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29–502 PDF 2007

S. Hrg. 109–974

NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: WHERE

DOES FEMA BELONG?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 8, 2006

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

DAVID T. FLANAGAN, General Counsel 

MELVIN D. ALBRITTON, Counsel 

KEITH B. JANSSEN, USCG Detailee 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Minority Staff Director 

BETH M. GROSSMAN, Minority Counsel 

JOSHUA A. LEVY, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 3

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 5

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 7

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 9

Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................................... 10

Senator Coburn ................................................................................................. 12

Senator Warner ................................................................................................ 54

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2006

Hon. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ...... 13

Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard .................................. 33

Donald F. Kettl, Ph.D., Director, Fels Institute of Government, University 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 43

John R. Harrald, Ph.D., Director, Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk 

Management, The George Washington University ........................................... 46

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Allen, Admiral Thad W.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 33

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 77

Chertoff, Hon. Michael: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 13

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 61

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 64

Harrald, John R., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 46

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 93

Kettl, Donald F., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 43

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 82

APPENDIX 

‘‘The FEMA Phoenix,’’ by Daniel Franklin, The Washington Monthly, July/

August 1995, article submitted by Senator Lautenberg ................................... 97

Questions and responses for the Record from: 

Mr. Chertoff ...................................................................................................... 104

‘‘UASI Grant Program Allocations, FY 2006 UASI Allocations,’’ chart submitted by Secretary Chertoff ............................................................................... 108

(1)

NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: 

WHERE DOES FEMA BELONG? 

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2006

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Voinovich, Coleman, Coburn, Warner, 

Lieberman, Carper, and Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. 

This morning the Committee will examine the structure of national emergency management in light of what we have learned 

through our investigation into Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, we 

are here to discuss our recommendation to rebuild and strengthen 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and to keep 

it within the Department of Homeland Security. 

I would like to begin by thanking Secretary Chertoff, Admiral 

Allen, and our other expert witnesses for their participation today. 

And as always, I thank my Committee colleagues for their continuing commitment to a matter of such vital importance. 

Of the 88 recommendations in the Committee’s report on Hurricane Katrina, the one we discuss today is the cornerstone. I believe 

that combining FEMA’s existing personnel and assets with essential preparedness resources, such as grant programs and infrastructure protection initiatives, would substantially strengthen our 

emergency management capabilities. 

The new National Preparedness and Response Authority that 

Senator Lieberman and I have proposed would be responsible not 

just for disaster response, as FEMA is today, but also for disaster 

preparedness. We must put preparedness and response back together. They are, after all, two sides of the same coin. 

Like FEMA, the strong new agency we envision would be part of 

the Department of Homeland Security. This would enable the Authority to maintain close relationships with other crucial DHS assets, such as the Coast Guard and the law enforcement agencies 

within the Department. These are precisely the entities that can 

help in the response to a catastrophe by conducting critical search 

and rescue missions and by protecting lives and property. Maintaining this connection is of paramount importance if we are to 

2

build a true all-hazards comprehensive preparation and response 

structure. 

Now there are those who maintain that the answer is not to 

build a new structure within DHS but rather to return FEMA to 

the stand-alone status that it held before the Department was created. This position seems to be based on the notion that the preDHS years were somehow the golden age of FEMA. 

This position, regrettably, is not supported by the evidence. On 

the contrary, whether it was independent or part of DHS, FEMA 

has had its ups and downs, its successes and failures over the 

years. The rosy view of the years when FEMA was independent ignores a long history of severe problems that FEMA experienced in 

dealing with major disasters. 

After Hurricane Andrew in 1992, for example, the Democratic 

Chairman of this Committee cited ‘‘Victims who have bitterly complained that FEMA’s follow-up on many occasions was an even bigger disaster.’’ 

He went on to say, ‘‘Since its inception, FEMA has been plagued 

with a host of problems.’’ 

The Government Accountability Office found that FEMA’s response to Hurricane Andrew ‘‘raised serious doubts about whether 

FEMA is capable of responding to catastrophic disasters.’’ In particular, the GAO found that the Federal strategy back then lacked 

provisions to assess damage and the needs of the victims and to 

provide food, shelter, and other essential services when the needs 

of the victims outstripped State and local resources. 

The very same problems that hampered FEMA’s performance 

during Hurricane Katrina were present a decade before DHS was 

even formed. Just this March, at one of our Hurricane Katrina 

hearings, Professor Herman Leonard of the Harvard Business 

School testified that FEMA was never designed or prepared in its 

entire history to manage a major catastrophe. 

The FEMA Office of the Inspector General issued reports in 

1994, 1995, and 2001 concluding over and over again that there 

were not adequate controls at FEMA to ensure that mission assignments were carried out at a reasonable cost and with acceptable 

performance. Again, the same kind of problems that we have seen 

with Hurricane Katrina. 

The inadequate controls that the IG initially identified more 

than a decade ago plagued FEMA’s assistance programs in the 

aftermath of the Florida hurricanes in 2004, not to mention Hurricane Katrina. Again, this is nothing new. Severe flaws in protecting the American taxpayers against waste, fraud, and abuse 

were flagged by the GAO in 1996 and by the Inspector General in 

2000. 

In answering the question of where FEMA belongs, it is instructive to look at the reasons that FEMA was moved into the Department of Homeland Security in the first place. In 2001, the HartRudman Commission, named after two of our former colleagues, 

recommended that the Federal Government create a single department responsible for planning, coordinating, and integrating various government activities involved in homeland security. The 

Hart-Rudman Commission called for the new department to have 

FEMA as its ‘‘necessary core.’’ The goal was to create a structure 

3

that would, in the Commission’s words, ‘‘Provide Federal assistance 

for any emergency, whether it is caused by a flood, earthquake, 

hurricane, disease, or terrorist bomb.’’ 

The Commission wisely recognized that the planning and training required to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack are largely 

identical to that required for a natural disaster. An attack by a 

weapon of mass destruction, for example, would likely contaminate 

food and water and require large-scale evacuations and shelters, 

just as Hurricane Katrina did. 

The effects on our population of a pandemic disease would be the 

same, whether it is spread by birds or created in a laboratory and 

unleashed by terrorists. 

If FEMA were removed from DHS, a duplicative agency would 

inevitably have to be created within DHS at additional cost to the 

taxpayer. Preparedness and response are functions so fundamental 

to the Department’s mission that it simply could not operate effectively without them. 

That ‘‘necessary core,’’ to use the words of the Hart-Rudman 

Commission, is no less necessary today. But the core’s long-standing weaknesses have been exposed by Hurricane Katrina, and they 

can no longer be ignored. FEMA must be rebuilt, and it must be 

a truly comprehensive all-hazards national emergency management 

structure within the Department of Homeland Security. 

And that is the foundation upon which our proposal stands. 

Finally, let me turn very quickly to another issue that has been 

in the news a great deal lately, and that is the allocation of homeland security funds. That is not the topic of today’s hearing, but it 

is of great interest to the Members of this Committee. Secretary 

Chertoff, I would say to you that you have managed to do what I 

thought was impossible, which is to make both New York and 

Maine equally unhappy. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I would add Connecticut to that. 

Chairman COLLINS. Connecticut, as well, and Minnesota and 

Michigan. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Actually, Michigan should be happy. 

Chairman COLLINS. This is an issue that we will be pursuing at 

another time. I continue to think the answer is the legislation that 

Senator Lieberman and I have proposed. We are going to be working with our colleagues on this Committee and on the House side, 

and I hope that we will be able to put this issue to rest once and 

for all. 

Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman, for 

an excellent opening statement. I agree with everything you said, 

and therefore I will try to abbreviate mine. 

Welcome to you, Secretary Chertoff. A special welcome to you, 

Admiral Allen. Thank you for your service. We all remember your 

extraordinary leadership in the aftermath and actually during Hurricane Katrina with all of your fellow members of the Coast Guard. 

And thank you for it. 

Madam Chairman, as you indicated, this Committee issued just 

last month an extensive analysis of what went wrong during the 

4

preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina. I know, Mr. 

Secretary, you are familiar with our findings and also with the recommendation contained within the report to rebuild FEMA into a 

more muscular, accountable agency within the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

I am pleased that you also believe that FEMA should remain 

within the Department. And I may say, I hope after we reason together that you will also come to agree with our other reorganization proposals, which we believe, in a bipartisan way, would pull 

together the resources, the missions, and the authority for an effective Federal catastrophic response, particularly when local and 

State agencies are simply overwhelmed. 

I just want to say, because time tends to dull the memories of 

all of us, that our driving motivation for rebuilding and reinventing 

FEMA is to save lives and to protect people’s lives and to help 

those who survive disasters rebuild their lives. 

Over 1,500 people lost their lives as a result of Hurricane 

Katrina. That is a devastating number when we consider that no 

other storm in the last 30 years caused as many as 100 deaths. But 

this one brought about the end of the lives of 1,500 people. Tens 

of thousands were left without basic necessities for days in conditions that shocked all Americans. The fact is that still today, 

months after the hurricane and at the start of yet another hurricane season, hundreds of thousands displaced by Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita still face uncertain futures. We can and must do 

better together. 

As you know, I and the report itself were critical of the leadership at the Federal, State, and local level in the immediate run up 

to and aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Probably active and decisive leadership is the single most important factor in a disaster or 

catastrophe. 

But what we are saying in our bill is that appropriate governmental structures and organization—organization that leads to preparedness—are second in importance. They can be very important. 

I join by reference what Senator Collins has said, that we have 

all got to remember that when the Department of Homeland Security was created, it was created in vision of the Hart-Rudman Report, and those of us who sponsored the original legislation with 

FEMA at its core did so because this was going to be a stronger, 

more comprehensive emergency management and response agency. 

Unfortunately, I think both the Administration and Congress 

have undermined that vision by depriving FEMA of the best leaders and adequate funding in years past. And then, obviously, Secretary Ridge and you took the preparedness functions out of 

FEMA, placing them elsewhere in your Department. I believe that 

was a mistake. 

That is why Senator Collins and I have proposed to reunite preparedness with response so that the same officials who helped 

State and local government emergency managers get ready for disasters are also the ones who help them respond. We see preparedness and response as two sides of the same critical coin. 

We also believe that FEMA should be less Washington-centric 

and more connected to the real work of preparing for disasters 

where they actually occur. So our proposal envisions a rebuilt 

5

FEMA with 10 strengthened regional offices to focus on preparedness and response coordination with local and State agencies, obviously focused on the kinds of natural disasters that are more likely 

to occur in that region, as opposed to other regions. 

Each regional office would house a permanent strike team that 

would include representatives from other Federal agencies involved 

in emergency response to ensure that the Federal Government is 

familiar with regional threats and personally with State and local 

emergency personnel. Our rebuilt FEMA would be designed to deliver the kind of rapid, energetic, courageous, and life-saving response exhibited by the U.S. Coast Guard during and after Hurricane Katrina. 

I note, as Senator Collins has, that the Coast Guard is obviously 

part of the Department of Homeland Security today, has a role defined by statute, which is just what we propose for our bigger and 

better FEMA. This obviously did not inhibit, in fact it strengthened, the capacity of the Coast Guard to deliver before and during 

Hurricane Katrina. 

Finally, and really importantly, our legislation would require the 

new agency’s, that is FEMA’s, top leaders to have the experience, 

the professional qualifications, and the relevant technical training 

that will enable them to give the American people the leadership 

that we expect during a catastrophe. 

Finally, let me just add a brief word to what Senator Collins has 

said with regard to the current controversy about grants. I do not 

like the way the formula worked out either, as we have all said. 

But I do think we have got to face this reality. And again, the responsibility here is shared by the Administration and Congress. We 

continue to underfund one of the most crucial needs of our country 

today, and that is the grants that allow State and local first preventers and responders to conduct the extensive planning and get 

the training and equipment they need to do their jobs. 

For the second year in a row, this funding has actually declined. 

The Administration’s budget for next fiscal year proposes significant additional cuts as well. Yet it is obvious that the risks to our 

communities, whether by natural disaster or terrorist attack, have 

not diminished. 

So that while we are, I think justifiably, angry at the allocations 

that you announced last week, we have also got to face the fact 

that no matter how good the allocations are or how much we agree 

with them, unless we put more money into that pipeline we are not 

going to get the homeland security that we need, regardless of how 

good our structures are. 

So I would say that we have got to be prepared to give the American people an emergency management structure that works, clear 

authority, strong leadership, and then adequate funds to make it 

work. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will enter my 

full statement for the record. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

6

[The prepared statement of Senator Coleman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

In the aftermath of last year’s disastrous hurricane season, there have been several proposals put forward that focus on reforming FEMA. Certainly, as the response to the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe demonstrated, FEMA is faced with severe and deep-rooted problems and I think we can all agree that the agency needs 

to be strengthened. That being said, I believe that the problems that occurred in 

the response to Hurricane Katrina had more to do with FEMA’s leadership rather 

than it not being separate from the Department of Homeland Security. 

The Committee’s report on Hurricane Katrina detailed FEMA’s leadership problems:

1. FEMA’s senior political appointees, including Director Michael Brown and 

Deputy Director Patrick Rhode, had little or no prior relevant emergencymanagement experience before joining FEMA.

2. Michael Brown, FEMA’s director, was insubordinate, unqualified, and counterproductive, in that he:

a. sent a single employee, without operational expertise or equipment and 

from the New England region to New Orleans before landfall; 

b. circumvented his chain of command and failed to communicate critical 

information to the Secretary; 

c. failed to deliver on commitments made to Louisiana’s leaders for buses; 

d. traveled to Baton Rouge with FEMA public affairs and congressional relations employees and a personal aide and no operational experts; 

e. failed to organize FEMA’s or other Federal efforts in any meaningful 

way; and 

f. failed to adequately carry out responsibilities as FEMA’s lead official in 

the Gulf before landfall and when he was appointed as the Principal Federal Official after landfall.

3. FEMA was unprepared—and has never been prepared—for a catastrophic 

event of the scale of Hurricane Katrina.

4. FEMA’s emergency-response teams were inadequately trained, exercised and 

equipped.

5. FEMA failed to adequately develop emergency-response capabilities assigned 

to it under the National Response Plan.

These leadership failures lead me to disagree with the claims that if FEMA were 

separate from DHS, the response to Hurricane Katrina would have been better. At 

the Committee’s March 7 hearing on FEMA reform, DHS Inspector General Skinner 

was specifically asked about this scenario and he also concluded that even if FEMA 

was separate from DHS during Hurricane Katrina, many of the same problems 

would have occurred because of the leadership failures. 

Whether one has a positive or negative view of FEMA’s history, the September 

11 attacks and the creation of DHS fundamentally changed the way this Nation prepares and responds to disasters, whether natural or man-made. Given these 

changes, it does not make sense to have one agency doing preparedness for terrorist 

attacks and another agency doing preparedness for natural disasters. One of the 

purposes of creating DHS was to consolidate Federal resources involved in disaster 

preparedness and response. A successful example of this synergy is the U.S. Coast 

Guard, which performed thousands of heroic rescues following Hurricane Katrina. 

Strengthening FEMA as a part of DHS will only make this synergy stronger and 

not isolate the agency from the vital resources the Department has to offer. 

On another note, but on the subject of disaster preparedness, I do have deep concerns regarding the cuts this year to the Homeland Security Grant Program. I understand that funding for these grants were reduced by 30 percent when compared 

as last year, but Minnesota took a 41 percent cut and like many other States will 

have to delay projects, and perhaps stop doing some homeland security activities. 

The recent arrest and breaking up of a terrorist cell across our northern border is 

another blunt reminder that we are still at war with terrorists and our States need 

to have the resources to protect their citizens. 

Each year, our States play a guessing game with regard to this funding and I 

want to reiterate my concerns that this unpredictability and lack of continuity can 

impede effective homeland security. As a remedy, I have supported legislation developed by Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman that would ensure conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 Sep 21, 2007 Jkt 029502 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\29502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
7

tinuity and accountability in terms of money distributed to cities and States. We 

need long term solutions for this problem for the sake of Minnesota’s and the Nation’s security. 

I would like to thank our distinguished Chairman and Ranking Member for holding this important hearing today and I look forward to hearing our witness’ testimony.

Senator COLEMAN. I want to start by associating myself with the 

comments of the Chairman and the Ranking Member. I am not 

there totally on all of the details of the rebuilt FEMA, but I am 

close to there. But clearly the idea of FEMA staying within the Department of Homeland Security and literally all of the things that 

the Chairman has laid out, I strongly associate myself with that. 

Just if I can make two observations. One, we will have another 

hearing on the funding. But if I can say briefly, Minnesota took a 

41 percent cut, pretty significant. The concern I have is with consistency. These kinds of ups and downs do not allow for long-term 

planning. I was a mayor for 8 years. You cannot operate that way. 

You have to have a sense of consistency here. 

Clearly, with the incident of terrorists across our northern border, all of our communities are at risk. And I think the legislation 

that the Chairman and the Ranking Member have put forth, and 

I have been supportive of, would go a long way toward resolving 

some of these. I just want to put that issue on the table. 

One other issue I want to put on the table, and that is this issue 

of public confidence. I was always a believer, again in my former 

service as mayor, that when people had hope and confidence, they 

invested. If they do not have hope and confidence, we are in trouble. If you look at the surveys that are going on now, I think Time 

Magazine had one, people do not have confidence in FEMA. Those 

who have been most directly impacted by FEMA services have less 

confidence than even the broader public. 

And so I think the confidence issue is resolved both by words and 

deeds. It is clear the first response we have to the next hurricane 

is going to make a big difference. And I presume the Secretary 

fully understands that. But I just want to stress the importance, 

that we have a confidence gap right now. And that impacts people’s 

lives. It impacts the choices they make and the decisions they 

make. 

And so as we talk about structure and reorganization, I do not 

want us to forget about this important lack of confidence and the 

things we must do, both in words and deeds, to lift that up because 

I think it will have a significant multiplier effect if the confidence 

level is raised. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chairman. I have a statement 

for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I’d like to begin by congratulating you and our Ranking Member, Senator 

Lieberman, for moving so swiftly after Hurricane Katrina to find out what went 

wrong and what needs to be done to prevent a repeat of that tragedy. 

8

As my colleagues are aware, last week marked the official beginning of hurricane 

season along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts. While the experts are predicting less activity this year than last, I’m certain we’ll experience at least a few major storms. 

Because of our experience with Hurricane Katrina, I think FEMA might be at 

least somewhat better prepared for the 2006 hurricane season than it was last year. 

We now have experienced leadership on board in the form of David Paulison, someone who managed the response to a number of major storms during his time in 

Miami-Dade county. 

And based on what I’ve heard from Chief Paulison and key emergency response 

personnel in my State, FEMA has been busy in the months since Hurricane Katrina 

filling staff vacancies and responding to lessons learned from their experiences on 

the Gulf Coast. 

That said, the FEMA that will respond to the next hurricane is, for the most part, 

the same FEMA that responded to Hurricane Katrina. I’m pleased, then, that we 

have Secretary Chertoff, Admiral Allen, and some experts in the emergency response field here to help us learn some more about what—if any—structural 

changes need to be made to FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security to 

make us truly prepared for major disasters, whether natural or man-made.

Senator CARPER. I want to say to Secretary Chertoff, welcome. 

Every now and then, Mr. Secretary, I complain to my wife about 

some aspect of my job. And she says do not complain to me, I 

thought you wanted this job. 

I do not know if you and your wife ever have those kinds of conversations, but as you sit here today thinking that rather than sitting here you could be with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, enjoying a lifetime appointment and a far less hectic life and less demanding life I am sure than that which you face, we are glad you 

are here. 

You have had about a year or so to get some time under your 

belt and figure out how to deal with some of the issues that are 

coming your way. 

Senator Lieberman and others have commented on the level of 

funding, whether it is Maine or Connecticut or New York or other 

States. Delaware is not complaining. I just want to say that for the 

record. It is not that we are getting more money than we got last 

year, but I think we are actually getting less. But we are not going 

to complain about the allocation. 

I would point out to my colleagues, we are going to have a chance 

to vote in a couple of hours on a proposal to allow us to diminish 

even further the funds that are available whether it is for responding to natural disasters, whether it is monies to provide help to 

folks in the cold of the winter trying to heat their homes, whether 

it is money to provide for kids that are in the Head Start programs, 

or any variety of needs in this country. It will be interesting to see 

how we answer the bell on that particular vote in a couple of hours. 

The structure of FEMA and the structure of the Department of 

Homeland Security is obviously important. A lot of time and effort 

have gone into the work by our Chairman and Ranking Democrat, 

our staff as well, to try to figure out how do we restructure homeland security and FEMA in order to better meet the challenges 

that are going to come literally in a couple of weeks. 

Big storms are going to be coming this year. We know that. The 

question is how further we have to change the agency or the agencies to enable us to respond. 

As important as structure is, and it is clearly important, just as 

important is leadership. That includes your leadership. That includes the leadership of David Paulison, who we have confirmed to 

9

head up FEMA, and the people on the team that he has assembled, 

your ability to work and communicate together, their ability to follow the chain of command, but your responsibly as a leader to respond quickly and with the kind of attention that the emergencies 

that you will face as they come across the bow. 

One of the biggest problems we had before was I think some of 

the folks who were running the Agency were not up to the task. 

What we have to do, we cannot change that now but we can sure 

change it going forward. And I hope we have with the selection of 

David Paulison. 

The other thing that can change is the way that you respond to 

the folks that are going to be working for you and FEMA or whatever we put in its place. 

I look forward to hearing from you. 

The last thing I want to say, Madam Chairman, as important as 

it is for the Federal Government to have its act together, as an old 

governor—we have a couple of old governors and mayors here—

there is also a responsibility that the States and the local authorities have. This is a team effort, and they are big being a part of 

that team, and they need to be up to the task, as well. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding 

this hearing. 

Before I discuss FEMA, I want to address three concerns briefly. 

First of all, Congress has appropriated less money for homeland 

security grants, and you have allocated based on risk management. 

And I am not complaining about the allocations because I believe 

a risk management formula is the correct approach for homeland 

security grants. 

Second, I urge you to increase funding for Emergency Management Performance grants. EMPG is the backbone of our State 

Emergency Management System. 

Third, we have a responsibility as a Committee to restore the 

money cut out of your MAX HR human resource initiative so that 

you can do the job that we have asked you to do. 

I want you to know that I share the Chairman and Ranking 

Member’s concern about the deficiencies and the response at every 

level to Hurricane Katrina. 

Following the catastrophe in the Gulf Coast, like many of my colleagues, I wondered whether FEMA should be restored as an independent cabinet-level agency. And I have dedicated much thought 

to this issue, including a long discussion with my good friend, 

James Lee Witt, who I got to know quite well when I was governor. 

After serious consideration, I have concluded that although factors relating to the merger of FEMA and DHS, such as the loss of 

key personnel, may have initially disrupted the Agency’s response 

capabilities, FEMA’s absorption into DHS was not the decisive factor in the inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina. The truth is 

that FEMA was never equipped to handle a catastrophic disaster 

like we had in Hurricane Katrina. 

I believe too much emphasis has been placed on the organizational structure and placement of FEMA. From my perspective as 

10

a former mayor and governor, organizational structures do not 

guarantee successful outcomes. I have dealt with organizational 

change and have found that you can have the best organizational 

structure in the world and still fail. It is the people who make the 

biggest difference in any organization’s success or failure. 

Instead of moving the boxes around again, we should focus on 

ensuring that DHS and FEMA are working as effectively as possible to improve mission performance and achieve results by assembling a strong workforce with experienced leaders, such as David 

Paulison, strengthening institutional capabilities and planning, and 

making the best use of budgetary and technological resources. I 

have grave concerns that another reorganization of FEMA and the 

Department of Homeland Security would be disruptive and could 

cause more harm than good. 

Major reorganizations require time and energy and could detract 

from the critical mission performance at DHS. 

I also would note that reorganizations are not budget neutral. 

While the Senate FEMA reorganization proposals do not yet have 

CBO scores, both of the House proposals are scored at over $1 billion over 5 years. We need to ask ourselves whether this is the best 

use of our limited Federal budgetary resources or whether these 

funds could be put to better use, for example, funding improvements in interoperable communications or Emergency Management 

Performance Grants. 

Mr. Secretary, as always, I appreciate your appearance before 

this Committee. I look forward to hearing from you. 

Last but not least, you have got the job for the next 21⁄2 years. 

I sincerely believe this Committee should listen to you to learn 

what you need to run your Department. I have observed, with all 

due respect to the Senate, that we have wonderful ideas about administrative organization. When it works, we are only too happy to 

take credit, but when it does not work, we are nowhere to be found. 

Mr. Secretary, I think the Committee owes you the opportunity to 

manage your Department as you think best. 

But I want you to understand that we are going to hold you responsible for what happens at the Department. The buck stops 

with you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I ask unanimous consent that the full statement that I have prepared be entered into the record as if read. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Madam Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and giving us an opportunity to discuss the important question of whether FEMA should be removed from 

the Department of Homeland Security, and if not, how it should be restructured 

within the Department. 

As you know, I believe FEMA should be separated from DHS and restored to its 

previous status as an independent cabinet-level agency. This would serve at least 

three critical purposes. 

11

First, it would give the FEMA Director regular access to the President, the White 

House, and the rest of the cabinet at all times—not just during a national catastrophe. 

Second, it would give Director Paulison a stronger voice to advocate for FEMA’s 

budget and priorities. 

Third, it would free FEMA of several layers of bureaucracy at DHS that have 

made it harder for the agency to do its job. 

This was how FEMA was structured during the Clinton Administration, under the 

leadership of James Lee Witt. And under that system, FEMA worked well. 

Over the past several weeks, I have heard the arguments that removing FEMA 

from DHS would not remedy the problems exposed by Hurricane Katrina. I have 

heard that a big part of the problem at FEMA was its weak, ineffective, and incompetent leadership. This is one point on which we can all agree. 

If this Administration continues to rely on political cronies and sidekicks to direct 

our emergency management operations, simply removing FEMA from DHS would 

not solve the problems. FEMA has suffered from poor leadership, and that must be 

fixed. But FEMA’s subservient position inside DHS has also contributed to plummeting morale and a loss of qualified professional staff. 

It has also been noted that Hurricane Katrina was not an ordinary disaster. It 

was a catastrophe on a scale that our Nation has never seen. We have no way of 

knowing exactly how FEMA might have responded under strong, independent leadership. But I believe that a strong, independent FEMA would have been better funded. It would have been fully staffed with dedicated employees. And it would have 

commanded greater authority and the ability to marshal needed resources throughout the Federal Government. 

Some of those who don’t want to restore FEMA to cabinet-level status have cited 

the outstanding performance by the Coast Guard in response to Hurricane Katrina. 

Amid the horror and despair of that catastrophe, every American was proud watching the Coast Guard in action. But it is misleading to compare FEMA to the Coast 

Guard. The Coast Guard was not a cabinet-level agency prior to being placed into 

DHS. The Coast Guard did not have an essential part of its mission taken away, 

as FEMA did. Most important, the Coast Guard wasn’t misused as a dumping 

ground for campaign workers and college chums, as FEMA was. 

When FEMA was folded into DHS, it was thrust into intense bureaucratic infighting over proper roles and resources. This infighting only compounded the problems 

with FEMA’s leadership. To cite one example, while Michael Brown can be blamed 

for poor communication, the fact is that the Homeland Security Operations Center 

received numerous messages about levee breaches and flooding in New Orleans. Yet 

DHS failed to respond to that information for more than 24 hours after Hurricane 

Katrina made landfall. 

Madam Chairman, in our nomination hearing for Director Paulison, you stated 

that, ‘‘FEMA lacks the stature, the protection, the resources, the connections with 

State and local officials and responders, and the direct communication with the 

President that are essential in responding to a catastrophe.’’

I agree with your diagnosis, Madam Chairman, but recommend a different cure. 

Every symptom you described would be addressed by removing FEMA from DHS 

and restoring it to its previous position as an independent cabinet level agency. 

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses—although I am disturbed that 

the Committee did not provide a witness who believes FEMA should be restored to 

its previous structure as an independent agency. I think a more balanced panel of 

witnesses would give us a more effective hearing. 

Thank you again, Madam Chairman, for holding this important hearing.

Senator LAUTENBERG. I sit her somewhat amazed by the process. 

There is no doubt about where I stand. I think FEMA ought to 

stand alone. I think the events of the past confirm that. But I do 

not see any witnesses that are going to offer that opinion. And that 

concerns me because we ought to have the other point of view. 

I would hope that we will have a witness panel that advocates 

the separation of FEMA from DHS, as does Senator Lott, as do I, 

as does Senator Mikulski, and several other people who have opinions that ought to be considered. 

Second, this criticism of FEMA is unjust, unfair, and I look back 

at a time when the terrible catastrophe struck Oklahoma City and 

a fellow named Tom Feverborne, Director of Oklahoma Civil EmerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 Sep 21, 2007 Jkt 029502 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\29502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
12

1The artile submitted by Senator Lautenberg appears in the Appendix on page 97. 

gency Management Department, cited events in ‘‘The FEMA Phoenix.’’ I will include this article in the record.1

This report was issued in 1995, so it was close to the time of the 

tragedy there. Mr. Feverborne says it was 9:02 a.m. when a truck 

bomb ripped through the Alfred Murrah Federal Office Building in 

downtown Oklahoma City. At 9:30, he placed a call to FEMA headquarters. At 2:05, FEMA’s advance team arrived, complete with 

damage assessors, etc. Mr. Witt himself arrived to be briefed. 

There is other indications of a pretty good operation. 

So, to disparage it here, I find contrary to the truth. 

And you cannot get there by condemning FEMA’s past when we 

saw what happened with Hurricane Katrina. I heard the Senator 

from Minnesota talk about the Time poll that said that FEMA was 

held in significant disregard. 

Contrasting that, I am going to ask the question as to whether 

or not DHS is held in high regard? I do not think so. And what 

we saw was a bureaucracy at its worst. Finger-pointing became the 

single result of that event. It was Michael Brown, it was this one, 

it was that one, it was not a fast enough response, I must say, from 

the Secretary’s office. 

And I must say, the Secretary is someone I know and trust very 

well. But the job is enormous. And in response to the fact that people make the difference—yes, people make the difference. But so 

does organizational structure. No matter how good the people are, 

if they are not in a situation where they can apply their skills and 

talents and the facilities are not there, it is not going to work. 

So I would hope that we are going to have a chance to hear another view of this. I respect Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman 

for the work that they have done on this. I just do not think it is 

a simple issue, and I do not think it ought to be dismissed with 

a single hearing. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Coburn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

One of the things that you noted in your opening statement, I 

think, needs to be reemphasized. When we look at FEMA and we 

look at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), one of the 

agencies that they depend on more than any other is the Corps of 

Engineers. And if it is not totally reformed, from top down and bottom up, totally changed, we are going to get the same responses. 

Because those are the legs in the field. Those are the people that 

are spending the money. Those are the people that are contracting. 

Our Subcommittee has held hearings on this, and what we saw 

was incompetence at the level of the Corps that we are now blaming on FEMA and we are now blaming on DHS. I believe, Mr. Secretary, you ought to get another contractor because I think that 

one is inefficient and broken. We ought to be talking about how we 

can reform the Corps of Engineers. 

I also would remind by fellow Senators that Senator Carper and 

I have now held 37 hearings on Federal financial management 

oversight. And if we are really concerned about getting more money 

13

1The prepared statement of Secretary Chertoff appears in the Appendix on page 64. 

for this mission of homeland security and FEMA, then you need to 

be helping to also eliminate the $160 billion worth of overpayments 

that the government makes, another $200 billion of waste, fraud, 

and abuse that we have discovered, rather than ignoring that as 

we go through the Senate appropriations cycle and saying we have 

got to spend more money. 

The fact is that there is plenty of money because there is plenty 

of waste, fraud, and abuse in the Federal Government. 

The final point that I would make is performance benchmarks, 

a key management tool, is missing in many areas of the Federal 

Government. I think you can have a rotten structure, but if you are 

holding people accountable to performance benchmarks and you 

have got an effective management, you can make things work. 

So I hope whatever we do, and I have some concerns with your 

legislation, but I am not totally against it. But I think if you do 

not put into it performance benchmarks that truly say here is the 

measurement, here is how we are going to hold you accountable. 

If you do not meet this then we are going to take action. And do 

that not only at FEMA but at DHS throughout. And I think we 

should give the Secretary the opportunity to implement some of 

those type of performance benchmarks that he is now implementing. 

So the area is of great concern. I appreciate the work and all of 

the work that the staff has done in looking at the results. 

But I would also associate with Senator Voinovich. I do not think 

anybody could have been prepared for Hurricane Katrina. We could 

have done a better job. But this is a massive disaster we have 

never experienced. We are going to be better prepared next time, 

but it is not going to go perfect because it cannot on something of 

that scale. 

And to be hypercritical of the management when we have something that we have never encountered before, where we ought to 

be critical is, did we learn from the mistakes that have been made? 

And should we change management structure and performance as 

much as we change organizational structure? 

With that, I have to be at another hearing, and I apologize. The 

Judiciary Committee is having a markup right now. But I thank 

you for the time. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Our first witness today is the Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff. We thank you for joining us, 

and I ask that you proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL CHERTOFF,1 SECRETARY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Thank you, Chairman Collins and Ranking 

Member Lieberman, and other Members of the Committee. 

I request, first of all, that the totality of my written statement 

be placed into the record. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I just want to speak very briefly, and then 

obviously I will be pleased to answer questions. 

14

I am in agreement with a very large percentage of what has been 

expressed here today about what we need to do to go forward. 

There are obviously some specifics and details I will want to discuss further, but I have no doubt of the wisdom of the original plan 

to have FEMA and the response capability of the government integrated into DHS. I think to the extent we had a structural problem 

last year, it was frankly the fact that we had not completed the job 

of integration. 

In fact, I observed as much myself in July, after I looked at the 

Department the first few months I was here. And regrettably, the 

hurricane came before we had a chance to really push along the 

issue of integration to where it should be. 

A number of the specific proposals that the Committee raised in 

what was a very thoughtful and comprehensive report, and was the 

product of what I think was an almost model investigation for a 

very difficult topic, are things we have already put into process or 

are actually completed. 

For example, we have strengthened regional offices. We have 

adopted the policy that we need to be introducing the people and 

training and exercising the people who will be part of the Federal 

response with their State and local counterparts well before the 

storm starts to hit 75 mile an hour winds. 

We have pursued the issue of building a real capable leadership 

in FEMA. We have done that, first of all, by the President having 

nominated and this Congress having confirmed David Paulison. 

The Deputy Director and Chief of Operations, Chief Operating Officer, Admiral Johnson, is a very experienced operator. We have converted three of the regional directors into career positions, and we 

are anticipating that we will be filling those positions very shortly. 

And all of this has been designed to give us the career professional capabilities to run the operations that I think the American 

people and this Department deserves. 

I would like to talk a little bit about what is gained by integration and what would be lost by disintegration. I am going to try 

to do so without repeating the very keen observations Members of 

this Committee have already made. 

If you look at the Coast Guard, which performed admirably last 

year, you will see one significant difference in the leadership of 

that organization and their approach to DHS as compared with the 

approach taken by some of the leaders at FEMA. The Coast Guard 

embraced integration. The Coast Guard contributed, at the top 

leadership level, time and effort to integrating the Coast Guard 

with the operations of the Department. And that is nowhere more 

reflected in the activities of then-Commandant Admiral Collins 

and, of course, the new Commandant, Admiral Allen. 

TSA, other agencies have driven towards integration. And if you 

look at the things which succeeded last year, the Coast Guard, the 

TSA’s ability to build an air bridge which got 22,000 people out of 

the New Orleans area in record time. Those were agencies of DHS 

that were separate from FEMA but were willing to play on the 

team in order to be with FEMA. 

One of the things which this Committee uncovered during the 

course of its investigation was that, at least in the minds of some 

leaders or at least one leader at FEMA, there was a resistance to 

15

integration and a desire not to integrate. And I think the conclusion I draw is that was a serious error in judgment and handicapped FEMA’s ability to leverage the capabilities of the whole Department at a time that we needed that the most. 

This year we are continuing to exploit the benefits of integration. 

And let me be really concrete about that. FEMA is an unusual 

agency in that it spends months out of the year doing very little 

except processing paperwork for disaster declarations. And then, 

when dramatic events happen, it has to surge into action. The 

problem is you cannot build a permanently standing large group of 

individuals and a large set of tools that are going to be idle 8 or 

9 months out of the year and active 3 months out of the year. 

What we bring to the table is this. All of the tools we use every 

year, P–3 aircraft that are used by Customs and Border Protection, 

helicopters used by the Customs and Border Protection air wing 

and used by the Coast Guard, communications equipment which 

we actually deploy 365 days a year. All of that comes into play 

when we train, when we exercise, and when we deploy in an emergency to support FEMA. 

Without the ability to have these units bound together in a single 

department year round, what would happen with an independent 

FEMA is exactly what we have said we do not like. The operators 

would introduce themselves as the storm was approaching, and 

they would then learn how to work together. 

I think what we have developed in DHS and what we are building upon is a style of integration which will allow people to pursue 

their ordinary missions day in and day out, keep sharp, keep their 

tools ready. And then, when they are required to step forward in 

the breach, when we face a catastrophe, to be ready to do so with 

a set of partners that they know very well, that they have trained 

with, and that they have exercised with. 

By contrast, I have to say that we do tend to look back on the 

old days with some rose colored glasses. This is not meant to denigrate the fine work that FEMA did in the 1980s and 1990s in a 

whole set of disasters. But the fact of the matter is you simply cannot compare any challenge that FEMA faced in the 1990s with 

what was faced in Hurricane Katrina. And to say that somehow 

the difference in response is indicative of the fact that we were better prepared when FEMA was independent is like comparing the 

statistics of a minor-league ball club with their performance when 

you call them up one day and say go play in the World Series 

against the New York Yankees. It is not an accurate comparison. 

Let me look back on Hurricane Floyd, which was a 1999 event. 

I can tell you, by any measure, Hurricane Floyd was about onetenth of the magnitude of the disaster of Hurricane Katrina. Onetenth in terms of affected people, actually even less than one-tenth. 

One-tenth in terms of registration, one-tenth in terms of damage. 

And then let me read you the comments that were made in the 

year 2000, and see if they sound familiar. A town manager in 

South Carolina who described FEMA’s performance as ‘‘The disaster after the disaster after the disaster. It offers convincing evidence that the Agency still has not cleaned all the bureaucratic 

jackasses from its stables.’’ 

16

1The chart referenced by Secretary Chertoff appears in the Appendix on page 108. 

Or a GAO report in the year 2000, looking back on Hurricane 

Floyd, which said ‘‘FEMA has suffered from chronic financial management problems, including a faulty method for projecting future 

disaster costs and a long-standing backlog of unfinished disaster 

recovery projects.’’ 

As I think many of you have observed, what you need to do at 

this point and what we are actually doing is the hard, not particularly glamorous work of actually building plans and capabilities in 

a way that has never been done before. That is why, for the first 

time, we have a computer model that will show us in real time 

where the trailer loads of commodities are positioned on the highways, headed from the warehouse to their ultimate destination. So 

we can plan and deploy these commodities effectively. 

That is why, for the first time, we have people who are trained 

and equipped to go into shelters with wireless laptops to register 

people when they show up on the scene. That is why we have communications equipment that is not merely additional tools given to 

FEMA, but that actually leverages the aircraft and the communications tools that we use every single day at Customs and Border 

Protection and Coast Guard and all of our other agencies. 

Now above and beyond all of that, of course, as Senator Coleman 

said, is the issue of confidence. There is no question that the proof 

of the pudding here is going to have to be in the eating. We have 

trained, we have exercised. I am not going to tell you that all the 

work is done, but I will tell you that a lot of work has been done. 

One thing I have been very insistent upon is building, for the 

first time, a set of metrics that gives the top leadership of FEMA 

and DHS real insight into how we are performing on all of the important measures of what we need to do. 

We are keenly aware of the fact that this year we have to look 

sharp and we have to act sharp. That is one of the reasons I have 

spent a considerable amount of personal time in going around the 

country, working with governors and emergency managers to make 

sure that we are tightly bound together in a national response. Not 

a Federal response but, as Senator Carper said, one that leverages 

on the still primary responsibility of State and local governments 

to manage disasters. 

Let me finally, because we have talked a little bit about the issue 

of funding, just spend one minute addressing that. I think Senator 

Lieberman is correct that we do have disagreement on all sides 

about this. But I suspect the disagreement reflects radically different views. If you listen to people in certain cities, they will say 

almost all of the money ought to surge to a few large cities. I think 

people in smaller cities may be disappointed that they got less 

money. 

We have a pie chart, I would like to put up for one second, which 

I think will illustrate where we are.1 And then, recognizing that 

this is a discussion at greater length on another day, I will say that 

there is kind of a philosophical issue we have to address. This 

year’s grants put roughly one-half of the total amount of money in 

five cities. In fact, New York, which got $124 million, the largest 

amount, if you look at the New York Metropolitan area, which inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 Sep 21, 2007 Jkt 029502 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\29502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
17

cludes Newark and Jersey City, as I certainly know and I know 

Senator Lautenberg knows, we have almost $160 million in one 

major metropolitan area. 

That recognizes the flow of threats that focuses on that particular area and comes close to being a quarter of the total amount 

of money in one major metropolitan area. 

Now I know there are some people in New York who do not think 

that is enough. But I direct your attention to the other half, the 

half of the total money that went to 41 other urban areas. If we 

cut that money by a lot, if we put even more on the right side of 

that pie chart, you would have so little money going to those other 

urban areas that it would scarcely be worth putting the money in 

there. 

And while I am the first person to say that New York and Washington face unique threats, I cannot tell you that they are the only 

cities that face threats. And I think, as Senator Coleman said, you 

look at what happened up in Canada, you look at the fact that we 

have arrested and convicted people in Sacramento, in Portland, in 

Washington, in other parts of the country, we need to make sure 

that even as we are putting the money where the threats are the 

greatest, we are building capabilities across the board and doing it 

in an accountable fashion. 

So there are some serious debates to be had here. I will leave you 

with one thought on this issue of should we put all of the money 

where we suffered the attacks in 2001? I want to emphasize I still 

agree that is the place we need to put an awful lot of money. 

But if all we do is protect what was attacked before, then we are 

going to repeat a famous historical mistake. In the 1930s and 

1920s, the French looked back on World War I, and they built a 

beautiful array of fortifications called the Maginot line. And they 

said this time we are going to deal with the threat of the Germans 

by building these forts. 

What happened in 1940 was in 30 days the Germans went 

around the forts and conquered France. Nobody has ever looked 

back on those generals and said they did a great job building the 

Maginot line. 

I do not want to build a Maginot line. I want to have a lot of 

fortifications in New York, New Jersey, and Washington. But I 

want to make sure we have fortification where it needs to be in 

other parts of the country. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Secretary, pulling FEMA out of the Department of Homeland 

Security is not nearly as simple as the proponents of that idea 

would have us believe. One critical question is if you take FEMA 

out of the Department, what comes with it? 

Well, if you look at one of the leading House bills that would extract FEMA from the Department, it would also take virtually all 

of the components of the Preparedness Directorate. That means 

that DHS would no longer have terrorism preparedness grants, 

such as the ones that you have just referred to, training exercise 

and infrastructure protection assets, the national communications 

system, and the Chief Medical Officer. All of those assets and personnel would be taken away from the Department. 

18

In other words, what some House members are proposing is to 

take away the Department’s ability to prepare for disasters, to protect critical infrastructure, to respond with medical teams, and to 

establish a secure communication system. 

What would be the effect of taking all of those assets away from 

the Department? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. The short answer is that would be to restore the very kind of stovepiping that we have tried very hard to 

eliminate from the government since September 11. We would have 

two choices. Either we would have to rebuild a lot of these capabilities to make sure we could plan and execute in a coordinated fashion with a terrorist attack. Or we would create a schizophrenic 

Homeland Security Department. The remainder of DHS would prepare to prevent an attack. But once an attack happened, we would 

simply be out of action, and FEMA would now have to respond to 

the attack. 

But it would even be worse than that. Because if we had a terrorist incident or an ambiguous incident, you would have to simultaneously continue to make sure you were preventing further attacks while responding to the old attacks. So we would have literally two competing agencies managing the incident in an uncoordinated fashion. 

And that is even before we get to the fact that we would have 

two separate grant programs, each operating in different directions. 

We would have, with respect to our Chief Medical Officer, some 

medical things we would have to pursue in terms of prevention of, 

for example, pandemics at the border, and a whole separate set of 

tasks, again, radically disconnected. 

It seems to me that to do this would have a huge budget impact, 

would invite precisely the kind of multiplication of bureaucratic obstacles that were a problem last time, and would utterly defeat the 

entire thrust of what we have done, not only in DHS, but in the 

intelligence community and everywhere else since September 11. 

Let me leave you with one final point. A lot of what we do with 

response and preparing for response is intelligence driven. The 

whole way we think about, for example, what we would need to do 

with a medical terrorist attack, a bioterrorist attack, or a chemical 

attack and infrastructure protection is actually driven by intelligence. So we would also have to now create a new intelligence 

agency that would service this new department as well as, of 

course, continuing our old intelligence agency. 

So I think that this illustrates the fact that once you get into the 

details, this is not a workable idea. 

Chairman COLLINS. I think you have just raised a very important point. Sometimes I think that proponents of this idea forget 

that we are living in a post-September 11 world. The threats are 

entirely different facing our country today. 

I want to follow up on a point that you made about the need to 

duplicate that capacity within the Department. Do you have any 

idea of what the cost would be of trying to replicate the absolutely 

critical functions that you would still need? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will tell you it is going to be counted in 

the billions of dollars because one of two things will happen. Either 

the FEMA that is removed will be so shriveled that you will have 

19

to really rebuild all of the pieces of the organization that we provide. Or you would take out elements of preparedness that we 

would then have to rebuild. 

And even then you would still have to ask yourself, where is the 

new FEMA going to get the planes and the helicopters that it is 

going to need? It can mission assign them, but that is going to be 

a lot slower than the way we work now. Or it is going to have to 

acquire those, too. I think that in this budget environment, that 

would be very difficult. 

Chairman COLLINS. Some of the House members who are proposing that FEMA be taken out of the Department issued a press 

release last night based on an alleged copy of your testimony. The 

point that is made in this press release, among others, in response 

to the arguments that we have made about keeping those functions 

within DHS, the two House members say that on the theory that 

all essential efforts of national response must be within DHS to 

function, half of Health and Human Services and large chunks of 

the Defense Department should be moved into DHS, as well. 

Now obviously they are not advocating that, but they are trying 

to make a rather strange argument. But I want to give you the opportunity to respond to that. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. First of all, I have not read the press release, but I believe that the quotations in the press release come 

from a draft of testimony that I actually threw out and that bears 

not that much resemblance to the current draft. Obviously, they 

both begin with my name is Michael Chertoff, but then they radically diverge. 

I think that argument is an example of people who argue that 

the perfect is the enemy of the good. Yes, it is true, even in our 

current structure, we do work with HHS and DOD because they 

supply some assets that we do not have. But to further fragment 

it and say that means let us break it up even more makes no sense 

to me. It suggests that because there is always a line-drawing problem and we always have to have somebody on one side of the line 

and someone on the other side of the line, we should draw more 

lines and stovepipes seems to be just completely illogical. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Secretary Chertoff, I was taken with your comparison of the 

Coast Guard and how well it performed during Hurricane Katrina 

to FEMA and how badly it performed. And it is true, as our investigation found out, that for a host of reasons, structural, personal, 

psychological, or whatever, in some way FEMA was functioning as 

an independent agency. In some strange ways, because of the attitude of its director, we got a look at what—maybe not a fair look—

but a look at what might happen if FEMA functioned outside of 

DHS as an independent agency. And to put it mildly, it was not 

a pretty picture. 

I do want to ask you to comment on one part of this. I have a 

recollection that the first meeting that Chairman Collins and I held 

with anybody involved in Hurricane Katrina was very early on. It 

was a closed meeting, and nothing really classified happened. It 

was with a representative—I forgot the Admiral’s name, it was not 

Admiral Allen or Admiral Collins—of the Coast Guard and then a 

20

gentleman from FEMA. We were all quite impressed—it was a day 

or two after the hurricane—with the Coast Guard. 

I remember asking the Admiral from the Coast Guard, before 

you redeployed your personnel and equipment outside of the immediate target, did you get authority from the Secretary of Homeland 

Security or from the President as commander-in-chief? The answer 

was no. 

Before you went into action within an hour or two of the landfall 

occurring to save people’s lives, did you get authority from or permission from the Secretary of Homeland Security or the commander-in-chief? No. 

The answer was Senators, this is what we do. We just did it. 

I wanted to convey that to you and ask you then to set your comment—I do not mean it denies the truth of your comment, but I 

want you to set that comment or that story within your comment 

about the Coast Guard being integrated. Because ultimately, this 

is a combination, is it not, of integration, preparation, and the 

readiness to take whatever action is necessary without going 

through a lot of bureaucratic hoops. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think this is indicative of the philosophy 

that I personally have about how the Department should run, and 

I think almost everybody in the Department, almost everybody, believed at the time. It is a combination of integration but also pushing the authority down. 

In the ideal world, and the Coast Guard really kind of comes 

close to the ideal, you want to be integrated in the sense that every 

operator has full access to all of the tools. But you want to push 

the authority down. 

And my philosophy with the Commandant of the Coast Guard 

was and remains, you understand what the mission is. You have 

the tools to do the mission. Execute the mission. If there is a problem that you are having executing the mission, you are not getting 

something you need, I will be there and make sure it happens for 

you. 

It is emphatically not to say you should be clearing all of these 

things through me. In fact, an operator who wanted to clear things 

through me, I think, would not be doing a good job. 

On the other hand, when the job is not getting done, the operator 

does have to come to the Department and say give me the help, 

bring me all of the tools. What you cannot do is simply say I am 

going to go ahead and continue not to get the job done because I 

do not want to ask anybody else for help. That is what I call a lone 

ranger mentality. 

I think a classic example, and it is one of those rare instances 

where you can almost prove a fact, and I do not want to embarrass 

Admiral Allen because he is sitting here, but we actually tried both 

methods in Hurricane Katrina. We had a week of someone whose 

attitude was let me alone and I am not going to let you know if 

I have a problem. And then we had somebody who was empowered 

to act alone but also understood that when there was a need for 

something else to come into play you do not just try to do it yourself, you come back to the Department and you leverage the assets. 

The first week was the go it alone model. The second week was 

the push the authority down but stay integrated model. And I do 

21

not think anybody would say that the first week was better than 

the second week. 

So I think we have demonstrated this idea of a stand-alone, goit-alone FEMA would bring us back to precisely that which failed 

last year. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

I am going to ask Admiral Allen, when he testifies, about the 

ways in which integration in the Department has assisted the 

Coast Guard to perform its mission. 

Let me ask you this final question in the time I have left. As you 

know, in the new national preparedness authority, which Chairman Collins and I would create, we have returned the preparedness function and joined it with response. We have also brought 

back, or brought in, the capacity to make grants—through this new 

authority to replace FEMA—to the State and locals. 

Here is both the substantive and, frankly, a tactical question I 

want to pose to you. The critics who want to take FEMA or a successor agency out of the Department of Homeland Security basically say it has been marginalized within the Department. And 

that to make it strong again, you have got to take it out. 

One of our concerns is that if preparedness is separate and the 

grantmaking function is separate, are we not lending strength to 

that argument that within the Department it is marginalized and 

really the best way to strengthen it to what we need it to be is to 

take it out and put all of the functions there independently? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. It is a little complicated question and let 

me answer this way. I think there is no doubt about the fact that 

preparedness covers an entire spectrum of functions. Some part of 

it does involve response, but another part of it involves things like 

prevention. It involves creation of capabilities to fuse intelligence. 

Or it involves figuring out how to elevate the degree of protection 

for our infrastructure. 

In a way, we use the word preparedness in two different ways. 

There is the preparedness for the actual mission of FEMA, the actual mission of response. And then there is the task of integrating 

our preparedness so that all of our activities cover the entire spectrum. 

A classic example is take a chemical plant. When you are looking 

at preparedness for a chemical plant, you are looking at do we have 

the facilities in place to prevent an attack? Have we hardened the 

plant to protect if an attack gets through? And do we have a fast 

response that would mitigate an attack? 

If you have separate grant programs and separate planning programs, everybody is going to look at their particular task and they 

are going to plan for that task. At best that is wasteful. At worst, 

it is actually inconsistent. 

Someone has got to stand back and look at the entirety of the 

issue and say if we add more prevention, maybe we need a little 

less protection. Or if we have a mitigation response capability that 

is very fast and effective, maybe we do not need to put that much 

money into putting the fences and barriers up. 

I want to make sure and I want to work with you to make sure 

that FEMA and the mission of response is fully prepared for and 

fully resourced. But I also want to make sure that we have the caVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 Sep 21, 2007 Jkt 029502 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\29502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
22

pacity in the Department to stand back and look at preparedness 

not only from the standpoint of the responder but from the standpoint of the preventer and the protector. 

I realize this mirrors to some degree a debate you will find in cities across the country where mayors struggle between fire chiefs 

and police chiefs who are struggling for dominance over the issue 

of preparedness. Our approach is to have a neutral broker and an 

integrator but make sure that in developing our overall strategy 

and our grant program the substantive expertise is not just 

FEMA’s but the Coast Guard’s when we are dealing with ports, the 

Border Patrol when we are dealing with border States, the medical 

officer when we are dealing with health issues. 

I think we want to get very much in the same place, and I just 

want to make sure we do not make the error of spending so much 

time looking at Hurricane Katrina that we do not look at all of the 

other kinds of things we have to worry about. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I hear you. I understand the point you are 

making. 

I am unconvinced on the larger point. I continue to feel, as 

Chairman Collins and I have proposed, that FEMA or whatever we 

call it will be stronger if we unite the functions. We can still 

achieve some of the perspective that you are talking about. But 

practically here in Congress, unless we make it as strong as possible within the Department, then there will be a tendency to do 

what I think is self-evidently not sensible and counterproductive, 

which is to take FEMA out and make it an independent agency 

again. And then it will just be duplicative and, frankly, less effective. 

So I appreciate the attitude that you are bringing to this, in addition to the arguments, and I look forward to working with you 

to see if we can reach common ground. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think we do want to get to the same 

place. I think we are basically in an area where, as we work 

through the details, I am confident we can find a lot to agree upon. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Secretary, we have a vote on, which is 

why you have seen this mass exodus of Members. However, the remaining Members are eager to ask their questions of you. So I ask 

that you stay. 

We will take a brief recess. 

When Senator Voinovich comes back, he is going to resume the 

hearing in my absence, and I will return as soon as possible. 

Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Senator VOINOVICH [presiding]. The hearing will come to order. 

The Chairman has asked me to continue with the questioning so 

we can move on to the other panels. 

Secretary Chertoff, what I think most Americans are not aware 

of is that you have taken over a massive bureaucratic reorganization, merging 22 agencies and 180,000 employees into one department. We are focusing here today on FEMA and its relationship 

with the Department. 

I would be interested in hearing from you as to what things we 

can do to help you get your job done. Specifically, is there legislaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 Sep 21, 2007 Jkt 029502 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\29502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
23

tion that you think we need to pass before the year is up? Are 

there some things in terms of the budget that we should be looking 

at that are of concern to you? And are there some efforts that we 

can make with certain people in the Administration to try to bring 

to their attention how important some of these things are so you 

can get your job done? 

So I would like to hear, how can we help you? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I appreciate, Senator, your asking that 

question. And let me begin by saying, as you observed, this is the 

largest reorganization since the Defense Department. That, of 

course, is generally viewed as having taken about 40 years to get 

right in Goldwater-Nickels. We are not going to take 40 years to 

get this right. In fact, I think we have made a lot of progress, but 

I do not think we should underestimate the challenge we face. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Let me just interrupt you one minute. That 

was the merger of all of the Department of Defense agencies. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Correct. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Where they all previously had some things 

in common with each other. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. And they were all fully formed and had 

worked together for decades, including throughout the Second 

World War. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And you have had 22 agencies that have different cultures and so forth that have built up over the years, and 

somehow you have had to try to get them together. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Correct, including agencies that did not 

come over whole cloth and some that were fabricated from new. So 

this is not by way of an alibi or an excuse, but it is a frank recognition of the fact this is a challenge. 

I would say there are three things that would be helpful. First 

of all, calling a halt to significant reorganization would be a big 

help. Even if people disagreed with the original impulse to put 

FEMA into DHS, I think the cost of removing it and reconstituting 

the Agency—and I do not just mean the financial cost, I mean the 

cost in morale and in continuity of operation is enormous. 

That is not to say that there is not always room to make some 

adjustments internally in order to make ourselves more efficient. 

In fact, I proposed doing——

Senator VOINOVICH. If I could interrupt you, how about recruiting people? Has discussion of reorganization hurt your recruitment 

efforts at DHS? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I was about to say, among other things, a 

lot of the complaints we get are you have not filled spots up. And 

yet it is very difficult to fill spots up when people have no idea 

whether they are going to wind up being ripped out of the agency 

they are joining in a year. 

In fact, I would argue that one of the problems we had in integrating FEMA goes back several years when there was a struggle 

from the very beginning of the Department, in which some people 

bitterly resisted the merger and continued to hold out the hope 

that the merger would be undone. And that itself created an organizational and a management program. 

24

There comes a time you have to say, even for those who disagreed with the original impulse, we have to make this work. And 

the constant organizational upheaval is totally counterproductive. 

The two other things I would mention are one, of course, in 

terms of funding. We are very grateful for the supplemental, which 

has worked its way through Congress. I think that is going to be 

enormously helpful, not only in terms of what we are doing at 

FEMA but in terms of what we are doing at the border, which remains of course a matter of great concern to the whole country. 

And third, I think as the Committee looks at some of the proposals on the Stafford Act, we find ourselves often wrestling with 

categories of funding and assistance that may make sense in the 

context of an ordinary disaster but really tie our hands when we 

are dealing with the kind of emergency like Hurricane Katrina. 

And understandably people ask the question, for example, why 

are we unable to fund housing that is more permanent and we are 

forced to use trailers that are, as some people described, 

tumbleweeds when another hurricane comes along? And that is 

largely driven by the fact that we have to categorize and we are 

restricted by the Stafford Act in terms of what kind of things we 

can fund. 

So I know this Committee has within its proposals some ideas for 

changing the Stafford Act, and I think those are areas which would 

be helpful to us going forward. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you think there is an urgency to the Stafford Act revisions, something we ought to just put on the top of the 

list and move forward with it? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I do think so. I think things we can do, 

even for this season, that would give us greater flexibility in our 

ability to deliver assistance to people in the way that matches what 

their actual needs are, as opposed to what the pre-existing categories are, that is the kind of thing that would, I think, make life 

easier for people this coming season. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Can I ask you, why have you not put more 

money in for EMPG? I mean, I got a little bit more money appropriated for EMPG last year, and I am attempting to increase the 

EMPG appropriation this year as well. The States need this money 

to improve their emergency planning and operations. They do not 

have the capacity to do it currently. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We have, and I have to say I did not come 

with the full background with me today. We have invested a lot in 

emergency management planning over the last several years. We 

have also put a lot of in-kind resources in, meaning we have put 

teams out there to work with State and local officials to leverage 

the tools that they have in terms of planning. 

Part of the theory is to increasingly put more of the funds into 

capacity building through things like Homeland Security grants 

and UASI grants, and then have those available and have planning 

available as a stream of activity that would be funded under those 

grants. 

Now again as we move into the next budget year, I am always 

willing to look to see if there is some adjustment we should do in 

the program. If it turns out that this is not doing the trick, then 

25

I am happy to take a look and see whether we need to do something more. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I can tell you, I am going to try and increase 

those EMPG funds again. In my State—and we have a darned good 

emergency management system in Ohio, I think you will recognize 

that. But that is the biggest complaint that I have from our people 

in Ohio, that we do not have the resources to fund full-time emergency planners that get up early in the morning and go to bed late 

at night doing the planning and coordinating. 

And there is some terrific progress going on in the States. I have 

never seen local government officials work together as they have 

today. But they need additional resources to get the job done. 

And I would really urge you to look at this issue again and talk 

to some of your people who coordinate with the States. Because you 

know what? If we do get another hurricane like Katrina, you are 

going to be having to ask those State folks to come and help you. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. That is right. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So I would really appreciate your looking 

into that. 

Another question that is off topic. We are passing this border legislation and immigration reform and so forth in the Senate. I think 

it is important that you candidly share with Congress what you are 

being asked to do and whether the funding is there to get the job 

done. Because the problem we have today in America with illegal 

immigrants coming here is we never previously gave the agencies 

charged with immigration enforcement and border security the resources to get the job done. 

In this last supplemental, no money for drones, no money for helicopters, no money for things that I think you need to secure the 

border. And you, I think, have a moral responsibility to let us know 

what you need in order to secure the border. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will say we have, in the 2007 budget, 

money for what we call SBI–Net. And that is really the technological piece to the border strategy. And that absolutely does envision that we are going to have not only ground technology but unmanned aerial vehicles. 

In fact, I think with this supplemental, we are envisioning that 

we would have the funding for four UAVs eventually to help us 

cover the border. So I am very mindful of the fact that the aerial 

vehicles, while not a total solution, are a very helpful ingredient in 

the total program. 

Senator VOINOVICH. My time is up. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. 

And I am glad to hear of your support of the unmanned aerial 

vehicle because I had a chance to go down to Arizona and watch 

the prototype. I thought the budget just had funding for one, but 

if you are saying that there is money available in a different pot 

of funding? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think we have two—if I recall correctly, 

I think we have—of course, one crashed, and we have to get it 

back. I think it is under warranty. The second one is supposed to 

come online this summer. And then I believe we have built into the 

budget, in the supplemental, money for two more. 

Senator COLEMAN. Again, just part of the solution. 

26

A couple of observations, one just about the funding issue. By the 

way, your statement was very strong, and you are absolutely right, 

you do not win a war by fighting yesterday’s battle. 

But for me the issue is consistency. I do not know what it is 

going to take to get there. We kind of go up and down, and it is 

very hard for folks at the local level to plan. We will get there, but 

I think your statement was a very strong opening statement, and 

it certainly moved me. 

Talking about morale, and you talked about the hard-to-fill spots 

if people do not know if they are going to be ripped out. I presume 

it has got to be hard to—I am not presuming here. 

What has been the impact in terms of morale and the impact in 

terms of recruitment on the hits that FEMA has taken? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. First, let me correct something I said yesterday at a press conference because I misspoke. I was quoted as 

saying, and I think I probably did say, that we were going to be 

between 90 and 95 percent filled by the end of the year. I meant 

to say by the end of the month, by the end of June. So we are making a lot of progress. 

I will tell you it has pained me a lot over the last few months 

to hear FEMA being ridiculed. From my own personal observations, 

as well as what I have heard from others, the lion’s share of the 

people at FEMA did a magnificent job. I mean, there were people 

who were hunkered down in the Superdome who were literally 

working 24/7, who were away from their families for months. And 

I feel that where FEMA failed it was largely because the people 

were failed by the tools that they had been given or the tools they 

had not been given. 

Clearly to the extent that we continue to treat FEMA as a joke 

or treat the issue as a problem with the people in the Agency, it 

has a devastating impact on morale. We have had people leaving 

the Agency, people retiring. Part of it is they are exhausted, and 

that is understandable. Part of it is I can sympathize with someone 

who, given the opportunity to put their skills into the private sector 

and be rewarded and admired, feels badly about the issue of being 

part of an agency that is now criticized for things that I think, as 

Senator Coburn indicated, sometimes have nothing do with even 

DHS. They may have to do with the Army Corps of Engineers. 

I understand there is some discussion in the legislation about renaming FEMA. I will tell you that for historical purpose, that was 

originally the plan in the legislation, to take that name FEMA out 

of DHS. It had bitter resistance from within the people who believed in FEMA. 

And I think the answer here is not to necessarily change the 

name but to change the reality. Because I think when the reality 

changes, then the name will come to stand for what I believe the 

people in the Agency deserve, which is a very hard-working agency 

with a small number of people doing a very big job. 

Senator COLEMAN. In addition to people being failed by the tools, 

they are also failed by the leadership. And I raised this with you 

before when you were before the Committee. I would have fired Michael Brown a lot sooner. If he was not returning my calls and I 

was the Secretary in the midst of the greatest natural disaster this 

27

country has experienced, I would have been on his case a lot sooner. 

And so I do hope and I know that you bring a lot of thought to 

this job and what is required of your own leadership. But leadership is critical. And I agree with your call for a halt to significant 

reorganization. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I am delighted to say that this time we go 

into battle with a team that I have been able to pick and a team 

that I am comfortable with. Of course, we have all learned some 

tough lessons from last year. I think lessons learned have real 

value because they change the way we proceed in the future. 

Senator COLEMAN. That is helpful. 

I talked about confidence. And one of my concerns about confidence is that it will also impact the way people respond to the 

next call from FEMA. That perhaps there will be a hesitancy to be 

as responsive to directives from FEMA if you do not trust the 

Agency. Do you take that into account in your preparedness? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We do. One of the principal reasons we 

thought it was important to send people down into the hurricane 

areas and other areas that are preparing well in advance was to 

establish the personal connections that actually lead to people 

being responsive. 

I go back in my own experience when I was doing law-enforcement. An awful lot of stuff got done in law enforcement not because 

there were written plans and agreements, but because people knew 

each other, you could pick up the phone and you had confidence in 

the person on the other end of the line. 

We missed an opportunity historically to do that by bringing 

PFOs or FCOs in who had never dealt with the State and local people, and so everybody had to get acquainted. So that is one big area 

we are trying to build confidence in. 

The other thing, quite honestly, is transparency. I think we really have to level with the American people about what their responsibility is. And that means the expectation that in a major disaster, 

help is going to come in 6 hours is not realistic. People are going 

to have to be prepared to sustain themselves for some period of 

time. They are going to have to listen when they are told to evacuate. 

If we do not treat the American people like adults and ask them 

to take responsibility, then we have ourselves to blame when they 

turn on us and they get disappointed. 

Senator COLEMAN. I concur with that assessment. Experience is 

a great teacher if we are willing to learn from experience. My sense 

here, Mr. Secretary, is that we have certainly learned a lot. And 

hopefully we will see that as the next hurricane season approaches. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS [presiding]. Thank you. And thank you, Senator Voinovich, for taking over the gavel. 

Senator Lautenberg is on his way back and does want to question you. So while we are waiting for him, I will ask you a question 

following up on a point that I understand Senator Voinovich raised 

and in which, in response, you said that there should be a halt on 

further major reorganizations of DHS. 

28

The Homeland Security Council at the White House, as part of 

its report, proposed reorganizations within the Department. For example, the Council proposed creating two new assistant secretaries 

to ‘‘integrate and synchronize preparedness and response functions.’’ 

It seemed to be getting at the same point that we have recommended, which is preparedness and response should be combined once again. Under the structure that we are proposing, integration between preparedness and response assets would be virtually assured because you are co-locating them. 

Now I understand that the White House has a slightly different 

version of that, but it nevertheless is a reorganization of assets 

within the Department. So I want to clarify the response that you 

gave to Senator Voinovich. Are you opposing even those kinds of 

reorganizations? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. What I said to Senator Voinovich is I recognize that we need to make some adjustments within the Department. What I am principally and strongly opposed to is anything 

that involves dismembering the Department or pulling it out. 

Now I recognize that even within the Department there can be 

some debate about what is the right way to reconfigure. My general 

principle is we should try to do the minimum possible disruption 

in terms of how we reconfigure. I was involved, obviously, and 

made suggestions to the White House report. We have agreed, and 

we have actually adopted some internal reorganization, including 

these much more enhanced regional operations. 

So I do not mean to suggest I am against any reconfiguration or 

adjustment. 

What I wanted to be clear about was anything that involves pulling a piece of the Department out, I think we have to say enough 

is enough. The Department has now got to, as a whole, remain intact and integrated, and we have to do the hard work of making 

it work. 

Chairman COLLINS. And just to wrap this issue up, obviously 

what Senator Lieberman and I have advocated does not dismantle 

the Department, does not take pieces out and make them freestanding or transfer them to other departments. But it is the kind 

of internal reorganization that the White House Homeland Security 

Council also has called for. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Correct. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. First, thank you, Madam Chairman, for 

holding this open so that we could review a couple of things with 

the Secretary. 

I do not want to put you on the defensive nor do I want to be, 

Mr. Secretary. As we review the evidence that confirms our point 

of view, I think we have to be a little careful about denigrating 

what took place with FEMA in past years. It has been said by several, and all of us are aware of the fact, that there has never been 

a disaster, a natural disaster, of the scope of Hurricane Katrina. 

So while I can be critical, and I am, of the response time, the fact 

that the President of the United States took some 21⁄2 days to view 

the damage from 30,000 feet I thought was shocking. To me it 

showed what the national interest was in this terrible catastrophe. 

29

Seeing people on the rooftops and knowing how disrupted life 

still is for so many, and still do not have a final—I will be crude—

body count, says to me that there was a lot that went wrong. 

And I do not understand why FEMA, as a separate independent 

agency, could not call on the resources. Can you imagine that those 

resources, whether it was the Coast Guard or military or other, 

would be unavailable to FEMA if they called for them at a moment 

of tragedy like this? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I guess what I would say, Senator, is this: 

First of all, I was not trying to denigrate FEMA in the 1990s. I 

think you are dead right. They were never prepared to face anything like this. I think the Agency was never more than about 

2,200 people. In fact, it went up slightly under DHS. 

I think if FEMA stood alone it would have done no better than 

and in some respects less well than it did in Hurricane Katrina. 

Yes, they could have mission assigned the Coast Guard, but that 

would have been, as the Chairman said, slower by hours or days 

than what happened because they would have encountered what 

they encountered when they mission assigned the Department of 

Defense. It would have taken a little while to work the mission out 

and get the troops and the helicopters there. Whereas, with respect 

to the Coast Guard, it was literally instantaneous. 

At a minimum, you would add a layer of bureaucracy. But there 

is another thing that would happen. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I do not want to cut you short, but whatever you can say in a couple of words, the time clock is glaring at 

me here. 

Are you aware, you must be, that the Coast Guard was not too 

happy to be joined in to the DHS embodiment or the body? That 

they thought they operated fairly well as an independent agency 

within the Department of Transportation? Are you aware of that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think I have heard; obviously I was not 

here at the time. I would be willing to bet that most of the agencies 

originally resisted going into DHS. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. That is fair because nobody likes to be 

suddenly moved around. 

One of the things that I propose moving FEMA to its original 

status is that I think you have an elephant-sized department that 

is really hard to manage when there are significantly two distinctly 

different missions. One anti-terror and one in a warlike mode. One 

involving tons of intelligence. The other involving planning. The 

other involving some forecasting that is not unreasonably available. 

So I think that the mixing of the two gives you, with a Department of 180,000 people embracing formerly 22 agencies, almost an 

impossible task. And I admire you for your courage and your work 

and your knowledge. 

We will continue our friendship despite our difference here. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. That is for sure. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I believe. 

But now, Madam Chairman, I was surprised to hear a discussion 

of that which we were not going to discuss, and that is the grants. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Grants. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I recall, Mr. Secretary, your statements 

and the statements of Tom Keane, the former governor, who did an 

30

outstanding job in the intelligence reform thing, described the best 

way to give grants as being risk-based. 

Well, we lost it 15–1 in this Committee. And now I have heard 

you say, well, there are risks in other places, as well. Yes, there 

are. But I do not think they compare to a two-mile stretch from the 

Newark Airport to the harbor where the FBI says it is the most 

inviting target for the amount of damage that could be created in 

that two-mile stretch between the harbor and the airport, could kill 

as many as 12 million people with all the chemical production, etc., 

there. 

So I still fight. I am not happy with the funds that we received, 

and I hope that we will, Madam Chairman, have a discussion 

about that and a separate hearing on that issue, if we can do that. 

Thanks very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thanks for bearing with us as we run and vote 

and do our other duties here. 

This has already been touched on, and I want to come back to 

it again, and I apologize if it has been asked before in a different 

way. But as you know, there is a feeling among some that FEMA 

is weak and simply because of the fact that Chief Paulison will be 

officially reporting to you as opposed to reporting to the President. 

I would just like you to take a minute to respond to that sentiment. 

And also to explain to us how the chain of command within your 

Department on preparedness and response issues will work, dayto-day, and during a disaster like Hurricane Katrina or like September 11. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Let me address the first issue. Of course, 

when I go to see the President to talk about a matter relating to 

response or preparedness, I do not necessarily go by myself. I bring 

with me Chief Paulison and the Undersecretary. It should not surprise you that the President solicits and gets advice from the people that have the expertise, and that is what he wants to do. 

I think we tried the direct report method, and that was the first 

week of Hurricane Katrina when the then-Director of FEMA was 

reporting directly to the White House. We saw that did not work 

because the White House, frankly, is not equipped to be moving the 

helicopters and the aircraft. They have to execute through an agency. So when Admiral Allen came on board, we actually were much 

more nimble. 

Let me try to explain the chain of command. In a normal disaster, one that was not an incident of national significance, FEMA 

would operate pretty much in the way it has traditionally operated. 

The President, under the Stafford Act, appoints a Federal Coordinating Officer. That person is the operational head of the FEMA 

support mission on the ground, supporting the State and local responders, reports to the Director of FEMA and then up through 

that director to me and ultimately, of course, I report to the President. 

If we had an incident of national significance, under the National 

Response Plan a Principal Federal Officer would be appointed. And 

that person would have the responsibility to coordinate among all 

31

of the Federal assets that were brought into the area. That person 

would report directly to me and through me to the President. 

That is virtually identical to what happens in the military with 

the combatant commander where the combatant commander, and 

let us say CENTCOM, who has Iraq, reports through the Secretary 

of Defense to the President of the United States. What that does 

is it achieves within the Department unity of command. And then, 

as it relates to the other departments of government, which have 

separate command structures, there is the coordinating mechanism 

of the Principal Federal Officer. Everybody has signed on to the 

National Response Plan, and then, of course, we also have the 

State and local governments operate within a parallel system at 

their level. 

Senator CARPER. Let me follow up and ask a little different approach on that question. The Coast Guard has gotten uniformly 

good reviews to the way they responded in Hurricane Katrina, 

FEMA not so. I know you have been asked this question before, but 

take a minute and just revisit why does the Coast Guard get generally very good reviews for their work and their responsiveness, 

as compared to FEMA? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. First of all, I think within the Department, 

the Coast Guard operates within the chain of command. That does 

not mean that we micromanage them. To the contrary, it means 

that they understand the strategic direction of the Department and 

then they execute it. And their operators are empowered to carry 

out that execution. 

But it also means that when they need help within the Department, they do not pussyfoot around or try to go it alone. They communicate either at an operational level with another operator or, 

if necessary, the commander calls me, the commandant calls me, 

and I resolve the issue, which I am capable of doing very quickly. 

I think what hampered FEMA, and I want to underscore what 

Senator Lautenberg said, this was, by any measure, an extremely 

challenging—just a super challenging disaster—was an unwillingness to recognize that there were certain things that were outside 

of FEMA’s capacity to deliver. And rather than going to other operators or coming to me and saying can you give us some additional 

assets, which could have been done literally in 10 minutes, there 

was a desire to try to do it by themselves, or at least on the part 

of Mr. Brown who wanted to do it himself. 

His calls to the White House, not surprisingly, did not produce 

the results because the White House does not actually control or 

have possession of helicopters and things of that sort. What they 

will say is go contact the operators. So time was actually lost. 

In addition to which, it deprived me of an awareness of what was 

going on so I could simply push in myself. 

Now what I wound up actually doing, 48 hours into this, was recognizing that Mr. Brown was not capable of doing what needed to 

be done; we simply took pieces of this over and started to run them 

out of Washington, like the air bridge, like some of the things we 

did with the Coast Guard. That is not a very desirable way to do 

things. The Coast Guard’s way of doing things is the model we are 

really applying across the board. 

32

Senator CARPER. As we go forward and try to decide what 

changes, if any, to make to the structure of your Department in 

this regard or to FEMA, give us a point or two of things that we 

absolutely—if we do nothing else, we ought to do one or two things. 

And say what they are. 

The converse of that is if there are a couple of things we ought 

not to do, and you feel very strongly about that, tell us what those 

might be. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I certainly feel in the not to do things is 

taking FEMA out, for all of the reasons we have explored at some 

length here. 

I think what we need to do is, first of all, there are some changes 

in the Stafford Act that would give us greater ability to tailor the 

assistance we need to render to people in a way that meets their 

needs. 

We had a lot of struggle with how do we house a large number 

of people in apartments and in hotels? Much of the struggle was 

about the fact that we could not pay directly under the Stafford Act 

in a way that was most accommodating to the localities and easiest 

for the people involved. 

So some flexibility in terms of the Stafford Act, I think, is something which will be helpful to us. 

I think the supplemental has been enormously helpful to us in 

giving us some additional tools. 

At the end of the day, what we need to do, though, is to be allowed the breathing space to build the metrics and build the capabilities which we are doing at a very fast rate of speed, but recognizing that procurement rules require a certain amount of time to 

elapse. We are doing much more precontracting this year than we 

have ever done before. We need to ask for some forbearance while 

we complete that process. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for your testimony this morning. You have been very patient as we have tried to incorporate the 

votes this morning. I look forward to working with you as we seek 

to ensure the implementation of the recommendations in our report. So thank you for being here today. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Madam Chairman, can we ask that the 

record be kept open for questions in writing? 

Chairman COLLINS. I always do that at the end of every hearing, 

and this hearing will be no exception. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Thank you for inviting me. I look forward 

to working with you on implementing the suggestions of the Committee. I think we have done a lot already. We look forward to 

doing more. And I think we are in sync on what we need to do 

here. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I would now like to call the second witness before us today. Coast 

Guard Admiral Thad Allen assumed his duties as the Commandant 

of the Coast Guard on May 25 of this year. 

I would note that this is Admiral Allen’s first official Congressional hearing since he assumed the position of Commandant, and 

we are very pleased to have him here today. 

33

1The prepared statement of Admiral Allen appears in the Appendix on page 77. 

Many of us recognize Admiral Allen for his role as the Principal 

Federal Official in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina last year. 

But perhaps less well known is the fact that Admiral Allen served 

as the Atlantic Area Commander during September 11. And he 

oversaw the Coast Guard’s response, which included one of the 

largest boat lifts in our history of more than 1 million people from 

lower Manhattan. 

So I wanted to make sure that was part of the record as well, 

Admiral. Admiral, we are very pleased to have you in your new position. We thank you for stepping into the leadership void in the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 

I would ask that you proceed with your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN,1 COMMANDANT, 

U.S. COAST GUARD 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I have a statement for the record, and I will submit that and make a few brief 

remarks if that is OK. 

I would like to start out by noting where I come to the hearing 

from this morning, Madam Chairman. As you know, I was a Principal Federal Official for Hurricane Katrina, and I am a Coast 

Guard leader. 

The two other roles that I have played in the past that I think 

maybe bear on the discussion here this morning as we move forward, I have also, for the last 3 years, been the Chairman of the 

Joint Requirements Council for the Department of Homeland Security, which is the vetting organ for all capital investments and acquisitions for the Department. I also was the Transition Director 

for the movement of the Coast Guard from the Department of 

Transportation into the Department of Homeland Security on behalf of the Commandant. I managed that process. 

I would like to make four brief points this morning, and I then 

would be glad to take your questions, Madam Chairman. 

The first point I would like to make is that in the view of the 

Principal Federal Official, which is a job I performed down in the 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita response, I tend to view FEMA’s role 

inside the Department as one which is critical to an integrated response across an all-hazards and all-threats environment. 

The Homeland Security Act and the Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5, 7, and 8 have created a role for the Secretary 

as the incident manager for the Federal Government. I believe that 

any move to take FEMA outside of the Department would erode 

the position of the Secretary as the incident manager and create 

some kind of peer competition that would create uncertainty and 

doubt when we need it the least, and that is in response to a major 

event. 

The second point I would make regarding FEMA’s location inside 

the Department is the synergy that we are deriving by all working 

together as components within the Department of Homeland Security. The synergy between FEMA and the Coast Guard since we 

have joined together in the Department has been extraordinary. 

We have increased the number of operations and exercises we have 

34

conducted just in the 3 years the Department has been in existence 

by over 300 percent. We have expanded the mission assignments 

that we deal with for FEMA from three or four areas across one 

or two emergency support functions to 10 emergency support functions and 22 pre-scripted mission assignments. 

Third, as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Council for 

the Department, I can say that the synergy gained by looking at 

requirements for emergency communications, emergency notification, capabilities and assets that we all bring to the fight out there 

together are being vetted, and we are working together to join 

those requirements and provide the most effective tools to the 

workforce inside the Department of Homeland Security. 

The fourth point I would make, as you know there is a proposed 

field structure to put preparedness officials at a regional level out 

there. I think any move to take FEMA outside the organization 

would create dual field structures and would increase not only the 

cost but the increased coordination at the regional level. 

With those brief comments, I would be glad to take any questions 

you may have of me. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

Admiral, when the Coast Guard was brought within the Department of Homeland Security, it was given certain statutory protections to prevent the Department from reorganizing it or stripping 

it of assets or authority. Do you think that is a model for this Committee to look at as we seek to keep FEMA within the Department 

but boost its authority? Has it worked well for the Coast Guard to 

be within DHS but to have that extra protection for its legal status? 

Admiral ALLEN. I think it has been extraordinarily beneficial for 

the Coast Guard to be in the Department of Homeland Security. If 

you look at what I would call a Venn diagram of the overlap of mission and roles related to what the Coast Guard does and where we 

were placed in DOT and the overlap within the Department of 

Homeland Security and the other components, I think there is a 

tremendous amount of overlap in the Department of Homeland security. I think it is the right place for us to be. 

You are right, Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act required 

that our mission set be intact when we moved over and that we 

move over in whole as an agency. We feel that with over 200 years 

of experience and all of the functions that we do on the water for 

America, that was the right thing for the Coast Guard. It has allowed us to sustain our level of performance and take what was a 

mature organization and continue our service to the United States. 

Chairman COLLINS. Admiral Allen, one of the findings of this 

Committee, when investigating Hurricane Katrina, was that the 

Coast Guard did a terrific job of prepositioning its assets, moving 

personnel out of harm’s way, and yet placing them close enough so 

that they could respond quickly once the fury of the hurricane had 

passed by. 

When Admiral Duncan, the Coast Guard’s 8th District Commander, testified last November, he said that there was a direct 

link between the Coast Guard’s preparedness and training and its 

success in responding. If we accept that the Coast Guard’s organization, which includes both preparation and response functions, is 

35

at least partially responsible for its success, doesn’t that organizational model also hold promise for FEMA? 

In other words, shouldn’t preparedness and response be recombined, given that good preparedness improves the response? 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, ma’am. I think I would expand on the comments that the Secretary made earlier. At the risk of condensing 

this to an oversimplification, I believe there is a big P in preparedness and a small P in preparedness. And what I mean by that is 

when you look at the Coast Guard in terms of preparedness or 

what we would call readiness, that really relates to the missions 

that we perform for the American public. 

If you look at the Department of Homeland Security’s mission to 

meet all hazards and all threats in an incident management mode 

for the entire country, there is also a big P on how you can combine 

what the Department is intending to do under the Homeland Security Act and the various policy statements that establish the Secretary as an incident commander to create what I would call a corporate preparedness function. 

One of the reasons we are able to perform as we do is we focus 

on the readiness and preparedness of our agency in relation to our 

own roles and missions. So I think there is an agency level preparedness level and then there is an integration of preparedness 

across the components of the Department. I believe that is what 

the Secretary is referring to. 

Chairman COLLINS. Admiral, I use the Coast Guard as Exhibit 

A when I am making the case that FEMA ought to remain within 

the Department because the Coast Guard was the stellar performer 

in response to Hurricane Katrina. And yet, it was moved within 

the Department. What do you think made the difference? Why was 

the Coast Guard successful as part of the Department of Homeland 

Security when FEMA was not? 

Admiral ALLEN. I remember at the time having some discussions 

with Secretary Mineta in DOT, and this was a very painful time 

for DOT and the Coast Guard. It was a very bittersweet moment 

for us. Secretary Mineta had arguably been our best service secretary inside the Department of Transportation. 

But when you are in the military, in the Coast Guard, you swear 

an oath to defend the Constitution, and ultimately there is a higher 

authority. When you are given an order, you obey it. We mustered 

up our service, we reported for duty, and at that point we committed to the full success of the Department. 

I said in my change of command speech on May 25 that the 

Homeland Security Act created the promise. We must keep it. And 

that is my position. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Commandant Allen, I congratulate you for the assignment you 

have and the experience that you bring to the job. We are very 

proud of the Coast Guard. I do not know whether you know my history of support for the Coast Guard. 

Admiral ALLEN. Extensively, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. A lot of years. So by no means, as these 

questions are raised, is there any intention to criticize the Coast 

Guard. 

36

We all watched with admiration and amazement the Coast 

Guard’s involvement in Hurricane Katrina. The helicopters, the 

bravery of the people in that terrible weather to complete their assignments. 

I heard you say that the Coast Guard moved bag and baggage 

into DHS. Are you aware of the fact that there was any opposition 

to that within the Coast Guard family in the days of planning? 

Admiral ALLEN. I think the Secretary commented earlier. Anytime there is change there are going to be people that are disrupted 

by it. 

The conversation I had at the senior leadership level, at the time 

I was the Atlantic Area Commander, my view was there was more 

of a concern that if we moved that our missions would stay intact 

and we would move over as an agency with that stable, mature 

pass that we have and be able to perform effectively right out of 

the chute. 

I know my own personal opinion was that if the direction was 

to move to the Department of Homeland Security, we should make 

that successful and focus on mission execution. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Could we apply the same thing to FEMA? 

All of us have now learned, unfortunately, that the assignments 

that FEMA faces could be far greater than anything imagined in 

all of the history of the country. 

And so they could move, and I am looking at your statement, and 

you talk about planning prescripted mission assignments and that 

you have committed yourself to get these things in place so that 

you can be effective for any of the disasters that you might be 

called upon to deal with. 

But would FEMA not be able to reach out to the Coast Guard 

if they were the calling agency, I will use the term? 

Admiral ALLEN. They could, they would, and they did before the 

move to the Department of Homeland Security. I would tell you the 

big difference is that when you work with an agency everyday, inside the same department, you get to know each other. And there 

are built-in synergies and efficiencies that do not show up on an 

organization chart or in legislation. 

The other thing is, with all of these assets being in one department at the discretion of the Secretary, he can move these assets 

before the mission assignments are made, and you can worry about 

the billing later. 

If the Secretary called me this afternoon and said here is the 

issue, we would launch an aircraft and we would take care of the 

paperwork later. It is a little harder to do if you are not in the 

same department. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But you did operate well within the Department of Transportation. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Always—semper paradis—and I know you 

hew to that motto, and we all believe that of the Coast Guard. I 

have seen you in places when you had to pull me in in a little 

stormy weather. This was before the Senate. I would not have 

called on you otherwise. 

I think it is certainly logical and possible that the Coast Guard 

could be as readily available whether FEMA was next door or they 

37

were down the block or in another city. The Coast Guard is known 

for being ever ready. 

Were there any problems in terms of getting the response to 

Hurricane Katrina in moving with the maximum commitment of 

resources that you had? There were not any, were there? Your people responded, the equipment was made available virtually on the 

spot. 

And so I see that facility available all the time. Maybe we have 

grown accustomed to your place, and that is that you are always 

there. I really believe that would be the condition that we would 

see if FEMA was a separate department. 

Admiral ALLEN. We would always endeavor to be responsive, 

Senator. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Thanks, Commandant. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you very much. 

I would like to congratulate you, Commandant, on the outstanding job, the stellar job, that the Coast Guard did responding 

to the catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina. 

You have been able to sit in the catbird’s seat for quite some 

time to watch what has been going on at DHS. And I would like 

first for you to share with us your observations about the integration that is going on within the Department. You were here for 

Secretary Chertoff’s testimony. I would be interested in your perspective on whether or not you are seeing integration among all 

these agencies that have never worked together before. 

Second, specifically regarding the Preparedness Directorate and 

FEMA, I have lots of good feelings that Mr. Foresman and Mr. 

Paulison are going to work together. But if you look at the structure there, if they were gone and you had two other people, do you 

think the structure would enhance a good relationship or detract 

from it? 

And last but not least, the issue of the Army Corps of Engineers. 

Senator Coburn was talking about the Army Corps and the fact 

that a lot of the problems we had in New Orleans dealt with the 

Army Corps of Engineers. 

Do you think it would be wise to improve coordination between 

the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Homeland Security? 

Admiral ALLEN. Let me address the first question. 

In looking at the relationship between an operating component 

in the Department and the preparedness undersecretariat, I think 

a useful analogy might be with the Coast Guard’s experience as we 

moved into the Department. Prior to the transition into the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard had a significant responsibility for what we called the National Contingency Plan. This 

was a series of plans that evolved most notably out of the Exxon 

Valdez spill in 1989 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that required 

a significant preparedness role for the Coast Guard including periodic drills on spills of national significance. 

I was a National Incident Commander for one of those in New 

Orleans in 2002, and we are planning for one next year at the new 

Madrid Fault in the central part of the United States. 

38

What we have done is we have taken the preparedness responsibilities that have grown extensively in the Coast Guard for the 

last 10 or 15 years and actually have married those in to the larger, what I referred to earlier, corporate preparedness function at 

the Department. We have moved those seamlessly together and actually have gained synergy. 

While we are testing our oil and HAZMAT response skills in the 

spill of national significance drill that is planned for 2007, we will 

also exercise this as an incident of national significance related to 

other aspects of the Department, including FEMA. 

So I think there is the potential to integrate from the component 

level up to the preparedness undersecretariat. I think we have 

demonstrated it can be done. I think it is possible, sir. 

Regarding the Corps of Engineers, I would almost have to beg off 

on that, but let me just make two comments as it relates to my role 

as the PFO down there. The Corps really served two purposes 

when I was down there. One of them was the execution of mission 

assignments for FEMA in terms of debris removal, delivering of 

commodities, and so forth. 

They also were down there repairing the levees, and they have 

a programmatic stake in that, in relation to their programs that 

are ongoing unrelated to the FEMA response. I dealt with them, 

in terms of an incident manager down there. I would not want to 

make any judgments or presume the prerogatives of the Department of Defense or anybody else on where they might be located, 

sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. The fact of the matter is that if additional 

budgetary resources had been available to the Corps of Engineers, 

the levee breaches in New Orleans would likely have been less severe. I was pointing out to the Chairman of this Committee that 

the Corp’s construction budget has been cut significantly. That is, 

to me, unacceptable. 

It seems to me that there ought to be more communication going 

on between the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of 

Homeland Security to examine the potential threats which could be 

mitigated. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. I did make one recommendation, and I 

did it informally, it was never in writing, in relation to Homeland 

Security and the Corps of Engineers. I thought there was a need 

for greater communications and alignment between the program in 

the Corps of Engineers which designs and builds the levee heights 

and that interaction with the National Flood Insurance Program 

and what the 100-year flood plain does, how it interacts with levees. I thought there was some room for coordination there, and I 

did make that recommendation. 

Senator VOINOVICH. One of the concerns that we all had when 

the Coast Guard came into the Department of Homeland Security 

was that you already had significant responsibilities. The concern 

was that with the added responsibilities, you would be shortchanged, you would not have the resources to take on the new role 

that we were asking you to take on at DHS. 

I know I am particularly familiar with the situation in Cleveland 

and Lake Erie. I’ve talked with folks from the Coast Guard, who 

have said, Senator, we have a big job to do and now you are asking 

39

us to do a whole lot more. They were very concerned about whether 

or not they would have the resources to take on additional duties. 

Could you comment on how you feel about the resources and 

whether we have given you the money that you need to get the job 

done? Or are there some areas that you feel deserve additional resources? 

Admiral ALLEN. Senator, when you take an organization like the 

Coast Guard, which is multimission, that means rather than having three or four agencies you have one agency that can do a lot 

of different things at any particular time. You are not going to be 

optimized along one program completely. So you are always having 

to make trade-offs, risk-based decisionmaking between the allocation of resources to the highest threat within your area of responsibility. 

We traditionally have allowed our commanders to do that. We 

provide them with a certain level of resources, and they adjudicate 

that in the area in which they are responsible for, whether it is 

Cleveland or the Straits of Florida or the Bering Sea. That is one 

of the geniuses of our organization. It also allowed us to be able 

to react with those resources down in New Orleans and everywhere 

else we operate in the Coast Guard. 

So there is a built-in mechanism in the Coast Guard to vet competing priorities and apply the resources available to the highest 

need. 

If you are looking at 95,000 miles of navigable coastline in this 

country with the rivers, the lakes, and the coast lines, you are 

never going to have enough resources to cover all of that. So we 

are always going to be in a situation where we are applying resources based on risk. 

Can we use more effectively? Sure we can. But the resources we 

have will be applied to the best extent that our professionalism and 

our competencies allow under risk-based decisionmaking. And we 

have evolved that significantly since September 11. We have come 

up with a risk-based decisionmaking model that accounts for both 

threats, vulnerabilities, and the consequences associated with that 

in our largest ports. We do allocations within those areas based on 

that risk-based methodology. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So you have——

Admiral ALLEN. Whatever money we get, we will spend it wisely, 

sir. [Laughter.] 

Senator VOINOVICH. You did a good job of dodging that. Maybe 

we ought to talk privately about this. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral Allen, thanks. Good morning, good afternoon now, and 

thanks for your service to our country. 

Part of what we are trying to get at is what we can learn not 

only from the failures of Hurricane Katrina but from the successes, 

and again, the Coast Guard was clearly a success. 

As I described, when Secretary Chertoff was here, we were 

struck, I was certainly, by the extent to which the Coast Guard operated essentially without having to check up the chain of command to do the basic things it had to do. 

40

Am I correct to conclude that is a manner of exercising long-held 

Coast Guard statutory authority? Or is it just custom, without separate statutory authority? 

Admiral ALLEN. It is both, Senator. First of all, any petty officer 

or commissioned officer in the Coast Guard is an officer of the Customs, and we have been since 1790. We were the first customs officers as part of the Revenue Marine and then the Revenue Cutter 

Service. So we have a long statutory basis for being able to act 

independently, either in a law enforcement capacity or in our role 

with the Department of Defense as an armed force. 

But by custom and by practice, the principal on-scene initiative 

is one that has been embedded in the Coast Guard for over 200 

years. It relates to the early days when you had a single revenue 

cutter in Long Island Sound attempting to stop British smuggling, 

or after the purchase of Alaska revenue cutters up there which 

were basically the government for Alaska until it was able to be 

established, clear to that patrol boat commander in the Persian 

Gulf among the oil platforms right now that is given tasking and 

expected to accomplish it out there. 

So it is a combination of statutory authority and how we have 

evolved as an agency and how we grow our leaders, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that, and that is an interesting 

part of the story. 

I want to ask you if you would just respond to this situation: 

Should we clearly give FEMA, or whatever we call the agency that 

carries out the responsibilities that FEMA does now, more clear 

statutory authority to act independently? I do not obviously mean 

in violation of a chain of command, but I mean to—for instance, 

right now there is some feeling, even in a catastrophe like Hurricane Katrina, that FEMA has to wait to be asked to come in. 

And I wonder whether we should, based on the precedent the 

Coast Guard has set, which is a good one, an important and effective one, authorize FEMA in that case to exercise independent authority and move in to help? 

Admiral ALLEN. I think you raise an excellent point, Senator, if 

I could make two points associated with that. The way the Stafford 

Act is constructed, and this gets back to a statement made earlier 

by the Secretary, resources can only be flowed into a State or local 

government pursuant to either a disaster or emergency declaration. 

So you are already a little bit behind the power curve in flowing 

resources to where you may need them. 

I think looking at the Stafford Act and creating some kind of 

mechanism that allows resources to be made in advance of an 

event to pre-stage would be something you probably ought to look 

at. 

I would commend to you the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 in the following sense, without being too melodramatic about this, the Exxon 

Valdez was the Coast Guard’s Hurricane Katrina. We did everything by the book, the way we were legally supposed to. And there 

was a general perception that there was a failure because not as 

much was being done that should have been done and the Federal 

Government should have stepped in. 

As a result of the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, there 

was a 5-cents-a-barrel tax put on crude oil that basically capitalVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 Sep 21, 2007 Jkt 029502 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\29502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
41

ized the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund that allows the Coast Guard 

to act under a threat of discharge, even if there is no responsible 

party. 

I think if you look at the structure of the Disaster Relief Fund 

and how we actually execute the disaster resource management 

function through FEMA, there might be some way ahead where 

you could have some buffer fund that would allow you to prestage, 

especially in communities that have certified evacuation plans or 

have demonstrated the competency to be able to apply those resources in advance, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is a very helpful answer. 

Or, as in the case of Hurricane Katrina, both prestage and 

maybe begin to act, particularly as in Hurricane Katrina when, at 

least in the city of New Orleans, the constituted authority was incapacitated because of failure of communication systems and the 

rest. Because if you are not there prepositioned, it is going to be 

pretty hard to act. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, sir. There were two elements to that. One 

is prepositioning the forces and applying them, but even after the 

event to flow the forces in. 

The mental model that I used to approach my job in New Orleans was that we had something more than a hurricane. And that 

a legacy hurricane response was not going to be sufficient to ensure 

the mission outcome that was being sought, at least in and around 

New Orleans when I first got there. 

Allen’s view of the event was when the levees were breached, you 

had the equivalent of a mass effect used on the city of New Orleans 

without criminality. What I mean by that is, normally, if you had 

a weapon of mass effect used, it would be a criminal action, there 

would be a definite investigative lead, and somebody would be applying tactical resources to mission effect. 

When you had the loss of command, control, and communications 

within the city of New Orleans, while we were flowing in urban 

search and rescue forces and disaster medical assist teams, there 

was nobody, in military terms, to take tactical control, or TACCON, 

of those resources and apply them to mission effect. 

So you had extraordinary heroism and courage demonstrated by 

the urban search-and-rescue teams and the helicopter pilots but 

they were basically self-organized. And they did it remarkably 

under incident command system because they knew enough about 

it, and there was enough on-scene initiative. 

But how they reported back up and how that related to the emergency repairs of the levees and the coordination of the law enforcement officers that were at the Royal Sonesta Hotel in New Orleans, 

that was not all bound together. So my first job when I got there 

was to create a unity of effort between those forces that had been 

deployed in but had to be self-organized and were not really 

brought together under a unified command. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is a very helpful answer, a very important recollection of what happened there. You know it required two 

things. One is the training, capacity, and authority within the 

Coast Guard, and your absolutely correct judgment that this was 

not a typical hurricane or disaster. 

42

And I am afraid, in the case of FEMA, not only were they not 

prepared because they had not pre-deployed or pre-positioned, also 

they did not have the preparedness to do what your Coast Guard 

forces were doing. 

This makes an important point, which our report tried to make, 

that as much as we look back at FEMA with appreciation for the 

times it has performed well, and we had testimony on this from 

one of the independent experts we had come before us at a hearing, 

FEMA has never been prepared to deal with—we have been using 

the terminology catastrophe. It dealt with disasters. It never was 

prepared to deal with a catastrophe. 

And that is what we have got to get it to be able to do, whether 

it is a naturally occurring catastrophe or, God forbid, an unnatural 

weapon of mass destruction effect catastrophe. 

Admiral ALLEN. Senator, I could make a comment, I think it has 

to do with the structure of FEMA, as it relates to the execution of 

their responsibilities under the Stafford Act, the role of the Federal 

Coordinating Officer as the disaster resource manager, which is a 

fiduciary responsibility they have to execute those appropriations. 

Once you go beyond a Stafford Act response and it requires 

something else, not related to the execution of those duties, then 

you are moving into the area where you need a Principal Federal 

Official because those are competencies and capabilities that are 

not resident in the day-to-day operations of FEMA. 

And that is where what I call this hybrid event started to diverge 

in terms of the requirements that were needed to respond to it, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Excellent point, full of insight that is obviously based on experience. 

Thanks very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

Admiral, thank you so much for appearing today. 

Before I let you go, I want to tell you that the Members of this 

Committee recognize that the Coast Guard has taken on enormous 

additional responsibilities since the attack on our country on September 11. And all of us are impressed with how the Coast Guard 

has stepped up to the plate, whether it is port security or other 

functions. 

I personally think that we have not done a sufficient job in making sure the Coast Guard has the resources to match its expanded 

mission. And several of us have been pushing for an acceleration 

of the Deepwater Program, for example, so that you are not spending 25 percent of your funds to repair legacy assets, so that your 

cutters and your aircraft are able to be mission ready at all times. 

I continue to believe that accelerating the Deepwater Program 

would not only assist the Coast Guard in performing its mission 

more effectively, but would actually save $1 billion in the long run. 

I am not going to put you on the spot by asking you if you would 

welcome an acceleration of the Deepwater Program because I assume the answer is yes. But I realize you are not always free to 

give those kinds of answers in your new position. But if you would 

like to make any closing comment before leaving us today, I would 

invite you to do so. 

Admiral ALLEN. I appreciate the kind remarks, not on behalf of 

myself but on behalf of the extraordinary men and women of the 

43

1The prepared statement of Mr. Kettl appears in the Appendix on page 82. 

U.S. Coast Guard. The greatest benefit that I have accrued in the 

job that I am taking over is I get the opportunity to work with 

these people for 4 more years, and that is an extraordinary blessing 

as far as I am concerned. 

I look forward to working with the Committee in the future. 

Chairman COLLINS. I think he dodged another one, Senator 

Voinovich. [Laughter.] 

But thank you for being here, and we wish you much success in 

your new position. 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. I would now like to welcome our third and 

final panel this morning, Dr. Donald Kettl and Dr. John Harrald. 

Dr. Kettl is the Director of the Fels Institute of Government at 

the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of numerous articles and journals on the topics of homeland security and emergency 

preparedness and is considered a preeminent scholar on these topics. 

Dr. Harrald is the Director of the Institute for Crisis, Disaster, 

and Risk Management at the George Washington University and 

a Professor of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering 

in the G.W.U. School of Engineering and Applied Science. He is the 

Executive Editor of the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and has been very engaged in these fields as 

a researcher in his academic career and as a practitioner during 

his 22-year career as a U.S. Coast Guard officer. 

We thank you both for joining us and for the advice that you 

have given the Committee. 

Dr. Kettl, we are going to begin with you. 

TESTIMONY OF DONALD F. KETTL, PH.D.,1 DIRECTOR, FELS 

INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Mr. KETTL. Madam Chairman, thank you so much and thanks 

for the opportunity to appear before you today and to share not 

only my opinions but some of the work that we have done at Penn, 

including our book on risk and responsibility, which is an effort to 

try to explore some of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. 

The core of those lessons is that we have serious problems that 

we need to fix. But we have to make sure that in the process of 

fixing them that we solve the right problem and make sure that 

in the process we do not inadvertently create new ones. 

The guiding principle for figuring out how to think about that, 

I think, Madam Chairman, is the need to try to focus on what will 

work on the front lines, that national policy and Federal policy, 

however well-intentioned, that does not work on the front lines for 

first responders will be, as we discovered in Hurricane Katrina, a 

prescription for continued failure. 

The approach to getting at that, I think, is a series of principles: 

To make sure that what we have first focuses on operational 

awareness, to make sure that what we do at the national and the 

Federal level works for the people on the front lines. 

Second, the front line effectiveness is the ultimate measure of 

whether or not we have the right policy. 

44

Third, the Committee’s recommendation for an all-hazards-plus 

strategy, one that recognizes the interconnection between natural 

and unnatural events in Homeland Security, is precisely the right 

one. 

And finally, to make this work, we have to make sure that we 

link preparedness, response, and remediation together in something that works in an integrated fashion. 

All of those things together, I believe, lead to a proposal and the 

need to try to keep Homeland Security operations and FEMA’s operations linked together inside the Department of Homeland Security. 

There are four reasons for that, and let me try to summarize 

those briefly. First is that we know we have problems. But I think 

any careful look would reveal that the problem is not structural. 

As Admiral Allen has just testified, the Coast Guard behaved superbly in the context of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, but 

did it because they were part of Homeland Security. If you look at 

FEMA’s response in the past, there have been serious difficulties 

with Hurricane Andrew in 1992, with the TOP–OFF 2000 exercise 

that showed difficulties in getting clarity of command, problems 

getting communication, difficulties of coordination with State and 

local officials. So that the structure itself does not seem to be connected with the results. 

What is connected with the results is the quality of the leadership that had been brought to the table. 

What we need to make sure is that we do not inadvertently, in 

response to last year’s clear and demonstrable problems, end up 

solving the wrong problem, instead of focusing on improving leadership and instead focusing on issues of structure. Structure matters, 

but leadership matters more. And the key is not to create some of 

those issues that now would make things even harder to solve. 

The first principle is that the fundamental problem is not structure. 

The second one is that response to the problems that we face has 

to build on an all-hazards-plus strategy. The easiest way to make 

this point is if you think back to the situation that the firefighters 

faced on the morning of September 11 as they rolled out of their 

stations in Lower Manhattan. All they really knew was they were 

responding to the scene of a very large fire. At the time, in fact, 

they thought it had been caused by the collision of a small plane 

into the World Trade Center. They just knew that they had a very 

large fire to respond to, and they found themselves in the middle 

of the biggest terrorist attack in U.S. history. 

The thing is that all homeland security events, all natural disasters, all terrorist attacks, all begin with the need for local responders to respond. And from the local point of view, there is no artificial distinction between things that are terrorist related, things 

that are based on natural disasters, things that are earthquakes, 

things that are fires, things that may be chemical, biological, or nuclear threats. They all require integrated local response. 

And the primary Federal responsibility has to be to make sure 

that the local response is aided by effective national policy. 

45

So that argues for the all-hazards-plus strategy that the Department has had recommended to it by this Committee and by its report. 

So the second point is that response has to build on the strategy 

for this all-hazards-plus strategy. 

The third piece is that it is clear that some organizational alternatives would make things worse. From the point of view of local 

first responders, there is no artificial distinction between preparedness and response, between remediation and dealing with consequences. Firefighters do what fighters do. Police officers do what 

police officers do. Emergency medical technicians do what they do. 

And it is their job to do what has to be done. 

The worst thing that could happen in the middle of a crisis is to 

say, OK, now all of the people that you dealt with in terms of preparedness now have to hand you off to people who are dealing with 

issues of response. For the people on the front lines, there is no distinction of that sort. And we owe it to them, more than anything 

else, to make sure that they can do their job effectively and do it 

well. 

And that argues for a need for linking preparedness with response, remediation with an effort to try to deal with consequences, 

to try to make sure that we have a seamless national strategy to 

make possible a seamless local response. What we discovered, unfortunately, in the case of Hurricane Katrina is that we had neither. It is our primary obligation to learn those lessons from New 

Orleans and from the Gulf to ensure that, in fact, we do not repeat 

those problems. 

So the third lesson is that it is clear that some organizational 

strategies would make things worse. And that would be a strategy 

that put back in the stovepipes that we have been trying so hard 

to break down. And that is what we owe local first responders. 

The fourth lesson is that leadership really matters most. What 

most of FEMA does most of the time is not exercise command authority. It is not a matter of command and control. Most of what 

FEMA does when FEMA does what it does well, and what the 

Coast Guard has done in doing what it has done so effectively, is 

to build partnerships. 

I think one of the things that Admiral Allen just testified to is 

something that bears repeating, which is that it is not really an 

issue of providing unity of command as much as it is unity of effort. 

What we need ultimately is unity in effectiveness as well. It is 

making sure that we have the different parts of the system that 

connect together that is FEMA’s foremost responsibility. 

What worries me about some of the proposals that have surfaced 

about bringing FEMA out of the Department of Homeland Security 

is that it is, in my mind, a misdiagnosis of the fundamental problem. We have issues that we need to solve. But if we focus on structure as the solution, we will miss the fact that the most important 

lesson that we draw from Hurricane Katrina and from the successes in Hurricane Katrina is that success comes from effective 

leadership. And focusing instead on structure, and trying to restructure to solve the problems, means that we risk making leadership harder, and it means we missed the possibility of truly understanding what the problems and the solutions are. 

46

1The prepared statement of Mr. Harrald appears in the Appendix on page 93. 

To be an effective FEMA Director, I think what we really need 

is somebody who sees their job as the conductor of a well-tuned orchestra. What we saw instead, in the aftermath of Hurricane 

Katrina, was an unseemly fight for the baton, a kind of battle over 

control. And we missed, and we risk continuing to miss, the important lesson that Hurricane Katrina has taught us, which is the importance of trying to ensure that we have that finely tuned orchestra and a orchestra conductor who can come to the head—sometimes, whether it is playing Beethoven or playing Bach, we find the 

right way to get this symphony to play the right instruments in the 

right way to create the right music when the Nation most needs 

it. 

I fear that moving FEMA again will risk distracting us from this 

most important lesson and that, in the end, we will miss the lesson 

that it is leadership that matters most. 

In conclusion, Madam Chairman, it seems to me that what we 

really need to understand is that FEMA does not need so much to 

be restructured as to be reimagined and to be focused with a strategy that puts leadership at its core, to make it a lively cutting edge 

organization that will make it key to the strategies and the solutions and the approaches that the country most needs to follow. 

It is true that some of this we could do if FEMA were removed. 

But it is unquestioned in my mind that all of this needs to be done 

and could be done much more and should be done much more effectively with FEMA included in the Department of Homeland Security. 

The reasons are that the problems are not fundamentally structural. They are based on issues of leadership. Restructuring cannot 

ensure leadership and in some ways could make things worse. The 

solution really lies in creating strong and effective leadership with 

an all-hazards-plus mission that links together preparedness, response, and remediation. It is creating that seamless piece of Federal strategy to ensure that ultimately what works most is making 

sure that FEMA and its strategies work on the ground where it 

matters most, where first responders need to respond, that lies at 

the core of what it is that has happened. 

So what we really need to do, I think, is to make sure that we 

keep FEMA in Homeland Security and integrate it more carefully, 

as the Coast Guard has proven can be done, into the Nation’s central homeland security strategies. 

That, Madam Chairman, I believe is the central lesson that Hurricane Katrina has so painfully taught us. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Dr. Harrald. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN R. HARRALD, PH.D.,1 DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR CRISIS, DISASTER, AND RISK MANAGEMENT, THE 

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. HARRALD. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, and distinguished Members of the Committee, for the opportunity to testify on how to best structure national emergency management resources. 

47

Your report ‘‘Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared’’ provides, I believe, well reasoned recommendations for revitalizing national emergency management on an all-hazards basis that should 

be seriously considered by both Congress and the Administration. 

Hurricane Katrina was the first test of the reconstruction of 

emergency management as a component of a homeland securitycentered national response system. Hurricane Katrina obviously, as 

we have discussed, exposed shortcomings across all phases of emergency management. As Karl Weick from Michigan State has observed, ‘‘reality is a cruel auditor.’’

The United States continues to be vulnerable to extreme events 

with potentially catastrophic consequences. Nature will not rest 

after Hurricane Katrina, nor did terrorists stop their planning after 

the September 11 attacks. Our society and economy must able to 

withstand and adapt to these extreme events and to continue to 

thrive at all levels of government. 

Form follows function, so we must first ask what we expect the 

Federal Government to do? The post-Katrina reports from this 

Committee, from the House Select Committee, the White House, 

the Government Accountability Office, and the Department of 

Homeland Security Inspector General collectively contained 321 

recommendations, providing some insight into these expectations. 

We certainly expect Federal leadership and coordination to produce 

an effective national emergency management network of organizations, led by DHS, capable of reducing vulnerability and managing 

the response to and recovery from potentially catastrophic events 

of all types. 

However, as William Jenkins of the Government Accountability 

Office notes, no matter how we organize, the Department of Homeland Security controls only a portion of the resources needed to succeed in this task. 

Coordination and networking, not command and control, are the 

essence of emergency management. DHS must coordinate the actions of other Federal departments, State and local governments, 

non-governmental non-profits, and private sector organizations. 

Coordination is one critical success factor. The others are capacity, capability, and competence. 

The current debate is framed in terms of organizational solutions. Should emergency management responsibilities remain in 

DHS? Or should an independent FEMA be created? If emergency 

management remains in DHS, are the changes proposed in Secretary Chertoff’s Second Stage Review and the ongoing postKatrina revisions to the National Response Plan and NIMS adequate? Or is more radical restructuring required? 

How extensive an emergency management role should we assign 

to DOD? 

I believe, as has been stated, that depending on the leadership 

and resources provided, any alternative could conceptually work or 

without the leadership and resources could also fail. 

I believe that the organizational proposal made by your Committee is superior to other alternatives for the following reasons: 

The DHS Second Stage Review reorganization does not restore 

comprehensive all-hazard emergency management within DHS and 

in my opinion will exacerbate some of the problems we witnessed 

48

in the Hurricane Katrina response. This element of the reorganization has been opposed by the National Emergency Management Association because it separates preparedness from response and recovery, creating a disconnect for the States. 

Under this plan, FEMA will be reduced to a response organization, competing with preparedness for a budget. 

More importantly, the proposed structure will constrain vital 

feedback between response and recovery results and the mitigation 

and preparedness programs, damaging our ability to learn from the 

experience and to reduce the impact of future disasters. 

As has been stated by others, FEMA cannot be recreated as an 

independent agency without a difficult organizational transition period and a rewriting of doctrine and redesign of systems that we 

can ill-afford. Natural hazards and terrorists are simply not going 

to wait for us to reorganize yet again. 

Emergency management at the Federal level has been absorbed 

in concept and in doctrine within Homeland Security. FEMA as an 

independent agency ceased to exist when DHS was formed and the 

Secretary was designated by law as the Primary Federal Official 

for all incidents of national significance. The FEMA name was retained largely to preserve internal morale and to capitalize on the 

Agency’s good public image. 

Functions performed by the formerly independent agency have 

been consolidated and somewhat distributed in DHS. The removal 

of FEMA from DHS will seriously disrupt the Department, removing the consequence management portion of its comprehensive risk 

management responsibilities, as Secretary Chertoff stated. 

An independent FEMA will remain a small agency that will be 

overwhelmed by a Hurricane-Katrina-scale event. It has been constrained in capacity and capability both as an independent agency 

and now as a member of DHS. 

I and other academics were frequently interviewed by the media 

in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina about FEMA’s performance. 

I made a practice of asking my interviewer how many people he or 

she believed actually worked for FEMA. The smallest answer I got 

was 10,000 people. The more typical response I got was between 

100,000 and 150,000 people. All were shocked when I informed 

them that the FEMA staff was less than 2,000 people. 

The creation of DHS was supposed to dramatically expand the 

pool of skilled personnel available as a surge capacity for emergency management. Hurricane Katrina showed that it does not yet 

work that way, but the potential is there and is seriously needed 

and is recognized in both the Second Stage Review and your Committee’s report. 

At this point I would add some comments based on my Coast 

Guard background, since that has been asked, why did the Coast 

Guard work and why not? One of my experiences was command of 

the Connecticut Region Group Long Island Sound for 3 years, living in New Haven. 

This was not the first response during which the Coast Guard 

had this agility and discipline. The Mariel boat lift, the September 

11 response, as you said. The leadership at the top levels, as we 

saw with Admiral Allen and with Admiral Collins, was certainly 

exemplary. But in my opinion, the decentralized local-based leaderVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 Sep 21, 2007 Jkt 029502 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\29502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
49

ship, the competence at the bottom levels, the bottoms up where 

it is just as key. And the organizational culture that is based on 

the delivery of services, the focus on mission, and the preparedness 

at the local level is very critical. 

The result is an organization, I think, the model that the Coast 

Guard has is the discipline and structure, which is doctrine and 

structure, but also the agility, which is a very decentralized organization. The people live there, they work there, and they live in the 

community. When I was in the command, I lived in New Haven. 

I knew the mayor. I knew the people. I worked with them on a dayto-day basis. 

When you fly in during an extreme event then you do not know 

who the local folks are. So that model, I think, of both agility and 

discipline is critical. 

In conclusion, getting the structure right will not be easy. It is 

only the first step in solving the problems identified in the postKatrina evaluation. 

The 9/11 Commission termed the failure to anticipate and deter 

the terrorist threat a failure of imagination. The House Select 

Committee called the inept response to Hurricane Katrina a failure 

of initiative. 

We now know about the potential catastrophic consequences 

from the threats and hazards facing our Nation. We also know 

what must be done to mitigate, to prepare for, to respond to, and 

to recover from extreme events. 

Failure to successfully reduce these potential future catastrophic 

consequences would, in my opinion, be viewed by history as a failure of intent. We must get it right this time. 

I thank the Committee for the opportunity to testify. And more 

importantly, I thank you for focusing the public discourse on issues 

critical to our Nation’s survival. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, Dr. Harrald. 

Your comments about your Coast Guard experience were very illuminating. 

As part of our report, we have proposed regional offices for DHS 

that would include strike teams that would be made up of all the 

Federal agencies that would be involved in a response and would 

train with State and local emergency managers. This has been an 

overlooked recommendation in our report, but I think it is our second most important recommendation. And I think your experience 

indicates why. 

Could you expand on the importance of having people who are 

familiar with the geography, and the public officials, and the emergency managers? 

Mr. HARRALD. Absolutely. I have known Admiral Allen for many 

years obviously, and I was watching television, as we all were. It 

did not surprise me that the very first thing that Admiral Allen did 

was lock himself in the room with the parish presidents, the equivalent of the county executives. And I have not talked to him, but 

I know exactly what he said. It is the same thing that I said when 

I took over my captain of the port zone and met with the local executives, not in an extreme event, and just asked them what is the 

problem, what are their needs? And by the time he left that room, 

he had a group of people who were clearly on his side. 

50

It is not just meeting people. It is listening to them. The people 

who know what is going on in the local area are the local officials, 

the people who live there, the people who are working within the 

systems. And that is absolutely a critical recommendation in your 

report. 

Chairman COLLINS. Dr. Kettl, you have written some very interesting articles in which you said that ‘‘the debate since Hurricane 

Katrina has confused the inescapable need for a unified command, 

ensuring that key decisionmakers are all on the same page, with 

the chain of command, the vertical links among decisionmakers, 

from top to bottom of the system.’’ And I want to explore that issue 

with you. 

Our current system for emergency preparedness and response is 

a bottom-up system. It relies on the local level first, then the State, 

then the Federal level, if needed. But we saw in Hurricane Katrina 

that the State and local levels were completely overwhelmed very 

quickly by the magnitude of the catastrophe and a failure to exercise good leadership and planning. 

What kind of structure should we put in place to deal with catastrophes that we know are going to be far beyond the capacity of 

State and local governments? 

Mr. KETTL. A couple of points on that, Madam Chairman. The 

first point is that there is no structure that we can possibly draw 

that will put the lines around the problems we are likely to face. 

That is why the problem, in the end, cannot fundamentally be a 

structural one. It has to be a relationship one. 

There is one quick story that is worth remembering. One of the 

reasons why the response at the Pentagon on the morning of September 11 was so effective, Federal, State, and local officials all 

working together, was that they had a drill the preceeding Sunday. 

They knew each other on a first name basis, and what they had 

practiced on Sunday they did for real on Tuesday. It is those preexisting relationships that are crucial. 

The second is that the Federal agencies who were involved had 

a sense of the operational realities because they had trained with 

these people in advance. They had the preparedness and the response pieces already worked out because they had the relationships already worked out and they understood the relationships between those. 

So what we need is an approach on the part of FEMA that understands that it cannot control the problem, that its job is to try 

to orchestrate a response, that it needs to understand that sometimes it will need the Department of Transportation, sometimes it 

will need the Department of Health and Human Services, sometimes it will be a Centers for Disease Control enterprise, and sometimes it will be something that may be primarily air or water or 

transportation-based. And it needs to find that right collection of 

Federal resources it can bring into place and do it in a way that 

has operational awareness. 

What FEMA missed was a sense of the horizontal connections 

among those agencies and a sense of the operational awareness on 

the ground. So it is little wonder those connections never quite 

happened. It is the matter of creating and sustaining those relationships that is absolutely critical. 

51

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I would like to, in my final question, ask both of you about a controversial issue in the chain of command. And this has to do with 

to whom should the FEMA Director report. There are those who 

argue that unless the FEMA Director always reports at all times 

directly to the President of the United States, that individual is 

never going to have the clout and the context necessary to respond 

effectively in a disaster. 

There are those, like Secretary Chertoff, who argue that if you 

allow a second person in the Department to report to the President, 

you confuse the chain of command. 

Our report takes a hybrid approach. I am not sure it is the perfect answer, and that is why I want to ask both of you to give us 

your best judgment. What we have said is that the FEMA Director 

should be elevated in the Department to the level of a deputy secretary and that he or she should report to the Secretary. 

But in times of catastrophe, when there is an incident of national 

significance, the Director would report directly to the President of 

the United States, as well as to the Secretary. 

In addition, we have proposed that the FEMA Director be the 

President’s principal adviser on emergency management issues. 

What is your advice to us on the reporting structure? I hate using 

the word structure because I agree with you, leadership is more 

important than structure. But we do need to establish what the 

chain of command is going to be. 

Mr. KETTL. I think that is exactly right, Madam Chairman. 

There are two points, two principles that I think help to answer it. 

One is that on matters of major national significance, the President 

ultimately has responsibility for ensuring that the response is adequate, and he is going to want to make sure that happens. And so, 

a direct relationship between him and the Director of FEMA is 

going to be essential. 

But on the other hand, in both day-to-day preparedness but also 

on an ongoing basis in ensuring these horizontal relationships 

work, it is critical that FEMA be integrated with the rest of the 

Department of Homeland Security’s operations. 

So while it runs the risk of potentially creating some confusion, 

I actually believe that the hybrid approach is the most sensible one 

because it is the only one that I can imagine that captures both of 

those fundamental realities. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Dr. Harrald. 

Mr. HARRALD. I think the Nation’s senior emergency management should be at least at the deputy secretary level. Part of the 

issue we saw was the competence, FEMA buried at three levels 

down in DHS, and it was just to many layers to go through. 

Whether that dotted line reporting arrangement in time of crisis 

would work or not, I do not know. Again, the model, the Coast 

Guard has worked as an independent military service reporting 

through a cabinet secretary both in Treasury and in Transportation, now in Homeland Security, with extreme events and others. 

And that seemed to work. 

The problem is I do not think you can expect over the years the 

appointment for the Secretary of Homeland Security with the broad 

range that he or she has to have that—you are not always going 

52

to pick an emergency manager, obviously, for the Secretary. So you 

need that expertise at their hip. 

So that part I would strongly endorse. The dotted line, I do not 

know. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I would say to my colleagues that you just witnessed a rare moment in a Congressional hearing where a Senator asked a question 

not knowing what the answer was going to be, but really trying to 

elicit the judgment of our expert witnesses. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman, you continue to 

be an inspiration, even if you violate the rules that I was taught 

at law school. But that was a very constructive exchange. 

Thanks to both of you for your help here today as we try to improve our national emergency preparedness and management capacity. 

I want to ask you both first to comment briefly on the question 

that I asked Admiral Allen at the end, which is one of the 

strengths of the Coast Guard in crisis seems to be its capacity to 

act of its own initiative, not as a rogue agency but obviously within 

stated authority. 

And one of the questions I think we have to ask about FEMA, 

or a successor to FEMA, is whether it should be more clearly given 

that authority, particularly in a catastrophic, as opposed to disastrous, circumstance, considering Hurricane Katrina to be a catastrophe. Do you have a thought about that, Dr. Kettl and Dr. 

Harrald? 

Mr. KETTL. Senator Lieberman, I think one of the things we discovered in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina is we need to have 

the opportunity for stronger Federal authority to assert itself. One 

of the things that I have heard people on the ground describe is 

that what happened was a kind of decapitation of government in 

Louisiana for some time. And the consequences were catastrophic. 

We have principles of federalism that are important, and we 

need to preserve the need to establish and continue local self-government. On the other hand, we cannot allow our citizens ultimately to be put at risk as a result of that. 

So what we need to do, and ultimately this has to be a presidential decision, is to build the capacity for the Federal Government to step in when necessary to provide the kind of emergency 

services that may regretfully be required some time in the future. 

I do not think we want to discover that lesson the hard way a second time. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Dr. Harrald, if I recall, before you actually 

answer the first question, you said to us during our investigation 

that in your opinion FEMA, even at its best, never really had the 

capacity to handle a catastrophe. 

Mr. HARRALD. No, it did not. It had a high degree of competence, 

and I think its major successes in the 1990s were actually in preparedness and mitigation, the very part that we are trying to separate out. 

If you compare probably the biggest event of the 1990s, which 

was the Northridge earthquake, to Hurricane Katrina, there is no 

comparison. You are in a State that was not only not overwhelmed, 

53

but was clearly, California and Los Angeles, city and county, probably the most prepared, equipped, and funded for the earthquake 

threat. 

So FEMA came in in the true support role that it was designed 

to do. 

The size of the Agency, without being able to quickly support and 

gather support from the rest of the government, was very constrained at that point and remains so. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Then I will ask you to respond to my question about whether we should be giving FEMA clear authority to 

act independently in a disaster or catastrophe? 

Mr. HARRALD. I think the bottom line difference between the way 

the Coast Guard is structured, and believe me, the Coast Guard 

can be as bureaucratic as any organization I’ve known, having 

lived through that part of it, too, but in times of operational mission, can operate very agilely and very flexibly. 

Hurricane Katrina showed that basically if you are trying to run 

an operational organization that is Washington-centric and bureaucratically structured, you are pretty much doomed from the get go. 

The one thing that we can say, whatever the next event is, it is 

going to be one that we did not anticipate and did not expect. So 

what we are doing in our drilling and our preparing is pretty much 

generic preparation. We can run as many scenarios and be as 

smart as we can, but we are going to meet with the unexpected 

when it does occur. 

When you do that, you have to be flexible and agile at where the 

resources are. You have to have full confidence that you can act 

and be backed up and have the ability to do so. 

I think the legislation and the structure and the history of FEMA 

have impeded that process as part of the organizational culture. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that obviously because it supports the position that Chairman Collins and I have taken, that 

you believe FEMA or a successor authority should be within the 

Department of Homeland Security. 

Is it fair to say then that you would say that during the times 

or occasions when FEMA was successful in responding to or preparing for or mitigating a disaster, it had less to do with its independent status than other factors, such as the quality of its leadership? 

Mr. HARRALD. I think it was the quality of leadership and, in 

particular, the contact of that leadership with the State and local 

and regional presence. Part of what FEMA lost as it withdrew into 

DHS was being the primary—well, the funding stream that went 

to the States that made you pay attention to FEMA. But the connection, where both the operational connections and mitigation 

were, was close work with the States and regions and local governments. That is where the disasters happen, that is where the preparedness had been. And I think FEMA had great success moving 

down that road. 

Mr. KETTL. One example of that, Senator Lieberman, is that one 

of the great successes in the 1990s was FEMA’s effort to reduce the 

damage from hurricanes. One of the ways in which they did that 

is they worked with local builders and local governments to improve building codes and construction standards. Among other 

54

things, they created incentives for builders to put steel bands to 

keep roofs from blowing off on the not surprising discovery that it 

is a lot cheaper to do that in advance than to try to replace houses 

after the roofs blow off and the homes are ruined. 

So one of the things that FEMA did is they understood a kind 

of seamless link between remediation and preparedness and response. The way to do that was to build partnerships between the 

Federal Government, the State Government, the local governments, 

the private sector, and the nonprofit sector. They saw it as a 

bridge-building piece, which meant that when things happened, 

they had pre-existing relationships. So where it worked best it 

worked because they had worked in advance on remediation when 

they had to come in and try to solve some of the problems, they 

already had the existing relationships. 

One other quick story. I was talking to one local government official in Wisconsin once, who was talking about some of the exercises 

that were done. One of the things that she said was most useful 

in that was in the course of one of the exercises she had learned 

the cell phone number of the local FBI agent. Which meant two 

things. One, when something happened, she would know how to get 

hold of the FBI agent. The second thing, when something happened, he would take her call because they already had the relationship. It is that piece that, in some ways, we have lost along the 

way and is the key to restoring FEMA’s success. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. My time is up. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Warner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

First I would say, as I look over your distinguished dossiers and 

the work to which you have devoted yourself by way of a career, 

we are fortunate, as a country, that people of your capacity and intellect are undertaking to render services in this area. It is very encouraging. 

Madam Chairman and my distinguished friend, the Ranking 

Member, I followed this hearing today. I have had our own committee hearing earlier this morning. But I want to say that I basically support the approaches Secretary Chertoff has with regard to 

his concept of how his Department should be organized and with 

regard to the integration of FEMA. 

And on the question of the dotted line, again I guess that drawing on my own inclination to pattern so many things after the military, I worry that in a time of national significance here—that was 

the term you used, and we ought to get a little better definition of 

when is it the triggering mechanism starts here. Is that possible, 

if I can digress from my question a minute? 

Who quantifies the catastrophe and rates it as one that triggers 

the necessary sequence of events within the Department of Homeland Security? 

Mr. HARRALD. The Secretary. 

Mr. KETTL. The Secretary has to, and I think, Senator Warner, 

you have identified, quite apart from the dotted line question, the 

single most important question. And it is one that not only is imVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 Sep 21, 2007 Jkt 029502 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\29502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
55

portant operationally, but it is important constitutionally. It is as 

essential as anything goes. 

But it is one of those things where I think we have in advance 

to recognize that at some point we will recognize that a line has 

been crossed. When that line has been crossed, we owe it to the 

American people to ensure that government provides as effective a 

response as possible. And then in the end, we make the problem 

drive things. 

But that is why it is important to have the debate and the discussion in advance and not, on the one hand, have the government 

step in too soon and run the risk that it treads on the principles 

of federalism or, on the other hand, delay in response and run the 

risk that people unnecessarily suffer. 

Senator WARNER. Does the current status of the law clearly provide for the criteria to make that decision? If not, should we try 

to correct it? 

I am asking both of you. 

Mr. HARRALD. There are specifics on government being overwhelmed, and how clear that is and whether how much wiggle 

room there would be from one administration to another, I think 

there is room for different definitions. And people would disagree 

on specific points. I am not sure that is entirely bad. I think it is 

a decision that has to be made and be made transparently. 

Senator WARNER. But with the swiftness of these national disasters, of course we also have the problem of the misfortune of, let 

us say, a weapon of mass destruction being released in one of our 

communities, we cannot all suddenly sit around a roundtable and 

decide now is this a national disaster to trigger Uncle Sam? 

Mr. KETTL. This is not a good time, Senator, to have a new Constitutional Convention. 

Senator WARNER. No, it is not. 

So I am wondering if we should not examine the law to make 

sure there is clarity that someone can make that decision and 

make it swiftly, and then set into motion the participation by the 

Federal sector in support of the State. 

Mr. KETTL. I think that makes sense, Senator, and there are a 

couple of things here. 

Senator WARNER. It makes sense but is it in law? It is one thing 

for a Senator to pop up in a hearing. 

Mr. KETTL. I think it is something that we need to think much 

more carefully about and perhaps look at the law, in part to make 

sure that we have addressed the question in advance, that we 

maintain the premise of State and local government rule wherever 

possible, understand that at some point we may need national action and establish these criteria as clearly as possible so that when 

we enter in we are not, in some ways, signaling that we are shifting forever the balance of power. And that ultimately, we put the 

interest of citizens at the core. 

Because the primary principle is the safety and well-being of citizens and not the principle of separation of powers and not the principles of federalism. 

Senator WARNER. If I might yield to the distinguished Chairman 

and Ranking Member, is this a matter that I can, or you as Chairman, might wish to elicit from this panel further comments on this 

56

point? And then we will address, and perhaps your staff, your able 

staff, can look at this issue. 

We do not want to face a problem and be sitting around trying 

to figure out when we act and when we do not act and who has 

that authority. 

Chairman COLLINS. We would certainly welcome your input, as 

well as our two expert witnesses on this issue. It is an issue that 

we talked about at some length in our report and the delay in the 

Secretary’s designation and whether that had implications for the 

response. 

Mr. HARRALD. I would like just one comment on that, going back 

to Senator Lieberman’s point. I think there are some things that 

are going to be clearly an incident of national significance. But 

there are others where the government is not overwhelmed. And 

the gray area between a reactive response and a total Federal response, where you are really providing unusual responses and unusual Federal assistance, removing the barriers to DHS and FEMA 

to be responsive and reactive in the absence of specific State and 

local requests, even lacking a declaration, is a piece that needs to 

be—it is not going to always be clear. 

Senator WARNER. Please give us your best advice. My time is almost up. 

On the question of the dotted line reporting, I think at this point 

in time I feel very strongly that all communications should go 

through the head of the Department of Homeland Security, currently Secretary Chertoff. And that you could have problems if you 

have got a collateral chain and he is not fully aware of what is 

being transmitted back and forth in that chain because he may 

well be directing other aspects of the Department, which are providing clear and important support to this crisis. And you do not 

want a clash of efforts that could cancel each other out or otherwise 

be redundant, or whatever. 

So we will work on that, but I wanted to identify myself there. 

Last, in a time of crisis, does Secretary Chertoff and his FEMA 

Director have the sufficient legal authority to order from the other 

departments and agencies the help that they need? 

Mr. HARRALD. The mission assignments? Yes, sir, they do. 

Senator WARNER. The mission assignments. 

Mr. HARRALD. Yes. 

Senator WARNER. You think it is sufficient? 

Mr. HARRALD. I think it is sufficiently clear. I do not see any resistance in the will to do those. It has been resource constrained 

and process constrained, but not authority constrained. 

Senator WARNER. If you are satisfied, I am going to yield to that. 

That might include the Secretary of Defense? 

Mr. HARRALD. Absolutely. 

Senator WARNER. I have served with about 10 of these individuals through my lifetime, and they are all a little bit different. I 

would like to be an observer as to someone calling them up and 

telling them I want 5,000 troops tomorrow morning, and here they 

are. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

57

There are lots of questions that evolve as the presentation goes 

on, and we thank you for being here with your considerable credentials. But obviously with that kind of a comment, you always find 

out what is the difference between what you think and I think at 

the moment. 

I, frankly, think that FEMA ought to be an independent agency 

with the same latitude. Perhaps it can be done in DHS. But when 

I look at DHS and I see the complications of the different services 

that it is responsible for, screening baggage and intelligence and all 

kinds of things, it is very hard to imagine lots of companies. I come 

out of the business world, and lots of companies deliberately try to 

siphon off sections so that they can have a degree of independence 

that always seems to bring out the best. 

That is where leadership counts. Dr. Kettl, you talked about that 

it is personnel or people that make the difference and not structure. But structure cannot be ignored. You cannot do it—on the 

basketball team, no matter how good the principal shooter is, if 

they do not know where they go on defense, they are in trouble. 

Dr. Kettl, in 2005, you wrote your report, ‘‘The Worst Is Yet To 

Come.’’ You said then, and I assume there has been a change of 

mind, if not a change of heart, that now structure matters not as 

much as leadership. It now seems clear that it was a mistake to 

move FEMA to the Department of Homeland Security, identifying 

something we talked about earlier, terrorist attacks are one thing, 

and natural disasters are quite something else. 

Does that contradict something you are saying today? Or did you 

have a change of mind? 

Mr. KETTL. What has happened, Senator, two things. One is that 

the investigations and the studies that all of us have done and 

what it is that happened, what worked and what did not work, has 

I think taught some important lessons. 

The second thing is the ability to be able to circle back and try 

to make sure that we focus on the main mission. Actually, I also 

gave an interview back when the Department was being created. 

I said it is conceivable at some point that we may face a major 

event like a hurricane that might conceivably swamp the ability of 

FEMA to be able to respond. 

My concern all along has been trying to figure how to structure 

the organization best to try to deal with its mission. And it has become increasingly clear to me that what we most need to do are 

two things. One is to avoid doing things that get in the way. That 

includes further restructurings and also things that get in the way 

of leadership and things that would most promote the connections 

among the pieces. 

What would concern me would be a FEMA disconnected from 

preparedness, from response, from the other things that are going 

on in homeland security. And what concerned me most about the 

way in which FEMA was operating within the Department of 

Homeland Security is that those connections were not being made. 

What I find most reassuring about the Committee’s recommendation is it finds ways to link those pieces up. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Dr. Harrald, you said, in March 2006, recognize that we are no better prepared to deal with a catastrophic 

event today than we were last August. 

58

So I wonder, what did we learn? DHS began operating in 2003. 

It is now in its third year. Have we learned nothing in all of that 

time? 

And I would ask for quick responses because I am conscious of 

the time and the vote. 

Mr. HARRALD. I think, yes, we have learned. And I think Hurricane Katrina has been the big lesson learned, and a lot is obviously 

being digested by your Committee and others. 

I think the issue of DHS really relegating the natural hazard 

preparedness and response to natural hazards is really internally 

a secondary role to the terrorism issue, combined with the structural way that FEMA was integrated into DHS, not as an independent agency as the Coast Guard was or Secret Service, but into 

a directorate and essentially put all of the resources for FEMA up 

for grabs bureaucratically, very internalized. 

And so, how it was done was as much of a problem as what was 

done. And I think a path out of that is necessary, and I think the 

Committee has provided that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Let me ask you a question that is a little 

far afield, but I think very directly related. The use of intelligence 

by DHS, by military organizations, is a critical factor. Now we are 

talking about fixing things after the breakage has begun. 

What about the question of where we are with our environmental 

concerns? Where are we in terms of—we are certainly seeing worse 

by way of storms, rainfall, differences in weather. Well, does that 

compare to the intelligence assignment that you have in the military engagement? Or do we go merrily along blasting pollution in 

the air that is ultimately going to disturb the waters and create 

more vicious hurricanes, etc.? 

Mr. HARRALD. Actually, I think this is one of the arguments that 

I would make for having FEMA or emergency management within 

DHS. FEMA as a stand-alone agency had no research capability 

and only very limited research ties to other agencies. DHS is building quite a robust research capability, which would tie in with and 

is tying in with the national labs, university research centers, people who are doing environmental research and others. 

Now has that research within DHS been linked to FEMA? Probably not. Is that a potential? Yes. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We all work for the same company; right? 

And the fact is that the company has a responsibility to supply us 

with as much information, product, etc., as we do. And I stare in 

amazement at the reports that we get about the worsening of our 

environment, about the raising of the temperatures, the raising of 

the sea level, and things that forecast gloom and disaster for the 

Navy to prepare for in the second half of this century, for everybody else. 

But we are going along, and we say well, OK, so we need some 

more of this, some more levees, some more of that. 

When do we step in and say hey, the patient’s developing a temperature? And it seems to be on a constant rise. At what point do 

we use some medicine or some therapy to make the patient better? 

Mr. KETTL. Senator, if I could respond in two ways. First, I think 

that is a terrific set of questions, which then frames a second issue, 

59

which is that the thing that concerns me most is our ability to respond to the thing that we have not thought of. 

One of the things that is fascinating, if you look at the morning 

of September 11 is there were some responses that were not so 

good. There were some responses that were really excellent. And 

what separated the two was not that one set of people imagined 

the possibility of using large airplanes as weapons of mass destruction, but that some groups had developed effective integrated 

teams prepared to respond to a wide range of threats, some of 

which they had never anticipated. 

What we need to do is to use some of what you have suggested 

as a way to imagine some of the threats we may need to be concerned about. 

But the more that we press in that direction, the more we need 

to build the capacity for a wide range of things, including the capacity to respond to threats that may not be Hurricane Katrina, 

may not be September 11, but may be something we have yet to 

be concerned about, to think through. 

And that is what argues, I think, most for this integration of 

strategies with some heavy Department of Homeland Security strategic thinking, but also the ability to integrate response and remediation. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. You do not want to put the National 

Science Foundation in DHS? 

Mr. KETTL. No, but I sure hope they are reading the reports. 

Mr. HARRALD. But they should be closely linked. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

We have a vote on, so I am going to adjourn the hearing. 

I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony. Your expertise 

is very helpful to the Committee as we grapple with these issues. 

Thank you very much for participating today. 

The hearing record will be held open for 15 days for the submission of questions and other additional materials. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Just a very strong personal thank you to 

both of you. You are a national resource and a great resource to 

this Committee. Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

This hearing is now adjourned. I want to thank the staff for their 

hard work, as well. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 1:09 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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