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CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN:

PROSPECTS AND CONSEQUENCES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 8, 2015

Serial No. 114–124

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

His Excellency Husain Haqqani, director for South and Central Asia, The 

Hudson Institute .................................................................................................. 5

Daniel S. Markey, Ph.D., senior research professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University ..................................................... 18

Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, executive director, Nonproliferation Policy Education 

Center .................................................................................................................... 24

George Perkovich, Ph.D., vice president for studies, Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace ........................................................................................ 34

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

His Excellency Husain Haqqani: Prepared statement ......................................... 8

Daniel S. Markey, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ...................................................... 20

Mr. Henry D. Sokolski: Prepared statement ......................................................... 26

George Perkovich, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ...................................................... 36

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 54

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 55

Mr. Henry D. Sokolski: Material submitted for the record .................................. 56

(1)

CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH 

PAKISTAN: PROSPECTS AND CONSEQUENCES 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject 

to the length limitation in the rules. 

Since the United States entered into a civil nuclear cooperation 

agreement with India in 2005, Pakistan has pressed for a similar 

arrangement. Pakistan sent a 56-page document to the U.S. officials in 2010 reiterating its request for U.S. support for its civilian 

nuclear program. Since 2010, U.S. officials have hinted at the possibility of this prospect. U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson commented at the time that we were ‘‘beginning to have a discussion with Islamabad about this issue.’’ She noted that, while the 

U.S. had serious nonproliferation concerns, we are beginning to 

pass on those. 

Nothing came out of those discussions. This past October, news 

outlets suddenly reported that the administration was allegedly revisiting this possibility. Administration officials quickly denied 

these claims, but this serious and recurring topic requires more examination. Discussions about a potential nuclear deal could send 

the wrong message to Pakistan, in my opinion, the Benedict Arnold 

of American allies. 

Pakistan crossed the nuclear weapons threshold in 1985 under 

the direction of the notorious scientist A.Q. Khan. In the very early 

years of the network, Khan established an extensive clandestine 

network in order to obtain necessary technologies and materials. 

Later on, Khan used similar channels to make a profit by selling 

nuclear designs and materials to other countries. 

The A.Q. Khan network is believed to have sold sensitive nuclear 

technology to the most unstable countries on the planet. It was the 

Khan network that allowed North Korea to get its uranium enrichment program up and running. Khan also sold Libya design secrets 

and nuclear weapons components during the same time. In 1987, 

2

Iran admitted to international inspectors that Khan’s network provided scientists with centrifuge specifications and equipment. 

So we have North Korea, we have Libya, and we have Iran. Pakistani scientists even met with Osama bin Laden in 1998 to discuss 

how to create a nuclear bomb. The full extent of the network’s illicit proliferation remains unknown because Pakistan just won’t 

come clean. 

Pakistan’s ties to terrorists do not end with the discussions about 

nuclear weapons. Pakistan has a long history of supporting terrorist proxies as a way of increasing its leverage in the region. 

Pakistan maintains close links with the Afghan Taliban, even allegedly holding direct meetings with senior leaders and coordinating attacks. 

There is evidence that Pakistan worked closely with Al Qaeda, 

helping the terrorists move arms and fighters in and out of Afghanistan to kill U.S. troops. In 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then 

Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before Congress that Pakistan supported numerous terrorist attacks by the 

Haqqani network in Afghanistan against American troops. What 

an indictment. 

One truck bombing at the NATO outpost south of Kabul on September 10, 2011, killed at least 5 people and wounded 77 coalition 

soldiers. The attack was one of the worst tolls for foreign troops in 

a single attack in the war. Another Pakistan-supported Haqqani 

network was an assault on the U.S. Embassy that killed 16 Afghan 

police officers and civilians. Mullen said, ‘‘The Haqqani network 

acts as a veritable arm of the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence 

Agency.’’

Meanwhile, Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance post-9/11. Congress has appropriated more than 

$30 billion in assistance to Pakistan between 2002 and 2015. Instead of talking about the possibility of rewarding Pakistan with a 

nuclear deal, we should be enforcing the consequences for Pakistan’s bad behavior. It seems ironic to me we keep sending money 

to Islamabad while Pakistan continues supporting terrorist groups 

that have killed American troops. This has got to cease. 

There are more steps in stopping its support for terrorists that 

Pakistan needs to take before we could even entertain the possibility of some kind of new type of nuclear agreement with them. 

They should start with disclosing exactly who they have given nuclear technology to. They need to fess up. 

Pakistan should slow down its rapid production of nuclear weapons. Pakistan already has 110 to 130 nuclear warheads and enough 

material to bring that total up to 400 to 500. If it continues on its 

current pace, it will surpass the United Kingdom as the fifth-largest nuclear-weapons state in the world. 

A civilian nuclear cooperation agreement would legitimize the 

Pakistani nuclear weapons program and reward Islamabad for its 

long history of bad behavior. We have already signed a bad agreement with Iran; we cannot afford to enter into another bad nuclear 

agreement that would further endanger not just American security 

but global security. 

And that’s the way it is. 

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I will now yield to the ranking member from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Keating, for his opening statement. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the witnesses who appear today. 

As we consider the issue of possible future civil nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, it is important to keep in mind that no agreement of any kind is on the table or appears very likely in the near 

future. Recent talks between the United States and Pakistan on 

this subject seem to be preliminary, and there is little indication 

at this juncture that Pakistan would agree to the sorts of constraints on the nuclear arsenal on which the United States would 

insist. Any arrangement allowing for U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation with Pakistan is hypothetical at this point. 

With that said, Pakistan’s security situation and its disputes 

with India present many serious risks. And I look forward to the 

testimony today on how best the United States can act to manage 

these risks. Many analysts view Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and 

the risks that these weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists 

or be used by Pakistan in an armed conflict with India as one of 

the world’s most dangerous problems. 

In addition to being a nuclear-arms state in an extremely dangerous neighborhood, Pakistan presents other difficulties, as well. 

Pakistan has a history of proliferation. The network led by one of 

the founders of its nuclear program, A.Q. Khan, sold nuclear-weapons-related equipment and technology to Iran, Libya, and North 

Korea. 

Further, while the United States partners with Pakistani counterterrorism activities, Pakistan has sometimes failed to tackle and 

elements of the government have lent even active support to violent extremist organizations, such as LET in Kashmir and Haqqani 

and the network that it organizes in Afghanistan. Perhaps most 

disturbingly, Pakistan’s intelligence service, the ISI, is reported to 

have provided considerable assistance to LET in planning the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai that killed 166 people, including 5 U.S. citizens. 

To be sure, Pakistan is a difficult partner in counterterrorism, 

just as it can be with respect to counterproliferation. Yet the issues 

of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the prevention of further proliferation of Pakistan’s nuclear equipment and technology, 

and deescalating nuclear tensions with India are not issues the 

United States can ignore. We must engage with Pakistan on these 

critical subjects. 

I look forward to the information and discussion today of our witnesses on how best we can work with Pakistan and other stakeholders on these issues. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair will recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Sherman, for a 1-minute opening statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was once chairman of this subcommittee. I see the ranking 

membership is in great hands. But one of the reasons why I moved 

over to Asia is I believe the greatest threat we have of the use of 

nuclear weapons is indeed in South Asia. 

4

I don’t think that there is any chance that a civil nuclear deal 

would be approved by Congress, but that doesn’t mean that we 

shouldn’t be talking to the Pakistanis about it. And I think our 

focus should be not to punish Pakistan for the proliferation of the 

past but to see if we can get an improvement in Pakistani behavior 

in the future. 

Pakistan is the world’s only schizophrenic nuclear power. Pakistan doesn’t just confuse anyone who studies it, it is, in fact, confused. Just the military elements are simultaneously fighting terrorists on the ground, at great cost, and supporting terrorists at 

the same time. 

And we see India, which needs to be persuaded that if there is 

a terrorist attack it cannot respond by pushing its military across 

the border, and Pakistan, which must be persuaded that no matter 

what happens with conventional weapons they cannot cross the 

line to nuclear. And there is no such thing as a small nuclear 

weapon. 

So I look forward to the gentlemen in front of us telling us how 

we can easily solve this problem. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit statements and questions and extraneous materials for the 

record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

Without objection, all the witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made part of this record. 

I ask that each witness will keep their presentation to no more 

than 5 minutes. 

As you probably heard, the bells are ringing. We are voting 

again. We will adjourn at some appropriate time, or recess at some 

appropriate time, so that we can vote. 

I will introduce each witness and then give each of you time to 

summarize your statements. 

Ambassador Haqqani is a Pakistan scholar and public figure who 

served as Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States from 2008 

to 2011. He is widely credited with managing a difficult period of 

U.S. and Pakistan relations during the global war on terrorism. 

Mr. Ambassador, welcome for being here. 

Dr. Daniel Markey is a senior research professor at the Johns 

Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Previously, he was a senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and the South 

Asia at CFR, where he specialized in security and governance 

issues. 

Mr. Henry Sokolski is currently the executive director of the 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He previously served in 

the Pentagon as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy and received a 

medal for outstanding public service from the Secretary of Defense, 

Dick Cheney. 

It is good to have you back before our subcommittee. 

And Dr. George Perkovich is vice president for studies at the 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on 

nuclear strategy, nonproliferation issues, and South Asian security. 

He is also the author of the prize-winning book, ‘‘India’s Nuclear 

Bomb.’’

5

At this time, the subcommittee will be in recess until this series 

of votes are over. We will be back, and then we will get to hear 

what you have to say about this complex issue. Thank you, gentlemen. 

We will be in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. 

For everyone’s information, it is my understanding that this series of interruptions will continue for the foreseeable evening, but 

let’s see how far we can go. 

Mr. Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY HUSAIN HAQQANI, DIRECTOR FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Ambassador HAQQANI. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for 

this opportunity to share with you and members of this committee 

my views on U.S.-Pakistan relations in general and the civil nuclear cooperation in particular. 

My written statement is already in front of the committee. Fundamentally, my point is that, although the Obama administration 

and Pakistani officials have both officially stated that formal negotiations are not currently underway for a civil nuclear deal for 

Pakistan, it is obvious that at least some elements of the current 

administration think that they can secure a change in Pakistan’s 

policies by offering it a nuclear accord along the lines offered to 

India. 

It is argued that, in return for Pakistan agreeing to restrict its 

nuclear program to weapons and delivery systems that are appropriate to its actual defense needs against India’s nuclear threat, 

‘‘the United States might support an eventual waiver for Pakistan 

by the 48-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group.’’

Pakistani officials have already said that, since they already get 

their nuclear materials from China, there is no advantage to them 

of membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 

The expectation that Pakistan would limit its nuclear arsenal is 

similar to the unrealistic expectation during the 1980s that supplying Pakistan with large amounts of economic aid and state-ofthe-art military equipment, including F–16 aircraft, would lead to 

Pakistan stopping short of developing nuclear weapons altogether. 

In my written testimony, you will actually find exact quotes from 

American officials who at that time reassured and assured Congress several times that support for Pakistan’s conventional military buildup was the only way to save Pakistan from going nuclear. 

And we all know where that led us. 

The reason why such mistakes have been made—and I have 

written an entire book on the subject—is because American officials 

often fail to understand Pakistan’s ambitions in South Asia and the 

policies that follow from those ambitions. 

If the purpose of Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons had 

been just to ensure that Pakistan was not overrun by a superior 

Indian military force, which is a legitimate defense goal, that objective was met by Pakistan nuclear tests conducted in 1998. Pakistan 

has refused to abjure first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict, a 

6

position similar to that of North Korea, which also claimed that it 

feared being overrun by a superior conventional force. 

The most likely scenario for nuclear conflict or military escalation on the subcontinent at the moment involves escalation resulting from terrorism of the kind we all witnessed in Mumbai in 

2008. 

Notwithstanding attempts in the United States to sell the prospect of a deal as a restraint on Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, 

Pakistan’s leaders see parity with India as the only reason they 

should seek a civil nuclear deal with the United States. Ever since 

the U.S.-India’s nuclear deal of 2005, as Mr. Chairman, you pointed 

out, Pakistan’s leaders have sought a similar deal to affirm that 

the two South Asian neighbors are equal in status and prestige. 

American readiness to look the other way at Pakistan’s conduct, 

such as support for jihadi terrorists, including the Afghan Taliban 

and the discovery of Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani garrison 

town, as well as U.S. willingness to offer aid to Pakistan even without fulfillment of conditionality mandated by Congress on the basis 

of Secretary of State’s waivers has often ended up as an enabler 

of Pakistan’s dysfunction. 

I would argue that Pakistan’s dysfunction stems from its desire 

to compete with India. Instead of discussing civil nuclear deals and 

selling more military equipment to Pakistan, U.S. officials should 

convince Pakistan that its ambitions of rivaling India are akin to 

Belgium trying to rival France or Germany. India’s population is 

6 times as large as Pakistan’s, while India’s economy is 10 times 

bigger and growing. India’s $2 trillion economy has managed consistent growth, whereas Pakistan’s $245 billion economy has grown 

sporadically and is undermined by jihadist terrorism and domestic 

political chaos. 

Pakistan also continues to depend on Islamist ideology through 

its school curricula, propaganda, and Islamic legislation to maintain internal nationalist cohesion, which inevitably encourages extremism and religious intolerance. 

It must be understood that, like all nations, Pakistan has a right 

to defend itself, and nobody denies it that right. Pakistan’s concern 

about resolution of the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir also deserves attention, albeit by peaceful means. 

But Pakistan’s security needs should be judiciously examined. 

Unlike other countries, Pakistan did not raise an army to match 

the threats it faces. Pakistan inherited 33 percent of British India’s 

army, raised for the Second World War, at independence in 1947, 

and has sought to identify threats that matched the size of that 

army. 

Pakistan is the sixth-largest nation in the world by population 

but only 26th by size of GDP on a purchasing power parity basis 

and 42nd in nominal GDP. It has the world’s sixth-largest nuclear 

arsenal and eighth-largest army but performs poorly in most nonmilitary indices. Pakistan’s literacy rate stands at 52 percent, and 

the country has one of the highest percentages of out-of-school children in the world. 

The military and intelligence services that dominate Pakistani 

national security decision making have sacrificed their country’s 

prosperity and progress in their relentless pursuit of military comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:35 Dec 22, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\120815\97855 SHIRL
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petition with India. Forcing New Delhi’s hand on Kashmir has become more important than educating Pakistan’s children. 

Since the 1950s, U.S. policy has ended up nurturing Pakistan’s 

military and keeping alive its dream of parity with India——

Mr. POE. Summarize your comments, Mr. Ambassador. We have 

a long way to go. Your statements are in the record, so summarize 

your final comments. 

Ambassador HAQQANI. My final comment is that raising the prospect of a civil nuclear deal with Pakistan without addressing the 

country’s dysfunction and militarism will aid neither U.S. policy objectives nor the people of Pakistan, who are perhaps the biggest 

victims of the national elite’s erroneous policies. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Haqqani follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Dr. Markey, you have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL S. MARKEY, PH.D., SENIOR RESEARCH 

PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 

Mr. MARKEY. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

about the potential ramifications of a civil nuclear agreement with 

Pakistan. 

Obviously, this has already been submitted for the record, so I 

will give some brief remarks now. Let me jump right to my bottom 

line. 

A nuclear deal of the sort that is reportedly being discussed with 

Pakistan is hardly the blockbuster that some commentators in the 

media would have us believe. It is less than meets the eye. Even 

so, discussions of a nuclear deal are poorly timed and, if pursued 

further, would be more likely to prove counterproductive to other 

near-term security interests than to deliver significant benefits. 

Now, in the abstract, I can imagine a good nuclear deal with 

Pakistan. And we should expect that diligent and creative American diplomats are exploring various options for securing and limiting the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. And if, as some 

analysts propose, Pakistan could be encouraged to commit to important limits on its nuclear program, then U.S. policymakers 

would have more and better reasons to think seriously about ways 

we could bring Pakistan into the world’s nuclear order. 

But I don’t think that Washington or Islamabad is actually ready 

to have serious conversations along these lines. I see no indication 

that Pakistan’s military leadership is inclined to place voluntary 

limits on the growth of its nuclear arsenal. That arsenal has always been justified as a deterrent against Indian aggression, and 

Indo-Pakistani relations are stuck in hostility. 

India, as a rising power, is expanding its military. This will continue because India competes not only with Pakistan but also with 

China. Any Indian military sized to deal with Pakistan alone would 

be insufficient to defend against China, while any program sized to 

deal with China would pose a menacing threat to Pakistan. And 

because Pakistan uses its nuclear program to make up for India’s 

superior conventional military power, the chances of Islamabad accepting nuclear caps while India’s military grows are slim. 

In sum, this triangular security dilemma between China, India, 

and Pakistan, or maybe even quadrilateral security dilemma if you 

include the United States, is a structural dynamic that favors persistent competition, most of all by the weakest player—that is, 

Pakistan. 

Now, even if Pakistan were to take incremental steps to limit the 

future growth of its nuclear program, I suspect and I think the 

comments already made here today reinforce the notion that that 

would not be sufficient reason for the United States to champion 

Pakistan’s mainstreaming in the global nuclear order. Placing limits on future nuclear growth would do too little to address our current concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. And that arsenal 

19

poses significant and serious threats, including that of insider 

theft, onward proliferation, accident sabotage, or unauthorized use. 

So, in other words, I doubt our own ability or our interests in delivering on even limited diplomatic benefits that Pakistan would 

expect if it committed to slowing or stopping the growth of its arsenal, which I already said is unlikely. 

Now, worst of all, the nuclear discussion shifts attention away 

from the other issues that worry us in Pakistan. Now, at present, 

the U.S. State Department has trouble certifying that Pakistan’s 

military has targeted the Haqqani network that has so viciously attacked U.S., Afghan, Indian, and coalition partners in Afghanistan. 

And U.S. officials do not believe that Pakistan has seriously tried 

to go after Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terrorist group responsible for 

Mumbai. 

Now, several other pressing issues also deserve more attention in 

a U.S.-Pakistan dialogue than does a nuclear deal. To start, Washington needs Islamabad’s commitment to advance any hope of a 

reconciliation process with the Afghan Taliban—again, an unlikely 

thing but something that is currently an essential pillar in the 

Obama administration’s war-termination strategy in Afghanistan. 

And relations between Pakistan and India are also troubled. U.S. 

officials would be smart, I think, to encourage a resumption of their 

formal and back-channel dialogues, if principally as a tactic to forestall a future crises. And I was happy to see the news just this past 

week of NSA-led-level talks in Bangkok between India and Pakistan. 

And Washington also has much to discuss with Pakistan about 

the state of its own counterterror and counterinsurgency operations 

inside Pakistan, from its tribal areas to its major urban centers. 

Now, if these short-term agenda items were somehow exhausted, 

Pakistan’s current condition raises other fundamental questions 

about its long-term relationship with the United States. Its fragile 

economy, its troubled civil-military relations, its bloody sectarian 

cleavages, anti-U.S. prejudices all inhibit trust-based partnership. 

In sum, this is a big country, an important location, with nearly 

insurmountable challenges at home and with its neighbors. And my 

concern is that, by turning senior-level attention to a nuclear deal, 

Washington sends a wrong and counterproductive message to Pakistan, as we have in the past. We are too likely to come across as 

distracted, unable to set and maintain priorities, and suffering 

from unfounded expectations. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Markey follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Markey. 

Mr. Sokolski, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY D. SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Keating, thank 

you for inviting me to testify today. 

I ask that, in addition to my testimony, one two-page addition be 

entered into the record, if that is okay. 

Mr. POE. Without objection. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Thank you. 

I would like to focus on two points: First, why offering Pakistan 

civilian nuclear incentives is self-defeating; second, why implementing title 5 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, which 

calls for nonnuclear cooperation and energy assessments for developing states, would make more sense. 

Several U.S. analysts recently championed offering Pakistan civilian nuclear incentives like those we have extended to India. 

They argue the U.S. could offer Pakistan a 123 agreement as it did 

for India or sponsor Pakistan’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group, as it is now trying to do with India. This would enable 

Islamabad to acquire Nuclear Supplier Group-controlled nuclear 

goods and a portion of the equal treatment that it seeks. 

Short of NSG membership, they argue, the U.S. might push the 

NSG to waive restrictions on NSG-controlled exports to Pakistan, 

something the NSG has already done at Washington’s urging for 

India. This line of thinking appears to have been behind the administration’s recent talks with Pakistani officials. 

In the end, however, no deal was cut. This should not be surprising. First, offering civilian nuclear incentives to moderate Pakistan’s nuclear posture is diplomatically risky. Pakistan and China 

may object to the U.S. pushing for India’s membership in the NSG, 

but trying to address their concerns by offering Pakistan NSG 

membership or an NSG waiver is not only certain to upset India 

but Pakistan, which demands being treated in an identical fashion 

with India. 

This, though, would require sealing a formal nuclear cooperative 

agreement that would upset India even more and cause a possible 

backlash here on the Hill. It would also likely prompt Israel to ask 

for similar treatment, which, in turn, would complicate nuclear restraint efforts in the Middle East. 

Second, it undermines nuclear restraint. The U.S. tried trading 

civilian nuclear incentives with India in 2008. Washington persuaded the NSG to allow India to import uranium for its civilian 

nuclear program. Yet this has only allowed India to dedicate more 

of its meager domestic uranium production to military purposes. 

Bizarrely, then, our peaceful nuclear initiative with India now is 

enabling India to make more bombs. Thus, Chairman Corker of the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently noted that his vote in 

favor of the deal back in 2008 was a mistake, that it has only undermined international nuclear restraint. Certainly, Pakistan’s 

military would benefit no less from access to internationally available advanced nuclear technology and goods. 

25

Finally, nuclear power is a poor form of energy assistance. The 

USAID, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, institutions dedicated to upgrading Pakistan’s energy system, have all 

focused on nonnuclear projects. These include Pakistan’s electrical 

distribution system—only roughly half of Pakistanis are able to 

connect to the central grid; reforming the financial management of 

its utilities, which continually fail to collect payment for electricity 

supplied; increasing energy efficiency—Pakistan’s rating is among 

the world’s worst; and preventing electrical theft, which accounts 

for a disturbing percentage of the electricity consumed; increasing 

utilization of natural gas, hydropower, solar, and wind resources, 

of which Pakistan has a considerable amount; and development of 

gas and oil pipelines. 

These outfits understand what several detailed energy assessments have determined: Nuclear power can only supply a small 

fraction of Pakistan’s electrical needs and is extremely expensive. 

By now, we should all know this. 

Much of New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program was a direct result of Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Program. I note this is the 

62nd anniversary today of that program. India’s first bomb came 

from plutonium produced in a Canadian reactor, moderated with 

U.S.-supplied heavy water, reprocessed in a U.S.-designed plant. 

India promised material to be strictly used for peaceful purposes. 

The rest is history. 

Recently, though, we compounded matters with the 2008 India 

nuclear deal. We need to stop pushing such deals. At a minimum, 

Congress should demand that the Executive implement title 5 of 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, which calls for nonnuclear cooperation and energy assessments with developing states. 

Much of this work is currently done by AID but not under the 

act. The act calls for country-specific assessments, annual reports, 

and the creation of a nonnuclear energy peace corps. Unfortunately, it has never been implemented. After 37 years and the recent events regarding Pakistan, Congress should hold a hearing 

and find out why. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sokolski follows:]

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Mr. POE. And Dr. Perkovich. 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE PERKOVICH, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT 

FOR STUDIES, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. PERKOVICH. Thank you, Chairman Poe and Ranking Member 

Keating. 

I won’t repeat what my colleagues have said, and I agree with 

much of it. Fundamentally, there is not going to be a nuclear deal 

like was reported in the press for reasons that my colleagues have 

mentioned. But I think that the very idea and the discussion that 

we are having is useful because it allows us and you to elucidate 

and think through some of the issues that are involved. 

I would begin by saying that the proliferation damage done by 

the Khan network is an enormous fact. It is an enormously important fact. But, at some point, the question then arises whether and 

when to learn from this fact and try to create new facts that are 

more propitious. Because if we have the status quo that happened 

in the past and that becomes the future, it is not anything that any 

of us would welcome. 

Now, one way to deal with it is to propose new punishments to 

try to change Pakistan’s behavior. But I am not aware of anybody 

who suggests doing that over nuclear policy in Pakistan today, in 

part because Pakistan’s actions to secure its nuclear arsenals and 

cooperate with the U.S. and the Department of Energy in that domain, which is very important for counterterrorism, has largely 

been positive. So what we are most worried about now is actually 

the expansion and future growth of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal 

and the implications of that for stability. 

So the question, then, is, you know, what can and should be done 

to motivate Pakistan to continue to improve its controls over nuclear materials and facilities and also to limit the growth of its nuclear arsenal? 

One answer is to just continue to isolate Pakistan and not deal 

with them. And that could go on forever as a policy. Indeed, that 

is the implication of a number of policies that we are practicing. 

The problem with that is obvious, which is, if Pakistan is facing 

that forever, what incentives do they have to change the course 

they are on? 

So another answer is to try to offer Pakistan ways to end its isolation by building international confidence that it is managing its 

nuclear program to standards comparable to those of other nucleararmed states and that it is going to limit its nuclear forces. And 

I think that is the objective that the Obama administration reportedly pursued. And for reasons that we have talked about, Pakistan 

is not going to agree to that. 

Now, there is another way that you could begin to pursue these 

objectives, and that would be to convey that no states that possess 

nuclear weapons outside of the Non-Proliferation Treaty—so that 

means Israel, India, and Pakistan—none of those states would be 

offered membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group without having 

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ties and materials but also could cover the nonexpansion of the nuclear arsenal. 

These NSG criteria would be established, and so only states that 

met those criteria could be admitted. But it also would mean that 

any state that did get admitted, such as India, wouldn’t be able to 

then block any other state forever from joining. Because the Nuclear Suppliers Group operates by consensus. Once India is in, as 

Obama is proposing, they can block Pakistan forever. And that is, 

in a sense, an incentive for unwelcome behavior in Pakistan. 

Now, my colleagues have talked about some of the reasons that 

Pakistan won’t agree, actually, to any of the things that could plausibly be proposed. I agree with all that. The fundamental issue is 

that Pakistan insists upon having what India has. And Ambassador Haqqani has written books on this; his testimony is elucidating on this. 

And the problem here is that the nuclear deal that we made with 

India puts no limits on India’s strategic nuclear capabilities. There 

are no limits on its fissile material production for weapons. There 

are no limits on the growth of its nuclear arsenal. There are no 

limits on its missile program and trajectory. And because of those 

reasons, the Pakistanis say, well, we want that, but the United 

States is never going to agree to no limitations in such an arrangement, and never the twain shall meet. 

So the only way to get at this problem is what Dan alluded to, 

is you would need a process with China, with India, with Pakistan 

and the U.S., all of us dealing with not only our nuclear and missile programs but new programs like conventional prompt global 

strike—the whole array of conventional and nuclear weapons that 

drive all of these players in this multifaceted competition. Anything 

less than that is not going to actually get the kind of limitations 

the administration is seeking. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Perkovich follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you all for all of the information, valuable information. And, of course, your official statements are part of the 

record. 

I will say this at the outset. Many members may have questions 

in writing that will be submitted to you. They are not in attendance. But look forward to, during the holidays, answering some of 

those questions and sending them back to us. 

I will start and yield myself 5 minutes for questions. 

Dr. Markey, what is the name of the terrorist organization responsible for the Mumbai terror attack? 

Mr. MARKEY. Lashkar-e-Taiba. 

Mr. POE. And are they in Pakistan? 

Mr. MARKEY. I believe, so, yeah. 

Mr. POE. How big are they? 

Mr. MARKEY. Thousands. 

Mr. POE. And has Pakistan done anything to hold them accountable for that attack? 

Mr. MARKEY. Not nearly as much as we would like. 

Mr. POE. What have they done, briefly? 

Mr. MARKEY. In brief, what they——

Mr. POE. Nobody has been arrested, have they? 

Mr. MARKEY. Well, yes, they have, but they weren’t kept locked 

up. 

I think what they have done is they have tried to put a lid on 

LET, on its operations, particularly any operations that would 

cross into India, and to—they would claim, that is—try to keep 

their violent activities to a minimum. 

But what they haven’t done and what is quite obvious to anybody 

watching is keep a lid on LET’s leadership or keep it out of the 

media and keep it from organizing and from conducting large-scale 

rallies in major Pakistani cities that Indians, of course, and others 

see as profoundly troubling. 

Mr. POE. A question regarding nuclear proliferation. We talked 

about what Pakistan—I mentioned about Pakistan helping North 

Korea, Iran, and Libya develop nuclear weapon capability. What 

about currently? Are they still sort of a rogue nation helping deliver any type of nuclear capability to anyone, terrorist organizations or nation-states? 

Yes, sir, Mr. Sokolski? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. The big question is what connection, if any, will 

they possibly have in the future to Saudi Arabia. And pundits love 

to say that will never happen, and pundits love to say it will happen. We don’t know. 

Mr. POE. So there is that possibility. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. There is. 

Mr. POE. And if we agree to this type of nuclear agreement with 

Pakistan, who is I don’t think an ally of the United States, then 

allies of the United States, such as Israel, will want the same deal. 

Is that correct? Is that what you said, Mr. Sokolski? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. It is a problem. 

I used to work for a man who just died, Harry Rowen, who was 

Assistant Secretary of Defense, had to deal with these problems. 

He always said that whenever he talked with Indians and they 

brought up the topic of nuclear reactors or rockets he would try to 

42

change the subject. Very good counsel. I think changing the subject 

here is important. 

In the case of Pakistan, one of the things they want is equality 

at some level or recognition of their nuclear systems. One of the 

things we probably would have to do if we wanted to try to moderate their posture is think about some limit that we could enter 

into as well as them. 

One such thought, having to do with Saudi Arabia, is perhaps it 

is time that we agree not to send nuclear weapons on other countries’ soil, beyond what we have already done, to any additional 

countries, and they should agree to do so, as well. I actually 

brought this up with some Pakistani generals. They were very excited about the idea. That was some time ago. We should take it 

up again, I think. 

Mr. POE. What is the effect of our continuing to give foreign aid, 

military reimbursement to Pakistan? I understand they are in the 

top five of all the countries that we give foreign aid to. Has that 

done anything to bring Pakistan, their rogue activities, whether it 

is support of terrorism or anything else, to the table to deal candidly with the United States? 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador HAQQANI. The simple answer is no. 

There have been some half-hearted and insufficient measures. 

Right after 9/11, General Musharraf promised a complete turnaround. You might recall that, at that time, the administration believed that Pakistan had turned around, only to find a few years 

later that support for Afghan Taliban was continuing. Later on, of 

course, one faction of the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, 

became the big issue. 

The problem there is that Pakistan’s own view of its national interest prompts it in acting very differently from what it says that 

it will do to the United States, which are commitments it has to 

make to Washington primarily to keep getting that aid. So I have, 

in many of my writings, argued that, in effect, that aid serves as 

a subsidy to Pakistan for bad policies that the United States thinks 

it wants to have changed. 

Mr. POE. One question, just yes or no. Should the United States reevaluate its commitment to sending $1 billion, approximately, a 

year to Pakistan? 

Ambassador HAQQANI. Yes. It should reevaluate. 

And the reevaluation should be based on Pakistan’s actual needs. 

Pakistan’s real needs right now are not more military. Pakistan already has the world’s eighth-largest military. But 48 percent of 

Pakistan’s school-going-age children don’t go to school. So if American money was to be sent to Pakistan to help Pakistan, it should 

be directed at those 48 percent school children, not at the Pakistani 

military. 

Unfortunately, money is fungible. That is why Congress, in its 

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, made it very clear that 

the military should no longer control decision making because then 

that enables the military to get the money diverted to itself. Unfortunately, the provisions of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act have all been subjected to waivers rather than to the certification that Congress desired. 

43

Mr. POE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

I yield 5 minutes to the ranking member from Massachusetts, 

Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you. 

We have another rollcall. I don’t want to have you come back for 

another series, so I am going to ask you to be very brief. But a couple of things. 

We were just approaching this, Ambassador. You wrote an article 

in the Wall Street Journal. You know what it is, obviously. But I 

want to ask you, in a sense, you are saying part of the problem 

with Pakistan is the delusion that it is the equal of India. 

What is the U.S. doing to add to that delusion? What should we 

be doing to change that delusion? 

Ambassador HAQQANI. In all Pakistani attempts at getting a 

strategic calculus, there is always an assumption that they will 

continue to have military assistance from the United States in one 

form or another. So military assistance from the United States 

makes Pakistan think that it can actually qualitatively compete 

with the United States—although that is becoming increasingly difficult, with American military equipment being available to India 

as well. Previously, it was not, especially during the Cold War. But 

I think that military assistance does lead to that delusion, number 

one. 

Number two, on almost all occasions, the administration, in particular, tries to always try and assuage Pakistani feelings whenever something happens in India-U.S. relations. 

I think both those things need to change. 

Mr. KEATING. Let me just comment quickly, too. If we were ever, 

hypothetically, to do a negotiation, it sounds very naive, but who 

are we really dealing with in Pakistan? Is it the ISI? Who is making the decisions? 

Ambassador HAQQANI. It is the Pakistani military, which also 

controls the ISI. And, unfortunately, the military always uses the 

excuse that the civilians are there, so it negotiated with the civilians when the military doesn’t want to deal. But when the military 

wants something to be decided, they come do you directly. 

And, unfortunately, that is something you have encouraged by 

talking to both separately, not insisting on civilian control of military institutions as was provided for in the Enhanced Partnership 

with Pakistan Act. 

Mr. KEATING. I also think that at the nucleus of a lot of these 

issues is the fact that Pakistan, to be a modern and thriving country, to compete with the countries they want to compete with, they 

have to get control of their own economy and their own revenue. 

We have been there. I know the chair has been there. I have 

been there. The revenue system there is incapable of supporting 

any kind of modern economy. 

Now, don’t you think, before we are talking about these other 

issues, or to not deal with these issues, we can’t even really begin 

to talk about the issues that are the centerpoint of this hearing. I 

honestly think that is the starting point there. And you touched 

upon it with the aid we have. 

So could anyone comment on that? To me, that seems the primary issue. 

44

Ambassador HAQQANI. Basically, aid has become a substitute for 

revenue in Pakistan. Pakistan has one of the worst tax-GDP ratios 

of any country in the world. And although every few years, when 

the American direct aid is less than quantum and the IMF is dealing with Pakistan, the IMF always insists on Pakistan enhancing 

its tax base, but it is almost never done. And for strategic considerations—which basically means Pakistan is too big to fail, so, therefore, let’s bail them out—those considerations are always set aside. 

Mr. KEATING. I am reminded, in our own country, the former 

Chair of the Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey, at the end of his nomination process, he was asked what was the most important issue 

for the U.S. security or military, and he said, ‘‘Our economy.’’ And 

I think this holds true here. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

We will be in recess for another vote. And as soon as that vote 

is over, we will resume this hearing. Thank——

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, would you object if I asked questions while you gentlemen are voting? Because I voted on this 

Capps motion. 

Mr. POE. I will need to be here when you do it. So we won’t be 

gone long. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to 

order. 

And now you can see why American foreign policy is right on target every time. 

Mr. PERKOVICH. Now you are in charge. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There you go. 

And I now call on my good friend from California, Mr. Sherman, 

for his questions. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I will address this one to Ambassador Haqqani, 

but others can chime in, as well. 

There has always been some dispute between Shiites and Sunnis 

in Pakistan. As I understand it, General Bhutto was a Shiite at a 

time when that did not preclude him from leading Pakistan. There 

is cooperation sometimes between Iran and Pakistan. At the same 

time, you see an intensification of Shiite-Sunni terrorist acts in Karachi. Worldwide, the split between Shiites and Sunnis has gotten 

considerably deeper as the Alawite in Damascus has killed at least 

200,000 Sunni Muslims. 

Is it politically difficult for Islamabad to cooperate with Tehran 

given the worldwide intensification of the split between the Shiites 

and the Sunnis? 

Ambassador HAQQANI. The short answer to the last part of your 

question, Congressman, is that, yes, it is difficult for Pakistan to 

cooperate with Tehran, although that hasn’t stopped individuals 

within the Pakistani Government, different branches of the government, from cooperating. 

Shias constitute 15 percent of Pakistan’s population, but relations between Shias and Sunnis generally have not been bad since 

independence. The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 

was Shia. Many members or Prime Ministers, specifically Bhutto’s 

45

government, were Shia. General Yahya Khan, who was one of Pakistan’s several military dictators, was Shia. 

This is more of a recent phenomenon in the last 20, 30 years. It 

has evolved as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran that 

has resulted in sectarian killings in Pakistan. 

The good part of it, of course, is that still we don’t see a bloodbath between Sunnis and Shias in towns where they live together. 

And, as far as policies are concerned, Pakistan has generally tended to side with Saudi Arabia rather than Iran on most questions. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But on proliferation issues, has Pakistan cooperated with Iran? 

Ambassador HAQQANI. Well, the A.Q. Khan network certainly 

supplied designs and equipment to Iran, although the Pakistani 

Government took the position that those were unauthorized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. 

Pakistan is 72-percent Punjabi—or correction, the military is 72-

percent Punjabi. The country is about 54-percent Punjabi. And I 

would assume the officer corps is more than 72 percent; and the 

generals, probably far, far more than that. 

Does this cause dissatisfaction among the other ethnic groups in 

Pakistan? And does that pose a risk for the military? Do you see 

the military perhaps changing and making a point of bringing in 

Sindhis and Baloch and Mohajir and other into the military? 

Ambassador HAQQANI. The makeup of the Pakistan Army, in 

particular, has changed very little since independence because it 

was based on British Government’s martial racist theory. They basically thought that certain ethnic groups were more martial than 

others, and they precluded groups such as the Sindhis from joining 

the military. 

Now, even if they make an attempt to try and have the army reflect the ethnic makeup of the country, it would take many, many 

years before a Sindhi who joins as a second lieutenant now or a 

Baloch who joins as a second lieutenant now, that he will have a 

shot at becoming a general. 

Pakistan has not had a single Sindhi general ever in its history, 

and it has had only one Baloch three-star general in its history. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Not even a one-star Sindhi? Wow. 

Ambassador HAQQANI. Not that I know of. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And you say even if the Pakistani Army tried to 

open it up it would take them a long time. Are they trying? 

Ambassador HAQQANI. They say that they are, but we all know 

that on a lot of occasions and on a lot of subjects what they say 

is not what is happening on the ground. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We cooperate with Pakistan in a variety of different categories. Does it make sense to compartmentalize our relationship on nuclear issues and keep that separate from our relationship on other issues—for example, terrorism? 

Ambassador HAQQANI. Personally, I think that it does not make 

sense, for the simple reason that all cooperation feeds into what I 

call Pakistan’s military’s delusion of equality, not ‘‘equality’’ in a 

principle sense but ‘‘equality’’ in a weapons-system-for-weaponssystem sense, which is not easy to do for a country as poor as Pakistan. 

46

Mr. SHERMAN. They view themselves as the military equal of the 

United States? Of India? 

Ambassador HAQQANI. Of India. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Of India. Yeah. 

Ambassador HAQQANI. But I am sure that my colleagues here 

would have some opinion on this matter, as well, because there are 

many people who think that nuclear issues can be compartmentalized from other issues. And I think it would be fair to——

Mr. SHERMAN. Let’s hear from Dr. Markey on that. 

Mr. MARKEY. I think that you have to be careful about the question of linkage across all of these issues. And, you know, there is 

the Pakistan that we wish it would be, and it is nothing like the 

Pakistan that really is. And that Pakistan is a Pakistan that is 

deeply troubling. And it is also a Pakistan that could be significantly worse. And so we are always caught in a situation of just 

what kind of risk do we want to run. 

With respect to stovepiping nuclear issues, there is certainly the 

issue of just how sensitive they are, and there is also the issue of 

the, sort of, technical aspects, which leads then necessarily to this 

kind of stovepiped area that is separate from others. 

But with respect to how they fit into our broader concerns, I 

think it has typically been the case that U.S. policymakers have 

placed them at the top of our list and yet have seen that our ability 

to reach in and do anything about it seriously—and that is, you 

know, a lot of the topic that we are here to discuss today, our ability to actually change their nuclear policy—is very, very limited. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Perkovich? 

Mr. PERKOVICH. I think you have to be prepared to separate the 

issues and treat them separately, especially when there is an opportunity to do something constructive. And there, it would be selfdefeating to link. 

And just do the thought experiment. We are very concerned 

about terrorism, for example. So if there were a new Al Qaeda in 

Pakistan and we were aware of it, and all of a sudden they were 

prepared to cooperate with us, we would do what it would take to 

facilitate that, regardless of whether they improved their tax collection or whatever else they are doing. 

And so, on nuclear policy, both from the standpoint of securing 

materials and facilities against terrorism or in a crisis where you 

are worried about a nuclear war with India, that becomes front and 

center, and you deal with that as you have to, and you forsake 

linkage. So I think, you know, we shouldn’t be naive about the 

need to do that. 

It is not exactly correct to say nuclear has always risen to the 

top. And Henry knows this very well, as well. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, for very understandable reasons, beginning 

1979 throughout the 1980s, the U.S. put nonproliferation to the 

side and put driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan as the numberone priority, and so didn’t exercise all of the leverage or even the 

legal authorities that it had at the time to pressure Pakistan on 

nonproliferation. 

Now, we don’t need to relitigate that; there was a good reason 

to do it. But it hasn’t always been the case that nuclear is the most 

pressing issue. 

47

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And, as I am in the chair, I will yield myself whatever time is 

necessary. 

First and foremost, let me just note that I have had a long, long 

relationship with Pakistan and with that part of world. I was probably elected as Pakistan’s best friend in Congress. And I have to 

say that, during the 1980s, I was involved with Pakistan at the 

highest level, in terms of supporting the mujahideen fight against 

the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. 

Even then, there were reasons for concern. The lion’s share of the 

supplies that we provided for the mujahideen went to Hekmatyar 

Gulbuddin. And the ISI, which is the intelligence unit there and 

their military intelligence in Pakistan, intentionally gave the most 

radical of the elements most of the weapons and supplies that we 

were providing. 

I found that, even then, to be, you know, upsetting and not 

thinking in terms of the long run, except I had assumed that because the ISI military people I was working with were all cleanshaven and looked like British officers that they were not radicals. 

I think I made a mistake. 

And so, after the Soviet Union was eliminated from Afghanistan—which I am proud to have played a part in that effort—there 

was a period of chaos, and the Taliban emerged. Why did the 

Taliban take power? Taliban took power because the people in 

Pakistan set it up and organized and supported and supplied the 

Taliban and then cut a deal with the Saudis to finance the Taliban. 

And, thus, the people of Afghanistan had radicalism, the Taliban 

version, shoved down their throats and started this whole cycle 

that has been so damaging. 

Let me note, after that, after 9/11 and all the way up until 9/11, 

the Pakistani ISI was deeply involved in supporting the Taliban 

and, thus, terrorism—terrorism—throughout the region and 

throughout the world. 

And, after 9/11, yes, I am told that the Pakistanis became very 

cooperative. I don’t know the details about that. I would assume 

they were cooperative at some point because we were, at that point, 

willing to really do some damage to people who were getting in our 

way of seeking revenge for the slaughter of 3,000 Americans on 

9/11. 

However, during that same period of the greatest height in our 

concern, the Pakistani Government saw fit to give safe haven to 

Osama bin Laden. 

First of all, is there anyone on the panel who believes that the 

high-level Pakistani authorities did not know that Osama bin 

Laden was in their country? Is there anyone here who could say, 

no, no, they didn’t know, we got to give them the benefit of the 

doubt? 

No, I have never met anybody willing to say that. 

And then, of course, since Osama bin Laden was brought to justice, we have Dr. Afridi, the man who helped us bring him to—he 

his been arrested by the Pakistani Government and thrown into a 

dungeon. And, to me, that is an insult, an intentional insult, to the 

American people, who have just seen our people slaughtered, that 

48

they are going to do harm to the person who helped us bring to justice the murderer of our people. 

So all of those things lead me, kind of, to think that maybe the 

Pakistan that I was supporting during the Cold War because they 

were supporting the United States is—that was either a really bad 

decision on my part back then, or we have evolved into a situation 

where Pakistan was once our friend and is now an enemy. 

And I will let you guys comment on that. But let me note one 

of our greatest adversaries now in the world, not an enemy of ours 

but an adversary, is China. And it is not Russia anymore. I mean, 

a lot of people want to have Russia as our enemy again, but it isn’t, 

as compared to China is our adversary, possibly enemy. And Pakistan’s Government is what? Trying to have as a close a relationship 

to China has they can. 

And that leaves us, then, with what other analysis can they—we 

are talking about nuclear materials here today. We have a country 

with all of that background, and we have to ask ourselves, do they 

deserve our trust for a civilian nuclear program? 

And I am going to let each one of you answer that question, but 

I want to leave one last item on the table. And that is the Pakistani Government has to be judged on what they have done and 

why that have done some of these things. Those things that I just 

outlined are damaging to the security of the United States and the 

peace of the world. But what they are doing, it seems to me, to 

their own people, the Baloch, the Sindhis, Christians, is 

unforgiveable and unconscionable. 

And we have let it ride. We have just let it slide. We continue 

giving them weapon systems that are used to destroy Baloch villages. We give them weapons that, instead of being used against 

the Taliban, are being used against people in their own country 

who oppose their government. And I think that is something that—

all of these things are important considerations. 

So let me ask the panel, number one, none of you decided to say 

that Pakistan probably didn’t know that Osama bin Laden was 

there. So let me just ask right down the line: Does the Pakistani 

Government today deserve our trust when it comes to this nuclear 

development? 

If you could just give me about a 30-second answer on that, and 

go right on down the line, that is fine. 

Ambassador HAQQANI. Congressman, I have already laid out my 

views in my written testimony and in two books in which I make 

the point that the focus of Pakistan has been—and American interests and Pakistani interests do not converge. They have not converged for a while. 

During the Cold War, Pakistan was interested in getting American military and economic assistance to compete with India, and 

it made some concessions to America in return. The problem is that 

in Washington there are always people who are willing to see the 

Pakistani glass as half-full, and they don’t see it from the view of 

the Pakistani people. 

Pakistan’s children don’t go to school, or 48 percent of them don’t 

go to school. The Baloch are being repressed. The Mohajirs in Karachi are being repressed. Sindhis have their own set of complaints. The support of the Taliban has actually resulted in blowVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:35 Dec 22, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\120815\97855 SHIRL
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back that has disrupted our own society. And one institution, which 

is the Pakistani military, dominates all others. That is not a 

healthy situation. 

American policy should be directed at trying to force or make or 

convince Pakistan into becoming a normal country where schools 

run, where electricity is available, where the aspirations of the people are answered, and not just some dream of the military of great 

conquests, which it hasn’t been able to fulfill except when it is oppressing and repressing its own people. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the answer was ‘‘no’’? 

Ambassador HAQQANI. Absolutely. That was a rather long ‘‘no,’’ 

but yes, Congressman Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

Doctor? 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. 

I think the question about nuclear negotiations with Pakistan 

should be judged—the utility of those negotiations should be judged 

on whether they are realistic and whether they could serve U.S. interests. 

And I think, right now, the answer to the first question of realism is ‘‘no,’’ it is unrealistic on both sides. And, at the moment, the 

answer to the second question is also ‘‘no.’’

Mr. SOKOLSKI. As I made clear in my testimony, I think it is a 

bad idea generally to go running around the world with nuclear 

carrots, particularly in the subcontinent. I would not limit it to 

Pakistan. I don’t think the India deal was a winner either. And it 

seems to me, you can actually make things much worse by playing 

with this. 

If you need to negotiate, I would do it on the merits. And I 

would, as you have laid out, expect performance as a function of 

what it is you are willing to offer. And I don’t think the nuclear 

area offers very much practically, and it can be really militarily 

dicey—that is to say, self-defeating. I would stay clear of it. 

Mr. PERKOVICH. I don’t think these things are done on the basis 

of trust. If they were, the answer would be a simple ‘‘no.’’ But as 

your former colleague or Governor first in California—I am a Californian—President Reagan—you know, ‘‘Trust but verify.’’ I would 

always say, ‘‘Distrust and verify.’’ And so that would be the proposition here. 

And I don’t think we are going to have an agreement, so I don’t 

think it is going to be an issue really. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, there are two factors. 

Number one, we do have the technological capabilities of building 

nuclear reactors today that will not have the waste left over, like 

the Iranian reactor will, producing nuclear weapons. And there is 

a whole new generation possible of nuclear power plants. So, no 

matter what we would ever do, we should—in fact, not just Pakistan but anyone that we are involved with, expanding the realm 

of nuclear power should be based on the new technology rather 

than the old technology. Because we don’t need no leftover material 

that can be used for nuclear bombs. We don’t need that anywhere. 

So that is the number-one thought. 

And let me just suggest that we give hundreds of millions of dollars every year to Pakistan. I would hope that we come to our 

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senses and, number one, treat Pakistan as it deserves to be treated 

by the decisions they have made that affect us. And all of their recent decisions have been contrary to America’s security needs and 

contrary to the peace of the world. 

So I would hope that we would—then I would hope that, if we 

make those decisions, that the Pakistani people themselves will understand what is going on, the repercussions of it, and start insisting on people to govern them who are more consistent with these 

values that we are expressing today. 

So I would call on my colleagues to join me in eliminating that 

aid that we are giving to Pakistan, at least until Dr. Afridi is set 

free as a sign of good faith to us. 

And, with that, I would recognize my good friend, who is almost 

as outspoken as I am. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, panel, for being here today. 

I am really grateful to be here with Congressman Rohrabacher. 

I appreciate his persistence in regard to the doctor, and that really 

should be so important for the relationship that we have with Pakistan. Additionally, I appreciate his expertise on nuclear reactors, as 

we just heard. And so that is just very helpful. 

My association and appreciation of South Asia is that my dad 

served in the Flying Tigers during World War II. And of all 

things—even Dana doesn’t know this—but he departed by boat, of 

all things, from Miami, Florida, went through the Suez Canal in 

1944 and landed at Karachi, and then went to service to protect 

the people of China and South Asia. So I am just very grateful, 

with that background. 

And then I had the opportunity to actually see a remarkable effort of cooperation, the earthquake relief in Muzaffarabad, where 

American and Pakistani military worked together. And there was 

a field hospital set up for female doctors to serve the injured female 

citizens of that region. It was a remarkable situation which I had 

hoped the people of Pakistan would see the hopes that we have for 

their country. 

And then, finally, a remarkable opportunity that I had that is 

very sad in retrospect, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited my 

home community of Lexington, South Carolina, and was a speaker 

at a dinner there for a local medical foundation. She made such a 

great impression. My wife was so impressed. Sadly, I was at her 

home in December 2007 and had breakfast, and 10 days later she 

was assassinated. 

So it just is heartbreaking to think—and then, Ambassador, for 

you to keep citing, correctly, the lack of education, that just breaks 

your heart for a country that should be doing well. 

Putting that in mind, Ambassador, would cooperation with the 

U.S. be valuable enough for Pakistan for it to consider joining the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? 

Ambassador HAQQANI. While it would be in Pakistan’s interest to 

consider all options of joining nuclear restraint regimes—because, 

very frankly, the pursuit of nuclear competition will not necessarily 

be in Pakistan’s interest—I do not see that happening. 

The opposition to joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as 

the CTBT has been very entrenched. And, so far, Pakistan’s estabVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:35 Dec 22, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\120815\97855 SHIRL
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lishment, as it is called, the Pakistani military and the intelligence 

service, have shown no interest in encouraging participation in 

those restraint regimes. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate you pointing out that it would certainly be in the interest——

Ambassador HAQQANI. Yes. 

Mr. WILSON [continuing]. Of the people. It would actually be in 

the interest of the military, the government, whatever. But thank 

you for raising that. 

And, Mr. Sokolski, with the three pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, being nonproliferation, disarmament, and 

the right to peacefully use nuclear technology, is it wise for the 

United States to enter into a 123 agreement with countries that 

cannot agree to these basis tenets? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. The three pillars you refer to is a doctrine that 

was promoted first by the Italians and the South Africans. It is not 

really in the treaty or even in the negotiating record. 

But just taking it nonetheless, I think, in general, you have to 

have standards for the NPT to mean anything. And we have been 

backing away from those standards too steadily over the last, I 

would say, 20 years. 

The key one—and I think a lot on the panel will agree on this—

was the India deal. I think that was a step backwards. So we are 

a little bit on our back heels right now. But you do want to insist 

on certain restraints that I don’t think Pakistan will agree to. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you for your insight. 

And for any of you or all of you, currently, the Pakistani civilian 

nuclear program consists of three operational reactors. And we 

know that they have already entered into a 123 agreement with 

the Chinese. 

Is the nuclear energy market in Pakistan large enough to be attractive to the U.S. nuclear industry? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I would like to take that. 

Most of the money that those reactors cost is financed by China. 

Without that financing, there would be no construction. So it is a 

negative market. In other words, you have to—listen, you don’t sell 

the reactor so much as the financing. 

And I don’t think that is a market that—I mean, I would hesitate to speak on behalf of the industry, but I doubt they are interested in going in. 

Mr. WILSON. And, to me, that is very unfortunate. 

Well, go ahead, please, Dr. Perkovich. 

Mr. PERKOVICH. Just to add, Henry is right. And I think for your 

thinking about this, too, there is no vendor other than the Chinese 

who would seek to build nuclear power plants in Pakistan for the 

reasons that Henry mentioned. Pakistan doesn’t have the money, 

and it is not a secure enough environment. 

Now, one of the problems that that raises is that is why the incentive that would be offered to the Pakistanis to control their nuclear program, if it is, ‘‘We will sell you nuclear power plants,’’ it 

is not really an incentive because they know they can’t buy these 

plants either. And so it is another reason why this kind of deal 

won’t actually work. 

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Mr. WILSON. Well, that is disappointing because I know, in my 

home State of South Carolina, over 60 percent of all electrical generation is clean, green nuclear. And it has enabled us to compete 

with the rest of the world in terms of manufacturing and living 

standards. 

And I just hope that something can be done to address the extraordinary issue of reliable electrical generation for the people of 

Pakistan. And whatever that is, I am happy to try to back each of 

you up. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Last night or, I guess, two nights ago, one does 

research before they come here I hope, and I did. So what do you 

do? You go on Google. And I plugged in ‘‘USAID,’’ ‘‘World Bank,’’ 

‘‘Asian Development Bank,’’ and I put in ‘‘electrical generation.’’

And what I got was really very disturbing. What you got were 

IG reports on all of the fraud associated with the aid that had been 

expropriated by the Pakistanis in ways that you couldn’t even get 

to, well, what were we trying do? When you got to the third page 

of the entry, you were able to see that USAID is trying to do a lot 

of sensible things. So is the Asian Bank. But it is all non-nuclear. 

And as I explained in the testimony, there are good reasons for 

that. It has to do with the expense and the availability of things 

like natural gas. 

So it is certainly something to hope for, but it certainly is not 

something to start with. I think that is sort of the basic point. 

And the good-governance question overrides all economic questions here. I mean, it is quite obvious. It is just embarrassing that 

we have to see IG reports before you get to what USAID wants to 

tell you. You know, it was a whole page of them. It was very disheartening. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you for your research. 

Thank you, each of you, for your insight. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you. 

And Congressman Wilson has been a wonderful person to work 

with over the years. And he takes this job very seriously, as we all 

do. 

And this issue today, I think, is of—it should crystalize in our 

minds what we are dealing with in terms of Pakistan. Can we trust 

the Pakistani Government to engage with us in a deal concerning 

nuclear power? And if we can’t, which is what I am understanding 

today and which my common sense tells me, why are we then giving so much aid, providing military equipment to a government, a 

regime, that we can’t even trust to deal with a civilian electricity 

through nuclear energy program? 

We need to reassess. The time is far past when we should have 

made the decision. But today we need to make the decision of reassessing our strategic position with Pakistan, trying to push them 

in the right direction by letting them know there are consequences 

to bad behavior and behavior that hurts other people. 

And so, with that said, I appreciate your testimony, the insights 

you have given us today. I appreciate Congressman Wilson being 

with us today and, of course, Judge Poe for calling this hearing. 

With that said, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MR. HENRY D. SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE

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