IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0955

Filed June 16, 2021

RUTH E. RARICK TRUST,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

CITY OF TIFFIN, IOWA,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Kevin McKeever, 

Judge.

The Ruth E. Rarick Trust appeals the denial of its petition for writ of 

certiorari. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Charles A. Meardon, Robert N. Downer, and Peter J. Gardner of Meardon, 

Sueppel & Downer P.L.C., Iowa City, for appellant.

Robert W. Goodwin of Goodwin Law Office, P.C., Ames, and Crystal K. 

Raiber and Robert S. Michael of Holland, Michael, Raiber & Sittig PLC, Iowa City,

for appellee.

Heard by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and May, JJ.
2

MAY, Judge.

The Ruth E. Rarick Trust (Trust) appeals the denial of its petition for writ of 

certiorari. We reverse and remand.

I. Factual Summary and Prior Proceedings

The Trust owns approximately eighty acres of land north of the City of Tiffin

(Tiffin). In August 2019, the Trust executed a quit claim deed to the City of 

Coralville (Coralville) for a 7.63 acre portion of land. The deed states the land is:

[S]ubject to the possibility of reverter unless the Grantee completes 

the following items:

a. The extension of Forevergreen Road located to the west of 

Jasper Avenue right-of-way is constructed by the City of Coralville at 

a location agreeable between Grantor and Grantee within five (5) 

years of the date of this deed . . . .

Tiffin sought to condemn a portion of the 7.63 acres for its own road project. 

In Iowa, the procedure for condemnation is set by Iowa Code chapter 6B (2019). 

See Iowa Code § 6B.1A. It requires an “acquiring agency”—like Tiffin—to take 

several steps before filing an application to condemn with the district court. See 

generally id. § 6B.3 (describing application process, including contents of 

application). We describe some of those steps here.

First, section 6B.45 requires the acquiring agency to have an appraisal 

prepared. The appraisal “shall include, at a minimum, an itemization of the 

appraised value of the real property or interest in the property, any buildings on the 

property, all other improvements including fences, severance damages, and loss 

of access.” Id. § 6B.45. Section 6B.45 also requires the acquiring agency to 

submit “a copy of the appraisal” to “the person, corporation, or entity whose 

property or interest in the property is to be taken.”
3

Next, section 6B.54(3) requires the agency to “establish an amount which it 

believes to be just compensation for the real property” and then “make a prompt 

offer to acquire the property for the full amount established by the agency.” The 

offer may not “be less than the fair market value the acquiring agency has 

established for the property or property interest pursuant to the appraisal required 

in section 6B.45.” Id. § 6B.54(3).

Then, “before filing an application for condemnation or otherwise 

proceeding with the condemnation process,” section 6B.2B requires the acquiring 

agency to “make a good faith effort to negotiate with the owner to purchase the 

private property or property interest.” Again, the “acquiring agency shall not make 

an offer to purchase the property or property interest that is less than the fair 

market value the acquiring agency has established for the property or property 

interest pursuant to the appraisal required in section 6B.45.” Id. § 6B.2B.

In light of these statutory requirements, Tiffin obtained an appraisal for the 

land it wanted to condemn. The appraisal acknowledged that Coralville and the 

Trust had separate property interests in the land. But the appraisal did not 

separately value those interests. Instead, the appraisal simply listed the 

“estimated just compensation” for the land at $41,300. It did not apportion or 

allocate the $41,300 between Coralville and the Trust.

In October, Tiffin passed a resolution. It established $41,300 as Tiffin’s 

determination of “just compensation for acquisition of” the land it sought to use “for 

the Forevergreen Construction Road Project.” Tiffin then sent a joint offer to 

Coralville and the Trust. The offer stated a purchase price of $41,300. It made no 

division between Coralville’s interest and the Trust’s interest. Presumably, Tiffin 
4

anticipated Coralville and the Trust would divide the amount between themselves. 

Coralville and the Trust rejected Tiffin’s offer.

In December, Tiffin passed a second resolution. It authorized Tiffin to 

initiate condemnation proceedings to acquire property rights for the land from 

Coralville and the Trust. It also proclaimed that Tiffin “has made a good-faith effort 

to negotiate with the owners to purchase” the relevant property “before proceeding 

with condemnation, but has been unable to acquire said portion and/or interest in 

the property.”

In January 2020, Tiffin submitted an application for condemnation to the 

chief judge as required by section 6B.3. In response, the Trust petitioned for writ 

of certiorari.1 It claimed Tiffin could not initiate condemnation proceedings before 

it (1) appraised the Trust’s interest separately from Coralville’s and (2) made 

separate offers to Coralville and the Trust.

2

 

1 The Trust’s petition for writ of certiorari is one of six cases that involve Tiffin’s 

plans to extend Forevergreen Road. The district court in case number 

CVCV080519 summarized the cases as such:

There are now six cases that have been filed that are related 

to this case, none of which are individually assigned to any judge of 

the Sixth Judicial District: CVCV081144 (a certiorari action brought 

by the Trust, which was dismissed by agreement of the parties on 

January 6, 2020); CVCV081458 (a certiorari action brought by the 

Trust); CVCV081474 (a certiorari action brought by the City of 

Coralville, Iowa); CVCV081479 (a declaratory judgment action 

brought by Tiffin); EQCV081622 (an Iowa Code chapter 6B claim 

brought by the City of Coralville, Iowa); and EQCV081617 (an Iowa 

Code chapter 6A and 6B claim brought by the Trust and Clint Rarick).

2 The Trust also claimed Tiffin did not have legal authority to proceed with the 

condemnation proceeding since there was no judicial determination prior to Tiffin 

passing the second resolution. This issue was resolved in Tiffin’s favor in case 

number CVCV080519. The Trust agrees this issue is now moot. So we see no 

reason to mention it further.
5

The district court denied the Trust’s petition for writ of certiorari. The Trust 

filed a motion to alter, amend, or enlarge pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil 

Procedure 1.904(2). The court denied the Trust’s motion. The Trust now appeals.

II. Standard of Review

“A writ of certiorari is limited to triggering review of the acts of an inferior

tribunal on the basis the inferior tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise

acted illegally.” Crowell v. State Pub. Def., 845 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Iowa 2014). 

“Illegality exists when the [tribunal]’s findings lack substantial evidentiary support, 

or when the [tribunal] has not properly applied the law.” Dir. of Iowa Dep’t of Hum.

Servs. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 621 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted).

On appeal, our review of the certiorari action before the district court is for 

correction of errors at law. Burroughs v. City of Davenport Zoning Bd. of

Adjustment, 912 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Iowa 2018). “We are bound by the district 

court’s findings if supported by substantial evidence.” TSB Holdings, L.L.C. v. Bd.

of Adjustment for City of Iowa City, 913 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). 

“However, we are not bound by erroneous legal rulings that materially affect the 

court’s decision.” Id. (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

We first address Tiffin’s argument that this appeal is moot. Because we 

conclude this appeal is not moot, we also address the Trust’s argument on the 

merits.

A. Mootness

“One familiar principle of judicial restraint is that courts do not decide cases 

when the underlying controversy is moot.” Rhiner v. State, 703 N.W.2d 174, 176
6

(Iowa 2005). “If an appeal no longer presents a justiciable controversy because 

the disputed issue has become academic or nonexistent, the appeal is ordinarily 

deemed moot.” Crowell, 845 N.W.2d at 681. “The key in assessing whether an 

appeal is moot is determining whether the opinion would be of force or effect in the 

underlying controversy.” State v. Avalos Valdez, 934 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa 2019)

(citation omitted).

Tiffin argues this case is moot because, in a separate case (CVCV080519), 

the district court ruled the quit claim deed from the Trust to Coralville was invalid.3 

As a result, the Trust no longer has a possibility of reverter4 but, instead, is the sole 

 

3 That court held:

[The Tiffin City Administrator]’s affidavit, which is not refuted 

by any affidavit testimony offered by the Trust, establishes that 

Forevergreen Road is an existing city street in Tiffin, and pursuant to 

the above-cited provisions of Iowa Code chapter 306, Tiffin has the 

authority to control, extend, and construct a new portion of 

Forevergreen Road in Tiffin. Further, the [c]ourt concludes the

undisputed facts, as established by the affidavit of [the 

administrator], show the Quit Claim Deed from the Trust to Coralville 

is invalid because the south 250 feet of the Trust’s property referred 

to in the Quit Claim Deed does not adjoin Coralville. It also is 

undisputed that the IDOT originally intended to construct 

Forevergreen Road through North Liberty to Jasper Avenue in Tiffin,

which then was a gravel two-lane road. Changes to the IDOT’s 

construction plans necessitated that the Tiffin portion of 

Forevergreen Road have to cross a small portion of the

Trust’s/Coralville’s property. Coralville has no jurisdiction and control 

over this area pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 306.

. . . Despite the fact that the Trust deeded the property to 

Coralville, Tiffin retains the authority and jurisdiction to condemn this 

portion of the Trust’s property because the land is not currently 

devoted to a public use through action to be taken by Coralville, and 

Tiffin’s construction of Forevergreen Road in Tiffin is a public 

purpose that supports exercise of eminent domain over the Trust.

(Emphasis added.)

4

In its reply brief, the Trust claims that Tiffin failed to preserve error on the issue 

of mootness. The district court in this case noted that Tiffin “supplemented its 

arguments to assert that . . . [the Trust]’s arguments in this action are moot based 
7

owner of the land Tiffin seeks to condemn. This means Coralville no longer has 

any interest in the land. This also means the sole question in this appeal—whether 

Tiffin was obligated to provide separate appraisals and offers to Coralville and the 

Trust—is now moot.

We disagree. The separate case mentioned by Tiffin (CVCV080519) is also 

currently before this court. Our opinion in that case is also being issued today. 

See City of Tiffin v. TAT, LLC, No. 20-0912, ____ WL _______ (Iowa Ct. App. June 

16, 2021). There, we hold the validity of the quit claim deed was not properly 

before the district court. See id. As a result, the court’s ruling does not impact the 

deed’s validity. See, e.g., Eller v. Newell, 141 N.W. 52, 55 (Iowa 1913) (noting 

relief allowed “must affect or be affected by the subject-matter of the action” and 

not “new matter[s] not essential to the determination of that put in litigation by the 

petition”). So we conclude the mootness doctrine does not apply here.

B. Writ of Certiorari

We turn next to the central issue in this appeal: Assuming the Trust holds 

the property interest known as a possibility of reverter (also referred to just as 

“reverter”) in the land sought by Tiffin, does the Iowa Code require Tiffin to provide 

the Trust with a separate appraisal and offer for its property interest? The Trust 

believes it does. And so, the Trust argues, Tiffin violated chapter 6B by failing to 

provide a separate appraisal and offer before initiating condemnation proceedings.

 

on [the ruling in CVCV080519].” Ultimately, the court found it appropriate to 

address the Trust’s underlying claims “for the purpose of establishing a complete 

record in this action.” We assume this is enough to preserve error. See Meier v.

Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (holding issues both raised and 

decided by the district court are preserved for appellate review); see also DeVoss 

v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 61–62 (Iowa 2002) (discussing error preservation).
8

Tiffin disagrees. Tiffin believes nothing in chapter 6B requires it “to appraise 

the value of [the Trust’s] possibility of reverter” or make a separate offer.

To decide which view of chapter 6B is correct, we look to “the text of the 

statute, the words chosen by the legislature.” Fishel v. Redenbaugh, 939 N.W.2d

660, 663 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Childs,

898 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Iowa 2017)); accord Amana Soc’y v. Colony Inn, Inc., 315

N.W.2d 101, 118 (Iowa 1982) (noting “[w]e take the statute as we find it” and 

observing that any “argument that the statute is inappropriate . . . should have 

been addressed to the legislature, not to this court”); Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co. v. City of

Osage, 176 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Iowa 1970) (noting “we cannot by judicial 

interpretation nullify the definite pronouncements of the legislature”). “We should 

give the language of the statute its fair meaning, but should not extend its reach 

beyond its express terms.” In re Marshall, 805 N.W.2d 145, 158 (Iowa 2011).

We generally give words “their common, ordinary meaning in the context 

within which they are used.” De Stefano v. Apts. Downtown, Inc., 879 N.W.2d 155, 

168 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted); cf. Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893)

(noting that, although “[b]otanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine,” they 

are “vegetables” in “the common language of the people”). “[B]ut technical words 

and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate 

meaning in law, shall be construed according to such meaning.” Iowa Code 

§ 4.1(38). Also, it is “a well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that ‘[w]hen 

the legislature has defined words in a statute—that is, when the legislature has 

opted to “act as its own lexicographer”—those definitions bind us.’” State v. Iowa

Dist. Ct. for Scott Cnty., 889 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted) (“As 
9

a corollary to this principle, when a statute defines a term, ‘the common law and 

dictionary definitions which may not coincide with the legislative definition must 

yield to the language of the legislature.’” (citation omitted)).

We also remember that private property rights are expressly protected by

both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Iowa. 

See Clarke Cnty. Reservoir Comm’n v. Robins, 862 N.W.2d 166, 171 (Iowa 2015). 

One implication is that state agencies may “only” condemn private property for 

public use “by express authorization of the legislature.” Id. (citation omitted). And 

statutes authorizing condemnation are “strictly construed” against the government 

and in favor of the property owner. Hawkeye Land Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 847 

N.W.2d 199, 208 (Iowa 2014).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the words of Chapter 6B. 

Section 6B.2B requires:

[t]he acquiring agency [to] make a good faith effort to 

negotiate with the owner to purchase the private property or 

property interest before filing an application for condemnation or 

otherwise proceeding with the condemnation process. An acquiring 

agency shall not make an offer to purchase the property or property 

interest that is less than the fair market value the acquiring agency 

has established for the property or property interest pursuant to the 

appraisal required in section 6B.45 . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

Section 6B.45 provides, in part:

When any real property or interest in real property is to be 

purchased, or in lieu thereof to be condemned, the acquiring agency 

or its agent shall submit to the person, corporation, or entity whose 

property or interest in the property is to be taken, by ordinary mail, at 

least ten days prior to the date upon which the acquiring agency or 

its agent contacts the property owner to commence negotiations, a 

copy of the appraisal in its entirety upon such real property or 

interest in such real property prepared for the acquiring agency or 
10

its agent, which shall include, at a minimum, an itemization of the 

appraised value of the real property or interest in the property, any 

buildings on the property, all other improvements including fences, 

severance damages, and loss of access.

(Emphasis added.)

Lastly, section 6B.54(3) provides, in part:

Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, the 

acquiring agency shall establish an amount which it believes to be 

just compensation for the real property, and shall make a prompt 

offer to acquire the property for the full amount established by the 

agency. In no event shall the amount be less than the fair market 

value the acquiring agency has established for the property or 

property interest pursuant to the appraisal required in section 6B.45

. . . .

(Emphasis added.)

We begin our analysis by considering the district court’s views. The district 

court concluded that the Trust’s possibility of reverter is a property interest of 

sufficient dignity to provide the Trust “a right to bring an action” under 

section 6A.24, which authorizes “[a]n owner of property described in an application 

for condemnation” to “bring an action challenging . . . condemnation proceedings.”

Iowa Code § 6A.24(1). The court also acknowledged that section 6B.2B 

“references negotiating with the owner of private property or property interest prior 

to instituting condemnation proceedings.” Even so, the court concluded the Trust’s 

possibility of reverter “is not sufficient to have required” Tiffin to provide the Trust 

with a separate appraisal. The court explained:

Iowa Code § 6B.54(3) provides that the acquiring agency shall 

establish “an amount” it believes to be just compensation “for the real 

property,” and § 6B.54(3) also provides that “the amount” shall not 

be less than the fair market value the acquiring agency has 

established for the property or the property interest pursuant to the 

appraisal required in § 6B.45. Nothing in chapter 6B requires
11

separate valuations for a property owner and a party who holds the 

possibility of reverter.

We agree on some points but not others. We agree that chapter 6B does 

not expressly use the phrase “possibility of reverter.” As noted, though, the district 

court found—and Tiffin does not dispute—a possibility of reverter is a property 

interest of sufficient dignity to permit its holder to contest the condemnation of 

land.

5 Moreover, at oral argument, Tiffin confirmed that the Trust’s possibility of 

reverter is a property interest and an interest in real property. We think it follows 

that the Trust’s possibility of reverter qualifies as a “property interest” for purposes 

of sections 6B.2B, 6B.45, and 6B.54(3); an “interest in real property” for purposes

of section 6B.45; and “real property” for purposes of section 6B.54(3).6 It would

 

5 Tiffin also concedes that, in a condemnation proceeding, the compensation 

commission “has authority to apportion the award of damages” between the deed 

holder and the holder of a possibility of reverter. This lends support to the idea 

that an acquiring agency’s pre-condemnation appraisal and offer should apportion 

separate dollar amounts to the deed holder and the holder of a possibility of 

reverter.

But Tiffin suggests that sometimes a “right of reversion is so remote and 

speculative” that “it has no present value.” Even if those facts were presented, we 

are not sure they would change our conclusion that the Trust’s possibility of 

reverter is a “property interest” for purposes of sections 6B.2B, 6B.45, and 

6B.54(3); an “interest in real property” for purpose of section 6B.45; and “real 

property” for purposes of section 6B.54(3). But we need not—and do not—decide 

that issue because the record does not show the Trust’s possibility of reverter is 

“so remote and speculative as to be without present value.” 29A C.J.S. Eminent 

Domain § 229 (2021).

6 While the term “real property” may connote ground and other physical items, 

Black’s Law Dictionary explains that “[r]eal property can be either corporeal (soil 

and buildings) or incorporeal (easements).” Real Property, Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019); see also Gray v. Osborn, 739 N.W.2d 855, 861 (Iowa 2007) 

(“Because an easement is an interest in real property, any express easement falls

within the statute of frauds and must be in writing.”). This is consistent with

section 4.1(13), which defines “real property” to “include lands, tenements, 

hereditaments, and all rights thereto and interests therein, equitable as well as 

legal.” (Emphasis added.)
12

also seem to follow that the Trust is entitled to all of the rights afforded by those 

provisions, including an appraisal and offer for the property interest Tiffin seeks to 

acquire from the Trust.

As the district court noted, however, these provisions sometimes use the 

singular. For example, section 6B.45 refers to “the appraisal.” From this, Tiffin 

infers that only one appraisal and one offer are required no matter how many 

property interests Tiffin seeks to condemn. We disagree. Throughout the Iowa 

Code, “the singular” generally “includes the plural.” Iowa Code § 4.1(17). This 

“caution[s] us against reading too much into the presence of” singular terms—such 

as “the”—in Chapter 6B. See Porter v. Harden, 891 N.W.2d 420, 426 (Iowa 2017)

(noting section 4.1(17) “should caution us against reading too much into the 

presence of the words ‘a’ or ‘an’ in a statute depending on the context”).

Instead, we think the more natural reading is that sections 6B.2B, 6B.45, 

and 6B.54(3) apply as written to each separately-owned property interest that is 

subject to condemnation. So, for each interest Tiffin wishes to acquire, Tiffin must 

obtain “the appraisal” for that “interest in . . . real property,” see Iowa Code § 6B.45;

Tiffin must “make a prompt offer to acquire the property,” see id. § 6B.54(3); and 

Tiffin must “make a good faith effort to negotiate with the owner” of the property 

interest, see id. § 6B.2B.

To illustrate, suppose Tiffin decides to acquire A’s property interest in 2021; 

and then, five years later, in 2026, Tiffin decides to acquire B’s property interest. 

We think most would agree that Tiffin would be required to (1) provide an appraisal 

and an offer to A in 2021, and then (2) provide an appraisal and an offer to B in 

2026. Now suppose instead that Tiffin decided to acquire both A’s property interest 
13

and B’s property interest simultaneously. We see no reason to think this would 

reduce the rights of A or B. Rather, we think separate owners of separate property 

interests would still be entitled to separate appraisals and separate offers, 

regardless of the government’s chosen timing. So even if Tiffin tries to obtain both

property interests at the same time, Tiffin must (1) provide an appraisal and an 

offer to A, and (2) provide an appraisal and an offer to B. And so, when Tiffin 

sought to obtain the separate property interests owned by the Trust and Coralville,

Tiffin should have provided the Trust with an appraisal and an offer for its separate 

property interest.

We think this reading is more consistent with the Code than Tiffin’s view,

under which Coralville and the Trust must share an appraisal and offer that do not 

specify any particular dollar amount for either of their respective property interests. 

Under Tiffin’s view, the Trust—“the . . . entity whose . . . interest in the property is 

to be taken” through condemnation of the possibility of reverter—does not actually 

receive an appraisal of its property interest, despite the requirements of

section 6B.45. Worse yet, the Trust receives no real “offer”7—no statement of an 

amount Tiffin is willing to pay—to purchase the Trust’s property interest, despite

the requirements of sections 6B.2B and 6B.54(3). We cannot square these 

outcomes with the language of the Code, especially when it is strictly construed to 

protect private property rights and prevent eminent domain abuse. See, e.g., City

of Des Moines v. Geller Glass & Upholstery, Inc., 319 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Iowa 1982) 

 

7 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “offer” as: “The act or an instance of presenting 

something for acceptance; specif[ically], a statement that one is willing to do 

something for another person or to give that person something[, i.e.] the 

prosecutor’s offer of immunity.” Offer, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
14

(“The statutory provisions regulating the exercise of the power of eminent domain 

must be strictly complied with and they are construed strictly to protect the 

constitutional property rights of the owner.”).

IV. Conclusion

Before Tiffin can initiate proceedings to condemn the Trust’s property

interest, Tiffin must comply with sections 6B.2B, 6B.45, and 6B.54(3) by providing 

the Trust with an appraisal and offer for the Trust’s property interest. Tiffin’s prior 

appraisal did not meet these requirements because it did not state a value for the

Trust’s property interest. And Tiffin’s prior offer did not meet these requirements 

because it did not offer an amount for the Trust’s property interest.

The district court erred in dismissing the Trust’s petition for certiorari. We 

reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.