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Information Notice No. 98-23: Crosby Relief Valve Setpoint Drift Problems Caused by Corrosion of

The Guide Ring

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 23, 1998

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 98-23:CROSBY RELIEF VALVE SETPOINT DRIFT PROBLEMS CAUSED BY CORROSION OF THE GUIDE RING

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses for pressurized water reactors (PWRs), except those licensees who have permanently ceased operations and have certified that

fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to potential problems caused by corrosion of the guide

rings in relief valves manufactured by Crosby. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions,

as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or

written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On November 2, 1996, Sequoyah Unit 2 experienced an over pressure condition on the safety injection system as a result of leaking check valves from the

reactor coolant system. The safety injection system design pressure is 12.2 MPa (1750 psig) and pressure during the evolution reached approximately 12.9 MPa

(1850 psig), at which time at least one relief valve lifted. There were three relief valves in the system that should have prevented system pressure from

exceeding 12.6 MPa (1805 psig). One of the relief valves was removed and tested. The relief was found to be out of tolerance and was subsequently replaced.

Corrective actions to resolve this condition adverse to quality were discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-327, 328/97-06 (Accession Number 9708040130).

On September 9, 1997, Sequoyah Unit 2 experienced another over pressure condition on the safety injection system, again as a result of leaking check valves

from the reactor coolant system. The three system relief valves should have prevented system pressure from exceeding 12.6 MPa (1805 psig); however, again as

a result of relief valve setpoint problems, system pressure approached 12.9 MPA (1850 psig).

During the Sequoyah Unit 2 refueling outage, in October 1997, the three safety injection system relief valves were replaced and approximately 20 other similar

Unit 2 relief valves were tested and/or replaced. The licensee disassembled five of the relief valves and performed a detailed root cause analysis of the failures.

The licensee noted that most of the valves had little or no internal lubrication present, and this lack of lubrication was a major contributor to the relief valve

setpoint drifting problem.

In addition, when the valves were disassembled, two of the relief valves removed from the safety injection system were found to have corrosion on the guide

rings. The licensee documented that the guide rings were fabricated from Type 416 stainless steel, which was subject to rust and corrosion if placed in borated

water service, at higher than ambient temperatures. In general, the licensee concluded that the Sequoyah relief valve preventive maintenance program needed to

be improved and that these relief valves should undergo periodic inspections.

Discussion

The Crosby relief valves provide system overpressure protection for various systems throughout the plant. The corrosion problem appeared to be limited to

borated water system applications. The corrosion was also limited to the guide ring assembly located in the discharge portion of the valve, which is normally in

a dry section of the system.

At Sequoyah Unit 2, the safety injection relief valves had lifted on several occasions, and it appeared that the discharge piping could provide a loop seal and

keep water in the discharge ports of the valves. This accounted for the excessive corrosion of the safety injection relief valves and explained why there was very

little corrosion of the rest of the relief valves located on other borated water systems.

Most of the Crosby relief valve components subjected to borated water applications at Sequoyah are manufactured from Type 300 series stainless steel. The

licensee noted that the relief valve guide rings were manufactured from Type 416 stainless steel, which can corrode if subjected to borated water at elevated

temperatures. The licensee and the manufacturer have been reviewing the feasibility of manufacturing guide ring replacements from Type 300 series stainless

steel or other corrosion-resistant material, such as Inconel.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. However, recipients are reminded that they are required by 10 CFR 50.65 to take

industry-wide operating experience (including information presented in NRC information notices) into consideration, when practical, when setting goals and

performing periodic evaluations. If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below or the

appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

/s/'d by

Jack W. Roe, Acting Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:Melvin C Shannon, RII

(423) 842-8001

E-mail: drs@nrc.gov

James A. Davis, NRR

(301) 415-2713

E-mail: jad@nrc.gov

Gary Hammer, NRR

(301) 415-2791

E-mail: cgh@nrc.gov

(NUDOCS Accession Number 9806170064)

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, May 22, 2015

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