A RESEARCH PAPER FROM THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

by Kate Almquist Knopf

September 2013

Fragility and State-Society 

Relations in South Sudan
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies supports United States foreign 

and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity of African 

states to identify and resolve security challenges in ways that promote 

civil-military cooperation, respect for democratic values, and safeguard 

human rights.
Washington, D.C.

Fragility and State-Society 

Relations in South Sudan

by Kate Almquist Knopf

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Research Paper No. 4

September 2013
For additional publications of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, visit the 

Center’s Web site at http://africacenter.org.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Department 

of Defense, or any other agency of the Federal Government.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, 

provided that a standard source credit line is included. 

First printing, September 2013.
iii

Contents

Executive Summary .............................................................1

The Challenge to Stability from State-Society 

Relations in South Sudan....................................................4

State Formation and Stabilization Framework..................16

Building Trust and Accountability Processes in 

South Sudan.......................................................................21

Strengthening State-Society Relations in South Sudan...30

Conclusion.........................................................................39

Notes..................................................................................41

About the Author .............................................................45
Wau

Aweil

Kwajok

Bentui Malakal

Bor

Rumbek

Yambio

Juba

Torit

Abyei

Abyei Region

Unity

Upper Nile

Jonglei Lakes

Warrap

Western Equatoria

Central

Equatoria

Eastern Equatoria

Northern Bahr

el Ghazal

Western Bahr

el Ghazal

ETHIOPIA

KENYA

DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC OF CONGO

CENTRAL 

AFRICAN

REPUBLIC

SUDAN

UGANDA

Political Map of South Sudan

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Modified by author. 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

1

Executive Summary

It has long been recognized that the new state of South Sudan 

would face daunting challenges. The world’s newest nation is also one 

of its poorest—the result of negligible investment in its people and 

infrastructure over many decades by the erstwhile governing authority 

in Khartoum. War ravaged the country nearly continuously since 1955, 

costing over 2 million lives. South Sudan’s state-building effort, moreover, 

started from a rudimentary institutional base, having inherited few 

functional governance systems. What governance structures existed were 

confined to former garrison towns such as Juba, the capital, in a territory 

roughly equivalent to Afghanistan with a population of 11.4 million 

people. Adding to the difficulty is the very real risk of renewed conflict 

with Sudan and the chicanery on the part of the government there to stir 

up trouble in its southern neighbor. In short, South Sudan was bound to 

face struggles.

Despite the steep road South Sudan must climb, the performance 

of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) since 

independence in July 2011 has made it steeper still, disappointing citizens 

and international partners alike. President Salva Kiir himself has decried 

the diversion of public monies—perhaps as much as $4 billion—by 

leading government and military officials. Perceptions are widespread of 

senior government malfeasance, self-interest, and disregard for citizen 

priorities. Meanwhile, state authority remains heavily centralized within 

the executive branch, where decisions are often made opaquely and 

without consultation or oversight. This has been matched by regular 

reports of repression by the army and the police, conveying an impression 

that government officials see their role as one of self-enrichment and 

maintaining power rather than provision of services to citizens. 

Ethnic divisions, long exploited by Khartoum during the war, have 

been deepened by the perception of Dinka dominance of the RSS. These 

fears have been reinforced by dubious state and national elections in 2010 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

2

that favored candidates from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. 

In some cases, this has translated into open insurgency followed by brutal 

reprisals by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Hundreds of innocent 

civilians have been killed in the process, particularly in Jonglei state but 

also in pockets of rising insecurity around the country.

The new country is not without assets. It took control of developed 

oil fields that are estimated to yield 350,000 barrels per day and annual 

net oil export revenues (at full potential) of roughly $9 billion for the 

government. The population in South Sudan, furthermore, is nothing if 

not resilient, having endured years of hardship, isolation, and war. Much 

of the expansive territory is highly fertile for agricultural production, 

though only 4 percent is currently under cultivation. Moreover, South 

Sudan enjoys a font of international good will, with key partners in 

East Africa, Europe, and the United States having provided extensive 

humanitarian assistance to South Sudan throughout the war and 

overwhelmingly endorsed the new state’s quest for independence and 

membership at the United Nations. 

Efforts to meet the young state’s many challenges will fail, however, 

without greater trust and social cohesion between the new government 

and citizens. State-society relations provide the foundation for any state. 

If this foundation is strong, built on the principles of trust and legitimacy, 

then even poor countries can be stable and withstand intense external 

threats. Conversely, if the foundation is weak, then instability will persist 

irrespective of government revenue flows, the strength of the security 

sector, or the maneuvers of any external adversary. Strengthening 

state-society relations, then, is an imperative for the state-building and 

stabilization agenda of South Sudan.

In some cases, though, the government is directly undermining this 

confidence by inhibiting the emergence of accountability processes. This 

is the case, for instance, when the RSS constrains access to independent 

information through the media and civil society. Intimidation and 

outright attacks on journalists and human rights advocates are 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

3

antithetical to building an inclusive, accountable state. Even more 

troubling, government actions to vilify ethnic communities home to 

rebel militia groups—such as the Murle population in Jonglei state—

and failure to hold security services accountable for attacks on civilians, 

destroy social cohesion across communities and prevent trust in the state. 

To improve state-society relations in the near term, the government 

must cease actions that alienate society from the state and focus on three 

critical tasks: building inclusive coalitions to support key institutional 

reforms, protecting space for independent voices in order to foster a 

national dialogue over the priorities for the new state, and achieving 

some tangible development progress to demonstrate the government’s 

responsiveness to citizen expectations. While South Sudan has suffered 

serious setbacks in its quest for state legitimacy during its first years of 

independence, upcoming foundational state-building processes afford 

opportunities for the government to reverse the deterioration: the 

national constitution review process, the national reconciliation process, 

the 2015 elections, and investment in public infrastructure that will link 

disparate regions of the new nation. Central to each will be a massive 

civic education campaign to inform and invite participation from all parts 

of South Sudanese society in a national dialogue on citizen expectations 

of the state and what it means to be South Sudanese.

The foundation of the state cannot be an afterthought. It must come 

before the structure is built. Generating renewed confidence in statesociety relations through these opportunities will provide the social 

capital needed to strengthen institutions most central to ending violence: 

citizen security (ensuring citizens’ freedom from physical violence and 

from fear of violence), justice (providing recourse to nonviolent dispute 

resolution), and jobs (enabling livelihoods without recourse to violence). 

South Sudan’s leadership can set a new course toward legitimacy, 

stability, and sustained development if it prioritizes building trust and 

social cohesion within the South Sudanese population.
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

4

The Challenge to Stability from State-Society 

Relations in South Sudan

The world’s youngest state, South Sudan, faces numerous acute 

challenges. Unresolved disputes with Sudan over oil pipeline usage, the 

status of the disputed Abyei region, border demarcation, and allegations 

of support for proxy militia groups occasionally flare up into cross-border 

military clashes that generate international headlines and fuel predictions 

of renewed war between North and South. 

Serious internal strains also abound. Intercommunal violence 

between South Sudan’s many ethnic groups poses a deadly and complex 

challenge to the new country’s stability and coherence. While not a new 

phenomenon, the frequency and intensity of ethnic violence in South 

Sudan has been on the rise since 2009 with thousands killed.1 For some 

communities, it is so intense and localized that neither the end of the civil 

war nor independence has apparently made an appreciable difference in 

their daily security.2 

Government security responses have, at times, inflamed ethnic 

tensions and contributed to escalating the violence rather than lessening 

it. Security operations by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 

primarily consist of coercive civilian disarmament campaigns after 

intercommunal violence flares. The campaigns have achieved only 

marginal success and been followed by immediate rearmament of the 

communities in question, particularly since the campaigns typically 

proceed sequentially, leaving newly disarmed communities vulnerable to 

attack from their as-yet disarmed neighbors. Serious human rights abuses 

by SPLA soldiers and South Sudan National Police Service officers 

against the communities being disarmed have further negated any security 

gains from these campaigns.3

 In 2013, government security responses to 

an insurgency in Jonglei state collided with intercommunal violence 

between several ethnic groups, resulting in the displacement of tens of 

thousands of people, serious humanitarian distress, reports of killings and 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

5

torture, and other allegations of gross human rights abuses by forces on all 

sides, notably the government.4

Predation and repression by government security forces is not the 

only self-inflicted wound causing internal stress and eroding citizens’ 

trust in the government. Perceptions of widespread corruption and 

government disinterest in citizens’ expectations are strong. Fifty-nine 

percent of South Sudanese believe government corruption is worsening 

and 75 percent are dissatisfied with the government’s efforts to fight 

corruption.5 These views are reinforced by disappointment with the slow 

pace of development progress, made more acute by inflation, which has 

soared since independence, significantly increasing the cost of living for 

all South Sudanese. Hikes in food prices have hit especially hard given 

the limited levels of local food production, high reliance on imported 

food, and Sudan’s prohibition on cross-border trade with South Sudan 

since independence.

Limits on freedom of expression and access to independent 

information have risen since independence in 2011. South Sudan 

was declared “Not Free” and barely edged out Zimbabwe in the 

quality of its political rights and civil liberties in its first appearance 

on the annual Freedom in the World assessment by Freedom House. 

Journalists who write about corruption and other governement abuses 

are frequently subject to harassment and attacks. Coupled with South 

Sudan’s extremely low socioeconomic development, large youth bulge, 

landlocked geography, war-ridden past, and a generally unstable 

regional neighborhood, the prospects for reverting back to conflict, this 

time internal, are formidable.

Underlying all these challenges, however, is the weakness of the 

foundation on which the legitimacy of the new state of South Sudan 

rests: its state-society relations. Ultimately, these relations will determine 

the country’s stability and even viability. As a new state, South Sudan 

has few of the institutional checks and balances—such as electoral 

management bodies, legislatures, courts, political parties, subnational 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

6

government offices, a merit-based civil service, a professional security 

sector, an independent media, and civil society—through which statesociety relations are productively managed and stresses absorbed. The 

country’s constitution, for example, should enshrine the agreed upon rules 

for how state and society will relate. However, South Sudan still lacks a 

permanent constitution forged through a broad-based, inclusive, public 

dialogue and subjected to popular referendum for approval.

Understandably, such institutions of accountability take time to 

develop and therefore are in various states of functionality in South Sudan. 

Less understandably are government actions that undermine confidence 

in the state through its own limited and often overbearing engagement 

with citizens. At times, this entails the active marginalization of ethnic 

communities home to rebel militia groups. Failure to hold security services 

accountable for attacks on civilians also destroys trust across communities 

and in the government itself, further perpetuating the stunting of statesociety relations. 

A window of opportunity is closing for South Sudan. Participation in 

the referendum on independence was tremendous—more than 75 percent 

of the eligible population registered to vote, and 98 percent of those who 

cast ballots opted for independence. South Sudanese were overwhelmingly 

unified on this issue. However, such unity is fraying under the weight of 

perceived autocratic tendencies of the government, disregard for public 

opinion, and ethnic bias.

The growing potential for instability in South Sudan also has 

significant implications for the region. During the civil war, 4 million 

South Sudanese were displaced internally while some 628,000 fled across 

borders, stretching the capabilities and finances of neighboring states. The 

prospect of renewed turmoil in South Sudan could lead to similar levels 

of spillover and further regional instability. South Sudan also borders the 

Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

where rebel groups roam across borders freely. The Lord’s Resistance Army 

(LRA) has frequently used South Sudan as a sanctuary.
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

7

The international community has invested billions of dollars over 

the years to address humanitarian needs and forge peace in the Sudans. 

Considerable diplomacy is still focused on outstanding disputes with 

Khartoum. Yet gains in stabilizing this vast region are most vulnerable 

to South Sudan’s unaddressed internal weaknesses. It is the challenge of 

strengthening state-society relations that will determine whether South 

Sudan breaks free from recurrent cycles of violence and finds its footing as 

a stable, resilient state. Without greater trust and social cohesion between 

the new government and citizens, efforts to meet the current political, 

security, economic, and social crises confronting the young state will fail.

Ethnic Violence in Jonglei State 

Ethnic fault lines abound in South Sudan. The most persistent and pernicious conflicts 

are between the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk ethnic groups in Upper Nile state; the Lou 

and Jikany Nuer in Upper Nile and Jonglei states; and the Murle, Lou Nuer, and Dinka 

in Jonglei state. Ethnic conflict also frequently arises at the intersection of Unity, 

Lakes, and Warrap states. Frayed ethnic relations in other states occasionally erupt 

into violent confrontation, such as between the Dinka and Fertit in Western Bahr el 

Ghazal state, or between Equatorians and Dinka in and around Juba. While some 

have their roots in competition over resources (land, water, and cattle), others arise 

from legacies of political competition between southern leaders during the war or 

from disgruntled aspiring political leaders.

Jonglei has become the epicenter of the most deadly ethnic violence in South Sudan, 

with the single worst incident taking place between December 2011 and January 

2012, when some 8,000 Lou Nuer youth raided Murle communities killing at least 

1,000, displacing more than 100,000, and stealing 100,000 head of cattle.6

 The assault is part of a downward spiral of Lou Nuer-Murle attacks and reprisals that began 

in 2009. Government interventions to stop mass violence can best be described as 

too little and too late, including a wholly unsuccessful attempt to prevent the January 

2012 attack. Some have accused the government of aiding the Lou Nuer militias. 

This cycle of revenge attacks was further compounded by the reemergence of militia 

leader David Yau Yau in mid-2012. Yau Yau lost a 2010 election for a Jonglei state 

assembly seat to a candidate from the ruling SPLM party. Yau Yau subsequently took 

up arms, some of which have been traced back to Khartoum, and may command 

as many as 4,000-6,000 combatants, though many are only loosely affiliated to his 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

8

South Sudan’s Path to Statehood

South Sudan’s present inability to provide security or services for its 

people frequently leads to the conclusion that it is a failed state. This 

presupposes that it was at some point a functioning state. Yet, South 

Sudan’s only modern governance model has been the predatory, repressive, 

and sectarian rule of successive regimes in Khartoum. 

Even among Sub-Saharan Africa’s many weak states, the shallowness 

of South Sudan’s government capacity and institutional depth make it 

an outlier. With a mere 6 years of experience as an autonomous regional 

government within Sudan from 2005 to 2011, South Sudan became the 

world’s newest independent state on July 9, 2011. Prior to this, southern 

Sudan was mired in civil war with the Government of Sudan (GOS) 

from 1955 to 1972 and again from 1983 to 2005. Between 1972 and 

1983, a semiautonomous regional government nominally ruled the 

South. In reality, the central government in Khartoum provided it few 

resources. 

Britain’s indirect colonial rule (1899-1955) effectively separated 

southern Sudan from northern Sudanese and Egyptian rule, leaving it 

rebellion. In March 2013, the SPLA launched a brutal counterinsurgency campaign 

against Yau Yau’s forces and associated Murle youth, resulting in a dire humanitarian situation for more than 120,000 people by mid-2013 as well as allegations of 

gross human rights abuses against civilians. The United Nations Mission to South 

Sudan (UNMISS) has also been caught in the crossfire with the downing of one of its 

helicopters by the SPLA and a vicious attack killing five peacekeepers and seven civilians by Yau Yau’s militia. According to the Small Arms Survey, many Murle no longer 

identify the Lou Nuer as their principal enemy, but rather the SPLA, state and national 

governments, and by extension the Dinka community. 

Such intercommunal tensions and counterproductive responses by the government 

perpetuate and deepen conflict dynamics within South Sudan, severely limiting 

prospects for productive relations among ethnic groups and between the government and communities. Rebel militia leaders continue to trade on these grievances to 

mobilize youths against the state and other ethnic communities. Thus, not only does 

the government response fail to protect citizens, its actions can directly exacerbate 

perceptions of marginalization and discrimination. 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

9

to “develop” indigenously, with minimal administrative presence, no 

infrastructure, and nominal support to missionary churches to provide 

limited schooling and medical services. It took the British well into 

the 1920s to even pacify the South. It finally did so largely through 

stabilizing the tribal system, not through any centralized governance. 

Unlike the North, which had a history of centralized governance to 

draw on from Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist rule, the South had no such 

experience, rendering indirect rule all the more attractive for Britain. 

Rather, existing authority structures were highly differentiated across 

the South’s 62 main ethnic groups (over 90 if subgroups are counted). 

Traditions of customary laws, courts, and conflict resolution within and 

between tribes varied greatly. What social norms of collective action 

that did exist centered on the tribe. Some had cultures of holding chiefs 

accountable to their people. Others did not. Where these norms existed, 

they were eroded by decades of civil war. Anchors of cultural unity, such 

as the predominance of Islam and Arabic in the North, were absent in 

southern Sudan.7

 

After World War II, Britain decided that southern Sudan should be 

administered from Khartoum and not integrated into British East Africa, 

as previously planned. The replacement of British district commissioners 

with northerners precipitated the outbreak of the first civil war between 

North and South in 1955, even before independence was granted to Sudan 

on January 1, 1956. The regime in Khartoum sent administrators to key 

provincial towns, but their authority never extended to the rural areas 

where the majority of the population lived. Even during the 1972-1983 

break in fighting, the semiautonomous southern regional government 

struggled to effect governance beyond municipal boundaries. 

For much of the second civil war (1983-2005), southern rebel 

factions, predominantly the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/

Army (SPLM/A) led by Dr. John Garang, held the majority of the 

territory of southern Sudan. The GOS in Khartoum retained control 

of key provincial capitals, including the capital of the South, Juba. 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

10

Fierce competition between southern military and political leaders over 

liberation strategies, stoked to a considerable degree by Khartoum’s 

malevolent intervention and manipulation, played out in atrocities and 

reprisals across ethnic groups and subgroups that cost more civilian lives 

than direct warfare between northern and southern forces. This left deep 

fault lines that have yet to be redressed in any meaningful reconciliation 

process. 

Significantly, the two bitterest southern rivals, John Garang and Riek 

Machar, did not reconcile until 2003, midway through the negotiation 

of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with Khartoum that 

ultimately ended the war. This alliance, along with the incorporation 

of other southern rebel groups into the SPLM/A, ultimately enabled the 

people of southern Sudan to unite behind the CPA as the best hope for 

ending the war and achieving their objective of autonomous rule. 

During the war, the southern rebel movements largely relied upon—

and often extracted forcefully—support from the civilian population. 

A massive humanitarian operation, largely coordinated by the United 

Nations and comprising a wide array of international nongovernmental 

organizations and local churches, provided the only services that 

reached southern Sudanese civilians. Cycles of flooding and drought 

coupled with denial of humanitarian access by the GOS produced severe 

humanitarian crises and famine. Populations close to the North-South 

divide were subjected to forced displacement, slavery, and cattle raiding 

by northern militias. The LRA in northern Uganda conducted regular 

attacks and kidnappings among communities in the far southern states. 

Throughout the South, civilians feared bombing raids by Khartoum 

and being caught in the crossfire of South-South infighting, the nastiest 

incidents of which tapped into the fears and rivalries between the Dinka 

and Nuer communities. It is estimated that over 2 million southern 

Sudanese died and over 4.6 million were displaced during the second 

civil war.8

 This is out of an estimated population of 8.3 million people 

at the end of the war.
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

11

When it was established in July 2005, the interim Government 

of Southern Sudan (GoSS) started building nearly all institutions and 

administrative structures of government from scratch. It was not even in 

possession of its capital city, Juba, until after the untimely death of John 

Garang 3 weeks after taking office as President of Southern Sudan and 

First Vice President of Sudan. Six years later, now under the independent 

government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS), the new country 

(with significant international support) had erected the basic elements of 

a modern state, including a transitional constitution, an executive office, 

a legislative assembly, a judicial system, and an army and police force. 

Not surprisingly, South Sudan’s development indicators are among 

the worst in the world. According to 2013 estimates, 51 percent of South 

Sudan’s 11.4 million citizens are below the age of 18. This includes an 

estimated 2.3 million southern Sudanese displaced during the civil war 

who have returned to their communities since 2005. Of those 15 years 

and older, only 27 percent (40 percent male, 16 percent female) can read 

and write. Infant mortality stands at 70 per 1,000 live births, the 18th worst 

in the world. The fertility rate is 5.5 children per woman, the 9th highest 

globally. In a territory approximately the size of Afghanistan, it has only 

one paved highway running roughly 120 miles from Juba to the Ugandan 

border. 

This history combined with a very small educated class, minimal 

physical infrastructure, marginal economic activity outside of subsistence 

agriculture and pastoralism, and an absence of social services create 

monumental challenges for improving living conditions. 

Declining Confidence in Government

Even though South Sudan possesses extremely limited state capacity, 

the SPLM enjoys inherent legitimacy stemming from its experience 

fighting Africa’s longest civil war and winning independence for its people. 

Nearly 99 percent of South Sudanese voters opted for independence in a 

referendum in January 2011. Popular support for and pride in the new 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

12

nation was at its highest on South Sudan’s Independence Day, July 9, 

2011. The international community lent further legitimacy through its 

embrace of South Sudan as a sovereign state and the newest member of 

the United Nations and the African Union.

After decades of exploitation and neglect by Khartoum, expectations 

of the dividends of peace were high. Citizens believed their new 

government would deliver major improvements in development and 

security once the government was in full control of its national resources. 

Such hopes were augmented by expectations that the 6-year interim 

period of autonomy prior to the independence referendum would have 

allowed the new government sufficient time to plan and prepare. They 

expected to live in relative safety without fear of daily violence once freed 

from northern oppression.9

 

The government’s post-independence honeymoon was fairly shortlived, however. Surveys indicated that by May 2013, half of all South 

Sudanese felt the country was headed in the wrong direction. Top reasons 

Figure 1. Why Do You Say that South Sudan is 

Heading in the Wrong Direction?

Source: International Republican Institute, April-May 2013. 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

13

cited for respondents’ pessimism were heightened levels of insecurity, 

rising costs of living, and dissatisfaction with the pace of development, 

with particularly elevated concerns over food shortages and poverty (see 

Figure 1).10

To some extent, such attitudes are an inevitable outcome of the 

young state’s extremely limited capacity measured against the severity of 

its challenges. Nevertheless, popular perceptions of willful government 

negligence (corruption, human rights abuses by the security services, 

closing of political space) and disinterest in meeting critical security, 

Debilitating Corruption

South Sudanese perceive the ruling elite as overwhelmingly corrupt, in part because 

of the view that there has been little development despite 6 years of oil revenues 

since the GoSS was formed in 2005. In June 2012, President Kiir issued a public letter 

to 75 incumbent or former government officials and military officers, stating that $4 

billion in government resources was missing. He demanded that the money be returned or else prosecutions would be launched. “We fought for freedom, justice and 

equality. Many of our friends died to achieve these objectives. Yet, once we got to 

power, we forgot what we fought for and began to enrich ourselves at the expense of 

our people,” wrote President Kiir. “The credibility of our government is on the line.”

While stunningly candid, the letter remains highly controversial—the figure has yet 

to be substantiated, and, thus far, no senior official has been prosecuted for corruption. (In June 2013, two ministers were suspended pending an investigation into a 

controversial procurement.) The impression left is of a ruling elite that enjoys total 

impunity, generating a sense of betrayal and anger for a lack of accountability for corruption. It also reinforces the exclusionary grievances of ethnic groups who feel less 

well represented in the government and military (which are largely dominated by the 

Dinka and Nuer) and therefore excluded from the spoils.

State institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Office of the Auditor General are only just beginning to operate. Senior government officials filed asset 

disclosures with the Anti-Corruption Commission for the first time in 2012. The Auditor General is systematically reviewing the finances of the GoSS (prior to independence) and submitting regular public reports of his findings to the National Legislative 

Assembly with recommendations for further investigations. These measures are an 

important start in confronting the challenge of corruption and restoring confidence in 

public office holders. Until individuals are actually held to account, however, corruption will continue to be a significant stress on the formation of the new state.
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

14

justice, and development expectations contribute to negative statesociety dynamics that challenge the confidence of citizens in their state. 

Tellingly, perceptions of poor service delivery and government corruption 

have grown markedly worse since independence. This dissatisfaction with 

and decline in trust of the government poses one of the greatest statebuilding challenges to the new nation (see Figure 2). 

Weak Ties to Local Communities

Perceptions of identity in South Sudan are complex. The near 

universal support for secession among South Sudanese during the 

independence referendum reflects a powerful unifying value throughout 

the new country. Moreover, a strong majority of citizens identify 

themselves as South Sudanese. Still, tribal affiliations remain very 

strong. Many South Sudanese retain higher levels of familiarity, respect, 

and confidence in their tribal leaders than in political officials.11 In 

some places, this has been a source of tension between the new state 

and traditional authorities. During the war, the SPLM/A instituted the 

practice of appointing civil/military administrators to supervise tribal 

Figure 2. How Satisfied Are You with the Performance 

of the National Government in the Following Areas?

Source: International Republican Institute, April-May 2013. 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

15

chiefs in liberated areas and report to SPLA zonal commanders. Some 

scholars argue this practice distorted traditional processes, militarized the 

chieftaincy structures, and strengthened the SPLM/A. Others maintain 

that in areas where civil/military administrators and tribal chiefs had 

cooperative relationships, it helped to reduce violence. Nevertheless, it 

severely challenged the connection between citizens and their leaders 

by making chiefs accountable to a different set of interests (i.e., the 

SPLM/A) than those of citizens. 

The SPLM/A never succeeded in developing a participatory 

civilian party structure with authentic grassroots mobilization and 

organization across communities and identity groups, such as women’s 

and youth leagues, not least because the SPLM/A leadership ultimately 

did not make this a priority. While secretariats resembling civilian 

ministries predate the CPA negotiations, the main civilian function of 

the SPLM prior to the pre-independence interim period (2005-2011) 

was to coordinate access for humanitarian organizations to areas under 

its military control. Effectively, security concerns took precedence 

over civilian administration. This inability to separate politics 

from administration has continued into South Sudan’s first years of 

independence, with the RSS leadership largely unable to separate party 

and government processes and structures. Decisionmaking remains 

centralized and top-down, with policy determined by the president 

of the RSS and the chairman of the SPLM—positions intentionally 

designed to be held by the same person. 

Hence, while there are positive unifying values in South Sudan, 

there are powerful divisive forces, as well. These are deepest in regions of 

South Sudan with strong legacies of ethnic violence. Coupled with the 

youth of the population—of which the vast majority has known only 

war—and the abundance of small arms in circulation (both leftover from 

the war and newly provided as part of Khartoum’s post-independence 

destabilization strategy), the propensity to resolve disagreements 

through violence remains very high. 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

16

State Formation and Stabilization Framework

Scholarship on fragile states has arrived at a number of important 

findings on violent conflict and how countries escape from it. As 

summarized by Bruce Jones and Molly Elgin-Cossart, 

We know that it is difficult to sustain an exit from 

conflict, but not impossible; that inclusive political 

settlements are important to peace; that building trust 

and confidence around the political settlement and in 

reformed institutions is vital to success. We also know 

this takes time—often decades.

To put it plainly, violence occurs in contexts where 

institutional alternatives to violence are weak or 

nonexistent; weak institutions combined with a range 

of political, security and economic motivations (and 

external pressures) creates the conditions for conflict 

and violence.12

Hence a state becomes fragile and ultimately fails primarily due 

to an absence of accessible, trusted processes for managing competing 

interests nonviolently. Resilient states, meanwhile, cope with stresses 

through “a combination of capacity and resources, effective institutions 

and legitimacy, all of which are underpinned by political processes that 

mediate state-society relations.”13 While much attention on fragile states 

is given to the symptoms of fragility, namely high levels of violence, 

humanitarian crises, or conflict-triggering events, it is the quality, 

credibility, and accessibility of political processes that largely determine 

fragility or resilience. With only inchoate state institutions, weakened 

traditional and community authority structures, and rising levels of 

corruption within the RSS, South Sudan lacks these fundamental 

elements of stability. 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

17

In particular, states that successfully manage competing demands 

across groups in society have representative and inclusive political 

processes through which citizens can influence decisionmaking, channel 

concerns and opposition to policies, raise and resolve disputes, and hold 

leaders and institutions accountable. The more inclusive, participatory, 

and trusted these various processes are, the more legitimate, stable, 

and durable the political system will be.15 As these trusted processes 

deepen, so too do the benefits they produce. Countries with pluralistic 

political processes and systems that distribute power widely and provide 

for the establishment of law and order tend to have inclusive economic 

institutions that create a level playing field where property rights are 

secured and investments in new technologies and skills are rewarded. In 

other words, political inclusivity not only reduces violence and instability 

but also contributes to development and growth.16

Stabilizing a nascent state such as South Sudan, then, requires 

transforming extractive or predatory political and economic norms 

into inclusive, accountable institutions to manage political contests 

nonviolently and provide a propitious environment for sustained 

economic growth. However, this does not come about merely by 

signing a negotiated peace agreement or by adopting a new constitution 

and holding an election, though each of those offer opportunities for 

engaging citizens and advancing reforms. Rather, societies arrive at a set 

of popularly supported political processes over time. In fragile situations, 

this can take a generation or more. 

Trust is the bedrock on which such political processes are built. Trust 

must be cultivated between groups that have been divided by violence, 

between citizens and the state, and between the state and other key 

stakeholders whose support is needed for recovery. The level of cohesion 

and trust in a society “often defines the starting norms of cooperation, 

equity, transparency, and social goals. Societies that are more cohesive 

have greater consensus on the direction in which they want to go and the 

willingness to cooperate to get there.”17 Consequently, generating trust 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

18

and cohesion, between both the state and society as well as across ethnic, 

cultural, linguistic, or other community divides, is essential to developing 

stable and viable state institutions.18

The 2011 World Development Report found that most states 

that escape cycles of violence initially developed “inclusive enough” 

coalitions of stakeholders to support national confidence building and 

institutional transformation. Such coalitions generate national support 

for fundamental reforms, cultivate trust between government and society, 

and promote outreach to community leaders to identify local priorities 

and deliver programs accordingly.19 Over time, the constructive 

collaboration that emerges expands confidence in the state as well as 

its legitimacy. As increasingly broader segments of society are included 

in trusted processes, political institutions become more effective and 

resilient, creating a virtuous cycle. 

Simply put, the health of the society is of paramount importance to the 

health of the state. Fragile societies breed fragile states, whereas durable, 

resilient states have rich and robust social networks that engender trust 

within and across different identity groups. “Nations with stronger social 

cohesion tend to be more stable, better off economically, less susceptible 

to crime and violence, and subject to lower levels of corruption.”20

Strengthening social cohesion through confidence-building measures 

that improve state-society relations is a first order priority, then. It is the 

foundation on which all state institutions must be built. 

The 2011 World Development Report highlights institutions that 

deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs as vital priorities. Timely, visible 

results in these areas are most effective in helping states break cycles of 

insecurity and reduce the risk of relapse.21 Partnering with other actors—

community, civil society, private sector—can accelerate gains and further 

restore confidence in the state. 

Citizens, moreover, will not consent to be governed by a regime if 

there are no meaningful and accessible avenues through which it can 

be challenged and reformed.22 On the other hand, citizens are much 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

19

more inclined to work through (as well as support and protect) a system 

that builds a track record of fairness and takes corrective actions when 

established rules have been broken. Developing systems of accountability 

to serve as checks and balances, particularly around the executive, help 

build confidence in the state and provide the basis for institutional reform. 

The processes through which state and society engage one another 

form feedback loops that are crucial to the credibility and responsiveness 

of the state. These processes happen through a variety of state- and 

society-based mechanisms that collectively provide complementary rings 

of accountability and thereby generate confidence in the state (see Figure 

3).23 State-based accountability mechanisms include: constitutions, 

Figure 3. Layered Accountability Structures

Source: Siegle, 2013.25
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

20

elections, legislatures, courts, political parties, subnational government, 

a merit-based civil service, and a professional security sector, among 

others. Society-based accountability mechanisms include: independent 

media and access to information, civil society, social capital, and external 

norms and standards.24 The development of any particular cluster is less 

important than the density, or layering, of accountability mechanisms 

across the state and society. This creates a more stable, resilient system in 

which there are multiple levels of constraint on the executive.26 

For many fragile or transitioning states, such accountability structures 

are weak or absent (see Figure 4). Typically, power is concentrated in 

the executive branch, which directs other branches of government. So 

extensive is the authority of the executive branch that it exerts control 

over even ostensibly independent entities like the media and private 

sector. Similarly, civil society is marginalized and unable to significantly 

engage in a dialogue with government or draw attention to citizen 

Figure 4. Dominant Role of Executive Branch in 

Contexts of Limited Accountability 

Source: Siegle, 2012. 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

21

priorities. The state-building challenge for South Sudan, then, is to 

move from a context of executive branch dominance to one of layered 

accountability in which the executive is still in the center, but ringed by 

overlapping layers of state and society-based accountability mechanisms.

Building Trust and Accountability Processes in 

South Sudan

Unsurprisingly, most accountability institutions in South Sudan 

are in their embryonic stages. While establishing a new state poses 

a unique set of obstacles, it simultaneously creates opportunities to 

establish checks and balances that would be more difficult to introduce 

if entrenched, patronage-based, dysfunctional institutions were already 

in place. Unfortunately, rather than investing time and resources in such 

accountability-building processes in the early years of South Sudan’s 

transformation, government policies have too often undermined them. 

State-Based Accountability Mechanisms

Constitution. An interim constitution written by the SPLM was 

amended without serious review just before independence to serve as a 

transitional constitution. A participatory and thorough national review 

process intended to culminate in the adoption of a permanent constitution 

is scheduled to unfold before elections in 2015. The transitional 

constitution gives extraordinary powers to the president with almost no 

checks afforded to other branches of government. The president cannot 

be impeached. He can dismiss the national and state assemblies and 

remove the vice president and state governors from office, as well as any 

justice or judge. President Kiir exercised these powers in January and July 

2013 when he removed two state governors and the vice president from 

office and dismissed his entire cabinet. The national review process is far 

behind schedule and almost entirely an elite exercise. The basic concept 

of a written constitution—providing the formal rules for how the state 

will function—is still not familiar to most South Sudanese.27
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

22

Elections. The first elections ever held throughout South Sudan 

took place prior to independence in 2010 as part of the CPA process, 

with contests at the national (then the united country of Sudan), 

regional (within the GoSS), and state levels. In the South, the elections 

were marred by intimidation and violence by the SPLM. The selection 

of SPLM candidates for office at the state and local levels was also highly 

controversial, with the party’s headquarters overriding many state-level 

party nominations. Some election results were completely disregarded at 

the state level. With no judicial recourse or other accountability structures 

through which to challenge these outcomes, several disgruntled losers 

took up arms (e.g., David Yau Yau in Jonglei state). The next round of 

elections is slated for 2015, though no electoral calendar was mandated 

in the constitution and thus the date of the election is left entirely to the 

discretion of the ruling SPLM. In the absence of greater accountability 

for public office holders, these contests will remain zero-sum exercises 

over who gains control of public resources, potentially resulting in ever 

greater divisions and violence.

Legislature. The South Sudan National Legislative Assembly (NLA) 

is dominated by the SPLM, which holds more than 90 percent of its seats 

with the remainder held by 5 opposition parties. Most members are elected 

based on geographic constituencies, party lists, and a women’s list. Some 

are appointed by the president. Legislation originates almost entirely from 

the executive, and the NLA exercises little independent oversight of 

the executive in the form of hearings, investigations, debates, or budget 

management. Most parliamentarians have infrequent contact with their 

constituents and were elected based on loyalty to the SPLM. The majority 

of the population resides in rural areas and is still largely unfamiliar with 

these new political institutions, their representatives, and how they relate 

to the use of state resources or the presidency.28 

Political Parties. Opposition parties are very weak, in terms of 

both resources and capacity, and are regularly intimidated and harassed 

by SPLM-affiliated security agents. Several parties are led by former 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

23

commanders of rebel factions who opposed the SPLM/A during the war, 

rendering them inherently suspect and dangerous in the eyes of the ruling 

party. Most retain loyal armed forces that can be mobilized to fight. 

Reflective of its military origins, debate within the SPLM is not 

encouraged, dissent is not tolerated, and decisions emanate from the top. 

The SPLM as a party is virtually indistinguishable from the RSS and 

therefore does not advocate for higher standards of accountability or checks 

on government abuses of power. Internal leadership contests in preparation 

for elections in 2015 threaten to split the party, particularly between those 

loyal to President Salva Kiir and those to former Vice President Riek 

Machar. Such rifts also threaten to further politicize ethnicity. In July 2013, 

President Kiir, a Dinka, dismissed Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, 

and SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum, a Shilluk.29 Without internal 

SPLM reform to handle intraparty contests credibly and democratically, 

the potential for political instability and violence will grow.30

Courts. South Sudan lacks a functioning independent judiciary with 

the power to interpret laws and rule on the legality of executive actions, 

much less provide recourse to justice for citizens.31 Laws are poorly 

disseminated throughout South Sudan and there is a confusing array of 

customary chiefs’ courts, which are appointed by state ministries of local 

governments, and government courts, which fall under the judiciary. 

Government courts variously find their origins in British colonial 

structures, Khartoum’s rule in garrison towns during the war, and attempts 

at SPLM/A administration during the war. Paradoxically, efforts to 

rationalize customary law to a written set of rules in order to achieve more 

clarity and uniformity may be inhibiting recourse to justice by eliminating 

some of the flexibility afforded by traditional processes. 

Courts at all levels are vulnerable to bribery and are widely perceived 

to disadvantage the poor.32 Estimates are that two-thirds of South Sudan’s 

states still do not have any government courts, relying on scarce roving 

mobile courts for formal justice. Recourse to public defenders, particularly 

for death row inmates, remains rare.33
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

24

The lack of viable recourse options through the courts, consequently, 

may lead more citizens to seek alternative dispute resolution methods, 

including through violence. The perpetrators of this violence, many 

believe, are able “to kill innocent people, loot livestock, destroy property, 

abduct women and children and commit acts of sexual violence with 

impunity.”34 Increasing accountability for violent crimes through public 

prosecutions and trials, especially for rural populations, would help to 

ease the burden on political and military institutions of responding to 

intercommunal and politically motivated violence.

Subnational Government. The constitution and several laws 

authorize the decentralization of certain security and social services to 

state and local governments. State legislative assemblies and Councils of 

Traditional Authority Leaders (COTALs) are also provided for, though 

their respective purposes remain unclear. When austerity measures took 

effect in mid-2012 due to the loss of oil exports, moreover, transfers 

to subnational authorities were largely curtailed, cutting the salaries of 

teachers and other state and local civil servants. Elected state governors 

typically appoint county commissioners who oversee education, basic 

healthcare, and other services, despite constitutional requirements that 

commissioners also be elected. Citizens are widely critical of both this 

practice and of the president’s power to unilaterally remove elected 

governors from office.35 Nine of the ten state governors are members 

of the SPLM. President Kiir has removed two governors from office—

Lakes state in January 2013 and Unity state in July 2013. While the 

president may appoint interim governors, the constitution requires 

special elections be held within 60 days to elect new governors. This 

requirement was not met in either case. In Lakes state, an SPLA Major 

General was appointed as the caretaker governor and has instituted 

a number of harsh and sweeping legal, institutional, and personnel 

changes that have generated extensive opposition. 

Civil Service. The RSS inherited an urban-based civil service from 

Khartoum’s administration of Juba and other garrison towns during the 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

25

war. Consequently, the majority of South Sudanese who live beyond the 

country’s few urban centers rarely interact with government personnel. 

Government jobs, meanwhile, have become a primary source of 

employment—and patronage—in South Sudan. Thus, not only is the 

civil service inaccessible but it also performs poorly. Adding to the 

complexity, South Sudanese widely support equal distribution of civil 

service jobs across ethnic groups as a key measure of how inclusive the 

government is. Furthermore, friction exists between younger, often 

more educated diaspora returning to support the new government and 

those who remained in South Sudan throughout the war. 

Security Sector. Neither the SPLA nor the South Sudan National 

Police Service has achieved significant progress toward becoming 

professional, apolitical security services. Both are largely untrained, 

illiterate, and ill-equipped forces derived from various amalgamations of 

the SPLA and other armed groups that existed during the war.36 Citizens 

widely perceive them to be sources of insecurity, not protection. Many 

senior officers have assumed a pernicious sense of entitlement following 

their role in the liberation struggle. This has resulted in land seizures, 

preferential contracts, government jobs, and other lucrative benefits.37

The RSS has plans to demobilize 150,000 of the more than 300,000 

soldiers on the SPLA payroll. In January 2013, President Kiir ordered an 

extensive overhaul of military and police leadership, retiring 35 general 

officers including all 6 deputies of the chief of general staff. While 

these moves were generally perceived as reigning in corrupt and overly 

entitled senior officers, and therefore popular, there was no legislative 

oversight of the nominations of senior officers to fill these positions.38

In general, there are negligible channels for exchange, engagement, or 

consultation between citizens and the security services. 

Society-Based Accountability Mechanisms

Independent Media and Access to Information. In spite of an 

increasing array of private media—radio stations, newspapers, and online 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

26

news sites—independent information is rarely accessible in South Sudan, 

particularly on subjects relating to insecurity, corruption, or anything 

perceived as critical of the government.39 Human rights organizations have 

documented increasingly frequent attacks, intimidation, and detentions of 

journalists by security agents, resulting in growing self-censorship by local 

media.40 The brazen assassination of prominent newspaper columnist and 

frequent government critic Isaiah Ding Abraham Chan Awuol outside his 

home in December 2012 prompted domestic and international alarm.41

No murder charges were brought in this case and attacks on the media 

have continued. 

The government’s intolerance of criticism and suppression of 

independent media undermine claims it makes of being accountable 

to the public and seriously damage its quest for legitimacy. Moreover, 

trustworthy and independent information is essential to mitigate conflict, 

counter corruption and other abuses, check and balance South Sudan’s 

preponderant executive branch, and increase citizens’ awareness of their 

rights and duties. Most South Sudanese view free speech as a fundamental 

right, an important demonstration of democracy, and an essential means 

of holding leaders accountable.42 Building a cohesive national identity 

will be impossible without a genuine public debate on what it means to be 

South Sudanese, a conversation that must include rural communities as 

well as urban ones. To do so, more independent media providing greater 

access to information is required, especially in local languages on radio 

stations, which represent an indispensable information lifeline for many 

South Sudanese who live in remote rural areas.43

Civil Society. South Sudan’s January 2011 referendum succeeded 

in no small measure due to government partnerships with civil society 

organizations to register voters, to inform the populous about the process, 

and then to observe the vote. The result was a rate of voter participation 

rare in countries with limited experience in electoral management. Three 

out of every four eligible South Sudanese cast ballots. Since independence, 

however, South Sudan’s budding array of civil society groups—service 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

27

delivery organizations, research centers, human rights advocates, and 

women’s, youth, and professional associations—confront an increasingly 

unfavorable environment. The government and legislative assembly are 

perfunctory, suspicious, and defensive in their engagement with civil 

society groups. Moreover, most civil society organizations are heavily 

concentrated in Juba.

Civil society, nevertheless, offers important linkages to rural 

communities and opportunities to develop networks of trust across ethnic, 

geographic, religious, and other communal lines. For instance, a coalition 

of civil society organizations known as the Civil Society Resource Team 

on the Constitutional Review Process is conducting citizens’ dialogues 

and civic education programs in all 10 states. The resulting input will be 

shared with the National Constitutional Review Commission.44 Another 

group of local democracy organizations, the South Sudanese Network for 

Democracy and Elections, is arranging and facilitating meetings between 

parliamentarians and their constituents and then helping constituents 

follow up on the concerns they raised. In these ways, civil society is helping 

to provide the nexus for dialogue and negotiation between government 

and society.

Social Capital. Social cohesion in South Sudan is strongest at the 

local level where sense of community and belonging to tribe or subtribe 

generates the most social trust and willingness to cooperate. There is 

relatively little that extends this cohesion across ethnic groups and 

regions, however, outside of pride in becoming an independent nation 

and the shared experience of struggling for liberation from Khartoum. 

Moreover, deep trauma from and the legacy of intra-South fighting 

sustains intercommunal (and intracommunal) discord. 

During the war, mission-run boarding schools provided one of 

the only civilian platforms for building social networks across ethnic 

groups and geographic regions. The churches’ role in social service 

delivery throughout decades of war and colonial rule, moreover, has 

made them among the most trusted institutions across South Sudan. 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

28

Leaders of the 12 main churches, which are united together under the 

South Sudan Council of Churches and represent more than 60 percent 

of the population,45 are frequently called on to lead local peace and 

reconciliation processes. In April 2013, President Kiir appointed the 

archbishop of the Anglican Church and the archbishop emeritus 

of the Catholic Church to lead a national reconciliation process. 

Religious leaders also advocate against human rights abuses and 

corruption as well as conduct civic education, including on the national 

constitutional review process. The churches’ popularity and credibility 

as an independent voice with the public makes them a trusted venue 

for facilitating engagement across ethnic divides. The churches are also 

a voice of conscience with the RSS, which renders the relationship 

with senior government and party leadership difficult at times. For 

their part, church leaders are wary of being perceived as too close to the 

government lest they lose the trust of their communities.

Outside of the churches, scarce platforms exist to create social 

bonds and networks across communal divides. Even South Sudan’s few 

functioning universities confront communal tensions, sometimes leading 

to violence and disruptions of classes for long periods of time.46 The 

SPLM and SPLA are the two broadest intercommunal networks in South 

Sudan. However, perceptions of Dinka domination of both institutions, 

the limited space for open debate within the party, and the challenges of 

integrating tribally based rebel militia groups into the SPLA47 constrain 

their contribution to building social capital. Indeed, the SPLM’s failure 

thus far to effectively link the grassroots to the national level may help 

to explain the renewed interest in holding regional conferences to discuss 

matters of local and national importance across the South’s three historical 

regional blocs: Upper Nile (Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states), Greater 

Equatoria (Western Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Central Equatoria 

states), and Greater Bahr el Ghazal (Lakes, Warrap, Northern Bahr el 

Ghazal, and Western Bahr el Ghazal states). Such conferences were held 

in the latter two regions in 2013, organized by state and local political 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

29

actors across state boundaries and outside of SPLM party structures.48

The conferences have provided forums to debate federalism as a system of 

national governance and other issues of concern. 

External. Prior to independence, donors were vital for providing 

humanitarian assistance to communities in the South, facilitating the 

CPA, and ensuring international support for South Sudan’s referendum. 

Since independence, however, international actors have grown 

increasingly frustrated with the RSS, particularly the decisions to shut off 

oil production and occupy disputed oil fields on the border with Sudan in 

early 2012. Many external partners are also increasingly concerned about 

the scale of corruption, abuses of civil and political rights, and reports of 

human rights violations, including killings and torture, by state security 

forces. Donors, accordingly, were not forthcoming in providing funding 

or new support to the RSS during its time of austerity. Feeling somewhat 

abandoned and greatly misunderstood, the RSS has become increasingly 

resistant to foreign pressure and input, even from its closest partners (the 

United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway). This has complicated 

donor support to state-building efforts. Donor dialogue is most productive 

under the guise of the g7+ New Deal for Fragile States, of which South 

Sudan is one of the pilot countries. South Sudan is also now a member 

of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and is in the 

process of negotiating a credit facility with the Fund, which will bring 

with it external requirements for financial accountability. Verification 

of South Sudan’s ability to meet the membership criteria for the East 

African Community, a major trading partner and export corridor, offers 

further opportunities to encourage the RSS to improve its standards of 

governance and development performance. 

In short, South Sudan’s mechanisms of state- and society-based 

accountability structures are limited. Government leaders have been 

slow to appreciate the immense value of such processes in building 

legitimacy and stabilizing an otherwise weak state. At times, leaders have 

actively resisted community mobilization, ignored popular grievances, 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

30

and suppressed efforts to improve accountability. In the absence of more 

diverse state-society engagement and layered accountability mechanisms, 

political power and wealth will continue to coalesce around the SPLM 

and the executive branch at the expense of a disempowered, ill-informed, 

and fragmented citizenry. 

Strengthening State-Society Relations in South 

Sudan

South Sudan is still in the early confidence-building stages of state 

development. The CPA and other subsequent transitional reforms have 

proved insufficient to foster badly needed trust and inclusivity, without 

which the state will never develop the legitimacy necessary to strengthen 

and expand its capacity to govern. Thus, overcoming this trust deficit and 

improving state-society relations must be an overriding concern of the 

Loss of Oil Revenues

South Sudan is the most oil dependent country in the world. The RSS was severely 

stressed by the loss of 98 percent of government revenues between January 2012 and 

June 2013 due to a dispute with Sudan over oil pipeline transport fees. (South Sudan 

relies on oil pipelines through Sudan to Port Sudan for all its oil exports.) During this 

time, the government operated under an austerity budget, nearly exhausting its 

foreign currency reserves. In September 2012, Khartoum and Juba reached an agreement to resume oil flows through Sudan. However, implementation was blocked until 

additional unrelated demands by Khartoum over proxy rebel militia support were 

resolved in April 2013. Export of South Sudanese oil finally resumed in June 2013, 

though allegations of reciprocal support to proxy rebel groups continue. 

The impact of the loss of oil revenues was felt most deeply in Juba, where the bulk 

of the national budget has been concentrated since the start of the interim period 

in 2005. According to the Sudd Institute, South Sudan’s 10 states received only 16 

percent of the national budget even before austerity measures took effect. The loss 

of oil exports caused cuts in civil servant salaries, reductions in block grants to states, 

and delays in development programs. Since 85 percent of the working population is 

engaged in non-wage work, chiefly subsistence-level agriculture, the impact at the 

household level outside of Juba and state capital cities was more limited than would 

otherwise be expected—further testament of the effective separation between the 

state and the rest of South Sudanese society. 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

31

leadership of South Sudan if the new nation is to realize durable peace, 

stability, and sustained development.

Drawing on the experience of other societies that have risen out 

of fragility, three critical tasks for improving state-society relations 

are essential: building inclusive-enough coalitions, expanding space 

for independent voices so as to enable national dialogue, and realizing 

tangible successes to demonstrate the state’s responsiveness to citizen 

expectations. 

Inclusive-Enough Coalitions

The state needs to make a more concerted and genuine effort to build 

collaborative partnerships beyond the class of elites who have dominated 

South Sudan’s political future thus far. This partnership-building process 

must also transcend societal fault lines and engage youth. By identifying 

viable partners, mutually beneficial priorities, and complementary 

strengths, such a strategy would improve the RSS’s engagements with local 

communities. Whether it involves matters of security, political processes, 

development needs, or other issues, the practice of building inclusive 

coalitions would make initiatives and reforms more viable, sustainable, and 

effective while fostering trust for future state-building efforts. 

Most South Sudanese have minimal to no interaction with the 

government in Juba. Thus, inclusive coalition building will have to take 

place at the state and local level as well as through nongovernmental 

groups with inter-regional networks. The elections for state and substate 

political offices are particularly important. There must be participatory 

mechanisms for citizens and communities to influence the selection of 

candidates as well as the direct election of state governors and county 

commissioners (as opposed to appointments made in Juba or state capitals). 

Similarly, impartial avenues for candidates from any political party to seek 

recourse for election irregularities are needed. Likewise, the president’s 

ability to dismiss elected officeholders at the national or subnational 

level should be explicitly limited. The composition of national and state 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

32

assemblies should also be clarified in the permanent constitution to be 

based on geographic constituencies as opposed to party lists or presidential 

appointment. COTALs also hold great potential for channeling citizen 

concerns and priorities and demonstrating that the state is serious about 

inclusion and responsiveness to local voices.

South Sudan’s ubiquitous and loosely networked churches are 

among the most trusted institutions in the country. Their respected 

mediators have made significant achievements in local peace and 

reconciliation efforts, such as the Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant of 1999 

that ended deadly bouts of intercommunal fighting. Partnering with 

churches on issues of local dispute resolution, civic education, or simply 

to improve intercommunal or state-society communication could foster 

enhanced trust in the state. More generally, by engaging with trusted 

nongovernmental and civil society organizations, the state can enhance 

its own political legitimacy.

Greater engagement with societal actors by the RSS would 

simultaneously diminish the justification for violence by communities 

that feel they have been excluded from the political process. Likewise, 

the RSS must recognize the difference between violence that is politically 

motivated (such as that carried out by rebel militia groups) and incidents 

that are resource related (protecting livestock from banditry or resolving 

disputes with neighboring communities over land, water, or other issues). 

While neither form is constructive, approaches to each should differ.

The RSS should engage directly with communities mobilizing 

merely for self-defense so as to jointly shape strategies that will provide 

consistent protection for property and legitimate economic activity (such 

as grazing and access to water). These engagements and operations should 

also extend to all communities and ethnic groups equitably. The extreme 

levels of violence in Jonglei state, for instance, will not come to an end 

so long as the Murle community feels targeted by the state while Dinka 

and Lou Nuer interests are more frequently protected.49 At the very 

least, the security services must cease their often indiscriminate responses 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

33

to violent actors as the high civilian casualties that result only further 

alienate communities.

Expanding Space for Independent Voices

Access to independent information is indispensable to establishing 

accountability mechanisms on which a stable, developmental state 

depends. Beyond actively cultivating coalitions and inclusivity, the state 

must protect space for citizens and communities to express themselves if 

the processes of a state-society dialogue are to gain traction. Drawing on 

the experience of other democratic transitions, a massive civic education 

and public outreach campaign is required to sensitize the population to 

key democratic values and principles such as: 

◆ The responsibility of all citizens to participate in political and 

policy debates so that citizen preferences can be heard

◆ Tolerance for opposing points of view

◆ Freedom of speech, media, and assembly

◆ Equality before the law

◆ The inalienability of rights for minority groups and parties

◆ Protection of private property rights

In addition to state actors, this effort should enlist the participation 

of religious leaders, traditional authorities, civil society, the media, 

opposition political parties, and international partners. These groups 

have the trust of various constituencies in society and, collectively, can 

reach the largest percentage of citizens possible. 

Rather than trying to monopolize state-society relations, the RSS 

and the SPLM should recognize independent civil society actors as 

representing authentic perspectives of citizens that can contribute to 

a stronger and more stable South Sudan. Harassing, intimidating, or 

otherwise inhibiting these voices sends exactly the opposite message—

that the state does not want a genuine discussion with its citizens and 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

34

intends to continue to dominate access to power and wealth. The 

outcome of such an approach is perpetual resistance and instability.

Media bills to protect freedom of speech should be passed and signed 

into law. Security services should be prohibited from persecuting the 

media, civil society, and international human rights monitors. Credible, 

independent investigations into all cases of intimidation and violence 

against journalists, human rights activists, and civil society leaders should 

be conducted and the results made public. The perpetrators should 

be tried publicly under due process of law. These are all immediate, 

consequential, and concrete signals that the government could send of 

its serious intent to become a government responsive to its citizens. 

Since the challenge of building a national consciousness is as much 

a cultural exercise as it is a political one, efforts to foster a new South 

Sudanese identity should complement reforms to protect and expand 

political and civil rights. South Sudan’s heterogeneity provides deep 

reservoirs of culture that, if appreciated and respected for their diversity, 

can foster a new national identity. This process includes identifying, 

documenting, preserving, and celebrating the rich cultural heritage in 

South Sudan as well as its shared history of liberation struggle. Music 

competitions, national sports teams, and youth sports leagues could 

build linkages across communal groups. Widespread pride in South 

Sudanese runner Guor Marial, who competed under the International 

Olympic Committee’s flag in the 2012 Olympic Games, was shared 

across ethnic and cultural divides in South Sudan. Preparing a national 

team to participate in the 2016 summer Olympics affords a forthcoming 

opportunity to further deepen national pride. The stories of Manute 

Bol and Luol Deng, two South Sudanese stars of the U.S. National 

Basketball Association, continue to inspire youths of all ethnic groups 

across South Sudan. Wrestling competitions hold deep traditional 

significance for some groups in South Sudan, providing an opportunity to 

bring historical traditions into the new national identity as well as foster 

healthy interaction and competition between communities. 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

35

Tangible Gains Responding to Citizen Priorities

Achieving modest improvements on key popular priorities is a 

tangible demonstration that the government has the interests of citizens 

at heart. Beyond the outcomes generated is the process adopted, for this 

signals how committed a government is to citizen participation and 

input—and ultimately accountability. Four strategic priorities integral to 

the state-building process provide focal points for generating confidence 

in the state so that vital institutional reforms in security, justice, and jobs 

can proceed. 

National Constitutional Review. A national constitutional review 

process was to have been completed by January 2013, leading to a final, 

permanent constitution soon thereafter. The review process is considerably 

behind schedule, so much so that the transitional constitution had to be 

amended to extend the National Constitutional Review Commission 

(NCRC) mandate for an additional 2 years to December 2014. This raises 

serious questions about the adoption of a new permanent constitution 

before the current terms of the president and national assembly expire in 

July 2015. 

More importantly, South Sudanese are frustrated not only by the 

delays but by how inaccessible and exclusive the review process has 

been. The composition of the NCRC is seen as highly politicized and 

dominated by the ruling SPLM party. Statements by some members of 

the NCRC questioning the need to consult illiterate citizens (the vast 

majority of the polity) have indicated to many people that the process 

will not be consultative or inclusive.50

A specific cause for concern was that the original composition 

of the NCRC largely excluded civil society members. President Kiir 

subsequently revised the composition to account for greater inclusion 

of civil society, though it is still dominated by SPLM politicians 

with no other political parties represented. The NCRC also does 

not seem to have plans for broad-based consultations across South 

Sudan, outside of the individual efforts of civil society members of the 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

36

commission. Moreover, the constitution is slated to be ratified by the 

heavily SPLM-controlled parliament without being put to a popular 

referendum, despite the fact that surveys show a large majority favors 

such a course. 

The national constitutional review process is an opportunity to 

educate citizens about what a constitution is and solicit views about 

what kind of government the people of South Sudan want. Instead, 

the path provided for in the transitional constitution—a permanent 

constitution drafted by the NCRC, reviewed by an appointed 

National Constitutional Conference, and then passed by the NLA 

for adoption—seems set to replicate the ruling party’s vision for how 

they should govern the country. It also leaves the product forever 

open to serious legitimacy challenges. There is still time to make this 

process more inclusive, participatory, and transparent.51 In addition 

to institutionalizing more consultative engagement with civil society 

and communities, the draft constitution should be put to a popular 

referendum to demonstrate societal commitment to this political 

course while significantly boosting the legitimacy of the new state. 

The independence referendum of 2011 was perhaps the most unifying 

and participatory experience in South Sudan, and so a constitutional 

referendum may be able to recapture and reinvigorate citizen 

participation in governance. 

An open and legitimate constitutional review process represents 

the most significant opportunity to lay an enduring foundation for 

national unity. A closed and exclusive process, however, will result 

in extended political grievances and perceptions of injustice. It will 

also seriously call into question the state leadership’s commitment to 

democracy. 

National Reconciliation. Although not mandated in the CPA 

or the transitional constitution, the RSS announced in early 2013 

an initiative for a national reconciliation process in recognition of 

the country’s long history of intercommunal fighting and grievances. 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

37

Delayed by early disagreements over the reconciliation committee’s 

mandate and membership, a new national reconciliation committee 

primarily composed of church leaders was established in mid-2013. 

Archbishop Daniel Deng of the Episcopal Church of South Sudan 

chairs the process supported by Archbishop Emeritus, Paride Taban, 

of the Catholic Church.52 The churches now have a significant 

opportunity to lead the country in a process of national healing.

A process of national reconciliation holds the potential to 

help drive progress toward security and justice, two critical sectors 

highlighted by the 2011 World Development Report as necessary for 

sustaining an exit from violence. The stakes are high, however, since 

a poorly managed process will provide further justification for violence 

to “address” grievances, while delegitimizing future initiatives to 

address intercommunal differences. Extensive public consultation and 

communication on why a process is necessary, how it should proceed, 

and what role state and nonstate actors will play will be critical 

to the success of the initiative. It is imperative that the process be 

apolitical and managed by independent and trusted nongovernmental 

institutions given the roles of many of the senior RSS leadership in the 

long history of South-South violence. Ensuring every community has 

an opportunity to air its grievances will be vital to the credibility of 

the process. The difficult question of whether and what forms of justice 

will be administered in response to the findings of the reconciliation 

dialogue comprises another significant challenge for the committee, 

political leadership, and society at large. 

Beyond the formal process for national reconciliation, promoting 

a culture of tolerance among youth and community leaders should 

be priorities. Numerous grassroots and civil society initiatives have 

attempted to do this during and since the war. However, some have 

neglected to include youth actors most central to perpetuating specific 

conflict dynamics, such as with the Murle and Lou Nuer youth in Jonglei 

state.53 Unless and until initiatives include stakeholders connected to 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

38

these actors and familiar with their motives and interests, success in 

reversing the increasing reliance on violence is unlikely.

2015 Elections. The 2015 elections represent an inimitable 

opportunity to build confidence and foster citizen participation and 

the legitimization of a governance agenda. 

The current terms of the president, state governors, and national 

and state assemblies expire in July 2015, suggesting that elections 

should take place in the first half of 2015. The transitional constitution 

does not make this explicit, however, and the delays in drafting the 

permanent constitution create uncertainty as to the timing of the next 

elections. Nevertheless, a National Electoral Commission has already 

been formed and is beginning preparations. Its independence from the 

SPLM and RSS leadership and preparations for a free and fair contest 

are crucial for building trust in the next government and its ability to 

advance reforms and implement policy. 

How national elections and internal SPLM candidacy issues 

are handled will go far in setting norms for future elections in South 

Sudan—and whether these contests will continue to be seen as winnertake-all competitions that heighten the likelihood of violence. Whether 

the losers in the SPLM chairmanship contest and the presidential 

election accept the results peacefully will impact profoundly on the 

state’s quest for legitimacy and viability. A key consideration in the lead 

up to elections for both the SPLM and the RSS will be to guarantee 

protections and space for the losers in the political process after the 

elections. 

More broadly, the 2015 electoral process is an opportunity for all 

office holders to engage sincerely with constituents to deepen statesociety relations. A question remains, however, whether there will be 

sufficient layers of accountability from both state and society for political 

actors to accept nonviolent competitions for power and resources. 

While this accountability-building process is still in a nascent stage, if 

perceptions take hold that the electoral process is not managed equitably 
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

39

and transparently, then not only will the legitimacy-enhancing benefits 

of this process be lost but the probability of instability and violence in 

South Sudan will increase.

Connecting the Country through Roads and Radio. The 

three critical processes unfolding in the lead up to 2015—national 

constitutional review, national reconciliation, and preparations for 

national, state, and local elections—all require the free and regular 

flow of information to citizens in even the most remote parts of the 

country. South Sudan’s sheer lack of physical infrastructure to enable 

the movement of people, goods, and services across the vast country, 

including during rainy seasons, will be a severe obstacle to every political, 

security, economic, and development objective. While some effort has 

been made to build the country’s communications and transportation 

networks since 2005, roads and radio coverage must be extended to every 

region of South Sudan as quickly as possible. So long as communities 

remain cut off from each other and from the government—physically 

and through the exchange of information—insecurity and political 

exclusion will persist. 

Conclusion

There is no substitute for the trust and social cohesion that is 

essential to stabilizing and strengthening fragile states. The state’s political 

legitimacy to act on behalf of its citizens is even more fundamental than 

the state’s ability to perform, although the two are clearly related. Building 

trust takes time. However, it is a matter of utmost urgency if state-society 

relations are to improve such that cycles of violence can be prevented and 

reversed. 

In South Sudan, then, the focus must first be on building an inclusive 

political process. Internal and external stresses will fluctuate, but what will 

keep South Sudan mired in instability is the weakness of its state-society 

relations. Enhancing these relations should be the overarching priority for 

government and civil society leaders. Without it, institutions capable of 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

40

dealing with conflict will not successfully emerge. An intensive focus on 

building trust and fostering social cohesion through bettering state-society 

relations is vital to reducing levels of ethnic violence and improving 

security, justice, and jobs. There is no path to peace and development in 

South Sudan without first establishing the foundation of the state.
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

41

Notes

1 Jonah Leff, My Neighbour, My Enemy: Inter-tribal Violence in Jonglei, HSBA Issue 

Brief No. 21 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, October 2012).

2 Jok Madut Jok, Mapping the Sources of Conflict and Insecurity in South Sudan: Living 

in Fear under a Newly-Won Freedom, Special Report No. 1 (Juba: The Sudd Institute, 

January 12, 2013), 7.

3 Leff.

4 “South Sudan: Army Making Ethnic Conflict Worse,” Human Rights Watch, July 

19, 2013, available at <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/19/south-sudan-army-makingethnic-conflict-worse>.

5 “Survey of South Sudan Public Opinion: April 24 to May 22, 2013,” 

International Republican Institute (IRI), available at <http://www.iri.org/sites/default/

files/2013%20July%2019%20Survey%20of%20South%20Sudan%20Public%20

Opinion%2C%20April%2024-May%2022%2C%202013.pdf>.

6 Leff.

7 P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the 

Present Day (Harlow, UK: Longman, 2000), 130.

8 “USCR Country Report Sudan: Statistics on Refugees and Other Uprooted 

People, June 2001,” U.S. Committee for Refugees, June 19, 2001, available at <http://

reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/uscr-country-report-sudan-statistics-refugeesand-other-uprooted>. 

9 Jok, Mapping the Sources of Conflict, 2.

10 Traci D. Cook, Leben Nelson Moro, and Onesimo Yabang Lo-Lujo, From a 

Transitional to a Permanent Constitution: Views of Men and Women in South Sudan on 

Constitution-Making (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute, June 2013). Traci 

D. Cook and Leben Nelson Moro, Governing South Sudan: Opinions of South Sudanese 

on a Government That Can Meet Citizen Expectations (Washington, DC: National 

Democratic Institute, March 22, 2012). “Survey of South Sudan Public Opinion.”

11 “Survey of South Sudan Public Opinion,” 30.

12 Bruce Jones and Molly Elgin-Cossart, Development in the Shadow of Violence: 

A Knowledge Agenda for Policy (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 

November 2011), 3.

13 Ibid.

14 Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt, From Power Struggles to Sustainable Peace: 

Understanding Political Settlements (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Development, 2011), 11.

15 World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development 

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), 10.

16 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of 

Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012).

17 Joseph Siegle, “Building Democratic Accountability in Areas of Limited 

Statehood” (paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

42

“Power, Principles, and Participation in the Global Information Age,” San Diego, 

California, April 1-4, 2012), 12, available at <http://africacenter.org/wp-content/

uploads/2012/07/Accountability-in-Areas-of-Limited-Statehood.pdf>.

18 World Development Report 2011, 11.

19 Ibid., 12-13, 119.

20 Joseph Siegle, “Social Networks and Democratic Transitions,” Developing 

Alternatives 12, no. 1 (Fall 2008), 42.

21 World Development Report 2011, 13.

22 Siegle, 2012, 4.

23 Ibid., 12.

24 Ibid., 8-10.

25 Joseph Siegle, “ICT and Accountability in Areas of Limited Statehood” in Bits 

and Atoms, eds. Steven Livingston and Gregor Walter-Drop (Oxford University Press, 

2013).Ibid., 12-13.

26 Ibid., 12-13.

27 Cook, Moro, and Lo-Lujo, 9.

28 Ibid., 43-45. “Survey of South Sudan Public Opinion,” 34.

29 “South Sudan’s Kiir Moves to Take Down Machar & Amum, Khartoum Says 

Accords Unaffected,” Sudan Tribune, July 23, 2013.

30 Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan, Crisis Group Africa Report No. 

172 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 2011). Abraham Awolich and Zacharia 

Diing Akol, The SPLM Leadership Contest: An Opportunity for Change or a Crisis of 

Governance? (Juba: The Sudd Institute, July 23, 2013).

31 David K. Deng, Challenges of Accountability: An Assessment of Dispute Resolution 

Processes in Rural South Sudan (Juba: South Sudan Law Society, March 2013).

32 Cherry Leonardi, Leben Nelson Moro, Martina Santschi, and Deborah H. 

Isser, Local Justice in Southern Sudan, Peaceworks Series No. 66 (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Institute of Peace, 2010), 5, 39.

33 Author interview with South Sudan Law Society, June 2012.

34 Leonardi, Moro, Santschi, and Isser, 1.

35 Cook, Moro, and Lo-Lujo, 48, 51.

36 John A. Snowden, Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan 

through February 2012 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, June 2012).

37 Jok, Mapping the Sources of Conflict, 12-14.

38 A Brave Decision or Security and Constitutional Quagmire? The President’s Recent 

Military and State Reform Orders, Weekly Review (Juba: The Sudd Institute, January 25, 

2013).

39 “Freedom in the World 2013: South Sudan,” Freedom House, available at 

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/south-sudan>. “Press 

Must Be Able to Work Freely in South Sudan,” Open Letter to President Salva Kiir 

Mayardit, Committee to Protect Journalists, May 22, 2013, available at <http://www.cpj.

org/2013/05/press-must-be-able-to-work-freely-in-south-sudan.php>.
Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan

43

40 “South Sudanese Media Forced into Self-Regulation by Security Services,” 

Sudan Tribune, May 27, 2013.

41 “South Sudan Police Investigate Killing of Political Commentator,” Sudan 

Tribune, December 6, 2012.

42 Cook, Moro, and Lo-Lujo, 20.

43 “South Sudan Public Opinion Survey,” 70.

44 “Nimule Declaration by Civil Society Resource Team on the Constitutional 

Making Process,” Sudan Tribune, May 22, 2013.

45 According to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 60.5% of South 

Sudanese in 2010 were Christian, 6.2% were Muslim, and 32.9% practiced traditional 

religions. The Global Religious Landscape: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the 

World’s Major Religious Groups as of 2010, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 

(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, December 2012).

46 “Juba University Closes Indefinitely as Inter-Tribal Violence Escalates,” Sudan 

Tribune, March 28, 2012.

47 Cyrus Samii, “Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration? Evidence from a Hard 

Case in Burundi,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 3 (August, 2013). 

48 Justice Deng Biong, “A Call to Discourage Regional Conferences in South 

Sudan,” Sudan Tribune, June 1, 2013. Lual A. Deng, Regional Conferences in South Sudan 

are Imperative, The Weekly Review (Juba: The Sudd Institute, June 25, 2013).

49 Jok, Mapping the Sources of Conflict, 4-5. Leff.

50 Jok Madut Jok, South Sudan: A Politics of Demise or a Vision for Progress? The 

Weekly Review (Juba: The Sudd Institute, March 9, 2013).

51 My Mother Will Not Come to Juba: South Sudanese Debate the Making of the 

Constitution, Juba University Lectures 2013 (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013).

52 Peace and Reconciliation in South Sudan: A Conversation for Justice and Stability, 

Special Report No. 2 (Juba: The Sudd Institute, June 7, 2013).

53 Leff, 8.
ACSS Research Paper, No. 4

44
About the Author 

Kate Almquist Knopf is an independent consultant on African 

issues and global development policy. She served previously as Assistant 

Administrator for Africa and Mission Director for Sudan and South 

Sudan in the U.S. Agency for International Development. Ms. Knopf 

represented the U.S. Government to the international Assessment and 

Evaluation Commission charged with overseeing the implementation of 

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan. 

She is an adjunct faculty member of the Africa Center for Strategic 

Studies. She can be contacted at kate.almquist@gmail.com.



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