a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

January 2005 WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION

Nonproliferation 

Programs Need Better 

Integration

GAO-05-157
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-157.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Joseph A. 

Christoff, (202) 512-8979 or 

christoffj@gao.gov; or Gene Aloise, (202) 

512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-157, a report to the

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 

Senate, and the Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

January 2005

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Nonproliferation Programs Need Better 

Integration 

GAO found that there is no overall strategy that integrates the threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs of the DOD, DOE, and others. DOD 

and DOE have strategies governing their respective programs, which 

generally contain the elements of a strategy as established by the 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. These strategies include a

mission statement and goals, identify external factors that could affect 

meeting these goals, establish metrics to evaluate the performance of the 

programs, provide cost estimates, and cover a period of at least 5 years. 

Given the involvement of multiple agencies, and the expansion of the threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs beyond the FSU, integration of 

agencies’ strategies is important. 

The agencies’ implementation of very similar programs has not always been 

well coordinated. While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE are 

distinct, GAO found three program areas that perform similar functions in 

the FSU. GAO found that the coordination of programs enhancing security at 

Russian nuclear warhead sites improved after the National Security Council 

(NSC) staff issued guidance. Specifically, the guidance delineates agencies’ 

roles, interactions, and ways to resolve disputes. The biological weapons 

scientist employment programs in DOD, DOE, and State are well 

coordinated and also have NSC staff guidance addressing roles, interactions, 

and disputes. By contrast, there is no governmentwide guidance delineating 

the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing border security 

programs. According to DOD and DOE officials managing these programs, 

agencies’ roles are not well delineated and coordination could be improved. 

DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Program Areas 

Since 1992, the Congress has 

provided more than $7 billion for 

threat reduction and 

nonproliferation programs in the 

former Soviet Union (FSU). These 

programs have played a key role in 

addressing the threats of weapons 

of mass destruction and are 

currently expanding beyond the 

FSU. The National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2004 mandated that GAO assess (1) 

Department of Defense (DOD) and 

Department of Energy (DOE) 

strategies guiding their threat 

reduction and nonproliferation 

programs and (2) efforts to 

coordinate DOD, DOE, and 

Department of State threat reduction and nonproliferation programs 

that share similar missions. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends (1) that the 

Secretaries of Defense and Energy 

develop an integrated plan for all 

U.S. threat reduction and 

nonproliferation programs and (2) 

that the Assistant to the President 

for National Security Affairs issue 

clear guidance for the coordination 

of border security programs. DOE 

agreed with the recommendations, 

while State and the NSC staff did 

not comment. DOD concurred with 

the need for better integrated 

nonproliferation programs, but did 

not specify whether it agreed with 

the need for an integrated plan. 

DOD concurred with the need for 

guidance governing border security 

programs.
Page i GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 4

DOD and DOE Strategic Plans for Threat Reduction and 

Nonproliferation Programs Are Not Integrated and Do Not 

Address U.S. Programs Worldwide 7

NSC Staff Guidance Delineating Agencies’ Roles, Information 

Sharing, and Dispute Resolution Results in Improved Program 

Coordination 17

Conclusions 22

Recommendations for Executive Action 23

Agency Comments 24

Scope and Methodology 24

Appendixes

Appendix I: DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation 

Projects, Fiscal Year 2004 27

Appendix II: DOD and DOE Metrics Used to Assess the Performance of 

Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs 31

Appendix III: DOD, DOE, and State Department Projects Addressing 

Similar Missions 34

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy 36

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense 39

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 41

GAO Contacts 41

Staff Acknowledgments 41

Related GAO Products 42

Tables Table 1: Selected GPRA Criteria for Strategic Planning 8

Table 2: Calls for Governmentwide Plans for Threat Reduction and 

Nonproliferation Programs 16

Table 3: Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Projects 27

Table 4: Department of Energy Nonproliferation Projects within 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 29

Table 5: DOD and DOE Performance Metrics 31
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 6: DOD and DOE Warhead Security Projects 34

Table 7: DOD, DOE, and State Biological Weapons Scientist 

Employment Projects 34

Table 8: Overview of Border Security Projects 35

Figures Figure 1: DOD Offices That Are Involved in Strategic Planning for 

the CTR Program 9

Figure 2: DOE Offices That Are Involved in Strategic Planning for 

Nonproliferation Programs 12

Figure 3: DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation 

Program Areas 18

Abbreviations

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction

DNN Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

FSU former Soviet Union

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of 1993

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NSC National Security Council

WMD weapons of mass destruction

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

January 28, 2005 Letr

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives 

Since 1992, the Congress has provided more than $7 billion for threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU). 

These programs encompass a range of projects, including removing 

nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; securing nuclear 

materials and warheads in Russia; and paying former weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) scientists to engage in peaceful research. The National 

Security Council (NSC) staff has the principal role in coordinating the 

many U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that are 

implemented primarily through the Departments of Defense (DOD) and 

Energy (DOE), although the Departments of State, Commerce, and 

Homeland Security implement related programs. DOD and DOE threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs have played a key role in 

addressing the threats posed by WMD in the FSU; these efforts have 

expanded in size and scope beyond the FSU states. For example, the 

United States recently provided assistance to dismantle WMD 

infrastructure in Libya, and DOE recently announced a new program to 

provide employment opportunities for Iraqi weapons scientists. 

Furthermore, in November 2003, the Congress authorized DOD to allow the 

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to spend up to $50 million 

annually of its existing funding to address proliferation threats outside the 

FSU. A bill pending in the Senate would allow DOD increased flexibility to 

undertake nonproliferation projects outside of the FSU.1

1

S. 2980, 108th Congress, 2nd Session.
Page 2 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20042 mandated 

that we assess the current management of DOD and DOE threat reduction 

and nonproliferation programs. We agreed to approach this assessment in 

two phases. First, this report assesses (1) DOD and DOE strategies guiding 

their respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and how 

they are integrated with those of other agencies and (2) efforts to 

coordinate the implementation of DOD, DOE, and State threat reduction 

and nonproliferation programs that share similar missions, goals, and 

activities. We included State in assessing the coordination of threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs because it shares responsibility in 

coordinating two programs. In the second phase, we plan to issue 

individual reports on DOD and DOE internal controls for their threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs. A list of our prior reports 

concerning DOD and DOE threat reduction and nonproliferation programs 

is included at the end of this report. 

To assess DOD and DOE strategies guiding their respective threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs, we assessed the agencies’ 

strategic plans against criteria established by the Government Performance 

and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). We also relied on our previous reviews of 

the CTR program in DOD and nonproliferation programs in DOE. 

Furthermore, we met with officials at DOD, DOE, and State and reviewed 

documents to determine if a plan exists that integrates the implementation 

strategies of DOD, DOE, and other agencies. To assess efforts to coordinate 

DOD, DOE, and State threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, we 

reviewed agency documents and interviewed agency officials. DOD 

officials included the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology 

Security Policy and Counterproliferation and other senior leaders. DOE 

officials included the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation and other senior leaders. We spoke with State 

Department officials in the Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to 

Europe and Eurasia and the Bureau of Nonproliferation. Although NSC 

officials did not respond to our requests to meet, we were able to meet our 

audit objectives by obtaining records and having discussions with DOD, 

DOE, and State officials regarding the role of the NSC staff and the extent 

of its participation in coordinating programs. Additionally, we provided a 

draft of this report to NSC staff to obtain their comments. We performed 

our review in Washington, D.C., from February 2004 to November 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

2

Public Law 108-136, Section 3611.
Page 3 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Results in Brief While both DOD and DOE have individual strategies governing their 

respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, there is no 

overall strategy that integrates these plans with one another, or with those 

of other agencies. DOD and DOE individual strategies generally contain the 

elements of a plan developed using GPRA criteria. These strategies include 

a mission statement and goals, identify external factors that could affect 

meeting these goals, establish metrics to evaluate the performance of the 

programs, provide cost estimates, and cover a period of at least 5 years. In 

2004, DOD and DOE implemented 39 threat reduction and nonproliferation 

projects costing approximately $1.8 billion. While it is important and 

valuable for DOD and DOE to have strategies to guide their respective 

programs, the expansion of these programs beyond the FSU and the 

involvement of multiple agencies make integration of all agencies’ 

strategies important. Since the mid-1990s, the Congress, GAO, and others3

have called for the executive branch to develop governmentwide plans to 

coordinate U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs 

worldwide. The NSC staff and State have prepared plans in response to 

these calls, but these plans either focus solely on one agency or on one 

geographic location. Therefore, these plans do not address U.S. threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs worldwide.

The agencies’ implementation of similar threat reduction and 

nonproliferation programs has not always been well coordinated. 

Coordination requires a delineation of each agency’s roles and 

responsibilities, regularized interactions, and clear procedures for 

resolving interagency disputes. While the majority of programs in DOD and 

DOE have distinct missions, we identified one area where DOD and DOE 

programs share similar missions, goals, and activities and two areas shared 

by DOD, DOE, and State. Both DOD and DOE have programs to improve 

the security of sites where Russian nuclear warheads are stored. Warhead 

security programs experienced coordination problems in the past because 

DOD and DOE were pursuing different approaches to securing nuclear 

warhead sites in Russia.4

 On the basis of our review of NSC staff guidance 

3

Other calls for governmentwide planning include the President’s National Strategy to 

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Baker-Cutler Commission, and the Commission 

to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Deutch Commission).

4

GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to 

Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, GAO-03-482 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 24, 2003).
Page 4 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

and discussions with programs officials, coordination improved when 

guidance specified agencies’ roles, interactions, and ways to resolve 

disputes. DOD, DOE, and State have programs employing former biological 

weapons scientists and enhancing the ability of countries to secure their 

borders against the smuggling of WMD materials. The biological weapons 

scientist employment programs in DOD, DOE, and State are well 

coordinated and have NSC staff guidance addressing roles, interactions, 

and disputes. Furthermore, DOD, DOE, and State Department officials 

were satisfied with the coordination of these programs. However, 

coordination of DOD, DOE, and State border security programs could be 

improved. DOD and DOE officials managing border security programs 

stated that agencies’ roles are not defined, information sharing is 

infrequent, and there are no procedures to resolve differences among 

agencies. 

We are recommending (1) that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, in 

consultation with other agencies that manage threat reduction and 

nonproliferation programs, develop an integrated plan for all U.S. threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs to ensure that the programs are 

effectively coordinated and (2) that the Assistant to the President for 

National Security Affairs, through the NSC staff, issue clear guidance for 

the coordination of DOD, DOE, and State Department border security 

programs, as it has done with programs to employ former biological 

weapons scientists and warhead security. 

DOE agreed with the recommendations in this report, while State and the 

NSC staff did not comment on them. DOD concurred with the need for 

better integrated threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, but did 

not specify whether it agreed with the need for an integrated plan. DOD 

concurred with the recommendation for NSC staff guidance governing 

border security programs. DOD, DOE, and State provided technical 

comments that we incorporated as appropriate. 

Background After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited the world’s 

largest arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. As Russia 

adopted economic reforms and moved toward an open society, its economy 

and central controls deteriorated, thereby making it difficult to maintain 

security at its weapons sites. Recognizing these difficulties, the Congress 

began authorizing funds in 1992 for programs to help destroy Russian 

weapons and improve WMD security. More recently, the events of 

September 11, 2001, have increased U.S. concerns that terrorists might 
Page 5 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

obtain WMD materials or weapons at poorly secured sites. While DOD and 

DOE implement most of the U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation 

programs, the Departments of State, Commerce, and Homeland Security 

implement related programs. 

The Congress established DOD’s CTR program in 1992 to reduce the WMD 

threat posed to the United States from weapons remaining in the FSU. The 

program was designed to assist the FSU in securing and destroying WMD 

and its means of delivery.5

 Initial CTR assistance was provided to Ukraine, 

Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, which had inherited the majority of the 

Soviet Union’s WMD. The program helped Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and 

Belarus remove nuclear weapons from their soil, eliminating the potential 

emergence of three additional nuclear states. CTR also facilitated Russia’s 

efforts to reduce its massive nuclear weapons arsenal and address its arms 

control commitments. In fiscal year 2004, CTR had 22 projects (see app. I). 

One of the newest CTR projects—the WMD Proliferation Prevention 

Initiative—is designed to strengthen the ability of non-Russian FSU states 

to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related 

materials. For example, DOD is providing equipment and training to 

Uzbekistan to enhance its ability to monitor its borders for illegal transport 

of radioactive material. Additionally, the CTR program has expanded 

outside of the FSU, as DOD will use CTR funds to help Albania eliminate its 

chemical weapons stockpile. Furthermore, a bill introduced in the Senate 

in November 2004 would grant DOD additional flexibility to expand the 

CTR program outside the FSU. DOD implements the CTR program through 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which receives policy 

guidance from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

In 1993, DOE began implementing programs funded by DOD, to help secure 

weapons-usable nuclear materials in the FSU. DOE also received funding in 

1994 from State to employ former Soviet weapons scientists and engineers 

in cooperative research projects with U.S. laboratories and industry to 

deter their employment by rogue states. In 1996, with the growth of these 

programs, funding shifted directly to DOE. These programs remained 

focused on the FSU and were spread throughout DOE. In October 1999, 

DOE’s nonproliferation programs were consolidated within the National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).6

 Since that time, NNSA’s 

5

Missiles, bombers, and missile carrying submarines may deliver WMD.

6

NNSA also manages DOE’s nuclear weapons and naval reactors programs.
Page 6 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

nonproliferation mission has been implemented by the Office of Defense 

Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), which seeks to detect, prevent, and 

reverse WMD proliferation. This mission has now expanded to address 

proliferation threats in more than 70 countries to prevent the spread of 

WMD. For example, DNN is initiating a new program to provide 

employment opportunities to Iraqi scientists, technicians, and engineers. In 

fiscal year 2004, DOE had 19 projects addressing nonproliferation threats 

worldwide (see app. I). The threat reduction and nonproliferation 

programs have evolved from a $400 million DOD program in 1992 to 

approximately $1.8 billion in programs at DOD and DOE in 2004.7

The State Department also manages its own nonproliferation programs and 

coordinates U.S. assistance to the FSU. In 1992, the Freedom Support Act8

established the Office of the Coordinator within the State Department to 

coordinate U.S. assistance to the FSU. The coordinator’s responsibilities 

include resolving program and policy disputes among U.S. government 

agencies regarding their programs in the FSU. In 1994, State and DOD 

established the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow to 

fund peaceful research carried out by otherwise underpaid weapons 

scientists.9

 The center supplements the income of scientists, purchases 

equipment for scientific research, and supports programs to help scientists 

identify and develop commercially viable research projects. In 1996, the 

Congress established State’s Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, 

and Related Programs Account to fund programs addressing the spread of 

WMD. For example, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund supports 

projects to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and 

related materials. 

NSC staff coordinates U.S. policy for threat reduction and nonproliferation 

programs and conducted reviews of these programs that validated the need 

7

In 2004, DOD programs were appropriated $451 million and DOE programs were 

appropriated $1.33 billion, which includes funds for programs in the United States, the FSU, 

and countries outside the FSU. Although the DOD and DOE budget data are being used for 

background purposes only, we assessed the reliability of these data and found they were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

8

Public Law 102-511.

9

A similar center was also established in Ukraine.
Page 7 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

to maintain them in 2001 and 2002.10 The Proliferation Strategy Policy 

Coordinating Committee, chaired by the Special Assistant to the President 

and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and 

Homeland Defense, sets general policy for U.S. nonproliferation programs. 

NSC staff establishes guidelines but does not implement programs or 

control their budgets. 

DOD and DOE 

Strategic Plans for 

Threat Reduction and 

Nonproliferation 

Programs Are Not 

Integrated and Do Not 

Address U.S. Programs 

Worldwide 

DOD and DOE prepare their own individual strategies to implement their 

respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, but there is no 

governmentwide strategy that integrates them with one another or with 

those of other agencies that implement threat reduction and 

nonproliferation programs.11 We found that DOD and DOE strategies to 

address security issues for their authorized agency missions generally meet 

selected criteria for strategic planning established by GPRA. Recognizing 

the importance of coordinating U.S. efforts, using resources effectively, and 

enhancing agencies’ abilities to anticipate growing nonproliferation 

concerns, the Congress, GAO, and others have required or recommended 

integrated planning among DOD, DOE, and other agencies’ threat reduction 

and nonproliferation programs. NSC staff and State created plans in 

response to the above requirements and recommendations, but these plans 

either focus solely on one agency or on one geographic location. 

Furthermore, these programs are expanding beyond the FSU and may 

potentially involve the response of multiple U.S. agencies.

10The 2001 review focused on programs implemented in Russia; the 2002 review focused on 

programs in non-Russian FSU states.

11Other agencies involved in threat reduction and nonproliferation programs include the 

Departments of State, Commerce, and Homeland Security.
Page 8 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

DOD and DOE Strategies for 

Threat Reduction and 

Nonproliferation Programs 

Generally Meet Criteria 

Established by the 

Government Performance 

and Results Act 

DOD and DOE each have strategic plans governing their respective threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs.12 We found that each agency’s 

strategic plan generally meets the selected GPRA criteria for strategic 

planning. See table 1 for a listing of the selected GPRA criteria. 

Additionally, we found that DOD and DOE have their own methods to 

prioritize their respective activities and programs. Furthermore, DOD and 

DOE threat reduction and nonproliferation programs undergo periodic 

internal and external reviews to improve program management.

Table 1: Selected GPRA Criteria for Strategic Planning

Source: GAO analysis of GPRA.

Department of Defense 

Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Planning

The CTR Policy Office, in conjunction with DTRA, produces and updates a 

strategy for the CTR program.13 We found that this strategy generally 

contains the elements of a strategic plan developed using GPRA criteria. 

Additionally, all CTR projects develop detailed plans that also contain these 

elements. Figure 1 depicts DOD offices that are involved in strategic 

planning for the CTR programs.

12The agencies have a variety of planning documents—such as strategies, annual plans, and 

multiyear project plans—which we refer to collectively as strategic plans.

Strategic plan element Description

Mission A comprehensive and concise statement describing the 

basic purpose of the agency, with a particular focus on its 

major agency functions and operations

Goals Provide clear direction to the work, services, programs, and 

activities of an organization and desired outcomes

External factors Describe the broader environment that can influence inputs, 

outputs, and outcomes, such as policy or economic changes

Performance metrics Provide a succinct and concrete statement of expected 

performance for subsequent comparison with actual 

performance

Cost estimates Describe the resources required to achieve the goals

Covers 5 years A strategic plan covers a period of at least 5 years forward

13The CTR Policy Office is located within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy. 
Page 9 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 1: DOD Offices That Are Involved in Strategic Planning for the CTR Program

In accordance with GPRA, the CTR program’s mission statement is 

comprehensive and concise: that is, to prevent the proliferation of WMD 

and related materials, technologies, and expertise from FSU states—

including providing for the safe destruction of Soviet-era WMD, associated 

delivery systems, and related infrastructure. The CTR program’s strategy 

also includes the following specific goals: (1) dismantle FSU WMD and 

associated infrastructure, (2) consolidate and secure FSU WMD and 

related technology and materials, (3) increase transparency and encourage 

higher standards of conduct, and (4) support defense and military 

cooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation. These goals 

provide clear direction to the activities and desired outcomes of the CTR 

program.

Office of the 

Secretary of Defense

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Strategic 

Offensive Arms 

Elimination

Program areas

Biological 

Weapons 

Proliferation 

Prevention

Nuclear 

Weapons Safety 

and Security

Chemical 

Weapons 

Elimination

WMD 

Proliferation 

Prevention

Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Directorate

Office of the Under Secretary of

 Defense for Policy

Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense (Technology, Security Policy 

and Counterproliferation)

Office of the Deputy Assistant to the 

Secretary of Defense (Chemical 

Demilitarization and Threat Reduction)

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Page 10 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

The CTR strategy also cites external factors that could affect the program, 

describes how performance will be measured, and states budget 

requirements. For example, the level of Russian cooperation is cited as an 

external factor that will affect the successful implementation of the 

program. The strategy provides metrics by which performance of the 

program can be measured, such as the number of missiles destroyed. DOD 

and DOE performance metrics are shown in appendix II. In accordance 

with GPRA criteria, the CTR plans include cost estimates and cover a 

period of 5 years. For example, the overall CTR funding request for fiscal 

year 2005 is $409 million, and the 5-year plan calls for an additional $1.5 

billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2009.

The CTR program has five program areas, with several projects under each 

program area. Each project has a plan that details its broad mission, 

specific objectives, external factors that could affect the achievement of 

these objectives, metrics that are used to evaluate the performance of the 

project, and cost estimates. For example, the mission of the Automated 

Inventory Control and Management System project, under the nuclear 

weapons safety and security program area, is to enhance Russia’s 

capability to account for and track the strategic and tactical nuclear 

weapons scheduled for dismantlement. Specific objectives include 

installing hardware and software at 18 sites within Russia and providing 

initial training and data entry. External factors cited for this program 

include whether Russia will grant sufficient access to the sites and improve 

the equipment storage conditions. The project uses milestone dates, which 

range from the procurement of the software to the final certification of the 

system at all sites, as one method to measure its performance. The project 

is estimated to cost $50.2 million.

Additionally, according to agency officials, DOD has not had to prioritize 

CTR projects on the basis of available funds. The CTR program generally 

receives the funding requested for its projects. DOD develops its budget 

request for the CTR program on the basis of funding needed to continue 

existing programs and implement new programs. As a result, projects have 

not competed for funding. 

Furthermore, the CTR program has undergone internal performance 

reviews in order to improve management practices. In 2003, the CTR Policy 

Office conducted a 6-month, project-by-project review of the program that 

changed the scope of several CTR projects to ensure that program 

activities met threat reduction goals. The review also resulted in a decision 

to stop funding activities that did not contribute directly to threat reduction 
Page 11 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

goals. For example, the CTR program no longer funds the restoration of the 

environment surrounding missile sites but continues to fund the 

elimination of the nuclear missiles and silos. 

The CTR program also has undergone several external reviews to identify 

areas needing improvement. For example, in 1996, we recommended that 

no funds should be obligated for constructing a chemical weapons 

destruction facility in Russia until reliable cost estimates were completed.14

(See prior GAO reports listed at the end of this report.) The DOD Inspector 

General also recommended that the CTR program adopt numerous 

controls to improve program management. For example, the DOD 

Inspector General recommended amendments to CTR program 

implementing agreements with Russia to ensure that Russia provides its 

weapons systems and their components scheduled for destruction, that it 

grants access rights to DOD, and that it is penalized for failure to use DOD 

assistance. As a result of this recommendation, DOD required Russia to 

sign an agreement specifying that all of Russia’s declared nerve agents 

could be destroyed at a facility under construction by the CTR program.15

However, DOD did not include a penalty for noncompliance.

Department of Energy 

Nonproliferation Planning

DNN produces a broad strategy for DOE’s nonproliferation programs, and 

DNN’s six program offices prepare strategic plans for their projects. 

Collectively, these plans generally contain the elements of a strategic plan 

developed using GPRA criteria. Figure 2 depicts DOE offices that are 

involved in strategic planning for DOE’s nonproliferation programs.

14GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Program, GAO/NSIAD-96-222 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 1996).

15Department of Defense Inspector General, Cooperative Threat Reduction: Cooperative 

Threat Reduction Program Liquid Propellant Disposition Project, Report No. D-2002-154

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2002) and Cooperative Threat Reduction: Cooperative Threat 

Reduction Construction Projects, Report No. D-2004-039 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003).
Page 12 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 2: DOE Offices That Are Involved in Strategic Planning for Nonproliferation 

Programs

In accordance with GPRA, DNN’s strategic plan clearly states its mission—

which is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear weaponsusable and radiological materials, technologies, and expertise. This plan 

also describes broad goals for its nonproliferation mission. For example, 

one of its goals is to secure nuclear and radiological materials at potentially 

vulnerable sites overseas. DNN’s plan identifies external factors that could 

affect its program goals, such as delays in its program to employ weapons 

scientists due to lengthy Russian government clearance procedures.

Although DNN’s strategic plan does not list performance measures for each 

of its nonproliferation projects, DNN maintains a database of goals and 

performance metrics for each of its six program areas. For example, to 

measure performance in preventing the migration of WMD expertise, DNN 

tracks the annual number of former Soviet weapons scientists, engineers, 

and technicians engaged by its programs. Appendix II contains 

performance metrics for DOE’s nonproliferation. In accordance with GPRA 

criteria, DNN plans include cost estimates and cover a period of 5 years. 

For example, DNN is requesting $1.3 billion for fiscal year 2005 and is 

projected to request an additional $5.7 billion between fiscal years 2006 and 

2009. 

Office of the Secretary of Energy

Nonproliferation 

Research and 

Engineering

Program areas

Nuclear 

Risk 

Reduction

Nonproliferation 

and 

International 

Security

International 

Material 

Protection and 

Cooperation

Fissile 

Materials 

Disposition

Global Threat 

Reduction 

Initiative

National Nuclear Security 

Administration

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.
Page 13 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

In the past, DNN generally received requested funding for its 

nonproliferation programs, but as the scope of these programs expanded, 

DNN began to prioritize projects within program areas, according to 

agency officials. In fiscal year 2004, DOE first applied several criteria, such 

as risk, availability of funding, and legal obligations, to prioritize projects. 

The criteria were used to identify activities with the greatest proliferation 

risk, on which DOE focused its resources. For example, in fiscal year 2004, 

Russia provided access to more nuclear warhead storage sites than 

originally planned. DOE diverted funds from lower priority activities, such 

as converting weapons-grade uranium16 to uranium that cannot be used in 

weapons,17 in order to fund security enhancements at the new nuclear 

warhead storage sites.

DNN’s nonproliferation programs have undergone internal and external 

reviews to identify areas needing improvement. The NNSA Under Secretary 

biannually reviews each program’s budget, accomplishments, and any 

other concerns. DOE also uses the results of external audits to identify 

areas needing improvement. For example, audits conducted by the DOE 

Inspector General have recommended improvements to NNSA’s process for 

matching program requirements with budgetary resources and managing 

the program to eliminate weapons-grade uranium in research reactors. In 

addition, we have conducted numerous reviews of various aspects of 

DOE’s nonproliferation programs. For example, in 2001, we found 

duplication between DOE’s two programs to employ former weapons 

scientists in Russia and recommended consolidating the programs.18 In 

response, DOE merged the programs into a new program, the Russian 

Transition Initiatives.

16Weapons-grade uranium is also known as highly enriched uranium.

17Uranium that cannot be used in weapons is also known as low enriched uranium.

18GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia’s 

Nuclear Cities Face Challenges, GAO-01-429 (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001).
Page 14 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Congress and Others 

Have Called for a 

Governmentwide Plan, but 

None Has Been Developed 

to Address U.S. Programs 

Worldwide

Since the mid-1990s, the Congress and others have called for the executive 

branch to develop governmentwide plans to govern threat reduction and 

nonproliferation programs. The Congress found that although U.S. 

nonproliferation efforts in the FSU have achieved important results in 

securing WMD materials, technology, and knowledge, the effectiveness of 

these efforts has suffered from a lack of coordination within and among 

agencies.19 Recognizing the importance of integrated planning of threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs, the Congress required the 

executive branch to develop three plans. To comply with the requirements 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, as 

amended,20 the President submitted a plan and an annual report on the 

implementation of the plan covering all agency efforts to secure nuclear 

weapons, material, and expertise in the FSU. This plan addressed the 

specific requirements of the legislation, including identifying the goals and 

objectives of the programs and strategies for terminating U.S. contributions 

to the programs. 

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 requires (1) the 

State Department to provide the appropriate congressional committees 

with a 3-year international arms control and nonproliferation strategy and 

(2) the President to provide the Congress with a plan detailing coordination 

of nonproliferation programs.21 State submitted the 3-year international 

arms control and nonproliferation strategy to the Congress in August 2003. 

The strategy focuses on the State Department’s programs and activities, 

discusses broad U.S. arms control and nonproliferation goals, and 

describes State’s efforts under way to achieve these goals. For the 

coordination plan, the Congress required the establishment of an 

interagency committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of 

Defense, Energy, State, Commerce, Homeland Security, and the Attorney 

General and other officials that the President deems necessary. This 

committee will exercise responsibility for coordinating all U.S. threat 

reduction efforts and enhance the U.S. government’s ability to anticipate 

19Public Law 107-228, Section 1332.

20Public Law 107-107, Section 1205; Public Law 107-314, Section 1205.

21Public Law 107-228, Section 1309.
Page 15 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

growing nonproliferation areas of concern. This committee is required to 

submit a coordination plan in May 2005.22

In past work, we found that the development of a governmentwide strategy 

could strengthen the coordination of threat reduction and nonproliferation 

programs.23 The strategy should identify overall goals, time frames for 

meeting those goals, and ways to set priorities for allocating resources 

governmentwide to address all U.S. nonproliferation concerns.

The executive branch also called for the development of a governmentwide 

plan for U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. Specifically, 

the President’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 

of 2002 calls on the Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee, 

chaired by NSC staff, to prepare a 5-year governmentwide plan by March 

2003.24 To achieve greater efficiency through program coordination, the 

strategy stated that this governmentwide plan should include all threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs in the FSU that are funded wholly 

or in part by the U.S. government. As of November 2004, the plan had yet to 

be developed. 

In addition, independent panels have also called for the development of 

governmentwide plans. In 1998, the Congress established the Commission 

to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the 

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Deutch Commission), 

which recommended coordinated and consistent governmentwide 

strategies to address nonproliferation threats to the United States. In 2001, 

the Baker-Cutler Commission, established by the Secretary of Energy, 

recommended the development of a national strategic plan to secure all 

Russian nuclear weapons-useable material and prevent WMD expertise 

from leaving Russia. No reports have been developed that address either 

commission’s recommendations. Table 2 is a listing of the various calls for 

governmentwide plans and their status.

22The legislation calls for a report to be submitted to the Congress 120 days after each 

presidential inauguration.

23GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Coordination of U.S. Programs Designed to Reduce the 

Threat Posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction, GAO-02-180T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 

2001).

24For our assessment of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction of 

2002, see Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).
Page 16 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 2: Calls for Governmentwide Plans for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs

Source: GAO description of legislation and reports related to nonproliferation programs.

None of the existing plans in table 2 integrates agencies’ plans with one 

another or addresses U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs 

worldwide. For example, the plan developed as a result of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 did not address programs to 

secure and eliminate chemical weapons in Russia or the infrastructure 

used to develop chemical and biological weapons throughout the FSU. 

Report name/Requester Requirement/Summary Status

National Defense 

Authorization Act for fiscal 

year 2002, as amended

Requires the President to submit a plan and an annual report on 

the implementation of the plan for all agency efforts to secure 

nuclear weapons and materials and prevent the outflow of WMD 

expertise from the FSU. 

Initial strategy was due in June 2002 and 

the annual report on implementation was 

due in January 2003, and annually 

thereafter.

Both the strategy and 2003 annual plan 

were delivered late to the Congress on 

March 11, 2003.

As of November 2004, the 2004 annual 

implementation report had not been 

delivered.

Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act, fiscal 

year 2003

Requires the State Department to submit a 3-year international 

arms control and nonproliferation strategy for reducing and 

controlling the proliferation of WMD, which includes (1) U.S. 

goals for arms control and nonproliferation of WMD and (2) a 

description of State Department programs intended to 

accomplish these goals.

State Department sent report to the 

Congress on August 11, 2003.

Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act, fiscal 

year 2003

Requires the President to submit a strategy to coordinate the 

threat reduction and nonproliferation objectives of the executive 

branch agencies. 

Report is not due until 120 days after the 

2005 inauguration. 

National Strategy to 

Combat WMD

Requires the Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating 

Committee to develop a 5-year plan for all threat reduction and 

nonproliferation programs in the FSU.

Plan was due in March 2003.

No plan was delivered as of November 

2004.

Deutch Commission Recommends developing coordinated and consistent 

governmentwide strategies that include country-specific, longterm plans to reduce the demands for WMD.

No deadline for submission.

No plan was delivered as of November 

2004.

Baker-Cutler Commission Recommends a plan for securing all nuclear weapons-usable 

material in Russia and to prevent the outflow of scientific 

expertise that could be used for nuclear or other WMD, which 

includes clearly defined goals and measurable objectives, 

associated budgets for each program, and criteria for success. 

No deadline for submission.

No plan was delivered as of November 

2004.
Page 17 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Similarly, the 2003 arms control plan that State prepared addressed U.S. 

arms controls efforts, but the plan is limited to a description of DOE’s 

programs for addressing these goals. 

NSC Staff Guidance 

Delineating Agencies’ 

Roles, Information 

Sharing, and Dispute 

Resolution Results in 

Improved Program 

Coordination 

On the basis of our review of NSC staff guidance and discussions with DOD 

and DOE officials, we found that coordination among programs that share 

similar missions, goals, and activities is improved when each agency’s roles 

and responsibilities are delineated, information sharing is formalized, and 

procedures for resolving interagency disputes are clear. While the majority 

of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct, three program areas perform 

similar functions in the FSU: (1) improving the security of sites where 

Russian nuclear warheads are stored, (2) employing former biological 

weapons scientists, and (3) enhancing the ability of countries to secure 

their borders against the smuggling of WMD materials. The warhead 

security programs implemented by DOD and DOE were not well 

coordinated in the past, but NSC staff guidance that describes each 

agency’s role, formalizes meetings, and establishes a dispute resolution 

process has improved coordination, according to agency officials. DOD, 

DOE, and State officials in the biological weapons scientists programs 

understand each agency’s roles and responsibilities, meet monthly, and 

follow dispute resolution procedures as described in governmentwide 

guidance for this program area. By contrast, there is no governmentwide 

guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing 

border security programs. As a result, DOD and DOE officials managing 

border security programs stated that agencies’ roles are not defined, 

information sharing is infrequent, and there are no procedures to resolve 

differences among agencies.

Most DOD and DOE Threat 

Reduction and 

Nonproliferation Programs 

Are Distinct

We found that most threat reduction and nonproliferation projects in DOD 

and DOE have distinct missions, goals, and activities. DOD’s CTR program 

has few projects that are similar to those in DOE and State. Figure 3 folds 

DOD’s projects into broader program areas and distinguishes those distinct 

program areas from those that are similar. First, DOD has several projects 

in the FSU to destroy strategic weapons systems such as bombers, missiles, 

and submarines. Second, DOD funds the safe and secure transport of the 

Russian nuclear warheads scheduled for elimination. Third, DOD is 

constructing a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye to help 

eliminate Russia’s declared stockpile of nerve agents. Fourth, DOD is 

assisting in the elimination of WMD infrastructure by, for example, 
Page 18 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

dismantling biological weapons facilities in Kazakhstan. Finally, the CTR 

program engages in projects that facilitate contact between U.S. and FSU 

defense and military personnel. Program events include conferences, 

seminars, and combined military exercises designed to strengthen defense 

partnerships between the United States and FSU states.

Figure 3: DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Program Areas 

 aCurrently, DOD only has programs employing biological weapons scientists, whereas DOE and 

State’s programs employ chemical, nuclear, missile, and biological weapons scientists.

• Strategic weapons 

destruction 

• Nuclear weapons 

transportation 

 security

 

• Chemical weapons 

destruction 

• WMD infrastructure 

elimination 

• Defense and military 

contacts

• Fissile materials 

disposition 

• Securing radiological 

materials 

• Highly enriched uranium 

transparency and recovery 

• Elimination of weaponsgrade plutonium 

production 

• Nonproliferation 

research and 

development

A. Warhead security

B. Employment of 

biological weapons 

scientists

C. Border security

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, and State data.

DOD and DOE project areas

DOD, DOE, and State project areas

DOD Threat Reduction DOE Nonproliferation

 Warhead security program 

coordination has improved.

A. Warhead security: These programs seek to 

improve the security of sites where Russian 

nuclear warheads are stored.

B. Employment of biological weapons scientists:

These programs seek to employ former biological 

weapons scientists.a

C. Border security: These programs seek to enhance 

the ability of countries to secure their borders against 

the smuggling of WMD materials.

 Biological weapons scientist 

employment programs have 

elements of good coordination.

 Border security programs lack 

elements of good coordination.

DOD and DOE activities that overlap Coordination status
Page 19 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

We also found that most DOE projects have distinct missions, goals, and 

activities addressing the proliferation threat posed by nuclear and 

radiological materials (see fig. 3). First, fissile materials disposition 

projects eliminate weapons-grade nuclear materials. For example, DOE has 

a project to eliminate surplus Russian plutonium by turning it into fuel for 

use in civilian nuclear power plants. Second, DOE is assisting Russia by 

shutting down three nuclear power plants that produce plutonium and 

replacing them with power plants fueled by coal. Third, DOE conducts 

nonproliferation research and development, such as developing 

technologies used to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. 

Fourth, DOE consolidates and secures radioactive materials that could be 

used in dirty bombs.25 Finally, DOE’s highly enriched uranium transparency 

project monitors the conversion of material from Russian nuclear 

warheads into fuel for civilian nuclear power plants.

We found three program areas where both DOD and DOE have projects 

that perform similar activities in the FSU. First, both agencies have projects 

to improve the security of sites where Russian nuclear warheads are 

stored, such as installing fences and security systems. Second, both 

agencies have projects to employ former biological weapons scientists to 

prevent the proliferation of their expertise to states and terrorist 

organizations. Third, both agencies have projects to enhance the ability of 

countries to secure their borders against the smuggling of WMD materials. 

The State Department has its own programs to employ biological former 

biological weapons scientists and secure borders against the trafficking of 

WMD materials and plays a role in coordinating U.S. efforts in these areas. 

See appendix III for more information regarding DOD, DOE, and State’s 

projects in these areas.

Warhead Security Program 

Coordination Has Improved 

We have previously reported that DOD and DOE were pursuing different 

approaches to securing nuclear warhead sites in Russia.26 DOD and DOE 

had plans to upgrade some of the same storage sites, and DOD had already 

purchased equipment to upgrade security at some of those sites. 

Additionally, DOD and DOE used different vendors to purchase different 

equipment to perform the same function, which could have resulted in 

25Dirty bombs are designed to disperse radioactive material by packaging explosives, such 

as dynamite, with radioactive material.

26GAO-03-482.
Page 20 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

extra training and maintenance costs. As a result of our work, DOD and 

DOE coordinated their efforts to avoid duplication by identifying the 

agency with the best access to and cooperation of the Russians to install 

the security upgrades. Furthermore, we recommended that an integrated 

plan be developed for these programs on issues such as resolving 

equipment standardization concerns. 

During the course of our audit work, NSC staff issued common policy 

guidance for DOD and DOE programs that help Russia secure its nuclear 

warheads. The policy guidance prohibited assistance to operational sites 

due to concerns that U.S. assistance may enhance Russia’s military 

capability. Additionally, NSC staff established interagency procedures for 

coordinating warhead security assistance activities through a working 

group that reviews all requests for assistance, with neither DOD nor DOE 

being allowed to implement a project without the group’s approval. In the 

case of a dispute, an agency can escalate the request for assistance to a 

higher level interagency group. According to both DOD and DOE officials, 

the guidelines and procedures implemented since our report have 

improved coordination, such as holding interagency meetings. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, DOE stated that DOD and DOE 

include representatives from the other agency on each other’s bilateral 

forums with the Russians. Other working group participants acknowledged 

that coordination concerns have been reduced but stated that information 

sharing should be improved, especially about issues escalated above the 

working group level. 

Biological Weapons 

Scientist Employment 

Programs Have Elements of 

Well Coordinated Programs

We found that the coordination of biological weapons scientist 

employment programs is characterized by clearly delineated roles and 

responsibilities, regular interaction, and dispute resolution procedures. In 

September 2002, NSC staff issued guidelines governing the coordination of 

the biological weapons scientist employment programs, which addressed 

these three elements. These guidelines state the roles of each agency, 

formalize information sharing, and include procedures for resolving 

disputes. Additionally, the guidelines describe oversight requirements and 

other factors to be considered when implementing these programs.

Agency officials managing the biological weapons scientist employment 

programs did not report any difficulties pertaining to coordination or to the 

activities of other agencies. These officials stated that the NSC staff 

guidelines are valuable in ensuring that activities are undertaken by the 

appropriate agency and agencies’ programs work toward common U.S. 
Page 21 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

objectives. These guidelines established the Nonproliferation Interagency 

Roundtable, which ensures that all agencies are aware of each other’s 

activities in employing biological weapons scientists in the FSU and that 

the agencies avoid duplication of efforts. Proposals for new projects are 

reviewed and voted on monthly by the Nonproliferation Interagency 

Roundtable. If disagreements arise after the voting process has occurred, 

agencies may escalate the decision to a group chaired by NSC staff. 

Officials we spoke with stated that coordination has worked successfully. 

DOD, DOE, and State officials all cited the NSC staff guidelines when 

discussing their programs with us and confirmed that these guidelines were 

applied governmentwide. 

Border Security Programs 

Lack Elements of Well 

Coordinated Programs

There is no governmentwide guidance for border security programs that 

delineates agencies’ roles and responsibilities, establishes regular 

information sharing, and defines procedures for resolving interagency 

disputes, according to DOD and DOE officials. Although the State 

Department prepared a strategic plan that identifies and describes border 

security programs and interagency coordination mechanisms in Eurasia, 

the plan does not clearly establish the departments’ roles or how 

information is shared.27 The plan also acknowledges that NSC staff will 

provide policy oversight and guidance to implement the border security 

programs, but DOD and DOE officials with whom we met were unaware of 

such guidance.

The primary coordination mechanism for all border security programs is an 

interagency working group chaired by the State Department’s 

Nonproliferation Bureau. According to DOD and DOE officials, the group 

does not have regularly scheduled meetings.28 DOE officials stated they 

would prefer to meet more often to facilitate coordination of their 

programs and reduce the amount of informal coordination, such as 

telephone conversations and e-mails, which they believe is less efficient. 

State Department officials acknowledged that coordination of these 

27Eurasia is defined as including the following countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 

Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 

Uzbekistan. 

28In commenting on a draft of this report, the State Department informed us that as of 

December 6, 2004, its Nonproliferation Bureau established a schedule for regular meetings 

of the interagency working group on border security issues. These meetings are scheduled 

to be held every 2 months during calendar year 2005.
Page 22 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

programs could be better, but stated that they lack the authority to resolve 

conflicts over coordination. 

In the absence of guidance for coordination, agency officials question the 

other agencies’ roles and responsibilities. For example, both State and 

DOD officials acknowledged that their border security programs conduct 

similar activities, such as training border security guards and providing 

equipment for detecting illicit trafficking of WMD. Furthermore, State 

Department officials questioned whether some aspects of DOD’s 

International Counterproliferation Program were targeting countries that 

may no longer require the type of assistance being provided. For example, 

DOD’s program provided basic level WMD courses to officials from 

Bulgaria, which is beyond the need for basic level training, according to a 

State Department official. 

In May 2002, we reported problems with the coordination of border 

security programs.29 We found that portal monitors provided through the 

State Department’s border security program did not meet the standards 

established by DOE.30 Since our report, the State Department has 

transferred responsibility of operation and maintenance of the monitors to 

DOE, and State is no longer funding the installation of portal monitors. 

According to State and DOE officials, the specific problems we highlighted 

have since been resolved, such as the coordination of agencies’ border 

security activities. We have follow-up work under way regarding this issue.

Conclusions DOD and DOE develop their own strategic plans, prioritize their own 

program activities, and measure their own program performance. While 

this approach helps keep the departments on track to meet their own 

objectives, it does not provide governmentwide guidance for U.S. threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs, which would include goals, time 

frames for meeting those goals, and mechanisms for establishing priorities 

across the various departments involved in program implementation. In 

light of the U.S. government’s elimination of nuclear infrastructure in Libya, 

29GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear 

Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-426 (Washington, D.C.:

May 16, 2002).

30Portal monitors are stationary equipment designed to detect radioactive materials carried 

by pedestrians or vehicles.
Page 23 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

recent agreement to eliminate chemical weapons in Albania, and the 

growing likelihood of other efforts expanding outside the FSU, overall 

strategic guidance becomes increasingly important given the involvement 

of multiple agencies. While NSC staff has provided guidance to agencies 

implementing programs to secure Russian warheads and employ former 

Soviet biological weapons scientists, there is no governmentwide strategy 

for agencies implementing threat reduction and nonproliferation programs 

worldwide. The requirement in the Fiscal Year 2003 Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act for a Presidential report detailing the coordination of 

nonproliferation programs provides an opportunity for the administration 

to review its broad array of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs 

to ensure that the programs and capabilities of the various departments 

address all proliferation threats worldwide. As part of this effort, DOD and 

DOE can draw upon lessons learned from programs in the FSU.

In addition, while the majority of threat reduction and nonproliferation 

programs do not address similar missions, it is still important for policy 

makers and program managers at DOD and DOE to (1) understand how 

their efforts contribute to broader U.S. goals and (2) have formal 

mechanisms for sharing information and lessons learned that cut across 

programmatic boundaries. In those areas where more than one department 

is addressing a similar mission, interagency coordination is important to 

avoid duplication and collectively meet common goals. We found that 

interagency coordination of threat reduction and nonproliferation 

programs appears to work best when there is clear guidance from NSC 

staff regarding the roles of the various departments, regularized agency 

interactions, and resolution of interagency disputes, as is the case with the 

projects to employ biological weapons scientists and secure warhead sites. 

However, we found that coordination is limited among the border security 

projects where there is no NSC staff guidance.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, in consultation 

with other agencies involved in threat reduction and nonproliferation 

programs, develop an integrated plan for all U.S. threat reduction and 

nonproliferation programs to ensure that the programs are effectively 

coordinated and address all threats. The results of this review should be 

reported to the Congress as part of the President’s response to section 1339 

of the Fiscal Year 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which requires 

the President to submit a report after each presidential inauguration on 

threat reduction and nonproliferation objectives and how executive branch 

efforts will be coordinated.
Page 24 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

We also recommend that the Assistant to the President for National 

Security Affairs, through the NSC staff, lead the development of a plan 

guiding the implementation and coordination of threat reduction and 

nonproliferation programs addressing border security as they have done 

with the programs addressing the employment of biological weapons 

scientists. This plan should identify U.S. government goals and objectives, 

designate departments’ roles and responsibilities, and establish procedures 

to resolve policy and program disputes. 

Agency Comments DOE and DOD provided comments on a draft of this report, which are 

reproduced in appendixes IV and V. DOE agreed with the report and the 

corresponding recommendations. DOD concurred with the need for better 

integrated nonproliferation and threat reduction programs, but did not 

specify whether it agreed with the need for an integrated plan. DOD 

concurred with the need for NSC staff guidance governing border security 

programs. State Department and the NSC staff did not comment on this 

report. DOE, DOD, and State provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate. 

Scope and 

Methodology

To assess DOD and DOE’s strategies to implement their respective threat 

reduction and nonproliferation programs, we obtained agencies’ strategic 

plans, project/program planning documents, budget documents, and 

annual reports. To assess attempts to integrate these strategies, we 

consulted relevant public laws and met with experts at the Nuclear Threat 

Initiative, a global initiative that seeks to raise public awareness of WMD 

threats and carries out threat reduction work; the Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 

a nongovernmental organization in the United States that provides research 

and training on nonproliferation issues; and the U.S. – Russia Corporate 

Partnerships Advancing Nonproliferation and National Security, a 

congressional bipartisan study group. To assess DOD and DOE strategies to 

implement their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, we 

compared them against select criteria contained in GPRA and reviewed our 

prior work relating to performance metrics and program assessment. We 

also interviewed DOD and DOE officials, including the Deputy 

Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and 

Counterproliferation, the Director and Deputy Director of DTRA’s CTR 

program, and senior leadership from the CTR program office. The DOE 

officials we interviewed include the Deputy Administrator for Defense 
Page 25 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Nuclear Nonproliferation and senior officials from the Initiatives for 

Proliferation Prevention Program. In addition, we spoke with officials from 

the DOD and DOE Inspector’s General office, the Office of Management 

and Budget, the Congressional Research Service, and the intelligence 

community. 

To assess efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and State programs with similar 

missions, we obtained documents from these agencies regarding their 

threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. We also reviewed NSC 

staff guidance on biological weapons scientists’ employment and warhead 

security programs. We also reviewed DOD, DOE, and State documents 

regarding their border security programs. Finally, we relied on our previous 

reviews of the CTR program and several nonproliferation programs within 

DOE and the State Department. We also interviewed numerous officials, 

including the Director and Deputy Director of DTRA’s CTR program, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy for CTR programs, and the 

Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and 

Counterproliferation. DOE officials include the Deputy Administrator for 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, the Assistant Deputy Administrator of 

the Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation, and other 

senior officials from the other DNN program areas. At the State 

Department, we interviewed the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe 

and Eurasia and met with officials from the Bureau of Nonproliferation. We 

also met with the managers of programs addressing border security, 

weapons security, and employment of biological weapons scientists. NSC 

officials did not respond to our requests to meet. However, we discussed 

the role of the NSC staff and the extent of its participation in coordinating 

programs with DOD, DOE, and State officials.

We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We performed our review in 

Washington, D.C., from February 2004 to November 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the National Security Council; and the Secretaries of Defense, 

Energy, and State. We will also make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.
Page 26 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

If you have questions regarding this report, please contact Mr. Christoff at 

(202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov or Mr. Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or 

aloisee@gao.gov. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in 

appendix VI.

Joseph A. Christoff

Director, International Affairs and Trade

Gene Aloise

Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Page 27 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix I

DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and Apendxies

Nonproliferation Projects, Fiscal Year 2004 ApendxiI

Table 3: Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Projects

Project Description

Emergency Response Support 

Equipment 

Provides equipment to Russia for use in an emergency response train should accidents occur 

during transportation of ballistic missiles. The equipment, including a rail-mounted crane, 

hydraulic tools, concrete pulverizers, and an excavator, is available to support missile

transportation and dismantlement.

Solid Propellant Intercontinental 

Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Submarine 

Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and 

Mobile Launcher Elimination

Will refurbish and operate Russian missile disassembly facilities; provide the equipment for and 

operation of, mobile launcher elimination facilities; and perform destruction of treaty-limited 

components.

Liquid Propellant ICBM and Silo 

Elimination 

Eliminates silos and destroy missiles in accordance with treaty requirements. Activities include 

deactivating silos, providing upgrades to the missile elimination and destruction facility at 

Surovatikha, and furnishing equipment to store and transport liquid missile propellant.

SLBM Launcher Elimination/Ballistic 

Missile Submarine Dismantlement 

Assists Russia in eliminating submarine missile launchers in accordance with treaty 

requirements and provide assistance to dismantle and eliminate submarine.

Spent Naval Fuel Disposition Supports submarine missile launcher elimination and associated ballistic missile submarine 

dismantlement through dry storage of spent nuclear fuel removed when defueling submarines. 

In addition to storing the fuel in storage/transportation containers, a means of transporting the 

containers by rail from the shipyard to a final storage/disposition location is included.

Liquid Propellant SLBM Elimination Assists in destroying submarine missiles from the Russian Northern and Pacific Fleets. The 

destruction process includes shipping, defueling, neutralization, and cutting into pieces all 

proliferable components of submarine missiles.

Personnel Reliability and Safety Provides training and equipment to assist Russia in determining the reliability of its guard 

forces.

Site Security Enhancements Enhances the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons storage sites through the use of 

vulnerability assessments to determine specific requirements for upgrades. The Department of 

Defense (DOD) will then develop security designs to address those vulnerabilities and install 

the equipment necessary to bring security standards consistent with those at U.S. nuclear 

weapons storage facilities.

Nuclear Weapons Transportation Assists Russia in shipping nuclear warheads to more secure sites or dismantlement locations.

Railcar Maintenance and Procurement Assists Russia in maintaining nuclear weapons cargo railcars. Funds maintenance of railcars 

until no longer feasible, then purchases replacement railcars to maintain 100 cars in service. 

DOD will procure 15 guard railcars to replace those retired from service. Guard railcars will be 

capable of monitoring security systems in the cargo railcars and transporting security force 

personnel.

Weapons Transportation Safety 

Enhancements 

Will provide emergency response vehicles containing hydraulic cutting tools, pneumatic jacks, 

and safety gear to enhance Russia’s ability to respond to possible accidents in transporting 

nuclear weapons. Meteorological, radiation detection and monitoring, and communications 

equipment is also included.

Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility Is constructing a destruction facility for Russian nerve agent-filled munitions near the town of 

Shchuch’ye. The United States will fund the design, construction, equipment acquisition and 

installation, systems integration, training, and start-up of the destruction facility. The Russians 

will construct one of the two buildings in which the nerve agent will be removed from munitions 

and neutralized, and the drained munitions will be decontaminated.
Appendix I

DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and 

Nonproliferation Projects, Fiscal Year 2004

Page 28 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Source: GAO summary of DOD threat reduction projects.

Chemical Weapons Production Facility 

Demilitarization 

Will demilitarize former nerve agent weapons production facilities by decontaminating, 

dismantling, and destroying specialized equipment and special features related to the 

production, transfer, and storage of chemical agent/weapons in accordance with treaty 

requirements.

SS-24 Missile Motor Elimination Is contingent on Ukraine agreeing to a means of missile motor disposal other than the original 

“water washout method.” According to DOD, this method was fiscally and technologically risky. If 

an alternate means is agreed upon, the project would also fund continued storage of the motors 

until eliminated.

Biological Weapons (BW) Infrastructure 

Elimination 

Assesses all known former BW facilities and institutes in the former Soviet Union where access 

is provided. These assessments provide detailed vulnerability and threat analyses for each 

institute and facility, which will then be used to develop implementation plans for reducing BW 

proliferation threats and prioritizing facility dismantlement efforts.

 Biosecurity and Biosafety Provides security and safety upgrades at institutes engaged only in legitimate dangerous 

pathogen research. Tasks include identification and implementation of necessary structural 

improvements and consolidation of dangerous pathogen collections to reduce the number of 

sites in a given country storing pathogens.

Cooperative Biological Research Engages former BW scientists in peaceful pursuits in order to prevent the proliferation of BW 

expertise to terrorist groups and rogue states. The United States works with institutes and 

scientists employed in legitimate research to develop collaborative projects involving dangerous 

pathogens for prophylactic, preventive, or other peaceful purposes.

BW Threat Agent Detection and 

Response 

Will promote biosecurity and biosafety at biological facilities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan by 

strengthening dangerous pathogen detection and response networks, enabling discovery of the 

diversion or accidental release of biological materials, and removing pathogens from existing 

field stations by safely and securely transporting and consolidating them in central labs. 

Caspian Sea Maritime Interdiction Seeks to provide Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan with a comprehensive capability for WMD 

detection and interdiction of illicit trafficking in WMD-related materials and components along 

the maritime borders of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea.

Uzbekistan Portal Monitors Provides a comprehensive nuclear detection and interdiction capability of illicit trafficking in 

WMD-related materials at key ports of entry.

Ukraine Land Border Proliferation 

Prevention

Provides Ukraine, in conjunction with DOE's Second Line of Defense, with a comprehensive 

capability for nuclear detection and interdiction of illicit trafficking in WMD-related materials 

along the Ukraine/Moldova border.

Defense and Military Contacts Expands contacts between defense establishments in the former Soviet Union in order to stem 

the proliferation of WMD, support the implementation of new strategic frameworks, and increase 

U.S. access by strengthening defense partnerships. Events will include, among other things, 

exchange visits of senior and midlevel officers, combined military exercises, conferences, and 

seminars.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Project Description
Appendix I

DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and 

Nonproliferation Projects, Fiscal Year 2004

Page 29 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 4: Department of Energy Nonproliferation Projects within Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

Project Description

Global Radiological Threat Reduction Secures radiological sources no longer needed in the United States and locate, identify, 

recover, consolidate, and enhance the security of radioactive materials outside the United 

States.

Global Nuclear Material Threat 

Reduction

Eliminates the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear facilities around the 

world by converting research reactors to the use of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, returns 

U.S.-origin HEU and LEU spent fuel to the United States from U.S.-supplied research reactors 

around the world, returns Russian-origin fresh and spent HEU fuel to Russia from Russiansupplied research reactors around the world, secures plutonium-bearing spent nuclear fuel 

from the BN-350 fast breeder reactor in Kazakhstan, and recovers nuclear materials at 

vulnerable locations throughout the world. 

Proliferation Detection Project Develops advanced remote sensing and ground-based technologies, in support of other 

agencies, to address problems related to detection, location, and analysis of foreign weapons 

programs.

Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Project Develops satellite and ground-based technologies to detect nuclear test explosions.

HEU Transparency Implementation 

Project

Monitors Russian uranium processing facilities to provide assurance that LEU sold to the United 

States for civilian nuclear power plants under the 1993 HEU Purchase Agreement is derived 

from weapons-usable HEU removed from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons.

Elimination of Weapons-Grade 

Plutonium Production Project

Provides replacement fossil-fuel energy that will allow Russia to shutdown its three remaining 

weapons-grade plutonium production reactors.

International Emergency Management 

Project

Assists foreign governments and international organizations in the development of emergency 

policy and preparedness infrastructure, emergency operations facilities, emergency 

procedures, exercise programs, and technical and training assistance.

Nonproliferation Policy Project Works to develop U.S. policy options and technical measures for use with foreign governments 

to promote safe, secure nuclear reductions and transparent monitoring of nuclear warheads, 

fissile material, and associated facilities; to strengthen regional security in order to reduce 

states’ incentives to obtain WMD; and to strengthen global nonproliferation regimes. Works with 

DOE/NNSA and National Laboratories to ensure compliance with applicable nonproliferation 

treaties and agreements.

Export Control Policy and Cooperation 

Project

Regulates the use and supply of technologies that could contribute to the spread of nuclear, 

chemical, and biological weapons as well as missile systems for the delivery of such weapons.

International Safeguards Project Develops and delivers technology applications to strengthen capabilities to detect and verify 

undeclared nuclear programs; enhances the physical protection and proper accounting of 

nuclear material; and assists foreign national partners to meet safeguards commitments.

Russian Transition Initiatives Project Redirects WMD scientists to peaceful, civilian employment.

Nuclear Warhead Protection Project Provides material protection, control, and accounting upgrades to enhance the security of Navy 

HEU fuel and nuclear material.

Weapons Material Protection Project Provides material protection, control, and accounting upgrades to nuclear weapons, uranium 

enrichment, and material processing and storage sites.

Material Consolidation and Civilian 

Sites Project

Enhances the security of proliferation-attractive nuclear material in Russia by supporting 

material protection, control, and accounting upgrade projects at Russian civilian nuclear 

facilities.
Appendix I

DOD and DOE Threat Reduction and 

Nonproliferation Projects, Fiscal Year 2004

Page 30 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Source: GAO summary of DOE nonproliferation projects.

National Infrastructure and 

Sustainability Project

Develops national and regional resources in the Russian Federation to help establish and 

sustain effective operation of upgraded nuclear material protection, control, and accounting 

systems.

Second Line of Defense and 

Megaports Initiative Project

Negotiates cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation and other key countries to 

strengthen the capability of enforcement officials to detect and deter illicit trafficking of nuclear 

and radiological material across international borders. This is accomplished through the 

detection, location, and identification of nuclear and nuclear-related materials, the development 

of response procedures and capabilities, and the establishment of required infrastructure 

elements to support the control of these materials.

Surplus U.S. HEU Disposition Project Disposes of surplus domestic HEU by down-blending it.

Surplus U.S. Plutonium Disposition 

Project

Disposes of surplus domestic plutonium by fabricating it into mixed oxide fuel for irradiation in 

existing, commercial nuclear reactors.

Surplus Russian Plutonium Disposition 

Project

Supports Russia’s efforts to dispose of its weapons-grade plutonium by working with the 

international community to help pay for Russia's program.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Project Description
Page 31 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix II

DOD and DOE Metrics Used to Assess the 

Performance of Threat Reduction and 

Nonproliferation Programs ApendxiI

DOD and DOE assess the performance of their threat reduction and 

nonproliferation programs. They establish goals and assess progress 

toward meeting these goals using performance metrics. Table 5 lists these 

DOD and DOE goals and metrics.

Table 5: DOD and DOE Performance Metrics

Goal Metric

DOD

Eliminate Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine Launched 

Ballistic Missiles, and nuclear-capable Air to Surface Missiles.

1. Number of missiles eliminated.

Eliminate silos, rail/road-mobile launchers, ballistic missile 

submarine launch tubes, and bombers.

2. Numbers of launchers eliminated.

3. Percentage of design completed.

4. Percentage of construction completed.

5. Projected total program cost.

Eliminate Former Soviet Union (FSU) nuclear, chemical weapon, 

and biological weapon infrastructure at “n” sites.

6. Number of sites.

Conduct vulnerability assessments to consolidate and secure FSU 

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities and materials.

7. Number of sites.

Develop site designs to consolidate and secure FSU nuclear and 

biological weapons facilities and materials.

8. Number of sites.

Complete site upgrades to consolidate and secure FSU nuclear, 

chemical, and biological weapons facilities and materials.

9. Number of sites.

Construct a Fissile Missile Storage Facility (FMSF) to provide safe 

and secure storage for fissile material from dismantled warheads.

10. Percentage of FMSF completed without transparency.

11. FMSF transparency system.

12. Projected total program cost.

DOE

Develop new technologies to improve U.S. capabilities to detect and 

monitor nuclear weapons production and testing.

1. Number of advanced radiation and remote sensing 

technologies developed and evaluated.

2. Number of advanced technologies and operational systems 

(e.g., satellite payloads and seismic station calibration data 

sets) delivered to U.S. national security users.

3. Number of professional papers/exchanges presented, each 

representing Science and Technology knowledge and U.S. 

leadership in program area.

4. Annual percentage of all active research and development 

projects for which an independent research and development 

merit assessment has been completed within the last 3 years.

Detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) materials, technology, and expertise, and to 

strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

5. Annual number of safeguards or physical protection courses 

conducted.

6. Annual percentage of U.S. exports reviewed for proliferation 

concern.

7. Cumulative number of cooperative agreement actions 

completed.

8. Cumulative kilograms of HEU purchased and delivered.
Appendix II

DOD and DOE Metrics Used to Assess the 

Performance of Threat Reduction and 

Nonproliferation Programs

Page 32 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Prevent nuclear terrorism by working in Russia and other regions of 

concern to (1) secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear weapons 

and weapons-usable material; (2) locate, consolidate, and secure 

radiological materials that can be used in a dirty bomb; and (3) 

install detection equipment at border crossings and Mega-Seaports 

to prevent and detect the illicit transfer of nuclear material.

9. Percentage of 39 Russian Navy warhead sites secured.

10. Percentage of 25 Russian Strategic Rocket Forces sites 

secured.

11. Percentage of 600 metric tons (MT) of weapons-usable nuclear 

material secured. 

12. Percentage of 27 MTs of HEU converted to LEU.

13. Cumulative number of Second Line of Defense sites with 

nuclear detection equipment installed.

14. Annual percentage of buildings scheduled for completion of 

security upgrades in a year that are done on time. 

Prevent adverse migration of WMD expertise by engaging weapons 

experts in peaceful efforts and by helping to downsize the Russian 

nuclear weapons complex.

15. Annual number of former Soviet weapons scientists, 

engineers, and technicians engaged.

16. Cumulative number of technologies commercialized or 

businesses created.

17. Cumulative percentage of nuclear complex reduction targets 

completed at six weapons facilities.

18. Annual percentage of non-U.S. government funding 

contributions obtained.

Assurance that the LEU being purchased under the 1993 

U.S./Russian HEU Purchase Agreement is derived from HEU 

extracted from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, by developing 

and implementing mutually agreeable transparency measures to 

ensure that the 500 MT of HEU covered by the agreement is 

permanently down blended and eliminated from Russian inventory.

19. Number of Blend-Down Monitoring Systems operational and 

the annual percentage of operation during the HEU blenddown process.

20. Percentage completed of the 24 annually allowed Special 

Monitoring Visits to the four Russian HEU-to-LEU processing 

facilities.

21. Percentage of the year that the on-site Transparency 

Monitoring Office is staffed at the Ural Electrochemical 

Integrated Plant.

Reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by facilitating shutdown of 

the three remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors 

in Russia through (1) construction of a new fossil-fuel plant, (2) 

refurbish an existing fossil-fuel power plant, and (3) execution of a 

nuclear safety upgrades project to improve reactor safety pending 

shutdown of the reactors.

22. Percentage of progress toward constructing a fossil plant in 

Seversk.

23. Percentage of progress toward constructing a fossil plant in 

Zheleznogorsk facilitating shutdown of one weapons-grade 

plutonium production reactor. 

24. Percentage of progress toward completing interim safety 

upgrades to the three operating Russian plutonium production 

reactors. 

25. Amount of Russian Federation weapons-grade plutonium 

production eliminated annually, and cumulatively, from the 1.2 

MT per year baseline.

Eliminate surplus Russian plutonium and surplus U.S. plutonium 

and HEU.

26. Percentage of the design and construction of the Pit 

Disassembly and Conversion Facility completed.

27. Percentage of the design and construction of the mixed oxide 

(MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility completed.

28. Amount of HEU shipped to the United States Enrichment 

Corporation for down blending. 

29. Amount of off-specification HEU down blended.

30. Russianize the design and construct the MOX Fuel Facility in 

Russia.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Goal Metric
Appendix II

DOD and DOE Metrics Used to Assess the 

Performance of Threat Reduction and 

Nonproliferation Programs

Page 33 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and DOE data.

Identify, secure, remove, and/or facilitate the disposition of 

vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment 

around the world.

31. Cumulative number of vulnerable radiological sites secured 

internationally.

32. Cumulative number of U.S. excess and unwanted sealed 

sources recovered.

33. Cumulative number of targeted research/test reactors 

converted from HEU to LEU fuel.

34. Cumulative kilograms of HEU fresh fuel and spent fuel from 

Soviet-supplied research reactors repatriated to Russia.

35. Cumulative number of fuel assemblies containing U.S.-origin 

spent fuel returned from foreign research reactors.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Goal Metric
Page 34 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix III

DOD, DOE, and State Department Projects 

Addressing Similar Missions ApendxiI

DOD and DOE and State have projects in three areas that address similar 

missions in the FSU. These areas are the employment of former biological 

weapons scientists to prevent the proliferation of their expertise, 

improvement of security at sites where Russian nuclear warheads are 

stored, and the enhancement of countries’ ability to secure their borders 

against the smuggling of WMD materials. Tables 6, 7, and 8 show the 

different projects, funding and countries served for all three agencies and 

areas. 

Table 6: DOD and DOE Warhead Security Projects

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and DOE data.

Table 7: DOD, DOE, and State Biological Weapons Scientist Employment Projects

Dollars in millions

Project Lead agency Description

2004 

funding Location

Site Security 

Enhancements

DOD This project is designed to enhance the safety and 

security of Russian nuclear weapons storage sites 

by conducting vulnerability assessments and 

providing equipment such as fences and sensor 

systems.

$47.9 Russia

Warhead Security 

Program

DOE DOE is enhancing the security around some 

strategic rocket forces sites and some Navy sites. 

Threat assessments are conducted at the sites 

and security equipment is provided.

107.0 Russia

Dollars in millions

Project Lead agency Description

2004 

funding Location

Biological Weapons 

Proliferation Prevention 

(BWPP) Program’s 

Cooperative Biological 

Research (CBR) Project

DOD The CBR project engages former biological 

weapons (BW) scientists in peaceful pursuits in 

order to prevent the proliferation of BW expertise to 

terrorist groups and rogue states.

$6.1 Russia, Kazakhstan, 

Uzbekistan, and 

soon-to-be Georgia

Russian Transition 

Initiative (RTI) Program’s 

Initiatives for Proliferation 

Prevention (IPP) Project 

DOE The IPP project engage scientists in the FSU in 

peaceful commercial activities.

23.3 Russia and the FSU
Appendix III

DOD, DOE, and State Department Projects 

Addressing Similar Missions

Page 35 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, and State data.

Table 8: Overview of Border Security Projects

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DOE, and State data.

Office of Proliferation 

Threat Reduction 

Program’s Bio-Chem 

Redirect Program

State 

Department

The Bio-Chem Redirect Program funds efforts to 

redirect former biological and chemical weapons 

scientists via civilian research projects in 

collaboration with the U.S. Department of Health 

and Human Services, Department of Agriculture, 

and Environmental Protection Agency.

19.9 Russia and the FSU

BioIndustry Initiative State 

Department

The initiative seeks to engage and strategically 

transform former Soviet biological production 

facilities, their technology and expertise for 

sustainable, commercial, and peaceful enterprises. 

2.0 The FSU

(Continued From Previous Page)

Dollars in millions

Project Lead agency Description

2004 

funding Location

Dollars in millions

Project Lead agency Description 2004 funding Location 

Second Line of 

Defense Program

DOE The Second Line of Defense Program seeks 

to provide detection equipment to combat 

nuclear material smuggling.

$52.0 FSU states and other 

countries

WMD Proliferation 

Prevention 

Initiative

DOD Bolsters states’ ability to prevent proliferation 

of WMD across their borders, DOD will 

provide equipment and logistics support, 

training, and other support to those agencies 

of recipient governments vested with the 

authority to monitor borders for illegal 

transport of WMD or related materials.

29.0 Non-Russian FSU 

states

International 

Counterproliferation 

Program

DOD Provides a series of training courses and 

equipment to counter and respond to WMDrelated incidents in-country and at borders, 

this is a DOD coordinated effort with the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. 

Customs designed to detect, deter, and 

prevent smuggling of WMD and related 

materials.

10.0 The FSU, Baltic 

states, and Eastern 

Europe

Export Control and 

Border Security

State 

Department 

Provides technical assistance, develops 

training materials, and provides support to 

enhance countries' export control and related 

border security capabilities. 

35.8 The FSU, Baltic 

states, and Eastern 

Europe
Page 36 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Energy ApendxiIV
Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 37 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 38 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page 39 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix V

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiV
Appendix V

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 40 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page 41 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix VI

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contacts Dave Maurer (202) 512-9627

F. James Shafer (202) 512-6002

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition, Hynek Kalkus, Wyatt R. Hundrup, Nanette J. Ryen, William 

Lanouette, Dorian L. Herring, Stacy Edwards, Lynn Cothern, Etana Finkler, 

Judy Pagano, and Ernie Jackson made significant contributions to this 

report.
Page 42 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Related GAO Products 

Russian Nuclear Submarines: U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military 

Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification. 

GAO-04-924. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2004.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce 

the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors. 

GAO-04-807. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close Russia’s Plutonium 

Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain. 

GAO-04-662. Washington D.C.: June 4, 2004.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to 

Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening. GAO-03-638. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to 

Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-03-482. 

Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction 

and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia. GAO-03-526T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 5, 2003.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat 

Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning.

GAO-02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science 

Centers Program. GAO-01-582. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in 

Russia’s Nuclear Cities Face Challenges. GAO-01-429. Washington, D.C.: 

May 3, 2001. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material 

Improving; Further Enhancements Needed. GAO-01-312. Washington, 

D.C.: February 28, 2001.
Related GAO Products

Page 43 GAO-05-157 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers 

Benefits, Poses New Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-138. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 

2000.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear 

Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States.

GAO/RCED/NSIAD-00-82. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May 

Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned. GAO/NSIAD-99-76. Washington, 

D.C.: April 13, 1999.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former 

Soviet Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 

1995.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former 

Soviet Union. GAO/NSIAD-95-7. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 1994.

(320255)
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to 

www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.”

Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional 

Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs Susan Becker, Acting Manager, BeckerS@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548