[Cite as State ex rel. Anderson v. Vermilion, 134 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320.] 

THE STATE EX REL. ANDERSON, APPELLANT, v. THE CITY OF VERMILION,

APPELLEE. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Anderson v. Vermilion, 

134 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320.] 

Public records—R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v)—Information on itemized attorney-billing 

statements that was not protected by the attorney-client privilege should 

have been disclosed. 

(No. 2012-0943—Submitted November 14, 2012—Decided November 21, 2012.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Erie County, 

No. E-10-040, 2012-Ohio-1868. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Jean A. Anderson, appeals from a judgment denying her 

request for a writ of mandamus to compel appellee, the city of Vermilion, Ohio, 

to provide copies of certain itemized billing statements for attorney services 

rendered to the city. Because the city did not establish that the entirety of the 

requested statements are exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act, 

we reverse that portion of the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the 

cause for further proceedings. We affirm the portion of the judgment denying 

Anderson’s request for an award of statutory damages and attorney fees. 

Facts

{¶ 2} Anderson served as the mayor of Vermilion from January 2006 

through December 2009. During her administration, the law firm of Marcie & 

Butler, L.P.A. (“Marcie & Butler”) provided legal services to the city, and the 

firm’s provision of services extended into the next mayor’s term. The new 

mayor, Eileen Bulan, appointed Kenneth Stumphauzer as the city’s director of 
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law. Stumphauzer’s law firm, Stumphauzer, O’Toole, McLaughlin, McGlamery 

& Loughman Co., L.P.A. (“Stumphauzer & O’Toole”), billed the city over 

$27,000 for legal services provided during the first six weeks of the new mayor’s 

administration. 

{¶ 3} Because she thought that the annual legal fees expended by the 

new administration would far exceed the fees incurred during her administration, 

Anderson made several records requests to permit public scrutiny of the city’s 

expenditure of funds for legal services. On May 25, 2010, Anderson personally 

delivered a written public-records request to the city’s finance director for copies 

of certain records, including “all itemized billing statements received from 

Kenneth Stumphauzer, Stumphauzer & O’Toole, [and] Marcie & Butler, for 

January, February, March and April 2010.” 

{¶ 4} The city acknowledged its receipt of Anderson’s request but 

denied it on the basis that the requested legal bills are exempted from disclosure 

by the attorney-client privilege: 

[T]he detailed billing statements, describing the specific work 

performed for and advice rendered to the City by Stumphauzer 

O’Toole and any other lawyers rendering services to the City are 

covered by the attorney-client privilege. In particular, bills 

submitted by Stumphauzer O’Toole to the City describe each 

matter with respect to which legal services were rendered, the 

dates on which such legal services were rendered and the specific 

tasks performed. As a result, we cannot agree to provide you with 

those detailed itemized billing statements. 

{¶ 5} In September 2010, Anderson filed a petition in the court of 

appeals. Anderson sought a writ of mandamus to compel Vermilion to provide 
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3

copies of the nonexempt portions of the requested itemized attorney-billing 

statements. Anderson also requested an award of statutory damages and attorney 

fees. The court granted an alternative writ, and the city submitted an answer to 

the petition. Anderson filed a motion for summary judgment, and the city filed a 

brief in opposition. The court of appeals granted Anderson’s motion for an in 

camera review of the requested attorney-billing statements, and the city filed the 

statements under seal. 

{¶ 6} On April 25, 2012, the court of appeals denied Anderson’s motion 

for summary judgment, granted summary judgment in favor of Vermilion, and 

denied the writ. 

{¶ 7} This cause is now before the court on Anderson’s appeal as of 

right. 

Analysis

Summary Judgment

{¶ 8} The court of appeals denied Anderson’s motion for summary 

judgment and, in essence, granted summary judgment in favor of Vermilion by 

determining that “there remains no genuine issue of material fact and [the city] is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 6th Dist. No. E-10-040, 2012-Ohio1868, ¶ 13. See also Todd Dev. Co., Inc. v. Morgan, 116 Ohio St.3d 461, 2008-

Ohio-87, 880 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 17 (“When a party moves for summary judgment, the 

nonmovant has an opportunity to respond, and the court has considered all the 

relevant evidence, the court may enter summary judgment against the moving 

party, despite the nonmoving party’s failure to file its own motion for summary 

judgment”). 

{¶ 9} “Summary judgment is appropriate when an examination of all 

relevant materials filed in the action reveals that ‘there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.’ ” Smith v. McBride, 130 Ohio St.3d 51, 2011-Ohio-4674, 955 N.E.2d 954, 
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¶ 12, quoting Civ.R. 56(C). “In reviewing whether the trial court’s granting of 

summary judgment was proper, we apply a de novo review.” Troyer v. Janis, 132 

Ohio St.3d 229, 2012-Ohio-2406, 971 N.E.2d 862, ¶ 6. 

Mandamus

{¶ 10} The court of appeals entered summary judgment in favor of 

Vermilion on Anderson’s mandamus claim for itemized attorney-billing 

statements. “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 

R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.” State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 

Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 

2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6. “We construe the Public Records Act 

liberally in favor of broad access and resolve any doubt in favor of disclosure of 

public records.” State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 126 Ohio 

St.3d 224, 2010-Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 6. 

{¶ 11} Vermilion claims—and the court of appeals found—that the 

requested itemized attorney-billing statements are exempt from disclosure based 

on the attorney-client privilege. “Exceptions to disclosure under the Public 

Records Act, R.C. 149.43, are strictly construed against the public-records 

custodian, and the custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an 

exception.” State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 

2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, paragraph two of the syllabus. 

Attorney-Client Privilege

{¶ 12} R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) excludes “[r]ecords the release of which is 

prohibited by state or federal law” from the definition of “public record” for 

purposes of the Public Records Act. “The attorney-client privilege, which covers 

records of communications between attorneys and their government clients 

pertaining to the attorneys’ legal advice, is a state law prohibiting release of 

[those] records.” State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 535, 542, 

721 N.E.2d 1044 (2000). 
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5

{¶ 13} More specifically, we have held that the narrative portions of 

itemized attorney-billing statements containing descriptions of legal services 

performed by counsel for a client are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 

State ex rel. Dawson v. Bloom-Carroll Local School Dist., 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 

2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, ¶ 28-29; see also State ex rel. McCaffrey v. 

Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 133 Ohio St.3d 139, 2012-Ohio-4246, 976 

N.E.2d 877, ¶ 36. 

{¶ 14} Anderson requested itemized attorney-billing statements for 

services provided to Vermilion by Stumphauzer, Stumphauzer & O’Toole, and 

Marcie & Butler for January, February, March, and April 2010. The Stumphauzer 

& O’Toole billing statements include the title of the matter being handled, e.g., 

the case name or general subject, a narrative description of the legal services 

provided, the hours expended, and the amount due. The Marcie & Butler 

statements include the dates the services were rendered, a narrative description of 

the services rendered, the hours and fee rate for the services provided, and the 

amount of money billed. 

{¶ 15} Under the Public Records Act, insofar as these itemized attorneybilling statements contain nonexempt information, e.g., the general title of the 

matter being handled, the dates the services were performed, and the hours, rate, 

and money charged for the services, they should have been disclosed to Anderson. 

“If a public record contains information that is exempt from the duty to permit 

public inspection or to copy the public record, the public office or the person 

responsible for the public record shall make available all of the information within 

the public record that is not exempt.” R.C. 149.43(B)(1). 

{¶ 16} The parties submitted the requested attorney-billing statements 

under seal for the court of appeals’ review. As we have held, the nonexempt 

portions of the records submitted under seal in public-records mandamus cases 

must be disclosed: 
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“[W]hen a governmental body asserts that public records are 

excepted from disclosure and such assertion is challenged, the 

court must make an individualized scrutiny of the records in 

question. If the court finds that these records contain excepted 

information, this information must be redacted and any remaining 

information must be released.” 

(Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Master v. Cleveland, 75 Ohio St.3d 23, 31, 661 

N.E.2d 180 (1996), quoting State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. 

Cleveland, 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 N.E.2d 786 (1988), paragraph four of the 

syllabus. 

{¶ 17} Consequently, in McCaffrey, 133 Ohio St.3d 139, 2012-Ohio4246, 976 N.E.2d 877, at ¶ 35-37, we held that the respondents in a public-records 

mandamus case had complied with a records request by providing copies of civilcase logs that had been redacted to exclude the narrative portions of the logs that 

were covered by attorney-client privilege. 

{¶ 18} The city nevertheless makes three separate arguments to support 

the court of appeals’ conclusion. Vermilion first claims that Anderson waived her 

right to the nonexempt portions of the requested attorney-billing statements 

because after the court of appeals’ judgment, she requested summaries of the 

information in attorney bills excluding attorney-client information and the city 

satisfied that request. It is true that providing the requested records to a relator 

generally renders moot a public-records mandamus claim. See State ex rel. 

Striker v. Smith, 129 Ohio St.3d 168, 2011-Ohio-2878, 950 N.E.2d 952, ¶ 22. But 

Anderson’s postjudgment records request was for records for a different period of 

time—June 2010 through May 2012—than the period at issue in this case—

January through April 2010. Therefore, Anderson did not waive her mandamus 
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claim or appeal by seeking and receiving different records than those at issue in 

this case. 

{¶ 19} The city next claims that it need not provide copies of the 

nonexempt portions of the requested attorney-billing statements because after 

redacting the narrative portions that are covered by the attorney-client privilege, 

the remainder would be “meaningless.” But there is no indication that the city’s 

subjective belief concerning the value of this information is true. The provision 

of information concerning the hours expended and rate charged for attorney 

services may have some value to the requester. Nor is there any exception to the 

explicit duty in R.C. 149.43(B)(1) for public offices to make available all 

information that is not exempt after redacting the information that is exempt. 

{¶ 20} Finally, the city contends that the statements were either exempt 

from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege or so inextricably intertwined 

so as to also be privileged. The court of appeals agreed with that assertion based 

on our decision in Dawson, 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, 

where we noted that attorney-billing statements withheld by a school district were 

“either covered by the attorney-client privilege or so inextricably intertwined with 

the privileged materials as to also be exempt from disclosure.” Id. at ¶ 29. 

{¶ 21} Nevertheless, in the very same paragraph cited by the city and 

relied on by the court of appeals, we emphasized that the school district did not 

have to provide the nonexempt portions of the statements to the requester in that 

case because the district had already provided summaries containing the 

nonexempt information: 

Therefore, the school district properly responded to Dawson’s 

request for itemized invoices of law firms providing legal services 

to the district in matters involving Dawson and her children by 

providing her with summaries of the invoices including the 
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attorney’s name, the fee total, and the general matter involved. No 

further access to the detailed narratives contained in the itemized 

billing statements was warranted. 

Id.

{¶ 22} In essence, the relator in Dawson was not entitled to the 

nonexempt portions of the requested itemized attorney-billing statements, because 

she had already been provided that information by the school district in the 

summaries. This rendered the relator’s claim for that part of the records moot. 

Striker, 129 Ohio St.3d 168, 2011-Ohio-2878, 950 N.E.2d 952, at ¶ 22. 

{¶ 23} This is the crucial fact that distinguishes this case from Dawson. 

Vermilion did not provide Anderson with alternate records that contain the 

nonexempt information from the requested attorney-billing statements for January 

2010 through April 2010. Therefore, her claim for these records is not moot, and 

she is entitled to that portion of the statements after they have been redacted to 

prevent disclosure of the narrative portions that are covered by the attorney-client 

privilege. R.C. 149.43(B)(1); Natl. Broadcasting Co., 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 

N.E.2d 786, at paragraph four of the syllabus. By concluding otherwise, the court 

of appeals erred. 

{¶ 24} Therefore, the court of appeals erred in denying Anderson’s 

motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the 

city on Anderson’s public-records mandamus claim. Anderson established her 

entitlement to a writ of mandamus to compel Vermilion to provide her with 

copies of the nonexempt portions of the requested itemized attorney-billing 

statements. 

Statutory Damages and Attorney Fees

{¶ 25} Anderson claims that the court of appeals also erred in denying her 

request for statutory damages and attorney fees. In assessing this claim, we 
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review whether the court of appeals abused its discretion in denying the request. 

State ex rel. Patton v. Rhodes, 129 Ohio St.3d 182, 2011-Ohio-3093, 950 N.E.2d 

965, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 26} The court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Anderson’s request, because a large part of the requested statements are exempt 

from disclosure. See State ex rel. Mahajan v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 127 Ohio 

St.3d 497, 2010-Ohio-5995, 940 N.E.2d 1280, ¶ 64 (denying request for statutory 

damages and attorney fees for reasons including that most of the public-records 

claims lacked merit). In addition, a well-informed public office could have 

reasonably believed, based on our decision in Dawson, 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-

Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, at ¶ 29, that the nonexempt portions of the attorneybilling statements could be withheld from disclosure. See R.C. 149.43(C)(1) and 

(2); see also State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-4149, 914 

N.E.2d 159, ¶ 37 and 40. 

Conclusion

{¶ 27} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in granting 

summary judgment in favor of the city and denying Anderson’s claim for a writ of 

mandamus. We reverse that portion of the judgment of the court of appeals and 

remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm 

the portion of the judgment denying Anderson’s request for statutory damages 

and attorney fees. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL,

LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

 Seeley, Savidge, Ebert & Gourash Co., L.P.A., and Andrew D. Bemer, for 

appellant. 
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 Weston Hurd, L.L.P., Shawn W. Maestle, and Timothy R. Obringer, for 

appellee. 

______________________