IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

E1999-02271-COA-R3-CV

KELVIN JACKSON, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9906-CV-00198

)

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) KNOX CIRCUIT

)

vs. ) HON. DALE C. WORKMAN,

) JUDGE

EDWARD W. SUNKENBERG, )

) REVERSED AND REMANDED

Defendant-Appellant. ) FOR A NEW TRIAL

T. SCOTT JONES, BANKS & JONES, Knoxville, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

R. KREIS WHITE, ADAIR, SCHUERMAN & WHITE, Brentwood, for DefendantAppellant.

O P I N I O N

Franks, J.

In this action for damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle

accident, a jury awarded plaintiff $10,000.00 as damages, and defendant has appealed. 

The issue on appeal is whether the Trial Judge properly applied

Tennessee Code Annotated §24-5-113 to the facts of this case. The Statute provides

in part:

(a)(1) Proof in any civil action that medical, hospital or doctor bills were

paid or incurred because of any illness, disease, or injury may be

itemized in the complaint or civil warrant with a copy of bills paid or

incurred attached as an exhibit to the complaint or civil warrant. The

bills itemized and attached as an exhibit shall be prima facie evidence

that the bills so paid or incurred were necessary and reasonable.

(2) This sec tion shall apply only in personal injury actions brought in

any court by injured parties against the persons responsible for causing

such injuries.

(3) This prima facie presumption shall apply to the medical, hospital and

doctor bills itemized with copies of bills attached to the complaint or

civil warrant provided, that the total amount of such bills does not

exceed the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).

. . . 

FILED

January 27, 2000

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk
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This action was originally filed in General Sessions Court for Knox

County by filing a civil warrant with attached itemized copies of plaintiff’s medical

bills, which totaled $3,356.50. Plaintiff obtained a judgment in Sessions Court and

the defendant timely appealed the ca se to the Circuit Court. In the Circuit Court,

defendant argued that plaintiff’s medical bills should not be introduced without expert

proof, because they exceeded $2,500.00, on the authority of the above -quoted statute. 

The Trial Judge apparently ruled that the statute would apply up to $2,500.00 of the

bills, and that without competent proof, the plaintiff could not recover any amount

above that limit for his medical expenses.

Plaintiff, through his testimony, introduced a copy of a chiropractic bill

totaling $2,650.00 over the objection of the defendant. At the time the bill was

introduced, the Trial Judge instructed the jury that they would later be instructed

regarding “ the medical bill presumption” and that said presumption only extended to

the sum of $2,500.00, and that without further proof plaintiff could not recover more

than $2,500.00 for his medical bills.

At the conclusion of the proof, the Trial Judge charged the jury and told

the jury again tha t the statutory presumption of reasonableness and necessity only

applied up to $2,500.00. He further instructed that the presumption could be rebutted

by evidence offered by the defendant. 

On appeal, defendant insists that since the plaintiff’s total medical

expenses exceeded $2,500.00, plaintiff should not have been able to utilize the

presumption created by the statute, and that under the strict construction of the statute,

the bill which totals $2,650.00 was improperly admitted without expert medical

testimony.

This Court has previously recognized that plaintiffs are required to

present competent proof regarding the reasonableness and necessity of their medical

expenses. Hogan v. Reese, 1998 WL 430627 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). In Hogan this

Court addressed the question regarding the applicability of T.C.A. §24-5-113 by

stating: 

At common law, reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses

allegedly caused by the defendant are elements constituting a part of the

burden of proof resting upon the plaintiff. To relieve this burden on

small claims, the legislature by chapter 734 of the Public Acts of 1978
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created a prima facie presumption of necessity and reasonableness under

certain conditions.

This act of the General Assembly is presently codified as T.C.A. §24-5-

113(a)(1)(2) and (3). The next change in the present codification as to

the 1978 act was chapter 481 of the Public Acts of 1981 raising the

original $500 maximum amount to the present maximum amount of

$2,500.

As Hogan notes, the statute simply means that plaintiffs are not forced to bring in

expert medical proof of reasonableness and necessity where “the total amount of such

bills does not exceed the sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00).” 

In this case, while plaintiff said he was only claiming $2,500.00 in medical expenses,

the “total” of the bill he sought to introduce at trial clearly exceeded $2,500.00. In

West v. Hudson, 1988 WL 122431 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988), (permission to appeal

denied by the Supreme Court March 27, 1989), this Court explained that when a

plaintiff has medical bills totaling more than $2,500.00, plaintiff must present expert

medical testimony regarding the reasonableness and necessity of those charges. It was

therefore e rror for the Trial Judge to admit into evidence plaintiff’s medic al bills

which exceeded the $2,500.00 total.

The jury instruc tion given by the Trial Court was erroneous. Not only

was the medica l bill improperly admitted without competent proof, the Trial Court

instructed the jury that they had to presume that $2,500.00 of plaintiff’s medical

expenses were reasonable and necessary. The Trial Court’s instruction in this case

regarding the medical bills was c learly erroneous and was misleading to the jury. See

Ladd by Ladd v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 939 S.W.2d 83, 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). 

Accordingly, we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.

The cost of the appeal is assessed to plaintiff.

__________________________

Herschel P. Franks, J.

CONCUR:

___________________________

Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
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___________________________

D. Michael Swiney, J.