ARAB THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND THE

FUTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE 

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

W. Andrew Terrill

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS

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The United States Army War College

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Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

ARAB THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND THE 

FUTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE 

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

W. Andrew Terrill

October 2015

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ISBN 1-58487-706-5
vii

FOREWORD

The Middle East is currently in one of its most dramatic periods of turbulence since the post-World War 

I emergence of the modern state system in that region. 

Recently, the United States and its Arab allies have 

been concerned by a number of distressing regional 

trends including the uncertain future of Iranian influence throughout the region, the rise and persistence 

of the Islamic State (IS) organization, the ouster of Yemen’s Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi government from 

the capital of Sana’a and that country’s subsequent 

civil war, and the rise of insurgencies in Libya, Egypt, 

and especially the Sinai. 

The intense unrest in the Middle East has created 

new conflicts, but it has also brought some of the regional status quo powers into a greater level of cooperation to help address these problems. Saudi Arabia 

has emerged as a significant regional leader, almost by 

default, as other important Arab states such as Iraq, 

Syria, Egypt, and Libya have been struggling with 

domestic crises. Since the ouster of Egypt’s Muslim 

Brotherhood government in July 2013, Riyadh and 

Cairo have maintained what often appears to be an 

important and stable working relationship. Saudi 

Arabia and other Gulf countries have provided billions in aid to the Abdel Fattah el-Sisi government in 

Egypt, and Riyadh and Cairo have discussed dramatically increased military cooperation. 

The Arab states aligned with the United States 

currently are facing a number of particularly serious 

regional policy problems and remains an incubator 

of radicalism and terrorism. The Syrian civil war currently presents few scenarios for a decent outcome 

and continues to consume massive numbers of lives. 
Iraq is also deeply troubled, with large portions of its 

northern territories including the city of Mosul still 

controlled by the IS organization. Other problem areas include Yemen and Libya, where dramatic domestic upheaval is continuing. In Egypt, President Sisi’s 

iron fist approach to a Sinai-based domestic insurgency has been unsuccessful in defeating the terrorists or 

containing the conflict, which is growing. Finally, the 

Iranian nuclear agreement between that country and 

a number of major powers led by the United States 

has generated considerable unease among some Arab 

countries fearful of an Iran no longer constrained by 

sanctions. 

Under these circumstances, the serious and mutating problems facing both the United States and 

the conservative Arab states are likely to cause both 

friction and cooperation between allies. The Saudis and other Gulf Arab oil producers also fear that 

new sources of global energy and more efficient usage of that energy have made them less important to 

the United States. As these problems become more 

complex, Arab allies are also aware that for now they 

have few other options for great power support beyond the United States. Russia has provided support 

to the hated Assad regime in the Syrian civil war and 

has little influence in the region except with Syria and 

Iran. Beijing’s clout in the region tends to be financial rather than military, and China does not currently 

have military forces in place to defend the Gulf Arab 

states from Iran even if it wanted to do so. While 

China is deeply interested in increasing its maritime 

capabilities, serious military power projection into the 

Gulf region seems a distant prospect. 

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer 

this monograph as a contribution to the national seviii
ix

curity debate on this important subject as our nation 

continues to grapple with a variety of problems associated with the future of the Middle East. This analysis 

should be especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders, 

policy analysts, and intelligence professionals as they 

seek to address the complicated interplay of factors 

related to regional security issues, fighting terrorism, 

and the support of local allies. This work may also 

benefit those seeking a greater understanding of long 

range issues of Middle Eastern and global security. It 

is hoped that this work will be of benefit to officers of 

all services as well as other U.S. Government officials 

involved in military and security assistance planning.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

xi

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

W. ANDREW TERRILL joined the Strategic Studies 

Institute (SSI) in October 2001, and is SSI’s Middle 

East specialist. Prior to his appointment, he served as 

a Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the International Assessments Division of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr. 

Terrill also served as a Visiting Professor at the U.S. 

Air War College on assignment from LLNL. He is a 

former faculty member at Old Dominion University in 

Norfolk, Virginia, and has taught adjunct at a variety 

of other colleges and universities. He is a retired U.S. 

Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel and Foreign Area 

Officer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill has published in numerous academic journals on topics including nuclear 

proliferation, the Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERT 

STORM, Middle Eastern chemical weapons and ballistic missile proliferation, terrorism, and commando 

operations. He is also the author of Global Security 

Watch—Jordan (Praeger 2010). From 1994-2012, Dr. 

Terrill participated in the Middle East Regional Security Track 2 talks, which were then part of the Middle 

East Peace Process. He has also served as a member of 

the military and security working group of the Baker/

Hamilton Iraq Study Group throughout its existence 

in 2006. Dr. Terrill holds a B.A. from California State 

Polytechnic University and an M.A. from the University of California, Riverside, both in political science. He also holds a Ph.D. in international relations 

from Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, 

California.

xiii

SUMMARY

 The threat perceptions of many Arab states aligned 

with the United States have changed significantly as a 

result of such dramatic events as the 2011 U.S. military 

withdrawal from Iraq, the emergence and then fading 

of the Arab Spring, the rise of Iranian power and Tehran’s nuclear agreement with key world powers, the 

Egyptian revolution and counterrevolution, and the 

development of civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and 

Libya. A particularly worrisome development and 

expansion has been the dramatic rise of the “Islamic 

State” (IS) organization which has seized considerable 

tracts of territory in Iraq and Syria and inspired terrorists throughout the region. Elsewhere in the region, 

the 2013 election of the pragmatic and statesmanlike 

Iranian president Hassan Rouhani is viewed by some 

Arab states as a potential opportunity but also a danger since the new Iranian government has a potentially shrewder and more effective president and cabinet 

than seen during the Ahmadinejad years. There have 

also been some notable differences that have developed between the United States and its Arab allies 

over how to address these issues and most especially 

Iranian regional ambitions. 

Some Arab leaders, including a number of Saudis 

and other Gulf Arabs, have subtly but publicly criticized the United States for appearing to lose interest in 

the Middle East as it becomes less dependent on that 

region’s energy and due to serious problems encountered with the U.S. military intervention in Iraq. Many 

Arab states are also concerned that the United States 

may become increasingly interested in disengaging 

from the problems of the Arab World at a time when 

increased U.S. attention may be required to address 
xiv

the discord over the South China Sea and emerging 

problems in Eastern Europe and particularly Ukraine. 

To these Arab states, other regions are something of a 

distraction and they see any increased U.S. attention 

on Asia or Eastern Europe as a potential long-term national security problem. Moreover, while the rise of 

the Islamic State (IS) organization has refocused U.S. 

attention on the Middle East, most conservative Arab 

states remain concerned about retaining a sustained 

U.S. commitment to the region and are worried that 

Washington and Tehran are in considerable agreement over the danger posed by IS, even as they are 

distrustful of each other. 

U.S. efforts to prepare for conflicts in the Middle 

East consequently remain vital, and doing so through 

actions which deter such conflicts is an especially optimal outcome. Shaping the Middle East strategic environment through carefully tailored collaboration with 

Arab partner nations presents one of the best ways to 

both prepare for a potential conflict and to deter that 

conflict through U.S. and allied defense preparedness. 

In this environment, it is important that Washington 

has an array of options that can be used to support 

and reassure local allies and deter aggression so that 

the threat of war can be averted before it is realized. 

The United States continues to project its interest in 

the region through a number of ways examined in 

this work including multilateral exercises such as Eager Lion in Jordan, regionally aligned forces, military 

forward presence, and military advice and assistance. 

Even with increased energy independence, the United States maintains a number of core interests in the 

Middle East and is often drawn back to the emerging 

problems and crises there. In parallel, the conservative Arab states are aware that they have no good 
xv

alternative to the United States as their most important security partner at the present time. A variety 

of U.S. officials are committed to a strong effort to 

convince Arab allies that the United States will not 

abandon them or downgrade the importance of their 

security concerns.

1

ARAB THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND THE 

FUTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE 

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Introduction: Protecting U.S. Interests in the Arab 

World in a Time of Global Change.

The Middle Eastern strategic environment has 

been especially dynamic in the last decade due to factors such as the 2003-11 U.S. combat operations in Iraq, 

the Arab Spring uprisings and attempted uprisings, 

the rise of Iranian power, the Egyptian revolution and 

counterrevolution, the Syrian civil war, the emergence 

of the Islamic State organization in Syria and Iraq, the 

danger of al-Qaeda affiliates in various countries including Syria and Yemen, and the continuing rise in 

sectarian tensions and violence throughout a number 

of regional countries, including some enveloped in 

civil war. All of these developments are of deep interest to Middle Eastern regional powers and to extra-regional powers that are involved in the Middle 

East including the United States. This monograph is 

focused on the conservative Arab states aligned with 

the United States, especially Egypt, Jordan, and the 

Gulf monarchies. It does not address Arab-Israeli relations which have been comprehensively discussed 

elsewhere.1 Additionally, some major Arab states such 

as Egypt and especially Iraq are currently so focused 

on domestic turmoil that they can direct only limited 

attention to foreign policy issues that do not impact 

them in a direct, short term way. These states sporadically assert themselves on a variety of some key issues.

In the midst of changing Middle East developments, the stability of the Arab world remains of critical importance to the United States, despite strategic 
2

challenges in other parts of the world. Numerous U.S. 

presidents have emphasized their country’s commitment to Middle Eastern defense and enumerated the 

U.S. interests in the region that need to be protected.2

In a recent example, President Barack Obama has 

stated that U.S. “core interests” in the Middle East 

include: (1) safeguarding energy supplies exported 

to the world, (2) counterterrorism, (3) countering the 

proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons 

of mass destruction, and (4) the defense of Israel and 

advancement of the Arab-Israeli peace process.3 Other 

recent and contemporary U.S. political and military 

leaders have elaborated on the President’s views by 

noting the Middle East will remain vital to Washington even as the United States moves closer to energy 

independence.4

Obama’s comments indicate that U.S. interests in 

the Middle East have become more complex in the last 

few decades and can no longer be reduced to the traditional goals of access to energy products at reasonable 

prices and support for Israel, although these concerns 

remain important. In this regard, new oil and gas discoveries within the United States, new technologies 

for energy extraction, and progress with alternative 

energy sources have made the United States significantly less dependent on Middle Eastern energy over 

the last 5 years.5 Nevertheless, U.S. energy interests 

extend beyond the country’s own imports. Serious 

conflict in the region can disrupt global energy markets and therefore hurt the U.S. economy. Moreover, 

a number of U.S. allies in Western Europe and Asia 

are nowhere near energy independence and will need 

continuing access to Gulf energy resources for the 

foreseeable future. 
3

More strategically, the United States garners significant global influence by using its diplomatic and 

military clout to guarantee freedom of navigation for 

the transportation of Persian/Arabian Gulf energy 

supplies.6 All states importing or exporting energy 

products from the Gulf consequently maintain an interest in U.S. policy toward the region. If the United 

States relinquished this position, a strategic vacuum 

would be created. Other powers, such as China or 

eventually even a resurgent Russia, under some circumstances may become interested in expanding their 

roles in the region, although they will not be able to 

replace the United States in any reasonable short- or 

medium-term scenario.7 In recent years, China has 

expanded its diplomatic and commercial presence in 

the Middle East and especially commercial relations 

with Saudi Arabia, although it currently maintains 

only a limited military presence in the Gulf.8 Moreover, at this time, Beijing is basing most of its growing 

blue water navy in Asian waters. It is doubtful China 

would expend significant resources to seek a major 

role as a Gulf military power, while facing geopolitical 

concerns and territorial disputes in the Pacific Ocean 

region.9 Chinese military ambitions in the Middle East 

would also alarm India which has increased its naval 

budget in response to previous expansions of Chinese 

naval activity.10 Additionally, most Arab states would 

prefer to retain the United States as the guarantor of 

Gulf Arab security if this option remains open. These 

nations do not consider Russia or China to be their 

natural allies and are concerned about Russian and 

Chinese ties to Iran and Moscow’s strong support for 

Syria’s Bashar Hafez al-Assad regime. 

In recent years, the U.S. leadership has put forward the strategy of a rebalancing of its military forces 
4

to meet needs in Asia, essentially to reassure U.S. and 

Asian allies that they will not be abandoned in the 

face of rising Chinese military power.11 This strategy 

seems to have declined in urgency as new U.S. security concerns have escalated in countries such as Iraq 

and Syria. Nevertheless, the level of discord between 

China and some other Asian states has intensified 

over disagreements on issues such as island sovereignty and the establishment of the Chinese air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China 

Sea on November 23, 2013. U.S. allies (such as Japan 

and the Philippines) and even neutrals (such as Vietnam) in Asia have sought to consolidate and improve 

their ties with Washington as they have become increasingly concerned about China. While the planned 

intensification of U.S. focus on Asia has been limited 

by serious problems in the Middle East including 

the rise of the Islamic State (IS) organization in Syria 

and Iraq, it could easily re-emerge in response to a 

deepening crisis there. 

The legacy of U.S. participation in the Iraq War 

(2003-11) is an important factor in the internal U.S. debate on Middle Eastern military policy since that conflict has generated increased public and policymaker 

aversion to the use of military force (and especially 

ground forces) to fight major wars and then engage in 

long occupations, nation-building efforts, and counterinsurgencies. The United States lost almost 4,500 

troops in the Iraq War, with a much larger number of 

wounded. The direct costs of the conflict were $804 billion from 2003 to 2011.12 These negative consequences 

were not widely foreseen prior to the invasion, and 

the George W. Bush administration initially suggested 

the war would be quick, one-sided, and would not 

require a lengthy occupation with a large number of 
5

troops.13 Unrealistic expectations of rapid and easy 

victory in Iraq in 2003 have sometimes made it much 

more difficult for contemporary policymakers to gain 

public support for even the limited use of force to address international concerns where there is a fear of 

expanding and deepening involvement in an ongoing 

conflict (often referred to as “mission creep”).14

While still in office, former Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates stated: 

In my opinion, any future defense secretary who 

advises the President to again send a big American 

land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa 

should have his head examined, as General MacArthur so delicately put it.15

Obama has never been this blunt, but he consistently 

indicates that he will seek to avoid using massive conventional military force except in cases involving a 

U.S. national survival interest. 16 In his 2014 State of 

the Union address, Obama stated: 

I will not send our troops into harm’s way unless it is 

truly necessary, nor will I allow our sons and daughters to be mired in open-ended conflict. We must 

fight the battles that need to be fought, not those that 

terrorists prefer from us—large scale deployments 

that drain our strength and may ultimately feed 

extremism.17

These concerns are clearly reflected in the administration’s efforts to address the IS threat without the use 

of U.S. ground units in direct combat so long as this is 

possible.

A planned summer 2013 limited attack on Syria 

with air strikes and cruise missiles to deter the Assad 

government from the future use of chemical weapons 
6

faced furious opposition from domestic critics and 

public opinion.18 Likewise, Obama’s decision to use 

air strikes against IS and deploy U.S. military advisors and technical specialists to Iraq over the course of 

2014 faced some public doubt, although these actions 

were less controversial than the potential strike on 

Syria, and significant elements of the U.S. public were 

willing to support air strikes against IS radicals. Support for U.S. military action in Syria and Iraq escalated 

dramatically when IS began beheading U.S. and other 

hostages, with these events displayed on the Internet. 

In a surprising turnaround, significant elements of the 

public briefly expressed a willingness to use ground 

troops as part of the war against IS in the immediate 

aftermath of these events.19

The need for U.S.-led military intervention to stop 

IS expansion illustrates that understanding the dangers of future military interventions does not allow 

one to reach the conclusion that military actions and 

activities are no longer required to defend U.S. vital 

interests in the Middle East. In the future, other potential U.S. military actions in the Middle East may 

be widely recognized by the public as truly necessary. 

Some challenges to U.S. interests may not be viewed 

as immediate threats to national survival, but the 

long-term consequences of leaving these problems 

unaddressed are likely to involve factors relating to 

both U.S. global leadership and the U.S. economic 

future. If vital U.S. interests are strongly threatened 

in the future, large segments of the U.S. public may 

consider future military actions involving the defense 

of these interests to be “wars of necessity.” Such interventions may still be required regardless of how conscientiously the U.S. leadership struggles to prevent 

such eventualities from playing themselves out. 
7

The U.S. interests previously noted will need to be 

protected. Many Arab states (particularly in the Gulf) 

have important natural resources and a great deal of 

infrastructure wealth, and are correspondingly concerned about their limited capacity for self-defense. 

Gulf leaders also consider their countries vulnerable 

to military pressure or even attacks by larger neighbors as well as insurgencies along the lines of recent 

problems in Yemen and Iraq.20 To deal with either 

type of contingency, friendly states will need limited 

but tangible allied support. Such strategies will need 

to be developed and refined to continue serving the interests already identified by Obama and his predecessors, in collaboration with regional allies. The United 

States will also have to make serious efforts to work 

through the problems with regional allies which have 

occurred in recent years and to find ways to reassure 

those allies about continuing U.S. interests in this vital 

region. In order to reduce the impact of these differences, Washington will need to understand regional 

threat perceptions regarding Iran, the Assad regime in 

Syria, IS, al-Qaeda affiliates, and other dangers.

Regional Threat Perceptions and the 

Syrian Civil War.

The Syrian civil war is an important national security concern for a variety of regional states. Saudi 

Arabia and Qatar were especially interested in shaping the outcome of the war and provided significant 

supplies of arms to non-IS, anti-Assad rebels. While 

the Saudis and many of their allies made the ouster of 

the Assad regime their initial priority for Syria, not all 

Arab nations felt this concern with the same degree 

of urgency. Iraq, under former Prime Minister Nouri 
8

al-Maliki’s government, maintained a relatively proAssad foreign policy after 2011 to the extent it could do 

so without provoking a crisis with the United States.21

The Lebanese government initially attempted to maintain its neutrality in the conflict as a strategy for avoiding being drawn decisively into the bloodshed, but it 

now seems to view the IS and the al-Qaeda affiliated 

al-Nusra Front as more serious threats to Lebanese security than Assad. Lebanese authorities have already 

dealt with some Syrian-related violence in their country and fear a process of future escalation leading to 

another round of Lebanese civil war.22 Egypt, while 

aligned with Saudi Arabia on most issues, has a much 

softer position on Syria. The Egyptians are opposed to 

Assad remaining in power but also stress that Assad’s 

non-Islamist government will have to be part of a negotiated solution.23 This viewpoint reflects Cairo’s intense distrust of the Islamist rebel groups and in some 

ways parallels concerns expressed by U.S. leaders. 

Kuwait also called for a political solution to the crisis 

and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states may 

become more openly supportive of this solution over 

time in the face of mounting problems with IS.24

Many conservative Arab leaders, and especially 

those from Sunni monarchical regimes, have always 

disliked Syria’s Alawite-led revolutionary “republic” 

under the Assads. This animus has become magnified 

as the Syrian death toll in the war mounted, and as the 

Saudis increasingly came to believe that the struggle in 

Syria has become a proxy war between their country 

and Iran, which is a strong Assad ally. Saudi Arabia 

and other conservative Arab states have also been distressed by U.S. policy toward the Syrian civil war. Early in the conflict, Saudi leaders argued that the United 

States had not done enough to help the rebels fighting 
9

against the Assad regime, and they argued for more 

lethal aid to moderate rebels and perhaps a no fly zone 

to halt the bombing activities of the Syrian Air Force.25

The United States has been hesitant to insert itself into 

a central role in the Syrian civil war, although it has 

provided moderate groups with limited amounts of 

lethal aid and much larger amounts of nonlethal aid. 

In recent years, Washington has been concerned that 

the moderate elements within the Syrian opposition 

(except for Kurdish fighters) are not very viable and 

may either collaborate or in some cases expand existing collaboration with more radical groups or simply 

have their weapons taken from them by these groups, 

as has occurred in the past.26 U.S. policymakers were 

particularly disturbed when TOW (tube-launched, 

optically tracked, wire-guided) anti-tank weapons 

provided to moderate rebels in 2014 came into the possession of the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front, after 

they had either co-opted or defeated the groups that 

had originally received these weapons.27 This situation 

changed when IS activities in Syria, and especially Iraq, 

became more threatening to larger regional interests, 

and the United States assembled a coalition of states to 

oppose IS. The most immediate result of this effort was 

the initiation of a U.S.-led bombing campaign against 

IS forces in Iraq and then Syria, and an effort to support the rebuilding of the Iraqi army, which will be 

discussed later. 

A number of conservative Arab states were also 

critical of the U.S. decision in the summer of 2013 to 

stand down from a planned air and cruise missile 

attack on Syrian regime targets as punishment for 

Syrian use of chemical weapons against unarmed civilians in a suburb of Damascus.28 The Saudis were 

particularly angry that the United States cancelled the 
10

strike against Syria in favor of a Russian-sponsored 

diplomatic solution to the problem of Syrian chemical 

weapons use. The clash of goals in this instance occurred because Washington was primarily concerned 

about enforcing the taboo against chemical weapons 

use in war and was not looking for an excuse to alter 

the balance of military power in Syria. Secretary of 

State John Kerry underscored the limited nature of the 

plan when he stated: 

We will be able to hold Bashar al-Assad accountable 

without engaging in troops on the ground or any other 

prolonged kind of effort in a very limited, very targeted, short-term effort that degrades his capacity to 

deliver chemical weapons without assuming responsibility for Syria’s civil war.

He then added that the strikes would be an “unbelievably small, limited kind of effort.”29 Additionally, 

it now appears that Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister 

Yuval Steinitz, under instructions from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, informed the United States 

that his country favored a solution that could eliminate Assad’s chemical weapons, which were originally developed and designed to use against them.30

These weapons would have remained a threat to Israel if the regime retained them, but might emerge 

as an even greater threat if they were seized by terrorists. Consequently, Israel favored the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons stocks rather than a 

punishment raid.

Another way that Saudi Arabia has expressed its 

unhappiness with the U.S. approach to the conflict is 

through its policies involving potential spillover from 

the Syrian civil war.31 Riyadh has agreed to provide 

the Lebanese Army $3 billion to purchase weapons 
11

primarily from France and thereby strengthening the 

Lebanese capacity to maintain its internal security 

while possibly weakening the position of the pro-Iranian militia, Hezbollah.32 The agreement also includes 

training programs for the Lebanese Army conducted 

by the French military.33 Weapons deliveries, under 

this agreement, began in April 2015 and are expected 

to continue over the next 4 years.34 The aid package favors the purchase of French weapons and equipment, 

a provision that may have been included to express 

Saudi dissatisfaction with Washington’s policies on 

Iran and Syria.35 Paris also maintained a clear hard 

line on Iranian nuclear weapons issues throughout the 

negotiations in Switzerland, which was reassuring to 

Riyadh.36 Lebanon, for its part, has an extremely serious need for modern weapons to cope with spillover 

(including jihadist incitement and infiltration) from 

the Syrian civil war. 

Over time, problems in Syria began to appear more 

far-reaching and complex. In the 2013-15 time frame, 

many Arab countries became increasingly concerned 

about IS actions and success throughout the Levant, 

while continuing to express their unwillingness to 

tolerate the continuation of the Assad regime.37 Saudi 

Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are also 

increasingly alarmed about domestic implications of 

this organization’s success in Syria and Iraq and have 

dramatically strengthened their counterterrorism 

laws, especially the penalties for joining or supporting terrorist organizations such as the IS.38 The UAE 

has even enacted a toleration law criminalizing insults 

against other religious sects and ethnicities or any act 

deemed to incite racial or religious hatred.39 Saudi and 

Emirati anxiety about such issues can be placed into 

perspective when one considers the large numbers of 
12

foreign fighters entering Syria at this time. According 

to The Washington Post, up to 1,000 foreign fighters a 

month were entering Syria in late-2014, with about 

16,000 already in place.40 The national breakdown of 

this group is unclear, and it is not certain how many 

of them are joining IS, rather than other radical groups 

such as al-Nusra Front. 

Following the summer 2014 disaster in Iraq, a variety of Sunni Arab countries were willing to join the international coalition organized by the United States to 

use airpower to fight IS in Syria and Iraq. Among the 

Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE, and Bahrain 

sent aircraft to participate in the air campaign, while 

Qatar provided ground support for the Arab portion 

of the air campaign.41 Units of these air forces conducted a limited number of bombing missions against 

both Iraqi and Syrian targets. Such actions were useful 

to the United States beyond their military value since 

the participation of these Sunni states in the coalition 

helps dispel any notion that Washington was unilaterally siding with Shi’ite-led regimes in Iraq and Syria 

against Sunni insurgents in a sectarian war. The Sunni 

Arab regimes are also almost certainly interested in 

participating in the coalition in order to have their 

views remain relevant for any future decisions regarding U.S. and regional policies for Iraq and Syria, 

especially in any final settlements of the conflicts.

Also in September 2014, the administration announced plans to help train and equip units of the Syrian moderate opposition, although this action was significantly less important than the bombing campaign. 

The program was expected to involve only around 

5,000 Syrians at a time, who were to be trained and 

equipped for defensive warfare.42 As of mid-2015, the 

U.S. portion of the training program for these troops 
13

had made almost no progress because of Syrian rebel 

desertions and a painfully slow vetting process for 

prospective participants.43 Should such problems 

continue, it is doubtful that these fighters can become 

even a minor force in Syria where more powerful 

entities, including the Assad regime, al-Nusra Front, 

and especially IS, currently dominate the struggle for 

power. Despite such problems, various GCC states 

sometimes still assert that the anti-IS struggle cannot lead to a relaxation of pressure on Assad or a de 

facto alliance with his regime. These countries often 

maintain the tyranny of the Assad regime is directly 

responsible for the rise of radical groups including IS 

and al-Nusra. They maintain that defeating IS, while 

not addressing the reason it rose to prominence in the 

first place, is a self-defeating strategy.44 This position 

sounds logical, but it also has problems since there are 

no good alternatives to these entities, and opposing 

both of them equally may not be realistic. 

The United States, while continuing to stress that 

Assad has lost all legitimacy and must leave the country, calls for a negotiated political transition in Syria. 

The negotiated solution envisioned by U.S. leaders involves the current Syrian government (without Assad 

himself) but does not include IS or al-Nusra.45 The 

Egyptian government, which detests Islamic radicals, 

is also interested in a political solution to the war that 

provides some major role for secular leaders while 

freezing out radical jihadists. Jordan, which was deeply anti-Assad in the first years of the civil war, now appears to have decided that IS is the bigger threat. This 

change has caused the Jordanians to disengage from 

some of the anti-Assad forces they previously supported and explore the possibility of working more 

intensively with tribal forces that are fighting IS rather 

than the Syrian government.46
14

As noted earlier, the Iranian role in the Syrian civil 

war is quite important and is a source of ongoing frustration to the conservative Arab states. Iran provides 

the Assad regime with financial support, military 

advisors, weapons, and diplomatic support. Iran’s alQuds Force (an elite force of the Islamic Revolutionary 

Guards Corps or IRGC) has been especially active in 

training pro-Assad Syrian militias and providing the 

regime with significant military advice and technical 

assistance. Tehran has also strongly encouraged the 

deployment of thousands of Hezbollah militiamen 

from Lebanon to provide auxiliary infantry to the 

Assad regime. Iran remains strongly committed to 

Assad and can be expected to continue supporting his 

regime despite the economic sanctions that Tehran is 

currently enduring. In Nouri al-Maliki’s last years as 

Iraq’s prime minister, his government also sided with 

Assad in the unfolding civil war, although it did so 

in a more low profile way. Iranian-supported Iraqi 

Shi’ite militiamen have also participated in the conflict on the government’s side, although virtually all of 

these forces are believed to have returned to Iraq after 

June 2014 in response to the crisis created by IS seizure 

of much of northern Iraq.47

The Saudis believed that the intense Iranian involvement in the Syrian conflict required a strong 

response. In the early years of the conflict, then head 

of intelligence, Prince Bandar pushed a very aggressive attempt to topple Assad by arming and supplying Syrian rebels.48 Critics maintain that this effort 

included directing funds and transferring weapons 

to the more effective rebel fighting units with insufficient regard for the danger of radical ideology. The 

Saudis have responded that they have not supported 

or funded militant jihadists “of any kind.”49 The sin-
15

cerity of these remarks is difficult to gauge, but Saudi 

Arabia has experienced a serious outbreak of al-Qaeda-sponsored terrorism within its own borders in the 

2003-06 time frame. Saudi leaders seem to understand 

that, in an interconnected age, terrorist ideas cannot 

be confined within the borders of any one state. The 

Saudis are particularly concerned about the potential 

radicalization of portions of their youth and have imposed severe penalties for any person joining a radical organization. Saudis who join IS or another radical 

organization will not be able to safely return to their 

home countries without the fear of lengthy imprisonment or even the death penalty. 

Even with Iranian help, the Syrian regime appears 

to be losing ground to IS and other radical guerrilla 

groups, while moderate Syrian fighters appear to have 

been completely overshadowed by the radicals. Antijihadist Kurdish fighters have fought well but there 

are limits to their geographic reach. The Syrian regime 

will probably be able to maintain control of territory 

in the Alawite areas and Damascus and survive in 

some form. Conversely, it is increasingly doubtful 

that the regime will recapture territory lost to IS in the 

north in the foreseeable future, and over time Assad 

may look more like a regional warlord than a national 

leader. Two major offensives in early-2015 collapsed 

in an indication of the staying power of IS and other 

rebel groups.50

Problems of the Islamic State and Long-Term 

Warfare in Iraq.

Although the conservative Arab states had a number of reasons to fear Saddam Hussein in the early1990s prior to Operation DESERT STORM, he was 
16

widely viewed as less dangerous by the early-2000s 

due to his 1991 defeat and post-war sanctions. In 

the aftermath of the 1958 revolution against Iraq’s 

Hashemite king, many of the remaining Sunni Arab 

monarchies viewed the safest and least revolutionary 

form of Iraqi government to have been a Sunni strongman who was able to suppress revolutionary activity 

among Iraq’s Shi’ites. The conservative Arab states 

were never ideologically committed to democracy, 

and some of them were deeply uneasy about the U.S. 

decision to invade Iraq in 2003 to install a democracy 

that they expected to empower the Shi’ite majority. 

The rise of a Shi’ite dominated government in Baghdad was correspondingly alarming to Sunni-led states 

such as Saudi Arabia and UAE. Jordan and pre-civil 

war Syria also faced a huge influx of Iraqi refugees. 

Sunni Arab concerns escalated following the U.S. 

military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, when the Maliki government dramatically increased its aggressive 

sectarian behavior.51 The Gulf press and various human rights organizations also suggest that Iraqi forces 

make frequent use of torture and the death penalty 

against Sunnis.52 Most significantly for Iraq’s future, 

Maliki arrested a number of important figures within Iraq’s Sunni political establishment following the 

U.S. withdrawal, thereby eliminating key leaders of 

the Sunni community while intimidating the others. 

Eventually, Maliki sidelined most of Iraq’s important 

Sunni political leaders and consolidated a special relationship with Iran to the enduring contempt of most 

Sunni Arab countries.53 The repression, corruption, 

and sectarian basis of the Maliki regime provided a 

perfect incubator for the revitalization of the insurgency. Maliki refused to accept responsibility for these 

problems and claimed that jihadist activity in Iraq 
17

was solely the result of spillover from the Syrian civil 

war. Later, in a reflection of the poisonous regional 

atmosphere, he blamed Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the 

UAE for “supporting terrorism” in Iraq.54 This charge 

appears mostly unfounded, although some weapons 

supplied to Syrian rebel groups could have changed 

hands and ended up in Iraq. 

In Iraq, IS’s initial effort to capture key urban centers was directed at the Sunni cities of Anbar Province.55 IS (then known as Islamic State in Iraq and the 

Levant [ISIL] or ISIS) then electrified the world with 

its northern offensive, which gave the organization 

its greatest victory. All four Iraqi army divisions stationed in the north collapsed rapidly when faced with 

jihadist assaults, and IS seized Iraq’s second largest 

city, Mosul.56 The militants then claimed to be planning to seize Baghdad, although this threat was never 

credible. At the time, IS had only 3,000-5,000 fighters 

in Iraq (with about the same number of allied auxiliary forces), while Baghdad is a city of over 7 million 

people, the majority of whom are hostile Shi’ites with 

their own militias.57 Moreover, the Shi’ite religious 

leadership, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, 

called for Shi’ite militias to defend Baghdad as well 

as the Shi’ite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. In displays of the most vulgar kind of raw sectarianism, IS 

calls Karbala “the filth-ridden city” and Najaf “the city 

of polytheism.”58 IS has also asserted that, once it had 

seized these cities, it would destroy their Shi’ite religious sites, which are among the most important of 

such shrines anywhere. In contrast to the Iraqi army, 

many of the Shi’ite militia were willing to fight to the 

last man to protect their holy sites. 

Following the June 2014 rout of Iraqi security 

forces, IS declared an Islamic caliphate in the area 
18

that it controlled, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the 

organization’s leader since April 2010, was declared 

“caliph” and the “leader of Muslims everywhere.”59

To underscore this claim, the organization began using the name Islamic State for the first time, replacing 

the name ISIL/ISIS and reflecting the organization’s 

enhanced ambitions beyond Syria and Iraq. This statement claimed that IS was now the only legitimate 

authority in the Muslim world and that its authority 

superseded and replaced the leadership of each Muslim country. It also seems natural for the leaders of a 

self-styled Islamic caliphate to be extremely interested 

in seizing control of Islam’s holiest cities of Mecca, 

Medina, and Jerusalem. Since Saudi Arabia controls 

the two most important of these cities, it would seem 

a natural target. Even with all of these warning signs, 

most of the Gulf monarchies continued to view Iran 

as their deadliest enemy in the immediate aftermath 

of the seizure of Mosul.60 During the 2015 battle to 

recapture Tikrit from IS, the Iranian role in assisting 

Iraqi government forces was particularly worrisome 

to many Arab leaders. The IRGC provided artillery 

and rocket support to the Iraqi forces and may have 

participated in the assault against strong points within the city although U.S. air support eventually was 

called upon to break the back of IS resistance.61 Former 

Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal stated that Iran 

had attempted to use its role in proving military aid to 

Iraq as a way of “taking over” that country.62

As noted, most Gulf Arabs leaders, and especially the Saudis, detested former Iraqi Prime Minister 

Nouri al-Maliki throughout much of his time in office. 

While most Sunni Arab states were delighted to see 

him removed from power, many have continued to 

view the Iraqi government with suspicion. Iraqi Prime 
19

Minister Haider al-Abadi seems to have earned some 

respect from Sunni Arab leaders by his apparently 

genuine efforts to reach out to Iraqi Sunnis, but many 

other Iraqi government leaders still view Iraq’s Sunnis 

as enemies.63 Highly sectarian Shi’ite cabinet members 

and other hardline government leaders have demonstrated considerable resourcefulness in preventing 

Abadi from implementing key reforms by establishing themselves as major power brokers.64 In one particularly alarming example, they have been highly effective at limiting Iraqi government military aid for 

anti-IS Sunni tribes that the United States would like 

to supply with weapons to defend themselves against 

IS forces.65 Instead, they strongly favored Shi’ite militias. Also, Iranian military aid to the Shi’ite militias 

is not new, but quickly increased and became more 

overt since the June 2014 defeats. Abadi has denied 

undue Iranian influence over his country, claiming 

that relations with Tehran are “very balanced” with 

ties with other important regional countries.66

In this difficult and uncertain environment, some 

Sunni Arab states have made an effort to improve relations with Iraq’s post-Maliki government, despite 

their ongoing concerns about Iranian influence and 

the excessive sectarianism of some Iraqi cabinet members. In this spirit, the Saudi leadership has announced 

that it will reopen its embassy in Baghdad and open a 

consulate in Erbil (the capital of the Kurdish Regional 

Government) as soon as security conditions permit.67

The Saudis had previously appointed an ambassador in 2009 but based him in Jordan, claiming that 

Baghdad was too dangerous for a permanent diplomatic presence. Diplomats from various countries had 

previously been kidnapped or killed in Iraq for several years after the removal of the Saddam Hussein 
20

regime, although this has not occurred in recent years 

except in territory overrun by IS forces.

Many leaders throughout the region increasingly 

view the future of Iraq as volatile with considerable 

potential for developments there to harm their own 

security for years to come. Sisi has stated, “[IS has] a 

plan to take over Egypt” which they hoped to implement after seizing Iraq, Syria, and then Jordan and 

Saudi Arabia.68 States neighboring both Syria and Iraq 

are deeply concerned that IS-controlled areas could 

become a center of terrorist training, operational planning, and propaganda against their regimes. Additionally, Jordan and Lebanon have been swamped by 

large numbers of refugees from Syria and to a lesser 

extent Iraq. Jordan became especially concerned that 

the fall of Palmyra in Syria, around 150 miles from 

the Jordanian border, would increase the number of 

refugees flowing into the kingdom and would also 

escalate the risk of jihadist infiltration.69

Even prior to the rise of IS, Saudi Arabia has faced 

serious problems with terrorism including a dramatic 

bombing and terrorism campaign conducted by alQaeda within the Saudi Arabian homeland from 2003 

to 2006. Since that time, a number of terrorist organizations have attempted to work with radical Saudis to 

strike against the government. Many of these people 

have been arrested in periodic sweeps, including individuals accused of receiving training from radical 

forces abroad, coordination with foreign terrorists, 

accumulating explosives or large numbers of weapons, harboring wanted individuals, and other such 

activities.70

Currently, IS also appears to be operating an uncertain number of cells in the Gulf monarchies. Saudi 

Arabia arrested a suspected IS operative in Riyadh in 
21

April 2015 as a suspect in the murder of two policemen. The suspect told police that he was an IS member 

and had received weapons, money, and instructions 

from his IS handlers.71 In a more sweeping event at 

approximately the same time, Saudi officials arrested 

93 people suspected of being IS members living and 

operating within Saudi Arabia. These arrests included 

at least 65 Saudi nationals as well as a number of foreigners within the Kingdom. Additionally, one cell 

that was swept up in the operation was reported to 

be planning a suicide car bombing against the U.S. 

embassy in Riyadh.72 More arrests would come later 

as important portions of the network progressively 

unraveled in the face of Saudi police work.

The problem also acquired a new dimension beginning in November 2014 when some extremely militant Sunni Saudi Arabians attacked a Shi’ite village in 

the Eastern Province’s village of al-Dalwah, killing at 

least 8 people. IS did not claim responsibility for the 

strike and there are no indications of operational coordination with the attackers, but many of them had 

been previously jailed for jihadist activities including 

fighting in Syria.73 The Saudi authorities moved quickly to arrest the suspects in the murders, clearly hoping to prevent the development of a cycle of terrorism 

and response. More recently, the previously unknown 

“Najd Province of the Islamic State” claimed several 

major Gulf attacks, which were also designed to sow 

sectarian discord.74 The most serious of these attacks 

against a target in Saudi Arabia occurred in lateMay 2015, when a suicide bomber attacked a Shi’ite 

mosque in al-Qadeeh village that killed 21 people 

and wounded nearly 100 others.75 The group openly 

acknowledged that it was attempting to provoke a 

sectarian confrontation to help facilitate the fall of the 

Saud family.76
22

In addition to Saudi Arabia, the Najd Province 

has also struck in Kuwait. In a particularly horrific 

episode, a suicide bomber arriving from Saudi Arabia 

walked into the historic Imam Sadiq Mosque and blew 

himself up, killing 27 Shi’ite worshipers and wounding a staggering 227.77 While the terrorist was clearly 

provided with the bomb and other forms of support 

inside of Kuwait, his handlers apparently believed 

that his identity as a foreigner would help to protect 

the Najd Province network inside of Kuwait. This belief seems to have been a mistake as Kuwaiti security 

forces moved intensively and aggressively to identify 

IS militants in their country. The Kuwaitis arrested at 

least 29 suspects, including 11 expected to be charged 

with murder for their roles in the mosque attack. The 

Kuwaiti government is expected to seek the death penalty in the trials of these individuals.78 Some suspects 

were also released after they were questioned, and the 

authorities were satisfied that they were not involved. 

Many Arab states are deeply concerned about the 

implications of IS sectarian terrorism, hatred, and incitement to violence within their home countries, especially in countries with significant numbers of Shi’ites 

including Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. These 

countries may be particularly vulnerable should IS be 

able to incite extremist Sunni citizens to attack Shi’ite 

neighbors and thereby fan the flames of sectarianism 

to a degree that will be difficult to extinguish. Suspicious and sometimes hostile attitudes toward Shi’ites 

have existed in these societies long before IS became 

a factor and have generally increased as a result of increased sectarianism throughout the Middle East following the rise of a Shi’ite-dominated government in 

Iraq, but it is also true that both IS and al-Qaeda seek to 

make the situation worse and that IS propaganda iden-
23

tifies Shi’ites as heretics who have little, if any, right to 

even live.79

The technical and marketing effectiveness of IS 

propaganda is another important capability unmatched by earlier terrorist groups targeting the Gulf 

monarchies. While Saudi counterterrorism capabilities have improved dramatically over the past decade, 

Riyadh may now be facing a much more effective enemy than al-Qaeda in the field of propaganda warfare. 

Moreover, by seizing large areas of territory in Syria 

and Iraq and declaring a caliphate, IS also appears 

more successful than other terrorist organizations and 

correspondingly can emphasize major achievements. 

In response to the radical message, the Saudi leadership continues to emphasize the theme of IS and alQaeda as brutal, renegade groups that have nothing to 

do with true Islam, regardless of what they say. Saudi 

Arabia’s leading cleric, Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul 

Aziz al-Sheikh, has stated that ISIS and al-Qaeda jihadists are “enemy number one” of Islam and that their 

calls for jihad were issued on “perverted” grounds.80

There is also the question of IS infiltration into 

countries bordering Iraq and Syria. This danger is especially troubling for Saudi Arabia, which has a long 

border with Iraq. So far, only a very limited number 

of terrorist infiltration efforts have occurred from Iraq, 

although at least one of these was especially bloody. 

In this instance, in early-2015 four heavily armed men 

from Iraq attacked a Saudi border patrol force with 

suicide vests and automatic weapons. While all of 

these attackers were killed, three Saudi soldiers also 

lost their lives.81 The Saudi Interior Ministry later announced that the attackers belonged to a “deviant 

group,” a phrase that usually indicates al-Qaeda but 

would also seem applicable to IS.82 In this difficult en-
24

vironment, Saudi Arabia is currently building a 900 

kilometer security fence along its border with Iraq to 

help manage the problem of infiltration.83 Jordan and 

Kuwait also have borders with Iraq, but they are much 

shorter and easier to monitor. The Kuwaitis, in particular, have also spent decades improving their border 

defenses with Iraq to the point that a serious infiltration danger probably no longer exists.84 Additionally, 

unlike Jordan and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia has a long 

border with Yemen that needs to be protected. This 

problem became especially clear on August 6, 2015, 

when an IS terrorist wearing a suicide vest walked 

into a mosque frequented by the security forces in the 

southwestern city of Abha, near the Yemeni border, 

and managed to kill 15 people after detonating his explosives.85 The terrorist, who was Saudi, is widely suspected of having infiltrated from across the Yemeni 

border, although this possibility remains unproven. 

U.S. Arab Relations and the Challenge of Iran.

A number of Arab allies including Egypt, Jordan, 

and especially the GCC states have viewed the potential rise of Iran to nuclear weapons state status as 

a major national security issue.86 This scenario may 

be averted for at least 10 years by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement arrived 

at by the United Nations (UN) Permanent 5 plus 1 

(P5+1) negotiators, but serious concerns remain. In 

particular, the agreement does not and was never 

meant to help resolve non-nuclear regional issues. 

Thus, many differences remain unresolved. As noted 

earlier, most Gulf Arab states have experienced longstanding problems in their political relations with 

Tehran which have been aggravated by the rise of the 
25

Iranian strategic threat following Iraq’s collapse into 

chaos and Tehran’s intense involvement in Syria, Iraq, 

Yemen, and elsewhere. 

The Arab world correspondingly has a mixed but 

generally unfavorable response to the announcement 

in July 2015 that the United States and its partners had 

worked out an agreement on Iranian nuclear weapons 

and sanctions relief. The Iraqi leadership viewed the 

agreement with a sense of relief since that country’s 

two primary supporters now appear less hostile to 

each other.87 Oman, which is the only GCC state that 

maintains good relations with Iran, also approves of 

the agreement.88 The leadership of Abu Dhabi in the 

UAE was deeply concerned about the agreement, although the leadership of the emirate of Dubai (also 

within the UAE) sees strong economic potential in the 

lifting of Iranian sanctions. Unsurprisingly, within the 

Arab world, the country most upset with the agreement is clearly Saudi Arabia. The Saudis appear less 

concerned with the technical aspects of the agreement 

than the potential for the United States to improve its 

relations with Iran, and the prospect of an economically stronger Iran due to sanctions relief.89 Most other 

Gulf States are generally concerned as well, although 

they have not chosen to confront the United States 

publicly over the issue. 

Many of the problems between Iran and various 

Arab states have been building for some time. In his 

book, Duty, Gates recounts his 2007 visit to Saudi Arabia and his meeting there with King Abdullah. This 

came at a time when public hostility between Iran 

and Saudi Arabia was less obvious, and Tehran and 

Riyadh did not yet have their current virulent disagreements over issues such as the Syrian civil war, 

the Saudi-led military intervention in support of Bah-
26

rain’s monarchy, and years later the bombing of Yemen. Nevertheless, according to Gates, “[Abdullah] 

wanted a full-scale military attack on Iranian military 

targets, not just nuclear sites.”90 As these discussions 

progressed, Gates did not react well to the king’s assertiveness, and he characterized Abdullah’s comments as treating the U.S. military as “mercenaries.” 

He further described the meeting by stating: 

The longer he talked, the angrier I got, and I responded quite undiplomatically. I told him that absent an 

Iranian military attack on U.S. forces or our allies, if 

the president [Bush] launched another preventive war 

in the Middle East, he would likely be impeached; that 

we had our hands full in Iraq; and the president would 

use force only to protect vital American interests.91

Gates also told King Abdullah that showing restraint 

was a sign of strength and not a sign of weakness 

as the king maintained. Four years later, in another 

meeting, King Abdullah graciously thanked Gates 

for his candor, although he might have preferred a 

different reaction.92

The cold war between Iran and some of the Gulf 

Arab states deepened significantly following the 

March 2011 Saudi-led GCC military intervention 

into Bahrain to support their monarchy and the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, which began in the same 

month.93 Prior to the GCC move into Bahrain, the Iranians publicly supported the demands of Bahrain’s 

mostly Shi’ite demonstrators, who called for a greater 

public role in the governance of the Sunni-led monarchy. These demonstrators were inspired by early 

days of the Arab Spring in which the governments of 

several other Arab countries already had been overthrown. The Manama government feared ouster and 
27

requested military and police support from its GCC 

partners. Saudi Arabia and the UAE agreed to provide 

the majority of forces for this intervention and met the 

Bahraini request. Tehran subsequently was infuriated 

by these actions which propped up an anti-Iranian 

monarchy just as it was being challenged by largescale protests with at least some pro-Iranian elements 

among the protestors. Although the GCC intervention 

forces never actually fought against the demonstrators, their presence was highly significant in signaling wider support for Bahrain’s government. Their 

deployment to protect key infrastructure and installations may also have freed Bahraini forces from some 

more routine duties so that they could more forcefully (and harshly) move against the demonstrators. 

Additionally, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 

the same month as the intervention in Bahrain further 

intensified Gulf Arab-Iranian tensions. The Saudi decision to intervene in Yemen, which will be discussed 

later, further damaged Iranian-Saudi relations. In the 

July 2015 Jerusalem Day demonstrations in Tehran, 

the House of Saud was unexpectedly denounced by 

protestors, in addition to the usual targets of Israel 

and the United States.94

Adding to the deterioration of Arab-Iranian relations at this sensitive time, some older antagonisms 

were further inflamed when a series of senior Iranian 

officials visited the disputed islands of Abu Musa and 

the Tunbs in 2012 and 2013 as a way of underscoring their physical control over them.95 Then President 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited the islands in April 

2013 very late into his presidency.96 The islands, originally seized by Iran in 1971, are also claimed by the 

UAE. UAE claims are strongly backed by the Arab 

League.97 Tensions over these very small islands re-
28

main a central factor in complicating Iranian-UAE relations for mostly symbolic and national pride-related 

reasons, although they have some strategic significance as well due to their proximity to the Straits of 

Hormuz. Ahmadinejad seemed to enjoy antagonizing 

the Gulf Arabs for no clear foreign policy reason and 

in sharp contrast to the measured approach of his successor. Unsurprisingly, the depth of fear and distrust 

in the UAE for the Islamic regime in Tehran is sometimes no less than in Riyadh, although as a smaller 

country, it is more cautious about openly confronting 

Iran.98

In contrast to their fears about an eventual Iranian 

nuclear weapons capability, most Arab nations are 

not deeply concerned about Iran’s conventional forces, which are large but also have significant shortcomings. In this regard, a great deal of Iranian conventional military equipment is older and has been severely 

worn by overuse. While the Iranian military should 

be able to function effectively as a defensive force, 

these units would have serious problems projecting 

offensive power by crossing large tracks of hostile terrain.99 Tehran’s ability to project conventional military 

power across the Gulf is also limited by Iran’s need 

to circumvent or neutralize U.S., British, French, and 

Gulf Arab naval forces stationed there. Iran’s ability to 

provide effective logistical support to its forces in hostile territory is especially doubtful, even with countries which can be reached without crossing the Gulf 

(such as Iraq or Kuwait through Iraq). 

The conditions of Iranian forces will almost certainly improve if the UN conventional arms embargo 

is lifted in 2020 as envisioned in the JCPOA generated 

by the Iranian nuclear negotiations, but even then 

considerable money, time, and effort will be needed 
29

to modernize Iranian forces. Iran has not had access to 

significant supplies of Western weapons since the fall 

of the Shah in 1979, and Iran has been under an effective UN arms embargo since 2010. This embargo effectively has blocked Iran from receiving conventional 

weapons from its most important post-1979 suppliers, 

including Russia and China.100 Consequently, Tehran 

has been forced to rely extensively on its domestic 

arms industry, which is incapable of fully compensating for Tehran’s inability to import modern weapons. 

The Russians have already indicated a strong desire 

to go forward with such sales and will probably push 

for the early lifting of the embargo to the extent that 

they can make any progress on this issue.101 When the 

embargo is lifted, Iran can be expected to purchase 

systems such as the S-300 air defense missiles fairly 

rapidly, but it is unclear how quickly they will attempt 

to modernize their ground and air forces. 

A more serious concern for many of the Arab states 

involves Iran’s unconventional forces. Although Tehran’s conventional military forces have major shortcomings, Iran has a strong capacity for waging asymmetric warfare with its naval and elite ground forces. 

Facets of this approach include the use of irregular 

forces and proxy forces, as well as covert arms transfers and providing training to such groups within 

a target country. One of Iran’s most useful tools in 

projecting this kind of power is the IRGC’s al-Quds 

Force. The al-Quds Force has a long record of working with pro-Iranian revolutionary groups in a variety 

of countries including Iraq and Afghanistan.102 In both 

of these instances, they are also known to have supplied highly effective improvised explosive devices 

to anti-American forces.103 In Syria, the al-Quds Force 

maintains an important role in supporting the Assad 
30

regime. While the al-Quds Force is not known to be 

playing a direct combat role in the war, its trainers and 

advisors have been invaluable in helping the government remain in power. The al-Quds Force willingness 

to help Assad is also underscored by the loss of five 

al-Quds Force generals in Syria in separate incidents 

since the beginning of the civil war. One of these generals was targeted and assassinated, while the others 

may have simply gotten too close to the fighting.104 In 

Iraq, the al-Quds Force has played at least an equally 

important role as in Syria, training and supporting 

pro-government Shi’ite militias.105

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and some other 

Arab states are uneasy about the possibility that Tehran might be able to normalize its relations with the 

West at a time when many Arab-Iranian problems 

are unresolved. These states are also concerned that 

the United States may become increasingly interested 

in a “grand bargain” on IS and other regional issues 

with Iran as a way of de-escalating tensions with Iran 

at a time when increased U.S. attention is required in 

the South China Sea and Eastern Europe (especially 

the Ukraine) and when both Washington and Tehran 

are struggling against IS in Iraq.106 In the past, many 

Arab states have been especially concerned about 

a U.S.-Iranian understanding, which resolves most 

of U.S.-Iranian differences and potentially leads the 

United States to take a much more sympathetic view 

of Iranian foreign policy.107 Some Arab allies are also 

concerned that the United States might give too much 

away in a deal with Iran or begin to view Iran as a potential partner on some issues in Iraq and elsewhere. 

These states may also be unhappy over the United 

Kingdom’s (UK) decision to re-establish diplomatic 

relations with Iran at the charge d’affaires level.108 The 
31

UK is Washington’s closest ally, and its actions could 

easily be viewed as paving the way for a similar 

U.S. action. 

A number of Arab leaders are also uncertain about 

the international implications of the leadership of Hassan Rowhani, the pragmatic Iranian president elected 

in 2013. Iran’s former President Ahmadinejad could 

always be counted upon to make extreme statements 

that would infuriate and mortify the West, ensuring 

that little to no progress could occur in improving 

Iranian relations with the United States and Europe. 

Rowhani is nothing like his undiplomatic predecessor 

and openly called for reconciliation with the Gulf Arabs upon taking office. Later, after the announcement 

of the opening of nuclear negotiations with the P5+1, 

Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited a 

number of Gulf States including Kuwait, Oman, the 

UAE, and Qatar but not Saudi Arabia or Bahrain.109 He 

travelled to these states to indicate an interest in better 

relations and assure these countries that the nuclear 

deal with the P5+1 would not be at their expense. Zarif has also indicated an interest in resolving the islands 

dispute with the UAE in sharp contrast to the rhetoric and symbolism of the previous government.110 He 

expressed interest in visiting Saudi Arabia to discuss 

sustentative matters “when they’re ready” and made 

a short mostly symbolic visit to Riyadh to pay Iranian 

respects after the death of King Abdullah in January 

2015.111 Unfortunately for Iranian moderates, Rowhani’s restraint is not always matched by that of Iran’s 

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who often 

favors extremely harsh rhetoric.

While the prospect of any kind of breakthrough 

in U.S.-Iranian relations beyond the 2015 JCPOA is 

always worrisome to conservative Arab states, such 
32

an occurrence at this time may be particularly alarming with the GCC-Iranian cold war further escalating over Yemen (discussed later). If U.S. attention 

is more focused on Asia and Eastern Europe, there 

is concern that the United States may not wish to 

confront Iran. Some Arab leaders are worried that 

the United States has negotiated a less than optimal 

nuclear agreement with Iran.112 Washington has also 

made an effort to insulate the nuclear talks from other 

issues, clearly indicating a belief that expanding the 

number of issues will over-complicate the talks and 

dramatically reduce already limited chances for success. This approach has not been agreeable to all U.S. 

allies. Saudi Arabia and Israel consistently have argued that any final deal over Iranian nuclear issues 

should also address regional issues, including Iran’s 

role in Syria.113 Conversely, Iranian Deputy Foreign 

Minister Abbas Araghchi told an Iranian State Television interviewer that a nuclear deal would not mean 

a normalization of ties with the United States.114 This 

sentiment was echoed in a more authoritative way 

by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei after the 

conclusion of the JCPOA.115

Some Arab states are also uneasy that both the 

United States and Iran have made efforts to prop up 

the Baghdad government and worry that this common 

goal could lead to a wider relationship. They point to 

the fact that Washington has at least temporarily limited its criticism of significant, overt Iranian involvement in Iraqi defense and suggested that under some 

circumstances this involvement may yield positive results.116 When asked about the possibility of increased 

cooperation with Washington on security matters as a 

result of the crisis, President Hassan Rowhani stated, 

“If we see that the United States takes action against 
33

terrorist groups in Iraq, then one can think about it.”117

The Gulf Arabs are often uneasy about any discussion 

of an expanded U.S.-Iranian relationship. Kerry has 

responded to this unease by noting that, at this point, 

the United States and Iran have a mutual interest but 

not a cooperative effort in Iraq. Obama has stated that 

he does not expect a “formal set of agreements” on 

U.S. and Iranian activities in Iraq but said U.S. officials 

would do their best to “de-conflict efforts by the U.S. 

and Iranian forces in that country.”118

Saudi Arabia’s leaders have also indicated that, if 

Iran ever acquires and deploys a nuclear weapon, they 

might be compelled to try to do the same thing and 

at this time, at least, reach the same level of nuclear 

infrastructure capability as Iran is granted under the 

JCPOA.119 Such statements may be genuine, or they 

may be mostly bluster and anger. In the early-1970s, 

many within the Arab world clearly believed reports 

that Israel had acquired nuclear weapons, but they did 

not seek to match that capability. For Saudi Arabia to 

seek to acquire nuclear weapons in contemporary times 

would involve a series of political difficulties with the 

United States, Europe, other Arab states, and Israel. 

Building its own nuclear infrastructure encompassing 

the full nuclear fuel cycle and weapons cycle would be 

a difficult and lengthy project for a nonindustrialized 

nation such as Saudi Arabia.120 Suggestions that Saudi 

Arabia might purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan also seem far-fetched, since Pakistan would reap 

a variety of international repercussions from such actions. Additionally, the Pakistanis do not seem to have 

much difficulty refusing Saudi Arabian requests, including Riyadh’s call for their participation in the air 

war against Houthi rebels in Yemen.121
34

Interestingly, on the basis of limited information, 

it also appears that Saudi citizens (like their leadership) consider Iran to be their more dangerous enemy. 

According to a public opinion poll conducted by the 

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the Interdisciplinary Center of Herzilya, Israel, 53 percent of Saudis identified Iran as their country’s main adversary, 

22 percent said the Islamic State, and 18 percent said 

Israel. Even more unexpectedly, a quarter of the respondents maintained that Saudi Arabia should work 

together with Israel against Iran. The questioners told 

respondents that they were conducting the survey for 

the International Data Corporation, but did not further identify the center or associate it with Israel.122

While the Saudi government is seldom led by public 

opinion, they also seem to be becoming more open to 

Israeli contacts. At a 2015 conference in Washington, 

Saudi Arabian and Israeli participants admitted that 

representatives of their countries had held a series of 

meetings on regional security issues.123 It is possible 

these ties will grow in response to the strenuous objections both countries have about the July 2015 P5+1 

agreement with Iran. Jordan and Egypt, which have 

diplomatic relations with Israel, may also be expanding their relations with the Israelis.124

The Role of Egypt and Libya in Middle 

Eastern Security.

The United States and many Arab states experienced some friction over policy differences involving 

Egypt as far back as the ouster of Egyptian President 

Hosni Mubarak in 2011. As the Mubarak government teetered, U.S. leadership had a choice of either 

maintaining its support for the Egyptian president or 
35

switching its backing to the demonstrators challenging him. This was not an easy decision and required 

a careful balancing of national objectives and values. 

Mubarak had been a longtime ally and a strong supporter of the 1979 Egyptian peace treaty with Israel 

and the struggle against Islamist terrorist groups such 

as al-Qaeda. Conversely, the demonstrators were 

clearly calling for democracy and expected U.S. support for their efforts to overthrow a friendly, but nevertheless highly autocratic regime. U.S. leadership 

avoided strongly committing to either side in the early 

stages of the conflict and did not start to tilt toward 

the demonstrators until after a major Mubarak speech 

on February 1, 2011, where he offered few meaningful concessions.125 U.S. policy toward the confrontation correspondingly satisfied virtually no one in the 

region. Young activists challenging the regime later 

expressed disappointment and strongly asserted that 

the United States waited until the Mubarak regime 

appeared doomed before switching its allegiance (a 

critique which probably went too far).126 In contrast, 

Arab conservatives, and especially the Gulf monarchies, were quick to charge that U.S. leaders abandoned Mubarak despite his many years as an ally.127

Gulf Arab leaders observing this process may have 

been particularly concerned that the United States 

would abandon them at some point for ideological 

reasons if their monarchical governments were ever 

challenged by a strong opposition demanding democracy or democratic reform. 

Unexpectedly, the Mubarak regime (which had 

been in power for almost 30 years) proved remarkably 

fragile in the face of determined demonstrations and 

calls for its removal. Egypt’s army, which had a long 

history of involvement in domestic politics, initially 
36

attempted to present itself as neutral and waited to see 

if Mubarak could de-escalate the crisis with promises 

of future concessions. Beginning on February 3, 2011, 

the military began to move toward an accommodation 

with the demonstrators as Mubarak proved increasingly incapable of pacifying or dispersing the crowd. 

On February 10, the Supreme Council of the Armed 

Forces (SCAF) issued a communique endorsing the 

“people’s legitimate demands,” effectively removing 

Mubarak from office.128 The next day the military assumed a caretaker governance of the country.

The Egyptian military assumed authority in the 

immediate aftermath of Mubarak’s ouster, but its 

most senior leaders and especially the elderly Defense 

Minister, Field Marshal Mohammad Tantawi, did not 

seem interested in ruling the country for a prolonged 

period of time so long as they were able to maintain 

the military’s privileged place in society. The Muslim 

Brotherhood then rapidly emerged as a leading political player, although it suffered an especially serious 

setback when the Egyptian Supreme Court dissolved 

a friendly parliament on June 14, 2012. The Brotherhood then strongly rebounded when its candidate 

Mohammad Morsi won a mid-June run-off election 

with 51.7 percent of the vote.129 This outcome is less 

impressive than it might initially seem, since Morsi 

was only able to gain approximately half the votes in 

an election against retired Air Force General Ahmad 

Shafiq, an important figure in the Mubarak regime.130

In this election, only a little over half of eligible Egyptian voters participated, while the rest did not vote. 

Adding to Brotherhood concerns, the SCAF issued a 

decree severely limiting the powers of the presidency 

shortly before the election results were announced.131

The SCAF based this proclamation on its status as 
37

the interim governing authority following Mubarak’s 

ouster. Morsi took office as Egypt’s president on June 

30, 2012.

The Morsi Administration lasted for just over a 

year in power. This time frame was characterized by 

considerable political infighting and no clear progress 

in addressing Egypt’s towering economic problems. 

On July 3, 2013, following several days of massive 

popular demonstrations against the government, the 

Egyptian military unilaterally dissolved Morsi’s government and placed him under arrest for a wide variety of crimes.132 Defense Minister General Sisi (who 

had replaced Tantawi) emerged as the most important 

figure in the ouster, although military leaders installed 

the Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitution Court 

as a figurehead president, pending new elections. In 

March 2014, Sisi resigned from the military to run for 

president. After winning the election, he assumed office in June. Morsi, by contrast, was sentenced to 20 

years in prison in April 2015 after being convicted of 

inciting violence and directing illegal detentions and 

torture.133 In May 2015, he was further sentenced to 

death, although it remains uncertain if this decision 

will ever be carried out.134

The United States was again caught in a difficult 

situation by the military’s 2013 seizure of power from 

the incompetent although democratically elected Morsi government. Washington sought to continue good 

relations with Cairo, and the administration refused to 

label the ouster a coup. If U.S. leaders had done so officially, they would have been legally required to halt 

aid to Egypt, which they wanted to avoid.135 Yet, while 

seeking to work with the Egyptians, Washington was 

also disturbed by substantial anti-democratic repression and ongoing excesses of the new government. 
38

The Egyptian government designated the Muslim 

Brotherhood to be a terrorist organization following 

a suicide car bombing of a police headquarters that 

killed 15 people. The government never provided any 

evidence of the Brotherhood’s involvement in the attack, although Sisi is openly determined to eradicate 

the Muslim Brotherhood.136 He has also been prepared to accept a great deal of criticism over Egyptian 

human rights policies to do so.137

The actions of the Egyptian military in ousting 

Morsi were applauded by a number of conservative 

Arab states. As Sisi moved against the Brotherhood, 

he was strongly backed with financial support from 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE.138 These wealthy countries 

sought to protect Sisi from potential U.S. pressure and 

provided the Egyptian leadership with political support for whatever harsh measures the Egyptian leadership considered necessary. In the aftermath of the 

military seizing power, there was considerable street 

unrest and bloodshed. Thousands of supporters of the 

Muslim Brotherhood and others were killed in street 

fighting with the police and army, often when government forces attempted to enforce a highly restrictive law regulating demonstrations. Huge numbers 

of both Islamist and secular dissidents were also arrested. The administration of justice appeared deeply 

flawed with some closed military trials for civilians 

and occasional mass sentencing on the basis of “trials” 

that lasted less than an hour and did not always allow 

defense attorneys to speak.139 By April 2015, around 

2,500 people had been killed in street violence, and 

more than 40,000 were incarcerated for anti-regime or 

pro-Islamist activities.140 In line with the example of 

some other Arab states (such as the UAE), the Egyptian government has also moved to consolidate official 
39

control of the mosques by replacing pro-Brotherhood 

clergy with licensed state approved clerics, who can 

be trusted to give sermons adhering to strict government guidelines.141

In July 2013, the United States downgraded its military relations with Egypt as the result of the Egyptian 

military seizing power and the ongoing crackdown on 

dissents that followed this action. Prior to this disruption, the United States had provided $1.3 billion in aid 

to Egypt, the balance of which was military aid. This 

aid was scaled down in 2013 when delivery of high 

profile items including F-16 aircraft, M-1 tanks, and 

AH-64D Apache helicopters was suspended. These 

measures were adopted reluctantly due to Egypt’s 

high value as a regional partner, and they began to be 

scaled back after less than a year. Correspondingly, 

on April 22, 2014, the United States announced that it 

would resume delivery of Apache helicopters to Egypt, 

citing that country’s continuing commitment to the 

peace treaty with Israel.142 The United States further 

released $650 million in other military aid to Egypt at 

the same time. These helicopters can be exceptionally 

helpful in the counterinsurgency operations, and there 

was a corresponding U.S. interest in transferring these 

items. Later, in April 2015, the United States lifted all 

remaining sanctions against the Egyptian military and 

restored the full military aid relationship. As a result 

of this change, the White House noted that the United 

States would be sending additional fighter jets, missiles and tank kits to Egypt, and that it would continue to provide $1.3 billion in military assistance for 

Egypt.143 The U.S. leadership also has indicated that it 

hopes to shift Egyptian military aid away from tanks 

and fighter aircraft toward weapons and equipment 

designed to enhance counterterrorism capabilities 
40

and border and maritime security.144 Egypt, however, 

has used air strikes against IS-affiliated forces in both 

Libya and the Sinai, and Egyptian leadership does not 

always seem to view counterinsurgency and conventional warfare in fundamentally different ways.

A major reason for the U.S. shift in military assistance policy involves the expansion of a serious Islamist insurgency centered in the Sinai Peninsula since 

Morsi’s ouster. There have been a number of lawless 

elements in the Sinai for decades, but the collapse of 

the Mubarak government led to the withdrawal of a 

number of policemen from the area and opportunities 

for various groups to expand into a more formidable 

threat.145 Currently, the militants are a mix of hardcore 

Egyptian Islamic extremists, radical Palestinians from 

nearby Gaza, foreign fighters, and disgruntled young 

Egyptian men who are angry about their poverty and 

lack of opportunities, according to Sinai residents.146

Some convicts who escaped from prison during the 

uprising against Mubarak also joined the militants 

in Sinai. 

The al-Qaeda group formerly known as Ansar 

Beit al Maqdis is the best known of the Sinai insurgent groups. In November 2014, the militants of this 

group abandoned their relationship with al-Qaeda 

and pledged loyalty to the IS caliphate, changing their 

name to the “Sinai Province of the Islamic State.” This 

group apparently pledged loyalty to the IS in the hope 

that the group could give them money, weapons, 

tactical advice, and propaganda support that might 

help in recruiting.147 It is not certain how much of this 

kind of support they received, although the group 

has increased their holdings of sophisticated weapons through smuggling enabled by the disarray of 

the Libyan civil war and the availability of weapons 

once under the control of the Libyan military.148 In this 
41

environment, hundreds of Egyptian soldiers and policemen have died since July 3, 2013, many in attacks 

by Muslim militants in Sinai but also in acts of terrorism throughout Egypt.

While Morsi was in power, he is believed to have 

sought negotiations with some of the less radical Sinai groups and also hoped to develop the peninsula 

economically in order to reduce the causes of instability, radicalism, and violence.149 However enlightened this approach may have seemed, it was too onedimensional to succeed and, as noted, allowed these 

groups to grow. The Sisi government has responded 

to this threat in a radically different but equally onedimensional manner, with an emphasis on military 

means. Thus far, such iron fist policies have not defeated the Sinai Province organization and other terrorist groups, nor have they reduced their ability to 

engage in complex terrorist strikes. In one particularly 

deadly attack on October 24, 2014, at least 33 soldiers 

were killed.150 The government responded to this disaster with a rapid decision to demolish houses on 

the Egyptian side of the border with the Gaza Strip 

(with compensation to the owners) in order to create a 

buffer zone there. The government expects this buffer 

zone to help stem the flow of weapons and militants 

across the border.151 Nevertheless, at the time of this 

writing, government forces, especially those in Sinai, 

continue to endure sophisticated attacks by terrorist 

forces. Police officers, soldiers, and security officials 

have been attacked at checkpoints, police stations, 

military camps, and while traveling in their vehicles. 

On July 1, 2015, in one particularly horrific effort, a 

wave of simultaneous attacks through Sinai killed 64 

soldiers.152 These ongoing security problems seem to 

indicate that Sisi’s approach to internal security is not 

showing much success.
42

While Egypt has faced a number of challenges 

since Morsi’s removal from power, it has continued 

to consolidate its relations with a number of important regional allies. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have a 

number of overlapping security interests and have 

coordinated on all major regional security issues, although the policy views of each county’s leadership 

are by no means identical on some important issues 

such as the war in Syria. The Gulf Arab states (except 

for Qatar) were openly hostile to the U.S. decision to 

hold the Egyptian Army even minimally responsible 

for the 2013 ouster of a democratic government and its 

violent aftermath. Many of these states were worried 

about the possibility of an Egyptian rapprochement 

with Iran under Morsi, which seemed possible despite 

the strong differences between Tehran and Cairo on 

the Syrian revolution. The process reached a point of 

alarm following then-President Ahmadinejad’s visit 

to Cairo in early-2013.153 Israel is also supportive of 

the Sisi government and strongly favors efforts by the 

United States to continue providing Cairo with weapons. Like the Egyptians, Israelis are deeply concerned 

about the insurgency in the Sinai, which they view as 

a threat.

In addition to the terrorists operating out of Sinai, 

IS-affiliated forces in Libya have also struck at Egypt 

from Libya. In one particularly egregious episode, ISaffiliated terrorists kidnapped and then executed 31 

Coptic Christian Egyptians who had been abducted 

from the city of Surt.154 The Egyptian military responded with a February 16 air strike on what were 

described as IS camps, training centers, and weapons 

storage areas in Libya.155 These attacks did not deter IS 

from engaging in other atrocities, and in April 2015, IS 

released a video showing the execution of dozens of 
43

Ethiopian Christians by shooting and beheading.156 ISaffiliated fighters in Libya have also claimed responsibility for attacks on Libyan government buildings, 

foreign embassies, a major Libyan oil field, and militias based in the city of Misurata. 

IS forces did not appear in Libya until 2014, but 

they have expanded dramatically since that time and 

may currently have as many as 3,000 fighters.157 IS in 

Libya has been able to survive because of the security vacuum that has resulted from two rival political 

leaderships, each claiming to be the legitimate government. The internationally recognized government, 

which is led effectively by General Khalifa Haftar, is 

based in the eastern cities of Tobruk and Bayda, while 

the pro-Islamist Libyan Dawn government is based in 

Tripoli. Hiftar is a Qadhafi-era general who defected in 

1990 and returned to Libya following the outbreak of 

civil war in 2011. Haftar’s government is strongly supported by Egypt’s President Sisi and by other conservative Arab governments, which have been shocked 

by the rapid development of the Libyan IS threat.158

The rival governments have often seemed more intent on fighting each other than on fighting IS.159 This 

situation may improve as a result of UN-sponsored 

unity talks, but this remains uncertain. IS currently 

controls the large coastal city of Surt and until lateJuly 2015 maintained militia in the eastern city of 

Derna. The force in Derna has now been driven out 

of the city by local Islamists, who did not wish to cede 

their authority to IS.160 This is an interesting example 

since some other local militias may also be willing to 

resist any IS incursions into areas under their control, 

and thus limit IS opportunities, even in the absence 

of a unified Libyan government. Unfortunately, it is 

not clear that this factor will be decisive in all future 
44

instances. The Libyan branch of IS has also been reported to be extremely close to the main organization 

with its headquarters in Syria, so it may be able to obtain meaningful assistance with recruiting and funds 

from this source.161

The Ongoing Crucible of Yemen.

Yemen is a large, important, but also economically impoverished Arab country having a lengthy 

border with Saudi Arabia and direct access to key 

strategic waterways including the Red Sea and the 

Gulf of Aden. It is currently the only nonmonarchy on 

the Arabian Peninsula as well as one of that region’s 

more heavily populated countries, with around 24-

25 million people. Yemen’s most important political 

figure from 1978-2012 was then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who left office in February 2012, during the 

Arab Spring, as the result of massive and unrelenting 

domestic, regional, and international pressure for him 

to resign. In this chaotic environment, Yemen’s Gulf 

neighbors became concerned about the escalating 

crisis in that country and the prospects for spreading 

instability. The nations of the GCC states led by Saudi 

Arabia consequently played a major role in easing 

Saleh out of office. Saleh’s Vice President Abd Rabbuh 

Mansur Hadi then became acting head of state and 

was elected president under a transition plan in which 

he was the only candidate on the ballot.162

Hadi never had the same kind of carefully cultivated power base as his predecessor and also lacks many 

of the former president’s political skills. To the extent 

that he could, Hadi waged an uncompromising war 

against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 

the most powerful and dangerous of the al-Qaeda 
45

affiliates. This effort produced important results but 

also required extensive funding from the GCC states 

and the U.S. support of the Yemeni armed forces 

with military training programs and the use of armed 

drones against terrorist targets.163 Hadi was particularly assertive in a 2012 offensive against AQAP, which 

had previously seized a significant amount of territory in southern Yemen during the turmoil of the Arab 

Spring when Saleh was challenged and overthrown.164

While Yemeni forces pushed AQAP out of the cities 

and towns that it had held prior to the offensive, the 

organization remained powerful and was still able to 

conduct spectacular acts of terrorism against government institutions.165 During this military offensive, 

there were also some signs of problems within the 

Yemeni regular military, which often seemed to play 

a secondary role in the fighting. These soldiers were 

overshadowed by the extensive use of U.S. drones to 

disrupt AQAP command and control and perhaps 

more tellingly by the use of Yemeni tribal fighters for 

ground combat. These irregular tribal fighters were 

paid well with GCC money and have sometimes been 

referred to as mercenaries.166 The need for tribal fighters as an indispensable element of the offensive was 

an important indicator of ongoing dysfunction within 

the regular military. 

AQAP is usually perceived by Western analysts 

and policymakers as the dominant threat to Yemeni 

peace and security, but their activities have been 

greatly overshadowed by the Houthi movement, 

which seized the capital of Sana’a in September 2014. 

The Houthis are Zaydi Shi’ites who have maintained 

a long history of disagreement with the central government in Sana’a. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 

the Yemeni government aggravated its problems with 
46

the Houthis by allowing a number of Saudi funded 

missionaries to establish religious institutions in 

northern Yemen.167 These institutions were designed 

to advance Sunni Salafi versions of Islam and seek 

converts among the Houthi citizens and youth. Such 

missionaries usually viewed Shi’ite religious beliefs 

in an unsympathetic and sometimes an outright toxic 

light, and their actions were viewed as confrontational 

and provocative by the Houthi leadership. The Yemeni government nevertheless did not wish to restrict 

the movement of these clerics into Yemen and thereby 

potentially offend Saudi Arabia, which was a chief 

source of Sana’a’s foreign aid. The Yemeni government later attempted to arrest the Houthi leadership, 

sparking a series of counterinsurgency wars from 2004 

until 2010.168

Saudi Arabia entered the anti-Houthi fighting for 

the first time in northern Yemen in November 2009. At 

this time, a group of Houthi rebels crossed into Saudi 

territory, killing at least two border guards and apparently taking control of two or more Saudi border 

villages. In response, Riyadh took swift and decisive 

action with military strikes against Houthi rebels rapidly unfolding as the largest combat operation that 

they had undertaken since the 1991 Gulf War. Saudi 

tactics in this conflict involved the heavy use of artillery and airpower bombardment followed by the deployment of infantry in mopping up operations. Such 

tactics were only partially successful as the Houthis 

proved tough and resilient in the face of bombing and 

artillery fire. The Saudi army reported that at least 

133 of its soldiers were killed in action, with an undisclosed number of others wounded or captured in 

the fighting.169 The Saudis discontinued their military 

involvement in the war in February 2010 when Houthi 
47

forces withdrew from Saudi territory, and a cease-fire 

involving both the Yemeni and Saudi governments 

was established, with all Saudi prisoners returned. 

Later, the Houthis gained an important opportunity 

to assert greater autonomy in their home province of 

Saada in 2011-12 when the Saleh government was coping with massive domestic unrest across a wide cross 

section of the Yemeni population. 

The 2015 capture of Sana’a by Houthi rebels fighting the Hadi government sent shock waves through 

the GCC states, although it was initially unclear if 

the Houthis would seek to hold the city indefinitely 

or expand their power elsewhere in Yemen. Many of 

the Arab leaders were concerned about having potentially pro-Iranian Shi’ites in power in Yemen. Most of 

the conservative Arab leaders have been especially 

concerned that Houthi clout in Yemen could lead to 

a wider role for Tehran in the southern Arabian Peninsula. There is no doubt that Iran is providing help 

to the Houthis, including weapons, but it is a mistake 

to simply view them as Iranian stooges.170 As Shi’ites, 

the Houthis did not expect support from Sunni Arab 

states during their confrontation with the Yemeni 

government, and Iran appeared to offer their only 

option as a strong external ally capable of providing 

them with material help and political support. Iraq, by 

contrast, has provided the Houthis with some rhetorical and diplomatic support but nothing more despite 

its own Shi’ite-led government.171

Much like the Iraqi army in Mosul in 2014, the Yemeni army failed to put up a serious defense against 

the Houthi rebels when they entered Sana’a. The circumstances were somewhat different in this instance 

than those in Iraq. In Iraq, large elements of the military (especially Sunnis) did not wish to fight for the 
48

corrupt, Shi’ite-dominated government of Maliki, and 

there were also a large number of Iraqi soldiers who 

were terrified by demonstrated IS brutality. In Yemen, 

by contrast, much of the army viewed Hadi as weak, 

and some officers had remained loyal to ousted Saleh. 

Additionally, Hadi was unpopular with large elements 

of the public for ending fuel subsidies and more generally failing to improve Yemen’s desperate economic 

situation.172 Saleh, despite his previous involvement 

in fighting the Houthis, was now prepared to strike a 

tactical alliance with them. This sort of duplicity and 

Machiavellian maneuvering had characterized his 33-

year rule and correspondingly cannot be considered a 

surprise. Before his ouster, Saleh seemed to be preparing his son, Ahmed, to be Yemen’s next president.173

Even after leaving power, he may not have given up 

on that hope, and many of his supporters openly called 

for Ahmed’s return to run for president.174 Hadi previously appointed Ahmed as ambassador to the UAE 

in April 2013 in an effort to remove him from a direct 

role in Yemeni politics.175 Hadi then fired Ahmed from 

that position during his own exile in Saudi Arabia in 

March 2015, and the UAE correspondingly stripped 

him of his diplomatic status and privileges.176

Hadi fled house arrest in Sana’a in February 2015 

and quickly established himself in the southern city of 

Aden. He clearly hoped to set up a rival center of power there and prove that his presidency was still viable. 

While Hadi’s ability to do this was usually viewed as 

doubtful, he was able to shore up considerable foreign 

support, with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab powers moving their embassies to Aden.177 Hadi’s ability 

to mobilize foreign support for his presidency now 

seemed a serious threat, and the Houthis began seizing additional territory with the clear strategic goal 
49

of eventually capturing Aden. The Houthi movement 

against Aden triggered Saudi-led military intervention against the Houthis on March 26, 2015. Riyadh 

gave the United States only a few hours’ notice of its 

impending military actions in Yemen.178

Riyadh assembled a 10-nation coalition to participate in the Yemen intervention. Other members of the 

coalition included Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, 

Pakistan, and all of the GCC countries except Oman.179

The Pakistani commitment provoked a major domestic backlash, and Islamabad correspondingly never 

rendered any tangible assistance to the campaign.180

At the time of this writing, the intervention consists 

mostly of an air campaign, although some nations, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have sent warships 

off the Yemeni coast and have shelled land targets. 

The Egyptian government also initially suggested that 

it was willing to send ground troops to Yemen “if necessary,” although it is extremely doubtful they would 

have ever followed through on this commitment.181

Limited numbers of Saudi and Emirati forces began 

fighting in Aden later in the war and have served as 

leaders of GCC trained and paid Yemeni units that 

entered Aden by sea, probably from Saudi Arabia and 

the UAE.182 Additionally, in late-July 2015, the UAE 

sent a 1,500 person brigade of its own troops to Aden. 

This force appeared to be a mechanized infantry unit 

and has taken some casualties.183 All of these forces 

have played an important role in clearing Houthi 

forces from Aden and surrounding areas. 

Almost immediately after the operation began, 

Washington offered expanded logistical and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia and its regional partners.184 The United States established a joint coordination and planning cell in the Saudi operations center, 
50

and weapons deliveries were also expedited.185 In April 

2015, the Pentagon also announced that the United 

States was providing aerial refueling for some coalition aircraft. Kerry also warned Iran against efforts to 

intensify its aid to the Houthis during the fighting. He 

cited flights coming in from Iran early in the fighting, 

which he seemed to imply were carrying weapons and 

war supplies.186 To underscore the U.S. alliance with 

Saudi Arabia, Washington sent the aircraft carrier USS

Theodore Roosevelt and an escort ship to join other U.S. 

naval ships in the waters off Yemen. The carrier was a 

reassuring presence to Saudi and Egyptian naval vessels enforcing a newly established UN ban forbidding 

weapons transfers to the Houthis. Washington may 

have been especially motived to demonstrate support for Saudi regional concerns following the conclusion of the interim framework agreement on Iranian 

nuclear issues that proceeded the JCPOA. The Saudis 

had reluctantly endorsed this agreement, but they had 

also been extremely concerned about the possibility of 

such a development for years.187 They are also deeply 

uneasy about any agreement that reduces Iran’s international isolation and allows it to begin rebuilding its 

economy, which has been badly racked by sanctions. 

The Saudis have stated that they wish to restore 

Hadi’s government, but his internal base of support remains extremely weak. Various militia forces in Aden 

have fiercely resisted the Houthis whom they view as 

enemies, but many of these same groups do not support Hadi.188 Instead, they have fought for anti-Houthi 

reasons or simply because they do not wish any group 

representing northern Yemen to have authority in the 

south. Rather, many would like to see the south restored to its previous status as an independent country.189 Some reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has also 
51

used its embassy in Aden to help organize and fund 

anti-Houthi tribal fighters, who, as previously noted, 

can often be significantly more effective than the Yemeni regular army.190 Nevertheless, these tribal combatants are fighting for money and correspondingly 

cannot be considered part of Hadi’s power base.

The Saudi Arabian Air Force has conducted most of 

the bombing strikes against Yemeni targets, although 

Jordan, and especially the UAE, have also participated in some missions.191 Unsurprisingly, the Saudi-led 

bombing of Yemen has further damaged relations between the GCC states and Iran. While Riyadh justified 

the GCC intervention on the basis of supporting the 

legitimate president, its basic strategic concern was 

limiting Iranian influence in Yemen. Iran’s Supreme 

Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called the intervention “genocide” while also asserting that Saudi Arabia 

is “as bad as Israel.”192 The Iranian leader also stated 

that “inexperience youths have taken over the affairs 

of the state and are replacing dignity with barbarity.”193 This was a personal insult to King Salman, who 

appointed his then-29-year-old son to serve as Saudi 

Defense Minister in 2015.194

The GCC problem with the Houthi rise was compounded by the new AQAP assertiveness in Yemen 

due to the security vacuum created by the Hadi government’s failures. While the GCC would like to prevent Houthi dominance of Yemen, it also wishes to do 

so in a way that does not benefit AQAP. Since these 

two forces are fighting each other, they are at least incapable of presenting a united front, although they can 

do a lot of damage to GCC interests separately.195 The 

rise of the Houthis and the collapse of Hadi’s already 

limited authority has also provided AQAP with a variety of opportunities to conduct important large-scale 
52

operations within Yemen. In one particularly dramatic 

development on April 2, 2015, AQAP fighters stormed 

a prison in Hadramaut Province and freed 300 prisoners, including many of their imprisoned comrades.196

On July 1, 2015, an even more alarming jail break took 

place when 1,200 prisoners were reported to have 

been freed from the central prison in the city of Taiz.197

An undisclosed number of these prisoners are AQAP 

members or supporters.198 In early 2015, AQAP was 

also able to seize and control territory including the 

port of Mukallah, Yemen’s fifth largest city, although 

it had worked together with local officials and tribes 

in a possible attempt to prove that it is no longer interested in implementing the types of brutality associated with previous AQAP control of Yemeni territory.199 The Houthis sometimes maintain that AQAP 

will seize any land that they relinquish control over as 

part of a peace agreement. 

Despite the importance of AQAP in Yemen, there 

is a limited but expanding role by Yemeni associates 

of the Islamic State organization. On March 20, 2015, 

fighters claiming to be associated with IS conducted 

their first major operation in Yemen using suicide 

bombers to attack a number of Shi’ite mosques, killing 142 people and wounding more than 350. A few 

days later, a newly announced “Green Brigade” asserting IS ties claimed to have killed a few Houthis in 

the central province of Ibb.200 Since that time a number 

of skirmishes have taken place between Yemeni or 

Houthi soldiers and fighters claiming an IS affiliation. 

Mosques utilized by Shi’ites have remained a favored 

IS target.201

A potential advantage for AQAP and IS supporters 

in Yemen is the crippling of U.S.-Yemeni counterterrorism cooperation. The United States has withdrawn 
53

125 Special Forces trainers and other U.S. personnel 

from Yemen as it has descended into chaos.202 Washington has also withdrawn its embassy from Sana’a 

and relocated the U.S. diplomatic mission to Jeddah, 

Saudi Arabia.203 This move enormously complicates 

counterterrorism coordination with both the Yemeni 

government institutions that remain in that country 

and the Yemeni military. These conditions have not 

ended drone use, although the potential for collateral 

damage with armed drones is virtually always enhanced by the lack of accurate intelligence obtained 

by friendly forces on the ground.204 Without such 

intelligence, the United States has been reported to 

have been forced to rely on “signature strikes” against 

AQAP targets in Yemen. Signature strikes involve selecting targets based on observed patterns of behavior rather than precise information on the identity of 

targeted personnel.205 Despite their controversial nature, these efforts have sometimes yielded important 

results, as when a June 2015 drone strike killed AQAP 

chief Nasir al-Wuhayshi.206

It is difficult to envision the Yemeni war going on 

indefinitely without creating a massive humanitarian 

crisis. Yemen was a desperately poor country even 

before the fighting began, and it now faces the danger of large amounts of people being unable to access 

food and uncontaminated drinking water. Diseases 

are spreading throughout the country, and large scale 

epidemics appear possible.207 While the Saudi leadership detests the Houthis to the point that serious 

diplomatic progress with them does not seem likely, 

Riyadh is more willing to negotiate with former President Saleh, who is also a key part of the conflict.208

The strong position of the Hadi government in Aden 

also improves the Saudi negotiating position and may 
54

help the Saudis reach an overall agreement. It is not, 

however, clear if Yemen will emerge from this crisis as 

one or two countries. It is fully possible that an independent south will re-emerge from this crisis and will 

align strongly with Riyadh.

U.S. Defense Ties with the Gulf Arab States.

In addressing the threats that they currently face, 

Arab allies must balance domestic public opinion with 

defense needs. Many Arab states have maintained a 

long and problematic history with Western military 

bases on their territory, and this background influences current Gulf Arab decisionmaking on how to 

organize military cooperation with the United States. 

Until at least the 1950s, great powers often maintained 

that their bases were designed to defend regional nations against foreign invaders, but the presence of 

such facilities was sometimes used to pressure and 

influence local governments. In response to these concerns, as well as changing Western military requirements and economic pressures, Western permanent 

military presence in the Middle East steadily declined, 

and a number of major bases were evacuated in response to nationalist demands. By the early-1970s, the 

United States and other Western nations had dramatically scaled down their presence in the area. Western 

combat units currently retain an ongoing presence 

at military facilities only in some smaller Gulf Arab 

states including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. 

In Jordan, the United States maintains hundreds of 

military personnel in that country to prepare for the 

large and important Eager Lion exercise (discussed 

later). The U.S. Army also stationed significant forces 

in Saudi Arabia during and after Operations DESERT 
55

SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990-91, but these 

forces were withdrawn in 2003. Iraqi bases host U.S. 

advisors and planners (along with some force protection units) but not U.S. Army or Marine Corps 

maneuver combat units. 

Most of the Gulf Arab countries traditionally have 

not favored large numbers of ground forces permanently stationed on their territory, and some have 

shown a preference for air or naval bases. Western 

facilities in Bahrain support the U.S. Fifth Fleet, while 

Qatar and the UAE allow the U.S. Air Force to utilize 

key air bases, although only a limited number of U.S. 

aircraft regularly use these facilities. Many of the U.S. 

combat aircraft currently used to protect the Gulf are 

naval aircraft stationed on aircraft carriers, although 

the U.S. Air Force presence in the region can be expanded in emergency situations. Conversely, Kuwait 

has a much more extensive history of hosting both U.S. 

ground and air forces, with many U.S. Army troops 

being stationed at Camp Arifjan, south of Kuwait 

city.209 Currently, Camp Arifjan is an important transit point for equipment being returned to the United 

States from Afghanistan. At this time, around 13,500 

U.S. service members are stationed in Kuwait, down 

from 25,000 during the last stages of the U.S. military 

presence in Iraq.210 Around 40,000 U.S. military personnel of all services are deployed to the Middle East 

(mostly the Gulf) at any one time.

Military Exercises.

Large military exercises have been somewhat less 

prominent over the last few years as ongoing wars 

in the region have required the attention of both the 

United States and its regional partners. A number of 
56

Arab air forces have been engaged in air combat operations as part of the struggles in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Some Arab naval forces, including those of Egypt 

and Saudi Arabia, also may have been marginally involved in the fighting in Yemen. Limited numbers of 

Saudi and Emirati ground forces have also fought in 

Yemen, as noted earlier. Yet, if joint U.S.-Arab military exercises have been somewhat overshadowed 

by actual combat recently, they nevertheless remain 

important to all parties. One of the most important advantages of military exercises is that some Arab countries, which display reticence about large numbers of 

foreign ground troops being stationed permanently 

on their soil, seek other forms of cooperation with U.S. 

military forces. The decision to reduce significantly 

U.S. Army forces in Europe from Cold War levels 

is also widely understood to complicate U.S. power 

projection into the Middle East by moving troops 

farther away, although that trend may eventually be 

reversed. The 2014-15 difficulties in Ukraine, Crimea, 

and elsewhere in Eastern Europe may lead to a significant upward revision of the optimal numbers of 

U.S. forces in Europe. Currently, such actions appear 

to be confined mostly to pre-positioning weapons and 

equipment, including M1A2 tanks and M2A3/M3A3 

Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, for use of military 

exercises or other training.211

Throughout the Middle East, many Arab countries 

are extremely interested in working with the U.S. military in joint exercises to help them continue professionalizing their armed forces and raising their standards 

for conventional defense, joint operations, intelligence 

operations, counterinsurgency, and other capabilities. 

U.S. commitment to support these activities through 

both training and exercises is clearly reassuring to 
57

friendly Arab states that are seeking to warn their enemies against aggressive action. To help meet these 

concerns, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 

made a number of visits to the region and also made 

a number of strong statements about the continuing 

U.S. interest in the region. In December 2013, he gave 

a particularly important speech at a conference in 

Manama, Bahrain, designed to underscore the future 

U.S. commitment to the partnership with Gulf allies. 

Hagel acknowledged that Arab allies were concerned 

over the U.S. decision to rebalance forces to Asia and 

cuts to the U.S. Defense budget, but insisted that these 

changes did not mean the abandonment of the Middle 

East. Hagel then envisioned a U.S. military presence 

of around 35,000 personnel and a U.S. Army footprint 

of 10,000 troops in the region.212 These numbers are 

somewhat larger now with around 40,000 military 

personnel in the Middle East at any one time.213 Hagel 

also noted that the United States maintained around 

40 ships at sea in the region including an aircraft carrier battle group. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter 

has also embraced these policies when he replaced 

Hagel.214

In this environment, many friendly Arab political 

and military leaders have found U.S.-led bilateral or 

multinational military exercises to be an exceptionally 

valuable tool for their security. Exercises, unlike basing rights, do not involve a long-term military presence that can grate on domestic public opinion and 

provide the appearance of excessive U.S. influence. 

Rather, military exercises can more easily be portrayed as a collaboration, in which the United States 

is showing its support for local militaries by working 

with them. Another advantage is that at times of domestic Arab political tension, exercises can usually be 
58

rescheduled by the host government. Conversely, at 

times of regional tension, regularly scheduled exercises can be expanded and the number of U.S. troops 

participating in the exercise can be increased to show 

support for the host government. Such expansions 

are generally seen in the region as a show of force, although their linkage to previously planned exercises 

allows the United States and its allies to deny that they 

are being provocative. Exercise Eager Lion, which is 

based in Jordan and involves the United States and a 

number of Gulf Arab allies, may be an example of this 

approach. Also, as a result of the July 2015 JCPOA, the 

United States is considering increasing the scope and 

number of multilateral exercises in the Gulf as a way 

of reassuring regional allies.215

Another reason for a vigorous ongoing U.S.-Gulf 

exercise program involves Iranian actions. The Iranians frequently engage in large-scale joint exercises, 

which they use for both training and propaganda purposes. The land component of these exercises is usually defensive, focusing on responding to a U.S.-led 

invasion of the Iranian homeland, which appears to be 

one of their primary military concerns. The Iranians 

usually proclaim these exercises to be completely successful and routinely exaggerate the numbers of forces 

involved, although the exercises remain meaningful as 

political theater.216 U.S.-led maritime exercises include 

not only large units, but also smaller ships. Multinational military exercises focused on anti-mining operations are particularly important since mine warfare 

is an important part of Iran’s maritime strategy that, 

as with land forces, stresses asymmetric capabilities.217

As with landpower and airpower, Iran is totally outclassed by allied capabilities at sea and therefore will 

continue to develop asymmetric capabilities in areas 
59

such as submarine warfare, mine warfare, and the use 

of fast small armed boats. 

The centerpiece of the Middle Eastern military 

exercise program was formerly Exercise Bright Star, 

held in Egypt. Unless cancelled for political or military reasons, Egypt has previously hosted Bright Star 

every 2 years. Bright Star exercises began in 1980 following the conclusion of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli 

peace treaty, with the most recent exercise occurring 

in October 2009. This exercise has served as a large, 

multinational training exercise that helps foster the 

interoperability of U.S., Egyptian, and allied forces. 

Bright Star eventually became the most important U.S. 

supported military exercise in the Middle East and a 

showpiece of U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation. It 

was cancelled in 2003 due to U.S. commitments to the 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was cancelled again 

in 2011 due to the Egyptian revolution and in 2013 due 

to U.S. concerns about the ouster of Morsi by the military. The outlook for this exercise therefore appears 

to be uncertain for the foreseeable future due primarily to U.S.-Egyptian differences over human rights as 

well as Egypt’s focus on suppressing a very serious 

insurgency within its borders. Nevertheless, in early 

August 2015, Kerry stated that the United States and 

Egypt were moving toward resuming Bright Star, although details about any progress in this effort have 

not been made public.218

While never directly presented overseas as a replacement for Bright Star, the Jordanian-based Exercise Eager Lion has been conducted for 5 consecutive 

years since 2011 (twice as often as Bright Star under its 

normal circumstances). Exercise Eager Lion has grown 

out of the earlier and smaller Exercise Infinite Moonlight, which began in 1996 and continued until the 
60

establishment of Eager Lion, with some interruptions 

because of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. This earlier bilateral exercise centered on the strong participation of 

the U.S. Marine Corps and focused primarily on Jordanian security rather than wider regional concerns. 

In the future, it will be possible for the conservative 

Arab states to expand their limited participation in 

Eager Lion exercises due to the uncertain status of the 

Egyptian-based Bright Star exercises. 

Eager Lion has an especially robust landpower 

component, which is important for U.S-Arab cooperation. In many Arab states, the army is the dominant 

service, and in all Arab countries, it is an important 

military service, so coordination with Arab ground 

forces will be especially important. In only a few 

wealthy Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, has the air 

force been more favored historically (primarily due to 

air force requirements for fewer human resources and 

a belief that armies rather than air forces can more effectively conduct anti-government coups). All of the 

Gulf States have small navies that function primarily 

as coastal defense forces, but U.S. Navy joint exercises 

with Arab navies are important due to the need to defend the numerous strategic waterways in the region. 

They will probably never involve the level of U.S.-Arab coordination and cooperation as exercises involving landpower, although the large joint U.S. military 

presence is vital for the defense of the region.219

Many observers believe Eager Lion also sends a 

message of solidarity with Jordan at a time of immense 

concern over Syria and Iraq. The message might have 

been reinforced by the U.S. decision to leave a Patriot 

missile battery and a limited number of F-16 fighter 

aircraft behind for use in future exercises.220 Since Eager Lion 2013, about 700-900 U.S. Army and Air Force 
61

personnel remained in Jordan to support these systems, along with around 100 soldiers stationed there 

throughout the year as a forward headquarters of the 

1st Armored Division.221 Although Jordan is not a Gulf 

State, it is an Arab monarchy which works extremely 

closely with both the Gulf Arabs and the United States 

on regional security matters. Ongoing Gulf participation in large multinational Eager Lion exercises may 

send an additional important message of U.S.-Gulf 

solidarity. The Gulf States are also involved in numerous smaller bilateral exercises with the United 

States within their own territory as well as the GCC’s 

Peninsula Shield exercises.222

The Importance of Regionally Aligned Forces.

In addition to military exercises, such as Eager 

Lion, one potentially effective way of improving U.S. 

landpower coordination with its Arab allies is through 

Regionally Aligned Forces (RAFs). RAFs units are a 

U.S. Army initiative based on the lessons of the Iraq 

and Afghanistan wars as well as earlier efforts to prepare U.S. Army units to fight in various regions. Aspects of the RAFs initiative are still undergoing evaluation and may be subject to ongoing modification over 

time. The concept involves U.S. Army maneuver combat units and their support forces being focused on a 

specific Geographic Combatant Command region as 

part of their normal training program.223 This concept 

was initially tested with a program to prepare the first 

such brigade for service with Africa Command, where 

it was successful enough to be considered a model 

for the Army component of the other Geographic 

Combatant Commands. 
62

RAFs units are expected to incorporate militarily 

useful information about the regions on which they 

are focused into planning and training. This approach 

is partially enabled through interaction with their 

counterparts from friendly regional countries. These 

units are expected to receive cultural training and language familiarization for the areas where they might 

be required to operate. By working more closely with 

regional militaries on a recurring basis, U.S. personnel are expected to interface quickly and effectively 

with their counterparts during an escalating crisis. 

Ideally, the soldiers of each nation will gain a working knowledge of the other states’ Standard Operating 

Procedures (SOPs) and establish good working relationships with their counterparts in partner military 

forces. Additionally, the U.S. Army and partner militaries seek to establish a common understanding of 

key military considerations that would enhance their 

ability to train and fight effectively together. Cooperation with local forces also has been strongly enhanced 

by the presence of numerous officers from allied nations who have received training and military education in the United States. An additional advantage is 

that English is widely spoken by officers in most Gulf 

militaries and some other militaries (such as that of 

Jordan) within the larger Middle East.

A central idea of the RAFs is that by gaining an 

enhanced understanding of the area, these units will 

avoid a “cold start” in actual military operations and 

identify avoidable mistakes in coordination, communications, and planning early in the process.224 The 

projected reduction in U.S. Army division, corps, 

and Army Service Component Command staffs by 25 

percent will make such efficiencies especially important in future operations.225 Subjects of military utility 
63

include cultures and subcultures (including ethnic 

and religious minorities); rural and urban geography 

(especially infrastructure); relevant languages; and the 

organization, doctrine, and effectiveness of partner 

militaries. The expense of such programs is somewhat 

mitigated by the fact that not every maneuver combat 

unit needs to be aligned with a Geographic Combat 

Command, but even limited expertise could be useful.226 General Raymond Odierno’s political advisor in 

Iraq, Emma Sky, has provided some insight on this 

problem, noting that U.S. forces entered the country 

with a deeply oversimplified view of the potential for 

conflict in Iraq once Saddam had been removed. In 

general terms, she felt that too many officers simply 

assumed that the only serious potential for violence 

was fighting between die-hard Baathists and newly 

liberated Iraqis. Sky maintains that U.S. military forces were slow in understanding the ethnic and sectarian problems that might arise from other sources such 

as intensified conflict between the Sunni and Kurdish 

populations, the area in which she was stationed early 

in the war.227 A greater awareness of these types of 

problems could be especially useful during any future 

rapidly evolving conflict that includes U.S. military 

participation.

A potential problem with RAFs is the difficulty and 

expense of soldiers gaining reasonable proficiency in 

some skills associated with the concept. Gaining an 

in-depth cultural knowledge of the region including 

key differences between various sub-cultures is often 

difficult, but even a limited amount of knowledge 

on such subjects can be useful if the limited scope of 

this knowledge is fully understood. In contrast, language proficiency is almost always the most difficult 

of RAFs-related skills to master, often being expensive 
64

and time consuming.228 Even a basic proficiency in 

Arabic or other Middle Eastern languages can never 

be gained in the pre-deployment courses of 8 or 16 

weeks, since these languages are extraordinarily difficult for Westerners to learn. Soldiers encountering unfamiliar local dialects would also have serious problems in communicating, even if they have been given 

more comprehensive language study. A further problem is that much of the language training is not maintained for soldiers that are rotated back to the United 

States and then redeployed at a later date.229 Noting 

these shortcomings, there is still value in providing 

language familiarization to soldiers, but the limitation 

of this effort is important to understand. Basic words 

and phrases can sometimes be of considerably more 

value than knowing nothing about a language. Additionally, in many cultures and often in the Middle 

East, local people seem to genuinely appreciate efforts by U.S. personnel to use their language. Under 

these circumstances, language familiarization remains 

important to RAF units. 

Cultural and linguistic knowledge also has value 

for other reasons than warfighting. Often U.S. military 

forces extensively interact with civilian populations as 

part of both warfighting and in a post-conflict environment. Sometimes they are asked to work with civilians 

to a much greater extent than they ever expected, such 

as in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. At 

this time, many U.S. officers believed that their forces 

would be replaced or at least supplemented by what 

Sky and her associates were told would be “a rapidly 

deployable team of experts with resources and readymade systems.”230 The shorthand for this concept was 

“government in a box,” which never came, despite the 

promises given to the U.S. military about nongovern-
65

mental organizations and other forms of civilian support. These people, not the military, were expected 

to address the majority of problems involving nonsecurity issues with the civilian population. Sky sarcastically describes the entire concept as a “mythical” 

rather than a “magical” concept, much to the disappointment of many soldiers, who saw such activities 

as completely different from their primary mission of 

warfighting.231

Currently, some of the aspects of the RAFs concept 

are being addressed in meaningful ways by large and 

important units. The 1st Armored Division, based in 

Fort Bliss, Texas, has been aligned with U.S. Central 

Command (CENTCOM) and has played an important role in the Eager Lion exercises previously discussed.232 During various Eager Lion exercises, the 

1st Armored Division provided the bulk of the U.S. 

Army ground forces assigned to the exercise. As part 

of the alignment with CENTCOM, 1st Armored Division has assisted the Jordanians with integrated missile defense, humanitarian assistance, and disaster 

relief.233 A strong working relationship with Jordan is 

particularly useful since forces operating out of this 

country can move into the Gulf area quickly if they 

are needed. The presence of such forces at times of 

crisis in the Gulf could be a restraining influence on 

potential aggressors. Adding to these advantages, the 

King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center 

(KASOTC), about 20 kilometers northeast of Amman, 

has also been proven to be an excellent command and 

control site for combined U.S.-Jordanian operations.234
66

The Challenges of Building Partner Capacity 

and Sharing the Lessons of Counterinsurgency. 

The concept of building partner capacity has undergone serious setbacks in mid-2014 due to the catastrophic military problems suffered by both the Iraqi 

and Yemeni armies at that time. The United States had 

strong train and equip programs for each of these countries in the past, and the program for Yemen was ongoing when the Yemeni military fragmented in September 2014.235 Additionally, harsher critics maintain that 

the Iraqi Army is too corrupt to assume the challenges 

of a serious military force, pointing to such problems 

as officer kickbacks and “ghost soldiers,” who receive 

salaries (usually pocketed by their officers) and have 

their names on personnel rosters but do not serve in 

units.236 There is also the question of how much can be 

accomplished by training foreign soldiers serving in 

countries with corrupt civilian and military elites. In 

a forceful statement on this problem, former Deputy 

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) John 

McLaughlin said, “People don’t fight because they’ve 

been trained; they fight because they believe in something. At present, the biggest believers in the region 

are with the Islamic State.”237 These problems indicate 

that train and equip programs, while important, will 

not work well in instances where governments are 

widely viewed as illegitimate by significant elements 

of their population and officer corps are involved in 

excessive corruption. 

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have reinforced 

the understanding that counterinsurgencies often can 

take years, if not decades, to resolve. These operations 

require time, public patience, and significant numbers 

of troops trained in counterinsurgency tactics. These 
67

troops optimally should be provided by the government rather than an outside power. Air and naval 

forces can play important supporting roles in counterinsurgencies, but ground forces almost always have 

to take the lead. Armed drones have also played an 

important role in countries such as Yemen, but strike 

weapons can only address certain aspects of the insurgent problem. They can kill insurgents but cannot 

reassert government authority in contested areas. It 

is therefore important that U.S. Army forces continue 

to provide practical advice and assistance to friendly 

nations, while maintaining as light a footprint as possible in those countries where military reform is possible and enabled by political reform.238

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps learned a great 

deal during the fighting in Iraq that may be useful for 

addressing other Middle Eastern insurgencies. While 

no two conflicts are alike, it is possible that some could 

have value in addressing the insurgencies that currently exist in a number of Middle Eastern countries 

including U.S. allies such as Egypt and Yemen. GCC 

states also view both of these insurgencies as dangerous, but they are most clearly focused on the future of 

Yemen.239 Currently, the GCC states, especially Saudi 

Arabia, are more focused on removing the Houthis 

from power, which they view as a prerequisite for 

moving against AQAP. Although AQAP was defeated and lost overt control of the contested territory in 

2012, it remained a strong terrorist and insurgent force 

and never gave up on the idea of creating an al-Qaeda 

emirate in southern Yemen, which could become a 

threat to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.240 The 

2015 capture of the city of Mukallah, discussed earlier, 

is clearly an effort in that direction. In the long term, 

AQAP can probably only be eradicated by a reformed 
68

Yemeni army that fights effectively and avoids largescale corruption. Moreover, Yemeni troops that are 

inadequately trained for counterinsurgency can take 

significant casualties and make serious mistakes that 

harm the struggle against AQAP. Fortunately, at least 

some Yemeni senior officers are also deeply committed to improving the quality of the force.241

The Iraqi government faces a hybrid war which 

involves significant elements of conventional and insurgent warfare. Sectarian hatreds are also a powerful 

component of this war. IS is directing acts of terrorism 

against government facilities and institutions as well 

as Shi’ite citizens in partial response to Sunni grievances but also to advance the IS agenda. The U.S. leadership will therefore have to make decisions on how 

to help the Iraqi government with advice and military 

equipment, while pushing it to be more inclusive and 

less corrupt.242 A key to any successful counterinsurgency is to place distance between the insurgents and 

the population where they operate. The Iraqi government cannot do this if it only serves the interest of its 

Shi’ite citizens. U.S. Army training and other support 

correspondingly must be closely linked to political reform, but military aid is vital and optimally effective 

once the Iraqi government moves forward in a serious 

effort at reform and Sunni inclusion.

Some important lessons of the Iraq War that may 

be of the most interest to local forces are tactical. This 

conflict involved a great deal of trial and error efforts 

by deployed troops, who, over time, developed new 

forms of “best practices” for the conduct of counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. In an excellent study of these issues, James A. Russell of the 

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School notes that, in these 

circumstances, doctrine is only a general guide, and 
69

that the operational environment ultimately has a 

tremendous impact on mission requirements.243 U.S. 

troops also encountered relatively unexpected problems that they found limited and more comprehensive 

solutions for over time. New tactics, techniques, and 

procedures were developed as well as new and more 

flexible SOPs.244 In one especially interesting insight, 

Russell notes that random searches of houses were 

regarded by the Iraqis as harassment, and this problem hurt U.S. military relations with the population. 

In Ramadi, however, patrol leaders came up with a 

highly innovative solution whereby affected citizens 

were provided with gifts of small toys, candy, and 

several two-pound bags of sugar to help reduce the 

anger over such visits.245

Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and 

Counterterrorism Support.

Intelligence support is one of the forms of U.S. assistance that is most often requested by Arab states.246

Many Arab leaders consider U.S. intelligence information both useful and a sufficiently low profile form of 

cooperation that will not usually excite nationalist anger. Such support is especially helpful in dealing with 

insurgent groups such as IS and Yemen’s Houthis 

which can field large military formations. Some Arab 

countries such as Jordan have excellent intelligence 

organizations, but they also have little choice except 

to rely heavily on the use of human agents. The gap in 

their capabilities usually involves the technical intelligence gathering that the United States is often considered to do very well. Arab governments concerned 

about foreign-sponsored subversion and terrorism often view efficient intelligence organizations as vital to 
70

their well-being and perhaps even survival. While the 

use of armed drones against terrorists tends to dominate headlines, unarmed drones are also an important 

source of military intelligence for the United States 

and its allies and may be particularly useful in counterinsurgency actions. According to the Defense News, 

the United States was flying about 50 intelligence 

gathering drone missions a day over Iraq in July 2014 

in the aftermath of the seizure of northern Iraq by IS.247

The United States can also provide technical support to allied militaries including helping to protect 

friendly command and control systems and the provision of cyber security technologies. Apart from battlefield counterintelligence, many Arab states are also 

deeply concerned about IS, al-Qaeda, and other radical 

cells operating within the civilian population of their 

countries. These allies seek U.S. support and information sharing to deal with internal terrorist activity. The 

problem became exceptionally serious in instances 

where powerful al-Qaeda affiliates have sprung up as 

a side effect of the Syrian civil war. Al-Nusra and the 

Islamic State are difficult to classify as pure terrorism 

and guerrilla warfare organizations since they also 

practice conventional warfare. Correspondingly, the 

Gulf States have also openly worried about “sleeper 

cells” in their countries that either serve al-Qaeda and 

its allies or those that might carry out acts of terrorism on the orders of Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah.248

Many states are also interested in U.S. technical help 

in securing their borders from terrorist infiltration.249

The potential problem here is that U.S. officials want 

to help these nations defeat terrorists, but they also 

have to be careful to ensure that such intelligence is 

not misused to strike at legitimate political opposition forces or groups targeted for ethnic or sectarian 

reasons. 
71

Air and Missile Defense.

Many Arab states, especially those of the GCC, are 

concerned about the extensive and formidable Iranian 

surface-to-surface missile program.250 U.S. defense officials have stated that the United States is aware of 

the Gulf States’ anxieties about Iranian missiles and 

that the United States is determined to support them 

in building a coordinated missile defense capability.251

The most important components of this layered defense are the Patriot air and missile defense system 

and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system 

(THAAD). Many partner countries within the region 

already have Patriot systems and have or are now 

acquiring PAC-3 anti-missile capabilities for those 

systems. The United States has also rapidly moved 

to increase the sale of PAC-3 missiles to Saudi Arabia 

following the conclusion of the JCPOA with Iran and 

support to other GCC nations is expected to increase 

as well.252 The UAE has made THAAD purchases and 

delivery is expected to begin in late-2015.253 Saudi Arabia and Qatar are also expected to purchase THAAD 

systems.254 With so much at stake, these states are 

tremendously interested in working with the United 

States on missile defense. 

Surface-to-surface missiles (such as Scuds) have 

been used extensively in some Middle Eastern wars, 

although they have never been employed with unconventional (chemical, biological, or nuclear) warheads. 

In the Gulf area, conflicts involving surface-to-surface 

missiles include attacks made by both sides during the 

Iran-Iraq war and missile strikes against Saudi targets 

during Operation DESERT STORM.255 Saddam Hussein also reached outside of the Gulf area and fired 39 

extended range Scud missiles at Israel during the 1991 
72

conflict, although there were very few Israeli casualties. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Scud missiles were 

used by secessionist forces in Yemen during the 1994 

civil war, and there have been some reports of Syrian 

government forces occasionally firing Scuds at rebel 

forces early in Syria’s civil war.256 One Scud missile 

was apparently fired at Saudi Arabia by Houthi forces 

in 2015 but was then believed to have been shot down 

by a Saudi Patriot missile. Iran also has an extensive 

program of missile development that is much more 

sophisticated than the Scuds used in various Middle 

Eastern wars. Iran is a large country, and many of 

Iran’s longer range missiles can be located in remote 

parts of the country and still strike the Gulf Arab countries and would be much more difficult to reach and 

target with airpower than the shorter range Scuds.

Friendly Gulf military forces are extremely interested in additional systems to defend their airspace 

against air and missile strikes because of the significant 

resources that Iran has applied to its ballistic missile 

program and the fear that Iranian missiles will eventually be armed with unconventional warheads.257 In 

any scenario where Iranian missiles are fired at a Gulf 

State, one might reasonably expect that U.S. and Gulf 

air forces will seek to destroy as many of these systems 

on the ground as possible. Such actions are indispensable, but there are continuing questions about how 

long this will take. The last U.S. war against an enemy 

which was well-armed with missiles occurred in 1991 

in Iraq. At that time, Saddam Hussein’s forces were 

able to fire a number of Scuds and modified Scuds at 

coalition military forces and Israel despite a substantial air campaign to destroy these assets. 
73

The United States has sometimes pushed the GCC 

states to consider ways of improving the level of integration of their missile defense systems. Hagel served 

as the driving force behind a 2013 initiative allowing 

the GCC to purchase missile defense systems as a bloc, 

and then integrate their radars, sensors, and early 

warning systems.258 This approach did not go forward 

due to distrust among individual GCC members. Nevertheless, such efforts cannot be abandoned if these 

countries are to optimize their defense. Moreover, a 

truly integrated missile defense program will require 

a high level of agreement among members about such 

issues as rules of engagement and coordination. Leading U.S. defense expert Anthony H. Cordesman notes 

that “You have to work out the entire engagement 

structure before the first missile is ever launched.”259

Conclusions.

1. U.S. leaders need to be aware that Arab attitudes on their military ties with the United States 

have changed since the 2003-11 Iraq War. While 

many Arabs formerly believed U.S. policies into the 

Middle East were too intrusive into their region, this 

attitude is now less prevalent. Rather, many friendly 

Arab leaders believe that the United States is no longer 

as interested in strong military links to their countries 

due to its experiences with war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Arab states need to be reassured by both words 

and actions that any new defense emphasis on Asia or 

elsewhere is not to be conducted at their expense. 

2. The United States must be aware of the increased concerns that Saudi Arabia and other Arab 

states have about Iran. Saudi Arabia and various 
74

other Arab states detested Saddam Hussein but had 

always hoped that he would be replaced by a friendly 

Sunni strongman. The Saudis were not interested in 

either a democratic Iraq or a Shi’ite-dominated Iraq. 

Now Saudi leaders feel that Iraq has ceased to be a 

bulwark against Iran and is instead a quasi-ally of Iran. 

This development represents a significant change in 

the balance of power which the Saudis and some of 

their Arab allies believe is being played out in a more 

aggressive foreign policy, including Iranian assertiveness on Bahrain and Yemen as well as Iraq. While 

some of these concerns sound excessive to Western 

ears, they are very real to many Arabs and must be 

treated with respect. Nevertheless, if U.S. relations 

with Iran improve dramatically (which is doubtful in 

the short term), then that development will probably 

result from conditions that will also allow for Arab 

states to improve their relations with Iran.

3. Closely related to the previous point, the United States must continue to emphasize that any improvement in relations with Iran will not come at the 

expense of other Middle Eastern allies. A dramatic 

improvement in such relations remains uncertain and 

the question of Iranian nuclear development is still 

unclear. If the JCPOA negotiated by the P5+1 is successful, then questions will arise over how the global 

community will interact with Iran in the future. Under no circumstances should the United States appear 

to support an Iranian position of dominance in the 

region, but it should also be willing to improve relations with Iran if the regime backs away from some of 

its most repugnant policies. A key point here is that 

the GCC states, Jordan, and even Egypt will continue 

to depend upon the United States, and, to a lesser
75

extent, the UK, to keep their militaries operational. 

Limited and symbolic acts of cooperation with other 

suppliers such as France and Russia can do little to 

change this reality. The United States must therefore 

carefully discuss its plans for future polices on Iran 

with these states, but it cannot give them a veto over 

U.S. policy initiatives. 

4. The United States must continue arms sales to 

friendly Arab states concerned about Iran, but cannot assume that relations will be harmonious because of these sales. Arab states buy military equipment from the United States both to modernize their 

military forces and to consolidate relations with the 

United States. If UN and other restrictions on arms 

sales to Iran are eventually lifted as envisioned in the 

Iranian nuclear agreement or if loopholes develop in 

the future, these states will need more support. 

5. The Strategy of “train and equip” or “arm and 

train” for Arab allies needs to be retained but cannot be treated as a panacea for Middle East security 

problems. Instead, it must be used in specific situations where the United States objectively assesses 

foreign soldiers to be both trainable and motivated. 

After setbacks in Iraq and Yemen, it is now clear that 

unmotivated officers and soldiers sometimes permeate allied militaries and cannot be depended upon to 

fight regardless of how much effort is dedicated to 

providing them with modern weapons and training. 

To make matters worse, such soldiers may repeat the 

2014 Mosul example and abandon massive amounts 

of weapons and equipment to enemy forces. In future 

scenarios, friendly forces receiving such training must 

be evaluated continuously and honestly regarding 
76

their levels of motivation, and this information must 

be collated and passed on to senior military leaders. U.S. officials must make assessments of friendly 

troops’ vulnerabilities to enemy psychological warfare and the ways in which national government graft 

and corruption filter into the military and cause a 

breakdown of government legitimacy. It needs to be 

well understood that a national military is usually 

no better than the government it is asked to defend 

and efforts at government reform must be pressed. 

The alternative to this approach cannot be allowed to 

become having U.S. forces fight the battles for these 

troops and leave dysfunctional, unreformed militaries 

in place. The United States should be willing to play a 

supporting military role in helping regional allies and 

not attempt to Americanize every conflict. 

6. Closely related to the point noted previously, 

the United States must recognize that buying time 

for threatened regimes through airpower or drones 

can only be successful if the time is used well as an 

opportunity to raise the warfighting capabilities of 

the militaries (especially the ground forces) of the 

country under siege and improve the quality of government to give soldiers something for which to fight. 

Otherwise, you may be simply postponing the inevitable collapse of a weak and often illegitimate government with a military that cannot defend it. All Middle 

Eastern states do not have to evolve into Western-style 

democracies, but many need to reduce dysfunctional 

levels of corruption and begin to provide some basic 

fairness in the political process and the administration of justice. Drone strikes, including “decapitation 

strikes” that kill terrorist leaders, can create setbacks 

for the organizations challenging weak governments, 
77

but new leaders will always be found to replace them. 

Drones, by themselves, do not win wars.

7. The United States and its allies may have to accept some limited tacit cooperation with the Assad 

regime in Syria in order to destroy or at least weaken 

IS in that country. This is not an easy recommendation 

to make or to follow. The Assad regime is responsible 

for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Syrians 

and has conducted warfare against civilians as well 

as anti-regime fighters. One of the only virtues that 

the Assad regime possesses is that IS is worse. The 

Egyptians and more recently the Jordanians seem to 

understand this situation. The GCC states may come 

to this conclusion eventually since IS is a direct threat 

to them and Assad is not. This tacit cooperation could 

involve such steps as more coalition efforts to bomb 

assembly areas for jihadists preparing to strike regime 

strongholds. In the highly unlikely event that Syrian 

moderates can be propped up to the point that they 

become a serious force in the war, this may allow the 

United States and its Arab allies more options. Nevertheless, Syrian moderates (except for Syrian Kurds) 

are not a force in that country now, and it is increasingly difficult to generate any reality-based scenario 

of how they might come to power. The United States 

may, nevertheless, have to continue supporting Syrian 

moderate fighters for political reasons to help prove 

that the United States is not biased against Sunni Arabs eventually taking power in Syria by ousting the 

Alawite-led regime. 

8. The United States needs to support a fair and 

timely settlement of the crisis in Yemen. A Yemen 

in chaos is not in the interests of the United States, 
78

and the U.S. military needs to be able to return to the 

mission of helping the Yemeni military, or at least 

their elite forces, deal with threats such as AQAP 

and IS, not the Houthis. The Houthi coup, backed by 

ex-President Saleh, was unwise and has led to terrible 

consequences. Nevertheless, not all Houthi claims are 

illegitimate, and giving them a more equitable stake 

in the Yemeni future is a good idea. In particular, 

Houthis in their home province of Saada should not 

be subject to excessive harassment by Salafi missionaries or militias, and they should receive a fair share of 

development aid. It is true that the Houthis are receiving aid, including military aid, from the Iranians, but 

at the present time they see that as their only option 

for a tolerable future in Yemen. A political solution 

therefore appears possible. Additionally, if the war in 

Yemen continues to drag on, it is imperative for the 

United States to continue stressing the need to get humanitarian relief to that country. 

9. To the extent possible, the United States should 

retain a strong intelligence gathering where friendly 

governments may be threatened. This is the form of 

support that these regimes most often support. Nevertheless, U.S. military intelligence personnel need to 

be aware that some technology and training used for 

counterterrorism can also be used for suppressing legitimate dissent. If U.S. support is being misused, this 

problem needs to be quickly and clearly conveyed to 

senior military leaders who must then pass it on to the 

U.S. civilian leadership. 

10. The U.S. military leadership must continue to 

emphasize a vigorous military exercise program. Organizing the timing, scope, and mix of forces for these 
79

exercises can be calibrated to meet regional threats 

while showing appropriate respect for the equality and sovereignty of U.S. partners in the region. 

Eager Lion is clearly a major success and should be 

continued.

11. The U.S. Army should continue to emphasize 

the value of RAFs. In the face of growing threats, 

many partner nations are almost certain to welcome 

U.S. support in providing RAFs acting in multilateral 

exercises to help improve their military performance 

in such skills as air and missile defense, chemical and 

biological protection, counterinsurgency operations, 

intelligence, and other important aspects of multilateral military cooperation.

12. Military forces (including RAFs) working 

with Middle Eastern and Gulf militaries will need 

to be properly supported with personnel, material 

resources, and funding for the ongoing training with 

counterpart militaries. If these units receive fewer resources than units aligned to the Pacific, this will be 

noticed by both Gulf allies and potential adversaries. 

The U.S. Government emphasis on the Pacific is important but cannot be allowed to seriously weaken 

other commands or bring our commitment to key allies into question. 

13. The United States must continue to support 

missile defense by those nations that feel most 

threatened by Iran. This is another central concern to 

GCC states and must be treated as a key priority for 

both symbolic and military purposes. 
80

ENDNOTES

1. See, for example, Daniel C. Kurter, Scott B. Lasensky, William B. Quandt, Steven L. Speigel, and Shelby Telhami, The Peace 

Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989-2011, Ithaca, 

NY: Cornell University Press, 2013. 

2. For an overview of past Presidential priorities and policies 

toward the Middle East, see Patrick Tyler, A World of Trouble: The 

White House and the Middle East from the Cold War to the War on 

Terror, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009. 

3. Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Remarks by 

the President on the Middle East and North Africa,” Washington, DC: The White House, May 19, 2011, available from www.

whitehouse.gov, accessed March 1, 2013. In this speech, Obama also 

spoke about the advancement of democracy and human rights 

but did not explicitly name them as core interests.

4. Lalit K. Jha, “Gulf Region Remains Important for US 

Interest: Dempsey,” Press Trust of India, March 19, 2013. 

5. “The Economics of shale oil,” Economist, February 15, 

2014, p. 23.

6. On the importance of Gulf Oil exports for the world economy and the requirement for military forces to prevent the disruption of their export during certain scenarios, see Kenneth 

Katzman, et al., Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz, Washington 

DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012, pp. 13-15; David Crist, 

The Twilight War: America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran, New 

York: Penguin Press, 2012, pp. 569-570; Mohammed El-Katiri, The 

Future of the Arab Gulf Monarchies in the Age of Uncertainties, Carlisle, PA; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 

2013, pp. 28-30.

7. “Putin’s Targeted Strike: Russia in the Middle East,” The 

Economist, April 18, 2015, p. 41; David E. Sanger, “Role for Russia 

Gives Iran Talks a Possible Boost,” The New York Times, November 

4, 2014.
81

8. “Saudi Arabia seeks strategic Chinese Partnership,” Arab 

News, Saudi Arabia, March 15, 2014.

9. China has sought limited military-to-military cooperation 

with Iran, but this is still done at a low-key level. See “China seeks 

closer military ties with Iran,” Gulf Today, Sharjah, United Arab 

Emirates (UAE), October 24, 2014.

10. Sanjeev Miglani, “India clears $8 billion warships project 

to counter Chinese navy,” Reuters, February 18, 2015.

11. “China Sends new anti-piracy mission to Gulf of Aden,” 

Daily Star, Beirut, Lebanon, April 3, 2015; Juliet Eilperin, “U.S., 

Philippines to sign 10-year defense agreement amid rising 

tensions,” The Washington Post, April 27, 2014.

12. Kenneth M. Pollack, Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb and American Strategy, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013, p. 272.

13. “Iraq war ‘will be short’,” BBC News: World Edition, 

November 15, 2002.

14. Stephen Peter Rosen, “The National Security Generation 

Gap: Young Americans have become skeptical about the use of 

U.S. power abroad,” The Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2014.

15. Greg Jaffe, “In one of final addresses to Army, Gates 

Describes vision for military’s future,” The Washington Post, 

February 25, 2011.

16. David Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars 

and the Surprising Use of American Power, New York: Crown 

Publishers, 2012, p. 421.

17. “FULL TRANSCRIPT: Obama’s 2014 State of the Union 

Address,” The Washington Post, January 28, 2014. 

18. Chris Lawrence, Jill Dougherty, and Tom Cohen, “Hagel: 

‘We’re ready to go’ if ordered on Syria Chemical Weapons,” CNN.

com, August 28, 2013; Megan Thee-Brenan, “Poll Shows Isolationist Streak in Americans,” The New York Times, May 1, 2013.
82

19. “Growing Support for Campaign Against ISIS—and Possible Use of U.S. Ground Troops,” Pew Research Center, February 

24, 2015, available from www.people-press.org; Eric Planin, “Most 

Americans Want Obama to Send Ground Troops to Battle ISIS,” 

Fiscal Times, March 4, 2015. 

20. Anthony H. Cordesman, Securing the Gulf: Key Threats and 

Options for Enhanced Cooperation, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 19, 2013, pp. iii, 1-3.

21. W. Andrew Terrill, “Iran’s Strategy for Saving Asad,” 

Middle East Journal, Vol. 69; No. 2, Spring 2015, p. 228.

22. “Lebanon Army vows to fight ‘terror’ after troops killed,” 

Arab News, March 30, 2014.

23. “Saudi Arabia, Egypt deny rift over Assad’s rule in Syria,” 

Khaleej Times, Dubai, UAE, June 1, 2015.

24. “Kuwait Backs Iraq in fight against ISIL-Min,” Kuwait 

News Agency, June 3, 2015.

25. Steven Erlanger, “Saudi Prince Criticizes Obama Administration, Citing Indecision in Mideast,” The New York Times, 

December 15, 2013.

26. “U.S. opposes supply of shoulder-fired missiles to Syrian 

rebels,” Daily Star, February 18, 2014; “Saudi-Qatari rivalry, depot 

raid blamed for FSA reshuffle,” Daily Star, February 18, 2014.

27. Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “Islamists Seize Control 

of Syrian City in Northwest,” The New York Times, April 25, 2015. 

28. Carol J. Williams, “US-Saudi Rift papered over by Kerry 

Visit,” Los Angeles Times, November 4, 2014.

29. Aaron Blake, “Kerry: Military Action in Syria would be 

‘unbelievably small’,” The Washington Post, September 9, 2013. 

30. Michael B. Oren, Ally: My Journey Across the AmericanIsraeli Divide, New York: Random House, 2015, pp. 344-345. 
83

31. Awad Mustafa, “Saudi Arabia’s Aid to Lebanon Presents 

Challenge for Iran,” Defense News, January 6, 2014. 

32. Nicholas Blanford, “Saudi Arabia promises record $3 billion in military aid to Lebanon,” The Christian Science Monitor, 

December 30, 2013.

33. “Arms shipments to begin in April: France,” Daily Star, 

February 26, 2015.

34. Hussein Dakroub, “French arms boost anti-terror fight,” 

Daily Star, April 20, 2015; Mazin Sidahmed, “French weapons receive red carpet treatment at airport,” Daily Star, April 21, 2015.

35. “Feeling US Snub, Saudis Strengthen Ties Elsewhere,” 

Jordan Times, December 29, 2013.

36. Pollack, p. 150.

37. See remarks by Qatar’s emir in “Fight against IS ‘will fail 

if Assad stays,’” Arab News, September 27, 2014.

38. Awad Mustafa, “UAE Stiffens Counterterrorism Laws,” 

Defense News, July 28, 2014; Associated Press, “Saudi Arabia: Decrees Lay Out Penalties for Fighting Abroad,” The New York Times, 

February 4, 2014. 

39. “UAE, concerned about militant Islam, passes law against 

race, faith hate,” Daily Star, July 7, 2015. 

40. Greg Miller, “Fighters are still flocking to Syria,” The 

Washington Post, October 31, 2014.

41. Loveday Morris and Rebecca Collard, “U.S. Airstrikes run 

risk of Helping Syria’s Assad,” The Washington Post, September 

24, 2014. 

42. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Syrian Fighters to fill only a 

defensive role,” The Washington Post, October 23, 2014.

43. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “First Syrians trained by U.S. 

return to country,” The Washington Post, July 16, 2015; W. J. 
84

Hennigan and Patrick J. McDonnell, “$500-million program to 

train anti-Islamic State fighters appears stalled,” The Los Angeles 

Times, May 4, 2015.

44. “Fight against IS ‘will fail if Assad stays’,” Arab News, September 27, 2014. “Miteb: Remove Syrian regime to eradicate IS,” 

Arab News, November 29, 2014.

45. “US security adviser: US committed to political transition 

in Syria,” Daily Star, March 24, 2015.

46. Taylor Luck, “Syria Crisis: Spooked by rebel gains, Jordan doubles down on Islamic State,” The Christian Science Monitor, 

May 4, 2015.

47. Phillip Smith, “From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi 

Fighters in Syria’s Shi’a Militias,” West Point Counterterrorism 

Center Sentinel, August 27, 2013, p. 8.

48. Phil Sands, Justin Vela, and Taimur Khan, “Saudi Prince 

Bandar promised a victory he could not deliver,” The National 

(UAE), April 16, 2014.

49. “KSA ‘Does Not Fund or Support IS Murderers’,” Arab 

News, August 30, 2014.

50. Liz Sly, “Assad’s hold on power looks shakier than ever 

as rebels advance in Syria,” The Washington Post, April 26, 2015.

51. “Saudi Arabia Warns of Civil War in Iraq,” Khaleej Times, 

June 18, 2014.

52. Agency France-Presse (AFP), “Renewed violence as Iraq 

executes 12 ‘terrorists’,” Jordan Times, November 18, 2013; “Anbar Conflict May Spread, warns Iraqi VP al-Hashemi,” Arab News, 

January 30, 2014; W. G. Dunlop, “Engulfed in Uncertainty,” Gulf 

Today, December 18, 2013.

53. Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and the State, Brussels, Belgium: 

International Crisis Group (ICG), August 14, 2013, pp. 15-23.
85

54. “Saudi slams ‘irresponsible’ terror accusations by Iraq 

PM,” Daily Star, March 10, 2014.

55. Michael Knights, “The ISIL’s Stand in the Ramdi-Fallujah 

Corridor,” West Point Counter Terrorism Center Sentinel, May 2014, 

Vol. 7, Issue 5, p. 8.

56. Farnaz Fassihi, A. Ali Tamer, and El-Ghobashy, “Iraq 

Scrambles to Defend Baghdad—Iraq Says Forces Join Battle 

Against Advancing Sunni Insurgents Threatening Capital, Holy

 cities,” The Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2014.

57. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Key Factors Shaping the President’s Islamic State Speech,” Burke Chair Paper, September 9, 

2014, pp. 1-3.

58. Thomas Erdbrink, “As Sunni Militants Threaten its allies in Baghdad, Iran weighs options,” The New York Times, June 

13, 2014.

59. AFP, “Jihadists fighting in Syria, Iraq declare ‘caliphate’,” 

Jordan Times, June 29, 2014.

60. Ann Barnard and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Arabs give Tepid 

Support to U.S. fight against ISIS,” The New York Times, September 

12, 2014, p. A-1. 

61. Anne Barnard, “Iraqi Drive Against ISIS Reveals Tensions 

with U.S.,” The New York Times, March 4, 2015.

62. “Saudi FM urges coalition to face ISIS challenge on the 

ground,” Daily Star, March 5, 2015.

63. “Iraq to stay out of Iran-Saudi Conflicts: PM,” The Peninsula, June 1, 2015. 

64. Norman Cigar, Iraq’s Shia Warlords and Their Militias: Political and Security Challenges and Options, Carlisle, PA., Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2015, pp. 18-22.

65. Tim Arango, “A Proposal to arm Sunnis fuels talk of an 

American plot to divide Iraq,” The New York Times, May 1, 2015.
86

66. Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “Iraqi leader calls for help against 

IS,” Associated Press, April 14, 2015.

67. “KSA appoints ambassador to Baghdad after 25 years,” 

Arab News, April 15, 2015. 

68. “Egypt’s Sisi says independence for Iraq’s Kurds would be 

‘catastrophic’,” Jordan Times, July 6, 2014.

69. “Drawing in the neighbors: Syria’s conflict,” Economist, 

July 4, 2015, p. 39.

70. “109 Saudis among 135 held for abetting terror,” Arab 

News, December 8, 2014.

71. Ben Hubbard, “Middle East; Saudi Arabia: ISIS is linked to 

killings,” The New York Times, April 25, 2015.

72. “Saudi foils ISIS attack on US embassy, arrests 93,” Daily 

Star, April 28, 2015. 

73. Angus McDowall, “Riyadh fears ISIS wants sectarian war 

in kingdom,” Daily Star, November 19, 2014. 

74. Ben Hubbard, “Bomber is Identified in Attack in Kuwait,” 

The New York Times, June 29, 2015.

75. “ISIS claims Saudi Arabia mosque bombing,” Daily Star, 

May 29, 2015.

76. Ibid.

77. “ISIS affiliate hits Shiite mosque in Kuwait, killing 27 

people,” Daily Star, June 27, 2015. 

78. “Kuwait seeks death for 11 mosque bombing suspects,” 

Reuters, July 15, 2015. 

79. Angus McDowall, “Uncurbed sectarianism prompted 

village attack say Saudi Shiites,” Daily Star, November 6, 2014.
87

80. “Young Saudis warned: Beware of False Jihadis,” Arab 

News, February 5, 2014. 

81. Ben Hubbard, “Border Clash with Iraqis Kill Seven, 

Saudis Say,” The New York Times, January 6, 2015. 

82. “Saudi Arabia: al-Qaeda gunman involved in Iraq border 

attack,” Daily Star, January 12, 2015.

83. “Saudi Arabia to reopen embassy in Baghdad,” Arab News, 

September 14, 2014. 

84. “IS poses no threat to Kuwait: Interior Ministry,” Kuwait 

Times, January 14, 2015.

85. “Mosque suicide bomber was Saudi, says Riyadh,” Gulf 

Today, August 9, 2015.

86. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with 

Iran, New Haven, CT, and London, UK: Yale University Press, 

2012, pp. 16, 172, 211.

87. Loveday Morris, “Iraq hopes U.S.-Iran nuclear accord 

will put an end to its divided loyalties,” The Washington Post, July 

15, 2015.

88. “Iran’s Nuclear Deal will give Oman a lift,” Times of Oman, 

July 14, 2015.

89. Loveday Morris and Hugh Naylor, “Arab States fear 

‘dangerous’ Iranian nuclear deal will shake up the region,” The 

Washington Post, July 14, 2015.

90. Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, New 

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014, p. 185.

91. Ibid., p. 185. 

92. Ibid.

93. The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 

Arabia, and the UAE. 
88

94. Ali Noorani, “Saudi joins Israel as target of Jerusalem Day 

protests,” AFP, July 10, 2015.

95. “Iran willing to talk to UAE on Islands Row,” The Peninsula, May 8, 2013; “UAE denounces Iran lawmakers’ visit to 

islands,” Khaleej Times, May 7, 2013.

96. Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran Takes Charm Offensive to the 

Persian Gulf,” The New York Times, December 4, 2013.

97. “Arab League stresses UAE sovereignty over Iranian-occupied islands,” Khaleej Times, March 11, 2014; and “Arab Summit 

backing bolsters UAE aspirations,” Gulf Today, March 27, 2014.

98. Pollack, p. 88.

99. Cordesman, Securing the Gulf, p. 15.

100. “UN Arms Embargo on Iran,” Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, available from www.

SIPRI.org, October 11, 2012, accessed August 15, 2013.

101. Barbara Opall-Rome, Aaron Mehta, and Awad Mustafa, 

“Gulf Nations Eye Iran Acquisition of S-300,” Defense News, June 

1, 2015, p. 6. 

102. Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat to the Northern 

Gulf, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007, pp. 78-81. 

103. “U.S. Blames Iran for new bombs in Iraq,” USA Today, 

January 31, 2007; “IED attacks up in Afghanistan, down in Iraq,” 

Army Times, November 15, 2007.

104. Marlin Dick, “Iran general killed in failed Deraa attack,” Daily Star, April 22, 2015; W. Andrew Terrill, “Iran’s Strategy for Saving Asad,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 69, No. 2, Spring 

2015, pp. 230-231.

105. Cigar, pp. 23-26.
89

106. Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Plans Military Drills in Eastern 

Europe,” The New York Times, April 19, 2014.

107. “Kerry promises Arab allies: No grand bargain with 

Iran,” Daily Star, March 6, 2015.

108. AFP, “Britain to Reopen Embassy in Tehran,” Jordan 

Times, June 17, 2014.

109. Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran Takes Charm Offensive to the 

Persian Gulf,” The New York Times, December 4, 2013.

110. Al Jazeera, “Gulf States Hesitant about Iranian Overtures,” Gulf Research Center Newsletter, December 9, 2013.

111. Ibid.

112. Ben Hubbard, “Arab World Split over Iran Nuclear 

Deal,” The New York Times, July 14, 2015.

113. Mark Landler, “On Iran and Syria, Tests of Diplomacy 

Intertwine,” The New York Times, December 19, 2013.

114. Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran Agrees to Provide Data on Its 

Detonators,” The New York Times, February 10, 2014.

115. Bozorgmehr Sharafedin Nouri, “US Disturbed by Iranian 

leader’s criticism after deal,” Reuters, July 21, 2015.

116. “Iran’s role in Iraq could be positive: US general,” Daily 

Star, March 4, 2015.

117. “US sends aircraft carrier to help Iraq,” The Peninsula, 

June 15, 2014.

118. Loveday Morris, “Iraq sees good reason to embrace nuclear agreement,” The Washington Post, July 16, 2015. 

119. “Prince Turki: Gulf states ‘must balance threat from 

Iran’,” Arab News, April 24, 2014.
90

120. Fareed Zakaria, “Saudi Arabia’s Bluff,” The Washington 

Post, June 14, 2015.

121. Tim Craig, “Defying Saudis, Pakistani lawmakers vote to 

stay out of Yemen,” The Washington Post, April 10, 2015. 

122. “Survey: Saudis consider Iran their top enemy, not 

Israel,” Daily Star, June 4, 2015.

123. “The New Frenemies; Israel and Saudi Arabia,” Economist, July 13, 2015, p. 47.

124. Karin Laub, “Israel, Jordan discreetly foster ties amid 

regional chaos,” Daily Star, June 23, 2015. 

125. Michael Morell, The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s 

Fight against Terrorism from al Qa’ida to ISIS, New York: Twelve, 

2015, p. 185.

126. David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret 

Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, New York: Crown 

Publishers, 2012, pp. 302-303.

127. Ibid., p. 302. 

128. William C. Taylor, Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings 

and the Future of Civil Military Relations in the Middle East, New 

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 125.

129. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement, Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, UK: 

Princeton University Press, p. 264.

130. Gregory Aftandilian, Egypt’s New Regime and the Future 

of the U.S.-Egyptian Strategic Relationship, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013, p. 11.

131. Wickham, p. 264.

132. An Egyptian criminal court convicted Morsi of a number of crimes, including inciting violence, but acquitted him of 

premeditated murder. He must still stand trial on additional 
91

charges. He has been sentenced to 20 years in prison but could 

receive additional sentences. David D. Kirkpatrick and Thomas 

Merna, “Egyptian leader deposed by Army in ’13 gets 20 year 

prison term,” The New York Times, April 22, 2015. 

133. David D. Kirkpatrick and Thomas Merna, “Egyptian 

leader deposed by army in ’13 gets a 20-year prison term,” The 

New York Times, April 22, 2015. 

134. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Egyptian Court Confirms Death 

Penalty for Morsi,” The New York Times, June 17, 2015.

135. See comments on Egypt by Secretary of State Kerry to 

various Arab leaders in “Jordan, US call for cooperation to restore 

security in Iraq,” Jordan Times, June 22, 2014. 

136. Michael Georgy and Tom Perry, “Egypt’s Sisi says Muslim Brotherhood is finished,” Reuters, May 6, 2014; Hamza Hendawi, “Egypt’s el-Sisi: No Reconciliation with Islamists,” Daily 

Star, June 8, 2014.

137. “Leading anti-Mubarak activist sentenced to 15 years in 

jail,” Jordan Times, June 11, 2014.

138. “Gulf states give Egypt $6B in aid,” Daily Star, April 24, 

2015; “King Abdullah calls El-Sisi to pledge economic support,” 

Arab News, June 7, 2014.

139. David D. Kirkpatrick, “529 Egyptians Sentenced to Death 

in One killing,” The New York Times, March 25, 2004; AFP, “Egypt 

Court condemns 188 to death,” Jordan Times, December 2, 2014; 

“Egypt: Of Judges and generals,” Economist, March 29, 2014, p. 48.

140. Elliott Abrams, “A Pinochet in Egypt?” The Washington 

Post, April 26, 2015.

141. Associated Press, “Egypt moves to restrict Ramadan 

sermons,” Jordan Times, June 29, 2014. 

142. Ernesto Londono, “U.S. to partially resume military aid 

to Egypt,” The Washington Post, April 22, 2014. 
92

143. “Egypt president welcomes return of US military aid,” 

Daily Star, April 1, 2015.

144. Editorial Board, “Mixed Messages in Egypt’s Military 

Aid,” The New York Times, April 1, 2015.

145. Gregory Aftandilian, Assessing Egyptian Public Support 

for Security Crackdown in the Sinai, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008, p. 8.

146. Ibid., pp. 11-15.

147. Eric Schmitt, David D. Kirkpatrick, “Islamic State 

Sprouting Limbs Beyond its Base,” The New York Times, February 

15, 2015.

148. AFP, “Israel raises alarm over Sinai-Gaza cooperation,” 

Jordan Times, January 16, 2012.

149. Unproven rumors also exist that Morsi had established a 

truce with Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. See Aftandilian, Assessing Egyptian Public Support for Security Crackdown in the Sinai, pp. 9-10.

150. Yusri Mohamed, “Attacks in Egypt’s Sinai kill 33 security 

personnel,” Reuters, October 24, 2014.

151. Kareem Fahim, “Protest is Muted as Egypt Levels Border 

Area in Sinai,” The New York Times, October 31, 2014.

152. Ashraf Swellam and Brian Rohan, “Massive assault on 

Egypt army in Sinai kills 64 troops,” The Washington Post, July 

1, 2015.

153. Kristen Chick, “Ahmadinejad visits Cairo: How Sect 

tempers Islamist ties between Egypt, Iran,” The Christian Science 

Monitor, February 5, 2013,

154. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Egypt Launches Strike in Libya 

on ISIS Branch,” The New York Times, February 17, 2015.

155. Ibid.
93

156. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Islamic State Video Appears to 

Show Execution of Christians in Libya,” The New York Times, 

April 20, 2015.

157. Hassan Morajea; Erin Cunningham, “Militants fill void 

in Libya’s Civil War,” The Washington Post, June 7, 2015. 

158. Libya: Getting Geneva Right, Brussels, Belgium: ICG, 

February 2015, p. 9. 

159. David D. Kirkpatrick and Suliman Ali Zway, “Western 

Officials Alarmed by ISIS’ Advances in Libya,” The New York 

Times, June 1, 2015.

160. Ulf Laessing and Ayman al-Warfalli, “Expulsion from 

Derna May Show limits for ISIS in Libya,” Daily Star, July 25, 2015; 

“Libya Officials: Jihadis Driving IS from Eastern Stronghold,” The 

New York Times, July 30, 2015.

161. Dion Nissenbaum and Maria Abi-Habib, “Islamic State 

Sends Fighters to Libya,” The Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2015. 

162. “65 percent of Yemeni Voters Picks a New President,” 

Khaleej Times, February 25, 2012.

163. W. Andrew Terrill, “Drones Over Yemen: Military 

Benefits and Political Costs,” Parameters: US Army War College 

Quarterly, Winter/Spring 2013, pp. 17-23.

164. “Yemen President Vows to Pursue al-Qaeda-linked 

Militants,” Jordan Times, March 6, 2012.

165. Ellen Knickmeyer and Hakim Almasmari, “Attack on 

Military is a Blow to Yemen,” The Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2012. 

166. “Al Qaeda in Yemen on the Run as Military regains control Over 2 of its Strongholds,” The Washington Post, June 12, 2012; 

Also see “Yemen Tribes Denounce Threats to Saudi Security,” 

Saudi Gazette, January 6, 2010;

167 . Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, 

Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon, 

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010, pp. 89-96.
94

168. Ibid., especially Chap. 5.

169. Robert F. Worth, “Yemen Seems to Reject Cease-Fire with 

Rebels,” The New York Times, February 1, 2010.

170. W. Andrew Terrill, “Iranian Involvement in Yemen,” 

Orbis, Summer 2014, pp. 429-438.

171. Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Tensions Flare Between Allies in U.S. Coalition,” The New York Times, April 16, 2015.

172. Associated Press, “Thousands rally in Yemen over ended 

fuel subsidies,” The Washington Post, August 18, 2014. 

173. Roger Owen, The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life, 

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012, pp. 107-108. 

174. Ali Aboluhom, “Supporters of Ahmed Saleh call on him 

to run for President,” Yemen Times, March 11, 2015; Associated 

Press, “Yemen protesters demand return of former autocrat’s 

son,” The Washington Post, March 10, 2015.

175. AFP, “Shiite rebel seizure of Yemen a ‘gift’ for Tehran?” 

Jordan Times, September 25, 2014. 

176 . Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki, “UAE revokes Ahmed Ali 

Saleh’s Diplomatic Immunity,” Yemen Times, April 8, 2015.

177. “US says no plans to move embassy in Yemen to Aden,” 

Daily Star, March 3, 2015. 

178. “Iran’s nuclear deal puts Saudis on edge,” Reuters, July 

15, 2015.

179. Faisal J. Abbas, “Why Operation Decisive Storm was 

needed in Yemen,” Saudi Gazette, March 27, 2015.

180. Katharine Houreld, “Iran minister meets Pakistan military chief amid Yemen dilemma,” Daily Star, April 9, 2015; Tim 

Craig, “Pakistani lawmakers choose to remain neutral in Yemen,” 

The Washington Post, April 11, 2015. 
95

181. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Egypt says it is ready to send air, 

sea and ground forces to Yemen,” The New York Times, March 

27, 2015. 

182. Awad Mustafa, “Evidence of Saudi-led Forces in Yemen 

grows,” Defense News, July 27-August 3, 2015. 

183. Saeed al-Batati and Kareem Fahim, “Foreign Ground 

Troops Join Yemen Fight,” The New York Times, August 4, 2015; 

“Three Emiratis martyred in Yemen,” Khaleej Times, August 

9, 2015.

184. “U.S. Expands intelligence sharing with Saudis in Yemen 

operation,” Reuters, April 11, 2015. 

185. “US Steps up arms shipments to support Decisive 

Storm,” Arab News, April 8, 2015.

186. “US to Tehran: Hands off Yemen,” Arab News, April 

10, 2015. 

187. “Kerry allays Gulf concerns,” Arab News, April 6, 2015. 

188. Hugh Naylor, “Yemen conflict’s risk for Saudis: ‘Their 

Vietnam’,” The Washington Post, April 9, 2015.

189. For an interesting history of the rise of the Southern Independence movement, see Yemen’s Southern Question: Avoiding a 

Breakdown, Brussels, Belgium: ICG, 2013.

190. “Yemen at War: Crisis Group Middle Eastern Briefing,” 

Brussels, Belgium: ICG, March 27, 2015, p. 2. 

191. “Saudi-led coalition keeps up strikes on Yemen Rebels,” 

Daily Star, April 23, 2015. 

192. Michael R. Gordon and Thomas Erdbrink, “Yemen Crisis Looms as Kerry Meets with Iranian Counterpart on Nuclear 

Accord,” The New York Times, April 28, 2015.

193. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Tensions Between Iran and Saudi Arabia Deepen over Conflict in Yemen,” The New York Times, 

April 10, 2015.
96

194. Ben Hubbard, “King Salman Upends Status Quo in Region and the Royal Family,” The New York Times, May 11, 2015.

195. Mohammed Ghobari, “Al Qaeda and Houthis clash in 

central Yemen: Residents,” Reuters, October 16, 2014. 

196. “An Exceptional franchise; al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula,” Economist, April 25, 2015, p. 46.

197. “Al Qaeda suspects among 1,200 who escaped from 

Yemeni Prison,” Arab News, July 1, 2015.

198. Zaid al-Alayaa and Laura King, “Militants free 300 Yemen inmates; al Qaeda attacks a southeastern prison as Houthi 

rebels surge into a key port,” The Los Angeles Times, April 3, 2015. 

199. Saeed al-Batati, “Qaeda Affiliate pushes military out of 

major Yemeni city,” The New York Times, April 4, 2015.

200. “New ‘Green Brigade’ of ISIS claims Yemen attack,” 

Daily Star, April 23, 2015.

201. “Daesh attacks Houthi mosques,” Arab News, June 

21, 2015.

202. “U.S. departure from Yemen weakens relations, terrorist 

fight, general says,” The Washington Times, March 3, 2015. 

203. “U.S. envoy to Yemen to work from Jeddah after 

embassy’s closure,” Reuters, March 3, 2015.

204. “Arabia Influx: The War in Yemen,” Economist, April 

18, 2015, p. 42; Declan Walsh, “Despite Errors, Drones Decimate 

Weakened Qaeda,” The New York Times, April 25, 2015.

205. Greg Miller, “Drone Rules: Is ‘near certainty’ enough to 

pull the trigger?” The Washington Post, April 24, 2015.

206. Greg Miller, “Al-Qaeda leader was not target of strike,” 

The Washington Post, June 18, 2015.
97

207. Ali al-Mujahed and Hugh Naylor, “In Yemen’s grinding 

war, if the bombs don’t get you, the water shortages will,” The 

Washington Post, July 23, 2015. 

208. “Saleh in talks on Yemen peace,” The Peninsula, July 

24, 2015.

209. “US set to hit Daesh group from ground,” Khaleej Times, 

February 16, 2015.

210. “Kuwait: Security and Foreign Forces,” Jane’s Sentinel 

Security Assessment—The Gulf States, June 6, 2015.

211. “Fund US Deterrent Programs,” Defense News, June 29, 

2015, p. 20. 

212. “News Transcript: Remarks by Secretary Hagel at the 

Manama Dialogue form Manama Bahrain,” U.S. Department of 

Defense, December 7, 2013, available from www.defense.gov. For 

Gulf reaction to Hagel’s speech, see “US to maintain 35,000 troops 

in Gulf,” The Peninsula, December 8, 2013. 

213. Awad Mustafa and Barbara Opall-Rome, “Security Assurances, but no Military Bonanza for Regional Allies,” Defense 

News, July 20, 2015, p. 1.

214. Ibid., and Craig Whitlock, “Carter Summons U.S. military 

commanders, diplomats to Kuwait, The Washington Post, February 

22, 2015.

215. Mustafa and Opall-Rome, p. 2.

216. Crist, pp. 569-570. 

217. “US-led Gulf Naval Exercises Underway,” Associated 

Press, May 6, 2013.

218. Michael R. Gordon and David D. Kirpatrick, “Kerry 

Warns Egypt Human Rights Abuses Can Hurt Fight Against Terrorism,” The New York Times, August 3, 2015. 
98

219. When the author visited Iraq in 2008, he was amused by 

Iraqi officers who continually addressed U.S. Navy captains serving as staff officers as “colonel” despite ongoing efforts to correct 

them. 

220. Michael R. Gordon and Thom Shanker, “U.S. to Keep 

Warplanes in Jordan, Pressing Syria,” The New York Times, June 

16, 2013. 

221. Donna Miles, “Advance Headquarters Elements Operating in Jordan,” U.S. Department of Defense Press Release, April 

18, 2013, available from www.defense.gov, accessed June 10, 2013.

222. Cordesman, Securing the Gulf, p. 2.

223. General Raymond Odierno, “Regionally Aligned Forces: 

A New Model for Building Partnerships,” Army Live, The Official 

Blog of the U.S. Army, March 22, 2012, accessed March 14, 2015.

224. Colonel Phillip A. Chambers and Colonel Tarn D. Warren “RAF Movement and Maneuver Warfighting Function” in Dr. 

Larry Miller, Gregory L. Cantwell, Colonel Tarn D. Warren, and 

Colonel Mark E. Orwat, eds., Regionally Aligned Forces: Concept 

Viability and Implementation, Carlisle, PA: Carlisle Compendia of 

Collaborative Research, 2015, p. 35.

225. Lieutenant Colonel Mark B. Parker and John A. Bonin, 

“RAF and Mission Command,” in Miller et al., Regionally Aligned 

Forces, p. 26. 

226. Colonel Gregory M. Smith and Colonel Tarn D. Warren,

“RAF and Fires Warfighting Function” in Miller et al., Regionally 

Aligned Forces, p. 59.

227. Emma Sky, The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq, New York: PublicAffairs, 2015, p. 136.

228. Colonel James B. Botters and Colonel Mark A. Haseman, 

“RAF and Intelligence Warfighting Functions,” in Miller et al., 

Regionally Aligned Forces, p. 48.
99

229. Smith and Warren in Miller et al., Regionally Aligned 

Forces, p. 58.

230. Sky, p. 44.

231. Ibid.

232. Brigadier General Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr., Colonel Patrick Matlock, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Norrie, and Major Karen Radka, “Mission Command in the Regionally Aligned 

Division Headquarters,” Military Review, November-December 

2013, pp. 3-9.

233. C. Todd Lopez, “1st Armored Division Troops aligned 

with CENTCOM ready for Eager Lion Kick-Off,” official home 

page of the U.S. Army, available from www.army.mil, June 3, 2013, 

accessed July 29, 2014.

234. See “King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center,” available from www.kasotc.com, accessed August 2, 2014.

235. Casey L. Coombs, “Yemen to Get UAVs from the U.S.,” 

Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 26, 2012; Anthony H. 

Cordesman, Robert M. Shelala II, and Omar Mohamed, U.S. and 

Iranian Strategic Competition: Yemen and U.S. Security, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 8, 

2013, pp. 10-15.

236. Loveday Morris, “Investigation finds 50,000 ‘ghost’ soldiers in Iraqi army, prime minister says,” The Washington Post, 

November 30, 2014.

237. John McLaughlin, “How the Islamic State Could Win,” 

The Washington Post, May 28, 2015.

238. For an excellent discussion of how U.S. troops became 

increasingly effective at counterinsurgency operations over time 

in Iraq, see James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War: 

Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 

2005-2007, Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011.
100

239. The GCC has taken the lead in providing support and 

financial help for Yemen’s transition to a more stable government including brokering the departure from power of longtime 

strongman, President Ali Abdullah Saleh. 

240. “Yemen Army Retakes al Qaeda Bastions,” Jordan Times, 

June 12, 2012.

241. The author has been consistently impressed by the seriousness, commitment, and integrity of Yemeni officers he has met 

at the U.S. Army War College and elsewhere.

242. Associated Press, “Iraqi Official: Baghdad would welcome U.S. military help as Pentagon Considers sending trainers,” 

The Washington Post, June 27, 2013.

243. Russell, p. 101.

244. Ibid., p. 174.

245. Ibid., p. 122.

246. Rick Gladstone, “Iraqi Envoy Calls on U.S. to Strengthen 

Relationship,” The New York Times, April 4, 2014.

247. Paul McLeay, “US, Iranian Drones Crowd Iraqi Air 

Space,” Defense News, July 28, 2014, p. 1.

248. “UAE to set up rehab centres for those ‘lured’ by terror 

cells,” Khaleej Times, August 25, 2014. 

249. Agencies, “Jordan, US to cooperate in upgrading border 

defence capabilities,” Jordan Times, May 14, 2014.

250. “US concerned about Iran missiles, committed to Gulf 

security,” Jordan Times, April 27, 2014. 

251. “US offers help for Gulf-wide missile defense 

capability,” Arab News, April 28, 2014.

252. “US approves arms sales to Saudi Arabia,” Daily Star, 

July 31, 2015. 
101

253. Dania Saadi, “Lockheed Martin set to deliver missile 

defence system to UAE,” The National (UAE), December 7, 2014.

254. Jeremy Binnie, “Idex 2015: Saudi, Qatari THAAD contracts in the pipeline,” Jane’s 360, February 24, 2015.

255. Thomas L. McNaugher, “Ballistic Missiles and Chemical 

Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War,” International Security, 

Fall 1990, pp. 5-34; W. Andrew Terrill, “The Gulf War and Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” Comparative Strategy, April-June 1992, 

pp. 163-176. 

256. Max Fisher, “What Syria’s Scud Missile launches tell 

us about the regime’s thinking,” The Washington Post, December 

12, 2012; Ben Hubbard and Hwaida Saad, “Syrian Government 

Blamed for Ballistic Missile Attack,” The New York Times, July 

28, 2013.

257. Kenneth Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (UAE) Issues 

for U.S. Policy, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

March 18, 2013, pp. 11-12; Suzanne Maloney, “Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and the Prospect of a Nuclear Iran,” 

Middle East Memo of the Saban Center at Brookings, Brookings Institution, January 27, 2013, p. 11.

258. Andrea Shalal and Matt Spetalnick, “Obama expected to 

push for Gulf missile defense at U.S. summit,” Daily Star, May 

6, 2015.

259. As cited in Andrea Shalal, “Missile Shield for Gulf to take 

years, and heavy U.S. commitment,” Reuters, May 16, 2015.

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