NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MERHAWI G. GEBRETADKAN, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting 

Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-70014 

Agency No. A215-546-757 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted February 8, 2021

San Francisco, California

Before: HURWITZ and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and CORKER,** District Judge.

Merhawi Gebretadkan, a citizen of Ethiopia, petitions for review of a decision 

by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of an Immigration 

Judge (IJ) order denying his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Clifton L. Corker, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAR 3 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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protection under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 

U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the petition and remand. 

The BIA based its dismissal of petitioner’s appeal on the IJ’s adverse 

credibility determination, affirming that finding on four grounds while explicitly 

disclaiming reliance on the IJ’s additional reasoning. Our review is limited to those 

grounds upon which the BIA relied. Qiu v. Barr, 944 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2019). 

Although “[w]e review factual findings, including adverse credibility 

determinations, for substantial evidence,” Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th 

Cir. 2020), the agency must provide “specific and cogent reasons” when finding an 

applicant not credible, id. (quoting Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 

2010)). “[B]are speculation, without other support in the record, cannot properly 

form the basis of an adverse credibility finding.” Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1161 

(9th Cir. 2019). The four grounds on which the BIA relied do not meet these 

standards.

First, the BIA found implausible petitioner’s testimony that he did not seek 

medical treatment following his 2015 beating and his year-long detention. But this 

finding rests on speculation, as there is no indication that petitioner needed medical 

treatment on either occasion. After his 2015 beating, petitioner’s injuries consisted 

only of “slight wounds on [his] legs and body” and “bruises,” and he was able to

drive away from the scene. Furthermore, although the IJ found that petitioner 
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suffered abuse while imprisoned in Jail Ogaden, the record is silent as to petitioner’s 

physical condition after his escape from detention, except that he appears to have 

been in sufficiently healthy condition to have made the escape. The record does not 

indicate when petitioner sustained injuries in custody relative to his escape. It was 

thus again speculative for the IJ to conclude that petitioner needed medical attention

at the time of his escape.

Second, the BIA found that petitioner’s testimony lacked detail about his time 

in Djibouti. But any lack of detail is not a basis for denying relief “when [the 

applicant] was not given notice that he should provide such information, nor asked 

at the hearing to do so, either by the IJ or by counsel for the [government].” 

Akinmade v. INS, 196 F.3d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Iman, 972 F.3d at 1066 

(“Because the government did not press [the petitioner] for any additional details 

about [a particular event,] it is unclear what further detail [the petitioner] should have 

provided.”). At petitioner’s hearing, the government’s counsel asked petitioner only 

a few questions about his time in Djibouti, which petitioner answered. The IJ did 

not ask for any further details. Thus, any claimed lack of detail here cannot form the 

basis of the agency’s adverse credibility finding.

Third, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding that it was implausible for petitioner, 

after his escape, to have lived in Djibouti for a year on his savings. But this 

conclusion is also speculative. See Arrey, 916 F.3d at 1161. Petitioner testified that 
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his mother sent him funds through the truck drivers that petitioner knew from his 

prior job and who had smuggled him out of the country. Petitioner also claimed to 

have worked for ten years while in Ethiopia. Nothing in the record suggests that 

petitioner could not have supported himself on his savings during his time in 

Djibouti, nor does the record reveal petitioner’s standard of living during that time. 

Finally, the BIA found inconsistent petitioner’s statements about whether he 

applied for immigration relief in Colombia. However, it is not apparent that 

petitioner’s three statements were inconsistent. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044 

(“[A]n IJ should consider . . . record evidence that sheds light on whether there is in 

fact an inconsistency at all.”). Petitioner’s statements on April 10, 2018, and April 

24, 2018, consistently indicated that the wait in Columbia for immigration relief was 

too long, and any potential inconsistency between the two statements depends on 

what petitioner meant by “applying for relief,” an issue the IJ did not probe further. 

Petitioner’s testimony before the IJ was not necessarily inconsistent with his two 

previous statements either, because the IJ included in his questioning whether 

petitioner had applied for asylum, and petitioner had not clearly indicated before that 

he had. 

Moreover, to the extent petitioner’s testimony was inconsistent, petitioner 

explained that he had not made the April 10 statement attributed to him. The IJ 

evidently disbelieved that explanation but gave no reason for doing so. See Rizk v. 
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Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that an IJ must “provide[] a 

specific, cogent reason for disbelieving the alien’s rationalization” of an apparent 

inconsistency). To the extent the IJ and BIA discounted petitioner’s explanation 

because they regarded him as generally not credible, that determination is not 

supported by substantial evidence for the reasons given.1

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.

1 The BIA also denied CAT relief at least in part on the basis of the adverse 

credibility determination. It is not clear from the BIA decision whether it treated 

other grounds as sufficient for denial of that claim. Under these circumstances, we 

remand the CAT claim to the agency as well.