### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 13, 200 9 S es sio n

La F R A N C IN E G IB SO N , as S ur viv in g R el at ive an d N ex t F ri en d of GEOR GIA JON ES, De ceased v. MET RO COM MU NITY CA RE HOME , INC., ET AL


### .

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forShelb y County No. CT-002341-06 R ita L. Stotts, Judge

No. W2008-02417-C OA-R3-C V - Filed Dec ember 15, 2009

The trial c ourt awa

rded summar

y judgme nt to Defe ndant common ca rrier
, fi nding that Defe ndant ha d n o no tic e that De c e de nt wa s me nta lly inc a pa c itate d and ho ldi ng that De fe nd ant ha d no du ty to

a s s e s s o r p r o b e D e c e d e n t in o r d e r to d is c o v e r a late n t or n o n

- a p p ar e n t ps y c h o lo g ic a l c o n d it io n

. We

a ff ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ff

ir me d; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined.

Le s Jo ne s, R. Po rt e r F e ilda ndFr a nk B. T ha c he r, II I, Me mphis
, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, LaFranc ine Gibson.
Christopher S. Campbell and Micha el F. Raffe rty, Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llees, Ye llow Cab Company.
Linda J. Mathis, Memphis, Tennesse e, for the Appellee , Wassie W . Wassie.

OP IN ION

Th is i s an a c tio n f

or pe rs on a l in

jur y and wr ongful deat h. De c e de nt G e or g ia Jone s ( Ms. J ones) wa s an 83-y ear

old resident of Me tro Communit y Care H ome (“ Metro Care ”), a n independe nt liv ingfa c ili ty

loc a te d at 13 28 Mis sis sip pi B ou le va rd in M e mph is. Ms. Jone s su ff e re d f ro m de me nti a and had a history of bec oming disoriente d and conf used. On September 2, 2005, she was tra nsported by a mbu lanc e fr om Me tr o Ca re to t he Re g ion a l Me dic a l Ce nte r at Me mph is ( “ the Me d” ) w ith

c omp la int s of ab do min a l and c he st pa in. A p hy sic a l e xam p e rf or me d at th e Me d r e ve a le d th a t Ms

. J ones wa s “not oriented to plac e/date/time.” She was discharg ed on September 6. A license d social-2-

wo rk e r, Ev a

Ar no ld ( Ms. Ar

no ld) , a n e mpl oy e e of

the Me d, wa s a ssi g ne d to c oo rd inate Ms. Jone s’ discharg e.

Ms. Arno l d

ca l l edYe l l o w C ab C o mp an y (“ Ye l l o w C ab ) t o t ra n s p o rt M s

. J o n es b ac k t o Metro C ar e. M s . Arnold provided Ms. Jones with a voucher , or third par ty pay er slip, re citing 1328 Mississ ippi as Ms. J ones’ d es t i n at i o n and a c harg e of $7.80. O nce inside the taxi , Ms. J ones ins tr uc te d th e c a

b dr ive r, Mr

. Was sie W. Was sie (M r. Was sie ), to take he r to 66 2 Ho lly wo od Str e e t, wher e she o n ce h ad lived. Ms. J ones told Mr. Wassie that she did not have a key to 1328 Mississ ippi; point ed to the house on Holly wood where she wanted to be de livered; a nd Ms. J ones
e xite d the ta xi and wa lke d up to the fr on t do or of the ho me . M r. Was sie watc he d M s. Jone s w a lk up to the front door a

nd drove a

way afte r a child opened the front door. Ms. J ones wa s later f ound de a d o n th e fr on t po rc h o f t he ho me ; th e c a

us e of de a th w a s d e te rm ine d to be c ard ia c arr e st.

I n May 2006, Plaintiff L aF ra ncine Gibson (Ms. Gibson), a cting as Ms. J ones’ surviving relative and nex t friend, f

iled a complaint for

persona l injury

and wr ong ful death in the Circuit Court fo r S he lby

County . M s. Gi bs on

name d M e tr o Co mmunit y Care Ho me , I nc .; She lby

County He a lth Care Corp.; Ye llow Cab Company ; Checker C ab Company of Memphis; and De nnis Blanke r as Def endants. De nnis Blanke r was voluntarily dismiss ed in Aug ust 2006, and Mr. Wassie wa s added

a s a De fe nd ant b y

c on se nt. Th e tr ial cou rt e nte re d a c on se nt o rd e r d ism iss ingMe tr o Ca re wi th prejudice in Aug ust 2008. I n September 2008, the trial court e ntere d a conse nt order of compromise, settlement and re lease as to Shelby County Hea lth Care Corp. d/b/a the Me d. Checke r Cab also wa s dismiss ed by

consent orde r.

De fe nd ants Ye llo w C a

b an d M r. Was sie mov e d f or su mma ry jud g me nt i n Jun e 20 08 . In th e ir motion, Defenda

nts stated that, with respec t to them, the lawsuit involved a dispute as to whethe r Ms. J ones’ de ath was c aused by the fa ilure to deliver he r to the Mississip p i Bouleva rd addr ess as opposed t o the Holl y

wood address. I n their st atement of undisputed fac ts, they asser ted that neither Ms. Ar no ld n or any oth e r em

plo y e e of the Me d or of Me tr o Car e inf or me d Mr. Was sie of

Ms. Jone s’ medic a l c o n d it io n o r me n ta l c a p a c it y , o r th e la c k th e r e o f

. T h e y f u rth e r r e f e r e n c e d M r . Wassie’s de po sit ion

in s up po rt

of the ir a sse rt ion that Ms

. Jone s did no t a

pp e ar c on fu se d. I n h e r r e sp on se , M s. Gi bs on a sse rt e d th a t a

g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f

a c t e xiste d a s to wh e the r D e fe nd ants “ too k a ll prac tical measur es to ca

re f or Ms. J ones while in the ir transit.” She asse rted that De fenda nts did not exercise their

utmost dilige nce, skill and fore sight considering Ms. Jones’ ag e and infirmity , and that a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t exi ste d

w ith respec t to whether D efe ndants brea ched the ir heig htened duty of ca re to Ms. Jones. M s

. Gi b s o n contende d that Def endants’ ow n proce dural guidelines requir e d M r

. Wa s s ie to c h e c k

w it h th e d is p a tc h e r

b e f o r e ta k in g M s

. Jo n e s to ana d dr e s s w hich dif fe re d f ro m t hat on

the vo uc he r. She a lso a sse rt e d th a t D e fe nd ants ha d f a ile d to a ff

ir ma tiv e ly neg ate the e lement of proximate cause

.
Th e tr ia l c ourt e nte re d su mma ry jud g me nt in De fe nd ants ’ fa vo r Se pte mbe r 23
, 20 08

. I n it s order , the trial cour

t stated that Def

endants had no notice of Ms. J ones’ mental incapa city and had “no duty to as s es s o r p ro b e Ms. J ones to lear n of her latent or non-a

ppare nt psy cholog ical

c on dit ion s. ” Ms. Gi bs on

fi le d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l to thi s Co ur

t.-3- Issues Presented

Ms. Gi bs on

pr e se nts the fo llo wi ngiss ue s f or our r e vie w:

1. Di d th e L ow e r C ourt e rr in d e fi nin g the du ty ow e d b y a c omm on c arr ie r t o it s passeng er?

2. Did the L ower

Court err in f

inding that r easona

ble minds could not disagr ee as to whethe r De fenda

nts breac hed the duty they owed to G eorg ia J ones and that D e fe nd ants we re the re fo re e nti tle d to su mma ry jud g me nt?

3. Should the trial court have found that Defenda nts’ motion for summary judgme nt did not affirmatively neg ate the e ssential element of causation?

4. Sho uld

the tr ia l c ourt

have fo un d that re a so na

ble min ds c ou ld d isa g re e a s to wh e the r D e fe nd ants ’ n e g lig e nc e wa s th e pr oximate c a us e of inj ur y and de a th to G e or g ia

Jone s?

Stan dard of Revie w

We r e vie w a

tr ia l c ourt ’s a wa

rd of su mma ry jud g me nt de novo , with no presumption of

corr ectne ss, review ing the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the nonmoving pa rty and dra wing all rea sonable infe renc es in that party ’s favor. Martin v . Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.
, 271 S.W .3d 76, 84 (T e nn

. 20 08 ) (c itatio ns omi tte d)

. Sum mary jud g me nt i s a

pp ro pr ia te on ly

wh e re the “ ple a din g s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, t og ether with the affidavits . . . show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the mov i n g p ar t y i s entitled to a judgme nt as a matter

of law.” Id. at 83 (q u o t i n g T en n

. R

. Civ. P . 56.04). The bur den is on the moving pa

rty to demonstrate that ther e are no ge nuine issues of mater ial fac t and that it is entitl ed to judgment a s a matter of law. Id. (citations omitted).

Af te r t he mov ingpa

rt y ha s ma de a

pr op e rl y su pp or te d mo tio n, the no nmo vi ng pa rt y mus t

e s ta b li s h th e e xis te n c e o f a g e n u in e is s u e o f mate r ia l fac t. Id. (c itatio ns omi tte d) . T o s a tis fy its b u r d e n , th e n o n mo v in g p arty ma y : ( 1 ) p o in t to e v id e n c e o f o v e r

- lo o k e d o r d is r e g ar d e d materia l fac tual disputes; (2) re habilitate evidence discr edited by the moving pa

rty ; (3) produc e additional evidenc e that esta

blishes the exis tence of a g enuine issue for trial; or (4) submit an a ffidavit asse rting the nee d for a dditional discovery pursuant to Rule 56.06 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedur e. Id. (citations omitted). The court must acce pt the nonmoving pa rty ’s evidenc e as true , resolving any doubts reg ardingthe exist ence of a g enuine issue of materia l fac t in that party ’s favor. Id. (citations omi tte d) . Adis pu te d f

a c t th a t mu st b e de c ide d to re so lve a su bs tanti ve c la im o r d e fe ns e is m a te ri a l, and it prese nts a g enuine issue if it r easona bly could be resolved in favor of either one party

or the other. Id. (citations omitted).-4- Anal y sis

The trial c ourt in this case a war ded summary

judgme nt to Defe ndants upon deter mining that De fe nd ants ha d n o noti c e of Ms. Jone s’ me nta l inf ir mity and that the y ha d no d uty to i nd e pe nd e ntl y assess or pr obe Ms. J ones in or der to de termine whether she was mentally competent to dire ct them to convey her to the H olly

wood addr ess rather than the addre ss rec ited on the vouche r. Duty is the first element that must be deter mined in an ac tion for neg lige nce. W hit e v . M e tro . G ov ’t

of N as hv ill e

an d D av ids on Cou nty , 860 S.W .2d 49, 51 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p . 1993)(c itations omi tted). Duty for the purpose s of a ne g lige nce c laim is the obligation re cog nized by the law to conf

orm to a par

ticular standard of

car e in orde r t o p ro t ec t against an unr easona ble risk of ha

rm to another. McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. , 937 S.W .2d 891, 894 (Tenn. 1996) “I t is a ref lection of socie ty ’s contempor ary policies and socia l require ments conce rning the rig ht of individuals an d t h e general public to be protec ted from a

nother’s c onduct.” W

hit e , 860 S.W .2d at 51. The de termination of the e x istence of a duty i s a q u es t i o n of law. E. g. , D ra pe r v . W este rfi e ld , 181 S.W .3d 283, 291 (Tenn. 2005)(c itation omit ted). We re view t h e t ri al court’s determinations on questions of law de novo
, wi th no pr e su mpt ion

of c or re c tne ss. Bo wde n v . W

ar d , 27 S.W .3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000) . Once the court ha s determined tha

t the defe ndant in a neg lige nce a ction owes plaintiff a duty , the question of whether the def endant ha s brea ched his duty and thereby cause d plaintiff' s injury are matters to be d eter mined by the finder

of fa ct. Patterson-Khoury v. W ilson W orld Hotel-Cherry Road
, 139 S.W .3d 281, 285 (Tenn. Ct. App 2003). W ith this standard of revie w in mind, we turn to whethe r the trial cour

t erre d by concludingthat Def

endants “had no duty to assess or probe Ms. J ones to lear n of her latent or non-a

ppare nt psy cholog ical conditions.”

Dut y to A sse ss f or No n- ap pa re nt Co ndi

tio ns

I n her br ief to this Court, Ms. Gibson asserts, “[b] eca use the law rec og nizes a spec ific and he ig hte ne d d

uty a tta c he s to c omm on

c arr ie rs by

vir tue of the sp e c ia l re la tio ns hip the y ho ld wi th t he ir passeng ers, the tr ial court e rre d by finding that ‘plaintiff must show that Mr. Wassie and Yellow Cab Company had noti ce of

Ms. J ones’ late nt or non-appa rent psy cholog ical conditions’ in orde r to show the ex istence of a duty .” De fenda nts, on the other hand, a

rg ue that this position would ex pand the duty of a common car

rier bey ond that of an insurer of their pa sseng ers’ well-be ing. T hey asser t that the position advocate d by Ms. Gibson would require taxi cab drivers to make “an indepe ndent and expert assessment of a

passeng er’ s mental status based solely on the passenger ’s age and limited phy sical ability

to ambulate.”

I t is we ll- se ttl e d that a ll pe rs on s have a br oa d du ty to us e re a so na ble c are in o rd e r t o avo id causingfore seea

ble injury to others. E.g., Draper , 181 S.W. 3d a t 291 (c itatio n omit te d) . I t is a lso

we ll- se ttl e d that c omm on c arr ie rs ow e the ir pa sse ng e rs a he ig hte ne d du ty of care an d tha t, “[c]onsi stent with the prac tical conduct of their business, they

must ex erc ise the utmost dili g ence , skill, and foresig ht, to provide for their passe ng ers’ safe ty .” W hite v. Metro. Gov’ t of Nashvill e and Da v ids on Cou nty , 8 6 0 S

. W

. 2 d 4 9
, 5 2 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Schindler v. Southe rn Coach Lines, Inc. , 188 Tenn. 169, 173-74, 217 S.W .2d 775, 778-79 (1949) ; Me mp his St. Ry . v . Ca v e ll , 135 Te nn . 4 62 , 4 65 , 1 87 S.W. 17 9, 18 0 ( 19 16 ); Oliver v. Union Transfer Co. , 17 Tenn. App. 694, 699,-5-

71 S.W .2d 478, 481 (1934)) . When a passeng er’ s ag e or infir mity is appare nt from their appe ara nce,
common car

riers w ill be held to a hig her standa rd of car e. Id. Howeve r, common ca rrier s are not insurers of

their passe ng ers’ safe ty

. Id.

I n th is c a se , it

is und isp ute d th a t Mr . Wa ssi e wa s n ot i nf or me d b y Ms. Ar no ld o f Ms. Jone s’ medical c onditio n o r her c ompromised mental ca pacity . Although Ms. Jones was elde rly and obviously had been hospitaliz ed, Def endants undisputedly had no knowledg e of Ms. Jones’ hospital

rec ords or medic al history . Ms. Gibson, however , asser ts that, in li g ht of the heig htened duty of ca re imposed on a common ca rrier , she wa s not require d to demonstrate that De fendan t s had notice of Ms. J ones’ impaire d mental ca pacity in or der to de monstrate that Mr. Wassie had a duty to deliver Ms. J ones to the Mississippi Boule vard a ddress prov i ded on the vouc her. She f urther a sserts that Y e l l o w C a

b ’ s g u i d e l i n e s f

o r t a x i dr i v e r s w i t h r e s p e c tt o v o u c h e r c o n t r a c tt r i p s e v i d e n c e t h i s d u t y.

We tur n first to Ms. Gibson’s assertion that Ye llow Cab’s g uidelines demonstrate that Mr. Wassi e had a duty

to s e e k d ir e c tio n f

ro m Y e llo w C a

b b e fo re c on ve y ingMs. Jone s to an a dd re ss oth e r t ha n th a t on the vo uc he r. De fe nd ants a sse rt that the se c tio n of the g uid e lin e s re fe rr e d to b y Ms. Gi bs on are no t r e le va

nt to de te rm ine the e xiste nc e of a du ty to a pa sse ng e r, bu t to bil lin g pr oc e dure s. Although not c ontrolling, company rules are admissible to asce rtain what the c ompany ’s employ ees should have done in a par ticular situation. Id.

As Ms. Gi bs on

a sse rt s, Ye llo w C a

b’ s “ Gu ide lin e s f

or Ta xi Dr ive rs ” state s:

Remember that the passeng er is se ldom the paying customer on a (vouche r) c ontrac t trip. Only the pay ing customer is authorized to direc t y ou, authorize stops, waiting time, or cha

ng e the de stination of the trip. Unlike y our cash trips where the passeng er is also usually the custom er y ou can not bill a diffe renc e for following the passeng ers dire ctions without the clients approva l.

When uncer

tain, make a voice request and ask the dispatche r for g uidance . You ar e not alone.

We cannot ag ree with Ms. Gibson’s asser tion that this provision in Yellow C ab’s guidelines

e vid e nc e a

du ty to M s. Jone s to de liv e r he r to the Mis sis sip pi B ou le va rd a dd re ss and no t an a lte rn a te

a dd re ss p ro vid e d b y

he r. Ra the r, the pr ov isi on re la te s to the e xten t to wh ic h a dr ive r m ay

e xpe c t to

re c e ive pa

y me nt f or a vo uc he r t

ri p und e r “ c ha

rg e a c c ounts [es ta

bli sh e d] f or many organi z ati on s, bu s in e s s e s an d o n ly a v e r y f e w in d iv id

u a ls f o r a c o n v e n ie n c e to dr iv e r s

. ” T h is n o ti c e to drivers appea rs in the g uidelines secti o n e nti tl e d “ c h a r g e tickets/contra cts.” The section states that “ [d] rivers may honor these vouc hers a s cash towa rd their c heck of

f,” a nd that “[t] he Yellow Cab Char g e Ticke t is, wh e n u ti li ze d c o r

r e c tl y , a s im

p le an d s e lf

- e xp la n a to r y f o r m to e xp e d it e c o r

r e c t b il li n g

. ” The section fur

ther states, “ [a] ny

char g e tickets with incomplete or err oneous information may be billed back to you, so please c heck the m car efully . I t is y our money .”W e n o t e t h at t h i s case do es no t i n v o l v e an y co n t ract u al ob l i g at i o n be t w een Y el l o w C ab an d t h e M ed or M et ro 1

C a re to d e liv e r p a tien ts to a n a d d re ss p ro v id e d b y th e m

. -6- We ag ree with Defe ndants that the para g raph relied on by Ms. G ibson, w hen rea d within the

c on te xt of the g u i d e l i n e s e c t i o n , p e rt a i n s t o b i l l i n g p r o c e d u r e s

. T h e s e c t i o no u t l i n e s t h e e xt e n tto wh ic h th e dr ive r m ay

e xpe c t to be pa id f

or a tr ip e xce e din g that a

uth or ize d b y

the vo uc he r. Th is para g raph does not pr ohibit a driver from convey ing a passeng er to a

n alternate addr ess, and it does

n o t evidence a leg al duty to independently

assess a pa sseng er’ s mental ca pacity to provide an

a l t e r n a t e a d dr e s s w h e r e t h e dr i v e r h a s n o n o t i c e o f

t h e p a s s e n g e r ’ s i n c a

p a c i t y o r m e n t a l i n f

i r m i t y.
We turn, then, to whether

Def endants owe d Ms. J ones a

duty to independently

assess whe ther she wa s mentally

competent to dire ct Mr. Wassie to take he r to the Holl y wood address rathe r than the Mississi ppi Bouleva

rd addr ess re cited on the vouch er

. This question require s us to consider whether a common car

rier owes a passeng er a duty to assess that passeng er for l atent, non-a ppare nt mental or psy cholog ical conditions w hich might impede the passeng er’ s mental ca pacity . Common

ca rr i er s wi l l b e h el d

t o a h i gh er s t an d ar d o f ca re wi t h re gar d t o age d o r i n fi rm p as s en ger s wh o s e a ge or infirmity

is appare nt from their a

ppear ance

. W

hite v. Me tro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cou nty , 860 S.W .2d 49, 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)( citations omitt ed). This duty does not extend, howeve r, to infirmities which ar e not apparent in the abse nce of actua l knowledg e. We must ag ree wi th D e fe nd ants tha

t, in the a bs e nc e of no tic e of Ms. Jone s’ imp a ir e d me nta l c a pa c ity , D e fe nd a nts had no duty to e ng ag e in a

n independe nt assessment re quiring specia liz ed skill or experience in order t o d i s c o v e r

a l a t e n t , n o n

- a

p p ar e n ti n f

i r m i t y. 1

Nei th er a pass e ng e r’ s a g e no r p hy sic a l di sa bil ity wo uld re lie ve a ta xica b d ri ve r o f h is obligation to convey

the passeng er to their r eques t ed d estination. I ndeed, se ction 6-80-52 of the Me mph is O rd ina

nc e s p ro vid e s:
Every driver of a taxi cab shall have the rig ht to demand pay ment of the re g ular fa

re in advanc e and ma

y ref use employ

ment unles s s o paid, but no driver of a taxicab sh a ll r e fu se or

ne g le c t to conve y

any or de rl y pe rs on or pe rs on s u

po n r e qu e st any wher e in the city , unless previously eng ag ed or una

ble to do so.

Al tho ug h ac tua l noti c e or a pp are nt me nta l impa ir

me nt o r i nc a

pa c ity wo uld g ive ri se to a

hig he r d uty to c on ve y a pa sse ng e r to an a dd

re ss p ro vid e d b y

a re sp on sib le thi rd

pa rt y , w e a g re e wi th D e fe nd a nts that, in the a

bs e nc e of no tic e or a pp are nt i mpa ir

me nt, to i mpo se a

le g a l duty

on ta xica b d ri ve rs to pr ob e and a sse ss e a c h p a sse ng e r’ s me nta l c a pa c ity to i ns tr uc t th e dr ive r t o c on ve y

the m to a va lid addre ss would be imprac tical and unrea sonable. As we noted in W hit e , the cour

t must determine the exis tence of a duty

“base d on the evidence and mix ed considerations of log ic, common sense, a nd public policy .” W

hit e , 860 S.W .2d at 51-52. I n this case, we ag ree with the trial court’ s conclusion that, in the absenc e of a

ny contra ctual oblig ation, corpor ate policy , instruction by the Med, or notice

or a pp e ara nc e of me nta l in fi rm ity , De fe nd ants did no t ha ve a du ty to i nd e pe nd e ntl y

a sse ss M s. Jone s’ mental ca pacity to i n s t ru ct Defenda

nts to convey

her to a valid addre ss within the city . I n the

a bs e nc e of no tic e or a

pp are nt me nta l inf

ir mity , c on fu sio n or inc a

pa c ity
, it wo uld de fy c omm on se ns e-7-

to r e qu ir e a ta xica

b dr ive r to a sse ss and pr ob e a pa sse ng e r’ s c a pa c ity to dir e c t c on ve y anc e to a va lid addr es s m er el y

o nt h e b as i s o f t h e p as s en ger ’s ad v an ce d age o r r ec en td i s ch ar ge f

ro m h o s p i t al i z at i o n.

Exi ste nc eof a G e nuine Iss ue of Ma te ria l Fa c t Re

ga rd ing App ar e nt In

fi rmity

We must consider, however
, whether summary judgme nt was appropriate in this case in lig ht of Ms. Gi bs on ’s a sse rt ion

tha t Ms. Jon e s’ me nta l in fi rm ity wa s a pp are nt. We a g re e wi th D e fe nd a nts that Mr . Wa ssi e c ou ld n ot b e c ha rg e d w ithkn ow le dg e of

Ms. Jone s’ me dic a l hi sto ry . I t is a lso

un dis pu te d in

thi s c a se that Mr . Wa ssi e wa s n ot a dv ise d o f M s. Jone s’ me nta l in c a pa c ity or de me nti a by personne l at the Med. I n her memorandum in opposition to D efe ndants’ motion f o r s u m m ary jud g me nt, ho we ve r, Ms. Gi bs on a sse rt e d th a t a

g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l fa c t exists wi th r e sp e c t to wh e the r Ms. Jone s e xhibi te d sig ns of de me nti a or c on fu sio n wh ile in De fe nd ants ’ tax ica b. Ms. Gibson asserte d that Mr. Wassie’s testimony that Ms. J ones was lucid and competent when she was in the taxi cab “ strains belief since it is di rec tly contra ry to the medical diag noses she re ceive d in the

s ev er al day s befor e at The Med.” She a sserted that, in light of Ms. J ones’ medic al re cords a nd history , Mr. Wassie’s testimony that Ms. J ones wa s lucid while in the taxi cab w as not rea sonable.

As no te d a

bo ve , the re is no dis pu te in thi s c a se that De fe nd ants , a c omm on c arr ie r, ow e d M s. Jone s a hig h s tand ard

of c are . T he re is n oth ingin t he re c or d to ind ic a te , h ow e ve r, that Ms. Jone s’ mental infirmit y o r d i m i n i shed mental c apac ity was a ppare nt when she w as in Mr. Wassie’s prese nce. O n the contra

ry , the re cord indicates only that Ms. J ones re quired some phy sical assistance to enter the taxi cab.

Fur ther, we cannot ag ree with Ms. Gibson that Ms. J ones’ a g e and r ece nt hospitaliz ation put Mr. Wassie on notice of diminished mental ca pacity . We decline to e x tend the duty of a c ommon
car rier to its passeng er so f

ar a s to require taxi cab dr ivers to inquire a bout the men t al hea lth or capa city of their pa sseng ers mer ely on the basis of ag e. I n this c ase, Mr. Wassie watche d Ms. J ones walk up to the home on Holly wood af ter e x iting the taxicab, and he waited until the door wa s opened to her be fore depar

ting. He clearly

took her a dvance d ag e into acc ount. Ms. Gibson has not pointed to any evidence in the re cord that would cre ate a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t reg ardingwhether Ms. J ones’ diminished mental ca pacity was a ppare nt to one witho ut knowledg e of he r medica l h i s t o r y.

Hol din g

I n li g ht o f t

he fo re g oin g , w e a ff

ir m summa ry jud g me nt in favo r of De fe nd ants . Co sts of thi s
a pp e a l are ta xed

to Ap pe lla

nt, L a F ra nc ine Gi bs on , and he r sure ty , f or wh ic h e xec uti on

may iss ue if

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER , JUDGE