NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

GARRISON BILLIE, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 20-0237 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017-147167-001 

The Honorable Laura Johnson Giaquinto, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Linley Wilson

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Robert W. Doyle

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 8-31-2021
STATE v. BILLIE

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge David D. Weinzweig

joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Garrison Billie appeals his convictions and sentences for two 

counts of aggravated driving under the influence. Billie’s counsel filed a 

brief per Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 

297 (1969) advising us there are no meritorious grounds for reversal. Billie 

filed a supplemental brief in propria persona. Our obligation is to review the 

entire record for reversible error, State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 

1999), viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

conviction and resolving all reasonable inferences against Billie, see State v. 

Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). After reviewing the record, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On May 20, 2017, at approximately 2:00 A.M., F.T. was exiting

off of Loop 101 onto northbound I-17 when he encountered a pickup truck 

crashed against the exit ramp wall. F.T. watched the driver attempt to move 

the vehicle and crash into the other side of the ramp. When the driver exited 

the vehicle and began walking away, F.T. informed the driver that he 

should remain at the scene. The driver ignored F.T. and left the scene of the 

accident. F.T. called the police and provided a description of the driver. 

Shortly after, police apprehended a suspect matching the description and 

requested F.T. identify the suspect. F.T. identified Billie as the driver of the 

vehicle. 

¶3 Billie was arrested after a horizontal gaze nystagmus test

indicated evidence of intoxication. Pursuant to a search warrant, Billie’s 

blood was drawn at 4:35 A.M. The blood draw revealed a blood alcohol 

concentration (“BAC”) of .223%. 

¶4 The State charged Billie with aggravated driving while under 

the influence of intoxicating liquor (impaired to the slightest degree) 

(“Count One”) and aggravated driving while under the influence of 
STATE v. BILLIE

Decision of the Court

3 

intoxicating liquor (BAC of 0.08% or more) (“Count Two”), both Class four 

felonies. 

¶5 Billie moved unsuccessfully under Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 20 for a judgment of acquittal and the jury convicted Billie as 

charged. After an aggravation hearing, the jury found the State had proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Billie lied to the police to hinder their 

investigation, left the scene of the crime, and was previously convicted of a 

felony within ten years immediately preceding the offense. 

¶6 The trial court found Billie had committed two prior nondangerous felony offenses and sentenced him to slightly mitigated terms of 

nine years on each count, to be served concurrently. The court also gave 

Billie credit for 227 days of presentence incarceration. Billie timely 

appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the 

Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 

-4033(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

¶7 Billie contends that his right to counsel was denied because 

his counsel provided ineffective assistance. This court does not consider 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims on a direct appeal because the issue 

must be raised in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Spreitz, 

202 Ariz. 1, 2, ¶ 4 (2002). 

II. Pre-Trial Discovery and Prosecutorial Misconduct 

¶8 Billie also contends the State failed to provide defense counsel 

with F.T.’s full name and address. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

15.1(b)(1) requires that, as part of pretrial discovery, the State must provide

defendant with the names and addresses of all persons the prosecutor 

intends to call as witnesses in the State’s case-in-chief. The purpose of the 

rule is “to give full notification of each side’s case-in-chief so as to avoid 

unnecessary delay and surprise at trial.” State v. Dodds, 112 Ariz. 100, 102 

(1975). While the record is not clear whether the State ever provided F.T.’s 

full name or address, Billie cannot claim surprise or prejudice as defense 

counsel interviewed F.T. prior to trial. Billie further contends the State 

prevented counsel from conducting a thorough interview of F.T. However, 

when defense counsel expressed a need for an additional interview with 

F.T., the court granted her request. On this record, Billie has shown no error 

nor any prejudice. 
STATE v. BILLIE

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4 

¶9 Lastly, Billie has failed to point to any meaningful evidence in 

support of his assertion of prosecutorial misconduct. Citation to a single 

comment made by the prosecutor during the direct examination of F.T. 

—that F.T.’s answers were “brief and succinct”—without a demonstration 

of how such comment “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 

resulting conviction a denial of due process,” is insufficient to prevail on a 

claim for prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79, ¶ 26 

(1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 

(1974)). Similarly, the comment did not address, let alone misstate, the 

reasonable-doubt standard of proof. See State v. Murray, 250 Ariz. 543, 

553-54, ¶¶ 37, 40 (2021) (defendant’s due process rights were violated, and 

his conviction overturned, where prosecutor misstated the 

reasonable-doubt standard). 

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶10 Billie alleges the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

convictions. “Reversible error based on insufficiency of the evidence occurs 

only where there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the 

conviction.” State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, 231, ¶ 6 (App. 2004) (quoting 

State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 200 (1996)). 

¶11 A person is guilty of aggravated driving while under the 

influence of intoxicating liquor if the person drives or is in actual physical 

control of a vehicle while the person’s privilege to drive is revoked and 

while the person is impaired to the slightest degree or has a BAC of .08% or 

more within two hours of driving or being in actual physical control of the 

vehicle. A.R.S. § 28-1383(A)(1). 

¶12 The State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

guilty verdict on both counts. The State introduced evidence that Billie was 

the driver of the vehicle, that he was aware his license was suspended at 

the time of the accident, that he was intoxicated, and that, based on a 

retrograde extrapolation, his BAC would have been above .08% within two 

hours following the accident. On this record, the jury reasonably concluded 

that Billie was guilty of both counts of aggravated driving under the 

influence. 

IV. Fairness of the Proceedings

¶13 All the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. So far as the record reveals, Billie was 

represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings. See State v. Conner, 

163 Ariz. 97, 104 (1990) (right to counsel at critical stages) (citations 
STATE v. BILLIE

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5 

omitted). Billie was present for jury selection and trial but absconded 

during jury deliberations and was not present for delivery of the verdict,

the aggravation phase, or the trial on priors. The trial court record of jury 

selection does not demonstrate the empanelment of any biased jurors.1 The 

jury was properly comprised of eight jurors, and the record shows no 

evidence of jury misconduct. See A.R.S. § 21-102; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(a). 

The trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the charged 

offenses, the State’s burden of proof, and Billie’s presumption of innocence. 

¶14 Billie was present and in custody for sentencing. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 26.9. At sentencing, Billie was given an opportunity to speak, and 

the court stated on the record the evidence, materials, and factors it 

considered in imposing the sentences. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.10. Although 

Billie contests the admission of certain evidence presented by the State, the 

court did not err in admitting and considering the evidence. See State v. 

Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 585, ¶ 26 (2005) (“[O]nce a jury finds or a defendant 

admits a single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the 

sentencing judge to find and consider additional factors relevant to the 

imposition of a sentence up to the maximum prescribed in that statute.”). 

¶15 Additionally, while Billie is correct that the court mistakenly 

noted the existence of four prior felony convictions rather than three, Billie 

was not prejudiced by this error as he was appropriately sentenced as a 

category three repeat offender, see A.R.S. § 13-703(C), and received a 

slightly mitigated term of imprisonment within the statutory limits, see 

A.R.S. §§ 13-701 through -709 (as applicable). 

¶16 Our review reveals no fundamental error. See Leon, 104 Ariz. 

at 300 (“An exhaustive search of the record has failed to produce any 

prejudicial error.”). 

CONCLUSION 

¶17 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none; therefore, we affirm Billie’s convictions and sentences. 

¶18 Defense counsel’s obligations pertaining to Billie’s 

representation in this appeal have ended. Counsel need do no more than 

inform Billie of the outcome of this appeal and his future options, unless, 

1 The defense exercised a peremptory challenge as to juror seven. The state 

challenged the strike under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and the 

court, finding a non-racial reason for the peremptory challenge, struck juror 

seven. Billie does not allege the court erred in striking juror seven. 
STATE v. BILLIE

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6 

upon review, counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to the 

Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 

Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). On this court’s motion, Billie has 30 days from the 

date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with an in propria persona

motion for reconsideration or petition for review.