alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
REPLY FORM

1. Owner's Name 2. Control No. 

THIS INFORMATION REQUEST IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. WHILE YOU ARE NOT

REQUIRED TO RESPOND, YOUR COOPERATION IS NEEDED TO MAKE THERESULTS

OFTHIS INVESTIGATION VALID

3. Do you own/lease a vehicle with the vehicle identification number

(VIN) ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___? _____yes _____no

4. If so, listthe Make Model 

5. Current odometer reading miles.

6. Are you the originalowner/lessee? yes _____no

7. Is your vehicle ______ automatic ______ manual

8. Are you interested in participating in this program?

yes _____ no _______ need more information.

9. May we contact you at your convenience:

Home Phone: (_____)-_____________________Best time to call: a.m. ______p.m. 

Work Phone: (_____)-_____________________Best time to call: a.m. ______p.m. 

Cell Phone: ( ) -_____________________ Best time to call: _______ a.m. p.m.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE CALL US TOLL FREE AT

(855)665-1228.

WHETHER OR NOT YOU PLAN TO PARTICIPATE,PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM INTHE 

POSTAGE PAID ENVELOPE.

 

 

Privacy Act Statement

Title 42, United States Code, Section 7451, Compliance by vehicles and engines in actual use, authorizes the collection of this information. The primary use is to 

provide an instrument by which individuals may indicate interest in and eligibility for participating in EPA’s Light-Duty In-Use Testing Program. Additional 

disclosures of this information may be made pursuant to published routine uses, including to appropriate agencies for law enforcement purposes and to contractors 

working for EPA who have a need to know in the course of that work.

Providing the requested information is voluntary, but failing to do so will result in EPA’s inability to approve your participation in the Light-Duty In-Use Testing 

Program.

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to vary from 1 to 60 minutes per response, with an average of 30 minutes per response, 

including time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the 

collection of information. Send comments regarding the burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection on information, including suggestions for 

reducing this burden, to Chief, Information Policy Branch, PM-223, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 401 M St., S.W. Washington, DC. 20460: and to 

the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office Of Management and Budget, Washington, DC. 20503.

EPA Form #5900-306 OMB No. 2060-0086 Expires (###)
§ 13.13 Consent orders. ( a ) The Chief Counsel, each Deputy Chief Counsel, and the Assistant Chief Counsel for Enforcement may issue a consent order to resolve any matter with a person that may be subject to legal enforcement action.
( b ) A person that may be subject to legal enforcement action may propose a consent order. The proposed consent order must include— ( 1 ) An admission of all jurisdictional facts;
( 2 ) An express waiver of the right to further procedural steps and of all rights to legal review in any forum;
( 3 ) An express waiver of attorney's fees and costs;
( 4 ) If a notice or order has been issued prior to the proposed consent order, an incorporation by reference of the notice or order and an acknowledgment that the notice or order may be used to construe the terms of the consent order; and
( 5 ) If a request for hearing or appeal is pending in any forum, a provision that the person will withdraw the request for hearing or notice of appeal.
§ 119.61 Duration and surrender of certificate and operations specifications. ( a ) An Air Carrier Certificate or Operating Certificate issued under this part is effective until— ( 1 ) The certificate holder surrenders it to the Administrator; or
( 2 ) The Administrator suspends, revokes, or otherwise terminates the certificate.
( b ) Operations specifications issued under this part, part 121, or part 135 of this chapter are effective unless— ( 1 ) The Administrator suspends, revokes, or otherwise terminates the certificate;
( 2 ) The operations specifications are amended as provided in § 119.51;
( 3 ) The certificate holder does not conduct a kind of operation for more than the time specified in § 119.63 and fails to follow the procedures of § 119.63 upon resuming that kind of operation; or
( 4 ) The Administrator suspends or revokes the operations specifications for a kind of operation.
( c ) Within 30 days after a certificate holder terminates operations under part 135 of this chapter, the operating certificate and operations specifications must be surrendered by the certificate holder to the responsible Flight Standards office.
[Docket No. 28154, 60 FR 65913, Dec. 20, 1995, as amended by Docket FAA-2018-0119, Amdt. 119-19, 83 FR 9172, Mar. 5, 2018]
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-6790
JOSEPH LEON HODGES, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus C. D. HILL, Sergeant, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Chief District Judge. (CA-96-1781-AM) Submitted: November 18, 1997 Decided: December 3, 1997 Before MURNAGHAN, ERVIN, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Joseph Leon Hodges, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. The district court assessed a filing fee in accordance with 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b)(1) (West 1994& Supp. 1997), and dismissed the case without prejudice when Appellant failed to comply with the fee order. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the district court's order. We dispense withoral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
**Exhibit      99**

**Financial      Measures that Supplement Generally Accepted Accounting      Principles**

**General      Electric Capital Services, Inc. and consolidated      affiliates**

**Delinquency      Rates on Certain Financing Receivables**

**GE      Commercial Finance**

|     | **At**             |   |
|----------|--------------------|--------|
|     | **9/30/06****(a)** |   | **12/31/05** |   | **9/30/05** |   |
|     |               |   |   |   |   |   |
| Managed  | 1.33               | %      | 1.31 | % | 1.24 | % |
| Off-book | 0.59               |   | 0.76 |   | 0.78 |   |
| On-book  | 1.55               |   | 1.53 |   | 1.43 |   |

**GE      Money**

|     | **At**             |   |
|----------|--------------------|--------|
|     | **9/30/06****(a)** |   | **12/31/05** |   | **9/30/05** |   |
|     |               |   |   |   |   |   |
| Managed  | 5.14               | %      | 5.08 | % | 5.23 | % |
| Off-book | 5.50               |   | 5.28 |   | 5.10 |   |
| On-book  | 5.11               |   | 5.07 |   | 5.23 |   |
|     |               |   |   |   |   |   |

| (a) | Subject                to update. |
|-----|-----------------------------------|
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-21027

Summary Calendar

TERRY E. HARTMAN; JON G. THORNE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

TEXACO, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

--------------------------------------------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-99-CV-2757

---------------------------------------------------------

September 12, 2001

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM: *

Terry Hartman and Jon Thorne appeal the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor

of defendant Texaco. Appellants first argue that the district court erred in denying their motion for

remand because their state-law claims were not preempted by ERISA. The district court did not err

in determining that ERISA completely preempted the appellants’ state-law claims. S ee Whittemore

v. Schlumberger Technology Corp.

, 976 F.2d 922, 923 (5th Cir. 1992); Perdue v. Burger King Corp.

,

7 F.3d 1251, 1253 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993). Because ERISA preempted the appellants’ claims, the district

court also did not err in granting the appellee’s motion for summary judgment.

The appellants further argue that the district court erred in determin ing t hat diversity

jurisdiction existed. Because the district court did not err in determining that ERISA completelypreempted the appellants’ state-law claims, it did not err in declining to remand the case, and there

is no need to consider this argument.

The appellants’ final argument is that there were genuine issues of material fact precluding

the entry of summary judgment. These alleged factual disputes are irrelevant to the issue whether

ERISA preempted the appellants’ state-law claims and are t hus not material to the district court’s

entry of summary judgment in favor of Texaco.

The appellants have not shown that the district court erred in determining that it had subjectmatter jurisdiction over the case or in granting Texaco’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly,

the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                     Exhibit 24
 
                                  SIGNATURES
 
  KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that each person whose signature appears
below constitutes and appoints C. Stanley Bailey, C. Marvin Scott and Rick D.
Gardner, and each of them, his true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent,
with full power of substitution, for him and in his name, place and stead, in
any and all capacities, to sign on his behalf, Superior Financial Corp, Inc.'s
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1998.
 
  Hereby executed by the following persons in the capacities indicated on
March 25, 1999.
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
<S>                                <C>                           <C>
      /s/ C. Stanley Bailey        Chairman of the Board and
_________________________________   Chief Executive Officer
        C. Stanley Bailey

       /s/ C. Marvin Scott         Director
_________________________________
         C. Marvin Scott

      /s/ Boyd W. Henderson        Director
_________________________________
        Boyd W. Henderson

        /s/ John M. Stein          Director
_________________________________
          John M. Stein

    /s/ David E. Stubblefield      Director
_________________________________
      David E. Stubblefield
</TABLE>
# C_2017014EN.01001701.xml

| 16.1.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 14/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.1.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 14/17

---

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 10 November 2016 (request for a preliminary ruling from the rechtbank Amsterdam — Netherlands) — Execution of a European arrest warrant issued against Halil Ibrahim Özçelik

(Case C-453/16) (1)

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Urgent preliminary ruling procedure - Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters - European arrest warrant - Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA - Article 8(1)(c) - Concept of ‘arrest warrant’ - Autonomous concept of EU law - National arrest warrant issued by a police service and confirmed by a public prosecutor for the purpose of criminal proceedings))

(2017/C 014/21)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Amsterdam

Party to the main proceedings

Halil Ibrahim Özçelik

Operative part of the judgment

Article 8(1)(c) of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, must be interpreted as meaning that a confirmation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, by the public prosecutor’s office, of a national arrest warrant issued previously by a police service in connection with criminal proceedings constitutes a ‘judicial decision’, within the meaning of that provision.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 383, 17.10.2016.

---
§ 1261.500 Scope of subpart. ( a ) This subpart applies to collection of claims by administrative offset under section 5 of the Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966 as amended by the Debt Collection Act of 1982 and the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (31 U.S.C. 3716), other statutory authority, or the common law; it does not include “Salary Offset,” which is governed by subpart 1261.6, infra.
( b ) NASA shall refer past due, legally enforceable nontax debts which are over 180 days delinquent to the Secretary of the Treasury for collection by centralized administrative offset. For purposes of debts governed by this provision, NASA adopts and will follow the procedures established by the Department of the Treasury in 31 CFR 901.3.
( c ) For claims not subject to mandatory transfer to the Department of the Treasury pursuant to paragraph (b), NASA may consider *ad hoc* non-centralized administrative offset of claims at its sole discretion. Any *ad hoc* non-centralized administrative offset of claims will be conducted consistent with the requirements of 31 CFR 901.3(c). ( 1 ) Debts owed by any State or local Government;
( 2 ) Debts arising under or payments made under the Social Security Act, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or the tariff laws of the United States; or
( 3 ) Any case in which collection of the type of debt involved by administrative offset is explicitly provided for or prohibited by another statute. However, unless otherwise provided by contract or law, debts or payments which are not subject to administrative offset under 31 U.S.C. 3716 may be collected by administrative offset under the common law or other applicable statutory authority.
[52 FR 19487, May 26, 1987, as amended at 82 FR 29386, June 29, 2017]
**Exhibit 31.1**
**Certification**
I, Steven A. Odom, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterended September 30, 2004 of Verso Technologies, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under whichsuch statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations andcash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented inthis report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for theregistrant and have:
(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made knownto us by others within those entities, particularly during theperiod in which this report is being prepared;
(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and
(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and
(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.   Date: November 9, 2004      /s/ Steven A. Odom Steven A. Odom, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
36
# Službeni list C 432I/2021

| | ISSN 1977-1088 |
| --- | --- |
| Službeni list
  Europske unije | C 432I |
| | |
| Hrvatsko izdanje | Informacije i objave | Godište 64.26. listopada 2021. |

ISSN 1977-1088

Službeni list

Europske unije

C 432I

Hrvatsko izdanje

Informacije i objave

Godište 64.26. listopada 2021.

---

| Sadržaj | Stranica |
| --- | --- |
| | V.   Objave |
| | ADMINISTRATIVNI POSTUPCI |
| | Europski institut za inovacije i tehnologiju |
| 2021/C 432 I/01 | Poziv na podnošenje prijedloga za osnivanje zajednice znanja i inovacija Europskog instituta za inovacije i tehnologiju – Identifikacijska oznaka poziva: HORIZON-EIT-2021-KIC-DESIGN | 1 |

Sadržaj

Stranica

V.   Objave

ADMINISTRATIVNI POSTUPCI

Europski institut za inovacije i tehnologiju

2021/C 432 I/01

Poziv na podnošenje prijedloga za osnivanje zajednice znanja i inovacija Europskog instituta za inovacije i tehnologiju – Identifikacijska oznaka poziva: HORIZON-EIT-2021-KIC-DESIGN

1

---

| HR | |
| --- | --- |

HR

---

V. Objave

ADMINISTRATIVNI POSTUPCI

Europski institut za inovacije i tehnologiju

| 26.10.2021 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | CI 432/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2021

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

CI 432/1

---

Poziv na podnošenje prijedloga za osnivanje zajednice znanja i inovacija Europskog instituta za inovacije i tehnologiju

Identifikacijska oznaka poziva: HORIZON-EIT-2021-KIC-DESIGN

(2021/C 432 I/01)

U skladu s Uredbom (EU) 2021/819 Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 20. svibnja 2021. o Europskom institutu za inovacije i tehnologiju (EIT), ovime se objavljuje da je otvoren poziv na podnošenje prijedloga za novu zajednicu znanja i inovacija EIT-a (ZZI). Pozivamo na podnošenje prijedloga u sklopu poziva.

Prioritetno područje poziva jest: Kulturni i kreativni sektori i industrije

Rok za podnošenje prijedloga i sve važne informacije o načinima provedbe poziva, kriteriji evaluacije, kao i smjernice za podnositelje prijedloga o načinima podnošenja prijedloga dostupni su u tekstu poziva i na stranici poziva na mrežnom mjestu EIT-a:

https://eit.europa.eu/our-activities/call-for-eit-communities/2021

---
#### UTTER *v.*WALKER’S ADMINISTRATORS.

*Injunction*— merger—satisfaction—plea in bar of a writ of error — -judges’ errors in fact.

Where a defendant in a judgment at law, obtains an injunction, upon a dissolution of which a decree is had against him for the judgment, &c. this does not merge or satisfy the judgment, though the party recovering can have but one satisfaction.

Such decree is no bar to a writ *of error*brought *upon the*judgment at law.

A court of error will not correct the erroneous deductions of the judges, as to *facts*submitted . to them.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas. The defendants in error pleadedinbar, that after judgment below, the defendant against whom judgment was taken, proceeded in chancery, obtained a provisional injunction, which the Supreme Court upon final hearing dismissed, and according to the statute in such cases, decreed the complainant, who was the defendant at law, to pay the judgment, costs and pen*47alty; which decree remained in full force. To this plea there was a general demurrer, and the question is, whether the plea is a good bar to the writ of error.

Hamer, for the plaintiff in error.

*Marshall,*contra.

By the Court.

This decree in chancery set forth in the plea, grows out of express legislative enactment, though no provision is made in the law, declaring *the effect of the decree;*29 O. *L.*88. The operation of the law is to give the party several judgments for the same debt, and also several bills of costs and the penalty. Upon these, as in analogous cases, he may sue out process in each or all, till he obtain satisfaction. One satisfaction for the debt will discharge so much of all the other judgments. It is therefore, in our opinion, no bar to the writ of error. Should the judgment be reversed, it is notneeessaryforus to inquire how the reversal would avail the plaintiff in error, to prevent the collection of the decree. We have only to look at the sufficiency of the matter set up in bar of the writ, and must adjudge the plea insufficient.

On looking into the record it appears, that all the evidence in the cause, with the *agreement on file,*was submitted to the court on the issue of *nil debet,*and a notice of special matter. The court found for the plaintiff, and gave him judgment. To this finding and judgment exception is taken. We do not, upon a writ of error, correct erroneous deductions which judges substituted for a jury by the parties, draw from facts, any more than we should correct the finding of a jury, if one had been called upon like premises; 5 *O. R.*172; 4 *Pet. R.*80. The judgment below is affirmed with costs.
#### Eugene JARVIS et al *v.*ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARD

5-6101

488 S.W. 2d 712

Opinion delivered January 8, 1973

*729
      *Perkins, Boyce if McLarty,*by: *Tim F. Watson,*for appellants.

*Ray Thornton,*Atty. Gen., by: *Gene O’Daniel,*Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

George Rose Smith, Justice.

The Director of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Department, after notice and a hearing, found that the two appellants, who own and operate a liquor store in Newport, had unlawfully sold alcoholic beverages to a minor. The Director ordered that the appellants’ liquor and beer permits be suspended for thirty days. The Director’s decision was sustained by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board and by the circuit court. This appeal is from the circuit court’s judgment.

The appellants concede that the only question is whether the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5-713 (Supp. 1971). The youth who made the actual purchase testified that in doing so he displayed to the seller, Noble Jarvis, a Selective Service card which showed the purchaser to be not quite nineteen years old. That testimony was corroborated by another youth, who was present, and by a State policeman, who arrested the two boys a few moments later. Noble Jarvis admitted the sale but testified that the Selective Service card showed the purchaser to be over twenty-one. It is evident that the administrative decision, upon conflicting testimony, is amply supported by substantial proof.

Affirmed.