J-S17032-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.J., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.S., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 339 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Juvenile Division at CP-51-DP-0000067-2020 

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.J., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.S., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 340 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Juvenile Division at CP-51-DP-0000239-2020 

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.D.J., A 

MINOR 

APPEAL OF: S.S., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 367 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 5, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Juvenile Division at CP-51-AP-0000566-2022 

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.J., A 

MINOR 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 
J-S17032-24 

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APPEAL OF: S.S., MOTHER 

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: No. 368 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 5, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Juvenile Division at CP-51-AP-0000567-2022 

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 24, 2024

 S.S. (Mother) appeals from the decrees involuntarily terminating her 

parental rights to her two sons, M.J., a/k/a M.D.J, and D.J., a/k/a D.M.J. 

(Children).1 Mother also appeals from the orders changing Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

M.J. was born in August 2017, and D.J. was born in January 2020. The 

Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved with the 

family the day after D.J. was born, when both D.J. and Mother tested positive 

for Subutex, Klonopin, cocaine and marijuana. N.T., 12/4/23, at 14. 

While D.J. remained in the hospital, DHS sought emergency protective 

care of M.J. The trial court granted DHS emergency protective custody of M.J. 

on January 17, 2020. M.J. was placed in kinship care with Children’s adult 

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1

 Children’s father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights. N.T., 12/4/23, 

at 12-13, 51. 
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brother, J.J., and J.J.’s wife, R.J. (Foster Parents). Id. at 42. On January 28, 

2020, the trial court adjudicated M.J. dependent. 

On February 21, 2020, the trial court granted DHS emergency protective 

custody of D.J. D.J. was discharged from the hospital and placed in kinship 

care with M.J. and Foster Parents. The trial court adjudicated D.J. dependent 

on March 2, 2020. Children have resided with Foster Parents since their 

placement in 2020. Id. Foster parents are a pre-adoptive resource. Id. at 

43. 

At the inception of the case, the trial court ordered Mother to obtain a 

dual-diagnosis assessment, complete drug and alcohol screens and treatment, 

and attend supervised visits with Children. The court also ordered Mother to 

participate in parenting, domestic violence, housing, and employment services 

as recommended by the Achieving Reunification Center (ARC). 

After a permanency review hearing in March 2021, the court found 

Mother was in “minimal compliance with [her] permanency plan.” Order, 

3/12/21. The court noted Mother “made only 2 visits [with Children] since 

the last court date[, and] Mother appears at the visits under the influence.” 

Id. The court continued to order that Mother, inter alia, obtain a “full drug 

and alcohol screen, dual diagnosis assessment, and 3 random [drug screens] 

prior to [the] next court date.” Id. 

After a review hearing in June 2021, the trial court again ordered Mother 

to obtain “a dual diagnosis assessment and forthwith screen plus 3 random 

screens.” Order, 6/21/21. The court also “referred [Mother] to ARC for 
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appropriate services[, with] Mother to provide an updated treatment plan and 

progress notes.” Id.

After a review hearing in November 2021, the trial court found Mother 

had made “minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances which 

necessitated [Children’s] original placement.” Order, 11/1/21. The court 

ordered that Mother be “re-referred to ARC for appropriate services.” Id.

At hearings in May and July 2022, the trial court found “no compliance 

with [Mother’s] permanency plan,” and “no progress toward alleviating the 

circumstances which necessitated the original placement.” Order, 5/13/22; 

Order, 7/29/22. 

On October 14, 2022, DHS petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights and change Children’s permanency goal to adoption. The trial court 

held hearings on December 4, 2023, and January 5, 2024. Mother had notice 

of the first hearing, but did not appear because she was incarcerated in Bucks 

County.2 N.T., 12/4/23, at 6, 44. 

DHS presented testimony from the Community Umbrella Agency (CUA)3

case manager, Beverly Jackson. Ms. Jackson confirmed that when the case 

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2

 Mother’s counsel learned that Mother was incarcerated shortly before the 

hearing. N.T., 12/4/23, at 6. The trial court bifurcated the hearing after 

determining that Mother could not testify remotely from Bucks County. Id.

at 10-12. The court “left the record open for Mother’s Counsel to present 

additional evidence at the next hearing should his client be released from 

custody.” Notice of Compliance with Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), 

2/6/24, at 1-2 (unnumbered). 

3

 CUA works with DHS to provide services. 
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began in 2020, Mother was given Single Case Plan (SCP) objectives of 

participating in drug and alcohol and mental health assessments and 

treatment, attending supervised visits with Children, and obtaining suitable 

housing and employment. N.T., 12/4/23, at 15. Ms. Jackson stated that 

Mother has had these same objectives “throughout the life of the case.” Id.

at 39. She specifically confirmed that Mother had not progressed with 

alleviating the circumstances that brought Children into care. Id. at 40. 

Ms. Jackson described Mother’s relationship with Children as “friendly,” 

but opined that Children do not view Mother as their parent. Id. at 50. 

According to Ms. Jackson, termination of Mother’s parental rights would not 

have a negative effect on Children. Id. at 51. 

Ms. Jackson has visited Children in their home with Foster Parents on a 

monthly basis. Id. at 59. She testified that Children are “very bonded” with 

Foster Parents, who provide for all of Children’s needs. Id. at 43, 51. Children 

refer to Foster Parents as “Mom” and “Dad.” Id. at 51. Ms. Jackson described 

the home as providing “consistency,” and being both “fun” and “safe.” Id. at 

42. 

 Mother did not appear at the second hearing, and her counsel stated 

that he had “no evidence” to present. N.T., 1/5/24, at 8. Counsel also stated 

that Mother had “been released from prison[, but] I haven’t had any contact 

with her.” Id.

 DHS recalled Ms. Jackson, who relayed that Mother had not visited 

Children in the month between hearings. Id. at 7. Ms. Jackson conducted a 
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home visit with Children on December 13, 2023. Id. at 6. She repeated that 

Foster Parents are Children’s “primary caretakers,” who Children “look to” for 

meeting their daily needs. Id.

 Children’s legal counsel, Attorney Carla Beggin, stated: 

I spoke with both [C]hildren. They are very happy where they 

are. 

They do want it to be a forever home. And they basically, in a 

rough way, understand the concept of the adoption. But they 

believe that [Foster Parents] are Mom and Dad. 

Id. at 8. 

 In advocating for termination, DHS’s counsel argued: 

The conditions which led to the removal and placement of both 

[C]hildren continue to exist. [C]hildren have been in care for an 

extended amount of time. 

[Mother has] failed to remedy the conditions [that resulted in 

Children’s placement] by [not] completing [her] single case plan 

objectives and visiting with [C]hildren. ... 

... The testimony was also that, under 2511(b), that there is no 

parent/child bond ... between [C]hildren and ... Mother. 

[C]hildren are well bonded with [Foster Parents]. They look to 

them as their primary caregivers for all their basic needs and 

everything that they would want. [Foster Parents] take care of 

[Children’s] medical and educational needs. 

[Foster Parents are] who [C]hildren look to for love, support, care, 

and comfort. And [it is DHS’s] belief that [Children] would suffer 

irreparable harm if they were removed from [Foster P]arents at 

this time. [DHS] would ask for the parental rights [of Mother] be 

terminated because it would be in [C]hildren’s best interest[, and 

DHS asks that] their goals ... be changed to adoption at this time. 

Id. at 9-10. 

 Children’s guardian ad litem (GAL), Attorney Pierre Simonval, added: 
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I’m in agreement with the recommendations of [DHS]. I’m also 

in agreement that [C]hildren would suffer irreparable harm if they 

were removed from their current placement. 

I’ve observed [C]hildren in placement. They’re extremely bonded 

with [Foster P]arents. And I believe, unfortunately, Mother has 

not presented enough to show a bond, a parent/child bond, or that 

she’s prepared to act [or] provide care for [C]hildren. 

I believe it’s in [C]hildren’s best interests to be ... adopt[ed] so 

they can remain in the home [with Foster Parents]. 

Id. at 10-11. Children’s legal counsel expressed her agreement with DHS and 

the GAL. Id. at 11. 

Mother’s counsel argued against termination, stating that Mother had 

“completed some services and classes,” and “was compliant with her mental 

health treatment, which is always an ongoing component in a case like this.” 

Id. Mother’s counsel also stated that “even though she didn’t complete any 

drug and alcohol treatment,” Mother had “a drug prescription in the past for 

[benzodiazepines].” Id. 

 The trial court announced its decision to change Children’s permanency 

goal to adoption, and terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1),(2),(5),(8), and (b). Id. at 12. On January 5, 2024, the trial 

court entered the respective orders and decrees. 

Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) at each docket.4 

Rather than author an opinion, the trial court issued an order giving notice 

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 On February 20, 2024, this Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte. 
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that it “stated on the record the reasons for its entry of the [decrees] 

involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights.” Notice of Compliance with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 2/6/24, at 1 (unnumbered). 

ISSUES 

Mother presents the following questions for review: 

1. Did the [t]rial [court] rule in error that [DHS] meant [sic] its 

burden of pro[ving] that Mother’s parental rights to h[er] children 

be terminated[?] 

2. Did the trial [court] rule in error that [] terminating Mother’s 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of [C]hildren[?] 

3. Did the trial [court] rule in error that the goal be change[d] to 

adoption[?] 

Mother’s Brief at 7. 

ANALYSIS 

We initially recognize that in “cases concerning the involuntary 

termination of parental rights, appellate review is limited to a determination 

of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence.” Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation 

omitted). An appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and 

credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. Id. When the 

trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may 

not disturb the ruling “unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of 

discretion.” Id. This standard of review reflects our deference to trial courts. 

Id. at 830. 
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The Adoption Act is the statutory authority for termination of parental 

rights and provides for a bifurcated analysis. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511-2514. 

First, the trial court must focus on the parent’s conduct and “the eleven 

enumerated grounds” for termination in 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a). Interest of 

M.E., 283 A.3d at 830. If the court finds grounds for termination under 

Section 2511(a), it must then assess the children’s needs and welfare under 

Section 2511(b), “giving primary consideration to the developmental, physical 

and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 

267 (Pa. 2013). This Court “need only agree with [the] decision as to any one 

subsection of [Section 2511(a), in addition to Section 2511(b),] to affirm the 

termination of parental rights.” In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc). 

1. Grounds for Termination 

In her first issue, Mother argues that DHS did not meet its burden of 

proving grounds for termination under Section 2511(a). Mother’s Brief at 9-

10. As the petitioner, DHS must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

its asserted grounds for termination are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 

276 (Pa. Super. 2009). The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of 

the evidence, make credibility determinations, and resolve conflicts in the 

evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). As this Court “need only agree with ... any one 
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subsection,” B.L.W., supra, we examine the trial court’s finding of grounds 

for termination under subsection 2511(a)(1). 

A parent’s rights may be terminated when: 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a 

child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) (emphasis added). 

 Mother claims DHS did not prove grounds for termination because 

“Mother was engaged in her goals and was not relinquishing a claim or fail[ing] 

to perform parental duties.” Mother’s Brief at 10. According to Mother, “she 

was compliant with her mental health treatment,” but was unable “to 

participate in the drug and alcohol program” because “Mother had a valid 

prescription for the [d]rugs she was testing positive for on the drug screens.” 

Id. at 12. Mother also states she was “remedying the drug and alcohol issue” 

and “maintaining the bond with [C]hildren.” Id. at 13. She references a 

“housing assessment” she completed on October 9, 2020, and a “financial 

education class” she completed on October 8, 2022. Id. at 10-11. Mother 

concedes she “did not have housing or employment,” but states that “she was 

remedying the situation and was trying to make improvements in housing.” 

Id. at 11. Mother’s argument lacks merit. 

 As DHS explains: 

By March of 2021, Mother’s level of compliance with the 

permanency plan had deteriorated to minimal, she was not 

making progress towards reunification, and ... was appearing for 

visits with [C]hildren while under the influence of a controlled 
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substance. (LRD Nos. 34, 29, 26, Permanency Review Order and 

Exhibits dated 3/12/21, 11/21/21, 5/13/21). 

Considering that Mother’s minimal level of compliance and lack of 

progress persisted, on October 22, 2022, or thirty-four (34)

months after M.J. came into care, DHS petitioned the trial court 

to terminate her parental rights and change [C]hildren’s goals to 

adoption. On this record[,] ... the trial court correctly found that 

Mother failed to perform parental duties and terminated her 

parental rights to M.J. and D.J. 

DHS’s Brief at 19-20 (citing In re Julissa O., 746 A.2d 1137, 1141 (Pa. Super. 

2000) (recognizing a parent’s “affirmative duty to work toward the children’s 

return”)). 

As discussed above, the record supports the trial court’s finding that 

Mother failed to perform parental duties “for a period of at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing of the [October 22, 2022] petition.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). The trial court concluded that Mother “failed to alleviate 

[Children’s] need for placement.” N.T., 1/5/24, at 12. The trial court 

explained: 

The record reflects that [C]hildren have been in care an inordinate 

amount of time. Since placement, single case plan objectives 

were established for reunification. 

While Mother has complied with some of her single case plan 

objectives, she has never been fully compliant with single case 

plan objectives, nor has she visited [Children] on a regular basis. 

N.T., 1/5/24, at 11-12. 

 There is ample support for the finding that Mother failed to perform 

parental duties for at least six months preceding the filing of the termination 
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petition. Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in 

terminating Mother’s parental rights under subsection 2511(a)(1). 

2. Children’s Needs and Welfare 

In her second issue, Mother repeatedly states that “[i]t would not serve 

the best interest of [C]hildren to terminate Mother’s rights[.] [C]hildren 

enjoyed their visits with [M]other.” Mother’s Brief at 27-28. She also repeats 

that she “was maintaining a bond with [C]hildren.” Id. Mother does not 

develop her argument beyond these statements and citation to boilerplate 

case law. Id.

In response, DHS asserts: 

Based on th[e] record, the trial court correctly concluded that the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would not cause [C]hildren 

to suffer irreparable harm and that their developmental, physical, 

and emotional needs and welfare were best served by termination 

of her parental rights and being freed for adoption by their kinship 

provider. 

DHS’s Brief at 27. We agree. 

 In terminating the rights of a parent under Section 2511(b), the trial 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “Notably, 

courts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing [their] 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for 

the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023). 

Courts must also “discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with 
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utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” 

Id. (citation omitted). However, 

the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case. Importantly, the question is 

not merely whether a bond exists, but whether termination would 

destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial relationship. 

In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 445 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations 

omitted). The parental bond “is but one part of the overall subsection (b) 

analysis, which includes a determination of whether the bond is necessary and 

beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” K.T., 296 A.3d 

at 1113. 

 Ms. Jackson’s testimony supports the trial court’s finding that 

termination served Children’s needs and welfare. Ms. Jackson testified that 

Mother’s “visits [with Children] never progressed to more than supervised.” 

N.T., 12/4/23, at 63. She relayed that M.J. was six years old and had been 

in care “for almost four years.” Id. at 35. She stated that M.J. could be 

“standoffish” and “kind of reluctant” during visits with Mother. Id. at 36. Ms. 

Jackson also opined that M.J. would not suffer irreparable harm from 

termination. Id. at 37. She explained: “I don’t think [M.J. is] bonded to 

[Mother].” Id. at 39. 

Regarding D.J., Ms. Jackson confirmed that he was four years old and 

had resided with Foster Parents since he was an infant. Id. at 38. She 

described D.J. as “more easygoing,” although “he goes where his brother 
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goes. He follows his big brother.” Id. Ms. Jackson also opined that D.J. 

would not be harmed by termination of Mother’s rights. Id. at 39. To the 

contrary, she testified that both Children would suffer if they were removed 

from their home with Foster Parents. Id. at 41. Ms. Jackson stated: 

[Children] have been in this position for almost four years. I think 

that they deserve to be in a place where there is going to be 

consistency. ... 

[T]hey enjoy the home they’re in. They have a lot of things there 

to help them learn and grow.... They have a stable home. And so 

I think it would be good for them to be adopted by [Foster 

Parents]. 

Id. at 40-41. Ms. Jackson reiterated her belief that adoption is in Children’s 

best interests. Id. at 44. 

 The trial court subsequently concluded: 

[C]hildren are extremely bonded with [Foster Parents], and they 

do not have a parent/child bond with [Mother]. ... 

These [C]hildren deserve permanency. And I find that it is in their 

best interest for the goal to be changed to adoption and the 

parental rights of [Mother] ... to be involuntarily terminated under 

... [Section] 2511 (b). 

N.T., 1/5/24, at 12. 

As the record supports this conclusion, the trial court did not err or abuse 

its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(b). 

3. Goal Change to Adoption 

In her third issue, Mother challenges the trial court’s decision to change 

Children’s permanency goal to adoption. However, Mother fails to address the 

goal change, factually or legally, in her argument. See Mother’s Brief at 7 
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(Statement of Questions Involved); id. at 29-30 (third section of the argument 

in which Mother does not mention goal change). 

We have stated repeatedly that “it is an appellant’s duty to present 

arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must 

support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record, 

and with citations to legal authorities.” In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 674 (Pa. 

Super. 2012) (citation omitted). “Moreover, when defects in a brief impede 

our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal 

entirely or find certain issues to be waived.” Id. This issue is waived because 

Mother has failed to present a cogent argument. 

Nonetheless, we note the issue would be moot because the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights. Interest 

of A.R., 311 A.3d 1105, 1114 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting In re Adoption of 

A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 446 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“The effect of our decision to 

affirm the orphans’ court’s termination decree necessarily renders moot the 

dependency court’s decision to change Child’s goal to adoption.”)). 

For the above reasons, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights and the change in Children’s permanency goal to adoption. 

 Decrees and orders affirmed. 
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Date: 6/24/2024