

increasingly, multinational factors impacting on the

command structure. At the corps level we see a

fundamentally multi-national HQ orchestrating the

efforts the national contingents and, unless there is

a 4-star Land Component HQ, being heavily

involved in campaign planning. 

Within the close battle, we might see a change in the

relationship between brigade and battlegroup

headquarters as brigade commanders acquire their

own ISTAR assets and gain access to better and

better information. This coupled with the capability to

rapidly develop plans and disseminate intent and

orders, might lead to circumstances where the

battlegroup headquarters will add less value to the

overall process, as sub-unit commanders will be

able to act within the brigade commanders intent.

This will be especially so in simple terrain where the

whole brigade area is a single environment. In

complex terrain there are micro-environments, which

create frictions at the lowest levels, the full

engagement of every level of command would be

required to develop plans that will work at each level.

In these circumstances (Northern Ireland, for

example) the emphasis on developing and

executing plans can move down to the battalion or

company level, or even below, with brigades

providing more of a co-ordinating framework. 

Again, as with the span of command, there is no

conceptual or practical basis for removing a

120 The Big Issue
particular layer in the tactical chain of command on

a universal basis. This does not mean that a slavish

structure is envisaged from brigade level to corps in

every operation. On the contrary, command

echelons have already evolved as indicated below.

This shows that, theoretically, any tactical formation

HQs might have to command at the operational level

in certain circumstances.

Fig 1 – The Evolution of Command: Levels For Differing

Operations

When this occurs, its superior tactical level formation

HQs in the peacetime structure are dispensed with

and the headquarters, with appropriate modular

augmentation, works directly to the national

command in the home base.

Headquarters Design

A modular approach such as that in Figure 2 would

allow HQs to concentrate or disperse, depending

on the situation and would allow them to take on

extra responsibilities when needed. Such an

Chapter 8 121
approach would provide the inherent flexibility

needed to allow formation HQs to flex between

acting as tactical HQs or at the operational level. All

formations and units require a ‘core’ set of modules

that give them a tactical warfighting capability,

optimised for the delivery of Joint effects. A second

set could be those modules required to enable a LC

tactical HQ to play its part in the Joint command

structure, as either a JFLCC or JTF HQ. A third set

might be those modules required for multinational

operations, particularly outside an ARRC context

and the fourth set comprising those modules

required for Other Operations at the tactical level.

As every HQ would have a ‘core’ Joint warfighting

set, the number of sets required would be driven by

the force structure. Sets 2 – 4 could be drawn upon

for training5 and operations on an as required

basis, and so the overall number of these sets

would be driven by Defence Planning and

Concurrency Assumptions.6

Current HQ structures at formation level do not

provide the C2 capability needed to support

sustained warfighting.7 They have neither the staff

nor the expertise to allow for continuous operation or

a seamless transfer of authority on change of

control. Disparities exist between the output possible

at one level of command, and the input which the

next level down can utilise. Planning capability at

Divisional Level, for example, ‘can become quickly

exhausted in comparison to that achievable within

HQ ARRC’.

8 In the future, fully empowered

headquarters capable of 24-hour operation are likely

122 The Big Issue
Fig 2 – Modular HQ Structure
to be essential (in order to allow for fleeting

opportunities to be grasped at all levels).

Mechanisms for providing these need to be

explored. Distributed databases (and the necessary

pool of expertise) may enable reserve or flanking

HQs to temporarily assume command of other

formations. The desegregation of planning and

execution at certain levels might also be considered.

Equally, the possibility of ‘pairing’ formation HQs to

provide identical shifts, each tasked with planning

and execution might be considered.9 Such

developmental work should also include exploration

of the separate but linked issue of the provision of

alternate HQs at all levels. Innovations such as

distributive planning and collaborative planning,

where different levels of command and horizontal

functional areas all participate concurrently in the

development of a plan, will have implications for HQ

structures, as there is an inevitable relationship

between process and organisation.

HQs also evolve during campaigns. Initially, enabling

capabilities allow for the arrival and Reception

Staging Onward movement and Integration of force

elements. As the campaign progresses, Transfer of

Authority where appropriate, preparation10 for and

then the conduct of operations is followed by

campaign termination, extraction and, finally,

recovery; or, equally, transition through conflict

prevention, conflict and post conflict activities. The

activities – and their relative importance to each

other – and hence of staff divisions can differ

considerably during different stages of the

campaign. Ultimately, any HQ facing the changing

requirements of a campaign must have the capability

124 The Big Issue
to grow, reduce, divide and merge seamlessly both

in terms of its infrastructure, staff activity and

functionality therein. Similarly, the rank of the

commander will need to change during the course of

an operation as its complexity, profile and scale wax

and wane. This could be achieved by adjustments

within the deployed HQ rather than necessarily

involving the deployment of a new HQ as well as a

new commander.

Command Post Design

CPs at all levels of command must promote human

interaction (and particularly the need to generate

shared intent and shared SA), support the rapid flow

of information into, out of and throughout the

Command Post, and enable the management of the

integration of effects in the battlespace. There are a

number of different models under development or in

service with the armies of different nations to meet

these requirements. The US and most of our allies

have already digitised their Army C2 systems. IBCT

TOCs, for example, provide a multi-screen briefing

wall for commanders and staffs. On the other hand,

the Swedish ROLF11 development project provides

an electronic birdtable solution, derived from an

exhaustive human factors study to derive the best

CP solution that would promote human interaction in

multi-disciplinary groups. This form of CP

environment would be more instinctively familiar to

those schooled in the UK ‘bird table’ style of working.

Chapter 8 125
The Staff

The competition for skilled manpower will continue

to be an intense one, especially within the

information technology fields. It may therefore be

necessary to concentrate expertise where it is

required, rather than making it available to all

regardless of need. Such a methodology might be

facilitated by a modular approach, though this brings

with it a concomitant risk of a lack of trust and

understanding between commanders and nonpermanently attached staff, without which mission

command is impossible to achieve. For such an

approach to succeed, therefore, the need for core

HQ elements to train alongside other modules –

either physically or electronically – will be central. 

During the next decade, the volume of information

available is unlikely to be matched by a comparable

increase in automated processing capacity. HQs

could, therefore, increase in size (the current US

experience) which would increase vulnerability and

lead to a requirement to disperse staff cells. The

challenge is to so utilise technology as to allow this

increased volume of information to be managed and

used, whilst bearing down on overall numbers of

staff, or risk oversized and unresponsive HQs.

126 The Big Issue
Decision support systems could in the future provide

a significant increase in operational tempo, by

reducing the processing time required by specialist

human staffs. Such technologies and concepts are

already well-developed, and increasingly capable of

being used within specific military applications.

Unsurprisingly, given the nature of their

environments, these applications have up to now

been of most value to the air and maritime

components. Land Manoeuvre support systems,

however, are now available commercially, offering,

for example, integrated battlespace intelligence

frameworks which allow users, inter alia, to project

future enemy movement from current behaviour and

doctrinal expectations. Systems such as these are

known as inference engines, and can provide the

link between data fusion techniques (whereby object

tracking data can be fused by the use of powerful

mathematical algorithms) and artificial intelligence

(AI) systems. AI systems are underpinned by the

development of techniques such as neural

networks12 and are increasingly sophisticated. 

As new capabilities enter service and we begin to

envisage possibilities of fighting the Land

Manoeuvre Joint battle in different ways, we may

find that our traditional staff structure constrains

effectiveness. New responsibilities might be added

incrementally to the existing G1–G9 and functional

cap-badged staffs. This may involve duplication,

and an increased use of cross-staffing and ad hoc

groupings – but it is an evolutionary approach. An

alternative would be to develop a staff structure

based on analysis of the C2 processes, which need

to take place at HQs at different levels. Models

Chapter 8 127
which describe C2 processes, their dependencies

and the information flows between them already

exist, at the single-Service and Joint levels. Such

tools could be exploited to support process

modelling that might be predicated on the effects

sought in the battlespace and analysed against the

core and enabling capabilities each HQ is required

to co-ordinate. One example of a resulting staff

structure might therefore be effects based. It is

recognised that such an approach would require

much development and experimentation, and could

not take place without consideration of

multinational issues.

Deputies

The demands placed upon leaders and their staffs

are likely to increase in the future as operations

become more complex. The need for a deputy in

some form, anathema to the command-led and

Chief of Staff focussed system bequeathed by

Montgomery and Guingand, is therefore likely to

become a fruitful and interesting area of debate.

There is a question mark over the quality of officer

that could be found for the Deputy role, is he to be of

commander in waiting quality, or more in the mould

of the traditional unit second in command? As

Clausewitz observes: 

‘An immense space lies between a General and

his Second in Command, for the simple reason

that the latter is in more immediate subordination

to a superior authority and supervision,

consequently is restricted to a more limited

sphere of independent thought... and in whom

128 The Big Issue
Fig 3 – Process Modelling for Staff Structures
constant discharge of routine duties has

produced a decided poverty of mind’.13

The function of such an individual is unclear in

circumstances where the commander is available for

much of the day (and night) and it is arguably best

taken on by an officer who is in his commander’s

mind, but who has a ‘day time job’ to do too. A viable

option might be to formalise the arrangement

whereby the senior ‘effects officer’, or fire support

officer takes on the role. But the growth in

importance of ISTAR, as operations perhaps

become more ‘Find led’ is such that the deputy might

be better placed and more in the commander’s mind

if he was the principal ISTAR officer. But that implies

that ‘Find’ is an end in itself, rather than the servant

of firepower and manoeuvre?

A possible generic role might be planning for future

operations within the commander’s intent. At the unit

level such a role would sit well with the unit Second

in Command. While at component level, a suitable

role might be to represent the commander’s

interests at the CJTFHQ, with an emphasis on

influencing the campaign plan, targeting and

information operations, particularly if our sister

services were to opt for placing their component

commanders there. If the Deputy does have to place

himself somewhere to represent the commander at

some interface, it is difficult to see how, on

operations of even moderate intensity, he can be so

represented by an officer with a busy day-time job of

Finding the enemy or orchestrating fire support at

the tactical level. In large-scale operations, with a

land component deployed in a number of countries,

130 The Big Issue
but engaged on the same operation, it might be

appropriate for the Land Component Commander to

locate himself at the CJTFHQ. In which case a

number of deputies or assistant commanders might

be required to deploy forward in order to look after

specific geographical or functional areas.

Liaison

Liaison is a requirement of any command support

system. Strong liaison teams should be deployed

upwards, downward14 and sideways to support the

rapid dissemination and understanding of the

commander’s intent. In the future liaison down will

assume critical importance, especially in

multinational operations.

Liaison teams may bring with them the capability to

access digitised C2 and decision support capabilities

from the superior HQ. More crucially, they should be

in their commander’s mind and culturally tuned to

the receiving HQ. Such teams, led by experienced

officers at the appropriate level, have a key role to

play in ensuring a closeness of fit15 between the

commander’s understanding of his own plan and his

subordinate commanders’ understanding of it. It is

an emerging truth that, in an era of increasing CIS

capabilities, the need for personal interaction

between different units, formations, components and

contingents remains as much of an imperative as it

has throughout history. Future structures must

ensure that liaison capability, enabled by digitised

CIS but focussed on human representation, is at the

heart of HQ design.

Chapter 8 131
Reachback

It will become technically feasible, though not

necessarily desirable, for elements of some staff

functions to be conducted outside the traditional

area of operations; either in a more secure area intheatre or in the home base. One key attribute of

reachback is that it might allow deployed forces to

access powerful national capabilities such as J2/G2

fusion and COA Analysis tools. Other advantages

include a smaller C2 footprint in theatre and the

ability to concentrate expertise at key nodes.

Disadvantages include a potential for a loss of

mutual understanding, the co-ordination of effort

difficulties apparent when one rear-based agency

serves more than a single customer, vulnerability of

links to C2W and a potential lack of in-theatre

capability to cope with worsening situations. The

approach to the use of reachback on operations

should be pragmatic and stem firstly from an

analysis of those functions that must be carried out

in the Area of Operations in order to achieve the

mission. This is particularly so in Other Operations

where so much of the C2 function is about interaction with a wide range of actors in the battlespace.

132 The Big Issue
Reachback can then be used to obviate the

requirement to deploy other C2 capabilities

unnecessarily, or to access powerful capabilities that

cannot or should not be deployed to theatre.

However, it is interesting to speculate as to how

command structures might be affected by the

theoretical evolution of a future reachback capability.

In Figure 4 below, the ‘today’ row shows the current

HQ structure for Land Component formation HQs. At

each level of command, a small forward HQ exists,

with a main and rear HQ based inside the area of

operations (alternate HQs have been omitted for

clarity). No in-theatre capability exists for rear-basing

(other than at Component Level), nor may any HQ

element organic to, or in support of, deployed

formations be home-based (direction is, of course,

received from higher level HQs in the home base).

Clearly, the lower the level of HQ, the less

opportunity exists for reachback, in order to preserve

the integrity of smaller HQs.

Initially, better situation awareness, underpinned by

a robust CIS, allows for the small ‘Tactical’ HQ to

become an improved, more capable ‘Forward’ HQ.

Main HQ also enjoys an improved capability to

integrate Joint effects throughout the battlespace.

Further improvements (stage 2) to CIS resilience,

capacity and coverage might allow the Rear HQ to

be relocated from its location in the area of

operations, to a rear-based secure area in-theatre.

The requirements of logistic SA (a combination of ‘J3

SA’, asset picture and monitoring of the logistic

process) would entail some elements of logistic

Chapter 8 133
Fig 4 – Possible Impact on Deployed HQ Structures of a Maturing Rea
Chapter 8 135

staffs remaining forward, however). Simultaneously,

more capable inter-theatre CIS allows an embryonic

support capability to be home-based.

Later (stage 3), significant improvement in C2

capability embedded within the Fwd HQ could allow

much of the effort conducted in Main HQ to be

transferred there. Similarly, Main HQ could pass

other functions to the Rear HQ in-theatre, whose

responsibilities would incorporate a range of

Mission Support activities. The home base now has

a substantial range of capabilities (eg J2, COA

Analysis, legal and logistic) on which deployed

component and formation commanders can draw.

The transfer of capabilities between HQs by this

stage is such that the new nomenclature becomes

appropriate: ‘Fwd’ HQ becomes a Comd HQ; ‘Main’

is the Control HQ, and ‘Rear’ is the Mission

Support HQ.

In a further development (stage 4) the C2

requirements of the operation are examined and

only the C2 capability required in-theatre is

deployed. Factors would include: the nature of the

operation; the C2 connectivity required in theatre

and the threat to strategic CIS links. C2

capabilities not required in-theatre would remain in

the home base. In addition, staffs would now be

able to draw on powerful home-based analysis and

planning capabilities.

Finally, (not shown in the diagram) it is possible to

conceive of a very small forward ‘Command HQ’

deployed in the theatre of operations, with a larger

‘Battlespace Management HQ’ carrying out control
functions from a relatively safe area in, or close to,

the theatre of operations and substantial Mission

Support being provided from the home base. These

ideas will take some readers outside their comfort

zone, but the potential will exist to exploit such

concepts in circumstances where a small, rapidly

deployable command footprint is essential. The

capability to exercise effective command in such a

configuration should be the desired end-state of a

command-centric approach to modernising

command structures. 

NOTES

1 Wesley Clarke, Waging Modern War, Public Affairs, New

York, 2001, pp 397-403.

2 Evidence other than anecdotal as to UK/US differences in

the ‘way of command’ also exist: see, for example, the US

Defense Communications Agency report into comparative

national command methods Headquarters Effectiveness

Program summary Task 002 (McLean, VA: Defense

Systems Inc, Sep 83).

3 Glynis Breakwell and Keith Spacie, Pressures Facing

Commanders, SCSI Occasional Paper No 29, p 5.

4 Both the US ‘Pentomic Division’ restructuring and BAOR’s

Ex WIDE HORIZON experiments, both of which involved

the removal of the brigade level of command, foundered,

largely due to a perceived inability for command to be

exercised effectively over such a broad span.

5 ‘Bolting on’ modules will not allow an effective C2

capability unless sufficient training between modules takes

place.

6 The significant resourcing issues associated with the

provision of these extra modules, and the additional

burden placed on, inter alia, the training organisation, are

not underestimated. Cost/benefit analyses of the modular

option, and any others developed, will be required as part

of developmental work in order to better inform investment

decisions.

7 During Op GRANBY, the strength of 1 (UK) Armd Div Main

increased from 45 offrs and 46 ORs to 76 offrs and over

100 ORs. At the same time, 7 Armd Bde Sig Sqn Gp

136 The Big Issue
trebled in size. Despite such augmentation, C2 capability

was, arguably, largely exhausted by the end of the 100-

hour Land Operation. It is, however, noted that the current

1 (UK) Armd Div HQ establishment is larger than its

predecessor’s at the height of the Op GRANBY

deployment.

8 Anecdotal evidence from HQ ARRC.

9 Such an approach is seen within the JRRF Concept, which

might be further developed.

10 Force preparation, in its widest sense, also includes the

peacetime management of resources, also carried out by

most LC tactical HQs. A debate is required into whether

operational C2 would be improved if deployable HQs were

divorced from routine resource management (in the

manner of the JFHQ and others). That debate is not

explored further here.

11 ROLF 2010: the way ahead and the first step, The

Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, 2000.

12 A computational technique (normally a software emulation

rather than a piece of hardware) which achieves

enormous processing power through the multiple

interconnection of simple processors, rather than

operation of a single, powerful processor. In the brain,

neurons send synaptic messages to each other,

continually modifying their level of excitation on the basis

of messages received, resulting in ‘learning’. Neural

networks are therefore very useful in pattern-matching

problems, and in decision-making where input data is

imprecise or incomplete.

13 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport,

Penguin Classics, Page 155.

14 This is, in broad terms, a new requirement, made

necessary by increasing complexity of forces (especially

MN) and tasks.

15 General Sir Rupert Smith believes that lack of this

‘closeness of fit’ is a key factor in command breaking

down.

Chapter 8 137
139

CHAPTER 9

BEYOND

INTEROPERABILITY:

PART 1

By Tim Blad and David Potts

‘History testifies to the ineptitude of coalitions in

waging war. Allied failures have been so

numerous and their inexcusable blunders so

common that professional soldiers had long

discounted the possibility of effective allied action

unless available resources were so great as to

assure victory by inundation. Even Napoleon’s

reputation as a brilliant military leader suffered

when students... came to realise that he always

fought against coalitions – and therefore against

divided counsels and diverse political, economic

and military interests.’

Dwight D Eisenhower1

Those who espouse an expeditionary ethos and

expect to operate in a joint/multinational

environment must endeavour to achieve

interoperability with their allies. Achieving C2

interoperability is a complex undertaking, made

critical by the rapid pursuit of digitization, the

increasing frequency of operations and an everwider range of bedfellows. ‘Unity of Command’
under a single commander whose authority is clearly

defined and absolute, is increasingly accepted as

being almost Utopian in the context of the practical

realities of contemporary multi-national operations,

largely due to national chains of command reaching

into theatre headquarters and below.

The traditional NATO understanding of C2

interoperability has been largely based on technical

issues such as common message formats and data

presentation protocols.2 Such an understanding is

unsuited to post-Cold War multinational operations.

An emerging US concept, which describes the richer

conceptual depth of interoperability required is that

of ‘co-operability’.

3 The term describes the shared

understanding which only cognitive and doctrinal

interoperability can provide. In the UK, this is termed

‘interoperability of the mind’. A similar German

concept is ‘einheit im denken’, – literally, ‘unity in

thought’. This implies a depth of common military

education and training to produce officers of quality

who approach problems in the same way – it does

not imply a lack of originality or flexibility of mind, but

rather a confidence and mutual understanding

based on shared military education and values.

Wellington commented that the ‘battle of Waterloo

was won on the playing fields of Eton’ – meaning

that the officers had all gone to the same school.

This is what our national staff college and higher

command courses provide nationally today. In an

era of multinational operations we must look at ways

of doing this internationally – one way of developing

‘co-operability’ or ‘unity in thought’, for example,

would be to establish a world class institution to

140 The Big Issue
develop commanders and senior staff for multinational appointments.

Unity in thought should contribute to ‘Unity of

Approach’ to a given set of circumstances founded

on common doctrine and procedures. Achieving this

can be challenging, even in an alliance context

where a body of alliance doctrine exists, but it is all

the more challenging in ad hoc coalitions where

there might be no previously agreed doctrine. In both

alliances and coalitions the challenge is

compounded by the need not just to have written

doctrine, but a common understanding of the

meaning and practical application of that doctrine.

This can be developed through good working

relationships and training.

Whilst Unity of Command on multi-national

operations might be a chimera, Unity of Effort will be

an essential pre-requisite to success. This requires

everyone to be working to achieve the same ends

within the commander’s intent – which must be

disseminated and understood throughout the

Combined Joint Force. There will be innumerable

electronic aids to disseminate intent: video

conferencing and whiteboarding (live sketching and

planning using map overlays and NATO symbology)

are enjoying a vogue. There is also a considerable

body of anecdotal evidence to suggest that symbols

laid over a map convey commander’s intent, plans

and orders more readily in a multi-national

environment than text. However, understanding

intent will be a richer and more complex issue

compounded by linguistic and cultural differences as

well as divergent ‘implicit understanding of intent’.

Chapter 9 141
This arises from different expectations of action

required or effort needed to achieve the mission

from one contingent to another – ranging from giving

up at the smallest setback to surmounting all

obstacles. Direct personal contact, whenever

possible, between commander and commanded, will

therefore be essential to ensuring Unity of Effort and

a common understanding of command intent.

Command philosophy too will vary from contingent

to contingent. Some nations have ingrained the

concept of ‘mission command’ into their military

cultures, allowing subordinates considerable

freedom of action to take the initiative within the

commander’s intent as circumstances change.

Others expect to command, and be commanded, by

detailed orders – with a commensurate need for

frequent reporting back to superiors and further

direction as circumstances change. As Drs Alberts

and Hayes observed in Command Arrangements for

Peace Operations: 

‘When forces with fundamental differences in

understanding of the degree of information they

should report, the detail that should be contained

in directives, and the degree to which

subordinate organizations should take the

initiative, are placed in one organization; the

potential for confusion is massive’.

So, for the foreseeable future, we must work towards

a common understanding of Mission Command to

maximize our effectiveness on multi-national

operations, while recognising and accommodating

different approaches. We also need to understand

142 The Big Issue
that Mission Command is not a dogma to be

adhered to slavishly, it is a philosophy to be applied

intelligently. In particular, we must recognise the

need in Information Operations, for example, for a

central message and acknowledge the challenge of

articulating intent with clarity in the complex

scenarios in which multinational forces often find

themselves. Mission Command also requires

subordinates to have considerable contextual

information with which to frame the higher

commander’s intent. In PSO this will include political

awareness and a very broad situational

understanding at quite low levels of command – from

which flows a multitude of training, educational and

information needs issues that are unlikely to be able

to be addressed as ‘on-the-job’ training with coalition

partners who are strangers to this kind of command

philosophy. Commanders will, therefore need to

recognise that sometimes subordinate HQs from

other nations require more detailed orders and that

equally, there will be occasions when the superior

HQ is either from another nation or is an unfamiliar

multi-national HQ and differences in command

culture will have to be accommodated.

States of command are the device by which

coalitions are subordinated and organized. They

give legitimacy and confer authority. NATO

Command States, developed for the Cold War, have

only been tested in the Bosnia and Kosovo

deployments, where, arguably, they have been

found wanting. COMKFOR reported recently, for

example, 39 operational employment variations and

limitations amongst his 39 contingents. There is

also evidence that national caveats would survive in

Chapter 9 143
a multinational warfighting coalition. CinC

CENTCOM4 and COMBRITFOR5 both reported that

the move of 1st (UK) Armoured Division into the

OrBat of VIIth (US) Corps, during Op DESERT

STORM, had more to do with ensuring a pivotal role

for the UK contribution to the operation and force

protection issues, than it did to any improvement in

force correlation. Whilst ideally, commanders

should have sufficient freedom to deploy force

elements at the tactical level without reference back

to Capitals, in reality, constraints on the employment

of national forces are a fact of life. Illustrative

national caveats should be applied in peacetime

training to practise commanders and staffs in

managing their impact on plans and operations.

During preparations for specific operations,

whenever possible, commanders should work to

minimize the extent to which such restrictions are

applied, ideally pre-transfer of authority, by

investing time in ensuring that national authorities

have confidence to place their forces under their

command. Once deployed, the caveats become yet

another complicating factor to take into account in

the employment of national capabilities. 

Force Protection (FP) and Rules of Engagement

(ROE) can be areas of friction and

misunderstanding.

‘If commanders learn through experience that

force preservation is valued more by the

organisation than is boldness, with its attendant

dangers, an entire army’s approach to war will

reflect as much.’ 6

144 The Big Issue
Nevertheless, a greater focus on FP and ROE

issues is an inevitable consequence when wars are

a matter of national choice, and not national

survival.7 The human cost of war (on both sides) will

influence public support for its execution.

Multinational operations will compound this issue,

since different nations will be more or less

susceptible to changing levels of public support for

their actions, and particularly those nations with a

powerful, independent – and often sceptical – press.

An agreed lexicon of ROE/FP measures could be

completed under the direction of an international

body such as the UN8 as a force preparation

measure. It would provide a useful tool for

commanders, and greatly simplify these complex –

and therefore time-consuming – issues. Whilst

commanders must work toward establishing a

common basis for ROE and FP postures, they must

also be prepared to work in circumstances where

ROE, ROE interpretation and FP policy varies from

contingent to contingent. ROE and FP posture must

therefore be considered as an integral part of the

capability of each element of the force and as a

factor in the allocation of missions and tasks.

As forces modernize and introduce information age

(digital) technology, they will adopt new ways of

fighting - in particular they will trade mass for tempo.

The difference in operating tempo of the most

digitized forces (the US) and that of analogue9 forces

will be stark. Superficially, a digitized US force could

reduce its tempo to accommodate the battle rhythm

of less digitized contingents. But digitized forces rely

on tempo as the source of their combat power.

Slowing down forfeits that advantage and risks

Chapter 9 145
increased casualties.10 Therefore, whilst force

modernization has the potential to increase

opportunities for interoperability, it also brings with it

new challenges which could potentially undermine

Unity of Effort in multi-national forces – potentially

low tempo may remain one of the greatest military

disadvantages of multi-nationality, especially when

facing a single nation opponent. For this reason,

whereas multinationality at company level may be

possible in Other Operations, multinational

formations at brigade level or below would be

unlikely to generate the tempo required for

warfighting. The challenge for the commander is

balancing loss of tempo by the most capable

elements of the force, with the risks inherent in that

for them, against the inclusion of the least capable,

in a way that achieves the aim. Part of the answer

lies in treating C2 capability as a factor in assigning

missions and tasks – just as a commander would

consider the numbers and effectiveness of a

contingent’s tanks or artillery.

It will also be necessary for digitally capable superior

HQs to provide digitised liaison teams downward to

bring appropriate links and functionality to

subordinate HQs. Paradoxically, therefore, the

requirement for human liaison in the information age

will be greater than ever before – especially in multinational operations. The key will be empowered,

trained and equipped Liaison Officers of appropriate

rank that can provide the ‘lubrication’ to make the

system work smoothly. 

Special arrangements will have to be made for the

sharing of intelligence in the new information

146 The Big Issue
environment. ‘Intelligence is guarded very jealously

nationally and very understandably so.’11 The swift,

transparent and honest passage of information

between the CJTFHQ and contingents within a

multi-national force is vital to the generation and

fostering of the spirit of trust, which in turn leads to

Unity of Effort. Despite this, nations and longstanding allies will not be persuaded to share their

entire intelligence picture with all coalition partners.

Greater co-operation and experience may allow

releasability to be reviewed, but such reviews will

themselves only take place within national circles.

Commanders must walk the tightrope of preserving

security, whilst at the same time ensuring that no

contingent or individual government is presented

with significant surprises. This will become ever

more challenging as we conduct operations with

increasingly unusual bedfellows – information

sharing with the Russians, for example, is something

we will need to get used to. 

But in the longer-term, all of these efforts will be at

best marginal if nations develop divergent concepts

for the exploitation of information age technology. A

common understanding of the potential impact of the

technologies and the opportunities to exploit them

will lie at the heart of interoperability. There is a need

for an internationally agreed vision of coalition

operations in the information age, shared at least by

those countries that are able and willing to lead such

operations. This needs to be underpinned by multinational experimentation, otherwise it remains an

untested hypothesis. Such experiments would have

explicit benefits leading to solutions to specific

problems, but they would also have an invaluable

Chapter 9 147
implicit benefit – a shared understanding of how the

operational art might evolve in the information age.

But irrespective of advances in information

technology, there are some human interoperability

issues that simply will not go away. The most

obvious of these is language. English is now very

much the ascendant language in business circles

and in international popular culture. It has

consequently emerged as the language of choice of

NATO’s nascent multi-national High Readiness

Force Land headquarters. This means it is all the

more important for native English speakers to be

able to speak other languages, in order to build

mutual understanding and respect.12 Language

training must therefore become an integral part of

officer development if the UK is to continue to play a

leading role in the kind of operations envisaged in

the information age.

The other great enduring issue will be food. All

armies march on their stomachs and taste varies

widely. Anecdotal evidence from a number of recent

events indicates that food will remain a key

interoperability issue. In our rush to digitise

148 The Big Issue
everything else, we must not forget the chefs – they

need to access the finest ingredients!

NOTES

1 Dwight D Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, New York,

Doubleday, 1948, page 4.

2 Interoperability: ‘the ability of systems, units or forces to

provide service to and accept services from other

systems, units and forces and to use these services so

exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together’.

(APP-6)

3 Coalition Military Operations – the way ahead through cooperability, US-CREST/FRS/RUSI/SWP Report Apr 00.

4 H Norman Schwarzkopf – It Doesn’t Take a Hero, Bantam,

Oct 1992, p. 449.

5 Sir Peter de la Billiere – ‘The Gulf Conflict: Planning and

Execution’, RUSI Journal, Winter 1991.

6 ‘Take no Prisoners’, Eikenberry, Parameters, Summer

1996, pp 109-118.

7 ‘On the other hand, the less intense the motives (for war),

the less will the military element’s natural tendency to

violence coincide with political directives’, Clausewitz, On

War.

8 This work is currently being scoped in ABCA.

9 Analogue forces are forces that have not been digitized.

10 Maj Gen J P Kiszely – ‘Battlespace Digitisation – The

Implications for Interoperability’ RUSI 15 Nov 00. Gen

Kiszely observes that “analogue forces might become Sun

Tzu’s cheng, ordinary force (useful role might be fix).

Digitized: Sun Tzu’s chi, extraordinary force (best suited to

strike); but fix = close = large casualties”

11 Taken from an after-dinner speech given by General Sir

Mike Jackson, published in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey

Till (Eds), The Challenges of High Command in the 20th

Century, SCSI Occasional Paper No 38, based on

proceedings of SCSI/JSCSC/Dept of War Studies RMA

Sandhurst Joint Conference, Bracknell, Oct 1998.

12 At a recent conference in Paris, Maj Gen Quiel, COS

EUROCORPS, delivered his formal speech in French and

answered questions in English, French and German

depending upon the native tongue of the interrogator.

When asked about language he said, to rapturous

applause, “I am not here as a German officer, but as a

Chapter 9 149
150 The Big Issue

multi-national officer and as such I should be able to

converse in the language of a force’s major contingents”.
151

CHAPTER 10

BEYOND

INTEROPERABILITY:

PART 2

By Paul Lefever

Nothing helps a fighting force more than correct

information. Moreover it should be in perfect

order, and done well by capable personnel.

Che Guevara

The advantages are nearly all on the side of the

guerrilla in that he is bound by no rules, tied by

no transport, hampered by no drill books, while

the soldier is bound to many things, not the least

by his expectation of a full meal every so many

hours. The soldier usually wins in the long run,

but very expensively.

Field Marshal Lord Wavell

Introduction

The events of 11 September 2001 heralded a new

form of terrorism in which the unthinkable

becomes the possible. The willingness of religiously

motivated terrorists to engage in a policy of self

sacrifice in order to achieve their perceived aims has
brought a new dimension to criminality. The concept

of an adversary prepared to abandon all the

previously held tenets of self preservation in pursuit

of an objective throws many of our preconceived and

accepted military theories into disarray and

necessitates a review of many aspects of our

approach to combating this threat. 

The immediate examination of events leading up to

September 11th has highlighted a lack of

coordination between various security and other

agencies worldwide. It has also identified the lack of

an international ability to integrate disparate pieces

of information and intelligence about people and

events into a coherent picture of terrorist activity.

Closer to home, the emerging chain of events

leading up to 11 September demonstrated the

ability of both foreign and British nationals with

connections to terrorist organisations to move freely

between the UK and other countries. Many in the

media express concern at how difficult it can be to

keep track of people in the United Kingdom whether

they be terrorists, asylum seekers, benefit

fraudsters, paedophiles or simply common or

garden criminals. A further complication is that

fundamentalist terrorists operate within the folds of

the fabric of society. 

The United States is following a policy of attacking

the heartland or root of terrorism, the states that

sponsor terrorism or harbour terrorists. The UK, by

its support of the US in this endeavour, has aligned

itself with this same policy. It seems likely therefore

that the UK will find itself increasingly involved in

operations of a similar nature to those in which it

152 The Big Issue
has been variously involved in Palestine, Malaya

and Northern Ireland over half a century;

operations falling under the generic title of Counter

Terrorist (CT) operations. Nations’ realisation of

their exposure to fundamentalist terrorism has

brought a new willingness to band together in

common opposition to terrorism. This has resulted

in the previously unthinkable sharing of information

and intelligence between the NATO countries and

Russia, nations of the Indian sub-continent and a

range of other unlikely bedfellows united by the

new threat.

In the UK, one result of this new appreciation of the

nature of fundamentalist terrorism has been a

realisation that more must be done nationally to

identify and counter the threat. The Armed Forces

have always been charged with the last ditch task of

repelling invasion in the defence of the home base.

Now, it seems entirely possible that the Armed

Forces and more specifically the Army will have an

additional role, that of defending the nation from the

‘enemy within’. CT operations will therefore have two

dimensions; Search and Destroy in the terrorist

homelands and Protection of the Home Base.

Good intelligence is the key to the effective conduct

of all military operations but in CT operations

intelligence is fundamental to success. Typically, the

information from which military intelligence is

derived is drawn from military sources; collected by

national and international military collection assets

and exchanged with the Armed Forces of other

nations. But the nature of terrorism is that the

terrorist works alone or in discrete cells concealed

Chapter 10 153
within the fabric of the population of a country. He

has no recognisable deployment pattern or

signature equipment to betray his presence neither

has he conventional tactics or doctrine. He presents

an unquantifiable threat operating within the most

tenuous of geographical boundaries.

Meeting the intelligence requirements arising from

CT operations is probably the most difficult task

facing the intelligence community in the whole of

the Spectrum of Operations. The key to fulfilling

this task is information. Information derived from

‘conventional’ military sources and agencies and

‘New Information’ which will be derived from new

sources different from those from which military

information is normally derived. The majority of

this information will be about people and the

patterns of their lives for it is through detecting

anomalies in these patterns that the terrorist can

be identified. Fortunately, very large stores of

information about people exist today, stored in

extensive databases scattered across a variety of

national and international commercial and

governmental organisations throughout the world.

It is the sharing of this ‘New Information’ that must

now be addressed. 

Information in the Civil

Environment

Information is regularly shared between commercial

companies, usually for a price. Extremely large

databases exist recording many millions of

consumers’ intimate details: sex, age, address,

154 The Big Issue
comprehensive likes and dislikes, financial

classification, spending patterns and much more.

These enable marketing organisations, retailers and

manufacturers to build consumer profiles of

considerable depth and accuracy enabling them to

target appropriate products at likely customers. 

Increasingly, interfaces are being established

between commercial and law enforcement

information systems. Linkages between Motor

Insurance databases, those operated by the

Statutory Vehicle Licensing Authorities and the

Police carry clear advantages. Other areas where

potential exists for meaningful linkages are between

Customs and Excise, the Inland Revenue, banks

and airline ticketing systems. The potential benefits

accruing from linkages of this nature are positive and

clearly make a direct contribution to the conduct of

the business of law enforcement in which those on

one side of the interface are involved. However, this

is not a one way information flow and there are

readily identifiable commercial benefits to

organisations who agree to share their data with

these statutory bodies; a reduction in false claims on

insurance companies is but one obvious benefit of

this type of arrangement.

Information about people is also held by a wide

range of Other Government Departments (OGD).

The Security Service and SIS, the Immigration

Service, the Inland Revenue, HM Customs and

Excise, DHSS, NHS, the Office of National Statistics,

Regional and Local Authorities and many other

government organisations maintain large databases

Chapter 10 155
of information covering numerous aspects of an

individual’s life.

In the main, information in the civil environment is

about people but increasingly, large amounts of data

about physical entities is being digitised and stored;

construction details of roads, railways, bridges and

tunnels, building plans and details of communication

and distribution networks. Information is also freely

available about shipping movements and details of

airline and road and rail transport schedules are

freely available. Environmental information is

increasingly stored in databases: meteorological

records, river and tidal flow records.

Quite clearly, much of this information has military

relevance to the conduct of Counter Terrorist

operations both within the country and overseas.

However, before any use can be made of this data a

survey would have to be made in order to determine

the location, format and relevance of such

databases. This would be a major task and a

scoping of the size of the problem and the

development of contingency plans for its resolution

would be a sensible precautionary move. The

implementation of such plans would almost certainly

require changes in primary legislation to allow

access to these databases.

Information in the Military

Environment

Over recent years, NATO has embarked on a series

of initiatives for the sharing of information and

intelligence between Alliance nations. These include

156 The Big Issue
standardised formatted messages, common

intelligence database structures and data standards,

Alliance wide bearer systems and Strategic

Command C2 systems enabling the sharing of

information and intelligence between the

components of Strategic Commands. Well

understood protocols are in place for the protection

of national intelligence and NATO agreements exist

for the maintenance of the security of information

and intelligence released for use within the Alliance.

In addition to arrangements for information and

intelligence sharing within the Alliance, individual

member nations have bilateral and multilateral

arrangements for information and intelligence

sharing with other Alliance partners.

Much of the most basic infrastructure required for

information and intelligence sharing between the

nations of the Alliance is either in place now or exists

in conceptual form and could be implemented

relatively quickly. As with most matters in the

Alliance the impetus for progress depends very

much on political will and the events of 11

September will have sharpened the imperatives in

this area very considerably. The state of affairs

within NATO whilst not perfect, does allow the

exchange of information and intelligence in a

relatively seamless manner and the potential exists

for an expansion and upgrading of these facilities.

With one or two notable exceptions such as treaty

organisations around the Pacific Rim, formal

arrangements for information and intelligence

sharing outside the Alliance have been virtually

non existent. There is now a new willingness on

Chapter 10 157
the part of nations such as Russia to share

information with others. This highlights the need

for the development of technical and procedural

protocols to ensure that the maximum benefit is

gained from what is potentially a major expansion

in the amount of information and intelligence

available for use in CT operations. Languages will

present problems in the sharing of information and

intelligence for the immediate future. The time

taken to acquire a language skill at a level

appropriate to interrogating a foreign language

database or evaluating a foreign language

intelligence report is years rather than months.

However, the rapid development of linguistic

translation software coupled with a targeted

programme of language training would alleviate

this problem within a year or two of its inception.

The Technological Challenge

In the commercial world data about people is a

saleable commodity. Names are sold for a few

pounds a thousand, companies are bought and sold

for prices based on the contents of their customer

databases. Physical data is equally highly regarded,

Ordnance Survey, the Hydrographer and the

Meteorological Office sell their data to customers the

world over either as bits and bytes or as products;

maps, charts, weather forecasts. The majority of

commercial databases are configured for the

convenience of their owners and with very few

exceptions such as in banking and other financial

institutions, they are rarely engaged in the routine

exchange of data. There is therefore very little

158 The Big Issue
impetus towards data standardisation across the

commercial world.

It is likely that commercial databases will be based

on one of the more widely used software packages.

In this case, the use of some form of translation

software would allow the straightforward importation

of civilian data into military databases where

necessary. Civilian data may also be held in custom

built databases for which no translation software

exists and in this case purpose built translation

software would have to be commissioned. This

would impose time and resource penalties some of

which could be avoided by early identification of

those essential databases which are configured on

non-standard software. Once these have been

identified, either some alternative source of the data

can be identified or an assessment of the resource

implications of using data from these databases can

be made.

Two major routes to gaining access to shared data

present themselves for consideration:

• Wholesale Data Import. If very large quantities

of commercial data are to be made available to

the Armed Forces from outside sources, then

arrangements for the military storage, retrieval,

interrogation and transmission of the data must

be in place before the outset of CT operations.

The provision of large volume data storage does

not present a problem today but decisions about

the format in which it is to be stored and the

compatibility of the storage format with national

C2 and G2 systems will have to be made before

Chapter 10 159
any data is transferred. Bandwidth problems

bedevil military C2 systems and the need to

move very large volumes of data into and

between military organisations will present

problems requiring early resolution. The

provision of large bandwidth bearer systems

between static locations is relatively

straightforward but if these same quantities of

data are to be provided to locations which are

either mobile or have the potential for

movement, then Direct Broadcasting by Satellite

(DBS) or some other more advanced

technological solution will have to be employed.

• A Networked Solution. An alternative approach

to the acquisition of data would not involve the

transfer of the contents of databases but would

require the acquisition of the rights to search for

data in existing databases through interfaces.

This would, to all intents and purposes, involve

networking the relevant databases. Whilst this

would pose an element of technological

challenge, it would remove the need for the

Armed Forces to move very large quantities of

data, and to store and manage them. It would in

fact remove many of the high cost overheads of

data ownership. The legal implications of such

an arrangement are far reaching and clearly

many guarantees of data security would have to

be in place before commercial organisations

would agree to allow the Armed Forces access

to their databases.

On balance the Networked Option offers the more

attractive solution but in practice, because of the

160 The Big Issue
difficulties involved in setting up networking

arrangements with databases in non-NATO nations

and with commercial organisations, it is likely that a

mix of both methods of sharing data would form the

eventual solution.

The possession of large quantities of data or having

the ability to access the same data through a

network is a potent tool for meeting the intelligence

requirements of CT operations. The wider the

baseline of information that is available to the

analyst, the better the intelligence that he produces

will be. However, information is only one part of the

intelligence equation and if the best use is to be

made of the information, then appropriate software

must be in place. Earlier mention has been made of

link analysis software which enables relationships

between any entities to be defined. There will be a

requirement for other software capable of pattern

detection and matching, of keyword search and of

other means of assisting the analyst to correlate and

visualise the vast amounts of information which will

be presented to him. All these applications will be

linked to powerful intelligent search engines capable

of scouring very large databases containing

disparate types of information and retrieving data of

significance to the analyst.

It is unlikely that Artificial Intelligence (AI) will be

available to the intelligence analyst for the

foreseeable future and the human analyst will

remain at the very core of the process for at least the

next five if not ten years. There will be a degree of

information fusion available which will help to reduce

the volume of information retrieved from networked

Chapter 10 161
or individual databases into a manageable flow but

in the near term this is likely to be a relatively crude

tool and it will be some years before truly

sophisticated information fusion is possible.

The introduction of complex IT systems; databases,

networks, search engines and analytical

applications will bring in its wake a new hierarchy of

support personnel; systems managers, systems

engineers and systems designers all of whom will

have to be accommodated either in existing budget

provisions or through new money. In this same vein,

the costs of widening access to information will be

considerable and until the data which will be needed

can be identified and quantified the resource

implications will remain unknown. Data sharing and

the enhancements that this will provide to CT

operations will come at a price and that price may

be high.

The Military Benefits of Information

Sharing

The basic CT intelligence requirement can be

crudely summarised as ‘Who does What with

Whom, When and Where do they do it, and Why?’.

These are very complex questions but, provided

that one small part of the equation can be identified,

then with access to very large stores of data and

with the appropriate software, linkages and

associations can begin to be teased out into a

comprehensive picture from which the intelligence

requirements can be met.

162 The Big Issue
In order to identify the benefits of information

sharing, it must be placed in the context of possible

CT operations. These can be divided into two

principal categories: 

• Search and Destroy. Operations conducted

outside the United Kingdom. Taking the fight to

the terrorists’ home base and destroying their

infrastructure, training and sustainment

organisations. Punishing the sponsors of state

terrorism and deterring potential sponsors and

paymasters. Detaining terrorist leaders,

demoralising terrorist followers and destabilising

linked terrorist groupings.

• Protection of the Home Base. Undertaken

within the United Kingdom as Military Aid to the

Civil Power (MACP) operations and therefore

under police primacy. Encompassing activities

appropriate to the operational situation including

KP and VP Guards, Cordon and Search, VCP

and PCP checks, escort duties and patrolling of

urban and rural areas including reconnaissance

and surveillance operations.

Illustrative of the intelligence requirements linked to

CT operations are those shown in the matrix (next

page) and from this it can be seen that much of the

information required to meet them will be held in

non-military, non-governmental databases.

The Intelligence Process in CT operations is no

different from the same process conducted in any

other type of operation. The difference lies in the

sources of the information from which the

intelligence is derived. What September 11 proved

Chapter 10 163

was that much of the information relating to events

on that date probably already existed in a database

somewhere. Had that information been available to

an organisation with the ability to retrieve and make

use of it, it is conceivable that the outcome might

have been different.

There is little doubt that if wholesale access were

available to ‘other military’ and commercial

databases then both the ability to meet CT

operations’ intelligence requirements and to provide

meaningful and timely indications and warnings

about terrorist activity would be greatly enhanced.

An Endstate

It is clear that if we are to effectively pursue

internal and external CT operations in the future,

access must be gained to existing but previously

unavailable sources of information and

intelligence. In order to make these available, it

may be necessary for new primary legislation to be

enacted and in some areas for old shibboleths to

be laid to rest. Access by the military to the

information contained in civil databases must be

accompanied by unequivocal guarantees of data

security. These will be essential to gaining the

acceptance of both the public and of law makers to

the military use of the information contained in civil

personnel databases.

We are fortunate in the United Kingdom that the first

demonstration of raw fundamentalist terrorism took

place somewhere else. It might however just as

easily have been here. The question that must be

Chapter 10 165
asked is whether we would have been any better

informed or prepared than the United States to meet

the threat of such an event or indeed, after the

event, whether we are now much better prepared

today. The provision of new information for use in the

derivation of military intelligence is ultimately, like all

military decisions, one that will be dependant on

political will. The potential exists for a quantum

improvement in the provision of intelligence support

to CT operations. The implications of putting in place

the arrangements that would enable that

improvement to take place are far-reaching but not

overly intrusive when compared to the effects of a

major terrorist act.

The choice presented here is somewhat stark. The

potential for information sharing exists, the benefits

are undeniable but there are costs both in financial

resources and loss of civil liberties. These must be

balanced against the potential effects of terrorism.

‘The will to conquer is the first condition of

victory!’

Marshal Foch

166 The Big Issue
167

CHAPTER 11

THE DIVINE THREADS

By Graham Le Fevre

‘...it is the divine manipulation of the threads and

is the treasure of the sovereign...’ 1

Sun Tzu

(on information gleaned from networks of spies)

I

n the future Intelligence, Surveillance, Target

Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR),

supported by effective Command, Control,

Computers and Communications (C4), must provide

timely, accurate, relevant and assured information

and intelligence in the right form to support decision

making, planning and execution of operations by

commanders at every level of command. Supporting

commanders is the primary function of C4ISTAR.

When manoeuvring and executing operations,

especially at the lower tactical levels, commanders

will require precise, real time intelligence on the

enemy and the environment and may even need to

have a ‘dialogue’ with a specific sensor or its

controller. Precise requirements of commanders will

of course vary with the level of command at which

they are operating – decision-making timescales, for

example, will expand at higher levels.

C4ISTAR must also serve other related purposes,

such as supporting Information Operations and
Media Operations, where a capability to rapidly

exploit imagery will be essential. Information for

evidential purposes can be expected to assume

increasing importance, but the crucial factor here is

the audit trail2 for the handling of information that

may be used as evidence, rather than the quality of

the information. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)

will be an enduring requirement with BDA for nonlethal capabilities, including Information Operations,

bringing new challenges. ISTAR will also have a role

in Combat Search and Recovery Operations.

Future operations will require a better understanding

of the environment and it is expected that

considerable amounts of environmental data and

fused environmental information will become readily

available to all users. 

C4ISTAR must support the application of single

service and joint effects, especially firepower,

which has unique demands of immediacy,

responsiveness and resolution. Any changes to our

future close battle capabilities will inevitably be

predicated on an enhanced ISTAR capability,

supported by capable C4, linked to precision

attack. This places a high premium on providing

timely and accurate information for targeting, and

putting effective Sensor-Decider-Shooter links and

processes in place.

A ‘System of Systems’ approach must be taken to

the organisation of collection assets3 across

components and in the multi-national environment.

Such an approach is where each collection

capability is considered as one element of a larger

168 The Big Issue
whole, the whole being co-ordinated and controlled

to ensure maximum efficiency is gained from each

element. The mix of ISTAR assets must be robust

ensuring that the essential interplay between them,

including cross-cueing, can be achieved, but there

must be no over reliance on any one type of asset.

A cultural shift is required from reliance by

commanders on ‘owning’ the collection assets as the

only way to meet their intelligence needs. They must

have confidence in the service provided by highly

capable assets, as well as access to information,

held at higher and joint levels of command,

supplemented by those assets under the

commander’s direct control.

Traditionally intelligence has been developed using

the Intelligence Cycle, with greater emphasis placed

on Direction, Processing and Dissemination rather

than Collection, often because of the paucity of

ISTAR collection assets at all levels of command.

The increase in collection capability that is already

being fielded demands a change in emphasis, where

due weight is given to collection planning and the coordination of the collection effort in a way that has

not been possible or necessary up to now. This must

be applicable across the levels of command as well

as within each level, requiring staffs to take a much

broader view of collection requirements and

available collection assets than has traditionally

been the case. 

Whatever happens organisationally as capabilities

and processes develop, the commander will still

require intimate, expert intelligence staff support to

help him define his Critical Information

Chapter 11 169
Requirements, ‘...of all those in an army close to the

commander, none is more intimate than the spies’.

4

They must also be able to present the intelligence

product to him that they have drawn from all

available sources and to which they have applied

expert judgement.

The ISTAR collection assets allocated to each level

of command must be commanded at the level

commensurate with their reach (in both time and

space) and co-ordinated. ISTAR must be mission

orientated and commanders must ensure that

missions allocated to lower levels of command are

matched by appropriate ISTAR collection assets

and C4. Individual system mission planning is likely

to remain within the command element of that

system, but co-ordination between systems will be

vital to ensure that sensors are in the right place at

the right time and can provide the coverage

necessary to meet the commander’s requirements.

This needs to be achieved whilst also minimising

duplication of effort, and taking full account of the

capabilities and limitations of the various systems in

the light of the prevailing operational

circumstances.5 ISTAR staff must be augmented

when additional ISTAR assets are allocated to

ensure that the commander can co-ordinate and

integrate the resources he has been given.

Figure 1 illustrates a generic C2 structure that could

be applicable at all levels of command. Information

and intelligence is received from assets controlled at

levels above and below any given level of command,

as well as from assets controlled directly by the

subject level of command. The ISTAR Cell is

170 The Big Issue
Figure 1. Generic ISTAR C2 Model
responsible for the ‘System of Systems’ coordination of organic collection assets, including

coordination with assets at differing levels of

command. It also carries out single source analysis

of reports from individual systems under control of

the subject level of command. It could be a cell

embedded in the Main HQ, or remoted from it, as a

satellite HQ, depending on the operational situation

and level of command. At the Corps level it would

remain embedded, as there is little imperative to

remote it. Whether remote or embedded, from an

ISTAR process perspective, it and the G2 cell should

be seen as a holistic entity. The ISTAR Cell receives

direction from the G3 and G2 staff, but is also closely

linked with other branches to support both

manoeuvre and fire support, for example.

A single nominated officer, with the necessary staff

support, should be responsible for ISTAR at every

level of command. He should be mission focused,

ensuring that assets are deployed to best effect and

dynamically re-task assets to achieve the

commander’s intent as circumstances change. He

must not impede the passage of information

between the collection assets and those who need

the information, nor should he allow ISTAR to

develop into a ‘stovepipe’.

The C2 model, replicated at each level of command,

would sit within a wider C4ISTAR architecture. The

architecture should allow access to information

wherever it may be held, the ability to pass Requests

For Information (RFI) and tasking to different levels

of command, the ability to control the collection

assets within a level of command and to disseminate

the intelligence produced. There are a number of

172 The Big Issue
possible options for an overall C4ISTAR

architecture, which are described below:

• Reachback is where supporting processes are

carried out at a location out of theatre.6

Reachback might provide an overall reduction in

ISTAR manpower, but would require major

investment in strategic communications7 and a

home based supporting intelligence

infrastructure and would also risk a loss of

‘theatre feel’ by analysts. It would also require

an in-theatre reversionary capability should

communications fail.

• Centralisation is where all of the staff

processes are carried out at a single location in

the Area of Operations. It would remove

processes from lower levels of command, and

help reduce footprint, but this might affect the

timely passage of information as well as

responsiveness. It would require a considerable

change to the operational level architecture and

place a burden on theatre communications. Like

reachback it would require a reversionary mode

should communications fail and, in itself, would

provide a single point of failure.

• Dispersal is where individual, or groups of

processes are carried out in different locations

at all levels of command. Dispersal would

fragment the infrastructure, would place a

significant extra burden on tactical

communications, and would make the coordination of the ISTAR ‘System of Systems’

more difficult. 

Chapter 11 173
A federated architecture is effectively a combination

of reachback, centralisation and dispersal. It

ensures that key processes are centralised at each

level of command, but aspects of reachback and

dispersal are also embedded. It would allow the

commander, at each level, to control his ISTAR

assets while accessing and contributing to the rich

web of information available from assets held at

other levels of command. 

It is expected that the future C4ISTAR architecture

will be based on the federated approach as shown in

Figure 2. The diagram is a fantastic simplification

and does not, for example, capture the cross-cueing

between sensors, or sensor to shooter links. It could

apply at each level of command from battlegroup to

corps.8 It shows the linkages that need to be made

across levels of command, and it supports the C2

model shown at Figure 1. Importantly it feeds, and is

fed, by the Common Operational Picture (COP),

understanding that at the higher tactical level it

coalesces into the Purple COP or Joint Operational

Picture (JOP) whilst at the lowest tactical level it is

clearly single service. The intent of such an

approach is to enable commanders at the tactical

level to benefit from the investment in operational

and strategic systems, whilst at the same time

enabling assets controlled at the tactical level to be

employed and exploited to best effect.

Such an architecture is not radically new, but is

evolutionary. Importantly it provides flexibility and the

basis for further development as our collection

capabilities improve. From the commander’s

perspective it should provide him with confidence

174 The Big Issue
Figure 2. Generic ISTAR C2 Model
that his direction is being met and that the resulting

intelligence is timely, as robust as possible and of

the ‘resolution’, or level of detail, that he requires.

Development work is already underway to realise a

future Federated C4ISTAR architecture, with much

effort focussed on the improved co-ordination of

what are currently disparate stove-piped elements.

The key challenge will be to deliver the processing

power (human and digital) and the Communication

and Information Systems (CIS) infrastructure to

realise the intent of the ISTAR architecture - to allow

the tactical level of command to benefit from

investment in operational and strategic systems,

while enabling tactical assets to be employed and

exploited to best effect.

NOTES

1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 6, ‘The Use of Spies’.

2 Often referred to as data tagging.

3 Potentially all organisations have a capability to collect

information but for the purposes of this paper the focus is

on those organisations whose primary role is I, S, TA or R.

4 Sun Tzu, ibid.

5 For instance the employment of manned systems requires

consideration of additional factors such as personnel

protection.

6 There is no formal definition of reachback, but it is

considered to mean reaching back to capabilities out of

theatre in the home or Alliance/Coalition base. Drawing on

capabilities placed in a safe, or relatively safe, area intheatre is considered to be part of centralisation.

7 Despite the US military’s major investment in military

satellite communications almost 60% of DoD satellite

communications are passed via non-military satellites

(source US Space Warfare Centre).

8 It could equally apply to command levels in other

components and in the Joint Environment.

176 The Big Issue
177

CHAPTER 12

3D VISION

By Graham Le Fevre

‘...the technology that is available to the US

military today and now in development can

revolutionise the way we conduct military

operations. That technology can give us the

ability to see a “battlefield” as large as Iraq or

Korea – an area 200 miles on a side – with

unprecedented fidelity, comprehension and

timeliness; by night or day, in any kind of

weather, all the time. In a future conflict, that

means an Army corps commander in his field

headquarters will have instant access to a live,

three-dimensional image of the entire

battlefield...’

Admiral Bill Owens, USN.1

Rommel was so determined to see the enemy’s

dispositions for himself that he often flew over

the front line in his Storch reconnaissance plane,

sometimes taking his Chief of Staff with him on

these perilous excursions.2 A number of aerial

surveillance systems entering service will provide

commanders with the bird’s eye view Rommel so

desperately sought, without them having to leave

the relative safety of their command posts. The

Airborne Stand-off Radar (ASTOR) and the

Reconnaissance Pod for Tornado (RAPTOR) will
provide commanders with near real time imagery

and when combined with Unmanned Aerial

Vehicles, soon to be ubiquitous, will revolutionise

land force commanders’ perspectives at every level

of command. Gone is the aerial photograph as a

stale snapshot in time – perhaps delivered too late

– and in comes still and moving imagery, real time,

where you want it, when you want it to support

planning, manoeuvre and target engagement. This

is perhaps the single most significant change to a

commander’s ability to see his own battlespace

since Frederick the Great raised a telescope to his

eye and was able to establish his headquarters in a

fixed location overlooking the battlefield, rather than

having to rush around it, as was the practice of

Gustavus Adolfus a century before.3

But this particular ‘revolution’ in capability has been

a long time coming. At the beginning of the 20th

Century, technology, tradition and force structures

meant that the capability to acquire information

within the military ground environment was delivered

by ground based reconnaissance forces and

espionage. The First World War saw many changes

in military technology and methods of operation but,

from an ISTAR perspective, was probably most

noticeable for the introduction of mobile4 air

reconnaissance and observation platforms. The use

of air reconnaissance increased between the First

and Second World Wars and by 1945 air

reconnaissance was an important and well

established collection capability. 

However the next real conceptual and technological

leap did not come until the second half of the 20th

178 The Big Issue
Century. The Cold War, and the requirement for

intelligence gathering at ‘strategic’ ranges by

superpowers divided by oceans and the polar ice

cap, drove the development of high flying, long

range and long endurance airborne reconnaissance

and surveillance systems. These systems carried

sensors supporting imagery, Signals Intelligence

(SIGINT) and other more specialist areas. The rapid

development of satellites from the late 1950s

onwards meant that sensors could be placed outside

the atmosphere providing greater endurance, range

and coverage with less platform vulnerability. 

Fielded airborne ISTAR systems within NATO now

carry a very wide variety of sensors supporting

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), SIGINT and

Measurement And Signature Intelligence (MASINT).

The UK itself has an extensive airborne collection

capability. These systems, linked to further

development of other tactical as well as strategic

and operational level airborne systems, will provide

the UK military with a really comprehensive airborne

reconnaissance and surveillance capability. The

Army has traditionally focussed on its ground based

collection assets, developing its processes based on

a fairly two dimensional view of the battlefield. At the

strategic level the balance has already shifted to a

much more multi-dimensional view of the

Chapter 12 179

SR-71 Blackbird
battlespace. The challenge the Army faces is how to

change its mindset to become properly 3-

dimensional and exploit the strategic systems and

the newer operational and tactical level airborne

systems to improve its Situational Awareness.

ASTOR 

The ASTOR programme has been underway for

some time, equipment is now being built and the first

elements of the ASTOR unit will start to form at RAF

Waddington next year. It has a maturing Concept of

Operations and all of the principal elements of the

system are well defined. ASTOR will be an allweather, day/night radar imaging surveillance

system able to detect and recognise moving and

stationary ground targets in Near Real Time (NRT).

The system will comprise high-flying air platforms,

exploitation Ground Stations (GS) and the

associated communications architecture. The air

platforms are based on the Bombardier Global

Express business jet, equipped with a long range,

dual-mode Radar System (DMRS). ASTOR’s GS will

be capable of supporting levels of command from a

deployed Joint Task Force HQ downwards. The

ASTOR system will have a comprehensive

communications suite that will enable the target area

180 The Big Issue
data to be passed directly, in near real time, from the

air platform to those HQs with ASTOR GS where the

exploitation will, for the most part, take place. This

methodology is designed to overcome much of the

delay traditionally associated with airborne imagery

collection systems. However, the system will retain a

capability for data exploitation on-board the AP.

ASTOR will be able to provide radar coverage of

significant areas of ground for long periods of time.

It will be fielded as a Joint capability and is likely to

be commanded as a national asset. There will be

competing demands placed on the system with the

UK National Contingent Commander (NCC) or

Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) providing

direction. However in order to support tactical

commanders it is expected that direct tasking

authority could be allocated to the brigade level.

GS should be allocated down to brigade level, but

the limited number to be acquired will not be able

to support all formations within a division sized

force. On warfighting operations, when formation

HQs need to move, two GS will be provided to

ensure 24 hour coverage. Any GS within range of

the aircraft can receive moving target indicator

(MTI) data but synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is

limited to only two GS at any one time. The need

for line of sight between aircraft and GS will

influence siting of the latter. GS can be located up

to 1 km away from the HQ they support but require

a direct line connection to pass information.

The fielding of ASTOR means that for the first time

within the British Armed Forces an operational level

system will provide broad area radar imagery

Chapter 12 181
coverage of the battlefield. The ability of ASTOR to

monitor and accurately locate activity over a

relatively large area will permit rapid tactical

planning and the efficient cueing of other sensor

and attack systems. ASTOR, in the vast majority of

its operations, will be working as part of an

integrated and Joint ‘system-of-systems’, covering

several levels of command all the way down to

brigade level. It will directly contribute to the

development of the Land Component situation

awareness as well as being able to effectively cross

cue other collection assets.

RAPTOR

RAPTOR is a new generation air reconnaissance

capability that is now coming into service. It will

consist of a number of pods and Data Link Ground

Stations (DLGS). The pods have a sophisticated

electro-optic/infra-red capability that can be used at

low and medium flight levels. The pods are selfcontained, with their own integral communications

suite, and can be carried by the GR45 variant of

Tornado. The pod will be able to execute a large

number of tasks per mission, comprising spot,

stereo, area and line searches. The system will

support the taking of swathes of imagery of

182 The Big Issue
considerable width per pass with airborne re-tasking

co-ordinated by the navigator. 

The pod will be able to communicate its imagery via

a line of sight downlink to a bespoke DLGS. In-flight

exploitation and tethered or selective data link will

allow rapid exploitation of the imagery and

dissemination of the resulting IMINT. The DLGS is

an air transportable and NBC compatible cabin

suitable for a Main Operating Base (MOB). It can be

deployed elsewhere if there is a requirement to

reduce the data link range, however its ground

mobility is very limited. RAPTOR products and

information and intelligence gleaned from them will

be disseminated through the CIS architecture to

those who need them.

UAV Developments

The UK’s current experience of UAVs is based on

the Phoenix system, NATO experience with US

UAVs in the Balkans and views of how other

countries have been using their UAVs. Phoenix has

only been in service for three years and yet the

Chapter 12 183
concept of how it should be used has already

changed quite considerably. It is no longer seen as

just a Target Acquisition system, but as a multicapable system with broad ISTAR utility.

UAVs have the potential to establish a persistent

dwell over a target area. This allows the enemy, or

object of interest, to be tracked continuously until

they are engaged by strike or manoeuvre assets, or

other appropriate action is taken. By being under the

control of every level of command, commanders will

potentially have their own aerial view of precisely the

area they are interested in for as long as they remain

interested, subject to system limitations and

operational circumstances. This is a truly

revolutionary capability, the potential impact of which

is yet to be fully understood.

Outside the UK UAVs under development, and in

service, have ranges that vary from metres to

thousands of kilometres and ceilings that range from

a few metres to well into the stratosphere. Generally

speaking the size of the UAV relates to its ceiling,

range, payload and endurance. A UAV that has an

extended range and that can reach significant

heights is likely to be of significant size, a short

range UAV could be only a matter of feet in size,

whilst at the lowest end a micro UAV could go down

to the size of an insect. Up until now UAVs,

especially the larger ones, have been considered to

be sophisticated air platforms that require the

platform controller to have a knowledge of avionics

and the theory of flight. However the increasing

sophistication of the software, and the greater use of

automation within UAV systems, is rapidly reducing

184 The Big Issue
the skills required of any pilot/operator. Developing

systems are already at the stage where the operator

needs minimal skills to be able to fly the air vehicle

as the software carries most of that burden.

There are three potential systems architecture

options for UAVs. These are:

• Satellite Relay. A UAV that is controlled via a

satellite relay has great flexibility as to where,

and how far away, the GS elements could be

located. It has considerable potential range and

is not inhibited by terrain.

• Airborne Relay. A UAV that is controlled via an

airborne relay, often another UAV of the same

type, is much more restricted. GS elements

need to be in relatively close proximity to the

relay platform but the UAV on mission could be

a considerable distance from the relay UAV.

• Line of Sight. A UAV that has no relay can only

operate within Line Of Sight (LOS) of the GS;

this will restrict the reach of the system.

All systems require GS in sufficient numbers to

enable the efficient working of the UAV system. GS

can be either ‘dumb’ ie they can only receive data

from the Air Vehicle or active when they control the

Air Vehicle and become known as Ground Control

Station (GCS). Such stations are likely to be

geographically located where they can receive data

from, or communicate with, the Air Vehicles. The

UAV system architecture must allow the free flow of

information from the tasker to the controller to the

analyst and the end user. We should expect that

Chapter 12 185
ISTAR UAV systems will be resourced with a

GCS/GS architecture that allows the product to be

disseminated to whoever requires it.

Airspace Management and Co-ordination is vital for

air operations and all UAV activity must be coordinated as part of the larger air situation. Generally

the higher and further the air vehicle flies the greater

the complexity of co-ordination, although very high

flying UAVs may require less co-ordination as they

will fly above the height envelope of most other air

vehicles.6 Air Traffic Control (ATC), especially in

peacetime or on operations conducted within a

civilian airspace management environment, is

crucially important to the effective use of UAVs.

Procedures must be put into place to ensure that the

operational use of UAVs is not unnecessarily

restricted. The procedural complexity of ATC will

require properly trained personnel.

The amount of logistics support required by a

system will vary. A small, expendable UAV will have

a relatively small logistics requirement, whereas a

large, long range UAV will have a logistics

requirement more akin to an aircraft. The amount of

logistics support required by a system is likely to

have a bearing on whether it has true tactical

capability or requires the type of infrastructure

associated with a fixed site, such as an airfield. 

Future UAVs could be used for many different tasks

but there are likely to be three primary ones: carrying

sensors, acting as a communications relay and

carrying a payload that achieves an effect, this could

range from physical destruction ie a bomb to

186 The Big Issue
information broadcast such as a PsyOps message.

Information gathering UAVs are used primarily to

support planning, operations (manoeuvre) and

targeting. The key requirement for tasking is that the

person who needs to task a UAV must be able to do

so rapidly, be assured that the task will be

undertaken, and that the information gathered will be

passed back rapidly. The further removed the

requester is from the UAV task co-ordination

function/cell the less responsive the system. When

speed of response to information received must be

in seconds and minutes any delay can be

detrimental to effectiveness.

There is always a requirement for the timely

dissemination of information or intelligence. This is

particularly important at the lower levels of tactical

command where the immediacy of response to a

detected threat can be critical to the battle outcome.

In the short to medium term C4 capability will

constrain the dynamic use of UAVs and require them

to be controlled close to the level of command at

which they are to be tasked, otherwise the

immediacy of the imagery from the 3rd dimension

will be prejudiced. However it is important to

recognise that the products of all UAVs should be

distributed to all who need them, of whatever

component or level of command. The C4I

architecture, and in particular the distribution of GS

must ensure that this can be achieved. In principle,

the key is having authority to task a system in the

knowledge that it is responsive enough to provide

the required information in the timeframe in which it

is needed and to be able to hold the system on task,

Chapter 12 187
providing a continual flow of imagery to support

engagement and manoeuvre.

Implications

The introduction of these systems will provide ISTAR

to underpin planning, manoeuvre and targeting for

the Land Component from corps level down to

battlegroup. Combined with information from other

systems, this will provide commanders at these

levels with an unprecedented understanding of their

own battlespace. Planning, manoeuvre and the

application of firepower will be much improved. In

particular, the immediacy and sustained flow of the

information provided by UAVs that can respond

dynamically as circumstances change, has the

potential to revolutionise the way commanders think

about and use ground and consequently has

implications for weapons, organisation and tactics.

NOTES

1 Adm B Owens USN, Lifting the Fog of War, Farrar Straus

and Giroux, New York, 2000, p 14. Adm Owens is a former

Vice Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2 See David Fraser, Knight’s Cross, Harper Collins, London,

1993.

3 For a historical perspective, see Martin van Creveld,

Command in War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge

MA, 1985.

4 Tethered air balloons with observers had already been in

use for many years.

5 The GR4a will continue to fly the Tornado Infra Red Recce

System (TIRRS).

6 High flying UAVs will still need to transit through multiple

levels of airspace to reach or descend from their operating

altitude.

188 The Big Issue
189

CHAPTER 13

THE CASE FOR

MANNED

RECONNAISSANCE

By Graham Le Fevre and John Thornton

‘I trust that none of my officers considers that the

aircraft can be used for anything other than

observation and dropping hand held bombs. The

responsibility for reconnaissance remains where

it has always been with the cavalry!’

Field Marshal Haig

The UK military’s plans for ISTAR equipment

acquisition are based, to a large degree, on the

acquisition of increasingly complex technical

systems which provide a remote view of the

battlespace. These systems will provide the

capability to undertake wide area and focused

surveillance. Yet they remain remote from their

target and, even when systems, such as unattended

ground sensors, can be placed on the ground they

only provide a partial picture. 

Paradoxically, therefore, in an era in which spacebased, aerial and remote sensor systems proliferate,

there is an enduring, even increasing requirement,

for manned reconnaissance. However, the term

manned reconnaissance can be misleading as it
implies, perhaps, that there is manned and

unmanned reconnaissance. This is too simplistic –

all forms of ISR have a ‘man in the loop’ somewhere.

ASTOR, for instance, is a remote stand off system,

but it is manned by aircrew and analysts. The idea

‘manned reconnaissance’ does not therefore

concern all forms of information gathering that

require a ‘man in the loop’. The distinction is twofold:

the activity is reconnaissance, which implies

infiltration and penetration of the enemy’s

battlespace; and ‘the man’ is so placed that he is at

some risk in carrying out this activity. Equally,

manned reconnaissance is not the prerogative of

ground forces. Manned aerial reconnaissance in fast

aircraft, for example, viewed by the RAF as a

continuing and essential part its capability, is an

element of the manned reconnaissance equation.

From a ground force perspective, a key advantage

of ground-based manned reconnaissance is that its

presence on a piece of ground can alter its status to

being in one’s own hands. The overflight of the

same by manned or unmanned assets, merely

190 The Big Issue

Armoured Reconnaisance in the Gulf War
provides information. For example on 8 June 1940

Rommel expressly ordered his Reconnaissance

Battalion Commander (Von Luck) to “push through

to the west for about 30 kilometres... take the hill

and establish yourself there until I arrive with the

tanks. Do not look left or right, only forward all the

time”.

1 Von Luck succeeded in his mission after

some difficulty and by 9 June had captured the little

port of Fécamp. Other similar examples include, of

course, the capture of the Remagen Bridge on 7

March 1945 by Lieutenant Timmermann. A more

contemporary example, perhaps, is Baghram

airbase, where a company of Marines went in,

ostensibly for reconnaissance purposes. The

impact of their being there had strategic significance

in a way that aerial reconnaissance of the same

would not. Granted, their position appeared

precarious – but that is precisely the risk/gain

equation of manned reconnaissance.

Manned reconnaissance will continue to contribute

decisively to Joint ISTAR and to targeting for Joint

strike assets. It will cue combined arms Air and

Ground Manoeuvre and should make an effective

contribution to all the components of capability:

manoeuvre, firepower, information, command and

control, deployment, protection, sustainability and

domination of the electromagnetic spectrum. It can

act both as a sensor and as a discriminating

‘decider’ within the ‘sensor to shooter’ system. It

may enable freedom of movement through flank and

economy of force tasks making use of organic

mobility, firepower, protection and surveillance.

Using indirect fire, manned reconnaissance should

Chapter 13 191
be capable of area denial, security of Lines of

Communication and of key points. 

It is also inherently flexible and can conduct other

tasks such as regulating movement or switching

rapidly to a liaison role, by virtue of having good

communications and high quality people at all levels

of command. For example, Von Luck, again, in the

fall of France in 1940, was able to switch rapidly to a

liaison role and thereby facilitated Pétain’s surrender

at Bordeaux.2

In Other Operations, covert manned reconnaissance

will have a key role to play – tasks could include

gathering evidence and cueing other agencies to, for

example, effect an arrest or to carry out some other

form of action. The more sensitive the surveillance

mission, the more specialised the unit carrying it out

will need to be.

Uniquely, and particularly in Other Operations when

there will be a premium at all levels on being able to

acquire information from third parties, manned

reconnaissance can interact with the populace and

other parties in the battlespace. This implies a need

to dismount from a vehicle or to operate on foot for

sustained periods. The mix of platforms and teamlevel structures may have to be adjusted between

warfighting and Other Operations and from one

scenario or environment to another. This will require

a range of manned reconnaissance capabilities and

argues for an increasing light infantry, or dismounted

formation level patrol element. 

In conflict prevention, the strategic mobility of

manned reconnaissance will contribute to rapid

192 The Big Issue
effect. The ability to achieve, quickly, both presence

and coverage of a wide area is a task for a military

force in which manned reconnaissance has a key

role to play. As ground forces they can build the

confidence that enables both civil-military cooperation and HUMINT operations. Manned

reconnaissance forces may appear benign but retain

the ability to escalate with organic weapons and

access to Joint fire support. Equally, overt manned

reconnaissance can monitor and negotiate to ensure

compliance or to reduce tensions. 

The flexibility of manned reconnaissance allows it to

switch roles and functions rapidly from Warfighting

to Peace Enforcement to Peacekeeping and back

again. It can be used in both an overt and covert

manner, switching between modes as the situation

demands. Ground-based systems with the tactical

mobility to reach then loiter in outlying areas can

monitor a situation and provide a visible presence.

Stand-off and remote systems might not have

sufficient discrimination3 and will certainly not be

capable of interaction to defuse, arbitrate or

enforce. Manned systems will be most suited to

obtaining evidence of infringements by former

Chapter 13 193

Reconnaissance Patrol in Sierra Leone
belligerents, reconnaissance in support of the

restoration of civil infrastructure, the enduring and

local provision of security and, if required, support

to humanitarian operations.

Manned reconnaissance will apply mission

command including the ability to self re-task to seize

and retain the initiative. Though range may be

reduced it will have an all-weather, 24 hour capability

with endurance. It can penetrate cover, dismounted

as necessary, to see inside buildings, tunnels and

caves or beneath dense foliage. By being on the

ground, manned reconnaissance can make

assessments on routes and going in which a

commander can have sufficient confidence on which

to act. It can also fully identify the extent and nature

of resources (dumps, stores, construction materiel,

etc) and infrastructure (road, rail systems, water,

power, production facilities, etc).

Crucially, manned reconnaissance can force the

enemy to react and, if suitably configured, can

choose to fight for information. Boldness in

probing, recognition of opportunities to exploit, for

example, by seizing bridges or terrain and by

attacking HQs, logistic or communications sites

will be enduring characteristics. 

Key to ground-based manned reconnaissance is the

fact that the soldier’s own sensory capabilities

supplement that of the technologies at his disposal.

This might appear initially to be a glib statement,

however technology has not managed to produce a

single sensor package equivalent to the human

senses integrated with an effective intelligence

194 The Big Issue
direction and analysis system – the human brain.

The essential quality of a human being to be able to

direct his senses, cross cue between them, re-direct

effort, collate and analyse the information received,

and all within a few milliseconds, is still beyond

technology. The overall benefit of a human linked

directly to a sensor, or indeed doing the sensing,

remains critical to the overall ISTAR mix.

Reconnaissance Trooper

However, the use of manned reconnaissance risks

loss of life, or capture, which will have a greater

media impact than the loss of unmanned systems.

Manned systems operating away from the main

body of the force will remain at high risk4 and the

complications of inserting, supporting with firepower

and extracting a penetrating ground-based force will

endure. Sustainment will be challenging for all forms

of manned reconnaissance, particularly medical

support and casualty evacuation, which places

further troops and assets at risk.

Communications links to small ground-based

teams will also be challenging, whether mounted in

a vehicle or dismounted. Challenges will include

distance, terrain (especially as manned

reconnaissance is most suited to complex terrain)

Chapter 13 195
and security. Mobility will be constrained by speed

of movement on the ground whether on foot or

vehicle borne, by obstacles such as rivers, which

could require organic mobility support. Moreover,

all ground movement is likely to increase

signatures - particularly to MTI detection. The

problem of combat identification is common to all

types of manned reconnaissance and in some

cases, co-ordination of deployment will be

constrained by a ‘need to know’ culture. Insertion

and extraction are particular Combat ID challenges

and these can be linked to the process of retasking, which can be time consuming in certain

circumstances where the assets must be

recovered, re-briefed and re-inserted.

But the disadvantages of manned reconnaissance

are far outweighed by the advantages. It will

sometimes produce information of operational or

strategic significance and sometimes it will produce

operational or even strategic effect just by being in

the right place. A key advantage is in ‘micro-recce’,

which provides invaluable detail to the level of

command at which it is generated. However, it

secures its place in the order of battle by its ability to

discriminate intelligently in circumstances where

strike assets must be employed within restrictive

rules of engagement and in its ability to move

amongst and interact with people.

NOTES

1 Von Luck, H, Panzer Commander, Praeger, New York,

1989, p 35.

2 Idem, pp 39-44.

196 The Big Issue
3 To discriminate between former belligerents, Displaced

Persons, NGOs, agitators, criminals, civil population

ethnic groupings, etc, is an essential for successful post

conflict activity.

4 Armoured Reconnaissance in particular is vulnerable

when operating far ahead of the main force.

Chapter 13 197
199

CHAPTER 14

THE DELILAH FACTOR

– NEW THREATS AND

VULNERABILITIES

By David Potts

‘Their wild eyes met his as the bloodshot eyes of

the prairie wolves meet their leader ere he

rushes on at their head in the trail of the bison,

alas! only to fall into the hidden snare of the

Indian.’

Herman Melville1

The ‘electronic flank’ is an area of vulnerability that

will require increasing and stinting attention.

Potential adversaries can acquire sophisticated

commercially available capabilities with which to

attack our information systems. These attacks could

have operational, or even strategic impact and for

relatively little cost compared to, say, developing a

long-range weapon with which to strike a distant

headquarters. There is therefore a pressing need for

some form of ‘Red Team’ analysis of the nascent

tactical network and its vulnerabilities. Networks will

need to be robust enough to remain effective in a

hostile command and control warfare environment.

Networks will also need to be stable enough and

robust enough to continue to operate and fight with
them in the face of system failure. There is much

talk of the importance of reversionary modes, but

we need to be realistic as to what these are. Once

a force has become digitised, traded mass for

tempo and become accustomed to information

feeds from a whole variety of aerial and stand-off

sensors, it will have developed a command tempo

and a way of fighting that simply does not lend

itself to reverting to chinagraph pencils and paper

maps. Procedures will need to be developed so

that the fall-back position to a digital environment

is another digital environment. For example, if an

application closes down, use another application,

if a workstation fails move to another one, or if all

of a particular command post’s systems fail, revert

to an alternative digitised command post. This

should be easier than trying to revert to an

analogue, or pre-digital mode, especially as

distributed databases should mean that all of the

information in a command post could be held and

automatically updated at its alternate

headquarters, for example. Reversionary modes

will also change over time – systems being

introduced now will seem reversionary compared

to subsequent technology generations.

The widespread use of GPS for military purposes

also brings with it new vulnerabilities. The system’s

global, all weather capability for precision weapon

aiming, position reporting and time synchronisation

underpins many of our information age capabilities.

Programmes and projects such as BOWMAN,

Tomahawk and Brimstone are and will continue to be

ever more dependent on the system’s capabilities.

200 The Big Issue
It would be foolish to imagine that potential enemies

will not attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities of GPS.

The satellites which transmit the GPS signals are

potentially vulnerable to space warfare from physical

attack or the effects of an electromagnetic pulse

(EMP). However, the spacing of the individual

satellites within the system would mean that each

satellite would have to be individually targeted. A

more realistic threat is jamming or ‘spoofing’.

Spoofing is the deliberate transmission of false

signals with the intent to produce a false position,

velocity and time output from a receiver. Spoofing is

relatively easy, but can be prevented by encryption.

The most significant threat is from low-cost jammers,

which are now available commercially for only a few

hundred dollars. Movement behind shielding terrain

can counter jamming, though the tactical situation

may not allow this. Technical solutions include

adaptive spectral filters to counter jammers;

integration of GPS with Inertial Navigation System

velocity data; and the use of controlled reception

pattern antennas that cancel jammers by forming

areas of extremely low gain in the radiation pattern.

These solutions, although feasible, are more

expensive than the GPS system they would be used

to protect.

Tempo drag is a possibility as allies digitize their

forces in varying timescales and to varying levels of

capability. In a multi-national force, formations with

less advanced C4I will not be capable of operating at

the same tempo or on the same battle rhythm as

fully digitized formations. This gap in C4I capability

will have to be managed by commanders in the

same way as other capability shortfalls are now2 – by

Chapter 14 201
allocating appropriate missions and tasks or by

allocating additional resources.3 Doctrine,

techniques and procedures will need to be

developed in international fora to manage potential

tempo drag. The challenges inherent in this will

increase over time as digitised forces become more

and more adept at operating in a digitised

environment and adjust their force structures and

tactics accordingly.

‘Information overload’ is the single most cited

potential drawback of Digitization. Staff in offices

already live under the tyranny of email and there is a

real fear in many quarters that Digitisation will

extend all of the worst aspects of this phenomenon

into the battlespace. It is easy to imagine busy staff

officers groping their way through a blizzard of such

communications from subordinates, superiors and

flanking forces. This is a real issue – of course

rigorous information management will help, but the

situation will still arise on occasion. 

Worse still is the prospect of information free-flowing

into the planning process, providing constant

updates and refreshes, so that a decision is never

reached. Or, alternatively, planning paralysis while

staff seek out every last obtainable detail of

potentially available information to inform a decision

that might consequently be delayed beyond the

point where taking it is effective. These spectres are

not valid reasons for shrinking away from the vision

of the network, but they are real concerns and do

underscore the importance of having clearly

ingrained methodologies for the effective

exploitation of information and, crucially, knowing

202 The Big Issue
when enough is enough. Above all, perhaps,

commanders will need to understand that in getting

inside the decision cycle of the enemy, the key is to

make a good enough decision quickly, rather than a

perfect decision when the moment has passed.

Linked to this is the threat to our cognitive powers of

decision support tools and any number of planning

aids that are envisioned for the future. The risk is

that the key staff and even commanders may

become so overly immersed in managing these

systems – providing input to them and assessing

their outputs – that they simply forget to analyse the

situation for themselves. The most important aspect

of decision making is thinking, drawing on one’s own

experiences and applying judgement based on a

developed understanding of the real world.

Combat occurs in the physical domain, not in the

information domain. Commanders will need to have

a feel for the difference between ground truth and

displayed information. UAV video feeds, ASTOR

moving target trails and displayed icons will tell a

commander where everything is, with some

imperfections, and may even show with some

veracity where his own forces and those of the

enemy are in relation to each other. But in vile

weather, in complex terrain, or when casualties are

being taken, there is no substitute in Land warfare

for genuine Fingerspitzengefuhl derived from first

hand knowledge of the actualities.

At the lowest tactical level, ground needs to be read

and understood. The fact that a UAV can see a

target does not, for example, automatically mean

Chapter 14 203
that a friendly direct fire system can actually see and

engage the target, even if it appears to be in line of

sight of it on a display screen. There could be tall

grass, hedgerows, debris, smoke or any number of

battlefield frictions and fogs that prevent the target

being seen and engaged. This is perhaps just a

matter of training, but one senses the potential for a

good deal of friction between levels of command,

especially in complex terrain.

There is also a risk of fighting ‘Red Icons’ rather than

the enemy. This is particularly so in circumstances

where a red picture has been compiled in some all

knowing superior headquarters and injected into

everyone else’s battlepicture. There might be a

tendency to attempt to engage these icons without a

real understanding of either the latency of the

information, or perhaps that the icons may have

been disaggregated from a centre of mass by a rule

and are therefore displayed as a mathematical

projection of reality, rather than actual positions.

Avoiding this requires technical solutions to the way

information is displayed as well as operating

procedures and a grasp of the difference between

displayed information and ground truth.

Despite all of this information on enemy forces, there

will still be surprises, and at every level – tactical,

operational and strategic. Even in relatively recent

times the West has been surprised by its enemies.

The crossing of the Yalu River by the Chinese and of

the Suez Canal by the Egyptians are text book

examples. The Tet Offensive achieved simultaneous

surprise throughout the entire depth of the American

deployment in Vietnam and, most recently of all, the

204 The Big Issue
attacks of 11 September shocked and stunned the

world, including those whose business it was to see

these sorts of things coming. We will continue to be

surprised, either because the other fellow conceals

his whereabouts and movements, or deceives us

into believing he is elsewhere, or that he is not

present in the strength we imagined. For example,

despite impressive aerial surveillance and bombing,

the Serbian Army in Kosovo withdrew with much of

its combat power intact as a direct consequence of

its effective concealment techniques. We will also

fail at some time in the future to draw the appropriate

conclusions from the facts that are presented to us.

In the information age, we will still find occasion to

recoil in shock and announce that ‘we never

believed he would do that!’

We will also continue to kill the wrong people, on

occasion. It seems unbelievable that despite

spending billions of dollars on state of the art

surveillance systems and having an enormous

intelligence bureaucracy, the United States still

managed to partially destroy the Chinese Embassy

in Belgrade. Subsequent investigations have

revealed that this was an error, a classic ‘cock-up’. It

is the sort of thing that could happen again and the

consequences could be much more adverse. Such

mishaps highlight the extent to which chance and ill

judgement can be determining factors in warfare and

serve to undermine the more extravagant Western,

and especially US, claims for information superiority.

Effective information operations are predicated on a

thorough understanding of the target set. It is

doubtful if the West, and particularly the US, can

Chapter 14 205
really develop a sufficiently sophisticated

understanding of the impact of information

operations messages on potential target audiences

world-wide. This will constrain the effectiveness of

such operations, which is, in any case, almost

impossible to measure. Difficulties are compounded

by the impossibility of compartmentalising messages

and audiences – the domestic message ends up

being beamed around the world. The images of the

alleged terrorist prisoners being held in Cuba by the

US is a case in point – photographs taken and

released by the US authorities seem to have had a

positive reaction in the US, but much of the world is,

rightly or wrongly, horrified. Information Operations

have a vital role to play in operations, but we need to

be more honest with ourselves as to how

perceptions can be shaped to advantage and what

our own limitations are in this field. In recent conflicts

our enemies (for example, Sinn Fein et al) appeared

to be better at this game than we, constrained,

rightly, as we are by all the trappings of liberal

democracy and a free press.

Some of the concepts underpinning network centric

warfare are arguably implausible. Selfsynchronisation, for example, is difficult to

envisage working in circumstances where

resources are constrained. This may occur either

because resources are intrinsically scarce, or

because they are scarce relative to the scale of the

target array. In such circumstances there will be a

need to prioritise and sequence engagements

more centrally, leading potentially to the centrist

control and timetable warfare to which NCW is

intended to be the antithesis.

206 The Big Issue
The operational art for the information age, spawned

or defined by NCW, appears to be one centred on

integrating the effects of long-range air and sea

launched weapons, linked to space-based and aerial

sensors. This has two failings.

The first is that in many circumstances it is simply

not cost effective to attack the target with such

expensive systems. The second is that it is

fundamentally attritional and the time will come

when an enemy will simply soak this punishment,

possibly even to the point of running down

operational stocks to dangerously low levels.

It also requires air superiority. It must be assumed

that no potential adversary would be able to survive

for long in air to air combat with the US. Equally, it

must be assumed that no potential adversary would

try to fight the US in the air. But innovations in

ground-based, theatre air defence are a different

matter and it must be assumed that potential

adversaries are energetically exploring this field.

This networked long-range attack collapses as a

form of warfare as soon as the defender develops an

air defence capability to counter the threat.

‘As long as airpower can defeat the antiairpower, then this recipe for warfare will

continue to flourish. But if we reach a stage in

which there are numerous directed energy

weapons, real-time, long range, that can track

and acquire instantaneously... then the equation

would be reversed’.4

The greatest strength of this form of warfare is also

its greatest weakness. Namely, that it has conferred

Chapter 14 207
upon the US, and by association, its allies, such an

air of invincibility in conventional ‘force on force’

warfare that it has become a powerful catalyst for

other forms warfare, labelled variously as

‘asymmetric’, or ‘unrestricted’ warfare. Conceivably,

such forms of warfare could, in time, render the

networked conventional force irrelevant. But network

based capabilities will have a vital role to play in

supporting intelligence gathering on secretive and

diffuse enemies and in executing novel attacks

against them, wherever they might be. 

Information age technologies and NCW concepts

have the potential to deliver a decisive advantage in

all forms of combat, including asymmetric warfare.

But in exploiting these technologies and concepts,

the Delilah Factor must be acknowledged and

properly addressed.

NOTES

1 In Moby Dick.

2 For example when a subordinate formation has little

organic artillery or has an unduly slow or vulnerable Main

Battle Tank.

3 It is not immediately clear what additional resources might

mean in a C4I context, but it might include enhanced

liaison teams or mechanisms to provide shared access to

particular planning tools for example.

4 General Wesley Clarke, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2 Jan 02.

208 The Big Issue
PART THREE –

PROGNOSIS

Tactical Combat with the New

C4ISTAR

Whither the Close Battle

Asymmetric Warfare

Once Upon a Time in the Future
CHAPTER 15

TACTICAL COMBAT

WITH THE NEW

C4ISTAR

By David Potts

This chapter considers the impact of the new

C4ISTAR on the way we might conduct tactical

combat in the future. It firstly describes the possible

impact on armoured manoeuvre forces engaged in

an expanded close battle in the 2010 timeframe. It

then outlines a concept for joint tactical combat and

points to the essence of the operational art in the

information age.

The Expanded Close Battle

Even at the lowest tactical level (brigade and

battlegroup), high quality, relevant information will

soon be provided by operational and strategic level

assets, which, when combined with locally gathered

information, will give commanders an undreamed of

information advantage over their adversaries. This

will enable rapid decision-making and action and the

application of appropriate and timely effects –

including joint firepower. This will change the way

land forces fight at the tactical level – with greater

emphasis on achieving decision in the deep battle

211
and a greater stand-off in the close battle. This will

be accompanied by a shift in emphasis from direct

fire, ground-based platforms to aerial and indirect

fire systems. As a consequence, it is possible that

the functions in combat paradigm of ‘Find, Fix and

Strike’ could evolve into ‘Find, Track, Strike, Exploit’.

This is of crucial significance as the functions shape

our understanding of the very nature of manoeuvre.

The divisional context, in which brigades sit, is itself

changing considerably. Think of a UK Division in

1990 and compare that to what we know of a UK

Division in 2010. Firstly, in 1990, even at the

Divisional level, information from strategic and

operational level assets could be characterised as

too little too late. In 2010 information from

operational and strategic level assets is expected

to be readily available. But crucially, the Divisional

level of command will itself control a range of

capable ISTAR assets that contrast most starkly

with the paucity of assets around 1990, when

drones, EW and sound ranging, for example, were

real Cinderella capabilities. This is indicated on

page 263, together with other anticipated major

changes in capability.

UAVs will provide real-time information and a

capability for persistent dwell over targets delivering

live imagery to allow tracking, engagement and

Battle Damage Assessment. This is a quantum leap

in capability compared to an aerial photograph by a

manned aircraft or drone providing a still snapshot in

time with a latency of hours or even days. Similarly,

the division can expect to have its own ASTOR

Ground Station permanently allocated in operations.

212 The Big Issue
This contrasts sharply with the situation in 1990/91

when the UK had no such capability. Even in the US

Army during the Gulf War, JSTARS was in its infancy

and a terminal could not be made available to VII US

Corps. The consequent difference in perception of

events between General Schwarzkopf, who had

such a terminal and Lieutenant General Franks, who

did not, is well documented.1

By 2010 the UK division’s EW capability will have

been modernised twice since 1990. COBRA and

ASP will provide an effective counter-battery target

acquisition system, effectively replacing and very

substantially upgrading the Cymbeline Mortar

Locating Radar capability, previously held in the

brigades’ Direct Support Artillery regiments.

Armoured reconnaissance, although fewer in

number, will also become more effective as CVR(T)

is replaced by an ISTAR platform based on the

Future Rapid Effect System (FRES). The whole will

be integrated much more effectively by digital

Chapter 15 213

1990 DIVISION 2010 DIVISION

ISTAR Arty Drones, Arty 

Patrols, Armoured 

Recce.

ASTOR, UAVs, 

EW, STA Patrols, 

Weapon Locating 

Radar, HUMINT, 

Armoured Recce.

AVIATION LYNX/TOW AH64D

DIVISIONAL 

ARTY

M107 & M110 MLRS, GMLRS, 

IFPA

GROUND 

MANOEUVRE

CHALLENGER 1, 

Warrior FV 432

CHALLENGER 2, 

Warrior MRAV, 

FRES.
communications and processing and with new

command and control, organisations and doctrine to

deliver an integrated, recognisable ISTAR capability.

The combination of these factors, ISTAR, better

integration with joint capabilities and a more effective

digital command system will make the division a very

formidable adversary, perhaps capable of

dominating an area of operations as much as 200

kilometres wide and perhaps 120 Kilometres deep.2

The reach and effectiveness of the divisional

artillery will have improved with the introduction of

MLRS and subsequently of improved, longerrange munitions. But the indirect fire assets,

whose projected ranges make them unlikely to be

able to concentrate fire across the divisional

frontage, will need to be allocated down to

brigades. Indeed, the enemy is most unlikely to

oblige us by massing his forces in future and we

can therefore expect to see increased emphasis

on the engagement of fewer and smaller, wellconcealed or mobile targets. This too could

encourage further decentralisation of artillery. 

The Apache AH64D will have replaced Lynx/TOW to

provide a genuine deep attack capability at corps

and divisional level, as well as a remarkably capable

ISTAR platform. The use of this asset at the

divisional level would deliver unstoppable combat

power to a UK Division. 

The brigades will be focused on the close battle, but,

by 2010, with increasing emphasis on longer-range

indirect fire engagement and with brigade areas of

operation in excess of 50 Kilometres Square.

214 The Big Issue
Brigades will take on many of the attributes of a

division today and will be more capable of

independent action than presently. As with the

division, it is anticipated that this level of command

will be able to benefit from information gathered at

the strategic and operational level. It will also have

organic ISTAR assets when deployed on operations

– the contrast with the UK brigade of 1990 could be

as stark as shown below:

We are half way through this journey in terms of

time, but perhaps only 20% through it in terms of

capability improvement. The dramatic changes in

ISTAR and command and control systems will occur

from the middle of the present decade onwards.

Chapter 15 215

1990 2010

Cymbeline Mortar 

Locating Radar

ASTOR Ground Station 

UAVs 

Armoured Reconnaissance 

(including Forward Air Controllers) 

Dismounted Reconnaissance Patrols 

EW 

HUMINT 
Their impact is therefore a matter of conjecture at

this stage, but we have had insights from our own

exercises and experiments and from those of our

allies to suggest that there will be profound changes

in how we will fight at this level of command. The

brigade commander will have timely, accurate and

relevant information on his enemy enabling him to

engage earlier, with a wider selection of weapon

systems and to more precise and lethal effect. He

will be able to manoeuvre with confidence and

develop the situation out of contact with the enemy,

preserving both his own combat power and his

tactical options. He will be able to act rapidly and

take a genuinely manoeuvrist approach to exploit

enemy weaknesses and seize opportunities.

Over time, as experience with this kind of ISTAR

capability grows, we will see changes to brigade

organisation and tactics. The expanded area of

operations will have implications for indirect fire

assets. It may require greater emphasis on more

capable mortars at battlegroup level, or the pushing

down of AS90 batteries to that level. Brigade level

firepower will be longer-range assets, such as

MLRS, attack helicopters and airpower.

There should also be fewer surprises – there will

probably always be some surprises, but,

conceivably, there should be much fewer of them.

This has implications for reserves – it does not

imply that they are not needed, but that they

could be smaller, or perhaps not held at every

level of command, or constituted differently in

some way. A commander should also have more

notice of needing to commit his reserve and this

216 The Big Issue
too should influence their composition and

posture. The balance of the purpose of a reserve

might also change from that of reacting to

unexpectedly adverse events, to one of exploiting

opportunity – this too would affect the form and

posture of reserves. 

Battlegroups too will be able to access relevant

information from assets held at higher levels of

command as well as being pushed time critical

information from whatever level of command, or

asset, that has generated that information. It is

anticipated that as digitised command and control

develop, particularly the automation of aspects of

ISTAR planning and processing, battlegroups should

be provided with more focussed and tailored

intelligence support than at present. Planning will be

better informed and they will be able to manoeuvre

with much greater confidence – dominating larger

areas and bringing combat power to bear more

effectively. The command tempo will be improved by

C4ISTAR and digitised command systems as well as

by improved command doctrine, such as effects

based planning – already beginning to impact now. 

Despite the ISTAR capability envisaged at the

Brigade level, battlegroup commanders will require

their own ISTAR assets to provide that fine grain

detail and immediacy so essential at this level of

command. The precise mix of assets will depend on

a variety of factors, including the mission, enemy,

terrain and operational priorities. There will also be

an interplay with the brigade level ISTAR and in

circumstances where brigade assets can provide

battlegroup commanders with much of the

Chapter 15 217
information they need, there will be less of an

imperative to expand the ISTAR mix at the

battlegroup level. But in complex terrain where lower

levels of command need very detailed and

immediate information and the scope for the

unexpected is greater, the Brigade level will be less

able to meet the immediate needs of battlegroups.

There will undoubtedly be an enduring requirement

for a scouting capability in light armoured vehicles.

But this could be supplemented, as required, by

other capabilities such as tanks, snipers, engineers

or anti-tank guided weapons. The most exciting

addition to the armoury will be the UAVs and their

associated Ground Stations, which will provide

battlegroups with their own ‘eye-in-the-sky’ real-time

information to support planning, manoeuvre and

engagement with indirect fire and joint systems.

The table above is purely indicative of the range of

assets that might be found in a future ISTAR

grouping at the battlegroup level. As the grouping

expands, sub-unit level command would be

218 The Big Issue

Fd Sy

MAMBA EW

Armd 

Recce

TACP/ 

FAC

ATGW

WR/AI PI

Snipers ISTAR 

Cell

Scout 

Tp/PI

FOOs/ 

MFCs

UAV 

ground 

station

Engr 

Recce

Core Capability

Possible additional 

capabilities for 

warfighting

Possible additional 

capabilities for Small 

Scale PSO

ISTAR 

Offr CR2 Tp MI HUMINT
required together with an effective architecture to

ensure the assets can be commanded and coordinated effectively and their information exploited

and acted upon. 

Crucially, the ISTAR grouping, whether a scout troop

or a sub-unit sized grouping, must have all the

appropriate linkages to apply the firepower available

to the force. The integration of effects and

battlespace management will, therefore, be key

functions at this level of command.

Effective command and control systems and the

automated support to the tasking, management

and cross cueing of assets will be the sine qua

non of effective ISTAR at brigade and battlegroup

level. Without appropriate C4I, there is a risk that

information overload, coupled to the burden of

commanding assets beyond the capability of the

command team, could turn ‘recce pull’ into

‘ISTAR drag’.

Joint Tactical Combat 

At first sight, the term joint tactical combat appears

to be a contradiction in terms. Joint has come to be

associated in our thinking with the operational level

of command,3 which is an entirely false horizontal

barrier. The Joint Force Commander and his staff

are of course operating at the operational level. But

individual platforms, for example, operating in ‘a

single integrated joint battlespace’ are operating at

the tactical level. This could mean that they are

working, as now, within a component framework

where the Land Forces are commanded by a Land

Chapter 15 219

Component Commander and assets from other

components are supporting him, or indeed that his

assets are supporting another component, air or

maritime, or special forces for example. But it might

also involve closer integration of ISTAR, manoeuvre

and strike assets into a joint framework with greater

emphasis on joint capabilities and joint command.

Such a shift in emphasis is especially relevant to the

precise application of force to achieve specific

effects in a complex battlespace where, increasingly,

tactical action has operational impact and strategic

significance. The diagram on page 272 provides a

simplistic and stark schematic of a tactical action

that is inherently joint. 

Any number of permutations is possible in the

diagram on page 272. The UAV could be operated

by the Air Component and launched from over

1,000 kilometres distant, or even from another

continent; or it could be a operated by the Maritime

Chapter 15 221
Component and launched from a ship, or ground

forces might be operating it from only a few hundred

kilometres away. Equally, the aircraft could be from

an airbase or a ship and might even belong to a

contingent from another nation. The ground based

manned reconnaissance could be special forces,

marines or an army patrol. Variations are also

possible on the combinations of sensor and strike

assets. For example: EW could acquire a target, a

HQ perhaps, ground based or aerial

reconnaissance could corroborate and discriminate

and the strike asset could be a sea launched cruise

missile or a combat UAV. Whatever is happening is

both joint and tactical and doing this well should

obviously be one of the much sought after positive

outcomes of our investment in digital technology. It

is also precise – it represents the application of

precisely the required force to achieve a specific

effect without unintended consequences. A key

feature should be that the ‘decide’ function in

executing the action is delegated within command

intent (Mission Command) to the lowest practicable

level, rather than micro-managed centrally.

222 The Big Issue
Developing this theme further, recent experience in

Afghanistan has suggested to some that:

‘the purpose of manoeuvre forces is to find the

enemy, to locate him, to determine the outline of

the enemy force, to find those specific points on

the ground that are most vulnerable to attack by

fire, to observe them, to separate civilians from

military, deception from real targets and then to

superintend going after those targets’.4

This is clearly about using special forces, Ground

Manoeuvre and ground based manned

reconnaissance capabilities to provide a framework

that enables the effective application of Joint

firepower. The capacity to discriminate and

superintend is clearly especially important when

operating within restrictive rules of engagement –

the most likely circumstance in the future operating

environment. However, Afghanistan is not

tomorrow’s war – it is already yesterday’s war,

although it obviously provides powerful signposts.

The circumstances might prove unrepeatable: a

benign airspace environment, a benign maritime

environment, a benign electromagnetic environment

and an obliging surrogate ground force of about

80,000 troops.

A more likely future scenario is one where light and

light mechanised ground forces create a framework

of secure operating bases to enable special forces

operations, manned reconnaissance and specialist

HUMINT operations. This also establishes an overt

presence and begins to facilitate and support

humanitarian and other non-military lines of

Chapter 15 223
operation, which might need to go on concurrently

with the engagement of targets in the same theatre

of operations (the 3-Block War). Favourable

conditions are also then created for follow-on forces

to enter theatre and do whatever needs to be done,

whether that be manoeuvrist warfighting with

overwhelming combat power enabled by new

technologies, or nation building. The core enabler to

all of this is an effective network over which the

requisite information can be passed and processed

with the necessary timeliness and granularity – this

is the key area for development and investment. But

there will be organizational implications too as the

twin imperatives, of the need for first echelon forces

to deploy rapidly and to operate jointly at the tactical

level, drive us toward the increasing optimization of

some forces for this form of joint combat. 

Whilst environmental components can be given the

lead for both enabling and taking action in the

battlespace, we should try to envisage alternative,

more dynamic models. Conceivably, if a balanced

deployed joint force is enabled by a robust network,

it will be possible to form joint task or effects-based

224 The Big Issue
teams of sensors, manoeuvre and strike assets to

achieve specific effects in the battlespace. These

teams could be networked together and formed and

reformed as the situation demands. The deployed

components then become the basis of managing

forces in or within reach of the theatre of operations,

rather than the basic command construct

responsible for executing tactical actions. This is not

as alien as it sounds – think of Northern Ireland and

the model there of framework patrolling by the Army

with ‘strikes’ against terrorists being carried out in an

integrated way by other agencies. Alternatively, a

new construct might emerge based on sensing

forces, strike forces and manoeuvre forces.5

Whatever the outcome, an agile and razor-sharp

command structure will be required to exploit the

potential offered by a robustly networked joint force

in which command intent is understood throughout

and execution can be delegated to the lowest

practicable level.

But it is tempting to ask whether, fundamentally, the

joint tactical combat described is really anything

Chapter 15 225
new? It still requires a blend of fire and manoeuvre,

otherwise it risks becoming a fantastically expensive

attritional slog.6 Perhaps all this merely serves to

highlight a debate that has been with us at least

since massed archers took the field at Crecy:

whether we envisage manoeuvre supported by

firepower or firepower supported by manoeuvre? or,

perhaps it just fuels debate on the efficacy of

airpower versus ground forces? These arguments

obscure the real issue, which is that information age

technology and the imperatives of the operating

environment are changing the form and purpose of

both firepower and manoeuvre. The relationship

between them is changing too and is now potentially

so dynamic that the balance could be adjusted

rapidly within operations as the situation develops –

combining cheng (normal force) and chi

(extraordinary force)7 in infinite combinations, across

all components and contingents, to achieve specific

effects in a complex battlespace. These precise

effects will, in turn, often be exploited outside the

military domain to create advantage in other lines of

operation. This will be the essence of the operational

art in the information age.

NOTES

1 General Norman Schwarzkopf, It doesn’t Take a Hero,

Bantam Books, 1992, pp 533-540.

2 Allies who have already digitised some of their forces

would recognise these parameters, but what a UK Division

will actually be capable of will depend very much on the

precise capabilities of C4ISTAR assets and weapons yet

to enter service.

3 A Land Force Commander could be operating at the

operational level and must be versed in the ‘operational

art’. This is especially so in Land-centric Other Operations.

226 The Big Issue
4 Major General Robert E Scales (USA Retd), quoted in

Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2 Jan 2002, Page 24.

5 See Admiral B Owens USN, Lifting the Fog of War, Farrar,

Straus and Giroux, New York, 2000 for advocacy of a

construct based on Find, Strike, Manoeuvre and

Sustainment. D A MacGregor, in Digital War, R L Bateman,

Presidio Press, Novato CA, 1999, pp 171-192 for

advocacy of a model based on Deep, Close and Rear.

6 See J A Antal, in Bateman, op cit, pp 153-170, which puts

the case for the continuing need for unhinge adversaries

through manoeuvre in conjunction with firepower.

7 Cheng (normal force), Chi (extraordinary force), Sun Tzu,

The Art of War.

Chapter 15 227
229

CHAPTER 16

‘WHITHER THE CLOSE

BATTLE ?’

By Richard Cousens

‘C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre’

Gen Bosquet (at Balaklava)

There is a general assumption in Western armies

that the close battle is the pivotal and most

significant aspect of warfare. This has certainly been

the case in past history, but there are some

indications that the Revolution in Military Affairs

(RMA) might be indicating the eclipse of the close

battle if not its demise. 

This brief chapter explores our love affair with the

close battle and its continued relevance for the

future. The aim is to describe our vision of the 2015

battlefield together with the significance of the close

battle within it, in order to identify some difficult

decisions on the horizon. It explores emerging UK

thinking on the framework of the future battlefield

and identifies some bitter pills that may require to be

swallowed. It will also suggest that we are having

difficulty in identifying the true potential of digitization

and that we are hampered by a cultural malaise that

is emotionally wedded to the equipment programme,

rather than to the concepts to which the equipment
should be subordinate. But UK conceptual thinking

for the battlefield of 2015+ is mature and

effervescent and that, following a fixation with

peacekeeping, we are now focussing back on

warfighting – the gold standard. This chapter also

explores a particularly sensitive idea – the notion

that the primacy of the manoeuvre elements in the

prosecution of decisive operations is fading and that

consequently the significance of the close battle is

changing too. The chapter concludes with a signpost

to possible changes in our structures over the next

15 years. 

Dr Michael Evans recently published a paper entitled

Close combat- lessons from the cases of Albert

Jacka and Audie Murphy. In it he makes the

definitive statement that ‘close combat has been the

defining feature of war in the past and is likely to

remain so in the future’. He concludes that: ‘success

in war usually requires first-class infantry to close

with and to finish off the enemy. There is no other

way of winning’. He also refers to the ‘mystical

appeal of close-quarter combat’, referring to a ‘long

history of eager participants’. Finally he offers the

thought that ‘men at arms, not military machines give

western society the mythology to nourish its mutual

pride and traditions’. Most soldiers can readily

identify with all these sentiments. They stem from

our history, our culture, our tradition and heritage.

The walls of infantry messes all over the world are

adorned with tributes to those who fought and died

in bloody close combat. Below is but one example of

the pivotal significance of the close battle in war:

230 The Big Issue
‘When dawn came, it was found that friend had

bayoneted friend, foe foe, and that the .303

bullets poured so furiously inwards, had gone

equally furiously outwards to the other side of the

perimeter and there settled in many an Australian

limb. From that time onwards the order was that

the enemy was to be engaged at night only with

bayonets – and we gunners, who had previously

used bayonets solely for the purpose of opening

condensed milk and bully beef tins, now had to

view these beastly weapons in a new and more

serious light which filled us with dismay.’

There is no better description of the bloody nature of

the close battle at its closest than that of Russell

Braddon in The Naked Island describing the battle

for Malaya in December 1941. It reinforces all

Michael Evans’ remarks and most soldiers would

identify strongly with them. There is certainly no

denying that some close combat will indeed be an

enduring feature of war, but one has to ask whether

this is becoming an institutional comfort-blanket that

is masking a genuine Revolution in Military Affairs?

Is it an excuse for clinging to branch-specific

structures that have less and less relevance in a

battlefield involving the orchestration of capability

rather than branches and cap-badges? It gives

perhaps gives credence to Field Marshal Slim’s

remarks that:

‘Generals have often been reproached with

preparing for the last war instead of for the next

– an easy gibe when their fellow-countrymen and

their political leaders, too frequently, have

prepared for no war at all.’

Chapter 16 231
There is no need to deviate from the aim by

exploring the nuances of the RMA debate. They are

familiar to most thinking soldiers. Michael Evans has

addressed the issues in depth in his recent paper on

Australia and the RMA in which he concludes by

remarking that:

‘The designation of information capabilities as a

separate capability grouping – with more funding

than that assigned to improving current strategic

strike – is perhaps the most fundamental

indication of how Australia has come to view the

knowledge edge as the foundation stone of its

military capability in the 21st century.’

This too is the foundation of the British approach and

it is best described by Dr Tim Benbow of Oxford

University in a parallel paper to that of Michael

Evans in which he explores the various RMA schools

of thought: ‘radicals, visionaries, moderates and

pessimists’. This chapter takes a radical standpoint.

It is no secret that, as we prepare to re-focus the

British army for high-tempo expeditionary

operations, we are equipped with major equipment

types that weigh over 30 tons that are a legacy of a

previous era – configured for continental warfighting.

The problem is that if one evolves from today – or

even yesterday, there is a danger of compounding

the error. Only by making a clean conceptual break

from the present can we design an army for 2015+

and we are making some strides in this direction.

Making this conceptual break is a real challenge for

us, we still have some officers who have a romantic

fixation with the 1(BR) Corps structures in Germany

232 The Big Issue
and there is often an assumption that all the

capabilities deployed in Germany must be replicated

in the future – ie the evolutionary approach. There is

no more precise description of the need to break

with the present than that offered by General Gordon

Sullivan (former US Army Chief of Staff) and Michael

Harper in their book entitled Hope Is Not a Method.

In it they explore the need to look back from the

future rather than evolve from the present.

Strategically, this is perhaps the key point of this

chapter from which all else stems.

‘Looking back from the future begins by going

back to the most basic questions: what is your

purpose as an organisation; what business are

you in? What will your purpose tomorrow be?

What will the characteristics of your strategic

environment be? What will it take to win in

tomorrow’s markets? Don’t ask yourself what the

“next” organisation will look like. The “next”

organisation is constrained by today; it must

evolve from today’s organisation. By imagining

the “after next” organisation, you can take off

today’s blinkers and imagine your organisation in

a world unconstrained by its present reality. This

technique does not deny the reality of the present

but rather helps you think beyond it.’

In short – if we focus on tomorrow, we are almost

guaranteed to get it wrong. The key therefore is to

focus on the day after tomorrow. 

Warfighting will remain the benchmark against which

to train and prepare. Operations in Bosnia, Kosovo,

Macedonia and Sierra Leone notwithstanding, we

Chapter 16 233
remain an army configured for high intensity

warfighting in the belief, to put it crudely, that you can

‘dumb down’ to peacekeeping but you cannot ‘dumb

up’. Secondly, asymmetric attack will become a

more prominent feature of warfighting and we must

be configured to conduct asymmetric attack

ourselves as well as defence. In the light of the

horrific attacks in Washington and New York in

September 2001, this is the understatement of the

century nevertheless we must not pretend that

because the term is currently in vogue it is new, it is

not. Thirdly – the preservation of fighting spirit and a

unique ethos goes without saying. We accept that a

regimental system is inextricably enmeshed with the

ethos and fighting spirit of the British army and that

it provides the enduring foundations of the moral

component of its fighting power. These then are the

constants – what about the changes? The

multinational dimension of warfighting will increase;

future adversaries will be more diverse and

unpredictable and are unlikely to accept the moral

and legal constraints that impinge upon us.

Operations in 2015+ will be set within a joint

campaign with the army commander drawing on

joint capabilities to a far greater degree than today –

facilitated by digitization. Indeed the availability and

use of information will profoundly change the way

the army operates. This is the most important point

of all and it merits expansion.

Brigadier Jim Wallace, recently retired from the

Australian Army, has written extensively on the

effects of digitization and in a recent paper stated

that: ‘one of the main motivations for digitization in

advanced western military establishments is the

234 The Big Issue
belief that the process will impose a new order on

the inherent chaos of the battlefield’. He rightly

identifies the enhancement that digitization brings to

decision-making and emphasises the need for it to

be balanced by firm battlefield leadership. But, in the

context of 2015, digitization is much more than

command and decision-making and the British army

has been slow to appreciate the more holistic

benefits to warfighting as a whole. As for the

Americans, the debate has been fogged by the Gulf

War which was perceived to be revolutionary but

actually was not. In his book, The Next World War,

James Adams suggested that: 

‘The 1991 Gulf War was the last hurrah of the

armed forces and generals who had trained on

the legacy of the Second World War. War had

changed its form with the arrival of stand-off

weapons and precision guided munitions.’

He noted that though the equipment had changed,

the tactics had not and observed that:

‘Mile after mile of tanks, armoured personnel

carriers and fuel trucks; serried ranks of tents

marching in perfect order over the horizon and

runways shimmering in the desert heat.’

So what are those changes in tactics and structures

that digitization will facilitate? In short – the doctrine?

The constants are the manoeuvrist approach and

the notion that tempo is the key to success.

Manoeuvre warfare theory will continue to be the

doctrinal bedrock for the British approach. As for the

changes we expect, they include: terminology, more

Chapter 16 235
emphasis on capabilities that enhance tempo and

greater interoperability through common doctrine.

Herein, for example, lies considerable scope for a

revitalised and more dynamic ABCA programme.

In 2015+ what is the relevance of the traditional

framework of the battlefield (deep, close and rear)

in battlespace that is acknowledged to be

dispersed, noncontiguous and non-linear? Does it

continue to have relevance when operations are

progressively enemy-focused rather than terrainfocused and where holding information is

arguably more significant than holding ground?

How can one describe close and rear operations

in such an environment?

Once again there is merit in identifying constants

and changes. In deep operations the constants

might be summarised as follows:

• The corps, division, brigade and battlegroup

hierarchy remains valid: whereas today the

lowest level at which deep operations are

prosecuted is division, we believe that around

2015 it will become brigade;

• Attacking the enemy’s centre of gravity;

• The need to commit ground forces in deep

manoeuvre;

• The difficulty in the indirect engagement of

moving targets. 

But the changes are far more significant and farreaching and perhaps point to the eclipse of close

operations as we know them:

236 The Big Issue
• Deep attack will be increasingly joint and

integrated;

• Deep operations will be increasingly decisive;

• There will be much greater reach – long range

precision artillery, air manoeuvre, EW and the

contribution of both maritime and air, fixed wing

and long range missiles, will deliver

synchronised fire at ranges out to 300

kilometres or more; digitization is the enabler –

not just the enhancement to C2 but also the

sensor to shooter links;

• Air Manoeuvre will deliver greater operational

impact than ground manoeuvre;

• Planning will be much more complex.

As for close operations, some form of close combat

continues to be inevitable but the changes are

profound:

• There are an increasing number of alternatives

to striking including, perhaps, isolation and

neutralisation;

• The range and volume of the close combat

zone will increase rendering existing capabilities

inadequate and a legacy of the analogue era.

The RMA really bites here;

• Sensor and shooter will be much more difficult

to conceal;

• Huge changes in the way that combat arms

fight;

Chapter 16 237
• More capable infantry. Fewer, digitally

empowered, light – lean – lethal;

• Armoured effect less likely in decisive

operations – they are unlikely to be there. Their

effect will be from much more dispersed

locations;

• Artillery – hugely significant and much more

integrated. The demise of dedicated FOOs and

increasingly joint effects;

• Much greater contribution by aviation and

hence, if there is a close battle, it is likely to be

a product of air manoeuvre – not ground

manoeuvre with a hugely reduced logistic drag. 

But what do we mean by ‘fewer but more capable’

infantry? At a recent infantry trial of battle group

thermal imagery installed in Warrior, a corporal

remarked ‘who needs close recce now?’ He had a

good point. He was sitting in a Warrior AFV with

better firepower, mobility, protection and surveillance

equipment than his colleagues in a CVR(T)-

equipped recce platoon and would not offer the

unique signature of a recce unit. We are arguably

wedded to the concept of manned recce but, with

the technology now available, do we need dedicated

recce platoons any more? The scope is huge: equip

the mortar platoons with 120mm mortars and topattack precision-guided munitions and dispense with

anti-tank platoons but, above all, equip the soldier to

cue and initiate effect from fire units which may not

be integral to his unit. The days of the decisive close

battle at less than 2000 metres surely must be

numbered? The see, tell, act cycle can now include

238 The Big Issue
the manoeuvre elements and suddenly the potential

exists for an infantry company commander to see, to

tell and act at ranges far deeper than today. The

answer for us lies in the FIST programme – Future

Infantry Soldier Technology. It is the UK equivalent of

the US Land Warrior programme.

FIST has particular potential in urban operations too

which remain an area in which concepts, tactics,

techniques and procedures have changed little since

1945. The British approach is to acknowledge that

close combat remains one of the most demanding

tasks of all but that the trend should be to make

close combat less close. Thus while developments

will never completely negate the need to close with

the enemy, the aim will be increasingly to locate the

enemy, neutralise his capabilities and break his

morale and will to fight while at a distance. We owe

it to our soldiers to use technology to take them out

of the loop where technology can deliver. Some

current USMC modelling of urban warfare projects a

casualty rate of 33%. No small army such as ours

can afford to sustain such a rate from such an oldfashioned, close and attritional activity. There has to

be another way.

Of course rear operations continue but those who

cling to the linear divide between rear and other

operations may be mistaken. The battlespace will be

more seamless and the US concept of ‘an

expanding area of close combat’ is very attractive.

The need for any commander to maintain his

freedom to manoeuvre and to support and sustain

operations while preserving his force will be

Chapter 16 239
increasingly important. It represents a role for

medium forces.

There will be a definite impact upon future structures

as a result of some of the conceptual thinking that I

have outlined. There was a prophetic article in The

Economist of 6 Jan 01 entitled ‘Wars of Intervention’

which sums up the strategic drivers nicely:

‘As late as 1938, Britain’s Neville Chamberlain

could get away with calling Czechoslovakia “a

far-off country of whose people we know

nothing”. That is a vanished past. Now, except for

a few sealed-off corners of Africa and Asia, what

a ruler does to his people is swiftly revealed by

camera, satellite and internet to a large,

interested and reasonably well-informed

audience; and, if what he does is outrageous

enough, the audience is likely to want something

done about it.’

The UK Defence Future Strategic Concept paper

indicates that the UK is likely to have to deploy

forces more rapidly in order to deliver strategic

effect. The emphasis is not just on rapid deployment

but on operational impact once deployed – what we

call ‘rapid effect’ which requires sufficiently capable

forces to be effective in theatre in order to deter, preempt or contain a crisis ie – a ‘medium’ capability.

We see that a medium capability will be based on

the enhancement of existing forces; in particular the

merging of light and mechanised infantry into light

mechanised infantry; and improving the inherent

light armoured characteristics of armoured recce,

taking advantage of enhancements in firepower,

240 The Big Issue
digitization and ISTAR. Significantly there is an

opportunity to do this within the current equipment

programme through what is known as the FRES

concept to develop a group of armoured platforms

that have broad utility, greater tactical and strategic

deployability and greater commonality. FRES stands

for Future Rapid Effect System and might blend the

armoured battle group support vehicle (ABSV),

multi-roled armoured vehicle (MRAV), and the future

command and liaison vehicle (FCLV). This is a

challenging issue but the key point is that the

transition towards medium forces is well under way.

Structures are bound to change, but note that the

reference is to a regimental system and not the

regimental system. The emphasis for ground

manoeuvre on balanced forces, versatility, high

tempo and a growing ‘medium’ capability may begin

to prove that the traditional distinctions between

armour, armoured infantry, mechanised and light

forces become less helpful. Similarly the traditional

boundary between firepower and manoeuvre could

become blurred in close combat leading to a much

closer integration between the two. Indeed we are

likely to acknowledge the subordination of

manoeuvre to firepower and an effects-based

approach. Hence not only whither the close battle?

But also whither the directorates on infantry and

armour as separate entities?

In The Australian Army In Profile Captain Glenn

Jones wrote an excellent piece on the 12th/16th

Hunter River Rifles. His conclusion is a classic:

Chapter 16 241
‘The history of the regiment is proud and

honourable. Its continuing success is grounded

in its traditions, values and its ability to

incorporate change as needs have changed over

a century of continuous capability.’

He has identified the central theme. Status quo is not

an option and the current generation of staff college

graduates in the UK are not as wedded to the past

as some of their predecessors – particularly having

been educated at a joint staff college. Ownership of

assets is no longer an issue – the key is the ability to

cue those assets in order to produce effect as deep

as possible. The close battle will indeed, as Michael

Evans suggests, be an enduring feature of war but

not the defining feature of war. Our love affair with

close combat leads perhaps to backwards looking

evolution when what is required is a lust for the deep

battle and forward-looking revolution.

242 The Big Issue
243

CHAPTER 17

ASYMMETRIC

WARFARE

By John Russell

‘Get ready for the future, it is murder.’

Leonard Cohen

Asymmetry is topical and the term pervades

current military litarature, particularly in the

United States. While the existence of asymmetry is

widely acknowledged, it is usually regarded as a

constant, which can be met within the compass of

our existing capabilities and doctrine, and that

conventional force-on-force warfighting will continue

to predominate. The Army has had a long tradition of

operating against irregular enemies and the

asymmetric threat is generally regarded as merely a

21st Century expression of these types of opponents

and only an adjunct to the main business of

warfighting. So has anything changed? The

asymmetrists argue strongly that it has. Their

argument is not that asymmetry is something new,

but that in its present guise it represents a

discontinuity, a fundamental change in warfare.

Whereas the Gulf War is seen as the prototype for a

new form of warfare, the asymmetrists argue that it

was the final manifestation of manoeuvre warfare

and an anachronistic throwback to World War II in
Europe but with updated weapons and systems.

They assert that western nations are designing

armies for yesterday’s war, the war they would like to

fight rather than the war they are likely to fight, and

that these nations have profoundly misunderstood

the nature of the asymmetric threat.

The fundamental premise of asymmetric advocates1

is that warfare undergoes generational change due

to political, social and economic factors rather than

just the technological. Thus it was not the

development of massed, rifled artillery, barbed wire

and machine-guns that brought about the warfare of

the Western Front in the Great War but rather the

evolution of the entire political, economic and social

structure required to wage war of this type and scale.

Asymmetric proponents see such a change taking

place today and that the weapons and systems

based on the information revolution, although

affecting the future of war, are not in themselves the

future and that other stronger forces are at work.

The asymmetrists argue that society’s conditions are

now in place for a change to a new generation of

warfare, which they term the Fourth (1st – massed

manpower, 2nd – massed firepower, 3rd –

manoeuvre). The title some have given to this

generation is ‘Netwar’ in which antagonists will fight

in the political, economic, social and military arenas

and communicate their messages through a

combination of networks and mass media. This

generation is likely to be based more on ideas rather

than military technology; this is a crucial point.

Warfare will not be the relatively clear-cut, high

technology ‘stately dance’ of conventional war but

244 The Big Issue
rather extremely complex, mainly low-intensity

conflicts. In these conflicts it will be hard to

differentiate between war and peace, military

operations and crimes, front and rear, combatants

and non-combatants. Fighting will involve an

amalgam of military tactics from all four generations

and the concepts of ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ will

probably cease to exist.

Our current approach to warfare views the future as

much like the present but with steady advances in

technology enabling changes to our operational

concepts and continued dominance over any likely

warfighting opponents. However, this technological

approach, summarised by some as the Revolution

in Military Affairs, is likely to be ill-suited to many of

the opponent types we could meet in the 21st

Century. Furthermore, history2 suggests that

technological supremacy is at best ephemeral, that

faith in a technological ‘silver bullet’ is misplaced

and that there are other forces stronger than

technology at play.

Fundamentally warfare falls into two categories:

symmetric and asymmetric. However, these

categories are likely to be blurred and it is possible

that a war could start symmetrically but change to

asymmetric if one of the combatants considered

that it best served his interests. Additionally, there is

no reason why a number of the weapons and

techniques of asymmetric warfare could not be

used in symmetric warfare, further blurring

distinctions. The French identify a third category –

dissymmetric warfare – which is included below for

the sake of completeness.

Chapter 17 245
• Symmetric warfare involves combatants with

broadly similar aims, strengths, assets, doctrine

and moral codes. As pure symmetry will result

in a stalemate, protagonists seek to break the

symmetry by strengthening or developing

winning capabilities, changing the conduct of

operations or reducing the opponent’s

capabilities. This need to break symmetry

means that there is always, to a greater or

lesser extent, asymmetry within warfare.

However, ‘asymmetry within warfare’ is wholly

different from ‘asymmetric warfare’.

• In asymmetric warfare there is a total or

extremely strong difference between the

opponents’ aims, capabilities, courses of action

and moral codes. An asymmetric threat implies

that one side is incapable, either due to his own

inability or the strength of the force opposing

him, of confronting an opponent in a

conventional manner, using similar means or

weapons. Instead he will use weapons and

tactics in ways that are unplanned for or

unexpected to foil, off set, reduce or circumvent

technological superiority. Asymmetric attacks

generally exploit vulnerabilities and have a

strong psychological as well as physical impact.

They can also be designed to goad the

adversary into an inappropriate response, thus

undermining their legitimacy in the eyes of their

constituencies. Asymmetric warfare can

threaten the homebase far more directly and

with a greater variety of methods of attack than

symmetric warfare. Vulnerabilities generated by

asymmetry will need to be identified. By

246 The Big Issue
addressing these vulnerabilities symmetry will

be restored, albeit to a new form of warfare.

• The thinking behind the French concept of

dissymmetry is not entirely clear but it

appears to be based on a major imbalance

between the combatants either in the stakes

or the performance of assets but not in the

broad nature of the assets or the conduct of

fighting. There is a strong resemblance

between the opponents.3

Outlined below is a synopsis of the key types of

asymmetry compiled from the extensive research

already undertaken both here and in the United

States. This summary is by no means definitive, but

does encapsulate the key elements of the concept,

as it is currently understood. The types are not

mutually exclusive and it is likely that more than one

could apply to any given situation.

• Asymmetry of interest, whether real or

perceived, is considered by some to be the

most basic asymmetry of all. Essentially it

occurs when one antagonist, usually

economically and militarily weaker, sees its

survival or vital interest at stake, while an

opponent is only protecting or promoting less

than vital interests. In these circumstances the

weaker adversary is likely to seek ways of

deterring an opponent from involvement in a

given situation. This can be achieved by

convincing an opponent that the potential

costs are too great and/or the potential

benefits too small.

Chapter 17 247
• Asymmetry of will exists when one antagonist,

usually with a higher stake, is willing to accept

greater risks, bear greater costs or undertake

actions which a less committed opponent might

eschew, possibly on moral or legal grounds. In

order to exploit a perceived asymmetry of will,

an adversary may seek to accentuate his own

willingness to pay any price ‘for the cause’ while

at the same time seeking to undermine the

weaker will of his opponent. In the context of

the UK and our allies, some adversaries already

perceive a disparity of wills which they can

exploit, for example, aversion to casualties and

excessive collateral damage, and our sensitivity

to domestic and world opinion.

• Asymmetry of values occurs between

adversaries with widely differing values and

beliefs – both of society and individual. Such

opponents are also unlikely to share our

priorities, moral constraints and legal principles.

They may be unwilling to conform to

internationally regulated or understood

standards of behaviour, and may simply not

care about ‘public opinion’. Indeed, some nonstate groups are probably not constrained

whatsoever by any Western democratic moral

or ethical convictions. They may be willing to

absorb or inflict large numbers of casualties

and major damage to infrastructure, or exploit

capabilities that we are unwilling or unable to

match. Examples of such actions could include

ethnic cleansing, terrorism, human shields,

child soldiers and the threat of, or use of

WMD/WME. The aim would not be to defeat us

248 The Big Issue
militarily but to constrain our freedom of action

or even to deter us from becoming involved at

all. The danger of such an approach (for the

adversary) is that their action might transform a

situation into one of vital national interest for us

(or our allies) thereby removing certain selfimposed constraints and inviting a

disproportionate response.

• Asymmetry of strategies and tactics will

become increasingly common. The Gulf War,

the ongoing campaign against Saddam

Hussein, and the Bosnia and Kosovo air

campaigns have shown potential adversaries

that there is little to be gained from force on

force confrontations with NATO. It is therefore

likely that our opponents will seek to employ

dissimilar strategies and tactics that are

designed to avoid Alliance strengths (dominant

manoeuvre, precision engagement, information

superiority etc) and exploit weaknesses (eg

force protection concerns, legal constraints,

coalition faultlines). Asymmetric opponents may

also choose to disregard the concepts of victory

and defeat, both of which belong to the interstate model of warfare.4 They are also likely to

select ground which will give them marked

advantage and reinforce the effect of other

asymmetries. For instance fighting in urban

areas would involve to a greater or lesser

degree asymmetries of will, values,

technologies/capabilities, organisation and time.

• Asymmetry in technologies and capabilities is

not new in itself. Conflict has always been

Chapter 17 249
characterised by disparities in technology.

These disparities have often proved to be

decisive, although clever adversaries have

found ways to counter technical superiority.

Historical examples can also be found of

weaker adversaries seeking to gain advantage

from novel technologies as a counter to a more

powerful opponent’s conventional superiority.

The availability of leading edge technologies on

the world’s arms markets provides the

opportunity to overmatch a western army in one

or more key capabilities, for instance TI or gunlaunched ATGM. The asymmetric opponent is

not burdened with lengthy research and

procurement cycles and the necessity to equip

large, structured organisations. Indeed, buying

off the shelf is in itself an asymmetric approach

to developed nations’ long procurement cycles.

His training requirement is minimised as the use

of the technology does not have to encompass

the complexities of an equipment’s use in

warfighting. At the opposite end of the

technological scale, an asymmetric opponent

could decide to ignore technology and attempt

to overwhelm us through massed infantry, so

called human wave attacks. Against such

attacks, forces which have traded manpower for

expensive, and therefore limited, precision

weaponry designed to combat other high

technology forces will be vulnerable to being

overwhelmed.

• Organisational asymmetry has often provided

one antagonist with a significant advantage over

another. That said, for some 50 years we have

250 The Big Issue
been faced by adversaries who have essentially

been organised along similar lines to ourselves.

In the future, we are just as likely to face nonstate groups organised as networks or simply

not organised at all. These groups may not

have any organised command structure or

centralised means of co-ordinating activity.

Potential adversaries may also be made up of

loose federations of disparate groups with very

few common beliefs or shared objectives. By

design or default, such organisational

asymmetry could provide an adversary with

significant advantages.

• Asymmetry of time occurs because the West

has little appetite for long and protracted

engagements. All US operations, for example,

must have a clear ‘exit strategy’ with rapid effect

then early withdrawal, a goal shared by many.

An asymmetry of time may occur when one

antagonist enters a conflict willing to see it

continue for a prolonged period, while their

opponent is only able to sustain collective will

for a short engagement. In this case, perception

is reality, and an adversary may only need to

appear willing to engage in a protracted conflict

to deter Western intervention.

Asymmetric Actors

The range of actors who could employ asymmetric

techniques is very broad. However, categorisation

of these actors is not easy due to their variety and

by compartmentalising them can obscure their

complexities. For instance, the Taleban regime

Chapter 17 251
was an autocratic system of religious fanatics

governing by a system of internal terrorism while

fighting something approaching a conventional

war against the Northern Alliance, cutting across at

least three categories.

However, while many of the potential adversaries to

a greater or lesser degree pose a threat to the UK

they do not necessarily pose a direct threat to the

Army, either as a deployed force or in the home

base. It is the state employment of asymmetric

techniques against deployed forces that is a greater

direct concern to the military, rather than the other

disparate actors whose impact will largely be political

and pose a security rather than a Defence threat.

Western nations face a dilemma when wishing to

confront opponents prepared to operate outside the

accepted norms of warfare and the laws that govern

it. This is particularly relevant to the non-state actor

for whom the traditional constraints are immaterial

and for whom the primary targets will be the people

and civil infrastructure, as well as the military. For the

252 The Big Issue

Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front
democracies this is the nightmare scenario

described by Martin van Creveld, 

‘Either modern states cope with low intensity

conflict, or else they will disappear; the suspicion

grows however, that they are damned if they do

and damned if they don’t.’ 5

The Range of Asymmetric Threats

The variety, availability, lethality and effectiveness of

asymmetric threats represents not only the most

significant element of asymmetric warfare but also

the most significant change. Whereas non-state

actors in former times would have had the ability to

cause damage at the tactical and maybe operational

levels, they did not have the access to weapons and

systems that could generate disproportionate effect

at the strategic level by attacking targets in-theatre

and, most significantly, in the homebase. There are

two key points about asymmetric threats. First they

must be significantly different from those capabilities

or options available to our own forces; thus what

matters are ‘the differences that make a difference’.

Secondly, that regardless of type, the weapons held

or used by an asymmetric opponent are themselves

of lesser importance than the effect they create in

the mind of the attacked.

Fundamentally, the range of asymmetric threats fall

into three categories: weapons of mass destruction

or effect, information operations and other tactical

concepts. All three offer possibilities for causing

disproportionate effect and the potential to be used

at the tactical level but migrate their effects upwards

Chapter 17 253
to the strategic level. Many of the threat technologies

are no longer strictly military, such as information

systems and biotechnology. It is not the intention in

this section to describe the detailed characteristics

of each threat but rather to provide a general

description of their asymmetric aspects.

The most spectacular and potentially lethal effects

are those connected with weapons of mass

destruction or effect.

• Nuclear. For a state actor, possession is the

key factor as use of a nuclear device remains

incredible due to the risk of massive response.

However, if faced with an apocalyptic situation

it is possible that some state actors could

consider their use. Although some non-state

actors could build a crude nuclear weapon it

would probably be easier to steal or buy one.

Despite the considerable difficulty in infiltrating

and emplacing a nuclear device, if this could

be achieved it would be very difficult to

establish responsibility and even harder to

mount a response in kind. Devices based on

scattering radioactive materials rather than a

nuclear explosion are relatively easy to

produce and could be used to create a ‘dirty’

area. However, the use of nuclear devices

should remain the least likely form of

WMD/WME attack as there are easier and

potentially equally effective alternatives.

• Biological. Biological weapons based on the

use of pathogens or toxins are easier and less

expensive to produce than either nuclear or

254 The Big Issue
chemical weapons and it is more difficult to

trace an attack’s sponsorship. Biological agents

can cause casualties on a scale similar to that

of nuclear weapons or threaten the food supply.

Their relatively low cost of production is within

the capabilities of basic civil bio-technologists

and they must be considered attractive to some

potential adversaries. Biological agents offer the

greatest advantages at the strategic level where

they can be delivered6 covertly and far more

easily than nuclear devices, are more deniable

and can achieve strategic effect. The cost and

problems generated by the UK’s foot and mouth

disease outbreak will not have gone unnoticed.

• Chemical. Chemical weapons are generally

considered to be the least potent of the

WMD/WME triad as they do not have the

apocalyptic leverage of the other two. However,

they are the easiest to procure and there is less

stigma attached to their use. Indeed, the use of

chemical agents by the Iraqis and an impure

Sarin attack on the Tokyo underground by the

Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult have further

reduced any taboo against their use. Similar to

biological weapons, their use in-theatre by a

state actor would risk a massive response,

which again would not be in the asymmetric

actor’s interest. However, the threat of use may

damage an alliance and split away those

nations less well-prepared to deal with chemical

attack. If used as a last resort, chemical

weapons could achieve disproportionate effect if

used against allied units or civilian populations

as this would stress host nation and military

Chapter 17 255
medical facilities and therefore political unity.

However, the greatest threat is strategic;

chemical weapons could achieve very marked

effect if threatened against or used in cities.

Information Operations (IO)

IO are actions taken in support of objectives that

influence decision makers by affecting the

information and/or information systems of others

while protecting your own information and/or

information systems. The conduct of offensive IO

poses a clear asymmetric threat to the West, with its

increased reliance on information and information

systems as a vital component of decision making. In

many cases we rely entirely on technology to deliver

information to military decisionmakers. That

technology is often connected through commercial

networks and therefore via routes that are both

publicly accessible and outside military control.

Ironically, the more we digitise, the more vulnerable

we become.

The West is becoming increasingly vulnerable to

cyber-based IO. This is not only in the military sector

but also in the civilian and commercial sectors.

There is the threat that asymmetric opponents may

use IO strategically to cause mass disruption to civil

society. A cyber war could slow the decision making

process of the governments involved. The real threat

is not the amateur hacker but the highly skilled and

trained products of government agencies or

corporate intelligence branches that work on the

open market. Cyber warfare does not however only

concern damaging systems but also intelligence

256 The Big Issue
gathering, counter-intelligence and disinformation.

Connected with cyber warfare is the prospect of war

in space. The temptation to attack Western spacebased systems would be irresistible.

The Soviet Union embraced high altitude nuclear

induced EMP as an integral part of its strategic

warfighting concept. However, since the end of the

Cold War we have tended to ignore the threat to our

electronic systems and the huge expansion in the

number and range of equipments with integrated

circuits has left us technically and operationally

vulnerable. The threat posed by EMP and HPM

weapons is an adjunct to IO and arises from their

ability to strike at the heart of the information,

decision making process and the command and

control structures that support it.

IO are not however purely technical and the use of

non-technical IO against a much more capable and

technologically advanced force was demonstrated

more than adequately during the Kosovo campaign

where, despite NATO’s supposed information

superiority, Belgrade would seem to have ‘won’ the

deception, psychological and perception war.7

Other Tactical Concepts

Fighting in urban areas offers them opportunity to

generate maximum political impact; absorb our

strength; cause mass casualties; degrade our

manoeuvre and Find capabilities; minimise our

ability to strike at distance by use of ‘hugging’ tactics;

and provide civilian inhabitants for use as a weapon.

The cover provided by urban areas allows the

Chapter 17 257
enemy to merge with the civilian population and

avoid the limitations of a defined front line. Close

attacks can be mounted at times and places of his

choosing and provide opportunities for the

employment of novel tactics, such as suicide truck

bombers. The problems we will experience will

create a wide variety of IO opportunities, which can

be mounted against us. Urban areas, particularly

cities, provide the maximum opportunity for the

exploitation of our unwillingness to engage in

attritional battles, our sensitivities toward civilians

and our aversion to collateral damage. Any stated

unwillingness and lack of capability on our part to

fighting in urban areas is likely to increase the

likelihood of asymmetric enemies forcing us to

confront them here.

Terrorism will appeal to many groups and weak

states as an attractive option to blunt the influence of

the West. It is not a new phenomenon and has

generally been relatively ineffective as a means to

achieve significant political change. Historically it

has had its roots in ethno-cultural or ethno-religious

differences between a group and a state. So what

has changed? First, while such roots still exist, the

techniques of terrorism are finding wider expression

in single-issue fanatical groups such as animal

liberationists and the nihilistic members of alQa’eda. Secondly, terrorist access to and

employment of the range of asymmetric threats

described in this section could drastically alter their

relative ineffectiveness.

Terrorism seeks to collapse the enemy from within.

In its ‘purest’ form it will attempt to bypass the

258 The Big Issue
enemy’s military strength and strike directly at his

homeland at civilian targets. Terrorism will use a

democratic society’s freedoms, openness and legal

system as weapons to be used against it. Terrorism

is, by its very nature, asymmetric as it aims to

achieve military-like results against an opponent

relatively cheaply and with little ‘friendly’ bloodshed.

The terrorist ‘battlefield’ is highly dispersed and

includes the whole of the enemy’s society.

Successful application of terror closely mirrors most

of the characteristics of manoeuvre warfare.8

Future terrorists will be less hierarchically organised

but better networked than they are today. They are

less dependent on state sponsorship and are,

instead, forming loose, trans-national affiliations

based on religious or ideological affinity and a

common hatred of the West, particularly the US.

Their diffuse nature will make them more

anonymous yet their ability to co-ordinate mass

effects will increase.

Technological Surprise

Potential asymmetric opponents are able to acquire

on the open market a wide range of leading edge

weapons and systems.9 The purpose of such

acquisitions will be to achieve a decisive and

unexpected technological advantage over an enemy

at the tactical, operational and/or strategic level;

otherwise known as technological surprise.

Technological surprise may achieve weapon system

superiority or unexpected parity, enable a change in

tactics, doctrine and capability. It can prevent defeat,

prolong conflict and cause heavy casualties. It has

Chapter 17 259
been made more likely by rapid advances in

technology, which is more affordable, and the heavy

competition in the arms market where arms are

provided for cash and there are few if any ethical

constraints. System modernisation can be

revolutionary rather than evolutionary as

generations can be skipped and there is little or no

requirement to run on legacy systems. Weapons can

be hybridised or modernised by component; for

instance T–55 can be vastly improved by the

addition of a larger calibre gun, defensive aids suites

and improved night fighting and fire control systems.

State asymmetric players are known to exchange

information regarding Western weapon systems and

doctrine. Technological surprise has particular

relevance to rapid reaction forces, which are

vulnerable to overmatch in terms of both equipment

and mass. Weapons can be acquired specifically to

defeat such forces, such as sophisticated sea mines

to deny SPODs and vehicle signature abatement

kits to defeat precision attack weapons. Helpfully the

Iranians have distilled the various measures needed

to defeat a coalition force, particularly one including

the US, as shown below:

260 The Big Issue

Make the Americans go home by:

• Defeating early entry force

• Causing casualties

• Stripping away key elements

• Destroying ‘icon’ systems/units

• Trading space for time

• Fragmenting alliances
Icon systems provide tempting targets due to the

psychological impact of their damage or destruction;

hence the Serbian determination to shoot down a

F117A and the suicide craft attack on the USS Cole

in Aden harbour.10 Icon systems can be relative to

the theatre in which they are used. Thus a Chinook

might be an icon system in Sierra Leone but not

elsewhere. UK icon systems could be attack

helicopters and, in the future, ASTOR; their

destruction would have a powerful psychological

effect on both sides and it should be presumed that

such targets would be afforded a high priority.

Sabotage, subversion and espionage are all fellow

travellers with asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric

opponents are able, should they so wish, to operate

outside the norms of Western cultural acceptance.

These norms are well-known and come under the

umbrella of respect for human rights; examples are:

avoidance of civilian casualties, non-use of children

as combatants, fair treatment of prisoners as

governed by the Geneva Convention, non-use of

anti-personnel mines and operating within a legal

framework. The asymmetrist can therefore employ

‘weapons’ which directly counter these norms and

have significant psychological effect.

Cynical Exploitation of Civilians

Refugees can be used deliberately. The Serbians11

used terror and atrocities to trigger the flow of as

many Kosovar Albanians as possible into Albania

and Macedonia. This was no random ethnic

cleansing but a systematic policy intended to swamp

NATO logistics, complicate and distract Allied

Chapter 17 261
decision making, weaken alliance resolve and gain

time to consolidate control of Kosovo. The effect was

intensified by the ‘denationalisation’ of the refugees

by the destruction of all forms of identity and proof of

property ownership and their brutal impoverishment

in order to make their survival entirely dependent on

outside aid.

Deliberate close co-location of civilians to military or

infrastructure targets, otherwise known as ‘hugging’

or human shield tactics, will present a major

targeting dilemma. Examples at the tactical level are

Serbian civilians ‘occupying’ Belgrade’s bridges over

the Danube and the reported use of children to

surround a Somali gunman in Mogadishu while he

lay on the ground in a fire position aiming through a

woman’s legs.

The deliberate causing of civilian casualties is

likely to have greater political impact than

military. Casualties among the latter are to some

degree accepted due to the hazards of the

profession; the same is not true for civilians.

Mass civilian casualties, particularly in the

homebase, will have an extremely sobering effect

on political decision making.

Warlords and Warriors

Asymmetric warfare will be dominated by warlords

and ‘warriors’ rather than soldiers. They are being

met increasingly: Arkan and his Tigers, Foday Kallay

and the West Side Boys, General Aideed and the

Somali Technicals, Chechen mafia/fighters, the

South China Sea pirates. The warrior lifestyle is

262 The Big Issue
characterised by shifting allegiances, habituation to

violence and no stake in civil order. Unlike soldiers,

they follow no rules other than their own and tend

not to obey orders they do not like. For the Western

soldier, trained to operate within tight codes of

behaviour, both military and personal, the warrior

provides a challenging enemy. Warriors will only

stand and fight conventional forces when they know

or believe that they have overwhelming advantage;

instead they will snipe, ambush, bomb and create IO

incidents. The increasing numbers of female soldiers

in Western armies will provide rich pickings for such

incidents. Rape, pillage, terror and ethnic cleansing

are all also within the warrior job specification. It

would, however, be very dangerous to dismiss

warriors as militarily incompetent. The Somalia

National Alliance’s (SNA) study of US tactics allowed

them, when the opportunity presented itself in

October 1993, to spring an effective tactical

counterstroke against US Special Forces (resulting

in 18 US killed and 73 wounded), and few in our

Army would dismiss the skills, however repellent, of

the South Armagh PIRA.

Chapter 17 263

A ‘warrior’
In summary, it is dangerous and simplistic to overemphasise Western technological dominance and

its current hegemony in conventional ‘force-on-force’

symmetric conflict as a basis for success in future

warfare. It is also clear from the analysis that

asymmetric warfare itself has many shades and

variations of shades. Asymmetry and conventional

force-on-force symmetric conflict are not black and

white alternatives and we need a great deal of new

thinking to close with the many complex implications

of asymmetry in all its guises. However, we should

take comfort from our long historical legacy of

fighting colonial and post-colonial operations against

irregular foes. The core of our capability to do so

successfully has been effective intelligence, an

ability to operate amongst people and the fighting

spirit of all our Services – exemplified, in this context,

by our Light and Special Forces. This must now be

developed and melded with state of the art C4ISTAR

and weaponry to deliver commanders a decisive

advantage in this, most ghastly, form of warfare.

264 The Big Issue

Omagh
NOTES

1 The majority of this section is ascribed to Lt Col Hammes,

‘The Evolution of Warfare: The Fourth Generation’, USMC

Gazette Sep 94.

2 At the close of World War II the US military had the atomic

bomb, millions of battle-hardened soldiers, unprecedented

mobility, systematic training, global logistics, excellent

battlefield communications and a host of other capabilities

from sophisticated artillery co-ordination to medical

evacuation helicopters. Yet, slightly less than five years

later in Korea, that same military was fought to a standstill

by a fourth rate army backed by a third rate.

3 Future Engagements by Ground Forces. CEMAT

4 Such disregard is neatly illustrated by a conversation

between a US officer (Col Summers) and a North

Vietnamese officer (Col Tu) in April 75. “You know you

never defeated us in the field”, said Summers. “That may

be true”, replied Tu, “but it is also irrelevant”.

5 Martin van Crefeld, On Future War. Quote extracted from

Introduction to SCSI Occasional Paper No 36, Sep 98.

6 It was once thought that biological weapons would not be

used due to the difficulties associated with the culture of

toxins and the methods of dispersal. It now appears (New

Scientist 1 Sep 01) that the Aum Shinrikyo cult

successfully cultured and then released a non-virulent

strain of anthrax in Tokyo (in addition to the Sarin attack).

7 Timothy L Thomas, ‘Kosovo and the Current Myth of

Information Superiority’, Parameters, Spring 00.

8 Application of strength against weakness; defeat and

disrupt rather than hold ground; precise application of

force at critical points and times against points of

weakness; and defeat the enemy by destroying his will

and desire to continue by seizing the initiative and

applying constant and unacceptable pressure at the times

and places that the enemy least expects.

9 At the Battle of Little Big Horn, many Indians were

equipped with Winchester repeating rifles bought from

traders; Custer’s troopers fought and died using singleshot breech-loaders.

10 Icon systems need not be military; the World Trade Centre

was very much an icon ‘system’.

11 An alternate view is that the KLA coerced their own people

to leave their homes in order to magnify the ethnic

cleansing and add to Milosevic’s demonisation. Either

way, civilians were used as asymmetric ‘weapons’.

Chapter 17 265
267

CHAPTER 18

ONCE UPON A TIME IN

THE FUTURE

By Jake Thackray

How it All Began

WWN WORLD-WIDE NEWS

“Good Evening. You’re watching Headline News at

six. Another continent: another crisis. It seems now

that the food shortages and civil unrest in the

Generic African State threaten to undo all that that

young nation has achieved in the 40 years since its

independence from Britain.

“In scenes reminiscent of the worst tragedies to

have befallen Africa over the past 15 years, the

collapse of what was once the only prosperous

country in the region seems to be a matter of weeks,

if not just days away. The footage from the

numerous refugee camps strung along the border is

particularly harrowing. Despite the presence of aid

agencies and volunteer organisations from Britain

and around the world, the death toll is reported to be

several hundreds every day, and rising.

“The picture is no less devastating in the teeming

streets of the GAS’s capital, New Pewsey. There,

gangs of youths, armed with a hodgepodge of
268 The Big Issue

weaponry, openly flaunt their rejection of the rule of

law. Across large swathes of this troubled city, police

and GAS Defence Force units appear powerless to

restore order. The worsening situation has resulted

in the recall of many diplomats, expatriate workers

and their families from the GAS. Nonetheless, it is

estimated that many thousands remain, trying to

tough it out in this ravaged landscape. Here in

London, the foreign Office is instructing all UK and

EU nationals not to visit the GAS for any reason,

unless and until the situation improves.

“Meanwhile, on its borders, the activities of the SubSaharan alliance, and in particular those of the

alliance’s largest and most powerful country,

Goldland, continue to threaten to destabilise the

entire region. It’s large and capable armed forces

have conducted a number of large-scale exercises

close to the border, and there have been a number

of small-scale border incidents with the border

patrols of the GAS. There is much speculation that it

is the SSA, and in particular Goldland, who are

behind the general lawlessness in the GAS,

speculation categorically denied by Goldland’s

leader yesterday.

“We’ll have more on this story later in this bulletin.

Other news, now. Heathrow’s Terminal 5

construction site was disrupted again today by

environmental and anti-capitalist protesters angry

about what they see as...”
Another continent: another crisis. It was not that

the international community ignored the

worsening situation in Africa until it was too late – it’s

just that it had to take its place in a seemingly everlengthening queue. Public outrage and sympathy

had simply run out.

Looking back, nothing that happened in the world

since 2002 should have come as a surprise. What’s

more, things could have been much, much worse.

There had been no discontinuities: none of the

world’s players had imploded (well, none of the ones

that matter, anyhow). Amazingly, there’d been no

use of nuclear weapons, anywhere. People said that

there’s been no organised use of bioweapons,

either, but then, who could tell? Somehow, however,

most of us had kept getting just a little bit richer (or

at least entertained the hope that our children would

be). Somehow, most of the world’s surface remained

able to sustain life. Somehow, hope endured.

And it was fortunate that hope enjoyed such an

enduring quality, because on occasions in that first

fifteen years of the 21st Century, it appeared that it

might be all but extinguished. The chasm between

rich and poor nations continued to widen, and the

suffering endured by those on the wrong side

seemed to beggar adequate description. Lack of

food – despite a world-wide surplus – lack of water

and lack of medical care bedevilled the marginalised

regions, and nowhere more than in sub-Saharan

Africa. That troubled continent also experienced the

worst ravages of disease – the AIDS pandemic chief

amongst them.

Chapter 18 269
Environmental disaster was a frequent visitor:

drought followed flood followed famine with all the

seeming regularity of seasonal change. But it could

so easily have been the Middle East, Indian subcontinent; Indonesia; or that arc of instability

between Russia and its Southern States.

The world wasn’t interested in Africa. The action was

in the Pacific. In late 2014, the enmity with which the

US and China faced each other across the Pacific

threatened – again – to explode into something

worse. Again Korea, the DMZ and the 38th parallel

provided the foci for tension. The rapid US

deployment to South East Asia was all that the late

1990s architects of transformation could have

wished for. The trouble was, the Chinese got there

quickly too, and showed no signs either of leaving or

invading. Both sides settled down to the stand off:

neither willing either to precipitate action nor to lose

face. The world’s two most capable military forces

were therefore distracted and fixed.

For us here in Europe, and exactly 100 years after

the Archduke’s visit to Sarajevo, the Balkans

problem still continued to confound everyone. The

sons and daughters of those first UN troops who

made their way into Bosnia in 1992 now stood guard

at key points throughout the Balkans. They wore

national uniform, but they operated under the control

of the EU Military Council and its land, air and

maritime directorates. Every year the European

media agonised over the cost in lives and treasure,

but in the end, the troops stayed. Meanwhile,

Russia’s post-Communist torpor and seemingly

270 The Big Issue
never-ending border skirmishes with the nations of

the Trans-Caucasus continued.

And the UK? Still awkwardly balancing the

requirements of the by-now well-developed

European pillar of NATO and the Atlantic Bridge. We

still had the ability to project at least some power

around the world: HMS Trafalgar, delivered in 2013

complete with its 50 Joint Strike fighters, was due to

be joined by a sister launching from Belfast in 2016.

Our Army could deploy a division to accompany its

Air Assault formation, and the RAF’s Typhoons were

still as good as anything Seattle might build. What’s

more, the MOD had won its intense political battle to

keep up the huge training effort involved in

maintaining a military force made up from both

Regular and Reserve elements, intrinsically bound

together, which was able to fight wars, and not just

police troublespots.

* * *

In Africa, the irony for the GAS was that it had found

itself a victim of its own success; in a continent of

despair, it remained the one, bright, shining hope. As

Africa fractured, its relatively stable government, its

modest trading success and well-ordered society

made it stand out from its neighbours. There, in what

was termed the Sub-Saharan Alliance (SSA),

various despotic regimes controlled societies either

by the gun, or bribery. Goldland, the dominant

partner in the Alliance, maintained a large, and very

powerful army, funded from the profits of the drug

lords and other criminal based activities. Able to put

together three divisions of armoured and

Chapter 18 271
mechanised forces, they had invested in a number

of advanced technologies; technologies which the

more unscrupulous of the world’s arms

manufacturers had queued up to sell them. They

maintained one of their divisions close to the border,

where it presented a visible and obvious reminder to

the GAS of Goldland’s capabilities. The others were

always kept near the capital – better to keep order

amongst the population. An iron grip was maintained

on the people of Goldland, and inevitably, rapid

migration into the GAS followed, welcomed at first,

but increasingly resented as the welfare system

buckled. It was a tough journey, but it could be

made, and thousands of them risked the journey

every day and every night. Once inside the GAS,

they disappeared into the shanty towns and villages.

As the world’s population steadied, and as part of

Africa’s actually reduced, that of GAS exploded.

The GAS government could, possibly, have

maintained control. Left alone, and with some

financial help from outside, they might have turned

the situation around. They weren’t to be left alone.

They had something that their neighbours wanted, a

resource more valuable than all the drug money and

mineral wealth in the continent. Their neighbours

wanted water.

Water was scarce throughout sub-Saharan Africa

and food production remained the single greatest

user of water. GAS’s traditional, small-scale

irrigation schemes, developed with World Bank

assistance to better harness local resources, were

enough – just – to meet their needs. Not so across

the GAS’s borders. There, a lack of irrigation water

272 The Big Issue
due to poor investment was beginning to make even

the most pliant farmers turn rebellious. An alternative

existed: the mountain range in the east of the GAS

contained – if it could be harnessed – a water

resource vast enough to meet all projected needs.

Moreover, the GAS’s neighbours need not invade –

not yet, at least. The border was still easily infiltrated,

and the migrant population easily coerced into

disobedience, sabotage or tribal atrocities.

Eventually, the GAS would simply disappear under

the weight of its burgeoning, uncontrolled

population. The rump of the country could either

become a client or could be annexed militarily at

leisure. As far as the UN was concerned, GAS was

suffering from a crisis of its own making.

In February 2015, after months of attempting to hold

the GAS together, its president formally requested

military assistance from the UN, ‘to restore and

ensure order throughout the nation’. The Security

Council, however, although willing and able to draw

up a Resolution supporting GAS’s request, still did

not enjoy the services of a dedicated military force.

Continental Europe and the US couldn’t help; Russia

was too busy policing its noisy southern neighbours.

The GAS was not a small country, and whoever did

deploy there would need to deploy in strength, and

might be there for a while. No-one was volunteering,

and it looked as if no-one would.

The thump which reverberated across the GAS

capital, New Pewsey, in the early hours of 4th March

was gruesomely familiar. The growing danger

evident in dispersed embassies had forced the UK

Chapter 18 273
and other Commonwealth nations into a rough-andready combined diplomatic presence in the country.

That presence was now a scene of carnage. Within

24 hours, it became clear that over 400

Commonwealth diplomats, financial and military

advisors and their families, including some 80

children, had perished. Designed to warn nations off,

the bomb, just as others in the past, had the reverse

effect. The UK spun up the readiness of its Joint

Reaction Force, specialists in what military

organisations called ‘rapid effect’. Other European

countries offered their support. Echoing events

unknown for more than fifty years, the

Commonwealth nations did the same. The multinational forces that formed the Coalition were thus

borne out of the long-established relationships of the

past; NATO, less the US in this case, Europe and the

Commonwealth. Larger, heavier formations in each

of these nations began their preparations, too.

Selective Reserve activation took place at military

bases throughout Britain. The first reconnaissance

274 The Big Issue

Amphibious Ready Group
and advanced command elements supported by an

Amphibious Ready Group poised offshore and an air

component above, landed on New Pewsey airport’s

only useable runway on 12th March. The fact that

this happened to be Commonwealth Day was an

irony lost on no-one involved.

Some Corner of a Foreign Field 

Chapter 18 275

WWN WORLD-WIDE NEWS

“Good Evening, and welcome to this special edition

of Headline News Insight Report. Well, here we go

again, and, as the Prime Minister told the House of

Commons yesterday, did we really have a choice?

The massacre of so many UK, EU and

Commonwealth citizens in the early hours of last

Thursday morning has left most of us shocked and

dazed. The Prime Minister said that it was an act

that could not be ignored, and that future such

attacks could not be discounted. And so, once

again, and in concert with our allies both close to

home and from thousands of miles away, young

British men and women have set off to some corner

of a foreign Amphibious Ready Group field. What

will they find there? How will they operate? What

can we expect them to do, and, most importantly

perhaps, when can we expect them to return? This

rapid deployment has raised these and many other

questions. To answer them, I’m joined in the studio

tonight by someone who was, until his retirement

last year, one of the British Army’s most senior

operational commanders. Now, you were involved in

many operations of this kind during your service,
276 The Big Issue

right back from, as many of us will recall, some of

the first deployments to Bosnia and Kosovo in the

last century. Do you see much that’s familiar here?”

“Well, yes I do, and, of course, that’s no surprise. All

military operations come down in the end, one way

or another, to servicemen and women going to do a

dirty job in nasty conditions that no-one else will do.

This is no different. The point here is: can they do

the job?”

“Well, yes, that’s the 64,000 dollar question. Do you

think we have the right people to do it?”

“We’ve certainly got the right people. The best

people, frankly, in the world, bar none. But the

question we should all be asking is – have we got

enough of the right people? What we’re looking at

here, or so it appears to me from this nice, warm

studio, is a classic peacekeeping operation in a

near-enough collapsed state. Now, these sort of

operations are very, very complex. They take a lot of

people to get right. There’s no obvious enemy, nor

are there any obvious friends amongst all these

armed militias that we can see on the streets of

Newtown and elsewhere. We need to be

everywhere, all the time, and that soaks up troops.

At the same time, someone’s got to get to grips with

the food situation over there, to make sure the relief

organisations can actually do their jobs. Again, not

easy. And it’s a big country, don’t forget, for which

we have very little current intelligence. Mark my

words, we’ve got our work cut out.”

“And what if we can’t get the job done? What then?”
Chapter 18 277

“Then nothing. At least, not in the current climate. As

far as the UK’s concerned, there’s nothing else in

the cupboard. This works – or we say goodbye to

the GAS.”

“Some viewers will be asking themselves why we’re

sending such an advanced and capable force to

deal with what, as you’ve said, is in fact a large

peacekeeping operation. Why all the tanks? Why

the attack helicopters? Why the Joint Strike

Fighters?”

“You need to bear in mind two things. First off – don’t

forget just how much force protection these big,

advanced systems, equipments and weapons offer

you. They scare the hell out of anyone who might

fancy having a go – and that’s a good situation for

any soldier to be in. Second, since before the turn of

this century, British forces have never, ever

deployed to any situation without being prepared for

it to get worse. If it looks like peacekeeping, it might

end up as warfighting, is the theory. All the big kit?

Well, think of that as an insurance policy.”

“Well, let’s hope it’s a policy we don’t have to claim

on. Thank you very much indeed. This has been a

Headline News Special Insight report. Goodnight.”

The retired General certainly earned his appearance

fee when he pointed out that these sort of operations

are complex. The British Land Component

Commander faced an organisational nightmare: His

three divisions – one British, one European and one

Commonwealth were all structured differently, had

widely differing logistic needs, offered a variety of
278 The Big Issue

capabilities and a huge range of equipment types

and systems. Under normal circumstances, he

would have liked at least three months with them to

try and get them working well together – but time

was one resource he didn’t have. Besides, whatever

preparations he’d like to make were inconsequential

– there was an overriding political imperative, driven

by public opinion back home in all the capitals

involved – to get on and do something. Stabilise the

situation, hand out the food, restore law and order

and come home – after all, that’s what armies were

paid to do, wasn’t it? His staff looked at the force

establishment figures, and the size of the problem,

and shook their heads. He couldn’t prepare for

warfighting and maintain peace and order in the

GAS at the same time. It had to be one or the other,

and the decision was made for him. Reluctantly, he

ordered his divisions to disperse to different

geographical areas of the country, with orders to

stabilise the situation and provide assistance to aid

agencies within their boundaries. A powerful reserve

force – that prerequisite for successful military

operations throughout history was a luxury he could

not afford, and yet he had to afford it. With

reluctance, he allocated the reserve task to the UK’s

Air Assault Brigade. It was the most potent offensive

weapon he had – able to strike over 300 Km across

the GAS’s borders if needed, and here he was – as

he privately confided to his Chief of Staff – ‘using it

like some sort of glorified airborne fire brigade’.

At least, thought the General, as he left his twicedaily press conference, he could depend on a

command and control system which would allow him

to communicate to his forces quickly and securely.
Between them, the UK’s FALCON and

CORMORANT CIS systems provided a high

capacity, robust network from his own HQs down to

all his component divisions, and up to the Combined

Joint Task force HQ in New Pewsey, as well as to the

air and maritime components and their forces. More

important, perhaps, was that some Herculean, if

largely unnoticed, efforts had allowed the protocols

which governed data exchange between the

contingents and components, to be unified

throughout the coalition. Were it necessary, he or his

staff – or any other staffs, for that matter, could seek

out crucial information, wherever it existed,

anywhere across the force. Nor was the General

under any illusion that critical information and

capabilities could be provided from elsewhere in the

coalition, either. He, and the generations of younger

officers who served under him, had been brought up

breathing the doctrine of inter-component liaison

and integration. In his own case, his first

appointment as a lieutenant colonel back in 1999

had been as Directing Staff at the then new Joint

Chapter 18 279
Services Command and Staff College. He’d

completed two ‘Joint command earning’ tours since

then, as well as passing all three modules of the

Joint Training and Operations Centre’s Senior

Command Course. He didn’t just ‘talk Joint’ – he

literally had no experience of any other way of

conducting operations. Whereas his two key

advisors would in the past have been his combat

engineer and firepower officers, they now wore dark

and light blue uniforms respectively, and the General

was well aware that a similar relationship was

enjoyed with his trusted representatives at the Air

and Maritime Component HQs, too. Although he

regarded it as something of a poisoned chalice, he

and his staff also had the capability to communicate

out of theatre, to each of the national capitals, to the

GAS’s government agencies, and to the other

departments and organisations without whom

integrated operations, of which military activity was

but one part, was impossible. The difficulty was,

each of these players had their own national,

international and corporate agendas, and trying to

maintain a cohesion between them was an

enormous task. Each of them had their own internal

and external audience, and each of them required

information to keep them unified behind their aims.

Information was everywhere, immediately, and in

quantities unimagined by previous generations of

military chiefs.

And information was crucial, to the way they all

operated. They depended on it like no other military

force in history. They had all, to a greater or lesser

degree, traded mass for tempo over the previous

fifteen years. The theory was that their digitised

280 The Big Issue
systems – BOWMAN had, despite everything, been

worth the wait – and the situational awareness that

came with it, made each of them so much more

capable, allowing their commanders and crews to

make decisions, and to translate such decisions into

effective action, much more rapidly than hitherto.

Information, moreover, was provided by a plethora of

sources; a range of intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance systems that appeared, on the face

of it, to be staggeringly capable. ASTOR was the

jewel in the crown, of course, providing him – and his

fellow component commanders – with (supposedly)

24 hour coverage. Synthetic Aperture Radar,

however, was merely one facet of what, by 2015,

had developed into true ISTAR system of systems.

Whether it was his capability to see out beyond 200

Km, using Watchkeeper and other UAVs, or groundbased manned reconnaissance, or indeed assets

held by other components, such as the RAPTOR

stand-off tactical air reconnaissance package, and

space-based surveillance systems, he could depend

on an electronic picture of his area of operations like

no other commander before him. Of course, this

plethora of information, sources and product had

brought problems with it, too. Staffs at all levels

continuously demanded highly detailed information –

so better to brief their superiors – and were then

overwhelmed when their browsers delivered it. The

continuing development of broadband data systems

enabled this huge amount of information to be

pushed around, but it was only with the introduction

of the first battlefield intelligent agents in 2010 that

the processing issue started to resolve itself.

Software, capable – for the first time – of accurately

Chapter 18 281
sifting, sorting and presenting intelligence and other

information, had really made a difference. Fewer

decisions meant fewer staffs, and for the first time

since the 1990s, HQs started to actually get smaller

instead of larger. So successful had their

introduction been that staff at every level had come

to accept the wisdom of their simple, trafficlight

go/no-go indicators as much as they accepted the

‘truth’ of the icons which marched across their threedimensional topographic displays.

The General wasn’t so convinced: he’d once been

naïve enough to believe the absolute truth of an

intelligence briefing – as a 20 year old second

lieutenant waiting to attack the Argentinean positions

at Goose Green 33 years before. He’d stayed alive

that day, and on operations ever since, due to his

discovery of an instinct for knowing what his enemy

was thinking, not what the intelligence picture said

he was doing. He wondered, for a moment, if his

instincts would hold good this last time – he had a

feeling he would need them.

Keeping the Motor Running

282 The Big Issue

WWN WORLD-WIDE NEWS

“Good Evening, and welcome to this special feature

from Headline News Report, continuing our look at

some of the amazing technology that the British and

coalition forces have at their disposal in the GAS.

Now, we’re all familiar with that little red light that

starts blinking on the dashboard when we’ve left the

oil change for too long. If we want the car to keep

running, it means a quick detour to the nearest
Chapter 18 283

garage. But imagine if, while you were having your

breakfast before you set off on your journey, new oil

was delivered to you, because your car had told the

nearest garage it needed some? Or a replacement

oil filter? or a light bulb? Well, it’s just that sort of

smart technology which our major vehicles and

weapon systems use now, and it’s changing the

whole way the British Army and its allies do

business.

“A major refit programme, which only ended last

year, re-equipped our Challenger 2 tanks with a host

of add-on features that their original designers back

in the 1980s could never have envisaged. It’s an

optional extras package you’re not likely to see

down at your local showroom, that’s for sure. Antimissile detectors and deflectors were only the first

elements; add that to a battlefield interrogation

device which automatically tells friend from foe, and

James Bond’s Q would be turning green with envy.

“But it’s what you can’t see that’s really impressive.

For the first time, these tanks have the automatic

capability to inform each other of ammunition usage,

fuel supply – even how much wear is left in their

clutch assemblies. For those that understand these

things – it has massively ramped up their ‘ Mean

Time Between Failure’ Figures. For those that don’t

– it means they just don’t break down. And that

changes everything. Remember, the automotive

power needed to shift one of these things is

equivalent to that needed for an express train. The

engine, on the other hand, has to fit in a space not

much bigger than a mini. Tanks always used to

break down – it was a part of military planning. Now,
284 The Big Issue

by and large, they don’t, and that means military

planners have got the equivalent of a whole new

weapon system to use – a tank they can depend on.

And these improvements aren’t limited just to the

tanks, either: right across the vehicle fleet, digital

linkages that go right down to assembly level – even

how many pallets are loaded on an individual truck,

mean that, instead of waiting for vital supplies for

hours or days, they can usually be called up in

minutes.

These days, they say the British Army regards

tempo as the most important weapon in its armoury.

If that’s so, it’s due in no small part to this sort of

amazing technology. Technology which allows the

routine to happen like lightning.”

The debate about the relative merits, necessity and

importance of close and deep operations had raged

without ceasing, ever since the 1991 Gulf War had

demonstrated the awesome impact of deep strike

systems. Whilst this debate continued, however, no

one with an ounce of military knowledge doubted for

a moment that the critical element in the framework

was that of Rear Operations. It didn’t matter how you

sought to bring the enemy to his knees: unless you

had the freedom to prepare, to move, to reinforce

and re-supply throughout your own area – and along

your lines of communication – then you would be

defeated. They used to say that poor Generals

discussed tactics and good ones logistics: by 2015

there weren’t any Generals who couldn’t discuss

logistics, and nor were their logisticians who failed to
Chapter 18 285

recognise that ‘rear’ operations meant a great deal

more than combat service support.

Rear operations enabled virtually every type of

military activity, and never more so than in the type

of deployment that was being conducted by the

coalition. In this situation, the normal roles ascribed

to armed forces appeared to be standing on their

heads. The ‘close operations’ were those activities

carried out by troops in and around the sprawling

refugee camps. Food distribution and medical

assistance were the front line activities. ‘Deep

Operations’ were those being carried out to

reconnect the infrastructure – the water, transport

and electricity networks. And rear operations?

Ironically, in this case, they were being conducted by

the very troops who would normally be expected to

be in the thick of the action. The fighting troops – the

infanteers and cavalrymen – their job was to make

sure the supply routes stayed open, and the towns

and cities policeable. Rear operations in the Land

Component, a task which had somewhat

dismissively left in the past to ill-equipped reserve

formations, were now the central business for an

integrated force package of identically equipped and

trained regular and reserve task forces. Military

thinkers back in the 1990s had seen this

phenomenon coming, and had argued with some

success, for the tools to do the job well. It was as

simple to achieve as ensuring that surveillance

systems could look backwards as well as forwards.

What was the point, it was argued, of being able to

see over 100 km into enemy territory, if you had a

blank screen 10 km to your rear. At least one of the
ASTOR platforms was kept on permanent ‘lookback’ mode.

There was, furthermore, no question that rear

operations had to be conducted on a Joint basis.

There was little point in maintaining an increased

intelligence overwatch on key vulnerabilities and

critical force elements if threats against them could

not be countered rapidly and effectively. And this

could only be guaranteed by the integration of all

components across the area. The rear operations

commanders presided over a highly complex and

rapidly-changing battlespace – made all the more

difficult to manage due to size, and multinationality

of the deployed force. The GAS’s civil infrastructure,

the aid agencies and international organisations and

each of the coalition contributors all needed real

estate, access to life support and facilities. Unless

co-ordination took place, freedom of manoeuvre

could not be maintained. The protection issues

surrounding these disparate and often vulnerable

elements were considerable, and, though there had

been no attack on coalition forces, it was feared by

many to be inevitable. The targets were just too

inviting to ignore.

Enormous strides had been made in the fields of

logistics and combat service support over the

previous decade. In its way, it was at least equal to

the developments that had taken place in

surveillance and strike systems. As ever, though -

and it showed that some things never really changed

– no one really found digitised asset-tracking and

automated warehouse management anything like as

sexy as new missiles and guns.

286 The Big Issue
It was called ‘directed logistics’ and its aim was to

overcome the age-old paradox of manoeuvrism. If

you wanted to manoeuvre rapidly around the

battlefield, you couldn’t do so whilst dragging a

lumbering logistic tail behind you. On the other hand,

if you divested yourself of this tail, then you’d

manoeuvre rapidly all right – but only until you either

ran out of fuel, or spares, or both.

Directed logistics, enabled by the digitised systems

valued so much by the surveillance and command

communities, broke this paradox – well, that was

the theory, anyhow. Because such an accurate

record could be kept of both resource usage and

availability, and such a complete track of assets

maintained, overstocking was, largely, a

phenomenon of the past. Logisticians – good ones,

anyway – had always tried to keep a little

something back for the rainy day. Quartermasters,

whether in 2015, 1915 or 1815 all knew that ‘stores

was for storing’. Now, despite the fact that the

physical environment had not changed (logistic

forces were still more vulnerable than fighting

troops, and were still, therefore, shepherded to the

rear) prediction had replaced over-caution. With full

asset visibility, cross-decking of material could take

place at every level of command, from sub-unit

through to formation. Full vehicle systems

integration allowed for ‘self-demanding’: the

process whereby platforms automatically

requested re-supply – or anticipated repair – from

the logistics organisation. This had revolutionised

the turgid process of military CSS forward planning

(though BMW had been doing it for thirty years). At

the same time, the reduction in overall stocks in

Chapter 18 287
theatre both on wheels and warehouse stored, had

meant a reduction in the numbers of logistics

troops required. Not only were their fewer drivers,

but the universal adoption of web-based stores

management had drastically reduced the numbers

of store managers and distributors.

There were many who trumpeted this remarkable

way of doing business as a ‘Revolution in Logistic

Affairs’, and it was, indeed, far more revolutionary

than anything that was taking place elsewhere. The

press came to see the revolution for themselves, but

saw instead trains being loaded from the quayside.

‘Some revolution’ they thought, and went to find

better library pictures elsewhere. The loggies

grinned at one another, rolled up their sleeves and

went back to winning the war.

Beyond Gethsemane

288 The Big Issue

WWN WORLD-WIDE NEWS

“This a Headline Newsflash. Headline News has

received reports in the last few minutes that seem to

indicate that a British logistics base in the GAS has

been attacked by some form of poison gas. We’re

going straight there now, where we have a live

satellite link up with the British Forces HQ in

Newtown and the coalition spokesman, Major

Andrew Maclean. Major Maclean, can you give us

and indication of what’s taken place?”

“...You’ll appreciate that we don’t have a full picture

yet here, but I am able to confirm that the UK

Reception and Staging area, some 50 Km north of
Chapter 18 289

where I’m standing, came under mortar fire without

warning, earlier today. It appears that the mortars

each carried some form of crude chemical warhead,

all of which detonated inside the perimeter of the

installation. It appears that the type was some form

of non-persistent agent, but—”

“Which units were involve, and can you tell us the

casualty count?”

“You’ll understand that we don’t release unit details

until we’ve informed the next-of-kin, and that

process is not yet complete. As far as casualties are

concerned, I’m afraid I have to report that, as of an

hour ago, we have 277, that’s two hundred seven

seven fatalities on site, of which 38 are UK

personnel—”

“Who were these others, major, and how is that so

many of them died? You said this was a British

installation.”

“The other victims were locally-employed labourers,

none of whom were in possession of chemical

protection equipment...er...we have another 67 UK

personnel suffering from chemical injuries, but none

are critical, right now.”

“How did this happen? Why weren’t we better

prepared for this?”

“It’s far too early to say for certain, of course, but we

will be reviewing our chemical defence capabilities

throughout the operational area, and—”

“A little late for that, some will say, Major. Who are

the families of those killed to blame for this failure in
290 The Big Issue

Well, it just goes to show that tactical level issues

can have strategic level impact. Major Maclean

thought that blame didn’t enter into it. Not from his

perspective, it didn’t, but it certainly did back in

London. This was an operation of choice, not

necessity, and there were those who would have

chosen differently. The UK forces had gone into

theatre with, supposedly, the best force protection

package on offer. So, how had this happened? For a

while, and until the end of a particularly emotional

and bad-tempered emergency Commons debate, it

appeared that the UK might actually withdraw. The

video conference between the Prime Minister and

the UK contingent commander later that day left the

latter in no doubt as to how precarious both their

positions were.

The public was also shocked to discover that, of the

38 British dead, 20 weren’t even service personnel.

our procedures, if that is, indeed, what has

happened?”

“Everyone here has nothing but sympathy for the

families who have lost loved ones here today, but I

need to remind you, and those watching tonight, that

this is a military operation, and military operations

always entail risk. Sometimes, we will take

casualties. We’ll take more before this difficult

campaign is over, I can virtually promise you. Noone’s to blame – blame doesn’t enter into it.”

“Major, I imagine you and the rest of the British HQ

there have much work to do. We’ll let you get on

with it. Thank you for joining us here tonight, and

good luck.”
Chapter 18 291

The logistics base was only partially run by the

British Army. It was, in fact, the collection and

distribution point for the Army’s operational pool of

vehicles. Here, hundreds of tanks, armoured

command cells, land rovers, trucks and other

vehicles were married up with soldiers familiar with

these same equipments in the training fleet. This

business had been almost entirely contracted out –

it was by far simpler and cheaper to do so – and the

terms of the contract extended to the delivery of the

fleet into the theatre distribution point. Contractors

were almost everywhere in the area of operations:

they provided additional strategic comms links; they

delivered on-site support to the specialist IT

systems; they managed vehicle fleets and more

besides. In the aftermath of the attack, it was

expected that these contractors would quit the

operation – getting killed, after all, wasn’t part of the

contract, but surprisingly few did. They had been

trained and equipped by the British Army for just

such an eventuality. Many of them also expressed a

kinship with the men and women in uniform

alongside whom they served (so many of them were

ex-servicemen, anyhow); those that didn’t ruefully

admitted that the money was just too good to ignore.

That apart, there was little to cheer the UK HQ that

night. They’d been hit, badly (and, privately, the staff

knew that they were at fault, that their procedures

had been found wanting: although the initial attack

forced everyone under cover, no one donned their

NBC respirators quickly enough – at least not till the

smell and the cloud were on top of them. The fact is

that the threat had not been recognised. No one had

expected a chemical attack. Well, they would from
292 The Big Issue

now on). But how could they strike back? No one

was claiming responsibility and the perpetrators had

vanished, presumably for good. What was galling

was that strategic SIGINT resources, deployed into

theatre under the strictest secrecy, gave the

commander a good steer that the attack had been

co-ordinated by the SSA. Telephone and data traffic

in and out of the capital showed it as clearly as a

signed confession. It was evidence, but not the sort

that could used in the court of world opinion. Like

Enigma and the Bletchley code-breakers, the British

had a capability they couldn’t admit to for fear of

losing its effectiveness. 

Instead, the entire Coalition reviewed its force

protection posture, tightened procedures, and

trained hard in chemical defence. Their ability to

support the aid agencies dropped, but, for the

moment at least, soldiers throughout the force

decided that they needed to do a little more looking

after themselves, or they wouldn’t be around to help

anyone else. 

It was an irony, then, that the next hammer blow to

strike the GAS was one that the coalition forces

could do absolutely nothing about – and nor could

they be blamed. Just as contractorisation had seen

more civilians based in the Area of Operations, so

new technology – and in particular high bandwidth

strategic comms links – had seen more and more

military staffs being based at home. They called this

‘reachback’ and the idea was that the ‘footprint’ intheatre could be much reduced, and personnel could

contribute a range of analysis and decision support

from the UK Intelligence staffs, mission planners and
Chapter 18 293

logistic specialists – all of whom would have been

deployed in previous expeditions – now assisted

their colleagues 5,000 miles away. They did so from

a grandly-titled – but visually unimpressive – Mission

Support Facility, a couple of dozen portakabins colocated with the SKYNET 5 downlink hub at

Corsham in Wiltshire. ‘Reachback’ was a good

theory, but it only worked in practice if the home

base was a more secure and safer place to operate

than the Area of Operations.

The incendiary device which almost razed the

Corsham facility to the ground 48 hours after the gas

attack lent the lie to that notion. Thankfully,

casualties on this occasion were light, though they

included the suicide bomber who had driven her fuel

tanker through the Corsham perimeter fence. But it

was the loss in capability that was important. The

hub went down – admittedly only for a few hours

before commercial standby links were re-engineered

– but the support facility could not be so easily

replaced. For an uncomfortably long period, the

reachback planning and analysis capability that

each of the components depended upon wasn’t

there. Reversionary modes existed – the architects

of the reachback capability had insisted upon it

throughout development, but they couldn’t be as

capable as the primary systems. Again, there was

much head-scratching on the MOD Main Building’s

mezzanine floor. How to defend against this? The

sombre mood wasn’t helped, first, by an admission

from the head of Special Branch that his people had

not been able to penetrate subversive groups

thought to be sympathetic to the SSA and second,

from the Director General Information that internet
294 The Big Issue

attacks on UK Defence and Government Information

Systems were increasing every day. If this continued

it would rapidly lead to the loss of some systems

unless he took radical quarantine action. Of course

none of these attacks affected the MOD’s standalone high-security links – they were protected by

some of the highest-rated cryptographic techniques

in the world, after all. Neither were these ‘attacks’

particularly complex and highly-skilled feats of

computer engineering (most of them were merely

simple viruses with automatic re-broadcast

attachments), but their impact on low-security,

supposedly firewall-protected targets was rapidly

becoming a real problem. Shutting these down for

quarantine would not only reduce capability yet

further; it would also announce to anyone who

wished to take notice that the UK was suffering from

‘cyber attack’ and could only deal with the problem

by hitting the off button. Around the UK, alert states

at MOD and associated contractor sites ramped up

– in some cases regional military units were

assigned guard of key installations. It appeared, to

those whose job it was to think of such things – that

‘mission-creep’ was now something that happened

at home, too.

Nothing Changes for the Infantry...

WWN WORLD-WIDE NEWS

“Good Evening, and welcome to this special edition

of Headline News Insight Report. With me tonight,

coming live from the UK deployment to the GAS, is

Corporal James Chilman, who’s been with the UK
Chapter 18 295

force in that country for – well, how long now,

Corporal?”

“I’ve been here about six weeks or so now.”

“And what’s your role in all this?”

“Well, I’m a Section Commander in the 1st Royal

Green Jackets Battlegroup. I command seven other

blokes, and we operate either inside or, more

usually, outside a Section Warrior vehicle. Our job

is...well... same as the infantry’s job’s always been,

really – we get stuck in and kill as many of the

enemy as we can, as quick as possible, before they

kill us.”

“Well, they say nothing changes for infantrymen like

you, and the job you have to do. How true is that? Is

it exactly the same as operations we’ve known in the

past?”

“The basics are the same, no question – but all this

new kit makes a hell of a difference when we

actually go into combat.”

“Perhaps you could take us through some of it – it

looks to me pretty much like what soldiers have

worn or carried for years. What’s so different?”

“It might not look much different, but everything you

can see here gives me and my men more chance of

killing the enemy and, hopefully, staying alive whilst

we do it. If you look at this rifle, first—“

“That’s one of those old SA80s isn’t it?”

“With about a thousand modifications – yeah. With

this sight, I’ve got a combined TI, II and night vision
296 The Big Issue

view of the battlefield And what’s more, it links up

from this sight into this head-up display in my

helmet. I can see round corners, and shoot round

them too. It’s also linked to this grenade launcher,

too. With this I can lob a 40mm grenade out to 250m

and I’ll know exactly where it will land. It’s brilliant.

And everything’s linked up into this computer in my

pocket – it tells me if I’m running out of ammo,

where my muckers are, if there’s a system fault,

whatever. But, if you were to ask me, the best thing

of all is this sensor-to-shooter business. Because I

know where everything is, and everyone else knows

where I am, I can call down fire instead of having to

fire myself. I’ve called up attack helicopters, strike

fighters, artillery, the lot. Remember, my main job

when I get out there is hiding. If I don’t have to

shoot, well, it makes hiding a whole lot easier.”

“It certainly sounds impressive. Why don’t they go

the whole hog and automate everything? Why do

we still need to send you out to do the killing?

There’s a lot of talk about robotics and unmanned

vehicles.”

“Well, er, that’s a bloody good question actually.

You’d have to ask someone in charge, I suppose.

But I’ll tell you this – I think all this Gucci kit is well

impressive – but I’ve never, in ten years in the Army,

ever been issued with anything that didn’t break

down at least once when I got my hands on it, so I

suppose we’re there to make sure it happens if stuff

goes wrong.”

“Corporal Chilman, I know you’re busy, and I’d like

to say thanks for coming on the programme tonight.
I know that your wife Tina and your children are

watching tonight. Do you have any messages for

them?”

“Just to say Ryan, Taylor, be good for your mum,

keep your feet off the sofa, and I’ll be back home

soon.”

Chapter 18 297

As invasions go, this one hardly looked like

BARBAROSSA. As the hotchpotch of pick-up trucks,

four wheel drive utility vehicles and minibuses

lurched across the border from Goldland and into the

GAS, it looked – as the ASTOR operator said to the

analyst sitting next to him – more like a refugee

column than anything else. Again, hindsight allows

us to reasonably ask the question: what were the

SSA thinking of? From our perspective, the invasion

was the strategic blunder – no matter how much

(unexpected) success it appeared to enjoy at the

time. Everything was going their way, or so it

seemed: their asymmetric attacks had hurt the

coalition, where it felt the pain most – it had killed

people. Furthermore, their policy on covert funding

and arming of militia groups had continued to leave

them relatively blameless in the eyes of the media

and therefore the world. Why change that? Again,

their action was meant to be pre-emptive, and it was
meant to hurt the coalition so badly that withdrawal

would be the only option – after all, went their logic –

look how the Coalition resolve wobbled when they

lost a few dozen casualties. What would they do if

they suffered hundreds? Or thousands? As irrational

as the SSA’s decision to launch an invasion might

have been, their assessment of the coalition’s centre

of gravity – its count of friendly casualties – and their

tactical methodology of getting to it, were right on the

money. It was an invasion with no objective to

capture, and with no territory to dominate. They

came across the border with the sole aim of killing

people until their enemies’ leaders decided the killing

wasn’t worth it.

Because at first it didn’t look like an invasion, it

wasn’t given the reception normally afforded one. It

was seen coming. As well as the ASTOR feed

(whose product was being relayed to HQ 1st

Armoured Division) a Watchkeeper UAV was able to

give a vehicle count – getting on for 50, whilst the

reconnaissance vehicles strung out on piquet duty

along the border maintained a silent watch. As we

know, an enormous investment had been made into

‘finding’ technology. It paid off, too: the enemy was

well and truly found. So, why weren’t they fixed, or

struck? Well, no combat indicators were identified by

the surveillance assets to suggest a threat. No

armour, no tracked vehicles, no heavy weaponry, no

support from the air. No electronic signature

whatsoever – no radios, cell phones, nothing. At

least six vehicles in the convoy were clearly buses

full of refugees, amongst them a significant number

of women and children. The outcome was that this

particular refugee convoy (admittedly larger than any

298 The Big Issue
seen before) would be treated like any other. The

nearest battlegroup – in this case, the Royal

Highland Fusiliers about 10 km up the road – could

intercept it, search it and then escort it to the nearest

aid centre.

The first direct action of the war was to be as violent

as it was brief. As the convoy approached the hastily

set-up checkpoint, the first few vehicles slowed and

stopped. The refugees began approaching the

checkpoint on foot. As they did so, without warning

the Defensive Aid Suites on the three Warriors

facing them barked out their alarms. The threat

appeared to come from the refugee vehicles, but

how? Almost before the gunners could slew their

turrets in their direction, beam-riding AT missiles,

guided by unseen marksmen in the buses,

unmasked from the pick up trucks behind the distant

ridgeline, launched, dipped, struck and detonated.

The platoon’s Warriors were instantly destroyed: the

troops inside them wiped out.

We all know now what happened next. Again,

hindsight allows us to realise that the outcome of the

close operation on the ground was never really in

doubt, despite the enemy’s initial success. We can

see now that the quality of our Ground Manoeuvre

forces, backed up with substantial artillery and joint

firepower allowed us to quickly regain the initiative,

irrespective of the surprise achieved by Goldland

and the SSA. Their ruse of using fake refugee

columns worked (at first) just as it was intended to

do: it drew in our forces on the border, and gave

them the opportunity to launch the main body of their

attack elsewhere. But it was never going to work. It

Chapter 18 299
played to our strengths, for the first time in the

campaign. That’s not to say the enemy capitulated

without the hardest of fights, though: the 1st

Armoured Division, attacked by Goldland was forced

into a defensive battle whilst the coalition’s air forces

struggled to close the door behind the invasion

force. Once again, the Goldland forces proved

themselves expert in forcing elements of the

coalition to operate on their terms – not ours. They

couldn’t defend against very high-level aerial attack,

so they forced us to low levels by never placing

themselves where they could be attacked without

the risk of significant collateral damage. Low level

attack risked losses from light, shoulder-launched

anti-aircraft missiles. Most missed, or were decoyed

– the defensive counter measures on the coalition

aircraft were state of the art – but they made the

successful prosecution of air attacks extremely

difficult and hazardous. Despite the best efforts of

the Coalition Forces Air Component Command, and

some well-documented heroism on the part of both

its land and sea-based pilots, the air forces could not

quite stop the SSA’s invasion force in its tracks, nor

entirely slam the door behind it. This didn’t stop them

trying, though. On the ground, too, the SSA showed

themselves unexpectedly skilled in placing

themselves where we could only manoeuvre against

them with difficulty. More than anything, they knew

how to negate our technological advantage by the

use of complex terrain, which the towns and villages

provided. These became their vital ground, and we

had to go and get them. Vicious, small unit close

combat – that most demanding of all human

activities – was still needed.

300 The Big Issue
Although close combat presented the same unique

and enduring challenges to soldiers on both sides of

this battlefield, one thing had changed. These close

operations were no longer as close as they were

before: direct battlefield engagement distances had

moved inexorably outward: from 1, 2 or 3 kilometres

increasingly to 4, 5, even 10 kilometres. The

increased capability of sensor systems, improved

battlefield awareness and a range of direct, near line

of sight and beyond line of sight systems could be

rapidly deployed to attack the enemy in an

increasing volume of the Close Operations area.

GPS enabled combat troops to work individually,

while knowing the location of others and with access

to a range of direct and indirect fire systems. From

then on, things started to work the coalition’s way.

‘The integration of Joint effects’ is a dry and doctrinal

term: for the Goldland division, what it meant was

that destruction came from all sides, and without

warning. Our investment in technology had paid off.

ISTAR assets could link right down to the artillery

battery, the armoured vehicle, or the FIST-equipped

soldier. High tempo, enabled by digital

communications and C2 systems, allowed chances

Chapter 18 301
to be seized as they presented themselves, not

hours later. Infanteers fought, where necessary,

either from their platforms or on their feet. Either

way, they were devastatingly effective, either by

calling down fire themselves, or by applying it, with

unheard of accuracy. Tanks, guns and sappers all

played their part: the traditional relationships

between each strengthened, not weakened – by the

information-age technologies common to all. As

ever, good workable procedures evolved out of

operational necessity. Ultimately, though, this

engagement – the largest for the British Army since

WW2 – would have been lost, irrespective of the

technology used, were it not for the fighting qualities

which allowed the coalition to withstand the early,

significant reverses.

After a week of little sleep, caused by the constant

demands of the operation, particularly dealing with

multi-national and host-nation concerns, and the

ever-present media, the land Component

Commander was able, finally, to report to the JTF

HQ that the Goldland attack had been repulsed. The

coalition had, however, lost over 300 dead, and both

he and his superior knew that statistic reflected

victory for the SSA. The news he received was both

good and bad. The good was that the coalition’s

302 The Big Issue
Chapter 18 303

political support was holding up, despite the

casualties. There would be no withdrawal. The bad

news was that this support would not hold for ever,

and certainly not if the casualty level increased much

further. The bottom line was – there could be no

large-scale, ground-based invasion of SSA territory

– the projected losses were simply untenable. So,

however this war was to end, it wouldn’t do so with

a set piece invasion across the ground like Kuwait.

Someone was going to have to come up with

something more clever. Fortunately for the coalition,

the Deep Operations Group in its HQ had something

just so clever in mind.

A Revolution in Military Affairs

WWN WORLD-WIDE NEWS

“Good Evening, and welcome to this special edition

WWN Insight Report. As regular viewers will know,

we’ve spent some time over the last few weeks, and

since the coalition operations began in the GAS,

focussing on some of the key equipments and

weapons in use with the British forces in theatre,

and on some of the men and women who operate

these systems in combat. Tonight, via our satellite

feed, we’re able to enjoy a live link-up with Captain

David Amlot, in command of 669 Squadron of the

Army Air Corps. Captain Amlot, can you hear me?”

“Yes, loud and clear.”

“Captain, I don’t need to remind you of the

operations that have been carried out over the past

days by coalition forces. You pilot one of the key
304 The Big Issue

weapons in the British armoury, that’s for sure. How

come we haven’t seen Apache involved in any

combat? Isn’t that what we bought it for?”

“Well, that’s true, but you need to remember that the

fighting that’s taken place up to now has been very

much focussed on the shanty towns and cities of the

GAS. It’s very difficult for us to carry out offensive

missions in this kind of terrain without running the

risk of causing civilian casualties, and as the British

Command HQ has pointed out, we’re not here to do

that. I can assure you, however, that we haven’t

been wasting our time – we’ve been training hard,

and we’re more than ready for action when the time

comes—”

“If the time comes, some might say, Captain. And if

it does, how many of these Apaches have we got

over there, and what sort of capability do they bring

to the fight? After all, they cost £21 million apiece,

don’t they?”

“It would clearly be wrong of me to talk about how

many assets we have or don’t have with us, Glen,

but I will say that the Apache gives us the ability to

deliver an overwhelming amount of precision

firepower, almost wherever we like. I’ve been flying

these things for over ten years now, and I can tell

you, eight Hellfire missiles, a pod of rockets and a

thousand rounds of 30 mm cannon is enough to

spoil your whole night’s sleep.”

“You sound confident –but we’ve taken losses –

substantial ones. How do you know we won’t do so

again?”
Chapter 18 305

“There’s risk for all of us on operations, and I’m not

going to pretend we all don’t think of that every time

we go up. But I can tell you that I’ve never been

more confident in anything I’ve ever flown in than

this airframe. And it’s not just this, of course: you’ve

got to remember that, since they developed the Air

Manoeuvre command system, I can sit in my cockpit

and call up a picture from just about any sensor on

the battlefield. I can call in fire from other Apaches,

fast jets, artillery, even ships. I can report in to

whatever HQ is planning or controlling the Op, and I

can do it right away. That’s also good for the rest of

the Air Assault Brigade, too. All the infantry

commanders on the ground, or even when they’re

airborne in the Chinooks. They all know exactly

what’s going on – they’re never blind. We know

where the enemy are, and believe you me, if they try

to run, they’re just going to die tired.”

“Captain, when and if that takes place, good luck

from all of us here. This has been a WWN Special

Insight report. Goodnight.”

By and large wars aren’t won (or lost) at the tactical

level. They’re won or lost at the strategic or political

level. Campaign planning allows you to undertake

maritime, air, and land operations, sequenced or

simultaneous, aimed at – eventually – attacking the

enemy’s centre of gravity. Do this well, and stop him

doing it, and you win the war. What the coalition was

planning now was something so ambitious that it

could – might – break this paradigm. They wanted to

win the war with a single engagement. Actually, it

wasn’t that revolutionary an idea; for years, the huge
investment on deep strike systems – and particularly

Air Manoeuvre – had been made on the basis that it

could have decisive operational or even strategic

impact, as well as tactical value.

If you desire, as a soldier, to project an effect 200 to

300 km beyond your own troops, you need to stop

thinking like a soldier. The battlespace out there

was as much ‘owned’ by the Air and Maritime forces

as it was by the Army. Much effort had been carried

out in the previous decade on how this battlespace

could best be exploited, and this effort was about to

pay off. Joint planning teams were already based in

each HQ, now able to work in virtual collocation.

Mission rehearsals and refinement took place within

a single, unified synthetic environment. An outline

concept already existed, but such was the

cumulative value of the assets involved, and the

impact if failure resulted, that every detail needed to

be worked out. The final go/no-go decision would

only be made by the CJTFC, and the criteria for a

go decision would be 90% forecast of success. Like

most military operations, timing was key. Unlike

most operations, however, these timings could not

be allowed to change.

For the first time, special forces and strategic human

intelligence assets (they used to be called spies) had

been able to work out in advance the movements of

Goldland’s leader. In 48 hours time, he would

address a rally in the capital’s central football

stadium. In this case, for the first time in the war we

had the chance to attack their Centre of Gravity.

Absolute power rested with this man, and with the

Army and militias he either funded or controlled.

306 The Big Issue
Neutralising him, however, was only part of the task.

Somehow, the Presidential Guard Goldland division

– kept, until now, out of the fighting as a strategic

reserve – had to be destroyed, too. Whilst that force

existed, the possibility of one dictator being replaced

instantly by another, equally as powerful, existed as

well. Finally, even if all this were achieved, it would

not be, of itself, enough. Somehow, the people in the

capital, and in the rest of the SSA, needed to be

persuaded that the void that they left behind could

be filled. The mission, then, depended on a complex

information operation: at the instant that the military

strike took place, a network of electronic and

psychological warfare assets had to ensure that our

information, and only ours dominated the

battlespace. Management of the Electro-Magnetic

Spectrum between the myriad of systems emitting

signals throughout the battlespace, was, fortunately,

now an active process. It was made possible by an

automated capability which de-conflicted users’

requirements and provided close to ‘frequencies on

demand’. When the Commander finally sat down for

his decision brief, his planning team on the other end

of the video link had, they hoped, put it all together.

Their synchronization matrix needed to be divided

between four screens because of its complexity, but

it did make sense. They had identified the enemy’s

main weakness, and this was the only way to exploit

it. The Commander listened patiently until the end.

He had no questions. He had, after all, been

personally involved at every stage of the planning

process. He gave the order.

We all know the rest, of course. Some say it was just

a lucky move – others have described it as a feat of

Chapter 18 307
arms as successful and significant as the Inchon

landings in Korea. The official report downplayed all

that, of course, merely attributing success to the

successful imposition of superior doctrine on an

unfamiliar situation, but, undeniably, it did work, just

as it had been planned.

The General commanding 1st (UK) Armoured

Division hadn’t been enamoured with the idea of

using his formation to psychologically fix the enemy,

particularly as he’d enjoyed no time for

reconstitution, but there was little choice. It was risky

– the Division was hardly more than 60% combat

effective – but it worked. Its noisy approach to the

border forced Goldland into a counter-move with the

Presidential Guard Division. This was enough:

ISTAR systems were able to plot sufficient enemy

movement and concentration areas for the next

phase of the operation to begin. 1st Armoured

Division, its job done, halted.

The air forces, unconstrained for the first time by the

rules of engagement, which had largely held it back

thus far, punched a series of corridors through the

airspace – corridors punctuated by precision strikes

not only from the air, but from long range precision

artillery and, for the first time, TLAMS launched from

offshore for the first time in this operation. The

integration of these effects and the deep operation

by 16 Air Assault Brigade was impressive enough:

more so was the tempo that was achieved. Active,

positive airspace procedures allowed each

component’s systems to work at their fastest. The

Information Operations mission was unfolding with

similar speed. The cell phones, mobile laptops and

308 The Big Issue
radios operated by the SSA were disabled in

swathes in Phase 1: in Phase 2 each of them –

supplemented by additional self-rebroadcast radios

– began displaying and replaying the Coalition’s

message to stay calm, to stay put and to stay alive.

The effort that had gone into airborne TV and civil

radio broadcast, in particular, paid off in spades. A

series of pre-recorded messages were beamed

down across the UHF and VHF range. The

audacious ‘capture’ of the SSA’s websites, and

subsequent link to webcams broadcasting events in

the capital, provided an instant world-wide audience

for the Coalition’s activities.

This deep manoeuvre was not without its reverses,

of course, since it remained impossible to remove

all risks. A well camouflaged anti-aircraft gun – 40

years older than the soldier manning it – opened up

at close range on a hovering Apache. All the

defensive aids suites in the world couldn’t deflect

the stream of lead which struck throughout the

Chapter 18 309
airframe. Saved from fatal splinter injuries by their

body armour, the crew managed to guide their

crippled aircraft to a thumped landing – whilst their

wingman, having destroyed the anti-aircraft gun,

activated the emergency link to the orbiting Combat

Recovery controller.

Incidents like this apart, the mission was a success,

by any yardstick. The shock and destructive power

of the AH Regiments had their intended effect. The

first strikes took out the key command vehicles,

cutting off the head of the force.

Thereafter, the Goldland Division, deprived of

direction, simply stopped moving coherently. There

was no organised response. The air assault infantry,

inserted at key locations in the division’s area, was

able to direct more withering and murderously

effective indirect fire. Selective close combat

operations quickly whittled the remaining Goldland

Division’s combat power down to nothing in a few

hours. The appearance of coalition forces,

simultaneously, at the rally was enough to paralyse

Goldland’s leader and his bodyguards: by the time

they’d started to think about escape, Special Forces

Teams had disabled them – temporarily, using Non

Lethal techniques - an act designed not to cause

panic. The opening of a Chinook tailgate to reveal

Goldland’s last elected ruler – long since exiled but

still revered – was both an inspired piece of theatre

and a huge risk. He was surrounded not by armed

troops, but by international aid agency staff; he

spoke the language of rebuilding and the crowds

listened. In the space of 30 minutes, just as planned,

a successful tactical engagement in support of

310 The Big Issue
information operations had operational impact,

which altered the strategic circumstances,

irrevocably. The Coalition, as a whole, took a deep

breath, and prepared to move into the SSA: not to

fight a war, but to cement a fragile peace.

Chapter 18 311
Afterword

Glossary of Acronyms

About the Authors
AFTERWORD: THE

IMPERATIVE FOR NEW

THINKING

By David Potts

‘Murder your darlings.’

Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch

Deploying massed force, employed to achieve a

decision against other such forces in a defined

battlespace, is giving way to deploying forces to

create the conditions in which a decision might be

achieved outside the military domain.1 The military

line of operation in a campaign is therefore not just

one of a number of lines of operation, it is

subordinate to and constrained by others:

diplomatic, political and economic and increasingly

by Information Operations, directed from the highest

political level, and legal considerations. War aims, or

even the desired endstate, will often be unclear at

the outset of operations when there may be an

imperative to act to alter the adverse dynamics of a

situation and to begin to create the conditions that

might allow possible endstates to be discerned. In

coalition operations there will be compromises about

ends, ways and means and there may even be a

need for constructive ambiguity as to ends in order

to maintain coalition cohesion.

315
The form of warfare that seeks to achieve a decision

in a defined timescale is intensely Western, forming

during 2,000 years or more of conflict between

various European powers and exported to the

Americas and elsewhere. It achieves results through

face to face struggle, by those who believe they can

and must prevail in such a struggle, in a defined

battlefield and within a narrow timeframe. An

alternative form of warfare is not European at all and

seeks results neither through decisive engagement

nor in a defined timescale.2 The capacity to confront

adversaries with such a perception of timescale

requires endurance. This includes preparing and

deploying successive follow-on forces, remaining

committed, adapting over time as circumstance

changes and shaping perceptions over a long haul.

Confronting those who seek to avoid decisive

engagement involves applying force precisely at

carefully chosen moments to create opportunities

that can be exploited by other lines of operation. It is

a fundamental shift away from the notion that a

massed force can be committed for a one shot

decisive action.

The setting of warfare is also changing – operations

will occur amongst people. Massed force and

concentration of force become redundant concepts.

Instead, there is a need for a specific effect at a

precise time and place. Therefore, while we might

still need hierarchical component constructs to

deploy forces into a theatre of operations, or to

within striking distance of a theatre of operations,

and to manage them there, the execution of tactical

action must be finessed and Joint.

316 The Big Issue
Old forms of warfare have taken a new and lethal

twist. The emergence of ‘New Terror War’ 3 has

reminded us of just how thin the crust of civilization

can be.

Fuller argued that the history of warfare was one of

conflict between the city dwellers and the nomads,4

civilization and barbarism – into which category falls

the 20th century wars between democracy and

totalitarianism. Huntingdon5 has updated and

expanded this idea. War between civilizations

(Christendom, Islam, China, India et al), he argues is

now too awful to contemplate. For Huntingdon, the

solution to a decent future for all of humanity lies in

civilizations standing together against barbarism,

otherwise they risk hanging separately. This is

exactly the battle-line that has been drawn,

superficially at least, in the war against terrorism and

it indicates that bloc-on-bloc and state-on-state

warfare are receding as the basic strategic construct

in which wars occur. We must now increasingly

anticipate coalition operations with ever more

unusual bedfellows – Russia and China, for example

– with all that that implies for our pre-conceptions of

future conflict.

Added to all of this, information technology is helping

to shape the age we live in. It is shrinking the global

village yet further and has unleashed an area of

highly competitive economic activity that impacts on

almost every aspect of our daily lives and is altering

the pattern of wealth creation on a global scale. It

also underpins a distinctly American form of warfare

and an apparent American hegemony in

conventional force on force combat. How can we in

Afterword 317
the UK exploit this technology to military advantage?

What kinds of forces will be required if we are to

succeed in the strategic circumstances described

and what will be the essence, for us, of the

operational art in the information age?

This Occasional has attempted to answer such

questions, but it is impossible to do so with certainty.

All that one can be certain about is that this is a time

for new thinking. There is no cow so sacred that our

thinking should be constrained by the assumption

that its importance now implies it has a part to play

in our military future. Take for example the Principles

of War – inviolate, perhaps – but if they are to be

useful as a guide to thought and action they need to

be relevant. New Principles of War for the

information age6 are therefore proposed: 

A minor essay could clearly be offered in explanation

and justification of each principle, including why it

was a principle of war rather than an operational

imperative. But that would miss the point – the new

principles are not offered because they are in any

318 The Big Issue
way intrinsically valid. They are offered purely to

make the point that we must ‘murder our darlings’.

No assumption, no principle of doctrinal certitude, no

precious equipment programme, or existing force

element should be allowed to constrain or skew our

thinking about what the military future might hold and

how best to prepare ourselves for it.

The most costly failings we could allow ourselves

now would be narrowness of vision and poverty of

aspiration. We must not allow ourselves to reduce

the possibilities before us to fit our pre-conceptions

– we must instead let go of preconception and open

our minds, nationally and internationally, to a

number of hypothetical futures that can be explored

and refined through experimentation. If we do that,

we could seize opportunities we have yet to imagine.

NOTES

1 Sir Rupert Smith, Wars in Our Time, World Defence

Systems, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2001.

2 John Keegan, The Penguin Book of War, introductory

remarks, 1999.

3 Chinese Peoples Liberation Army terminology for the

synthesis of maniacal terrorism and weapons of mass

destruction (see Chapter II).

4 J F C Fuller, Decisive Battles of the Western World,

Grenada Publishing, London, 1970 (first published 1954).

5 Samuel Huntingdon, The Clash of Civilizations, New York,

Simon and Schuster, 1996.

6 See R R Leonard, The Principles of War for the

Information Age, Presidio Press, Novato CA, 1998, for an

in depth analysis of this issue. Leonard examines the US

principles (different in emphasis from the UK principles

above and including, for example, ‘Unity of Command’,

although derived from J F C Fuller’s list in 1921). He

argues that they are not principles of war at all, but

principles of battle in industrial age, symmetrical, land

warfare. He does not propose new principles, but

Afterword 319
“eschews any attempt to formulate aphorisms for a future

conflict that we can scarcely envision, let alone control”.

320 The Big Issue
321

GLOSSARY OF

ACRONYMS

ABCA America, Britain, Canada and

Australia

ABSV Armoured Battle Group Support

Vehicle

ACTORD Activation Order

AFV Armoured Fighting Vehicle

AH Attack Helicopter

AI Artificial Intelligence

AP Air Platform

ARRC Allied Command Europe Rapid

Reaction Corps

ASP Advanced Sound Ranging Post

ASTOR Airborne Stand Off Radar

AT Anti Tank

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATGM Anti Tank Guided Missile

ATGW Anti Tank Guided Weapon BAOR

British Army of the Rhine

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

BEF British Expeditionary Force

C2 Command and Control
C4I Command Control Communications

Computers and Intelligence

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications,

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance

and Reconnaissance

C4ISTAR Command, Control, Communications,

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,

Target Acquisition, and

Reconnaissance

CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation

CDS Chief of the Defence Staff

CENTCOM Central Command

CinC Commander in Chief

CIS Communications and Information

System

COA Course of Action

COBRA Counter Battery Radar

COMARRC Commander Allied Command Europe

Rapid Reaction Corps

Combat ID Combat Identification

COMBRITFOR Commander British Force

COMKFOR Commander Kosovo Force

COP Common Operational Picture

CR2 Challenger 2

CSS Combat Service Support

CT Counter Terrorist

322 The Big Issue
DBS Direct Broadcasting by Satellite

DHSS Department of Health and Social

Security

DIF Difficulty, Importance and Frequency

DLGS Data Link Ground Station

DMRS Dual Mode Radar System

DMZ Demilitarised Zone

DVLC Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre

EMP Electromagnetic Pulse

EO/IR Electro Optic/Infra Red

EU European Union

EW Electronic Warfare

FAC Forward Air Controller

FCLV Future Command and Liaison vehicle

FIST Future Infantry Soldier Technology

FOO Forward Observation Officer

FP Force Protection

FRES Future Rapid Effect System

FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia

GOC General Officer Commanding

GMLRS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket

System

GPS Global Positioning System

Glossary of Acronyms 323
GS Ground Station

HPM High Powered Microwave

HQ Headquarters

IBCT Interim Brigade Combat Team

IFPA Indirect Fire Precision Attack

IM Information Management

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

IO Information Operations

ISR Intelligence Surveillance and

Reconnaissance

ISTAR Intelligence Surveillance Target

Acquisition and Reconnaissance

IT Information Technology

JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters

JFLCC Joint Force Land Component

Commander

JOP Joint Operational Picture

JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack

Radar System

JTFHQ Joint Task Force Headquarters KFOR

Kosovo Force

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

KP Key Point

LC Land Component

324 The Big Issue
LCC Land Component Commander LOC

Line of Communication

LOS Line of Sight

MACP Military Aid to the Civil Power

MASINT Measurement and Signature

Intelligence

MFC Mortar Fire Controller

MI Military Intelligence

MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System MOB

Main Operating Base

MRAV Multi Role Armoured Vehicle MTI

Moving Target Indicator

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NBC Nuclear Biological and Chemical

NCC National Contingent Commander

NCW Network Centric Warfare

NDM Naturalistic Decision Making

NHS National Health Service

NORTHAG Northern Army Group

NRT Near Real Time

OGD Other Government Departments

OODA Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act

OSCE Organisation for Security and

Cooperation in Europe

Glossary of Acronyms 325
P5 Nation Permanent Member of the UN

Security Council

PCP Pedestrian Check Point

PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army

PSO Peace Support Operations

PsyOps Psychological Operations

RAPTOR Reconnaissance Pod for Tornado

RCS Rational Choice Strategies

RFI Request for Information

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

ROE Rules of Engagement

SA Situational Awareness

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar

SDR Strategic Defence Review

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SIS Secret Intelligence Service

SNA Somalia National Alliance

SPOD Sea Port of Disembarkation

STA Surveillance and Target Acquisition

TACP Tactical Air Control Party

TEWT Tactical Exercise Without Troops

TI Thermal Imaging

326 The Big Issue
TIRRS Tornado Infra Red Reconnaissance

System

TLAMS Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

TOC Tactical Operations Centre

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UN United Nations

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

USMC United States Marine Corps

VCP Vehicle Check Point

VP Vital Point

WFE Warfighting Experiments

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WME Weapons of Mass Effect

WR Warrior

Glossary of Acronyms 327
329

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

The authors work in the British Army’s conceptual

‘think tank’, the directorate General of

Development and Doctrine, located at Upavon on

Salisbury Plain. Most, but not all, are members of

Command Development Branch (comdsp.bas@

gtnet.gov.uk). This is a small team of six personnel

whose focus is the conceptual and doctrinal

development of the Army’s Command, Intelligence,

Surveillance, Target Acquisition and

Reconnaissance capabilities in a joint and multinational context, with particular emphasis on the

exploitation of information age technologies. All of

the serving authors attended the Army’s Command

and Staff Course. The views they have expressed

are entirely their own.

Colonel Richard Cousens has an infantry

background and commanded a regular infantry

battalion in the airmobile and mechanised roles. He

served for 3 years in the USA as senior British

Liaison Officer to the US Army, where he was

involved in both the Force XXI and Army After Next

Experiments. It was during this period that he

became interested in the conceptual implications of

digitization. He subsequently became responsible

for infantry Force Development and was, until

recently, Director Defence Studies (Army) working

for the Director General Development and Doctrine. 

Colonel David Potts has an artillery background

and commanded a regular regiment in the depth fire

and target acquisition roles. He has served at unit
level in the UK, Germany, Northern Ireland, Belize

and with the UN. He served on the staff in the UK

MOD Joint Operations Centre during the Gulf War

and the humanitarian relief operation in Northern

Iraq and was Military Assistant to two successive

Army Board members. For the past two years he has

been responsible for the development of the British

Army’s Command and ISTAR capabilities. He holds

a bachelor’s degree in American Studies from

Nottingham University and Carroll College,

Wisconsin, and won the Commandant’s Prize on the

Army Command and Staff Course in 1989. He was

appointed a MBE in 1991.

Lieutenant Colonel Tim Blad is an Engineer

officer who has served in the UK, Germany and

Northern Ireland. He has extensive experience on

the Staff and has been active in international

command and control interoperability for the past

three years, particularly in the fields of information

exchange requirements, messaging and

symbology. He chairs and attends a very wide

range of international panels and working groups in

NATO, ABCA and other fora. He recently moved

within Upavon to become the co-ordinating focus for

all of the Directorate’s international activity. He

holds a master’s degree from Cambridge in

engineering and law.

Lieutenant Colonel Graham Le Fevre has a

background in ISTAR at the Strategic, Operational

and Tactical levels. He has served in ISTAR related

posts in the UK, Northern Ireland and Germany. He

has been an instructor at Sandhurst and an

exchange officer with the US Army working within

330 The Big Issue
their digitization programme. He was the senior J2

officer within the British Joint Task Force

Headquarters on Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone.

His responsibilities within Command Development

Branch were the authorship and coordination of panArmy ISTAR concepts and doctrine. He holds a

bachelor’s degree in Mediaeval and Modern History

and a master’s in Military Studies. He recently left

Command Development Branch to command a

Military Intelligence battalion.

Lieutenant Colonel John Russell is an infantry

officer. He has had extensive service in Northern

Ireland and during the 1980s with the British Army of

the Rhine in Germany. In 2000 he served as the HQ

KFOR liaison officer to the Kosovo Protection Corps.

For the past year he has been working as a member

of the Army’s Force Development Branch,

responsible for the long-term development of the

future British Army. He holds a bachelor’s degree in

Geography, Modern History and Archaeology and

was appointed a MBE in 1992.

Lieutenant Colonel Jim Storr is an infantry officer

with considerable experience of working in army and

joint force headquarters. Recent appointments

include work on battlefield digitization and

operational research. He has a bachelor’s degree in

civil engineering, a master’s in defence technology,

and will submit his doctoral research thesis on ‘The

Nature of Military Thought’ in May 2002. He won the

Royal United Services Institute’s Trench Gascoigne

Prize in 2000 and is a member of MENSA.

About the Authors 331
Lieutenant Colonel Jake Thackray is a Signals

officer and has served in regimental appointments in

England, Northern Ireland and Germany. He studied

at the Royal Military College of Science at

Shrivenham for his bachelor and masters degrees,

both of which were related to the development of

Information Age military technologies. He was

Deputy Chief of Staff for logistics, personnel and

administration with the British Army’s 7th Armoured

Brigade and later commanded a brigade signals

squadron. He recently left Command Development

Branch and now commands a Signals Regiment

providing support to NATO’s Allied Command

Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

Lieutenant Colonel John Thornton is a Royal Tank

Regiment Officer who has seen regimental service in

UK and Germany. He has served on the staff of a

brigade headquarters in the UK; with Headquarters

ARRC in Germany; as a member of the Directing

Staff at the Royal Military College of Science,

Shrivenham; and on the seagoing staff of the UK

maritime component commander. His current

responsibilities are the development of concepts for

Ground Manoeuvre; including armoured forces,

manned reconnaissance and urban operations. He

is also the focal point in the Directorate for the future

development of the UK contribution to the ARRC. He

holds an honours degree in Humanities.

Paul Lefever, in ‘a former existence’, carried out

regimental duties in Northern Ireland and Germany,

attended the National Defence College and was a

staff officer in NATO Headquarters. He also filled

Attaché and Adviser posts behind the Iron Curtain

332 The Big Issue
and in the New World. He is now a Senior

Intelligence Officer, whose principal responsibilities

are the development of national and international

Land intelligence doctrine and the design of

intelligence databases. He is both author and editor

of a range of NATO publications and Standardisation

Agreements dealing with the derivation, recording

and exchange of information and intelligence data in

the multinational environment. He is a leading

member of a variety of international intelligence and

intelligence related working groups.

About the Authors 333