Opinion issued August 28 , 2018

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 17
- 00488
- CV

——————————— ROBERT GULLEDGE AND DIANA GULLEDGE , Appellants V. WARREN WESTER AND TH EODORE SULLIVAN , Appellee s

On Appeal from the 10th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 16
- CV
- 1022

O P I N I O N In this negligen t nuisance case , Clear Lake Shores residents, Robert and Diana Gulledge , were permanently enjoined from finishing constructi o n of a second story deck on their boathouse after two neighbors complained that the tall structure would block their water views. The Gulledges appeal, contending that the re is legally and2

factually insuf

ficient evidence to support the nuisance claim and injunction

. Alternatively, they contend that the injunction i s broader than the pleadings and evidence permitted. We reverse and render. Background Roughly a dozen homes are located on Blue Point Road, a w aterfront community in Clear Lake Shores . The homes are located in a “unique area” of the Clear Lake channel, where the water is particularly deep and provides direct access to the Gulf of Mexico for large boats heading to sea. Through a licensing process with the State, residents can construct boathouses in the channel that function as garages for the ir boats. These combined features make the community attractive to people who own large boats and want to store them in attached boathouses. There are no othe r neighborhoods nearby with such deep

- water access. One expert testified that it is “very difficult to find water this deep up to a
residential lot. . . . It ’ s a very limited commodity, and it ’s very valuable.” The expert explained that there are only two places “in the Galveston Bay system ” where
someone can store boats 40

- feet and longer behind their homes. According to the expert, there is “a relationship between the depth of the water and what size boats you might expect people would be able to utilize or berth behind their houses on Blue Point Road.” And “if it ’ s a big boat, it ’ s going to require a big boathouse.”3

Another witness testified about the Blue Point subdivision, “You’re not limited to the size [boat] that you could bring in.”
Th us, th e abil ity to store a large boat at your home rather than at a marina is one of the attractions of the Blue Point subdivision

. There are also aesthetic features that make the neighborhood attractive to homeowners . To varying degrees, community residents have vie ws of the channel, Seabrook Shipyard, and the nearby Kemah bridge. From their properties , they can watch local boat parades and the “very busy” passing boat traffic entering and exiting
the channel. The Blue Point subdivision homeowners are bound by variou s community restrictions , including a restriction that home structures cannot be placed within five feet of the property lines or the water line . B ut there are no community or city restrictions regarding the height of residents’ boathouses. The v iew of the channel and other features is impacted by the size and design of neighbor ing boathouses. Many are close to 20 feet tall , and at least one is 25 feet tall

. 1 They have varying lengths to accommodate the boats being stored, and one boathouse is 81 feet long.
Some boathouses have an open design , while others are enclosed

. Without community restrictions, Blue Point residents do not have complete control over their

1 According to a boathou se architect, the average heights vary from 14 to 28 feet. He has never designed a boathouse larger than 34 feet tall.4

water views, and the size and type of boathouse their neighbors chose to construct has the potentia l to diminish the ir water views

. T he homes on Blue Point Drive run north

- south, and the channel is to the east of the homes. In 2011, Robert and Diana Gulledge bought a home between the homes of Warren Wester and Theodore Sullivan

. Their homes, relative t o one another , are shown on the diagram below:

The lots are relatively narrow . M ost are 50 feet wide , but Sullivan’s is 70 feet

w ide. Like many of their neighbors , the Gulledges had a boathouse , which held a
40

- foot boat

. In 2015 , they bought a larger , 55

- foot Azimut yacht and decided to construct a larger boathouse to store it. Their design called for a 60

- feet long and 20

-5

feet wide boathouse with a height of 25 feet above mean tide . T his height was necessary to provide sufficient clearance for the Az imut. 2
The Gulledges submitted a construction application to the State’s General Land Office. This was required because the community’s boathouses are not located on private land s ; they are located on State land . The GLO approves plans and grants
a coasta l easement that leases the State’s submerged land for use as a boathouse . The
GLO reviews a proposed boathouse’s footprint but not its height. Thus, the GLO reviews a boathouse ’ s length into the channel for navigation purposes but does not review its aesthetic impact. As part of the permitting process, GLO notified the Gulledges’ neighbors of their application and offered an opportunity to object. Sullivan objected to the proposed boathouse’s original location , asserting that it was too close to his p roperty line and made access to his boathouse more difficult. After meeting with the GLO and Sullivan, the Gulledges agreed to move the ir proposed boathouse closer to the Wester property to the south and to knock down their existing boathouse, which was on ly two years old at the time. Sullivan agreed to withdraw his objection. After they submitted their original construction plans, the Gulledges noticed that some other boathouses in Galveston County (but not in the Blue Point

2 The yacht is over 20 feet tall, sleeps six people, and has three cabins and a small kitchen.6

subdivision) had covered roofto p decks. Robert Gulledge testified that a deck on top of the ir boathouse would provide an area to socialize with family and friends and a clearer view of the boats coming down the channel. The Gulledges revised their plans to include a deck 25 feet above t he water level, with an aluminum

- covered roof at least 10 feet above the deck. 3 The second story, like the first, would not be enclosed, but it would have a spiral staircase, side railings, “minimal” lighting, diagonal braces , and a small cargo lift withou t sides . The roof over the 1200

- square feet deck would be supported by piers, and the new height of the boathouse would be 39.5 feet instead of the original 25

- f ee t height

. Wester and Sullivan objected to the redesign, asserting that the second story woul d block their view of the waterway. They testified that they had no objection to a boathouse that was comparable in height to their own

— around 17 feet high

— or to the first design for a 25

- foot boathouse . The GLO informed Wester and Sullivan that it does no t regulate boathouse height. 4 The GLO approved the Gulledges’ boathouse footprint and construction began

.

3 The deck’s rooftop has a peak that is 3

- f ee t 6

- inches high. According to expert testimony from an architect, if the roof was removed but the deck remained, a guardrail would still be required under applicable building codes.

4 The GLO did, however, charge the Gul ledges an additional fee for the ir boathouse’s second story, which is the agency’s custom because of the risk of increased debris in the water after a storm.7

After the Gulledges obtained the GLO’s authorization and beg a n the boathouse construction , Wester and Sullivan initiated the underlying suit , assert ing claims for intentional private nuisance, negligent private nuisance, and invasion of privacy. Wester and Sullivan focused their suit on and limited their request for injunctive relief to the second story. At trial, Wester and Sullivan each testified th at the Gulledges’ proposed boathouse blocked the water view from their property and that the boathouse was significantly larger than any other in the area. Wester and Sullivan each also stated

— and photographs confirm

— that the second story deck allows its o ccupants to look down into their backyards. Additionally, Wester testified about some adverse health effects he attributes to the presence of the oversized boathouse , including high er blood pressure. Wester and Sullivan also presented testimony from two ot her residents who agreed that the Gulledges’ boathouse was unlike the others i n the neighborhood . One testified that, if the Gulledges had built that boathouse next to his property, he would have move d . The other testified that the Gulledges’ boathouse block s his water view as well

. A local realtor testified that the Gulledges’ boathouse would decrease the
value of Wester ’s and Sullivan’s properties because of the diminished view , but he did not quantify the difference in value . He also testified that it would be harder to8

sell Wester ’s and Sullivan’s propert ies because the Gulledges’ boathouse was “out of character.” The Gulledges presented counter testimony from two neighbors that they were not bothered by the Gulledges’ boathouse. They also presented t he testimony of another realtor, who testified that the Gulledges’ boathouse would benefit the value of the neighborhood properties by showing prospective buyers the potential to build larger boathouses in the community

. Wester and Sullivan assert that th e second story of the Gulledges’ boathouse obstructs their water view. The Gulledges’ boathouse does not have siding; therefore, when empty, it only partially blocks the view the first 25 feet above water, but there would be additional view obstruction due to the planned railing, diagonal braces, and staircase leading to the second

- story deck, as well as the proposed copper roof and gutter in the upper portion of the two

- story structure and the piers that support the nearly 40

- feet tall structure. When the Gulledges’ yacht is docked, the view would be more obstructed on the lower level , though the upper deck level would be unaffected. But i t is undisputed that each Blue Point resident’s view is blocked to varying degrees by their neighbors’ boathouses. The Sullivan’s boathouse is 17 feet tall and
has solid

- wood siding; therefore, it completely blocks the Gulledges’ north

- eastern view for the first 17 feet above water level. Robert Gulledge’s brother, Jed , owns9

land in the community and has a boathouse that i s roughly 26 feet tall and 60 feet long. Another neighbor , Williams Keys , has a boathouse that is 81 feet long. And , to the extent some of the boathouses are not enclosed, when their owners have their boats docked, their neighbors’ views are obstructed by the docked boats. Moreover,
t he Gulledges’ yacht is not the only large boat in the neighborhood; at least two other homeowners have yachts. Additional view obstruction is caused by landscaping choices. For example, Sullivan has a number of trees and extensive vegetation on his land that partially obstruct the Gulledges’ view.
S till more potential view obstruction may result from the homes themselves.
T he community restrictions permit residents to build two

- story homes as close as five feet from their neighbor’s property line and the waterline. A two

- story house 5 that is five feet from the waterline would partially obs truct the water views from the neighboring properties. The se visual obstructions , however, are less significant from each owner’s second story. All three homeowners involved in this suit

— the Gulledges, Sullivan, and Wester

— have two

- story homes , and their second stor ies are roughly 17 feet high and hav e large window s to provide a view of the channel. According to Robert

5 Jed Gulledge has a home on Blue Point Road that is 55 feet above the normal tide of channel.10

Gulledge, each owner can see passing ships and the Kemah bridge from their second
sto ries even when his yacht is parked in the boathouse be cause of the difference between his boat height (21.5 feet) and the deck floor (25 feet) and because of the absence of siding on his boathouse. The jury found that the Gulledges did not intentionally cause a nuisance and that the boathouse did not invade Wester and Sullivan’s privacy

. The jury found the Gulledges liable for negligent nuisance but awarded no past damages. After trial, the trial court rendered a judgment for negligent nuisance, including a permanent injunction. The permanent injunction limit ed the roof height of the Gulledges’ boathouse to 25 feet above mean high tide and prohibited use of the deck for social gatherings. Standard of Review In a legal

- sufficiency review, the court determines whether reasonable and fair

- minded people could arri ve at the factfinder’s conclusion, after considering all evidence that supports the verdict and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We will conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding only if ( 1 ) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, ( 2 ) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, ( 3 ) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more11

than a mere scintilla, or ( 4 ) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. Id. at 810. We review the evidence in the ligh t most favorable to the judgment. Id. at 822. Negligent Nuisance In their first issue, t he Gulledges challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the negligent nuisance claim. A. Definition of nuisance
T he Texas Supreme Court recently undertook the task of clarifying private nuisance law. See Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner , 505 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2016)

. The Court explained that the law of “nuisance” seeks to balance a property owner’s right to use his property “as he chooses in any lawful way” against his duty

to refrain from using it in a way that “injure[s] another.” Id. at 590

– 91 ( quoting Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Oakes , 58 S.W. 999, 1000 ( Tex. 1900)). With that principle in mind, the Court defined “ nuisance ” as “ a condition that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities attempting to use and enjoy it.” Id. at 593 (quoting Holubec v. Brandenberger , 111 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2003 ) )

. A ccording to the Crosstex Court , a nuisance does not refer to a cause of action but instead to “ the particular type of legal injury that can support a claim or cause of action seeking legal relief.” I d. at 594 . “ T he law of nuisance recognizes that certain12

injuries to a person ’ s right to the ‘ use and enjoyment of property ’ can . . . constitute a form of legal injury for which a legal remedy will be granted. ” Id. at 59 4

. The Court explained that “ the condition the defendant causes may interfere with a wide variety of the plaintiffs ’ interests in the use and enjoyment of their property. It may, for example, cause physical damage to the plaintiffs ’ property, economic harm to the property ’ s market value, harm to th e plaintiffs ’ health, or psychological harm to the plaintiffs ’ ‘ peace of mind ’ in the use and enjoyment of their property. ” Id. at 596. In fact, the Court explained, “ v irtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of the property may amount to a nuisance.” Id. at 59 6 ( quoting
W ILLIAM L. P ROSSER , L AW OF T ORTS § 90 (3d ed. 1964 ) )

. But , importantly here, to rise to the level of nuisance, the interference must satisfy two other requirements: it must (1) be “substantial” in light of all the
circumstances and (2) cause “discomfort or annoyance” that is “unreasonable.” Id. at 595. 6

6 The Court explained , for instance, that “while noises or odors from a horse stable might occasionally or minimally interfere with the enjoyment of neighboring land, they can create a nuisance only if the stable is so kept, or so used, as to destroy the co mfort of persons owning and occupying adjoining premises, and impair their value. ” Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner , 505 S.W.3d 580 , 595 (Tex. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted)

. Similarly, “ because gunpowder must be stored somewhere, its storage can create a nuisance when it is a constant source of apprehension and alarm, prevents the plaintiffs from renting their land at any price, and substantially reduces the land ’ s market value .” Id. (internal quotations and citations om itted)

.13

The first limitation

— the substantiality requirement

— “ sets a minimum thresh old that confirms that the law ‘ does n ot concern itself with trifles, or seek to remedy all of the petty annoyances and disturbances of every day life in a civilized community even from conduct committed with knowledge that annoyance and inconvenience will result. ’ ” Id . at 59 5 (quoting W. P AGE K EETON ET AL ., P ROSSER &
K EETON O N T ORTS § 8 6 (5 th ed. 1984))

. T he Court emphasized that foul odors, dust, noise, and bright lights must be “sufficiently extreme ” to constitute a nuisance. Id. at 595 n.8. 7 In determining whether the interference is substantial, a court may review whether the use impairs the adjoining property’s market value. Id

. at 595. The substantiality test is fact

- specific and includes , “ for example, the nature and extent of the interference, and how long the interference lasts or how often it recurs. ” Id . at 595

– 96. The second limitation is that the “discomfort or annoyance” must be unreasonable

— i.e, that ‘“the harm resulting from the invasion is severe and greater than the other should be required to bear without compensation.” Id . at 596 (quoting

7 The C ourt quoted but added an emphasis to its 2004 opinion in Schneider Nat iona l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates , 147 S.W.3d 264, 269 (Tex. 2004), holding modified on other grounds, Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines (E. Tex.), L.P. , 449 S.W.3d 474 (Tex. 2014) , when it included the following sentence in footnote eight: “There is no question that foul odors, dust, noise, and bright lights

— if sufficiently extreme

— may c onstitute a nuisance.” Id . at 595 n.8.14

R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF T ORTS § 829A). 8 The Court emphasized that the unreasonableness inquiry focuses on the conduct’s effect, not the conduct itself, id. at 596

– 99 , and that the test is an objective one that views the effect from the standpoint of a “persons of ordinary se nsibilities

. ” I d. at 596, 599

– 600 . This reasonableness “ determination requires balancing a wide variety of factors, depending on the specific facts.” Id . at 596; see id. at 600

– 01 (“To establish a cause of action for which the law provides a right to relief,

. . . there must not only be an injury or loss but it must have been occasioned by the commission of a legal wrong, that is, violation of legal right and a breach of legal duty.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Finally, the Court set forth a liability standard of care. Id . at 604

. There are three classifications for private nuisance: intentional nuisance, negligent nuisance, and strict

- liability nuisance. Id. at 602, 604

– 609. A negligent nuisance “claim is governed by ordinary negligen ce principles.” Id. at 607. Accordingly, Wester and Sullivan were required to prove that the Gulledges owed them a duty, they breached the duty, and Wester and Sullivan suffered damages as a proximate cause of the breach. See id. In addition, Wester and Su llivan had to prove that the Gulledge s ’ “negligent conduct caused a nuisance, which in turn resulted in [Wester’s and

8 The Court also described t he nuisance created by a horse stable as “destroy[ing] the comfort of persons owning and occupying adjoining premises, and impair[ing] their value.” Id. at 595.15

Sullivan’s] damages.” Id. Thus, “a nuisance may result from ‘a failure to take precautions against a risk apparent to a reasonable man.’” Id . (quoting P ROSSER , L AW OF T ORTS § 88 ). B. Wester and Sullivan did not show a substantial interference that unreasonably a ffects their use and enjoyment of their property The Gulledges contend that a view impairment cannot support a nuisance claim

. On the other hand, Wester and Sullivan maintain that Crosstex left the issue of whether a nuisance exists to the jury. Id. at 609 (observing that questions of whether interference with use and enjoyment of property is “ substantial” or “the
effects of such an interference on the plaintiffs are unreasonable” are generally

“ questions of fact for the jury to decide”)

. 9
We conclude that it is unnecessary for us to determine whether Texas law, post

- Crosstex, erects a bright

- line barrier against all view

- impair me nt nuisance claims because there is legally insufficient evidence of a substantial inference that unreasonably a ffect s Wester’s and Sullivan’s u s e and enjoyment of the ir land. See
i d. at 609 (“A court may decide the issues as a matter of law only if the underlying facts are undisputed or, in light of all the evidence, reasonable minds cannot differ.” (internal quotations and citations omitted) )

. Whi l e the witnesses differ in their

9 See i d

. at 600 ( stating that “determination of whether a defendant’s interference with a plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of land is substantial or whether any particular effect of that interference is unreasonable requires consideration and balancin g of a multitude of factors”)

.16

conc lusions about the impact of the Gulledges’ boathouse, the photographs show the extent of the visual impairment , and the testimony regarding the neighborhood and other landowners ’ relative conduct is undisputed. We turn to applying the undisputed facts to t he Crosstex factors for measuring the impact of the boathouse’s
interference. First, we examine “the nature of the interference.” Id . at 609 . T here was no invasion onto the plaintiffs ’ property. Unlike cases where light, odor, or smoke invade an adjoining property , the eff ect of the Gulledges’ conduct was not on the plaintiffs’ land itself. Even if view impairment could potentially have economic or psychological effects, Wester and Sullivan did not present any expert testimony quantifying any economic harm. And the jury, in its response to the damages jury question, rejected a psychological harm claim: it fou nd that Wester and Sullivan did
not suffer any “damages for annoyance or discomfort, caused by a nuisance that impairs the use and enjoyment of real property.” Second, we consider “the character and nature of the neighborhood, each party’s land usage, and social expectations ” as well as “the extent to which others in
the vicinity are engag ing in similar conduct.” Id . at 600. These factors underscore that the record presents no substantial and unreasonable interference. T he unique characteristics of the subdivision and the channel show that the use of large boathouses (which impair water vie ws) is not unexpected. T here were no deed17

restrictions, city regulations, or GLO provisions that regulated the sizes of boathouses. T he subdivi si on landowners purchased their homes with knowledge that city regulations permitted homes to be built higher tha n the Gulledge’s boathouse
and as close as five feet from the water, which would create an even larger visual impairment than the Gulledges’ boathouse

. Wester and Sullivan knew that the channel was deep and led to Galveston Bay, making it a prime location for yachts. Indeed, they purchased their properties , in part, so they could watch parades of yachts and other boats. And if the landowners owned and temporarily docked a yacht outside their homes, the moored boats would block an adjoining neighbor’s view of the channel. If the yacht owners wanted to store their boat s adjacent to their own property, as Wester and Sullivan do for their boats, they would need comparatively large boathouses to store them. Indeed, Wester and Sullivan have boats and boathouses that would be viewed by many as large. Other landowners had yac hts even longer than the Gulledges’ new yacht, and boathouses are the one constant feature for all neighboring homes. Thus, social expectations were that homeowners could purchase the lots with the plan to store yachts there in their accompanying boathouse s. T he vegetation, particularly tall trees, creates additional visual obstructions . And the narrow lot size and resulting density , as well as the close proximity of the homes to their boathouses , add even more visual obstructions and present an obvious ris k of additional visual obstructions. As noted, Wester and18

Sullivan do not challenge all these present visual obstructions to their view. They instead challenge the open

- sided second story of the Gulledges’ boathouse. Considering the parties ’ reasonable exp ectations and the already present view impairment , this record presents no evidence that the second story of the boat house caused a substantial interference that unreasonably a ffected what Wester and Sullivan could and should have expected

. The “defendant’s motive” is another factor for determining whether any interference is substantial or its effects unreasonable

. Id

. T he jury rejected the claim of intentional interference. And the undisputed evidence showed that the Gulledges took some ste ps to minimize the visual obstructions . First, they moved the boathouse to accommodate Sullivan . Then , they elected not to add wooden siding so as to minimize the visual impairment caused by the boathouse . Next , they designed other features , such as the ha nd rails, cargo elevator, and staircase , to minimize the visual obstruction caused by the second story . Short of not erecting a cover or hand rails for a deck, Wester and Sullivan have not identified anything that could be done to minimize the visual obstruc tion created by a second

- story deck

. Finally, we examine the extent of the interference and how long it last s or how often it reoccurs. Id . at 595

– 96. The Gulledges testified that they intend to dock their boat at their Blue Point residence three

- to

- four months annually, so the full extent of the obstruction will last less than eight or nine months annually. Regardless of its19

height, the Gulledges’ boathouse does not impair Wester ’s and Sullivan view looking immediately east to the ship channel from their land. It does, however, impair their view if they look to the direction where the Gulledges’ boathouse stands (i.e ., if Wester looks to the north east and Sullivan looks to the south east ). But t he obst ruction created by the Gulledge s ’ boathouse’s second story is only partial ; while impaired, photographs show that residences can see through the open

- sided second story of the boathouse. In contrast, t he Sullivan ’s boathouse obstructs the view for the firs t 17 feet even more than the Gulledges’ boathouse because its sides are covered with solid wood, while the Gulledges’ boathouse has no siding. The Gulledges’ boathouse is a partial

— not total

— visual obstruction. Bob Randall, an architect who designed the bo athouses for Wester, Sullivan, and the Gulledges, testified t hat the Gulledges’ boathouse is “ two floating planes supported by wood structure piles that are 70 feet long. Architecturally the roof plane and the deck plane are separate. And approximately 80 percent of that side area is open so that one can view through the structur e. It does not have a mansard roof or an appendage hanging down or wall

- type tha t restricts the view corridor.” Wester and Sullivan argue that, because they presented multiple peopl e in the neighborhood to testify that the Gulledges’ boathouse would disturb their sensibilities, they have presented evidence in support of this element of their negligent nuisance action. B ut th i s argument overlook s the Crosstex C ourt’s holding20

that , to rise to the level of a nuisance, the defendant’s conduct must substantially interfere with and unreasonabl y a ffect the use and enjoyment of property. See id. at 593

– 94. Those two requirements are not satisfied on this record , given that the second sto ry is open with only the supporting structural beams and the narrow deck and roof

- line planes obstruct ing the views. Finally , Wester and Sullivan argue that their negligent nuisance claim is supported by the manner in which the Gulledges obtained permits f rom the GLO and the Army Corp s . Wester and Sullivan recognize that the GLO and Army Corp s do not regulate the height of structures that extend into the water. Yet they argue that the boathouse “was non

- compliant with the plans originally approved” because the ultimate height was greater than the originally

- proposed height. 10 Likewise, they argue that “the Gulledges did not notify the neighbors of the additional height added to the boathouse” without establishing that the Gulledges had any obligation to
notif y them of such or how this led to any legal injury

. T hese arguments do not

10 Wester and Sullivan argue in their brief that “the evidence at t rial was that the only permit the Gulledges ever received .

. . did not authorize any construction over 25 feet. This alone would support the jury’s finding of negligence.” There are a number of problems with this argument. They cite no authority in suppo rt of their assertion. It is inconsistent with t heir concession elsewhere in their brief that the GLO and Army Corps do not regulate the height of structures. They brought a negligent nuisance claim, not a general negligence claim, and the jury was instru cted on negligent nuisance. And they provide no explanation for how they have standing to complain about the permitting process.21

change the nature and character of the neighborhood or the nature and character of the interference

. The evidence is legally insufficient to support the judgment against the Gulledges for negligent nuisance and the related injunction. We therefore sustain the Gulledges’ first issue. 11
Conclusion We reverse the trial court’s judgment on Wester ’s and Sullivan’s negligent nuisance claim and render a take nothing judgment against Wester and Sullivan

.

Harvey Brown Justice Panel consists of Justices Higley, Brown, and Caughey. Justice Higley, concurring

.

11 Because it would not result in greater relief, we do not reach the Gulledges’ remaining two issues concerning the factual su fficiency of the evidence and the scope of the injunction. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.1.