GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2000 DEFENSE 

TRANSPORTATION

Operational Support 

Airlift Requirements 

Are Not Sufficiently 

Justified

GAO/NSIAD-00-126

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Operational Support Airlift Aircraft Inventory and 

Characteristics 16

Appendix II: Photographs and Descriptions of Operational Support 

Airlift Aircraft 19

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 27

Tables Table 1: Inventory of Operational Support Airlift Aircraft as of

November 1999 16

Table 2: Number and Characteristics of Operational Support Airlift 

Aircraft by Type 17

Figures Figure 1: C-9 McDonnell Douglas 19

Figure 2: C-12 Beech King Air 20

Figure 3: C-20 Gulfstream III 20

Figure 4: C-21 LearJet 35A 21

Figure 5: C-22 Boeing 727-100 21

Figure 6: C-23 Short Brothers Sherpa 22

Figure 7: C-26 Fairchild Aircraft Metroliner 22

Figure 8: C-37 Gulfstream V 23

Figure 9: C-38 AIA Astra SPX 23

Figure 10: C-135 Boeing 707 24

Figure 11: CT-39 Rockwell-60 24

Figure 12: CT-43 Boeing 737-200 25

Figure 13: UC-35A Cessna Citation 25

Figure 14: VP/UP-3 Lockheed Electra 26

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation
Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-284770 Letr

April 27, 2000

The Honorable Barbara Boxer

The Honorable Tom Harkin

United States Senate

The Honorable Peter DeFazio

House of Representatives 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified a wartime requirement 

for 391 aircraft to transport passengers and cargo on short notice when 

other military and commercial flights are not able to provide transportation 

in a time-sensitive manner. These aircraft are referred to as operational 

support airlift aircraft. Although DOD’s policy specifies that the number of 

support aircraft are to be based on wartime requirements, DOD uses these 

aircraft during peacetime for crew training as well as passenger and cargo 

support. 

This report responds to your concerns about whether the existing 

requirement for operational support airlift aircraft is linked to wartime 

needs. Specifically, we evaluated the process DOD uses to determine its 

requirements for these aircraft. As requested, we have also provided 

information on the current operational support airlift inventory and 

planned changes to that inventory in appendixes I and II.1

Results in Brief The current process used to determine requirements for operational 

support airlift is inadequate because it is not clearly linked to wartime 

requirements as DOD policy requires. In our review of the process DOD 

used for the 1995, 1998, and ongoing analyses of operational support airlift 

requirements, we identified several weaknesses that call the current 

requirement for 391 aircraft into question. Specifically, the Department has 

not clearly explained the basis for the key assumptions it is using to justify 

the requirements or identified the assumptions that should be updated in 

each succeeding review. For example, DOD has assumed that most 

1

The fiscal year 2000 DOD appropriations act gives the Air Force the authority to lease up to 

six new aircraft to provide operational support airlift.
B-284770

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

overseas airfields should be connected to each other by nonstop flights 

three times a day. However, DOD has not explained why it is necessary to 

connect these airfields with such frequency to support wartime 

requirements. In addition, DOD has not issued sufficient guidance to define 

participant roles and responsibilities for validating these airlift 

requirements. For example, we were unable to determine whether any 

command had validated the requirement for 85 aircraft that were based 

within the continental United States during DOD’s 1998 review of support 

aircraft requirements. DOD has also failed to ensure that sufficient 

documentation to support previous analyses is maintained. Moreover, DOD 

has only reviewed its requirements for operational support aircraft twice 

since 1995, despite its own directive to validate the requirements on an 

annual basis. Officials involved in the review process, however, suggested 

to us that annual reviews may be too frequent, given that they would not 

expect the requirements to change significantly from year to year.

In light of the problems we identified, we are recommending that DOD 

make changes to its operational support airlift requirements determination 

process so that it can better demonstrate how the requirement for these 

support aircraft is linked to DOD’s wartime needs. We are also 

recommending that DOD reexamine the requirement to validate 

requirements annually. 

Background DOD maintains operational support airlift aircraft to meet short-notice 

wartime requirements for high-priority air transportation that cannot be 

met by regularly scheduled military or commercial flights. The inventory is 

comprised of 14 types of fixed-wing aircraft that vary in size, speed, and 

range. Almost half of these are eight-passenger propeller-driven aircraft, 

but the inventory also contains larger-capacity jet-propelled aircraft 

capable of flying up to 5,500 nautical miles. Each service maintains an 

inventory of these aircraft; however, 45 percent of the total fleet is in the 

Army’s inventory. More detailed information about the inventory and 

characteristics of support aircraft is presented in appendixes I and II. 
B-284770

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Prior to the mid-1990s, each service determined its own support aircraft 

requirements; by 1995, there were 520 support aircraft in the inventory. In 

May 1995, a review of DOD’s post-Cold War role concluded that the 

services had no documentation to show that the number of support aircraft 

was based on wartime requirements, and it recommended that the 

inventory be reduced to eliminate the excess capacity.2

 In response, the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff to recalculate the wartime requirements. The Joint Staff subsequently 

formed a working group comprised of representatives from the Joint Staff, 

the services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the major military 

commands both in the United States and abroad to determine operational 

support airlift requirements for conventional wars involving two major 

regional conflicts. 

The working group devised a model applicable to four geographic areas of 

operation—Europe, the Middle East, Korea and Japan, and the continental 

United States. The model was based on a methodology that divided each 

geographic area into a number of regions. Within each region, the working 

group identified specific destinations, called airfield nodes, representing 

either a single airfield or a group of neighboring airfields. Airfield nodes in 

each overseas region were to be connected to all other nodes within that 

region by nonstop flights three times a day. Likewise, each region in an 

overseas area was to be connected to every other region in that area by 

nonstop flights three times a day. Because of the ready availability of 

commercial flights, nodes within a region in the continental United States 

were connected to each other by nonstop flights an average of one and a 

half times a day, and regions were connected to every other region once a 

day. (The working group also designated a few airfields as remote links in 

those cases where it determined that only a reduced level of service would 

be required. Remote locations require just one aircraft.) The working group 

then increased the airlift requirements by applying a mission capable rate 

to allow for the fact that, on any given day, a number of aircraft would not 

be available for use because they were under repair or awaiting spare parts. 

2

This review was conducted by the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.
B-284770

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

After these requirements for each region were determined, the working 

group added in mission-specific aircraft requirements that were identified 

by nine DOD commands.3

 Mission-specific requirements include aircraft to 

transport key commanders and other required users and to provide 

transportation to link commands to their distant locations—for example, to 

link the European Command to Africa. The overall operational support 

airlift requirement of 391 aircraft reflected the sum total of the aircraft for 

the four geographic areas and all mission-specific aircraft requirements, 

plus an additional allowance to provide for attrition, depot maintenance, 

and training demands for aircraft.

The Joint Staff presented the results of the requirements determination 

process, along with the methodology it used, in a report that it issued in 

October 1995. The Joint Staff has used this methodology as the basis for 

subsequent requirements reviews. One of these reviews was begun in 

December 1997 and completed in May 1998. In that study, the Joint Staff 

confirmed the current requirement for 391 aircraft that was first identified 

in 1995. Another review started in November 1999 and remains ongoing.

Requirements Process 

for Support Aircraft Is 

Inadequate

The processes that DOD uses to identify its requirements for operational 

support airlift have a number of weaknesses that make it difficult to assess 

whether the current inventory meets the wartime needs. In reviewing the 

process used in the 1995 and 1998 analyses, we could not determine how 

the methodology relates to wartime requirements. The current guidance 

does not explain the basis for key assumptions that influence the analysis 

or identify the extent to which key assumptions need to be revalidated. 

Furthermore, the guidance does not present a clear delineation of the 

participating entities’ roles and responsibilities, and it does not identify 

documentation that should be maintained to support the results of the 

analysis. The Joint Staff is aware that weaknesses exist in the process, and 

it intends to consider changes to the process once the current review is 

complete.

3

The nine commands, referred to as combatant commands, that provide input to the 

operational support airlift wartime requirements process are the Central Command, 

European Command, Joint Forces Command, Pacific Command, Southern Command, 

Special Operations Command, Space Command, Strategic Command, and Transportation 

Command. Not all of the commands have geographically based operational support airlift 

requirements; some only have mission-specific airlift requirements.
B-284770

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Methodology Does Not 

Explain Linkage to Wartime 

Requirements

Although DOD Directive 4500.43 states that operational support airlift 

requirements should be based solely on wartime needs, the methodology 

that DOD used in 1995 and 1998 does not draw a clear link to the scenario 

for two major regional conflicts specified by the National Military Strategy.4

The October 1995 Joint Staff report states that the working group 

determined airlift requirements for two concurrent major regional 

conflicts. Beyond this statement, it is unclear exactly how the model that 

was developed related to the two unspecified conflicts. As previously 

noted, the model called for overseas airfield nodes in most regions to be 

connected by nonstop flights three times a day and that each region also be 

connected to every other region in the same geographic area three times a 

day. However, the report does not explain why it would be necessary to 

connect all overseas airfield nodes with such frequency to support two 

major conflicts. Nor does it fully explain the assumptions for the 

frequencies given for intra- and inter-regional flights (one and a half flights 

and one flight, respectively) between airfield nodes in the United States.

In discussing the relationship of the model to wartime scenarios, 

individuals involved in the ongoing requirements review could provide no 

more detail about the assumptions upon which the flight frequencies were 

based. One military officer involved in the 1995 study said that using an 

assumption of four flights a day yielded a requirement deemed to be too 

high and that using an assumption of two flights a day yielded a 

requirement deemed to be too low by the commanders in chief. 

Operational support airlift requirements are significantly affected by this 

single assumption. For example, our earlier review of support aircraft 

found that 55 fewer aircraft were required when an assumption of two 

flights a day rather than three was used for overseas theaters.5

Basis for Other Key 

Assumptions Is Unclear 

The October 1995 Joint Staff report does not explain the basis for other key 

assumptions that influence the analysis of the number of aircraft required. 

For example, the 1995 report stated that “robust commercial airlift” could 

satisfy many of the scheduled airlift requirements within the United States. 

4

The National Military Strategy provides the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, in consultation with other key military commanders, on the strategic direction of the 

Armed Forces.

5

Operational Support Airlift: Analysis of Joint Staff Estimate of Military Wartime 

Requirements (GAO/NSIAD-96-157, June 21, 1996).
B-284770

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

However, the Joint Staff did not quantify the amount of commercial airlift 

that was assumed to be available. The report also failed to define key 

concepts, which could lead to misinterpretation and inconsistency among 

commands. For example, the report includes requirements for surge 

aircraft, but it does not define what constitutes surge aircraft or the method 

for determining the number of surge aircraft that should be required. As a 

result, one geographic area reported a need for 7 surge aircraft out of a 

total requirement of 133 aircraft, while another reported a need for 8 surge 

aircraft out of a total requirement of 76 aircraft. 

The report also did not provide the criteria that were used for determining 

whether an airfield should be designated as an airfield node or as a remote 

location. These criteria are significant because the classification of an 

airfield as a node rather than as a remote location can greatly increase the 

number of support aircraft required. Since the methodology for most 

regions requires that each overseas node needs to be connected to every 

other node in its region three times a day, multiple aircraft would be 

required. Conversely, connecting from a node to a remote location only 

requires one aircraft. Officials involved in the current review told us that 

one command has identified the need to fly to several new airfields that had 

not been identified in 1995. Identifying these new airfields as nodes or 

remote links will determine the number of additional aircraft required. 

It was also unclear why mission capable rates were factored into the 

geographically based requirements and not the mission-specific ones. The 

1995 report states that rates of 80 and 85 percent were applied to the shortand long-range aircraft, respectively, that connect airfield nodes and 

support regions to allow for the fact that on any given day a certain number 

of aircraft will be unavailable because they are undergoing repair or 

waiting for spare parts. However, there was no explanation for why similar 

factors were not applied to the short- and long-range aircraft needed to 

meet mission-specific needs, which make up about 30 percent of the total 

operational support airlift requirement. 

The process for determining the requirements for mission-specific aircraft 

was also not clearly explained in the October 1995 Joint Staff report or the 

1998 review. The 1995 report simply stated that a certain number of longand/or short-range aircraft were needed without any apparent 

consideration of aircraft capacity. According to officials at several 

commands involved in the requirements process, it is important to consider 

factors such as an aircraft’s passenger and cargo capacity in determining 

requirements. In fact, the Joint Staff completed a separate study in 1999 
B-284770

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

that specifically examined the requirements for aircraft that are used by the 

commanders in chief. This study found that the commanders’ aircraft 

required a number of capabilities, including (1) a minimum passenger 

capacity of between 16 and 36 passengers, (2) the ability to land on 

runways that are limited in their length, and (3) the capacity to fly much 

farther than the 600-nautical mile standard that defines a long-range 

aircraft in the current validation process. Because these criteria are not 

considered in the operational support airlift validation process, it is 

possible that the current or future mix of support aircraft might not meet 

the wartime needs of the commanders in chief. 

Officials Do Not Appear to 

Have Reviewed 

Assumptions in Subsequent 

Validation

The Joint Staff did not provide formal guidance on how the 1998 review of 

the operational support airlift requirement was to be done, and we found 

very little documentation surrounding this validation. In fact, according to 

the Joint Staff documentation that does exist, during the 1998 requirements 

process seven of the nine commanders in chief who were asked about their 

airlift requirements simply concurred with the requirements outlined in the 

1995 study without comment. 

Because little documentation on the 1998 revalidation exists, we were 

unable to determine to what extent officials revalidated the assumptions 

contained in the earlier 1995 Joint Staff study. It would appear that several 

assumptions would need to be reviewed during any subsequent operational 

support airlift revalidation. For example, the number and location of 

airfields, the availability of scheduled aircraft to meet mission 

requirements, the extent of assumed commercial aircraft support, and 

factors related to the availability of aircraft should all be reviewed since 

any changes might affect the overall airlift requirements. Clear guidance on 

these factors would seem to be important to permit consistent application 

of the model by all participants. 

Joint Staff Has Not Clearly 

Specified Roles or 

Documentation 

Requirements

The Joint Staff has not issued sufficient guidance defining roles and the 

division of responsibilities to ensure that the process for determining 

operational support airlift requirements is complete. For example, as part 

of this review we attempted to identify the DOD command currently 

responsible for reassessing the wartime requirement for support aircraft 

based within the continental United States. However, we found uncertainty 

among the Joint Staff and some of the military commands about who was 

responsible for validating the geographically based requirement for these 

85 aircraft (representing more than 20 percent of the total requirement for 
B-284770

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

operational support airlift). Because documentation for the 1998 review 

was not available from the commands or the Joint Staff, we could not 

determine whether the requirement for the 85 aircraft was examined in 

DOD’s 1998 review. In response to this observation, Joint Staff officials told 

us that they were taking the responsibility for examining the requirement 

for support aircraft within the United States during the ongoing 

revalidation effort. 

The Joint Staff also has not maintained records documenting its previous 

requirements reviews, so it is not possible to determine whether some 

options for reducing requirements were examined. For example, a DOD 

cover memorandum attached to the 1995 requirements study 

recommended that the Secretary of Defense approve the requirement of 

391 support aircraft, but observed that further reductions could be 

considered in subsequent annual airlift wartime requirements validations if 

certain assumptions and operational practices were changed. The 

suggested options included both reducing the assumed number of flights 

per day between overseas support regions and contracting with the 

commercial market for much of the operational support airlift requirement 

within the United States. Although this memorandum was approved by the 

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff has no documentation to show 

whether or not these options for reducing the number of support aircraft 

were ever considered in the subsequent and ongoing requirements studies 

or what the ramifications would be if the frequency of flights were reduced. 

Requirement Process is Not 

Conducted Annually

The 1995 Joint Staff study recommended that the size of the operational 

support airlift fleet be reviewed and validated annually, and DOD made this 

a requirement in Directive 4500.43 in 1996. However, the Joint Staff has not 

followed this guidance. The Joint Staff began its first revalidation in 

December 1997, 2 years after the completion of the initial study. The 

ongoing requirements review of operational support airlift did not begin 

until November 1999, again nearly 2 years later. During the course of our 

work, a number of officials suggested that the annual revalidation cycle is 

too frequent. They said that annual reviews were unwarranted since the 

factors that affect the numerical requirements for aircraft do not change 

dramatically from year to year. 

Joint Staff Plans to Review 

the Process

Officials in the Joint Staff are aware that weaknesses exist in the 

revalidation process. Although formal plans do not yet exist, Joint Staff 

officials have stated their intent to bring together a working group to 
B-284770

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

address the limitations in the process once the current review is complete. 

Officials in the Joint Staff have also told us that one of their goals is to 

create a set of formal guidelines that will incorporate what has been 

learned during the ongoing revalidation.

Conclusions The current process used to determine requirements for operational 

support airlift aircraft is inadequate because it is not clearly linked to 

wartime requirements as DOD policy requires. It does not adequately 

explain the basis for key assumptions used to determine the number of 

support aircraft required or identify those assumptions that should be 

updated in succeeding validations, and it is not accompanied by formal 

guidance that clearly delineates roles, responsibilities, and required 

documentation for the requirements process. The lack of clear linkage to 

wartime requirements raises questions about whether the support aircraft 

fleet is appropriately sized to meet short-notice mobility needs in wartime. 

Silence on the basis for key assumptions used to determine support aircraft 

requirements as well as on what assumptions need to be updated during 

revalidations raises questions about the soundness and currency of the 

methodology. Because detailed guidance on how the analysis should be 

conducted is lacking, the potential exists for participating entities to 

inconsistently apply the methodology. Moreover, the lack of clarity in roles 

could cause confusion as to who is responsible for revalidating portions of 

the fleet, as occurred in the current validation with respect to U.S.-based 

aircraft. Further, because DOD has not explicitly said what documentation 

is required in the validation process, it is difficult to replicate previous 

reviews and evaluate their validity. For all these reasons, we believe a more 

rigorous process is needed to better ensure that support aircraft 

requirements accurately reflect wartime needs. 

Although we did not find any evidence to suggest negative consequences, 

we also observed that the Joint Staff is not revalidating operational support 

airlift requirements annually as required by DOD directive. We simply note 

that the current practice is inconsistent with policy and that it is misleading 

to suggest that the support aircraft requirements are being revalidated on 

an annual basis.

Recommendations In order to improve the visibility of the process and better link the airlift 

requirements setting process with wartime needs, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
B-284770

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

develop formal guidance establishing a process that clearly (1) links the 

inventory of operational support airlift aircraft more closely to the wartime 

requirements of DOD’s combatant commands and military services, 

(2) explains the basis for underlying assumptions, (3) identifies the factors 

and assumptions that should be updated during each annual validation, and 

(4) defines the responsibilities of participating entities and requires 

documentation to support the result of the analysis. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense reexamine the 

requirement to conduct annual revalidations and (1) change the 

requirement if it is determined to be too stringent or (2) hold the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accountable to that standard if it is deemed 

appropriate. 

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with 

the findings in this report and concurred with our recommendations. 

Further, DOD commented that it will take our findings into consideration 

during its future determinations of operational support airlift requirements. 

DOD also commented that it will reexamine the requirement to conduct 

annual revalidations and take appropriate action if the requirement is 

determined to be no longer appropriate. 

DOD suggested several technical changes to the draft, which we have 

incorporated where appropriate. DOD’s comments are presented in 

appendix III.

Scope and 

Methodology

In response to concerns from congressional requesters about the size of the 

operational support airlift fleet and the potential need for additional 

aircraft, we evaluated the process DOD uses to determine its wartime 

requirements for these aircraft. We also gathered data on the current 

operational support airlift inventory and planned changes to that inventory. 

To evaluate the process DOD uses to determine its support aircraft 

requirements, we reviewed current and previous DOD reports and 

interviewed officials in the Joint Staff and at selected joint commands. To 

identify the current inventory of support aircraft and planned changes to 

that inventory, we gathered data and interviewed officials within each of 

the four military services.
B-284770

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

We visited or contacted individuals at the following headquarters or field 

locations:

• Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.;

• Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.;

• U.S. Army Operational Support Airlift Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia;

• U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Huntsville, Alabama;

• Department of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.;

• Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.;

• U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.;

• Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.;

• U.S. Transportation Command, Joint Operational Support Airlift Center, 

Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;

• U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia;

• U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida;

• U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida; and

• U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany.

We conducted our study from October 1999 through March 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further 

distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we 

will send copies to the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; 

the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the Honorable 

Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, 

Secretary of the Air Force; and General James L. Jones, Commandant of 

the Marine Corps. We will also make copies available to appropriate 

congressional committees and to others upon request. 
B-284770

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call 

Bill Solis at (202) 512-8365 or me at (202) 512-5140. Major contributors to 

this report were David Moser, Madelon Savaides, and Howard Deshong.

Carol R. Schuster

Associate Director

National Security Preparedness Issues
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation
Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Appendix I

Operational Support Airlift Aircraft Inventory 

and Characteristics ApendxiI

The current inventory of support aircraft is based on the approved wartime 

requirement of 391 aircraft. Based on agreements between the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services, the requirements for support 

aircraft were apportioned among the services. The Army was apportioned 

the largest share, 43 percent, of the total requirement for support aircraft. 

The Air Force and the Navy were apportioned about 25 percent each, and 

the Marines have the remaining share of the total requirement. As of 

November 1999, each service has fewer support aircraft than the number 

apportioned to it. Table 1 shows the apportioned requirement and 

inventory of support aircraft by service as of November 1999.

Table 1: Inventory of Operational Support Airlift Aircraft as of November 1999

Source: The military services. 

The operational support airlift inventory contains 14 types of aircraft. The 

most common aircraft is the C-12. These eight-passenger propeller-driven 

aircraft account for about 45 percent of the total fleet and more than half of 

the aircraft in the Army’s operational support airlift inventory. The second 

most common aircraft is the C-21. These seven-passenger jets account for 

about 20 percent of the operational support airlift inventory. Table 2 

presents characteristics of each type of support aircraft. 

Service

Number of

apportioned aircraft

Number of aircraft

 in the inventory

Army 170 165

Air Force 103 91

Navy 94 86

Marine Corps 24 22

Total 391 364
Appendix I

Operational Support Airlift Aircraft 

Inventory and Characteristics

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Table 2: Number and Characteristics of Operational Support Airlift Aircraft by Type

Note: The information displayed for speed and range is an average for the type of aircraft. Aircraft 

speed and range will vary within the aircraft type, model and series, age, and among the services. 

Also, the number of passengers and cargo on board, cruising altitude, and other factors can have a 

significant impact on speed and range data. 

Source: The Joint Operational Support Airlift Center and the military services.

All four services plan to acquire some support aircraft over the next few 

years. For the most part, these aircraft will replace older aircraft that are 

approaching the end of their useful service or that would require major 

modifications in order to extend their useful service. The Army plans to 

purchase eight UC-35As between fiscal years 2002-2005. In order to remain 

within the apportioned requirement of 170 support aircraft, the Army plans 

to retire its older C-12s as the UC-35As are delivered. Similarly, the Marine 

Corps plans to acquire seven support aircraft over the next 6 years. Two of 

these aircraft are being acquired to bring the Marine Corps’ inventory up to 

its apportioned share of the operational support airlift requirement. The 

remaining new aircraft will be used to replace older aircraft. The Navy 

currently does not plan to increase its inventory of support aircraft. 

However, the Navy is planning to acquire replacement aircraft for its older 

Aircraft type

Speed

(in knots)

Range

(in nautical miles) Passenger capacity

Number of aircraft

in the inventory

Propeller

C-12 260 1,200 8 163

C-23 180 600 18 32

C-26 265 1,100 14 17

VP/UP-3 300 4,500 37 8

Jet

C-21 440 1,700 7 71

C-9 440 2,000 90 30

UC-35A 420 1,300 7 17

C-20 450 3,500 26 13

C-135 475 5,000 20 5

C-22 460 1,800 77 3

C-38 480 2,100 7 2

C-37 520 5,500 12 1

CT-39G 430 1,200 6 1

CT-43 420 1,800 38 1

Total 364
Appendix I

Operational Support Airlift Aircraft 

Inventory and Characteristics

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

C-9 and VP-3 aircraft. Similarly, the Air Force does not plan to increase its 

support aircraft inventory, but is currently studying options to lease new 

aircraft for operational support airlift, including transportation for the 

commanders in chief. The Air Force was given authority to lease up to six 

aircraft for this purpose in the fiscal year 2000 Department of Defense 

(DOD) appropriations act, but it was not given any additional funding. The 

Air Force is exploring ways in which it can fund this program, but it does 

not anticipate negotiating any leases until fiscal year 2001 or beyond. 
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Appendix II

Photographs and Descriptions of Operational 

Support Airlift Aircraft ApendxiI

The services maintain diverse aircraft in their inventories to transport 

passengers and cargo with needs that cannot be accommodated by 

scheduled military and commercial flights. The current inventory is 

comprised of 14 different types of aircraft that vary in size, speed, and 

range.

Figure 1: C-9 McDonnell Douglas 

Propulsion: Jet

Passenger Capacity: 90

Speed: 440 knots

Range: 2,000 nautical miles

Number: 30
Appendix II

Photographs and Descriptions of Operational 

Support Airlift Aircraft

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Figure 2: C-12 Beech King Air 

Propulsion: Propeller

Passenger Capacity: 8

Speed: 260 knots

Range: 1,200 nautical miles

Number: 163

Figure 3: C-20 Gulfstream III

Propulsion: Jet

Passenger Capacity: 26

Speed: 450 knots

Range: 3,500 nautical miles

Number: 13
Appendix II

Photographs and Descriptions of Operational 

Support Airlift Aircraft

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Figure 4: C-21 LearJet 35A 

Propulsion: Jet

Passenger Capacity: 7

Speed: 440 knots

Range: 1,700 nautical miles

Number: 71

Figure 5: C-22 Boeing 727-100

Propulsion: Jet

Passenger Capacity: 77

Speed: 460 knots

Range: 1,800 nautical miles

Number: 3
Appendix II

Photographs and Descriptions of Operational 

Support Airlift Aircraft

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Figure 6: C-23 Short Brothers Sherpa 

Propulsion: Propeller

Passenger Capacity: 18

Speed: 180 knots

Range: 600 nautical miles

Number: 32

Figure 7: C-26 Fairchild Aircraft Metroliner

Propulsion: Propeller

Passenger Capacity: 14

Speed: 265 knots

Range: 1,100 nautical miles

Number: 17
Appendix II

Photographs and Descriptions of Operational 

Support Airlift Aircraft

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Figure 8: C-37 Gulfstream V

Propulsion: Jet

Passenger Capacity: 12

Speed: 520 knots

Range: 5,500 nautical miles

Number: 1

Figure 9: C-38 AIA Astra SPX

Propulsion: Jet

Passenger Capacity: 7

Speed: 480 knots

Range: 2,100 nautical miles

Number: 2
Appendix II

Photographs and Descriptions of Operational 

Support Airlift Aircraft

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Figure 10: C-135 Boeing 707

Propulsion: Jet

Passenger Capacity: 20

Speed: 475 knots

Range: 5,000 nautical miles

Number: 5

Figure 11: CT-39 Rockwell−60

Propulsion: Jet

Passenger Capacity: 6

Speed: 430 knots

Range: 1,200 nautical miles

Number: 1
Appendix II

Photographs and Descriptions of Operational 

Support Airlift Aircraft

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Figure 12: CT-43 Boeing 737-200

Propulsion: Jet

Passenger Capacity: 38

Speed: 420 knots

Range: 1,800 nautical miles

Number: 1

Figure 13: UC-35A Cessna Citation

Propulsion: Jet

Passenger Capacity: 7

Speed: 420 knots

Range: 1,300 nautical miles

Number: 17
Appendix II

Photographs and Descriptions of Operational 

Support Airlift Aircraft

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Figure 14: VP/UP-3 Lockheed Electra

Propulsion: Propeller

Passenger Capacity: 37

Speed: 300 knots

Range: 4,500 nautical miles

Number: 8
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Defense

(702024) Letr Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-126 Defense Transportation

Now on pp. 11-12.

Now on p. 12.
Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of 

reports are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to 

the Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit 

cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are 

discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

Orders by visiting:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders by phone:

(202) 512-6000

fax: (202) 512-6061

TDD (202) 512-2537

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and 

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list 

from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone 

phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain 

these lists.

Orders by Internet:

For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet, 

send an e-mail message with “info” in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web home page at: 

http://www.gao.gov

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, or Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact one:

• Web site: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

• e-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

• 1-800-424-5454 (automated answering system)

United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. GI00