### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 28, 200 9 S es sio n M IC HA EL S OW EL L v
. ES TA TE OF JA M ES W. D A V IS An Appeal from the C ircuit Court f or Gibson County No. 8350 Clayburn Peeples, Judge

No. W2009-00571-C OA-R3-C V - Filed Dec ember 21, 2009

This appea l i n v o l v es Tenne ssee’ s savings statute. The plaintiff f iled a tort lawsuit aga inst the defe ndant. During the pendenc y of the action, the defe ndant died. The plaintiff did not file a motion to substit ute the prope r party for the de cea sed de fendant, as re quired unde r T.R.C.P. 25.01. The lawsuit was no t d is mi s s e d o n th a t b a s is

. T h e tria l c o u r t a ll o w e d th e p lain ti f f to ta k e a v o lu n ta ry nonsuit. The plaintiff re -filed the instant law suit withi n one yea r, making the s ame a llegations as in the original ac tion but naming the estate of the de cede nt as the defendant. The estate f iled a mot ion to d ism iss , a

rg uing that th e sa vin gs statut e wa s in app lic able be c a us e the origi na l la ws uit should have be en dismissed pursuant to T.R.C.P. 5.01 for failure to substitut e the proper party, a nd beca use the de fenda nts in the original lawsuit and the re- filed lawsuit were not identical. The tria l court granted the estate’s motion to dism iss on both grounds. The plaintiff now a ppeals. W e reve rse, f in d i n g that the estate ’s ar gument that it is not an entity ca pable of being sued ha s been waived, an d concluding that the tria l court er red in de termining that the savings statute was inapplicable.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t i s Reve rsed and Remanded
H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., joined.
Sc ott ie O. W ilk e s, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the Pla int if

f/Ap pe lla nt, Mic ha e l So we ll. Ky le C. A tki ns , H umb old t, T e nn e sse e , f or the De fe nd a nt/Ap pe lle e , E state of Ja me s W . D a vis

.T h e law su it a ro se o u t o f a n a u to m o b ile a c c id e n t. 1

The doc um ent s s uppor t i ng t hes e f ac t s w er e not i ncl uded i n t he appe l l at e r ec or d i n t hi s ca s e. H ow eve r , t he 2 fa c ts a re u n d isp u te d fo r p u rp o se s o f th is a p p e a l. -2- OP IN ION
F ACT S AND P R O C EE D ING S B E L OW
Th e fa c ts o f this c a se are un dis pu te d. On Ju ly 1 6, 19 99 , Pl a int if f/Ap pe lla nt M ic ha e l So we ll (“Sowe ll ” ) f

il e d a to r t la w s u it a g a in s t J a me s W

. D a v is ( “ D a v is ” )

. O n M a y 3 1 , 2 0 0 5 , while the 1 lawsuit was still pending, Defe ndant Davis died. O n August 3, 2005, a suggestion of death was filed in the c a se a ndse rv e d o n So we ll. Acco rdi ng to R ule 25 .0 1 o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du re , a

mot ion to s ub sti tut e the pr op e r p art y f or a de c e a se d p art y may b e ma de wi thi n n ine ty da ys a ft e r the su gg e sti on of de a th i s f ile d: (1) I f a pa

rty dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the c ourt may orde r substitut ion of the proper parties. The motion for substitut ion may be made by any pa rt y o r b y th e su c c e sso rs or re pr e se ntativ e s o f the de c e a se d p art y a nd , tog e the r w ith the notice of

hearing, shall be serve d on the parties a s provided in Rule 5 and upon pe rs on s n ot p art ie s in the ma nn e r p ro vid e d in Ru le 4 for the se rv ic e of

pr oc e ss. Un le ss the mot ion fo r s ub sti tut ion is m a de no t late r tha n 9 0 d a ys a ft e r the death is suggeste d u p o n th e r e c o r d b y s e r v ic e o f a s tate me n t o f th e f a c t o f th e d e a th a s provided he rein for the s ervic e of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the dece ased pa

rty.
Tenn. R. C i v
. P

. 2 5

. 0 1 (1). De spite the filing of the suggestion of death, neither Sowell nor a repr esentative of Da vis f

iled a motion to substitut e a proper party for Davis pursua nt to Rul e 25.01 a t a ny tim e du ri ng the pr oc e e din gs
. Th e c a se pr oc e e de d to tria l. By the tim e of tr ia l, Sow e ll’ s c ou ns e l ha d w ith dr a wn , s o So we ll proce eded pr

o s e
. Prior to trial, the Def endant filed a motion to di smiss pursuant to the mandatory la ng ua ge in R ule 25 .0 1. On the mornin g of tr ia l, M a y 1 0, 20 07 , th e tr ia l ju dg e su gg e ste d to Sow e ll that he file a motion for a voluntary nonsui t. Appar ently acting on this advice , Sowell filed a motion for a voluntary nonsui t, and the trial court e ntere d an orde r dismissing t he ca se without prejudice on that basis. The trial court did not adjudicate the def endant’ s motion t o dismiss based on Rule 25.01. The trial c ourt’s orde r gra nting the voluntary non-suit was not appe aled. 2 On May 8, 2008, Sowell re -filed this ac tion, pr o s e , pursuant to T ennesse e’s “s avings statute,” this time naming the “Estate of James W. D avis ” as the defe ndant. Pursuant to the

“ sa vin gs statut e ,” a vo lun tari ly dis mis se d la ws uit ma y b e re -f

ile d w ith in o ne ye ar o f s uc h d ism iss a l: (a) If the a cti o n i s co m m enced within the time limi ted by a r ule or statute of limit ation, but the judgment or dec ree is render ed agai n s t t h e plainti ff upon a nyB y th e ti m e h e filed h is re sp o n se , S o w e ll h a d re ta in e d c o u n se l. 3
-3- ground not conc luding the pla intiff's right of action,

. . . the plaintiff, or the plaintiff's repr esentatives and privies, a s the ca se may be , may, from time to time, commence a new action within one (1) year afte r the re versa l or arr est. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 28- 1-105 (2000) (“sa vings statute”).
On Au g u s t 8, 2008, “the Estate ” filed its answe r and a motion to di smiss, arguing that the re- filed lawsuit must be dismiss ed pursuant to Rule 25.01 be cause the Estate of James W. D avis was never substitut ed as a

proper party in the original action following the suggestion of dea th filed on August 3, 2005. “The E state” r elied on the plain langua ge of Rule 25.01, whic h states t hat, wher e no motion for substitut ion is made under the Rule within ninety days, “the action shall be dismissed a s to the de c e a se d pa

rt y. ” In a dd iti on , “ the Es ta te ” arg ue d in its mot ion that So we ll c ou ld n ot a va il himself of the savings statute, beca use the parties in the original lawsuit and the r e-f iled lawsuit were not identical, asserting that “[t]he sa vings statute is not applicable to claims i n a re newe d complaint against a pa

rty not named a s a def

endant in the original complaint.” Engl e r v . Kar ne s L e ga l Se rv s. , No. W2006-02443-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2219279, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. May 29, 2008) (quoting Turner v. Aldor C

o. of Nashville, Inc. , 827 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991))

. In re sponse, Sowell ar g u ed t h at R ule 25.01 is inapplicable be cause the original ca se wa s te rm inate d b a se d o n h is mo ti on to t ake a vo lun ta ry no ns uit , n ot p ur su a nt t o Ru le 25 .0 1. Sow e ll 3
asserted that he wa s entitled to take a voluntary nonsuit be cause , at the time, no adver se decision had been entere d against him. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01. There fore , Sowell contended, pur suant to the sav i ngs statute, he wa s entitled to re-f ile his lawsuit within one year. Furthermore, he claimed, James Da vis and the “Esta te of Jame s Davis” a re one and the sa me for pur pos es o f t h e savings statute. Thus, bec ause the original lawsuit and the r e-f iled lawsuit were substantially the same, he argue d, “the Estate ’s” motion to dismi ss should be denied.
On De c e mbe r 1 , 2 00 8, the tr ia l co urt con du c te d a he ari ng on “ the Es ta te ’s ” mot ion to dismiss . At the conc lusion of the hearing, the trial court gr anted the motion. On Februa ry 11, 2009, the trial court entere d an orde r of dismissal, stating:
Michae l Sowell had not complied with Rule 25.01 and there fore this matter shall be dis mis se d. Furthe r, the sa vin gs statut e c a n n ot b e app lie d to sa ve a c la im a ga ins t a party who w as not a pa

rty to the original ac tion.
Fr om this or de r, Sow e ll n ow app e a ls.A gai n, w e not e t h at t he r ecor d of t he f i r s t l aw s ui t w as not fi l ed w i t h t he appel l at e r ecor d i n t hi s ca s e. 4 H o w ev er, t h e fa cts are u n d i sp u t ed b y t h e p arti es. -4-

I S S UE S ON A PP E AL AND S TANDA RD OF R EVIEW On appe al, Sowell makes the same ar guments as he made to the trial court, that Rule 25.01 is i na pp lic able be c a us e the fi rs t la ws uit was volun tari ly d ism iss e d, a ndthat th e sa vin gs statut e is applicable to his re-filed la wsuit because the de fenda nts named in the first and second lawsuits are substantially identical. The fa cts involved in this appeal are undisputed, and the issues prese nted ar e purely que stions of law. Ther efor e, we revie w the trial c ourt’s dec ision de novo o n the re cord prese nted, without a p re s u m ption of corr ectne ss in the trial court’s de cision. See In re Estate of Wil lia ms , No. M2000-02434-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 1961805, at *26 ( Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2003).
A N A L Y SIS Rul e 25.01
We f irst addre ss Sowell’s argument that the tria l court er red in dismiss ing this l awsuit based on his failure to comply with Rule 25.01 in the original lawsuit. Sowell c oncede s that the trial court could have dismiss ed the original lawsuit pursuant to R u l e 25.01 after the time f or permitti ng su bs tituti on of pa

rt ie s exp ir e d. He no te s, ho we ve r, that th e la ws uit wa s n ot d ism iss e d o n th a t ba sis

. Rather, the c ase pr ocee ded to trial, and S o well fil ed a motion to take a voluntary nonsuit as suggest ed b y the trial court. The trial court granted the nonsuit and dismis sed the c ase w ithout pr e jud ic e , a ndthe re wa s n o app e a l of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s or de r. Th e re fo re , he c la ims , be c a us e the c a se was not a ctually dismiss ed based on Rule 25.01, but rather was dismissed without prejudice, he was permitted to ava il hims elf of the protec tion of the savings statute. In response , “the Estate” a rgues that the language of Rul e 25.01 is mandatory, a nd that the trial court did not err in dismissi ng Sow e ll’ s la ws uit

on thi s b a sis

. W e a gr e e that th e plain l a ng ua ge in R ule25 .0 1 mand a te s a dis mis sa l f

or failu re to c omp ly wi th the Rul e ’s re qu ir e me nt that a pro pe r part y be tim e ly sub sti tut e d f or a de c e a se d p art y. Th us , it app e ars that th e tr ia l c ou rt in the origi na l la ws uit wo uldha ve be e n ju sti fi e d in dis mis sin g th a t la ws uit based on Sowe ll’s failure to substitute th e p ro p er p ar t y within ninety days of the suggestion of Da vis ’s de a th. It

is u nd isp ute d, ho we ve r, that th e la ws uit was no t in fa c t di smi sse d o n th a t ba sis

. Rather, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice ba sed on Sowell’s motion to t ake a vo lun tary no ns uit . T he tr ia l c ou rt ’s failu re to a dju dic a te Da vis ’s mot ion to d ism iss ba se d o n Ru le 25 .0 1 c ou ld h a ve be e n a

pp e a le d, bu t it

wa s n ot. Th e sa vin gs statut e op e rate s to sav e a la ws uit if it 4 is r esolved “upon any ground not c oncluding the plaintiff’s right of action

. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 2 8- 1- 20 5. Th e fa c t th a t th e origi na l la ws uit could have be e n d ism iss e d pu rs uant to Rul e 25 .0 1 is of no moment, bec ause it wa s not dismi ssed on that basis. Sowell’s lawsuit was actua lly dism issed wi tho ut p re

jud ic e on a

gr ou nd that didno t c on c lud e his ri gh t of a c tio n, so Sow e ll w a s p e rm itt e d to avail himself of the savings statute. Identical PartiesA t o ra l a rg u m e n t, c o u n se l fo r S o w e ll a rg u e d th a t, if th e issu e h a d b e e n ra ise d in th e tria l c o u rt, S o w e ll w o u ld 5
t hen h ave had t he op po r t un i t y t o s eek an am endm ent of hi s pet i t i on t o s ub s t i t ut e t he proper part y for t he E s t at e. -5- Sowell next argue s that the trial court erre d in fi n d i n g that the savings statute wa s not app lic able to his re -f

ile d la ws uit , be c a us e “ the Es ta te ” wa s no t a pa rt y to the origi na l a c tio n. Th is Court has held that the savings statute a pplies only when the original c omplaint and the re -filed complaint are “substantially for the same cause of action,” and has specifie d that “[t]he re must be an identity of the parties in or der for the ne w and original complaints to be substantially the same.” Turner v
. Aldor Co. of Nashville, Inc. , 827 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Sowell urges thi s Co urt to find , h ow e ve r, that th e origi na l la ws uit a ndthi s la ws uit

are “ su bs ta nti a lly the sa me cause of ac tion,” and that the pa rties ar e identica l for purpose s of the savings statute.
In re sp on se , “ the Es ta te ” arg ue s th a t a stric t a pp lic a tio n o f the “id ent ity of pa rt ie s” require ment is nece ssary to pre vent abuse of Tenne ssee’ s savings statute. It notes that “Ja mes W. Davis” a nd the “Estate of James W . Davis ” ar e i n fac t not one and the same. Sowell had an opportunity to subst itute the proper party in the original a ction, but failed to do so. Ther efor e, “the Es ta te” argu es, Sow e ll s ho uldno t be pe rm itt e d to “ sa ve ” a la ws uit a ga ins t a pa rt y w ho wa s n ot a party to the original law suit.
Neither party ha s cited a Te nnessee case on this iss ue, and w e have found none. The ref ore, it must be conside re d an i s s u e of first impression. It is certainly true that Sowell could have, a nd should have, substitut ed the prope r party for the de cede nt Davis afte r the suggestion of de ath was fi le d in the origi na l la ws uit . How e ve r, fo r pur po se s of re so lvi ng thi s is su e , th e situatio n is the sa me as if Da vis’s death oc curr ed after the original lawsuit was nonsuited. In such a situation, the plaintiff would have no choice but to re- file the lawsuit against the estate of the dec edent through the persona l rep re s en t at i v e. Unde r the re asoning advoc ated by “ the Estate,” the plaintiff in that circ umstance wo uldbe pr e c lud e d f

ro m a vai li ng hi ms elf of

the sa vin gs statut e . W e c a nn ot a gr e e wi th this interpre tation. There fore , we must re spectfully disagree with the holding of the trial court. Under the circ umstances pr esente d in this case, we co n clude that, for purposes of the savings statute, “Da vis” and the “ Estate of D avis” a re c onsidered to be substantially identical.
Estate Not A Part

y Capable of Being Sued On appe al, “the E state” a sserts that this Court shou l d af fi rm t he trial c ourt’s dismissal of Sowell’s complaint for the a dditional reason that Sowell’s law suit was filed aga inst the estate, rather than the per sonal repr esentative of the e state, and a n estate is not a pr oper pa rty ca pable of suing or being sued. Sowell conc edes that, under Te nn es s ee law, an e state is not a prope r party defe ndant capa ble of being s ued exc ept in certain circ umstances. Se e Bry ant v . Es tate of

Kle in , No. M2008- 01546-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 1065936 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr . 20, 2009) (c iting Go ss v . Hu tc hins , 75 1 S. W .2 d 8 21 , 8 24 (T e nn . 1 99 8) ). He no te s, ho we ve r, that “ the Es ta te ” did no t ra ise thi s is su e in the trial court, and that, t here fore , this argument has be en wa ived. Indee d, “the Estate ” points to no 5 place in the rec ord in which the issue w as brought bef ore the trial court.-6-

It is w ell settled that issues not raised in the tria l court ar e wa ived and may not be raised f or the first time on appe al. Se e Ale xa nde r v . Ar

me ntro ut , 2 4 S. W .3 d 267 , 272 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; se e als o Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) . From our revie w of the a ppellate r ecor d, we f

i n d t h at t h is issue was not proper ly raised a nd that, there fore , it has been w aived.
C ONCL US I ON
The de cision of the trial c ourt is reve rsed a nd the cause i s rema nded for further proce edings c on sis te nt wi th thi s Op ini on
. Cos ts on app e a l are to be ta xe d to Ap pe lle e Es ta te of Ja me s W . D a vis , for whic h exec ution may issue, if nece ssary.

___________________________________ HOLLY M. K IRBY, JUDGE