NO. 07-00-0183-CV

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

	SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL B

	MARCH __14, 2001

	__________________________________

	VERONICA BALLESTEROS AND ABEL REYNA, 

									Appellants

	v.

	TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PROTECTIVE AND REGULATORY SERVICES, 

									Appellees

	__________________________________

	FROM THE 106th JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR GARZA COUNTY;

	NO. 98-05-05411-CV; HON. GENE L. DULANEY, PRESIDING

	__________________________________

Before Boyd, C.J., and Quinn and Johnson, JJ.

	Veronica Ballesteros and Abel Reyna appeal from an order terminating their

parental rights.  Through two points of error, they contend that the trial court erred in failing

to appoint them legal counsel, in omitting to orally state the statutory grounds upon which

termination was warranted, and in basing its decision on an improper standard of proof. 

We overrule each point and affirm.

	Point One

	As previously mentioned, Ballesteros and Reyna initially argue that the trial court

erred in failing to appoint them counsel.  Statute requires the appointment of counsel to an “indigent” parent who responds in opposition to a suit seeking the termination of the parent-

child relationship.  Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.013(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2001); In re T.V., 8 S.W.3d 448, 449 (Tex. App.–Waco 1999, no pet.).  Though Ballesteros and Reyna

opposed termination of their parental rights neither proved that they were indigent, and,

therefore, entitled to appointed counsel.  Indeed, both represent in their appellate brief that

“there is no indication in the record that [they] were in fact indigent.”.  Furthermore, at trial,

Ballesteros informed the court that she had monies with which to hire counsel.  Given this

and the statutory requirement that counsel be appointed to those who are indigent, the trial

court did not err in omitting to appoint either an attorney.  

 	Point Two 

	Through point two, Ballesteros and Reyna assert that the trial court erred in

terminating their parental rights 1) without orally specifying the grounds upon which

termination was based and 2) after applying the wrong standard of proof.  See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §161.001 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (stating that the court must find by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a specified statutory ground before terminating the

parent-child relationship).  The record discloses that the trial judge did not specify any

particular statutory ground warranting termination when he orally announced his decision

at the end of trial.  So too does it disclose that he stated in open court that his decision was

based upon a “preponderance of the evidence.”.  However, the written findings of fact and

conclusions of law subsequently issued by the trial judge not only specified the statutory

grounds for his decision but also stated that the existence of those grounds was

established by clear and convincing evidence.  The latter findings being written, they

control over anything said or unsaid at trial.  Maeberry v. Gayle, 955 S.W.2d 875, 878 n.3 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.).  Thus, we cannot say that the trial court either

applied a wrong standard of proof or failed to base its decision on the existence of a

statutory ground for termination.

	Accordingly, we affirm.

									Brian Quinn

									    Justice

Do not publish.