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i 

96–238 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–47] 

THE FUTURE OF AIR FORCE LONG– 

RANGE STRIKE—CAPABILITIES AND 

EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 9, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice Chair 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

BRUCE JOHNSON, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................... 2 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Elder, Lt Gen Robert J., Jr., USAF (Ret.), Ph.D., Faculty, George Mason 

University ............................................................................................................. 3 

Grant, Rebecca, President, IRIS Independent Research ...................................... 6 

Gunzinger, Mark, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments ..................................................................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Elder, Lt Gen Robert J., Jr. ............................................................................. 27 

Grant, Rebecca .................................................................................................. 49 

Gunzinger, Mark .............................................................................................. 35 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 57 

(1) 

THE FUTURE OF AIR FORCE LONG–RANGE STRIKE— 

CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 9, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. Today the subcommittee meets to discuss the future 

of Air Force long-range strike capabilities and employment concepts. Our distinguished panel of guests testifying today includes 

Lieutenant General, retired, Robert J. Elder, Jr., Ph.D., faculty, 

George Mason University; also Mr. Mark Gunzinger, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; and 

Dr. Rebecca Grant, president, IRIS Independent Research. 

These distinguished guests, we are glad to have you here. You 

have all done a lot of great work, and we look forward to your testimony this afternoon. 

During World War II, America gained the ability to strike targets 

at long range with its massive bomber force. The Air Force flew 

thousands of conventional daylight precision bombing missions over 

Europe and Asia. Crossing thousands of miles of ocean, the war in 

the Pacific was brought to a decisive end by the nuclear strikes on 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From that point, the United States maintained the robust conventional and nuclear long-range strike capabilities needed to deter the aggression of hostile states and assure 

the security of our allies around the globe. 

As the threat environment evolved, so have our capabilities. 

Stealth and precision standoff weapons enable our Navy and Air 

Force to penetrate anti-access environments. Our increasing ability 

to process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance information helps deter future conflicts and deescalate regional tensions. 

That said, our long-range strike capabilities must evolve further 

to address the range of challenges posed by the rapid and threatening rise of China; a resurgent and expansionist Russia; a subversive and terrorist-supporting Iran; and an unpredictable and provocative North Korea. China, Russia, and North Korea are established nuclear powers, and Iran, regardless of the negotiated P5 

agreement, remains a nuclear threat in the not-so-distant future. 
2 

† Correction for the record: The total number of bombers is 159. 

Adding to this complex security environment, I am concerned 

about Russia and China rapidly fielding highly capable integrated 

air defense systems and other anti-access capabilities. The proliferation of these weapon systems is eroding our ability to perform 

long-range strike with our legacy bomber fleet and standoff precision weapons, thus diminishing our ability to deter and respond to 

aggression. 

The current state of our bomber force is of great concern. The 

newest B–52 bomber is 53 years old. In at least one Air Force family, three generations of airmen have piloted the Stratofortress in 

combat engagements from Vietnam to Enduring Freedom. As of 

September 2015, our Air Force bomber force structure consists of 

158 † total bombers—63 B–1s, 20 B–2s, and 76 B–52 aircraft—with 

an average age of 39 years. Of the total, only 96 are currently funded for combat service. 

The Air Force plans on recapitalizing B–1 and B–52 force structure with a smaller fleet of 80 to 100 Long-Range Strike Bombers. 

As we grapple with the proliferation of anti-access systems in contested environments, dwindling force structure, and continuing 

budget constraints and uncertainty, it is critically important that 

we identify the long-range strike capabilities and concepts that we 

need for the future. 

Once again, I want to thank our witnesses for participating in 

our hearing this afternoon, and I look forward to discussing this 

important topic. 

With that, I turn to my good friend and colleague the ranking 

member of the subcommittee, Joe Courtney. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CONNECTICUT, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing on our Air Force long-range strike capabilities. 

Given the impending award of the contract for the Long-Range 

Strike Bomber in the coming weeks, this is an excellent opportunity to discuss the future of this critical part of our Nation’s 

power projection abilities. 

The Air Force long-range bomber fleet has long provided our Nation with a flexible and effective deterrent tool. From composing 

one the three legs of our strategic triad to providing a full complement of conventional long-range strike options for decision makers, the ability to project power and convincingly strike from far 

distances is one of the most important components of our military 

arsenal today. 

Our long-range strike fleet, composed of our B–52s, B–1s and B– 

2s, are also amongst the oldest aircraft inventory today. However, 

the current timeline projects that the Long-Range Strike Bomber 

will not actually be ready for operations until 2030, adding 15 

years to the average ages of our existing bombers, effectively making the B–52 eligible for Social Security by the time the LongRange Strike Bomber comes online. 
3 

I am interested in hearing from our witnesses about the kinds 

of ideas they have in regards to sustaining our current fleet in the 

years before the new bomber comes on line as well as lessons that 

we should draw from the longevity of these aircraft as they would 

apply to this new class. The strategic importance of demonstrating 

our Nation’s long-range strike capability cannot be overstated, especially as it applies to the Asia-Pacific region. As noted by one of 

our witnesses today, Lieutenant General Elder, our bombers were 

an important part of deterring North Korean sabre-rattling in 

2013. When B–52 bombers flew 6,500 miles from Missouri to South 

Korea to drop bombs on a test range, North Korea quickly toned 

down its threatening rhetoric, and the bombers effectively deterred 

further provocation in a volatile region. 

As our near-peer competitors, especially China, develop formidable anti-access/area denial technologies, our ability to maintain 

a military advantage hinges on our ability to penetrate those defenses. I hope our witnesses will share their views with the committee on how the Long-Range Strike Bomber and long-range 

strike capabilities generally fit into the strategic priorities of the 

Asia-Pacific rebalance. 

This new program is going to occur at a time of intense budget 

pressure, not just within the Air Force alone but also the entirety 

of the Department of Defense. Yet, with the aircraft expected to be 

in service well into this century, it is important that we get this 

right. As such, it is important that this panel and this Nation fully 

understand the challenges ahead and the options available to ensure that we retain a credible and robust long-term strike capabilities well into the future. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the discussion today. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Joe. 

And I guess we are going to line up. 

If you guys are comfortable, we will start with General Elder and 

work our way across. 

General, we look forward to any comments that you may be willing to offer us today. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN ROBERT J. ELDER, JR., USAF (RET.), 

PH.D., FACULTY, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 

General ELDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Courtney, 

members of the committee, it is a privilege to have been offered 

this opportunity to talk with you today about the value of the 

Long-Range Strike Bomber to U.S. national security. As both of you 

have already mentioned, our capabilities are withering, and we 

have less than 100 combat-ready bombers with an average age of 

38 years. 

Quite frankly, the older bombers we have are simply not survivable in the face of modern air defenses. And as you pointed out, 

we are going to have to live with them for quite a bit longer. The 

newer B–52s remain potent but are few in number. And my belief, 

quite frankly, is the 80 to 100 aircraft number is not going be 

enough to replace the B–1, B–52 fleet, even though its capability 

against a target set will be greater, but what amounts to the rotational commitments, it is not going to satisfy that. 
4 

Unlike most military systems which are designed to provide utility for a small number of missions, bombers provide value in time 

of peace, crisis, and conflict. It takes many different platforms combined to do all the things that a bomber can do. Long-range strike 

bombers serve as a global strike air sensor platform, but they are 

distinctly capable of providing a range of effects against dynamic 

targets anywhere on the globe, and they can use their own organic 

queuing. 

Study after study has shown that bombers do more than simply 

strike targets. They offer structural stability for both conventional 

nuclear scenarios and, as you point out, provide the most flexible 

component of the U.S. strategic triad. And they are the best way 

to reassure allies of our commitment to extend a deterrence because they can signal. In other words, the bomber is more than just 

a strike and sensor platform; it is also a powerful tool of diplomacy. 

Long-range strike capabilities provide the Nation practical alternatives for global security and regional stability and provide combatant commanders increased effectiveness in the conduct of joint 

operations across the full range of conflict. They are absolutely critical for our national security. Because of their versatility, I believe 

they provide the Nation exceptional value, and I look forward to 

getting your questions, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Elder can be found in the 

Appendix on page 27.] 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. 

Mr. Gunzinger. 

STATEMENT OF MARK GUNZINGER, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER 

FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Mr. GUNZINGER. Yes, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member 

Courtney, members of the subcommittee, thank you as well for inviting us to talk to you today about this really important topic. 

I would like to suggest a framework that might help you think 

about the LRS–B [Long-Range Strike Bomber] and other capabilities in the long-range strike family of systems. Now what I postulate is two competitions. One we call the hiders-finders competition; the other is a salvo competition. 

Now the hiders-finders competition, what that is about is developing the capabilities to penetrate contested airspace, contested 

areas, and an enemy, a thinking enemy who develops countermeasures. It is a cycle. As we develop advantages, they develop countermeasures. Keeping advantage in that cycle in this competition is 

critically important. 

In the 1950s, for example—the B–52 was designed about then; 

1952 I think was the first flight—the most significant threat to our 

bombers was aircraft, interceptors, and surface-to-air fires—artillery. So the B–52 was designed to fly at high altitudes, and they 

gave it a gun in the tail to defend against fighters until SAMs, surface-to-air missiles, came on the scene in the latter half of that decade in the early 1960s. So the Air Force adapted and started flying 

B–52s at low altitude so it could terrain mask and hide in ground 

clutter, and fighters couldn’t find them effectively, and it designed 

the B–1 to be a low-altitude, high-speed sprinter to penetrate contested airspace. 
5 

Until, about 1979, DOD [Department of Defense] announced 

that, well, Russia, or the Soviet Union has developed ‘‘look-down/ 

shoot-down’’ radars for its fighters, capable of fighting our bombers 

at low altitude. So they started a program called the Advanced 

Technology Bomber Program, which led to the B–2 program to buy 

139 B–2s to replace the B–52, and that would be a high-altitude 

stealthy penetrator. 1990, end of the Soviet Union, we essentially 

disengaged from this competition. DOD shifted its attention from 

preparing to fight two regional conflicts against North Korea, Iran, 

Iraq. They didn’t have advanced air defenses, so while it continued 

to invest in stealth technologies for future platforms, it stopped the 

B–2 buy at 21 aircraft. And it also shifted the weight of its effort 

in terms of strike campaigns toward its fighter forces under the assumption that, well, we will be able to deploy our fighter forces 

very quickly into a theater of conflict, stage them at bases on the 

borders of our enemies; to bring the high-volume fires. We just 

didn’t need the bombers to do that after the opening stages of a 

conflict. 

The problem is our competitors didn’t stop. China, Russia, Iran, 

and others have developed advanced air defenses—developed them 

or bought them—that are a real challenge to our current force. So 

while we modified our current bomber force to stay current and 

give it new radars and so on over the intervening years, we didn’t 

invest in a new bomber. 

Now the second competition is what we call the salvo competition, and that occurs between two adversaries who both have 

PGMs [precision guided munitions], not just the ability to attack 

with precision but also defend against the PGMs of an enemy. That 

is the situation we have today, certainly with Russia, China, North 

Korea, and Iran. They have capabilities to attack our bases in the 

western Pacific and the Middle East, all of them. So the assumption DOD made in the 1990s, it said: Well, we will rely mostly for 

strike on our fighters, and we will stage them really close to bases. 

Those bases are now at risk. That is an increasingly risky proposition. But we can compensate for that by beginning to use bases 

that are further away from our adversaries that, frankly, are out 

of the most immediate threat, out of range of those short-range 

cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. 

And we can also disperse our fighter forces at those close-in 

bases to expeditionary airfields, civil airfields suitable for military 

use, as well as military airfields, to complicate the targeting problem of our enemies who have their own PGMs. So what this suggests, both the hider-finder competition and the salvo competition, 

is we might start thinking about reversing priorities that we established for bombers and fighters back in the 1990s. 

Perhaps future air campaigns, the weight of the strike should be 

provided by long-range strike capabilities. They are stealthy and 

have large payloads staged at more distant bases. Whereas our 

fighters at the close-in dispersed posture provide counter-air, help 

kick down the door, provide close-air support, and other missions 

rather than relying on those fighters, which have about one-tenth 

the payload of a bomber and one-fifth the range of a bomber primarily for strike. 
6 

The Air Force has made a great start—and DOD has as well— 

at reengaging in both these competitions with the LRS–B, but it is 

just a start, and it is only one element of a long-range strike family 

of systems, which I hope we can get into in your questions. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gunzinger can be found in the 

Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mark. 

Dr. Grant. 

STATEMENT OF REBECCA GRANT, PRESIDENT, IRIS 

INDEPENDENT RESEARCH 

Dr. GRANT. Thank you very much for the opportunity. As my colleagues have said, America’s bomber force is one of the truly 

unique tools of our national security and our international diplomacy. Sadly, today we have at any one time only 16 combat-ready 

B–2 bombers that are able to take on the most heavily defended 

types of targets, and it is this situation that we are setting out to 

correct. 

I want to speak very briefly to the capabilities and employment 

concepts of the bomber and then touch on how the Air Force will 

manage this program. The first capability, of course, is access, and 

that does still very much mean stealth. Stealth remains a fundamental design requirement, and we should expect to see improved 

stealth techniques that have advanced beyond the B–2 and will include electronic warfare and other state-of-the-art survivability 

techniques. 

Range and payload, of course, are what define a bomber and separate it from other types of aircraft. Recall that every bomber design has had to make a tradeoff from the B–17 right to the B–2. 

So we may expect to see, of course, excellent range, but that will 

be defined as range from leaving the tanker track. Payload will be 

a mix of munitions, both the small precise munitions and the heavy 

munitions for hardened and deeply buried targets. We don’t know 

what parameters the Air Force has chosen this time, but we will 

expect to see something that has blurred the distinctions between 

global and theater attack. 

Also I think highly important and new in this Long-Range Strike 

Bomber program will be an open software architecture. That will 

be very important because this bomber will be new in its communications and data link relay abilities. It should be able to immediately join not only the SATCOM [satellite communications] but 

the aerial layer networks, those IP [Internet Protocol]-enabled networks that now define the gold standard in battlespace communications. 

We expect, of course, for this bomber to roll off with the basics 

of nuclear capability installed but to proceed to certify that capability quite a bit later after it completes initial flight tests. Most 

of all I want to see some upgrade capacity here in the winning design. Our bomber will reach initial operating capability perhaps in 

the mid-2020s—or just a touch later—but continue to operate and 

fly missions until 2055 and beyond. This bomber, therefore, has to 

have the ability to do what is asked of it now and also to do a bit 

more as we look for upgrades and new mission capabilities over 
7 

time. That means planning now for the airframe with the classic 

power, space, and cooling, and ability to accommodate those upgrades. 

What will this bomber do specifically? It will, of course, participate in the battlespace under joint force commander direction. It 

will draw on ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance], on 

tankers, and many other things. It will be dependent on stealth 

fighters, too. But it will have some very unique roles, and those include direct attack; the ability to drop a bomb; not a cruise missile, 

per se, because cruise missiles are—and other standoff weapons— 

are not always of capable of taking out every type of target this 

bomber may be assigned to strike. 

We expect that targets in the future that are the most difficult 

will be a combination of mobile and of separate deeply buried targets. This is a very tough target set, and we need a penetrating 

bomber with the ability to take out those targets and hold them at 

risk. We also will see perhaps extensive target sets. A consideration we might not have thought through 5 years ago, but the 

bomber force here remains a unique strategic tool. It will have to 

do things like suppress airfields; counter enemy air defenses; and 

perhaps help hunt, destroy, and contain enemy surface naval vessels and submarines. This points us towards a highly capable force 

but one that also is big enough to be persistent across these missions. And I echo General Elder’s concern; 80 to 100 is a start. I 

think closer to 150 might be better to assure the persistence in sortie generation. 

Let me conclude with a remark about risk reduction and how the 

Air Force will manage this program. We all are awaiting a down 

select, and we want to see the best possible stewardship of this important national security capability. The Air Force says that it has 

taken a rather different approach with this bomber. It has funded 

both teams to conduct extensive risk reduction of the designs. What 

this means to us is that the winning design will be far more mature than other types of aircraft programs. And specifically, I believe, quite a bit more mature than the B–2 at a comparable stage 

of development. This winning design should go into EMD [engineering, manufacturing, development] with some critical work already carried out. For instance, the Air Force has said that they 

have identified specific risk areas to include propulsion integration—that is the engines—and integration of apertures and antennae, and conducted specific risk-reduction work in these areas. This 

again marks a bold and different approach, something quite distinct from what we saw with B–2, F–22, or F–35. This means that 

the Department of Defense’s final choice of a winner should reflect 

analysis of capability, of the ability to proceed quickly through engineering, manufacturing, and development. And it should also reflect some analysis of the winning team’s ability to proceed directly 

toward manufacturing. 

To sum it up, the Air Force appears to have taken a rather bold 

approach, and what this means is we should expect to see a far 

more mature design. That should also give us in the end confidence 

in two things: One is the ability to adhere to cost targets from the 

EMD phase forward; and the second is that the Air Force should 

be certain that its winning design really has those mandated capa-
8 

bilities and the extra margins that it needs, not only for upgrade 

capacity for the future, power, cooling, et cetera. 

Of course, there are many things in the end that can affect a program, but the risk reduction is unique in this case, has been carried out with a great deal of forethought, and I think should give 

us a very confident basis from which to proceed to develop a new 

Long-Range Strike Bomber. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Grant can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

Mr. FORBES. Before we go to Mr. Courtney for his questions, can 

all three of you give us your thoughts about what happens if we 

don’t get this long-range strike capability? And number two, how 

do you assess so far the process that we’ve used to get here as you 

look at the Air Force and what they have done? What is your 

thought on that? 

General Elder. 

General ELDER. Mr. Chairman, that is an interesting question, 

I think the Nation will be in quite a bind, quite frankly, particularly with the threats that you highlighted in your initial marks, 

if we don’t get this new capability, the Long-Range Strike Bomber. 

There is a perception that things aren’t too bad right now. We 

seem to be holding things in check with the current force structure, 

but the reality is that our adversaries do know how to go after our 

strengths. They are looking for ways to exploit that. Actually, as 

Mark Gunzinger pointed out, this going back and forth, the LRS– 

B is a huge jump over where they are in terms of their ability to 

counter it. So it will be important from that standpoint. 

I also believe that as a Nation the types of things we do when 

we talk about our ability compared to others, what perhaps makes 

this a superpower is this capability to operate globally. And these 

other airplanes we have are getting too old, and so we basically 

will wither down to where we basically in the future will only have 

the B–2 fleet and then forces that we can deploy. These deployable 

forces are very important, that they provide a capability to operate 

globally, but they don’t give you a global capability. And certainly 

from a time standpoint, in terms of giving options to the President, 

any adversary knows that there is going to be this long period of 

time before you would be able to get there. I think that is going 

to raise huge concerns among our allies, who are counting on us 

not only in some cases for nuclear umbrellas but also for kind of 

a strategic stability globally. And, of course, the bombers have been 

working for years now with the sea forces in terms of providing stability. Particularly in the Pacific, but not only there, in Europe and 

the Central Command region as well. So I think it would be disastrous for the Nation’s force not to get this new airplane. It will be 

critical to our national security in the future. 

In terms of the process that was used. It is interesting that one 

of the challenges we have had when you try to bring out these new 

technologies and you want these new technologies to give you this 

asymmetric advantage, that asymmetric advantage works for a period of time until the adversary knows what they are, and then 

they are going to start trying to work these counters. So the one 

good thing about this approach for sure is that this whole period 

of time, the adversary knows that something new is being devel-
9 

oped, but they have no opportunity to even start thinking about 

how they might counter it. There is a lot of discussion about ways 

it can be approached, but those things all depend on pretty fragile 

knowledge of how that would happen. So from a standpoint of trying to protect the way this airplane is going to give us this asymmetric increase in capability, I think it is a good thing we have 

done this because it basically saves the government a lot of money. 

It also means that when this airplane is produced, it has quite a 

bit more capability from the get-go. 

The second thing, which is actually something that Dr. Grant 

pointed out, the airplane is designed to be able to continue to 

evolve with technology and with new threats because of the open 

architecture design. And so once the airplane is something that 

people can actually see and our adversaries can see, we will know 

that they will start working to look at ways to counter that. But 

it will be much easier with this platform than platforms we have 

had in the past to be able to bring those changes in and continue 

to maintain the LRS–B as a relevant platform for a very long time. 

Mr. GUNZINGER. Excellent question. I am going to give you the 

U.S. perspective—our U.S. perspective—and an enemy’s perspective on this question. First, we throw around numbers about the 

size of the force, and how many are combat capable and total aircraft inventory and so forth. Today our Nation can launch about 12 

B–2 sorties on any given day. If B–2s have to operate from Guam 

or Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, that is about 12 sorties. That 

is our Nation’s long-range penetrating strike capability and a handful of standoff cruise missiles. If we don’t buy the LRS–B, well, the 

B–2 eventually will not be able to penetrate into China, into Iran, 

and some other areas. The B–1s and B–52s already can’t penetrate 

into those higher threat areas. So we will be a Nation that will be 

able to fight on the periphery of some of our potential adversaries 

in the future. 

From the enemy’s perspective, it would create a one-dimensional 

problem for them. All they have to do is defend against these 

standoff capabilities. They can project power out to attack our 

bases, to attack our aircraft orbiting to launch standoff cruise missiles and so forth. They don’t have to defend their interior. Those 

deep targets are not at risk. So they can pour their money into 

their outer defenses and into offensive capabilities instead of having to defend their interior. So that would not help us impose costs 

on an enemy at all. 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Grant, how do you assess where the Air Force 

has come so far in this process? 

Dr. GRANT. In the process? In my opinion, the Air Force has 

taken a very deliberate and careful path. It has chosen an unusual 

and very, I think, successful acquisition strategy as it works 

through the process of taking the two teams down to contract 

award. 

I personally wish that the Air Force and the Department of Defense would minimize some of the classification around the acquisition aspects of the program, obviously not jeopardizing national security capabilities, but I would like to see the Department of Defense tell us a bit more about how they have conducted this process. Based on what the Air Force has said, they have taken un-
10 

usual steps to take risk reduction much further than in any program we have seen in many a decade. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In terms of just trying to assess the value, which the chairman’s 

first question certainly zeroed in on, obviously, this program’s ability to operate jointly with other branches in terms of the Navy or 

ground forces, I was just wondering if you could maybe help us sort 

of understand the value from that aspect. 

General ELDER. That is a great question, and one of the things 

about this particular airplane—although when you are operating in 

a contested environment and people are shooting at you, you definitely don’t want to present yourself as an easy target. But if you 

were to look today, even where it is relatively an uncontested environment in Afghanistan and you look at where the bulk of support 

to our ground forces is coming from, it is actually coming from B– 

1s that are providing that close air support. That wasn’t something 

that was really that easy to do before we had the weapons we have 

today. They have the same type of targeting pods that the fighters 

have; they have the GPS [Global Positioning System]-guided weapons. The big thing they can do is they can persist for a long time 

and get there quickly. And because of that, you can provide quite 

a bit of coverage. So it is invaluable from that standpoint. 

If this were a contested environment, those airplanes wouldn’t be 

able to just loiter there because they would become targets themselves. So having that advanced stealth, while not going to be a 

panacea, but they will have a capability to operate that our current 

platforms would have difficulty being able to operate in. From a 

naval standpoint, there is a different way of looking at this, and 

it goes back to all those—I guess it is going a little bit out of vogue 

now, the whole AirSea Battle. 

But there are advantages to air forces and vulnerabilities, and 

there are advantages to sea forces and vulnerabilities. But it turns 

out that when you put those together, they are actually pretty complementary, and that was the whole idea behind AirSea Battle: 

Let’s take advantage of some of the things that the maritime force 

can do to help make the air forces be more effective and vice versa. 

This platform operating in conjunction with maritime forces is 

going to be able to do quite a bit. One of the things is, as a sensor 

platform itself, it is actually going to be able to see targets and 

relay that information back to where a maritime force could be 

launching weapons as well. 

And if you understand how special forces operate, there is a nice 

advantage to that because if you have one group that is actually 

doing the surveillance and another one is doing the shooting, you 

don’t give away your surveillance position when you shoot and then 

you can leave. So operating together, you are going to have a nice 

complement there. 

Without going into any classification, there are a lot of things 

that maritime forces can do from a sensing standpoint. I wouldn’t 

want to go into detail here; the committee I am sure is well aware 

of those. That information can be used to make bombers more effective and actually also help protect the bombers. So you can see 

that these different forces are supposed to have—particularly when 
11 

you are talking about undersea forces—have their own kind of 

stealth, a different kind of stealth but they are a stealthy force. 

You put those together, and it provides a very complex environment for an adversary to believe that they could defeat us. That 

is useful not only actually when you go to fight, but when someone 

is trying to think about fighting, they might want to give it a second thought and say: You know, they have so many different ways 

they can deal with us; we might think we have a leg up, but in 

reality, we can’t be sure because particularly when they put these 

capabilities together, we have no idea just how significant those 

forces, the synergistic capabilities that would come from bringing 

those forces together, would be. 

Mr. GUNZINGER. Back when the debate was hot and heavy over 

whether or not we should start a new program, and I was still in 

the Department of Defense, the Air Force started looking at the 

problem as a families of systems problem. It is not—it wasn’t rhetoric, and it is not rhetoric today. This isn’t about, what should the 

Air Force buy to maintain its capability? It was, what does the 

joint force need to be able to maintain his capability to strike an 

enemy deep, to threaten and put at risk all of his most significant 

targets. 

Family of systems encompasses airborne electronic attack, penetrating ISR capabilities, service-based capabilities, carriers, submarine launch, cruise missiles, the whole family. So this was—it 

was born out of a concept to develop the future of long-range strike 

family of systems and also to figure out how it would be integrated 

in joint operations, not just what it could do to improve Air Force 

operations, but the joint force operations for the future. So I think 

that is a very important thing to keep in mind as you assess the 

value of the LRS–B. It hopefully will be able to execute missions 

in support of the Navy, for example, anti-surface warfare. Why not 

have the LRS–B capable of launching more LRASMs, Long-Range 

Anti-Ship Missiles, in the future? They can carry a lot of them, I 

hope. They will be able to cover large areas at sea and will have 

great sensors for wide-area surveillance, a perfect supporting mission for the Air Force to support the Navy. It may even be able to 

do future air dominance. Given enough space, weight, power, and 

cooling capacity, perhaps it could carry air-to-air missiles and, in 

the future, lasers to help support not just the Air Force but the 

Navy to counter enemy aircraft. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being here. 

Being the only CPA [certified public accountant] on the subcommittee panel, I’m trying to do the math. The original version 

was $550 million a copy? At just—$31 billion or $33 billion was the 

original cost. How do you buy 100 at $550 million apiece for $33 

billion? And how does that get less at $41 billion or $58 billion? 

Mr. GUNZINGER. Right. Well, the answer is, you don’t. The $550 

million number was procurement costs in fiscal year 2010 dollars. 

It did not include EMD, and of course, it didn’t include inflation 

that will occur year by year. Plus, the number that you are citing— 
12 

I think $33.1 billion—that was between 2015 and 2025. I am pretty 

sure. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So you are not buying 100. 

Mr. GUNZINGER. Not by 2025, that is correct. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. So, Ms. Grant, you mentioned that the Air 

Force is using a different procurement program that is successful. 

Maybe I got lost in the conversation, but the most recent—about 

the F–22 and F–35, how is the Air Force going to avoid—the years 

on the F–35 or the F–22, mid-1980s to 2006—so how does the Air 

Force avoid doing that same thing again? 

Dr. GRANT. That is a very good question, and the first step of 

many in that is to go forward with a design that is closer to being 

ready to produce and go into flight test. And here I applaud what 

the Air Force says it has done, which is essentially to wait awhile 

on the award process. So instead—as was the case with B–2 in 

1981, with F–22 in 1990, and F–35 in 2001—you can do this either 

way, but in those prior programs, the Air Force did less analysis 

of the contenders prior to EMD. What they say they have now done 

building on some lessons of the past decade and using a different 

procurement organization, the Rapid Capabilities Office, which is a 

joint body between—obviously run by DOD—but with DOD and Air 

Force leadership. 

Mr. CONAWAY. How does that circumvent the normal procurement process? 

Dr. GRANT. It is within the process, but it would have—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Is that the same group that did the MRAPS 

[mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles] and body armor? 

Ms. GRANT. They apparently have done a great many things, but 

I am not sure of those specifically. Once this is done, if I may just 

address the case of Long-Range Strike Bomber, the Air Force says 

they have used a smaller team. They have funded both teams to 

do much more extensive risk-reduction work. So they have asked 

them to analyze not just how this aircraft will look and fly and 

meet some minimum standards, but to look several layers down 

into the produceability and maintainability. That is a very important step one. Sir, as you rightly point out, there are many steps 

to come with this, but moving into EMD with a more mature design is the best possible start for this to really set a new path and 

get us the capability more quickly and on cost. 

Mr. CONAWAY. From a complexity standpoint, the F–35 was a 

more complex platform than this or less complex? 

Dr. GRANT. A difficult analysis to make. You know what? They 

are both very complex aircraft. All right? I would say F–35 is more 

complex because of its tri-service and allied requirements. And one 

more thing I think is important for us to understand: The LongRange Strike Bomber will build on the lessons of at least the past 

two decades in development of stealth, integration of AESA [active 

electronically scanned array] radar, and many other things. So I 

think we are looking at a bomber program that this time is building on things that are already in hand, maybe even some things 

you and I don’t know about, but that they know about and are able 

to put this into production more quickly. So I think they have 

done—by using more mature technology than we have seen in 

cases where technology had to be developed to meet the require-
13 

ments, we see really a conservative approach to a great new capability. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay, is it fair to say, without describing what we 

are talking about, that there were certain breakthrough technologies on the F–35, that you won’t have to reinvent that wheel 

on the bomber, that would shorten the delivery time? 

Dr. GRANT. Right. Obviously, as we haven’t done source selection, 

we don’t know what we are talking about, and I’m not an official. 

But you are absolutely on the right track. What B–2, F–22, and F– 

35 asked was to develop technologies in order to meet those thresholds. Long-Range Strike Bomber I think will have some great new 

stuff but is able to take advantage of more mature technology development in several key areas, and that should make a difference. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I yield back. 

Mr. GUNZINGER. I absolutely agree, the B–2 and F–22 are more 

inventions than the LRS–B. LRS–B is more of an integration program where it is taking very mature technologies from other programs, maybe even actual components and engines, and integrating it into a new platform that is going to be much more capable than the B–2 and other systems. 

It is also I think important to remember that it has been about 

10 years since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] said: 

Let’s start a new program for a penetrating bomber. And there was 

a previous program to do that that was canceled in 2009. But the 

knowledge and technologies and the skilled workforce that were 

dedicated to that effort, they are still around, and they were able 

to pour a lot of that knowledge and technology into this program. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman is exactly right, though, on the cost 

situation. We are going to have to have a discussion with the Air 

Force. I don’t think there was any bad intention or anything there, 

but still those numbers, it is a big gap from 33 to 58 and then back 

down we think now to about 41, but still a huge discrepancy. 

The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Graham, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you so much. Thank you again for being 

here today. 

We talked a lot about what has gone into developing the proposed next generation of LRS [long-range strike]. Are we also looking at the adaptability for the future so that whoever is seated here 

10 years from now isn’t talking about an already obsolete LRS that 

we are again having to invest in building new aircraft? Something 

I think we all should be focusing on is we know what we are capable of today, but are we looking into the future in order of adaptability so we are not pouring additional—huge amounts of resources into future aircraft sooner than we need to? Thank you so 

much. 

Dr. GRANT. If I may start with that, an excellent question. I 

think two things are highly important: One, our aircraft today are 

so information dependent. This new bomber will have a tremendous advantage because it is not like the B–2 that needs to be upgraded or B–52. It will come out with that open mission system architecture. That means that we can add devices in almost as easily 

as if you add an app [application] on a phone. So that is a tremendous advantage in keeping it relevant. 
14 

The Air Force has also said that they intend to fund the science 

and technology development for continual upgrades and to feed 

that funding line through. So, yes, I think we have every confidence that it will be able to be upgraded and stay relevant across 

that 40-year service life. 

Mr. GUNZINGER. Five years ago, before there was an LRS–B program—I have to caveat, I like that—CSBA [Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments] put out a report for the need for a 

new bomber and how it might be developed in a different way. We 

recommended that the first thing you do is ensure it has enough 

space, weight, power, and cooling so you could adapt it to new missions, integrate new components in the future, perhaps lasers, for 

example, to take on the air-to-air missions. 

But the second thing is to develop it so you can upgrade it or integrate block upgrades over time, to refresh its technologies, to be 

able to counter new threats as they emerge, to take on new missions. If you design it with the idea that you are going to be able 

to do these block upgrades over time, then you greatly reduce the 

risk that when it is produced and it is on the ramp, it is not going 

to be outdated. The second thing is it helps you to spread the cost 

over time because you buy new capabilities for these block upgrades rather than try to get everything into the first model. 

General ELDER. Not to beat a dead horse, but one of the things 

about this airplane is that they really were smart about this. I was 

pulling out some testimony from Mr. LaPlante, who is the acquisition head for the Air Force, and this has been a big deal for this 

program, this concern about the fact that when they buy bombers, 

they have them for a long time, and they want to make sure that 

they can continue to bring these new capabilities in. 

The other thing that Dr. Grant pointed out is about this information piece, but the other thing I realize now—I don’t know what the 

percentage is, but the percentage cost of an airplane these days, actually any system, military system, a huge amount is actually 

caught up in the software, the code that is being written for these 

systems. What they are enforcing here is the use of what the Air 

Force calls open mission systems. The Navy has a slightly different 

name. It has actually been mandated by OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], by the Department overall, that you have this. 

What it allows for is plug and play. They have different levels of 

integrated capability, but just ask for an iPhone or an Android, 

someone else can write the application besides Apple or Google, for 

example. You have the same thing here, and when someone has a 

better idea, they will be able to write that, test that module, and 

then plug it in. They won’t have to go through the complete endto-end test, which is what has driven us to these block upgrades 

in the past, where it was incrementally done. Now, as soon as you 

can write these things, you can plug them in. You also can also add 

new systems to the airplane because they are working with open 

standards in terms of the plugs of plug and play for actual boxes 

that would go into the airplane. 

So as we look to the future, as I mentioned to people in the past, 

the people in this room have no idea what this airplane is going 

to be able to do because we haven’t given them to the captains yet. 

When the captains get a hold of this airplane, they are going to 
15 

say, well, we can do this with this; the airplane will do this. The 

things that the B–2 does today, a lot of those things were never 

imagined until it actually got into the hands of these brilliant 

young captains to think about how to do this. The same thing is 

going to happen with this. The difference is that when a captain 

in 2025 gets a great idea, if I could just write a piece of software, 

it would really help me out, they are going to be able to do that 

in 6 months to a year, instead of having to wait for a 3- or 4-year 

block upgrade. That is going to be the huge difference with this 

platform. 

Ms. GRAHAM. All three terrific answers. Thank you very much. 

I appreciate it. I don’t have any more time, but thank you for being 

here. Again, I appreciate it. 

Mr. FORBES. Colonel Cook is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COOK. Well, I am going to apologize in advance; I am going 

to be the cynic here. And, once again, at least with me, I am not 

as smart as you guys. If you are going to talk with a bunch of acronyms that I don’t understand, right away my eyes start to gloss 

over. If you could kind of ‘‘keep it simple, stupid’’ for me, I would 

appreciate it a little bit. 

You know, I am probably one of the biggest hawks on this committee, but it bothers me about things in the future and the 

amount of money. And maybe I have had too many briefs about the 

number of missiles that the Chinese are going to throw against aircraft carriers and cruisers and what have you. And they are going 

to build as many as—maybe one aircraft carrier, they might be 

able to build, I don’t know, 5,000 missiles. I am just looking at it 

from the CPA standpoint, and maybe that is—and that is ironic because I am an infantry guy, but in terms of by the time you get 

there and the changes in technology, I don’t know if we can do 

that, predict the future. 

I am still upset that we cut back on the F–22s. I thought it was 

a great airplane. I think everybody is going back: Oh, we shouldn’t 

have done that. Well, we did that. It was a mistake. Can you tell 

me why, when the F–4 Phantom came out, we said, ‘‘Oh, we don’t 

need any machine guns on that plane’’? This was going to be missile to missile; this is the new warfare. This is talking to a ground 

guy in Vietnam that was probably saved because they modified 

that airplane before some of you were born—let me correct that, 

before most of you in this room were born. But that was a failure 

to anticipate what was going on with the Air Force. 

I am a big, big supporter of airpower and what you have to do. 

I just have—I don’t know if we can predict the future. I would hope 

that we could have modified the B–1 and the B–2. It scares me 

when you said we only are going to have 12 flights of B–2s—God 

almighty—with all of the missiles of the Chinese. Aren’t the Russians still flying turbo prop [propeller] bombers around scaring 

everybody when they come down the English Channel, or maybe 

that is—but how old is that aircraft? It is not at as old as me, but 

close. And I am saying they modified that, just like the Chinese, 

one of the figures I heard was—what?—their budget was 300 percent in the last—increase—in the last 10 years. So I think when 

we are talking about some of these programs. And as I said, I have 

been around this planet for a long while. I have seen the F–4, and 
16 

I have seen that plant on the Connecticut River in the ranking 

member’s district where they spent, I don’t know how much money, 

Pratt & Whitney, to develop a nuclear energy—excuse me, a nuclear engine for an airframe. I won’t tell you how many years and 

how much money that went in. You can tell where that went. 

So I have some serious reservations about this. I think we have 

got to get it right. And I just hope because the more you stick on 

there and everything else, it gets so expensive that it’s going to fail 

the budgetary wars. And everybody is going to come down and say, 

what are we going to cut? And I still want more C–17s, I want 

more lift for marines who have got to go across the Pacific. We 

can’t do it, but you definitely got my attention when you said we 

are going to go have 12 sorties of B–2s. We have a real problem. 

I am going to support it. I just want to make sure we do it right, 

and I am going to—I notice your name, sir, is very, very close to 

how I feel right now. And maybe I am the gunslinger here. And 

you probably have heard something comparable. I don’t have a 

question. I think what you are doing—but we have got to get this 

right. 

The other thing is we don’t have 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, because this is a very, very, dangerous—and I wish we could do it 

just like that. If it was World War II, how long did it take to get 

the B–29 on line? When we had planes flying around at Pearl Harbor day, the B–18—anyone ever seen that? Whatever happened to 

B–36, the B–47, the B–58 Hustler? I could go on and on, and I was 

a marine, but I read a few Air Force books. So thank you very 

much for your presentation. Sorry I vocalized so much. 

Mr. FORBES. And Paul finishes that with, isn’t that true? That 

is his question. 

Mr. Knight is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Boy, I love the colonel. He brings up a lot of good points, though, 

he does. In the 1950s, we built the Sentry series in about 5 years, 

put F–100s in the air, put F–106s in the air in about a 5- or 6- 

year period. And I bring this up all the time, that building something today with today’s knowledge and then thinking 30 years 

from now might not be the way we should do this. What we might 

want to do is look back at the 1950s, look back at the 1960s, when 

we were building multiple aircrafts over a shorter time period. If 

we are going to build something today and fly the wings off it— 

we are going to fly the F–35 for 50 years. There is no doubt in my 

mind that we are going to do that. We are building a bomber right 

now that we are projecting probably for a 40- or 50-year timeframe. 

And then probably in 20 years from now, we will start talking 

about a new bomber. 

So I might ask that we think about a new strategy of not flying 

the wings off and of not buying 100, and then when we need them 

or when they are down—and I have Edwards Air Force Base in my 

district. I get to watch the B–2 all the time because there is always 

one or two of them over there. That means if we have 20 of them 

and 2 of them are at the test facility, those are not 2 that are capable of going out. And we have to refurbish, and we have to go 

through the whole process. I have seen this, and I understand that 

we have learned a whole lot from the B–2 to what we are going 
17 

to do with a Long-Range Strike Bomber with stealth technology, 

with the reapplication of the skin, with all these types of technology. 

But I would just ask if this is the proper—I will support this as 

long as we keep the price down and it accomplishes the mission. 

But is this the proper stance that America should look at? Or 

maybe should we look at two or three aircraft in a 50-year timeframe, where they overlap, and we are not looking at a 10- or 12- 

year time period of when we are thinking about it, when we are 

building it, and when we are testing it, and then it goes IOC [initial operating capability], because this aircraft will not be in the air 

for that young captain to fly until about 2025? That means today, 

until then, we have the B–52, the Bone [B–1], and the B–2. So that 

is my question. 

General ELDER. Congressman Knight, your point is actually accurate, and I believe, I’m not read in on the program, but based 

on everything I have heard about the program and the public testimony that—why I keep referring back to this open mission systems 

and the open architecture. It is a physics problem basically to design a stealth platform in terms of plan, form, and the basic shape 

that actually makes it stealthy. There are other things you can add 

to it that make it stealthier, but in terms of adding the capabilities 

to the platform, in the past, the problem that we had was that if 

you were going to try to change these things, you had to break into 

the airplane basically to do it. What they realized after the work, 

particularly with the B–2, was that they needed to have a way that 

they could make substantial capability improvements to the airplane, whether that was a weapon system. You have to remember 

so much of this is involved with the code, but it also has to do with 

communications. If you need to put a new aperture, as they call it, 

a new antenna, an aperture on the plane, it would require this 

major amount of testing. They don’t have the problem with the 

LRS–B, and they have already demonstrated—all three of the vendors involved with this have demonstrated their ability to comply 

with these open mission standards, and they have various different 

tests that show that they can make this work. So, in effect, they 

are actually doing what you have suggested because the airplane 

that is built in 2025 will be different than the one that is built in 

2030 in terms of capabilities it has, but the neat thing is that they 

will be able to take the one that was built in 2025 and bring it up 

to that 2030 capability, because they can put the same software 

and because of the way it has been designed in the first place. 

Mr. KNIGHT. General, I am not going to cut you off, but I am 

going to grab some time here. I understand that, and software is 

what F–35, F–22, to much of the extent F–16 and F–15 do today. 

You cannot change the structure of an aircraft. So if I built the 

structure of an aircraft today, that will be the structure that I have 

in 2050. That will be it. So if something changes in that time period, that they can see our bombers quicker or they can address our 

bombers quicker, because of the structure, I am stuck, I am done. 

I might be able to do some sort of software, I might be able to do 

some sort of jamming upgrades, but if something happens in the 

next 40 years that stops me from doing that because of the structure, I am stuck. 
18 

Mr. GUNZINGER. Very quickly, sir, you are right. It is very difficult to change the plan, form, shape, and size of an aircraft after 

it has been designed and produced. You can do things like give it 

new codings. You can put maybe new leading edge treatments on 

it, things that can improve its stealth characteristics. You might 

also be able to do some things to give it active as well as passive 

measures to improve its ability to survive. But like we all understand, I believe, stealth is the product of active and passive measures, and not just one aircraft but multiple platforms operating together to include cyber operations to create the environment where 

you defeat the enemy’s kill chain, the air defense kill chain. And 

it does not remain invisible, but all you have to do is prevent him 

from getting a good shot. 

Mr. KNIGHT. I appreciate that, and I appreciate the chair letting 

me go over just a little bit. I understand that, and I will be highly 

supportive of this, again, if we can stay within the budget and 

within the parameters we have set forth. I just think that this 

should be a discussion that we move forward with in the future, 

that we talk about these programs that overlap more than talking 

about a program that—now the B–2 is 25 years old. I was there 

at the rollout, and I was there at the 25th anniversary. It is still 

our top bomber with 10 or 15 years from where we are going to 

get to the next bomber. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, we want to thank our witnesses for being here 

today. As we mentioned at the outset to each of you, we would love 

to give you some time to do a wrap-up of what you think we need 

to have on the record for this program. So we are going to give you 

that time now if you need it. And any clarifications for anything 

on the record or any additions, we would love to hear from you at 

this time. 

General, we will once again start of off with you, and we will finish with Dr. Grant. 

General ELDER. Well, Mr. Chairman, and the committee, again, 

I really do appreciate the opportunity to be here. This platform, I 

am not read in on this platform. I was very familiar with the airplane that was going to be built in 2018, and they made a conscious decision at that time that they were going to lock in the requirements and they were going to work with technologies that 

were well known, well developed. When I was still on Active Duty, 

I remember I had some great ideas myself. I said that this would 

be a great thing to have on this new airplane, and they said: We 

will put it into the mix for a possible adaptation down the road, 

but it is not a proper TRL [technology readiness level] level or the 

level of sophistication that we are willing to consider because we 

only want to bring things into this platform that we know will 

work when we integrate them together. 

But at the same time, they said: Don’t worry because we are 

building this airplane so that these new capabilities can be added 

later on. We have gone to great efforts to make sure they do that, 

and they have had programs to continue to do that. 

As Dr. Grant pointed out, the teams that developed the 2018 

bomber, the Department of Defense right away provided money to 

keep those teams working, so as they put together the new, which 
19 

then became the LRS–B, so these teams have been consistent for 

a long period of time, which is part of the reason that I am very 

confident that this airplane is going to have the great capabilities 

that we are attributing to it. And I also believe it is going to have 

the adaptability and, from talking to people who are involved with 

the program, who say: I wish I could tell you about the program, 

I wish I could tell you. It is just absolutely phenomenal what they 

have done with this program. I have talked to logisticians, who are 

usually the biggest ones to complain about a program, because they 

say they forgot about us. And they said: It is phenomenal. They 

thought about us. They thought about how to maintain it. There 

has been a big push to keep high emission-capable rates, which 

means that you have to make it easy to maintain. All these things 

have been worked in. 

So while I haven’t been read into the program, the people I know 

that are very familiar with this—and I guarantee would have no 

qualms at all to complain to me if they thought there was an 

issue—are just ecstatic about this. I have always liked to think of 

myself, I grew up in Strategic Air Command, and I was someone 

who thought a lot about deterrents. And with the fall of the Berlin 

Wall, there was a lot of people who thought we did not need to 

think about deterrence anymore because we didn’t have a Soviet 

Union. They were right that we didn’t need to worry about the Soviet Union anymore, but they were wrong to think that we didn’t 

need to worry about someone else coming and finding some way to 

attack us. And we have had these various different ways. We have 

grown much more sophisticated in terms of our understanding of 

how to use military force in concert with other instruments of national power to be effective, and we have seen not only bombers but 

all of our military force. 

But I will try to highlight the bombers, how they have been used 

in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, in Libya, in Iraq, to be able 

to do things that we typically don’t think about the airplanes doing. 

And, again, this goes to those great captains who say: Hey, you 

know, I know what we can do this with airplane. And then you 

have some great strategic leaders or operational leaders who say: 

Boy, now that you have showed me we could do that, we can work 

this thing in, and we can make it effective. 

The LRS–B provides a platform. It is kind of like, I like to use— 

You buy an iPhone or you buy an Android—it doesn’t matter—and 

it gives you capabilities to bring all these different apps that you 

can put on. And as Mr. Gunzinger was pointing out, these apps— 

there are a lot of apps. They can be electronic warfare apps. They 

can be ISR apps. They can be bombing apps. They might be cyber 

apps. All these things are possible because this particular platform 

was designed not only to be something that is easily adaptable, but 

it also was designed to be part of a family of systems. So this ability to interoperate with maritime forces, with ground forces, with 

space forces, it really is an important aspect of this. 

And whereas the B–2 was largely developed, initially at least, 

that it would try to go in alone and unafraid and that is why you 

weren’t going to see it because there wasn’t much around. This 

time they are recognizing you are going to want to use this platform in cases where people are looking for you, so you are just 
20 

going to make it really difficult for them to pick you out. And because the plan form of this thing, that is the physics of it, it makes 

it very difficult for acquisition and particularly for the radars that 

are actually used to target, to be able to hit, but it is bringing in 

all of the different types of stealth. It is stealth across the entire 

electromagnetic spectrum to make this thing very hard to go 

through as, Mr. Gunzinger, the kill chain. You can’t—not just 

enough to see it, to actually put a weapon against, it is going to 

be very difficult. And I believe from the people that I have talked 

to, although I can’t personally witness to because I haven’t seen it, 

but I believe that the Nation is going to be very impressed when 

they see this airplane. And I believe that the Department is going 

to be able to use this platform in conjunction with the Navy, the 

Army, and the Marine Corps to do some very good things for national security for the Nation. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Gunzinger. 

Mr. GUNZINGER. Yes, very quickly. We did essentially end up 

with a silver bullet force in the B–2s in the 1990s, and pretty much 

the F–22s, I would have continued production of that as well. Because we devalued stealth, the air defense strike wasn’t there, but 

today it is. And it is just going to be increasing in the future, and 

these technologies are proliferating, so stealth increasingly is going 

to be the price of admission into future fights. 

The second is long range and large payloads. Aircraft that can 

fly from more distant airfields out of the immediate threat of the 

short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles is 

going to be very important to us. That might reshape the kind of 

force we want in the future. 

The third, we have said it has been about 10 years since the 

2006 QDR. It is going to be about another 10 years for LRS–Bs to 

show up in numbers. That period could be longer. We focused on, 

should it be 80 to 100 or something more? And I agree with my 

fellow witnesses that, yes, I think the number is eventually going 

to be much larger than that, but that is a 2020s decision. Of more 

importance to me is, how quickly can we field this force? And if the 

yearly procurement rate is set pretty low due to budget problems, 

budget caps, budget constraints, then it is just going to extend into 

the future our long-range penetrating strike capability gap. So that 

is something that you might focus on as well. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Grant, we are going to let you have the last 

word. 

Dr. GRANT. It comes down to two things: First, your excellent 

question. What happens if we don’t get a new bomber? If we don’t 

get a new bomber, our adversaries will hide and keep in sanctuary 

hostile military capabilities, like anti-satellite weapons, like potential weapons of mass destruction. And these capabilities will 

threaten our national security and the world we live in, and we 

won’t be able to do anything about it. 

Second question, should we buy this bomber, the one that is coming to down select? And I say yes. I think this is the one. But from 

what the Air Force has said, they have conducted more risk reduction. They have taken a new approach, and they have built on tre-
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mendous technologies from other programs. This is the one to buy. 

We can’t afford the risk of waiting. Thank you very much. 

Mr. FORBES. We want to thank all three of you for being here. 

We give you, as I told you before, an open invitation as you see this 

process. What Mr. Cook raised, what Mr. Knight raised, great 

questions. We actually posed some of these to them before this 

hearing because these are important things to do. 

Mr. Courtney and I recently were at some briefings, and I think 

we were both informed and both concluded that probably cutting 

that F–22 production line was one of the worst mistakes we made 

for national defense in some time. So we need to get these things 

correct and make sure that we are able to produce them. 

But we thank you for giving us your expertise, your wisdom, and 

your knowledge on this. If no one has anything else, then we are 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 9, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 9, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 9, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. The LRS–B will have a much higher per-unit cost than our current fighter aircraft. However, achieving the strike power of a single long-range 

bomber takes dozens of fighters. Given that operating a dozen fighter aircraft presents an operation and sustainment bill far in excess of what it would take to support a bomber, What can the Air Force and DOD do to more clearly articulate a 

long-term enterprise view for the LRS–B? 

General ELDER. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union 

changed the focus of the entire DOD from deterrence and preservation of global stability to expeditionary operations focused on regional instabilities and restoration of 

regional stability. No longer did the U.S. face a global threat, and with the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, combatant commanders rightly emphasized planning for regional contingency operations with assigned forces rather than depending 

on out-of-area capabilities such as long-range strike bombers. The success of Desert 

Storm strengthened the belief that long-range airpower had become a niche capability, although this perspective failed to consider the impact of bombers flying from 

bases outside the region. Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo reinforced this 

misperception. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq again highlighted the value of 

bombers. LRS–B and the legacy bombers are not niche capabilities—sufficient numbers are important. 

It is important to ensure that the American people, particularly key decisionmakers, understand the unique role of long-range strike bombers to the success of 

U.S. military operations abroad. Specifically, long-range strike bombers can reach 

targets across the globe without the need for costly and time-consuming expeditionary deployment. This provides the Nation a rapid response capability at the outset of a crisis which can be transformed later into one providing persistence strike 

capabilities for extended operations. 

LRS–B benefits from the Open Mission System (OMS) lessons gained on other Air 

Force platforms. The OMS approach will enable LRS–B to incorporate new technologies throughout its long service life at much less cost than its predecessors. To 

put this in perspective, the capabilities of today’s bomber fleet are significantly 

greater than the capabilities these same platforms possessed when they first entered service. The same evolution in capability will be true for the LRS–B, but upgrades will occur more often and at less cost. 

With a fleet properly sized to meet Combatant Commander demands, which 

should equate to one combat-coded bomber squadron for each of the ten Expeditionary Air Forces, the Air Force will also be able to obtain economy of scale when 

sustaining the LRS–B fleet, making it less costly to operate. 

Finally, the LRS–B will provide never-before-seen advantages for operations in 

contested (anti-access/area denial) environments. Leveraging low probability of 

intercept (LPI) networking capabilities developed for use in current fighter platforms will enable the LRS–B to employ new concepts of operation which will increase its survivability and mission effectiveness. 

Ms. BORDALLO. We have learned a lot over the past 14 years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq about the need to securely link ISR data with responsive firepower and access to the command and control network. The MQ–1 Predator and 

MQ–9 Reaper were pioneers in this regard—linking sensors, firepower, and data 

links in an incredibly potent fashion. What steps need to be taken to ensure the 

LRS–B harnesses a similar approach? 

General ELDER. Earlier bombers were initially designed to fly as standalone platforms incorporating all the necessary sensors and self-protection capabilities to ensure individual bombers could deliver their weapons on target using only their organic capabilities. When datalinks and other technologies which provide connectivity 

to external sources of information were developed, the legacy bomber fleets were 

modified to incorporate these new systems. This postured them to operate more effectively as part of large force packages and employ precision weapons with ‘‘realtime’’ information. But in general, these external data capabilities were ‘‘strap on’’ 

modifications rather than fully integrated system solutions. The LRS–B was designed to be a key element in the future networked force, so it will incorporate exist-
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ing stealth communication technologies equal to, or better than those on today’s 

most advanced platforms. Unlike legacy bombers, these capabilities will be fully integrated into the operation of the LRS–B weapon system. With the use of Open Mission Systems (OMS), the LRS–B will be able to easily incorporate new C2 network 

capabilities, links and other sources of data as they become available, and fully integrate new external sensors and other sources of information. In short, next steps 

to ensure the LRS–B can securely link ISR data with responsive firepower and access to the command and control network throughout its service life should focus 

on advancing and implementing open mission systems to the greatest extent possible. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The LRS–B will have a much higher per-unit cost than our current fighter aircraft. However, achieving the strike power of a single long-range 

bomber takes dozens of fighters. Given that operating a dozen fighter aircraft presents an operation and sustainment bill far in excess of what it would take to support a bomber, What can the Air Force and DOD do to more clearly articulate a 

long-term enterprise view for the LRS–B? 

Mr. GUNZINGER. While unit costs and operation and sustainment (O&S) costs 

should inform development of the future force, DOD and the Air Force should articulate how requirements for bombers and fighters are driven by different operational needs. They should also explain how fundamental aeronautics principles 

govern the design of advanced military aircraft. Combat aircraft designed to carry 

bomber-sized payloads over very long ranges may not have the ability to out maneuver surface-to-air and air-to-air threats. Similarly, combat aircraft designed to optimize their stealth characteristics—such as the B–2 ‘‘flying wing’’—may not be highly 

maneuverable. 

I anticipate that DOD has sought to optimize the LRS–B’s stealth, range, and 

payload capabilities simultaneously. These characteristics will greatly increase our 

Nation’s penetrating strike ‘‘magazine depth.’’ LRS-Bs should also be capable of carrying large, specialized munitions that are effective against hardened or deeply buried targets that cannot be carried in the internal weapons bays of much smaller 

fighter aircraft. 

That said, pairing heavy strike aircraft such as the LRS–B with high-performance 

fighters will increase options for U.S. commanders and complicate the defensive 

challenge for our Nation’s enemies. For instance, high-performance fighters can escort penetrating bombers or help suppress enemy defenses to allow LRS-Bs to 

achieve their missions. 

Bottom line, while fighters and bombers have different unit and O&S costs, they 

are complementary capabilities. DOD and the Air Force should articulate a case for 

why both are needed by our Nation’s warfighters. 

Ms. BORDALLO. We have learned a lot over the past 14 years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq about the need to securely link ISR data with responsive firepower and access to the command and control network. The MQ–1 Predator and 

MQ–9 Reaper were pioneers in this regard—linking sensors, firepower, and data 

links in an incredibly potent fashion. What steps need to be taken to ensure the 

LRS–B harnesses a similar approach? 

Mr. GUNZINGER. MQ–1 Predators and MQ–9 Reapers are the product of ad hoc 

requirements and development processes. Their C2/ISR linkages are far more 

‘‘clunky’’ compared to what should be expected of the LRS–B. Moreover, while Predators and Reapers were effective in Iraq and Afghanistan, they are not well suited 

for operations in contested or denied environments. LRS–B design teams have the 

advantage of applying lessons-learned from development of the MQ–1 and MQ–9 as 

well as the most advanced stealth airplanes in the world, the B–2, F–22, F–35, and 

B–2. They also have considerable experience in designing advanced low probability 

of intercept/low probability of detection (LPI/LPD) communications systems. As a 

consequence, it should be expected that LRS-Bs will have advanced data link technologies—high bandwidth, low latency, LPI/LPD—and associated methods for fusing 

information. These capabilities would enable LRS-Bs to maintain near-real-time 

awareness of the threat environment using information from off-board and on-board 

sources. The LRS–B’s sensor suite should also be a significant step forward from 

anything the Air Force now operates. The combination of advanced sensors, a stateof-the art communications suite, and large weapons capacity would make the LRS– 

B much more than a ‘‘bomber.’’ It should have the potential to act independently 

with a vast array of weapons, perform as a key node that provides real-time situational awareness to other penetrating capabilities, and conduct net-centric, collaborative warfare operations as part of the long-range strike family of systems. In summary, the LRS–B should be capable of doing anything MQ–1s and MQ–9s can do 

with greater speed, range, payloads, and in highly contested operational conditions. 
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Ms. BORDALLO. The LRS–B will have a much higher per-unit cost than our current fighter aircraft. However, achieving the strike power of a single long-range 

bomber takes dozens of fighters. Given that operating a dozen fighter aircraft presents an operation and sustainment bill far in excess of what it would take to support a bomber, What can the Air Force and DOD do to more clearly articulate a 

long-term enterprise view for the LRS–B? 

Dr. GRANT. Previous analyses have shown that one long-range bomber can often 

hit more targets than a dozen or more fighters. Add in extra supporting aircraft and 

the efficiency of the bomber stands out. Aircrew and maintainers are key drivers 

in combat aircraft sustainment costs. Crewing a dozen fighters may require up to 

16 pilots based on war readiness manning. A bomber like the B–2 may require only 

2–4 aircrew to meet the same standards. This is just one quick example of how 

bombers provide significant aircrew cost savings from an enterprise perspective. 

Ms. BORDALLO. We have learned a lot over the past 14 years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq about the need to securely link ISR data with responsive firepower and access to the command and control network. The MQ–1 Predator and 

MQ–9 Reaper were pioneers in this regard—linking sensors, firepower, and data 

links in an incredibly potent fashion. What steps need to be taken to ensure the 

LRS–B harnesses a similar approach? 

Dr. GRANT. Building a new long-range strike bomber will actually make it easier 

to ensure the bomber has sensors and datalinks to securely link to the command 

and control network. Software-programmable communications, the flexibility of 

AESA radar, and even potential laser-based communications links can be part of the 

bomber from the start. The Open Mission Systems practice developed by the USAF 

and used on systems like the B–2 will ensure that the new LRS–B can add in new 

communications, sensor and processing capabilities as technology advances. 

Æ