alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                           8,804
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                             286
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 3,200
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     36,023
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                           6,055
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                             6,081
<LOANS>                                        111,075
<ALLOWANCE>                                      1,117
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 169,496
<DEPOSITS>                                     154,904
<SHORT-TERM>                                       356
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              1,154
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         9,578
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,504
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 169,496
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 10,559
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                2,173
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   473
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                13,205
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               4,586
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,610
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            8,595
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      153
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                  53
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  6,703
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,748
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       2,748
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,621
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.79
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.74
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    9.12
<LOANS-NON>                                        563
<LOANS-PAST>                                       404
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 1,007
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                       53
<RECOVERIES>                                        10
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                1,117
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                               924
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                            193
        

</TABLE>
§ 1204.1506 Procedures for selecting programs and activities under these regulations. ( a ) A state may select any program or activity published in the Federal Register in accordance with § 1204.1503 of this part for intergovernmental review under these regulations. Each state, before selecting programs and activities shall consult with local elected officials.
( b ) Each state that adopts a process shall notify the Administrator of the Agency's programs and activities selected for that process.
( c ) A state may notify the Administrator of changes in its selections at any time. For each change, the state shall submit to the Administrator an assurance that the state has consulted with local elected officials regarding the change. The Agency may establish deadlines by which states are required to inform the Administrator of changes in their program selections.
( d ) The Administrator uses a state's process as soon as feasible, depending on individual programs and activities, after the Administrator is notified of its selections.
§ 107.115 Category 2 operations: Operating requirements. To conduct Category 2 operations— ( a ) A remote pilot in command must use a small unmanned aircraft that— ( 1 ) Is eligible for Category 2 operations pursuant to § 107.120(a);
( 2 ) Is listed on an FAA-accepted declaration of compliance as eligible for Category 2 operations in accordance with § 107.160; and
( 3 ) Is labeled as eligible to conduct Category 2 operations in accordance with § 107.120(b)(1).
( b ) No remote pilot in command may operate a small unmanned aircraft in sustained flight over open-air assemblies of human beings unless the operation meets the requirements of either § 89.110 or § 89.115(a) of this chapter.
#### WILHELMINA GUEMBELL v. JOSEPH GUEMBELL.

A divorce will be decreed, where the husband converts his effects into money, leaves his wiie and returns to Germany, after three years absence.

Divorce. Cause, wilful absence. It appeared that these parties were married in Germany, eight years ago. In Philadelphia they quarreled, because, as was alleged, he was after other women. They made that up and removed to Ohio, where, after seven or eight months, he collected all her property and furniture, converted it into cash, and left for Germany, as *he*said, never to *return. She*after-wards expressed a wish that he never would return. She was left destitute, has since been in the employ of a reputable family as a seamstress, and sustains a good reputation, tie has been gone more than three years without being heard from.

■Divorce decreed, with $150 alimony and costs.
#### Roscoe Davis, *Plaintiff in Error,*v. The State of Florida, *Defendant in Error.*

Decision Filed May 8, 1923.

A Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Alachua County; A. V. Long, Judge.

*483
      *Evans Haile*and *W. S. Broome,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*Rivers Buford,*Attorney General, and *J. B. Gaines,*Assistant, for the State.

Per Curiam.

This cause having heretofore been submitted to the court upon the transcript of the record of the judgment herein, and briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties, and the record having been seen and inspected, and the court being now advised of its judgment to be given in the premises, it seems to' the court that there is no error in the said judgment; it is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the court that the said judgment of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.

All concur.
Motion to Reinstate Appeal Granted, Memorandum Opinion filed November 

1, 2016, Withdrawn, Appeal Reinstated, Order filed November 15, 2016 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-16-00634-CV

____________

MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY LP, Appellant

V.

CHERRY MOVING COMPANY, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the 405th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 15-CV-1324

ORDER

On November 1, 2016, this court issued an opinion dismissing this appeal. On

November 3, 2016, appellant filed a motion to reinstate the appeal. The motion is 

GRANTED. 

This court’s opinion filed November 1, 2016, is WITHDRAWN, and our 

judgment of that date is VACATED. The appeal is ordered REINSTATED.

Appellant’s brief is due 30 days from the date of this order.
PER CURIAM
1 The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 09-2214

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri. Parker Willingham, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: February 5, 2010 Filed: February 23, 2010

___________ Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Pursuant to a written plea agreement containing an appeal waiver, Parker Willingham pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit wire fraud and to defraud the United States by impairing, obstructing, a nd defeating the collec tion of tax revenue, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The district court 1 sentenced him to 41 months in prison and 3 years of supervised rel ease, and ordered him to pay $31,650 in restitution. On appeal, his counsel has m oved to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel argues that the district court erred-2- by using the attempted loss rather than th e actual loss to enhance the base offense level, that the sentence did not reflectWillingham’s limited participation in the conspiracy, and that the sentence is incons istent with sentences received by similarly situated codefendants.
Upon careful review, we conclude that Willingham knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreemen t and the appeal waiver, thatthe issues raised on appeal fall within the scope of the appeal waiver, and that enforcing the appeal waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Andis , 333 F.3d 886, 889- 92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (stating circum stances in which cour t will enforce appeal waiver); see also United States v. Estrada-Bahena , 201 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (enforcing appeal waiver in Anders case).
Having reviewed the record i ndependently under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issue for appeal beyond the scope of the waiver. Accordingly, we enforce the appeal waiverand dismiss the appeal. We also grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________
3-LTS Doc#:19883-1 Filed:01/21/22 Entered:01/25/22 14:39:35 Desc:

Envelope Page 1 of 1
Editorial Note on Part 747
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 747 appear at 84 FR 1609, Feb. 5, 2019.

§ 747.26 Document subpoenas to nonparties. ( a ) *General rules.* ( 1 ) Any party may apply to the ALJ for the issuance of a document discovery subpoena addressed to any person who is not a party to the proceeding. The application must contain a proposed document subpoena and a brief statement showing the general relevance and reasonableness of the scope of documents sought. The subpoenaing party must specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for making production in response to the document subpoena.
( 2 ) A party may apply for a document subpoena under this section only within the time period during which such party could serve a discovery request under § 747.24(d). The party obtaining the document subpoena is responsible for serving it on the subpoenaed person and for serving copies on all parties. Document subpoenas may be served in any state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or as otherwise provided by law.
( 3 ) The ALJ will promptly issue any document subpoena requested pursuant to this section. If the ALJ determines that the application does not set forth a valid basis for the issuance of the subpoena, or that any of its terms are unreasonable, oppressive, excessive in scope, or unduly burdensome, the ALJ may refuse to issue the subpoena or may issue it in a modified form upon such conditions as may be consistent with the Uniform Rules.
( b ) *Motion to quash or modify.* ( 1 ) Any person to whom a document subpoena is directed may file a motion to quash or modify such subpoena with the ALJ. The motion must be accompanied by a statement of the basis for quashing or modifying the subpoena. The movant must serve the motion on all parties, and any party may respond to such motion within ten days of service of the motion.
( 2 ) Any motion to quash or modify a document subpoena must be filed on the same basis, including the assertion of privilege, upon which a party could object to a discovery request under § 747.25(d), and during the same time limits during which such an objection could be filed.
( c ) *Enforcing document subpoenas.* If a subpoenaed person fails to comply with any subpoena issued pursuant to this section or any order of the ALJ, which directs compliance with all or any portion of a document subpoena, the subpoenaing party or any other aggrieved party may, to the extent authorized by applicable law, apply to an appropriate United States district court for an order requiring compliance with so much of the document subpoena as the ALJ has not quashed or modified. A party's right to seek court enforcement of a document subpoena will in no way limit the sanctions that may be imposed by the ALJ on a party who induces a failure to comply with subpoenas issued under this section.
Exhibit 99.1


                   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                    18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                       SECTION 906 OF THE
                   SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection  with the Quarterly Report of  Epolin,  Inc.  (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended May 31,  2003,  as
filed  with  the Securities and Exchange Commission on  the  date
hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned certifies, pursuant to  18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906  of  the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002, to the best  of  the  undersigned's
knowledge, that:

     (1)  The  Report  fully  complies with the  requirements  of
          Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange  Act
          of 1934; and

     (2)  The   information  contained  in  the   Report   fairly
          presents,  in  all  material  respects,  the  financial
          condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: July 15, 2003                /s/ Murray S. Cohen
                                       Murray S. Cohen,
                                       Chairman of the Board and
                                       Chief Executive Officer


Date: July 15, 2003                /s/ James Ivchenko
                                       James Ivchenko,
                                       President (Principal
                                       Financial Officer)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐x 

In re:                  PROMESA  

                  Title III 

THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND  

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, 

  as representative of   

                  No. 17 BK 3283‐LTS  

THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, et al.,                 (Jointly Administered) 

      Debtors.1

  

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐x 

ORDER AMENDING STANDING ORDER 

  This Court hereby amends the Standing Order applicable to matters before Judge Dein 

in these PROMESA cases (currently entered at 17‐mc‐00506‐JGD Docket No. 1).  As indicated by 

the redline attached hereto, this Court has added Paragraph 4 regarding Deadline Extensions 

and Requests to Exceed Page Limits. 

    

SO ORDERED.           

/ s / Judith Gail Dein               

Judith Gail Dein 

              United States Magistrate Judge  

DATED: January 30, 2018 

 

1

 The Debtors in these Title III Cases, along with each Debtor’s respective Title III case number and the 

last four (4) digits of each Debtor’s federal tax identification number, as applicable, are the (i) 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3283‐LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 

3481); (ii) Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (“COFINA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3284‐LTS) 

(Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 8474); (iii) Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority 

(“HTA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3567‐LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3808); (iv) Employees 

Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“ERS”) (Bankruptcy Case 

No. 17 BK 3566‐LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 9686); and (v) Puerto Rico Electric Power 

Authority (“PREPA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 4780‐LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3747) 

(Title III case numbers are listed as Bankruptcy Case numbers due to software limitations). 

   

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:2316 Filed:01/31/18 Entered:01/31/18 08:41:28 Desc: Main

Document Page 1 of 1
#### § 622.107 Transcripts.

Transcripts, if any, of an investigative proceeding shall be recorded by any means authorized by the designated FCA representative conducting the investigation. A person who has given testimony in an investigative proceeding (or counsel for such person) upon proper identification shall have the right to inspect the transcript of the person's testimony but may not obtain a copy if the FCA's representative conducting the investigation has cause to believe that the contents should not be disclosed.
#### McGREGOR, ET AL. *v.*ROGERS AND KILGORE.

Negligence — sinking boat — excuse.

Where the defendants’ boat was negligently run upon a boat of the plaintiffs’ which she sunk-, it is no excuse that the plaintiffs’ boat might have been more safely moored in some other place.

The imprudence of the plaintiff, in placing his property in an exposed place, affords no authority to the defendant to destroy the property so exposed.

Case against the defendants as owners of the Lady Franklin steamboat, for negligently running foul of a flat boat of the plaintiff’s, and sinking her. (See the case, *'5 O. R.*310.) Plea not guilty.

*Fox*and *Storer,*for plaintiff.

*King*and *N. Wright,*contra.

*583Láne, J.

to the jury. If you are satisfied that the defendants’ boat negligently run foul of the flat of the plaintiffs, they are entitled to a verdict to the extent of the injury. It is not disputed but the Lady Franklin did run foul of the flat and sunk it with the cargo, for which the plaintiffs, the carriers, have had to pay. If the injury was occasioned by the careless act of the defendants* it is no excuse to show that it would have been more prudent and proper for the owners of the flat to have moored the flat in some other place. It would be most prudent in your streets to walk on the side walks, yet if I took the less prudent course and walked in> the middle of the street, I am indeed more exposed to harm, but it- conifers no right-upon a man passing with a carriage negligently to drive over me.

Verdict and judgment for plaintiffs, for *‡*1740.
REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT.

[Scioto Circuit Court,

March Term, 1896.]

Clark, Cherrington and Russell, JJ.

#### Crull v. Morgan.

Discretion of Reviewing Court — Judgment as to Costs.

Where the error in a judgment, rendered by a justice of the peace consists only in the taxing of the costs, the court of common pleas, on error, might have reversed such judgment as to such costs erroneously taxed only. But that court had the authority in its discretion to reverse the judgment in toto, and the circuit court will not reverse the judgment of the common pleas for such action,

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Scioto county.

The plaintiff in an action before a justice of the peace recovered a judgment against the defendant for the amount due on a promissory note, and the justice of the peace in entering the judgment in favor of the plaintiff for all the costs of the suit, in which judgment for'costs was included the costs incurred by the defendant as well as those made by the plaintiff. The costs of both the plaintiff and defendant were separately taxed in the margin as required by law. The plaintiff in error in the common pleas complained of the judgment rendered against him by .the justice of the peace for the reason that the justice rendered judgment against him for all the costs of the case, including the costs of the defendant below, when judgment ought to have been rendered against him for the amount of the debt and the costs of the plaintiff below, and asked that the same be reversed. The defendant in error filed an offer in the common pleas to remit from the judgment rendered by the justice of the peace the amount of the defendant’s costs, and consented that the judgment as to such costs be reversed,

The court of common pleas reversed the judgment in *toto.*

*275
      *John C. Milner,*for Defendant in Error,

cited 81 Ohio St., 636, 637, 293. Section 6708, Revised Statutes.

*Bannon & Bannon,*for Plaintiff in Error,

cited 37 Ohio St., 442, 443, 434; 33 Ohio St., 459; 34 Ohio St., 400; 31 Ohio St., 293; 5 Ohio, 276, Sections 6708, 6709, 1318, Revised Statutes,

ChBRINGTON, J.

Held, 1. The judgment rendered as to the costs was erroneous, but was one which the common pleas court could have remedied by modification if, in the exercise of its ■ sound discretion, it had deemed it advisable so to do, and it was not incumbent upon the common pleas court to reverse the judgment in *toto,*but the same could have been reversed as to the costs erroneously taxed.

Had this court been the first reviewing court, the judgment would have been modified.

2. The court of common pleas having declined to reverse the judgment of the justice as to such costs erroneously taxed only, but having reversed the same in *toto*the circuit court cannot question its authority in this respect on. error, and will affirm the judgment of the court of common pleas.
**Exhibit
      32.1**











CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
      connection with the Annual Report of Innodata Isogen, Inc. (the “Company”) on
      Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jack Abuhoff, Chief
      Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as
      adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of
      my knowledge:





1.
            the
                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
            the
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.







/s/
                Jack AbuhoffJack
                AbuhoffChairman
                of the Board,Chief
                Executive Officer and PresidentMarch
                29, 2006