United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

NUCLEAR WASTE

DOE Should Reassess 

Whether the Bulk 

Vitrification 

Demonstration Project 

at Its Hanford Site Is 

Still Needed to Treat 

Radioactive Waste 

June 2007 

 

GAO-07-762 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2007

NUCLEAR WASTE

DOE Should Reassess Whether the Bulk 

Vitrification Demonstration Project at Its 

Hanford Site Is Still Needed to Treat 

Radioactive Waste 

Highlights of GAO-07-762, a report to 

congressional committees 

The Department of Energy (DOE)

is demonstrating a technology 

called bulk vitrification, in parallel 

with the Hanford waste treatment 

plant, to treat a portion of the 

radioactive waste stored in 177 

tanks at its Hanford site in 

southeastern Washington state. 

DOE faces technical and 

management problems that have

affected the original objectives to 

justify demonstrating the bulk 

vitrification technology. 

This report discusses the extent to 

which DOE (1) has managed the 

bulk vitrification demonstration 

project consistent with DOE 

management guidance and (2) 

continues to need a supplemental 

technology, such as bulk

vitrification, to treat a portion of

the low-activity tank waste. To 

assess DOE’s management of the 

project, GAO reviewed reports by

DOE and others and discussed the 

project with DOE and contractor 

officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOE (1)

reassess the need for a 

supplemental technology and the 

costs and benefits of bulk

vitrification compared with other

viable technologies and (2) report 

to Congress the results of the 

reassessment. In addition, 

Congress should consider 

withholding additional funding for 

the project until DOE does so. DOE

disagreed with several of the

report’s findings but did not 

comment on GAO’s

recommendations.

DOE did not follow its management requirements during the first 2 years of 

the demonstration project in an effort to accelerate tank waste cleanup. This 

decision contributed to a nearly fourfold increase in estimated costs from 

$62 million to $230 million and a 6-year delay on the project. DOE did not 

conduct key internal and external reviews and did not fully develop or 

update key project planning documents as required. Without these 

management tools, DOE initially overlooked a number of technical and 

safety problems facing the project, such as uncertainties about the quality of 

the glass formed using the bulk vitrification technology and inadequate 

systems to shield radioactive material from workers and the environment. In 

late 2005, largely because of these problems, DOE began taking steps to 

implement its management requirements on the project. 

DOE’s need for a supplemental technology to treat a portion of the lowactivity tank waste at Hanford is no longer clear, but DOE does not plan to 

reassess the need for the project before completing the demonstration. 

Originally, DOE justified the bulk vitrification project as a relatively lowcost, rapidly deployable supplemental technology to assist the department to 

complete tank waste treatment at Hanford by 2028. However, none of the 

key components to this justification remains today (see table). First, the 

price of a full-scale bulk vitrification facility has risen to $3 billion or more, 

about the same cost as adding a second low-activity waste treatment facility 

to the waste treatment plant. Second, the technology is no longer rapidly 

deployable because, as discussed above, the project faces at least a 6-year 

delay. Finally, it is now apparent that completing tank waste treatment at 

Hanford by 2028 is not possible under any reasonable scenario and that the 

waste treatment plant must operate for longer than DOE previously planned.

This is significant since longer operating periods may reduce the need for a 

supplemental technology. Given the plant’s estimated treatment capacity, 

more of the low-activity waste could be treated in the waste treatment plant 

facilities. Although DOE’s management guidance specifies that when 

conditions have significantly changed DOE should reassess the mission need

of a project, DOE does not intend to conduct this reassessment because 

DOE officials said they want more information about the technology. 

Proceeding with the demonstration project before reaffirming the need for 

the project increases the risk that DOE will spend an additional $137 million 

or more to develop a technology that may not be needed. 

Original Objectives and Current Conditions of DOE’s Demonstration Project 

Original objective Current condition 

Rapid demonstration of the technology by 2006 

Not achievable; current estimated completion 

by 2012 or later 

Rapid deployment of full-scale facility by 2011 

Not achievable; current estimated deployment 

by 2019 

Full-scale facility costing about $1.3 billion 

Not achievable; current estimated life-cycle cost 

is $3 billion or more

Complete waste treatment by 2028 

Not achievable; current estimated completion 

date unclear but ranges from 2039-2074 

Source: DOE. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-762.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5

Background 7

Management Weaknesses during the Bulk Vitrification 

Demonstration Project Contributed to Technical Problems, Cost 

Increases, and Schedule Delays 8 

The Extent to Which the Bulk Vitrification Demonstration Is Still 

Needed Is Unclear; However, DOE Does Not Plan to Reassess Its 

Need Before Continuing with the Demonstration 13 

Conclusions 17

Recommendations for Executive Action 17 

Matter for Congressional Consideration 18 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 21 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Energy 23 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 25

Table 

Table 1: Original Objectives for Demonstrating and Deploying Bulk 

Vitrification Technology Compared with Current

Conditions 13

Page i GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
Abbreviations 

AMEC AMEC Earth and Environmental, Inc. 

DOE Department of Energy 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

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Page ii GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

June 12, 2007 

The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan 

Chairman 

The Honorable Pete V. Domenici 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan 

Chairman 

The Honorable Pete V. Domenici 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky 

Chairman 

The Honorable David L. Hobson 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky 

Chairman 

The Honorable David L. Hobson 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for one of the world’s 

largest environmental cleanup programs—the treatment and disposal of 

nuclear waste created as a by-product of producing nuclear weapons. 

Decades of nuclear weapons production have left a legacy of chemical, 

hazardous, and radioactive wastes to be cleaned up at DOE sites across 

the country. One of the most contaminated nuclear waste sites in North 

America is DOE’s Hanford site located along the Columbia River in 

southeastern Washington state. This site occupies 586 square miles upriver 

from the cities of Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick, with a combined 

regional population of over 200,000. Since 1989, DOE has spent more than 

$10 billion to manage about 56 million gallons of high-level radioactive and 

hazardous waste at the site and explore ways to treat and dispose of it. 

However, to date, none of the tank waste at Hanford has been treated for 

final disposal. Over the years, including testimony before this

subcommittee in April 2006, we have criticized DOE’s management of 

Hanford’s tank waste and its efforts to design and build facilities that are 

capable of treating the waste.1

 

The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for one of the world’s 

largest environmental cleanup programs—the treatment and disposal of 

nuclear waste created as a by-product of producing nuclear weapons. 

Decades of nuclear weapons production have left a legacy of chemical, 

hazardous, and radioactive wastes to be cleaned up at DOE sites across 

the country. One of the most contaminated nuclear waste sites in North 

America is DOE’s Hanford site located along the Columbia River in 

southeastern Washington state. This site occupies 586 square miles upriver 

from the cities of Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick, with a combined 

regional population of over 200,000. Since 1989, DOE has spent more than 

$10 billion to manage about 56 million gallons of high-level radioactive and 

hazardous waste at the site and explore ways to treat and dispose of it. 

However, to date, none of the tank waste at Hanford has been treated for 

final disposal. Over the years, including testimony before this

subcommittee in April 2006, we have criticized DOE’s management of 

Hanford’s tank waste and its efforts to design and build facilities that are 

capable of treating the waste.1

1

GAO, Hanford Waste Treatment Plant: Contractor and DOE Management Problems Have

Led to Higher Costs, Construction Delays, and Safety Concerns, GAO-06-602T 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006). 

Page 1 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
DOE currently manages this waste in 177 large, aging, underground 

storage tanks. The waste contains high-level radioactive constituents (less 

than 10 percent by volume) to be stabilized on the Hanford site and then 

sent to a geologic repository for permanent disposal. DOE plans to 

stabilize the low-activity radioactive constituents (more than 90 percent by 

volume) and dispose of it on-site in near-surface burial facilities. DOE is 

required to complete treatment of all of the Hanford tank waste by 2028, as

part of the Tri-Party Agreement between DOE, the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of 

Ecology.2

 DOE manages its projects under a project management order 

and implementing guidance3

 that require a formal set of internal and 

external reviews and approvals during the planning and execution of a 

project to help ensure work is completed on schedule, within budget, and 

according to mission needs. 

To address the tank waste, DOE is constructing the Hanford Waste 

Treatment and Immobilization Plant (waste treatment plant), a large

complex of treatment and support facilities.4

 DOE’s initial plan for the 

waste treatment plant was a phased approach to first demonstrate 

treatment technologies and then add capacity by constructing additional 

treatment facilities within the plant. DOE initially expected that treating all 

of the tank waste would take until about 2046, but during the design and

early construction years of the plant the department began to explore 

ways to accelerate the cleanup and treat all of the waste by 2028, as 

required by the Tri-Party Agreement. DOE’s contractor subsequently 

modified the plant design to expand the capacity or “throughput” of the 

facilities under construction by, for example, requiring larger waste 

treatment equipment. Based on those changes, DOE expected that the 

 2

The Tri-Party Agreement is a legally binding agreement that incorporates the requirements

of federal environmental laws and guides the process under which DOE will address the

wastes and environmental contamination at the Hanford site. 

3

DOE Order 413.3, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital 

Assets, issued Oct. 13, 2000. DOE issued a revised order as DOE Order 413.3A on July 28, 

2006. 

4

The waste treatment plant includes three primary waste processing facilities—the 

pretreatment facility, which will receive waste from Hanford’s underground tanks and 

separate it into its high-level and low-activity waste components; the high-level waste 

facility that will immobilize high-level waste for off-site disposal through a process known 

as vitrification, which mixes nuclear waste with molten glass; and the low-activity waste 

facility that will immobilize the low-activity waste for on-site disposal. In addition, a large

analytical laboratory and more than 20 other buildings will support waste treatment 

activities. 

Page 2 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
waste treatment plant would be able to treat all of the high-level waste and 

about half of the low-activity waste by 2028. 

To treat the other half of the low-activity waste without adding to the cost 

of the waste treatment plant that was already under construction, DOE 

began exploring options to develop a supplemental technology that would

be low cost, capable of being rapidly developed, and could help complete 

all waste treatment by 2028. In 2003, after examining a variety of 

alternatives, DOE decided to develop a separate supplemental technology 

called bulk vitrification to see if it had the potential to treat the remaining 

low-activity tank waste.5 Bulk vitrification involves drying and placing lowactivity waste in large steel containers, mixing the waste with other feed 

material—such as soil and other glass-forming materials—heating it with 

electrical currents inside the containers until the mixed materials melt, 

and then letting them cool into a solid, glass material. The waste is then 

permanently stored on-site in those containers.6

 DOE selected the bulk 

vitrification technology because the department believed it would add 

flexibility to DOE’s tank waste treatment effort and be less costly, 

relatively rapid and straightforward to develop, and likely to meet a more 

aggressive schedule compared with other options. In addition, the bulk 

vitrification technology was acceptable to federal and state environmental 

agencies because it would stabilize the waste in glass that would meet or 

exceed the disposal standards agreed to in the Tri-Party Agreement. A 

contract was awarded in June 2004 to design and build a pilot plant that 

would both test and demonstrate the viability of the technology and treat 

about 200,000 gallons of tank waste within 2 years. 

By 2006, DOE planned to compare bulk vitrification with other viable 

alternatives, and, if selected, design, build, and then beginning in 2011, 

operate a full-scale bulk vitrification facility in parallel with the waste 

treatment plant. DOE initially estimated the Demonstration Bulk 

 5

To examine the alternatives, DOE conducted a review that included an assessment of 

studies and a series of workshops with experts from national laboratories, industry, and 

academia. The experts grouped the technologies into potential treatment approaches 

involving various methods of preparing, treating, and solidifying the waste for permanent 

on-site storage. In all, DOE compared about 10 available technical approaches for treating

Hanford’s low-activity waste.

6

In contrast to a bulk vitrification facility, the low-activity waste vitrification facility for the

waste treatment plant would consist of a vitrification technology that involves feeding the

waste and other feed material into a device, called a melter, where the waste is heated to a

molten state, then poured into stainless steel canisters, where it is allowed to cool into a 

solid form and permanently stored on-site. 

Page 3 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
Vitrification System (demonstration project) would cost $62 million. 

However, since awarding the contract in 2004, the project’s estimated cost 

has increased from $62 million to $230 million, and its scheduled 

completion date has been extended from 2006 to 2012.

7

 In mid-2005, DOE 

suspended construction activities and decided not to request continued 

project funding from Congress in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 until it had a

better understanding of the project’s scope and technical uncertainties. To 

date, DOE has spent about $93 million on the demonstration project. If 

bulk vitrification is selected as the supplemental technology for treating a 

portion of Hanford’s tank waste, DOE’s plans include eventually building 

and operating two full-scale bulk vitrification facilities located near the 

underground storage tanks in the east and west areas of the Hanford site. 

Because of the significant technical and management problems DOE is 

facing on the waste treatment plant project and the important role DOE 

assigned to the bulk vitrification demonstration in achieving the overall

objectives for stabilizing the tank waste at Hanford, you asked us to 

review the status of the demonstration project. On October 12, 2006, we 

briefed your staff on the preliminary results of our review. To respond to 

your remaining concerns, this report addresses the extent to which DOE 

(1) has managed the bulk vitrification demonstration project consistent 

with departmental management guidance and (2) continues to need a 

supplemental technology, such as bulk vitrification, to treat a portion of 

the low-activity tank waste. 

To determine how the bulk vitrification demonstration has been managed, 

we compared project management practices with project management 

guidance and documented any differences. We also documented the steps

the department has taken to improve management of the demonstration. 

To determine the extent to which DOE continues to need a supplemental 

technology, we reviewed external technical studies and cost reviews on 

the project and discussed with DOE and contractor officials the steps they 

have taken to resolve problems experienced to date. In addition, since the

purpose of the bulk vitrification technology is to supplement the capacity 

of the Hanford waste treatment plant, we spoke with DOE’s Office of River 

Protection and contractor officials to determine the extent to which the 

waste treatment plant’s cost, schedule, and technical changes may affect

 7

The initial contract price of $62 million included a smaller work scope involving a 

modular, mobile waste treatment facility, while the $230 million contract price involves a 

larger, stationary treatment facility that includes the capacity to accept waste retrieved 

from an underground storage tank. 

Page 4 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
the bulk vitrification demonstration project. A more detailed description 

of our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I. We performed 

our work between June 2006 and May 2007 in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. 

DOE did not follow departmental project management requirements 

during the first 2 years of the demonstration in an effort to accelerate the 

tank waste cleanup, which contributed to a nearly fourfold increase in 

estimated project costs from $62 million to $230 million, and a 6-year delay 

on the project. Specifically, early in the demonstration, DOE did not 

conduct key internal and external reviews that would have evaluated the 

project’s design, procurement, and construction management approach 

and that were designed to identify potential problems and address them 

before starting construction. In addition, DOE did not fully develop or 

update key project planning documents, such as a project execution plan, 

an acquisition plan, and a validated project cost baseline. Without these 

management tools, DOE initially overlooked a number of technical and

safety problems facing the demonstration project, such as uncertainties 

about the quality of the glass formed using the bulk vitrification 

technology and inadequate systems to shield and confine radioactive 

material from workers and the environment. These problems contributed 

to an increase in the project’s estimated cost and a delay in the estimated 

completion date. In late 2005, largely because of these problems, DOE 

determined that the project should be managed in accordance with 

departmental guidance, including focusing on completing the facility 

design before continuing construction activities, updating project 

execution and acquisition plans, and commissioning two independent 

reviews to assess the viability of the project’s approach, as well as its cost 

and schedule estimates. 

Results in Brief 

DOE’s need for a supplemental technology to treat a portion of the lowactivity tank waste at Hanford is no longer clear, but DOE does not plan to

reassess the need for the bulk vitrification project before continuing with 

the demonstration. In the 4 years since DOE selected the bulk vitrification 

technology for further development, conditions have changed. Originally, 

DOE justified bulk vitrification as a relatively low-cost, supplemental 

technology that could be rapidly deployed to complement the waste 

treatment plant and treat all of the remaining tank waste at Hanford by 

2028. However, none of the key components to this justification remains 

today. First, technical and safety problems during the project have not 

only led to higher project costs, but have also led DOE to make changes to 

the facility design. These problems have also resulted in increases to the 

Page 5 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
estimated life-cycle cost of future full-scale bulk vitrification facilities from

about $1.3 billion to $3 billion. This is about the same cost as another 

alternative DOE previously considered—adding a second low-activity 

waste treatment facility to the waste treatment plant. Second, the 

technology is no longer rapidly deployable because, as discussed above, 

the project faces at least a 6-year delay. DOE now estimates that the bulk 

vitrification demonstration project would not be completed until 2012 and

that the full-scale bulk vitrification facilities would not be fully available 

until late 2019. Finally, it is now apparent that completing waste treatment 

at Hanford by 2028 is not possible under any reasonable scenario and that

the waste treatment plant must operate for longer than DOE previously 

planned. This is significant since longer operating periods may reduce the 

need for a supplemental technology. Given the plant’s estimated treatment

capacity, more of the low-activity waste could be treated in the waste 

treatment plant facilities. 

DOE’s project management guidance specifies that when conditions have

significantly changed, the department should reassess the mission need, as 

well as the benefits and appropriateness of continuing with a project. 

Despite this fact, DOE plans to renew requests for project funding in fiscal 

year 2009 but does not intend to reassess the overall need for the project 

until much later. DOE project officials acknowledged that the need for 

bulk vitrification may be less compelling than when initially selected, but 

they said that developing more information about bulk vitrification would 

provide additional treatment flexibility that may have value in the future.

As part of the effort to develop more information, DOE is in the process of

comparing various combinations of treatment options for completing tank

waste treatment at Hanford. The purpose of this comparison is to support 

near-term tank waste funding decisions rather than assess bulk 

vitrification or the need for a supplemental technology. However, 

proceeding with the demonstration project before reaffirming the need for 

a supplemental technology, or reassessing the need for the bulk 

vitrification project, increases the risk that DOE will spend an additional 

$137 million or more to develop a technology that may not be needed or is

no longer the best option for treating Hanford’s low-activity tank waste. 

We are recommending that, before continuing with the bulk vitrification 

demonstration project, the Secretary of Energy direct the Assistant 

Secretary for Environmental Management to (1) reassess the continuing 

need for a supplemental technology to treat a portion of Hanford’s lowactivity tank waste; (2) if a reassessment shows that a supplemental 

technology is still needed, reassess the relative costs and benefits of 

demonstrating and deploying bulk vitrification compared with other 

Page 6 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
available technologies; and (3) report to Congress on the results of the 

reassessment before requesting additional funding for the bulk 

vitrification demonstration. If DOE does not reassess the bulk vitrification 

project before requesting additional funding for the project, we are 

recommending that Congress consider withholding the additional funding 

until DOE implements these recommendations. 

DOE commented on a draft of the report and disagreed with the report’s 

assertions that the bulk vitrification project did not follow the 

department’s project management requirements. In addition, DOE 

commented that the project has been subject to multiple, formal 

independent project management, technical, and safety reviews. 

Furthermore, DOE stated that it is already performing an assessment of 

options to complete the cleanup of Hanford’s waste tanks and that bulk 

vitrification is one of several supplemental treatment technologies being 

evaluated. We disagree with DOE’s comment that the bulk vitrification 

project followed DOE’s project management requirements. Documents 

that DOE provided during our review indicate it was not until September 

2005—after the project had experienced numerous problems and 

significant cost and schedule increases—that DOE decided the 

demonstration project would be subject to the department’s project 

management order. Regarding DOE’s assessment of options to complete 

tank waste cleanup, we do not believe it constitutes the reassessment of 

the need for a supplemental technology or the relative costs and benefits 

of demonstrating and deploying bulk vitrification compared with other 

viable technologies that our report recommends. Although DOE did not 

comment on our recommendations, we believe that implementing them 

will enhance the available data on the bulk vitrification project and 

improve the basis for future DOE decisions. 

DOE carries out its waste cleanup program at Hanford under the direction 

of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management and in 

consultation with a variety of stakeholders. EPA and the Washington State 

Department of Ecology provide regulatory oversight of cleanup activities 

at the site. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety Board) 

also oversees DOE’s operations.8

 Other stakeholders involved in the 

Background 

 8

The Safety Board was created by Congress in 1988 to provide an independent assessment 

of safety conditions and operations at defense nuclear facilities, including DOE’s Hanford 

site. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2286-2286i. 

Page 7 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
Hanford cleanup project include county and local governmental agencies,

Native American tribes, advisory groups, and citizen groups. These 

stakeholders advocate their views through various processes, including

site-specific advisory boards. DOE manages the tank waste at Hanford 

through its Office of River Protection, which Congress directed DOE to 

establish in 1998. The office has a staff of about 110 DOE employees and a 

fiscal year 2007 budget of about $1 billion. It manages Hanford’s tank 

waste through two main contracts: a tank farm operations contract with 

CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc., to maintain safe storage of the waste in 

underground tanks and to prepare it for retrieval, and a construction 

contract with Bechtel National, Inc., to design, construct, and commission 

the waste treatment plant. DOE’s tank farm contractor, CH2M HILL 

Hanford Group, Inc., awarded a subcontract to AMEC Earth and 

Environmental, Inc. (AMEC), to begin testing the bulk vitrification 

technology.

As part of the effort to accelerate the tank waste cleanup at the Hanford 

site, DOE site officials decided not to follow a number of project 

management requirements on the bulk vitrification demonstration project. 

Without the management tools that these requirements provide, DOE 

initially overlooked a number of technical and safety problems facing the 

demonstration, which contributed to an increase in the project’s estimated 

cost and a delay in the estimated completion date. In late 2005, largely 

because of the technical and safety problems, DOE determined that the 

project should be managed in accordance with departmental requirements 

and is currently in the process of implementing these requirements. 

DOE’s project management requirements outlined in the DOE order 

specify that a number of steps be taken throughout the development of a 

project. These requirements apply to all capital projects having a total cost 

of at least $20 million and are intended to ensure that projects are 

effectively delivered on schedule and within budget and that both DOE 

and its contractors are held accountable. According to the Secretary of 

Energy, the purpose of the requirements is to provide for a documented 

decision-making process that fosters a disciplined project planning 

approach and a method for measuring progress toward defined goals. As 

such, the order includes a requirement to follow a strict set of decision 

points outlining specific actions that DOE must take before beginning the 

Management 

Weaknesses during 

the Bulk Vitrification 

Demonstration 

Project Contributed 

to Technical 

Problems, Cost 

Increases, and 

Schedule Delays 

DOE Did Not Follow 

Project Management 

Requirements during the 

First 2 Years of the 

Demonstration 

Page 8 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
construction and operations of a new facility. Some of these specific 

actions include conducting various internal and external reviews, 

developing key project documents, such as an acquisition strategy and a

project execution plan, and developing and validating a cost and schedule 

estimate.9

 These requirements are applicable to both DOE and its 

contractors on the project. 

However, during the first 2 years of the bulk vitrification project, DOE did 

not follow its management requirements. In an effort to expedite cleanup

activities in 2003, as part of DOE’s accelerated cleanup initiative, DOE 

officials at the Hanford site determined that activities connected to 

Hanford’s tank waste cleanup effort would not be subject to the project 

definition requirements of the DOE order. Specifically, DOE made two key 

determinations to justify its decision to accelerate the project. First, DOE 

reasoned that since the tank farm cleanup effort, as a whole, did not 

technically meet the definition of a project—work that has a defined start

and end point and that creates a “product, facility, or system”—related 

activities would not be subject to DOE’s strict project management 

requirements. Based on that decision, in 2004, DOE officials at Hanford 

determined that the bulk vitrification demonstration project, which was 

managed as part of DOE’s tank farm activities, would also not be subject 

to DOE’s project management requirements. However, this determination 

was not consistent with DOE’s requirements since the demonstration 

project is expected to have a start and end point and result in a facility. 

Second, DOE officials further justified the decision to not apply the 

project management requirements by asserting that the demonstration 

project was a minor research and development effort. However, specific 

language in the DOE order states that “technology development activities,” 

such as the bulk vitrification project, should be subject to the 

requirements in the order. 

As a result of DOE’s decision not to apply some of the requirements of its 

order during the early stages of the demonstration project, DOE and its 

contractor did not take a number of key project management steps called 

for in the order. For example, DOE is required to conduct internal and 

external reviews to evaluate a project’s mission need and cost estimate in 

 9

According to the DOE order, an “acquisition strategy” is a document describing the highlevel business and technical management approach that includes a master schedule, along 

with details about planning, organizing, and controlling a project; a “project execution 

plan” is the core document for managing a project and includes policies and procedures to

be followed and how the project is to be accomplished. 

Page 9 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
the development of a project. However, DOE did not conduct these 

reviews that could have helped identify potential problems during the first 

2 years of the bulk vitrification demonstration. Similarly, DOE’s guidance

requires project managers and DOE contractors to develop and update key 

project planning documents, such as a project execution plan and an 

acquisition strategy. While both of these documents were created in early

2004, neither was updated when the contractor was awarded the contract 

for the demonstration several months later. Instead, the contract called for 

a fast-track, design-build approach where design, construction, and 

technology development occur simultaneously. This approach increases

the risk of encountering problems that can adversely affect a project’s cost

and schedule.10 Finally, the project management order requires DOE to 

develop, validate, and maintain an updated cost and schedule baseline for 

its projects and to notify the proper DOE headquarters officials when 

significant changes to these estimates occur. However, DOE did not 

develop, and still does not have, a validated cost and schedule baseline for 

the project about 3 years after awarding the contract. DOE now plans to 

follow the management order by developing and validating a cost and 

schedule estimate for the demonstration project in early fiscal year 2008. 

The Demonstration Project 

Faced a Number of 

Technical and Safety 

Problems Resulting in Cost 

Increases and Schedule 

Delays 

The bulk vitrification technology posed a number of technical and safety 

problems very early on in the development of the project. Even before the 

contract was awarded in 2004, DOE’s contractor was aware of potential 

problems that could affect the demonstration. For example, during initial 

testing of the technology in 2003, which involved melting simulated waste, 

not all of the simulated waste—intended to mimic the properties of 

hazardous materials, such as technetium 99—was retained in the glass. In

subsequent large-scale tests, some of the simulated waste collected near 

the surface of the container and began leaking out through the joints in the 

container. Similarly, testing in 2003 indicated that the contractor was 

aware of potentially dangerous emissions during operations of the facility 

that could have safety implications to demonstration workers. In August 

2005, the Safety Board reported that the facility, as designed, would not 

adequately contain radioactive and hazardous emissions during and after 

melting operations. The Safety Board pointed out that the facility design 

did not comply with DOE’s own facility safety requirements and requested 

that DOE resolve these weaknesses. 

 10Since 1992, we have reported frequently on the problems and risks of this approach to

managing projects. See, for example, GAO-06-602T. 

Page 10 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
These technical and safety problems contributed to an increase in the 

demonstration’s estimated cost and a delay in the projected completion 

date. One month after awarding the $62 million contract for the 

demonstration, the contractor informed DOE that to address these issues, 

the cost estimate had nearly doubled to an estimated $102 million. The 

cost estimate has since risen to about $230 million—nearly a fourfold 

increase from the initial contract price—as DOE and its contractors have 

taken steps to address these problems. These steps included upgrading 

facility designs, such as changes to accommodate more robust safety 

systems than had originally been anticipated; additional testing; and other 

scope changes, such as adding the cost to accept waste retrieved from one 

of Hanford’s tanks for testing. In addition, these changes caused the initial 

estimated completion date for the demonstration to slip from 2006 to the 

current estimate of 2012.

DOE’s decision not to follow its project management requirements likely 

contributed to these problems. Without the management tools called for in 

DOE’s requirements, such as updated timely reviews, project documents, 

and a validated cost and schedule baseline, these problems were not 

brought to the attention of DOE headquarters. For example, even though

the costs increased significantly during the first few months of the project,

without a validated baseline for the project, DOE’s contractor did not file 

an official baseline change request that would have alerted DOE 

management of the cost increases. Similarly, because DOE and its 

contractor did not follow the strict set of approvals required by DOE’s 

order at key decision points, there was no way for DOE to formally 

reassess the risks and mission needs as the project became more 

expensive and complex. According to a review of the project conducted in

September 2005, having these key management tools in place when the 

project began would have provided DOE with an opportunity to identify

and address these problems.11 Without these tools, however, DOE was not 

fully informed, and the contractor was allowed to continue at an 

accelerated pace. Despite the problems facing the project, construction 

began on the demonstration facility in January 2005, with detailed facility 

design only about 30 percent complete. 

 11Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Independent Review Report, Longenecker and 

Associates, September 2005.

Page 11 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
In 2005, facing numerous problems, DOE halted construction on the 

project and determined that it should be managed in accordance with 

departmental project management requirements. In May 2005, 4 months 

after construction had begun, DOE’s contractor began slowing down its 

activities related to the demonstration in order to assess the reasons 

behind the cost increases and schedule delays. In addition, in August 2005, 

the Secretary of Energy instructed all program offices to follow DOE’s 

order “scrupulously, without exception.” As a result, in September 2005, 

DOE officials at Hanford instructed the contractor to more rigorously 

follow project management requirements, including focusing on 

completing facility design before continuing construction activities, 

updating project execution and acquisition plans, and commissioning two 

independent reviews to assess the demonstration’s technical approach and

cost and schedule estimates. DOE decided not to request funding for the 

project in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 while the problems are being 

resolved. 

DOE Began Following 

Management Requirements 

in the Third Year of the 

Demonstration 

DOE is currently in the process of implementing a number of its project 

management requirements to address the problems facing the project and 

to better control costs. Because the project was at an advanced stage of

design development when DOE chose to begin following its management 

order, DOE has had to implement some of the requirements retroactively. 

For example, DOE updated the project initiation documents, such as the 

project execution plan and the mission needs statement, and obtained 

internal approvals for those documents even though the project was past 

the initiation stage. DOE also commissioned external independent reviews 

called for in its order, including two external technical reviews of the 

demonstration,12 as well as a management review of the project. Finally, 

DOE is currently in the process of developing and validating a cost and 

schedule baseline for the demonstration and plans to submit the entire 

project package for another review by the department’s Office of 

Engineering and Construction Management in early fiscal year 2008, as 

required by DOE’s order. 

 12One of these reviews of the project identified 19 technical issues that could result in a 

failure of the bulk vitrification demonstration to meet performance requirements unless

addressed before operational startup, and 26 areas of concern that could result in a change

to facility design or require additional testing to determine if the design is adequate. See A 

Comprehensive Technical Review of the Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System, 

Technical Assessment Conducted by an Independent and External Team of Experts,

Volume 1, chartered by CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc. (Richland, Wash.: Sept. 28, 2006).

Page 12 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
The extent to which DOE continues to need a supplemental technology to

treat a portion of the low-activity tank waste at Hanford is unclear. In the 

years since DOE selected bulk vitrification as the preferred technology, 

significant changes to the objectives that originally existed have raised 

questions about whether bulk vitrification is the most viable option for 

treating a portion of Hanford’s low-activity tank waste. Despite these 

questions, DOE does not plan to reassess the project before continuing 

with the demonstration and has not developed an acquisition strategy that 

clearly shows how the bulk vitrification and waste treatment plant 

projects will be integrated to control costs and meet tank waste cleanup 

requirements. 

The original objectives DOE used to justify demonstrating and deploying 

the bulk vitrification technology are no longer achievable. Table 1 

compares DOE’s original objectives for demonstrating and deploying the 

bulk vitrification technology with the current conditions. 

Table 1: Original Objectives for Demonstrating and Deploying Bulk Vitrification 

Technology Compared with Current Conditions 

The Extent to Which 

the Bulk Vitrification 

Demonstration Is Still 

Needed Is Unclear; 

However, DOE Does 

Not Plan to Reassess 

Its Need Before 

Continuing with the 

Demonstration 

The Original Objectives 

That Justified Developing 

the Bulk Vitrification 

Technology Are No Longer 

Achievable

Original objectives Current conditions 

Rapid demonstration of the 

technology by 2006 

Not achievable; current estimated completion by 

2012 or later 

Rapid deployment of full-scale facility 

by 2011 

Not achievable; current estimated deployment by 

2019 

Full-scale facility costing about $1.3 

billiona

Not achievable; current estimated life-cycle cost 

is $3 billion or morea

Complete waste treatment by 2028 Not achievable; current estimated completion 

date unclear but ranges from 2039–2074 

Source: DOE. 

a

These figures are in constant 2006 dollars. 

DOE’s goals of rapidly demonstrating and deploying bulk vitrification as a 

supplemental technology in conjunction with waste treatment plant 

operations are no longer achievable. DOE initially planned to use a fasttrack, design-build approach to demonstrate bulk vitrification as the 

preferred supplemental technology by 2006 and have a facility fully 

operational by 2011 when the waste treatment plant was scheduled to 

begin operations. Although DOE has not been able to demonstrate and 

deploy the bulk vitrification technology at this aggressive pace, the 

Page 13 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
urgency to do so no longer exists because of delays with the waste 

treatment plant schedule, of at least 8 years, to late 2019. DOE has not yet 

finalized the design of the bulk vitrification demonstration, resumed 

construction of the demonstration facilities, or validated the project’s 

estimated cost and schedule. Instead of demonstrating the technology by

2006, as originally planned, DOE estimated that the bulk vitrification 

demonstration project may be completed in 2012, or about 6 years behind 

schedule. Recently updated demonstration project schedules show that 

the demonstration may be delayed even further until early 2013. Similarly,

instead of having a full-scale treatment facility operational by 2011, DOE 

now estimates that supplemental treatment facilities may not be fully 

operational until 2019, or about 8 years later than originally planned.13

Further, DOE expected that a supplemental technology would be less 

expensive than expanding the waste treatment plant, but DOE is no longer 

able to develop and deploy a supplemental technology at low cost. As 

discussed earlier, during the years that the bulk vitrification 

demonstration has been under way, costs increased primarily because of

the technical and safety problems that have plagued the project. Such 

problems required DOE to make changes to the demonstration project’s 

design and resulted in increased costs to demonstrate the bulk vitrification 

technology. These problems have also increased the expected cost of a 

full-scale operating bulk vitrification facility. DOE’s life-cycle cost estimate 

of a full-scale bulk vitrification facility has increased from about $1.3 

billion to about $3 billion. This is about the same cost as another 

alternative DOE previously evaluated in 2003—adding a second lowactivity waste treatment facility to the waste treatment plant—and which 

DOE considered to be too expensive.14 In addition, the latest bulk 

vitrification life-cycle cost estimate is expected to increase further 

 13Based on the project schedule, a full-scale bulk vitrification facility in the west area of the

Hanford site may be operational between 2014 and 2016. The planned facility in Hanford’s 

east area is not scheduled to be operational until late 2019. 

14Although the estimated life-cycle costs of the two facilities are about the same, their 

technologies are at different stages of development. A low-activity waste treatment facility, 

like the one currently under construction on the waste treatment plant project, represents

a more mature technology than bulk vitrification because it has already been extensively 

demonstrated, its detailed design is more than 90 percent complete, and construction of the 

facility will be about 50 percent complete by the end of fiscal year 2007. 

Page 14 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
because it is based on assumptions that are no longer current15 and, 

according to project officials, is a conceptual estimate that is subject to 

change as DOE proceeds with the demonstration. 

DOE also based its need for a supplemental technology, in part, on the 

expectation that it could accelerate the overall cleanup effort by treating 

about half of Hanford’s low-activity waste by 2028, the legal milestone for 

completing tank waste treatment. However, given the recent schedule 

delays for both the bulk vitrification and waste treatment plant projects, 

this goal is no longer achievable, and it is no longer clear when, or if, a 

supplemental technology will be needed. DOE now estimates that the 

waste treatment plant may begin treating waste in late 2019, or about 8 

years later than originally scheduled. A variety of factors affecting the 

operation of the waste treatment plant remain unresolved, including the 

actual capacity of the waste treatment plant facilities and the operational 

reliability of those facilities. Given these uncertainties, DOE has not yet 

defined how long waste treatment plant operations will extend. However, 

the length of plant operations may range from 20 to 55 years.16 This wide 

range reflects DOE’s uncertainty about the amount of waste that the waste 

treatment plant can treat each year and the outcome of future negotiations

DOE will have with federal and state environmental agencies to set a new 

time frame for completing tank waste treatment operations. This is 

significant as longer operating periods may reduce the need for a 

supplemental technology because, given the plant’s estimated treatment 

capacity, more of the low-activity waste could be treated in waste 

treatment plant facilities. For example, based on the plant’s maximum 

estimated treatment capacity, for tank waste treatment to be completed in

20 years, a supplemental technology would need to treat about half of the 

low-activity waste. If treatment operations extend for more than 40 years, 

supplemental technology may not be needed because the waste treatment 

plant would be able to treat all of the tank waste.

 15One such assumption in the bulk vitrification life-cycle cost estimate is that tank waste 

treatment would be completed by 2036. In contrast, DOE’s fiscal year 2008 budget request 

states that treatment will not be completed until 2042, or at least 6 years later than

previously estimated. DOE contractor officials acknowledged that an extension to the 

estimate’s schedule would result in increased costs, but they had not updated the estimate 

because the length of the operating schedule is not yet known. 

16Although the fiscal year 2008 budget request indicates an operating schedule through

2042, DOE has not specifically defined the length of the waste treatment plant’s operating 

schedule. DOE’s project managers stated that the operating schedule may range from 22 to 

35 years. However, an internal engineering study estimated operations may range from 20 

to 55 years. We include the latter range because it reflects the full range of estimates. 

Page 15 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
Even though the conditions justifying the bulk vitrification demonstration

have changed significantly, DOE does not plan to reassess the need for the

project and plans to continue the demonstration. This decision runs 

contrary to DOE’s project management requirements that specify that 

when conditions have significantly changed, the department should 

reassess the mission need and reexamine available alternatives as well as 

the benefits and appropriateness of continuing with a project.

Furthermore, DOE plans to renew requests for project funding in fiscal 

year 2009 but does not intend to reassess the overall need for the project 

before proceeding. Instead, DOE decided to continue with the 

demonstration to obtain more information on the performance of bulk 

vitrification technology and compare the technology with other available 

alternatives by 2012 or later. 

DOE Does Not Plan to 

Reassess the Need for 

Continuing the 

Demonstration and Risks 

Additional Spending on a 

Technology That May Not 

Be Needed or Is Not a 

Viable Option for Treating 

Hanford’s Radioactive 

Waste

DOE project officials acknowledged that the need for bulk vitrification 

may be less compelling than when initially selected but said that 

developing more information on this technology would provide additional 

treatment flexibility that may have value in the future. As part of this effort 

to develop more information, DOE initiated an internal study in late April 

2007 to compare advantages, disadvantages, and risks for various 

combinations of treatment options, including bulk vitrification, for 

successfully completing tank waste treatment at Hanford. Although this 

study, which is to be completed by June 30, 2007, is not a decision-making 

document or a comprehensive reassessment of individual technologies or

the overall need for a supplemental technology, it will be used to support 

near-term funding decisions for the tank waste cleanup program. After 

completing the demonstration project in 2012 or later, DOE plans to 

compare the bulk vitrification technology with other viable technical 

alternatives, such as building a second low-activity waste facility, as 

required by the Tri-Party Agreement.17 However, DOE’s decision to 

proceed with the demonstration before reassessing the need for the 

project increases the risk that it may spend an additional $137 million or 

 17Tri-Party Agreement milestone M-62-08 required DOE to conduct a final assessment of 

supplemental technologies and submit a Hanford tank waste supplemental treatment

technologies report by July 31, 2005. DOE missed this milestone but has agreed to perform

this assessment by 2012. However, a revised milestone has not yet been formally negotiated 

with federal and state environmental agencies. 

Page 16 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
more18 to develop a technology that may not be needed or is no longer the 

most viable option for treating Hanford’s low-activity tank waste. 

Nearly 4 years after selecting bulk vitrification as the preferred technology 

for treating about half of Hanford’s low-activity tank waste, DOE is faced 

with a host of technical, safety, and management uncertainties on the 

demonstration project, as well as more fundamental questions as to 

whether a supplemental waste treatment technology is still needed. 

Although bulk vitrification was initially viewed as a relatively low-cost 

technology that could be rapidly developed, demonstrated, and deployed

to supplement the operations of the waste treatment plant, technical 

problems, rising costs, and schedule delays with the bulk vitrification 

demonstration project raise questions about DOE’s overall strategy for 

addressing the waste. In light of these questions, it is unclear if pursuing 

the demonstration of this particular technology, instead of other 

technologies, is the best approach. Furthermore, because DOE now 

expects the waste treatment plant to operate for much longer than 

originally planned, the plant may be capable of treating most or all of the 

low-activity waste a supplemental technology was originally intended to 

treat. However, despite this significant uncertainty about how much waste, 

if any, a supplemental technology would actually need to treat, DOE is not 

planning to reexamine the need for bulk vitrification before proceeding 

with the demonstration project. In taking this approach, DOE is not 

following its guidelines that specify that when conditions have

significantly changed, the department should reassess the benefits and 

appropriateness of continuing with a project. Without this reassessment, 

DOE risks spending an additional $137 million or more to demonstrate a 

technology that may not be needed or is no longer the best available 

option for treating Hanford’s low-activity tank waste. 

In light of major changes that have occurred on both the bulk vitrification 

demonstration and the waste treatment plant, which may affect the 

demonstration’s costs, schedule, and mission justification, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Energy direct the Assistant Secretary for 

Environmental Management to take the following three actions: 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

 18To date, DOE has spent about $93 million of the estimated $230 million for the bulk 

vitrification demonstration project. 

Page 17 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
• Reassess the need for a supplemental technology to treat a portion of 

Hanford’s low-activity tank waste. The reassessment should clearly 

identify how a supplemental technology would complement and be 

integrated with waste treatment plant operations.

• If a reassessment shows that a supplemental technology is still needed, 

reassess the relative costs and benefits of demonstrating and deploying 

bulk vitrification compared with other viable technologies, such as 

constructing a second low-activity waste vitrification facility.

• Report to Congress on the results of the reassessment before requesting 

additional funding for the bulk vitrification project. 

Congress should consider withholding future funding for the 

demonstration until the department conducts and reports on a 

reassessment that clearly confirms the need for a supplemental technology 

at Hanford and bulk vitrification as a viable alternative for treating 

Hanford’s low-activity waste. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOE for its review and comment. In 

written comments, DOE’s Assistant Secretary for Environmental 

Management expressed areas of disagreement with the report’s findings 

but did not comment on our recommendations. DOE’s written comments 

on our draft report are included in appendix II. DOE also provided 

technical comments that we have incorporated where appropriate. 

In its written comments, DOE disagreed with the draft report’s finding that 

the bulk vitrification project did not follow the department’s project 

management requirements. In addition, DOE commented that the project

has been subject to multiple, formal independent project management, 

technical, and safety reviews. Furthermore, DOE stated that it is already 

performing an assessment of options to complete the cleanup of Hanford’s 

waste tanks and that bulk vitrification is one of several supplemental 

treatment technologies being evaluated. 

Based on our review of available documentation, we continue to believe 

that the bulk vitrification project did not follow DOE’s project 

management requirements. Multiple documents provided by DOE during 

our review demonstrate that the department determined in 2003 that 

activities related to the Hanford tank farm cleanup effort, such as the bulk 

vitrification project, would not be subject to all of DOE’s project 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 18 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
management requirements. In fact, DOE even advised its contractor that it 

would not be required to follow the formal decision process outlined in 

DOE’s project management order. Because of this decision, DOE 

proceeded from the initiation phase of the project to the construction 

phase without taking preliminary steps called for in the order, such as 

developing a cost and schedule baseline. DOE commented that, as early as

November 2004, it recognized that additional project management 

oversight would be warranted as the project matured. However, 

documents provided to us by DOE indicate that it was not until September 

2005—after the project had experienced numerous problems and 

significant cost and schedule increases—that DOE decided that the 

demonstration would, from that time forward, be subject to the 

requirements of its project management order. 

We agree with DOE that the bulk vitrification project has been subject to 

multiple, formal independent project management and technical and

safety reviews by organizations inside and outside of the department. Our 

draft report discussed many of these reviews. Although these reviews have 

addressed important management, technical, and safety problems of the 

project, they are not reassessments of the need for a supplemental 

technology. It is also important to note that the assessment of options to 

complete the cleanup of Hanford’s waste tanks that DOE refers to in its 

comments is likewise not a reassessment of the need for a supplemental 

technology or of bulk vitrification technology. In fact, as stated in its 

charter, the assessment—which is for information purposes only and is 

not intended as a decision-making document—assumes the continued 

need for a supplemental technology and development of the bulk 

vitrification technology. Furthermore, as our draft report noted, it is only 

after the bulk vitrification demonstration project is completed in 2012 or 

later that DOE plans to compare bulk vitrification technology with other 

technical alternatives. Given the scope and purpose of this assessment, we

do not believe it constitutes the reassessment of the need for a 

supplemental technology or the relative costs and benefits of

demonstrating and deploying bulk vitrification compared with other viable

technologies that our draft report recommends. 

While DOE agrees that the extent to which a supplemental technology 

would be used is imprecise, it continues to assert that there is a very high 

likelihood that the cleanup mission at Hanford would benefit from added 

capacity to treat low-activity waste. Although DOE may be correct, we are 

uncertain whether the department has adequately demonstrated the basis

for this assertion. As our draft report discussed, the original cost and 

schedule conditions DOE used to justify the need for supplemental 

Page 19 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
technology have changed significantly, and the original objectives that 

justified developing the technology are no longer achievable. In light of 

these significant changes, we continue to believe that the department 

should reassess the mission need and benefits of continuing the project, 

rather than simply assuming that the need still exists. Contrary to DOE’s 

contention, we are not recommending that the department cancel its 

evaluation of the bulk vitrification approach before it has data on which to

base a decision. Indeed, we believe that our recommendation that DOE 

reassess the need for supplemental technology and the costs and benefits 

of bulk vitrification compared with other viable technologies would 

actually enhance the available data on the project and improve the basis 

for future DOE decisions. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 

committees and to the Secretary of Energy. We also will make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available 

at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff has any questions on this report, please contact me at

(202) 512-3841 or by e-mail at aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix III. 

Gene Aloise 

Director, Natural Resources and Environment 

Page 20 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine how the Department of Energy (DOE) has managed the bulk 

vitrification demonstration project, we compared project management 

practices with project management guidance and documented any 

differences. We reviewed project planning and acquisition documents to 

understand the original objectives and assumptions DOE used to justify 

demonstrating bulk vitrification technology and for managing the 

demonstration project. We documented the management problems the 

contractor has experienced on the project from contract award to the 

present. We also documented the steps the department has taken to 

improve management of the demonstration. We discussed these steps with 

department and contractor officials to determine their status and to assess 

DOE’s progress. We also discussed project oversight efforts with officials 

of DOE’s Office of Engineering and Construction Management in 

Washington, D.C. 

To determine the extent to which DOE continues to need a supplemental 

technology, we reviewed internal and external technical studies and 

reviews on the project and discussed with DOE and contractor officials 

the steps they have taken to resolve problems experienced to date. We

also discussed these issues with key representatives of federal and state

environmental agencies. We visited the bulk vitrification demonstration 

site, interviewed DOE and contractor officials, and reviewed key studies 

and project documents that describe how DOE and the contractor plan to

conduct the demonstration. To assist in evaluating the technical aspects of 

the demonstration project, we obtained assistance from a technical 

consultant, Dr. George Hinman, who has a Doctor of Science degree in 

physics and is Professor Emeritus at Washington State University. Dr. 

Hinman has extensive nuclear energy experience in industry, government,

and academia. Since the purpose of the bulk vitrification technology is to 

supplement the capacity of Hanford’s waste treatment plant, we spoke 

with DOE’s Office of River Protection and contractor officials to 

determine the extent to which the waste treatment plant’s cost, schedule,

and technical changes may affect the bulk vitrification demonstration 

project. We also obtained documentation and discussed with these 

officials the life-cycle cost of a second low-activity waste facility as part of

the waste treatment plant. We compared this cost with the current lifecycle cost estimate for a full-scale bulk vitrification facility. 

We relied on dollar figures provided by DOE and its contractors but took 

various steps, such as analyzing cost estimating documents and reviewing 

cost estimating assumptions, reviewing budget documents, and obtaining

clarifications from the officials who prepared them, to ensure that the data

were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report. We performed our 

Page 21 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

work between June 2006 and May 2007 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 22 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy 

of Energy 

Page 23 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Energy 

Page 24 GAO-07-762 Nuclear Waste
Appendix III: GAO

St

 Contact and 

aff Acknowledgments

Page 25 GAO-07-762

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841, aloisee@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, William R. Swick, Assistant 

Director; Ryan T. Coles; John Delicath; Doreen Feldman; George Hinman; 

Jeffrey Larson; and Thomas Perry made significant contributions to this 

report. Others who made important contributions included Mark Braza, 

Doreen Eng, and Mehrzad Nadji. 

Nuclear Waste

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(360731) 
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