NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

R. JEAN BLANSETTE CRUGER, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

BRADLEY BLANSETTE, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0649 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2020-005924

The Honorable Richard F. Albrecht, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Bradley Blansette, Scottsdale

Defendant/Appellant

Sacks Tierney, PA, Scottsdale

By Randy Nussbaum, Michael J. Harris

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

FILED 9-8-2022
CRUGER v. BLANSETTE

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 In this forcible detainer action, Bradley Blansette challenges 

the superior court’s entry of judgment in favor of R. Jean Blansette Cruger, 

in her capacity as trustee of the R. Jean Blansette Cruger Living Trust, dated 

October 17, 2018 (the Trust). For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Cruger is Blansette’s mother. In 2004, Cruger recorded a 

warranty deed documenting her purchase of certain real property (the 

Property), in her individual capacity, as her sole and separate property. 

Since 2004, Blansette lived at the Property. Although no written lease 

agreement governed the terms of his occupancy, Blansette initially paid the 

Property’s mortgage but ceased making payments in 2006. In 2018, Cruger 

conveyed record title to the Property to the Trust via a warranty deed. 

¶3 In 2019, Cruger, as trustee of the Trust, notified Blansette

through a certified letter that his right to occupy the Property would 

terminate effective December 31, 2019. After Blansette refused to move out, 

Cruger filed a forcible detainer action to evict him from the Property. In 

response, Blansette denied the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship

between him and Cruger and instead claimed an ownership interest in the 

Property - asserting, as co-owner, he needed no “permission” to reside on 

the premises.1

¶4 At an initial hearing, Blansette pled not guilty and requested 

a jury trial. The superior court denied his request for a jury trial and set the 

matter for a bench trial at a later date.

¶5 Shortly thereafter, Cruger moved for summary judgment, 

attaching the recorded warranty deeds and the termination of tenancy letter 

as supporting documents. The superior court denied the motion for 

1 Blansette also filed a quiet title action, but the sole subject of this 

appeal is the forcible detainer action.
CRUGER v. BLANSETTE

Decision of the Court

3

summary judgment, citing Cruger’s failure to submit a declaration or 

affidavit, and proceeded to a forcible detainer bench trial. After the parties 

elicited sworn testimony from the witnesses and admitted evidence into the 

record, the superior court issued a ruling finding Blansette guilty of the 

forcible detainer. 

¶6 Blansette timely appealed that judgment, challenging the 

superior court’s denial of his request for a jury trial. Cruger v. Blansette,

1 CA-CV 20-0391, 2021 WL 2671919, at *1, ¶ 7 (Ariz. App. June 29, 2021) 

(mem. decision). While noting that the right to a jury trial “is not violated 

when there are simply no genuine issues of fact for a jury to consider,” this 

court vacated the forcible detainer judgment because the superior court 

failed to make an express finding regarding the existence of disputed facts.

Id. at *2, ¶¶ 9–11 (internal quotations omitted). In remanding the matter for 

further proceedings, this court explained that Cruger “[wa]s free to renew 

her motion for summary judgment . . . and the superior court remain[ed] 

free to grant a forcible detainer judgment without a jury” if it found no 

material facts in dispute. Id. at ¶ 12.

¶7 On remand, Cruger again moved for summary judgment. In 

support of her motion, Cruger again submitted the warranty deeds and 

termination of tenancy letter but also attached a signed declaration and a 

signed judgment in her favor from the parallel quiet title action. In 

response, Blansette reasserted his claim of an ownership interest in the 

Property and argued that Cruger obtained the warranty deeds by fraud.

¶8 Upon review of the parties’ motions and exhibits, the superior 

court granted the motion for summary judgment, expressly finding that the 

“undisputed material facts” established that Cruger “has a right of superior 

possession as a matter of law.” Blansette timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

¶9 Citing United Effort Trust Plan v. Holmes, 209 Ariz. 347, 350–51, 

¶ 21 (App. 2004), and Phoenix-Sunflower Industries, Inc. v. Hughes, 105 Ariz. 

334, 336 (1970), which held that the forcible detainer statutes apply only 

when the parties have a landlord-tenant relationship, Blansette contends

that a genuine factual dispute concerning the existence of a landlord-tenant 

relationship precluded entry of summary judgment in this forcible detainer 

action. Denying the existence of such a relationship, Blansette claims that 

he and Cruger purchased the Property as part of “a real estate partnership,” 

granting him “a life-estate interest” in the Property.
CRUGER v. BLANSETTE

Decision of the Court

4

¶10 In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts 

and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. Normandin v. Encanto Adventures, LLC, 

246 Ariz. 458, 460, ¶ 9 (2019). “We determine de novo whether any genuine 

issues of material fact exist and whether the [superior] court correctly 

applied the law.” Diaz v. Phx. Lubrication Serv., Inc., 224 Ariz. 335, 338, ¶ 10

(App. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the moving party shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

¶11 A forcible detainer action “is a statutory proceeding, the 

object of which is to provide a summary, speedy and adequate means for 

obtaining possession of premises by one entitled to actual possession.” 

Heywood v. Ziol, 91 Ariz. 309, 311 (1962). Accordingly, challenges to the 

validity of title can neither be raised nor resolved in such a proceeding, 

though “the fact of title may be proved as a matter incidental to showing 

right of possession by an owner.” Andreola v. Ariz. Bank, 26 Ariz. App. 556, 

557 (1976); A.R.S. § 12-1177(A) (“On the trial of an action of forcible entry 

or forcible detainer, the only issue shall be the right of actual possession and 

the merits of title shall not be inquired into.”). We review the superior 

court’s application of the relevant statutes de novo. See City of Tucson v. Pima 

County, 190 Ariz. 385, 386 (App. 1997). 

¶12 It is undisputed that: (1) Cruger recorded a warranty deed in 

2004 reflecting her acquisition of the Property as her sole and separate 

property; (2) Blansette resided in the Property from 2004 to 2022; (3) no 

written agreement governed Blansette’s occupancy of the Property, but he 

initially made the Property’s mortgage payments and ceased making 

payments in 2006; (4) Cruger conveyed title to the Property to the Trust in 

2018; (5) Cruger, on behalf of the Trust, mailed Blansette a certified letter 

notifying him that his tenancy terminated effective December 31, 2019; and 

(6) Blansette remained in possession of the Property after the termination 

date.

¶13 To defend against the motion for summary judgment, 

Blansette submitted a signed statement from Cruger acknowledging that he 

provided one-half of the earnest money deposit for the Property (“in the 

amount of approximately $18,350”) and made several mortgage payments 

for the Property (“for at least the first 15 but not more than 24 months”). But 

contrary to Blansette’s apparent contention, his initial contribution to the 

Property’s earnest money deposit and subsequent payments on the 

Property’s mortgage do not negate the uncontroverted evidence that 

Cruger (now as Trustee of the Trust) is the Property’s owner of record. 
CRUGER v. BLANSETTE

Decision of the Court

5

Stated differently, Blansette’s claim that he holds an ownership interest in 

the Property and Cruger defrauded him by failing to name him on the 2004 

warranty deed challenges the merits of title to the Property, not the right to

actual possession of the Property, and therefore must be resolved in a 

separate quiet title action.2 See Curtis v. Morris, 184 Ariz. 393, 398 (App. 

1995) (“Because [a forcible detainer] action does not bar subsequent 

proceedings between the parties to determine issues other than the 

immediate right to possession, those issues are better resolved in 

proceedings [other than forcible detainer actions].”).

¶14 “A person is guilty of . . . forcible detainer . . . if he [w]ilfully 

and without force holds over any . . . real property after termination of the 

time for which such . . . real property were let to him . . . , after demand 

made in writing for the possession thereof by the person entitled to such 

possession.” A.R.S. § 12-1171(3). “There is a forcible detainer if [a] tenant 

. . . by sufferance . . . whose tenancy has been terminated retains possession 

after his tenancy has been terminated or after he receives written demand 

of possession by the landlord.” A.R.S. § 12-1173(1). A tenancy by sufferance 

is created when a person who initially lawfully possessed property

continues to hold possession after his right to possession has been 

terminated. See Andreola, 26 Ariz. App. at 558 (“To constitute a tenancy by 

sufferance there need not have been any prior contract of letting; all that is 

necessary is that the tenant should have entered into possession of the 

premises lawfully and shall continue to hold after the termination of his 

right.”) (quotation omitted).

¶15 The parties do not dispute that Cruger permitted Blansette to 

reside at the Property from 2004 through 2019.3 The record also clearly 

2 We note that the superior court resolved the quiet title action in 

Cruger’s favor, concluding Blansette held no ownership interest in the 

Property. 

3 Relying on A.R.S. §§ 12-522 and -526, Blansette contends that 

Cruger’s forcible detainer claim is time-barred, but neither statute applies

to this case. Section 12-522 imposes a two-year limitation on a property 

owner seeking to recover property from another who has claimed the 

property “by right of possession only,” and A.R.S. § 12-526 precludes a 

landowner from bringing an action to recover property that has been 

adversely possessed by another for more than ten years. While Blansette 

seemingly argues that his claim to the Property “by right of possession” and 

“adverse possession” began when he ceased making the mortgage 
CRUGER v. BLANSETTE

Decision of the Court

6

reflects that Cruger sent Blansette a certified letter notifying him that his

right to occupy the Property terminated on December 31, 2019. Despite 

having received the written demand, Blansette failed to vacate the 

premises. By remaining on the premises after the termination date, 

Blansette became a tenant by sufferance and committed forcible detainer.

¶16 Finally, to the extent Blansette challenges the superior court’s 

denial of his request for a jury trial, we find no error. While A.R.S. § 12-1176 

liberally confers a jury trial right to litigants in a forcible detainer action, 

A.R.S. § 12-1176(B) (“If the plaintiff does not request a jury, the defendant 

may do so on appearing and the request shall be granted.”), Rule of 

Procedure for Eviction Actions 11(e) directs the superior court, when 

presented with a jury trial request, to “inquire and determine the factual 

issues to be determined by the jury.” If no question of fact exists, “the matter 

shall proceed to a trial by the judge alone regarding any legal issues or may 

[be] disposed of by motion or in accordance with the[] rules, as 

appropriate.” Id. Read together, the statute and rule provide that a 

defendant in a forcible detainer action who requests a jury trial is entitled 

to one insofar as the court determines that factual issues exist for a jury to 

decide. See Hornbeck v. Lusk, 217 Ariz. 581, 583, ¶ 6 (App. 2008) (explaining 

courts consider related statutes and rules in conjunction with one another 

and harmonize them when possible). In the event no factual issues exist, 

however, the court alone may decide the legal matters by trial or motion. 

See Montano v. Luff, 250 Ariz. 401, 406–07, ¶¶ 15–17 (App. 2020). Because the 

defense improperly challenged the merits of Cruger’s title and no genuine 

dispute of material fact existed, the superior court did not err by denying 

Blansette’s request for a jury trial and summarily entering judgment in 

Cruger’s favor.4

payments in 2006, he has not cited, and our review of the record has not 

revealed, any evidence that he challenged Cruger’s title to the property ten 

years, or even two years, before Cruger filed the forcible detainer complaint 

in this action. See Leon v. Byus, 115 Ariz. 451, 453 (App. 1977) (“As a general 

rule, a possession in its inception permissive, or otherwise not hostile, does 

not become hostile without a clear disclaimer of the true owner’s title and 

a claim of adverse right . . . .”).

4 In his opening brief, Blansette alleges in passing that the superior court 

judge demonstrated “significant bias” against him. By failing to develop the 

argument beyond a single, fleeting statement or cite relevant supporting 

authority, Blansette waived this claim. See Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 
CRUGER v. BLANSETTE

Decision of the Court

7

CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the forcible detainer 

judgment. Both parties request attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal, citing 

A.R.S. §§ 12-341, -341.01, and -349. Blansette was not represented by counsel 

on appeal, and we deny his request for attorney’s fees and other unspecified 

fees, punitive damages, and property damages. Under A.R.S. 

§ 12-341.01(A), a court may award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in 

a dispute that arises out of a contract. A forcible detainer action against a 

tenant by sufferance, however, does not arise out of contract. Bank of New 

York Mellon v. Dodev, 246 Ariz. 1, 11–12, ¶ 38 (App. 2018); Carrington Mortg. 

Servs. LLC v. Woods, 242 Ariz. 455, 457, ¶ 14 (App. 2017). Therefore, A.R.S. 

§ 12-341.01 provides no basis for an attorneys’ fees award in this case. 

Section 12-349, on the other hand, authorizes a sanction-based award of 

attorneys’ fees. While unsuccessful, we do not conclude that Blansette’s 

claims are wholly groundless or otherwise made in bad faith, and therefore 

deny Cruger’s attorneys’ fees request on that basis. As the prevailing party 

on appeal, we nonetheless award Cruger her costs, conditioned upon 

compliance with ARCAP 21.

214 Ariz. 489, 491, ¶ 6 n.2 (App. 2007) (explaining an appellant’s failure to 

develop and support an argument waives the issue on appeal).