a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

June 2007 UNITED NATIONS 

ORGANIZATIONS

Oversight and 

Accountability Could 

Be Strengthened by 

Further Instituting 

International Best 

Practices

GAO-07-597
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2007

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS 

Oversight and Accountability Could Be 

Strengthened by Further Instituting 

International Best Practices 

Highlights of GAO-07-597, a report to 

congressional committees 

Since 2005, the United Nations 

(UN) has been attempting to

reform its management processes,

in part to help ensure that 

resources are used effectively and 

efficiently. Some of these reforms 

focus on improving oversight and 

accountability at the United 

Nations. In this report, GAO 

examines the extent to which 

selected UN organizations’ 

(1) internal audit offices have 

implemented professional 

standards for performing audits 

and investigations, (2) evaluation 

offices have implemented UN

evaluation standards, and 

(3) governing bodies are provided 

with information about the results

of UN oversight practices. GAO 

obtained and analyzed 

international standards and 

relevant documents from six of the 

largest UN organizations, and also 

met with U.S. and UN officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the

Secretary of State direct the U.S. 

Missions to work with member

states to improve oversight in UN

organizations by (1) making audit 

reports available to the governing

bodies and (2) establishing 

independent audit committees that 

are accountable to their governing 

bodies. GAO received written 

comments from State, FAO, UNDP, 

WFP, and WHO indicating that they

generally agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations. However, ILO

and UNICEF expressed concerns

about implementing GAO’s 

recommendations. 

Although the six UN internal audit offices that GAO reviewed have made 

progress in implementing international auditing standards, they have not 

fully implemented key components of the standards. The organizations lack 

completed organizationwide risk-management frameworks, which are 

essential in identifying the areas with the greatest vulnerability to fraud, 

waste, and abuse. In addition, three audit offices lack sufficient staff to cover

high-risk areas of the organization. Furthermore, some of the audit offices 

have not fully implemented quality assurance processes, which include 

activities such as external peer reviews. Some of the organizations also do 

not have professional investigators to probe allegations of wrongdoing. 

While the six UN evaluation offices that GAO reviewed are working toward 

implementation of UN evaluation standards, they have not fully implemented 

them. Most of the evaluation offices lack sufficient resources and

appropriate expertise to manage and conduct evaluations, especially at the 

country level. This has impacted their ability to conduct high-quality and 

strategically important evaluations. In addition, most of the evaluation 

offices have not fully implemented quality assurance processes relating to 

areas such as evaluation methodology, scope, evidence, and findings. 

Furthermore, all of the evaluation offices are working toward fully 

establishing mechanisms that systematically follow up and report on the 

status of their recommendations. 

 

The governing bodies responsible for oversight of the six UN organizations 

that GAO reviewed lack full access to internal audit reports and most lack 

direct information from the audit offices about the sufficiency of their 

resources and capacity to conduct their work, which could provide greater 

insights into the organizations’ operations and identify critical systemic

weaknesses. In addition, with one exception, the organizations’ audit 

committees that GAO examined are generally not accountable to their 

governing bodies, and some are composed of senior management officials. 

Differences in UN Organizations’ and IIA’s Best Practices Accountability Structures 

Source: GAO analysis of UN data and Institute of Internal Auditors’ guidance.

Accountability relationship Accountability relationship of audit committee Information provided

Governing 

body

Member 

states

Senior

management

Senior

management

Audit 

committee

Internal 

audit office

External 

auditor

Governing 

body

Member 

states

Audit 

committee

Internal 

audit office

External 

auditor

UN organizations’ accountability structure: most 

audit committees report to senior management

External to UN organization

organization

IIA’s best practice accountability structure: audit 

committee reports to governing body

External to UN organization

organization

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-597.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Thomas Melito 

at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 7

UN Internal Audit Offices Have Not Fully Implemented Key 

Components of International Auditing Standards 14

UN Evaluation Offices Have Not Fully Implemented UN Evaluation 

Standards 29

Governing Bodies Lack Full Access to Information That Could 

Provide Greater Insights into UN Organizations’ Operations and 

Identify Critical Systemic Weaknesses 39

Conclusions 50

Recommendations for Executive Action 50

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 51

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 55

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 60

Appendix III: Comments from the Food and Agriculture Organization 64

Appendix IV: Comments from the World Food Program 67

GAO Comment 69

Appendix V: Comments from the World Health Organization 70

GAO Comments 72

Appendix VI: Comments from the International Labor Organization 73

GAO Comments 76

Appendix VII: Comments from the United Nations Development Program 78

Appendix VIII: Comments from the United Nations Children’s Fund 79

GAO Comments 81

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 83

Related GAO Products 84

Figures Figure 1: Governance Structure of Selected UN Funds and 

Programs and Specialized Agencies 10

Figure 2: Internal and External Oversight Structure of Selected UN 

Funds and Programs and Specialized Agencies 12
Contents

Page ii GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Figure 3: Selected UN Funds’ and Programs’ and Specialized 

Agencies’ Progress toward Implementing International 

Auditing Standards 15

Figure 4: Selected UN Funds’ and Programs’ and Specialized 

Agencies’ Progress toward Ensuring Sufficient Resources 

to Perform Investigations 25

Figure 5: Selected UN Funds’ and Programs’ and Specialized 

Agencies’ Progress toward Implementing Financial 

Disclosure and Whistleblower Protection Policies 28

Figure 6: Selected UN Funds’ and Programs’ and Specialized 

Agencies’ Progress toward Implementing UNEG 

Standards and Norms 30

Figure 7: Audit Committee Purpose, Membership, and 

Responsibilities According to Best Practices 44

Figure 8: Differences between Current Practice for Most of the UN 

Organizations and IIA’s Best Practice Accountability 

Structure for Audit Committees 46

Figure 9: Audit Committees at the Six UN Organizations That We 

Examined 48
Contents

Page iii GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Abbreviations

ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and 

Performance in Humanitarian Action

BOA Board of Auditors

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

IIA Institute of Internal Auditors

ILO International Labor Organization

IT information technology

JIU Joint Inspection Unit

OECD/DAC Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/

Development Assistance Committee

OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services

PBAC Program, Budget and Administration Committee

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNEG United Nations Evaluation Group

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

WFP World Food Program

WHO World Health Organization

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

June 18, 2007 Letr

The Honorable Norm Coleman

Ranking Member

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

Member states contribute billions of dollars annually to the United Nations 

(UN) system1

 for programs that meet emergency humanitarian needs, 

provide development assistance, and support economic and social 

development in over 190 countries. To direct these programs, member 

states have created governing bodies in each UN organization to develop 

governance practices for maintaining the strategic direction of the 

organization, overseeing the effective and efficient use of resources, and 

monitoring the actions of management and operations. The UN system 

generally has both internal and external accountability and oversight 

mechanisms. Internal oversight functions include reviewing the 

effectiveness and efficiency of the organizations’ operations, evaluating the 

organizations’ compliance with UN financial rules and regulations, 

conducting investigations on allegations of misconduct, and reporting to 

the executive heads of the organizations. External oversight functions 

generally report to the organizations’ governing bodies on the 

organizations’ finances and also may perform nonfinancial reviews of the 

efficiency and effectiveness of the organizations’ operations. 

1

The UN system is composed of the main Secretariat and separately administered funds and 

programs and specialized agencies. For example, funds and programs include the United 

Nations Children’s Fund and the United Nations Development Program, which have 

executive boards and executive heads but are under the authority of the UN SecretaryGeneral. In contrast, specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, 

have their own governing bodies and executive heads and are not under the authority of the 

Secretary-General. The agencies, which are legally independent international organizations 

with their own rules, membership, organs, and financial resources, were brought into 

relationship with the United Nations through negotiated agreements.
Page 2 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

As the largest financial contributor to the United Nations, the United States 

has advocated comprehensive management reform of the UN system, 

including measures to strengthen governance and improve oversight. Also, 

over the past 2 years, member states and independent experts have 

proposed management reforms that call for sustained action to strengthen 

accountability and transparency in the UN system by improving UN 

oversight practices. As such, several management reforms and proposals 

have focused on improving the effectiveness and increasing the capacity 

and independence of the oversight function at the United Nations. 

In 2005, representatives of UN member states identified an urgent need to 

improve UN management processes and requested that the UN 

Secretariat’s Secretary-General and General Assembly propose and 

approve reforms for strengthening the organization in several areas, 

including accountability and oversight. For example, at the 2005 World 

Summit, the General Assembly requested a comprehensive independent 

review of the Secretariat’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) 

with a view toward strengthening that office, as well as a systemwide 

review of UN governance and oversight.2

 While these reforms have focused 

primarily on the Secretariat, they serve as a model for UN systemwide 

reforms to help ensure that resources are used effectively and efficiently. 

However, in 2006, we reported to Congress that progress toward 

implementation of reforms, including those relating to strengthening 

oversight, has been slow.3

In this report, we examine the extent to which (1) internal audit offices 

have implemented professional standards for performing audits and 

investigations, (2) evaluation offices have implemented UN evaluation 

standards, and (3) governing bodies are provided with information about 

the results of UN oversight practices. The scope of our work includes the 

internal audit and evaluation offices at the three largest UN funds and 

programs—the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United 

2

We reported in 2006 that UN funding arrangements constrain OIOS’s ability to operate 

independently and recommended that reliable funding arrangements that do not undermine 

the independence of the office be made. See GAO, United Nations: Funding Arrangements 

Impede Independence of Internal Auditors, GAO-06-575 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006).

3

GAO, United Nations: Management Reforms Progressing Slowly with Many Awaiting 

General Assembly Review, GAO-07-14 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5, 2006).
Page 3 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Program (WFP);4

and three of the largest UN specialized agencies—the Food and Agriculture 

Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the 

World Health Organization (WHO). In most of the organizations that we 

studied, the investigations function was part of the internal audit office.

To complete this study, we analyzed UN documents and processes and 

practices relating to the audit, investigation, and evaluation functions of the 

six UN organizations we examined. We reviewed professional standards, 

guidelines, and best practices for performing audits, investigations, and 

evaluations, including the Institute of Internal Auditors’ (IIA) International 

Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing,5

 the UN 

Uniform Guidelines for Investigations, and the UN Evaluation Group 

(UNEG) standards and norms.6

 The six UN organizations we examined 

have adopted these standards, norms, and guidelines. For the purposes of 

our study, we selected key audit standards to examine the extent to which 

these organizations have implemented IIA standards. To examine the 

extent to which the organizations have implemented UNEG standards and 

norms, we selected those standards and norms to match the key audit 

standards to the extent possible. We also compared current governance 

structures at the six organizations with IIA guidance on the use of audit 

committees. We interviewed UN officials and staff with governance and 

oversight responsibilities and members of the internal audit committees 

and the external auditors for each organization. Finally, we interviewed 

officials from the U.S. Departments of State (State), Labor, and Health and 

Human Services; the U.S. Agency for International Development; and 

32 UN member state representatives. Appendix I contains more details on 

our scope and methodology. We conducted our work in Washington, D.C.; 

New York; Geneva; and Rome. We performed our work between June 2006 

4

WFP is a subsidiary of both the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization.

5

IIA is recognized as the internal audit profession’s leader in certification, education, 

research, and technological guidance. IIA provides comprehensive guidance for internal 

auditing through its Professional Practice Framework, including the International 

Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, which outlines the tenets of 

the internal audit profession and the Role of Auditing in Public Sector Governance that 

defines key elements needed to maximize public sector audit activity.

6

UNEG is a group of professional practioners. UNEG adopted standards and norms in 2005 

to professionalize the evaluation function, provide guidance to evaluation offices in 

preparing their evaluation policies or other aspects of their operations, as well as to guide 

the establishment of the institutional framework, management of the evaluation function, 

and the conduct and use of evaluations. 
Page 4 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

and March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

Results in Brief Although the six UN internal audit offices that we reviewed have made 

progress in implementing international auditing standards, they have not 

fully implemented key components of the standards, such as basing annual 

work plans on organizationwide risk-management frameworks and 

obtaining the necessary resources to conduct their work. All of the audit 

offices are at various stages of developing and implementing their own riskbased work plans, but the offices are doing so without the benefit of 

completed organizationwide risk-management frameworks, which are 

essential in identifying the areas with the greatest vulnerability to fraud, 

waste, and abuse. In addition, three of the six UN audit offices lack 

sufficient staff to cover high-risk areas of the organizations. Furthermore, 

three of the audit offices have not fully implemented quality assurance 

processes, which include activities such as internal and external peer 

reviews. For example, ILO has not had an external peer review, but it plans 

to have one this year for the first time. All audit offices have a tracking and 

follow-up system for recommendations to ensure that senior management 

is addressing deficiencies identified by internal and external auditors, and 

some offices have undertaken efforts to strengthen their follow-up 

processes. In addition, three of the organizations currently do not have 

professional investigators and rely heavily on auditors to probe allegations 

of wrongdoing, which is a practice that could impact the organizations’ 

ability to provide adequate audit coverage and ensure that investigations 

are properly carried out. While most of the organizations are in various 

stages of considering and implementing ethics policies, none have adopted 

financial disclosure requirements for their oversight staff to monitor 

potential conflicts of interest.

Although the six UN evaluation offices that we reviewed are working 

toward implementation of UN evaluation standards and norms, such as 

resource adequacy and quality assurance processes, they have not fully 

implemented them. Five of the evaluation offices reported that they lack 

sufficient resources and staff with expertise to manage and conduct 

evaluations—conditions that have impacted their ability to conduct highquality and strategically important evaluations. For example, UNICEF 

reported that about two-thirds of its country offices do not have sufficient 

staff with the requisite skills to consistently deliver high-quality 

evaluations. In addition, five of the evaluation offices have not fully 

implemented quality assurance processes relating to evaluation staff 
Page 5 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

selection, design, and reporting. Specifically, they have identified 

weaknesses in areas such as evaluation methodology, scope, evidence, and 

findings. Furthermore, all of the evaluation offices are working toward fully 

establishing mechanisms that systematically follow up and report on the 

status of their recommendations, to provide assurance to senior 

management that steps are being taken to address identified weaknesses in 

their programs. 

The governing bodies responsible for oversight and accountability of the 

resources of the six UN organizations that we reviewed lack full access to 

internal audit reports and most lack direct information from the internal 

audit offices about the sufficiency of their resources and capacity to 

conduct their work, which could provide greater insights into the 

organizations’ operations and identify critical systemic weaknesses. In 

addition, although most of the organizations have audit committees that 

review internal audit activities and report to the heads of the organizations, 

only WHO has an audit committee that is autonomous of senior 

management and is part of the governing body. To carry out some of their 

oversight responsibilities, UN governing bodies are provided with the 

external auditor’s report on the organization’s financial statements as well 

as the internal audit office’s summary of internal audit activities. However, 

the governing bodies do not have full access to internal audit reports—

including those that identify systemic weaknesses in internal controls and 

cases of fraud, waste, and mismanagement—and the management 

response letter to audit reports, which includes senior management’s plans 

for taking correction action. Also, most of the governing bodies lack direct 

information from the internal audit offices on the sufficiency of the audit 

offices’ staffing and financial resources as well as the audit offices’ capacity 

for conducting effective oversight. International best practices suggest that 

oversight could be strengthened by establishing an independent audit 

committee—composed of members external to the management of the 

organization and reporting to the governing body on the effectiveness of 

the audit office and on the adequacy of its resources—as part of the 

governance structure of each of the United Nations’ governing bodies. 

However, the audit committees at four of the six UN organizations that we 

examined are not in line with these international best practices, and one 

entity does not have an audit committee. Four of the five audit committees 

are not accountable to their governing bodies, and three of these 

committees are composed of senior management officials. An audit 

committee that is composed of external members and accountable to its 

governing body also could assist it with its responsibility to monitor the 

organization’s oversight function. In the absence of such an audit 
Page 6 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

committee, many of the member state representatives to the governing 

bodies told us that they find such monitoring difficult because they lack 

sufficient resources and expertise.

We make recommendations in this report to the Secretary of State to direct 

the U.S. Missions to work with member states to improve oversight and 

accountability in UN organizations by (1) making audit reports available to 

the governing bodies that will provide further insight into the operations of 

the United Nations’ organizations and identify critical systemic weaknesses 

and (2) establishing independent audit committees that are accountable to 

their governing bodies, where this does not now occur.

We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from the 

Secretary of State and cognizant officials representing the six UN-affiliated 

agencies that we reviewed—FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO. 

These comments are reprinted in appendixes II through VIII, along with our 

responses to specific points. State endorsed the main findings and 

conclusions of the draft report and stated that the United States has 

established partnerships with several other like-minded member states, 

and will continue to work with them to build a constituency for 

strengthening oversight and accountability in the UN system. FAO stated 

that our report observations are clear, comprehensive, and well-reasoned 

and that its governing body has begun taking steps that align with 

implementing our recommendations. UNDP stated that it is reviewing the 

issues related to the recommendations, and that a number of these issues 

will be part of the interaction with the Executive Board during June 2007. 

WFP noted that the substance of our recommendations is currently being 

debated in many forums throughout the UN system, and that its Executive 

Board and its bureau have been engaged in considering issues related to 

the composition and reporting lines of the audit committee. WHO 

commented that it is engaged with other organizations in the UN system in 

addressing the issue of access to internal audit reports and noted that its 

Program, Budget and Administration Committee already fulfills most of the 

requirements that we advocate, such as independence from senior 

management and accountability to the governing body. ILO commented 

that it has serious reservations about implementing our recommendation to 

make internal audit reports available to governing bodies. We maintain that 

providing the governing body access to all internal audit reports will 

provide the governing body greater insight into the organization’s 

operations and highlight systemic weaknesses in internal controls. 

UNICEF noted that any proposal to reorder the governance mechanisms so 

as to align them with a particular understanding of the IIA standards would 
Page 7 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

be a matter for UNICEF’s Executive Board (among other institutions). We 

recognize that decisions regarding changes in UNICEF’s lines of reporting 

to allow UNICEF’s governing body access to all audit reports, as well as the 

creation of an independent audit committee to be in line with international 

best practices, will require the consideration and approval of UNICEF’s 

Executive Board. We also maintain that the United States, as a member of 

UNICEF’s governing body, should work with other member states to 

consider implementation of these recommendations.

Background According to the United Nations, effective oversight services are a high 

priority and a crucial component in the Secretary-General’s efforts to 

strengthen the organization in the 21st century. Effective oversight 

practices are integral to establishing good governance and help to provide 

assurance to governing bodies and senior management that resources 

contributed to the organization are not vulnerable to waste, fraud, and 

abuse. 

Generally, governance is the system by which organizations are directed, 

controlled, and held to account to provide reasonable assurance that 

objectives are met and that operations are carried out in an ethical and 

accountable manner. Good governance requires a clear division of 

responsibilities between the governing body and senior management. In 

addition, good governance includes clearly articulated ethical values, 

objectives, and strategies; proper tone at the top; and internal controls. An 

absence of good governance structures and a lack of adherence to basic 

governance principles increases the risk of public corruption. The 

governing bodies in each UN organization are responsible for developing 

governance practices for maintaining the strategic direction of the 

organization, and monitoring the actions of management and operations. 

Oversight is a key activity in governance that addresses whether 

organizations are carrying out their responsibilities and serves to detect 

and deter public corruption. Oversight functions include monitoring, 

evaluating, and reporting on the organization’s performance and holding 

senior management accountable for results. These functions also 

encompass the auditing, internal and external, of the organization’s 

financial results and the effectiveness of its internal controls. In addition, 

oversight also includes investigation of allegations of fraud. The UN 

system, including its affiliated funds and programs and specialized 

agencies, generally has both internal and external accountability and 

oversight mechanisms. 
Page 8 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

The principal bodies responsible for conducting oversight in the UN funds 

and programs and specialized agencies in our study include member states 

in their capacity as members of the governing bodies; governing body 

committees; internal auditors; investigators; evaluation offices; and 

external auditors, including the UN Joint Inspection Unit (JIU). These 

bodies are defined in the following text and illustrated in figure 1. 

• Member states refers to those countries that are members of each of the 

UN organizations.

• Governing body is composed of member state representatives who are 

responsible for steering and directing the organization. Its role is to set 

and maintain the organization’s strategic direction, effective and 

efficient allocation of resources, and effective monitoring of 

management and operations. The governing body exercises oversight 

over senior management. 

• Governing body committee is composed of member state 

representatives who are responsible for certain governance functions, 

such as budget and finance committees; it makes recommendations to 

the governing body or acts on its behalf in the interests of efficiency and 

effectiveness. 

• Senior management refers to the chief administrative or executive 

officer of a UN organization and his or her senior management team. 

Senior management is responsible for the organization’s day-to-day 

operations and the implementation of the policies, strategies, and 

budgets established by the governing body. It has the duty to assess risk 

and establish effective controls to achieve objectives and avert risk. 

Senior management exercises oversight over the organization’s 

operational activities.

• Internal auditors determine whether there is an adequate and effective 

system of internal controls for providing reasonable assurance with 

respect to the integrity of financial and operational information; 

compliance with regulations, rules, policies, and procedures, and 

safeguarding of assets; economic and efficient use of resources, and 

identifying opportunities for improvement; and effectiveness of program 

management for achieving objectives consistent with policies, plans, 

and budgets. Internal auditors are generally accountable to the 

organization’s senior management.
Page 9 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

• The Office of Internal Oversight Services is the internal auditor of the 

UN Secretariat and other UN organizations, including several funds and 

programs, under the authority of the UN Secretary-General. Certain 

funds and programs, such as UNDP and UNICEF, fall within OIOS’s 

jurisdiction but do not always use OIOS’s services because they have 

their own oversight units. OIOS’s authority does not extend to UN 

specialized agencies, such as FAO, ILO, and WHO.7

• Investigators examine allegations of wrongdoing, including fraud, 

corruption, misconduct, and other irregular activity, to propose 

corrective management and administrative measures, such as an 

eventual prosecution or disciplinary measures as appropriate. 

Investigators are accountable to the organization’s senior management.

• Evaluators determine the relevance, effectiveness, and impact of an 

ongoing or completed program, project, or policy in light of its 

objectives and accomplishments to incorporate lessons learned into 

decision-making processes. The governance structures of evaluation 

offices vary among organizations; either the governing bodies or the 

heads of the organizations are responsible for the governance of the 

evaluation offices. 

• The external auditor reports on the organization’s accounts and may 

make observations on financial procedures, the accounting system, 

internal financial controls, and the administration and management of 

the organization in general. Several bodies within the UN system 

provide external oversight. The Board of Auditors (BOA) serves as the 

external auditor for the UN funds and programs. BOA is mandated to 

express an opinion on the financial statements and, in general, on the 

administration and management of the organization. Each of the 

specialized agencies has its own external auditor, which is generally the 

Auditor-General of a member state’s supreme audit institution.8

7

GAO-06-575.

8

BOA examines the UN Secretariat and other UN organizations within the SecretaryGeneral’s authority. BOA is presently composed of the heads of the national audit offices of 

France, the Philippines, and South Africa. Unlike the other funds and programs, WFP does 

not fall under BOA’s jurisdiction. Instead, WFP’s governing body appoints its external 

auditor in accordance with WFP’s Financial Regulations. The National Audit Office of the 

United Kingdom currently serves as the external auditor of WFP and ILO, while the 

Comptroller and Auditor-General of India serves as the external auditor for WHO and FAO.
Page 10 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

• In addition, the Joint Inspection Unit, the only independent 

systemwide external oversight body, has the authority to perform 

inspections, evaluations, and investigations throughout the UN system, 

including the funds and programs and specialized agencies.9

Figure 1: Governance Structure of Selected UN Funds and Programs and Specialized Agencies 

9

JIU primarily examines thematic areas, such as the possibility of outsourcing certain 

services that cut across UN organizations. Although the JIU statute provides it with the 

mandate to conduct investigations, at the time of our study, it did not have the resources to 

carry out its mandate to investigate wrongdoing, according to JIU.

Source: GAO analysis of UN data.

General

Assembly

composed of

member states

Member

states

Governing

body

Governing

body

Funds and programsc Specialized agencies

Funds and programs

Governance Structure of Selected UN Funds Programs and Specialized Agencies

 Audit authority

 Operational/Reporting relationship

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

ILO International Labor Organization

OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

WFP World Food Program

WHO World Health Organization

 OIOS has no oversight authority

 OIOS has oversight authority

 These organizations have their own internal oversight entities

External 

auditorsb

Joint 

Inspection 

Unit

External 

auditorsa

UNDP UNICEF

WFPd

FAO

ILO

WHO
Page 11 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

a

The Board of Auditors serves as the external auditors for both UNDP and UNICEF. Currently, the 

National Audit Office of the United Kingdom serves as the external auditor for WFP.

b

Currently, the National Audit Office of the United Kingdom serves as the external auditor for ILO, while 

the Comptroller and Auditor General of India serves as the external auditor for WHO and FAO.

c

UN funds and programs operate under the authority of the UN Secretariat.

d

WFP is under the authority of the Director General of FAO and the UN Secretary-General.

The UN funds and programs and specialized agencies organize their 

internal oversight functions10 in different ways. For example, in most of the 

UN organizations we examined, the oversight functions are separated into 

two distinct units—one unit for the audit and investigation functions, and 

another unit for the evaluation function—while in WHO, these three 

functions are combined into a single unit and operate under one office. 

Figure 2 provides an overview of the organizational structure of the 

oversight functions at the UN organizations we studied, as well as their 

total budgets for the biennium 2006-2007. On the basis of UN member 

states’ assessed rates of contribution, the U.S. government provides 22 

percent of the budgets of FAO, ILO, and WHO. The amounts that the United 

States provides to UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP are on a voluntary basis. On 

the basis of the United States’ budget for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, the 

United States provided total amounts of about $209 million to UNDP and 

$249 million to UNICEF. In calendar year 2006, the United States 

contributed $1.1 billion to WFP.11

10For the purposes of this report, oversight functions include audit, investigation, and 

evaluation functions.

11Contributions to WFP are dependent on an ongoing needs assessment for emergency food 

aid. Therefore, State could not provide us with an estimate for U.S. contributions made in 

2007.
Page 12 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Figure 2: Internal and External Oversight Structure of Selected UN Funds and Programs and Specialized Agencies

a

ILO’s 2006-2007 biennium budget figure does not include voluntary contributions.

Source: GAO analysis of UN data.

Oversight UNDP UNICEF WFP ILO WHO FAO

2006-2007 biennium

agency budget

(dollars in billions)

Member states

Size of governing body

Audit and 

investigation

Oversight function

$9.2 $4.9 $5.9 $0.6a $3.3 $1.7

191 191 191 178 192 189

36 36 36 56b 32 49

In the Office of Audit 

and Performance 

Review

In the Office of 

Internal Audit 

In the Office of 

Internal Audit and 

Oversight 

Both report to the 

Inspector General and 

are in the Oversight 

Services Division

In the Office of 

Internal Oversight 

Servicesc

Under the 

Office of the 

Inspector 

General

External auditors UN Board of 

Auditors

UN Board 

of Auditors

National Audit 

Office of the 

United Kingdom

National Audit 

Office of the 

United Kingdom

Supreme Audit 

Institution of 

India

Supreme Audit 

Institution of 

India

Evaluationd Conducted by 

evaluation offices

Conducted 

by evaluation 

offices

Budget and staff 

data do not include 

regional and country 

offices

Conducted by 

evaluation 

offices

Conducted by 

evaluation 

offices

Conducted by 

the Office of 

Internal Oversight 

Services

Conducted by 

evaluation 

offices

Current unit 

staff size

Audit:

49 positions, 

including 39 

professional staff

Investigation: 

6 positions, 

including 

5 professional staff

Audit:

24 positions, 

including 21 

professional staff

Investigation:

1.5 positions

Audit:

21 positions, including 

14 professional staff

Investigation: 

7 positions, including 

5 professional staff

5 positions, including 

4 professional staff 

16 positions, 

including 14 

professional staff and 

6 vacancies with 1 

vacant senior 

investigator position

Audit: 

17 positions, 

including 13 

professional 

staff and 3 

vacancies

Investigation:

5 positions, 

including 

2 vacancies

Current office 

staff size

20 positions for the 

evaluation office at 

headquarters, 

including 19 

professional staff

20 dedicated 

professional field 

positions funded 

by separate budget

12 positions for the 

evaluation office at 

headquarters, 

including 9 

professional staff

56 dedicated 

professional field 

positions funded by 

separate budget

12 positions, 

including 

8 professional 

staff 

4 positions, 

including 

3 professional 

staff

2 evaluation 

officers included 

in total positions

above

12 positions, 

including 9 

professional 

staff

2006-2007 

budgets

(dollars in millions)

$20.2: audit and 

investigation

$9.2 audit

$0.8 investigation

$6.7 audit

$2.0 investigation

$1.8: audit and 

investigation

$7: audit, 

investigation, and 

evaluation 

$5.9: audit and 

investigation 

2006-2007 

budgets

(dollars in millions)

$8.0 $7.4 $5.2 $1.5 See total budget 

in audit and 

investigation section

$5.8
Page 13 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

b

ILO’s governing body is a tripartite structure, which is composed of 28 member state representatives, 

14 employer members, and 14 worker members.

c

WHO’s OIOS is composed of the audit, investigation, and evaluation functions.

d

Evaluations can be conducted or managed or both by headquarters, regional, and field offices. Some 

evaluation offices (UNDP, ILO, WHO, and FAO) are centrally managed and oversee the activities of the 

regional and field offices. Other evaluation offices (UNICEF and WFP) activities are decentrally 

managed and overseen directly by the regional and field offices.

The audit, investigation, and evaluation functions within UN organizations 

were established to advise senior management. The primary objective of 

internal oversight in these organizations is to assist senior management in 

fulfilling its responsibilities by providing advice on the adequacy of internal 

controls and management practices on the basis of a systematic and 

independent review of the organizations’ operations. For example, the 

mission of WFP’s internal audit office is to help the organization 

accomplish its objectives with a systematic approach to assess the 

organization’s risk-management, control, and governance processes and 

suggest improvements to them. At the six organizations we studied, the 

chief audit executives were appointed by and accountable to the heads of 

their respective organizations, and in some organizations—such as ILO and 

WHO—the appointments are made following a consultation with its 

governing body. 

The span of oversight and accountability of the evaluation function varies 

among the six organizations we examined. Also, the types of evaluations 

vary and may include corporate,12 thematic, and programmatic evaluations. 

Generally, at the six organizations that we examined, evaluation reports are 

made publicly available.13 UNDP, ILO, WHO, and FAO evaluation functions 

are centralized, such that the headquarters evaluation offices manage the 

evaluation function of the organization. For example, based on the 

evaluation policy of UNDP, the evaluation office at headquarters is the 

custodian of the evaluation function.14 As such, the evaluation office, 

12Corporate evaluations have a scope that is of interest to the whole organization and have 

systemic implications.

13ILO said that its public page contains full text reports of major evaluations and abstracts of 

all other independent evaluations. According to UNICEF, as established by the Evaluation 

Committee Rules and Procedures in June 2004, the evaluation office will assume that all 

reports are suitable for public dissemination unless informed in writing by the 

commissioning office.

14In June 2006, the governing body of UNDP approved its first evaluation policy, which is in 

line with the requirements of UNEG norms and standards.
Page 14 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

among other things, submits its annual plan to the governing body, reports 

annually to the governing body on the function, findings and 

recommendations of evaluations, assures mandatory decentralized 

evaluations and support quality assurance of evaluations, as well as 

conduct strategic, thematic, program, and other evaluations as required.15 

In contrast, the management of UNICEF’s and WFP’s evaluation functions 

is decentralized. For example, WFP’s evaluation function consists of its 

central evaluation office, which manages evaluations, complemented by 

evaluations that are managed by regional bureaus and country offices. In 

addition, WFP’s evaluation office at headquarters provides limited informal 

support to the bureaus and country offices. UNICEF’s evaluation office at 

headquarters commissions and conducts evaluations and provides 

guidance on evaluation standards, but it has no responsibility for 

overseeing the quality and independence of evaluations at the regional or 

country level. The regional office conducts evaluations related to regional 

strategies and provides oversight and support for evaluations undertaken 

by country offices, and the country offices are responsible for strategically 

selecting and conducting evaluations at the country level.

UN Internal Audit 

Offices Have Not Fully 

Implemented Key 

Components of 

International Auditing 

Standards

Although the six UN internal audit offices that we examined have made 

progress in implementing key components of international auditing 

standards, they have not fully implemented key components of the 

standards. All of the audit offices are at various stages of developing and 

implementing their own risk-based work plans, but they lack a completed 

organizationwide risk-management framework, which is essential in 

identifying the areas with greatest exposure to fraud, waste, and abuse. In 

addition, three audit officials stated that their audit offices lack sufficient 

staff to cover high-risk areas. Three audit offices have not fully 

implemented quality assurance processes, such as internal and external 

peer reviews. All of the audit offices have a recommendations tracking and 

follow-up system to ensure that senior management is addressing 

deficiencies identified by internal and external auditors, and some offices 

have undertaken efforts to strengthen their follow-up process. In addition, 

some of the organizations do not have professional investigators and rely 

15UNDP defines strategic evaluations as those evaluations that assess its performance in 

areas that are critical to ensuring sustained contribution to development results in the 

context of emerging development issues and changing priorities at the global and regional 

levels. Strategic evaluations may cover the organization’s policies and programmatic 

approaches.
Page 15 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

heavily on auditors to probe allegations of wrongdoing, a practice that 

could impact the organizations’ ability to ensure that investigations are 

properly carried out. In addition, while most of the organizations are in 

various stages of considering and implementing ethics policies, none have 

adopted financial disclosure requirements for their oversight staff to 

monitor potential conflicts of interest. Figure 3 provides information on the 

six UN audit offices’ progress toward implementing international auditing 

standards.

Figure 3: Selected UN Funds’ and Programs’ and Specialized Agencies’ Progress 

toward Implementing International Auditing Standards 

a

WHO conducted an internal self-assessment that was validated by an external party. The scope and 

findings of this review were not provided to GAO.

No implementation – Evidence that no steps have been taken to implement the standard.

Partially implemented – Evidence of some actions taken toward implementation. Category can range 

from a few initial steps to actions that indicate considerable progress has been made.

Generally implemented – Evidence of a series of actions that indicate the standards are generally or 

mostly implemented.

Source: GAO analysis of UN data.

Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) UNDP UNICEF WFP ILO WHO FAO

Auditing Standards

Risk-based planning (IIA standards 2010 and 2110)

Annual risk-based work plans informed by 

entity’s risk-management framework

Sufficient resources to achieve audit work plans

Quality assurance (IIA standards 1300 and 1312)

Systematic internal quality assurance processes

External assessment (every 5 years)

Recommendation tracking (IIA standards 2500 and 2500.A1)

System in place to monitor recommendations

Process for following up on implementation 

status

Resource management–audit (IIA standard 2030)

a
Page 16 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

All Audit Offices Are 

Developing Risk-Based 

Work Plans but Lack 

Completed 

Organizationwide RiskManagement Frameworks 

to Guide Their Work 

All audit offices are developing and implementing risk-based work plans, 

but the organizations’ senior management has not completed 

organizationwide risk-management frameworks that would assist in 

guiding the audit offices’ work plans, as shown in figure 3. A riskmanagement framework is (1) a systematic approach to identifying, 

assessing, and acting on the probability that an event or action may occur 

that could threaten or adversely affect an organization’s activities, assets, 

and reputation and (2) the responsibility of the organization’s management. 

Accordingly, the framework should reflect senior management’s 

perspective of the organization’s risk environment and enable the internal 

audit office to direct audit resources to those areas with the greatest 

exposure to fraud, waste, and mismanagement. While risk management is 

the responsibility of the organization’s senior management, IIA standards 

state that the internal audit office should assist the organization by 

identifying and evaluating significant exposures to risk and by contributing 

to the improvement of risk management and control systems. 

While the internal audit offices of ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO 

have contributed to their respective organizations’ development of a riskmanagement framework, none of the organizations have fully completed 

such a framework. For example, IIA reported that WFP’s audit office 

played a key role in introducing an organizationwide risk-management 

framework by helping to draft the risk-management proposal that the 

executive board approved in late 2005 and by facilitating a series of 

organizationwide risk-management workshops for headquarters and field 

offices.16 IIA also reported that the implementation of this organizationwide 

risk-management framework would take about 2 years to complete, and it 

recommended that WFP continue to implement the framework. In 

response to IIA, WFP indicated that it was in the process of identifying a 

corporate risk coordinator and a chief risk officer to work on the project’s 

implementation. However, these are only initial steps to developing an 

organizationwide risk-management framework. WFP audit officials stated 

that until WFP has a risk-management model in place, the audit office will 

have to rely on its current process for assessing risks, which includes a 

range of factors, such as questionnaires to managers; consideration of prior 

audit results; emerging risks identified in consultation with management; 

and the results of data collection and analysis. In contrast, FAO’s audit 

office has not been involved in assisting senior management in developing 

IIA Standard: Planning

The internal audit activity plan of 

engagements should be based on a risk 

assessment, undertaken at least annually. 

The input of senior management and the 

board should be considered in this process. 

(2010.A1)

16This information is based on IIA’s review of WFP’s audit function in 2006. 
Page 17 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

an organizationwide risk-management framework, according to FAO’s 

senior audit officials. 

All audit offices are making progress toward establishing their own riskassessment processes to plan their work. These processes are unique to 

each audit office, and the methodology for conducting the risk-assessments 

ranges from an informal process to a more formal risk-assessment model. 

For example, ILO’s audit office developed a risk-assessment model and 

undertook a risk assessment toward the end of 2006. The model is based on 

a quantitative approach that defines the audit universe, numerically ranks 

audit risks on the basis of a risk index, and uses a formula-based scoring 

system. Previously, ILO’s external auditor had recommended that the audit 

office develop a more comprehensive risk-based work plan for each 

biennium, and that the plan be formally accepted or approved by the head 

of the organization to confirm his satisfaction on the level of internal audit 

assurance being delivered. ILO first used this risk model to prioritize its 

2007 work plan. Another example is WHO’s audit office, which uses an 

informal risk-assessment process to plan its audit work. WHO audit 

officials stated that the organization has engaged a consultant to assist in 

developing an organizationwide risk-management framework. Once this 

framework is established, audit officials said that they will be better 

informed and will use the framework to help refine their risk-based work 

plans. 

Finally, all audit offices submit their risk-based work plans for review and 

approval by senior management. However, only WHO submits its work 

plans to the governing body for review as called for by IIA standards. IIA 

standards state that the input of senior management and the governing 

body (board) should be considered in the work plan. Input from the 

governing body is essential to help ensure, among other things, that the 

work plans are consistent with the organizations’ goals; that management 

understands its risk environment; and that the audit office has sufficient 

resources (which are determined by the management and the governing 

body) to execute the work plan. In addition, most audit offices (FAO, 

UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO) create annual work plans as called for by 

IIA standards.17 However, according to audit office officials, their work 

plans would benefit from an organizationwide risk assessment that reflects 

management’s perspectives of the organizations’ risk environment. 

17ILO prepares a comprehensive risk-based work plan on a biennium basis and updates the 

work plan annually.
Page 18 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Some Audit Offices Lack 

Sufficient Staff to Cover 

High-Risk Areas

Three of the six senior audit chiefs (FAO, UNICEF, and WFP) reported that 

they do not have sufficient resources to carry out their approved work 

plans, while three (ILO, UNDP, and WHO) reported that they have sufficient 

resources. IIA standards require that audit chiefs have resources that are 

appropriate, sufficient, and effectively deployed to achieve the approved 

work plan. While UN audit chiefs can request additional resources from the 

head of the organization through the budgeting process, it is the 

responsibility of the head of the organization to ensure that the audit office 

receives sufficient resources to audit high-risk areas or accept the risks for 

not taking action. Generally, UN governing bodies are unaware of the audit 

offices’ budget requests, but governing bodies would be aware of external 

auditors’ reports that identify the need for increased audit resources. 

Without sufficient financial resources for audit and investigative positions, 

audit offices would not be able to adequately address areas, such as 

financial management and information technology systems that are 

vulnerable to fraud and abuse. We did not review the sufficiency of the 

reported resources.

Senior audit officials of FAO, UNICEF, and WFP stated that they do not 

have sufficient resources to execute their audit work plans. UNICEF’s audit 

capacity does not provide adequate coverage of high or significant audit 

risk areas in headquarters and the field, according to UNICEF senior audit 

officials and UNICEF’s external auditor, BOA. BOA reported in June 2006 

that the audit office’s deployment of most of its staff resources to the field 

has limited its coverage of the 18 headquarters offices and divisions. 

Specifically, BOA reported that between 1999 and 2005, the audit office 

conducted between one and four headquarters audits per year, and that in a 

number of cases, the areas audited did not pertain to the core activity of the 

division. BOA also reported that except for one review—the financial 

logistics system security and authorization—carried out in 2001, the audit 

office had not audited information technology areas such as data centers, 

applications, networks, security, and data integrity. At the time of BOA’s 

audit, the audit office lacked information technology (IT) expertise, but it 

subsequently hired one senior IT specialist in 2006. UNICEF audit officials 

agreed with BOA’s findings and informed us that additional auditors are still 

needed to expand the coverage of headquarters, systems, and performance 

audits. According to BOA, a possible indicator of understaffing is the 

relationship between the number of audit staff and the growth in UNICEF’s 

budget and country offices. For example, between 2000 and 2004, although 

UNICEF’s budget increased by about 57 percent and its reserves and fund 

balances doubled, the audit office’s staff level decreased by one during that 

period. UNICEF audit officials informed us that on the basis of BOA’s audit, 

The audit chief should ensure that internal 

audit resources are appropriate, sufficient, 

and effectively deployed to achieve the 

approved plan. (2030)

IIA Standard: Resource Management
Page 19 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

its executive board requested that the audit office conduct a needs 

assessment of its resource requirements, which it is currently performing 

as part of a UNICEF-wide review.

FAO’s audit chief also informed us that the audit office lacks sufficient 

resources to address high-risk areas. The audit chief said that there are 

many high-risk areas that the audit office cannot cover within a 2-year 

period, and that FAO would like to cover 100 percent of its high-risk areas 

every 2 years. According to the audit chief, FAO’s audit work plan is driven 

by the financial resources provided to the internal audit unit, and the 

determination of which high-risk areas to cover depends on the amount of 

available financial resources. 

WFP’s audit chief informed us that the audit office does not have sufficient 

resources to conduct its planned work for 2007. The audit chief stated that 

the audit office had experienced a budget shortfall based on its work plan 

for 2007, and that WFP absorbed this shortfall by decreasing audit coverage 

of lower-risk areas. However, WFP senior officials stated that further 

budget revisions and curtailment of planned recruitment in 2007 has left 

WFP’s internal audit service short of its requirements, and that budget 

uncertainties continue into 2008. Furthermore, according to the audit 

office, for 2007, resource constraints have resulted in deferred audit 

coverage of a number of field offices, and the planned audit of a complex 

special operation also was deferred to a future year.

ILO’s, UNDP’s, and WHO’s audit chiefs stated that their audit offices have 

sufficient resources to conduct most of their planned audit work, 

especially in high-risk areas. According to ILO’s audit chief, the audit office 

has sufficient resources to achieve its 2007 audit work plan, and funds are 

available in the 2007 budget to outsource an IT audit.18 ILO’s external 

auditor had recommended in 2006 that the office consider increasing its 

level of IT audit specialists to support the audit of internal controls, 

particularly regarding its integrated resource information system. The audit 

chief also stated that the proposed 2008-2009 program budget includes 

provisions for an additional professional staff, a part-time general service 

staff, as well as nonstaff resources, which could be used to provide IT audit 

services. The International Labor Conference will consider the proposed 

18However, according to ILO’s audit chief, the 2007 work plan is based on current staffing 

levels, and the achievement of the work plan will be subject to demands placed on the audit 

office to undertake investigations.
Page 20 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

2008-2009 budget in June 2007. In addition, WHO’s audit chief stated that he 

has obtained the number of positions that his office requires to complete its 

planned work and has not had to postpone work or travel due to lack of 

resources. WHO’s audit chief also reported that the office successfully 

hired additional staff in 2006 for the 2007 plan of work. 

UNDP’s senior audit officials stated that the organization currently has 

sufficient resources to address most of its audit work plan for 2007. In 2005, 

the audit office reported to the agency head that the cases of fraud 

uncovered in some country offices and at headquarters had occurred over 

long periods, which indicated that internal controls and review processes, 

including internal audits, had been very weak. In 2006, the audit office 

requested a budget of about $13 million on the basis of its risk-based work 

plan.19 However, UNDP’s senior management initially provided the office 

with a budget allocation of about $7 million, according to UNDP audit 

officials. The audit office did not have enough funds to perform its planned 

work and requested additional resources, which was increased by three 

subsequent allotments totaling $1.4 million. Both the audit chief and 

UNDP’s external auditor had emphasized to the head of the organization 

that the audit function needs to be strengthened. Furthermore, BOA 

reported in June 2006 that UNDP’s internal audit coverage was insufficient 

and that in the past 4 years, the audit office had performed an average of 

less than four audits per year at headquarters, all of which were of a very 

limited scope. BOA reiterated its recommendations to increase the audit 

capacity to cover key areas, such as financial records, procedures, and 

controls at headquarters. In April 2007, UNDP officials informed us that for 

2004 to 2006, all very-high-risk-rated countries and 72 percent of high-riskrated countries had been audited. In addition, UNDP officials said they 

performed a risk assessment at the end of 2006, and senior management 

allocated $10 million to carry out its audit work plan in 2007. Furthermore, 

the officials said that senior management has committed to allocate 

additional resources as deemed necessary. According to UNDP officials, 

for the 3-year period of 2005 to 2007, they plan to audit all very-high-risk 

areas and 96 percent of high-risk countries.

19The $13 million would have allowed high-risk countries to be audited once every 2 years, 

medium-risk countries once every 3 years, and low-risk countries once every 4 years.
Page 21 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Some Audit Offices Have 

Not Fully Implemented 

Quality Assurance 

Processes

Although all six audit offices have a number of quality assurance measures 

in place, FAO, ILO, and UNDP fall short of fully meeting the IIA quality 

assurance auditing standards. Quality assurance mechanisms are 

important tools that can provide a level of assurance to the management of 

the organization on the effectiveness and performance of the audit 

function. Quality assurance and improvement programs include 

continuous reviews that are conducted by internal and external reviewers. 

Internal reviews include supervisory reviews of audit documentation and 

reviews of completed audits by auditors who were not involved with the 

engagement to determine whether they were conducted in accordance with 

the organization’s quality control policies and procedures. External reviews 

are generally conducted by independent firms that examine the audit 

function and audit documentation against established auditing quality 

standards, such as IIA standards. 

While all audit offices have some form of internal quality assurance 

processes in place, the processes vary widely across organizations and are 

not always standardized or documented. All audit officials stated that their 

internal quality assurance processes include reviews of audit 

documentation by senior audit officials, audit peers, or team coordinators 

to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support audit findings. 

For example, WHO audit team coordinators review work conducted by 

auditors from the inception to the end of the audit and examine the quality 

of work and the audit evidence gathered. In addition, WHO’s internal 

oversight director stated that he reviews all aspects of the auditing work, 

including planning memorandums, report drafts, and comments from the 

auditee, before a report is issued in its final format. While some audit 

offices, such as ILO, UNICEF, and WFP, have documented their internal 

quality assurance processes or have adopted software that documents their 

quality assurance processes, FAO and UNDP have not. UNDP has not 

documented its quality assurance process, and the audit office is currently 

taking steps to document the process to comply with IIA standards. FAO 

audit officials stated that they do not have standardized procedures to 

review audit documentation of field auditors but expect to standardize the 

process with the introduction of electronic work papers that auditors from 

headquarters can review. Standardized procedures, including 

documentation of the internal quality assurance process, would help to 

provide assurance that the internal audit activity is performed in 

accordance with the organization’s standards and assist peer reviewers in 

evaluating the organization’s compliance with the standards.

Internal assessments should include ongoing 

reviews of the performance of the internal 

audit activity. (1311)

External assessments, such as quality 

assurance reviews, should be conducted at 

least once every 5 years by an independent 

reviewer or review team from outside the 

organization. (1312)

IIA Standards: Quality Assurance and

Improvement Program
Page 22 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Although periodic external peer reviews required by IIA can provide 

reasonable assurance of the quality of the audit offices’ work, we found 

that two of the audit lacked a timely external review. UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, 

and WHO audit offices have met IIA standards by undergoing external 

reviews of their quality assurance processes at least once over the past 5 

years. On the basis of an external review of UNDP’s 2004-2005 audit 

activities, in June 2006, UNDP’s external auditor made several 

recommendations for improving UNDP’s audit activities. For example, 

BOA recommended that UNDP enforce the timely receipt of audit reports 

that are prepared by contractors who audit UNDP program activities in the 

field to facilitate the audit office’s review. BOA also reviewed UNICEF’s 

audit activities and reported that UNICEF had implemented many quality 

assurance processes required by IIA standards. BOA recommended that 

the audit office institute internal peer file review and ensure that there is 

evidence of supervisory review on all audit documentation. UNICEF 

responded that it had implemented BOA’s recommendations pertaining to 

quality assurance. Regarding WFP, IIA conducted an external review in 

March 2006 and found that WFP generally conforms to its standards. IIA 

made a number of recommendations, including that WFP expand and 

formalize its internal quality assessment activities, such as supervisory 

reviews of selected audits, and provide training to audit management and 

staff to ensure consistent application of audit documentation standards. 

WFP reported that it is in the process of implementing these 

recommendations. In August 2006, WHO’s OIOS performed an internal 

quality assurance self-assessment, which was validated by external 

reviewers. However, WHO did not provide us with information covering the 

scope and findings of this review. According to the director of WHO’s OIOS, 

the quality assurance review included the office’s three functions of audit, 

evaluation, and investigation and indicated general compliance with IIA 

standards. 

FAO and ILO have not had external peer reviews in the past 5 years, 

according to audit officials. For example, FAO audit officials stated that 

FAO’s audit office was peer reviewed in 2001 against standards established 

by the UN Panel of External Auditors. The office was due to be reviewed in 

2006, but the review was postponed due to budget constraints. However, 

IIA began a review in February 2007, according to FAO audit officials. ILO 

has not had an external review, but according to the acting chief of audit, 

plans have been placed on hold for such a review due to difficulty in having 

audit staff available to support the review. According to ILO’s acting chief 

of audit, funds have been included in the 2007 budget for an external 
Page 23 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

review to be performed on the basis of IIA’s standards beginning in fall 

2007. 

All Audit Offices Have 

Implemented a 

Recommendations Tracking 

System and Follow-up 

Process, and Some Have 

Implemented Mechanisms 

to Strengthen Their Process

All six audit offices we examined have a system in place to monitor and 

follow up on the recommendations that are made to agency management to 

help ensure that proper attention is being paid to any deficiencies that are 

identified by the internal audit office. Some audit offices have also 

undertaken efforts to strengthen their follow-up process to ensure that 

recommendations are acknowledged and addressed by their organizations’ 

management. UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP track the status of their 

recommendations in electronic work paper software, such as CARDS, 

Team Mate, and AutoAudit.20 UNICEF reports that establishing the 

database in AutoAudit has significantly improved tracking and reporting on 

the status of its recommendations. In contrast, FAO, ILO, and WHO track 

their recommendations in software such as Excel or Access. FAO audit 

officials said that they plan to use Team Mate in the future because Excel is 

not as flexible, and that Team Mate will allow for input from the 

departments they have audited. 

All audit offices have a process in place to follow up on the status of their 

recommendations and to determine whether any action has been taken to 

address them. However, the frequency of follow-up and the way in which it 

is conducted varies from agency to agency. For example, three of the audit 

offices follow up with auditees every 6 months (FAO, ILO, and UNDP); 

UNICEF follows up quarterly; WFP follows up monthly on the basis of the 

recommendation implementation due date; and WHO has no set time frame 

for follow up, which instead is determined by the types of outstanding 

recommendations. The audit offices rely on implementation reports from 

the offices that were audited to determine whether adequate actions have 

been taken to close the audit recommendations. However, all senior audit 

officials we interviewed stated that these written reports from the auditees 

are supplemented by subsequent reviews of the status of recommendations 

during the audit office’s next field visit to verify whether the appropriate 

actions were taken to implement the recommendations. 

Three of the audit offices (FAO, ILO, and WFP) have established 

mechanisms to ensure that recommendations are acknowledged and 

IIA Standards: Monitoring Progress

The chief audit executive should establish 

and maintain a system to monitor the 

disposition of results communicated to 

management. (2500)

The chief audit executive should establish a

follow-up process to monitor and ensure that 

management actions have been effectively 

implemented or that senior management has

accepted the risk of not taking action. 

(2500.A1)

20AutoAudit is an electronic audit system that is widely used in the audit industry. The 

planning, execution, and follow-up actions of all audits are documented in AutoAudit.
Page 24 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

addressed by organization management. For example, according to an FAO 

official, the audit committee has been playing an active role in monitoring 

the status of recommendations, and, as a result, there is more commitment 

from management to follow up on recommendations. At every audit 

committee meeting, the committee members review each recommendation 

to determine which ones have not been addressed. As a result of the audit 

committee’s regular monitoring, FAO has cleared the backlog of 

recommendations and improved the timeliness of their implementation. 

According to FAO, of the 2,790 recommendations issued during 2000 to 

2005, 88.9 percent are closed, 4.9 percent are open, and 6.2 percent are 

ongoing. ILO’s Accountability Committee is charged with examining cases 

of persistent failure on the part of officials to implement the 

recommendations of the internal and external auditors. Furthermore, 

according to WFP audit officials, WFP’s audit committee is very active in 

consulting with management in instances of nonresponsiveness by 

management and where internal audit has concluded that management’s 

implementation plans are not satisfactory.

Some Internal Oversight 

Units Lack Sufficient 

Investigative Staff and Rely 

on Other Parties to 

Investigate Wrongdoing

Investigation, which is an integral element of oversight, is a legally based 

and analytical process designed to gather information to determine 

whether wrongdoing has occurred. At the six organizations we examined, 

investigations are guided by the UN Uniform Guidelines for Investigations. 

Three internal oversight units lack a sufficient number of professional 

investigators and rely on other parties who may not be qualified to conduct 

investigations, such as auditors, to determine whether wrongdoing has 

occurred. In addition, some of the oversight units that do have professional 

investigators reported that they are limited in their capacity to conduct 

investigations with their existing staff. Limited investigative capacity 

impacts their ability to conduct planned audits and close cases, which may 

cause backlogs. According to the UN Uniform Guidelines for 

Investigations, organizations should reasonably ensure that resources 

available for investigations are proportionate to the number and magnitude 

of allegations and the potential benefits to the outcome of the case. Figure 

4 provides information on selected UN funds’ and programs’ and 

specialized agencies’ progress toward ensuring sufficient resources to 

perform investigations.
Page 25 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Figure 4: Selected UN Funds’ and Programs’ and Specialized Agencies’ Progress 

toward Ensuring Sufficient Resources to Perform Investigations

Currently, ILO, UNICEF, and WHO do not have professional investigators. 

UNICEF and WHO each have one full-time position allocated for a 

professional investigator. UNICEF’s position is currently vacant, while 

WHO’s position is in the process of being filled. ILO does not have any 

investigator positions, although its internal oversight officials have made 

several requests to management for additional investigative resources. In 

March 2007, ILO’s governing body approved ILO’s 2008-2009 budget, which 

requested an increase for oversight resources. According to ILO’s chief 

internal auditor, the additional resources will be allocated to employ a 

qualified and experienced investigator. In addition, while UNDP has 

professional investigators, in late 2006, UNDP senior officials reported they 

needed additional investigative staff because of increases in the number of 

cases due to the adoption of a whistleblower protection policy and the 

establishment of a fraud hotline in 2005. Accordingly, UNDP’s internal 

oversight unit stated in its annual report to its governing body that 

additional investigative resources are needed to address the increased 

caseload. Subsequently, in 2007, UNDP’s investigative unit received a 43 

percent increase in resources, for a total of $2 million, and UNDP officials 

told us that they are sufficiently staffed to meet their needs. Moreover, 

FAO’s investigative capacity is limited because the head of investigations is 

the only staff member with a background in investigations. The rest of the 

staff consists of auditors who have some investigative training but lack 

investigative experience, according to FAO officials. Currently, WFP’s 

investigative function is staffed with seven positions, including five 

professional staff. However, there are new organizationwide initiatives that 

may increase WFP’s caseload, and WFP’s senior officials told us they will 

No implementation – Evidence that no steps have been taken to implement the standard.

Partially implemented – Evidence of some actions taken toward implementation. Category can range 

from a few initial steps to actions that indicate considerable progress has been made.

Generally implemented – Evidence of a series of actions that indicate the standards are generally or 

mostly implemented.

Source: GAO analysis of UN data.

UNDP UNICEF WFP ILO WHO FAO

UN Uniform Guidelines for 

Investigations

Ensure sufficient resources to perform 

investigations
Page 26 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

monitor the impact of these initiatives to ensure that investigative 

resources continue to be sufficient.

Because the UN internal oversight units we examined lack professional 

investigators, these units rely on auditors or consultants to conduct 

investigations. As a result of their limited capacity, many internal oversight 

units have backlogs of investigative cases and are unable to complete 

planned audits. The internal oversight units of ILO and WHO, which do not 

have professional investigators, rely on auditors to conduct investigations 

on an as-needed basis. Currently, all of ILO’s auditors are engaged in 

conducting investigative work, according to ILO senior officials. Also, in a 

2006 report of the internal oversight activities, WHO noted that it makes 

resources available for investigations as situations develop, and that 

regularly scheduled audit work is interrupted or deferred to provide 

resources for investigative purposes. FAO and ILO internal oversight 

officials reported that they have been unable to conduct their planned 

audits because auditor resources were diverted at times to conduct 

investigations that occurred throughout the year. In addition, some 

organizations hire consultants to conduct investigations as an interim 

measure. FAO, UNDP, WFP, and WHO officials reported hiring consultants 

to conduct investigative work. These shortfalls, in part, have led to a 

backlog of cases that have not been resolved at four of the six 

organizations we studied (FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP). For example, in 

2006, UNDP reported a backlog of 57 outstanding cases—55 unresolved 

cases were carried forward from 2005, and 2 unresolved cases were from 

2004. With the additional resources for two investigator positions UNDP 

received in 2007, UNDP officials told us that their capacity to handle cases 

should improve.

UN Agencies Are in Various 

Stages of Adopting Ethics 

Policies 

Most organizations are in various stages of adopting ethics policies, such as 

requiring conflict-of-interest and financial disclosure statements and 

adopting whistleblower policies to protect those who reveal wrongdoing. 

Ethics policies could strengthen oversight by helping to ensure more 

accountability and transparency within the organizations. All UN 

employees are subject to standards for ethical conduct that have been 
Page 27 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

established by the International Civil Service Advisory Board.21 Ethical 

standards developed by IIA and the UN Uniform Guidelines for 

Investigations apply specifically to auditors and investigators, respectively. 

UNEG is currently drafting its own set of ethical guidelines for UN 

evaluation staff.22

UN organizations have created various ethics policies across the six 

organizations to help to ensure that all staff, including internal oversight 

staff, are free from conflicts of interest. Some internal oversight units rely 

on their staff to comply with a general declaration that all UN employees 

sign when they are employed by the organization. For example, all FAO 

employees, including oversight staff, are required to sign a Declaration for 

Code of Conduct, which states that one must exercise loyalty and 

discretion as an international civil servant and maintain independence from 

any government or other external party. Similarly, in 2006, ILO began 

requiring all of its employees, including oversight staff, to complete a 

disclosure of interest statement on a periodic basis. WHO employees also 

complete a Declaration of Interest statement; however, the requirement 

applies to its senior managers and staff members who perform selected 

functions, such as procurement, and does not apply to its entire oversight 

staff. Other organizations, such as UNDP and WFP, rely on their oversight 

staff to self-report any conflict of interests, although WFP’s investigative 

unit was developing a conflict-of-interest policy to cover investigations 

staff in fall 2006. 

None of the six organizations we examined require their internal oversight 

staff to disclose their financial interests, which could help to ensure that 

employees are free from conflicts of interest. In late 2006, UNICEF 

21The Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service were prepared by the 

International Civil Service Advisory Board and were adopted by the United Nations General 

Assembly in resolution 56/244 in 2001. Regarding ethics, the Standards of Conduct state that 

international civil servants may be required to disclose certain personal assets if this is 

necessary to enable their organizations to make sure there is no conflict.

22Although the IIA standards do not call for organizations to establish an ethics office or to 

provide compulsory ethics training, some UN organizations have made efforts to implement 

such policies. Among the six organizations we studied, only ILO and UNDP have established 

an ethics office or officer, while WHO is discussing whether to create such an office or 

position. The other organizations—FAO, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO—had not taken steps to 

establish such an office or position. UNDP is the only organization that we examined that 

has instituted compulsory ethics training, a best practice, for its employees. UNICEF offers 

voluntary ethics training to its staff, while other organizations have not developed or 

implemented such training.
Page 28 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

established a financial disclosure policy for senior management and 

officials who are responsible for selected functions, such as procurement, 

but did not apply the policy to auditors, investigators, and evaluators below 

the senior management level. Although FAO does not currently require its 

oversight staff to disclose their financial interests, it is currently seeking 

governing body approval to amend its staff regulations to require financial 

disclosure statements. Once FAO has amended its staff regulations, WFP 

will also be able to require its staff to disclose their financial interests. 

However, FAO and WFP have not determined whether this policy will apply 

to all of their internal oversight staff. Furthermore, all six of the 

organizations we studied have made efforts to increase accountability by 

implementing whistleblower protection policies in line with UN Uniform 

Guidelines for Investigations to protect those who reveal wrongdoing 

within their respective organizations. FAO, ILO, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO 

have established whistleblower protection policies, and UNDP is 

developing such a policy. Figure 5 provides information on selected UN 

funds’ and programs’ and specialized agencies’ progress toward 

implementing financial disclosure and whistleblower protection policies.

Figure 5: Selected UN Funds’ and Programs’ and Specialized Agencies’ Progress 

toward Implementing Financial Disclosure and Whistleblower Protection Policies

No implementation – Evidence that no steps have been taken to implement the standard.

Partially implemented – Evidence of some actions taken toward implementation. Category can range 

from a few initial steps to actions that indicate considerable progress has been made.

Generally implemented – Evidence of a series of actions that indicate the standards are generally or 

mostly implemented.

Source: GAO analysis of UN data.

Ethics Standard or Guideline UNDP UNICEF WFP ILO WHO FAO

Financial interests disclosed by oversight staff

Whistleblower Protection Policy

Ethics: Employees may be required to disclose assets if necessary to ensure no conflict (International 

Civil Service Advisory Board standard); avoid conflict of interest; disclose impairments (IIA standard 

1120-1130); and disclose actual or potential conflicts of interest (UN Uniform Guidelines for 

Investigations, Guidelines IC4 and IIIC)

Ethics: Protect identities of those who make complaints to investigative office (UN Uniform Guidelines

for Investigations, Guideline IVA4)
Page 29 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

UN Evaluation Offices 

Have Not Fully 

Implemented UN 

Evaluation Standards

Although the six UN evaluation offices that we examined are working 

toward implementing components of UN evaluation standards and norms, 

they have not fully implemented them.23 These components include 

ensuring that adequate resources are allocated to enable the evaluation 

function to operate effectively, implementing quality assurance processes, 

and following up systematically on recommendations that were made to 

management. Most of the evaluation offices reported that they lack 

sufficient resources and staff with expertise to manage and conduct 

evaluations—conditions that have impacted their ability to conduct highquality and strategically important evaluations.24 Most of the evaluation 

offices have not fully implemented quality assurance processes; as a result, 

there are reported weaknesses in areas such as evaluation staff selection, 

design, and reporting processes. In addition, all of the evaluation offices 

are working toward fully establishing mechanisms that systematically 

follow up and report on the status of their recommendations to provide 

assurance to senior management that steps are being taken to address 

identified weaknesses in their programs. Figure 6 provides information on 

the six UN evaluation offices’ progress toward implementing UNEG’s 

standards and norms.

23“Evaluation office” as used in this report refers to evaluations conducted or managed, or 

both, by headquarters, regional, and country offices.

24Strategic evaluations are those that assess performance in areas that are critical to 

ensuring sustained contribution to development results in the context of emerging 

development issues and changing priorities at the global and regional levels. These strategic 

evaluations may cover policies and programmatic approaches. 
Page 30 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Figure 6: Selected UN Funds’ and Programs’ and Specialized Agencies’ Progress 

toward Implementing UNEG Standards and Norms

No implementation – Evidence that no steps have been taken to implement the standard.

Partially implemented – Evidence of some actions taken toward implementation. Category can range 

from a few initial steps to actions that indicate considerable progress has been made.

Generally implemented – Evidence of a series of actions that indicate the standards are generally or 

mostly implemented.

Source: GAO analysis of UN data.

UNEG Standard or Norm UNDP UNICEF WFP ILO WHO FAO

Resource management (standard 1.1:2) 

Adequate resources for effective service 

delivery and capacity strengthening

Sufficient staff with appropriate expertise to 

manage the evaluation process and to conduct 

evaluations

Quality assurance (norms 8.1 and 8.2)

Systematic internal quality assurance processes

Recommendation tracking (norms 12.2 and 12.3, also standards 3.17:41 and 3.17:42)

Systematic follow-up on implementation status

Periodic report on recommendation 

implementation to the governing body and/or 

the head of the organization

Competency of staff (norm 9.3 and standards 2.1:2 and 2.1:3)
Page 31 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Most Evaluation Offices 

Lack Sufficient Resources 

and Expertise

The evaluation offices of FAO, ILO, UNICEF, UNDP, and WFP reported that 

they do not have enough staff or staff with the appropriate expertise, 

especially in the field, to manage or conduct high-quality and strategically 

important evaluations as required by UNEG. WHO’s officials stated that 

their evaluation office has sufficient staff and staff with appropriate 

expertise to conduct and manage evaluations. Due to the lack of 

evaluations staff and expertise at most organizations, member states may 

not be provided with accurate and comprehensive information regarding 

whether the program or project is achieving its intended objectives, to 

make informed decisions as to whether the program or project should be 

modified or eliminated. Specifically, UNEG standards call for governing 

bodies or heads of the organizations, or both, to ensure adequate financial 

and human resources to allow the efficient and effective delivery of 

evaluation services by competent staff. In addition, although all evaluation 

offices engage consultants to supplement the work conducted by their 

evaluators, according to a panel of evaluation experts, the availability of 

qualified evaluation consultants in many countries is limited. Some 

regional officers have developed rosters of prescreened consultants to 

support country offices in managing the evaluation process. However, UN 

officials reported that budget constraints and limited supply of wellqualified people hamper regional directors’ and monitoring and evaluation 

officers’ efforts to hire local consultants. We did not review the sufficiency 

of the reported evaluation staff.

Officials in UNICEF’s evaluation office and its peer review panel reported 

that they do not have sufficient numbers of staff or staff with appropriate 

expertise to conduct evaluations and to strengthen evaluation capacity.25

Although the number of professional monitoring and evaluation staff has 

increased by 42 percent since 2002, UNICEF’s evaluation officials reported 

that their staffing needs are still unmet at headquarters and in the field.26

UNICEF also reported that funding for evaluations at the country level is 

not allocated separately from other functions so that the 156 professional 

staff in the field perform other duties as well as devote a portion of their 

time to conducting evaluations. In addition, the evaluation office reported 

Ensure adequate financial and human 

resources for evaluation in order to allow 

efficient and effective delivery of services by 

a competent evaluation function and enable 

evaluation capacity strengthening. (standard 

1.1:2)

Evaluators must have the basic skill set for 

conducting evaluation studies and managing 

externally hired evaluators. (norm 9.3 and 

standards 2.1:2 and 2.1:3)

UNEG Standard/Norm

25UNICEF reported that evaluation resources are scarcer for the more expensive 

evaluations, including corporate-level and country-program evaluations. Donor-funded 

efforts usually do not face implementation constraints, but quality may be less than desired 

if the country office does not have a fully skilled evaluation staff.

26UNICEF reported that it had 48 evaluation professionals in 2002, and 68 in 2006. 
Page 32 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

that about two-thirds of UNICEF’s offices do not have a monitoring and 

evaluation officer at the appropriate level of expertise and therefore are 

less able to consistently deliver high-quality evaluations.27 In May 2006, an 

external peer review panel recommended that the resources for the 

evaluation office be increased to sufficiently cover strategic evaluations 

based on the organization’s priorities. The review panel also stated that 

critical gaps in quality and resources at the regional and country levels 

weaken the usefulness of the evaluation function as a management tool. 

According to evaluation officials, UNICEF’s executive board requested that 

they assess the adequacy of the evaluation budget, which they are currently 

performing as part of a UNICEF-wide review.

UNDP officials reported that they do not have sufficient staff or staff with 

the right skills to manage the evaluations that are performed by consultants 

at the country and regional levels.28 According to UNDP officials, existing 

budget practices for evaluation vary among country offices. Evaluation 

resource requirements are often determined on an informal basis for field 

offices, and the amounts allocated are generally insufficient for quality 

evaluations. In addition, most of the country and regional offices are not 

staffed with evaluation specialists, but rather with focal points. With few 

exceptions, focal points are not evaluation specialists but managers with 

multiple responsibilities who may perform some evaluation-related work. 

Specifically, only 20 of the 142 country offices have full-time monitoring 

and evaluation professionals, specialists or advisors, while 22 country 

offices have only focal points. In addition, all 5 regional bureaus have focal 

points that support evaluation planning and liaise with country offices and 

with the evaluation office at headquarters. Only 1 regional center has a 

monitoring and evaluation specialist position.29 A senior evaluation official 

informed us in April 2007 that a number of country offices are in the 

process of recruiting monitoring and evaluation professionals. In contrast, 

according to UNDP officials, the centrally managed evaluation function, 

which resides in the evaluation office at headquarters, independently 

produces evaluations of a strategic and policy nature and presents them 

27UNICEF has 126 country offices and 7 regional offices. 

28The evaluations conducted by UNDP fall into two categories: (1) independent evaluations 

conducted by the evaluation office at headquarters and (2) decentralized evaluations 

managed by country offices, regional bureaus, and practice and policy bureaus that are 

conducted by consultants. 

29Annual Report of the Administrator on Evaluation in 2005 (May 2006).
Page 33 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

directly to the Executive Board. These evaluations are funded adequately, 

and the expertise of the evaluation staff at headquarters and the 

consultants it recruits are considered highly professional. 

FAO’s evaluation officials informed us that FAO does not have sufficient 

resources to manage and conduct evaluations to address a reasonable level 

of senior management’s concerns. The evaluation office relies heavily on 

the use of outside consultants for its expertise; however, it is difficult to 

maintain quality evaluations while only using consultants, according to the 

officials. Resources are needed to hire staff to manage the consultants’ 

work.30 In addition, ILO officials said that all four of its evaluation 

professionals at headquarters are experienced, and that they provide 

guidance to their regional and technical offices.31 However, all major 

evaluations are conducted by consultants in the field, and there is not 

enough staff at the field level with the expertise to manage the evaluation 

process and to ensure that the evaluations produced by the consultants are 

of good quality. ILO officials informed us in April 2007 that the 2008-2009 

budget will include funding for two additional staff. Furthermore, 

according to WFP officials, their current plan of work for evaluations has 

been designed to fit resources allocated for evaluations rather than to 

ensure adequate resources for the evaluation function. WFP officials said 

that they lack resources to conduct evaluations especially in the regional 

and country offices. According to the officials, only 50 percent of WFP’s 

planned decentralized evaluations managed by regional bureaus and 

country offices were actually conducted in 2006. Similar to other UN 

evaluation offices, such as UNDP and UNICEF, WFP officials said that 

there are few dedicated monitoring and evaluation staff in regional offices, 

and that most of them handle a large number of other duties with only 

limited experience in evaluation. According to the officials, this situation 

hampers the quality of decentralized evaluations.

30The officials said that resources are inadequate for regular program activities and 

significantly inadequate for extrabudgetary programs. 

31ILO’s evaluation office at headquarters has three professional staff. The fourth evaluation 

professional staff joined the evaluation office in 2007 on a temporary basis for 1 year.
Page 34 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Most Evaluation Offices 

Have Not Fully 

Implemented Quality 

Assurance Processes

The evaluation offices of FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP have not fully 

implemented quality assurance processes to help ensure that evaluation 

reports adequately address criteria such as evaluation methodology, scope, 

evidence, and findings.32 WHO’s director of OIOS states that the office has 

in place a stringent internal and external quality assurance review system 

for the evaluation function and that an internal quality assurance selfassessment, which was validated by external reviewers, indicates that the 

evaluation office was in general compliance with IIA standards.33 A number 

of the reported deficiencies point to weaknesses in the design process 

(purpose and objectives, scope, and methodology); in the reporting process 

(evidence-based findings, conclusions, and limitations); and the staff 

selection process (the quality of the evaluators and management of the 

process). However, while not required by UNEG’s standards and norms, 

some of the entities have taken steps to implement quality-review 

mechanisms, such as external peer reviews of draft reports, external 

review of their quality assurance processes, and evaluation committees, to 

provide an added level of quality assurance. UNDP and UNICEF have had 

external peer reviews of their evaluation offices at headquarters, and FAO, 

ILO, and WFP have performed quality appraisal exercises or selfassessments that have identified several areas where their quality 

assurance processes could be improved. 

ILO’s evaluation office reported in November 2006 that while it has 

addressed shortcomings in its evaluation practices, it needs to fully 

implement quality assurance processes to improve the quality of its 

evaluations. The evaluation office reported that some areas of the 

evaluations show strength, but the office does not consistently have welldeveloped monitoring and review plans, as well as indicators and targets, 

for which evaluators can conduct evaluations. To improve the quality of its 

Each evaluation should employ design, 

planning, and implementation processes that 

are inherently quality oriented, covering 

appropriate methodologies for data collection, 

analysis, and interpretation. (norm 8.1)

Evaluation reports must present in a

complete and balanced way the evidence, 

findings, conclusions, and recommendations, 

etc. (norm 8.2)

UNEG Norm

32In addition, in 2005, UNEG performed a baseline review of its UN evaluation members and, 

among other things, reported that management follow-up and quality assurance processes 

were found to be consistently weak, according to UNICEF. UNEG Task Force on ‘Quality 

Stamp’ for Evaluation – Baseline Synopsis of UNEG Members (December 2005). 

33WHO’s OIOS is composed of audit, evaluation, and investigation functions. According to 

the director, the office has chosen the IIA standards as the overarching professional 

guidance because they are more independent and authoritative than UNEG standards and 

are responsive to the evaluation function. However, OIOS also has adopted the UNEG 

standards for its evaluation function and applies them accordingly in the performance of 

evaluation projects. In addition, WHO conducted an internal self-assessment that was 

validated by an external party. The scope and findings of this review were not provided to 

GAO.
Page 35 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

evaluation reports, ILO performed a quality appraisal exercise and 

reviewed 16 of the 65 independent project evaluations that were finalized in 

2005. In November 2006, ILO reported, among other things, the following 

results on the basis of its review: 

• About one-half of the evaluation reports did not state the purpose, 

scope, or objectives of the evaluation. 

• Many reports did not include a methodology section or did not explain 

the methodology in a satisfactory manner. 

• Only 1 of 6 evaluation reports that used sampling or case studies 

explained the selection method. 

• All but 1 of the reports included recommendations and identified 

lessons learned, but it was difficult to extract the lessons learned from 

the evaluations. 

• The findings and conclusions were generally of adequate to good quality, 

but the quality of the analysis varied. 

On the basis of this appraisal, ILO officials stated that the two key factors 

for improving the quality of evaluations are the quality of evaluators and 

the effective management of the evaluation process. As a result, (1) the 

evaluation office has designed 1-day training courses on managing 

independent evaluations, guidelines to provide to all external evaluators on 

expected content and quality of their evaluation reports, and (2) steps are 

being taken to include oversight and control of the selection of evaluators, 

among other things. 

A UNDP senior official reported in May 2006 that the quality and utility of 

the evaluations commissioned by country offices are uneven. Some 

evaluations present rigorous and credible assessments of UNDP 

performance, while others are lacking in their assessment of the program’s 

performance and evaluative evidence, according to the UNDP senior 

official.34 The UNDP senior official also said that part of the problem comes 

from a lack of clarity in program objectives and poorly defined 

34According to UNDP, the evaluations produced by country offices, besides being used for 

programmatic improvement, are building blocks for strategic, global, regional, and country 

program evaluations. 
Page 36 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

performance indicators. In contrast, UNDP officials said that the evaluation 

office at headquarters follows a strict regime of quality assurance, 

including quality validation by external advisory panels. In December 2005, 

an external advisory panel completed a peer assessment of UNDP’s 

evaluation office at headquarters and reported that it produces evaluations 

that are credible, valid, and useful for learning and strategy formation in the 

organization.35 UNDP reports that it is taking a number of actions to help 

ensure the quality of centrally managed and decentralized evaluations. In 

June 2006, the Executive Board approved an evaluation policy for UNDP, 

which is based on the requirements of UNEG standards and norms. Quality 

standards are being developed for each stage of the evaluation process, 

including the planning, conduct, and use of evaluations. UNDP officials 

said that these standards will provide objective, transparent benchmarks 

against which quality can be checked, scored, and ensured at each stage of 

the process.36 According to UNDP officials, the implementation of the 

evaluation policy for field evaluations has just begun, and the evaluation 

office at headquarters intends to carry out an assessment of the policy’s 

implementation in 2008-2009. Furthermore, the evaluation office hopes to 

update its handbook on evaluation and monitoring in 2007. 

While UNICEF’s evaluation office at headquarters reports that it has 

provided guidance and quality standards for conducting evaluations and 

reporting on them, it states that while there has been progress over the past 

2 years, considerable improvement is required, particularly at its country 

offices, to ensure the quality of its evaluations.37 In addition, UNICEF’s peer 

review panel reported in May 2006 that at the country level, in particular, 

there were inconsistencies in applying guidance provided by the evaluation 

office at headquarters to ensure that all evaluations and evaluation reports 

meet the required quality standards. The panel reported that consideration 

should be given to strengthening guidance through training on evaluation 

reporting standards, such as evidence, conclusion, and recommendations, 

and that the accountability for quality assurance across UNICEF’s 

35This peer assessment was designed under the auspices of the Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee Network on 

Development Evaluation. 

36Annual Report of the Administrator on Evaluation in 2005 (May 2006). 

37UNICEF Evaluation Office, The Quality of Evaluations Supported by UNICEF Country 

Offices 2000-2001 (September 2004). In this 2004 report, UNICEF stated that nearly onethird of its evaluations are poor, and that major improvements and value for money can be 

gained by enhancing quality.
Page 37 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

evaluation function should be more clearly defined, particularly at the 

country and regional levels.

FAO evaluation officials said that they have a quality assurance process in 

place that differs on the basis of the types of evaluation reports it produces. 

According to the evaluation officials, internal quality assurance was 

strengthened with a set of quality standards introduced in the last 3 months 

and the addition of review conducted by external evaluation specialists to 

the reviews carried out by independent peer review panels and staff. FAO 

officials informed us that there was further room for improvement 

regarding whether the evaluation office was meeting UNEG’s quality 

standards, including for corporate evaluations. WFP performed a selfassessment of its evaluation function in August 2005 as part of the UNEG 

checklist on evaluation quality and identified areas for improvement, such 

as ensuring that the quality of evaluation reports is systematically 

controlled by quality rules, which it is currently addressing.

While not required to do so by UNEG’s standards and norms, some of the 

organizations have taken steps to implement quality review mechanisms, 

such as external peer reviews of draft reports, peer reviews of the 

evaluation function, and evaluation committees, to provide an added level 

of quality assurance. For example, WFP’s evaluation office said that it uses 

the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in 

Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) for the review of its humanitarian 

evaluations.38 In addition, three of the evaluation offices (UNDP, UNICEF, 

and WHO) have had external peer reviews that cover their quality 

assurance processes within the past year or 2, while two are currently 

undergoing reviews (FAO and WFP). Furthermore, four of the evaluation 

offices (FAO, ILO, UNICEF, and WFP) have established evaluation 

committees. 

38ALNAP reviews UN organization evaluations on humanitarian assistance programs and 

comments on their quality.
Page 38 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

All Evaluation Offices Are 

Working toward Fully 

Establishing Mechanisms to 

Systematically Follow Up 

and Report on the Status of 

Their Recommendations 

All evaluation offices are working toward fully establishing mechanisms to 

systematically follow up and report on the implementation status of their 

recommendations. UNEG requires its evaluation offices to perform a 

systematic follow-up and prepare a periodic report on the status of the 

implementation of the evaluation recommendations that have been 

accepted by the head of the organization or the governing body, or both. 

FAO’s, ILO’s, UNDP’s, and WHO’s evaluation offices have systems in place 

to follow up on management’s response to their evaluation 

recommendations. Officials of ILO’s evaluation office said that its 

monitoring of management’s implementation of recommendations is 

overseen by ILO’s Evaluation Advisory Committee, which requires ILO 

management to formally respond every 6 months to the evaluation office’s 

findings and recommendations. UNDP’s evaluation office developed its 

recommendation monitoring system in 2006 and has a systematic follow-up 

process in place. FAO’s program committee39 requires that management 

respond to the evaluation office’s recommendations by indicating which 

recommendations it will accept or reject, or both, and report on the 

progress made in implementing the recommendations. The program 

committee requires FAO’s evaluation office to determine whether the 

report is produced and complies with the standards, according to the chief 

evaluation officer. WHO has a follow-up process in place, and the frequency 

of recommendation follow-up depends on the type of the evaluation.

UNICEF’s and WFP’s evaluation offices have begun to develop evaluation 

recommendation tracking systems to allow better follow-up on the status 

of their recommendations. UNICEF’s evaluation officials stated that they 

are in the process of developing such a system because the prior 

recommendation monitoring processes did not use a consistent structure 

or guidance. Specifically, the evaluation office had been addressing the 

status of recommendations through memorandums that are exchanged 

among divisions or offices involved in action plans.40 Like UNICEF, WFP is 

in the process of developing a follow-up system, which will take into 

account international good practice, as discussed during UNEG’s meetings, 

to further improve its system. 

UNEG Standard

There should be a systematic follow-up on 

the implementation of the evaluation 

recommendations that have been accepted 

by management and/or the governing bodies. 

(norm 12.2 and standard 3.17:41)

There should be a periodic report on the 

status of the implementation of the evaluation 

recommendations. This report should be 

presented to the governing bodies and/or the 

head of the organization. (norm 12.3 and 

standard 3.17:42)

39This program committee is a committee of the member countries (governing bodies). 

40In addition, UNICEF’s peer review panel reported in May 2006 that management responses 

have not been systematically required until recently, and that there has been no system for 

tracking follow-up of recommendations.
Page 39 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

All of the evaluation offices provide periodic reporting on the status of their 

recommendations to agency heads or their governing bodies, or both. The 

reporting of the status of recommendations would indicate to management 

and the governing bodies the extent to which actions are being taken to 

address identified weaknesses in the evaluation programs or projects. ILO’s 

and WFP’s evaluation offices report to their governing bodies annually on 

the implementation status of their recommendations, and WHO reports 

twice a year to its senior management and governing body. FAO’s 

evaluation office is required to provide a status report on its 

recommendations to its governing body after 1 to 2 years, depending on the 

type of evaluation performed. Every 4 months, the head of UNDP’s 

evaluation office provides a report to senior management on the status of 

the implementation of its recommendations, which includes highlighting 

recommendations and systemic issues that are not being addressed. 

UNDP’s evaluation office plans to provide a periodic report on the status of 

its recommendations to its governing body as part of its annual reporting, 

beginning in 2007. In addition, UNICEF’s evaluation office provides a report 

on the status of its evaluation recommendations to its evaluation 

committee, which is chaired by its executive director. While UNICEF 

officials said that UNICEF does not provide periodic reporting covering the 

specific status of each recommendation to its governing body, it provides 

information to give the governing body a general understanding of whether 

the systemic issues the evaluation office raised are being addressed. 

Governing Bodies Lack 

Full Access to 

Information That 

Could Provide Greater 

Insights into UN 

Organizations’ 

Operations and 

Identify Critical 

Systemic Weaknesses 

The governing bodies responsible for oversight and accountability of the 

resources of the six UN organizations that we reviewed lack full access to 

internal audit reports and most lack direct information from the internal 

audit offices about the sufficiency of their resources and capacity to 

conduct their work, which could provide greater insights into the 

organizations’ operations and identify critical systemic weaknesses. In 

addition, although most of the organizations have audit committees that 

review internal audit activities and report to the heads of the organizations, 

only WHO has a committee that is autonomous of senior management and 

is part of its governing body. To carry out some of their oversight 

responsibilities, UN governing bodies are provided with the external 

auditor’s report on the organization’s financial statements as well as the 

internal audit office’s summary of internal audit activities. However, where 

the governing bodies do not have full access to internal audit reports, they 

may lack full information on systemic weaknesses in internal controls; 

cases of fraud, waste, and mismanagement; senior management’s response 

to audit recommendations; and senior management’s plans for taking 
Page 40 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

correction action. Also, most of the governing bodies lack direct 

information from the internal audit offices on the sufficiency of the audit 

offices’ staffing and financial resources as well as the audit offices’ capacity 

for conducting effective oversight. In addition, international best practices 

suggest that oversight could be strengthened by establishing an 

independent audit committee—composed of members external to the 

management of the organization and reporting to the governing body on the 

effectiveness of the audit office and on the adequacy of its resources—as 

part of the governance structure of each of the United Nations’ governing 

bodies. However, the audit committees at four of the six UN organizations 

we examined are not in line with these international best practices, and one 

of the entities does not have an audit committee. Four of the five audit 

committees are not accountable to their governing bodies, and three of 

these committees are composed of senior management officials. An audit 

committee that is composed of external members and accountable to the 

governing body could also assist it with its responsibility to monitor the 

organization’s oversight function. In the absence of such an audit 

committee, many of the member state representatives to the governing 

bodies told us they find such monitoring difficult because they lack 

sufficient resources and expertise.

Governing Bodies Lack Full 

Access to Internal Audit 

Reports 

While the governing bodies of the six organizations we examined receive 

information from various sources about the effectiveness of the 

organizations’ financial and programmatic operations, they do not have full 

access to internal audit reports, which could increase transparency and 

provide further insight into the organizations’ operations. Currently, the 

governing bodies receive information on the organizations’ operations from 

various sources, including the external auditor’s report on the 

organization’s financial statements, the internal audit office’s report 

summarizing its main findings and activities, and the audit committee’s 

report on the internal audit office’s activities. For example, UNICEF’s audit 

office provides an independent annual report to the governing body 

covering its summary of audit activities, findings, analysis of systemic 

weaknesses, and issues of internal controls. In September 2006, UNICEF’s 

Executive Board requested that UNICEF’s audit office further enhance the 

level of analysis in its annual report to include management responses to 

key and recurring issues identified by the audit office, as well as assess and 

report on the adequacy of resources for the internal audit function, which 

the audit office will provide in future reporting. 
Page 41 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

While these existing information sources help the governing body exercise 

its oversight responsibilities, some member states want access to internal 

audit reports, which would increase transparency and their awareness of 

the adequacy and effectiveness of the organization’s system of internal 

controls. For example, a representative stated on behalf of the European 

Community that the international organizations should work in the spirit of 

transparency regarding member states’ access to internal audit reports. 

Similarly, in a governing body committee meeting to discuss member 

states’ access to internal audit reports, a U.S. representative stated that 

although the internal audit office’s annual report to the governing body 

contains useful information, it does not provide enough information to 

determine whether implemented recommendations significantly improve 

FAO’s operations. Over the past year, another U.S. representative requested 

specific internal audit reports that would provide more information on the 

oversight of UNDP’s operations in a specific country. The U.S. 

representatives stated that full access to UNDP audit reports would help 

them to exercise their oversight responsibilities as members of the 

governing body. 

The UN Secretariat’s internal audit office provides member states with 

access to internal audit reports upon request, and some of the UN 

organizations we studied are considering making these reports available to 

member states. In December 2004, the UN General Assembly granted 

member states access to internal audit reports of the UN Secretariat’s 

internal audit office to increase transparency and accountability at the 

Secretariat.41 Previously, the internal audit offices’ reports were issued only 

to the Secretary-General and the heads of the UN organizations under 

examination. According to a U.S. representative, the practice of providing 

member states with access to audit reports at the UN Secretariat has 

helped to provide insight into the operations of the United Nations and 

identify critical systemic weaknesses. Currently, although WHO’s internal 

audit office does not provide member states with copies of its internal audit 

reports, the office’s policy is to provide a detailed briefing, which may 

include reading the internal audit report, to member states upon request. 

Under ILO’s financial regulations, the chief internal auditor has the 

authority to submit any internal audit report to the governing body, if the 

chief internal auditor deems it necessary to do so. In addition, some of the 

organizations we studied are considering making internal audit reports 

available to member states. For example, since May 2006, FAO’s governing 

41See G.A. Res. 59/272, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/59/272 (2005). 
Page 42 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

body has been discussing the criteria by which member states may access 

FAO’s internal audit reports. Although WFP’s governing body has not 

formally considered requesting access to audit reports, WFP’s chief 

internal auditor said he would not oppose such a measure if the governing 

body makes such a decision after considering all of the advantages and 

disadvantages, including issues of confidentiality and due process, because 

he believes that member states’ access would enhance the organization’s 

transparency. However, some internal audit officials indicated that it may 

be difficult and time-consuming to modify the current structure of audit 

reports to delete sensitive material, and that making the reports available 

to member states would raise issues concerning confidentiality, 

administrative workloads, and the potential for micromanagement by 

member states. 

Most Governing Bodies 

Lack Direct Information 

from the Internal Audit 

Offices on the Adequacy of 

the Audit Offices’ Resources 

and Capacity to Conduct 

Oversight

Most governing bodies of the six UN organizations we examined are not 

provided with information directly from the internal audit offices on the 

adequacy of the audit offices’ staffing and financial resources; as a result, 

the governing bodies may be unaware of the audit offices’ capacity to 

conduct effective oversight. WHO’s governing body does receive this 

information through its Program, Budget and Administration Committee. 

According to international auditing standards, an internal audit office 

should have sufficient resources to effectively achieve its mandate. 

However, the internal audit officials must rely on senior management to 

ensure that they have sufficient resources to conduct their planned audits. 

Several UN audit officials stated that they had expressed the need for 

additional resources to senior management officials who can grant or deny 

their funding request, depending on the budgetary situation of the 

organization and senior management’s commitment to oversight issues. 

For example, ILO audit officials stated that over the past several years, they 

had requested resources to hire an investigator, but until this year, no 

action had been taken. In March 2007, the governing body approved ILO’s 

2008-2009 budget request, which sought additional funds for its internal 

audit office; according to ILO’s chief internal auditor, ILO will use the 

additional oversight resources to employ a qualified and experienced 

investigator. While the governing bodies approve the organizations’ overall 

budgets, in general they do not see the internal audit office’s budget, staff 

size, and results of resource needs assessments. Therefore, the governing 

bodies may be unaware of the internal audit offices’ requests for additional 

resources. For example, although UNICEF officials told us that the audit 

office lacks adequate resources to address high-risk areas and that 
Page 43 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

UNICEF’s audit chief submits an annual report directly to its governing 

body, the audit chief did not communicate this deficiency to its governing 

body when it had the opportunity to do so in its June 2006 annual report on 

its internal audit activities. As a result, the governing body may not be 

aware of the audit chief’s concerns. 

Most Audit Committees Are 

Not Aligned with Best 

Practices

Although five of the six UN organizations that we examined have 

established audit committees, the accountability structure and 

composition of four of these audit committees are not aligned with IIA’s 

best practices.42 According to IIA, an independent audit committee is 

considered critical to help ensure that the organization has strong and 

effective processes related to independence, internal control, risk 

management, compliance, ethics, and financial disclosure. Figure 7 depicts 

the purpose, membership, and responsibilities of an audit committee, 

according to best practices. Best practices also suggest that the governing 

body approve the functions and responsibilities of the audit committee. In 

addition, members of the audit committee should understand accounting 

principles, financial statements, and internal controls. According to IIA, an 

audit committee’s responsibilities are to review the proposed budgets of 

the internal oversight offices, make recommendations to the governing 

body on the level of resources needed for internal oversight, and provide a 

level of independence from the organization’s senior management. 

Moreover, an independent audit committee provides the governing body 

with an independent and objective assessment of audits of the 

organization’s financial statements and the internal auditors’ performance. 

Of the six UN organizations, only WHO’s PBAC has an audit committee 

structure that includes many of IIA’s best practices. 

42All six UN organizations that we studied have adopted IIA’s International Standards for the 

Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
Page 44 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Figure 7: Audit Committee Purpose, Membership, and Responsibilities According to Best Practices

Although five of the six UN organizations that we examined have 

established audit committees, the accountability structure and 

composition of four of these audit committees are not aligned with the IIA 

best practices. Specifically, most audit committees, except for WHO’s, are 

neither independent of senior management nor accountable to the 

governing body, and most include senior management officials rather than 

exclusively external financial experts. WHO’s PBAC functions as an audit 

committee and is generally aligned with IIA’s best practices.43 The PBAC is 

composed of 14 of WHO’s governing body members and is accountable to 

WHO’s entire governing body.44 In addition, WHO’s PBAC independently 

provides information on the effectiveness and capacity of WHO’s internal 

audit office directly to the full governing body. In contrast, according to the 

audit committee charters of FAO’s, UNDP’s, UNICEF’s, and WFP’s, their 

audit committees are accountable to the heads of their respective 

organizations and not to their respective governing bodies. In addition, 

these committees do not independently report on the effectiveness and 

Source: GAO analysis of IIA guidance.

Best Practice Audit Committee

• To assist the governing 

body in its oversight 

responsibilities

• To act as an 

independent safeguard 

on management

• Independent from 

the organization

• With specialized 

skills in financial 

reporting, 

corporate 

governance, and 

internal control 

• Selected by the 

governing body

Purpose: Membership:

• Reviewing and approving the internal audit activity’s charter

• Ensuring communication and reporting lines between the chief internal auditor and the 

 audit committee

• Reviewing internal audit staffing and ensuring that the function has the necessary 

 resources

• Reviewing and assessing the annual internal audit plan

• Overseeing the coordination of the internal auditor and the external auditor

• Reviewing periodic reports on the results of the internal auditor’s work

• Reviewing senior management’s responsiveness to internal audit findings and 

 recommendations

• Monitoring and assessing internal audit effectiveness

Responsibilities:

43In May 2004, WHO’s governing body merged the Administration, Budget and Finance 

Committee, the Audit Committee, and the Programme Development Committee into a single 

committee, composed of its members, called the Program, Budget and Administration 

Committee. 

44WHO’s governing body is composed of 32 members. 
Page 45 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

capacity of the organization’s internal audit office directly to their 

respective governing bodies, as IIA suggests. Although all four audit 

committees provide reports summarizing their work to the governing 

bodies, FAO’s, UNICEF’s, and WFP’s audit committees issue their reports 

to their respective organization heads who provide a copy to the governing 

body. In contrast, UNDP’s audit committee charter allows the committee to 

independently submit its annual report to its governing body. Without an 

independent and knowledgeable audit committee, senior management’s 

opinion could override that of the audit committee. As a result, a governing 

body would not have the benefit of an audit committee’s assistance in 

ensuring that an organization has implemented effective oversight 

practices. Figure 8 illustrates the differences between the current practice 

of the four UN organizations without independent audit committees and 

IIA’s best practice accountability structure for the audit committee, 

governing body, senior management, external auditor, and internal audit 

office.
Page 46 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Figure 8: Differences between Current Practice for Most of the UN Organizations and IIA’s Best Practice Accountability 

Structure for Audit Committees

Most Audit Committees Are Not 

Accountable to Their Governing 

Bodies

The audit committees at four of the five organizations that have audit 

committees are not accountable to their governing bodies, despite IIA’s 

recommendation that the audit committee report regularly to the governing 

body. As previously stated, WHO’s PBAC (audit committee) is composed of 

members of its governing body, and it is accountable to the governing body. 

According to their charters, UNDP’s and WFP’s audit committee 

chairpersons may present their annual reports to their respective governing 

bodies. However, UNDP’s audit committee was newly reconstituted in 2006 

and has not issued its first annual report, so UNDP’s governing body has 

not had the opportunity to request that the audit committee chairperson 

present it. Although WFP’s governing body received the audit committee’s 

first annual report in 2005, the contents of the report were not discussed at 

WFP’s governing body meetings. WFP’s audit committee did not release its 

annual report in 2006, so the chairman has not had the opportunity to 

present it. Although WFP’s audit committee charter specifies that the 

Source: GAO analysis of UN data and IIA guidance.

Accountability relationship

Accountability relationship of audit committee

Information provided

Governing 

body

Member 

states

Senior

management

Audit

committee

Internal audit 

office

External

auditor

Governing 

body

Member 

states

Senior

management

Audit 

committee

Internal audit 

office

External 

auditor

UN organizations’ accountability structure: most audit 

committees report to senior management

External to UN organization

organization

IIA’s best practices accountability structure: audit 

committee reports to governing body

External to UN organization organization
Page 47 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

chairman shall present an audit committee report annually45 to the 

governing body, the chairman believes there is insufficient interaction 

between the committee and the governing body. In 2006, WFP’s external 

auditor recommended that the governing body formally acknowledge the 

role and mandate of the audit committee to reinforce the independence of 

such a committee and to ensure a closer alignment of WFP’s arrangements 

with best practices in governance. A member of WFP’s governing body 

stated that the governing body has begun discussing what role, if any, the 

audit committee should have in the organization and what type of 

relationship it should have with the governing body. The governing body 

members have not reached consensus on this matter. At FAO and UNICEF, 

the extent to which the audit committee interacts with the governing body 

is unclear. The relationship of FAO’s audit committee to its governing body 

is not mentioned in its charter. One FAO governing body representative 

stated that he was unaware of the activities and composition of FAO’s audit 

committee, and that there was no formal interaction between the audit 

committee and the governing body. UNICEF’s audit committee charter 

specifies that its audit committee is expected to maintain free and open 

communication with BOA, the internal audit office, and UNICEF senior 

management, and that it may consult the head of the governing body only 

in exceptional circumstances. 

Some Audit Committees Are 

Composed of Senior 

Management Officials

At three of the UN organizations that we examined, the organizations’ 

senior management officials are members of the audit committees, and the 

audit committees are not always composed of financial experts. IIA 

recommends that the audit committee be composed of external members 

who have expertise in accounting and financial matters. Figure 9 provides 

information on the current composition and accountability structure of the 

UN audit committees that we studied. UNDP has an audit committee that is 

composed entirely of external members who have oversight or financial 

backgrounds, but it is not accountable to the governing body. WHO’s audit 

committee is composed of 14 of its governing body members, 2 from each 

of its 6 geographical regions, plus a chairman and a vice-chairman who are 

ex officio members. UNICEF’s, WFP’s, and FAO’s audit committee charters 

allow for the inclusion of senior management officials on the committee. 

Whereas UNDP’s, UNICEF’s, and WFP’s audit committee charters specify 

that the chairperson shall be a member external to the organization, FAO’s 

45WFP’s audit committee charter does not specify whether the report that the governing 

body receives is the same report submitted to the head of the organization. 
Page 48 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

audit committee charter specifies that the audit chairperson shall be the 

Deputy Director General. 

Figure 9: Audit Committees at the Six UN Organizations That We Examined

a

In 2004, WHO’s Administration, Budget and Finance Committee, the Audit Committee, and the 

Programme Development Committee merged into a single committee. 

Some Organizations Are 

Considering the Establishment 

of Audit Committees That Are 

Aligned with Best Practices

An independent audit committee could assist the governing body in 

monitoring the organization’s oversight functions. In the absence of such 

an audit committee, many member state representatives said that they find 

such monitoring to be difficult because they lack sufficient resources and 

expertise. The majority of the member state representatives are 

responsible for programmatic and policy issues within several UN 

organizations, and many said that they consider oversight issues secondary 

to programmatic issues. In addition, some representatives told us that the 

Source: GAO analysis of UN data.

UNDP UNICEF WFP ILO WHO FAO

Audit committee 

composition and 

by whom its

members are 

appointed

Composed of 5 

external members

appointed by the head 

of the organization.

External member of 

committee designated 

by the head of the 

organization.

Committee issues

annual report to the 

head of the 

organization, who 

provides a copy to 

the governing body.

Committee issues

annual report to the 

governing body.

Upon request, 

chairman shall 

present the report to 

the governing body.

Committee issues

annual report to the 

head of the 

organization. 

Committee also 

prepares a report 

that is transmitted 

through the head of 

the organization to 

the governing body.

Not applicable. Committee 

issues/presents

reports twice per 

year to the governing 

body.

Committee issues

annual report to the 

head of the 

organization, who 

provides a copy to 

the governing body’s

Finance Committee.

External member of 

committee elected 

by committee 

members. 

External member of 

committee, 

appointed by the 

head of the 

organization.

Not applicable. Chairman and 

Vice-Chairman ex 

officio selected from 

among the 

governing body 

members.

Deputy Director 

General.

Head of the 

organization.

Head of the 

organization. 

Head of the 

organization. 

Head of the 

organization. 

Not applicable. Governing body.

Composed of 3 

external and 3 

internal members

appointed by the 

head of the 

organization.

Composed of 3 

external and 2 

internal members

appointed by the 

head of the 

organization.

Currently, there is no 

audit committee. In 

March 2007, ILO 

submitted a proposal 

to its governing body 

to consider 

establishing an 

independent 

oversight committee.

Created by member 

states and 

composed of 14 

members selected 

from among the 

governing body.a

Composed of 2 

external and 5 

internal members

appointed by the 

head of the 

organization.

Committee 

chairperson

To whom the audit 

committee is

accountable

Reports issued to 

its governing body
Page 49 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

highly technical aspects of auditing make it difficult for them to question or 

challenge audit practices. As a result, some member states are not actively 

engaged in monitoring UN oversight organizations due to impediments in 

the existing governance structure and the lack of resources and expertise. 

However, an independent audit committee could provide the governing 

body with an independent assessment of the organizations’ financial 

statements and the internal auditors’ performance.

Some organizations have begun discussing whether to establish audit 

committees that are aligned with IIA best practices. According to WHO, its 

PBAC, which acts as its audit committee, fulfills most of the requirements 

of an audit committee. Its audit committee was created by the member 

states, and it is independent from senior management and is accountable to 

the governing body. In addition, among other things, PBAC reviews the 

work plan of the internal audit office and the external auditor; reviews the 

internal audit staffing and ensures that the function has adequate 

resources; reviews periodic reports of internal audit, including annual 

reports summarizing audit findings and progress on implementation of 

internal and external audit recommendations. However, WHO’s chief 

internal auditor does not have a direct organizational reporting line to the 

PBAC, but rather reports directly to WHO’s Director-General. IIA’s guidance 

provides that the internal auditor should have the organizational 

independence to allow the audit activity to conduct work without 

interference by the entity under audit. By reporting organizationally to 

WHO’s Director-General, rather than to the PBAC, the chief internal auditor 

does not have a level of organizational independence that is consistent with 

IIA’s guidance. The member states of ILO’s governing body and its external 

auditor recommended that ILO establish an audit committee. In response, 

ILO is currently making progress toward establishing an independent 

oversight advisory committee that could be in line with best practices and 

accountable to the governing body and entirely composed of external 

members, if implemented as proposed. For example, in March 2007, ILO 

submitted a proposal to its governing body to consider establishing an 

independent oversight committee, but the governing body has not yet 

reached consensus on this matter. In addition, FAO’s senior management is 

taking steps to reconstitute its audit committee by 2008 so that the 

committee is composed entirely of external members; however, the audit 

committee will still be accountable to the head of the organization, rather 

than to the governing body, according to a senior FAO official. Moreover, 

WFP’s senior management indicated that it would be open to adopting an 

external audit committee that conforms to IIA’s best practices, and WFP’s 

current audit committee chairman concurred with this view. 
Page 50 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Conclusions The governing bodies of the UN funds and programs and specialized 

agencies are responsible for providing effective oversight and 

accountability for the billions of dollars provided annually by member 

states, including the United States, to support a wide range of activities 

globally. Since UN organizations are funded with government resources, it 

is essential that member states have measures in place that provide timely, 

independent, and comprehensive information on the operational 

effectiveness and efficiency of their programs. Independent and adequately 

resourced oversight mechanisms that employ international accountability 

standards and best practices are an integral part of organizations and can 

provide the governing bodies with reasonable assurance that the UN 

organizations’ funds are being used as intended. For various reasons, 

existing internal oversight mechanisms within the six UN organizations 

that we reviewed had not fully implemented some key components of 

internationally accepted standards and best practices. This condition 

hinders them from carrying out some of their oversight responsibilities as 

defined by the governing bodies of their respective organizations. In 

addition, because key internal oversight structures, such as audit 

committees, do not report directly to the governing bodies, the 

organizations’ good governance practices are hampered. Without the 

insights provided by access to internal audit reports, an independent audit 

committee, and an internal audit activity with a high level of independence, 

the governing bodies could face challenges in fully executing their 

responsibilities of monitoring the effective and efficient use of resources, 

senior management’s actions, and the organization’s operations. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To improve oversight in UN organizations, we are making 

recommendations to the Secretary of State to direct the U.S. Missions to 

work with member states by taking the following two actions:

• Make internal audit reports available to the governing bodies to provide 

further insight into the operations of the United Nations’ organizations 

and identify critical systemic weaknesses. 

• Establish independent audit committees that are accountable to their 

governing bodies, where this currently does not occur. Audit committee 

oversight responsibilities could include the following:

• ensuring communication and reporting lines between the head of 

internal audit and the audit committee,
Page 51 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

• reviewing internal audit staffing and ensuring that the function has 

the necessary resources,

• reviewing and assessing the annual internal audit plan, 

• reviewing management’s responsiveness to internal audit findings, 

and

• monitoring and assessing internal audit effectiveness.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from the 

Secretary of State and cognizant officials representing the six UN-affiliated 

agencies that we reviewed—FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO. 

These comments are reprinted in appendixes II through VIII, along with our 

responses to specific points. State, FAO, UNDP, WFP, and WHO generally 

agreed with the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. ILO 

commented that it has serious reservations about implementing our 

recommendation to make internal audit reports available to governing 

bodies. UNICEF expressed concerns about our recommendation to 

establish independent audit committees that are accountable to their 

governing bodies. State and the six UN-affiliated agencies submitted 

technical comments that we have incorporated into this report, as 

appropriate.

State endorsed the main findings and conclusions of our report. 

Specifically, State fully agreed that members of the governing bodies 

should have access to reports and that the establishment of independent 

audit committees that meet international best practices would strengthen 

governance. State also noted that our report accurately recognizes that this 

goal will require the United States to work with other member states to 

build support. According to State, the United States has established 

partnerships with several other like-minded member states, and will 

continue to work with them to build a constituency for strengthening 

oversight and accountability in the UN system.

FAO stated that our report observations are clear, comprehensive, and 

well-reasoned. The organization also said that the report’s thrust toward 

instituting further best practices is considered timely and consistent with 

the approach that FAO has been observing in recent years. In addition, 

regarding the recommendation on the sharing of internal audit reports, 

FAO said that this matter is currently under consideration by both the FAO 
Page 52 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

governing bodies and by the Chief Executives’ Board for Coordination of 

the UN system. Furthermore, regarding our recommendation on 

establishing an independent audit committee that is accountable to these 

entities’ governing bodies, FAO stated that from 2008 onwards, the FAO 

audit committee will be composed solely of external members who will act 

in an advisory capacity to the FAO Director-General.

UNDP stated that it has taken note of the recommendations put forth in the 

report. Also, UNDP stated that it is reviewing these recommendations, and 

that these will be part of the interaction with the Executive Board during 

June 2007.

WFP stated that the report is a useful contribution to the ongoing debate on 

enhancing oversight and accountability in the UN system. Specifically, WFP 

noted that the substance of our recommendations is currently being 

debated in many forums throughout the UN system. In addition, WFP noted 

that its Executive Board and its bureau have been engaged in considering 

issues related to the composition and reporting lines of the audit 

committee.

WHO commented that it is engaged with other organizations in the UN 

system in addressing the issue of access to internal audit reports. The 

organization noted that while it supports the concept of transparency, there 

is a need to balance the sharing of information against the need to protect 

privileged information and the rights of staff members. In addition, WHO 

noted that its PBAC already fulfills most of the requirements that we 

advocate, such as independence from senior management and 

accountability to the governing body. Upon receipt of WHO’s technical 

comments, our report was updated to reflect that WHO has a PBAC that 

operates similarly to an audit committee. Furthermore, WHO stated that 

IIA’s best practice accountability structure illustrated in our report would 

effectively create a second external auditor, which would not be a 

workable solution. We disagree that the IIA guidance would create an 

external auditor and leave the Director-General without an internal audit 

function. Specifically, IIA guidance on the key elements of an effective 

public sector audit activity, which would apply to the internal audit activity 

at WHO, provides that at a minimum, the audit activity needs to have 

organizational independence that allows audit work that is without 

interference by the entity under audit and is seen to be independent as well. 

The IIA guidance states that this organizational independence contributes 

to the accuracy of the auditors’ work and the ability to rely on the audit 

results. By having the WHO internal audit activity report organizationally to 
Page 53 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

the PBAC, which serves as the audit committee for WHO’s governing body, 

the independence of internal audits of the Director-General’s programs and 

responsibilities would be enhanced significantly. In addition, the DirectorGeneral would continue to have an internal audit function, but it would be 

reporting organizationally to the PBAC of the governing body.

ILO noted that our report did not sufficiently reflect actions taken by ILO to 

address issues highlighted regarding inadequacy of audit staffing levels; 

lack of an organizationwide risk-management framework; and lack of 

access to internal audit reports and other information by the governing 

body, audit staff financial disclosure, and an audit committee. Our report 

was updated after receipt of ILO’s technical comments to reflect 

information provided by the organization regarding several of these issues, 

including adequacy of resources, financial disclosure, and the proposal 

submitted by the Director-General to ILO’s governing body calling for the 

creation of an independent audit committee. In addition, ILO stated that the 

report does not reflect the process that ILO has in place concerning the 

provision of access to information. We updated our report to reflect 

information provided in ILO’s technical comments about this process. 

Furthermore, ILO commented that it has serious reservations about 

implementing the recommendation regarding making internal audit reports 

available to governing bodies. We maintain that providing the governing 

body with access to all internal audit reports will provide the governing 

body greater insight into the organization’s operations and highlight 

systemic weaknesses in internal controls.

UNICEF noted that many of the issues raised in our report are for 

consideration by the UNICEF Executive Board, and UNICEF recognizes 

the importance of ensuring that any discussion of such issues takes place 

within the jurisdiction of the UNICEF Executive Board. Regarding the 

recommendation of making internal audit reports available to the 

governing body and audit committee, UNICEF stated that its Executive 

Board has requested that UNICEF further enhance the level of analysis in 

the publicly available annual report of UNICEF’s Office of Internal Audit; 

include management responses to the key and recurring issues identified 

by the Office of Internal Audit; and assess and report on the resources 

required for the internal audit function. In addition, UNICEF noted that any 

proposal to reorder the governance mechanisms so as to align them with a 

particular understanding of the IIA standards would be a matter for the 

UNICEF Executive Board (among other institutions). We recognize that 

decisions regarding changes in UNICEF’s lines of reporting to allow 

UNICEF’s governing body access to all audit reports, as well as the creation 
Page 54 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

of an independent audit committee to be in line with international best 

practices, will require the consideration and approval of UNICEF’s 

Executive Board. We also maintain that the United States, as a member of 

UNICEF’s governing body, should work with other member states to 

consider and implement these recommendations.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of State, and the U.S. Permanent Representative 

to the United Nations. We will also make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page of 

this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix IX.

Thomas Melito

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Page 55 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

Our objectives were to examine the extent to which (1) internal audit 

offices have implemented professional standards for performing audits and 

investigation, (2) evaluation offices have implemented United Nations 

(UN) evaluation standards and norms, and (3) governing bodies are 

provided with information about the results of UN oversight practices. For 

our review, we selected 6 UN organizations from among the 10 funds and 

programs and 15 specialized agencies that comprise the universe of all UN 

funds and programs and specialized agencies. On the basis of their budgets 

for biennium 2004-2005, we selected the 3 largest funds and programs and 3 

of the largest specialized agencies.1 Therefore, our results cannot be 

generalized to the full universe of all funds and programs and specialized 

agencies and may not represent the practices of the smaller UN 

organizations. The funds and programs we selected include the United 

Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s 

Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Program (WFP). The specialized 

agencies we selected include the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 

the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the World Health 

Organization (WHO). 

To examine the extent to which the six organizations’ internal audit offices 

have implemented professional standards for performing audits, we 

reviewed relevant standards issued by the Institute for Internal Auditors 

(IIA), which is recognized as the internal audit profession’s leader in 

certification, education, research, and technological guidance. IIA provides 

comprehensive guidance for the profession through its Professional 

Practice Framework, including the International Standards for the 

Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, which outlines the tenets of 

the internal audit profession and The Role of Auditing in Public Sector 

Governance, which provides guidance to all levels of government. The six 

UN organizations that we examined have adopted the IIA standards. To 

conduct our review, we selected key audit standards that were based on 

previous GAO work.2

 Specifically, we (1) selected standards relating to 

risk-management framework, risk-based audit work plans, resource 

management, quality assurance, recommendation monitoring, and ethics 

practices and (2) assessed the extent to which these six organizations’ 

1

Total 2004-2005 biennium budgets (in billions of US dollars) for the following UN 

organizations include regular and extrabudgetary resources: UNDP, $7.13; WFP, $5.99; 

UNICEF, $4.87; WHO, $3.98; FAO, $1.34; and ILO, $0.90.

2

GAO, United Nations: Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of Internal 

Auditors, GAO-06-575 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006).
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 56 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

practices were consistent with these standards. We examined documents 

from the six organizations, including reports prepared by the organizations’ 

external auditors, external peer reviewers, and audit committees, as well as 

reports prepared by the chief audit executives for senior management and 

governing bodies. In addition, we conducted interviews with various 

officials, including officials of the internal audit offices, finance division, 

audit committees, legal offices, and external auditors. We did not perform 

independent assessments of the organizations’ audit functions. Our reviews 

were limited to reviews of documents and interviews with the various 

officials. For example, to assess whether the internal audit offices had 

sufficient resources to conduct their risk-based work plan, we based our 

findings on interviews with the organizations’ audit officials and their 

external auditors’ assessment of the adequacy of the organizations’ audit 

coverage. 

Regarding investigations, the six UN organizations we examined have 

adopted the UN Uniform Guidelines for Investigations, which are intended 

to be used as guidance in the conduct of investigations in conjunction with 

each organization’s rules and regulations. In particular, we focused on the 

guideline that states that the planning and conduct of the investigation 

should reasonably ensure that resources devoted to investigations are 

proportionate to the allegation because having resources for investigations 

is fundamental to probe allegations of wrongdoing. To assess the extent to 

which investigative resources were sufficient, we examined documents 

from the six organizations, including reports prepared by the organizations’ 

external auditors, annual reports of the oversight unit chiefs to the head of 

the organization, and the audit committees’ reports, where applicable. In 

addition, we conducted interviews with various officials, including external 

auditors, internal auditors, and investigators, where applicable. We did not 

perform independent assessments of the organizations’ investigative 

functions. To assess the organizations’ efforts to adopt financial disclosure 

and whistleblower policies, we examined their policies and procedures and 

spoke with relevant officials, including officials from the organizations’ 

human resources, legal, and oversight units. All UN employees are subject 

to standards for ethical conduct established by the International Civil 

Service Board. In addition, each oversight function—audit, investigations, 

and evaluations—is guided by its respective professional standards. IIA has 

developed standards to guide the ethical conduct of auditors. The UN 

Uniform Guidelines for Investigations applies specifically to investigators. 

The UN Evaluation Group is currently drafting its own set of ethical 

guidelines for UN evaluation staff. The International Civil Service Board, 

IIA, and the UN Uniform Guidelines for Investigations all address the need 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 57 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

for staff to avoid conflicts of interest and disclose any such impairments. 

The UN Uniform Guidelines for Investigations recommends the practice of 

protecting the identities of those who make complaints to the investigative 

office. 

To examine the extent to which the six organizations’ evaluation offices 

have implemented UN evaluation norms and standards, we reviewed the 

relevant standards and norms issued by the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG). 

UNEG adopted these norms and standards in 2005 in an attempt to 

professionalize the evaluation function and provide guidance to evaluation 

offices in preparing their evaluation policies or other aspects of their 

operations. Norms are the guiding principles for evaluating the results 

achieved by the UN system, the performance of the organizations, the 

governance of the evaluation function within each organization of the UN 

system, and the value-added use of the evaluation function. A set of 

standards complementing these norms has been drawn from the best 

practices of UNEG members, Organization of Economic Cooperation and 

Development (OECD)/Development Assistance Committee evaluation 

principles, national standards of OECD countries, evaluation policies of the 

international financial institutions, evaluation policies of the European 

Union, standards of evaluation associations, and evaluation guidance 

developed by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and 

Performance in Humanitarian Action. These standards are intended to 

guide the establishment of the institutional framework, management of the 

evaluation function, and conduct and use of evaluations. UNEG conducted 

a baseline assessment of its evaluation office members in 2005; however, 

we could not obtain access to this information. Only UNDP’s and UNICEF’s 

evaluation offices have had external assessments performed on the basis of 

these standards and norms.3

 To conduct our review, we selected standards 

and norms relating to ensuring the adequacy of financial and human 

resources, competency of staff, quality assurances processes, and 

recommendations follow-up. To the extent possible, we based our review 

on those standards and norms that matched key audit standards. Although 

we did not assess the quality of evaluations conducted, we did examine 

whether processes to help ensure quality were in place. Time and resource 

constraints limited our ability to evaluate organizations’ implementation of 

the other UNEG standards and norms. We examined documents from the 

3

For the UNDP peer review, the reviewers assessed the evaluation functions on the basis of 

the norms, and for UNICEF, the peer reviewers used primarily the norms. UNDP’s peer 

review was completed in December 2005, and UNICEF’s was completed in May 2006.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 58 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

six organizations, including reports prepared by the organizations’ 

evaluation offices and external peer reviewers, and annual reports of the 

evaluation offices. In addition, we conducted interviews with various 

officials of the evaluation offices. We did not perform independent 

assessments of the organizations’ evaluation function.

To assess the organizations’ efforts to implement professional standards, 

guidelines, and norms for audit, ethics, and evaluations, and to assess the 

sufficiency of the organizations’ investigative resources, we developed the 

following scale: 

1. Generally implemented: Evidence of a series of actions that indicate the 

standards, norms, or guidelines are generally or mostly implemented. 

2. Partially implemented: Evidence of some actions taken toward 

implementation. 

3. Not implemented: Evidence that no steps have been taken to 

implement the standards, norms, or guidelines.

4. Not clear: Insufficient or conflicting information regarding status in 

implementing the standards, norms, or guidelines. 

Three GAO staff used this scale to assess the organizations’ performance 

and sufficiency of their resources independently of each other. These staff 

then met to reconcile any differences in their initial assessments.

To examine the extent to which governing bodies are provided information 

about the results of UN oversight practices, we reviewed documents from 

the six organizations, including reports prepared by the organizations’ 

external auditors, the oversight unit chiefs, the governing bodies, and the 

audit committees, where applicable. We also examined the charters of the 

audit offices and the audit committees, where applicable. In addition, we 

reviewed relevant guidance regarding audit committees issued by IIA. 

Furthermore, we conducted interviews with various officials, including 

internal audit officials, external auditors, and members of the audit 

committees, where applicable. We also interviewed selected 

representatives from UN member states, including representatives from 

the U.S. UN missions in Geneva, Rome, and New York and U.S. 

representatives to the governing bodies of the UN organizations we 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 59 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

examined. In Geneva, we spoke with members of the Geneva Group,4

including representatives from the United Kingdom, Canada, the 

Netherlands, Australia, and Germany. In Rome, we spoke with additional 

members of the Geneva Group, including representatives from the United 

Kingdom, Spain, Canada, Sweden, South Korea, Germany, Switzerland, 

Finland, Italy, France, Russia, New Zealand, Japan, and the Netherlands. In 

addition, we met with representatives of the Group of 775

 from Zimbabwe, 

Madagascar, Iraq, Dominican Republic, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, 

China, Egypt, Kuwait, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and 

Thailand. In New York, we spoke with mission representatives to the UN 

from Belgium, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Pakistan. 

Furthermore, to address our objectives, we spoke with senior officials from 

the Departments of State (State) and Labor in Washington, D.C., and senior 

officials from State, Labor, Health and Human Services, and the U.S. 

Agency for International Development at the U.S. Missions to the United 

Nations in Geneva, Rome, and New York. At these locations, we met with 

management and staff responsible for governance and oversight at FAO, 

ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO. In addition, for information on the 

budget and staff resources of these six organizations, we used fiscal 

biennium 2006-2007 data provided by these organizations. We determined 

that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

We conducted our work from June 2006 through March 2007 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

4

The Geneva Group consists of the 14 largest donor countries on the basis of their 

contributions.

5

The Group of 77 is a coalition of developing countries that promotes its members’ 

collective interests. Currently, 131 developing countries are members of the G-77.
Page 60 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 61 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 62 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 63 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations
Page 64 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Appendix III

Comments from the Food and Agriculture 

Organization ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments from the Food and Agriculture 

Organization

Page 65 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations
Appendix III

Comments from the Food and Agriculture 

Organization

Page 66 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations
Page 67 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Appendix IV

Comments from the World Food Program ApendxiIV

Note: GAO comment 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.
Appendix IV

Comments from the World Food Program

Page 68 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations
Appendix IV

Comments from the World Food Program

Page 69 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

The following is GAO’s comment on the World Food Program’s letter dated 

May 7, 2007.

GAO Comment 1. WFP noted that a request was made for an appropriate change in staff 

rules and regulations to oblige key staff to undertake periodic conflict 

of interest and final disclosure. While we agree that this is a critical 

step toward fully implementing a sound ethics policy, we noted in this 

report that all staff conducting audits, investigations, and evaluations 

should be included as those defined as “key staff.”
Page 70 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Appendix V

Comments from the World Health 

Organization ApendxiV

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix V

Comments from the World Health 

Organization

Page 71 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.
Appendix V

Comments from the World Health 

Organization

Page 72 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

The following are GAO’s comments on the World Health Organization’s 

letter dated May 8, 2007.

GAO Comments 1. WHO commented that our report lacks recognition of its key efforts to 

increase transparency during the past several years. We updated the 

text of our report to include additional information on what is and can 

be provided by the internal auditor to the Health Assembly and member 

states.

2. WHO commented that its Program, Budget and Administration 

Committee (PBAC) operates similarly to an independent audit 

committee and already fulfills most of the requirements that we 

advocate, such as independence from senior management and 

accountability to the governing body. We updated the text of this report 

to include this information.

3. WHO stated that the IIA’s best practice accountability structure 

illustrated in our report would effectively create a second external 

auditor, which would not be a workable solution. We disagree that the 

IIA guidance would create an external auditor and leave the DirectorGeneral without an internal audit function. The guidance focuses on the 

reporting relationship needed to achieve organizational independence 

for the internal audit function. Specifically, IIA guidance on the key 

elements of an effective public sector audit activity, which would apply 

to the internal audit activity at WHO, provides that at a minimum, the 

audit activity needs to have organizational independence that allows 

audit work that is without interference by the entity under audit and is 

seen to be independent as well. The IIA guidance states that this 

organizational independence contributes to the accuracy of the 

auditors’ work and the ability to rely on the audit results. By having the 

WHO internal audit activity report organizationally to the PBAC, which 

serves as the audit committee for WHO’s governing body, the 

independence of internal audits of the Director-General’s programs and 

responsibilities would be enhanced significantly. In addition, the 

Director-General would continue to have an internal audit function, but 

it would be reporting organizationally to the PBAC of the governing 

body.
Page 73 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Appendix VI

Comments from the International Labor 

Organization ApendxiVI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix VI

Comments from the International Labor 

Organization

Page 74 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.
Appendix VI

Comments from the International Labor 

Organization

Page 75 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

See comment 6.
Appendix VI

Comments from the International Labor 

Organization

Page 76 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

The following are GAO’s comments on the International Labor 

Organization’s letter dated May 11, 2007.

GAO Comments 1. ILO commented that our report did not sufficiently reflect actions 

taken by ILO to address issues highlighted regarding inadequacy of 

audit staffing levels, lack of an organizationwide risk-management 

framework, lack of access to internal audit reports and other 

information by the governing body, audit staff financial disclosure, and 

an audit committee. Our report was updated after receipt of ILO’s 

technical comments to reflect information provided by the organization 

regarding several of these issues, including adequacy of resources, 

financial disclosure, and its proposal submitted by the Director-General 

to ILO’s governing body in March 2007 calling for the creation of an 

independent audit committee. 

2. ILO commented that the report refers to an overall lack of a 

requirement for financial disclosure. According to ILO, in February 

2006, it introduced a declaration that required that all procurement 

officials submit an annual declaration. In addition, in April 2007, ILO 

introduced a register of financial interests for all senior staff (graded at 

D1 level and above) and other designated officials (procurement) 

requiring them to make an annual financial disclosure identifying 

potential conflicts of interest and any supplements or gifts received. We 

updated our report to reflect these actions, but maintain that requiring 

financial disclosures from all staff conducting audits, investigations, 

and evaluations is a sound practice that could help to ensure that 

employees are free from conflict of interest.

3. ILO disagreed with our use of the findings from the quality assessment 

exercise that was published in its Annual Evaluation Report submitted 

to ILO’s Governing Body in November 2006. Consistent with our 

generally accepted government auditing standards, we cite the findings 

of external assessments, if publicly available and where applicable, that 

specifically relate to our reporting objectives. We do not independently 

endorse the findings of these assessments, but are transparent about 

the use of them in the scope and methodology sections of our report.

4. ILO stated that it has serious reservations about implementing the 

recommendation regarding making internal audit reports available to 

governing bodies. We maintain that providing the governing body with 

access to all internal audit reports will provide the governing body with 
Appendix VI

Comments from the International Labor 

Organization

Page 77 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

greater insight into the organization’s operations and highlight systemic 

weakness in internal controls.

5. ILO stated that the report should note that the proposed Terms of 

Reference for an Independent Oversight Advisory Committe submitted 

by the Director-General to ILO’s governing body in March 2007, is in line 

with the recommendation for establishing an independent audit 

committee. We updated our report after receipt of ILO’s technical 

comments to reflect this action.

6. ILO commented that the report makes no reference to the tripartite 

governance structure of ILO. We updated our report to include a 

sentence explaining ILO’s tripartite structure.
Page 78 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Appendix VII

Comments from the United Nations 

Development Program ApendxiVI
Page 79 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Appendix VIII

Comments from the United Nations Children’s 

Fund ApendxiVI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.
Appendix VIII

Comments from the United Nations 

Children’s Fund

Page 80 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

See comment 5.
Appendix VIII

Comments from the United Nations 

Children’s Fund

Page 81 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

The following are GAO’s comments on the United Nations Children’s Fund 

letter dated May 18, 2007.

GAO Comments 1. UNICEF commented that our draft report did not reflect a full 

appreciation of the specific governance structures of the United 

Nations. We provide information in the introduction, background, and 

body of our report to help our readers understand the context of our 

three reporting objectives. Our review was not of the overall UN 

governance structures, but rather of the governance structures of the 

six UN affiliated organizations noted in our report. Figure 1 in our 

report shows the overall UN governance structure of the six UNaffiliated organizations reviewed.

2. UNICEF noted that any proposal to reorder the governance 

mechanisms so as to align them with a particular understanding of the 

IIA standards would be a matter for the UNICEF Executive Board 

(among other institutions). We recognize that decisions regarding 

changes in UNICEF’s lines of reporting to allow UNICEF’s governing 

body access to all audit reports, as well as the creation of an 

independent audit committee to be in line with international best 

practices, will require consideration and approval by UNICEF’s 

Executive Board. In addition, State and several of the other UN 

organizations reviewed noted that discussions relating to our 

recommendations are currently being considered in many forums 

throughout the UN system.

3. UNICEF stated that the draft offered a view of “best practice” that is 

inconsistent with certain legislated oversight arrangements. Current 

best practice calls for the external auditor to report to an audit 

committee, which is part of the governing body, which in this case is 

the General Assembly. Therefore, the current reporting by UNICEF’s 

external auditor is consistent with IIA’s guidance, and we do not 

suggest that it be changed.

4. UNICEF commented that in 2002, the President of IIA opined that “as 

long as your reporting relationship permits you to accomplish your 

responsibilities, as stated in [IIA] standard 1110, you are reporting to 

the correct level.” UNICEF stated that administrative reporting to the 

executive head of an organization is in accordance with IIA standards. 

We do not imply that reporting to the executive head is not in 

accordance with IIA standards. IIA guidance does provide that, at a 
Appendix VIII

Comments from the United Nations 

Children’s Fund

Page 82 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

minimum, the organizational independence of the internal audit activity 

needs to allow audit work that is without interference by the entity 

under audit and is seen as independent as well. IIA guidance describes 

the audit committee’s responsibility for overseeing internal audit as 

well as the reporting relationship between internal audit and senior 

management. By having the UNICEF internal audit activity report 

organizationally to an independent audit committee of the governing 

body, the independence and appearance of independence would be 

significantly improved. 

5. UNICEF noted that its internal audit service provides a detailed 

summary of audit activities, findings, and analysis of systemic 

weaknesses to the governing body. In addition, UNICEF stated that its 

Executive Board has requested that UNICEF further enhance the level 

of analysis in the annual report of UNICEF’s Office of Internal Audit, 

include management responses to the key and recurring issues 

identified by the Office of Internal Audit, and assess and report on the 

resources required for the internal audit function. We updated our 

report to reflect these actions.
Page 83 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Appendix IX

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIX

GAO Contact Thomas Melito, (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the person named above, Phyllis Anderson, Assistant 

Director; Zina Merritt, Assistant Director; Debbie Chung; Jane Kim; Andrea 

Miller; and Barbara Shields made key contributions to this report. In 

addition, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Valerie Caracelli, Martin De Alteriis, Mark 

Dowling, Etana Finkler, Jackson Hufnagle, Charlotte Moore, and Jena 

Sinkfield provided technical support.
Page 84 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

Related GAO Products

United Nations: Management Reforms Progressing Slowly with Many 

Awaiting General Assembly Review. GAO-07-14. Washington, D.C.: 

October 5, 2006.

United Nations: Weaknesses in Internal Oversight and Procurement 

Could Affect the Effective Implementation of the Planned Renovation. 

GAO-06-877T. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2006.

United Nations: Oil for Food Program Provides Lessons for Future 

Sanctions and Ongoing Reform. GAO-06-711T. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 

2006.

United Nations: Internal Oversight and Procurement Controls and 

Processes Need Strengthening. GAO-06-710T. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 

2006.

United Nations: Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of 

Internal Auditors. GAO-06-575. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.

United Nations: Lessons from Oil for Food Program Indicate Need to 

Strengthen Internal Controls and Oversight. GAO-06-330. Washington, 

D.C.: April 25, 2006.

United Nations: Procurement Internal Controls Are Weak. GAO-06-577. 

Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.

Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. 

Operations in Haiti. GAO-06-331. Washington, D.C.: February 21, 2006.

United Nations: Preliminary Observations on Internal Oversight and 

Procurement Practices. GAO-06-226T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2005.

United Nations: Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to Achieve 

Lasting Results. GAO-05-392T. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005.

United Nations: Oil for Food Program Audits. GAO-05-346T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 15, 2005.

United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Areas for 

Further Investigation. GAO-04-953T. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2004. 
Related GAO Products

Page 85 GAO-07-597 UN Organizations

United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Iraq’s 

Food Security. GAO-04-880T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2004. 

United Nations: Observations on the Management and Oversight of the 

Oil for Food Program. GAO-04-730T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2004. 

United Nations: Observations on the Oil for Food Program. GAO-04-651T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004. 

Recovering Iraq’s Assets: Preliminary Observations on U.S. Efforts and 

Challenges. GAO-04-579T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2004. 

United Nations: Reforms Progressing, but Comprehensive Assessments 

Needed to Measure Impact. GAO-04-339. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 

2004.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.N. Confronts Significant Challenges in 

Implementing Sanctions against Iraq. GAO-02-625. Washington, D.C.: May 

23, 2002.

United Nations: Reform Initiatives Have Strengthened Operations, but 

Overall Objectives Have Not Yet Been Achieved. GAO/NSIAD-00-150. 

Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2000.

United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms. GAO/NSIAD-99-71. 

Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1999.

United Nations: Status of Internal Oversight Services. GAO/NSIAD-98-9. 

Washington, D.C.: November 19, 1997.

(320442)
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER