GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Honorable

Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senate

July 2000 CONVENTIONAL 

ARMS TRANSFERS

U.S. Efforts to Control 

the Availability of 

Small Arms and Light 

Weapons

GAO/NSIAD-00-141

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Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers, 

Fiscal Years 1996-98 24

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 26

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 29

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of State 30

Tables Table 1: Examples of Weapon Collection Programs Conducted

in Other Countries, 1995-99 17

Table 2: 14 Key Tasks for Implementing Weapon Collection 

Programs 19

Table 3: Top 25 Recipients of U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons 

Authorized or Delivered for Fiscal Years 1996-98 25

Figures Figure 1: Dollar Value of U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons

Authorized or Delivered for Fiscal Years 1996-98 24

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-285207 Letr

July 18, 2000

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

United States Senate

Dear Senator Feinstein:

The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons in regions of 

conflict1

 is a matter of concern among governments and nongovernmental 

and international organizations. Small arms include pistols, revolvers, and 

machine guns, while light weapons include such items as grenade 

launchers and man-portable missiles.2

 Although it is impossible to estimate 

the quantity of small arms and light weapons in circulation worldwide, the 

international community believes that the availability of these relatively 

inexpensive weapons contributes to regional instability, facilitates crime, 

jeopardizes peacekeeping operations, and hinders economic development 

in conflict areas. U.S. government policy objectives on U.S. conventional 

arms transfers (that is, their sale, grant, lease, license, or loan through the 

Departments of State and Defense) are designed to meet legitimate defense 

needs of friends and allies, in support of U.S. national security and foreign 

policy interests. The policy objectives are also aimed at restraining arms 

transfers that may be destabilizing or threatening to regional peace and 

security. You expressed concern about U.S. small arms and light weapons 

transfers, both commercial and government to government, and steps 

being taken by the U.S. government to reduce their availability in areas of 

conflict.

As agreed with your office, this report provides information on (1) U.S. 

government monitoring and reporting policies regarding small arms and 

light weapons transfers, (2) the steps the U.S. government is taking at the 

1

Regions of conflict and post-conflict include such areas as sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, 

and Central America.

2

For the purposes of our review, we are using the United Nations’ definition of small arms 

and light weapons. Small arms are those weapons manufactured to military specifications 

and designed for use by one person, whereas light weapons are those used by several 

persons working as a crew. Ammunition and explosives needed for small arms and light 

weapons are also included in the definition.
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international level to address the availability of small arms and light 

weapons, and (3) lessons identified regarding weapon collection programs.

To address the report’s objectives, we obtained documents and information 

from U.S. government agencies, such as the Departments of State, Defense, 

and the Treasury; international organizations such as the United Nations; 

and nongovernmental organizations such as the British American Security 

Information Council, the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, the 

Federation of American Scientists, Human Rights Watch, the International 

Peace Research Institute, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 

and representatives of the firearms industry. We summarized data and 

other information from weapon collection studies and conducted analysis 

of agency reports submitted to Congress. In addition, a separate evaluation 

of the Department of Defense post-delivery review process for foreign 

military sales is being conducted to determine the sufficiency of the 

Department’s monitoring process.3

 For a complete discussion of our scope 

and methodology, see appendix II.

Results in Brief The U.S. government has guidance, procedures, and regulations for 

monitoring and reporting U.S. conventional arms transfers to foreign 

recipients, including small arms and light weapons. Both the Departments 

of State and Defense are responsible for monitoring U.S. conventional arms 

transfers. The Department of Defense has the principal responsibility for 

monitoring government to government arms transfers, while the State 

Department licenses and monitors commercial arms exports. The 

Departments’ monitoring activities include reviewing proposed transfers to 

foreign recipients (pre-delivery checks) and verifying that recipients of U.S. 

conventional arms receive and/or use these weapons as intended

(post-delivery checks). The Departments of State and Defense must notify 

Congress prior to conventional arms transfers, if such transfers either meet 

or exceed specific dollar thresholds, and provide an annual report on the 

aggregate dollar value and quantity of all conventional arms that have 

already been transferred to recipients.

3

At the request of the Chairman, House Committee on International Relations, we are 

currently examining the Defense Department’s end-use monitoring program for all U.S. 

government-to-government conventional arms transfers and expect to issue our report in 

late August 2000.
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In response to the international concern about the availability of small 

arms and light weapons in areas of conflict, the U.S. government has taken 

the lead in (1) creating international standards for governments to prevent 

illicit small arms transfers, including helping to negotiate the first regional 

agreement designed to prevent and combat illicit firearms trafficking in the 

Western Hemisphere, (2) establishing mechanisms to govern small arms 

transfers, such as strengthening export control procedures and complying 

with arms moratoriums, (3) developing diplomatic initiatives with other 

nations and multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations and the 

European Union’s “Statement of Common Principles on Small Arms and 

Light Weapons,” and (4) helping other nations to destroy their excess 

weapons as the United States did in Liberia. 

Case studies of weapon collection programs conducted in other countries, 

such as “buyback” programs, have identified lessons that could be applied 

by governments or nongovernmental and international groups to future 

programs’ design. According to experts, these case studies show that a 

failure to adopt a comprehensive approach, including setting realistic goals 

and providing appropriate incentives, results in programs encountering 

implementation problems. Although Department of Defense officials 

recognize the need to incorporate these factors into their weapon 

collection programs, there currently is no department guidance concerning 

how to implement these lessons within Department-managed weapon 

collection programs. 

This report recommends that the Department of Defense develop guidance, 

based on a comprehensive approach, for conducting future weapon 

collection programs. In written comments on a draft of this report, the 

Department generally agreed with the report’s content and 

recommendation.

Background According to a variety of government, international, and nongovernmental 

sources,4

 over the past few years there has been an increase in the 

4

These sources include statements and documents obtained from officials at U.S. agencies 

such as the Departments of State and the Treasury, international organizations such as the 

United Nations, and various nongovernmental organizations such as the British American 

Security Information Council, the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, the Federation 

of American Scientists, Human Rights Watch, the International Peace Research Institute, the 

Monterey Institute of International Studies, and others including representatives from the 

firearms industry and related organizations.
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availability, accumulation, and uncontrolled transfer of small arms and 

light weapons. Although no universally accepted definition of small arms 

and light weapons currently exists, most experts agree that small arms are 

those weapons manufactured to military specifications and designed for 

use by one person (such as an AK-47 rifle), whereas light weapons are 

those used by several persons working as a crew (such as a man-portable 

missile system). Small arms and light weapons are readily available, cheap 

to acquire, and need minimal maintenance and training to operate. 

Moreover, the number and type of small arms and light weapons available, 

even within regions of conflict, are unknown.

A 1997 U.N. report states that the excessive and destabilizing accumulation 

and transfer of small arms and light weapons are closely related to the 

increased incidence of internal conflicts and high levels of crime and 

violence.5

 Since 1989, Africa has experienced more armed conflict than any 

other continent and is perhaps the region most affected by small arms and 

light weapons proliferation, according to the U.S. State Department. 

According to the U.N. report, ineffective governmental control, open 

borders, and the lack of resources and information inhibit the region’s 

ability to contend with the small arms problem. Also, in Eastern Europe, 

the collapse of the former Soviet Union has led to the greater availability of 

small arms and light weapons outside of government control. In 1998, the 

Secretary of State stated that the uncontrolled flow of arms, ammunition, 

and explosives into tense areas of the world, particularly Africa, is a serious 

international problem and called for greater global efforts to restrain 

transfers of these items to regions of conflict.

The U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy announced in February 1995 

advocates promoting restraint, both by the United States and other 

suppliers, in transfers of conventional weapons that may be destabilizing or 

dangerous to international peace. At the same time, it provides for transfers 

that meet legitimate defense requirements of U.S. friends and allies, in 

support of U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.

5

Report of the Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms as requested by the U.N. 

General Assembly and issued in August 1997. 
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Both direct commercial sales and government-to-government U.S. 

conventional arms transfers are controlled under U.S. law. The Arms 

Export Control Act6

 and the Foreign Assistance Act 7 establish licensing, 

monitoring, and reporting requirements for U.S. conventional arms 

transfers, which include small arms and light weapons. Under the authority 

of the Arms Export Control Act, the State Department, through its Office of 

Defense Trade Controls, issues export licenses for the commercial sale of 

munitions items.8

 This act also permits the Department of Defense (DOD) 

to transfer U.S. defense articles, services, and training to eligible foreign 

governments through its Foreign Military Sales program.

For fiscal years 1996 through 1998,9

 the United States authorized or 

delivered $3.7 billion in small arms and light weapons to 154 nations 

through direct commercial sales; foreign military sales; or other transfers, 

including grants and “drawdowns” from Department of Defense stocks.10 In 

keeping with its conventional arms policy, the United States transferred 

most of its small arms and light weapons to its friends and allies, including 

Egypt, Germany, Israel, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and the United 

Kingdom. Such transfers ranged from ammunition and small caliber 

handguns to machine guns and Stinger missiles. (See app. I for more details 

on U.S. small arms and light weapons transfers for fiscal years 1996-98.) 

The United States is a major supplier of all types of conventional arms 

worldwide, according to government and nongovernmental sources. Most 

government and nongovernmental officials with whom we spoke, however, 

indicated that American small arms found in regions of conflict were 

primarily acquired illicitly or recycled from U.S. involvement in war, such 

as Vietnam. 

6

22 U.S.C. section 2751. 

7

22 U.S.C. section 2151. 

8

Munitions items are those designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified solely for 

military applications. 

9

At the time of our review, complete fiscal year 1999 data was not available.

10If the President determines that an emergency exists that cannot be met under the Arms 

Export Control Act or any other authority, then he may direct the drawdown of U.S. defense 

articles, services, or training from DOD stocks. 22 U.S.C. section 2318 
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U.S. Government 

Monitoring and 

Reporting of U.S. Small 

Arms and Light 

Weapons Transfers 

The U.S. government has guidance, procedures, and regulations for 

monitoring and reporting U.S. conventional arms transfers to foreign 

recipients, including small arms and light weapons. Both the Departments 

of State and Defense are responsible for monitoring U.S. conventional arms 

transfers. The Department of Defense has the principal responsibility for 

monitoring government-to-government arms transfers, while the State 

Department licenses and monitors commercial arms exports.11 The 

Departments’ monitoring activities include reviewing proposed transfers to 

foreign recipients (pre-delivery checks) and verifying that recipients of U.S. 

conventional arms receive and/or use these weapons as intended

(post-delivery checks). The Departments of State and Defense must notify 

Congress prior to conventional arms transfers, if such transfers either meet 

or exceed specific dollar thresholds, and provide an annual report on the 

aggregate dollar value and quantity of all conventional arms that have 

already been transferred to recipients. Congress may not receive prior 

notification of small arms and light weapons transfers if their dollar values 

are lower than the established notification thresholds. In addition, the 

legislation does not require the executive branch to specifically identify 

which transfers include items classified as small arms and light weapons. 

State’s “Blue Lantern” 

Monitoring Program

Consistent with requirements in law, the State Department conducts 

monitoring of commercial weapon transfers to recipients of concern12 in 

order to deter and detect violations of law. Specifically, under its “Blue 

Lantern” program, the State Department conducts pre- and post-delivery 

checks. State’s program, as implemented by its Office of Defense Trade 

Controls, applies 20 specific criteria or “flags” to determine when the need 

for “end-use monitoring” (either or both pre- and post-delivery review) is 

needed. These criteria reflect concerns about (1) a customer (for example, 

the customer or purchasing agent is reluctant to provide foreign end-use or 

end-user information); (2) an end-user (for example, the requested 

equipment does not match the known requirements or current inventory of 

the foreign end-user); or (3) a shipment (for example, a private 

intermediary is involved in the export, particularly in sales involving major 

11Also, the Commerce Department licenses and monitors most dual-use items—those items 

with both civilian and military uses.

12Recipients of concern include governments, suppliers, individuals, and so forth, whose 

cases are suspicious prior to the issuance of an export license or have a need to establish 

proof of appropriate end-use.
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weapon systems, end-user, or shipper activities). In general, State 

Department officials, who specialize in certain commodities and have 

developed an institutional knowledge of firms and types of transactions 

that may be suspicious or in violation of U.S. export law, initiate “Blue 

Lantern” requests. These requests are generally used to verify end-users 

and are implemented by State and other officials at U.S. embassies.

DOD’s Monitoring Program A 1996 amendment to the Arms Export Control Act13 established a program 

that requires, to the extent practicable, monitoring of U.S. arms transfers 

by providing “reasonable assurance” that recipients comply with U.S. 

government export control requirements regarding the use, transfer, and 

security of defense articles and services. As a result of the amendment, 

DOD reviewed State’s “Blue Lantern” standards and determined that it had 

equivalent pre-delivery controls in place.

13Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act was added by section 150 of Public

Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1436), codified at 22 U.S.C. section 2785.
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DOD, however, concluded that additional standards were needed to 

monitor government-to-government transfers after their delivery. 

Consequently, DOD established five additional conditions to be used as 

standards for conducting post-delivery checks in its December 1996 

end-use monitoring guidance. The additional standards call for conducting 

post-delivery reviews when (1) there is an indication that a recipient 

country has violated section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act14 (for 

example, a retransfer of U.S.-provided defense items took place without 

U.S. government permission); (2) a recipient country develops substantial 

defense or other ties with countries whose interests are not compatible 

with those of the United States; (3) significant and unusual political or 

military upheaval is impending or has occurred in a recipient country;

(4) countries unfriendly to the United States in the recipient’s region are 

illicitly seeking U.S. equipment or support items of the type held by the 

end-user; or (5) substantial problems or weaknesses are found during a 

security survey of the recipient country conducted for a General Security of 

Military Information Agreement.15 The one condition that requires DOD to 

conduct a mandatory post-delivery check occurs when the State 

Department reports to Congress a possible end-use or transfer violation 

under section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act. If one or more of the five 

conditions are suspected to have occurred, then DOD’s Security Assistance 

Offices16 located at U.S. embassies overseas are to conduct a post-delivery 

check. 

14Under section 3, when the President (through the State Department) makes a 

determination that a possible end-use or retransfer violation may have occurred, he must 

then promptly provide a report to Congress. 22 U.S.C. section 2753(c)(2).

15To assure that the recipient government will protect classified military information in a 

manner equivalent to that provided by the United States itself, a General Security of Military 

Information Agreement is signed between the United States and the recipient country. 

16Security Assistance Offices are located at U.S. embassies overseas and are responsible for 

end-use monitoring of U.S.-origin defense equipment and services. Such offices include all 

DOD personnel located in a foreign country with responsibilities for administering security 

assistance management functions.
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Independent of these five standards, DOD through its Security Assistance 

Offices, conducts end-use checks of man-portable missile systems because 

DOD has a special requirement to monitor transfers of these systems.

Man-portable missile systems include Stinger missiles and are considered 

light weapons.17 In addition, the Security Assistance Offices conduct 

end-use checks of items transferred under the State Department’s 

International Narcotics Control Program. Such items include small arms 

and light weapons. 

Foreign Assistance Act 

Reporting Requirements

Under section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended,18 the 

Departments of State and Defense are to submit an annual report to 

Congress on the aggregate dollar value and quantity of all defense articles 

and services, and military education and training authorized by the United 

States to other countries. Prior to the enactment of a 1999 law, State’s 

reporting on direct commercial sales of conventional arms reflected only 

authorized exports, not actual shipments, whereas DOD provided actual 

delivery information on the sale, grant, or drawdown of such weapons to 

Congress. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2000 

and 200119 mandates that exporters now provide shipment information to 

the State Department for inclusion in its reports.

17According to DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, a worldwide baseline 

inventory, completed in December 1999, accounted for most, but not all, of the missiles and 

identified security concerns at some locations. DOD is investigating to reconcile these 

discrepancies.

1822 U.S.C. section 2415.

19The full name of the act is the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign 

Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, Public Law 106-113, App. G, 113 

Stat. 1501A-405.
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Arms Export Control Act 

Reporting Requirements

Under section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act, DOD is required to notify 

Congress about sales of major defense equipment,20 defense articles,21 or 

services22 to foreign countries and international organizations, when those 

sales exceed certain cost thresholds.23 Similarly, the State Department must 

notify Congress of any license to export major defense equipment, defense 

articles or services the cost of which exceeds established thresholds.24

Congressional notification requirements established under this section 

rarely capture small arms and light weapons transfers, as few have large 

enough dollar values to trigger the notification requirements. However, 

there are exceptions. When some transfers of small arms and light 

weapons, such as Tow and Stinger missile systems, fall within the range of 

the established notification dollar values, then Congress is notified of such 

transfers.

Under section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act, if the President (through 

the State Department) makes a determination that a possible end-use or 

transfer violation may have occurred, he must then provide a report to 

Congress. Between June 1975 and January 1999, 39 reports based on 

possible section 3 violations were provided to Congress, including 

7 involving small arms and light weapons. These seven reports cover eight 

small arms cases. In all eight cases, recipient countries failed to receive 

approval from the United States before transferring small arms-related 

defense articles to third parties. Of the eight cases, four provided an 

20The Arms Export Control Act defines “major defense equipment” as any item of significant 

military equipment on the U.S. Munitions List having a nonrecurring research and 

development cost of more than $50 million, or a total production cost of more than 

$200 million. 22 U.S.C. section 2794(6).

21The Arms Export Control Act defines “defense article” broadly as including weapons, 

weapons systems, munitions or other implements of war; items used for the purposes of 

making military sales; items necessary for manufacturing, producing, or using any defense 

article; and any component or part of any defense article described. 22 U.S.C. section 

2794(3).

22The Arms Export Control Act defines “defense service” as generally including any service, 

inspection, or technical or other assistance used for making military sales. 22 U.S.C. section 

2794(4).

23The cost thresholds are: for an offer to sell major defense equipment, $1 million, and 

before an offer for sale is made, $14 million. For defense articles or services, $50 million 

before an offer for sale is made. 22 U.S.C. section 2776(a) and (b)(1). 

24For licenses to export major defense equipment, $14 million; for defense articles or 

services, $50 million. 22 U.S.C. section 2776(c).
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explanation of how such violations were resolved, while the remaining four 

failed to indicate the final outcomes. 

Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Years 2000 and 2001—

Reporting Requirements

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 

mandates and requests additional reporting requirements for small arms 

and light weapons transfers and modifies current reporting on 

conventional weapons transfers. Specifically, the law requires the 

Secretary of State to submit a detailed report to Congress on various 

aspects of small arms proliferation by May 2000 and requests a report to 

Congress on the U.S. arms licensing process, including data on small arms 

licenses. To date, neither report has been submitted to Congress, but State 

has prepared a draft for the required report on small arms proliferation. 

Another provision of the law now requires exporters to report all shipment 

information to State for all items on the U.S. Munitions List (which include 

small arms and light weapons) 15 days after their export. Prior to the 

enactment of this law, State’s reporting on direct commercial sales 

reflected only authorized exports, not actual shipments of items on the 

munitions list, as did DOD’s reports to Congress. This new reporting 

provision is designed to address that problem. 

U.S. Initiative for 

Global Small Arms and 

Light Weapons 

Transfers

The United States has developed an initiative intended to help promote 

security in regions of conflict. This initiative includes efforts to reduce 

illicit sales of small arms and light weapons; to improve, among other 

factors, the legal transparency (openness) of sales; to establish diplomatic 

initiatives; and to provide resources for weapon destruction programs.

U.S. Initiative to Address 

Small Arms Transfers

The U.S. initiative on small arms and light weapons is intended to help 

promote security in regions of conflict and close down illicit arms markets. 

Accordingly, the executive branch approach encompasses a number of 

wide-ranging measures to address the illicit transfers of small arms to 

regions of conflict. The Chairman of the executive branch interagency 

working group on small arms and firearms issues25 summarized the U.S. 

government’s initiative as four overarching steps, including the following:

25This interagency working group consists of representatives from a number of U.S. 

government agencies, including the State Department, DOD, and the Treasury.
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• Creating international standards to control illicit trafficking in small 

arms. The Organization of American States’ 1997 Convention Against the 

Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms26 is designed to 

prevent, combat, and eradicate illicit trafficking in firearms, 

ammunition, and explosives in the Western Hemisphere. The United 

States played a leadership role in negotiating the convention, the first 

regional agreement to address the small arms issue. By the end of 

calendar year 2000, the United States hopes to have completed a global 

protocol that would build upon and globalize the standards set forth in 

the Organization of American States’ Convention. Examples of such 

standards include (1) establishing licensing regimes, where needed;

(2) developing common weapons marking and tracing practices; and 

(3) encouraging more transparent or open arms transfer practices.

• Establishing mechanisms to govern small arms transfers. The United 

States is encouraging other governments to strengthen export control 

procedures and enforcement for arms transfers and to comply with 

international arms moratoriums and embargoes. For instance, the 

United States wants other governments to be more transparent or open 

in monitoring and reporting their small arms exports so that baseline 

data can be collected to estimate small arms transfers worldwide. 

Another example is to have governments review all transfers and not 

approve transfers of weapons to conflict areas, such as the U.S. 

government does in the cases of Angola, the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.27

• Establishing diplomatic initiatives. The United States is working with 

multilateral organizations and other nations (such as the United 

Nations, the Organization of American States, the European Union, the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe, the Wassenaar Arrangement,28 various African 

regional organizations, and Norway) to help address the proliferation of 

26In November 1997, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States adopted 

the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 

Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials.

27In response to the problem of small arms trafficking in Africa, the United States also 

provided technical assistance to the small arms moratorium on the import, export, and 

manufacturing of small arms in West Africa.

28The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls and Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 

Goods and Technologies is comprised of 33 member states who seek, through their national 

policies, to ensure that arms transfers of these items do not contribute to the development 

or enhancement of military capabilities that undermine these goals.
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small arms. For example, in December 1999, the United States and the 

European Union released a statement of “common principles” in which 

they pledged to observe restraint in their export policies and harmonize 

their export policies and procedures governing small arms. Both agree 

that a comprehensive approach—incorporating law enforcement, arms 

control, and security—is needed to address the small arms issue and 

recognize the importance of effective national controls for arms 

brokering and transparency measures with regard to small arms 

transfers.

• Providing resources to help other countries destroy their excess 

weapons. According to State Department officials, providing such 

assistance can play an important role in securing peace in regions of 

conflict. To this end, the U.S. government has already provided experts 

and monies to destroy small arms and light weapons in Liberia, Haiti, 

and the former Yugoslavia. For example, in Liberia, the U.S. 

government, along with other nations, provided $300,000 to help destroy 

some 18,000 weapons, including light mortars, grenades, and 

ammunition. To assist other states in weapon destruction projects, the 

State Department has requested $4.8 million in funding as part of its 

budget request for fiscal year 2001, but the request has not yet been 

funded.

The Secretary of State has said that although the United States is 

undertaking these measures to address the availability of small arms and 

light weapons in regions of conflict, the international community must 

develop an integrated and comprehensive response.29 Consensus appears 

to be emerging within the international community over the causes and 

multifaceted impact of uncontrolled small arms and light weapons 

transfers and over responses needed, yet unresolved issues both at the 

domestic and international levels can hinder the achievement of U.S. goals. 

For example, government, nongovernment, and international sources have 

identified these problems:

29Remarks of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, made before the United Nations in 

September 1999.
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• Definitional disagreements make consensus difficult concerning which 

types of arms to control. Differences exist between the terms “small 

arms and light weapons” and “firearms.” The U.N. definition focuses on 

those weapons manufactured to military specifications and designed for 

personal use or use by several persons. The Organization of American 

States’ definition of “firearms” is broader and refers to any barreled 

weapons that will or is designed to or may be readily converted to expel 

a bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive. This distinction 

between small arms and firearms also exists within the U.S. 

government.30

• The unknown scope of both legal and illicit small arms transfers makes 

designing effective responses difficult. Only limited transparency or 

openness exists over legal transfers.31 According to government and 

nongovernment experts, increased openness is crucial for governments 

to monitor small arms exports and establish baseline estimates. 

• While the United States helped to negotiate the Organization of 

American States’ Convention, the first regional agreement to address the 

small arms and light weapons proliferation issue, the United States and 

other major signatories have not yet ratified the agreement.32 Progress in 

reaching future agreements also involves resolving differences among 

foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations concerning 

the degree of regulation required for small arms transfers. Some 

supplier nations, particularly China, Russia, certain Eastern European 

states, and the U.S. domestic firearms industry and sporting 

organizations, have expressed concerns that restrictions not be overly 

stringent. In contrast, countries such as Canada and Norway and 

nongovernmental organizations involved with humanitarian and arms 

control issues are concerned that proposed measures will not be 

stringent enough.

30While DOD has compiled a specific listing of items it defines as small arms and light 

weapons, the State Department and the U.S. law enforcement community (that is, the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) apply the broader definition of firearms.

31The United States publicly reports detailed information on its transfers of conventional 

arms that include small arms and light weapons, through the Departments of Defense and 

State. The governments of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, and the 

United Kingdom have begun providing limited data on their small arms shipments. 

32The President transmitted the Convention to the Senate in April 1998.
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Weapon Collection 

Programs’ Lessons 

There have been a number of weapon collection programs implemented in 

various countries. Table 1 contains a listing of weapon collection programs 

that have been conducted in other countries. These programs are viewed as 

a way in which governments, communities, and individuals can reduce 

illegal and surplus weapons. Through such collection efforts, individuals 

and groups are encouraged to turn in weapons, usually for noncash 

incentives or, sometimes, for money. Local and national governments, 

nongovernmental groups, international groups, and the U.S. military in a 

variety of situations, including U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa and 

Central America, and post-conflict situations in Panama and Haiti, have 

organized and conducted weapon collection programs. Judging the success 

of weapon collection programs is difficult and controversial because of the 

lack of knowledge about the total number of weapons available and the 

appropriate collection goal. According to State Department officials, 

experts involved with buyback programs admit that while such programs 

have symbolic value, they are not an especially effective or robust means of 

recovering weapons. Nevertheless, countries believe that the symbolic 

aspect of weapon buyback programs warrants their continuation.

Table 1: Examples of Weapon Collection Programs Conducted in Other Countries, 1995-99

Country Sponsor Date Incentives offered Weapons collected

Russia Tatar government September 1995 Cash No information available

Philippines Philippine Army April 1996 Cash 81 high-powered war 

materials

Iran Iranian government September 1996 New firearms permits 200,000 unregistered 

weapons

Lesotho Lesotho government October 1996 Amnesty No information available

Colombia Colombian government December 1996 Food vouchers 250 weapons

Taiwan Taiwanese police February 1997 Amnesty 780 weapons

Croatia United Nations 

peacekeepers

February 1997 Cash 100,400 rifles; 253,000 

antitank launchers; 6,271 

grenades 

Myanmar Myanmar government February 1997 Amnesty Over 400 small and heavy 

weapons

Mozambique Christian Council of 

Mozambique

March 1997 Goods and tools 800 guns and 24,000 

armaments

El Salvador Patriotic Movement 

Against Crime

March 1997 (Second 

phase of program started 

in 1996)

Vouchers redeemable for 

goods and food

Over 3,000 in 1996; Over 

2,000 weapons in 1997
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Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

Sources: GAO summary of information obtained from the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 

the Institute for Security Studies, the United Nations, the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, and 

the British American Security Information Council.

Dominican Republic Dominican government April 1997 Amnesty No information available

Croatia − Eastern 

Slovenia

United Nations 

Transnational 

Administration in Eastern 

Slovenia

August 1997 Cash 7,963 rifles and machine 

guns; 1,922 antitank 

rocket launchers, 

cannons, and surface-toair missile launchers

Albania Albanian government August−September 1997 Amnesty Over 5,000 weapons; 

3,289 grenades

Australia Australian government September 1997 Cash 600,000 firearms

Central African Republic Central African Republic 

government

October 1997 Amnesty 1,372 light and heavy 

weapons

El Salvador Patriotic Movement 

Against Delinquency with 

assistance from the 

Organization of American 

States

February 1998 

(continuation of program 

started in 1996)

Food coupons Since 1996, 6,634 arms 

including pistols, rifles, 

and explosives collected 

Nicaragua Nicaraguan government 

with support from France, 

Canada, and Sweden

April 1998 Land No information available

Albania United Nations January 1999 Development projects 6,000 small arms; 100 

tons of ammunition

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country Sponsor Date Incentives offered Weapons collected
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Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

Lessons Derived From 

Weapon Collection 

Programs

Experts from a variety of nongovernmental and international 

organizations33 who have implemented and studied weapon collection 

programs in various countries have identified a number of lessons that 

could be learned from their experiences. For example, case studies of 

weapon collection programs demonstrate that a comprehensive approach, 

one that considers multiple factors (such as the economic, social, and 

cultural background of the area), and employs a number of key tasks such 

as (1) determining appropriate incentives and (2) establishing program 

goals and objectives tailored to the specific case, is essential. The experts 

who have studied weapon collection programs have concluded that, 

without such a comprehensive approach, weapon collection programs 

could encounter problems that might otherwise be avoided. These lessons 

have been compiled in a guide for small arms and light weapons collection, 

entitled Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Practical Guide for 

Collection and Destruction.34 Table 2 summarizes 14 key tasks that these 

experts have concluded need to be considered when setting up a weapon 

collection program.

Table 2: 14 Key Tasks for Implementing Weapon Collection Programs

33Our sources include experts from the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, the 

Institute for Security Studies, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the United 

Nations, and the British American Security Information Council.

34This is a joint publication of the Program on Security and Development at the Monterey 

Institute of International Studies and the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 

February 2000.

Task Description

Conducting a feasibility assessment The current economic, social, psychological, and cultural conditions in which weapons will 

be exchanged need to be assessed to determine whether it is feasible to implement a 

weapon collection program. Consideration should be given to factors such as community 

demographics, economic factors, levels of crime and violence, quality of law enforcement 

and judicial systems, the specific types of weapons causing the problem and the sources of 

supply, and the laws that govern the possession and use of small arms.

Establishing program goals and objectives Realistic goals must be established at the outset so everyone is clear as to the objectives 

and for evaluation of the project. Selecting program objectives can be affected by several 

factors. First, various parties may agree to support the program in pursuit of different 

objectives. Second, objectives that participants say they are pursuing may be quite different 

from what they really hope to achieve. Third, objectives may be directly or indirectly related 

to weapons collection. 
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Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

Integrating the weapon collection program 

with other programs

To increase the likelihood that the program will accomplish its primary goals and objectives, 

they should be integrated and coordinated with other programs that address not only 

reducing the number and visibility of weapons but also the larger aims of human security 

and development.

Choosing appropriate incentives One of the keys to a successful weapon collection program is providing the appropriate 

incentives for those citizens who will voluntarily turn in their weapons. They must be 

incentives that do not detract from the program’s goals or create additional problems. 

Examples include vouchers for food, clothing, and other goods needed by the population; 

tools for trades or agriculture; and cash.

Organizing a weapon collection program A weapon collection program can be organized in any number of ways, including (1) local 

government in collaboration with local civil society groups including the private sector; (2) 

local civil society groups with the assistance of local and/or national governments, especially 

the police or military to receive and destroy weapons; and (3) national government in 

collaboration with civil society groups- local, national, or international.

Considering legal factors It is necessary to understand the current laws and regulations in the area where the weapon 

collection program is to be conducted. In some countries or provinces, providing an amnesty 

requires amending existing statutes or even constitutions. In others, carrying firearms in 

public may be prohibited, and regulations must be amended or suspended to allow people to 

participate in the program.

Establishing the types of weapons to be 

collected

Based on the feasibility assessment and program objectives, planners must decide which 

types of weapons can and should be turned in. Factors to be considered are the weapons’ 

lethality or destructiveness, their perceived proliferation or pervasiveness, the risk of 

improper use or harm to untargeted people or objects, and the specific individuals or groups 

that are supposed to hand in weaponry.

Obtaining funding and support Weapon collection programs are most likely to succeed when they enjoy strong support 

across the political spectrum. Depending on the size, scale, and geographic scope of a 

specific program, resources are needed for compensating staff; renting facilities; arranging 

transportation, incentives, publicity, and promotion; and providing storage. In many cases, 

resources are obtained from a mix of cash and material contributions or offset by volunteers.

Selecting an appropriate location A clear delineation of the area of the weapon collection program is critical. Making clear who

is in charge and who is eligible to participate will avoid problems of intermediaries and 

weapons traders coming to the program from outside the community. The site for a program 

should most often be a location other than a military base or police station. Especially in 

communities where the police are not trusted and/or for those programs that hope to collect 

illegal weapons, alternate venues are preferable. 

Determining the length and timing The duration of a weapon collection program is dependent on many factors, including the 

amount of funds raised, the size of the program, the expectations of organizers, and the 

logistical realities. Programs can range from 1 day to 1 year or more. Sometimes these 

programs are annual events. Timing is important, because most weapon collection 

programs occurred in post-conflict situations such as in Haiti and Panama or after a 

shocking incident involving the use of weapons. There should be a clear deadline.

Attracting publicity Publicity is key to maximizing the number of participants and therefore the number and types 

of weapons turned in. This is especially true for programs in which one of the primary 

objectives is to increase awareness regarding gun violence and mishaps due to improperly 

stored or secured firearms in the home. All types of media-print, television, radio, and 

Internet (if existing and appropriate) - should be utilized, with the focus on that forum to 

which the majority of the people in the community have access. 

(Continued From Previous Page)

Task Description
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Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

Source: Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Practical Guide for Collection and Destruction 

(Program on Security and Development by the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the 

Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Feb. 2000).

DOD Weapon Collection 

Programs in Panama and 

Haiti 

DOD, through the U.S. Army, has conducted weapon collection programs in 

Panama and Haiti. During Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989 and 

1990, the U.S. Army used a “money for weapons” incentive designed to 

affect the confiscation of unauthorized weapons. Over 10,000 rifles, 

shotguns, pistols, and grenades were turned in at a cost of over $1 million. 

According to army after-action reports, however, commanders in the field 

believed the buyback program had limited success because the local 

civilian population was already turning in large numbers of weapons before 

the program went into effect. Afterwards, the local population turned in a 

few weapons at a time in order to collect more reward money. 

Commanders also felt that many of the weapons turned in were not the 

type of weapons that they were seeking. The after-action report on the 

Panama operation recommended that in future weapon collection efforts, 

more consideration should be given to whether a money for weapons 

program is actually feasible.

The U.S. Army’s experience in Haiti was similar to its experience in 

Panama. U.S. Army commanders who were involved with the planning and 

execution of the gun buyback program during the 1994-95 Operation 

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti told us that the program was ineffective. 

The goals of the program were to (1) reduce the number of weapons, 

(2) promote stability, and (3) provide monetary incentives to Haitian 

citizens who supported the program. According to the after-action report 

on the Haiti operation, a total of 9,915 items, including 3,389 weapons, were 

Developing weapon turn-in procedures Even when the types of weapons to be accepted in a particular program are established, 

care should be taken to make sure that all weapons are operable and unloaded. Even in the 

case of amnesty and anonymity, serial numbers should be recorded before destruction. A 

qualified technical person should be present at all times.

Establishing destruction plans and process In many instances, weapon collection programs include a destruction component to dispose 

of the weapons collected. This can be done to prevent the weapons turned in from 

recirculating and to provide evidence of this to the program participants and collaborators. A 

program can handle the destruction of weapons in a variety of ways. In all cases, the 

weapon should be documented as to type, serial number, condition, etc.

Evaluating the program By their nature, weapon collection programs are very high profile and can be controversial. 

The citizens of the community, the governments involved, and the sponsors and funders will 

all demand to know the results of the program. Therefore, the evaluation component of the 

program must be part of the initial plan. In this section of the plan, documentation is 

developed for both auditing and evaluation purposes. 

(Continued From Previous Page)

Task Description
B-285207

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

purchased by the United States at a total cost of $1.8 million. U.S. Army 

commanders have said the program was a “dismal failure” in reducing the 

number of weapons and achieving a secure and stable environment. The 

weapons turned in were old and unusable and not the type of weapons that 

could be used against U.S. and other multinational forces. U.S. Army 

commanders have identified several sources for the shortfalls in the 

program. First, there were no initial goals for the number of arms to collect. 

Second, while information provided by higher headquarters indicated there 

were large numbers of weapons in the military and civilian population, 

such a level of weapons was not seen. Finally, no assessment of the social, 

cultural, and political environment was done prior to the inception of the 

buyback program. According to U.S. Army commanders, a weapon 

buyback effort should be considered only after the ground commander 

does such an assessment to determine the program’s feasibility or is 

provided reliable current assessments from higher headquarters. They 

suggested that a 30- to 60-day evaluation period would be appropriate to 

determine whether a weapon buyback program would be viable. 

Use of Lessons by DOD DOD has recognized the need to incorporate lessons it has identified into 

its weapon collection or buyback programs. U.S. Army commanders and 

other Army officials who were involved with weapon collection programs 

in Panama and Haiti concluded that a comprehensive approach looking at a 

variety of economic, social, and cultural factors is needed for the conduct 

of a successful weapon collection program. Specific factors the 

commanders and officials identified to help assure a successful weapon 

collection program include (1) conducting a feasibility assessment,

(2) setting realistic goals for each program, and (3) providing appropriate 

incentives. Current U.S. military doctrine or field manuals provide no 

guidance in this area. The U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned proposed 

that doctrine and procedures be incorporated into DOD guidance for 

weapon collection programs; however, DOD has no immediate plans to do 

so.

Conclusion Current U.S. military doctrine and field manuals provide no guidance on 

conducting weapon collection programs. Based on the experiences of the 

U.S. Army in conducting buyback programs in Panama and Haiti and the 

studies conducted of weapon collection programs worldwide, DOD lacks 

procedures for conducting such programs in post-conflict areas.
B-285207

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

Recommendation To more effectively conduct weapon collection programs in the future, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that guidance, based on a 

comprehensive assessment and approach, be developed for implementing 

weapon collection programs.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency of the Department of Defense generally agreed with 

the report’s content and recommendation. The agency stated it would 

examine the requirement for involvement in weapon collection programs 

and promulgate guidance as appropriate. The Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, also 

provided written comments and generally agreed with the contents of the 

report. Department of Defense and State written comments are reprinted in 

their entirety as appendixes III and IV, respectively. The Department of the 

Treasury chose not to provide comments on the report. The Customs 

Service, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State provided 

technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees and the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the 

Honorable Madeline K. Albright, Secretary of State; the Honorable 

Lawrence H. Summers, Secretary of the Treasury; and Raymond W. Kelly, 

Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service. Copies will be made available 

to others upon request.

If you have any questions concerning this report, please call me at 

(202) 512-4128 or Boris L. Kachura, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-3161. 

Sincerely yours,

Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

Appendix I

U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers, 

Fiscal Years 1996-98 ApendxiI

For fiscal years 1996 through 1998, the United States authorized or 

delivered1

 $3.7 billion in small arms and light weapons to 154 nations 

through direct commercial sales, foreign military sales, or other transfers, 

including grants and drawdowns. Consistent with its arms policy, the 

United States transferred most of these items to its friends and allies 

including Egypt, Germany, Israel, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and the 

United Kingdom. Such small arms and light weapons transfers ranged from 

ammunition and small caliber handguns to machine guns and Stinger 

missiles. Figure 1 shows the dollar values for direct commercial sales and 

foreign military sales, including grants and drawdowns, of small arms and 

light weapons for fiscal years 1996-98. Tables 3 illustrates the top 25 

recipient countries (based on the dollar value) of U.S. small arms and light 

weapons transfers (authorized direct commercial sales and delivered 

foreign military sales combined) for fiscal years 1996-98. 

Figure 1: Dollar Value of U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons Authorized or 

Delivered for Fiscal Years 1996-98

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO summary and analysis of data provided by the Departments of Defense and State.

1

Authorized refers to the approved licenses for direct commercial sales approved by the 

State Department and delivered refers to the actual deliveries provided by the Defense 

Department through foreign military sales. As discussed earlier in the report, the Foreign 

Relations and Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 addresses this reporting 

difference between the Departments by mandating that exporters now provide actual 

shipment information to the Department of State.
Appendix I

U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons 

Transfers, Fiscal Years 1996-98

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

Table 3: Top 25 Recipients of U.S. Small Arms and Light Weapons Authorized or Delivered for Fiscal Years 1996-98

Source: GAO summary and analysis of data provided by the Departments of Defense and State.

Recipient country Total

Authorized direct

commercial sales

Delivered foreign

military sales

Japan $621,377,579 $621,377,579 0

United Kingdom 548,267,268 548,201,182 $66,086

Israel 257,053,723 234,983,364 22,070,359

Germany 247,643,469 247,387,806 255,663

Saudi Arabia 167,679,235 154,967,890 12,711,345

Norway 122,101,526 122,101,526 0

Sweden 105,013,927 105,013,927 0

Taiwan 100,158,877 68,818,003 31,340,874

Belgium 96,580,420 96,580,420 0

Egypt 90,073,176 33,607,413 56,465,763

Australia 84,573,761 84,548,707 25,054

Switzerland 81,398,677 81,398,677 0

Venezuela 76,311,076 76,311,076 0

South Korea 73,163,814 73,142,502 21,312

France 70,382,532 70,382,532 0

Italy 70,036,440 69,843,769 192,671

Philippines 68,535,982 66,353,287 2,182,695

Thailand 64,224,312 61,065,684 3,158,628

Turkey 59,746,809 52,349,950 7,396,859

Netherlands 58,447,275 52,780,257 5,667,018

Mexico 48,749,506 48,749,506 0

Spain 47,858,498 46,652,154 1,206,344

Argentina 47,065,049 47,028,839 36,210

Greece 41,260,888 34,086,501 7,174,387

Brazil 33,487,195 26,461,544 7,025,651
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

Appendix II

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApendxiI

At the request of Senator Diane Feinstein, we obtained information on 

(1) U.S. government monitoring and reporting policies regarding small 

arms and light weapons transfers, (2) the steps the U.S. government is 

taking at the international level to address the availability of small arms and 

light weapons, and (3) lessons identified regarding weapon collection 

programs.

To obtain information on how the U.S. government monitors small arms 

and light weapons transfers, we reviewed legislation, including the Foreign 

Assistance Act, Arms Export Control Act, and applicable U.S. regulations 

and guidance. We interviewed officials from the Department of the 

Treasury, including the U.S. Customs Service, and visited the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms’ Gun Tracing Center in West Virginia. We 

met with officials and obtained documents from the Department of State, 

specifically the Office of Defense Trade Controls that implements State’s 

“Blue Lantern” end-use monitoring program. Specifically, we obtained data 

on pre- and post-delivery checks for small arms and light weapons transfers 

conducted under the Blue Lantern program for fiscal years 1997-99. We also 

met with officials and obtained documents from the Defense Department’s 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which is responsible for the 

Department’s end-use monitoring program. Through the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency, we queried Security Assistance Offices at 22 U.S. 

posts overseas via the Internet to obtain information on the extent of their 

end-use monitoring activities and procedures for government to 

government transfers of small arms and light weapons. Specifically, we 

contacted the posts in Bolivia, Brazil, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, 

Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 

Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, the Netherlands, Oman, Switzerland, Taiwan, 

Thailand, and Turkey. We selected the posts in those countries that were 

the recipients of U.S. small arms and light weapons transfers for fiscal 

years 1996-98. We received written responses from all of the posts 

contacted except for Morocco.

To identify executive branch reporting requirements for small arms and 

light weapons, we reviewed legislation including the Foreign Assistance 

Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and the Foreign Relations Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001. We obtained and reviewed various 

documents, including reports and notification letters from the State 

Department and the Department of Defense that are required under the 

Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. For fiscal years 

1996 through 1998, we compiled our own database for U.S. transfers 

(authorized and delivered) of small arms and light weapons based on State 
Appendix II

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

and Department of Defense reports, required under section 655 of the 

Foreign Assistance Act, and other documents. In compiling the database of 

U.S. small arms and light weapons transfers, we defined small arms and 

light weapons primarily based on the United Nations’ definition. State and 

Defense officials, however, provided us with separate, detailed lists of 

those items that each defines as small arms and light weapons. 

To determine what is known about the extent of small arms and light 

weapons transfers and the steps the U.S. government is taking to address 

such transfers, we met with and acquired information from various 

international, governmental, and nongovernmental officials from the 

United Nations; the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the 

Central Intelligence Agency; the Federation of American Scientists; Human 

Rights Watch; the British American Security Information Council; the 

Monterey Institute of International Studies; the International Peace 

Research Institute; the Institute for Research on Small Arms in 

International Security; and representatives of the firearms industry and 

lobby. We also attended periodic meetings between the State Department 

and the nongovernmental organizations on the issue of small arms and light 

weapons transfers and U.S. efforts to address the issue. To obtain 

information on the extent of small arms and light weapons transfers 

worldwide, we obtained and reviewed documents from the Bonn 

International Centre for Conversion, the International Action Network on 

Small Arms, the Norwegian Initiative on Arms Transfers, the Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institute, the Institute for Security Studies, 

and the Red Cross. We also interviewed officials and collected information 

on U.S. efforts to address small arms transfers from the Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs, and the Interagency Working Group on Small Arms 

and Light Weapons within the State Department; and the Treasury 

Department, including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and 

the U.S. Customs Service.

To obtain information on “lessons learned” regarding weapon collection 

and “buyback” programs, we focused on (1) reviewing numerous written 

studies on weapon collection programs conducted in other countries and in 

the United States, (2) meeting with and interviewing acknowledged experts 

in the area, and (3) acquiring information from knowledge centers on the 

issue. We met with and interviewed officials from the National Defense 

University and the Departments of Defense and State. We attended a 

September 1999 conference on the policies and practices of small arms and 

light weapons disarmament sponsored by the Fafo Institute of Applied 
Appendix II

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

Social Science, in Montreal, Canada. At this conference, we met with and 

interviewed experts involved with weapon collection efforts in 

Mozambique, El Salvador, Albania, and Sierra Leone. We also traveled to 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to meet with U.S. Army Special Operation 

Command officers who were involved with the U.S. buyback programs in 

Haiti. In addition, we spoke with officials from the U.S. Army Civil Affairs 

and Psychological Command at Fort Bragg and the Center for Lessons 

Learned and the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. We also reviewed 

written after-action and historical reports on Operation JUST CAUSE in 

Panama and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. 

We performed our work from January 1999 through May 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-00-141 Conventional Arms Transfers

Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of State ApendxiIV

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