[Cite as Tisdale v. ADP, L.L.C., 2021-Ohio-3827.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Eileen Tisdale, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 20AP-521 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 20CVH-345)

ADP, LLC, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on October 28, 2021 

 

On brief: Eileen Tisdale, pro se. Argued: Eileen Tisdale. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

DORRIAN, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Eileen Tisdale, appeals from the November 4, 2020 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas which dismissed her complaint 

against defendant-appellee, ADP, LLC, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a 

claim for relief. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} Appellant's complaint asserts she attended Vanderbilt University from 

August 1987 to May 1991 but was not awarded a degree. On April 12, 2002, the United 

States Department of Education ("U.S. Dept. of Edn.") determined that her debt merited a 

discharge due to falsification of ability to benefit from the training. The attachments to the 

complaint appear to indicate that the discharge covers only the loan held by U.S. Dept. of 

Edn., Federal Student Aid, which appellant obtained to attend Vanderbilt University 

("Vanderbilt") (Debt No. G199709014372901). U.S. Dept. of Edn. made no determination 
No. 20AP-521 2 

regarding any loans held by guaranty agencies, servicers, lenders, or educational 

institutions. 

{¶ 3} On January 17, 2013, Vanderbilt received a judgment for $23,658.40 against 

appellant in the General Sessions Court for Davidson County, Tennessee. 

{¶ 4} On March 4, 2014, appellant was granted a discharge of debts under 11 U.S.C. 

727 (Chapter 7) by the United States Southern District of Ohio Court (Petition No. 2:13-bk59348). 

{¶ 5} On January 14, 2020, appellant filed a complaint in the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas seeking lost wages in the amount of $3,586.49 plus $2,000,000 in 

damages on grounds of "cruel and unusual punishment, harassment and mental cruelty" 

because appellee, on behalf of her employer Wal-Mart, had been garnishing her wages for 

a debt to Vanderbilt that appellant contends was discharged. Appellant attached to her 

complaint a final report and answer of garnishee filed by Walmart; a 2007 letter from the 

U.S. Dept. of Edn. regarding a loan discharge; a bankruptcy discharge notice from 2014; a 

copy of the bankruptcy docket and list of creditors; a garnishment stop order; two 

garnishment payment notices; and a notice of wage withholding. 

{¶ 6} On September 30, 2020, the trial court filed a notice of intent to dismiss, 

pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), unless appellant demonstrated the inapplicability of R.C. 

2716.21(F)(2) to her claims. On November 4, 2020, the trial court sua sponte dismissed 

appellant's complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).1 

II. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 7} Appellant appeals and assigns the following three assignments of error for 

our review: 

[I.] ADP, LLC. acted on three instances against R.C. 2716.041 

[II.] ADP, LLC. confirmed the validity of a discharged debt 

before processing the writ of garnishment. 

[III.] ADP, LLC. Acted in "Good Faith" after the Final Report 

issued May 7, 2019 by restarting the writ of garnishment again 

on November 23, 2019. 

1 Generally, a court may dismiss a complaint on its own motion after the parties are given notice of the court's 

intention to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. Bullard v. McDonald's, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-374, 2021-

Ohio-1505, ¶ 10. 
No. 20AP-521 3 

(Sic passim.) Since her assignments of error are related, we shall address them together. 

III. Analysis 

{¶ 8} By her assignments of error, appellant contends that appellee has wrongfully 

been garnishing her wages for a debt that was not valid. 

{¶ 9} The trial court dismissed the action, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), finding 

appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because R.C. 2716.21 

applied to these facts. 

{¶ 10} When reviewing a judgment rendered on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, ordinarily an appellate court's 

standard of review is de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-

Ohio-4362, ¶ 5. A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the 

complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548 

(1992), citing Assn. for Defense of Washington Local School Dist. v. Kiger, 42 Ohio St.3d 

116, 117 (1989). In considering the motion to dismiss, a trial court may not rely on 

allegations or evidence outside the complaint. State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander, 79 Ohio 

St.3d 206, 207 (1997). The trial court may only consider the complaint itself and certain 

written instruments attached thereto by the plaintiff. Cline v. Mtge. Electronic Registration 

Sys., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-240, 2013-Ohio-5706, ¶ 9. 

{¶ 11} A trial court must presume all factual allegations contained in the complaint 

to be true and must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 

Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988). "[A]s long as there is a set of 

facts, consistent with the plaintiff's complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover, 

the court may not grant a defendant's motion to dismiss." York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 

60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145 (1991). The court need not, however, accept as true any unsupported 

and conclusory legal propositions advanced in the complaint. Morrow v. Reminger & 

Reminger Co., L.P.A., 183 Ohio App.3d 40, 2009-Ohio-2665, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). 

{¶ 12} Appellant filed her action against appellee seeking lost wages and 

$2,000,000 in damages on grounds of "cruel and unusual punishment, harassment and 

mental cruelty" based on the garnishing of her wages. Appellant argued U.S. Dept. of Edn. 
No. 20AP-521 4 

discharged the debt to Vanderbilt in 2002, and then the debt was again discharged in 

bankruptcy in 2014. 

{¶ 13} The trial court dismissed the complaint, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), finding 

that R.C. 2716.21(F)(2) prohibited any action for damages against appellee. R.C. 

2716.21(F)(2) provides, as follows: 

A garnishee who acts, or attempts to act, in accordance with 

Chapter 2716. of the Revised Code is not liable for damages in 

any civil action for any action taken pursuant to that chapter 

in good faith or any omission made in good faith. 

 

{¶ 14} Appellant contends that appellee did not act in good faith because it was 

garnishing her wages based on a debt that has been discharged. However, there was no 

evidence before the trial court that appellee did not act in good faith. While appellant 

argues that U.S. Dept. of Edn. discharged the debt in 2007, and the letter attached to 

appellant's complaint indicates that Debt No. G19970901432901, Account No. 251-57-

8994, was discharged, there was no indication that the loan held by Vanderbilt was 

discharged. The letter specifically provides that the "discharge covers only the loan held by 

[U.S. Dept. of Edn., Federal Student Aid], which you obtained to attend Vanderbilt. The 

Department has made no determination with regard to loans held by guaranty agencies, 

servicers, lenders, or educational institutions." (Compl. Ex. 2.) Thus, the discharge was for 

a loan held by U.S. Dept. of Edn. only, not any loans held by Vanderbilt. Appellant did not 

offer any evidence that loans held by Vanderbilt were included in this discharge. Further, 

Vanderbilt received the judgment against appellant in Tennessee on January 17, 2013. If 

the loan had been discharged in 2007, Vanderbilt would not have received a judgment 

against appellant for the repayment. 

{¶ 15} Appellant further argues that the loan was discharged in her bankruptcy 

proceedings in November 2013. Appellant attached a list of creditors that appear to have 

been sent service of process in the case. However, appellant provided no further evidence 

as to which debts were discharged. There is no evidence that her student loans were 

discharged in bankruptcy.2

2 We observe that student loans are typically not automatically discharged under Federal Bankruptcy Code 11 

U.S.C. 523(a)(8). 11 U.S.C. 523 governs the dischargeability of student loans and provides, as follows: 
No. 20AP-521 5 

{¶ 16} Further, we note that the appropriate vehicle to provide a defense or 

exemption to a garnishment is provided in R.C. Chapter 2716. R.C. 2716.0313 provides: 

(F) The judgment debtor may receive a hearing in accordance 

with this division by delivering a written request for a hearing 

to the clerk of the court within five business days after receipt 

of the notice provided pursuant to division (E) of this section. 

The request may set forth the judgment debtor's reasons for 

disputing the judgment creditor's determination of the 

current balance due on garnishment order; however, neither 

the judgment debtor's inclusion of nor the judgment debtor's 

failure to include those reasons upon the request constitutes 

a waiver of any defense of the judgment debtor or affects the 

judgment debtor's right to produce evidence at the hearing. If 

the request is made by the judgment debtor within the 

prescribed time, the court shall schedule a hearing no later 

than twelve days after the request is made, unless the 

judgment debtor indicated that the judgment debtor believed 

the need for the hearing was an emergency, in which case the 

(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1192, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title [11 USCS § 727, 

1141, 1192, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b)] does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt— 

* * * 

(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship 

on the debtor and the debtor's dependents, for— 

(A) 

(i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, 

or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit 

institution; or 

(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or 

(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the 

Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 221(d)(1)], incurred by a debtor who is an individual[.] 

Furthermore, case law from the First District Court of Appeals indicates that a student loan is presumed not 

to be discharged in bankruptcy unless a specific determination of the loan's dischargeability under section 

523(a)(8) is made. See Cadle Co. v. White, 1st Dist. No. C-980492 (Apr. 16, 1999). A separate written 

complaint needs to be filed with the bankruptcy court in order to start an adversary proceeding and the debtor 

must prove undue hardship before a student loan is discharged. In this case, appellant did not provide 

evidence that the student loan was discharged. 

3 We note that the form to request a hearing outlined in R.C. 2716.06(B) specifically provides that no 

objections to the judgment itself will be heard or considered at the garnishment hearing. Statutory 

exemptions to garnishment are set forth in R.C. 2329.66. In some instances, parties pursue procedural or 

substantive defect related to the garnishment. The trial court does not have the authority to vacate the 

Tennessee judgment and appellant should have attacked the validity of the judgment in the Tennessee court 

at the time the judgment was rendered. 
No. 20AP-521 6 

court shall schedule the hearing as soon as practicable after 

the request is made. The court shall send notice of the date, 

time, and place of the hearing to the parties in accordance 

with division (H) of this section. The hearing shall be limited 

to a consideration of the amount of the current balance due 

on the garnishment order, if any. 

{¶ 17} R.C. 2716.06 provides that the judgment debtor should dispute the judgment 

creditor's right to garnish the wages at a requested hearing by demonstrating an exemption 

or reason the garnishment is improper. 

{¶ 18} Prior to pursuing the instant case, appellant did request a hearing on the 

garnishment. We take judicial notice of the record in Creditor Vanderbilt Univ. v. Debtor 

Tisdale, Franklin C.P. No. 17JG-069187, in which appellant requested a hearing which was 

held before a magistrate on May 30, 2018. The magistrate found appellant had not met her 

burden of proof as to an exemption or defense to garnishment and concluded the 

garnishment shall proceed. The trial court overruled appellant's objections and adopted 

the magistrate's decision. The trial court also overruled appellant's "Civ.R. 60(B) motion 

to vacate" a foreign judgment. On December 3, 2020, a magistrate held another R.C. 

2716.13 hearing. Appellant made several arguments as to why the garnishment is improper, 

including: (1) U.S. Dept. of Edn. discharged the debt in 2007, (2) the debt had been 

discharged through her bankruptcy filing, (3) the garnishee had filed a letter that the 

garnishment was improper because the debt was discharged in bankruptcy, (4) since the 

garnishee filed a final report, the judgment creditor was required to obtain a new judgment 

before her wages could be garnished, and (5) garnishment was inappropriate and violated 

her civil rights since she did not gain anything from Vanderbilt, such as a college degree, 

and Vanderbilt failed to offer any evidence that she owed the debt. 

{¶ 19} In its decision rendered December 3, 2020, the magistrate found all of 

appellant's arguments without merit. The magistrate found appellant failed to provide 

evidence that the discharge provided in the 2007 letter from U.S. Dept. of Edn. related to 

the loan and/or debt to Vanderbilt. Further, the magistrate determined she was bound by 

the trial court's July 16, 2018 ruling overruling appellant's "60(B) motion to vacate the 

judgment," in which the trial court determined it did not have the authority to vacate the 

Tennessee judgment against appellant. 
No. 20AP-521 7 

{¶ 20} The magistrate found that although Vanderbilt was listed as a creditor in 

appellant's bankruptcy proceeding, there was no evidence provided that the student loan 

was discharged in bankruptcy. 

{¶ 21} The magistrate also denied appellant's third argument regarding a letter from 

the garnishee supporting her assertion that the garnishment was improper, and the debt 

was discharged in bankruptcy. The magistrate ruled that under Ohio law, a garnishee 

cannot assert an exemption on behalf of the judgment debtor. R.C. 2329.66. The 

magistrate denied appellant's argument that since the garnishee had filed a final report, 

Vanderbilt was required to obtain a new judgment against her before her wages could be 

garnished. The magistrate found that R.C. Chapter 2716 did not support appellant's 

argument and there was no evidence of a statutory exemption to the garnishment. 

{¶ 22} Finally, the magistrate found that appellant did not meet her burden of proof 

that she did not owe any money or that the judgment was invalid. The trial court adopted 

the magistrate's decision on December 21, 2020. Appellant asserts several of these same 

arguments that were addressed and denied at her hearings on May 30, 2018 and 

December 3, 2020 in Franklin C.P. No. 17JG-069187 which occurred before and during the 

pendency of this case since she filed her complaint in this case in January 2020. 

{¶ 23} Given that there is no evidence of a lack of good faith in appellee's actions, 

appellee cannot be liable for damages in any civil action. There are no facts consistent with 

appellant's complaint which would allow appellant to recover, and the trial court did not 

err in dismissing the action. Appellant's three assignments of error are overruled. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 24} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant's three assignments of error 

and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT and MENTEL, JJ., concur.