Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

CARA SCHAEFER WIENEKE GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Plainfield, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

RICHARD C. WEBSTER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

CHRISTOPHER DeMOSS, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 84A05-1408-CR-235

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable David R. Bolk, Judge

Cause No. 84D03-0601-FA-337

December 9, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RILEY, Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Christopher DeMoss (DeMoss), appeals the trial court’s 

revocation of his probation. 

We affirm.

ISSUE

DeMoss raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether 

fundamental error occurred when the trial court revoked DeMoss’ probation on the basis 

of hearsay evidence. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 5, 2006, DeMoss entered into a plea agreement with the State, 

pleading guilty to two Counts of Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine, one Count 

of Class D felony dealing in marijuana, and one Count of Class D felony possession of a 

controlled substance. On October 30, 2006, pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, 

the trial court sentenced DeMoss to an aggregate term of twelve years, with four years 

suspended to probation.

On June 27, 2012, DeMoss was advised of and signed the terms of his probation. 

Thereafter, on October 24, 2012, the trial court granted DeMoss’ request to transfer his 

probation from Vigo County to Pike County. In February 2013, DeMoss admitted to 

violating his terms of probation by testing positive for methamphetamine and served a 

thirty-day sentence. In July 2013, the State file a second notice of probation violation 

after DeMoss was charged with two drug-related offenses.
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On January 23, 2014, the Vigo County Probation Department filed a third notice 

of probation violation, arguing that DeMoss violated the terms of his probation by failing 

to report to the Pike County Probation Department for scheduled appointments on 

November 13, 2013 and January 22, 2014, and by failing to advise the Pike County 

Probation Department of his changed address and telephone number. On March 27, 

2014, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. During this hearing, DeMoss’ 

Vigo County Probation Officer testified that his colleague with the Pike County 

Probation Department had sent him a report, alerting him of DeMoss’ failure to report 

and update his contact information. Finding the evidence “reasonably reliable,” the trial 

court concluded that DeMoss had violated the terms of his probation and sentenced him 

to serve three years of his previously suspended sentence. (Transcript p. 25).

DeMoss now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

Probation is a favor granted by the State and is not a right to which a criminal 

defendant is entitled. Sparks v. State, 983 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The 

decision to revoke probation lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. Thus, 

a trial court’s decision to revoke probation and its subsequent sentencing decision are

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. A probation revocation proceeding is in the 

nature of a civil proceeding, and, therefore, the alleged violation need be established only 

by a preponderance of the evidence. Jenkins v. State, 956 N.E.2d at 146, 148 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2011), trans. denied. Violation of a single condition is sufficient to revoke 
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probation. Id. As with other sufficiency issues, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge 

the credibility of witnesses. Id. We look only to the evidence which supports the 

judgment and any reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Id. If there is substantial 

evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s decision that the probationer 

committed a violation, revocation of probation is appropriate. Id. 

II. Analysis

DeMoss contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it relied only on 

hearsay evidence, which it characterized as “reasonably reliable,” to revoke his probation. 

(Tr. p. 25). Because the Rules of Evidence do not apply in probation revocation hearings, 

the general rule against hearsay is inapplicable. See Ind. Evidence R. 101(d)(2). 

Nevertheless, due process principles applicable in probation revocation hearings afford 

the probationer the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Figures v. 

State, 920 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Yet because the due process right 

applicable in probation revocation hearings allows for procedures that are more flexible 

than in criminal prosecutions, the right to confrontation and cross-examination is 

narrower than in a criminal trial. Id. For these reasons, the general rule is that hearsay 

evidence may be admitted without violating a probationer’s right to confrontation if the 

trial court finds the hearsay is substantially trustworthy. Id. Ideally, the trial court should 

explain on the record why the hearsay is substantially trustworthy or sufficiently reliable 

to be admissible. Id.

Regardless, a claim of error in the admission of evidence is generally not available 

for argument on appeal unless a specific objection to the evidence was made in a timely 
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manner during trial. Evid. R. 103(a). Failure to timely object, as here, results in waiver 

of the suppression claim. However, a claim that has been waived by a defendant’s failure 

to raise a contemporaneous objection can be reviewed on appeal if the reviewing court 

determines that a fundamental error occurred. Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 

2010), reh’g denied. The fundamental error doctrine is extremely narrow and applies 

only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or 

potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental 

due process. Id. This exception is available only in egregious circumstances. Id.

In support of his argument, DeMoss refers this court to Mateyko v. State, 901 

N.E.2d 554, 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, in which we reversed a revocation of 

probation based on an erroneous admission of hearsay evidence. However, we find 

Mateyko readily distinguishable as the court relied on hearsay within hearsay within 

hearsay, a triple layer of hearsay, which is absent in the case at bar.

At the evidentiary hearing, Steven Bell (Bell), DeMoss’ Vigo County Probation 

Officer, testified that he had been alerted by DeMoss’ Pike County Probation Officer that 

he had missed two scheduled appointments and had failed to keep his information 

updated. Bell clarified that while he did not talk with the Pike County Probation Officer 

in person, he had received his written report. During his testimony, DeMoss informed 

the court that he had failed to attend the two scheduled appointments because he did not 

know he was supposed to report on those dates. The trial court deemed the testimony of 

the Vigo County Probation Officer “reasonably reliable” and revoked DeMoss’ 

probation. (Tr. p. 25).
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While we agree that the trial court applied a different standard than the 

requirement of substantial trustworthiness imposed by the supreme court, we find that 

Bell’s testimony nonetheless fell within this ambit. See Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 

440 (Ind. 2007). The information relied upon to revoke DeMoss’ probation was a report 

conveyed from one probation officer to another concerning a mutual client. DeMoss did 

not establish that either probation officer had any reason or motive to fabricate the 

allegations or to be untruthful in the report and testimony. As such, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion, let alone commit a fundamental error, in relying on the Probation 

Officer’s hearsay testimony, which was substantially trustworthy, as a basis for revoking 

DeMoss’ probation. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly revoked 

DeMoss’ probation.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J. and VAIDIK, J. concur