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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

PHILLIP DANIEL ARCHER, : No. 3471 EDA 2015

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, October 11, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Criminal Division at No. CP-48-CR-0000485-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND FITZGERALD,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 03, 2016

Phillip Daniel Archer appeals nunc pro tunc from the October 11, 

2013 judgment of sentence of five to ten years’ imprisonment imposed after 

a jury found him guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm.1 After careful 

review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts adduced at trial as 

follows:

Early in the morning on May 28, 2012, 

[appellant] checked into Room 125 of the Knights 

Inn Hotel. [Appellant] was in the company of a 

female companion, Rashida McClain [(“McClain”)]. 

[Appellant] and [McClain] requested to change their 

room approximately forty-five minutes later, 

apparently complaining that bugs were located in 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.
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Room 125. The hotel staff provided [appellant] with 

a new room, numbered 268.

After [appellant] and [McClain] vacated 

Room 125, Virginia Sarver, the executive 

housekeeper at the Knights Inn Hotel, was alerted to 

the presence of a gun under the pillow in Room 125 

by one of her employees who had been cleaning the 

recently-vacated room. Upon inspection, Ms. Sarver

observed a gun under the pillow of the bed in 

Room 125. Ms. Sarver informed the front desk 

manger to immediately “lock the room out.” 

Ms. Sarver locked Room 125 out and did not go back 

into it.

. . . .

On May 28, 2013, Raja Mehta was working as 

the front desk manager at the Knights Inn Hotel. 

Her shift was 9:00 pm – 4:00 am. During her shift, 

a male guest informed Ms. Mehta that he had left 

something in Room 125. Ms. Mehta recalled that a 

female may have been standing behind the male. 

Ms. Mehta gave the male guest access to Room 125 

to search for his items, pursuant to the Knights Inn 

Hotel’s policy. Nearly simultaneously, Ms. Mehta was 

notified of the presence of a gun in Room 125. Upon 

inspection of the record for the room, Ms. Mehta 

discovered that the name of the guest for Room 125 

was “Archer.” Ms. Mehta then called the general 

manager and the police to report the presence of a 

gun in the hotel room to them, again following 

established protocol.

[At approximately 9:30 a.m.,] Trooper Ryan 

Belusko of the Pennsylvania State Police was 

dispatched to the Knights Inn Hotel due to the report 

of a firearm in a hotel room. Trooper Belusko spoke 

with the office manager about the report and 

requested information regarding the person who 

rented the room. He was given a Connecticut ID for 

[appellant]. Trooper Belusko ran the ID and 

discovered that [appellant] was not permitted to 

possess a firearm. Trooper Belusko conducted a 
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search of Room 125, but did not find the firearm. 

Trooper Belusko did not conduct a search of the 

second room, Room 268. According to his 

testimony, [Trooper Belusko] went to Room 268 [at 

approximately 11 a.m., accompanied by other 

troopers] and knocked and announced [their] 

presence. [McClain] opened the door to Room 268. 

Both [appellant] and [McClain] were removed from 

the room and transported to the State Police 

barracks [(“PSP Bethlehem”)]. . . .

Trial court opinion and order, 11/19/13 at 2-3 (footnote omitted).

After the troopers entered Room 268, appellant repeatedly denied that 

there was a gun in the room. (Trial court opinion, 7/15/13 at 5, citing notes 

of testimony, 2/12/13 at 37.) The troopers did not search Room 268 or 

gather any evidence at this time. (Notes of testimony, 5/31/13 at 14-15.) 

While the troopers waited for approval of the search warrant, they secured 

Room 268 by closing the door and posting a trooper outside. (Id. at 15.) 

At approximately 11:30 a.m., appellant was read his Miranda2rights at PSP 

Bethlehem, and declined to make any verbal or written statements to police. 

(Id. at 15-16.) Thereafter, at approximately 12:30 p.m., Corporal Jason R. 

Troutman, a supervisor in charge of the Pennsylvania State Police forensics 

services unit, executed a search warrant for Room 268. (Id.) Corporal 

Troutman found a silver .40-caliber Ruger P94 pistol submerged in the 

retention tank behind the toilet, as well as cash and jewelry. (Id.) 

Appellant was subsequently placed under arrest. While in custody, appellant 

 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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inquired as to whether McClain would be charged and ultimately made a 

statement indicating that McClain “doesn’t know nothing about nothing.” 

(Trial court opinion 7/15/13 at 8-9, citing notes of testimony, 2/12/13 at 38, 

42.)

On May 28, 2012, appellant was charged with unlawful possession of a 

firearm.

3

 On May 6, 2013, appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to, 

inter alia, suppress the evidence seized from his unlawful detention and the 

search of his room, as well as any statements he made to police. (See 

“Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion for Relief,” 5/6/13 at ¶¶ 6-10.) Following a 

hearing, the trial court filed a comprehensive opinion and order denying 

appellant’s suppression motion on July 15, 2013. Thereafter, appellant 

proceeded to a jury trial and was found guilty of unlawful possession of a

firearm on September 10, 2013. As noted, appellant was sentenced to five 

to ten years’ imprisonment on October 11, 2013. On October 23, 2013, 

appellant filed untimely post-sentence motions. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1) 

(stating, “[e]xcept as provided in paragraphs (C) and (D), a written 

post-sentence motion shall be filed no later than 10 days after imposition of 

sentence.”). The trial court denied appellant’s post-sentence motions on 

November 19, 2013. On November 26, 2013, appellant filed notice of 

 

3 Appellant was also charged at docket No. CP-48-CR-0000486-2013 with 

robbery and related offenses for an incident that took place earlier that same 

day. That matter went to trial in August 2013, and appellant was found not 

guilty of all charges.
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appeal that was ultimately dismissed by this court for failure to file a brief. 

(See per curiam order, 10/10/14.)

On October 7, 2015, appellant filed a timely petition pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, requesting that his 

direct appeal rights be reinstated. On October 23, 2015, the trial court 

granted appellant’s petition and reinstated appellant’s direct appeal rights 

nunc pro tunc. This timely appeal followed on November 10, 2015.4

On appeal, appellant raises the following issue for our review:

Did the [trial] court er[r] in failing to sup[p]ress 

statements made by [appellant] as well as physical 

evidence and observations obtained from a 

warrantless entry into a hotel room in which he was 

staying as well as the later entry into the same room 

pursuant to a search warrant? 

Appellant’s brief at 5.

Our standard of review when addressing a challenge to a trial court’s 

denial of a suppression motion is well settled.

[An appellate court’s] standard of review in 

addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression 

motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. Because the 

Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression 

court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the 

defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those] 

 

4 Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal 

conclusions are erroneous. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal 

denied, 135 A.3d 584 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted; brackets in original).

Appellant raises multiple sub-issues in support of his claim that the 

trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. (See appellant’s brief at 

5-6.) For the ease of our discussion, we elect to address some of these 

issues concurrently.

Appellant’s first two claims challenge his initial encounter with police 

and whether the troopers’ warrantless entry into his hotel room was illegal. 

(See id. at 16-29.)

“Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 

Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee individuals 

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v.

Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 550 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 

158 (Pa. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[W]arrantless searches and seizures are . . . unreasonable per se, unless 

conducted pursuant to a specifically established and well-delineated 

exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 556. One exception to the 

warrant requirement is when probable cause and exigent circumstances are 

present. “Absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless 

searches and seizures in a private home violate both the Fourth Amendment 

[of the United States Constitution] and Article 1[,] § 8 of the Pennsylvania 
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Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Bowmaster, 101 A.3d 789, 792 

(Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). These constitutional protections have 

been extended to include a person’s hotel room. See Commonwealth v. 

Dean, 940 A.2d 514, 521 (Pa.Super. 2008) (stating, “[w]arrantless searches 

and seizures inside a . . . hotel room are presumptively unreasonable unless 

the occupant consents or probable cause and exigent circumstances exist to 

justify intrusion.”) (citations and parentheses omitted).

Herein, appellant first argues that the troopers lacked probable cause 

to enter his hotel room on the day in question. (Appellant’s brief at 16.) 

“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s 

knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent individual in believing that an 

offense was committed and that the defendant has committed it.” 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 24 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 34 A.3d 82 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).

Instantly, our review of the record reveals that the troopers had 

probable cause to believe that appellant had committed a crime at the time 

they entered his hotel room. The record reveals that at approximately 

9:30 a.m., Trooper Belusko was dispatched to the Knights Inn Hotel to 

investigate a report that a firearm had been discovered in one of the rooms. 

(Notes of testimony, 5/31/13 at 7-8.) Upon arriving at the hotel, 

Trooper Belusko spoke to the front desk manager and the member of the 

cleaning staff, both of whom had observed the firearm under a pillow in 
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Room 125. (Id. at 8-9, 19-21.) Trooper Belusko checked Room 125 with 

cleaning staff personnel but did not find the firearm. (Id. at 10.) 

Trooper Belusko was aware that appellant had checked into Room 125 

earlier that morning, but had recently switched to Room 268. (Id. at 8, 

10-11.) Trooper Belusko was also aware that appellant had two prior felony 

convictions that disqualified him from lawfully possessing a firearm and had 

re-entered Room 125 prior to the trooper’s arrival to retrieve something he 

had forgotten. (Id. at 9-11.)

Appellant also contends that there were no exigent circumstances in 

this case sufficient to justify the troopers’ warrantless entry in appellant’s 

hotel room. (Appellant’s brief at 21.) We disagree.

Exigent circumstances arise only where “the need for prompt police 

action is imperative, either because the evidence sought to be preserved is 

likely to be destroyed or secreted from investigation, or because the officer 

must protect himself from danger . . . .” Commonwealth v. Lee, 972 A.2d 

1, 5 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted). 

[V]arious factors need to be taken into account to 

assess the presence of exigent circumstances; for 

example: 1) the gravity of the offense; (2) whether 

the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; 

(3) whether there is a clear showing of probable 

cause; (4) whether there is a strong reason to 

believe that the suspect is within the premises being 

entered; (5) whether there is a likelihood that the 

suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; 

(6) whether the entry is peaceable; (7) the timing of 

the entry; (8) whether there is hot pursuit of a 

fleeing felon; (9) whether there is a likelihood that 
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evidence will be destroyed if police take the time to 

obtain a warrant; and (10) whether there is a danger 

to police or other persons inside or outside of the 

dwelling to require immediate and swift action.

Dean, 940 A.2d at 522 (citation omitted).

Contrary to appellant’s contention, our examination of the Dean

factors reveals that there were exigent circumstances in this case sufficient 

to justify the troopers’ warrantless entry in appellant’s hotel room. The 

gravity of the offense in this matter is high; unlawful possession of a firearm 

is graded as a second-degree felony. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a.1). As 

discussed, Trooper Belusko clearly had probable cause to believe appellant 

was in unlawful possession of the firearm that was observed by hotel staff 

earlier that morning. The record further reveals that Trooper Belusko was 

informed by hotel staff that appellant was in Room 268. (Notes of 

testimony, 5/31/13 at 11.) Trooper Belusko also testified that one of the 

reasons he elected to enter Room 268 rather than wait for the search 

warrant was that “the search warrant does take some time and in that time 

[appellant] could have left . . . the motel room, possibly with a firearm.” 

(Id. at 13).

Additionally, the record reflects that the troopers’ entry into Room 268 

was relatively peaceable. Prior to obtaining a search warrant for Room 268, 

Trooper Belusko received verbal confirmation to detain appellant and secure 

Room 268. (Id. at 11-12, 27.) At approximately 11 a.m., Trooper Belusko, 
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Trooper Alamo,5and Corporal Peter Candianis (“Corporal Candianis”) 

knocked on the door of Room 268, announced who they were, and stated 

that they wished to speak to appellant. (Id. at 12-14.) Although Corporal 

Candianis removed McClain from the doorway and Troopers Belusko and 

Alamo entered the room behind a ballistics shield, appellant was found 

standing naked at the foot of the bed. (Id.) There was no indication of any 

violence, undue force, or threats. Furthermore, the troopers’ entry into 

Room 268 did not occur at night, but rather mid-morning, at approximately 

11 a.m. See cf. Commonwealth v. Berkheimer, 57 A.3d 171, 179 

(Pa.Super. 2012) (stating that, “the fact that an entry is made at night 

raises particular concern over its reasonableness[.]”) (citation omitted).

The troopers in this matter were not in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon 

and had no reason to believe appellant was attempting to destroy the 

firearm. However, the record reveals that the troopers’ entry into Room 268 

was conducted, in part, based upon their belief that appellant posed a 

danger to both the troopers and the other hotel guests. Trooper Belusko 

testified that after he was unable to locate the firearm in Room 125, he 

made the decision to obtain a search warrant for Room 268 because the 

hotel’s “rooms were rented out by multiple people[,]” appellant had two 

prior felony convictions, and “[t]he public was at risk, officer safety [was] at 

risk[.]” (Notes of testimony, 5/31/13 at 12-13.)

 

5 Trooper Alamo’s first name is not apparent from the record.
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that appellant’s claim that the 

trial court should have granted his suppression motion because there was no 

probable cause nor exigent circumstances to justify the troopers’ entry into 

his hotel room must fail.

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress various statements he made to the troopers. Appellant 

contends that, even if exigent circumstances existed for the troopers to 

enter his hotel room, his statement that there was no firearm in the room 

should have been suppressed because he was not advised of his Miranda

rights prior to making this statement. (Appellant’s brief at 30, citing notes 

of testimony, 2/12/13 at 37.) Appellant further avers that the statement he 

made to the troopers at PSP Bethlehem indicating that McClain “doesn’t 

know nothing about nothing” should have been suppressed because it 

stemmed from his illegal arrest and was made after he indicated that he did 

not want to speak with the troopers. (Appellant’s brief at 45, citing notes of 

testimony, 2/12/13 at 42.) These claims are meritless.

It is a fundamental precept enshrined in the United 

States Constitution that a suspect subject to a 

custodial interrogation by police must be warned that 

he has the right to remain silent, that anything he 

says may be used against him in court, and that he 

is entitled to the presence of an attorney.

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 71 A.3d 998, 1003 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). A custodial interrogation 

occurs when there is a “questioning initiated by the police after a person has 
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been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom of 

action in any significant way.” Commonwealth v. Clinton, 905 A.2d 1026, 

1032 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 934 A.2d 71 (Pa. 2007) (citations 

and emphasis omitted). In determining whether police conduct is the 

functional equivalent of interrogation, our supreme court has noted that,

the court must focus on a suspect’s perceptions and 

give relevance to the officer’s constructive 

knowledge. Such considerations were required by 

the [Supreme Court’s] direction [in Rhode Island v. 

Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)] that the inquiry 

must look at the suspect’s perceptions rather than 

the intent of the police. Moreover, a practice that 

the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke 

an incriminating response from a suspect . . . 

amounts to an interrogation.

Commonwealth v. Gaul, 912 A.2d 252, 255 (Pa. 2006), cert. denied, 552 

U.S. 939 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In conducting this 

inquiry, we are mindful of the fact that “not every statement made by an 

individual during a police encounter constitutes an interrogation.” 

Commonwealth v. Page, 59 A.3d 1118, 1131 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 80 A.3d 776 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).

In the instant matter, we agree with the trial court that appellant was 

not entitled to receive Miranda warnings prior to his statement regarding 

the firearm, as he was not subject to interrogation at the time this 

statement was made. (See trial court opinion, 7/15/13 at 5.) Rather, the 

record reveals that appellant’s repeated denial that there was a firearm in 

his room was made voluntarily and not in response to any questioning or 
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interrogation by police. This court has long recognized that “[v]olunteered 

or spontaneous utterances by an individual are admissible even without 

Miranda warnings.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 30 

(Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

Likewise, appellant’s contention with regard to the statement he made 

about McClain is also without merit. The trial court credited

“Trooper Belusko’s testimony that he witnessed Corporal Candianis provide 

[appellant] with Miranda warnings before [appellant] made the statement 

about McClain.” (Trial court opinion, 7/15/13 at 9; see also notes of 

testimony, 5/31/13 at 15-16.) “It is within the suppression court’s sole 

province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight 

to be given their testimony[,]” and we will not disturb the court’s credibility 

determinations on appeal. Commonwealth v. Dutrieville, 932 A.2d 240, 

242 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted). Accordingly, appellant’s motion to 

suppress these statements was properly denied by the trial court.

Appellant’s remaining claims concern the validity of the affidavit of 

probable cause upon which the search warrant issued for Room 268 was 

based. Appellant contends that the affidavit of probable cause did not set 

forth sufficient information within its four corners to provide the magistrate 

with a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to issue 

said warrant. (Appellant’s brief at 34-35, 40-45.)
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Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution mandate that search warrants

must be supported by probable cause. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

42 A.3d 1017, 1031-1032 (Pa. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1795 (2013).

[T]he question of whether probable cause exists for 

the issuance of a search warrant must be answered 

according to the totality of the circumstances test 

articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, [503 A.2d 

921 (Pa. 1985)], and its Pennsylvania progeny, 

which incorporates the reasoning of the United 

States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 

213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). The task of the 

magistrate acting as the issuing authority is to make 

a practical, common sense assessment of whether, 

given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, 

a fair probability exists that contraband or evidence 

of a crime will be found in a particular place. A 

search warrant is defective if the issuing authority 

has not been supplied with the necessary 

information. The chronology established by the 

affidavit of probable cause must be evaluated 

according to a common sense determination. 

Commonwealth v. Arthur, 62 A.3d 424, 432 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 78 A.3d 1089 (Pa. 2013) (some citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted; citation formatting corrected).

Upon review, we conclude that the affidavit provided a substantial 

basis to support the issuing authority’s finding of probable cause to search 

the hotel room in question. The affidavit of probable cause detailed the 

discovery of a firearm in Room 125 by hotel staff, the fact that Room 125 

had been previously occupied by appellant, and that appellant had moved to 

Room 268. (Affidavit of probable cause, ¶¶ 2-4; certified record at 6.) The 
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affidavit further indicated appellant had returned to Room 125 prior to 

Trooper Belusko’s arrival to retrieve something he had forgotten, and less 

than ten minutes after appellant re-entered Room 125, cleaning staff 

returned to the room and the firearm was no longer there. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.) 

Additionally, the affidavit indicated that Trooper Belusko obtained 

information that appellant had multiple felony convictions that prohibited 

him from possessing a firearm. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.) Based on the totality of the 

circumstances, we find that the affidavit in question provided probable cause 

to search Room 268.

Appellant further contends that the affidavit of probable cause relied 

on evidence that was illegally obtained during the trooper’s initial 

warrantless entry into his hotel room to detain him. (Appellant’s brief at 36-

39.) The record belies this claim. As explained, the trooper’s initial entry 

into appellant’s hotel room was lawful, as there were exigent circumstances 

in this case sufficient to justify a warrantless entry. Moreover, as the trial 

court properly recognized, the troopers did not even gather any evidence or 

even search Room 268 when they entered the room to detain appellant. 

(Trial court opinion, 7/15/13 at 5, 13-14; see also notes of testimony, 

5/31/13 at 14-15.) Accordingly, this claim must fail.

Lastly, appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the 

independent source doctrine is applicable to the instant matter. (Appellant’s 

brief at 48.) Our review of the record indicates that appellant did not raise 
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this specific issue in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Accordingly, we deem this 

issue waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“[i]ssues not included in [an 

appellant’s 1925(b)] Statement . . . are waived”); see also 

Commonwealth v. Dozier, 99 A.3d 106, 110 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 104 A.3d 523 (Pa. 2014) (deeming appellant’s issues waived for 

failure to present them in his Rule 1925(b) statement).

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we discern no error on the 

part of the trial court in denying appellant’s suppression motion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/3/2016