1

Filed 7/7/14 Young v. Daimler AG CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

KIMBERLY PATRICE YOUNG et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

DAIMLER AG,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A135999

 (County of Alameda 

 No. RG-10-509414)

In this products liability action, the trial court granted a motion to quash service of 

summons for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by specially-appearing defendant Daimler 

AG, a German public stock company (Daimler). Appellants contend that the trial court’s 

jurisdictional decision is erroneous, as a finding of general personal jurisdiction over 

Daimler is appropriate based on the substantial California contacts of current and former

indirect subsidiaries of Daimler that are attributable to the German company under 

theories of agency. Finding the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in 

Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 746] (Bauman II), dispositive on 

the jurisdictional issue and contrary to the arguments advanced by appellants, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 29, 2008, Kimberly Patrice Young (Young) and her daughter, Keyona 

Chester (collectively, appellants), were driving a 2004 Jeep Cherokee in San Joaquin 

County, California, when the vehicle rolled over, causing the roof to collapse. As a result 

of this incident, Young sustained catastrophic injuries, rendering her a permanent 

quadriplegic. In addition, Young’s daughter allegedly suffered both physical and 
2

emotional harm. On April 13, 2010, appellants filed the instant action (complaint), 

claiming that the roof and restraint systems of the 2004 Jeep Cherokee were defectively 

designed and caused the injuries they sustained in the 2008 rollover. 

The 2004 Jeep Cherokee at issue was designed, manufactured, and distributed by 

DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DCC), a former indirect subsidiary of Daimler. Thus, 

among others, the complaint named both Daimler and DCC as defendants. Daimler is a 

German Aktiengesellschaft (public stock company) that designs and manufactures 

Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany and has its principal place of business in Stuttgart.

Prior to 1998, DCC was known as Chrysler Corporation. Following a 1998 agreement, 

Chrysler Corporation became an indirect subsidiary of Daimler (then known as 

DaimlerChrysler AG) and changed its name to DCC. DCC was at all relevant times a 

Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. It ceased to be a 

subsidiary of Daimler in 2007, subsequently changing its name to Chrysler LLC. 

Daimler is not a successor-in-interest to either DCC or Chrysler LLC.1

Appellants personally served Daimler with the complaint in accordance with the 

Hague Convention. Subsequently, on April 7, 2011, Daimler filed a motion to quash 

service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. Specifically, Daimler asserted that 

there is no basis for personal jurisdiction (either general or specific) over Daimler in 

California.

2 General jurisdiction is lacking, Daimler averred, because it is not qualified, 

 

1 As is widely known, Chrysler LLC filed for bankruptcy in April 2009, becoming the 

first major American automaker to seek such protection since Studebaker in 1933. (See 

Rutenberg & Vlasic, Chrysler Files to Seek Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. Times (May 1, 

2009).) Although not part of our record on appeal, appellants report that DCC was 

subsequently dismissed from this action as part of its planned bankruptcy reorganization. 

2

Personal jurisdiction is “specific” when the suit “aris[es] out of or relates[s] to the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum.” (Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall

(1984) 466 U.S. 408, 414, fn. 8 (Helicopteros Nacionales).) “General jurisdiction,” in 

contrast, is appropriate over foreign corporations “when their affiliations with the State 

are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum 

State.” (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) ___ U.S. ___, ___ 

[131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851] (Goodyear); see also In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I and II

(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 108 (Automobile Antitrust Cases).) General jurisdiction, if 
3

licensed, or authorized to do business in California; does not maintain any office, agency, 

or representative in California; does not have any officers, employees or agents working 

for it in California; has not appointed an agent for service of process in California; does 

not conduct advertising or solicitation activities in California; does not operate any sales 

or service network in California; does not have a California bank account; does not own, 

use, or possess any California real estate; and does not pay California taxes. According 

to Daimler, to the extent any Mercedes-Benz vehicles manufactured by Daimler in 

Germany are distributed and sold in California, such distribution and sales are conducted 

by companies separate and distinct from Daimler. (Compare Goodyear, supra, 131 S. Ct. 

at p. 2852.) In addition, Daimler argued that the facts do not support a finding of specific 

jurisdiction over Daimler in this case as Daimler did not design, manufacture, or 

distribute the 2004 Jeep Cherokee at issue. 

Appellants opposed Daimler’s motion to quash, arguing that Daimler was properly 

subject to both specific and general jurisdiction in California. For instance, appellants

contended that specific jurisdiction was appropriate because the accident at issue was 

related to the California activities of DCC, Daimler’s indirect subsidiary. With respect to 

general jurisdiction, appellants urged the trial court to follow the Ninth Circuit’s recent

decision in Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2011) 644 F.3d 909 (Bauman I), which 

found Daimler subject to general jurisdiction in California based on the extensive 

California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), an indirect subsidiary of 

Daimler. Because of its importance to the ultimate resolution of this appeal, we review 

this Ninth Circuit decision in some detail.

In Bauman I, twenty-two Argentineans filed suit against Daimler in the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that one of 

Daimler’s subsidiaries—Mercedes-Benz Argentina—“collaborated with state security 

forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill the plaintiffs and/or their relatives during 

 

established, “may bring the defendant before California courts even if the cause of action 

is unrelated to the defendant’s activities in this state.” (Automobile Antitrust Cases, 

supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 109.) 
4

Argentina’s ‘Dirty War.’ ” (Bauman I, supra, 644 F.3d at p. 911.) Since these claims did 

not arise out of any contacts Daimler might have had with California, the sole question at 

issue in Bauman I was whether the district court had general personal jurisdiction over 

Daimler. (Id. at pp. 912, 919.) The Ninth Circuit concluded that it did, based on 

Daimler’s relationship with MBUSA. (Id. at pp. 912, 924.) 

The Bauman I court described MBUSA as follows: MBUSA is a Delaware 

limited liability company and indirect Daimler subsidiary. (It is a wholly owned 

subsidiary of a holding company which, in turn, is a wholly owned subsidiary of 

Daimler.) MBUSA acts as the sole distributor for all Mercedes-Benz vehicles in the 

United States, purchasing those vehicles from Daimler in Germany for sale in this 

country. (Bauman I, supra, 644 F.3d at pp. 913-914.) Although its principal place of 

business is in New Jersey, MBUSA has multiple California-based facilities, including a 

regional office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic 

Center in Irving. In fact, MBUSA is the largest supplier of luxury vehicles to the 

California market, with its California sales accounting for 2.4 percent of Daimler’s 

worldwide sales. (Ibid.) Based on these facts, the parties in Bauman I did not dispute 

that MBUSA, itself, is subject to general jurisdiction in California. (Id. at p. 914.) 

MBUSA’s distribution of Mercedes-Benz vehicles in the United States is 

governed by a General Distributor Agreement (GDA). After analyzing the provisions of 

the GDA “at some length,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that, under the terms of the GDA, 

Daimler has “the right to control nearly every aspect of MBUSA’s operations.” (Bauman 

I, supra, 644 F.3d at pp. 914-917, 920-924.) Additionally, the Bauman I court opined 

that the sale of Daimler’s cars in California was “sufficiently important” to Daimler 

that—if MBUSA went out of business—Daimler would continue selling its cars in 

California, either by itself or through another representative. (Id. at pp. 920-922.) Under 

these circumstances, the Bauman I court determined that MBUSA was Daimler’s agent 

for personal jurisdiction purposes, that MBUSA’s extensive contacts with California 

could therefore be imputed to Daimler, and that, as a consequence, Daimler was properly 

subject to general jurisdiction in California. (Id. at pp. 912, 920, 924.) The Ninth Circuit 
5

went on to conclude that the assertion of such jurisdiction over Daimler was reasonable

under the particular facts of the case. (Id. at pp. 924-931.) In the present action, 

appellants argued that the trial court should “follow the example” set by Bauman I and 

deny Daimler’s motion to quash.

The trial court, however, disagreed with appellants. After allowing for 

jurisdictional discovery, it granted Daimler’s motion to quash on June18, 2012. Noting 

that a plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts sufficient to justify the 

exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, 

Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062; Automobile Antitrust Cases, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 111), the trial court first stated that appellants had failed to present adequate 

evidence to support the existence of specific jurisdiction in this action. In particular, 

appellants had failed to show that Daimler “was directly involved in the design, 

manufacture, distribution or sale of the subject 2004 Jeep Cherokee.” The trial court next 

determined that no showing of general jurisdiction had been made. Specifically, citing 

Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 541, the trial court 

opined that appellants had not shown that Daimler exercised control over the day-to-day 

operations of either DCC or MBUSA that was “ ‘so pervasive and continual that the 

subsidiary may be considered nothing more than an agent or instrumentality of the 

parent.’ ” Finally, the trial court declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s Bauman I 

decision, noting that it was not binding precedent and finding that it was factually 

distinguishable.

Notice of entry of the trial court’s order was served on appellants by Daimler on 

June 21, 2012, and this timely appeal followed. Thereafter, on April 22, 2013, the United 

States Supreme Court granted Daimler’s petition for a writ of certiorari in Bauman I. 

(Bauman I, supra, 644 F.3d 909, cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman

(2013) ___ U.S. ___ [133 S.Ct. 1995].) On November 19, 2013, we stayed proceedings 

in this case pending the high court’s resolution in the Bauman matter. 
6

II. THE SUPREME COURT’S BAUMAN DECISION

On January 14, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in 

Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. 746, unanimously reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 

Bauman I.

3

 The Court began by noting that “California’s long-arm statute allows the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under the U. S. 

Constitution.” (Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 753; see also Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 410.10.) It therefore framed the issue as whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction 

over Daimler under the facts of the case “comports with the limits imposed by federal 

due process.” (Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 753.) 

After tracing the early history of personal jurisdiction, Justice Ginsberg confirmed 

that the “ ‘canonical opinion’ ” in the area remains International Shoe Co. v. Washington

(1945) 326 U.S. 310 (International Shoe), which held that the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is permissible “ ‘if the defendant has “certain 

minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” ’ ” (Goodyear, supra, 131 S.Ct. 

at p. 2853, quoting International Shoe; Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 754.) After 

International Shoe, the two distinct categories of personal jurisdiction that we recognize 

today—general and specific—developed, but while specific jurisdiction became “ ‘the 

centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory,’ ” general jurisdiction played “ ‘a reduced 

role’ ” and has been confined to “limits traditionally recognized.” (Bauman II, supra,

134 S.Ct. at pp. 754-755, 757-758, fn. omitted.) Indeed, prior to its decision in Bauman 

II, the high court had considered the application of general jurisdiction on only three 

occasions in the post-International Shoe era. (Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at pp. 755-

758; Goodyear, supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 2854.)

First, in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437 (Perkins), a 

Philippine company ceased its mining operations during the Japanese occupation of the 

 

3

Justice Ginsberg delivered the opinion of the Court, in which seven other justices 

joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. (Bauman 

II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 750.) 
7

Philippines in World War II. The company’s president moved to Ohio, where he kept the 

company’s files and conducted its corporate activities. (Id. at pp. 447-448.) General 

jurisdiction over the company in Ohio was appropriate in this “ ‘textbook case’ ” because 

the state was “ ‘the corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of business.’ ” (Bauman

II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at pp. 755-756.) In Helicopteros Nacionales, in contrast, general 

jurisdiction over a Columbian helicopter company in Texas state court was found to be 

improper. That case involved a helicopter crash in Peru that killed four U.S. citizens. 

The foreign helicopter operator’s contacts with Texas were limited to attending a

contract-negotiation session in Houston; purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training 

services from a Texas-based company for substantial sums; accepting checks drawn on a 

Houston bank; and sending personnel to Texas for training. (Helicopteros Nacionales, 

supra, 466 U.S. at p. 416.) The Court concluded that “the company’s Texas connections 

did not resemble the ‘continuous and systematic general business contacts . . . found to 

exist in Perkins.’ ” (Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 757.) 

Finally, in Goodyear, the high court determined that general jurisdiction over 

foreign subsidiaries of a United States parent corporation was not available under the 

facts of the case. Goodyear involved a bus accident outside of Paris that killed two boys 

from North Carolina and allegations that a defective tire manufactured by the Turkish 

subsidiary of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear USA) was responsible 

for the fatal crash. (Goodyear, supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 2850.) Although Goodyear USA 

had plants in North Carolina and did not contest jurisdiction, its foreign subsidiaries had 

no affiliation with the state. However, a small percentage of tires manufactured by the 

foreign subsidiaries were distributed in North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates. 

(Id. at pp. 2850, 2852.) Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsberg rejected the 

notion that placement of a product into the stream of commerce was sufficient to support 

a finding of general jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 2854-2855.) Rather, relying on International 

Shoe, Justice Ginsberg opined that general jurisdiction may only be asserted “over 

foreign (sister-state or foreign country) corporations to hear any and all claims against 

them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render 
8

them essentially at home in the forum State.” (Id. at p. 2851.) Since the foreign 

subsidiaries in Goodyear were “in no sense at home in North Carolina,” general 

jurisdiction over them was improper. (Id. at p. 2857.)

Based on these precedents, the Bauman II Court affirmed that “only a limited set 

of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction 

there.” (Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 760.) A corporation’s place of incorporation 

and principal place of business, for instance, are “paradigm all-purpose forums.” (Ibid.) 

Citing Perkins, the Court went on to acknowledge that “in an exceptional case” a 

corporation’s operations outside of these paradigm forums “may be so substantial and of 

such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” (Id. at p. 671, fn. 19.) 

However, it rejected as “unacceptably grasping” the plaintiff’s suggestion that general 

jurisdiction be deemed appropriate in every state in which a corporation “ ‘engages in a 

substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.’ ” (Id. at pp. 760-761.) 

Rather, the Bauman II Court emphasized the language of International Shoe—speaking in 

terms of “ ‘substantial’ ” and “ ‘continuous corporate operations within a state’ ”—and 

held that, for general jurisdiction purposes, a foreign corporation’s forum contacts must 

be “comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State.” (Bauman, supra, 134 S.Ct. at 

p. 758, fn. 11, 761.) Finally, the Court concluded that undertaking an analysis of general 

jurisdiction “calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, 

nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be 

deemed at home in all of them.” (Id. at p. 762, fn. 20.) 

The Court also noted that it had “not yet addressed whether a foreign corporation 

may be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-state 

subsidiary.” (Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 759.) In this regard, it was critical of the 

agency test applied by the Ninth Circuit in Bauman I, stating—“The Ninth Circuit’s 

agency finding rested primarily on its observation that MBUSA’s services were 

‘important’ to Daimler, as gauged by Daimler’s hypothetical readiness to perform those 

services itself if MBUSA did not exist. Formulated this way, the inquiry into importance 

stacks the deck, for it will always yield a pro-jurisdiction answer: ‘Anything a 
9

corporation does through an independent contractor, subsidiary, or distributor is 

presumably something that the corporation would do “by other means” if the independent 

contractor, subsidiary, or distributor did not exist.’ ” (Ibid.) The Court also faulted the 

Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Daimler’s right to control MBUSA based on a GBA that 

expressly established MBUSA as an independent contractor. (Id. at pp. 752, 760, fn. 15.) 

In the end, however, the Bauman II Court did not need to reach the agency issue because 

it held that—even assuming that MBUSA was at home (i.e., subject to general 

jurisdiction) in California and assuming further that MBUSA’s California contacts are 

imputable to Daimler—“there would still be no basis to subject Daimler to general 

jurisdiction in California, for Daimler’s slim contacts with the State hardly render it at 

home there.” (Id. at p. 760.) As a consequence, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 

general jurisdiction finding.4 (Id. at p. 763.)

III. GENERAL JURISDCITION IN THE WAKE OF BAUMAN

In the present appeal, appellants do not argue that Daimler’s own contacts with 

California are sufficient to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over the German 

corporation. Nor do they claim that specific jurisdiction over Daimler is appropriate

under the facts of this case.

5 Rather, as in Bauman II, appellants’ sole contention on 

appeal is that general jurisdiction over Daimler in California is proper based on Daimler’s 

relationship with MBUSA and MBUSA’s contacts with California.6

 

4

In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor stated that she would have found the 

exercise of general jurisdiction over Daimler unreasonable “ ‘in the unique circumstance 

of this case.’ ” (Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at pp. 762-764 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, 

J.).)

5

Indeed, it would be difficult to argue that this suit “aris[es] out of or relates[s] to” 

Daimler’s contacts with California for purposes of specific jurisdiction, given the trial 

court’s finding that Daimler was not shown to have been “involved in the design, 

manufacture, distribution or sale of the subject 2004 Jeep Cherokee.” (See Helicopteros 

Nacionales, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 414, fn. 8.) 

6

In their opening brief, appellants argued that the California contacts of DCC should also 

be imputed to Daimler under theories of agency and that such contacts further support a 

finding of general jurisdiction over Daimler. Appellants appear to have abandoned this 

claim in their reply brief, stating: “The only issue before the Court is whether the 
10

As stated above, “California courts may exercise jurisdiction on any basis that is 

not inconsistent with the state and federal Constitutions.” (Automobile Antitrust Cases, 

supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 107; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) Thus, the inquiry 

in California is whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction “comports with the limits 

imposed by federal due process.” (Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 753; Automobile 

Antitrust Cases, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 107-108.) “On review, we apply our 

independent judgment to the ultimate question of jurisdiction, but to the extent that the 

question of jurisdiction turns on factual issues, we are bound by the trial court’s findings 

of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (Automobile Antitrust Cases, 

supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 113-114; see also CenterPoint Energy, supra, 157 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1117 [in personal jurisdiction matters “ ‘ “we review independently the 

trial court’s conclusions as to the legal significance of the facts” ’ ”].) 

 

relationship between Daimler and its distributor subsidiary MBUSA, Inc. gives rise to 

general jurisdiction . . . .” However, even if the argument was still properly before us, we 

would find it unavailing. Unlike specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction is determined 

no earlier than at the time a suit is filed. (See DVI, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 104 

Cal.App.4th 1080, 1101 [exercise of general jurisdiction comports with due process when 

defendant “has substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with the forum at the time 

the complaint is served on that defendant”]; Serafini v. Superior Court (1998) 68 

Cal.App.4th 70, 78-80 [where defendant’s contacts with California arose solely out of his 

corporation’s contacts with the state and he had ceased working for the corporation prior 

to being served, defendant “absented himself and terminated any general jurisdiction of 

California over him”]; see also CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 

Cal.App.4th 1101, 1123-1124 [where subsequent to a corporate reorganization defendant 

succeeded only to the assets and liabilities of its predecessor’s regulated businesses, 

evidence of forum contacts by agent related to the predecessor’s unregulated businesses 

insufficient to support general jurisdiction over defendant] (CenterPoint Energy); 

Bauman I, supra, 644 F.3d at p. 914, fn. 7, citing Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. 

Co. (9th Cir. 1977) 556 F.2d 406, 422 [to support a finding of general jurisdiction, 

agency must be shown at the time suit was filed].) This makes sense as a finding of 

general jurisdiction is essentially a finding that a foreign defendant’s contacts with a 

forum are “ ‘so wide-ranging that they take the place of physical presence’ ” for purposes 

of service of process. (Serafini, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 78.) Since DCC ceased to be 

affiliated with Daimler long before the complaint in this action was filed or served, 

DCC’s contacts with California are irrelevant to our general jurisdiction inquiry. 
11

After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bauman II, we requested 

supplemental briefing from the parties regarding the impact of that decision on the 

continued viability of these proceedings. Unsurprisingly, Daimler argues that Bauman II

is indistinguishable from the present case and requires this court to affirm the trial court’s 

order quashing service. Specifically, Daimler points to multiple statements in the 

Bauman II opinion which indicate that—as a matter of due process under the United 

States Constitution—California courts do not have general personal jurisdiction over 

Daimler. (See, e.g., Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 751, 763 [“subjecting Daimler to 

the general jurisdiction of courts in California would not accord with the ‘fair play and 

substantial justice’ due process demands”]; id. at p. 760, fn. 16 [“California is not an allpurpose forum for claims against Daimler”]; id. at p. 761, fn. 17 [although “a 

corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or 

principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the 

corporation at home in that State[,] . . . Daimler’s activities in California plainly do not 

approach that level”].) Appellants, in contrast, attempt to distinguish Bauman II in 

several ways, none of which we find persuasive. 

First, appellants argue that Bauman II should be confined to its particular facts—

that is, to cases involving foreign parties “based on events occurring entirely outside of 

the United States.” (Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 750; see also id. at p. 751 [noting 

the question presented in Bauman II is “whether the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment precludes the District Court from exercising jurisdiction over 

Daimler in this case, given the absence of any California connection to the atrocities, 

perpetrators, or victims described in the complaint”].) Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs are 

from California, the accident occurred in California, the product was purchased in 

California, and a United States subsidiary of Daimler manufactured the product. Under 

such circumstances, appellants contend, it would not offend notions of due process to 

find Daimler “at home” in California for general jurisdictional purposes. 

In our view, appellant’s argument impermissibly “elide[s] the essential difference 

between case-specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction.” (Goodyear, supra, 131 
12

S.Ct. at p. 2855.) It is true that Justice Ginsburg does emphasize the entirely foreign 

nature of both the parties and the events underlying the Bauman II litigation. (Bauman II, 

supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 750; see also id. at p. 751.) She highlights these facts, however, not 

to create exceptions to the broadly applicable test ultimately adopted by the Court, but 

rather to point out the inadequacies of the expansive jurisdictional approach advocated by 

the plaintiffs. (See id. at pp. 760-761 [plaintiff’s suggested test “unacceptably 

grasping”]; id. at p. 754, fn. 5 [plaintiff’s would find Daimler amenable to suit in 

California for a Polish car accident that injured Polish plaintiffs].) Indeed, the test

endorsed in Bauman II—whether a foreign defendant is “ ‘essentially at home in the 

forum state’ ”—focuses on the defendant’s significant corporate presence in the forum. 

(Id. at pp. 751, 758 & fn. 11, 760-761 & fn. 19, 762 & fn. 20.) Thus, under Bauman II, 

the domicile of the plaintiffs and the location of the incident sued upon are essentially 

non-factors in the general jurisdiction calculus. (See also Goodyear, supra, 131 S.Ct. at 

p. 2857, fn. 5 [“ ‘[g]eneral jurisdiction to adjudicate has in [United States] practice never 

been based on the plaintiff’s relationship to the forum’ ”].) 

Appellant’s second contention—that Bauman II did not consider California’s 

representative services doctrine which would permit the assertion of general jurisdiction 

over Daimler in this case—is equally unpersuasive. As we have recognized, the 

representative services doctrine is “a species of agency.” (F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. 

Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 798.) As such, the result of its application is 

that “the contacts of a local agent through which a foreign principal acts may be imputed 

to that foreign defendant,” thereby conferring general jurisdiction over the foreign 

defendant under “agency principles.” (Automobile Antitrust Cases, supra, 135 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 119-120.) While the Bauman II Court questioned the formulation and 

application of the Ninth Circuit’s agency test, in the end it assumed agency and still 

concluded that MBUSA’s California contacts were insufficient to confer general 

jurisdiction over Daimler in California. (Bauman II, supra, 134 S.Ct. at pp. 758-760 

[“we need not pass judgment on invocation of an agency theory in the context of general 

jurisdiction, for in no event can the appeals court’s analysis be sustained”].) Thus, the 
13

specifics of the agency test applied are irrelevant to the Bauman II holding, as the result 

would be the same under any theory of agency.

7

In sum, appellants cannot escape the fact that the Bauman II decision controls with 

the instant action and mandates the conclusion that, barring the development of new 

facts, “California is not an all-purpose forum for claims against Daimler.” (Bauman II, 

supra,134 S.Ct. at p. 760, fn. 16.) We therefore decline to disturb the trial court’s order 

granting Daimler’s motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.

8

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Each party to bear their own costs.

 

7 Appellants’ final argument—that “any remaining factual issues relative to jurisdiction 

should be construed against Daimler” due to Daimler’s failure to cooperate in the 

jurisdictional discovery process—does not help them. We agree with the trial court that 

appellants have waived any issues regarding inadequate discovery by failing to raise them 

in a timely fashion in the court below, either through appropriate motions to compel or 

otherwise. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (b) [60-day deadline for motion to 

compel with respect to inadequate deposition testimony]; see also id., §§ 2030.300, subd. 

(c) [45 day waiver of right to compel further response for written interrogatories], 

2031.310, subd. (c) [same for document inspection], 2033.290, subd. (c) [same for 

requests for admission].) Regardless, given the holding in Bauman II and the outcome of 

this case, additional discovery into the “intricate and detail-rich relationships between 

[Daimler] and its subsidiaries” would hardly have been likely to lead to the production of 

facts establishing general jurisdiction over Daimler in California. (Automobile Antitrust 

Cases, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 127.) 

8 We do not, by our decision in this matter, mean to discount in any way the very real 

suffering Young has endured and will continue to endure as a result of the August 2008 

accident. We cannot, however, in our sympathy for Young, ignore the very clear 

boundaries for the exercise of general jurisdiction established by the Supreme Court in 

Bauman II, boundaries which were, themselves, erected to protect fundamental due 

process rights. 
14

_________________________

REARDON, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

_________________________

RIVERA, J.

_________________________

HUMES, J.