COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00180-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF R.L.G., JR., 

A CHILD

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FROM THE 393RD DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant R.L.G. Sr. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s judgment 

terminating his parental rights to his eight-year-old son, R.L.G. Jr. (R.L.G.). B.R.C. 

(Mother) does not appeal from the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to 

R.L.G. Because we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the 

termination, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

In part of his issue, Father challenges his affidavit of voluntary relinquishment 

on the ground of incompetence. In addition to finding that termination of the parentchild relationship was in R.L.G.’s best interest and that Father had executed an 

irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment, however, the trial court also found that Father

had

knowingly placed or allowed R.L.G. to remain in conditions or surroundings 

which endangered his physical or emotional well-being;

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically 

established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of R.L.G., who 

had been in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Texas 

Department of Family and Protective Services (TDFPS) for not less than nine 

months as a result of his removal from Father for abuse or neglect; and

constructively abandoned R.L.G., who had been in the temporary managing 

conservatorship of TDFPS for not less than six months, and TDFPS made 

reasonable efforts to return R.L.G. to Father, Father did not regularly visit or 

maintain significant contact with R.L.G., and he demonstrated an inability to 

provide R.L.G. with a safe environment.

2

Father did not challenge these three findings. Along with a best interest 

finding, a finding of only one ground alleged under section 161.001(1) is sufficient to 

support a judgment of termination. 3 We therefore overrule this portion of his issue. 4

 

2See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (N)–(O) (West Supp. 2012).

3

In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); In re E.M.N., 221 S.W.3d 815, 

821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).

4See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(N)–(O), (2); A.V., 113 S.W.3d at362; 

In re K.W., 335 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.).
3

In the remainder of his issue, Father contends that the evidence is factually 

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is 

in R.L.G.’s best interest.

A parent’s rights to “the companionship, care, custody, and management” of 

his or her children are constitutional interests “far more precious than any property 

right.”5 “While parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute. 

Just as it is imperative for courts to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the 

parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical interests of 

the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right.” 6

In a termination case, the State seeks not just to limit parental rights but to 

erase them permanently—to divest the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, 

duties, and powers normally existing between them, except for the child’s right to 

inherit.7 We strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe 

involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. 8

In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under section 

161.001 of the family code, the petitioner must establish one ground listed under 

 

5Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982); In 

re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003).

6

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).

7

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.206(b) (West 2008); Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 

18, 20 (Tex. 1985).

8Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20–21; In re R.R., 294 S.W.3d 213, 233 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
4

subsection (1) of the statute and must also prove that termination is in the best 

interest of the child.9

Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.10 

Evidence is clear and convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a 

firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” 11 

Due process demands this heightened standard because termination results in 

permanent, irrevocable changes for the parent and child. 12

In reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to the 

factfinder’s findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own. 13 We determine 

whether, on the entire record, the factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction 

or belief that the termination of the parent-child relationship would be in the best 

interest of the child.14 If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a 

reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant 

 

9

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005).

10Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; see also id. § 161.206(a) (West 2008).

11Id. § 101.007 (West 2008).

12In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 

611, 616 (Tex. 2007) (contrasting standards for termination and modification).

13In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006).

14Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.
5

that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction in the 

truth of its finding, then the evidence is factually insufficient. 15

There is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the 

child’s best interest. 16 Prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe 

environment is also presumed to be in the child’s best interest. 17 The following 

factors should be considered in evaluating the parent’s willingness and ability to 

provide the child with a safe environment:

(1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities;

(2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements;

(3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to 

the child;

(4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after 

the initial report and intervention by the department or other 

agency;

(5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the 

child’s home;

(6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental 

evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family 

members, or others who have access to the child’s home;

(7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by 

the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home;

(8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s 

family or others who have access to the child’s home;

 

15H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.

16In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006).

17Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a) (West 2008).
6

(9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified;

(10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, 

accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with 

and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision;

(11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect 

positive environmental and personal changes within a 

reasonable period of time;

(12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting 

skills, including providing the child and other children under the 

family’s care with:

(A) minimally adequate health and nutritional care;

(B) care, nurturance, and appropriate discipline consistent 

with the child’s physical and psychological development;

(C) guidance and supervision consistent with the child’s 

safety;

(D) a safe physical home environment;

(E) protection from repeated exposure to violence even 

though the violence may not be directed at the child; and

(F) an understanding of the child’s needs and capabilities; 

and

(13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an 

extended family and friends is available to the child. 18

Other, nonexclusive factors that the trier of fact in a termination case may use 

in determining the best interest of the child include:

(A) the desires of the child;

(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in 

the future;

 

18Id. § 263.307(b); R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 116.
7

(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in 

the future;

(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;

(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to 

promote the best interest of the child;

(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the 

agency seeking custody;

(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;

(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that 

the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and

(I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.19

These factors are not exhaustive. 20 Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just 

one factor may be sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that termination 

is in the best interest of the child. 21 On the other hand, the presence of scant 

evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a finding. 22

Findings of fact are the exclusive province of the factfinder. 23 Findings of fact 

entered in a case tried to the court have the same force and dignity as a jury’s 

 

19Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted).

20C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27.

21Id.

22Id.

23Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 742, 744–45 (Tex. 

1986).
8

answers to jury questions. 24 The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewable for legal 

and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support them by the same standards that 

are applied in reviewing evidence supporting a jury’s answer. 25

But when findings of fact are filed and are unchallenged, they occupy the 

same position and are entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury; they are 

binding on an appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or 

there is no evidence to support the finding. 26

In addition to the ultimate findings located in the decree, the trial court also 

entered the following unchallenged findings of fact,

12. The Court finds the testimony of Stephanie Kolb, Adam 

Soyars, [Mother], Katrina Young, and Amanda Mention to 

be credible.

13. [Father and Mother’s] relationship was characterized with 

frequent arguments, involving yelling and screaming, in 

the presence of [R.L.G.] and [T.M., Father’s teenage 

daughter]. [Father and Mother] engaged in throwing items 

and breaking items during arguments.

14. [Father and Mother] engaged in physical fighting in the 

presence of [R.L.G.]

15. [R.L.G.] yelled and screamed at [Father and Mother] to

stop and would physically intervene during the arguments 

between [them].

 

24Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991).

25Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 

S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994).

26McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); Rischon Dev. 

Corp. v. City of Keller, 242 S.W.3d 161, 166 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. 

denied), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 996 (2008).
9

16. [Father and Mother] engaged in recurring illegal drug use, 

including, cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamines, in 

the presence of and while caring for [R.L.G.]

17. Drug use by [Father] began when [R.L.G.] was an infant.

18. [Father] was aware of [Mother’s] recurring illegal drug use; 

yet, he permitted [] her to care for [R.L.G.]

19. [Mother] engaged in recurring prescription drug abuse in 

the presence of and while caring for [R.L.G.]

20. [Father] engaged in recurring prescription drug abuse in 

the presence of and while caring for [R.L.G.]

21. [Father] illegally sold his prescription pain medication in 

the presence of [R.L.G.] numerous times.

22. [Father and Mother] experienced instability in their 

housing situation, moving approximately 20 times with 

[R.L.G.]

23. [Father and Mother] depended on family members and 

community resources to meet their needs and the child’s 

needs.

24. [R.L.G.] attended numerous schools due to his frequent 

moves in residences while living with his parents.

25. [R.L.G.] displayed destructive behaviors while living with 

his parents . . . . Those behaviors include[] throwing 

items; temper tantrums; yelling and screaming; hitting and 

punching himself; and crying excessively.

26. [R.L.G.] was diagnosed with ADHD while in the care of his 

parents.

27. [Mother and Father] did not provide consistent mental 

health treatment for [R.L.G.’s] ADHD.

28. [Mother] overdosed on prescription medication in late 

December 2009 in the presence of [R.L.G.]

29. Prior to [her] overdose in December 2009, [Father] was 

aware of [Mother] abusing various prescription 
10

medications and continued to allow [her] to have 

unsupervised access to [R.L.G.]

30. [B.G.], a brother to [Father], has a history of drug abuse 

and his parental rights to his own children were 

terminated.

31. [D.G.], the wife to [B.G.], has a history of drug abuse and 

her parental rights to her children were terminated.

32. [Father] permitted [B.G. and D.G.] to have contact with 

[R.L.G.], including staying at his residence overnight.

33. [TDFPS] received a referral on or about January 7, 2010 

regarding [Mother, Father, T.M., and R.L.G.]

34. Stephanie Kolb, an employee of [TDFPS], investigated the 

report and spoke to [Mother, Father, T.M., and R.L.G.]

35. [T.M.] is the daughter of [Father] and the half sibling to 

[R.L.G.] She was living in the home with [Father, Mother, 

and R.L.G.]

36. [T.M.] was previously diagnosed with a mental health 

disorder and had a history of acting out violently. [Father] 

did not provide consistent mental health treatment for 

[her].

37. [Father] was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder in 2008.

38. [Father] admitted to Stephanie Kolb that he was not taking 

his prescription medication for his Bipolar Disorder.

39. [TDFPS] provided Family Based Safety Services to the 

family, consisting of [Mother, Father, T.M., and R.L.G.]

40. During the time [TDFPS] was offering Family Based 

Safety Services to [Father], he began a relationship with 

Misty Crader. Misty Crader met [Father] after her 

inpatient hospitalization at Wichita Falls State Hospital, a 

mental health hospital.
11

41. [Father] allowed Misty Crader and her children to move 

into the residence with him and [R.L.G.] after knowing her 

for only several weeks.

42. Misty Crader was at the time and is currently on probation 

for Injury to a Child for striking her own child.

43. On September 30, 2010, [Father and Mother] agreed to 

an Order to Participate in Services. The order prohibited 

[Father] from permitting Misty Crader contact with [R.L.G.] 

unless approved by [TDFPS].

44. On October 1, 2010, [Father] permitted Misty Crader to 

have contact with [R.L.G.]

45. On October 6, 2010, [Father] and Misty Crader discussed 

with Katrina Young the process to withdraw a child from 

the school district and transfer the child to Missouri 

schools.

46. [TDFPS] removed [R.L.G.] pursuant to court order under 

Tex. Fam. Code §262.102 on October 6, 2010.

47. An adversary hearing was held on October 29, 2010. 

[Father and Mother] appeared in person and with counsel. 

The Court entered temporary orders appointing [TDFPS] 

as temporary managing conservator of [R.L.G.] and made 

the requisite findings under Tex. Fam. Code §262.201.

48. On October 29, 2010, the Court entered temporary orders 

that specifically established the actions necessary for 

[Mother and Father] to obtain the return of [R.L.G.]

49. On October 29, 2010, [Father] was ordered by the Court 

to participate in the following services:

a psychological evaluation and follow the 

recommendations of the psychological evaluation;

participate in individual counseling and follow any and all 

recommendations and continue until no further sessions 

are necessary;
12

participate in a drug/alcohol assessment and follow any 

and all recommendations;

participate in parenting classes until completion;

submit to drug testing at the request of [TDFPS]; and

to participate in an intake/ evaluation at Denton County 

Mental Health Mental Retardation for treatment of his 

Bipolar disorder.

[Mother] was ordered to participate in substantially the 

same services.

50. [Mother and Father] were court ordered to establish and 

maintain safe and suitable housing and refrain from 

engaging in criminal activity.

51. [Mother and Father] were court ordered to establish and 

maintain suitable employment for a period of at least six 

months and continue through the pendency of the suit.

52. [Father] was ordered to have two visits weekly with 

[R.L.G.] [Father] missed over half of his visits with the 

child over the pendency of this case.

53. [Father] has not regularly visited or maintained significant 

contact with [R.L.G.]

54. [TDFPS] established counseling, parenting, drug 

treatment services, and a psychological evaluation for 

[Father] in Texas.

55. [R.L.G.] was returned to the care of [Mother] in June 2011 

and the Court modified the temporary orders under Tex. 

Fam. Code §263.403. In November 2011, [R.L.G.] was 

removed from the returned care of [Mother] after her 

overdose on prescription pills and the Court modified the 

temporary orders and established a new dismissal date.

56. [Father] moved several weeks after the adversary hearing 

out of state to Missouri with Misty Crader. [Father] moved 

residences multiple times during the case.
13

57. [Father’s] plan for [R.L.G.] includes living with Misty 

Crader and her children. Misty Crader’s daughter has a 

history of mental health hospitalizations and acting out 

aggressively.

58. Misty Crader has a history of marijuana use. Misty Crader 

has a history of not taking her prescription medication for 

treatment of her Bipolar Disorder. Misty Crader has a 

history of suicide attempts. Misty Crader has a prior 

history with [TDFPS]. Misty Crader has prior criminal 

charges involving assault in Missouri.

59. [Father] threatened suicide in February 2012 and had a 

suicide plan developed.

60. [Father] has demonstrated an inability to provide [R.L.G.] 

with a safe and stable environment.

61. [Father] did not successfully complete all of the 

services . . . which the court ordered.

62. [Father] has not been employed since approximately 

2008. [He] has no independent means to support a child.

. . . . 

66. [TDFPS] made reasonable efforts to return the child to 

[Father and Mother].

67. [TDFPS’s] plan for [R.L.G.] is adoption by a non-relative.

68. [R.L.G.] has appeared happier and less anxious since 

placement in his new foster home.

69. [R.L.G.] needs a safe and stable environment to thrive 

emotionally.

. . . . 
14

The record contains evidence to support all of these unchallenged findings; 

accordingly, we are bound by them.

27

Additionally, Mother, who voluntarily relinquished her rights, testified that she 

had learned that children with ADHD need structure and that she did not believe that 

Father could give R.L.G. that structure because “[Father] always puts himself first. 

He never thinks of [R.L.G.] A good example, he moved to Missouri instead of 

staying in Texas.” Mother also testified that she believed that Father’s parental 

rights to R.L.G. should be terminated “[b]ecause he cannot provide for [R.L.G.] 

mentally, physically, [and] stably.” She stated that she and Father “both do more 

harm to [R.L.G.] than good [and] always have.” She further stated that it would not 

be in R.L.G.’s best interest to be with Father because, in her opinion, Father could 

not provide for him, would not appropriately supervise him, chose to leave him with 

inappropriate caregivers, and was not always protective of him. She also did not 

believe that Father would be vigilant enough to make sure that R.L.G. took his 

medicine properly.

Mother testified that “since [R.L.G. has] been placed in the foster home that 

he’s in now, he’s a lot happier. He’s less anxious. He talks about his foster dad all 

the time. He’s very comfortable with him. And [she] believe[s] [that R.L.G. is] finally 

getting the support and stability that he needs.” She also testified that she believes 

that R.L.G. “wants to remain in the custody of his foster parents.” “He talks about 

 

27See McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 696; Rischon Dev. Corp., 242 S.W.3d at 

166.
15

[his foster dad] all the time. He’s very happy. He calls him dad. He needs 

structure. He’s getting structure.”

Consequently, reviewing all the evidence and giving due deference to the trial 

court’s findings, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial 

court’s best interest finding.

We overrule the remainder of Father’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DELIVERED: September 20, 2012