alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3771 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3771

    To extend the date for the submittal of the final report of the 
   National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, to 
 provide additional funding for the Commission, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 4, 2004

  Mr. Fossella (for himself, Mr. Shays, Mr. Hinchey, Mr. Emanuel, Mr. 
   Tancredo, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Cooper, and Mrs. Maloney) 
    introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Select 
              Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select)

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To extend the date for the submittal of the final report of the 
   National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, to 
 provide additional funding for the Commission, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE 
              UNITED STATES.

    (a) Extension.--Section 610(b) of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 6 U.S.C. 101 note; 116 
Stat 2413) is amended by striking ``18 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act'' and inserting ``January 10, 2005''.
    (b) Additional Funding.--Section 611 of such Act (6 U.S.C. 101 
note; 116 Stat 2413) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
            (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
        subsection (b):
    ``(b) Additional Funding From the National Foreign Intelligence 
Program.--In addition to the amounts made available to the Commission 
under subsection (a), of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 
108-177) and available in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 
2004 (Public Law 108-87) for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, 
not more than $6,000,000 shall be available for transfer to the 
Commission for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this 
title.''; and
            (3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated by paragraph (1), 
        by striking ``subsection (a)'' and inserting ``this section''.
                                 <all>
```
#### BANK OF THE UNITED STATES v. ENNIS AND SANDIGE.

Post nuptial settlement — fraud—trust—transfer of by trustee.

A post nuptial *voluntary*settlement made by a debtor for his wife and children is void as to previous creditors, thought it may be good as to subsequent creditors; but if made with a fraudulent design, it is void as to all creditors.

A trust created in land for a married woman and Iter children, at her death, vests in the children.

*605A conveyance by the trustees of the trust property to the father of the children, is not per se fraudulent, although he is in debt or insolvent, he holds in trust for the children.

If such trust is legally created, no act of the trustee can affect the interest of the beneficiaries of the trust.

In Chancery. The bill seeks to sell in satisfaction of a judgment, at law against Ennis, lot No'. 126, in Cincinnati, which has been levied upon, but will not be sold, because the title is in Sandige, though he holds it in trust for Ennis, who is insolvent.

Ennis, in his answer, admits the judgment, levy, and his insolvency. He insists that some years since, before he contracted the debt to the plaintiff, he had received a piece of land and much other property from his wife’s father as her portion of his estate, and finding himself in sinking circumstances conveyed the land to Sandige in *trust for his*(Ennis’) *wife and children.*Afterwards by agreement of all concerned, the land was sold, and the proceeds invested in lot 125; after which, his wife died, and Sandige to rid himself of the trust, conveyed to Ennis in trust for Mrs. Ennis’ four children. This investment was made before the debt to the complainant was contracted. He alleges that he holds only in trust, and *denies*all fraud. To this there is a general replication.

*Storer,*for the complainant, and

Hammond, for the respondents,

relied on 8 *Wheat. R.*229.

Wright, J.

A post nuptial *voluntary*settlement, made by a debtor for his wife and children, is void as to previous creditors, but as to subsequent ones, is valid, the consideration being held good and valuable. But if a conveyance is made for that purpose with a fraudulent design, then it is void as to subsequent creditors also.

A trust created in land for the wife and her children, vests in the children at her death. A conveyance by the trustee of the trust property to their father, in trust for them, is not per se fraudulent, though he is in debt. Nor is such conveyance made in honest execution of a trust, to be avoided by proof that the father when he took the trust was indebted and insolvent. If the trust estate is valid at its inception, no act of the trustee can affect the interest of the cestui que trust.

The complainant then agreed that the bill be dismissed,
#### BEVER v. BUTLER AND HULL.

Principal and security — giving time — consideration—statute of frauds.

Where time lias been given to the principal debtor under an agreement which has been executed, the creditor will not be allowed, as against the security, to show that the agreement to give time was invalid, being without consideration.

The real question in such cases is, was time given to the principal debtor, without the consent of the security? if so, the new contract waives the performance of the old one, and substitutes in its stead the new, thus discharging the old.

Such an agreement, to give time to a bond to convejr land, is not within the statute of frauds.

Debt on a penal bond, conditioned that Butler should make a deed for certain land, within a stipulated time. Hull pleaded three pleas, in substance: that he was security in the obligation, and after its execution; but before the time for making the deed, Bever, by agreement with Butler, without the defendant’s knowledge or consent, postponed the time for making the deed, beyond the time mentioned in the condition, to such time as he should demand it. The plaintiff replied, that after the postponement, he demanded the deed, which was refused. To this there is a general demurrer.

*368
      *•Newton*and Perkins, for the defendant,

contended that the replication was no answer to the pleas.

*J. C.*and *J. II.*Paine, contra,

contended that the first fault was in the pleas, which were—

1. That the agreement to postpone, was void under the statute of frauds, as an agreement arising out of lands.

2. Void, because it was without consideration.

• 3. Bad, because it did not aver that the contract was performed. They cited 15 *John. R.*202; 1 *Wend. R.*318; *5 East.*i?. 18; 2 *Wend.R.*590; 5 *Wend. R.*503; 3 *T. R.*598; 2 *Bay. R.*208.

By the Couet.

The case of *The Bank of Steubenville*v. Carrol, 5 *O. R.*214, is decisive of this. The cases cited upon the subject of valid contracts and good consideration, do not apply to the question before us. In this case, the contract (to give time) has been *executed*by the parties as a valid one, and it does not lie in the mouth of either now to say, they might have refused to execute the contract, because it was without consideration. ■ The real question is, was time given by the obligee to the principal debtor, without the consent of the surety? that is alleged and admitted by the demurrer. Such time given upon a new contract, waves the performance of the old one, and substitutes in its stead a new one, and in that way discharges the old. We do not presume that the statute of frauds bears upon the contract; but if it did, the execution or admission of the contract would take it out of the statute.

Judgment for the defendant.
#### BEASLEY V. THE STATE.

(Decided January 15, 1914.)

Appeal from Montgomery City Court.

Heard before Hon. Armstead Brown.

*661• Mark D. Brainard, for appellant. R. O. Brickell, Attorney General, and W. L. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Walker, P. J.

No error.

Affirmed.
#### CARTER *v.*McDOWELL.

Slander — words since suit — loss of marriage.

Slanderous words spoken since the commencement of the suit, may be -given in evidence, for the sole purpose of showing the sense in which the slanderous words relied upon were uttered.

*Quere*— When a loss of marriage is relied upon in aggravation'of the damages'in slander, should not the declaration set out the contract, and show it subsisting when the words were spoken *?*

*Quere?*— Should not the declaration in that case have set out the fact of a contract of marriage-existing between the plaintiff and Dorian? In 2d *East.*426, the libel was the repeating what one Guy had before said of the plaintiff. The declaration there sets forth that Guy and the plaintiff had dealing, and the plaintiff had sent him an account, on which he rashly accused the plaintiff of swindling. Of the error of which charge of swindling, he became satisfied; yet, the defendant, knowing that fact, maliciously spoke and repeated the words. It was held that the repetition was no justification under such circumstances. When special damage is claimed, I incline to think the contract claimed to have been broken up by the slander, should be set *out.*— Reporter.

Slander. The declaration charged the speaking of these words, ‘She had sexual intercourse with a married man, by means, &e. and on no other account, one C. Dorian, who was about to marry her, has since declined, and neglected so to do; and plaintiff hath been deprived of the gains, profits and comforts, which would have arisen from her marriage with him.

A witness was called, and asked to state slanderous words spoken by the defendant since the suit was brought.

*Rice*and *W. Silliman,*for the defendant,

objected to the testimony, as irrelevant.

*Avery*and Glasgow, for the plaintiff.

Bx the Court.

You may prove such words for the sole purpose of showing the *sense*in which words, not otherwise actionable, were. spoken.

Lane, J.

charged the jury; but, they being unable to agree, were discharged.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, January 17, 2017.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, January 17, 2017

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A17D0211. RICO MARTINEZ PEARSON et al. v. GEORGIA REAL ESTATE 

COMMISSION.

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

2016CV276094
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3704

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the 7.5 percent 

threshold on the deduction for medical expenses and to allow that deduction to taxpayers whether or not they itemize deductions. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 20, 2004

Mr. MCINNIS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal 

the 7.5 percent threshold on the deduction for medical 

expenses and to allow that deduction to taxpayers whether or not they itemize deductions.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Help Everyone Achieve 

5 Lower Taxes for Health Care Act of 2004’’ or the 

6 ‘‘HEALTH Care Act of 2004’’. 

2

•HR 3704 IH 

1 SEC. 2. MEDICAL CARE DEDUCTION ALLOWED TO ALL TAX2 PAYERS; REPEAL OF 7.5 PERCENT THRESH3 OLD. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 213(a) of the Internal 

5 Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to the treatment of med6 ical and dental expenses) is amended to read as follows: 

7 ‘‘(a) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION.—There shall be 

8 allowed as a deduction the expenses paid during the tax9 able year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, 

10 for medical care of the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, 

11 or a dependent (as defined in section 152).’’. 

12 (b) DEDUCTION ALLOWED WHETHER OR NOT TAX13 PAYER ITEMIZES OTHER DEDUCTIONS.—Subsection (a) 

14 of section 62 of such Code is amended by inserting after 

15 paragraph (18) the following new paragraph: 

16 ‘‘(19) MEDICAL EXPENSES.—The deduction al17 lowed by section 213.’’. 

18 (c) DE MINIMIS EXPENSES; SUBSTANTIATION.—Sec19 tion 213 of such Code is amended by adding at the end 

20 the following new subsection: 

21 ‘‘(f) DE MINIMIS EXPENSES; SUBSTANTIATION.—No 

22 deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any 

23 taxable year unless—

24 ‘‘(1) the expenses exceed $200, and 

3

•HR 3704 IH 

1 ‘‘(2) the taxpayer substantiates such expenses 

2 by adequate records or by sufficient evidence cor3 roborating the taxpayer’s own statement.’’

4 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

5 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

6 the date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUIS RAMIREZ

- GREGORIO,

Petitioner,

v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 15

- 71250
Agency No. A205

- 648

- 301

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 13, 2016 **

Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
We grant Respondent’s unopposed motion to expedite this appeal, and deny
her motion to lift the stay (Docket Entry No. 26). Luis Ramirez

- Gregorio, a native
and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

SEP 21 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 15

- 71250

application for asylum. Our jurisdiction is gove rned by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We
review de novo questions of law, and for substantial evidence the agency’s factual
findings. Husyev v. Mukasey , 528 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2008). We dismiss in
part and deny in part the petition for review.
We lack jurisdi ction to review Ramirez

- Gregorio’s contention that he
established extraordinary circumstances excusing the delay in filing his asylum
application based on legal disability and applications for other immigration

benefits because he did not raise this conten tion before the BIA. See Barron v.
Ashcroft , 358 F.3d 674, 677

- 78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review
claims not presented to the agency).
Apart from his contention regarding extraordinary circumstances, Ramirez

Gregorio does not challenge the BIA’s finding that he did not establish changed
circumstances excusing his untimely asylum application

. See Lopez

- Vasquez v.

Holder , 706 F.3d 1072, 1079

- 1080 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised
and argued in a party’s opening brief are waived)

. Thus, we deny the petition for

review.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; D ENIED in part.
I 

108TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3711

To amend the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 

Act of 2003 (Public Law 108–173) to eliminate the comparative cost 

adjustment program. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 20, 2004

Mr. WEXLER (for himself, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. OWENS, and Mr. 

JEFFERSON) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee 

on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 

Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within 

the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL

To amend the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 

and Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108–173) 

to eliminate the comparative cost adjustment program.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF COMPARATIVE COST ADJUSTMENT 

4 PROGRAM. 

5 Subtitle E of title II of the Medicare Prescription 

6 Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (Pub7 lic Law 108–173) is repealed and the provisions of law 
2

•HR 3711 IH 

1 amended by such subtitle are restored as if such subtitle 

2 had not been enacted.

Æ
February 3, 2015



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

REGINALD BROUSSARD , Appellant

NO. 14

- 13

- 01020

- CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

________________________________ This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. Having considered the record, this Court holds that there was no error in the judgment. The Court orders the judgment AFFIRMED

. We further order appellant pay all costs expended in the appeal. We further order this decision certified below for observance.
# AGENCY:

 Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements (CITA). 

# ACTION:

 Issuing a directive to the Commissioner of Customs reducing limits. 

# EFFECTIVE DATE:

 January 20, 2000. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

 Naomi Freeman, International Trade Specialist, Office of Textiles and Apparel, U.S. Department of Commerce, (202) 482-4212. For information on the quota status of these limits, refer to the Quota Status Reports posted on the bulletin boards of each Customs port, call (202) 927-5850, or refer to the U.S. Customs website at http://www.customs.ustreas.gov. For information on embargoes and quota re-openings, call (202) 482-3715. 

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

 

Authority: Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1854); Executive Order 11651 of March 3, 1972, as amended. 

The current limits for certain categories are being reduced for carryforward used. 

                    A description of the textile and apparel categories in terms of HTS numbers is available in the CORRELATION: Textile and Apparel Categories with the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (see                     **Federal Register**                     notice 64 FR 71982, published on December 22, 1999). Also see 64 FR 54868, published on October 8, 1999.                 

                        Troy H. Cribb,                    

Chairman, Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements. 

Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements

Commissioner of Customs, 

Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC 20229. 

Dear Commissioner: This directive amends, but does not cancel, the directive issued to you on October 4, 1999, by the Chairman, Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements. That directive concerns imports of certain cotton, wool and man-made fiber textile products, produced or manufactured in Guatemala and exported during the period which began on January 1, 2000 and extends through December 31, 2000. 

Effective on January, 20, 2000, you are directed to reduce the current limits for the following categories, as provided for under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing:

The guaranteed access levels for the above categories remain unchanged. 

The Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements has determined that these actions fall within the foreign affairs exception of the rulemaking provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1). 

Sincerely, 

                        Troy H. Cribb,                    

Chairman, Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements. 

[FR Doc. 00-1042 Filed 1-14-00; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510-DR-F
#### § 619.9135 Direct lender.

The term *direct lender* refers to Farm Credit banks and associations (production credit associations, agricultural credit associations, and Federal land credit associations) authorized to lend to eligible borrowers identified in § 613.3000.

[55 FR 24889, June 19, 1990]
EXHIBIT B

CUSTOMARY AND COMPARABLE COMPENSATION

DISCLOSURES

(See Guidelines ¶ C.3. for definitions of terms used in this Exhibit.) 

CATEGORY 

OF 

TIMEKEEPER

(using categories 

already maintained 

by the firm)

BLENDED HOURLY RATE

NONBANKRUPTCY 

BLENDED 

HOURLY RATE

CONTINENTAL 

BLENDED 

HOURLY RATE1

CONTINENTAL 

BLENDED 

HOURLY RATE

(AFTER 20%

REDUCTION)2

Partner $610.91 $549.44 $439.55 

Counsel N/A N/A N/A

Associate $437.91 $360.14 $288.11 

All timekeepers 

aggregated $503.02 $458.76 $367.01 

1 The calculation of Continental’s Blended Hourly Rate does not take into account Continental’s agreement to reduce 

its fees by an amount equal to 20% of its total hourly fees. 

2

 For illustrative purposes only.

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:22875-2 Filed:11/15/22 Entered:11/15/22 19:49:05 Desc:

Exhibit B Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                              JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                    $ 2,122,872
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                               4,689,196
<ALLOWANCES>                                        0
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            7,180,408
<PP&E>                                     20,795,468
<DEPRECIATION>                             13,579,036
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             14,723,820
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       4,532,606
<BONDS>                                             0
<COMMON>                                   13,883,965
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<OTHER-SE>                                 (6,493,240)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               14,723,820
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           11,132,299
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              11,144,470
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               50,445
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            154,817
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (217,433)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   26,546
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (243,979)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (243,979)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.05)
        

</TABLE>