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20-897-cv

Hassan v. Town of Brookhaven

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 15th day of December, two thousand twenty.

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

SUSAN L. CARNEY,

MICHAEL H. PARK,

Circuit Judges. 

JOHN HASSAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 20-897-cv

v.

TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

FOR APPELLANT: JOHN HASSAN, Pro Se, Center Moriches, 

NY.

FOR APPELLEE: KENNETH J. LAURI, Assistant Town 

Attorney, for Annette Eaderesto, Town 

Attorney, Brookhaven, NY. 
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Appeal from a March 3, 2020 order of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (Steven I. Locke, Magistrate Judge).

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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and hereby is

AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Hassan (“Hassan”), who is proceeding pro se, brought this matter 

against Defendant-Appellee Town of Brookhaven (the “Town”), principally challenging the Town’s 

enforcement of its Anti-Littering Law against him as well as the Town’s requirement that he submit 

to a home inspection to qualify for Meals on Wheels.2 On March 3, 2020, the U.S. District Court for 

the Eastern District of New York (Steven I. Locke, Magistrate Judge) granted the Town’s motion for 

summary judgment, and judgement entered on March 4, 2020. Hassan timely appealed. We assume 

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, “resolv[ing] all ambiguities and draw[ing] all 

inferences against the moving party.”3 “Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”4 We “liberally construe 

pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest 

arguments they suggest,”5 and afford these litigants “some latitude in meeting the rules governing 

litigation.”6 But “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary 

judgment motion.”7

1 The parties agreed to submit this matter to Magistrate Judge Locke pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), 

which permits the parties to a “civil matter” to consent to the plenary authority of a magistrate judge and thus 

permits the magistrate judge to enter final, directly appealable orders. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), (3); see also 

LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 91–92 (2d Cir. 1995).

2 Magistrate Judge Locke liberally construed Hassan’s Second Amended Complaint as alleging claims 

under the Equal Protection Clause and the Fourth Amendment, as well as a defamation claim.

3 Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2013).

4 Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)); see also Selevan v. N.Y. 

Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A defendant is entitled to summary judgment where the 

plaintiff has failed to come forth with evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to return a verdict in 

his or her favor on an essential element of a claim on which the plaintiff[ ] bear[s] the burden of proof.”

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

5 McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

6 Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

7 Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).
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Upon de novo review of the record on appeal and upon consideration of the arguments 

advanced by the parties, for substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court’s opinion, we 

conclude that Hassan did not adduce evidence creating factual disputes that would preclude 

summary judgment.

8 Accordingly, because Hassan did not come forward with specific facts showing 

that there were genuine issues for trial in connection with his claims, the District Court did not err in 

concluding that the Town was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed the arguments raised by Hassan on appeal and find all of them to be 

without merit.9 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the March 3, 2020 order of the District Court granting 

summary judgment to the Town. 

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

8 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (explaining that once the 

movant has met its initial burden, the party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show 

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . [T]he nonmoving party must come 

forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)).

9 Insofar as Hassan advances additional arguments raised for the first time on appeal, we decline to 

address them. Virgilio v. City of N.Y., 407 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In general we refrain from passing on 

issues not raised below.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).