* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-20069

M. FRANK RUSSELL; RENE W. VAN ZANTEN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

SANCHEZ-O’BRIEN OIL AND GAS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(H-96-CV-3340)

November 2, 1999

Before REAVLEY, POLITZ, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge: *

Rene W. van Zanten and M. Frank Russell alleged that their former

empl oyer, Sanchez-O’Brien Oil and Gas Corporation, violated Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by discriminating against them on the bases

of their race and national origin. The district court dismissed their action for lack

of jurisdictio n, and van Zanten and Russell timely appealed. For the reasons

assigned, we affirm the judgment of dismissal, but we do so upon non-jurisdictional

grounds.

BACKGROUND1 An “overriding royalty interest” is the right to receive part of the income proceeds

generated from the production of oil and gas.

2 In late 1970s and early 1980s, van Zanten and Russell serv ed in executive

position s for Sanchez-O’Brien Oil and Gas Corporation. Van Zanten, general

couns el, eventually rose to the position of president. Russell served as vicepresid ent and general counsel. Effective January 1, 1980, Sanchez-O’Brien entered

into agreements with appellants, conveying to them “overriding royalty interests.” 1

Under their respective agreements, each appellant was to rec eive royalties provided

that he was an employee of Sanchez-O’Brien at the time the first well – drilled

subsequent to Sanchez-O’Brien’s acquisition of the property

– was spudded on the

property.

Appellants resigned from Sanchez-O’Brien in September 1981.

Approximately thirteen years later, in the fall of 1994, they began to suspect that

Sanchez-O’Brien was failing to make royalty payments related to the So uthwest

Escobas Prospect in Zapata County, Texas. Van Zanten became suspicious while

reviewing documents on behalf of Concord Oil Company, which, at the time, was

engaged in a lawsuit against Sanchez-O’Brien. Van Zanten’s discovery led to

numerous conve r sations with Sanchez-O’Brien’s current and former employees

regarding whether appellants were entitled to ass i gnments and royalties arising

from the Zapata County property. In particular, van Zanten spoke and

corresponded with Armando Medina, a former employee of Sanchez-O’Brien, and

learned that he had received royalty payments under his royalty agreement.

Initially appellants proceeded in state court under a contract theory because,2 Calhoun County v. United States , 132 F.3d 1100, 1103 (5 th Cir. 1998) (“This Court

reviews a district court’s

. . . dismiss[al] for lack of jurisdiction under a de novo standard of

review.”).

3 they opine, they l acked reason to suspect that discriminatory animus motivated

Sanchez- O’Brien’s decision to withhold royalty interests to which they were

entitled. Appellants maintain that during discovery in the state court case they

uncovered information reflecti ng that Sanchez-O’Brien discriminated against them

by paying royalties to Medina under an agreement identical to theirs. According

to appellants’ complaint, filed with the EEOC and the Texas Commission on

Human Rights in September 199 6, Sanchez-O’Brien discriminated against them on

the bases of their race and their national origin, using royalties that should have

been distributed to them to establish a benefit pool for Hispanic employees.

Before the district court, Sanchez-O’Brien contended that appellants failed

to file their charge of discrimination within 300 days after they discovered that

Medina had been paid the royalty interest. The district court conducted an

eviden tiary hearing and determined that paying overriding royalty interests to

Medina triggered a cause of action that plaintiffs knew or should have known of no

later than September 1994. According to the district court, plaintiffs were required

to file a charge with the EEOC on or before August 31, 1995. As they failed to do

so , the district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, and denied

plaintiffs’ subsequent motion for alteration of judgment. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

We review d e novo dismissals for lack of jurisdiction. 2 Here, the district3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (“A char ge under this section shall be filed within one

hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred

. . ., except

that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved

has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek

relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect there to upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved

within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred

. . . .”).

4 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 455 U.S. 385 (1982).

5 Brennan v. Stewart , 834 F.2d 1248, 1255 (5 th Cir. 1988).

6 Id. ; see also Foreman v Babcock & Wilcox Co. , 117 F.3d 800, 804 (5 t h Cir. 1997)

(“We must affirm a judgment of the district court if the resu lt is correct, even if our

affirmance is upon grounds not relied upon by the district court.”), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct.

1050 (1998); Williams v. AgriBank, FCB

, 972 F.2d 962, 965 (8 th Cir. 1992) (holding that

a judgment can be affirmed on grounds fairly supported by the record).

4 court dismissed appellants’ action for lack of jurisdiction because appellants filed

their complaint with the EEOC outside of the statutory time limit. 3 In Z ipes v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

, however, the Supreme Court held that filing a timely

charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisd ictional prerequisite to

b ringing a Title VII action but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is

subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. 4 We perforce must conclude that

the district court erred in dismissing the suit for lack of jurisdiction.

In most instances, an improper jurisdictional dismissal necessitates reversal

and remand t o allow the district court to consider the merits. 5 Where the district

court has considered the merits of an aspect of the action that provides a basis by

which we can affirm, reversal is inappropriate; instead, precedent directs us to

a ffirm on alternative grounds. 6 We therefore consider the merits of appellants’

claim to determine whether the case warrants remand or whether alternative

grounds allow us to affirm.7 Nilsen v. City of Moss Point , 701 F.2d 556, 562 (5 th Cir. 1983) (en banc).

8 Pending before the district court at the time that it dismis sed the suit for lack of

jurisdiction was Sanchez-O’Brien’s motion for summary jud gment; also on file were

appellants’ respon s e and Sanchez-O’Brien’s reply. This court normally does not address

matters that have not been addressed by the district court, International Union of Operating

Engineers v. Sullivan Transfer, Inc.

, 650 F.2d 669, 680 (5 th Cir. Unit A 1981) (“since the

district court did not reach the issue, we reserve judgment”), but in moving for summary

judgment, Sanchez-O’Brien raised the issue whether appellants timely filed their complaint

with the EEOC. We adhere to precedent by seeking alternative grounds for affirming the

district court. In so doing, we interpret the rationale for the district court’s jurisdictional

dismissal as a rationale supporting a grant of summary judgment for Sanchez-O’Brien.

9 Merrill v. Southern Methodist Univ. , 806 F.2d 600, 605 (5 th Cir. 1986).

1 0 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (“within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful

employment practice”).

5 A dismissal for failure to meet the timeliness requirements of Title VII is a

dismissal on the merits. 7 In dismissing the suit for “lack of jurisdiction,” the

district court determined that appellants failed to meet the timeliness requirements

of Tit le VII. We conclude that the district court’s stated rationale – a “merits”

rationale

– withstands our scrutiny and provides alternative grounds for

affirmance. 8

It may not have been until July 1996 that appellants learned that SanchezO’Brien allege dly was using royalties to which they were entitled to establish a

benefit pool for Hispanic employees. The limitations period, however, does not

commence when a plaintiff first perceives what motive caused the discriminatory

act about which the plaintiff complains. 9 T he appropriate focus is not upon motive

but, rather, upon the date of the discriminatory act 10 and upon the date that the1 1 Delaware State College v. Ricks

, 449 U.S. 250, 259 (1980) (co ncluding that the

limitations period commenced when plaintiff was notified that he had been denied tenure);

Merrill , 806 F.2d at 605.

1 2 Appellants contend that their overriding royalty interests were a form of compensation.

Each of appellants’ agreements provided that the royalties were “not a gift,” and that

Sanchez-O’Brien made no representations that the royalties conveyed would not be taxable

as income.

1 3 Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist.

, 644 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5 th Cir. Unit

A 1981).

6 plaintiff learned of, or reasonably should have learned of, the discriminatory act. 11

Appellants concede that they did not file within 300 d ays of the

discriminatory act. They contend, however, that their filing was timely due to the

di scovery rule; they contend that they did not know – and in the exercise of

reasonable diligence, could not have known

– of the discriminatory nature of the

act un t il July 1996. By late 1994, however, appellants possessed sufficient

knowledge to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. To establish a prima

facie case of discrimination with respect to compensation, 12 a plaintiff must show

that he was paid less than a similarly situated individual not in his protected class. 13

Appellants

– both attorneys

– were aware of, or should have been aware of, the

f acts necessary to support a prima facie case of racial/national origin discrimina tion

by late 1994.

Appell ants concede that they learned, by late 1994, that they had not received

overriding royalty interests to which they thought that they were entitled. F urther,

by that time app ellants knew or should have known that Medina was similarly

situated to them in that he had a similar agreement for overriding royalty interests,14 EEOC v. Shell Oil Co.

, 466 U.S. 54, 68 (1984); Pruet Prod. Co. v. Ayles , 784 F.2d

1275, 1279 (5 th

Cir. 1986) (ADEA).

1 5 Cf. Pruet Prod. Co.

, 784 F .2d at 1279 (determining that plaintiff’s knowledge was

sufficient to commence limitations period when plaintiff knew facts that would establish a

prima facie case for an ADEA claim).

1 6 Pruet Prod. Co. ,784 F.2d at 1280 (ADEA); Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp.

, 950 F.2d

1209, 1217 (5 th

Cir. 1992) (ADEA).

7 and that the requisites of these agreements had been met. Further, by late 1994,

appellants knew that Sanchez-O’Brien had paid Medina royalties to which they

appar ently were entitled but were not paid. Appellants had known all along the

races and national origins of the relevant parties.

The showing required of a filing with the EEOC is even more lenient than

the minimal showing necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination,

because the charge serves onl y to initiate the EEOC investigation. 1 4 B ecause

appellants knew or should have known facts sufficient to make out a prima facie

case in la te 1994, their knowledge of the facts was sufficient to commence the

limitations period for the filing of a complaint with the EEOC. 15 As appellants did

not file with the EEOC unt il almost two years after the limitations period

commenced, their filing was untimely.

The disco very rule does not benefit appellants. Nor does equitable tolling

cure the untimeliness of appellants’ EEOC filing because appellants were aware of

sufficient facts to commence the limitations period by late 1994, regardless of

appellants’ contention that Sa nchez-O’Brien concealed other facts pertinent to their

claim. 16 The contention that appellants suffered a continuing violation also lacks17 Huckabay v. Moore , 142 F.3d 233, 238-39 (5 th Cir. 1998).

18 Florida v. Long , 487 U.S. 223, 239 (1988).

8 merit. First, the continuing violations doctrine is not applicable. Unlike, for

example, certain claims of hostile work environment, the payment of these royalty

interests is not the type of claim where the discriminatory effects would not be

manifest except in cumulation over a perio d of time. 1 7 Further, the payment of

royalty interests is not payment for work presently performed and completed by the

employee. 18 Even if the doctrine were applicable, appellants have not directed this

court to evidence that payments of the overriding royalty interests continued to a

time within 300 days of their filing with the EEOC. As there is no genuine issue of

material fact related to the untimely filing, Sanchez-O’Brien is entitled to summary

judgment.

Appellants contend that summary judgme nt for Sanchez-O’Brien is

precluded by the fact that the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the

timelines s of their charges. Appellants similarly contend that the seventh

amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure entitle them to proceed to a jury on the limitations issue which presents

questions of fact. The record before this court makes plain that appellants have

conceded facts that lead inescapably to the conclusion that the limitations period

had run prior to the time of their filing with the EEOC. Appellants present no

genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of the EEOC filing. This

court need not rely on any findings of fact that may have been made by the district9

court as a result of the evidentiary hearing. Further, the seventh amendment, the

Civil Rights Act of 1991, and Rule 38 do not require a jury trial when there are no

genuine issues o f material fact regarding a dispositive matter that entitles a

defendant to judgment as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm t h e judgment of dismissal in favor of

Sanchez-O’Brien.