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[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3759 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3759

   To close high risk wildlife markets and prevent wildlife disease 
             transmission globally, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 19, 2020

 Mr. Coons (for himself and Mr. Graham) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To close high risk wildlife markets and prevent wildlife disease 
             transmission globally, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Global Wildlife 
Health and Pandemic Prevention Act''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 5. Closing high risk wildlife markets.
Sec. 6. Preventing outbreaks of diseases of wildlife origin.
Sec. 7. Authorization of appropriations.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Emerging infectious disease.--The term ``emerging 
        infectious disease'' means an infectious disease whose 
        incidence in humans has increased in the past two decades or 
        threatens to increase in the near future.
            (2) High risk wildlife markets.--The term ``high risk 
        wildlife markets'' means any commercial market that sells or 
        processes wildlife for human consumption, whether the animals 
        originated in the wild or in a captive situation, and where--
                    (A) the species of wildlife or regulation of the 
                market is determined under section 6(a)(1) to be a risk 
                factor for zoonotic disease spread to humans or is 
                linked with the global illegal trade in wildlife; or
                    (B) the manner of processing the wildlife is 
                determined under section 6(a)(1) to be a risk factor 
                for zoonotic disease spread to humans.
            (3) One health.--The term ``One Health'' means a 
        collaborative and transdisciplinary approach to achieving 
        optimal health outcomes that recognizes the interconnection 
        between people, animals, plants, and their shared environment.
            (4) Spillover event.--The term ``spillover event'' means 
        the transmission of a pathogen from one species to another that 
        was not previously a host for that pathogen.
            (5) Zoonotic disease.--The term ``zoonotic disease'' means 
        any disease that is naturally transmissible from vertebrate 
        animals to humans.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) According to the Centers for Disease Control and 
        Prevention, the majority of emerging infectious diseases in 
        recent years have originated in wildlife, and the rate of 
        outbreaks of these diseases is increasing.
            (2) Zoonotic disease spillover events can occur from 
        unnatural interaction between human and wildlife populations or 
        between wildlife populations without human presence.
            (3) The collection, production, trade, and sale of wildlife 
        for human consumption can be a serious risk factor for 
        spillover events, particularly if it involves animal species 
        not typically in close proximity to humans or to each other, 
        living under poorly regulated and stressful conditions that 
        exacerbate the shedding of zoonotic pathogens.
            (4) Changing land use practices and human expansion into 
        wildlife habitat also increase opportunities for contact 
        between wildlife and humans that can lead to disease 
        transmission.
            (5) Markets where wildlife is sold for human consumption 
        are found in many countries throughout the world, and in some 
        cases these products represent the only accessible source of 
        protein for communities; therefore, sustainable production of 
        alternative protein should be supported in such communities in 
        order to reduce need or demand for wildlife as a food source.
            (6) The human, economic, and security costs of global 
        pandemics and regional epidemics of zoonotic diseases and 
        emerging infectious diseases is overwhelming. It is believed 
        that the COVID-19 pandemic will result in tens of thousands of 
        deaths and trillions of dollars in economic damage to the 
        United States alone.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States Government should prioritize actions 
        that lead to the immediate and permanent closure of high risk 
        wildlife markets around the world; and
            (2) the United States Government should utilize a One 
        Health approach to emerging zoonotic and infectious disease 
        prevention, detection, reporting, and response that leverages 
        expertise across public health, epidemiology, wildlife and 
        biodiversity conservation, food security, and veterinary 
        medicine designed to eliminate the risk of future such zoonotic 
        and emerging infectious disease epidemics and pandemics.

SEC. 5. CLOSING HIGH RISK WILDLIFE MARKETS.

    (a) Closure of Markets.--The Department of State, the United States 
Agency for International Development, the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service, and the Department of Agriculture, in collaboration 
with other relevant United States agencies, shall--
            (1) prioritize the closure of high risk wildlife markets 
        around the world and associated activities as part of United 
        States diplomatic efforts;
            (2) provide support for other governments around the world 
        in their efforts to close high risk wildlife markets;
            (3) work with other governments and multilateral 
        organizations, through appropriate existing treaties and 
        conventions, to develop agreements or protocols around closing 
        high risk wildlife markets; and
            (4) coordinate these activities with existing United States 
        Government efforts to combat wildlife trafficking, including--
                    (A) providing assistance to combat corruption, 
                strengthen governance, and build law enforcement 
                capacity abroad;
                    (B) aiding countries in detecting and deterring 
                illegal import, transit, and export of wildlife;
                    (C) improving information sharing in order to halt 
                wildlife trade that may spread zoonotic disease and 
                emerging infectious disease; and
                    (D) reducing demand for wildlife and wildlife 
                products, including by increasing access to alternative 
                protein sources for food insecure communities.
    (b) National Security Council Measures.--The National Security 
Council, in consultation with the United States Agency for 
International Development, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the 
Department of Agriculture, shall develop policies and mechanisms to 
support the closure of high risk wildlife markets and associated 
activities globally.
    (c) Sanctions.--
            (1) Findings warranting sanctions.--If the Secretary of 
        State, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Secretary of 
        Agriculture finds that a country is continuing to willfully 
        harbor high risk wildlife markets, including a failure to 
        enforce relevant laws and regulations, the Secretary making 
        such finding shall certify such finding to the President and 
        shall report this certification within 15 days to Congress.
            (2) Actions.--Upon the receipt of any certification made 
        under subsection (c), the President may--
                    (A) prohibit the import of any products from the 
                offending country, to the extent that such prohibition 
                is permitted under current trade agreements;
                    (B) freeze assets of any government officials from 
                the offending country; or
                    (C) impose travel bans and visa restrictions on any 
                government officials from the offending country.
    (d) Exceptions.--In carrying out this section, limited exceptions 
shall be considered if necessary to meet the nutritional, subsistence, 
or cultural needs and rights of indigenous peoples or communities 
dependent on wildlife for food security.

SEC. 6. PREVENTING OUTBREAKS OF DISEASES OF WILDLIFE ORIGIN.

    (a) Integrating Human, Animal, and Environmental Health.--The 
Department of State, the United States Agency for International 
Development, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service, the United States Geological Survey, 
and the Department of Agriculture, in collaboration with other relevant 
United States agencies as appropriate, shall leverage public health, 
animal health, and environmental health expertise to--
            (1) identify high risk wildlife markets for the purposes of 
        carrying out section 5;
            (2) coordinate an integrated, Federal government-wide 
        approach to global zoonotic disease preparedness, surveillance, 
        and response;
            (3) support efforts to better understand the connection 
        between human and wildlife health;
            (4) promote a multi-sectoral approach that coordinates 
        global health, food security, and biodiversity activities;
            (5) strengthen global capacity for detection of zoonotic 
        diseases with pandemic potential by--
                    (A) supporting institutions that can prevent and 
                provide early detection of zoonotic outbreaks;
                    (B) investing in laboratory diagnostic capability 
                and workforce training;
                    (C) supporting surveillance at locations at high 
                risk of spillover events; and
                    (D) preventing biodiversity loss and ecosystem 
                degradation that can lead to zoonotic disease 
                transmission;
            (6) invest in food security efforts that aim to--
                    (A) eliminate public health threats from zoonotic 
                disease spillover events;
                    (B) prevent biodiversity loss and species 
                extinction; and
                    (C) protect food insecure communities from loss of 
                access to protein that may result from closure of high 
                risk wildlife markets and efforts to reduce demand for 
                wildlife as a food source; and
            (7) take action to minimize the human-wildlife interface in 
        the wild, including by--
                    (A) preventing the degradation and fragmentation of 
                intact ecosystems;
                    (B) restoring the integrity of degraded and 
                fragmented ecosystems;
                    (C) supporting effective indigenous and local 
                stewardship of traditional territories;
                    (D) supporting national and subnational governments 
                in effectively managing their protected areas;
                    (E) helping enforce current laws that protect 
                wildlife; and
                    (F) investing in risk reduction and community 
                education programs that reduce demand for wildlife as a 
                food source and increase access to alternative protein 
                sources.
    (b) Identification of High Risk Wildlife Markets.--In carrying out 
subsection (a)(1), the following factors shall be considered:
            (1) Wildlife markets that are regulated under national and 
        international veterinary standards for slaughter shall not be 
        considered high risk wildlife markets.
            (2) Mammals, birds, reptiles, and amphibians of wild 
        origin, whether removed directly from the wild or bred in 
        captivity, shall be considered wildlife for the purposes of 
        identifying high risk wildlife markets.
    (c) Global Health Funding Plan.--The Secretary of State and the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development 
shall include information about zoonotic disease preparedness and 
surveillance in the reports required under section 406(b) of the 
Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
2020 (Public Law 116-123).

SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    The following amounts are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
year 2021 to carry out the activities outlined in this Act:
            (1) $100,000,000 for State International Narcotics Control 
        and Law Enforcement.
            (2) $50,000,000 for the Fish and Wildlife Service Office of 
        Law Enforcement.
            (3) $20,000,000 for the Fish and Wildlife Service Office of 
        International Affairs.
            (4) $40,000,000 for the United States Geological Survey 
        National Wildlife Health Center.
            (5) $30,000,000 for the USDA National Animal Health 
        Laboratory Network.
            (6) $200,000,000 for USAID Global Health Security Programs.
            (7) $125,000,000 for USAID Food Security Programs.
            (8) $500,000,000 for USAID Biodiversity Programs.
                                 <all>
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