alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-13-00265-CV 

IN RE KRISS CAMP, RELATOR 

 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

 

June 25, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. 

Relator, Kriss Camp, appearing pro se, has filed a motion for leave to file a 

petition for writ of mandamus and a petition for writ of mandamus. In the petition he

seeks an order compelling respondent, the Honorable Don R. Emerson, judge of the 

320th District Court of Potter County, to vacate a judgment in an underlying divorce 

proceeding and grant relator a new trial. Chief among relator’s complaints seems to be 

that Judge Emerson rendered a judgment declaring relator’s marriage void in 

contradiction of this court’s mandate in Camp v. Camp.

1

 We will deny relator’s petition.

 

1 Camp v. Camp, No. 07-11-00282-CV, 2012 Tex. App. Lexis 6473 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo Aug. 3, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reversing and remanding case for new trial).
2

The writ of mandamus will issue to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the 

violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no adequate remedy available by 

appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. 

proceeding). The relator must generally bring forward all that is necessary to establish 

a claim for relief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7; Dallas Morning News v. Fifth Court of 

Appeals, 842 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). This includes providing 

an adequate record to substantiate the allegations contained in the petition for writ of 

mandamus. Dallas Morning News, 842 S.W.2d at 658; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 

833, 837 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Absent a sufficient record, mandamus will not 

issue. Id.

None of relator’s factual allegations are supported by citation to evidence 

included in the appendix or record. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(g); 52.3(j) (required 

certification). Indeed, the petition is not accompanied by anything even approximating a 

proper appendix or record. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k) (appendix); 52.7 (record). Further 

we are not shown why the complaints relator raises were incapable of resolution by 

appeal. In this way, nothing shows how any action by Judge Emerson threatens 

interference with our judgment in Camp v. Camp. Upjohn Co. v. Marshall, 843 S.W.2d 

203, 204 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding). 

We therefore must, and do, deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. His 

request for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed as moot. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 52, Notes and Comments (“The requirement of a motion for leave in original 

proceedings is repealed”); TEX. R. APP. P. 52.1; In re Bryant, No. 07-11-0052-CV, 2011
3

Tex. App. Lexis 1421, at *5 n.4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 25, 2011, orig. proceeding) 

(per curiam, mem. op.). 

James T. Campbell

 Justice
§ 121.505 Flight time limitations: Two pilot crews: airplanes. ( a ) If a certificate holder conducting supplemental operations schedules a pilot to fly more than eight hours during any 24 consecutive hours, it shall give him an intervening rest period at or before the end of eight scheduled hours of flight duty. This rest period must be at least twice the number of hours flown since the preceding rest period, but not less than eight hours. The certificate holder conducting supplemental operations shall relieve that pilot of all duty with it during that rest period.
( b ) No pilot of an airplane that has a crew of two pilots may be on duty for more than 16 hours during any 24 consecutive hours.
[Doc. No. 6258, 29 FR 19218, Dec. 31, 1964; 30 FR 3639, Mar. 19, 1965, as amended by Amdt. 121-253, 61 FR 2613, Jan. 26, 1996]
EXHIBIT 10.7

ICAGEN, INC.

Summary of 2010 Bonus Targets

Executive Officer 2010 Bonus Targets



|                                                                                                                          |  |                         
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | ------------------------
|Executive Officer                                                                                                         |  | Bonus Targets for 2009  
|P. Kay Wagoner, Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer and President                                                              |  | Up to 50% of base salary
|Richard D. Katz, M.D., Executive Vice President, Finance and Corporate Development, Chief Financial Officer and
Treasurer |  | Up to 40% of base salary
|Seth V. Hetherington, Senior Vice President, Clinical and Regulatory Affairs                                              |  | Up to 40% of base salary

Cash bonuses for Dr. Wagoner, Dr. Katz and Dr. Hetherington for 2010 will be based on the achievement of specified corporate performance objectives. The corporate performance objectives for 2010 are progression of research,
preclinical and clinical development programs; building shareholder confidence; achievement of corporate and business development objectives; timely, effective and efficient completion of public company reporting obligations; and completing and
maintaining policies and procedures for internal controls and compliance obligations. The actual amount of such cash bonuses, if any, will be determined in the discretion of the Compensation Committee, subject to the maximum bonus targets shown
above. The Compensation Committee will evaluate the Companys and each executives performance against the objectives listed above from time to time during 2010, and may, in its discretion, approve the payment of any bonuses in one or more
installments during 2010 or in early 2011.
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Map scale 1:45,000

Map generated by the Billings Field Office in July 2011

Albers Equal Area, NAD83 Projection

This map is intended for display purposes. No warranty is made by the Bureau

of Land Management as to the accuracy, reliability, or completeness of the data for

individual or aggregate use with other data, or for purposes not intended by BLM. 

This map may not meet National Map Accuracy Standards. This product was 

developed through digital means and information may be updated without notification. Map 86a

Billings & Pompeys Pillar 

National Monument RMP / EIS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

Legend

Acton ERMA

Roads

Streams

Bureau of Land Management

State Lands

Private

Public Lands Survey System

Wyoming

Location Map

Montana

Billings 

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Office

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#### § 119.31 Applicability.

This subpart sets out certification requirements and prescribes the content of operations specifications and certain other requirements for operations conducted under part 121 or part 135 of this chapter.
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KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

Suite 2700, Independent Square
One Independent Drive
RO. Box 190
Jacksonville, FL 32201-0190

                          Independent Auditors' Report

The Board of Directors
HomeSide Lending, Inc.:

We have  examined  management's  assertion  about  HomeSide  Lending,  Inc.  and
subsidiaries'  (the Company's)  compliance with the minimum servicing  standards
set forth in the  Mortgage  Bankers  Association  of  America's  Uniform  Single
Attestation  Program for  Mortgage-Bankers  and that the Company had in effect a
fidelity bond and errors and  omissions  policy in the amount of $76 million and
$20 million,  respectively,  as  of September  30, 1998  and for the period from
February  11, 1998 through  September  30,  1998,  included in the  accompanying
management  assertion  letter.  Management  is  responsible  for  the  Company's
compliance with those minimum  servicing  standards.  Our  responsibility  is to
express an opinion on  management's  assertion  about the  Company's  compliance
based on our examination.

Our  examination  was  made in  accordance  with  standards  established  by the
American  Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,  accordingly,  included
examining,  on a test basis,  evidence about, the Company's  compliance with the
minimum,  servicing  standards  and  performing  such  other  procedures  as  we
considered  necessary  in the  circumstances.  We believe  that our  examination
provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.  Our examination does not provide a
legal  determination  on the  Company's  compliance  with the minimum  servicing
standards.

In  our  opinion,   management's  assertion  that  HomeSide  Lending,  Inc.  and
subsidiaries  have  complied in all material  respects  with the  aforementioned
minimum  servicing  standards and that the Company had in effect a fidelity bond
and errors and  omissions  policy in the amount of $76 million and $20  million,
respectively, as of September 30, 1998 and for the period from February 11, 1998
through September 30, 1998 is fairly stated, in all material respects.

KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

December 11, 1998

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<PAGE>   1
                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.5.1


                  THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDED AND RESTATED
                             EAGLE BANCSHARES, INC.
                   1994 DIRECTORS STOCK OPTION INCENTIVE PLAN


         THIS THIRD AMENDMENT to the Eagle Bancshares, Inc. Amended and
Restated 1994 Directors Stock Option Incentive Plan (the "Plan"), made as of
the day and year noted on the last page hereof, by Eagle Bancshares, Inc. (the
"Corporation"), to be effective as noted below.

                             W I T N E S S E T H :

         WHEREAS, the Corporation sponsors and maintains the Plan for the
benefit of its directors and their beneficiaries, and, pursuant to Section 8.2
thereof, the Board of Directors of the Association has the right to amend the
Plan at any time; and

         WHEREAS, the Corporation wishes to amend the Plan for the purpose of
increasing the number of shares covered by the Plan, increasing the number of
shares that may be granted to directors under the Plan;

         NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows effective as
indicated below:

                                       I.

         Article 4 of the Plan is amended effective as of June 5, 2001, to read
as follows:

                                   ARTICLE 4

                                     Stock

         The stock subject to the Options and other provisions of this Plan
shall be authorized but unissued or reacquired shares of Common Stock.
Effective June 5, 2001, subject to readjustment in accordance with the
provisions of Article 8, the total number of shares of Common Stock which may
be granted to, or for which options may be granted to, persons participating in
the Plan, shall not exceed in the aggregate 82,500 shares of Common Stock.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, shares of Common Stock allocable to the
unexercised portion of any expired or terminated Option again may become
subject to Options under this Plan.

                                      II.

         All other provisions of the Plan not inconsistent are hereby confirmed
and ratified.

<PAGE>   2
         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Third Amendment to the Plan has been executed
by the Corporation and its corporate seal attached hereto this 11 day of June,
2001.


                                CORPORATION:

[BANK SEAL]                     EAGLE BANCSHARES, INC.



                                By: /s/ C. Jere Sechler, Jr.
                                    ----------------------------

                                Title: Chairman, President & CEO
                                       -------------------------

ATTEST

By: /s/ Betty Petrides
    ---------------------------

Title: Executive Vice President
       ------------------------
§ 625.22 Answer to application. ( a ) Within 30 days after service, counsel for the FCA may file an answer to the application. Unless the FCA counsel requests an extension of time for filing or a statement of intent to negotiate under paragraph (c) of this section is filed, the presiding officer, upon a satisfactory showing of entitlement by the applicant, may make an award for the applicant's fees and other expenses under the EAJA.
( b ) The answer shall set forth any objections to the requested award and identify the facts relied on in support of the FCA's position. If the answer is based on any alleged facts not already in the record of the adversary adjudication, the FCA counsel shall include with the answer either supporting affidavits or a request for further proceedings under § 625.25 of this part.
( c ) If the FCA counsel and the applicant believe that the issues in the fee application can be settled, they may jointly file a statement of their intent to negotiate a settlement. The filing of this statement shall extend the time for filing an answer for an additional 30 days, and further extensions may be granted by the presiding officer upon request by the FCA counsel and the applicant.
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#### BENJAMIN *v.*GAREE.

Malicious prosecution — the putting an end to the prosecution — discharge by a justice after íecognizance.

To sustain a suit for a malicious prosecution, it must be averred that the prosecution is at end. Where a justice of the peace has taken a recognizance of one accused of crime to appear in court, the law makes it his duty to return the recognizance, and he has no power to cancel the recognizance and discharge the accused, and if he do so, his acts are void.

If a party, &c. who has been so discharged by the justice, would put an end to the prosecution, he should appear in court and obtain an order for his discharge.

Case for maliciously charging plaintiff on oath with having'stolen a trace chain, and procuring him to be taken on a warrant for larceny, and to be detained a long time before a justice, before and *451after examination, to enter into recognizance to appear at-the Court of Common Pleas, to answer the charge. It is averred that the justice, after the recognizance was taken, judging the proof insufficient, refused to return the recognizance to the court, cancelled it, and discharged the plaintiff, of which the defendant was notified, and has no further prosecuted his complaint, but abandoned it, and so the same is wholly ended.

To this there is a general demurrer.

*H.*Stanberry, for the defendant,

cited 2 *Stark. Ev.*907, *and notes.*

*H.*Hunter, contra,

cited 2 *Ch. PI.*606, *note*1 *T. R.*536.

Wright, J.

To sustain a suit for a malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must aver and prove that the prosecution of which he complains, *is legally at an end.*The plaintiff, in the case, before us, seeks to satisfy this requisite, by alleging that the examining justice, who, when first acting on the complaint, adjudged the ground sufficient, and recognized the accused to appear at court, to answer the charge, afterwards changed his opinion, refused to return the recognizance, gave' notice to the prosecutor, and discharged the accused. It is by law made the duty of the justice, if he recognizes a party to answer to the complaint, to return the recognizance, with a transcript of his proceedings, to the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas, or to the attorney for the state in the county, *without unnecessary delay.*29 *O. L.*197. After the justice, acting as an examining magistrate, has recognized a party, he has expended his entire power over the case, and can no more interfere with it, and if he do so, as in the case before us, his acts are *null and void.*The notice to the complaining party, and his neglect to prosecute, does not make the justice’s discharge valid. The party accused however can, if he choose, obtain his discharge, by application to the Court of Common Pleas, and when that is done, may sue, the prosecution being then at an end.

The demurrer is sustained.
EPA SANITIZED EPA SANITIZED
#### WILSON *v.*ROBBINS.

Slander in Ohio, in a case where not so at common law.

It is not actionable to charge a *man*with adultery, though it is to charge a *woman*wit?; adultery, because of the tendency of such a charge to exclude her from society. Neither charge will sustain an action at the common law.

Slander. The plaintiff declared upon the following words, spoken by the defendant of the plaintiff: ‘He was at home one night when

I was there. Wilson and wife were in bed together. -Wilson kicked his wife out of bed, and said he cared nothing for her; and in his shirt tail, he went to bed with the other girl, Priscilla Ballard; that he was going to run away with the said Priscilla Ballard, and abandon his family.’

To this declaration there was a general demurrer, and joinder.

*Clough,*for the defendant,

urged that the words as laid, were not actionable.

*Brazee,*for the plaintiff,

contended that the charge imputed the prime of adultery to the plaintiff, which in Ohio had been adjudged to support an action. But upon common principles, the charge, if true, under the statute of Ohio, would subject a person to infamy, and fine, and imprisonment.

By the Court.'

Supposing the words declared upon, do charge the plaintiff with adultery, which it would be difficult to maintain, are they actionable? It has been determined in this state, that to charge a-woman with being an adulteress, or a whore, is actionable. The courts have gone no further. Their going that far is conceded to be an innovation upon the common law rule. This exception, from the common law, rests upon the peculiar influence of such a charge upon a *woman,*to exclude her from the society of respectable people, and to prevent her from forming an advantageous connexion in life. It may be matter of regret to us, that the moral perceptions of community do not place the two sexes on the same level in respect to the odium of such offences; yet, we cannot be ignorant of the fact, that such is not the case. The reason given, then, for making an exception from the common law rule, in the case of the *female,*does not apply to the case of the *male.*We are unwilling to carry the exception further than it has been carried, and have so decided heretofore. If it be advisable to alter the law, it is better for the legislature to do it.

Judgment for the defendant.
§ 121.426 Pilots: Upgrade flight training. ( a ) Upgrade flight training for pilots must include the following: ( 1 ) Seat dependent maneuvers and procedures, as applicable;
( 2 ) Duty position maneuvers and procedures, as applicable;
( 3 ) Extended envelope training set forth in § 121.423;
( 4 ) Maneuvers and procedures set forth in the certificate holder's low altitude windshear flight training program;
( 5 ) Sufficient scenario-based training incorporating CRM and leadership and command skills, to ensure the pilot's proficiency as pilot in command; and
( 6 ) Sufficient training to ensure the pilot's knowledge and skill with respect to the following: ( i ) The airplane, its systems and components;
( ii ) Proper control of airspeed, configuration, direction, altitude, and attitude in accordance with the Airplane Flight Manual, the certificate holder's operations manual, checklists, or other approved material appropriate to the airplane type; and
( iii ) Compliance with ATC, instrument procedures, or other applicable procedures.
( b ) The training required by paragraph (a) of this section must be performed inflight except— ( 1 ) That windshear maneuvers and procedures must be performed in an FFS in which the maneuvers and procedures are specifically authorized to be accomplished;
( 2 ) That the extended envelope training required by § 121.423 must be performed in a Level C or higher FFS unless the Administrator has issued to the certificate holder a deviation in accordance with § 121.423(e); and
( 3 ) To the extent that certain other maneuvers and procedures may be performed in an FFS, an FTD, or a static airplane as permitted in Appendix E of this part.
( c ) If the certificate holder's approved training program includes a course of training utilizing an FFS under § 121.409(c) and (d), each pilot must successfully complete— ( 1 ) With respect to § 121.409(c)—A proficiency check in the FFS or the airplane to the level of proficiency of a pilot in command in at least the maneuvers and procedures set forth in Appendix F of this part that are capable of being performed in an FFS.
( 2 ) With respect to § 121.409(d), training and practice in at least the maneuvers and procedures set forth in the certificate holder's approved low-altitude windshear flight training program that are capable of being performed in an FFS in which the maneuvers and procedures are specifically authorized.
[Amdt. 121-382, 85 FR 10924, Feb. 25, 2020, as amended by Docket No. FAA-2019-0360; Amdt. No. 121-392, 89 FR 51428, June 18, 2024]
#### § 619.9050 Associations.

The term *associations* includes (individually or collectively) Federal land bank associations, Federal land credit associations, production credit associations, and agricultural credit associations.

[55 FR 24888, June 19, 1990]
§ 107.110 Category 1 operations. To conduct Category 1 operations— ( a ) A remote pilot in command must use a small unmanned aircraft that— ( 1 ) Weighs 0.55 pounds or less on takeoff and throughout the duration of each operation under Category 1, including everything that is on board or otherwise attached to the aircraft; and
( 2 ) Does not contain any exposed rotating parts that would lacerate human skin upon impact with a human being.
( b ) No remote pilot in command may operate a small unmanned aircraft in sustained flight over open-air assemblies of human beings unless the operation meets the requirements of either § 89.110 or § 89.115(a) of this chapter.
[Amdt. No. 107-8, 86 FR 4382, Jan. 15, 2021, as amended by 86 FR 62473, Nov. 10, 2021]
#### GIBSON V. THE STATE.

(Decided February 5, 1914.)

Appeal from' Lawrence County Court.

Heard before Hon. J. C. Ktjmpe.

*667No counsel marked for appellant. R. O. Briokell, Attorney General, for the State.

Pelham, J.

No error.

Affirmed.
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-23-00261-CR

TYRONE E. GEORGE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

§

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from Criminal District Court 

No. 3

of Tarrant County (1737689)

June 13, 2024

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

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JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there 

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By /s/ Dana Womack

 Justice Dana Womack