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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of

WALID KAMAL EL GOHARY,

Appellant,

and

HABIBA EZZAT MOHAMED AMER,

Respondent.

No. 80228-3-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

CHUN, J. — Walid El Gohary appeals the trial court’s Findings and 

Conclusions about a Marriage and its Final Parenting Plan. El Gohary fails to 

assign error to the trial court’s findings. Even if he had, substantial evidence 

supports the findings on El Gohary’s monthly income; spousal maintenance; 

awarding the parties’ Toyota Prius to Habiba Ezzat Mohamed Amer; and El 

Gohary’s history of domestic violence. The trial court’s findings of fact support its 

conclusion of a lack of direct evidence that Amer engaged in abusive use of 

conflict. Finally, the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to admit 

evidence that had not been authenticated and in retaining jurisdiction over the 

parenting plan for three years to clarify provisions of the plan or resolve disputes 

as necessary. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

El Gohary and Amer married in 2007 in Egypt. After they married, El 
No. 80228-3-I/2

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Gohary returned to the United States, where he had been living. Amer continued 

living in Egypt. They had two children together in 2009 and 2017, both born in 

Egypt. In 2017, Amer and both children moved from Egypt to the United States. 

In January 2018, the parties separated. 

A month later, in February 2018, in a separate matter, Amer filed for a 

domestic violence protection order against El Gohary. The court granted the 

protection order on August 8, 2018.

El Gohary filed for dissolution of the marriage in March 2018. Trial took 

place in May 2019. Both parties were represented by counsel.

On June 11, 2019, the trial court issued five orders: Findings and 

Conclusions about a Marriage; Final Parenting Plan; Final Divorce Order 

(Dissolution Decree); Final Child Support Order; and Final Restraining Order.

On June 21, 2019, El Gohary moved the trial court to reconsider several of 

its orders. Upon reconsideration, the trial court entered a Corrected Child 

Support Order on July 2, 2019, but denied all other requests for reconsideration.

Representing himself, El Gohary appeals the Findings and Conclusions 

about a Marriage and the Final Parenting Plan.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Exhibits 11 & 12

El Gohary contends that the trial court erred by declining, for lack of 

foundation, to admit Exhibits 11 and 12 into evidence. The exhibits are 

transcripts from interviews of Amer by El Gohary’s defense attorney in a separate 
No. 80228-3-I/3

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criminal proceeding. We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion.

We review a trial court’s decision on whether to admit evidence for an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Bradford, 175 Wn. App. 912, 927, 308 P.3d 736 

(2013). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly 

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Id.

ER 901 requires authentication or identification as a condition precedent 

to admissibility. ER 901(a). This requirement is satisfied by evidence sufficient 

to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims. Id.

During El Gohary’s case in chief, parenting evaluator Marilyn Liepelt 

testified that a discrepancy exists between two of Amer’s interview statements 

about whether her head hit the dashboard of a car during an alleged incident of 

domestic violence. El Gohary then sought to admit the two transcripts. Amer 

objected on hearsay grounds. She said the transcripts contained out-of-court 

statements by others who were not present at the trial and could not be crossexamined. She said that the transcripts were being offered for the truth of the 

matter asserted. She also said that whoever prepared the transcripts was not 

present at the trial to authenticate it.

El Gohary said he was seeking to admit the transcripts because of the 

inconsistencies, and that Liepelt relied on statements contained in them in writing 

her recommendations and report. He said he was not seeking to admit them 

based on the truth of the matter asserted.
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The court ruled that it would allow the witness to testify about what she 

found significant about the statements and the basis for her opinion. The court 

said it was not going to admit the transcripts because a foundation had not been 

laid: the transcripts had not been authenticated and the court did not have a 

certified copy of them.

El Gohary’s attorney did not ask Liepelt any other questions about Amer’s 

statements in the interviews. Later, during cross-examination of Amer, El 

Gohary’s attorney asked her questions about discrepancies between her 

statements regarding how long El Gohary held her head during the same alleged 

incident of domestic violence in the car.

El Gohary contends that the trial court should have admitted the two

transcripts because they contain contradictory accounts about the allegations of 

domestic violence. But the trial court did allow El Gohary to question witnesses 

about discrepancies in the statements.1 And he made no attempt to authenticate 

the statements themselves at trial. See ER 901(a) (requiring authentication). 

The trial court acted within its discretion in declining to admit Exhibits 11 and 12.

 

1 The trial court also made the following finding regarding discrepancies in 

Amer’s statements: 

The Family Court Services parenting evaluator, Marilyn Liepelt, placed 

significant weight on discrepancies in the mother’s versions of several of 

the abusive incidents. However, given that there were multiple different 

interpreters involved in obtaining those statements from the mother, the 

discrepancies do not appear significant. Moreover, the lack of police 

reports or medical evidence does not carry much weight. Even here, where 

we have protective laws and enforcement mechanisms, it is not uncommon 

for the victims of abuse to go without medical treatment and to forego 

calling the police. While there was limited testimony on the topic, the 

testimony that there was suggested that there are additional reasons why 

a victim might not make a report in Egypt.
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B. Calculation of El Gohary’s monthly income and child support payments

El Gohary says that the trial court erred by calculating that his monthly 

income was $5,500 per month. We disagree.

If a party does not challenge a trial court’s finding, we treat the finding as a 

verity on appeal. In the Matter of the Estate of Lint, 135 Wn.2d 518, 532-33, 957 

P.2d 755 (1998). If a party challenges a finding, we determine whether 

substantial evidence supports it. In re Marriage of Griswold, 112 Wn. App. 333, 

339, 48 P.3d 1018 (2002). Substantial evidence exists if the record contains 

evidence of sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the 

truth of the declared premise. Id. We then determine whether the findings of fact 

(either unchallenged or supported by substantial evidence) support the trial 

court’s conclusions of law. Landmark Dev., Inc. v. City of Roy, 138 Wn.2d 561, 

573, 980 P.2d 1234 (1999). We do not review credibility determinations, which 

we leave to the trier of fact. In re Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 

P.2d 144 (1999).

The court issued findings explaining that El Gohary’s gross monthly 

income was $8,500 and his legitimate monthly business expenses were about

$3,000:

The father’s gross income from his business is approximately $8,500 

per month. It is difficult to determine what his business expenses are 

because he has used one bank account for all of his expenses. In 

addition, he is now engaged to, and living with, his employee, 

Ms. Hessen, so her wages, payment to her for rent, and repayment 

of funds she has loaned him to pay for attorney’s fees and supervised 

visits are all paid from the same bank account. 

While the court could not determine the father’s legitimate business 

expenses with precision, it appears that he has approximately 
No. 80228-3-I/6

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$3,000 per month in expenses, including wages paid to Ms. Hessen 

in 2018.

The court found El Gohary not credible about “his business expenses, 

including the amount he pays to Ms. Hessen” and “his relationship with

Ms. Hessen (he made various representations to the evaluators and the court).”

El Gohary fails to assign error to these findings. The findings support a 

calculation that El Gohary’s monthly income was $5,500 per month. We may 

affirm on that basis. See Lint, 135 Wn.2d at 532-33. 

Even if El Gohary did assign error, substantial evidence supports the 

findings. For 2018, El Gohary’s tax form 1099-MISC shows an income of 

$105,799.30, or $8,816.61 per month. In 2017, El Gohary’s tax return shows a 

gross business income of $97,921, or $8,160.08 per month. Since those were 

the two most recent years at the time of trial, substantial evidence supports the 

court’s finding that El Gohary’s gross business income was approximately

$8,500. 

As for business expenses, El Gohary’s 2016 tax return shows business 

expenses of $36,412, or about $3,000 per month. His 2017 tax return reports a 

sharp increase in business expenses to $76,342, or about $6,361.83 per month. 

This increase was largely because of a $41,000 increase in the amount El 

Gohary claimed for “contract labor,” i.e., the amounts he paid to Hessen—his 

fiancée and only employee. El Gohary testified that he paid Hessen $1,000 per 

week in 2017. He testified that he had not yet filed a 2018 tax return at the time 

of trial but had continued to pay Hessen various amounts of money as an 
No. 80228-3-I/7

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employee even after they entered into a dating relationship around mid-2018. 

But the court specifically found El Gohary not credible about his business 

expenses, including the amount he pays to Hessen. As mentioned above, we 

defer to the trial court on issues of credibility. See Greene, 97 Wn. App. at 714. 

Thus, his challenge to these business expense findings is unpersuasive. 

Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding about El Gohary’s monthly 

gross income from his business and business expenses. These findings support 

the calculation of a monthly net income of $5,500.

El Gohary also contends that because the trial court used his incorrect 

monthly income to calculate his child support payments, the trial court also 

miscalculated his child support payments. El Gohary failed to appeal the Final 

Child Support Order or the Corrected Child Support Order. Even if he had, as 

detailed above, we affirm the trial court’s findings about El Gohary’s monthly 

income; and he offers no other basis to challenge his child support payments.

C. Spousal Maintenance

El Gohary contends that the trial court erred by awarding spousal 

maintenance to Amer. We review a trial court’s award of spousal maintenance 

award for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Zahm, 138 Wn. 2d 213, 226, 978 

P.2d 498 (1999). Here, the trial court acted within its discretion. 

In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant a 

maintenance order for either spouse. RCW 26.09.090. The applicable statute 
No. 80228-3-I/8

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includes a non-exclusive list of factors for the court to consider in awarding 

spousal maintenance: 

The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such 

periods of time as the court deems just, without regarding to 

misconduct, after considering all relevant factors including but not 

limited to: 

(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, 

including separate or community property apportioned to him or her, 

and his or her ability to meet his or her needs independently, 

including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living 

with the party includes a sum for that party;

(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or 

training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find employment 

appropriate to his or her skill, interests, style of life, and other 

attendant circumstances; 

(c) The standard of living established during the marriage . . .;

(d) The duration of the marriage . . .;

(e) The age, physical and emotional condition, and financial 

obligations of the spouse . . . seeking maintenance;

(f) The ability of the spouse . . . from whom maintenance is 

sought to meet his or her needs and financial obligations while 

meeting those of the spouse . . . seeking maintenance.

RCW 26.09.090.

The trial court ordered El Gohary to pay Amer spousal maintenance in the 

amount of $1,000 per month for two years.2 The court concluded that it should 

order spousal maintenance because Amer had the need for support and El 

Gohary had the ability to pay.

 

2 El Gohary says incorrectly that the trial court awarded Amer spousal 

maintenance for a period of three years. We also note that the amount and duration of 

spousal maintenance is listed only in the Final Divorce Order (Dissolution Decree), 

which El Gohary did not appeal. But because the Findings and Conclusions about a 

Marriage do state that the court should award spousal support and includes the 

supporting findings, we address the issue.
No. 80228-3-I/9

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The court issued findings regarding spousal support, addressing the 

factors in RCW 26.09.090:

The Court has considered the relevant factors, including all of the 

factors under RCW 26.09.090. This is a 10-year marriage. The wife 

clearly has a need in that she has not been employed outside the 

home on a regular basis for many years or at any time since coming 

to the United States, has very limited English-speaking ability, and 

has no financial resources. She is now taking English classes and 

should be able to obtain employment within two years, at which point 

[the parties’ daughter] will likely be in preschool or Headstart so that 

the daycare costs will be lower. Although the husband does not have 

a large income, he has run a successful business for many years 

and, relative to the wife, he has the ability to pay. 

El Gohary fails to assign error to these findings. The findings support the 

trial court’s award of spousal maintenance to Amer. We may affirm on that basis. 

See Lint, 135 Wn.2d at 532-33.

Even if El Gohary did assign error, substantial evidence supports the 

findings. El Gohary’s tax returns, bank account statements, and other financial 

evidence supports that El Gohary has run a successful business and has the 

ability to pay relative to Amer. El Gohary’s petition for dissolution, Amer’s 

response, and the testimony of both parties supports that this was a ten-year 

marriage. Amer’s testimony supports that she had never worked in the United 

States, was not working at the time of trial, and was taking in English classes so 

that she could get a job. Amer’s testimony about her expenses and the fact that 

she had no other income besides child support also supports a finding that she 

needs approximately the awarded spousal maintenance. The trial court’s 

findings are supported by substantial evidence and support the trial court’s 
No. 80228-3-I/10

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conclusion to grant Amer spousal maintenance in the amount of $1,000 per 

month for two years. 

El Gohary says that the court awarded one of his two work vehicles to 

Amer, thus impairing his ability to earn income and pay spousal maintenance. 

But as detailed in the next section, El Gohary concedes that Amer returned the 

vehicle to him after four months, and the trial court found that he had been

readily able to acquire new vehicles.

The findings quoted above about spousal maintenance, along with the 

court’s other financial resource findings also unchallenged by El Gohary, support 

an award of spousal maintenance to Amer. The court did not abuse its discretion 

in awarding spousal maintenance to Amer.

D. Property division

El Gohary contends that the trial court erred by awarding the 2013 Toyota 

Prius to Amer. A party challenging a property distribution must show that the trial 

court abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Gillespie, 89 Wn. App. 390, 398, 

948 P.2d 1338 (1997). The trial court acted within its discretion.

The court found that the Prius was community property. The court’s 

findings also provide specific reasons for awarding the Prius to Amer and 

addressed El Gohary’s arguments about the car:

The wife has requested that she be awarded the 2013 Prius. The 

husband opposes that request because she does not have a driver’s 

license and has previously rejected his suggestion that she go to 

driving school and obtain a license. The wife’s decisions about 

obtaining a driver’s license while living in Egypt are likely governed 

by very different factors, and have little bearing on the decisions she 

makes now. She has testified credibly that she intends to learn to 
No. 80228-3-I/11

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drive and to obtain a license. Awarding her the 2013 Prius may be 

her only opportunity to own a car since her income is likely to be 

insufficient to obtain a car loan for a considerable period of time.

It is fair and equitable to award the 2013 Prius to the wife, along with 

its accompanying debt, as she requests.

El Gohary fails to assign error to these findings. The findings support the 

trial court’s awarding the Prius to Amer. We may affirm on that basis. See Lint, 

135 Wn.2d at 532-33. Even if El Gohary did assign error, Amer’s testimony that 

she was planning to learn how to drive, which the court found credible, supports 

the trial court’s findings.

El Gohary says that the Prius is a business vehicle that he uses in his 

medical courier business, because it is modified with a refrigeration system to 

allow him to maintain the required temperature to transport sensitive medical 

items. El Gohary contends that his income depends on the two business 

vehicles he owns, and when the court awarded one of them to the wife, it 

effectively cut his income in half. 

We are unpersuaded by El Gohary’s arguments. First, he concedes on 

appeal that Amer returned the Prius to him after only four months. And even if 

Amer had not returned the Prius, El Gohary made the same arguments to the 

trial court in his motion for reconsideration and the trial court denied it,3 saying 

that he had been readily able to acquire new vehicles: 

Mr. El Gohary requests that the court reverse its award of the 2013 

Prius to Ms. Amer, arguing that it is a business asset and that his 

business income will be cut in half with the loss of the Prius. The 

evidence in the record reflects that Mr. El Gohary has had a series 

of vehicles that had been used in the business and that he has been 

readily able to acquire vehicles when he has crashed one vehicle or 

 

3 El Gohary did not appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to reconsider. 
No. 80228-3-I/12

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when he has wanted to add a vehicle. The evidence also reflects 

that Mr. El Gohary intermingled business and community assets and 

used business vehicles for personal purposes. Moreover, the court’s 

order permits Mr. El Gohary to preserve that particular vehicle by 

providing Ms. Amer with another similar vehicle.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Prius to Amer.

E. Finding of history of domestic violence

El Gohary says the trial court erred in finding that he had a history of acts 

of domestic violence.4 We disagree.

A permanent parenting plan must not require mutual decision-making or 

designation of a dispute resolution process other than court action if it is found 

that a parent has engaged in a history of acts of domestic violence as defined in 

RCW 26.50.010(3). RCW 26.09.191(1). Domestic violence is defined as “(a) 

Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical 

harm, bodily injury or assault, between family or household members; (b) sexual 

assault of one family or household member by another; or (c) stalking as defined 

in RCW 9A.46.110 of one family or household member by another family or 

household member.” Former RCW 26.50.010(3)(b) (2015).

The parenting plan states that “Walid El Gohary has a history of domestic 

violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010(1).” The parenting plan states that major 

decision-making must be limited because El Gohary has this problem.

The court made specific findings of domestic violence:

 

4 El Gohary’s assignments of error 6 and 8 refer to a “ten year restraining order” 

and a “domestic violence based restraining order.” But his argument in the 

corresponding sections of the brief focuses on the finding of a history of acts of domestic 

violence under RCW 26.09.191. If El Gohary is trying to challenge the Final Restraining 

Order issued by the court on June 11, 2019, we reject his challenge because he failed to 

appeal it.
No. 80228-3-I/13

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Notwithstanding some questions about the mother’s credibility, the 

court finds that there has been domestic violence by the father 

against the mother to which [A.M., the parties’ son] has been 

exposed. This finding is supported by the fact that during supervised 

visits the father . . . made threats to slap [A.M.] so hard he would 

forget his name and actually did slap [A.M.]. There are other 

statements that the father made both during his testimony and to the 

Family Court Services social workers suggesting a pattern of 

coercive control.

El Gohary fails to assign error to these findings and we may affirm on that 

basis. See Lint, 135 Wn.2d at 532-33.

Even if El Gohary had assigned error to the findings quoted above about 

domestic violence, substantial evidence support the court’s findings. As for the 

court’s finding that El Gohary threatened and slapped his son during a 

supervised visit, the supervisor’s written report states that at a supervised visit 

with his children on December 15, 2018, El Gohary told his son that “if you get up 

I will slap your face so hard you forget your own name.” El Gohary then “put his 

left hand on [A.M.]’s jaw and slaps [A.M.]’s cheek with his right hand. [A.M.]

drops his head to the table and is sobbing.” El Gohary testified that he never hit 

his son, but “covered his face with my left hand and I slapped my left hand over 

my right hand.” But the trial court specifically found El Gohary not credible 

regarding “[t]he nature of his slap of [A.M.] (claimed that [he] hit own hand).” We 

defer to the trial court on issues of credibility. See Greene, 97 Wn. App. at 714.

As for acts of domestic violence by El Gohary towards Amer, a 12-page 

domestic violence assessment by a Family Court Services social worker 

summarized alleged acts of domestic violence committed by El Gohary against 

Amer and concluded that “it appears more likely than not that the father engaged 
No. 80228-3-I/14

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in a pattern of behavior consistent with acts of domestic violence and coercive 

control and as such the mother’s [domestic violence protection order] should be 

granted and include the children.” The parenting plan evaluation states that, 

when interviewed, Amer reported various incidents of domestic violence, some of 

which their son had been exposed to, including three beatings in 2016 and an 

incident involving choking in 2017. Amer testified at trial that El Gohary beat and 

choked her. Although the trial court acknowledged some credibility concerns 

about Amer, her testimony that El Gohary committed acts of domestic violence 

against her was not an area where the court found her not credible. See Greene, 

97 Wn. App. at 714 (we defer to trial court on issues of credibility). Substantial 

evidence supports the court’s finding that there had been domestic violence by El 

Gohary. The court’s findings support its conclusion that El Gohary had a history 

of acts of domestic violence.

F. Abusive use of conflict

El Gohary says the trial court erred by not imposing limitations on Amer

based on abusive use of conflict. We disagree. 

“A parent’s involvement or conduct may have an adverse effect on the 

child’s best interests, and the court may preclude or limit any provisions of the 

parenting plan” if the following factor exists: “[t]he abusive use of conflict by the 

parent which creates the danger of serious damage to the child’s psychological 

development.” RCW 26.09.191(3)(e).
No. 80228-3-I/15

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The trial court concluded that there was not enough direct evidence to 

make a finding that Amer engaged in abusive use of conflict: 

[A.M.] is, at this point, estranged/alienated from his father. It appears 

that that has been caused by a combination of behavior by the father 

that has caused estrangement and the mother involving the child in 

conflict. [A.M.]’s experience of his father’s abusive conduct is 

undoubtedly compounded by the fact that he spent such a limited 

amount of time with his father during the years that the mother was 

residing in Egypt and so had less of a positive foundation to build on.

Because there are multiple possible explanations for [A.M.]’s

conflicted conduct towards his father and his conduct during the 

supervised visits, the court does not find that there is enough direct 

evidence to make a finding that the mother has engaged in abusive 

use of conflict.

El Gohary fails to assign error to these findings; we may affirm on that 

basis. See Lint, 135 Wn.2d at 532-33.

Even if El Gohary did assign error, the findings are supported by 

substantial evidence. Evidence documenting El Gohary’s abusive conduct 

toward Amer and her son is detailed in the section above. That Amer and both 

children lived in Egypt until 2017 was undisputed. The parenting plan evaluation 

written by social worker Marilyn Liepelt summarizes behavior by El Gohary that 

would cause estrangement, as well as behavior by Amer involving their son in 

conflict. Although the trial court acknowledged credibility concerns about Amer, it 

ultimately determined, after weighing the evidence, that there was not enough 

direct evidence that Amer had engaged in an abusive use of conflict. We defer 

to the trial court. See In re Marriage of Woffinden, 33 Wn. App. 326, 330, 654 

P.2d 1219 (1982) (we defer to the trial court because it its unique opportunity to 

observe the parties, determine their credibility, and sort out conflicting evidence).
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G. Protection order

El Gohary says that the trial court erred by not vacating a protection order 

at trial. We disagree.

In a separate case, on August 8, 2018, King County Superior Court 

entered a protection order against El Gohary and in favor of Amer. The 

protection order was set to expire on August 8, 2019, two months after the 

Findings and Conclusions about a Marriage were entered. Amer requested that 

the court renew the protection order as part of this case. The court declined to 

either terminate or renew the protection order: “The court should neither 

terminate nor renew the Order for Protection. The court finds that the father had 

proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he is unlikely to engage in 

further acts of domestic violence.”

“[W]here only moot questions or abstract propositions are involved . . . the 

appeal . . . should be dismissed.” Hart v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 111 

Wn.2d 445, 447, 759 P.2d 1206 (1988) (alterations in original) (quoting 

Sorsenson v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972)). We 

will review moot issues only if they are of “continuing and substantial public 

interest.” Hart, 111 Wn.2d at 447.

This issue is moot because the protection order was set to expire on 

August 8, 2019—over a year ago. El Gohary does not allege, nor does he 

present any evidence, that the protection order is still in effect. El Gohary’s claim 
No. 80228-3-I/17

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does not meet the “continuing and substantial public interest” standard. We 

decline to review this issue further because it is moot.

H. Retaining jurisdiction

El Gohary contends that the trial court erred by retaining jurisdiction over 

the parenting plan for three years because it failed to enter findings of fact on the 

record as to why it retained jurisdiction. We conclude the trial court acted within 

its discretion. 

“Although express authority to retain jurisdiction is not provided by statute, 

authority to defer permanent decision-making with respect to parenting plans ‘for 

a specified period of time’ comes from the trial court's traditional equitable power 

derived from common law to act in the best interests of the child.” In re Marriage 

of Rounds, 4 Wn. App.2d 801, 805, 423 P.3d 895 (2018) (quoting In re Marriage 

of Possinger, 105 Wn. App. 326, 336–37, 19 P.3d 1109 (2001)). We review for 

abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to retain jurisdiction. Id. at 804. We 

may affirm on any ground supported by the record. In re Marriage of Rideout, 

150 Wn.2d 337, 358, 77 P.3d 1174 (2003).

The trial court retained jurisdiction over the parenting plan for three years, 

in writing at the end of the parenting plan:

This court retains jurisdiction for a period of three years over this 

parenting plan. If a provision requires clarification or there is a 

dispute regarding whether the plan advances to the next stage, a 

motion shall be set before this court. Absent an emergency where 

this court cannot be available, all matters regarding the parenting 

plan shall be set before Judge Helson.
No. 80228-3-I/18

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The trial court explained its reasons for retaining jurisdiction over the 

parenting plan: to clarify provisions of the parenting plan and resolve disputes, as 

necessary. El Gohary cites no authority requiring the trial court to make 

additional findings regarding retaining jurisdiction. The trial court retained 

jurisdiction only for a specified period—three years. The trial court acted within 

its discretion. 

We affirm. 

WE CONCUR: