i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 7- 00 38 7- CR J onathan RO DRIG UE Z , Appellant
v . T h e STA TE of

Te xas, Appellee Fr om the County

Court at L aw No. 7, Be x ar County , Texas Trial Court No. 928877 Honora ble Monica E. Gue rre ro, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Sitt ing: Alma L . L ópez, Chief J ustice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: October 1, 2008 AFF I RMED J onathan Rodriguez was convic ted of a ssault with bodily injury and sente nced to one y ear in jail, probated for

eig hteen months, and a

$1,000 fine. On appea l Rodriguez c omplains the trial
c ourt vio late d h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts by a dmi tti ng the c omp la ina nt’ s o ut- of

-c ourt state me nts int o
e vid e nc e . We a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.04
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1 ... T he reco rd d o es no t i nd i cat e whether R o d ri guez was rem o ved f rom t he ho use i m m ed i at el y or was present d u rin g the late r q u e stio n ing o f M .G
.

- 2- B ACKG ROUND On J une 22, 2005, San Antonio Police Offic er Greg Hovis was dispatche d to the scene of a repor ted assault. Offic er Hovis, the S tate’s only witness, testified that when he arr ived at the house , he found the complainant, M.G., and her child in the drivewa y . M.G. was c rying a

nd she appe are d “shake n up” and “ very

scar ed.” She told Of

fice r Hovis she had been “assaulted” by her boy friend and showe d him an injury to her lip. M.G. said she ha d “esc aped” from inside the house. She did not provide fur

ther de tails as to how the assault had oc curr ed. When Office r Hovis’s bac kup arr ived, t hey enter ed the house and M.G. told the offic ers “ he” was proba

bly in the m aster bedroom. Officer Hovis found R odrig uez aslee p in the master be droom
and imm e diate ly

de ta ine d h im. 1 The off

icer then interview ed M.G., wh o told him R odrig uez had locked he r in the bedr oom with him, h i t her, a nd kicked he r. M.G. said she e nded up in a f etal po sit ion be tw e e n th e be d a

nd c ri b. She tol d Of

fi cer Hov is the a ssa

ult ha pp e ne d at a

pp ro xima te ly 11 :00 a .m. , b ut s he ha d w a ite d a bo ut o ne ho ur

fo r R od ri g ue z to f

a ll a sle e p b e fo re sh e c ou ld c a ll police. She showe d Offic er H ovis bruises on her face and ar ms, as well as blac k ey es and a cut lip. Pho togra ph s o f he r inj ur ie s we re int ro du c e d into e vid e nc e . O ff ic e r H ov is t e sti fi e d Ro dr igue z tol d him he and M. G
. h a d

anar g u me n t a

b o u t t h e c h il d an d “ it g o t a li tt le o u t o f

h an d
. ” T h e o ffice r te sti fi e d th a t, b a se d o n M .G .’ s in jur ie s, he be lie ve d h e r v e rs ion of the e ve nt. Rod ri g ue z wa s th e on ly

oth e r p e rs on

to t e sti fy
. He tol d th e jur

y he he ard M. G. y e lli nga t th e ir child and we nt to investigate
. He testified he sawM.G. g rab the child, pull her hair, a nd spank her
. Ac c or din g to R od

ri g ue z, M.G . wa s “out of co ntr ol, ” so he g ra bb e d he r by

the arm s and

he ld h e r t o preve nt her fr om using “ forc e” on t h e ch ild. M.G. attempted to swing at him but R odrig uez04
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- 3- preve nted her

from using her a

rms. When shown photogr aphs of the injurie s, Rodrigue z admitt ed he may have c aused the bruises on M.G.’s a rms but stated he ha d “no re collection” about her black ey e or the injury

to her lip. He later de nied ca using a ny injuries i n t h e photog raphs a nd denied beatingor kickingher. D I S CUS S I ON I n his first point of error , Rodrigue z complains he was denied due proce ss of law unde r the Four th and Four

teenth Amendme nts to the United States Consti tution when Office r Hovis testified as to M.G.’s out-of- court stateme nts. I n his second point of error, Rodriguez complains admission of the state me nts vio late d his Si xth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o c on fr on t th e wi tne ss a g a ins t hi m. Rodrigue z enumerate s as a s ep ar at e p o i nt of err or the ha rm ca used by the admission of Hovis’s testimony . Rodrigue z does not arg ue how the F ourth and F ourtee nth A mendments are implicated and cites no leg al authority for his f irst point. There fore , we will c onsider o n l y wh et h er Hovis’s testimony violated Rodrig uez’s Six th Amendment r ig ht u n d e r th e Co n f r o nta ti o n Cl a u s e , a nd whether the er ror, if a ny , was ha

rmful. As a preliminary matter, we consider the State’s asser tions that Rodriguez failed to pr eser ve
e rr or . De fe ns e c ouns e l ob je c te d on bo th he ars ay and c on fr on tatio n g ro un ds e a c h tim e the State
e lic ite d M .G .’ s o ut- of

-c ourt state me nts . Co un se l’ s f

ir st o bje c tio n r esulte d in

a le ng thy argume nt, outside the prese nce of the jury , during which Rodrig uez’s objections and their g rounds wer e discussed extensively

and we re ove rruled. The State contends Rodriguez failed to pre serve err or as to “seve ral” of M.G.’s statements, arg uing the objections wer e not made until af ter the w itness ga

ve the complained of answe r. We disa g ree . On two occa sions whe n counsel objected a fter the answe r, the question did not call for he arsa y and only the answe r wa s objecti onable. We find only one04
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- 4- ins tanc e wh e re the State ’s qu e sti on c a lle d f or he ars ay and

the re c or d r e fl e c ts O ff

ic e r H ov is g a ve his
on e wo rd ans we r i mme diate ly

be fo re c ouns e l ob

je c te d. Ho we ve r, the re po rt e r’ s r e c or d a lso re fl e c ts the trial w as co n tentious and there are numerous occ asions when se vera l people we re spe akingat the same time. In light of the rec ord, we cannot say with any assura nce that counsel’s obje ction was not made conte mporane ously with the witness’s re spo n s e. C ounsel timely objected to the
a dmi ssi bil ity of M. G. ’s state me nts to O ff ic e r H ov is, state d th e sp e c if ic g ro un ds fo r t

he ob je c tio ns , and obtained a

ruling . That is a ll that is r equire d to pr eser ve er ror. SeeT EX . R. E V ID . 1 03 (a )( 1) ; T EX . R. A PP . P. 3 3. 1( a ); se e als o W alk e r v . S tate , 180 S.W .3d 829, 835 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The State a lso contends Rodrig uez waived e rror by cross-e x amining Off

i ce r Hovis about M. G. ’s state me nts . Ade fe nd ant d oe s n ot w a ive his pr e vio us ob je c tio n to te sti mony

by c ro ssexa m i n i n g t he witness about his direc t testimony
. Se e Roge rs v . S tate , 8 5 3 S. W. 2 d

2 9 , 3 5 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ) ( ho ldi ng“ e rr or is n ot w a ive d w he n the e vid e nc e is br ou g ht in lat e r in an e ff or t to meet, re but, destroy , deny or explain th e i m p ro p erly admitted evidenc e”)
. Her e, trial c ounsel vigor ously

cross-e x amined Of

fice r Hovis ab o u t h i s testimony . I n some questions, trial counsel repe ated state ments the offic er c laimed M.G. made
. On other oc casions, Of fice r Hovis re peate d the statements in response to counsel’s que stio n s . Howeve r, the re cord c lear ly demonstrates tria l counsel wa s attempting to mee t, rebut, destroy , deny , and explain evide nce that had been a dmitted
ov e r h is p re vio us ob

je c tio ns . We wi ll the re fo re c on sid e r t he me ri ts o f R od

ri g ue z’s c omp la int s. Applicable Law We reviewthe trial cour

t’s decision to admit evidenc e under an abuse of discretion standa rd. M o n t g o m e r yv . S tat e , 81 0 S .W.2d

37 2, 39 0- 92 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ) ( op . o n r e h’ g ). We w ill04
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- 5- uphold the trial judge ’s decision unless it is outside the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment. Id
. When de c idi ngc a se s invo lvi ng the fe de ra l con sti tut ion , T e xas c ourt s a re bo un d b y

Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me Court decisions interpre ting the f eder al constitution. State v. Guzman , 9 5 9 S. W. 2 d 6 3 1 , 6 3 3 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1998). The United States Supre me Court has held that “ [t ]estim onial statements of wi tne sses a

bs e nt f ro m tr ia l [may

be ] ad mitte d o nly

wh e re the de c lara

nt i s unava ila

ble , a nd on ly wher e the de fenda

nt ha s had a prior opportunity to c ross-examine.” Crawf ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). “Stateme nts are nonte stimoni al when ma de in t he course of police interrog ation
un de r c ir c ums tanc e s o bje c tiv e ly ind ic a tin g that the pr ima

ry purp os e of the int e rr og a tio n is to e na ble police assis t an ce to meet an ong oing e merg ency . They are testimonial when the circ umstances objectively

indicate that ther e is no such ong oing e merg ency , and that th e p rimary purpose of

the interrog ation is to establish or prove past events potentially rele vant t o later c riminal prosec ution.” Davis v. W

ashington , 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). In V i n s o n v . Stat e , th e court

of c ri min a l a

pp e a ls sug ges t ed a non- exhaustive list of fa ctors to consider in determining whether

the statements we re te sti mon ia l: 1) wh e the r t

he sit uatio n w a s st ill in p ro g re ss; 2) wh e th er t he qu e sti on s so ug ht t o de te rm ine wh a t is pr e se ntl y ha pp e nin g a s o pp os e d to wh a t ha s ha pp e ne d in the pa st; 3) wh e the r t

he pr ima ry purp os e of

the int e rr og a tio n w a s to re nd e r a id r a the r t ha n to memorialize a possible crime; 4) whether the questi o n i n g wa s conducte d in a separ ate r oom, away

from the a l l ege d at tacke r; and 5) whether the eve nts were deliberately

rec ounted in a step-by -step fa shion. 252 S.W .3d 336, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (ci t i n g Dav is , 547 U.S. at 829-30). We re view de
novo the q u es t i o n of whe ther a statement is testimonial or non-testimonial. W all v . S tate , 184 S.W .3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).04
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- 6- App lic ation o

f L aw t o Fa c ts I n the ca se o f domestic disputes, “‘ [o] ffice rs ca lled to investigate . . . nee d to know whom the y are deali ng wi th in or de r t o a sse ss t he sit uatio n, the thr e a t to the ir ow n s a fe ty , a

nd po ssi ble dang er to the pote ntial victim.’” Da v is , 5 4 7 U
. S
. a t 8 3 2 (q u o t i n g Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. D ist. Ct . of Nev. , 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004)). When Of fice r Hovis ar

rived at the scene , he knew he wa s
re s p o n d i n g t o an al l ege d

as s au l t . He wa s m et b y

a w o m an i no b v i o u s d i s t re s s , wh o wa s h o l d i n g a child. The off

icer ’s initial q u es tions to her wer e objec tively desig ned to deter

mine what wa s prese ntly happeningand to assess the situation, not to memorialize a possible crime. When, as here , th e p u r p o s e o f th e o f

f ic e r ’ s qu e s ti o n s , v ie w e d o b je c ti v e ly , is to a s c e rta in if th e r e is anong oing
emer g ency , the re sponses are not testimoni al. Se e Da v is , 542 U.S. at 822. Acc o rd i n g ly , M.G.’s statements to Offic er H ovis that she had “e scape d” fr om ins i d e t h e house where she had be en assaulted by

her boy friend, he r exhibit ion of the injury to her lip, and he r statement that he r boy friend
wa s pr ob a bly in the be dr oo m we re no t te sti mon ia l, and the ir a dmi ssi on

int o e vid e nc e did

no t vi olate Rodrigue z’s rights under

the Confrontation Clause. After Offic er Hovis located Rodrigue z in t he bedr oom and detaine d him, any emer g ency

that
may have e xiste d e arl ie r w a s o ve r. T he of fi c e r’ s su bs e qu e nt q

ue sti on ingof

M. G. wa s d e sig ne d to discover what happe ned in the past and to memorialize events for later prosecution. Her response s
wer e ther efor e testimonial. See id. Be cause M.G. did not testify at trial and Rodrigue z did not have pr ior op po rt un ity to c ro ss- e xami ne he r, it w a s e rr or of c on sti tut ion a l di me nsio n to a dmi t th e se statements, which consisted primarily of M.G.’s ve rsion of how the a ssault occur red. See Cra wfo rd , 54 1 U. S. at 59 ; Vinson , 252 S.W .3d at 341. We must now determine whe ther the e rror is rever sible. SeeT EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(a).04
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- 7- Har m Analy sis F e de ra l c on sti tut ion a l e rr or is ha rm le ss and no t re ve rs ibl e if it a pp e ars “ be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt that the err or complaine d of did not contribute to the ver dict obtained.” C h a p man v. Cal ifo rn ia , 3 86 U. S. 1 8, 24 (1 96 7) ; Cla yv . S tate , 240 S.W .3d 895, 904 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007). “Unde r Chapman , a fe dera l cons t i t u t i o n al err or ‘did not contribute to the ve rdict obtained’ if the verdic t ‘would have been the same a bsent the er

ror.’ ” Clay , 2 4 0 S
. W
. 3 d

at 9 0 4 (q u o t i n g Neder v. U. S. , 527 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1999)) . The Chapman te st i s co di fi ed in Te xas R ule of Ap pe llate Procedur e 44.2(a ). Clay , 240 S.W .3d at 904. To asses s the likelihood that, absent the trial c ourt’s er ror in admitting the evidenc e, the jury ’s ver dict would have be en the same, we must e x amine the entire r ecor d. Id . Among the fa ctors to consider a

re: (1) the importance of the e vidence to the State’s case ; ( 2) whether the evidenc e wa s cumulative of othe r evide nce; ( 3) the pre sence or abse nce of other e vid ence cor

roborating or contra dicting the evidenc e on mater ial points; and (4) the overa ll stre ng th of the State’s ca se. Id. We must also consider any

other fa ctor in the record that may shed l ight on the proba ble impact of the trial court’ s err or on the minds of ave rag e jurors. Id
. M.G. identified her

attacke r in her nonte stimonal statements by stating he r boy friend ha d “assa ulted” her

and “he ” wa s in the bedroom. She showed Of fi ce r Ho v i s an injury

to her lip. Rodrigue z admitt ed in his testimony that he had a

n ar gu m en t wi t h M.G., he g rabbe d M.G. by the arms, and he likely

cause d the bruises on M.G.’s arms. Although Rodrigue z denied causingM.G.’s other injuries, Of

fice r Hovi s t es t i fied Rodriguez told him “thing s g ot out of hand,” a nd the ph oto g ra ph s a dmi tte d into e vid e nc e de pic te d n ot o nly br uis ingon M. G. ’s arm s, bu t a lso inj ur ie s to her lips and br

uises on her e y e, neck, s houlder, and chest. I n light of this evidenc e, the testimonial04
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- 8- evidenc e wa s of slight importanc e to the State’s c ase. Most of M.G.’ s testimonial statements were cumulative of a

nd corr oborate d b y ev i d ence proper ly befor e the jury . The only noncumulative evidenc e that should not have be en admitted we re M.G.’ s statements t h at R odrig uez locked the bedroom door a

nd kicked he r, and that she retr eate d to a fe tal position between the be d and the cr ib. Howeve r, in light of Rodriguez’s admissions that he had an a rgument with M.G., things g ot “ out of hand,” a nd he used his ha

nds ag ainst M.G., which likely resulted in bruising, we conclude bey ond
a re asonable doubt the verdic t of the jury would have be en the same had M.G.’ s testimonial statements not been a dmitted. Rodrigue z arg ues he w as har med bec ause t h e testi monial hear say was the only

evidenc e supporting the manner

and mea ns alleg ation in the information, which stated Rodrig uez committed the assault by

“striking the complainant with the ha nd of the defenda

nt and striking the complainant with foot of the de fenda

nt.” Rodrig uez essentially contends that without proof a s to the manner a nd
means a lleg ed in the information, the evidence would have be en leg ally insufficient to support the verdic t. We disag ree for two r easons. F irst, the char g e allowe d the jury to convict on a f

inding that Rodrigue z struck he r with the hand or fo ot. Rod

ri g ue z’s te sti mony

tha t he us e d h is h and s to re str a in M.G. and likely

cause d the bruises on h er ar m s wa s s ufficie nt to establish he assaulted M.G. by striking he r with his hand. Second, fa ilure to prove the manner and mea ns alleg ation would n o t h av e re ndere d the evidenc e insuffic ient. When evaluatingthe suffic iency of the e vidence , an appellate cour t considers the e vid e nc e in l ig ht o f a

hy po the tic a lly c or

re c t jur y c ha rg e a s a uth or ize d by the c ha

rg ingins tr

ume nt. Ma lik v . S tate , 953 S.W .2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). F or purpose s of a suff iciency revie w, the hy pothetically

corr ect j ury

char g e nee d only

contain the e ssential elements of the offe nse and04
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- 9- “nee d not incorporate alleg ations that g ive rise to immateria l varianc es.” Go lli ha r v . S tate , 46 S.W. 3d 24 3, 25 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ). I n a n a ssa ult c a se , the e sse nti a l ele me nts of the of fe ns e
are : (1) a pe rson; (2) intentionally knowing ly , or recklessly ; (3) causes bodily injury ; (4) to another. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 22.0 1 (V er n o n S u p p . 2008). A va rianc e in the manne r in which the assault o c c u r

r e d w o u ld n o t h av e b e e nmate r ia l a n d th e r e f o r e w o u ld

n o t b e in c lu d e d

in the h y p o th e ti c a ll y

c o r r e c t c h arg e. S

ee G ollihar , 46 S.W .3d at 257 (holding varia nce is not mater ial unless it deprived a

ppellant of a dequate notice or subjected him to a risk of beingprosec uted later for the sa me cr ime). A v ar i an ce i n the manner and mea ns would not have re ndere d the evidenc e ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the ve rd ic t and

the re fo re did

no t c a us e the ha rm Rod ri g ue z al le g e s. The trial c ourt’s judg ment is affirme d.
Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Pub lis h