NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 19-3794

__________

ANGELIQUE JENKINS,

Appellant

v.

SEPTA

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-19-cv-02180)

District Judge: Honorable Chad F. Kenney

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 6, 2020

Before: KRAUSE, MATEY and COWEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 14, 2020)

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OPINION*

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PER CURIAM

Angelique Jenkins appeals from an order of the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which granted the motion to dismiss filed by 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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Defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”). We will 

vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Jenkins filed a complaint under Title VII, alleging that she was discharged from 

her employment with SEPTA and was retaliated against. Jenkins was under a “Last 

Chance Agreement” with SEPTA based on a previous incident. She was discharged after 

opening the wrong door of a train, a safety violation. Jenkins’ complaint seemed to

suggest that SEPTA fired her because of a complaint she made against a custodial 

worker.1

 The complaint also suggested that she was fired because of her plans to run for 

union president. 

After answering her complaint, SEPTA filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In its motion, 

SEPTA noted that Jenkins had not alleged that she was discriminated against on any 

protected basis, such as race or gender. In her response and attached exhibits, Jenkins 

alleged that she was the “only Black Female Discharged for this rule violation.” Dkt. #21 

at 3. She also suggested that she was retaliated against for filing a complaint against 

SEPTA director Shwanna Rodgers, who used to be employed in SEPTA’s Labor 

Relations Department. She repeated her allegation that she was discharged to prevent her 

from running for union office. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss and 

Jenkins timely appealed.

1 Jenkins and the worker had a verbal disagreement about the availability of paper towels 

at work, and the worker later vacuumed under Jenkins while she was eating her lunch.
3

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the grant of a Rule 12(c) 

motion for judgment on the pleadings under a plenary standard. Rosenau v. Unifund 

Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008). The standards governing Rule 12(c) motions 

are the same ones that govern motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Spruill v. Gillis, 

372 F.3d 218, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations 

removed); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

We agree with the District Court’s decision to dismiss the Title VII claims. 

Jenkins did not make any allegation in her complaint that she was a member of a 

protected class. The single statement in her Rule 12(c) response that she was the “only 

Black Female Discharged for this rule violation” falls far short of alleging facts that could 

support a prima facie case for a Title VII claim.

But before dismissing a complaint, a district court “must inform the plaintiff that 

[s]he has leave to amend within a set period of time, unless amendment would be 

inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 

2002). The District Court did not allow Jenkins to amend her complaint. We cannot say 

with certainty that amendment would be futile, as Jenkins made some bare allegations in 

her Rule 12(c) response, and in her brief here, that suggest that she might be able to state 

a Title VII claim or a claim for First Amendment retaliation. See, e.g., Baloga v. Pittston 

Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 752-53 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining elements of First 
4

Amendment retaliation claim); Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. SEPTA, 148 F.3d 242, 

247 (3d Cir. 1998) (“SEPTA is a state actor . . . [and its] actions are constrained by the 

First and Fourteenth Amendments.”).

For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand for 

further proceedings.