59–006 

114TH CONGRESS REPT. 114–393 " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session Part 1 

IRAN TERROR FINANCE TRANSPARENCY ACT 

JANUARY 11, 2016.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State 

of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. ROYCE, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 3662] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 3662) to enhance congressional oversight over the administration of sanctions against certain Iranian terrorism financiers, 

and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do 

pass. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Background and Purpose of Legislation ................................................................ 2 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 4 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 7 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 7 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 7 

New Budget Authority, Tax Expenditures, and Federal Mandates .................... 7 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 8 

Directed Rule Making ............................................................................................. 10 

Non-Duplication of Federal Programs ................................................................... 10 

Congressional Accountability Act ........................................................................... 10 

New Advisory Committees ...................................................................................... 10 

Earmark Identification ............................................................................................ 10 

Constitutional Authority Statement ...................................................................... 10 

Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 11 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 12 

Additional and Dissenting Views ........................................................................... 19 


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BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF LEGISLATION

On July 14, 2015, the United States, negotiating alongside the 

United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China as the 

‘‘P5+1’’ reached a ‘‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’’ (JCPOA) 

with Iran. This final agreement asserts to limit Iran’s nuclear program to peaceful purposes, in exchange for broad relief from U.S., 

European Union (EU), and United Nations sanctions. A resolution 

sponsored by the United States to approve the deal and allow for 

the removal of U.N. sanctions was passed by the Security Council 

on July 20, 2015. The agreement’s ‘‘Adoption Day’’ was marked on 

October 18, 2015. The Obama administration asserted that the 90- 

day timeframe allowed for review of the JCPOA by Congress under 

the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114–17) and for review by Iran and any other legislature of the other P5+1 states. On 

Adoption Day, the United States issued the provisional presidential 

waivers required to implement U.S. sanctions relief, with the waivers and associated sanctions relief to formally take effect on ‘‘Implementation Day.’’ 

The Committee expects Implementation Day to take place within 

the next few weeks. Once it does, the United States, the U.N., and 

the EU will cease application of specific sanctions. The U.N. Security Council will terminate the provisions of its resolutions on Iran: 

1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 

1929 (2010), and 2224 (2015). 

Members of Congress have expressed concerns with the scale of 

the sanctions relief offered by the U.S. and its negotiating partners. 

The agreement lifts restrictions on arms sales to Iran after 5 years, 

and, after 8, removes restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missiles. Experts have testified in front of the Committee that Iran will likely 

use the financial windfall gained from sanctions relief to reinforce 

its ‘‘revolutionary’’ regime at home while bankrolling terrorist activity in the region, including Hamas and Hezbollah. 

Iran’s ballistic missile program, in particular, has concerned Congress. Ballistic missiles are a central component of any country’s 

nuclear weapons program as they are the most effective way to deliver a nuclear warhead—no country that has not aspired to possess nuclear weapons has ever opted to sustain a lengthy and expensive missile program. Iran’s long-range ballistic missiles provide 

it the ability to target Israel as well as U.S. forces throughout the 

Middle East. Iran has been undertaking extensive efforts aimed at 

providing their long-range ballistic missile forces greater accuracy 

and range. 

The 2013 interim agreement called for Iran to abide by all U.N. 

Security Council resolutions—which state that ‘‘Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.’’ In February 2014, U.S. negotiator Wendy 

Sherman testified that Iran’s ballistic missile program ‘‘is, indeed, 

going to be part of something that has to be addressed as part of 

a comprehensive agreement.’’ However, after the Supreme Leader 

called restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missiles ‘‘a stupid, idiotic expectation,’’ Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified that 

‘‘The scope of this agreement, if there is one, is the nuclear program. That’s what our partners have agreed to. That is what is 

being negotiated. It is not a missile agreement.’’ 


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The final agreement provides Iran with substantial relief from 

sanctions on its ballistic missile program without requiring any 

limits on Iran’s efforts to develop this dangerous technology. In 

what appears to be a last minute concession driven by Russia and 

China, after 8 years the agreement removes the ban on Iran developing ballistic missiles potentially capable of reaching the United 

States. Iran has conducted two ballistic missile tests in the wake 

of the deal, both in violation of a binding U.N. Security Council resolution. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has recently ordered 

the defense ministry to accelerate Iran’s missile program. Iran will receive up to $150 billion in funds and or assets held 

abroad. Such large-scale sanctions relief will allow the Iranian 

economy to recover and fund a new generation of terrorism and 

threats. The United States has designated Iran as a State Sponsor 

of Terrorism since 1984. The State Department report on international terrorism for 2013 stated that Iran ‘‘continued its terrorist-related activity’’ and describes Iran’s support for key proxies 

including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Assad regime as well as opposition militants in Bahrain and separatists in northern Yemen who 

recently toppled the country’s government. Experts warn that 

Iran’s significant support for Shia militias fighting ISIS in Iraq 

risks fueling sectarian tension. Similarly, Iran has used the Houthi 

advances in Yemen as an opportunity to advance its regional objectives by leveraging a Zaidi Shiite armed group, similar to its relationship with Shiite Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon. It also sees 

Yemen as a battlefield in its proxy war with Saudi Arabia, a longtime competitor for regional hegemony. 

Within this context, the Obama administration made a political 

commitment to provide Iran relief from ‘‘nuclear related’’ sanctions 

using waivers and regulatory authority. Yet many sanctions related 

to Iran’s nuclear program are also related to Iran’s other destabilizing activities—including its support for international terrorism, 

its ballistic missile program, and its conventional weapons programs. 

U.S. sanctions are also aimed at preventing the Iranian banks 

that use money laundering and other illicit financial practices to 

support terrorism and Iran’s other destabilizing activities from accessing the U.S. and global financial systems. These illicit financial 

practices are so pervasive in Iran that since November 2011 the entire country has been designated as a ‘‘Jurisdiction of Primary 

Money Laundering Concern’’ by the U.S. Treasury Department. 

In announcing the nuclear agreement, President Obama stated, 

‘‘American sanctions on Iran for its support of terrorism, its human 

rights abuses, its ballistic missile program, will continue to be fully 

enforced.’’ However, there is nothing in U.S. law to prevent the administration from lifting sanctions on those involved in these destructive activities. 

In fact, under the deal, the Obama administration agreed to lift 

sanctions on a significant number of specific individuals, companies, and banks, some of which are engaged in Iran’s support for 

terrorism and its ballistic missile program. 

In response, this legislation is designed to block the President 

from offering sanctions relief to an individual or bank until certifying that such entity has not conducted a significant transaction 

with a terrorist organization, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 


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Corps, or in support of either Iran’s ballistic missile or its conventional weapons programs. 

It also prohibits the administration from lifting Iran’s designation as a ‘‘Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern’’ 

until it certifies that the Government of Iran is no longer supporting terrorism, pursuing weapons of mass destruction and their 

means of delivery, or engaging in illicit financial activities. 

The bill applies the Congressional Review Act to provide Congress the ability to disapprove of Iran-related changes to the Code 

of Federal Regulations. Finally, it clarifies that Iran’s proxies— 

Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad—are included in the definition terrorist organizations for the purposes of 

financial sanctions against Iran. 

HEARINGS

During the 114th Congress, the Committee has continued its active oversight regarding Iran, including multiple hearings related 

to the content of 3662, such as: 

January 27, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Iran Nuclear Negotiations 

After the Second Extension: Where Are They Going?’’ The Honorable Eric S. Edelman, Distinguished Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Mr. John Hannah, Senior 

Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Mr. Ray 

Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on 

Foreign Relations; and The Honorable Robert Einhorn, Senior 

Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, The Brookings Institution. 

February 11, 2015—Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, 

and Trade: ‘‘State Sponsor of Terror: The Global Threat of 

Iran.’’ Frederick W. Kagan, Ph.D., Christopher DeMuth Chair 

and Director, Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute; Mr. Ilan I. Berman, Vice President, American Foreign 

Policy Council; Mr. Tony Badran, Research Fellow, Foundation 

for Defense of Democracies; and Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., Professor, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of 

Foreign Service, Georgetown University. 

February 26, 2015—Joint Hearing: Subcommittee on the Middle 

East and North Africa and Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: ‘‘The Shame of Iranian Human Rights.’’ Mr. Shayan 

Arya, Central Committee Member, Constitutionalist Party of 

Iran (Liberal Democrat); Mr. Mohsen Sazegara, President, Research Institute on Contemporary Iran; Mr. Anthony Vance, 

Director, U.S. Baha’i Office of Public Affairs. 

March 18, 2015—Joint Hearing: Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and North Africa and Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: ‘‘Iran and Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere.’’ Mr. 

Joseph Humire, Author; Mr. Dardo Lo ́pez-Dolz (former Vice 

Minister of Interior of Peru); Mr. Scott Modell, Senior Advisor, 

The Rapidan Group; and Mr. Michael Shifter, President, InterAmerican Dialogue. 

March 19, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Negotiations with Iran: Blocking or Paving Tehran’s Path to Nuclear Weapons?’’ The Honorable Antony J. Blinken, Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State; Mr. Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under SecVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:28 Jan 12, 2016 Jkt 059008 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR393.XXX HR393

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retary, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury. 

March 24, 2015—Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa: ‘‘Iran’s Noncompliance with Its International Atomic Energy Agency Obligations.’’ Mr. William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John 

F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Ms. 

Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, Fellow, George C. Marshall Institute; 

Mr. David Albright, Founder and President, Institute for 

Science and International Security. 

April 22, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Nuclear Agreement with Iran: 

Can’t Trust, Can We Verify?’’ Mr. Charles Duelfer, Chairman, 

Omnis, Inc. (former Chairman, UN Special Commission on 

Iraq [UNSCOM]); The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker, National Security Advisor, Bipartisan Policy Center (former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control & Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of 

State.); Mr. David Albright, Founder and President, Institute 

for Science and International Security. 

June 2, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Americans Detained in Iran.’’ Mr. 

Ali Rezaian (brother of Jason Rezaian); Mrs. Naghmeh Abedini 

(wife of Saeed Abedini); Ms. Sarah Hekmati (sister of Amir 

Hekmati); Mr. Daniel Levinson (son of Robert Levinson). 

June 10, 2015—Joint Hearing: Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces: 

‘‘Iran’s Enduring Ballistic Missile Threat.’’ Lieutenant General 

Michael T. Flynn, USA, Retired (former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency); The Honorable Robert Joseph, Ph.D., Senior 

Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy (former Under 

Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security); David A. Cooper, Ph.D., James V. Forrestal Professor and 

Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs, U.S. 

Naval War College; Anthony H. Cordesman, Ph.D., Arleigh A. 

Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

June 16, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Advancing United States’ Interests at the United Nations.’’ The Honorable Samantha Power, 

U.S. Permanent Representative, United States Mission to the 

United Nations, U.S. Department of State. 

June 17, 2015—Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa: ‘‘The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act: 

State Department’s Non-Compliance.’’ Mr. Thomas Melito, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Government Accountability Office. 

July 9, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran (Part I).’’ The Honorable Stephen G. 

Rademaker, Foreign Policy Project Advisor, Bipartisan Policy 

Center (former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control & 

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. 

Department of State); Michael Doran, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, 

Hudson Institute; Michael Makovsky, Ph.D., Chief Executive 

Officer, JINSA Germunder Center Iran Task Force; Kenneth 

M. Pollack, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution. 


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July 14, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran (Part II).’’ The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, 

Co-Chair, Iran Task Force, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (former United States Senator); General Michael V. 

Hayden, USAF, Retired, Principal, Chertoff Group (former Director, Central Intelligence Agency); The Honorable R. Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations, Belfer Center for Science 

and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (former Under Secretary for Political 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State); Ray Takeyh, Ph.D., Senior 

Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations. 

July 23, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran (Part III).’’ The Honorable Robert Joseph, 

Ph.D., Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy 

(former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security); Mr. Mark Dubowitz, Executive Director, 

Foundation for the Defense of Democracies; Mr. Ilan Goldenberg, Senior Fellow and Director, Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security. 

July 28, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Iran Nuclear Agreement: The Administration’s Case.’’ The Honorable John F. Kerry, Secretary 

of State, U.S. Department of State; The Honorable Jacob Lew, 

Secretary of the Treasury, U.S. Department of the Treasury; 

The Honorable Ernest Moniz, Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy. 

July 28, 2015—Joint Hearing: Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, 

and Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa: ‘‘The 

Iran-North Korea Strategic Alliance.’’ Mr. Ilan Berman, Vice 

President, American Foreign Policy Council; Ms. Claudia 

Rosett, Journalist-in-Residence, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Larry Niksch, Ph.D., Senior Associate, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies; Jim Walsh, Ph.D., Research Associate, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

September 9, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Implications of a Nuclear 

Agreement with Iran (Part IV).’’ General Chuck Wald, USAF, 

Retired (former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command; 

Admiral William Fallon, USN, Retired (former Commander, 

U.S. Central Command); Vice Admiral John Bird, USN, Retired (former Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet); Mr. Leon 

Wieseltier, Isaiah Berlin Senior Fellow in Culture and Policy, 

Foreign Policy and Governance Studies, The Brookings Institution. 

September 17, 2015—Subcommittee on the Middle East and North 

Africa: ‘‘Major Beneficiaries of the Iran Deal: IRGC and 

Hezbollah.’’ Emanuele Ottolenghi, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Matthew Levitt, Ph.D., 

Fromer-Wexler Fellow, Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy; Suzanne Maloney, Ph.D., Interim Deputy Director, Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution. 

December 2, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps: Fueling Middle East Turmoil.’’ Mr. Ali Alfoneh, 


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Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Mr. 

Scott Modell, Managing Director, The Rapidan Group; Mr. 

Daniel Benjamin, Norman E. McCulloch Jr. Director, The John 

Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, Dartmouth College (former Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator 

for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State). 

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

This bill blocks the administration from offering sanctions relief 

to any entity—a bank, business, or individual—included in the nuclear deal until the President certifies that they have not done 

business with a terrorist organization, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps, or in support of either Iran’s ballistic missile or its 

conventional weapons programs. Performance goals associated with 

these objectives include, but are not limited to, the certification and 

delisting of persons or financial institutions includes no person or 

financial institution involved in Iran’s support for terrorism or ballistic missile development. 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

On January 7, 2015, the Foreign Affairs Committee marked up 

H.R. 3662 in open session, pursuant to notice. After debate, the bill 

was ordered reported favorably to the House by voice vote, a reporting quorum being present. 

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee reports that findings and 

recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities 

under clause 2(b)(1) of House Rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report, particularly in the ‘‘Background 

and Purpose of Legislation’’ and ‘‘Section-by-Section Analysis’’ sections. 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, TAX EXPENDITURES, AND FEDERAL

MANDATES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (P.L. 104–4), the Committee adopts 

as its own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement authority, tax expenditure or revenues, and Federal mandates contained in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 


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CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Washington, DC, January 8, 2016. 

Hon. EDWARD R. ROYCE, Chairman, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3662, the Iran Terror Finance Transparency Act. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Pamela Greene, who can 

be reached at 226–2680. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL. 

Enclosure 

cc: Honorable Eliot L. Engel 

Ranking Member 

H.R. 3662—Iran Terror Finance Transparency Act. 

As ordered reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

on January 7, 2016 

SUMMARY

H.R. 3662 would amend current law to provide more congressional oversight over U.S. economic and trade sanctions. The bill 

would prohibit the President from removing certain sanctions unless specific certifications are provided to the Congress. In addition, 

H.R. 3662 would subject any changes to Iranian sanctions to the 

Congressional Review Act, which allows the Congress to review 

and disapprove of new agency rules. 

Specifically, H.R. 3662 would require the administration to make 

certain certifications before it could remove sanctioned Iranian entities from U.S. lists of specially designated nationals and blocked 

persons and would expand the prohibited list of organizations 

under other sanctions. As a result of those requirements, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 3662 would increase administrative 

costs of the Treasury Department by less than $500,000 annually, 

subject to the availability of appropriations. 

In addition, because of its possible effect on the removal of sanctions on Iran, H.R. 3662 could increase both revenues and associated direct spending. If the bill’s requirement of Presidential certification had no effect on sanctions, there would be no budgetary 

effect. If, on the other hand, enacting the bill effectively nullified 

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) related to Iran’s 

nuclear activities, certain sanctions would continue in effect, and 

additional revenues (relative to CBO’s baseline) from penalties for 

violations of those sanctions would amount to about $220 million 

over the 2016–2025 period, CBO estimates. Most of those receipts 

would be spent, so direct spending also would increase, but by less 

than the revenues. On net, deficits over the 2016–2025 period 

would be reduced. However, CBO has no basis for a specific estiVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:28 Jan 12, 2016 Jkt 059008 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR393.XXX HR393

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mate of those budgetary effects because it has no basis for projecting how the legislation might affect the timing of the possible 

waiver of sanctions under the JCPOA. 

Because enacting the legislation could affect direct spending and 

revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3662 would not increase net direct spending by more 

than $5 billion and would not increase on-budget deficits in any of 

the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2026. 

BASIS OF ESTIMATE

On July 14, 2015, the JCPOA was agreed to by a number of parties, including negotiators from the United States and Iran. That 

agreement provides, in part, that under certain conditions Iran will 

receive relief from certain nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the 

United States. The United States currently imposes penalties for 

civil and criminal violations of some sanctions that would be 

waived under that agreement; collections of those amounts are recorded in the Federal budget as additional revenues. Some of the 

penalties from violating those sanctions are deposited into the 

United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund and can 

be spent without further appropriation action. 

Before the JCPOA is implemented, a number of actions must be 

taken, including verification by the International Atomic Energy 

Agency that Iran has taken certain steps related to its nuclear activities. In order to account for uncertainty surrounding the full implementation of the JCPOA, CBO assumes for its baseline that 

there is a 50-percent chance that, under current law, the JCPOA 

will be implemented and the sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear 

program will be waived, most likely starting in the first half of calendar year 2016. That assumption is consistent with how CBO 

would treat the possibility of an agency implementing a notice of 

proposed rulemaking. 

CBO has no basis for assessing whether and to what extent H.R. 

3662 would slow the implementation of the JCPOA or whether the 

potential delay in the lifting of sanctions would entirely stop the 

implementation of the JCPOA. Hence, CBO has no basis for providing a specific estimate of the increases in revenues and direct 

spending that could occur under the legislation. 

If H.R. 3662 delayed or halted the waiver of sanctions under the 

JCPOA, CBO expects that the revenues from collections of civil and 

criminal penalties would increase relative to baseline revenues for 

existing sanctions because penalties related to those sanctions 

would continue to be assessed and collected during that time. Also, 

CBO expects that some additional revenues might be received from 

penalties for activities associated with the expanded list of organizations with which transactions are prohibited. 

In the event that the JCPOA was not implemented as a result 

of this legislation, CBO estimates that revenues from civil and 

criminal penalties would increase relative to the baseline, which incorporates a 50-percent chance that the related sanctions are 

waived, by roughly $220 million over the 2016–2025 period. In that 

case, the associated direct spending would also increase by a smaller amount. In total, any net increase in revenues would exceed any 

direct spending effects over the 2016–2025 period. 


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INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE-SECTOR IMPACT

H.R. 3662 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

ESTIMATE PREPARED BY

Federal Costs: Matthew Pickford 

Federal Revenues: Pamela Greene 

Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Jon Sperl 

Impact on the Private Sector: Logan Smith 

ESTIMATE APPROVED BY: 

H. Samuel Papenfuss 

Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis 

DIRECTED RULE MAKING

Pursuant to clause 3(c) of House Rule XIII, as modified by section 3(i) of H. Res. 5 during the 114th Congress, the Committee 

notes that H.R. 3662 contains no directed rule-making provisions. 

NON-DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Pursuant to clause 3(c) of House Rule XIII, as modified by section 3(g)(2) of H. Res. 5 during the 114th Congress, the Committee 

states that no provision of this bill establishes or reauthorizes a 

program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report 

from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to 

section 21 of Public Law 111–139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. 

CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

H.R. 3662 does not apply to terms and conditions of employment 

or to access to public services or accommodations within the legislative branch. 

NEW ADVISORY COMMITTEES

H.R. 3662 does not establish or authorize any new advisory committees. 

EARMARK IDENTIFICATION

H.R. 3662 contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as described in clauses 9(e), 9(f), and 

9(g) of House Rule XXI. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for this legislation in article I, section 8 of the Constitution. 


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SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Short Title. 

This section provides that the short title of this Act is the ‘‘Iran 

Terror Finance Transparency Act.’’ 

Section 2. Certification Requirement for Removal of Foreign Financial Institutions, Including Iranian Financial Institutions, from 

the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. 

As part of the Iran nuclear agreement’s ‘‘Joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Action,’’ the administration has committed to lifting sanctions against a number of foreign financial institutions. This section prohibits the President from lifting sanctions against these financial institutions until the President certifies to the appropriate 

congressional committees that the bank or financial institution has 

not conducted a significant transaction for, or on behalf of, Iran’s 

Revolutionary Guard Corps, a foreign terrorist organization, or 

anyone sanctioned in connection with Iran’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. 

Section 3. Certification Requirement for Removal of Certain Foreign 

Persons from the List of Specially Designated Nationals and 

Blocked Persons. 

As part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the administration has committed to lifting sanctions against a number of persons and entities. This section prohibits the President from lifting 

sanctions against these persons or entities until the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that they have 

not conducted a significant transaction for, or provided material 

support to, a foreign terrorist organization, or anyone sanctioned in 

connection with Iran’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 

missile programs. 

Section 4. Certification Requirement for Removal of Designation of 

Iran as a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern. 

In November 2011, the United States designated the entire Iranian banking sector, including the country’s central bank, as a ‘‘primary money laundering concern.’’ This provision prohibits the 

President from removing the designation of Iran as a primary 

money laundering concern until the President certifies that Iran is 

no longer supporting terrorism, or pursuing weapons of mass destruction or illicit financial activities. 

Section 5. Applicability of Congressional Review of Certain Agency 

Rulemaking related to Iran. 

This provision allows the Congress to disapprove of any alterations to regulations governing Iran sanctions, and requires comprehensive reporting on licenses issued by the U.S. for activities in 

Iran. 

Section 6. Prohibitions and Conditions with Respect to Certain Accounts Held by Foreign Financial Institutions. 

This provision adds Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic 

Jihad to the third-party financial sanctions contained in the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 


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2010, explicitly sanctioning anyone doing business with these organizations. 

Section 7. Definitions. 

This section provides definitions of several key terms used 

throughout. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italics 

and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 

roman): 

COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, 

AND DIVESTMENT ACT OF 2010 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE I—SANCTIONS 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 104. MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS. 

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) The Financial Action Task Force is an intergovernmental body whose purpose is to develop and promote national 

and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 

(2) Thirty-three countries, plus the European Commission 

and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 

belong to the Financial Action Task Force. The member countries of the Financial Action Task Force include the United 

States, Canada, most countries in western Europe, Russia, the 

People’s Republic of China, Japan, South Korea, Argentina, 

and Brazil. 

(3) In 2008 the Financial Action Task Force extended its 

mandate to include addressing ‘‘new and emerging threats 

such as proliferation financing’’, meaning the financing of the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and published 

‘‘guidance papers’’ for members to assist them in implementing 

various United Nations Security Council resolutions dealing 

with weapons of mass destruction, including United Nations 

Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1803 (2008), 

which deal specifically with proliferation by Iran. 

(4) The Financial Action Task Force has repeatedly called 

on members— 

(A) to advise financial institutions in their jurisdictions to give special attention to business relationships and 

transactions with Iran, including Iranian companies and 

financial institutions; 


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(B) to apply effective countermeasures to protect their 

financial sectors from risks relating to money laundering 

and financing of terrorism that emanate from Iran; 

(C) to protect against correspondent relationships 

being used by Iran and Iranian companies and financial 

institutions to bypass or evade countermeasures and riskmitigation practices; and 

(D) to take into account risks relating to money laundering and financing of terrorism when considering requests by Iranian financial institutions to open branches 

and subsidiaries in their jurisdictions. 

(5) At a February 2010 meeting of the Financial Action 

Task Force, the Task Force called on members to apply countermeasures ‘‘to protect the international financial system from 

the ongoing and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks’’ emanating from Iran. 

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF SANC- TIONS ON THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN.—Congress— 

(1) acknowledges the efforts of the United Nations Security 

Council to impose limitations on transactions involving Iranian 

financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran; and 

(2) urges the President, in the strongest terms, to consider 

immediately using the authority of the President to impose 

sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and any other Iranian 

financial institution engaged in proliferation activities or support of terrorist groups. 

(c) PROHIBITIONS AND CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN

ACCOUNTS HELD BY FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 

the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall 

prescribe regulations to prohibit, or impose strict conditions on, 

the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a foreign 

financial institution that the Secretary finds knowingly engages in an activity described in paragraph (2). 

(2) ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.—A foreign financial institution 

engages in an activity described in this paragraph if the foreign financial institution— 

(A) facilitates the efforts of the Government of Iran 

(including efforts of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps or 

any of its agents or affiliates)— 

(i) to acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction; or 

(ii) to provide support for organizations designated 

as foreign terrorist organizations under section 219(a) 

of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

1189(a)) or support for acts of international terrorism 

(as defined in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 

1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note)), including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic 

Jihad, and any affiliates or successors thereof; 

(B) facilitates the activities of— 

(i) a person subject to financial sanctions pursuant 

to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 


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14 

(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), or 1929 (2010), or 

any other resolution that is agreed to by the Security 

Council and imposes sanctions with respect to Iran; or 

(ii) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction 

of, or owned or controlled by, a person described in 

clause (i); 

(C) engages in money laundering to carry out an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B); 

(D) facilitates efforts by the Central Bank of Iran or 

any other Iranian financial institution to carry out an activity described in subparagraph (A) or (B); or 

(E) facilitates a significant transaction or transactions 

or provides significant financial services for— 

(i) Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its 

agents or affiliates whose property or interests in 

property are blocked pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 

seq.); or 

(ii) a person whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to that Act in connection 

with— 

(I) Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass 

destruction; or 

(II) Iran’s support for international terrorism. 

(3) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in subsections 

(b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that 

violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a 

violation of regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) of this 

subsection to the same extent that such penalties apply to a 

person that commits an unlawful act described in section 

206(a) of that Act. 

(4) DETERMINATIONS REGARDING NIOC AND NITC.— 

(A) DETERMINATIONS.—For purposes of paragraph 

(2)(E), the Secretary of the Treasury shall, not later than 

45 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat 

Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012— 

(i) determine whether the NIOC or the NITC is an 

agent or affiliate of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps; 

and 

(ii) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the determinations made under 

clause (i), together with the reasons for those determinations. 

(B) FORM OF REPORT.—A report submitted under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be submitted in unclassified form 

but may contain a classified annex. 

(C) APPLICABILITY WITH RESPECT TO PETROLEUM

TRANSACTIONS.— (i) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.—Except as provided in clause (ii), if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the NIOC or the NITC is a person described in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (2)(E), the regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall apply 


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with respect to a significant transaction or transactions or significant financial services knowingly facilitated or provided by a foreign financial institution 

for the NIOC or the NITC, as applicable, for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran, 

only if a determination of the President under section 

1245(d)(4)(B) of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(B)) 

that there is a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products produced in countries other than 

Iran to permit purchasers of petroleum and petroleum 

products from Iran to reduce significantly their purchases from Iran is in effect at the time of the transaction or the provision of the service. 

(ii) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES.—If the 

Secretary of the Treasury determines that the NIOC 

or the NITC is a person described in clause (i) or (ii) 

of paragraph (2)(E), the regulations prescribed under 

paragraph (1) shall not apply to a significant transaction or transactions or significant financial services 

knowingly facilitated or provided by a foreign financial 

institution for the NIOC or the NITC, as applicable, 

for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products 

from Iran if an exception under paragraph (4)(D) of 

section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)) applies 

to the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution at the time of the transaction 

or the provision of the service. 

(iii) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The exceptions in 

clauses (i) and (ii) shall not be construed to limit the 

authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to impose 

sanctions pursuant to the regulations prescribed under 

paragraph (1) for an activity described in paragraph 

(2) to the extent the activity would meet the criteria 

described in that paragraph in the absence of the involvement of the NIOC or the NITC. 

(D) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph: 

(i) NIOC.—The term ‘‘NIOC’’ means the National 

Iranian Oil Company. 

(ii) NITC.—The term ‘‘NITC’’ means the National 

Iranian Tanker Company. 

(d) PENALTIES FOR DOMESTIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR ACTIONS OF PERSONS OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY SUCH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 

the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall 

prescribe regulations to prohibit any person owned or controlled by a domestic financial institution from knowingly engaging in a transaction or transactions with or benefitting 

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its agents or affiliates whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 

U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 


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(2) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in section 

206(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 

(50 U.S.C. 1705(b)) shall apply to a domestic financial institution to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person 

that commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of 

that Act if— 

(A) a person owned or controlled by the domestic financial institution violates, attempts to violate, conspires 

to violate, or causes a violation of regulations prescribed 

under paragraph (1) of this subsection; and 

(B) the domestic financial institution knew or should 

have known that the person violated, attempted to violate, 

conspired to violate, or caused a violation of such regulations. 

(e) REQUIREMENTS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MAINTAINING

ACCOUNTS FOR FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe regulations to require a domestic financial institution 

maintaining a correspondent account or payable-through account in the United States for a foreign financial institution to 

do one or more of the following: 

(A) Perform an audit of activities described in subsection (c)(2) that may be carried out by the foreign financial institution. 

(B) Report to the Department of the Treasury with respect to transactions or other financial services provided 

with respect to any such activity. 

(C) Certify, to the best of the knowledge of the domestic financial institution, that the foreign financial institution is not knowingly engaging in any such activity. 

(D) Establish due diligence policies, procedures, and 

controls, such as the due diligence policies, procedures, and 

controls described in section 5318(i) of title 31, United 

States Code, reasonably designed to detect whether the 

Secretary of the Treasury has found the foreign financial 

institution to knowingly engage in any such activity. 

(2) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in sections 

5321(a) and 5322 of title 31, United States Code, shall apply 

to a person that violates a regulation prescribed under paragraph (1) of this subsection, in the same manner and to the 

same extent as such penalties would apply to any person that 

is otherwise subject to such section 5321(a) or 5322. 

(f) WAIVER.—The Secretary of the Treasury may waive the application of a prohibition or condition imposed with respect to a foreign financial institution pursuant to subsection (c) or section 104A 

or the imposition of a penalty under subsection (d) with respect to 

a domestic financial institution on and after the date that is 30 

days after the Secretary— 

(1) determines that such a waiver is necessary to the national interest of the United States; and 

(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 

report describing the reasons for the determination. 

(g) PROCEDURES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.— 


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(1) IN GENERAL.—If a finding under paragraph (1) or (4) of 

subsection (c) or section 104A, a prohibition, condition, or penalty imposed as a result of any such finding, or a penalty imposed under subsection (d), is based on classified information 

(as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.)) and a court reviews the finding or 

the imposition of the prohibition, condition, or penalty, the Secretary of the Treasury may submit such information to the 

court ex parte and in camera. 

(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection 

shall be construed to confer or imply any right to judicial review of any finding under paragraph (1) or (4) of subsection (c) 

or section 104A, any prohibition, condition, or penalty imposed 

as a result of any such finding, or any penalty imposed under 

subsection (d). 

(h) CONSULTATIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATIONS.—In 

implementing this section and the regulations prescribed under 

this section, the Secretary of the Treasury— 

(1) shall consult with the Secretary of State; and 

(2) may, in the sole discretion of the Secretary of the 

Treasury, consult with such other agencies and departments 

and such other interested parties as the Secretary considers 

appropriate. 

(i) DEFINITIONS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—In this section: 

(A) ACCOUNT; CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAYABLETHROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms ‘‘account’’, ‘‘correspondent 

account’’, and ‘‘payable-through account’’ have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 31, United 

States Code. 

(B) AGENT.—The term ‘‘agent’’ includes an entity established by a person for purposes of conducting transactions on behalf of the person in order to conceal the identity of the person. 

(C) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘financial institution’’ means a financial institution specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (M), or 

(Y) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code. 

(D) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION; DOMESTIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The terms ‘‘foreign financial institution’’ and ‘‘domestic financial institution’’ shall have the 

meanings of those terms as determined by the Secretary of 

the Treasury. 

(E) MONEY LAUNDERING.—The term ‘‘money laundering’’ means the movement of illicit cash or cash equivalent proceeds into, out of, or through a country, or into, out 

of, or through a financial institution. 

(2) OTHER DEFINITIONS.—The Secretary of the Treasury 

may further define the terms used in this section in the regulations prescribed under this section. 

* * * * * * * 


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ADDITIONAL VIEWS

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs has compiled an enviable record of bipartisan legislation and oversight, especially with 

regard to security matters. The Committee embodies the spirit that 

‘‘politics should end at the water’s edge.’’ 

So I am disappointed that the Committee has approved H.R. 

3662 on a purely partisan vote. The bill was drafted and introduced 

without consultation with or input from Democrats on the Committee or in the House. 

In crafting legislation and conducting oversight in this Committee, I have made clear my views on the rogue regime in Iran. 

We were wrong to allow Iran to continue enriching during the talks 

that resulted in the JCPOA. This past September, I voted against 

the nuclear deal and I continue to believe the agreement is deeply 

flawed. I view the Iranian regime for what it is—the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism and a destabilizing force across the 

Middle East. 

But Congress had an opportunity to vote on the deal, and we 

lost. There weren’t enough votes to override a veto or even send a 

resolution of disapproval to the President. And the agreement now 

has gone into effect. 

Now, I think that we have to work together on bipartisan legislation that will hold Iran’s feet to the fire on its nuclear program, 

and hold the regime accountable for its support of terrorism and 

other nefarious activities. And also to help our ally Israel with her 

legitimate security needs. 

Unfortunately, the provisions of the bill would not accomplish its 

stated purpose of strengthening oversight of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for Iran’s nuclear program. Instead, this is yet 

another attempt to undermine the deal, rather than to ensure Iran 

lives up to its word. So I don’t think it serves any purpose to take 

up a partisan bill like this that has the effect of killing the deal 

and leaving us with no clear path forward. 

Fundamentally, the bill would impose conditions on carrying out 

the U.S. commitment under the JCPOA that could never be met. 

No President could ever certify that a person has never engaged in 

sanctionable activity, particularly the activity for which the person 

was sanctioned in the first place. But without such a certification, 

none of the persons specified in the JCPOA could be removed from 

our sanctions list. 

Therefore, I oppose the bill. There is no shortage of good ideas 

of how to achieve our goals, and I am confident we can craft an effective bill and enact it with bipartisan support. 

ELIOT L. ENGEL. 


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DISSENTING VIEWS

H.R. 3662 is unfortunately yet another example of unproductive 

partisan politics to undermine what is now established U.S. policy. 

This bill does not offer measures to strengthen our foreign policy 

towards Iran. Instead of approaching this issue in a bipartisan 

manner to propose effective sanctions that communicate U.S. security policy, H.R. 3662 is a political move that threatens to overturn 

an agreement that has already gone into effect. Instead, we should 

be working together across the aisle to develop measures that will 

improve our national security and strengthen our leverage with 

Iran and other countries trying to build up their nuclear arsenals. 

H.R. 3662 is a political gesture, not a bill designed to make us any 

safer. 

WILLIAM KEATING. 

I want to thank Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and 

my distinguished colleagues on the House Foreign Affairs Committee for all of the good work that we have done over the last 

year, which was typically done in a bipartisan fashion, respecting 

the order and process of our committee system. I share the feelings 

of many of my colleagues, including Ranking Member Engel, that 

H.R. 3662 stands out as an exception to our bipartisan efforts. Unfortunately, the bill was not drafted in the Foreign Affairs Committee, and no Democrats were consulted during the drafting of the 

bill. It faces a certain veto by the President. I had hoped that we 

could start 2016 by building on the bipartisanship that we achieved 

in passing the omnibus bill that will fund the needs of the American people. However, the lack of bipartisanship on H.R. 3662 has 

resulted in a bill that I and many of my Member colleagues are unable to support. 

While I supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

(JCPOA), I appreciate that many Members have reservations about 

the United States signing the JCPOA with Iran. I think we all 

agree Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism and a 

destabilizing force across the Middle East. As Ranking Member 

Engel noted, Congress had an opportunity to vote on the plan, and 

there weren’t enough votes to override a veto or even send a resolution of disapproval to the President. The JCPOA is now being implemented and represents the best chance for a long-term resolution that effectively addresses our nuclear proliferation concerns. I 

stand ready to work with my colleagues on bipartisan legislation 

that will hold the Iranian regime accountable for its nuclear program, its support of terrorism, and other nefarious activities. As 

this process moves forward, it is important to reaffirm strong support for our ally, Israel, and its legitimate security needs. 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL. 

Æ 


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