Opinion issued October 18, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

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NO. 01-16-00125-CV

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KATHY MONROE, Appellant

V.

GRAYSON LAKES COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the 400th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 14DCV219687

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Kathy Monroe attempts to appeal the trial court’s denial of her petition for bill 

of review. Grayson Lakes Community Association, the appellee, has moved to 

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, contending that Monroe’s notice of appeal 
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was untimely. We conclude that the notice of appeal was untimely and therefore

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Background

On October 15, 2015, the trial court denied Monroe’s Petition for Bill of 

Review in the underlying case. On October 30, 2015, Monroe timely filed a “Motion 

for New Trial[,] Motion to Reconsider and For a More Definite Order.” The trial 

court signed an order denying Monroe’s motion on January 26, 2016. On February 

12, 2016, 120 days after the judgment, Monroe filed her notice of appeal. Appellee 

filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In response, Monroe argues that 

“[t]he appeal is a restricted appeal based upon the failure of the court to state the 

reasoning behind the denial of the bill of review.” 

Discussion

I. The notice of appeal was not timely filed to invoke appellate jurisdiction.

Generally, a notice of appeal is due within thirty days after the judgment is 

signed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. The deadline to file a notice of appeal is extended 

to ninety days after the date the judgment is signed if, within thirty days after the 

judgment is signed, any party timely files a motion for new trial, motion to modify 

the judgment, motion to reinstate, or, under certain circumstances, a request for 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a); TEX. R. CIV. P.

329b(a), (g). The time to file a notice of appeal may also be extended if, within 
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fifteen days after the deadline to file the notice of appeal, a party properly files a 

motion for extension. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.5(b), 26.3. A motion for extension of 

time is necessarily implied when an appellant, acting in good faith, files a notice of 

appeal beyond the time allowed by Rule 26.1, but within the fifteen-day extension 

period provided by Rule 26.3. See TEX .R. APP. P. 26.1, 26.3; Verburgt v. Dorner, 

959 S.W.2d 615, 617–18 (Tex. 1997).

Here, the trial court signed the order from which Monroe appeals on October 

15, 2015. Monroe filed a motion for new trial on October 30, 2015 that was later 

denied. Because Monroe filed a motion for new trial, the notice of appeal deadline 

was extended to 90 days following the trial court’s judgment; thus, her notice of 

appeal was due by January 13, 2016. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. Monroe did not file 

her notice of appeal until February 12, 2016—120 days after the deadline. Without 

a timely filed notice of appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 25.1.

II. Because this appeal is not a restricted appeal, the rules of appellate 

procedure do not extend the appellate deadlines to confer jurisdiction.

In response to the motion to dismiss, Monroe contends that her notice of 

appeal was timely because she claims that this is a restricted appeal. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 26.1(c) (“in a restricted appeal, the notice of appeal must be filed within six 

months after the judgment or order is signed”). 
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Monroe asserts:

The Bill of Review was not a trial but a hearing without having 

a full evidentiary hearing. Further, there was no evidence 

allowed or permitted at the hearing. There was no trial for Kathy 

Monroe to participate in which produced the order. She was no 

able to present evidence. There is no clear definition of 

participation in the case. This appeal is clearly within the 

restricted appeal as there was never a trial on the Bill of Review 

which would have produced a judgment.

Monroe relies on Norman Communications v. Texas Eastman to list the 

requirements for an appeal by writ of error under former Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 45. See 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997). As the Texas Supreme Court 

noted in that case, however, Rule 45 was repealed and replaced by Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 30 on September 1, 1997. See Norman Commc’ns, 955 S.W.2d 

at 270 n.1. Thus, the requirements of Rule 30, not former Rule 45, govern whether 

Monroe’s appeal qualifies as a restricted appeal. 

Rule 30 provides in relevant part that: 

A party who did not participate—either in person or through 

counsel—in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained 

of and who did not timely file a post judgment motion or request 

for findings of fact and conclusions of law, or a notice of appeal 

within the time permitted by Rule 26.1(a), may file a notice of 

appeal within the time permitted by Rule 26.1(c).

TEX. R. APP. P. 30. Accordingly, to be entitled to a restricted appeal under Rule 30, 

Monroe must establish that (1) she filed notice of the restricted appeal within six 

months after the judgment was signed, (2) she was a party to the underlying lawsuit, 
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(3) she did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of 

and did not timely file any post-judgment motions or requests for findings of fact 

and conclusions of law, and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record. Alexander 

v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004); see TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c), 

30.

Monroe fails to meet Rule 30’s requirements for a restricted appeal. First, the 

record demonstrates that Monroe and her counsel participated in the hearing that 

resulted in the denial of her bill of review. Monroe argues that the bill of review was 

“not a trial but a hearing” and “[t]here was no trial for [her] to participate in which 

produced the order.” But, unlike former Rule 45, Rule 30 requires that the party 

demonstrate that she did not participate in “the hearing that resulted in the judgment 

complained of.” TEX. R. APP. 30. Second, Monroe filed a post-judgment motion for 

a new trial within the time permitted. Rule 30 requires that Monroe establish that she 

did not timely file any post-judgment motions. Because she participated in the 

hearing in the trial court and timely filed a post judgment motion seeking a new trial, 

Monroe fails to meet the requirements for a restricted appeal under Rule 30.
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Conclusion

We grant Grayson Lakes Community Association’s motion to dismiss this 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Any other pending motions are dismissed as moot.

Jane Bland

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bland, Massengale, and Lloyd.