J-A14018-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DURANT J. JOHNSON

Appellant No. 1285 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 6, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-SA-0000046-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MAY 10, 2016

Durant J. Johnson appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence 

imposed on June 25, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin 

County. Following a summary appeal and de novo hearing, the trial court 

found Durant guilty of driving while operating privilege is suspended or 

revoked1(sixth offense), and sentenced him to 30 days to 6 months’ 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a).
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incarceration.2 Because we find Johnson has waived any claims on appeal, 

we affirm.

On December 6, 2014, Johnson was charged with driving while 

operating privileges is suspended or revoked, and was subsequently found 

guilty of that offense and sentenced by a magisterial district judge. Johnson 

appealed to the court of common pleas, and was granted a de novo hearing 

on June 25, 2015. The trial court found Johnson guilty, and sentenced him 

as stated above. Johnson filed a notice of appeal pro se. Thereafter, in 

response to the order of the trial court, he filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement, which reads in its entirety:

I would like to appeal this suspension license ticket because of 

Thomas Ladd v. Commonwealth Dept. of Transportation, 

[753 A.2d 318 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000)]. It talks about retroactively 

____________________________________________

2 Specifically, the trial judge re-imposed the sentence previously imposed by 

the magisterial district judge:

 

[Johnson] is ... subject to $1000 fine and a jail sentence 

minimum of 30 days but not more than 6 months, the Court 

hereby confirms the judgment of sentence imposed by the 

magisterial district judge for a sentence of 30 days in the 

Franklin County Jail, and it appearing that [Johnson] has 

satisfied that condition will not be incarcerated this date. It 

further appears that sentence was imposed April 2, 2015, and 

was intended to impose a 150 day suspended sentence 

subsequent to the servi[ng] of the jail sentence of 30 days, the 

Court hereby confirms this portion of the sentence and the fines 

and costs imposed by the magisterial district judge with the 

addition of $5 certification fee.

Order, 6/25/2015.
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reinstating licenses. I believe this applies to me because I was 

placed under suspension because of a mistake by Penndot. I 

believe statute 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 903(b), Cross Appeals could 

come into play. I just came across Ladd a few months ago. I 

guess my trial lawyer back through July 2014 was not aware of

Ladd because he handled my Dept. of Transportation hearing 

also. I will include Ladd and the petition of the mistake. A nunc 

pro tunc decision in the Commonwealth Court for the license 

itself of a Cross Appeal may help this court.

Johnson’s pro se Concise Statement, 8/20/2015.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court noted that Johnson’s concise 

statement “makes no attempt to explain how Ladd impacts his conviction 

[and] that Johnson only claimed with regard to 42 P.C.S. § 903(b) was that 

it “‘could come into play’.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/16/2015, at 2 

(unnumbered). The trial court found itself “in the unenviable position of 

having to guess as to why [Johnson] is appealing the decision of this Court.” 

Id. The trial court opined Johnson “alleges no errors made by this Court, 

and presents no issues sufficiently clear enough to be properly addressed by 

this Court.” Id. The trial court concluded that Johnson failed to comply with 

Rule 1925(b) and therefore waived his claims on appeal. 

It is well established that:

[A] timely-filed Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement statement does not 

automatically equate to issue preservation. Jiricko v. Geico 

Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa. Super. 2008). “[T]he Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement must be sufficiently ‘concise’ and ‘coherent’ 

such that the trial court judge may be able to identify the issues 

to be raised on appeal. . . .” Id. 

Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying and 

focusing upon those issues which the parties plan to raise 

on appeal. Rule 1925 is thus a crucial component of the 
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appellate process. When a court has to guess what issues 

an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for 

meaningful review. When an appellant fails adequately to 

identify in a concise manner the issues sought to be 

pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its 

preparation of a legal analysis which is pertinent to those 

issues. In other words, a Concise Statement which is too 

vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on 

appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise 

Statement at all. While [Commonwealth v.] Lord[,] 

[553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306 (1998)] and its progeny have 

generally involved situations where an appellant 

completely fails to mention an issue in his Concise 

Statement, for the reasons set forth above we conclude 

that Lord should also apply to Concise Statements which 

are so vague as to prevent the court from identifying the 

issue to be raised on appeal.

Commonwealth v. Dowling, 2001 PA Super 166, 778 A.2d 

166, 778 A.2d 683, 686–687 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted).

Commonwealth v. Ray, ___ A.3d ___, ___ [2016 PA Super 37, 2016 Pa. 

Super. LEXIS 104] (Pa. Super. 2016).

Here, the claims Johnson raises in his concise statement lack the 

requisite specificity required by our rules of court. See Pa. R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(ii) (“The Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or error 

that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all 

pertinent issues for the judge.”). Johnson does not identify any rulings of 

the trial court that constituted an abuse of discretion or misapplication of the 

law to support his appeal. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that 

Johnson waived appellate review. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4).
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/10/2016