Filed 9/4/14 T.R. v. A.J. CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and pa rties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for pu blication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered publi shed for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

T.R.,
Petitioner and Respondent,

v.
A.J.,
Respondent,

T.J.,
Claimant and Appellant. B247965
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PF003745)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Lo s Angeles County, B. Scott Silverman, Judge. Affirmed. T.J., in pro. per., for Claimant and Appellant. T.R., in pro. per.; and Michele Lyn Gibson for Petitioner and Respondent.

_____________ _______________ _____________2 Maternal grandmother, T.J., appeals fro m an order denying her petition seeking visitation with her grandson. The record suppor ts the trial court’s exercise of discretion;
we affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROC EDURAL SUMMARY 1
Conner, the child at the center of this long-running dispute, was born in 2007. His father (T.R.) and mother (A.J.) were teenagers when he was bor n. They all lived with the maternal grandmother and her boyfriend for the first few months of the child’s life; father moved out when his relationship with mother soured, but mother a nd the child stayed. Grandmother and her boyfriend assumed much of the responsi bility for the child’s care. Father brought a parentage action in 2008, seeking a declaration of paternity, legal custody and visitation. The relationship between mother a nd father had grown more and more antagonistic, as had the parents’ re lationships with the grandmother and her boyfriend. Competing requests for custody, visitation, and re straining orders were filed in the parentage action. In June 2009, the parents were awarded joint physical and legal custody of Conner; the court also restrained the parents from allowing the child to have contact with several people, includin g grandmother and her boyfriend. Mother entered into a relationship with another man and had two more children. In December 2011, father petitioned for a modi fication of child custody and visitation. The parents were awarded joint legal custody, and father was awarded primary physical custody, with visitation for mother. The cour t ordered that Conner was not to be left alone in the presence of grandmother and her boyfriend, without supervision by mother. Mother appealed from this order, but later dismissed that appeal. In November 2012, grandmother notic ed bruises on mother’s two younger children. She made a report to Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), and

1 The factual and procedural history is li mited by the parties’ failure to provide a clear statement of facts in their briefs and th e confidentiality of the record in the related dependency case.3 all three of mother’s children were detained. 2 At the detention hearing, Conner was
released to father and the two younger children were placed in foster care. Mother sought a restraining order against grandmother; gra ndmother and her boyfri end sought de facto parent status as to the three children. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in December 2012, the court denied the de fact o parent request, and sustained an amended petition finding the younger children had be en physically abused, placing all three
children at risk of abuse. The court terminat ed jurisdiction with resp ect to Conner with a family law order giving sole physical custody to father, joint legal custody to mother and father, and unmonitored day visits to mother. In December 2012, while the dependenc y case was pending, grandmother and boyfriend filed a petition in the parentag e action seeking join der and grandparent visitation. Father opposed; mother did no t appear. The matter was heard on March 27, 2013. The court found no statutory basis for n onparents to join the parentage action, and denied the request for joinder. As to the request for grandparent visitation, the court found the boyfriend had no sta nding because he is not a gran dparent; he has not appealed from this ruling. The court denied grandmot her’s request for grandparent visitation. Grandmother filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
I Grandmother challenges the court’s denial of her request for joinder, and its denial of grandparent visitation. A denial of joinde r, which is in effect a denial of leave to intervene, may be appealed because it finally and advers ely determines the moving party’s right to proceed in an action. ( Hodge v. Kirkpatrick Development, Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 540, 547.) A trial court’ s ruling on a request for modification of judgment as to visitation is appealable un der Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2) as an orde r made after judgment. (See Chalmers v. Hirschkop (2013)

2 We take judicial notice of the appellate decision in the resulting dependency case, In re Jonathan H., Jr. , No. B246776, filed March 19, 2014. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)4 213 Cal.App.4th 289, 304; Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1377.) The trial court correctly denied gra ndmother’s request for joinder, finding no statutory basis for nonparents to join a parent age case. Father brought this action under the Uniform Parentage Act, Family Code s ection 7600 et seq. (UPA) (All statutory
references are to this code unless otherw ise indicated.) “In a UPA action, the only interested parties are the children and the na tural or presumed mothers and fathers.” ( Scott v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 540, 5 44.) Section 7635 sets out who shall and who may be made parties to a pare ntage action: a child under the age of 12, may, and if over the age of 12, shall be made a party to the action (subd. (a)); the natural parent and each person presumed to be a pare nt, and each man allege d to be the natural father, may be made a party to the action (subd. (b).) No provision is made for a grandparent to be joined in the action, no r has appellant cited us to any statutory authority. 3 The court properly denied the request for joinder.
II
Grandmother also claims the court e rred when it immediately conducted the hearing on visitation, rather than ruling on ly on the joinder motion. After denying the request for joinder, the court informed the pa rties that it was treating the petition as an application for grandparent visitation. It explained that they were free to present additional comments or arguments , but “[i]f you are proposi ng that additional evidence be provided, you’re going to have to make an offer of proof and explain why that would be necessary at this point, given the lengthy declarati ons that were submitted.” Grandmother made no offer of proof, and pr oceeded to present her own sworn testimony and that of her boyfriend. Only at the conc lusion of the hearing, when the court denied the petition, did grandmother assert that if sh e had known “this was going to be the actual petition for grandparent [visitati on] hearing, I woul d have had more w itnesses lined up to

3 The only authority relied on by grandmothe r is an excerpt from a booklet put out by the family law facilitator’s o ffice of the Sacramento County Superior Court. It cites no authority applicable in Los Angeles Superior Court.5 support my side.” As before, she made no offer of proof as to the evidence she would have presented. Grandmother was not denied the opportunity to be heard on her petition.
III Grandmother’s primary claim is that the tr ial court erred in denying her request for visitation. “Grandparents’ rights to court-or dered visitation with their grandchildren are purely statutory.” ( In re Marriage of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 219.) Section 3102 permits visitation by a deceased parent’s chil dren, siblings, parent s, and grandparents; section 3103 permits a court to grant gra ndparent visitation in specified proceedings involving the custody of a ch ild; and section 3104 permits grandparents to petition for visitation if the grandchild’s parents are not ma rried or if certain other conditions are met. ( In re Marriage of Harris , at pp. 219-220.) Section 3104 is the governing st atute in this case. It pr ovides: “(a) On petition to the court by a grandparent of a minor child, the court may grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent if the court does both of the following: [¶] (1) Finds that there is a preexisting relationship between the gr andparent and the gr andchild that has engendered a bond such that visitation is in the best interest of the child. [¶] (2) Balances the interest of th e child in having visitation w ith the grandpar ent against the right of the parents to exerci se their parental authority.” There are two rebuttable presumptions in section 3104. Subdi vision (f) sets out a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that grandparent visitation is not in
the best interests of the child if the parent who has sole le gal and physical custody of the child objects to such visitation. Father has sole physical custody of Conner, but he and mother share joint legal custody, so this presumption does not apply. And subdivision (e) of section 3104 creates a rebuttable presumpti on that grandparent visitation is not in the
best interest of a minor child if the natural parents agree that the grandparent should not be granted visitation. The re cord contains no such agreement—father opposes visitation, and mother did not appear in court nor pr ovide a declaration indicating her view on grandparent visitation. The court took the vi ew that given father’s objection to visitation and the absence of mother’s support for vis itation, “it appears” that the presumption6 would apply. Despite that statement, the co urt proceeded to engage in the balancing of interests required by the statute, considering whether it would be beneficial to Conner to grant visitation rights to his grandmother, wh ile also considering whether such an order would be an unreasonable impairment of the fundamental right of father to exercise his parental authority. (See Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 [recognizing the due process right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children].) Given the court’s reasoning, and the record supporting it, any error in applying a presumption under section 3104, subdivision (e) is harmless.
We review a visitation order under the abuse of discretion test. ( Rich v. Thatcher (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1176, 11 82.) “‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the re viewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’” ( In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318- 319.) It is undisputed that Conner and grandmot her have a preexisting relationship. The question is whether an order for grandparent vis itation at this time is in his best interest, when balanced against the right of his parent s to exercise their parental authority. ( In re Marriage of Harris, supra , 34 Cal.4th at p. 221.) At the hearing, the court noted that the order in pla ce prior to the detention of Conner and his brothers by DCFS permitted vi sitation by grandmother and her boyfriend, if monitored by mother. Grandmother adm itted she and her boyfriend had seen Conner on more than one occasion while this petiti on was pending, most recently the week before the hearing, when moth er stopped by their house. The court asked why this was not an appropriate means for grandparent vis itation. According to grandmother, mother
feared father would withhold her ability to visit with Conner if he found out mother was allowing the child to see grandmother and her boyfriend. Gra ndmother acknowledged that father had permitted them to write to Conner on his birt hday, and that he told them
he would let them see Conner in play therapy in the future; father reportedly said he would allow grandmother and her boyfriend to see Conner when the “court crap” was7 over. The reasonable inference fro m this evidence is that desp ite the history of animosity between father and gr andmother, Conner has, and will c ontinue to have , a relationship with his grandmother, with or w ithout additional visitation orders. Grandmother’s ongoing mistrust of father’s ability to parent his child also is clear from the evidence. The history before the court included grandmother’s efforts to have Conner refer to her and her boyfriend as mom a nd dad, and to father by his first name, an example of her apparent view that she and her boyfriend are more able to parent the child than is father. Grandmother sought to tarn ish the court’s view of father’s parenting ability based on his allowing Conn er to visit with mother a nd her boyfriend, and on his allowing Conner to have vis its with his (father’s) family. Grandmother also sought to undermine father’s right to raise his child through communications with Conner’s school regarding family disputes. The court fo und, based on these and other actions, that grandmother continued to challenge father’s right as a fit parent to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his child, as pr otected under the constitution. ( Troxel v. Granville, supra , 530 U.S. at pp. 66-67.) In denying the request for a visitation order, the court did not determine that
visitation itself was harmful to the child. The court determined that ordering visitation in this acrimonious relationship would interfere with father’s cons titutionally protected parental rights, and that such interference outweighed the benefit to the child from courtordered visitation. This was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court expressed the hope that, l ooking forward, the parties would do what
is best for Conner—establish a workable and respectful re lationship which will allow the
child to benefit from his father’s parenting and his grandmother’s well-intentioned support. We share that hope.8 DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur:

WILLHITE, J.

EDMON, J.*

*Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chie f Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.