United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 07-2662

ORLANDO RODRÍGUEZ,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Lipez, and Howard,

Circuit Judges.

Peter John Porrata, with whom Law Offices of Peter John

Porrata, was on brief for appellant.

Antonio Gnocchi-Franco, with whom Gnocchi Franco Law Offices,

Larry M. Roth, and Law Office of Larry M. Roth, P.A., were on brief

for appellee.

June 22, 2009
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff, Orlando Rodríguez

("Rodríguez") brought this diversity action against Suzuki Motor

Corporation ("Suzuki") alleging that a manufacturing defect in his

Suzuki motorcycle caused the injuries he sustained in a motorcycle

accident. The United States District Court for the District of

Puerto Rico granted Suzuki's motion for summary judgment on the

ground that the complaint was barred by the applicable one-year

statute of limitations. Rodríguez appeals the dismissal on the

theory that under Puerto Rico law, his previously filed complaint

against other entities that were jointly and severally liable with

Suzuki tolled the statute of limitations for the instant action

against Suzuki. After careful consideration, we reverse.

I. Background

As this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we

"view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party

and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the same." Chadwick

v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2009).

This action arises out of an accident that occurred on

June 22, 2001. On that day, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Rodríguez

was driving his Suzuki GSX/1300R motorcycle along Las Américas

Express Road in Puerto Rico, when he started to experience a

shaking on the front fork of the motorcycle, the handlebars, and

grips. Suddenly, he fell off the motorcycle on to the road.

Rodríguez alleges that he was surprised as there was no reason for
 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1) (providing that an individual in a 1

foreign country may be served "by any internationally agreed means

of service . . . such as those authorized by the Hague Convention

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the fall to have occurred. When he looked at the motorcycle, he

noticed that the frame had split in half and separated the front

fork from the rest of the frame. Rodríguez alleges that as a

result of this motorcycle accident he suffered various injuries.

On June 20, 2002, Rodríguez, who was at that time a

citizen of Florida, filed a complaint in the United States District

Court for the District of Puerto Rico (the "2002 Action") against

the retail seller of the Suzuki motorcycle, Rainbow Motors Inc.

("Rainbow"), a Puerto Rico corporation. Rodríguez amended the

complaint on October 16, 2002 to include the distributor of the

motorcycle, Panorama Motors Inc. ("Panorama"), also a Puerto Rico

corporation. In his complaint, Rodríguez alleged that the injuries

he sustained were a direct and proximate result of the motorcycle's

defective design, a manufacturing defect, defendants' negligent

marketing, and defendants' failure to adequately warn. Rodríguez's

complaint in the 2002 Action did not name the manufacturer of the

motorcycle, Suzuki, as a defendant.

On March 7, 2003, Rainbow moved to file a third-party

complaint against Suzuki, a Japanese corporation. Because Suzuki

is a foreign corporation, Rainbow was required to follow the

procedures established for service under the Hague Convention and

these requirements caused some delay. On March 19, 2003 Rainbow 1
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents");

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2) (providing that a corporation outside the

United States must be served in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f)

for serving an individual).

 Rodríguez admits that he chose not to include Rainbow and 2

Panorama in the 2004 Action in an effort to preserve federal

diversity jurisdiction. At the time Rodríguez filed the 2004

Action, his residence had changed to Puerto Rico.

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filed a motion to stay the litigation until Suzuki was joined as a

party. On March 25, 2003, the district court denied this motion.

On June 4, 2003, Rainbow moved to voluntarily dismiss, without

prejudice, its third-party complaint against Suzuki. The court

granted this motion. On November 10, 2003, Rodríguez moved to

voluntarily dismiss the 2002 Action without prejudice. The court

granted this motion as well.

On May 10, 2004, Rodríguez commenced a new action in the

federal district court by filing a complaint against Suzuki (the

"2004 Action"). The 2004 Action did not name Rainbow or Panorama

as defendants. On February 9, 2005, the court dismissed the 2004 2

Action without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) because,

despite various extensions, Rodríguez had not completed service of

process against Suzuki.

On February 6, 2006, Rodríguez, again in the federal

district court, filed a new action against Suzuki (the "2006

Action"), from which this appeal arises. As was the case with the

2004 Action, Rainbow and Panorama were not named as defendants in

the 2006 Action. Suzuki moved for summary judgment on the ground
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that Rodríguez had failed to file his suit within the applicable

one-year statute of limitations for tort actions under Puerto Rico

law. Rodríguez opposed summary judgment, relying on Puerto Rico's

"solidarity doctrine" to argue that his 2002 Action against

Panorama and Rainbow, with whom Suzuki was jointly and severally

liable, tolled the statute of limitations with respect to the

later-filed actions against Suzuki. The district court granted

Suzuki's motion for summary judgment. Rodríguez v. Suzuki Motor

Corp., No. 06-1144, slip op. (D.P.R. Aug. 29, 2007) (opinion and

order granting summary judgment).

The district court held that Rodríguez failed to bring

his suit within the applicable one-year prescriptive period from

the date that he was put on notice of his injury, the

manufacturer's defect, and the manufacturer's identity. Id. at *7.

The district court further held that the 2002 Action did not toll

or reset the statute of limitations with respect to Rodríguez's

claims against Suzuki. Id. at *11. Finding that solidarity

existed between Suzuki, Rainbow and Panorama, the court noted that

"[i]nasmuch as the 2002 Action was timely filed," the solidarity

doctrine would have allowed Rodríguez to amend his 2002 complaint

to add Suzuki, but "[Rodríguez] made an affirmative decision not to

do this." Id. at *9. Rather, Rodríguez chose to voluntarily

dismiss the 2002 action and then file a subsequent complaint. The

court explained that in order for a prior suit to toll and reset
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the statute of limitations with respect to a subsequent suit,

Puerto Rico law requires "identicality" of claims, relief

requested, and defendants. Id. at *10 (quoting Rodríguez-García v.

Mun. of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 98 (1st Cir. 2004)). Noting that

"Suzuki was not a party to the 2002 Action, and neither Rainbow nor

Panorama were sued in the 2004 Action," the court concluded that

the "2002 Action did not continue to preserve or toll the Statute

of Limitations against [Suzuki] since the 2004 Action was not

identical." Id. at *11. Finding the 2004 Action to be untimely,

it held that "the case at bar [was] likewise untimely." Id.

Rodríguez timely appealed from the district court's grant

of summary judgment in favor of Suzuki.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

"We review the district court's decision to grant

defendant's motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations

grounds de novo, construing the record in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party." Douglas v. York County, 433 F.3d 143,

149 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 15

(1st Cir. 2005)). "We will affirm if, based on our independent

review of the evidentiary record, there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the undisputed facts indicate that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.; see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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"Under the 'Erie Doctrine', federal courts sitting in

diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law."

Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).

In Puerto Rico, the prescription of civil actions is a question of

substantive rather than procedural law. See Rodríguez-Narvaez v.

Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 1990); García-Pérez v.

Corporación de Servicios para la Mujer y la Familia, etc., 174 P.R.

Dec. ----, 2008 TSPR 114, 2008 WL 2717833, at *4 (P.R. June 30,

2008). Thus, as this case comes before us under our diversity

jurisdiction, we must apply Puerto Rico substantive law to resolve

the statute of limitations issue in dispute.

"As a federal court sitting in diversity, our task is to

'interpret and apply as best we can the state rules of decision.'"

Norton v. McOsker, 407 F.3d 501, 506 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Catex

Vitol Gas, Inc. v. Wolfe, 178 F.3d 572, 576 (1st Cir. 1999)). We

rely "on pronouncements of the state supreme court" and "ultimately

'our task is to ascertain the rule the state court would most

likely follow under the circumstances, even if our independent

judgment on the question might differ.'" Id. (quoting Wolfe, 178

F.3d at 576-77).

B. Statute of Limitations

Rodríguez's action was brought under Puerto Rico's tort

statute, Article 1802 of the Civil Code, see P.R. Laws Ann. tit.

31, § 5141, to which a one-year statute of limitations applies.
 The district court found that Rodríguez "had actual notice of 3

the identity of [Suzuki] no later than March 19, 2003," as this was

the day when Rainbow moved to stay the 2002 action until Suzuki

could be joined. See Rodríguez, at *7 n.4. Whichever of these

dates is the actual date of accrual, there is no question that the

2006 Action was filed more than one year thereafter.

-8-

See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2). The statute of limitations

or prescriptive period for such tort actions begins to run "from

the time the aggrieved person has knowledge thereof." P.R. Laws

Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2); see also García-Pérez, 2008 WL 2717833, at

*4 (stating that the statute of limitations starts to run once the

injured party knows both that he has suffered a harm and who is

responsible for it).

Rodríguez does not dispute the applicability of the oneyear prescription period to his action against Suzuki. The

accident giving rise to Rodríguez's injuries undisputedly took

place on June 22, 2001, and Rodríguez makes no contention that the

action accrued at a later date. Nor is there any dispute that the

instant action was filed on February 6, 2006, well past one year

from the accrual of the cause of action. Thus, unless the 3

prescription period was effectively tolled, the instant action is

time-barred. "Although prescription is an affirmative defense,

once it has been raised, the burden of proving that prescription

has been interrupted shifts to the plaintiff." See Tokyo Marine &

Fire Ins. Co. v. Pérez y Cía., 142 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998)

(citing Puerto Rico cases).
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C. Tolling

Rodríguez argues that because the statute of limitations

was "tolled" as a matter of Puerto Rico law by his filing of

intervening actions in 2002 and 2004, the district court erred in

finding that the instant tort action against Suzuki was timebarred. Rodríguez's argument proceeds as follows. He argues that

by filing the 2002 Action against Rainbow and Panorama within oneyear of the accident, on June 20, 2002, Rodríguez "tolled" the

statute of limitations with respect to all parties jointly and

severally liable with those companies, including Suzuki, even

though Suzuki was never a party to the 2002 Action. Rodríguez

further contends that when the 2002 Action was dismissed without

prejudice on November 10, 2003, the one-year statute of limitations

was reset and began to run anew, rendering his 2004 Action against

Suzuki, filed six months later on May 10, 2004, timely as well.

Finally, Rodríguez contends that when the 2004 Action was dismissed

without prejudice on February 9, 2005, he again had one year from

that date to file a subsequent action. Thus, Rodríguez takes the

position that when he filed the instant action within 362 days from

the dismissal of the 2004 action, on February 6, 2006, the action

had not prescribed. We agree.

Article 1873 of Puerto Rico's Civil Code provides three

mechanisms by which the prescription of actions can be interrupted

or "tolled": "[(1)] [B]y their institution before the courts, [(2)]
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by extrajudicial claim of the creditor, and [(3)] by any act of

acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31,

§ 5303; see also Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at 4. When a plaintiff

tolls the statute of limitations by bringing an action before the

courts, "the mere filing of the complaint has a tolling effect,"

rather than service of the summons. See Durán-Cepeda v. MoralesLebrón, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. 776, 779 (1982). Moreover, the

filing of an action tolls the statute of limitations even if

"plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss[] the action without prejudice

before the defendants ha[ve] been summonsed." Silva Wiscovich v.

Weber Dental Mfg. Co., 19 P.R. Offic. Trans. 592, 604 (1987)

(resolving question certified to it by this court); see also SilvaWiscovich v. Weber Dental Mfg. Co., 835 F.2d 409, 410 (1st Cir.

1987) (subsequent review after Puerto Rico Supreme Court addressed

certification question).

"Under Puerto Rico tolling rules, which are based on the

Spanish civil law, the institution of an action in court is

commonly held not only to interrupt the running of the applicable

statute of limitations but, at least in the event of a voluntary or

usual non-prejudicial dismissal of the original action, to cause

the entire limitations period to run anew from the date the

previous action came to a definite end." López-González v. Mun. of

Comerío, 404 F.3d 548 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Silva-Wiscovich, 835
 See also Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 97 (Once an action "comes 4

to a definite end," the statute of limitations is reset and "begins

to run anew from th[at] date."); Rodríguez-Narvaez, 895 F.2d at 43

("It is . . . well established that once the period of limitations

is interrupted through any of the ways available under Puerto Rico

laws and the tolling ends, the statute of limitations begins to run

anew."); Sánchez Montalvo v. Autoridad de los Puertos, 153 P.R.

Dec. 559, 568 (2001) (certified translation) ("The effect of the

mechanisms of interruption is that the prescriptive term must be

computed again completely from the moment in which is produced the

act which interrupts."); Durán-Cepeda, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 777

(citing Feliciano v. A.S.A., 93 P.R. 638 (1966) for the proposition

that "a whole new term begins to run at the termination of an

action whose institution tolled the statute of limitations.").

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F.2d at 410). An action comes to a "definite end," inter alia, on 4

the date upon which such action is voluntarily dismissed without

prejudice. See Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 97 (quoting SilvaWiscovich, 835 F.2d at 410).

Applying these tolling principles to the facts before us,

we can conclude that if Rodríguez had in fact interrupted the

statute of limitations with respect to his products liability suit

against Suzuki when he instituted the 2002 Action (see infra,

Section II.D.), then this tolling effect persisted until that

action came to a "definite end" on November 10, 2003, when it was

voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. At that point, the

statute of limitations was reset and began to run anew for another

year. The filing of the 2004 Action within that year was therefore

timely. As the 2004 Action was also dismissed without prejudice,

then, by the same logic, the filing of the 2006 Action within one

year of its dismissal, was timely as well.
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Though not raised by the parties, we note one caveat to

our interpretation of Puerto Rico's tolling provisions -- the issue

of due diligence. The usual rule under Puerto Rico law is that the

filing of a judicial action tolls the statute of limitations and,

if the action is dismissed without prejudice, the limitations

period is reset and starts to run again from that date. See SilvaWiscovich, 19 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 603-04. Although Rodríguez's

2004 Action was dismissed by the district court as a result of

Rodríguez's failure to complete service of process upon Suzuki in

a timely manner, it was nevertheless dismissed "without prejudice."

Thus, under the usual Puerto Rico tolling rule, the statute of

limitations would re-run for the full period from the date of the

dismissal. Id. This approach, however, may be in tension with

"common law and equitable principles," under which "an involuntary

dismissal made without prejudice but as a sanction does not toll

the statute of limitations." See López-González, 404 F.3d at 554

(emphasis added and citing cases); see also Hilton Int'l Co. v.

Unión de Trabajadores, 833 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating

that "dismissal by the court for punitive or other reasons, even

though labeled (sic) 'without prejudice,' is, in fact, with

prejudice if the statute of limitations has run," noting that "any

other result . . . would be most unfair.").

Faced in López-González with the question of applying

these tolling principles to a federal § 1983 action governed by
 Federal law under § 1983 borrows a state's coordinate rules on 5

tolling unless they are inconsistent with the federal Constitution

and law, or with the federal policy underlying § 1983.

Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 97. While Puerto Rico is not a

state, our court has treated Puerto Rico as if it were a state for

purposes of the application of this rule. See, e.g., id.

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Puerto Rico's statute of limitations law, we held that we "[could 5

not] say for sure whether similar considerations would lead a

Puerto Rico court" to follow the common law rule and "make an

exception . . . to its civil law restart tolling principle," in the

event dismissal was imposed as a sanction. 404 F.3d at 554.

Nevertheless, we noted that in Durán-Cepeda the Puerto Rico Supreme

Court had suggested a possible exception to the restart rule

"'[f]or cases where the [tolling] rule is abused or used in bad

faith.'" Id. (quoting Durán-Cepeda, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 785

n.1); see also, Silva-Wiscovich, 19 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 601

(citing same footnote in Durán-Cepeda). We concluded that

"[w]hatever the correct reading of Puerto Rico's law," given the

plaintiff's "flagrant and abusive delay," the application of Puerto

Rico's restart tolling principle to that case, would be

inconsistent with "federal policies underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983."

Id. Thus we declined to apply Puerto Rico's restart rule to the

dismissed action. López-González, 404 F.3d at 554-55.

Applying the principles of López-González to the case

before us, we are cognizant of the possibility that the judgment

dismissing Rodríguez's 2004 Action, though labeled "without
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prejudice," may have been intended as a sanction for Rodríguez

unjustifiably delaying service of process upon Suzuki. In that

case it would seem hardly equitable to reward Rodríguez for his

lack of due diligence by granting him another year within which to

file his claim. Nevertheless, the instant action, unlike the

§ 1983 claim in López-González is purely a question of Puerto Rico

tort law. Moreover, the district court was not explicit as to

whether dismissal was intended as a sanction or as to whether

Rodríguez, in fact, acted in bad faith. Under these circumstances,

we feel that we are bound to adhere to the usual rule and apply

Puerto Rico's restart rule to the involuntary dismissal without

prejudice of Rodríguez's 2004 Action. Thus, provided that the

tolling effect extends to Rodríguez's suit against Suzuki, the 2006

Action, filed within one year of the dismissal of the 2004 Action,

will be considered timely.

D. Identicality and Solidarity

Suzuki argues that whatever tolling effect the filing of

the 2002 Action may have had, it does not save the instant action

against Suzuki, because this action is not "identical" to the 2002

Action. Suzuki is correct that § 5303 does not toll the statute of

limitations "'for all claims arising out of the same facts.'"

Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 97 (quoting Fernández v. Chardón, 681

F.2d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 1982)). Rather, instituting an action before

the courts pursuant to § 5303 only tolls the statute of limitations
-15-

with respect to "identical" subsequent actions. See id. (citing

Cintrón v. Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 27 P.R. Offic. Trans. 582

(1990)); see also Del Valle v. Vornado Realty Trust, 515 F. Supp.

2d 222, 226 (D.P.R. 2007) (explaining that "in order for a prior

judicial action to toll the statute of limitations as to a later

filed complaint, it is necessary that the second complaint assert

a cause of action identical to the one asserted in the first

action"). This rule is known as the "identicality requirement."

Rodríguez-García, 354 F.3d at 97. We have held that, in order to

be "identical" under § 5303, the claims asserted in the subsequent

action (1) "must seek the same form of relief" as the first action;

(2) "must be based on the same substantive claims"; and (3)

"provided that other Puerto Rico tolling statutes do not rescue the

claims on other grounds . . . must be asserted against the same

defendants in the same capacities; new defendants should not be

added." Id. at 98. This "identicality requirement" serves to

"prevent[] plaintiffs from circumventing the notice function of the

statute of limitations by asserting different claims in belated

federal court complaints." Id. at 97.

Suzuki relies on the identicality requirement to argue,

as the district court held, that the 2002 Action did not toll or

reset the statute of limitations as it pertains to the claims

against Suzuki because there was no "identicality" of parties

between the 2002 Action and the subsequent suits. Specifically,
 The concept of "solidary liability" or "obligación solidaria," 6

which is the original term in Spanish, "is a term of art which is

similar to, but not strictly synonymous with 'joint and several

liability.'" Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at 4 n.1. "The essential

feature of solidarity is that the solidary debtors are jointly

responsible for the same obligation." Id. at 5 (citing Puerto Rico

cases).

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Suzuki argues that because Rodríguez never sued Suzuki in the 2002

Action and never sued Rainbow or Panorama in the 2004 Action, the

2004 Action was not "identical" to the 2002 Action, and therefore

the 2002 Action did not toll the statute of limitations with

respect to Suzuki. Because the 2004 Action was untimely, Suzuki

reasons, it could not serve to toll the statute of limitations with

respect to the instant action against Suzuki, which was not filed

until 2006, and therefore, this action was properly dismissed. We

disagree. As noted above, "identicality" has been read to include,

inter alia, a requirement that for a prior suit to have a tolling

effect upon a subsequent suit, it must be asserted against the same

defendants, but only "provided that other Puerto Rico tolling

statutes do not rescue the claims on other grounds." RodríguezGarcía, 354 F.3d at 98 (emphasis added). In this case, we find

that another provision of Puerto Rico law known as the "solidarity

doctrine" rescues this claim.

The solidarity doctrine, rooted in Article 1874 of the

Puerto Rico Civil Code "is based on the theory that there is one

obligation, shared by several debtors." Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at

6. In such situations, "the interruption of prescription against 6
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one defendant also interrupts the prescription of claims against

any other defendants who are solidarily liable with the first."

Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at 4 (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5304

and Arroyo v. Hosp. La Concepción, 130 P.R. Dec. 596, 606 (P.R.

June 5, 1992)); see also P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5304

("Interruption of prescription of actions in joint obligations

equally benefits or injures all the creditors or debtors."). Thus,

in situations where various defendants are held to be "solidarily

liable" with each other, this doctrine has been interpreted to

allow for the "timely inclusion of a solidary tortfeasor not

originally included in an action." See Arroyo, 130 P.R. Dec. at

607-08 (quoting official translation). The theory is that "[t]he

interruption of the prescription of the cause of action based on

[a] unitary obligation . . . need only be performed once." Tokyo

Marine, 142 F.3d at 6. Relying on the solidarity doctrine,

Rodríguez argues that Suzuki, the manufacturer of the motorcycle,

is solidarily liable with Rainbow, the retailer, and Panorama, the

distributor, and that therefore, by filing the 2002 action against

Rainbow and Panorama, Rodríguez "tolled the statute of limitations

against all joint tortfeasors including [Suzuki]."

The threshold question is whether there is in fact

solidarity between Rainbow or Panorama and Suzuki such that the

interruption of the statute of limitations as to the former

prejudiced the latter. Solidarity exists under Puerto Rico law
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"when several people take part or cooperate in causing a wrong."

Arroyo, 130 P.R. Dec. at 604. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has

held that "joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable." Tokyo Marine,

142 F.3d at 6 (citing Arroyo, 130 P.R. Dec. at 603); see also id.

at 6-7 ("[A]rticle 1874 of the Civil Code applies to joint

tortfeasors, so that the timely filing of a suit against one joint

tortfeasor had interrupted the prescription of the suit against the

other tortfeasors."). "Under article 1802, when the negligent acts

of more than one person have adequately caused a harm, each such

person is a joint tortfeasor who is liable in full to the plaintiff

for the harm caused." Id. at 6. The district court found it

"clear" that solidarity exists in this case between Panorama,

Rainbow and Suzuki. We agree. As the district court explained:

Plaintiff alleges that [Suzuki], Rainbow and

Panorama sold a motorcycle that was amongst

other things, negligently designed, tested,

assembled, packaged, marketed, advertised and

sold. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff

seeks compensation for pain and suffering, as

well as the cost of the Motorcycle. Since

[Suzuki] was the manufacturer of the

Motorcycle, and Plaintiff's claim is one for

product liability, it is clear that solidarity

amongst the defendants exists.

Rodríguez, at *8-9. The district court's finding of solidarity is

further bolstered by Puerto Rico's adherence to the theory of

strict tort liability in cases involving products liability.

Aponte-Rivera v. Sears Roebuck de P.R., Inc., 144 P.R. Dec. 830,

838-39 (1998) (official translation); see also Del Rosario-Ortega
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v. Star-Kist Caribe, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 277, 284 (D.P.R. 2001)

(noting that "[in] a cause of action in products liability, . . .

as a matter of public policy, each and every entity involved in the

chain of distribution is strictly liable to the consumer") (citing

Ferrer-Delgado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 100 P.R. Dec. 246, 257-58

(1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)). Thus, under Puerto Rico

law, "all those who take part in the manufacturing and distribution

chain of a product are solidarily liable, along with the

manufacturer, to the injured party." Aponte-Rivera, 144 P.R. Dec.

at 838 n.6.

Concluding that Panorama, Rainbow and Suzuki are in fact

solidarily liable, we must now address Rodríguez's argument that

his 2002 Action, filed against parties solidarily liable with

Suzuki, effectively tolled the statute as to his subsequent actions

against Suzuki. Though no single case is entirely controlling,

this argument has substantial support in the case law. For

example, in Tokyo Marine, plaintiff, the subrogee for an imported

automobile dealer (Mitsubishi), brought a tort action under Article

1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code against Pérez y Cía., the owner

of a storage facility where plaintiff's automobiles were stored,

for property damage to Mitsubishi's vehicles resulting from their

storage in Pérez y Cía.'s facility. See 142 F.3d at 2-3. The

cause of action, which was filed more than one year after it had
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accrued, had been dismissed by the district court on grounds that

it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 3.

The issue before us was "whether the plaintiff interposed an

'extrajudicial claim' . . . that successfully interrupted the

prescription of the cause of action before the original one-year

term expired." Id. at 4. We held that it did. Id. at 4-5. We

reasoned that Tokyo Marine effectively tolled the statute of

limitations pursuant to Article 1873 by filing, within the

limitations period, an extrajudicial claim letter against Pérez y

Cía.'s liability insurer, UAC. Id. We further reasoned that

because Pérez y Cía. was solidarily liable with its insurer, under

Article 1874, "the timely interruption of prescription as to UAC

had a like effect as to its insured." Id. at 10. Thus, we

reversed the district court's conclusion that the challenged claim

was time barred, and amended the judgment accordingly. Id. at 10-

11.

A similar result was reached by the Puerto Rico Supreme

Court in Sánchez Montalvo, 153 P.R. Dec. 559. In that case, the

plaintiff, who was injured in an airport terminal, filed an

extrajudicial claim letter against the Port Authority on the day of

the accident. Id. at 562-63. No extrajudicial letter or other

tolling mechanism, however, was timely filed against American

Airlines, which controlled the area where the accident took place,

even though plaintiff was on notice that American could be liable.
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Id. at 572-73. Two years later plaintiff filed an action under

article 1802 against the Port Authority and American Airlines. Id.

The trial court dismissed the action against American as timebarred, reasoning that plaintiff failed to interrupt the statute of

limitations as to American. Id. at 574. Nevertheless, the Puerto

Rico Supreme Court reversed the dismissal. Id. The supreme court

held that "[t]he cause of action in regards to [the Port Authority]

not being time barred, and joint liability between [the Port

Authority] and American having been alleged, the interruption of

the prescriptive term with regards to [the Port Authority]

interrupted the term equally for American." Id. (citing MartínezDíaz v. E.L.A., 132 P.R. Dec. 200 (1992); see also García-Colón v.

García-Rinaldi, 340 F. Supp. 2d 113, 126 (D.P.R. 2004) (holding

that by sending extrajudicial claim letter to one physician,

malpractice plaintiff effectively tolled the statute of limitations

as to the other joint tortfeasors including another physician and

the hospital, thereby rendering suit against the others, outside

the one-year limitations period, timely).

Suzuki acknowledges that these cases support the

proposition that "the filing of an extrajudicial claim letter

toll[s] the running of the statute of limitations, even against

those parties to whom a tolling letter had not been sent," but

attempts to distinguish them on the ground that Rodríguez did not

file an extrajudicial claim, but rather, instituted a judicial
-22-

action. We find this distinction unpersuasive. As noted above,

Article 1873 provides three mechanisms which can be employed to

toll the statute of limitations, and these include, inter alia,

filing an "extrajudicial claim" and "instituti[ng] [an action]

before the courts." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5303. Neither the

statute nor the case law provide a basis for differentiating among

these mechanisms with respect to the consequences of solidarity

upon their operation, nor does Suzuki provide us such a basis. In

fact, the case law suggests the contrary. For example, in Tokyo

Marine, when discussing the § 5303 tolling mechanism in the context

of the solidarity doctrine, we stated as follows:

[T]he interruption of prescription against one

defendant also tolls the statute against any

other defendants who are solidarily liable

with the first. Regardless of the method

used, when the prescriptive period is

successfully interrupted, the full period

begins to run again. 

142 F.3d at 4 (emphasis added and footnote and citation omitted).

Although in Tokyo Marine the statute of limitations was tolled via

the filing of an extrajudicial claim letter, we stated that the

result would be no different in the event of a prior suit tolling

the statute of limitations for a subsequent suit. See id. at 7

(noting that "the interruption of prescription as to one solidary

debtor affects the other solidary debtors, so that a suit against

one joint tortfeasor may be filed up to one year after judgment is

entered in a suit against another joint tortfeasor" (citation
-23-

omitted)); see also García-Pérez, 2008 WL 2717833, at *7 (noting

that filing a judicial or extrajudicial claim against a tortfeasor

interrupts the prescription period in question as to the rest of

the solidary tortfeasors). This reading is also the one most

consistent with other provisions of Puerto Rico law, including

Article 1097 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[a] creditor

may sue any of the joint debtors or all of them simultaneously" and

that "[t]he actions instituted against one shall not be an obstacle

for those that may be brought subsequently against the others, as

long as it does not appear that the debt has been collected in

full." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3108 (emphasis added).

Moreover, there are other cases on point in which the

timely filing of a judicial action has been found to toll the

statute of limitations as to new defendants who are solidarily

liable with those against whom the action was initially filed. For

example, in García-Molina v. Gobierno de la Capital, the plaintiff

sued the Municipality of San Juan and its insurer for injuries

sustained in a car accident while plaintiff was a passenger, but

failed to sue either the owner or the driver of the vehicle. 72

P.R. Dec. 138, 141 (1951) (official translation); see also

Hernández-Moreno v. Serrano-Marrero, 719 F. Supp. 70 (D.P.R. 1989)

(discussing García-Molina). Codefendants, the municipality and its

insurer, then moved to file a third-party complaint against the

owner of the vehicle outside the limitations period. García-
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Molina, 72 P.R. Dec. at 141-42. Addressing the timeliness issue,

the Puerto Rico Supreme Court noted, citing sections 1094 and 1874

of the Civil Code, that "actions instituted against any one of the

joint debtors shall prejudice all of them" and that "[i]nterruption

of prescription of actions in joint obligations equally benefits or

injures all the creditors or debtors." Id. at 148. Applying the

solidarity doctrine, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court thus concluded

that "[t]he original complaint against the third-party plaintiffs

[the municipality and its insurer] having been filed within one

year," "prescription against the third-party defendants [the owner

and driver of the vehicle] had been interrupted and the third-party

complaint was therefore timely filed." Id. at 148-49.

Similarly, in Torres-Vázquez v. Commercial Union Ins.

Co., longshoreman brought a tort action under Puerto Rico law

against a marine terminal, but did not file a complaint against the

marine terminal's liability insurer until four years after the

incident. 367 F. Supp. 2d 231, 234-35 (D.P.R. 2005). The insurer

sought to dismiss the complaint as barred by the applicable oneyear statute of limitations, but the district court denied the

motion. Id. at 239-40. The court, relying on our interpretation

of Puerto Rico law in Tokyo Marine, held that because the original

complaint against the marine terminal had been filed in a timely

fashion, "there is no doubt that the statute of limitations for all

tortfeasors jointly liable, as is [the insurer], was stalled for
-25-

the interruption against one tortfeasor benefits all others." 367

F. Supp. 2d at 240. Thus, the amended complaint adding the marine

terminal's insurer as a defendant four years after the incident was

held to be timely. Id.

Suzuki attempts to distinguish this line of cases on the

ground that in these cases the plaintiffs took advantage of the

tolling effect of the previously filed judicial complaint to file

a complaint against additional solidarily liable tortfeasors in the

same action rather than in a subsequent suit. In contrast,

Rodríguez seeks to rely on the tolling effect of the 2002 Action in

a subsequent action against the alleged joint tortfeasor. However,

we see no basis for regarding this distinction as dispositive. If

initiating a judicial action against a tortfeasor tolls the statute

of limitations as to all other tortfeasors jointly and severally

liable with the first, as the solidarity doctrine provides, and

that action is dismissed without prejudice thereby permitting its

re-institution before the courts, there is no basis for concluding

that the tolling effect of the initial action somehow ceases as a

result of the dismissal, especially given that Puerto Rico provides

for the reset of the statute of limitations upon dismissal.

To be sure, we are not holding that identicality is

inapplicable when tolling the statute of limitations in suits

involving solidarily liable tortfeasors. Rather, for a prior

judicial or extra-judicial claim to toll the limitations period for
-26-

a later-filed suit against a solidary tortfeasor, the later suit

must nevertheless contain the same substantive claims and seek the

same relief. As we stated in Rodríguez-Narvaez, "tolling the

statute as to one jointly and severally liable defendant tolls it

as to all, but the tolling is effective with regard only to

identical causes of action." 895 F.2d at 43 (citation omitted).

In this case, we conclude that the causes of action stated in the

2002, 2004 and 2006 Actions were identical, in that each was a

products liability action seeking damages resulting from the same

alleged defects in Rodríguez's Suzuki motorcycle.

The requirement of identicality of parties, however,

cannot apply where the parties against whom the statute of

limitations was tolled and those parties ultimately sued are

solidarily liable for the same obligation. We find this

interpretation to be the clearest way of reconciling the

identicality requirement with the solidarity doctrine as those

concepts are applied in Puerto Rico law. To hold otherwise and

allow the identicality requirement to preclude additional

defendants from being later sued, where the prescription period has

been effectively tolled against other defendants solidarily liable

with those defendants, would directly violate the principle that

the "interruption of prescription of actions in joint obligations

equally benefits or injures all the creditors or debtors." See

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5304. In other words, mandating
-27-

"identicality of parties" between a prior and subsequent suit as a

prerequisite to tolling, where the solidarity doctrine allows a

prior suit against one solidary tortfeasor to toll the statute of

limitations with respect to a subsequent lawsuit against other

tortfeasors solidarily liable with the first, would render the

solidarity doctrine meaningless.

Thus we read the solidarity doctrine as requiring that,

with respect to identical causes of action, the filing of a

judicial action against one solidarily liable defendant tolls the

statute as to all defendants solidarily liable with the first.

This is the case regardless of whether the later-sued tortfeasors

are brought into the initial action that created the tolling effect

or they are sued in a subsequent action. These principles compel

a result in Rodríguez's favor.

Accordingly, we conclude that Rodríguez effectively

tolled the statute of limitations as to his later-filed actions

against Suzuki, pursuant to sections 5303 and 5304 of title 31 of

the Puerto Rico Civil Code, by timely bringing before the court an

identical cause of action against parties solidarily liable with

Suzuki. The instant action having been filed within the

limitations period, which reset after the dismissal of those prior

actions, the district court erred in holding Rodríguez's claims to

be time-barred.
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III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment entered

in favor of Suzuki and against Rodríguez is reversed.

Costs are granted to appellant.