U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

97–268PDF 2015

NORTH KOREA: BACK ON THE STATE SPONSOR

OF TERRORISM LIST?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 22, 2015

Serial No. 114–118

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Sung Kim, Special Representative for North Korea Policy, 

U.S. Department of the State ............................................................................. 5

Ms. Hilary Batjer Johnson, Deputy Coordinator for Homeland Security, 

Screening, and Designations, Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department 

of State .................................................................................................................. 12

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Sung Kim: Prepared statement .................................................... 8

Ms. Hilary Batjer Johnson: Prepared statement .................................................. 14

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 30

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 31

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade: Internet link for material submitted for the record .............................. 32

Written responses from Ms. Hilary Batjer Johnson to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State of California ....................................................................... 33

(1)

NORTH KOREA: BACK ON THE STATE 

SPONSOR OF TERRORISM LIST? 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject 

to the limitations in the rules. 

In 1987, North Korea bombed Korean Air Flight 858, killing 115 

people. For its role in the bombing and its history of other terrorist 

acts, North Korea was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism 

from 1988 to 2008. 

In 2008, North Korea was taken off the list of state sponsors of 

terrorism, not because most of the reasons cited in the State Department had changed. Instead, the decision, to me, was purely 

diplomatic and based on the nuclear agreement reached as a result 

of the Six-Party Talks. North Korea was to freeze and disable its 

nuclear program. In exchange, the United States would remove 

North Korea from the state sponsor of terrorism list. 

The agreement fell apart because North Korea did not hold up 

its end of this bargain. Since 2008, North Korea has made significant advances in its nuclear program. North Korea conducted two 

nuclear weapons tests since 2008: One in 2009 and one in 2013. 

Earlier this month, there were rumors of yet another test in the 

works that may come. 

The other reasons the State Department cited for keeping North 

Korea on the state sponsors of terrorism list for 20 years are still 

relevant today. North Korea had a long history of abducting Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. Some of these kidnapped Japanese are still unaccounted for. North Korea has maintained its 

support for terrorist organizations. North Korea harbored Japanese 

Red Army terrorists who participated in the hijacking of a jet in 

1970. These terrorists are still living peaceably in North Korea 

today. 

In 2009 alone, three North Korean arms shipments bound for 

terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas were seized by the 

UAE, Israel, and Thailand. In 2014, Western security sources reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:08 Dec 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\102215\97268 SHIRL
2

ported that Hamas brokered an agreement to purchase communications equipment and rockets from North Korea. Hamas fighters reportedly used North Korean anti-tank guided missiles against 

Israel as recently as 2014. 

A U.S. district court ruling in 2014 determined that North Korea 

materially supported Hezbollah’s terrorist attacks in Israel in 2006. 

And, without objection, the Chair will submit to the record the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the plaintiffs in cause of action 10–483, where the Federal judge, and I 

quote, on page 4:

‘‘The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

Hezbollah carried out the rocket attacks that caused plaintiffs’ 

injuries and that North Korea provided material support. 

North Korea provided Hezbollah with a variety of material 

support, including a professional military and intelligence 

training and assistance in building a massive network of underground military installations, tunnels, bunkers, depots, and 

storage facilities in southern Lebanon.’’

And it continues. And that will be a part of the record. 

North Korea’s ties to these terrorists do not end with the weapons sales. North Korean experts advised both Hezbollah and 

Hamas in the construction of their terrorist tunnel networks. 

Beyond its ongoing ties to terrorist groups, North Korea remains 

a major proliferator of weapons of mass destruction. North Korea 

has cooperated with Iran on ballistic missiles since in the 1980s. 

North Korea is now believed to be working on an intercontinental 

ballistic system. If fully developed, this missile could drop a nuclear 

bomb as far away as the United States. 

There is growing evidence that Iran and North Korea are cooperating on developing nuclear capabilities. North Korea helped set up 

the nuclear reactor in Syria, which could have been used to 

produce plutonium for a nuclear weapon. Since 2009, several North 

Korean shipments of equipment used in chemical weapons programs have been directed to Syria. U.S. Government officials have 

also said that North Korea provided nuclear material to Libya in 

the 2000s. 

North Korea engages in the harassment, abduction, and murder 

of refugees, dissidents, and foreigners attempting to help North Koreans defect. The most prominent of these cases is the abduction 

and murder of Reverend Kim Dong-sik, a U.S. permanent resident 

from northeastern China. 

North Korean cyber attacks have reportedly targeted the Web 

sites of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 

Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, and others. Last year, 

North Korea carried out a cyber attack against Sony pictures that 

included direct threats against its employees and warning to ‘‘remember the 11 of September 2001.’’

Meanwhile, the administration has been exercising a policy of 

‘‘strategic patience’’ against North Korea. As a judge, it certainly 

wouldn’t have been good policy for me to have strategic patience for 

the criminals committing crimes in Texas. 

North Korea has not stopped sponsoring terrorism, even if our 

Government has said it has. The Kim regime not only fails to take 

3

substantial steps to combat terrorism, it has provided weapons and 

other support to designated foreign terrorist organizations. 

So North Korea is still manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, and its nuclear program has grown more advanced than in 

2008. So it appears that North Korea’s actions have gotten bolder 

and more flagrant. So the purpose of this hearing is to consider 

putting North Korea back on the state sponsor of terrorism list. 

The Chair now yields to the ranking member from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for his opening statement. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you, Chairman Poe, for conducting this 

hearing. 

And I thank our witnesses for being here today. 

North Korea is a rogue state which engages in all sorts of nefarious activities. This is not in dispute. The North Korean regime is 

involved in international organized crime, perpetrates terrible 

human rights abuses on its own citizens, and continually engages 

in internationally provocative actions. 

Its nuclear capabilities remain an ever-present threat for its 

neighbors and for the United States. North Korea has not held 

back from conducting nuclear tests, engaging in cyber attacks, and 

ratcheting up military tensions with South Korea. North Korea’s 

continuation of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs is a direct 

violation of numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions and previously held commitments. Even more disturbing, because of the 

regime’s desperation, its need for hard currency make proliferation 

and extortion an ongoing threat. 

With these violations in mind, I, along with Chairman Poe, cosponsored legislation introduced by Chairman Royce in this Congress to improve the enforcement of sanctions against North Korea. 

It is important that we, along with our allies, uphold our commitments to North Korea’s denuclearization. It is also important that 

North Korea face consequences when intentionally engaged in prohibited activities. 

With respect to North Korea’s ties to terrorism, I remain concerned about reports of potential recent North Korean support of 

Hamas and Hezbollah and reports of attempted and successful 

kidnappings and assassinations of North Korean dissidents living 

abroad. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding these reports and, more generally, how the State Department currently assesses whether North Korea is a state sponsor of terrorism and 

what factors it considers when making this assessment. 

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlemen from Massachusetts. 

The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Sherman, for an opening statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

This hearing raises a number of questions. Clearly, for reasons 

both prior speakers have indicated, North Korea deserves to be on 

the list of state sponsors of terrorism. So we will want to know why 

we took them off, why we haven’t put them back on, and why Congress just sits by and lets the executive branch make all the foreign 

policy decisions, where, in this case, the decision to take them off 

and leave them off is so questionable. 

4

But then we look at House leadership, which seems to be putting 

us in a position where the foreign ops bill is going to be presented 

to Congress in a way in which no member of this committee can 

offer an amendment. No Member of the House will be able to offer 

an amendment. And I look forward to working with people here to 

make sure that just because you stick it in an omnibus bill doesn’t 

mean you can have a whole year or, in this case, several years of 

foreign ops appropriations with no Member of the House and certainly no member of the Foreign Affairs Committee being able to 

offer an amendment. 

A decade ago, North Korea wanted a nonaggression pact with the 

United States. We turned them down because we don’t do nonaggression pacts, which is perhaps the silliest reason not to do it. 

Just, ‘‘Well, we don’t do that here.’’ Now they want a peace treaty. 

I don’t think we should give it to them unless we get something 

in return, but to dismiss it out of hand seems absurd. 

We have taken them off the terrorist list. I don’t think we got 

much for it. 

I want to focus our attention on their—we had hearings in this 

subcommittee with my Asia Subcommittee and others on the North 

Korea-Iran alliance. I got to spend an hour with the President in 

the Oval Office. It is amazing how nice the administration is before 

you announce your position on the Iran deal. And I spent most of 

that time focusing on the possibility of a transfer of fissile material 

from North Korea to Iran. 

Well, where are we at present? We have one country that desperately wants nuclear weapons and is about to get its hands on, 

let us say, $100-billion-plus of money. We have another country 

that has nuclear weapons and fissile material and desperately 

needs money. What could go wrong? And, certainly, just North Korea’s nuclear involvement with Syria and Iran is reason enough to 

put them on all of the lists. 

Israel, roughly 5 years ago, 6 years ago, took out the Al Kibar 

nuclear facility. The sole purpose of that facility was to help Syrian 

and/or Iran develop nuclear weapons. At that time, North Korea 

was unwilling to sell, or apparently unwilling to sell, fissile material because I think they need about a dozen nuclear weapons to 

defend themselves from us, or at least the speculation is that that 

is what they think they need. Well, now they will be creating 

enough fissile material for four additional nuclear weapons every 

year. 

Now, I am not saying their thirteenth weapon goes on eBay, but 

they have already sold for hundreds of millions of dollars nuclear 

technology to Syria and/or Syria and Iran. One would suspect more 

Iran than Syria. And now Iran has a lot more money. And North 

Korea has more fissile material than it needs as its minimum defense requirement. 

So I think we should focus not only on what terrorist and proliferation activities North Korea has engaged in but what they are 

likely to do in the future. 

I thank you for the time, and I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Without objection, all the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made part of the record. I ask that each witness keep 

their presentation to no more than 5 minutes. I will introduce each 

5

witness and then give time for their statements, and then questions will follow. 

Ambassador Kim is the Special Representative for North Korean 

Policy and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Korea and Japan. 

Previously Ambassador Kim served as Special Envoy for the SixParty Talks and is a former prosecutor. 

Mrs. Hilary Batjer Johnson is the Deputy Coordinator for Homeland Security, Screening, and Designations in the Bureau of Counterterrorism. Ms. Johnson oversees the designations of foreign terrorist organizations and individuals under authorities of the Secretary of State. 

Ambassador Kim, we will start with you, and you have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SUNG KIM, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NORTH KOREA POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE 

Mr. KIM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for inviting me today, along with Deputy 

Coordinator Johnson, to testify about the global security threat 

posed by North Korea. 

North Korea’s provocative and repressive policies and actions 

constitute one of the most difficult and complicated challenges the 

United States faces. Mr. Chairman, we share your concerns about 

the grave threat posed by North Korea. 

Multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions require 

North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs 

and prohibit countries from engaging with the DPRK to buy or sell 

weapons and related items and technologies. North Korea itself 

committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 

programs in the Six-Party process. 

Yet North Korea continues to violate these commitments and obligations through its pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and its proliferation of weapons and technologies abroad. This 

conduct poses a growing threat to the United States, our friends in 

the region, and the global nonproliferation regime. 

We are committed to using the full range of tools—deterrence, diplomacy, and pressure—to counter the threat and to make clear: 

North Korea will not achieve security or prosperity while the regime pursues nuclear weapons, abuses its own people, and rejects 

its obligations and commitments. 

We have refused to respond to North Korean provocations with 

concessions. Instead, since 2009, we have tightened sanctions and 

consistently underscored to the DPRK that the path to a brighter 

future begins with authentic and credible negotiations that produce 

concrete denuclearization steps. 

Part of our effort to change North Korea’s strategic calculus is 

maintaining the strongest possible deterrent capabilities. The 

DPRK should have no doubt that the United States stands ready 

to defend our interests and our allies. In this, we could have no 

better partners than in our allies in Seoul and Tokyo. We have 

made it a priority to modernize these alliances for the 21st century, 

6

and this important goal was reaffirmed during the recent visits 

here by President Park and Prime Minister Abe. 

By maintaining credible deterrence and by applying sustained 

sanctions pressure on the regime, we increase the cost to the DPRK 

of its destructive policy choices. Vigorous sanctions enforcement is 

the key to cracking down on North Korea’s proliferation activities 

which finance and facilitate North Korea’s dangerous programs. 

Strong sanctions implementation also helps prevent North Korea’s 

weapons from spreading, potentially destabilizing other global 

hotspots or reaching groups that would seek to harm the United 

States and our allies. 

We of course monitor very closely all available intelligence on 

North Korea’s global arms trade, and we take action, together with 

our partners, to mitigate those transactions and to impose consequences on those responsible. 

In January, President Obama issued a new Executive order giving us an important, powerful, and broad new sanctions tool. We 

immediately began using this Executive order to apply additional 

pressure on wrongdoers in the DPRK, imposing sanctions against 

the DPRK’s primary intelligence agency known to be responsible 

for its cyber operations as well as its main arms trade agency and 

several of its overseas arms dealers, and we will continue to use 

this new tool, along with our other sanctions authorities. 

Our sanctions are always more effective when supported by our 

partners, and so we have focused on strengthening multilateral 

sanctions against North Korea. The sanctions that we have successfully pushed for in the United Nations Security Council give 

countries the authorities they need to crack down on North Korea’s 

proliferation networks. 

When North Korea’s major shipping firm was involved in an illegal weapons shipment, we led efforts at the United Nations to 

sanction the firm. Since then, the company’s ships have been denied port entry, scrapped, impounded, or confined to their 

homeports in North Korea, and the shipping firm has lost its contracts with many foreign-owned ships. 

We have engaged countries across Southeast Asia, Africa, and 

the Middle East that have been targeted by North Korea for proliferation-related activities, reminding them of their obligation to 

implement United Nations sanctions and strengthening their capacity to do so. As a result of our outreach, key countries have reemphasized their commitment to the United Nations Security 

Council sanctions and have taken some positive steps on enforcement. 

We also continually review all available intelligence to determine 

whether North Korea is subject to additional measures. Naturally, 

this includes reviewing available information to determine whether 

the facts indicate the DPRK should be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. 

Equally important is North Korea’s political isolation, driven by 

the overwhelming international consensus that North Korea cannot 

fully participate in the international community until it abides by 

its obligations and commitments. We have built that consensus 

through our active and principled diplomacy, and that diplomacy, 

of course, begins with our partners in the Six-Party process: South 

7

Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Our coordination ensures that, 

wherever Pyongyang turns, it hears a strong, unwavering message 

that it must live to up to its obligations. 

Mr. Chairman, holding North Korea accountable and combating 

its illicit activities requires a sustained and international effort. We 

and our partners will continue to deploy the full range of tools—

deterrence, pressure, and diplomacy—to counter the threat and to 

lead Pyongyang to different choices. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kim follows:]

8


97268a-1.eps
9


97268a-2.eps
10


97268a-3.eps
11


97268a-4.eps
12

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes Ms. Johnson for your opening 

statement. You have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MS. HILARY BATJER JOHNSON, DEPUTY COORDINATOR FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, SCREENING, AND 

DESIGNATIONS, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to join my 

colleague, Special Representative for North Korea Policy Sung Kim, 

to testify today about the process for designating a country as a 

state sponsor of terrorism and North Korea’s designation in 1988. 

Special Representative Kim already expressed our shared concern for the global security threat posed by North Korea and summarized clearly our policy and tools of deterrence, diplomacy, and 

pressure. So, with the chairman’s permission, I would like to briefly outline the criteria and the process for designating a country as 

a state sponsor of terrorism ahead of our broader discussions. 

First, in order to designate a country as a state sponsor of terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine that the government 

of such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. The standard for applying and rescinding this 

designation are set out in the three separate statutes: Section 620A 

of the Foreign Assistance Act; section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act; and section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act. The 

standard for designation is the same in all three. 

In making such a determination, the Secretary’s evaluation generally includes but is not limited to the following criteria. And, I 

if may, I will read those as well: Allowing the use of its territory 

as a safe haven from extradition or prosecution for terrorist activity; furnishing arms, explosives, or lethal substances to individuals, 

groups, or organizations with the likelihood that they will be used 

in terrorist activities; providing logistical support, such as transportation, to individuals, groups, or organizations involved with terrorist activities; providing safe houses or headquarters for any individuals, groups, or organizations involved with terrorist activities; 

planning, directing, providing training, or assisting in the execution of terrorist activities; providing direct or indirect financial 

backing for terrorist activities; and providing direct or indirect diplomatic facilities, such as support or documentation, intended to 

aid or abet terrorist activities. 

A state-sponsor-of-terrorism designation is made only after careful review of all available evidence in its entirety to determine if 

a country meets the statutory criteria for designation. Such a designation involves a number of laws, and the four main categories 

of sanctions of an SST would include: A ban on arms-related exports and sales; restrictions over exports of dual-use items; restrictions on foreign assistance; and imposition of miscellaneous trade 

and other restrictions, including potential liability in U.S. courts 

for acts that fall within the terrorism exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 

The Secretary of State designated North Korea as a state sponsor 

of terrorism on January 20, 1988, for repeatedly providing support 

13

of acts of international terrorism, particularly the bombing of Korean Airlines Flight 858 on November 29, 1987, that killed 115 people and the Rangoon bombing of 1983 that killed 17, including 4 

South Korean cabinet ministers. 

After a thorough review conducted in accordance with the relevant statutory criteria for SST recision, on October 11, 2008, 

North Korea’s state-sponsor-of-terrorism designation was rescinded. 

In May 2015, the United States recertified North Korea as a 

country not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, 

pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as 

amended. In making this annual determination, the Department of 

State reviewed North Korea’s overall level of cooperation with U.S. 

efforts to combat terrorism, taking into account U.S. counterterrorism objectives with North Korea and a realistic assessment of 

North Korea’s capabilities. 

Of note, the standards are different for certification as a notfully-cooperating country versus the designation of a state sponsor 

of terrorism. The determination of whether a country is not fully 

cooperating is made based on a review of the country’s cooperation 

with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, whereas, again, a state-sponsorof-terrorism determination is based on whether a country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. 

In addition to annually reviewing North Korea’s certification as 

a not-fully-cooperating country, the Department of State regularly 

reviews the available information and intelligence on North Korea 

to determine whether the facts indicate that it should be, once 

again, designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. These judgements are not based solely on the news of the day, and we look systematically at what has been done to make these determinations. 

In conclusion, I would like to thank you and the subcommittee 

for the opportunity to appear today along with my colleague, Special Representative Kim, to outline the state-sponsor-of-terrorism 

process and its history with respect to North Korea, and I am 

happy to answer any questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]

14


97268b-1.eps
15


97268b-2.eps
16


97268b-3.eps
17

Mr. POE. Thank you both. 

When North Korea was put on the state sponsor of terrorism list, 

and whatever the reasons were it was put on, which of those no 

longer apply today in 2015? 

Ms. JOHNSON. So, when we rescinded the SST designation, we 

again go back through the statutory criteria, which require us to 

go back 6 months that they are listed for the review and determine. 

And so, at this point, from 2008 on, we, again, review all credible 

information, all information and intelligence from all sources, and, 

again, we look to corroborate that, make sure——

Mr. POE. So which of those that were available to you that you 

said, ‘‘These are the reasons we are putting them on the state 

sponsor of terrorism’’—which of those no longer apply in 2015? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Well, I would have to look at what exactly was included in the recision package. But, again, for recision, it is really 

only a looking back—for the statute requirements—is looking back 

at 6 months, did they commit any acts of international terrorism. 

And they also must produce assurances that say they will not commit or provide support for acts of international terrorism going forward. That is the requirement for the SST statute for recision. 

Mr. POE. All right. 

Ambassador Kim, does North Korea have nuclear weapons? 

Mr. KIM. So I think in this setting it is difficult for me to answer 

clearly, but, obviously, we are very concerned about the advances 

they have made in their nuclear program. 

Mr. POE. Are they developing ICBMs? 

Mr. KIM. Well, again, very concerned about the advances they 

have made in their delivery capabilities. 

Mr. POE. And are they working with Iran in the development of 

ICBMs? 

Mr. KIM. So we have long been concerned about relations between Iran and North Korea, and this is a matter that we watch 

very closely. We have a number of sanctions, both multilateral and 

U.S. Sanctions, that prohibit any such dealings. And this is obviously something that we will pursue vigorously whenever we have 

credible information. 

Mr. POE. Ambassador and Ms. Johnson, are you familiar with 

the District Court for the District of Columbia case that I cited earlier, Kaplan v. Hezbollah case? I am sure you have read it. Let me 

read you another portion that I have not read from the district 

judge, July 23, 2014:

‘‘Moreover, North Korea worked in concert with Iran and Syria 

to provide rocket and missile components for Hezbollah . . .’’

Hezbollah terrorist organization.

‘‘North Korea sent these rocket and missile components to 

Iran, where they assembled and shipped to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria. These rocket and missile components were intended by North Korea and Hezbollah to be used and were, in 

fact, used by Hezbollah to carry out rocket and missile attacks 

against Israeli civilian targets.’’

Now, to me, that sounds like a terrorist act on the end. Would 

that information be used to consider or reconsider putting North 

18

Korea back on the state sponsor of terrorism list? Either one or 

both of you. 

Ms. JOHNSON. I will go ahead first. 

So I wouldn’t want to comment on the alleged activities in the 

district court ruling. Again, I think we—and I believe——

Mr. POE. Well, assume they are true. Just assume that is true. 

Whether you agree or not, assume it is true. The judge says this, 

but—I don’t want to violate any security things, but assume that 

is true. Would that be, as we called it in law school, a weight factor 

to consider putting them back on the list as a state sponsor of terrorism? 

Ms. JOHNSON. So, again, I would go back to the statutory criteria 

requires us to look at all available evidence. We would, again, look 

at unclassified information, press reporting, other information, including intelligence. And, again, we would be verifying——

Mr. POE. Okay. Excuse me, Ms. Johnson. You read the criteria. 

I gave you some examples. Would that fit the criteria? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Well, I don’t want to get into hypotheticals. So, 

again, you would have to look at a variety of information and 

sources, again, look if it is, you know, true, credible, corroborated. 

And you look at it in its entirety. 

So I can’t speculate, again, on alleged activities and be able to 

comment——

Mr. POE. Well, that information is disturbing. Would you not 

agree? 

Ms. JOHNSON. A lot of activities in North Korea——

Mr. POE. Mr. Kim? 

Mr. KIM. If I may, if true—and I think you are asking us to assume that that report is true, that allegation is true—certainly, it 

would be a relevant factor for consideration in determining whether North Korea meets the criteria of having repeatedly supported 

acts of international terrorism. 

Mr. POE. All right. 

And my understanding is that the policy of the administration in 

dealing with North Korea is strategic patience. Is that correct? 

Mr. KIM. Sir, no. I think the term ‘‘strategic patience’’ was used 

to describe an approach we were taking to any resumption of negotiations. And the idea was that we wanted to avoid the mistakes 

that had been made previously with attempts at negotiations with 

the North Koreans, so we wanted to be more cautious about resuming the negotiations, that we weren’t going to rush back to negotiations, that we weren’t going to offer any concessions to North Koreans in order to get them to the table. 

We wanted to coordinate very closely with our partners. We 

wanted to deliver to them—we wanted to make sure that we gave 

us the best chance possible to actually making some lasting concrete progress on the inquisition. 

It was not meant to describe our policy. I think our policy is what 

we both described, which is the combination of deterrence, pressure, sanctions, as well as diplomacy. 

Mr. POE. All right. I am out of time. 

I will yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, 

who talks faster than I do. 

Mr. KEATING. We both have accents, just different ones. 

19

Again, thank you for being here. 

I just want to just dwell on one practical aspect of this. What 

practical effect would the designation of North Korea as a state 

sponsor of terrorism have? I mean, they are already heavily sanctioned. There are not many countries more isolated economically in 

the world than they are. 

So, if this occurred, hypothetically, what other added restrictions 

would be in place? And what would be the effect if it was symbolic? 

Would that have a practical and an important effect, too? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Well, again, if I may, so the SST designation leads 

to bans on arms-related exports and sales, controls over exports of 

dual-use items, restrictions on foreign assistance, and other miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. 

So when you look at North Korea currently, which is one of the 

heaviest sanctioned countries around, there is no real practical—

I mean, practically speaking, it would not enhance or necessarily 

alter any of the current sanctions that are applicable to the DPRK 

at this time. 

Mr. KEATING. Yeah. What do you think in terms of a symbol or 

message that that would make? 

Mr. KIM. I mean, I think there is obviously some symbolic value 

in designating them as a state sponsor of terrorism, but only if 

they actually meet the criteria for that designation. 

If I may, sir, I would just add, I mean, sort of, the flip side of 

your question is, did they gain anything when we delisted them? 

And I think the answer is the same. Because, as you pointed out, 

they are so heavily sanctioned already, both multilaterally and unilaterally, that they really did not gain anything from delisting 

other than whatever symbolic appreciation they might have had. 

Mr. KEATING. Yeah. Just as a process, how does the Department 

factor in, in this instance North Korea but in any instance, participation in cyber attacks and cyber crime when determining whether 

it is a designated state sponsor of terrorism? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Yeah, and I think, cyber being new, you know, it 

is an important area. 

Mr. KEATING. Yeah. 

Ms. JOHNSON. And so we would look at all of that information. 

And, again, cyber acts is something we would look at. And, again, 

we would look at the statute, its repeated acts, and, again, if it 

meets the criteria. 

So, again, looking at all intelligence related to a particular cyber 

attack, we would definitely take a look at it closely. 

Mr. KEATING. Yeah. 

And, again, getting to the process, as a whole, of the designation, 

is it—you know, some of the bad acts they are doing and some of 

the actors they are involved with are actual state sponsors. Can 

you comment on how the fact that these are state actors, how that 

might affect the designation process? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Well, I mean, it is certainly alarming for us that 

the DPRK has close relationships with Iran and Syria, both state 

sponsors of terrorism. But, again, we go back to the legal criteria, 

and we look at it very closely, of course, because these are state 

sponsors of terrorism. And we, again, look for repeated acts and, 

again, verifying and corroborating and making sure credible inforVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:08 Dec 10, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\102215\97268 SHIRL
20

mation exists if there are linkages there, and, again, looking at the 

relevant criteria. 

Mr. KEATING. Yeah. 

Now, I know that we are limited, and that is what is a little frustrating in a, you know, open setting. So, to the extent you can—

you can follow through in a classified setting, of course—but touching on the support of Hezbollah and Hamas, what would that have 

as an impact in the designation to any country? 

Ms. JOHNSON. And, again, we would be very concerned with any 

relationships with foreign terrorist organizations and, again, would 

go back to look at, again, repeated acts. I mean, it sounds very 

process-oriented, but it is, to make sure that the standard remains 

the same. Again, are they doing repeated acts or support for acts 

of international terrorism, and then again looking at the intelligence to see if that backs it up to make——

Mr. KEATING. Yeah. Clearly, would you weigh—it would be much 

more influential than perhaps state acts, working with state actions of——

Ms. JOHNSON. Yeah, the concern—I mean, very much a concern 

of state sponsors of terrorism, or STS. 

Mr. KEATING. All right. 

Well, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back because we are limited in 

the terms of what we can ask in an open setting along the lines 

that I was going to pursue. So I yield back my time. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

The Chair will yield to the gentleman from California, Colonel 

Cook, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am not an attorney, so I don’t understand a lot of the process 

you are talking about. And I thank my lucky stars. 

Ms. JOHNSON. I am not either, if that helps. 

Mr. COOK. But the answers you gave there about what you would 

have to do, I kind of get the feeling that it would take a nuclear 

event and then it might take 6 months to examine the radioactive 

material that would be available before you made a decision. 

And I am being somewhat caustic, maybe sarcastic, but it almost 

seems that you are very, very reluctant to establish what line they 

have to cross that they haven’t already crossed. Because I thought 

they would have met this based upon their past behavior and the 

terrorist groups that they are associated with. 

Ms. JOHNSON. I appreciate the question. 

I would definitely say that we take this very seriously, and ‘‘seriously’’ means we look, again, at all of the relevant criteria and intelligence and information. And I don’t think we want to put countries on the list willy-nilly, so we do a very close examination of 

all the evidence. 

Mr. COOK. Well, it is hard to think of another country that 

should be closer to the all-star list there, in terms of their behavior. 

All right. We will switch gears. I am one of those ones that I 

think they are just going to thumb their noses at us. But there is 

one country in the area there that can make a difference and will 

probably, and that is China. Do you agree with that, that if they 

were going to change their behavior in a lot of ways, that the fulcrum point is China? 

21

Mr. KIM. Sir, there is no question that China has a special relationship with North Korea, that they have significant leverage over 

North Korea. And we have urged China to exercise that leverage, 

use their leverage more effectively to persuade Pyongyang to start 

making some smart, positive decisions. 

Obviously, there is more that the Chinese can do. But I can assure you that they have made very clear publicly, including when 

Xi Jinping was here just a few weeks ago, that they remain committed to the shared goal of denuclearization and that they strongly oppose any actions by North Korea in violation of Security Council resolutions. 

We will continue to work with the Chinese to try to persuade 

them that they need to be doing more, they need to be doing more 

effectively, to persuade North Korea back to some credible negotiations, to persuade them to take some concrete actions toward 

denuclearization. 

Mr. COOK. So, officially, the word from China to us is they will 

not get involved. That is my understanding. 

Mr. KIM. Well, I don’t think that is accurate, sir. I mean, I 

think——

Mr. COOK. It is not? You just admitted, you said that they were 

the one country that probably has the most leverage over that. And 

they came here and everything, and if we ask them point-blank, 

the one country there to make a difference, so that they can perhaps save lives or cut down on this influence, and we don’t want 

to go there? Or am I misunderstanding this? 

Mr. KIM. No, sir, I wasn’t suggesting that the Chinese are not 

doing anything or that they are not working with us at all. What 

we have seen has not been completely satisfactory. And this is why 

we are continuing to remind the Chinese that North Korea’s irresponsible behavior and repressive actions hurt China’s own interests, and, therefore, Beijing needs to get more serious, more focused about persuading North Korea. 

Mr. COOK. But they haven’t done it yet, and they won’t do it. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. KIM. I think they are continuing to make an effort, but, obviously, less than satisfactory from our perspective. 

Mr. COOK. Effort means a communique to North Korea, ‘‘Hey, 

knock off the following events. Do this. It is in the best interest of 

North Korea and China and everyone else to do it.’’ Have they done 

anything? Obviously, I am being allegorical here to a certain extent. 

Mr. KIM. I mean, I can tell you that Chinese efforts and sanctions enforcement and implementation have improved over recent 

years. Is it perfect? No. But we have seen tighter border controls. 

We have seen stricter controls over export of dual-use items from 

China to North Korea. So we have seen some improvements, but 

we need to see more is what I am trying to say. 

Mr. COOK. Well, I am running out of time here. I don’t agree 

with you. I don’t agree that China has leaned on them at all. And 

I don’t even think they have agreed to the United States that they 

are going to lean on them. And I think they are the country that 

probably has the most influence. 

And I yield back. 

22

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from California. 

The Chair now recognizes the other gentleman from California, 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I think the previous gentleman from California 

had it right. China is subsidizing North Korea, and China will occasionally send us a statement that says they love us very much 

and they wish that North Korea wasn’t acting so badly. 

When we threaten or impose taxes on Chinese exports to the 

United States, we will get their attention. Until then, we will get 

statements that I describe as love letters—they may even have little hearts directly from President Xi—saying that they love us very 

much and they share our goals. 

We may need to clarify the state-sponsor-of-terrorism statute because, Ms. Johnson, is there any doubt that—let’s say Syria engages is planning terrorism, and they go to North Korea and say, 

‘‘Hey, you guys have a special explosive that will help us blow up 

more people.’’ North Korea provides it to Syria. And Syria, not a 

nonstate actor, Syria itself commits the act of terrorism and kills 

extra people because they have the good explosives. 

Are you saying that, under the statue, it is unclear that that 

would get a country put on the state sponsor of terrorism list? 

After all, they didn’t help a terrorist group; they didn’t carry out 

an act of terrorism themselves. They just supplied special terrorist 

equipment to another state sponsor of terrorism. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you for the question. 

I would say that, again, we look back to the statue, which says 

repeated acts, that they would provide support for repeated acts of 

international terrorism. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Let’s say they did it four or five times, but 

all of their aid was to a state actor, not a nonstate actor. 

Ms. JOHNSON. So we would look at the intelligence and the available information to be able see——

Mr. SHERMAN. Say it is perfect intelligence; five times, they provided things to Syria that Syria used for terrorism. They are building the barrel bombs. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Well, I don’t want to get into hypotheticals, but I 

would say, again, we would look at all——

Mr. SHERMAN. How can I possibly understand how you interpret 

this statute if we don’t get into hypotheticals? 

I am asking you a simple question. Is support for a state sponsor 

of terrorism a reason to put a country on the state sponsor of terrorism list? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Again, we would look at——

Mr. SHERMAN. ‘‘We would look at’’—can you give me an answer? 

Okay. Look, it is pretty obvious you are not following the statute. 

Mr. Kim, North Korea abducted Japanese citizens. Are some of 

them still imprisoned in North Korea, as far as you know? 

Mr. KIM. So we don’t have that information. In fact——

Mr. SHERMAN. Have they returned the bones, or have they returned the people? All of them. I know they have done on occasion. 

Mr. KIM. No. 

Mr. SHERMAN. No. Okay. So I would think that kidnapping Japanese citizens is an act of terrorism not only on the day you kidnap 

them but a month later when you are still holding them, 10 years 

23

later when you are still holding them, two decades later when you 

are still holding them. 

Ms. Johnson, I am going to try and understand this 6-month 

rule. A country is on the state sponsor of terrorism list, but they 

periodically issue statements saying they don’t believe in terrorism. 

So they have met one of the two prongs. The other prong is they 

have to go 6 months without engaging in a terrorist act or at least 

us knowing about it. 

Let’s say a country meets those two standards. The intel briefs 

you and says, ‘‘It has been 6 months and a day since they have engaged in terrorism that we can document. And, oh, by the way, 

here is a copy of their most recent statement opposing terrorism.’’

Under those circumstances, are you saying you can take them off 

the terrorist list or you are required by law to take them off the 

terrorist list? 

Ms. JOHNSON. So there is nothing under the statute that talks 

about reviewing. The not-fully-cooperating country list, for instance, there is an annual review, and if you don’t recertify, you 

are off the list. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Right. Okay. 

Ms. JOHNSON. So, for the statutes, that is not the case. If there 

is review called, we look back 6 months prior to the call for the review for any acts of international terrorism and for support or——

Mr. SHERMAN. And let’s say you look back 6 months and you 

don’t see any. Do you then feel legally compelled to give somebody 

a get-out-of-jail-free card because it has been 6 months and a day? 

Or is it just optional with the State Department? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Well, we provide the recommendation to the Secretary of State, and then that would go to the——

Mr. SHERMAN. Are you required to recommend that a country be 

taken off the state sponsor of terrorism list if, as far as you know, 

they have gone 7 months without blowing anything up? 

Ms. JOHNSON. I belive the answer is yes. And I could get back 

to you on that. But yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, please get back to us. Although, as to North 

Korea, every day that those Japanese citizens are not returned is 

a continuing act of terrorism. Every day that the bodies of those 

who died in North Korea are not returned is a continuing act of 

terrorism. 

So, even if the law is as you describe it, the recommendation of 

your bureau to take North Korea off the state sponsor of terrorism 

list was certainly unjustified legally. And then, as far as a matter 

of politics or international foreign policy, hey, North Korea said it 

would disable its nuclear installation in Yongbyun, it did, then it 

didn’t, and they are still off the list of—you know. I am not sure 

that the removal is justified, as a matter of foreign policy. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair will have another round of questions from 

the Members of Congress. We will go 2 minutes this time instead 

of 5. 

The Chair will yield to Colonel Cook from California. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I want to switch gears a little bit. And I understand that the 

North Korean chamber of commerce and China has probably given 

24

them a five-star rating for being good guys, but don’t we have the 

U.S. military that has Top Secret intelligence flying, you know, satellite data, U–2s, and everything else? 

And when you talk to the military and if you ask them that question, they would probably say diplomatically, ‘‘Not in our area.’’ But 

then they would tell you things and reasons why you couldn’t sleep 

at night and why the threat is so great, and they would also talk 

about their affiliation with certain terrorist groups. 

Do you guys talk to the military and get that same take that we 

get, maybe not in Foreign Affairs but the House Armed Services 

Committee, where we get an analysis of a particular country? And 

all I have gotten is—boy, if North Korea doesn’t qualify for that 

list, then no one does. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Well, we look to the entire intelligence community, 

and so——

Mr. COOK. But my question, does the military come to you and 

do you have that exchange that we are having right now? Or is 

that something outside your realm? 

Ms. JOHNSON. No, we are consistently looking at the intelligence 

and the information. So if military is coming with information, yes, 

we would——

Mr. COOK. But do you have meetings together where you would 

have a dialogue like this? 

Ms. JOHNSON. We talk to the military intelligence frequently on 

a number of countries. And, you know, we do have discussions with 

them regularly, yes. 

Mr. KIM. Sir, if I may, I think from our side, as well, we remain 

in very close touch with our military colleagues. 

And I served as U.S. Ambassador to Seoul until just recently, 

and I know from my own experience that the communication between us, the Embassy, and U.S. Forces Korea continues every 

day, and it is very much focused on the threat posed by North 

Korea. 

And the same thing in Washington. I stay in very close touch 

with my colleagues in the Pentagon, and we share information 

about threats posed by North Korea. 

Mr. COOK. Well, as somebody who was in the military a long 

while, I had a different take on it than you did. So, obviously, my 

26 years in the Marine Corps was wasted, because I am very, very 

worried about North Korea. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to try a thread of questioning that I started and that 

Mr. Sherman tried to start, and maybe this will yield an answer. 

Because we are interested in whether the process needs to be altered in any way. 

So, in the instance that we both led some questioning on, where 

it is a state actor that is involved and it is repeated sufficiently and 

it is credible, would you be precluded from the designation because 

it is a state actor? 

25

Ms. JOHNSON. If a country meets the criteria and we have the 

intelligence, again, to support that criteria, we would make a recommendation, yes. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. So you are not precluded by that. 

Ms. JOHNSON. But, again, yes, I mean, hypotheticals are hard to 

answer in——

Mr. KEATING. Oh, I am talking generally, not about North Korea, 

in this instance. 

Ms. JOHNSON. But, again, the criteria, I think, are—I mean, 

there is no definition of ‘‘acts of international terrorism.’’ So we 

have pulled from the statutes and legislative history and then 

used——

Mr. KEATING. Right. So the state-actor designation doesn’t preclude——

Ms. JOHNSON. So an SST, a foreign terrorist organization——

Mr. KEATING. Right. 

And just one other question, because we were talking about sanctions and other issues. And I know this, but I would be interested 

in Ambassador Kim’s comments, you know, that might be more recent or relevant. 

They are among the most repressive countries in the world with 

its own citizens—terrible human rights abuse of its own citizens. 

How is our intelligence—to the extent that we can talk about this, 

is there dissent among the people? Is there significant feeling 

against a country that acts like this? Are there indications that 

that is increasing recently? 

Mr. KIM. Thank you. 

I think it is difficult to tell. You would think that there would 

be dissatisfaction, dissent among the North Korean public, but 

North Korea remains a unique place. In many bad ways, it is a 

unique place. The information flow is very limited. The regime remains one of the most brutal. So I think it is difficult for North Korean citizens to express dissent, dissatisfaction in any way that we 

would be able to detect. 

But, certainly, I mean, obviously, we monitor very closely developments on the ground. And we are not seeing any indication of 

any movement from the North Korean people. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. The Chair yields to the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ms. Johnson, I have, well, a hard question, but it 

will be easy right now, and that is: I would like you to furnish for 

the record from your bureau an analysis of how you interpret the 

law. When are you required to list a state as a state sponsor of terrorism? When are you allowed to do it? When do you have to take 

them off the list, if ever? When are you allowed to take them off? 

And I will ask you to have a series of hypotheticals. If country 

A—you don’t have to name any countries—takes the following action, then we are required to list them, we are allowed to list them, 

we are required to delist them, we are allowed to delist them. 

Because it is our job, when necessary, to rewrite statutes, and if 

we don’t know how you are interpreting this statute, we don’t know 

whether it needs to be rewritten or not. Now, in a perfect world, 

26

we would just quickly write a new statue that would be so clear 

we wouldn’t have to ask you how you interpret it. I have learned 

that Congress is not a perfect world. And if you are interpreting 

the law in a certain way that seems to be correct, you will save us 

a lot of time in trying to improve it. 

Ambassador Kim, there is a tendency for us to say, ‘‘Well, the 

guys are the bad guys, just do bad things and have no moral compass at all.’’ It has been my experience that bad guys don’t think 

they are the bad guys, and they have their own compass, as distorted—I mean, it may be pointing due south. 

And, in looking at North Korea, they seem to be very legalistic, 

and they seem to care whether we have a nonaggression pact with 

them—not that that would stop a single division from moving 

north. They seem to care about whether they are designated as a 

state sponsor of terrorism, when, in fact, if we took them off the 

list, that would not improve their economy in any way I can ascertain. And now they are pushing for a peace treaty. And even if we 

had a peace treaty with them, God knows they engage in activity 

that would justify unpeaceful activity in the future. 

How much do they care about these three things, and why? What 

is their internal thinking? 

Mr. KIM. Thank you very much, Congressman. I think that is a 

very important question. 

Frankly, I am skeptical about their call for a peace treaty because I think they understand that we have certain fundamental 

requirements. I mean, they would need to denuclearize; they would 

need to abandon their pursuit of dangerous delivery means, missile 

capabilities; and they would need to improve their human rights 

situation. I mean, I cannot imagine any circumstance in which we 

would enter into a peace treaty with North Korea that continues 

to reject international obligations and commitments. 

So they know that. So for them to be proposing peace treaty negotiations without addressing, sort of, the core issues that we care 

deeply about, frankly, it is disingenuous. So it is hard for me to, 

you know, sort of, decipher why Kim Jong-un is so focused on this. 

But I agree with you completely that they tend to be very legalistic. And this is, I think, one of the lessons we learned from our 

previous efforts in negotiating with the North Koreans, is that we 

really have to be very careful in drafting these documents and entering into any side agreements, because they are very much focused on the most minute details and looking for loopholes wherever possible. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. Just a couple more questions. I think we are voting now 

or soon. Thanks again for both of you being here. 

There was a report back in the 2000s, early 2000s, that North 

Korea set up a nuclear reactor in Syria and then provided nuclear 

materials to Libya. 

Assume that is true. Would that fit the criteria of abetting the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which is one of the 

issues to determine whether somebody should be on the foreign terrorist organization/state sponsor of terrorism list? 

Is that right, Ms. Johnson, or not? 

Ms. JOHNSON. The FTO list and statutes are different than——

27

Mr. POE. I know. I meant state sponsor of terrorism. I am not 

trying to make North Korea a foreign terrorist organization. State 

sponsor of terrorism is the key here. Would that be a criteria for 

putting them on the list? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Again, I think we look at everything very closely. 

I know——

Mr. POE. But would it be one of the things that you would look 

at, this fact? 

Ms. JOHNSON. We would look at it very closely and make sure 

that it is repeated acts for support for international terrorism and, 

again, evaluate the criteria and look at it holistically and as an entirety. Because, again, I think it is very hard to do hypotheticals 

without looking at——

Mr. POE. Okay. How about cyber attacks? That was mentioned, 

but I am not sure I understood the answer. Would that be a new 

criteria now that you could consider to put a country on the state 

sponsor of terrorism list? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Again, we would review cyber attacks just as 

closely as any of the other acts. And, again, for cyber attacks, you 

know, you could look at them in a variety of different ways depending on what we are talking about as far as——

Mr. POE. Yeah. Some of us look at them as an act of war. 

Ms. JOHNSON. So, again, we would look at it against the relevant 

criterial and, again, in its entirety. 

Mr. POE. And there are——

Ms. JOHNSON. But repeated acts is an important element. 

Mr. POE. Ambassador, I understand there are three countries 

that are state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Syria, and Sudan. Is that 

correct? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Mr. POE. Is there anybody else that we don’t know about? 

Ms. JOHNSON. No. 

Mr. POE. I mean, that I don’t know about. 

Kim Jong-un had a press conference, apparently, some time ago. 

Maybe it was last year. During the press conference, he had behind 

him a chart or a hit list of things he wanted to destroy. It is kind 

of personal to me that his first target on that list, with his ICBM 

capability that he wants, was Austin, Texas. I take that a little 

personal. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Why Austin? Yeah. 

Mr. POE. And that was my question. Why Austin, Texas? 

But, bigger than that, it seems to me that the government is 

doing everything it can to be a bad actor in the world. They are 

helping all the bad guys. They want to be a bad guy. They want 

nuclear weapons. They want to help sponsor terrorism, Hezbollah, 

Hamas. 

And when I was with the Pacific Command not too long ago, the 

admiral, I asked him the question: Of the five countries that are 

threats, or the five entities—China, North Korea, Iran, ISIS, Russia—which one are you the most nervous about? He told me North 

Korea he was the most concerned about because you never know 

what they are going to do. 

28

So, anyway, I want to thank both of you for being here. We will 

have a classified hearing at some later time where we will have 

more members, and we will have that hearing. Thank you both. 

We are voting now, and we are adjourned. Court is over. 

[Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(29)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

30

f


97268n.eps
31

f


97268m.eps
32

[NOTE: The document submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, entitled, ‘‘United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia: Civil Action No. 10–483 (RCL) and Civil Action No. 09-

646 (RCL),’’ demonstrating a court ruling in 2014 that North Korea materially supported Hezbollah’s terrorist attacks in Israel in 2006, is not reprinted here but may 

be found on the Internet at: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20151022/

104081/HHRG-114-FA18-20151022-SD001.pdf]

f

33


97268c-1.eps
34


97268c-2.eps
35


97268c-3.eps
36

Æ


97268c-4.eps