NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. PREMIER HOLDING CORPORATION; RANDALL LETCAVAGE,

Defendants

- Appellants,
and JOSEPH GREENBLATT,

Defendant. No. 21

- 55249
D.C. No. 8:18

- cv - 00813

- CJC

- KES

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted February 9, 2022 San Francisco, California Before: HURWITZ and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSEN, * * District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

FEB 23 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Defendants Randall Letcavage and Premier Holding Corporation appeal a summary judgmen t entered in favor of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the district court’s subsequent imposition of civil remedies. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and affirm

. We review a summary judgment de novo, with all facts and inferences being
drawn in favor of the non

- moving party. See Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. , 765 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 2014). Evidentiary rulings made in
connection with a summary judgment, including order s precluding evidence, are
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Richards , 541 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2008). A district court’s determination of appropriate remedies is
also reviewed for abuse of discretion. See SEC v. Platfo rms Wireless Int’l Corp. , 617 F.3d 1072, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010); SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp , 142 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998).
1. Letcavage challenges the district court’s preclusion order that prevented him from introducing certain evidence in oppositio n to the SEC’s motion for summary judgment. The district court ’s order was based on Letcavage’s failure to meaningfully answer the SEC’s questions during depositions and his blanket
invocation of the Fifth Amendment during the enforcement proceeding

. Eve n when
a defendant is entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment in a civil proceeding , “a district court has discretion in its response to a party’s invocation of the Fifth.” SEC3

v. Colello , 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, Letcavage refused to meaningfully answer any questions about the WePower note, the TPC assets, or his employment agreement

— the three central issues of this case. Therefore, the district court’s preclusion order was a reasonable response to Letcavage’s decision and not
an abuse of discretion

. 2. Defendants challenge the district court’s finding of scienter, which here “refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder , 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). The d istrict court did not abuse its discretion in making this determination. The district court can infer scienter
based on a defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment when “ independent evidence exists of the fact to which the party refuses to answer.” D oe ex rel. Rudy

Glanzer v. Glanzer , 232 F.3d 1258, 1264 (9th Cir. 2000). The SEC offered ample independent evidence to justify an adverse inference of scienter in this case , including numerous public and private statements by Letcavage

. 3. Finally, Defendants challenge the district court’s imposition of injunctive 1 and monetary remedies

. The district court properly analyzed the relevant
factors , including Letcavage’s repeated violations of security laws and lack of any admission of wrongdo ing , when crafting its injunctive remedies, and we find no

1 These included a permanent injunction against Defendants from committing future securities violations and a 5

- year bar preventing Letcavage from being an officer

director or trading in penny st ocks.4

abuse of discretion. See SEC v. Murphy , 626 F.2d 633, 655 (9th Cir. 1980) ; First Pac. Bancorp , 142 F.3d at 1193

. The district court’s disgorgement order was
likewise proper. Defendants object to the district court’s disgorgement calculation,
but Defendants bear the burden of proving “that the disgorgement figure was not a reasonable approximation

. ” Platforms Wirele ss , 617 F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted)

. Because Defendants failed to meet their burden of prov ing that any of the purported business expenses were actually incurred or were “legitimate , ” Liu v. SEC , 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1950 (2020) , we find no abuse of discr etion

. AFFIRMED.