NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

PREMIER HOLDING CORPORATION; 

RANDALL LETCAVAGE, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

JOSEPH GREENBLATT, 

Defendant.

No. 21-55249 

D.C. No. 

8:18-cv-00813-CJC-KES 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 9, 2022

San Francisco, California

Before: HURWITZ and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSEN,** District 

Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the 

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

FILED

FEB 23 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Defendants Randall Letcavage and Premier Holding Corporation appeal a 

summary judgment entered in favor of the Securities and Exchange Commission and 

the district court’s subsequent imposition of civil remedies. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm. 

We review a summary judgment de novo, with all facts and inferences being 

drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package 

Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 2014). Evidentiary rulings made in 

connection with a summary judgment, including orders precluding evidence, are 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Richards, 541 F.3d 

903, 909 (9th Cir. 2008). A district court’s determination of appropriate remedies is 

also reviewed for abuse of discretion. See SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 

617 F.3d 1072, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010); SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 

1190 (9th Cir. 1998).

1. Letcavage challenges the district court’s preclusion order that 

prevented him from introducing certain evidence in opposition to the SEC’s motion 

for summary judgment. The district court’s order was based on Letcavage’s failure 

to meaningfully answer the SEC’s questions during depositions and his blanket 

invocation of the Fifth Amendment during the enforcement proceeding. Even when 

a defendant is entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment in a civil proceeding, “a 

district court has discretion in its response to a party’s invocation of the Fifth.” SEC 
3 

v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, Letcavage refused to 

meaningfully answer any questions about the WePower note, the TPC assets, or his 

employment agreement—the three central issues of this case. Therefore, the district 

court’s preclusion order was a reasonable response to Letcavage’s decision and not 

an abuse of discretion. 

2. Defendants challenge the district court’s finding of scienter, which here 

“refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst 

& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). The district court did not 

abuse its discretion in making this determination. The district court can infer scienter 

based on a defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment when “independent 

evidence exists of the fact to which the party refuses to answer.” Doe ex rel. RudyGlanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1264 (9th Cir. 2000). The SEC offered ample

independent evidence to justify an adverse inference of scienter in this case, 

including numerous public and private statements by Letcavage. 

3. Finally, Defendants challenge the district court’s imposition of 

injunctive1and monetary remedies. The district court properly analyzed the relevant 

factors, including Letcavage’s repeated violations of security laws and lack of any 

admission of wrongdoing, when crafting its injunctive remedies, and we find no 

1 These included a permanent injunction against Defendants from committing future 

securities violations and a 5-year bar preventing Letcavage from being an officerdirector or trading in penny stocks. 
4 

abuse of discretion. See SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 655 (9th Cir. 1980); First 

Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d at 1193. The district court’s disgorgement order was 

likewise proper. Defendants object to the district court’s disgorgement calculation, 

but Defendants bear the burden of proving “that the disgorgement figure was not a 

reasonable approximation.” Platforms Wireless, 617 F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted). 

Because Defendants failed to meet their burden of proving that any of the purported 

business expenses were actually incurred or were “legitimate,” Liu v. SEC, 140 S. 

Ct. 1936, 1950 (2020), we find no abuse of discretion. 

AFFIRMED.