# Official Journal C 366/2016

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 366 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 595 October 2016 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 366

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 595 October 2016

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| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| | RECOMMENDATIONS |
| | European Central Bank |
| 2016/C 366/01 ECB/2016/28 | Recommendation of the European Central Bank of 23 September 2016 to the Council of the European Union on the external auditors of the Banca d’Italia (ECB/2016/28) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RECOMMENDATIONS

European Central Bank

2016/C 366/01 ECB/2016/28

Recommendation of the European Central Bank of 23 September 2016 to the Council of the European Union on the external auditors of the Banca d’Italia (ECB/2016/28)

1

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| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2016/C 366/02 | Euro exchange rates | 2 |
| 2016/C 366/03 | Final Report of the Hearing Officer — Steel Abrasives (Pometon) (AT.39792) | 3 |
| 2016/C 366/04 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 25 April 2016 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39792(1) Steel Abrasives — Rapporteur: Hungary | 5 |
| 2016/C 366/05 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 23 May 2016 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39792(2) Steel Abrasives — Rapporteur: Hungary | 5 |
| 2016/C 366/06 | Summary of Commission Decision of 25 May 2016 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39792 — Steel Abrasives) (notified under document C(2016) 3121) | 6 |
| | Court of Auditors |
| 2016/C 366/07 | Special Report No 24/2016 — More efforts needed to raise awareness of and enforce compliance with State aid rules in cohesion policy | 8 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2016/C 366/02

Euro exchange rates

2

2016/C 366/03

Final Report of the Hearing Officer — Steel Abrasives (Pometon) (AT.39792)

3

2016/C 366/04

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 25 April 2016 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39792(1) Steel Abrasives — Rapporteur: Hungary

5

2016/C 366/05

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 23 May 2016 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39792(2) Steel Abrasives — Rapporteur: Hungary

5

2016/C 366/06

Summary of Commission Decision of 25 May 2016 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39792 — Steel Abrasives) (notified under document C(2016) 3121)

(notified under document C(2016) 3121)

6

Court of Auditors

2016/C 366/07

Special Report No 24/2016 — More efforts needed to raise awareness of and enforce compliance with State aid rules in cohesion policy

8

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| EN | |
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EN

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RECOMMENDATIONS

European Central Bank

| 5.10.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 366/1 |
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5.10.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 366/1

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RECOMMENDATION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

of 23 September 2016

to the Council of the European Union on the external auditors of the Banca d’Italia

(ECB/2016/28)

(2016/C 366/01)

THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,

Having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, and in particular Article 27.1 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | The accounts of the European Central Bank (ECB) and national central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro are audited by independent external auditors recommended by the ECB’s Governing Council and approved by the Council of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The accounts of the European Central Bank (ECB) and national central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro are audited by independent external auditors recommended by the ECB’s Governing Council and approved by the Council of the European Union.

| (2) | The mandate of the Banca d’Italia’s current external auditors, PriceWaterhouseCoopers SpA, ended following the audit for the financial year 2015. It is therefore necessary to appoint external auditors from the financial year 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The mandate of the Banca d’Italia’s current external auditors, PriceWaterhouseCoopers SpA, ended following the audit for the financial year 2015. It is therefore necessary to appoint external auditors from the financial year 2016.

| (3) | The Banca d’Italia has selected BDO Italia SpA as its external auditors for the financial years 2016 to 2022, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Banca d’Italia has selected BDO Italia SpA as its external auditors for the financial years 2016 to 2022,

HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that BDO Italia SpA should be appointed as the external auditors of the Banca d’Italia for the financial years 2016 to 2022.

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 23 September 2016.

The President of the ECB

Mario DRAGHI

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 5.10.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 366/2 |
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5.10.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 366/2

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Euro exchange rates (1)

4 October 2016

(2016/C 366/02)

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,1161 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 114,50 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4418 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,87540 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 9,6005 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,0949 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 8,9175 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 27,021 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 307,42 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,2936 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,4583 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 3,3883 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,4564 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,4697 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 8,6565 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,5327 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,5289 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 238,16 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 15,1834 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 7,4462 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,5070 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 14 507,07 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,6067 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 53,856 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 69,7125 |
| THB | Thai baht | 38,729 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 3,5816 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 21,5831 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 74,2035 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,1161

JPY

Japanese yen

114,50

DKK

Danish krone

7,4418

GBP

Pound sterling

0,87540

SEK

Swedish krona

9,6005

CHF

Swiss franc

1,0949

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

8,9175

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

27,021

HUF

Hungarian forint

307,42

PLN

Polish zloty

4,2936

RON

Romanian leu

4,4583

TRY

Turkish lira

3,3883

AUD

Australian dollar

1,4564

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,4697

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

8,6565

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,5327

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,5289

KRW

South Korean won

1 238,16

ZAR

South African rand

15,1834

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

7,4462

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,5070

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

14 507,07

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,6067

PHP

Philippine peso

53,856

RUB

Russian rouble

69,7125

THB

Thai baht

38,729

BRL

Brazilian real

3,5816

MXN

Mexican peso

21,5831

INR

Indian rupee

74,2035

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(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

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| 5.10.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 366/3 |
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5.10.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 366/3

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Final Report of the Hearing Officer (1)

Steel Abrasives (Pometon)

(AT.39792)

(2016/C 366/03)

This case concerns an infringement of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement consisting of price coordination throughout the EEA in the steel abrasives sector.

This case is a hybrid cartel case. The Commission has already adopted, on 2 April 2014, a decision addressed to four undertakings which opted for the cartel settlement procedure (‘the Settlement Decision’) (2). The present draft decision is addressed to Pometon SpA. (‘Pometon’), which did not introduce a settlement submission.

On 3 December 2014 the Commission adopted a statement of objections (‘SO’) against Pometon which was notified to Pometon on 5 December 2014. In the SO the Commission expressed its preliminary view that Pometon coordinated the price of steel abrasives in the EEA. In particular, the SO preliminarily concluded that Pometon colluded with other parties on a key component of the price steel abrasives, the scrap surcharge, in the EEA and also agreed with those parties not to compete on price with respect to individual customers. The Commission found that the alleged infringement took place from 3 October 2003 until 16 May 2007. In the SO the Commission indicated its intention to impose fines on Pometon pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (3).

Pometon was given access to the file at the Commission premises on 18 and 19 December 2014 as well as via CD-ROM on 19 December 2014 and it was granted a deadline of six weeks to reply to the SO which was extended, upon its request, by two weeks until 16 February 2015. Pometon replied to the SO on 13 February 2015 with a request to be heard orally.

During the oral hearing, which took place on 17 April 2015, Pometon raised, in addition to the arguments developed in its written response to the SO, concerns in relation to the impartial treatment of its case and the presumption of innocence. Firstly, Pometon complained that the Settlement Decision contained unnecessary references to it. Secondly, Pometon complained that on 23 December 2014 the Commission published on its website a provisional non-confidential version of the Settlement Decision from which the name of Pometon was not redacted. That version remained accessible on the Commission’s website until 6 January 2015, when it was replaced by a new provisional non-confidential version, in which the name of Pometon was replaced by ‘[another undertaking]’. The Director of the Cartel Directorate responded to Pometon’s second argument during the hearing, and apologised for the human mistake at the origin of the inadvertent disclosure, while assuring Pometon that the incident would not change the impartial assessment by the Commission of Pometon’s case.

As the General Court has recently confirmed (4), in a hybrid cartel case, the settlement procedure for the settling parties and the standard procedure for the non-settling parties are two separate procedures. No conclusions as to the guilt of Pometon can thus be drawn from the Settlement Decision. Moreover, it appears from recital 29 and the document referred to in footnote 32 of the Settlement Decision that the starting date for the participation of the settling party MTS (5) in the infringement, as found in the Settlement Decision, is based on an email from a manager of Pometon of that date. This made it inevitable to mention that Pometon was one of the participants of the meeting of 3 October 2003 and of the subsequent contacts. Furthermore, the Settlement Decision indicates in footnote 4 that it is not addressed to Pometon, that the references to Pometon in the factual descriptions were used exclusively to establish the liability of the settling parties, and that the proceedings against Pometon were still pending. I thus consider that Pometon’s right to respect of the presumption of innocence has not been violated by the references to Pometon in the Settlement Decision.

Finally, in my view, the apology and assurance given by the Commission services at the oral hearing constitute an adequate response to the inadvertent disclosure of Pometon’s name in the provisional non-confidential version of the Settlement Decision published on 23 December 2014, given that the disclosure resulted from a human error.

Pursuant to Article 16 of Decision 2011/695/EU, I have examined whether the draft decision deals only with objections in respect of which Pometon has been afforded the opportunity of making known its views. I conclude that it does.

Overall, I conclude that the effective exercise of procedural rights has been respected in this case.

Brussels, 24 May 2016.

Wouter WILS

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(1)  Pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of Decision 2011/695/EU of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 275, 20.10.2011, p. 29) (‘Decision 2011/695/EU’).

1

(2)  See Commission Decision C(2014) 2074 final of 2 April 2014, Summary publication in OJ C 362, 14.10.2014, p. 8 and the Final Report of the Hearing Officer (OJ C 362, 14.10.2014, p. 7).

2

(3)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).

3

(4)  Judgment in Timab Industries and CFPR v Commission, T-456/10, EU:T:2015:296, paragraphs 71 and 72.

4

Timab Industries and CFPR

Commission

(5)  Metalltechnik Schmidt GmbH & Co. KG.

5

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| 5.10.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 366/5 |
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5.10.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 366/5

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Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 25 April 2016 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39792(1) Steel Abrasives

Rapporteur: Hungary

(2016/C 366/04)

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the anticompetitive behaviour covered by the draft decision constitutes agreements and/or concerted practices between undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the anticompetitive behaviour covered by the draft decision constitutes agreements and/or concerted practices between undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the undertaking concerned by the draft decision has participated in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. |
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2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the undertaking concerned by the draft decision has participated in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the object of the agreements and/or concerted practices was to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the object of the agreements and/or concerted practices was to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the agreements and/or concerted practices have been capable of appreciably affecting trade between the Member States of the EU and EEA. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the agreements and/or concerted practices have been capable of appreciably affecting trade between the Member States of the EU and EEA.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment as regards the duration of the infringement. |
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5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment as regards the duration of the infringement.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission as regards the addressee of the decision. |
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6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission as regards the addressee of the decision.

| 7. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
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7.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

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| 5.10.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 366/5 |
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5.10.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 366/5

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Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive agreements and dominant position given at its meeting of 23 May 2016 regarding a draft decision relating to Case AT.39792(2) Steel Abrasives

Rapporteur: Hungary

(2016/C 366/05)

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that a fine should be imposed on the addressee of the draft decision. |
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1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that a fine should be imposed on the addressee of the draft decision.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the basic amount of the fine. |
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2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the basic amount of the fine.

| 3. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the determination of the duration for the purpose of calculating the fine. |
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3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the determination of the duration for the purpose of calculating the fine.

| 4. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that there are no aggravating circumstances applicable in this case. |
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4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that there are no aggravating circumstances applicable in this case.

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the reduction based on the mitigating circumstances. |
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5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the reduction based on the mitigating circumstances.

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the adaptation of the fine based on point 37 of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines. |
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6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the adaptation of the fine based on point 37 of the 2006 Guidelines on Fines.

| 7. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the final amount of the fine. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the final amount of the fine.

| 8. | The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
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8.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

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| 5.10.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 366/6 |
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5.10.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 366/6

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Summary of Commission Decision

of 25 May 2016

relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement

(Case AT.39792 — Steel Abrasives)

(notified under document C(2016) 3121)

(Only the English text is authentic)

(2016/C 366/06)

On 25 May 2016, the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
   (1)
  , the Commission herewith publishes the name of the party and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed, having regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.

1.   INTRODUCTION

| (1) | The Decision concerns the participation of the undertaking Pometon SpA (‘Pometon’) in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement in the sector of steel abrasives. The infringement for Pometon lasted from 3 October 2003 to 16 May 2007 and consisted of an agreement and/or concerted practice to coordinate the pricing of steel abrasives. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Decision concerns the participation of the undertaking Pometon SpA (‘Pometon’) in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement in the sector of steel abrasives. The infringement for Pometon lasted from 3 October 2003 to 16 May 2007 and consisted of an agreement and/or concerted practice to coordinate the pricing of steel abrasives.

| (2) | Steel abrasives are loose steel particles, either in round (steel shot) or angular (steel grit) form, with their main applications in the steel, automotive, metallurgy, petrochemical and stone cutting industries. They are produced by the atomisation of molten steel from steel scrap, followed by a series of thermal and mechanical treatments in order to give them final characteristics. The anti-competitive conduct identified in this case covers both steel shot and steel grit in all their grades. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Steel abrasives are loose steel particles, either in round (steel shot) or angular (steel grit) form, with their main applications in the steel, automotive, metallurgy, petrochemical and stone cutting industries. They are produced by the atomisation of molten steel from steel scrap, followed by a series of thermal and mechanical treatments in order to give them final characteristics. The anti-competitive conduct identified in this case covers both steel shot and steel grit in all their grades.

| (3) | In this case two decisions have been adopted: on the one hand a decision for the four undertakings that submitted a formal request to settle (2) and were addressees of the Commission Decision of 2 April 2014 (the ‘Settlement Decision’) (3) that is to say (i) Ervin (ii) Winoa; (iii) Metalltechnik Schmidt; and (iv) Eisenwerk Würth, and, on the other hand, a decision for Pometon, which did not submit a request to settle. This summary relates to the decision addressed to Pometon. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In this case two decisions have been adopted: on the one hand a decision for the four undertakings that submitted a formal request to settle (2) and were addressees of the Commission Decision of 2 April 2014 (the ‘Settlement Decision’) (3) that is to say (i) Ervin (ii) Winoa; (iii) Metalltechnik Schmidt; and (iv) Eisenwerk Würth, and, on the other hand, a decision for Pometon, which did not submit a request to settle. This summary relates to the decision addressed to Pometon.

2.   CASE DESCRIPTION

2.1.   Procedure

| (4) | The case was opened on the basis of an immunity application by Ervin. The Commission carried out unannounced inspections between 15 and 17 June 2010 at the premises of various producers of steel abrasives. |
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(4)

The case was opened on the basis of an immunity application by Ervin. The Commission carried out unannounced inspections between 15 and 17 June 2010 at the premises of various producers of steel abrasives.

| (5) | During the investigation, the Commission also sent several requests for information under Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. |
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(5)

During the investigation, the Commission also sent several requests for information under Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

| (6) | On 16 January 2013, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 against the addressee of the Decision and other four undertakings with a view to engaging in settlement discussions with them. Settlement meetings took place between February 2013 and December 2013. At the end of the negotiations Pometon decided not to submit a request to settle and therefore the Commission reverted to the standard cartel procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 16 January 2013, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 against the addressee of the Decision and other four undertakings with a view to engaging in settlement discussions with them. Settlement meetings took place between February 2013 and December 2013. At the end of the negotiations Pometon decided not to submit a request to settle and therefore the Commission reverted to the standard cartel procedure.

| (7) | On 3 December 2014, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections addressed to Pometon. |
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(7)

On 3 December 2014, the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections addressed to Pometon.

| (8) | After having been granted full access to the file, Pometon replied in writing to the Statement of Objections on 16 February 2015 and participated in an oral hearing held on 17 April 2015. |
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(8)

After having been granted full access to the file, Pometon replied in writing to the Statement of Objections on 16 February 2015 and participated in an oral hearing held on 17 April 2015.

| (9) | The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued a favourable opinion on 25 April and 23 May 2016 and the Commission adopted the Decision on 25 May 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions issued a favourable opinion on 25 April and 23 May 2016 and the Commission adopted the Decision on 25 May 2016.

2.2.   Summary of the infringement

| (10) | The Decision concerns a cartel, the ultimate aim of which was to coordinate prices of steel abrasives and to restrict price competition. In order to achieve their aim the parties engaged in anticompetitive bilateral and multilateral contacts. Those contacts were used by the parties to discuss the key price components applicable to all their EEA steel abrasives sales. In particular, Pometon used these contacts to:






  (a) | coordinate the introduction of a uniform calculation model for a common scrap surcharge — a variable surcharge that would be applicable to the price of all steel abrasives in the EEA; the common surcharge was applicable throughout the entire period of the infringement; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(10)

The Decision concerns a cartel, the ultimate aim of which was to coordinate prices of steel abrasives and to restrict price competition. In order to achieve their aim the parties engaged in anticompetitive bilateral and multilateral contacts. Those contacts were used by the parties to discuss the key price components applicable to all their EEA steel abrasives sales. In particular, Pometon used these contacts to:

(a)

coordinate the introduction of a uniform calculation model for a common scrap surcharge — a variable surcharge that would be applicable to the price of all steel abrasives in the EEA; the common surcharge was applicable throughout the entire period of the infringement;

| (b) | coordinate behaviour with respect to individual customers; the parties discussed (mainly through bilateral contacts) which parameters of competition would be allowed between them as regards individual customers: in principle price competition was restricted, which limited competition only to quality and services. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

coordinate behaviour with respect to individual customers; the parties discussed (mainly through bilateral contacts) which parameters of competition would be allowed between them as regards individual customers: in principle price competition was restricted, which limited competition only to quality and services.

| (11) | The geographic scope of the conduct was EEA-wide. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The geographic scope of the conduct was EEA-wide.

2.3.   Remedies

| (12) | The Decision applies the 2006 Guidelines on Fines (4) and imposes fines on Pometon. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The Decision applies the 2006 Guidelines on Fines (4) and imposes fines on Pometon.

2.3.1.   Basic amount of the fine

| (13) | In setting the fines, the Commission took into account the sales of Pometon in the markets concerned in the last year prior to the end of the cartel, the fact that price coordination arrangements are amongst the most harmful restrictions of competition, the duration of the infringement and it covered the entire EEA. The basic amount of the fine is set at 16 % of the value of the relevant sales as defined above and the additional amount at 16 % in order to deter undertakings from entering into price coordination practices. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

In setting the fines, the Commission took into account the sales of Pometon in the markets concerned in the last year prior to the end of the cartel, the fact that price coordination arrangements are amongst the most harmful restrictions of competition, the duration of the infringement and it covered the entire EEA. The basic amount of the fine is set at 16 % of the value of the relevant sales as defined above and the additional amount at 16 % in order to deter undertakings from entering into price coordination practices.

2.3.2.   Adjustments to the basic amount: aggravating or mitigating circumstances

| (14) | The Commission did not apply any aggravating circumstances. The Commission considered that mitigating circumstances apply to Pometon, since evidence showed that it contributed to a lesser extent than other parties in maintaining the arrangement on coordination on individual customers. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The Commission did not apply any aggravating circumstances. The Commission considered that mitigating circumstances apply to Pometon, since evidence showed that it contributed to a lesser extent than other parties in maintaining the arrangement on coordination on individual customers.

2.3.3.   Adaption of the adjusted basic amount

| (15) | In view of the specific circumstances of this case, the Commission exercised its discretion in accordance with point 37 of the 2006 Fines Guidelines and adapted the fine of Pometon at a level that is proportionate to the infringement and achieves a sufficiently deterrent effect. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In view of the specific circumstances of this case, the Commission exercised its discretion in accordance with point 37 of the 2006 Fines Guidelines and adapted the fine of Pometon at a level that is proportionate to the infringement and achieves a sufficiently deterrent effect.

2.3.4.   Application of the 10 % turnover limit

| (16) | Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 provides that the fine imposed for each infringement shall not exceed 10 % of the undertaking’s total turnover relating to the business year preceding the date of the Commission Decision. |
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(16)

Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 provides that the fine imposed for each infringement shall not exceed 10 % of the undertaking’s total turnover relating to the business year preceding the date of the Commission Decision.

| (17) | In this case, the fine does not exceed 10 % of Pometon total turnover for 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

In this case, the fine does not exceed 10 % of Pometon total turnover for 2015.

3.   CONCLUSION

| (18) | The following fine was imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003:






  (a) | Pometon: EUR 6 197 000. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(18)

The following fine was imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003:

(a)

Pometon: EUR 6 197 000.

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(1)  OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1.

(2)  Article 10a(2) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 as regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases.

(3)  C(2014) 2074 Final, OJ C 362, 14.10.2014, p. 8.

(4)  OJ C 210, 1.9.2006, p. 2.

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Court of Auditors

| 5.10.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 366/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.10.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 366/8

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Special Report No 24/2016

‘More efforts needed to raise awareness of and enforce compliance with State aid rules in cohesion policy’

(2016/C 366/07)

The European Court of Auditors hereby informs you that Special Report No 24/2016 ‘More efforts needed to raise awareness of and enforce compliance with State aid rules in cohesion policy’ has just been published.

The report can be accessed for consultation or downloading on the European Court of Auditors' website: http://eca.europa.eu or on EU Bookshop: https://bookshop.europa.eu

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