Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

CARA SCHAEFER WIENEKE GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana

Plainfield, Indiana

CHRISTINA D. PACE

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

MATTHEW A. MAHONEY, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 84A01-1405-CR-191

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable David R. Bolk, Judge

Cause No. 84D03-1304-FB-1015

November 10, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Matthew Mahoney appeals his sentence following his convictions for three counts 

of sexual misconduct with a minor, as Class B felonies; sexual misconduct with a minor, 

as a Class C felony; vicarious sexual gratification, as a Class D felony; child solicitation, 

as a Class D felony; and dissemination of matter harmful to minors, a Class D felony; 

after he pleaded guilty as charged. Mahoney presents a single issue for our review, 

namely, whether his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

From July 15, 2012, through March 23, 2013, Mahoney, a youth pastor at Good 

Shepherd Baptist Church (“the Church”) in Vigo County, and his wife hosted fourteenyear-old A.B., a member of the Church, overnight at their home on most Friday nights. 

Mahoney, both with and without his wife’s participation, engaged in frequent sexual 

activities with A.B., including sexual intercourse. On April 3, 2013, the State charged 

Mahoney with three counts of sexual misconduct with a minor, as Class B felonies; 

sexual misconduct with a minor, as a Class C felony; vicarious sexual gratification, as a 

Class D felony; child solicitation, as a Class D felony; and dissemination of matter 

harmful to minors, a Class D felony. And on March 4, 2014, Mahoney pleaded guilty as 

charged without a plea agreement.

At sentencing, the trial court identified the following mitigators: Mahoney’s

guilty plea without the benefit of an agreement; his cooperation with police; and his 

insignificant criminal history. And the trial court identified the following aggravators: 

the harm suffered by the victim was significant and greater than the elements necessary to 
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prove the commission of the offenses; and Mahoney was in a position of trust with the 

victim. The trial court found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and imposed 

an aggregate twelve-year sentence with ten years executed and two years suspended to 

probation. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Mahoney purports to appeal his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), but 

he makes no cogent argument regarding the nature of the offenses or his character. See

Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Instead, we read Mahoney’s contentions on appeal to 

amount to a request that we review the weight the trial court assigned to the mitigators 

and aggravators in imposing his sentence. But in Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 

491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007), our 

supreme court held that, “[b]ecause the trial court no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’

aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, unlike

the pre-Blakely statutory regime, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its 

discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Thus, we will not review the trial 

court’s weighing of aggravators and mitigators here.

To the extent Mahoney challenges his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 

7(B), we set out the applicable standard of review. Although a trial court may have acted 

within its lawful discretion in determining a sentence, Article VII, Sections 4 and 6 of the 

Indiana Constitution “authorize[] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence 

imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) 

(alteration original). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate 

Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B) requires the appellant 
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to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and 

his character. See App. R. 7(B); Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007). We assess the trial court’s recognition or non-recognition of aggravators and 

mitigators as an initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was 

inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, “a 

defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] 

inappropriateness standard of review.” Roush, 875 N.E.2d at 812 (alteration original).

The Indiana Supreme Court has also stated that “sentencing is principally a 

discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable 

deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Indiana’s flexible 

sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the 

circumstances presented. See id. at 1224. The principal role of appellate review is to 

attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id. at 1225. Whether we regard a sentence as 

inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, 

the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to 

light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.

Mahoney, a youth pastor, took advantage of his position of trust with a young 

member of his church and sexually abused her over the course of several months. His 

sentence is not an outlier. Mahoney’s aggregate twelve-year sentence is not 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.