Filed 1/22/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

QUEEN SEARLES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL ARCHANGEL,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 B296011

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 18PDRO01062)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Amy Pellman, Judge. Affirmed.

Queen Searles, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

No appearance by Defendant and Respondent. 

___________________________
2

The superior court dismissed Queen Searles’s petition for a 

civil harassment restraining order when she was unable to 

personally serve Michael Archangel with a copy of the petition 

and notice of hearing as required by Code of Civil Procedure 

section 527.6, subdivision (m).1 On appeal Searles argues the 

court erred in denying her motion to waive traditional service 

and allow her to serve Archangel through social media. Although 

we acknowledge the practical merit to Searles’s request, the 

superior court properly concluded it was obligated to follow 

section 527.6’s express requirement for personal service. 

Accordingly, we affirm the order of dismissal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Petition for Restraining Order and Initial Hearing 

Dates

Searles, self-represented in the superior court as she is on 

appeal, filed a request for a civil harassment restraining order on 

July 23, 2018 using mandatory Judicial Council form CH-100, 

identifying Archangel as the person from whom protection was 

sought. In the lines for Archangel’s address Searles wrote, 

“None.”

Searles alleged that, while she was in her car in a parking 

lot near a Starbucks in the Burbank Empire Center on July 14, 

2018, Archangel threatened her “us[ing] a wicked looking stick to 

perform his personal form of Martial Arts, which he calls ‘Tae 

Kan Kick Yo Ass’ or [‘

]Tae Kick Yo Ass.’” Checking the section of 

the form requesting she be allowed to give less than five days’ 

notice of hearing, Searles wrote, “Petitioner does not know how to 

1 Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 

stated.
3

contact the Stalker, Michael (Yahziel) Archangel, coupled with 

the fact that an Empire Center Security Supervisor stated that 

the respondent is ‘smart enough to know when & how long to 

[stay] away.’ The stalker may stay away long enough to avoid 

being served prior to the scheduled court date as Petitioner told 

him that she would be filing on July 17, 2018 or as soon 

thereafter as possible. Petitioner is concerned that he may not 

come to any of the Starbucks locations where she is known to 

frequent for a while as he did in June 2018.” Searles included in 

an attachment to the petition an extended narrative of 

Archangel’s threatening conduct, as well as photographs of what 

she described as his intimidating actions and gestures.

The court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) on 

the same day as the petition was filed. In the portion of the TRO 

form filled out in advance by Searles, Archangel’s home address 

was listed as “unknown/homeless”; and he was described as an 

“unknown vagabond-stalker.” The order authorized service on 

Archangel by the sheriff or marshal without charge because it 

was based on a credible threat of violence or stalking. The 

hearing on Searles’s petition was scheduled for August 14, 2018.

Searles moved for a continuance of the August 14, 2018 

hearing, stating she had been unable to serve Archangel. She 

explained, Archangel “is homeless and avoids the area when he is 

aware that someone is looking to bring charges against him.” 

The court continued the hearing to September 6, 2018 and 

ordered that the previously issued TRO would remain in effect 

until the continued hearing date. Searles again moved to 

continue the hearing on September 6, 2018 when she remained 

unable to serve Archangel. The court granted the request, 
4

continued the hearing to September 27, 2018 and ordered the 

TRO to remain in full force and effect until the new hearing date. 

2. Searles’s Motion To Waive Traditional Service

Together with another request to continue the hearing, on 

September 27, 2018 Searles moved to waive traditional service 

and for authorization to serve Archangel by social media. 

Specifically, stating that Archangel followed her public Facebook, 

YouTube and Twitter postings, Searles requested leave to serve 

him by simultaneously posting the documents “to the Scribd 

website and linked to Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.”

In her supporting declaration Searles stated Archangel was 

intentionally making himself unavailable and described the 

efforts she had made to effect personal service, primarily 

requesting that employees and customers at various businesses 

where Searles had seen Archangel serve him with her papers if 

they saw him near their stores. 

In a legal memorandum Searles quoted several out-of-state 

cases in which service of process by social media had been

permitted, including Baidoo v. Blood-Dzrako (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) 

48 Misc.3d 309 [5 N.Y.S.3d 709] in which a New York family law

court authorized service of the summons in a divorce action 

through a direct message to the defendant’s Facebook account (he 

had no email address), a decision based on state statutes allowing

a court to authorize an alternative method of service if a 

sufficient showing had been made that personal service and 

traditional substitute service would be impractical and the 

method proposed was reasonably calculated to provide the 

defendant with actual notice of the pendency of the action. In 

reaching this conclusion, the court rejected service by publication 

as a viable option, explaining, “[I]t is almost guaranteed not to 
5

provide a defendant with notice of the action for divorce, or any 

other lawsuit for that matter.” (Id. at p. 316.) The court 

continued, “Under the circumstance presented here, service by 

Facebook, albeit novel and nontraditional, is the form of service 

that most comports with the constitutional standards of due 

process. Not only is it reasonably calculated to provide defendant 

with notice that he is being sued for divorce, but every indication 

is that it will achieve what should be the goal of every method of 

service: actually delivering the summons to him.” (Id. at p. 317.)

Searles asserted that Archangel, like the defendant in the

Baidoo case, could not be personally served and, because no one 

knew where he lived, he also could not be served by mail. 

Accordingly, she argued the court had discretion pursuant to 

section 413.30 to authorize service in a different manner provided 

it was reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party to 

be served, as she asserted use of social media would be in this 

case.

At the hearing on September 27, 2018 the court, after 

hearing Searles’s description of what she had done to date in her 

efforts to effect personal service, denied the motion to allow 

service by an alternative method and directed her to keep trying 

to serve Archangel personally, as required by section 527.6, 

subdivision (m). The court explained the Los Angeles County 

Sheriff’s Department could assist her and suggested she ask for 

help at the sheriff’s office located in the courthouse. The court 

continued the hearing to October 18, 2018 and ordered the TRO 

to remain in effect until that date.2

2 The court on September 27, 2018 also granted Searles’s 

request for a fee waiver, which included a waiver of any sheriff’s 

fees for serving the petition. 
6

3. Searles’s Renewed Motion and the Ultimate Dismissal of 

Her Petition Without Prejudice

With her October 18, 2018 request to continue the hearing 

date, Searles again stated Archangel could not be personally 

served and explained the sheriff had attempted service on 

October 1, 2018 at the Starbucks where Archangel was most 

often seen, but had returned the documents marked, “Not 

Found.” The hearing was continued to November 29, 2018. The 

TRO remained in full force and effect.3

On November 29, 2018 Searles renewed her motion for 

authorization to serve Archangel by social media, providing the 

court with a slightly modified version of the supporting 

documents she had previously filed. At the hearing the court 

denied Searles’s request to present witnesses to testify as to the 

difficulty of finding Archangel in order to personally serve him 

and denied her request for service by social media as 

unauthorized by the Code of Civil Procedure. The court stated it 

would give her one final opportunity to effect personal service on 

Archangel, continued the hearing to January 31, 2019 and 

extended the TRO through the hearing date. 

The court on January 31, 2019, noting that Archangel had 

not been personally served as required, dismissed Searles’s 

petition for a civil harassment restraining order without 

prejudice and dissolved the TRO. The court explained to Searles, 

3 On October 29, 2018 Commissioner Timothy Martella, who 

had presided over the proceedings subsequent to issuance of the 

TRO, accepted Searles’s peremptory challenge pursuant to 

section 170.6, filed October 10, 2018, and ordered the case 

reassigned to another court for the hearing on November 29, 

2018. 
7

if she still was concerned about being harassed, she could file 

another petition and request for a TRO, adding, “If it has merit, 

then it will get granted and that will give you some more time to 

have him served. If you can’t have him served, then you can’t.”4

DISCUSSION

1. The Developing Law of Service by Social Media

As discussed, in Baidoo v. Blood-Dzrako, supra, 48 Misc.3d 

309, cited by Searles, a New York family law court authorized 

service of the summons and complaint in a divorce case pursuant 

to state statutes generally allowing service “in such manner as 

the court, upon motion without notice, directs,” if service is 

“impracticable” by traditional methods including personal service 

and substitute service. (N.Y. CPLR § 308(5).) Similarly, in K.A. 

v. J.L. (2016) 450 N.J. Super. 247 the court approved service of a 

complaint and order to show cause via Facebook pursuant to 

rule 4:4-3(b) of the New Jersey Rules of Court, which permits the 

court to authorize an alternative method of service if the 

4 Searles on January 31, 2019 moved to vacate the orders 

entered on September 27, 2018 and November 29, 2018. As to 

the earlier order, Searles argued Commissioner Martella should 

have granted the challenge for cause she filed on October 29, 

2018, rather than her earlier filed peremptory challenge, and the 

September 27, 2018 order denying her motion to waive 

traditional service was invalid because he was biased against her. 

Any challenge to Commissioner Martella’s failure to grant her 

motion to disqualify him for cause, however, is not reviewable on 

appeal. (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 268.) As to the later

order, Searles contended Judge Dorothy Shuba, who presided at 

the November 29, 2018 hearing and denied her renewed motion, 

did not give her a fair hearing. The court (Judge Amy Pellman) 

did not rule on the motion before dismissing the case. 
8

plaintiff’s good faith attempts to effect personal service are 

unsuccessful: “If service cannot be made by any of the modes 

provided by this rule, any defendant may be served as provided 

by court order, consistent with due process of law.” (See also 

WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun (E.D.Va. Feb. 20, 2014, No. 1:13-CV00526-AJT-TRJ) 2014 U.S.Dist. Lexis 22084 [authorizing service 

of summons and complaint on a foreign defendant by email and 

social networking websites identified by defendant as belonging 

to him].) 

Texas has taken authorization of service of process by 

social media one step further. In 2019 the Texas Legislature 

directed that state’s supreme court to “adopt rules to provide for 

the substituted service of citation by an electronic communication 

sent to a defendant through a social media presence.” (Tex. Civ. 

Prac. & Rem. Code, § 17.033, subd. (b).) In response, the Texas 

Supreme Court on August 21, 2020 approved amendments to 

rule 106, subdivision (b), of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 

effective December 31, 2020, to provide, “Upon motion supported 

by a statement—sworn to before a notary or made under penalty 

of perjury—listing any location where the defendant can probably 

be found and stating specifically the facts showing that service 

has been attempted under (a)(1) [personal service] or (a)(2)

[registered or certified mail] at the location named in the 

statement but has not been successful, the court may authorize 

service: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) in any other manner, including

electronically by social media, email, or other technology, that the

statement or other evidence shows will be reasonably effective to

give the defendant notice of the suit.” The rule’s comment

explains, “Amended Rule 106(b)(2) clarifies that a court may, in 

proper circumstances, permit service of citation electronically by 
9

social media, email, or other technology. In determining whether 

to permit electronic service of process, a court should consider 

whether the technology actually belongs to the defendant and 

whether the defendant regularly uses or recently used the 

technology.”5

As summarized in a recent law review note, “Traditional 

methods of service of process are preferred, but are not always 

practicable. When a defendant cannot be reached through 

traditional methods, judges should use their discretion and allow 

alternative service by social media in appropriate cases. Current 

methods of alternative service, such as publication, are not 

efficient or effective. By allowing alternative service of process 

via social media in certain cases, the defendant is much more 

likely to receive actual notice in a cost-effective manner.” (Davis, 

Social Media: A Good Alternative, for Alternative Service of 

Process (2020) 52 Case Western Reserve J.Internat. Law 573.)

Commentators who support permitting courts to authorize 

service of process through social media in appropriate 

circumstances, however, have articulated several important 

5 According to the National Center for State Courts, Texas 

was not the first state to put into its rules such a provision. 

Rule 4(e) of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure permits a litigant 

to serve process through posting to the court’s legal notice 

website or to a social media account once the litigant has made a 

diligent effort to serve process by certified mail/restricted 

delivery/return receipt and/or via a process server. (See NCSC, 

New Texas Rules Explicitly Permit Service of Process Via Social 

Media (Aug. 27, 2020) <https://www.ncsc.org/information-andresources/trending-topics/trending-topics-landing-pg/new-texasrules-explicitly-permit-service-of-process-via-social-media> [as of 

Jan. 22, 2021], archived at<https://perma.cc/7QNX-E7BB>.)
10

limitations on its use. “First, the social media site itself must 

provide a platform consistent with service of process. This means 

that the site should offer a non-connected user a means of 

contacting another user through a private message. [fn. omitted.]

The messaging feature of the site must also have the ability to 

include attachments in the message so that the summons and the 

complaint can be attached and sent in the message. . . . [¶] 

Second, because a question will likely be raised about whether 

the account belongs to the defendant, the plaintiff must make 

reasonable efforts to verify the account through corroboration of 

the information contained in it. . . . [¶] Third, in order to 

establish timeliness of notice via social media, there must be 

evidence of the defendant’s use of the site, such as status 

updates, postings on others’ walls, connecting with other users, or 

similar activity. . . . If frequency of use cannot be shown or the 

user’s account has been set to private, service would not be 

permissible.” (Knapp, #serviceofprocess @socialmedia: Accepting 

Social Media for Service of Process in the 21st Century (2014) 

74 La. L.Rev. 547, 576; see Davis, Social Media: A Good 

Alternative, for Alternative Service of Process, supra, 52 Case 

Western Reserve J.Internat. Law at pp. 590-593 [noting issues 

related to authenticity of the social media account to which 

service was directed]; Upchurch, “Hacking” Service of Process: 

Using Social Media to Provide Constitutionally Sufficient Notice 

of Process (2016) 38 U. Ark. Little Rock L.Rev. 559, 580-590 

[explaining to be constitutionally sufficient social media notice 

must be directed to the proper person, conspicuous and verifiable 

and must permit sufficient access to the summons and 

complaint].)6

6 Notably, Searles’s motion sought leave to serve Archangel 
11

The question before us, however, is not whether it would be 

a sound policy development to permit the superior court to 

authorize service by social media, at least in those circumstances 

where service by publication in a newspaper is now deemed 

sufficient, let alone whether it should be permitted in civil 

harassment restraining order cases, where personal service of the 

petition and notice of hearing is now required. If it were, our 

answer to the first of those questions would be a qualified yes. As 

Justice Cooper wrote in Baidoo, “[A] concept should not be 

rejected simply because it is novel or nontraditional. This is

especially so where technology and the law intersect. In this age

of technological enlightenment, what is for the moment

unorthodox and unusual stands a good chance of sooner or later

being accepted and standard, or even outdated and passé.” 

(Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, supra, 48 Misc.3d at pp. 313-314.) 

We encourage the Legislature and the Judicial Council,

which have already authorized extensive use of electronic service 

of notice (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6; Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 2.251; see also Prob. Code, § 1215, subd. (c)), to consider 

developing pilot programs to test the efficacy of utilizing new 

technologies as an approved method of service of process. But as 

the superior court properly ruled in this case, current law 

requires personal service of the petition, TRO and notice of 

hearing in civil harassment restraining order cases and does not 

permit the court to approve alternative methods of service. 

by posting the petition and notice of hearing on her own social 

media platforms, not by directing it to Archangel’s sites, which 

poses different, but equally difficult, issues of verification of 

receipt (that is, of actual notice).
12

2. The Service Requirement in Civil Harassment 

Restraining Order Cases

Section 527.6, subdivision (a), permits a person who has 

suffered harassment as defined in the statute to seek an ex parte

TRO and, after notice and a hearing, a protective order 

prohibiting harassment for up to five years (frequently referred to 

as a “permanent” restraining order).

7 Section 527.6, 

subdivision (g), provides a hearing must be held on the petition 

within 21 days, or, if good cause is shown, within 25 days from 

the date a TRO has been granted or denied, although 

subdivision (p)(1) authorizes the court to grant a continuance of 

the hearing on the petition on a showing of good cause. 

Subdivision (m) provides, “Upon the filing of a petition under this 

section, the respondent shall be personally served with a copy of 

the petition, temporary restraining order, if any, and notice of 

hearing of the petition. Service shall be made at least five days 

before the hearing. The court may for good cause, on motion of 

the petitioner, or on its own motion, shorten the time for service 

on the respondent.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1160(c) [“The 

request for a protective order, notice of hearing, and any 

temporary restraining order, must be personally served on the 

respondent at least five days before the hearing, unless the court 

for good cause orders a shorter time. Service must be made in 

the manner provided by law for personal service of summons in 

civil actions”].)

7 The restraining order may be renewed for a duration of no 

more than five additional years without a showing of any further 

harassment since the issuance of the original order. (§ 527.6, 

subd. (j)(1).)
13

3. Section 413.30 Does Not Authorize Alternative Methods 

of Service in Civil Harassment Restraining Order Cases

Section 413.30 provides, “Where no provision is made in 

this chapter[8] or other law for the service of summons, the court 

in which the action is pending may direct that summons be 

served in a manner which is reasonably calculated to give actual 

notice to the party to be served and that proof of such service be 

made as prescribed by the court.” Searles argued in the superior 

court, and contends again on appeal, that, given her inability to 

effect personal service on a homeless respondent who was 

actively evading service by staying away from locations he 

usually visited, section 413.30 authorized the court to allow 

service by social media as an alternative that was reasonably 

calculated to give actual notice of the case to Archangel.

8 Chapter 4 of Part 2, Title 5, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 

in which section 413.30 is located, provides for service of 

summons in civil actions. Section 413.10 states, “Except as 

otherwise provided by statute, a summons shall be served on a 

person: [¶] (a) Within this state, as provided in this chapter.” 

Sections 415.10 through 415.95, also part of the chapter, describe 

the various permissible modes of service of summons, including 

personal delivery to the person to be served (§ 415.10); under 

defined circumstances, leaving a copy with a competent person at 

the home of the person to be served and thereafter mailing copies 

to that address, generally known as “substitute service” (§ 415.20, 

subd. (b)); mail with an acknowledgement-of-receipt form to be 

signed and returned (§ 415.30); and publication in a newspaper

“if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in 

which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot 

with reasonable diligence be served in another manner specified 

in this article” (§ 415.50). 
14

Searles’s position arguably finds support in unpublished 

United States District Court opinions that have construed 

section 413.30 as authorizing alternative methods of service of a 

summons, specifically by email, when traditional methods have 

proved ineffective. For example, in Beqa Lagoon Support 

Services v. Hasselman (S.D.Cal., Oct. 26, 2020, No. 20-CV-968

JLS (AHG)) 2020 U.S.Dist. Lexis 198751, the court, after noting 

that rule 4(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

(28 U.S.C.) (rule 4(e)(1)) authorizes service of process on an 

individual within the United States in conformity with the law of 

the state in which the district court is located, ruled 

section 413.30 permitted service by email after the plaintiff’s 

attempts to effect service by personal delivery through a certified 

process server and the sheriff and by certified mail and Federal 

Express had been unsuccessful, provided the plaintiff 

demonstrated email was reasonably calculated to provide actual 

notice of the pending case. Similarly, in Twitch Interactive, Inc. 

v. Johnston (N.D.Cal., Jan. 19, 2017, No. 16-CV-03404-BLF) 2017 

U.S.Dist. Lexis 7787 the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to 

serve defendants at their email addresses pursuant to rule 4(e)(1) 

and section 413.30, finding that the plaintiff had made 

substantial efforts to personally serve the defendants with the 

summons and complaint and that service by email was 

reasonably calculated to provide actual notice. (Accord, 

Facebook, Inc. v. Banana Ads, LLC (N.D.Cal., Mar. 27, 2012, 

No. C-11-3619 YGR) 2012 U.S.Dist. Lexis 42160 [authorizing 

email service of process pursuant to rule 4(e)(1) and 

section 413.30]; see also Floyd v. Saratoga Diagnostics, Inc.

(N.D.Cal., June 5, 2020, No. 20-CV-01520-LHK) 2020 U.S.Dist. 

Lexis 100279 [certified mail authorized as alternative method for 
15

service of summons pursuant to rule 4(e)(1) and section 413.30 

when personal service was unsuccessful].) 

In marked contrast to these decisions, the district court in 

Federal Insurance Company v. Caldera Medical Inc. (C.D.Cal., 

Apr. 8, 2015, No. 2:15-CV-00393-SVW-PJW) 2015 U.S.Dist. 

Lexis 187119 rejected the plaintiff’s request, made pursuant to 

rule 4(e)(1) and section 413.30, to authorize an alternative 

method of service of a summons—one not expressly authorized by 

the Code of Civil Procedure—explaining section 413.30 “permits a 

court to direct service ‘in a manner which is reasonably 

calculated to give actual notice to the party to be served’ so long 

as ‘no provision is made in this chapter or other law for the 

service of summons.’ [Citation.] The problem is that the Court 

just discussed the provisions providing for service of summons 

upon authorized agents. See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 416.90.[9] Thus, 

the Court cannot invoke Section 413.30 to circumvent

Section 416.90.” (Accord, Oh My Green, Inc. v. Cuffe (C.D. Cal., 

Mar. 20, 2020, No. CV-20-2509 PA PVCx) 2020 U.S.Dist. Lexis 

107056 [denying plaintiff’s request to serve defendant with the 

summons, complaint and moving papers in support of a TRO 

through email; “section 413.30 does not authorize service by 

alternative means when California law provides other methods 

for service”].)

We agree with the analysis of the district courts that 

decided Federal Insurance Company and Oh My Green, Inc. As 

discussed, the Legislature has expressly mandated that the 

9 Section 416.90 provides, “A summons may be served on a 

person not otherwise specified in this article by delivering a copy 

of the summons and of the complaint to such person or to a 

person authorized by him to receive service of process.” 
16

respondent in a proceeding for a civil harassment restraining 

order be provided notice of the hearing, together with a copy of 

the petition and any TRO, only through personal service. 

(§ 527.6, subd. (m).) Thus, section 413.30 is inapplicable in this 

situation: The necessary prerequisite for the court to authorize 

an alternative method of service—that “no provision is made in 

this chapter or other law for the service for summons”—is 

unsatisfied. Section 413.30 does not provide, as does, for 

example, section 308, subdivision (5), of the New York Civil 

Practice Law and Rules, that the court may order an alternative 

method of service if the procedures expressly identified by the 

Legislature prove impractical. Nor does section 527.6 state 

personal service is preferred, but other means of service may be 

employed if personal service is not feasible. 

Provisions of the Probate Code make clear that we cannot 

simply attribute to legislative oversight the absence of any 

provision authorizing the court to utilize Code of Civil Procedure 

section 413.30 if personal service in a restraining order case has 

proved unsuccessful. Probate Code section 1215 provides for 

service of notices and other papers in probate proceedings

through delivery by mail or personal delivery (and by electronic 

delivery with consent). However, Probate Code section 1212 

expressly directs the court to section 413.30 and authorizes 

alternative methods of service if neither of those methods is 

feasible: “Unless the court dispenses with the notice, if the 

address of the person to whom a notice or other paper is required 

to be delivered pursuant to [Probate Code] Section 1215 is not 

known, notice shall be given as the court may require in the 

manner provided in Section 413.30 of the Code of Civil
17

Procedure.”

10 The Legislature’s decision not to include a 

comparable provision for alternate forms of service in 

section 527.6 precludes our rewriting the statute to allow service 

other than by personal delivery. (See People v. Leal (2004)

33 Cal.4th 999, 1008 [“‘It is our task to construe, not to amend, 

the statute. . . . We may not, under the guise of construction,

rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the

plain and direct import of the terms used’”]; Cornette v.

Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63 73-74 [“[a]

court may not rewrite a statute, either by inserting or omitting 

language, to make it conform to a presumed intent that is not 

expressed”].)

4. Requiring Personal Service of the Notice of Hearing Did 

Not Violate Searles’s Due Process Rights

Even if not expressly authorized by statute or court rule, 

California courts have inherent authority to facilitate an indigent 

10 The limited scope of section 413.30 is illustrated by the Law 

Revision Commission Comment to section 1250.130, enacted in 

1975, which specifies additional requirements when service by 

publication has been ordered in eminent domain proceedings. 

After noting that sections 415.10 through 415.30 generally 

provide the manner of service in an eminent domain proceeding, 

the Commission explained, where service by publication is 

ordered pursuant to section 415.50, section 1250.130 requires 

that the court also order the plaintiff to post a copy of the 

summons and complaint on the property and record a lis pendens 

to increase the likelihood interested parties will receive actual 

notice of the proceeding. Citing section 413.30 the Commission 

then suggested, “The court should by order also give appropriate 

directions as to the manner of posting, e.g., location and number 

of copies.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 19 West’s Ann. Code 

Civ. Proc. (2007 ed.) foll. § 1250.130, pp. 490-491.)
18

civil litigant’s equal access to the judicial system by recognizing 

exceptions to, or variations in, general procedural requirements. 

(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 605.) Thus, in Cohen v. 

Board of Supervisors (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 236, 239, at a time 

when fee waivers in this state did not include costs for service of 

process, the court of appeal, relying on section 413.30, held

indigent parties in family law cases whose spouses could not be

found for personal service and who could not afford to pay costs of

service by publication could instead serve their spouses by 

mailing to their last known addresses and posting at those 

locations, a method of service of process described by the United 

States Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 

371 [91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 119].11 The Cohen court explained, 

“[T]here really is no other provision made by law for service, 

because although publication is theoretically possible, practically 

there is no way of efficient publication save by the doubtful 

expedient of ordering public officials to make expenditures which 

no statute authorizes them to make. This would be a measure 

justifiable, if at all, only if it were the sole available means of 

carrying into execution the service of summons which plaintiffs, 

as indigent litigants, rightfully demand as an incident of due 

process.” (Cohen, at p. 239.)

11 The Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, 

401 U.S. 371 held the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment requires states to allow an indigent party to divorce

proceedings to litigate without payment of fees and costs.

“[A]bsent a countervailing state interest of overriding 

significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and 

duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful 

opportunity to be heard.” (Id. at p. 377.)
19

Searles’s inability to obtain a permanent restraining order 

against Archangel, however, is not a product of her indigency. 

Searles paid no filing fee because she alleged, pursuant to 

section 527.6, subdivision (y), that Archangel had threatened 

violence against her or had acted in a manner that made her 

reasonably fear for violence. Similarly, there was no cost to 

Searles to have the sheriff’s department attempt to personally 

serve Archangel because the court granted her request for a fee 

waiver. The same difficulty Searles faced in trying to have 

Archangel personally served, a statutory prerequisite to issuance 

of a permanent restraining order, would confront any petitioner 

seeking a restraining order. There is no equal access issue here. 

Searles’s contention her inability to proceed against 

Archangel conflicts with a crime victim’s rights to justice and due 

process, as set forth in article I, section 28, subdivision (b), of the 

California Constitution, is misplaced. It may be that Archangel’s 

threatening conduct toward Searles constituted a crime. If so, he 

is subject to arrest; and, as his victim, Searles may qualify for a 

pretrial protective order pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2, 

subdivision (a), and, following a conviction, a more extended 

restraining order, valid for up to 10 years, under Penal Code 

section 646.9, subdivision (k). In seeking a civil harassment 

restraining order, however, Searles does not come within the 

scope of the victims’ rights provisions of the California 

Constitution.

Even though her petition was ultimately dismissed, 

Searles’s rights were fully protected in this case. The superior 

court rescheduled the hearing on her request for a permanent 

restraining order multiple times, from August 14, 2018 through 

January 31, 2019, continuing the TRO she obtained against 
20

Archangel for more than six months and providing her an 

extended opportunity to effect personal service. In addition, 

when it dismissed the petition, the court did so without prejudice, 

advising Searles that if Archangel was continuing to harass her—

something that seems unlikely given his disappearance—she 

could file a new petition and begin the process again, including 

obtaining another TRO if one was justified. Nothing more was 

required. 

DISPOSITION

The order dismissing the petition is affirmed. Searles is to 

bear her own costs on appeal.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.