Filed 8/5/21 Hennessey v. Rasmussen CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MAUREEN HENNESSEY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JACOB RASMUSSEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B304904

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct.

 No. 19STRO08172)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Joshua D. Wayser, Judge. Affirmed.

Jacob Rasmussen, in pro. per., for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Shebby • Hirashima, David P. Shebby and Kristen 

Hirashima for Plaintiff and Respondent.

——————————
2

Maureen Hennessey obtained a five-year protective order 

under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. 

Code,

1 § 6200 et seq.) against Jacob Rasmussen because he 

stalked her and became threatening after she repeatedly told him 

that she did not want to continue their brief dating relationship. 

Rasmussen appeals from the issuance of the protective order. We 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

Viewing the record according to the applicable rules of 

appellate review (Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 

1140, 1143),2 the following facts emerge: Hennessey and 

Rasmussen work in different departments at the University of 

California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Rasmussen lives in Westwood; 

Hennessey lives in central Santa Monica. The two dated in 

January and February 2019. They were sexually intimate in 

February 2019. Hennessey then realized she was not 

romantically interested in Rasmussen. 

In mid-February, Hennessey went hiking with Rasmussen 

so she could tell him she was not interested in dating him. 

Rasmussen appeared not to comprehend her and made advances 

1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code 

unless otherwise indicated.

2 Rasmussen’s briefs improperly cite to many facts that are 

not part of the record on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.204(a)(1)(C) [appellant’s briefs must support any statement of 

fact with citation to the record]; id., rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) 

[appellant’s briefs must limit statements “to matters in the 

record” on appeal].) We cannot consider such facts and therefore 

decline to mention or address them. (Dhawan v. Biring (2015) 

241 Cal.App.4th 963, 967, fn. 7.)
3

by holding her hand, and hugging and squeezing her. Feeling 

very uncomfortable, Hennessey tried to keep her distance. She 

agreed to have lunch with Rasmussen twice in late February 

2019 to reiterate that she did not want to date him. 

In May 2019, as Hennessey was walking to her parking lot 

after work, Rasmussen ran up behind her. As he walked her to 

her car, he interrogated her about why she would not date him. 

His questions came faster and faster, and “appeared to be getting 

more frantic.” Hennessey made it clear she had no romantic 

interest in him and would not date him. Upon arrival at the car, 

Rasmussen stood “very close” to Hennessey and to her car, 

repeating his questions. She felt uncomfortable. He continued to 

question her. She told him to calm down and that she was 

leaving. 

In April and May 2019, Hennessey encountered Rasmussen 

in the hallway to her office. Rasmussen had a new job in which 

he periodically conducted meetings in the room next door. On 

several occasions, Rasmussen tried to stop Hennessey as she 

walked to the restroom, but she refused to engage with him. One

morning, Rasmussen and two others were walking toward 

Hennessey as she returned to her office. Rasmussen veered in 

her direction forcing her to hop to the side, turn sideways, and hit 

the wall to avoid colliding with him. Later, she encountered him 

again chatting with several people. He blocked her access to her 

office and in a loud voice said, “we should probably get lunch 

soon.” Embarrassed, and to get him to stop and move out of her 

way, she responded, “yeah maybe,” and darted into her office. 

The following day, Hennessey told Rasmussen that he had 

been unprofessional and had embarrassed her. Rasmussen 

insisted his behavior was justified because she had “ghosted” 
4

him. He repeatedly asserted that she could not treat him 

disrespectfully and that she owed him more. She begged him to 

leave her alone. He stood up, looked down at her, and yelled, 

“bipolar, anorexic, bitch!” Hennessey came to dread Mondays 

and to avoid using the restroom for fear she would encounter 

Rasmussen loitering in the hallway.

Hennessey believed the two additional times she ran into 

Rasmussen between May and September 2019 were coincidences. 

However, on September 25, 2019, at 6:15 p.m., she noticed 

Rasmussen jogging in front of her home and in front of her 

Pilates studio, which surprised her because he lived and worked 

seven miles away in Westwood. She met with an attorney.

On October 8, 2019, Hennessey’s ex-boyfriend Sammy Shon 

saw Rasmussen jogging up and down the street four times in 

front of Hennessey’s Pilates studio. Shon watched Rasmussen 

stop jogging and walk past Hennessey’s apartment building. 

Shon followed Rasmussen as he went to his car, and observed 

him as he drove back past the Pilates studio three more times. 

The next day, Shon watched Rasmussen drive past the Pilates 

studio. A week later, Shon saw Rasmussen walk by Hennessey’s 

apartment building and stare into the lobby. 

Hennessey hired a private investigation company whose 

employees followed Rasmussen, at approximately 5:00 p.m. on 

October 14, 15, and 28, 2019, as he drove 25 to 35 minutes from 

his Westwood home, along Sunset Boulevard, to Hennessey’s 

Santa Monica neighborhood. Each time, the employees 

photographed as Rasmussen jogged around Hennessey’s 

neighborhood and slowed to a walk in front of her Pilates class, 

and then drove 35 to 40 minutes back home. Out of fear for her 

safety, Hennessey began carrying pepper spray. 
5

On November 19, 2019, Hennessey’s attorney served 

Rasmussen with a cease-and-desist letter. Around midnight that 

night, Rasmussen sent an email to his boss, with copies to 

Hennessey and her boss, in which he emphasized he’d had a 

“private encounter” with Hennessey.

On November 26, 2019, Hennessey applied for a domestic 

violence restraining order against Rasmussen because her dating 

relationship with him had become threatening. Manny Tau, a 

clinical and forensic psychologist and “Certified Threat 

Manager,” declared in connection with Hennessey’s application 

that Rasmussen posed a “high threat potential for harassing, 

threatening[,] and unwanted-pursuit/stalking behaviors” towards 

Hennessey. 

The trial court issued a temporary order that same day, 

restraining Rasmussen from coming within 100 yards of 

Hennessey’s home, workplace, car, and the Pilates studio where 

Hennessey exercises. Rasmussen filed his own request for a 

restraining order two weeks later.

In December 2019, while the temporary restraining order 

protecting Hennessey was in effect, Shon saw Rasmussen within 

100 yards of the building in which Hennessey works and again 

within 100 yards of her Pilates studio.

At the close of the trial on Hennessey’s request for a 

permanent restraining order, the trial court stated, “[W]hat 

you’re saying to me is, no, it wasn’t stalking. It was just 

engaging in his usual pattern of behavior, and that’s really the 

heart of the matter, and it’s just a credibility call. I think that’s 

largely it. Am I missing something?” Rasmussen’s counsel 

replied, “No, Your Honor.” Declaring the “credibility call” to be 

“an easy one,” the court believed Hennessey and disbelieved 
6

Rasmussen’s story that he was simply exercising in Hennessey’s 

neighborhood, finding that Rasmussen’s case “just doesn’t add 

up.” The court also found that the testimony of a UCLA police 

officer, not included in the record on appeal, “set[ ] off lethality 

factor worries.” Finding Rasmussen to be stalking Hennessey, 

the trial court issued a permanent order restraining him from 

contacting, harassing, stalking, disturbing the peace of, or 

surveilling Hennessey, and ordering him to stay at least 

100 yards from her home, work, vehicle, and Pilates studio for 

five years. Rasmussen timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Rasmussen fails to demonstrate error.

A. Inadequate record and improper briefing

Rasmussen did not designate a complete record. He 

omitted his own testimony, that of Hennessey, and that of the 

UCLA Police Officer; and he included only part of the reporter’s 

transcript of the statement of decision. Rasmussen’s failure to 

carry his burden to provide an adequate record on a particular 

issue “ ‘requires that the issue be resolved against’ ” him. 

(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) Rasmussen moved 

to augment the record with numerous documents that were not 

before the trial court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.122(a)(1),

(b)(3)(A).) Augmentation cannot be used to supplement the 

record with materials not before the trial court. (Vons 
7

Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, 

fn. 3.)3 

B. Invited error and forfeiture

The DVPA defines domestic violence as “abuse perpetrated 

against,” among others, a “person with whom the respondent is 

having or has had a dating or engagement relationship.” (§ 6211, 

subd. (c).) The DVPA defines abuse to include placing “a person 

in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to 

that person or to another,” and stalking. (§§ 6203, subd. (a)(3) & 

6320, subd. (a).) 

Rasmussen contends that the trial court erred in finding 

that he was in a dating relationship with Hennessey. But in his 

own application for a domestic violence restraining order, 

Rasmussen checked off the box characterizing their relationship 

as follows: “We are dating or used to date, or we are or used to be 

engaged to be married.” (Italics added.) Having claimed in the 

trial court that he was in a dating relationship with Hennessey, 

Rasmussen cannot be heard to argue to the contrary on appeal. 

(Cf. Tri-Counties Assn. for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc. v. 

3 We grant Rasmussen’s January 6, 2021 motion to 

augment the record with the exhibits from volumes two through 

four of the motion, but as noted, we deny the motion to augment 

with the exhibits from volumes five and six because there is no 

indication these exhibits were filed or lodged with the trial court. 

(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.4th at 

p. 444, fn. 3.) Rasmussen’s second request for judicial notice filed 

on May 3, 2021, is denied in its entirety. (Ibid. [appellate courts 

do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to trial 

court].) Hennessey’s motion dated April 13, 2021, to take judicial 

notice of exhibits one through three is granted, but is denied as to 

exhibit four. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) 
8

Ventura County Public Guardian (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1129, 

1140–1141 [party estopped under invited error doctrine from 

challenging trial court’s finding made based on party’s 

assertion].)

Rasmussen next argues that the trial court erred in 

admitting the testimony of Hennessey’s private investigators 

because they were not licensed. At no time during trial, however, 

did Rasmussen object to the investigators’ testimony. Rather, 

Rasmussen’s attorney cross-examined each of those witnesses 

and elicited that the private investigators, who were not licensed, 

worked under a licensed investigator. Rasmussen’s counsel did 

not then move to strike the witnesses’ testimony. Rasmussen 

may not therefore claim now that the admission of the evidence 

was error (People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 924), and has 

forfeited the argument on appeal (People v. Dowl (2013) 

57 Cal.4th 1079, 1082).

C. We may not reassess the trial court’s credibility 

findings.

Many of Rasmussen’s contentions on appeal challenge the 

trial court’s evaluation of the evidence and of the witnesses’ 

credibility. Although the grant or denial of a protective order 

under the DVPA falls within the trial court’s discretion (Burquet 

v. Brumbaugh, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143), we review the 

court’s factual findings for sufficiency of the evidence (ibid.). 

Under that standard, we do not “weigh conflicts and disputes in 

the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact.” (Howard v. 

Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) Our review 

“ ‘ “ ‘begins and ends with the determination as to whether there 

is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which 

will support the finding of fact.’ [Citations.]” 
9

[Citation.] . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The test ‘is simply whether 

there is substantial evidence in favor of the [prevailing party]. If 

this “substantial” evidence is present, no matter how slight it 

may appear in comparison with the contradictory evidence, the 

judgment must be upheld. As a general rule, therefore, we will 

look only at the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting 

the successful party, and disregard the contrary showing.’ ” 

(People v. Overstock.com, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1079.)

Rasmussen appears to argue that Hennessey produced no 

evidence that he stalked her, whereas he had an innocent reason 

for his increasingly frequent presence in Hennessey’s 

neighborhood in the evenings, namely exercise. We cannot 

consider the myriad allegations in Rasmussen’s briefs, which are 

designed to support his defense below but which are unsupported 

by the record. Rather, the inadequate record Rasmussen has 

provided on appeal means we must resolve this issue against 

him. 

The evidence that the record does contain, moreover, amply 

supports the trial court’s finding that Rasmussen stalked 

Hennessey and disturbed her peace of mind. She declared that 

Rasmussen became aggressive and angry at her, and scared her 

when she reiterated that she did not want to see him. 

Rasmussen then became vicious and insulting and sought to 

embarrass her. Numerous witnesses described how Rasmussen 

frequently and repeatedly drove approximately 35 minutes from 

his home, in 5:00 p.m. traffic, to jog in a radius around 

Hennessey’s neighborhood, and how he slowed to a walk in front 

of her home and her Pilates studio. Shon related how Rasmussen 

violated the temporary restraining order in December 2019. In 

issuing the permanent restraining order, the trial court credited 
10

evidence introduced by Hennessey, and disbelieved Rasmussen’s 

explanation for his conduct. As Rasmussen’s attorney 

acknowledged to the court, at its core, the case called for a 

credibility assessment. We can neither reassess the trial court’s 

credibility finding nor reweigh the evidence. 

Rasmussen contends that the trial court improperly used 

“folklore, anecdote and invented facts[,] rather than law and 

evidence” in issuing the protective order, which violated his 

“constitutional right to Freedom of Movement.” Rasmussen cites 

to the portion of the reporter’s transcript in which the court

explained, based on personal experience, that Rasmussen’s 

explanation for being in Hennessey’s neighborhood—namely that 

he traveled out of his way in some of the worst traffic in Los 

Angeles simply to exercise—was nonsensical. The portions of the 

record Rasmussen cites demonstrate that the court did exactly as 

it is required to do: it used its common sense and experience—

not folklore and invented facts—when deciding whether to 

believe Rasmussen’s explanation for his behavior. (See In re 

H.M. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136, 144 [courts view evidence 

objectively and “through the lens of common sense and 

experience” in determining factual questions].) 

The contentions in the section of Rasmussen’s brief entitled 

the “STALKING VERDICT ISSUE” are unclear. It appears 

Rasmussen is arguing that the trial court engaged in favoritism 

because it based its finding on speculation about the “amount of 

money” Hennessey spent to obtain the protective order, and 

about whether she is mentally ill. Rasmussen recites the court’s 

statement that “Ms. Hennessey is either lulu, or she’s just been 

through the ringer about times ten, and she just spent a lot of 

time and money to protect herself, and I understand why she did. 
11

She was exactly right to.” The quoted statement is simply 

another explanation for why the court believed Hennessey’s view 

of the events over Rasmussen’s. When the trial court’s 

assessment of credibility and the evidence is based upon actual 

observation of the witnesses and the evidence introduced during 

trial, that assessment does not amount to improper bias or and 

prejudice merely because it appears to be adverse to the 

appellant. (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 

Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219.) That Rasmussen disagrees with the 

court’s conclusion does not make the order reversible.

Finally, Rasmussen contends that the trial court 

mischaracterized exhibit 12, the midnight email entitled 

“Harassment claim against Maureen Hennessey” that 

Rasmussen sent to his employer, Hennessey, and her boss, 

several hours after he was served with Hennessey’s cease-anddesist letter. In the email, Rasmussen wrote in very large font 

that he was involved in “a private encounter” with Hennessey. 

The court rejected Rasmussen’s attorney’s argument that 

Rasmussen sent that email to be a “responsible professional,”

stating, “one does not send an e-mail at twelve o’clock at night to 

one’s employer unless you want to communicate you’re under 

stress and then copying her boss . . . referring to an intimate 

relationship, using all caps, I believe.” Although Rasmussen’s 

email did not use the words “intimate relationship,” and did not 

use all capital letters, the court clearly disbelieved the letter was 

sent in a responsible and professional manner because of the 

hour at which it was sent, the very large font size, the recipients, 

and the gratuitous reference to a private encounter. 

More important, however, even assuming the trial court 

improperly mischaracterized the capitalization and the phrase 
12

“private encounter”—which, on the record presented, we do not 

conclude that it did—Rasmussen makes no effort to demonstrate 

prejudice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) “Reversal is justified ‘only 

when the [appellate] court, “after an examination of the entire 

cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is 

reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing 

party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (In 

re Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1098–1099.) Given 

the ample evidence supporting the restraining order, any 

mischaracterization of the capitalization and of the phrase 

“private encounter” in Rasmussen’s email is of no moment. It is 

simply not reasonably probable Rasmussen would obtain a 

different result absent the mischaracterization. On the contrary, 

the court’s lengthy explanation for its ruling—in the part of the 

transcript Rasmussen did include in the record on appeal—shows 

that the trial court acted well within its discretion in issuing the 

protective order. 
13

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Maureen Hennessey is awarded her 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

THOMAS, J.*

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

LAVIN, J.

*

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.