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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SANJAE THAJ MENDEZ

(AC 35126)

Gruendel, Lavine and Flynn, Js.

Argued September 15—officially released December 23, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Fairfield, Thim, J.)

Richard E. Condon, Jr., senior assistant public

defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Brian W. DeBlasiis, certified legal intern, with whom

were Bruce R. Lockwood, senior assistant state’s attorney, and, on the brief, John C. Smriga, state’s attorney,

and Joseph J. Harry, senior assistant state’s attorney,
for the appellee (state).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. The defendant, Sanjae Thaj Mendez,

appeals from the judgment of conviction,rendered after

a jury trial, of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first

degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a)

(1) and 53a-48, and conspiracy to commit larceny in

the second degree in violation of General Statutes

§§ 53a-119, 53a-123a (3), and 53a-48.1 On appeal, the

defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to

convict him of conspiracy to commit robbery in the

first degree. We affirm in part and reverse in part the

judgment of the trial court.

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the

jury reasonably could have found the following facts.

On March 13, 2011, Jose Mota, a Fairfield University

student, held a party at his on-campus townhouse. The

victim, Montovani Joaquin, attended the party with his

cousin. The defendant arrived at Mota’s party with several other people including Axel Lee. Lee drove the

defendant to the Fairfield University campus in his

black Mazda. While at the party, the victim noticed the

defendant inside the townhouse.

When the party ended at approximately 5 a.m., the

victim left the townhouse and saw the defendant standing outside with a group of people. When the victim

passed by the defendant, he felt something strike the

back of his head and immediately turned around and

saw Lee standing behind him. The victim began ‘‘fighting’’ with Lee when he felt someone approach him from

the left. As the victim turned to the left, the defendant

punched him directly in the jaw. The victim fell to the

ground and felt someone ‘‘yank’’ his gold and silver

chain from his neck. The victim then saw three people,

including the defendant, run toward a black Mazda,

which prompted him to chase after them. The victim

saw the defendant getting into the passenger seat of

the car. In an attempt to stop them, the victim grabbed

onto the hood and then the rear bumper of the black

Mazda, leaving blood stains on the Mazda before the

car pulled away. As the Mazda drove away, Mota heard

people screaming. He went outside and found the victim

on the ground bleeding. Mota ran to pick up the victim;

he saw that the victim’s jaw appeared to be dislocated,

he was missing teeth, and was no longer wearing his

gold and silver chain.

Fairfield University Public Safety Officer Bruno

Morias was working the midnight to 8 a.m. shift when

a man stopped him to report that individuals in a black

Mazda had assaulted the victim and stole his chain.

Morias subsequently spotted the black Mazda on campus and initiated a motor vehicle stop along with two

Public Safety Officers, Edward Baclawski and Filipe

Rodriquez. Morias identified the driver as Lee and the

passenger in the right rear seat as the defendant. When
the victim arrived at the scene of the motor vehicle stop,

Rodriquez asked him who assaulted him. The victim

pointed to the defendant while making punching

motions to his jaw and ‘‘yanking towards his neck area.’’

Morias then called for an ambulance and the Fairfield

Police Department.

The victim was taken to St. Vincent’s Medical Center

in Bridgeport and was later transferred to Yale-New

Haven Hospital to be examined by a maxillofacial surgeon who diagnosed the victim with a jaw that was

broken in two places. The victim underwent corrective

surgery at University Hospital in New Jersey to realign

his jaw with plates and screws. After the surgery, the

victim’s jaw was wired shut for four to six weeks. Two

of his teeth were pulled. During that time, the victim

could take nourishment only through a straw. At the

time of trial, the victim continued to have pain in his

mouth and complained that his jaw will never function

the same as it did before it was broken.

The Fairfield Police Department investigated the incident and obtained arrest warrants for both Lee and the

defendant. The defendant was charged with robbery in

the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (1); assault

in the second degree in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-60 (a)(1); larceny in the second degree in violation

of §§ 53a-119 and 53a-123 (a) (3); conspiracy to commit

robbery in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48 and

53a-134 (a) (1); and conspiracy to commit larceny in

the second degree in violation of §§ 53a-48, 53a-119,

and 53a-123a (3).

A jury found the defendant guilty of conspiracy to

commit robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to

commit larceny in the second degree, and not guilty of

the other three charges. The court sentenced him on

each count to five years incarceration, suspended after

one year, and five years of probation. The court ordered

the sentences to run concurrently. This appealfollowed.

Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction of conspiracy to commit

robbery in the first degree.2 Specifically, the defendant

claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific

intent to cause ‘‘serious physical injury’’ to the victim.

We disagree.

‘‘The standard of review employed in a sufficiency

of the evidence claim is well settled. [W]e apply a two

part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light

most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we

determine whether upon the facts so construed and the

inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of

fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. . . . In evaluating evidence, the

[finder] of fact is not required to accept as dispositive

those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [finder of fact] may draw

whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and

logical. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there

is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support

a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead,

whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that

supports the [finder offact’s] verdict of guilty.’’(Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vega, 128 Conn. App.

20, 26–27, 17 A.3d 1060, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 919, 21

A.3d 463 (2011).

To establish the crime of conspiracy, the evidence

must show that an agreement to engage in conduct

constituting a crime had been entered into, that the

conspirators intended for the conduct to be performed,

and that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy

followed. General Statutes § 53a-48 (a); State v. Palangio, 115 Conn. App. 355, 362, 973 A.2d 110, cert. denied,

293 Conn. 919, 979 A.2d 492 (2009). ‘‘Conspiracy is a

specific intent crime, with the intent divided into two

elements: (a) the intent to agree or conspire and (b)

the intent to commit the offense which is the object of

the conspiracy. . . . Thus [p]roof of a conspiracy to

commit a specific offense requires proof that the conspirators intended to bring about the elements of the

conspired offense.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138,

167, 869 A.2d 192 (2005). A formal agreement is not

necessary to sustain a conspiracy conviction ‘‘[b]ecause

[given] the secret nature of conspiracies, a conviction

is usually based on circumstantial evidence . . . [and]

inferred from the conduct of the accused.’’ (Citations

omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Boykin, 27 Conn. App. 558, 564–65,

609 A.2d 242, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 905, 610 A.2d

179 (1992).

In the present matter, the crime that was the object

of the conspiracy was robbery in the first degree. Section 53a-134 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is

guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course

of the commission of the crime of robbery . . . he or

another participant in the crime: (1) Causes serious

physical injury to any person who is not a participant

in the crime . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (4) defines

‘‘serious physical injury’’ as an ‘‘injury which creates a

substantial risk of death, or which cause serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss

or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.’’

(Emphasis added.) In turn, General Statutes § 53a-133

provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person commits robbery

when, in the course of committing a larceny, he uses

or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon

another person . . . .’’
The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that, with a single punch, he had the

specific intent to cause serious physical injury to the

victim. In this appeal, both the defendant and the state

construe the conspiracy to commit robbery in the first

degree statutes; General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a134 (a) (1); as requiring proof of specific intent for all

elements of the offense, including subdivision (1) of

§ 53a-134 (a), causing ‘‘serious physical injury.’’3 The

defendant cites other cases in which courts have found

the defendant caused ‘‘serious physical injury’’ on the

basis of more severe conduct than one punch to the

victim. Our courts, however, have found sufficient evidence of serious physical injury when, in conjunction

with other ailments, victims have suffered broken bones

and lost teeth. See State v. Robinson, 174 Conn. 604,

606, 392 A.2d 475 (1978) (victim suffered from two

fractured ribs and fractured finger); State v. Sawicki,

173 Conn. 389, 395, 377 A.2d 1103 (1977) (victim sustained fractured upper jaw and cheekbones, required

corrective surgery and jaw wired shut for four and onehalf weeks); State v. Lewis, 146 Conn. App. 589, 607,

79 A.3d 102 (2013) (victim suffered fractured bones in

his face and nose and four chipped teeth), cert. denied,

311 Conn. 904, 83 A.3d 605 (2014); State v. Barnett, 53

Conn. App. 581, 595, 734 A.2d 991 (victim lost four

teeth), cert. denied, 250 Conn. 918, 738 A.2d 659 (1999).

Both the defendant and the state acknowledge that

‘‘[i]ntent is generally proven by circumstantial evidence

because direct evidence of the accused’s state of mind

is rarely available. . . . Therefore, intent is often

inferred from conduct . . . and from the cumulative

effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational

inferences drawn therefrom.’’(Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 278, 794

A.2d 565, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935, 802 A.2d 88 (2002).

The defendant further submits that a ‘‘single punch to

the mouth does not naturally and necessarily cause a

[serious] physical injury.’’ This court recognizes that a

serious physical injury is ‘‘fact intensive and not predicated upon a threshold showing of grievousness.’’ State

v. Lewis, supra, 146 Conn. App. 608. Whether a victim

has suffered serious physical injury is a question of fact

for the jury. State v. Sewell, 38 Conn. App. 20, 23, 658

A.2d 598, cert. denied, 234 Conn. 918, 661 A.2d 98 (1995).

‘‘We note that [i]t is not the function of this court to

sit as the seventh juror when we review the sufficiency

of the evidence . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, 146 Conn.

App. 341, 352, 77 A.3d 880 (2013).

‘‘[Jurors] may draw from the evidence only such inferences as are reasonable, but they are not required to

put aside their common sense.’’ State v. Palangio, supra,

115 Conn. App. 366. In the present case, the jury reasonably could have inferred from the following facts that
the defendant conspired with others to steal the victim’s

chain and to use force to do so with the intent to cause

serious physical injury: Lee and the defendant arrived

on campus together in his black Mazda; they and the

victim attended the same party; upon leaving the townhouse, Lee hit the victim in the back of the head and

the defendant punched him in the jaw in quick succession; an unknown individual forcibly removed the victim’s silver and gold chain immediately thereafter; and

then the defendant, Lee, and another man were

observed running toward the black Mazda and fleeing

the scene. See State v. Channer, 28 Conn. App. 161,

169, 612 A.2d 95 (‘‘evidence clearly demonstrates that

the entire chain of events . . . could be [viewed] as

intentional conduct supporting’’ conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree [emphasis

added]), cert. denied, 223 Conn. 921, 614 A.2d 826

(1992). Given these facts presented at trial, the jury

reasonably could have found that the act of punching

the victim directly in the jaw is strongly corroborative

of an intention to cause serious physical injury. ‘‘[T]he

jury may infer that the defendant intended the natural

consequences of his actions.’’ (Emphasis added.) State

v. McRae, 118 Conn. App. 315, 320, 983 A.2d 286 (2009).

The jury reasonably could find that a punch in the mouth

could result in a broken jaw and the loss of two teeth.

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable

to sustaining the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the

jury reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to cause

the victim serious physical injury. Accordingly, we

reject the defendant’s insufficiency of the evidence

claim.

II

On appeal, the state brought a double jeopardy issue

to this court’s, and the defendant’s, attention. The state

noted that punishing the defendant for two conspiracy

convictions stemming from a single unlawful agreement

violated the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution. We agree.

‘‘A conspiracy to commit multiple offenses is, itself,

a single offense. . . . The single agreement is the prohibited conspiracy, and however diverse its objects it

violates but a single statute . . . . For such a violation,

only the single penalty prescribed by the statute can

be imposed. . . . [When] the facts point to only one

agreement, the defendant cannot be subject to sentencing for two conspiracies. . . . Multiple, albeit concurrent, sentences are not proper and cannot stand . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Guzman,

125 Conn. App. 307, 320, 7 A.3d 435 (2010), cert. denied,

300 Conn. 902, 12 A.3d 573 (2011).

The information charging the defendant with conspiracy to commitrobbery in the first degree and conspiracy
to commit larceny in the second degree alleged that

both conspiracies arose out of the same factual scenario

and that the agreements were entered into on the same

date, at the same time, and at the same location. After

the jury found the defendant guilty of both conspiracy

charges, the trial court ordered both sentences to run

concurrently, for a total effective sentence of five years’

incarceration, suspended after one year, and five years

of probation. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant’s multiple sentences for two conspiracy crimes

arising out of a single agreement are unlawful and cannot stand. The appropriate remedy, pursuant to State

v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242, 245, 249 n.3, 61 A.3d 1084

(2013), is to reverse the conviction of conspiracy to

commit larceny in the second degree and remand the

case to the trial court.4

The judgment is reversed only as to the conviction

of conspiracy to commit larceny in the second degree

and the case is remanded with direction to vacate the

conviction of that offense. The judgment is affirmed in

all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Although the defendant did not raise the issue on appeal, the state

has posited that the defendant’s separate punishment for two conspiracy

convictions arising out of a single unlawful agreement violates the double

jeopardy clause; we agree. See part II of this opinion.

2 The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support

his convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree and

conspiracy to commit larceny in the second degree because ‘‘the jury found

the defendant not guilty, as a principal or accessory, of the three substantive

crimes charged.’’ Our appellate courts repeatedly have recognized that ‘‘[w]e

are not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed. . . . We

consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion,

is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the

issue properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Claudio C., 125

Conn. App. 588, 600, 11 A.3d 1086 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 910, 12

A.3d 1005 (2011). The defendant’s claim of inconsistency in the jury verdict

is only addressed in one paragraph and he fails to cite any legal authority

in support of his argument. Accordingly, we decline to review this claim.

3 This case brings into view an anomaly in our law. The robbery in the

first degree statute, § 53a-134 (a) (1), requires a perpetrator to cause serious

physical injury but does not require a specific intent to do so. In State v.

Pond, 138 Conn. App. 228, 233, 50 A.3d 950, cert. granted, 307 Conn. 933,

56 A.3d 714 (2012), this court held that the language of the conspiracy

statute, § 53a-48, requires proof of a specific intent to perform all elements

of the crime that was the object of the conspiracy, including any aggravating

elements. Our Supreme Court granted certification in Pond, on the issue of

whether this court ‘‘properly determine[d] that in order to convict a defendant of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree . . . the state

must prove that the defendant conspirator had the specific intent that there

would be a display or threat of the use of what was represented to be a

deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, even if that specific intent is not

required for proof of the underlying crime of robbery in the second degree?’’

State v. Pond, 307 Conn. 933, 56 A.3d 714 (2012). The issue is still pending

before our Supreme Court.

In his concurrence in Pond, Justice Borden highlights the ‘‘anomaly in

our Supreme Court’s interpretation of the conspiracy section of the Penal

Code.’’ State v. Pond, supra, 138 Conn. App. 239 (Borden, J., concurring).

‘‘It is simply anomalous that the state would be required to prove a greater

mens rea for an inchoate crime—conspiracy—than for the completed crime

itself.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 246–47. Because the state makes no claim

in this appeal that, to prove the charge of conspiracy to commit robbery in

the first degree, it was not required to prove that the defendant had the

specific intent to cause serious physical injury, we do not address that claim.
4 The state accurately noted that the question of proper remedy for situations such as the one before us is currently pending in our Supreme Court.

That court granted certification in State v. Wright, 144 Conn. App. 731,

745–49, 73 A.3d 828, cert. granted, 310 Conn. 945, 80 A.3d 907, 908 (2013),

on the issue of whether this court properly applied Polanco to multiple

punishments for the defendant’s three conspiracy convictions arising out

of a single agreement.