* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-40537

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

OWEN GARTH HINKSON, also known as Charles M. Williams,

Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:97-CR-134-2

-------------------- February 1, 2001

Before DAVIS, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Owen Garth Hinkson appeals his sentence f o r illegal

reentry into the United States after deportation. Hinkson argues

that: (1) the district court erroneously enhanced his prior

conviction for assault and battery on a police officer; (2) the

district court erred in enhancing his instant sentence pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A); and (3) the district court erred in

failing to void 18 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) and U.S.S.G. §§ 2L1.2 &

4B1.2 for unconstitutional vagueness.2 Hinkson’s first argument was not raised in the district

court and is, therefore, reviewed for plain error. S ee United

States v. Krout , 66 F.3d 1420, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995). There is no

merit to Hinkson’s contention that the district court enhanced his

prior c onviction for assault and battery on a police officer.

Rather, the district court enhanced Hinkson’s instant sentence for

illegal reentry based on its determination that h is deportation

followed his aggravated felony conviction for assault and battery

on a police officer. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The district

court did n ot plainly err in this regard. S ee Krout

, 66 F.3d at

1434 (holding that plain error requires a clear or obvious error

that affected the defendant’s substantial rights).

Hinkson’s asser tion that the district court erred in

applying U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) is based on his claim that under

United States v. Delgado-Enriquez

, 188 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir.

1999), his conviction for assault and battery on a police officer

was not an aggravated felony because it carried a sentence of only

one year

. In D elgado-Enriquez

, 188 F.3d at 594, this court

paraphrased 18 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) by stating that “a ‘crime of

violence’ is an aggravated felony when it meets the definition

found in 18 U.S.C. § 16 for non-political offenses for which the

term of imprisonment is more than one year.” The D elgado-Enriquez

decision, however, did not turn on whether the offense at issue

carried an imprisonment term of one year or more than one year.

188 F.3d at 595.

Moreover, in a decision rendered prior to D elgadoEnriquez

, this court recognized that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)3

defines the term “aggravated felony” to include a crime of violence

carrying a sentence of “‘at least one year.’” S ee United States v.

Banda-Zamora

, 178 F.3d 728, 729-30 (5th Cir. 1999)

. To the extent

t hat these two decisions conflict, B anda-Zamora

, as the earlier

opinion, controls. S ee United States v. Jackson

, 220 F.3d 635, 639

(5th Cir. 2000). Thus, the district court did not err in applying

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) to enhance Hinkson’s sentence.

Finally, Hinkson’s unconstitutional vagueness arguments,

which were raised for the first time on appeal, are without merit.

Hinkson’s void-for-vagueness challenge to 18 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(F) based on a missing word in that provision was

rejected by this co urt in B anda-Zamora

, 178 F.3d at 729-30. And

Hinkson’s unconstitutional vagueness argument with respect to

U.S.S.G. §§ 2L1.2 & 4B1.2 is unfounded because he is challenging

sentencing guidelines, not a criminal statute. See United States

v. Pearson

, 910 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Due process does

not mandate

. . . notice, advice, or a probable prediction of

where, within the statutory range, the guideline se ntence will

fall”); United States v. Arevalo-Sanchez , No. 98-20093, p. 3 (5th

Cir. Sept. 23, 1998) (unpublished). The district court did not

plainly err in failing to void 18 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) and

U.S.S.G. §§ 2L1.2 & 4B1.2 for unconstitutional vagueness. S ee

Krout , 66 F.3d at 1434.

AFFIRMED

.