United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 19-1031 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

ADARBAAD F. KARANI, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges. 

Katherine C. Essington for appellant. 

Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom 

Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for 

appellee. 

January 4, 2021 
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LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. After a six-day trial, a jury 

convicted Adarbaad F. Karani, a former officer of the Boston Police 

Department, on two counts of making false statements during the 

purchase of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), and 

one count of making a false statement in a record required to be 

kept by federal law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A). 

The district court sentenced Karani to concurrent three-month 

terms of imprisonment, followed by a one-year term of supervised 

release. 

Karani appeals his conviction on all three counts, 

arguing that we must vacate the conviction because the district 

court's jury instructions contained several legal and factual 

errors. In particular, Karani claims that the decision of the 

district court to define the terms "gift" and "actual purchaser," 

used in a document essential to the purchase of the firearms, 

invaded the province of the jury. He also argues that the court 

provided inconsistent, mistaken, and confusing instructions on the 

first count of making false statements during the purchase of a 

firearm in violation of § 922(a)(6).1 

After careful review of the record and the law, we 

affirm. 

1 This case does not implicate any Second Amendment concerns. 
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I. 

A. The Ilnicki Transfer 

 We recount the facts, most of which are undisputed, as 

the jury could have found them. In November 2015, the Boston 

Police Department ("BPD") recovered and transferred to the Federal 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") a Glock 

.45 caliber pistol with serial number YVT194. ATF agents traced 

the firearm's ownership to David Ilnicki, who had reported the gun 

stolen about a month earlier. Ilnicki told police that the gun 

was a "gift" from a "friend." ATF's investigation revealed that 

the original purchaser of the firearm ("the Ilnicki gun") was 

appellant Karani. 

Karani met Ilnicki while working police details at 

nightclubs in Boston where Ilnicki worked as a security manager 

and promoter. Ilnicki testified that he initially sought to build 

a rapport with Karani to ensure security ran smoothly at the clubs, 

but they eventually became friends. In August 2015, Ilnicki asked 

Karani via text message whether Karani knew if any BPD officers 

were selling unwanted firearms at a discounted price. Karani 

responded that he would "hook [Ilnicki] up." The pair discussed 

the various firearms of interest to Ilnicki, who ultimately settled 

on a Glock, model 30S, .45 caliber pistol. 

That model did not meet Massachusetts' consumer safety 

standards and, therefore, could be purchased from an FFL in 
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Massachusetts only by qualified law enforcement officers, which 

precluded Ilnicki from purchasing the gun on his own. See Mass. 

Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 123 (prohibiting the sale of certain 

categories of firearms in Massachusetts); 501 Mass. Code Regs. § 

7.02 (identifying the categories of firearms that are prohibited); 

see also 18 U.S.C. § 926B (providing that, "[n]otwithstanding any 

other provision of the law of any State . . . a qualified law 

enforcement officer . . . may carry a concealed firearm that has 

been shipped or transported in interstate commerce," except 

machine guns, firearm silencers, or other destructive devices). 

As a police officer, however, Karani could purchase the pistol and 

was also eligible to receive a manufacturer discount.2 With the 

discount, Karani paid $530 to purchase the Ilnicki Gun from 

Precision Point Firearms, a federal firearms licensee ("FFL") 

located in Woburn, Massachusetts. 

To complete the purchase of the gun, Karani filled out 

ATF Form 4473, a document that FFLs must use to gather the details 

that they are required by federal law to report about persons 

purchasing firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 923(g); 27 C.F.R. § 478.124. 

That data includes the purchaser's name, address, date of birth, 

2 In particular, Karani was eligible for Glock, Inc.'s "Blue 

Label Program," which offers members of law enforcement, 

firefighters, paramedics, and military personnel a $75-$100 

discount on certain Glock pistols. See GLOCK Blue Label Program, 

GLOCK, Inc., https://us.glock.com/buy/blue-label-program (last 

visited Nov. 17, 2020). 
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ethnicity, height, and weight. Form 4473 also assists FFLs in 

collecting the information needed for the criminal background 

checks required under federal law. 

Form 4473 also contains a series of questions intended 

to assess whether an individual may lawfully purchase and possess 

a firearm. For example, Questions 11.c. and 11.k. ask whether the 

potential purchaser is a felon or illegally present in the United 

States, statuses that preclude the possession of a firearm. See 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),(5)(A). Of relevance to this case, Question 

11.a. asks whether an individual is "the actual transferee/buyer" 

of the firearm. Question 11.a. also offers the following 

admonition: "Warning: You are not the actual buyer if you are 

acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf of another person. If you are 

not the actual buyer, the dealer cannot transfer the firearm(s) to 

you. (See Instructions for Question 11.a.)." The associated 

instructions state: 

Question 11.a. Actual Transferee/Buyer: For 

purposes of this form, you are the actual 

transferee/buyer if you are purchasing the 

firearm for yourself or otherwise acquiring the 

firearm for yourself (e.g., redeeming the 

firearm from pawn/retrieving it from 

consignment, firearm raffle winner). You are 

also the actual transferee/buyer if you are 

legitimately purchasing the firearm as a gift 

for a third party. ACTUAL TRANSFEREE/BUYER 

EXAMPLES: Mr. Smith asks Mr. Jones to purchase 

a firearm for Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith gives Mr. 

Jones the money for the firearm. Mr. Jones is 

NOT THE ACTUAL TRANSFEREE/BUYER of the firearm 

and must answer "NO" to question 11.a. The 
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licensee may not transfer the firearm to Mr. 

Jones. However, if Mr. Brown goes to buy a 

firearm with his own money to give to Mr. Black 

as a present, Mr. Brown is the actual 

transferee/buyer of the firearm and should 

answer "YES" to question 11.a. 

The answer to Question 11.a. must be "Yes" for the sale 

to proceed; that is, the individual filling out the form must 

attest that he is the actual transferee/buyer of the gun. As the 

instructions explain, an individual falls into that category if he 

purchases the gun either for himself or as a gift for a third 

party. The Form does not, however, ask an individual to identify 

which of those two scenarios applies.3 

In September 2015, Karani checked "Yes" in response to 

Question 11.a., attesting that he was the "actual 

transferee/buyer" of the Ilnicki gun. He did not indicate to the 

FFL whether he was purchasing the firearm for himself or as a gift 

and the FFL did not ask. 

In addition to Form 4473, Karani also signed an 

"Affidavit in Support of Handgun Purchase for Official Duty" ("the 

Ilnicki Affidavit" or "the Affidavit"). By signing the Affidavit, 

Karani swore, under penalty of perjury, that he was purchasing the 

3 If an FFL nonetheless becomes aware during a transaction 

that the individual is purchasing a firearm as a gift, the FFL 

might, as a matter of practice, keep the firearm in the store until 

the recipient picks it up, at which point the recipient himself 

will complete ATF Form 4473 and undergo a background check. There 

does not seem to be any law or regulation that explicitly requires 

this practice. 
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firearm to "directly or indirectly supply [himself] with a handgun 

for [his] official duties as a law enforcement official or member 

of the United States military."4

Either before or shortly after Karani purchased the gun, 

Ilnicki provided Karani confirmation of his firearms license and 

paid Karani $500 in cash. Ilnicki testified that he intended to 

give Karani $530, but the ATM would allow him to take out only 

$500. When Ilnicki said he would owe Karani $30, Karani responded 

that Ilnicki could make up the difference with a round of drinks. 

When Karani completed the documents to transfer the gun 

to Ilnicki, he entered the incorrect serial number.5 That serial 

number -- XRF158 -- belonged to another Glock firearm that was 

4 The FFL testified at trial that the Affidavit was prepared 

by his attorney for the FFL's own "peace of mind" and to protect 

him from liability under state law by confirming Karani's status 

as a law enforcement officer. In closing, however, defense counsel 

argued that the sole purpose of the Affidavit was to confirm 

Karani's eligibility for the Glock discount. Although the impetus 

for the Affidavit is thus somewhat unclear, this uncertainty does 

not affect the issues presented in this case. The Affidavit was 

withdrawn from the jury's consideration for the reasons explained 

infra in Section I.F. 

5 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, §§ 128A and 128B require all gun 

sales, transfers, inheritances, or losses to be reported to the 

Massachusetts Department of Criminal Justice Information Services 

Firearms Records Bureau through the online Massachusetts Gun 

Transaction Portal. See Massachusetts Gun Transaction Portal,

https://mircs.chs.state.ma.us/fa10/action/home?app_context=home&

app_action=presentHome (last visited Nov. 4, 2020). The required 

information includes a detailed description of the transferred 

weapon (caliber, make, model, and serial number) and the name and 

address of both the seller/transferor and buyer/transferee. Mass. 

Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 128B. 
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purchased by Karani less than a year earlier and was transferred 

to another individual, Joseph DePasquale, just two days after its 

purchase. The timing of that transfer aroused ATF's suspicion and 

led agents to investigate whether Karani had unlawfully purchased 

the gun on behalf of DePasquale. 

B. The DePasquale Transfer 

 Like Ilnicki, Karani knew DePasquale through working in 

the Boston nightlife industry. DePasquale's father owned various 

restaurants and nightclubs in Boston for which Karani regularly 

provided police detailing services. DePasquale testified that, 

after he told Karani that he was getting his gun license, Karani 

offered to help him purchase a firearm at a law enforcement 

discount. Based on DePasquale's preferences, Karani purchased a 

Glock, model 27, .40 caliber pistol ("the DePasquale gun") in 

November 2014, from FFL North Shore Firearms, LLC, in Middleton, 

Massachusetts. DePasquale was prohibited from purchasing that 

model Glock on his own because it could be purchased from an FFL 

in Massachusetts only by qualified law enforcement officers for 

the same reasons described above with respect to the Ilnicki gun. 

See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 123; 501 Mass. Code Regs. § 7.02; 

see also 18 U.S.C. § 926B. Karani also purchased a holster for 

the DePasquale gun. 

Karani completed and signed an ATF Form 4473 for the 

DePasquale gun identical to the one described above with respect 
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to the Ilnicki gun. Karani similarly checked "Yes" to Question 

11.a. He also signed a document titled "Certification Letter," 

stating, not under penalty of perjury, that he was a law 

enforcement officer purchasing the firearm for "on or off duty use 

and . . . not . . . for resale."6

On November 19, 2014, Karani sent DePasquale a text 

message stating: "picked up your piece today. gotta good deal on 

it. . . . came out to $500 w/tax. should wait a few days before 

we do the transfer." DePasquale agreed to pay Karani the "exact 

amount" and sent Karani a picture of his valid firearms license. 

On November 21, Karani completed the paperwork to transfer 

ownership of the firearm to DePasquale.

A week later, Karani transferred physical possession of 

the gun to DePasquale and arranged for payment at a later date. 

6 At trial, a seventeen-year ATF veteran explained the 

function of the Letter somewhat inconsistently. Compare Docket 

No. 106, at 136 (explaining that the Letter was prepared by the 

wholesaler/distributor and had the dual effect of confirming 

Karani was a law enforcement officer eligible to purchase a gun 

that was otherwise prohibited under Massachusetts law, and 

providing assurance to the manufacturer that Karani was eligible 

to receive the manufacturer's law enforcement discount), with 

Docket No. 106, at 141-42 (explaining that the Letter was not 

prepared for the manufacturer to confirm eligibility for the 

discount, but instead was a form that an FFL is required by 

Massachusetts law to keep in his records). For reasons we will 

explain infra at note 14, however, the origin and purpose of the 

Certification Letter do not impact our analysis of the issues 

presented in this appeal. 
- 10 - 

DePasquale ultimately paid Karani $540, which was the total cost 

of the firearm and holster with Karani's law enforcement discount.

C. The Indictment 

In April 2017, Karani was indicted on four counts of 

knowingly making a false statement in connection with purchasing 

a firearm. Counts 1 and 2 alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(a)(6), which makes it unlawful for any individual "knowingly 

to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement . . . 

with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness" of a federal 

firearms sale. Counts 3 and 4 alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(a)(1)(A), which provides that whoever "knowingly makes any 

false statement . . . with respect to the information required 

. . . to be kept in the records" of an FFL, "shall be fined[,] 

. . . imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 

Counts 1 and 3 involved Karani's purchase of the 

DePasquale gun under the respective statutes. Count 1 alleged 

that Karani made two false statements in violation of § 922(a)(6): 

(1) by claiming that he was the "actual transferee/buyer" of the 

DePasquale gun on the ATF Form 4473 that he completed at the time 

of purchase; and (2) by stating on the Certification Letter that 

he was purchasing the DePasquale gun for "official use and not for
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resale."7 Count 3 alleged that Karani's statement on the ATF Form 

4473 alone also violated § 924(a)(1)(A). 

Counts 2 and 4 involved Karani's purchase of the Ilnicki 

gun under the respective statutes. Count 2 alleged that Karani 

made two false statements in violation of § 922(a)(6): (1) by 

asserting that he was the "actual transferee/buyer" of the Ilnicki 

gun on the ATF Form 4473 that he completed at the time of purchase; 

and (2) by claiming on the Ilnicki Affidavit that he was 

"indirectly or directly" purchasing the gun for "official use." 

Count 4 alleged that Karani's statement on the ATF Form 4473 alone

also violated § 924(a)(1)(A). 

D. Karani's Defense at Trial 

In his opening statement, Karani presented the essence 

of his defense: he "reasonably view[ed] the transfer of the two 

firearms at the police discount as being a gift to his friends" 

within the meaning of Form 4473. On the third day of trial, 

however, the court informed counsel that it intended to charge the 

jury "that [Form 4473] pertains to a transfer of a gun or gift of 

a gun, not of a discount, and that it is not a defense to the case 

to say that Karani was giving a discount." Defense counsel 

objected to no avail, arguing that the court was upending the 

7 The indictment incorrectly quotes the Certification Letter, 

which actually states that the gun was purchased for "on or off 

duty use and . . . not . . . for resale." This discrepancy is 

discussed in further detail infra in Section II.E. 
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defense and that whether the "gift" in ATF Form 4473 refers to the 

gun itself or the transfer of a discount was a factual question 

for the jury to decide.

Testifying on the fourth day of trial, Karani conceded 

that he never intended to keep either the DePasquale or the Ilnicki 

gun. In both instances, he intended to use his law enforcement 

status to purchase a gun at a discounted price for a friend. 

Despite the court's warning that it would instruct the jury that 

the discount was not a gift, Karani maintained that he was truthful 

in his purchases because he reasonably believed that the discount 

constituted a gift. Recognizing that the court's previewed 

instruction foreclosed that defense, Karani also testified that 

the guns themselves were gifts because he transferred them without 

profit, was reimbursed only after he had purchased the guns with 

his own money, was not reimbursed fully for the Ilnicki gun, and 

was not compensated for his time or travel expenses. 

E. Jury Instructions 

 The district court instructed the jury on the fifth day 

of trial. The court began by explaining that Karani was indicted 

on four counts of knowingly making a false statement under two 

different statutes, with respect to two different purchases. In 

defining a "gift" ("the gift instruction"), the court stated: 

Now, Form 4473 describes an actual buyer/transferee 

as one who buys a firearm for his own use or one 

who legitimately buys a firearm as a gift for [a] 
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third party. A "gift" means something that is 

voluntarily transferred to someone without payment, 

without compensation. In Form 4473, "gift" refers 

to the firearm, not the discount. 

The court further explained that the jury had to decide Karani's 

intent ("the actual purchaser instruction"): 

Was [Karani] buying the firearm for himself or as 

a gift for someone else or did he buy it for another 

with the intention to transfer the gun to that 

person with the expectation that the person would 

pay for it and did so, in which case he is not the 

actual purchaser. 

 The court pointed out that Karani was charged with making 

two false statements concerning each purchase in Counts 1 and 2: 

one each on ATF Form 4473 and a supporting document. The court 

informed the jury that, even though the indictment alleged that 

Karani made both false statements for each gun purchase, there is 

an indictment convention that "and" means "or" and "or" means 

"and."8 Accordingly, the court explained, "the [g]overnment d[id] 

not have to prove . . . that the [d]efendant made a false statement 

in two documents."9 The court further informed the jury that "all 

12 of you have to be in agreement as to one or the other or both; 

8 The parties cite no such generally applicable indictment 

convention. See infra at note 31. 

9 This instruction, when read in the context of the complete 

jury charge, sought to inform the jury that, even though Counts 1 

and 2 each alleged two separate false statements (one each in ATF 

Form 4473 and a supporting document), the government needed to 

prove only one false statement on each count in order to sustain 

a conviction on that count. 
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that if all of you do not agree that the [d]efendant made a false 

statement in at least one of these documents and which one, you 

must find him not guilty." 

Following the jury charge, defense counsel objected only 

to the court's gift instruction. 

F. Questions from the Jury 

On the first afternoon of deliberations, the jury 

submitted three questions to the court, two of which are relevant 

to this appeal: (1) "Under which counts is a false statement on a 

4473 a violation?" and (2) "Under which counts would a false 

statement on the affidavits signed at the FFL(s) (not the 4473) be 

a violation?"10 After a lengthy discussion with counsel, the court 

responded: (1) "[O]n all counts, 1 through 4, a false statement on 

Form 4473 is a violation of law";11 and (2) "Count 1 is the only 

count that references an affidavit on which the [d]efendant is 

accused of representing that the 'purchase was for official use 

and not for resale.'"12

10 The third question asked for a transcript of Karani's 

testimony, which the court informed the jury was not yet available. 

11 As noted, there were two ATF Form 4473s at issue: one 

involving the DePasquale gun on Counts 1 and 3 and one involving 

the Ilnicki gun on Counts 2 and 4. 

12 Although the court used the term "affidavit," it was 

referencing the Certification Letter in Count 1. The implications 

of the court's misuse of the word affidavit are discussed infra in 

Section II.E. 
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This explanation modified an earlier instruction of the 

court that a conviction could be sustained on Count 2 for the 

Ilnicki gun based on either the ATF Form 4473 or the Ilnicki 

Affidavit.13 The court's revised instruction left only the ATF 

Form 4473 as grounds for conviction on Count 2, but left Count 1 

untouched. For the DePasquale gun, the subject of Count 1, either 

the ATF Form 4473 or the Certification Letter could sustain a 

conviction. Defense counsel objected to this modification, 

insisting that the court's logic on Count 2 applied equally to 

Count 1, and that a false statement on an ATF Form 4473 was 

necessary for a conviction on either count. Specifically, defense 

counsel argued that because the Certification Letter was not 

required for the sale to proceed under federal law, a false 

statement on the Certification Letter was not an independent basis 

for a conviction on Count 1.14 

13 After much back and forth with counsel, the court decided 

that the Affidavit cited in Count 2 was too "broad" to be submitted 

to the jury because, unlike the Certification Letter, it did not 

include a statement that Karani was not purchasing the gun for 

resale. This supplemental instruction triggered several 

additional questions from the jury relating to the Count 2 

Affidavit. As we shall further explain at the end of this section, 

that back and forth affected the jury's ultimate task on each 

count. 

14 On appeal, Karani no longer argues that the Certification 

Letter could not support a conviction on Count 1, which charged a 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). He argues only that the 

court's original and supplemental instructions regarding the 

Certification Letter were incorrect and confused the jury. The 

rationale for this change of position seems clear. To prove a 

violation of § 922(a)(6), the government needed to prove that an 
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 Approximately one hour later, the jury submitted two 

additional questions not relevant to this appeal.15 Less than a 

half hour after the court answered those questions, the jury posed 

two additional questions, one of which is relevant here:16 

Count 2 on the indictment indicated that [Karani] 

signed an affidavit that the purchase was for 

official use. Per your first note, you said only 

Count 1 [] references the affidavit. The second 

count would fall to a unanimous vote if the 

affidavit is relevant. So, we just want to check 

on if that would be true. 

After another lengthy conversation with counsel, the 

court concluded that it would not retract its previous instruction 

oral or written statement was made knowingly, was false, and was 

material to the lawfulness of a federal firearms sale. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(a)(6). Unlike its counterpart, § 924(a)(1)(A), there is no 

requirement in § 922(a)(6) that the statement be made in a record 

required by law to be kept by an FFL. Neither is there any 

requirement that the statement be made in a form required by law 

or even be one that an individual was required by state or federal 

law to make. Id. The manner or form of a knowingly false statement 

is irrelevant so long as the statement is material to the lawful 

sale of the firearm. Id. Assuming, then, that the statement in 

the Certification Letter was material to the lawfulness of the 

sale, a proposition which Karani does not challenge, it was 

actionable under § 922(a)(6).

15 In the first question, the jury requested a copy of the 

indictment, which the court provided. In the second question, the 

jury again asked for a transcript of Karani's testimony and also 

requested a transcript of the testimony of one of the government's 

witnesses. The court informed the jury that the requested 

transcripts could not be prepared "within a reasonable time." 

16 In the additional question, the jury asked the court 

"[p]ursuant to [its] last answer, what [qualifies as] a 'reasonable 

time'" for the requested transcripts. The court provided the 

requested transcripts to the jury the following business day.
- 17 - 

directing the jury to disregard the Ilnicki Affidavit in Count 2. 

Yet, given the jury's continuing confusion about the focus of its 

deliberations, the court deemed it appropriate to provide the jury 

with the following supplemental verbal instruction: 

All of the Counts, 1, 2, 3 and 4, allege that the 

false statement was that the [d]efendant was the 

actual purchaser, and that was made on Form 4473. 

Now, for each count, it's the same allegation on 

each count and the same form for each count. Count 

1 also alleges substantially the same false 

statement on an affidavit that says that he bought 

for official use and not for resale. 

For purposes of 4473, in all counts he is an actual 

purchaser if he buys for his own use or is buying 

to make a gift of the firearm to someone else. For 

purposes of the affidavit in Count 1, he is a buyer 

if he bought for official use and not for resale. 

Those are the facts that you need to examine the 

evidence, as to which you need to examine and as to 

which you make a determination. Did he buy for his 

own use or did he buy for official use or did he 

buy for resale. . . . 

So that is really what I can explain to you. I'm 

not sure I can give you a whole lot more explanation 

and now the question for you is does that explain 

enough for you to be able to determine your verdict? 

The foreperson responded "No," and again asked about the 

Ilnicki Affidavit and its relation to Count 2. The court 

responded: "Don't worry about Count 2. The affidavit in Count 2 

you can ignore." To clarify further the jury's task, the court 

explained that the jury 

should first look at 4473 and see whether [Karani] 

falsely made a statement on that. If you find he 

did not, then in Count 1 go to the affidavit. And 
- 18 - 

if he did not with respect -- if you find that he 

did not make a false statement under the affidavit 

on Count 1 as well, then you may find -- must find 

him not guilty. On Counts 2, 3 and 4, if you find 

he did not make a false statement knowingly on the 

form, 4473, then you also must find him not guilty 

as to Counts 2, 3 and 4. 

 The jury submitted yet another question to the court on 

the morning of the sixth trial day: 

Sorry for continuing to ask questions regarding the 

affidavit in Count 1, but assuming the jury is 

unable to reach a consensus in regards to whether 

the [d]efendant knowingly made a false statement on 

the 4473, but can [all capitals double underlined] 

reach a consensus that he lied on the affidavit 

knowingly, would the jury find the [d]efendant 

guilty on Count 1 or would it continue to be hung? 

 The court17 conferred with counsel and provided the 

following verbal answer: "[Y]es, if the jury finds unanimously 

that the [d]efendant knowingly made a false statement in the 

affidavit, then the jury should return a guilty finding on 

Count 1." The court also gave the jury an Allen18 charge in 

response to its suggestion that it was hung. 

 At this point, after the numerous exchanges between the 

court and the jury, this was the posture of the case: (1) a false 

17 On the sixth day of trial, Judge Leo T. Sorokin covered for 

Judge Rya W. Zobel, who was unavailable. 

18 An Allen charge is a "supplemental jury instruction given 

by the court to encourage a deadlocked jury, after prolonged 

deliberations, to reach a verdict." Allen Charge, Black's Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Allen v. United States, 164 

U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896). 
- 19 - 

statement that Karani was the actual buyer of the DePasquale gun 

on ATF Form 4473 was sufficient to sustain a conviction on Count 1

and necessary to sustain a conviction on Count 3; (2) a false 

statement that the DePasquale gun was for on or off duty use and 

not for resale on the Certification Letter was an independent basis 

for conviction on Count 1; (3) a false statement that Karani was 

the actual buyer of the Ilnicki gun on ATF Form 4473 was necessary 

for a conviction on both Counts 2 and 4; and (4) a false statement 

on the Ilnicki Affidavit charged in Count 2 was no longer a basis 

for conviction on Count 2. 

 Approximately one hour later, the jury reported by 

general verdict that it had found Karani guilty on Counts 1, 2, 

and 4, and not guilty on Count 3.19 

II. 

 Karani argues that his convictions must be vacated, and 

a new trial ordered, because of prejudicial errors in the jury 

instructions. First, he asserts that the court's instructions and 

19 The convictions on Counts 1, 2, and 4 have this internal 

logic. The jury must have determined that Karani's statement that 

he was the actual buyer of the Ilnicki gun on Form 4473 was false 

because that statement was the sole basis for a guilty verdict on 

Counts 2 and 4. The jury found no falsity in Karani's statement 

that he was the actual buyer of the DePasquale gun on Form 4473 

because that statement was the sole basis for Count 3, on which 

Karani was acquitted. The jury's conviction on Count 1 must have 

been based on the Certification Letter alone because its acquittal 

on Count 3 meant that it necessarily found no falsity in the 

DePasquale Form 4473, the alternative basis for a conviction on 

Count 1. 
- 20 - 

supplemental instruction on the terms "gift" and "actual 

purchaser" were incorrect and effectively directed a verdict for 

the government. Second, Karani avers that the court misrepresented 

the content and legal effect of the Certification Letter. He 

contends that if either ground is insufficient on its own to 

warrant a new trial, the cumulative effect of the court's errors 

requires that outcome. 

A. Standard of Review 

When addressing a preserved claim of legal error in jury 

instructions, we review de novo. See, e.g., United States v. 

Figueroa-Lugo, 793 F.3d 179, 190-91 (1st Cir. 2015). This standard 

applies to Karani's challenge to the gift instruction. 

Karani concedes, however, that he did not preserve his 

objection to the court's actual purchaser instruction or the 

court's treatment of the Certification Letter. We therefore review 

those portions of the charge and the supplemental instructions for 

plain error. United States v. Velázquez-Aponte, 940 F.3d 785, 800 

(1st Cir. 2019). To demonstrate plain error, Karani must show 

that (1) the district court erred, and that (2) the error was clear 

and obvious, (3) it affected his substantial rights, and (4) it 

"seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings." Id. at 793 (quoting United States v. 

Montañez-Quiñones, 911 F.3d 59, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2018)). 
- 21 - 

B. Legal Background 

 Karani was found guilty on Counts 1 and 2 of making a 

false statement during the purchase of a firearm in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which provides, in relevant part: 

It shall be unlawful for any person in connection 

with the acquisition . . . of any firearm . . . 

knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or 

written statement . . . with respect to any fact 

material to the lawfulness of the sale or other 

disposition of such firearm . . . . 

Karani does not contest the materiality of his statements on 

appeal, presumably because the Supreme Court has conclusively 

determined that statements regarding whether an individual is 

engaging in a straw purchase -- i.e., a sale in which an individual 

purchases a firearm on behalf of another while claiming the firearm 

is for himself -- are material to the lawfulness of a firearms 

purchase. See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 188-89 

(2014). 

 Relatedly, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A), the basis for 

Karani's conviction on Count 4, prohibits an individual from 

"knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or representation with 

respect to the information required by [Chapter 44 of Title 18] to 

be kept in the records of [an FFL]." Although there is some 

overlap between these two provisions, § 922(a)(6) encompasses all 

materially false statements made regarding the legality of the 

firearm sale, whereas § 924(a)(1)(A) lacks a materiality 
- 22 - 

requirement and applies only to statements made in records an FFL 

is required to maintain. 

 The "twin goals" of these provisions, within the broader 

statutory scheme, are "to keep guns out of the hands of criminals 

and others who should not have them, and to assist law enforcement 

authorities in investigating serious crimes." Abramski, 573 U.S. 

at 180. Exercising congressionally delegated authority, the 

Attorney General authorized ATF to develop Form 4473 as a means of 

implementing these goals. See id. at 172-73. 

 The Supreme Court has explained that the federal 

firearms laws reflect a congressional intent to regulate straw 

purchases regardless of whether the "true purchaser" -- i.e., one 

who sends an agent to the FFL to purchase a gun on his behalf -- 

was lawfully entitled to possess the gun. Id. at 186-87. The 

Court noted that Congress chose to enforce gun regulations by 

requiring a purchaser to transact directly with an FFL when that 

individual is purchasing a gun from the FFL. Id. 

C. The Gift Instruction 

ATF Form 4473 states that a person is an actual purchaser 

if he purchases a gun for his own personal use or as a gift. In 

its instructions to the jury, the district court defined a "gift," 

as that term is used in Form 4473, as "[a] firearm, not [a] 

discount," that is transferred voluntarily "without payment, 

without compensation." Karani contends that the court's 
- 23 - 

definition is inaccurate and, because the term is not defined in 

Form 4473 or the applicable statutes, the court erred in defining 

what constitutes a "gift" for the jury. 

We need look no further than the plain and ordinary 

meaning of the language in Form 4473, however, to conclude that 

the court properly defined a gift in these circumstances. Cf. 

Textron Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 336 F.3d 26, 31 (1st 

Cir. 2003) ("[I]f the language of a statute or regulation has a 

plain and ordinary meaning, courts need look no further and should 

apply the regulation as it is written."). The instructions to 

Question 11.a. state that an individual is an actual purchaser if 

he buys a "firearm as a gift for a third party." That language 

makes clear that it is the firearm itself -- not a discount or any 

other associated benefit of the transfer -- that must be "given." 

To discern when a firearm is transferred as a "gift," we 

look to the ordinary meaning of that term. Legal and non-legal 

dictionaries alike define a gift by using terminology comparable 

to that used by the district court -- a transfer without 

remuneration. See Gift, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) 

("The voluntary transfer of property to another without 

compensation"); Gift, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 

(11th ed. 2014) ("[S]omething voluntarily transferred by one 

person to another without compensation"). The Supreme Court has 

described a gift in these circumstances using similar language in 
- 24 - 

dicta. See Abramski, 573 U.S. at 186-88 (explaining that ATF 

sought to allow bona fide gifts and prohibit straw purchases where 

an individual purchases a gun on behalf of another with 

compensation or reimbursement); see also id. at 199 (Scalia, J., 

dissenting) (explaining that, under the government's view, a 

transfer lawfully qualifies as a gift "[s]o long as no money 

changes hands, and no agency relationship is formed"). Based on 

the foregoing, we conclude that the district court properly defined 

the term "gift" in Form 4473 as a firearm, not a discount, 

transferred without compensation. 

Karani contends that he was nevertheless entitled to 

submit his own understanding of the term "gift" to the jury because 

his understanding of that term was inextricably intertwined with 

whether he (1) made a false statement on Form 4473 and (2) did so 

knowingly. In making this argument, Karani relies first on United 

States v. DiRico, 78 F.3d 732 (1st Cir. 1996). 

In DiRico, where materiality was an element of the 

offense, we reversed the district court's determination that the 

materiality of a statement on a tax return was a legal question 

for it, rather than the jury, to decide. Id. at 736. Although it 

was the duty of the court to "properly instruct the jury on the 

legal definition of materiality," the jury had to decide 

materiality based on the evidence proffered at trial. Id. 
- 25 - 

Here, unlike in DiRico, the court did not remove an 

element of the offense from the jury's consideration. Indeed, the 

term "gift" is not an element of the false statement offenses. 

Instead, it is a term relevant to the determinations that the jury 

had to make on the elements of the offenses -- for Counts 1 and 2: 

knowledge, falsity, and materiality; for Counts 3 and 4: knowledge, 

falsity, and appearance in a record that an FFL was required to 

keep by law. The court had a responsibility to define the term 

"gift" because the jury's understanding of that term was essential 

to its determinations on the elements of the offenses. 

Moreover, contrary to Karani's assertion, the court's 

definition of "gift" did not necessitate a finding that his 

statements were false. After the court informed the parties that 

it would instruct the jury that it must find that the firearm 

itself, not the discount, was a gift, Karani adjusted his defense. 

Although he still argued in closing that the discount was a gift, 

he also argued that the firearms themselves were gifts under the 

court's definition because he did not profit from their transfers, 

he expended time and resources for which he was not compensated, 

and he paid for the guns out-of-pocket before he was reimbursed. 

Thus, the court's definition of gift did not invade the duty of 

the jury to decide whether Karani's statements were false. 

We find similarly unavailing Karani's argument, relying 

on Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), that his 
- 26 - 

understanding of the term "gift," even if it was wrong, was a 

mistake of law that was critical to the jury's determination of 

whether he knowingly made a false statement. In Cheek, the 

defendant was charged with willfully violating income tax laws. 

Id. at 194. Although the defendant conceded that he violated the 

law, he argued that his violation was not willful because he 

sincerely believed that income taxes were unconstitutional. Id. 

at 195-96. The district court instructed the jurors that an 

"objectively reasonable good-faith misunderstanding of the law 

would negate willfulness." Id. at 196-97. However, it also told 

them that the defendant's belief that he had no legal duty to pay 

taxes was not objectively reasonable. Id. The Supreme Court 

reversed, explaining that the sincerity of the defendant's belief 

as to whether he had a legal duty to pay taxes, even if 

unreasonable, was a jury question because it went to the heart of 

whether he had committed a "willful" violation of the tax code. 

Id. at 203. 

Cheek is inapt precedent for Karani's knowledge-based 

claim of error. As the Supreme Court has explained, the "highly 

technical" tax code risks "ensnaring individuals engaged in 

apparently innocent conduct." Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 

184, 194 (1998). To counteract that risk, "willful" mens rea in 

certain portions of the tax code requires specific intent to 

violate a known legal duty. Id. at 193-96. If the jury credits 
- 27 - 

a defendant's proffered ignorance or misunderstanding of the 

specific legal duty he is charged with violating, he cannot be 

held criminally liable. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202. Cheek thus carves 

out a limited exception for certain tax violations to the 

traditional rule that a mistake of law does not excuse a violation 

of the law.20 See id. at 203-04; see also Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194-

96. 

In Bryan v. United States, to demonstrate the limited 

applicability of Cheek, the Court considered specifically whether 

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D),21 which imposes an increased penalty for 

"willful" violations of certain federal firearms laws, carried a 

Cheek-like mens rea requirement, such that mistake of the law was 

a valid defense. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194-96. Despite Congress' 

use of the same term -- willful -- the Court held that Cheek was 

inapplicable because the federal firearms laws did not present the 

same danger of ensnaring apparently innocent conduct that 

motivated the decision in Cheek. Id. at 195. Hence, the Court 

20 That ignorance of the law is no excuse for violation of the 

law is "deeply rooted in the American legal system." Cheek, 498 

U.S. at 199. It is premised on the notion that "the law is definite 

and knowable" and, for that reason, we presume, unless Congress 

provides otherwise, that every person knows the law. Id. (citing 

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 47-48 (1881)). 

21 Pursuant to § 924(a)(1)(D), "whoever willfully violates any 

. . . provision of [this chapter except as otherwise provided] 

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than five 

years, or both." 
- 28 - 

held that "willful" in the federal firearms laws "d[id] not carve

out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law 

is no excuse." Id. at 196. 

Drawing on Bryan, we conclude that, if Cheek does not 

apply to a willful violation of the federal firearms laws, it 

likewise does not apply to the lesser, knowing violation at issue 

here. See id. at 193 (explaining that a willful state of mind 

requires an "evil-meaning mind," which is more than a knowing state 

of mind). Indeed, we recognized as much in United States v. Meade, 

175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir. 1999), although we considered a different 

subsection of the firearms laws. There, we explained that "it 

simply does not appear plausible" that Congress intended a 

"knowing" violation of § 922(g), which criminalizes the possession 

of a firearm by prohibited persons, "to carry a mens rea 

requirement of actual knowledge of the law." Meade, 175 F.3d at 

226 n.5; see also Acosta v. Loc. Union 26, UNITE HERE, 895 F.3d 

141, 145 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2018) (explaining that courts presume, 

absent a material variation in the surrounding text, that a word 

bears the same meaning throughout a statutory provision). 

Accordingly, to prove a knowing violation of the federal 

firearms laws at issue here -- §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(A) -- 

the government only needed to prove that Karani "knowingly [made]
- 29 - 

a[] false . . . statement."22 In other words, it needed to show 

that when Karani signed the relevant documents affirming that he 

was purchasing the gun either for himself or as a gift for a third 

party, he knew the facts contrary to those representations -- i.e., 

that he was purchasing a gun on behalf of another and would be 

reimbursed -- and, hence, he knew his statements were false. To 

assist the jury in making that determination, the district court 

properly and accurately instructed the jury on the legal meaning 

of the term "gift," and, in doing so, did not direct a verdict on 

any element of the offense or otherwise invade the province of the 

jury. We therefore detect no error in the district court's gift 

instruction. 

D. Actual Purchaser Instruction 

Karani argues for the first time on appeal that there 

were multiple errors in the district court's actual purchaser 

instruction, which asked the jury to consider whether: 

[Karani was] buying the firearm for himself or as 

a gift for someone else or did he buy it for another 

with the intention to transfer the gun to that 

person with the expectation that the person would 

pay for it and did so, in which case he is not the 

actual purchaser. 

22 The other requirements of either provision are not at issue 

here because (1) again, Karani does not challenge materiality under 

§ 922(a)(6), and (2) the false statements alleged to violate 

§ 924(a)(1)(A) in Counts 3 and 4 were made in Form 4473s, which 

are "required by [Chapter 44 of Title 18] to be kept in the records 

of [an FFL]," see 18 U.S.C. § 923(g); 27 C.F.R. § 478.124. 
- 30 - 

As noted above, we review this challenge only for plain error. 

See Velázquez-Aponte, 940 F.3d at 800. 

Karani initially contends that the actual purchaser 

instruction presupposed that a transfer of a firearm at a discount 

could never be considered a gift. As we have explained, the 

availability of a discount does not render a firearm purchase a 

"gift." Accordingly, the district court did not err by instructing 

the jury that a gun purchased by someone who intends to transfer 

the firearm to someone else, with reimbursement for the cost, is 

not a "gift" and, hence, the transferor is not the actual buyer. 

 Karani also objects to the actual purchaser instruction 

quoted above on the ground that the court directed the jury to 

find that Karani was not an actual purchaser because it used the 

facts of this case as an example, and stated that, under those 

facts, the defendant could not be considered an actual purchaser. 

This claim of error also fails. Although it would be 

easy to mistake the example used in the court's instruction for 

the facts of this case -- an individual purchasing a gun for 

another with the expectation that the person would, and did, pay 

for the gun -- the instruction merely illustrated a quintessential 

straw purchase. That Karani admitted to facts that have a strong 

resemblance to a typical straw purchase does not render the court's 

instruction erroneous. 
- 31 - 

Indeed, the district court mirrored language routinely 

used by the Supreme Court and our sister circuits in describing a 

straw versus actual purchaser. See, e.g., Abramski, 573 U.S. at 

171-72 (describing a straw purchaser as "a person who buys a gun 

on someone else's behalf while falsely claiming that it is for 

himself"); United States v. Blake, 394 F.3d 1089, 1090 (8th Cir. 

2005) (describing a straw purchaser as one who "purchased [guns] 

from [FFLs] on behalf of others who provided the money for the 

guns"); United States v. Ortiz, 318 F.3d 1030, 1038 (11th Cir. 

2003) (identifying a straw transaction as one where the defendant 

"at the time of completing Form 4473 had no intention of keeping 

the firearms or giving them as a gift"). 

Accordingly, we discern no error in the court's actual 

purchaser instruction.23 

E. The Certification Letter 

 Karani asserts that the district court committed several 

errors in instructing the jury on Count 1 concerning the substance 

and legal effect of the Certification Letter. Those errors can be 

divided into two categories: (1) claims that the court 

mischaracterized the Certification Letter, and (2) claims that the 

court improperly instructed the jury on the significance of the 

23 Because we conclude that the district court's gift and 

actual purchaser instructions were not erroneous, we need not 

consider appellant's argument that the alleged errors were 

structural.
- 32 - 

Certification Letter to Count 1.24 Karani concedes that these 

claims were not preserved and, therefore, we review for plain 

error. 

1. Mischaracterization of the Certification Letter 

 Karani correctly points out that the district court 

inaccurately referred to the Certification Letter as an affidavit 

-- mirroring the language of the indictment -- and also misquoted 

the Certification Letter's language on several occasions. He 

contends that these instructional errors resulted in an improper 

variance between the charges against him and the proof at trial. 

 To prevail on a claim of improper variance, an appellant 

must "show a material factual difference between the crime charged 

in the indictment and the crime proved at trial." United States 

v. Rodríguez-Milián, 820 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2016). He must 

also demonstrate that the variance resulted in prejudice. Id. 

None of Karani's contentions concerning the Certification Letter 

satisfies these requirements. 

 First, Karani argues that the court's instructions and 

supplemental instructions were improper because the Certification 

Letter was not signed under penalty of perjury and was, therefore, 

not an affidavit. Karani is correct; the Letter was not an 

24 Again, we note that Karani does not argue on appeal that 

the Certification Letter itself was a legally insufficient basis 

for his conviction on Count 1. See supra note 14. 
- 33 - 

affidavit. Indeed, the government concedes as much, even though 

Count 1 of the indictment classifies the Certification Letter as 

an affidavit and both parties used that term to describe the 

Certification Letter at trial. The Ilnicki Affidavit, which was 

signed under penalty of perjury and, as previously discussed, 

ultimately withdrawn from the jury's consideration on Count 2, was 

apparently the source of this confusion. 

Nevertheless, Karani fails to explain how the court's 

mischaracterization of the Certification Letter as an affidavit 

resulted in a material factual difference between the crime charged 

and the crime proven at trial, or prejudiced him in any way. As 

we have already explained, to prove a violation of § 922(a)(6) on 

Count 1, the government had to prove only that Karani knowingly 

made a false statement that was material to the legality of the 

federal firearms purchase.25 The statute is not concerned with the 

form of the statement so long as it is material, and Karani does 

not challenge materiality.26 See § 922(a)(6). Whether the 

Certification Letter was an affidavit is simply not relevant to 

whether a statement made within the document is a violation of 

25 See supra note 14 and Section II.B. 

26 See supra note 14 and Section II.B. The allegedly false 

statement in the Certification Letter -- that the DePasquale gun 

was for "on or off duty use and . . . not . . . for resale" -- 

was material to the lawfulness of the sale because it concealed 

that Karani was engaging in a straw purchase. See Abramski, 573 

U.S. at 188-89.
- 34 - 

§ 922(a)(6). Accordingly, the court's errors did not cause a 

prejudicial variance.

 Second, Karani claims that the court instructed the jury 

that he declared on the Certification Letter that he purchased the 

DePasquale gun "for official use and not for resale," when, in 

fact, the Letter states that he purchased the firearm for "on or 

off duty use and . . . not . . . for resale."27 Karani contends 

that the jury could have found that he purchased the gun for his 

own off-duty use -- meaning that his statement on the Certification 

Letter would be true -- but convicted him based on the court's 

incorrect instruction that the Certification Letter stated that 

the gun was only for official use. Karani further asserts that 

the jury must have relied on the Certification Letter in finding 

him guilty on Count 1. 

For reasons we have already explained, we agree with 

Karani's contention that the jury likely convicted him on Count 1 

based solely on his statements in the Certification Letter.28 

Nevertheless, Karani fails to demonstrate the requisite prejudice 

27 The court's instruction quotes the language in Count 1 of 

the indictment, which states that Karani "signed an affidavit that 

the purchase was for official use and not for resale." It is the 

Affidavit in Count 2, however, not the Certification Letter in 

Count 1, that states that Karani was purchasing the firearm to 

"directly or indirectly supply [himself] with a handgun for [his] 

official duties as a law enforcement official."

28 See supra note 19. 
- 35 - 

resulting from the court's misstatement of the Letter's specific 

language. The jury was given the Certification Letter and was 

therefore able to review the language itself. Moreover, the 

distinction between a purchase for his own official or off-duty 

use is inconsequential in the circumstances of this case. The 

question before the jury was whether Karani purchased the firearm 

for his own use (official or otherwise) or for resale. By 

insisting that he purchased the guns as gifts for his friends, he 

conceded that he did not purchase the guns for his own use. Hence, 

the court's imperfect use of language had no impact on the trial 

and is not reversible plain error. 

2. Certification Letter's Significance to Count 1 

Karani argues that, mistaken description aside, the 

instructions related to the Certification Letter were 

substantively problematic in multiple respects. He contends that 

the court (1) confused the jury by giving inconsistent instructions 

regarding whether the government was required to prove a false 

statement in both the Certification Letter and ATF Form 4473, as 

alleged in Count 1 of the indictment; (2) failed to address the 

duplicity in the indictment; and (3) overlooked the government's 

waiver of reliance on the Certification Letter as a basis for 

conviction on Count 1. We address each argument in turn. 

a. Inconsistent instructions. Karani is correct that 

the court provided conflicting instructions concerning the 
- 36 - 

significance of the Certification Letter to the Count 1 charge. 

In some parts of its instructions, the court told the jury that a 

false statement in either the Certification Letter or Form 4473 

could support a conviction on Count 1, and at other times it 

referenced only the statement in the Form 4473.29 At the end, 

however, when the jurors asked for clarification during their 

deliberations, the court instructed them, correctly, that either 

statement could form the basis for a conviction on Count 1.30 We 

presume jurors follow a district court's curative instruction. 

See e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1185 (1st Cir. 

1993). 

b. Duplicitous indictment. Count 1 of the indictment 

states that Karani "represented on ATF Form 4473 that he was the 

actual transferee/buyer of the firearm and signed an affidavit 

29 For example, the court explained to the jury that the 

"indictment charges that the Defendant represented on 4473 that he 

was the actual purchaser of the firearm, and at the end of Counts 

1 and 2 signed an affidavit that the purchase was for official use 

and not for resale." Docket No. 109, at 66. In another instance, 

the court stated that "[a] false statement is one that gives 

information that is not true or correct. Here the Defendant's 

answer to Question 11A on this Form 4473, that he was the actual 

purchaser of the firearm, that's the alleged false statement." 

Docket No. 109, at 65. In yet another instance, the court 

explained to the jury that Counts 1 and 2 alleged that Karani made 

a false statement by representing on "ATF Form 4473 as to each 

sale that he was the actual buyer for his own official use and was 

not buying for resale when he actually did buy to sell to someone 

else." Docket No. 109, at 64.

30 See supra Section I.F. discussing the posture of the case 

following the court's several supplemental instructions. 
- 37 - 

that the purchase was for official use and not for resale." 

(Emphasis added.) Karani claims that the indictment's use of "and" 

required the government to prove a false statement in both the 

Form 4473 and the Certification Letter and, for that reason, the 

district court improperly instructed the jury that Karani could be 

found guilty on Count 1 based on either one of the two documents. 

Although this claim highlights a flaw in the indictment, 

Karani's assertion of error in the court's instructions is 

unavailing. Because the indictment charges two distinct and 

complete violations of the same statute in a single count joined 

by the conjunctive "and," it is duplicitous. See United States v. 

Newell, 658 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir. 2011) ("[T]his indictment [i]s 

duplicitous in consolidating multiple complete offenses under 

single counts."). The remedy for a duplicitous indictment is a 

specific unanimity instruction to ensure that the jury understands 

that its verdict must be unanimous as to which instance of the 

alleged statutory violation resulted in a crime. See id. at 28 

("[T]he failure to provide a specific unanimity instruction [for 

the duplicitous charges] was error."). The district court provided 

such an instruction: 

It is enough if [the government] proves that 

[d]efendant made a false statement on either Form 

4473 or the affidavit or on both documents, but all 

12 of you have to be in agreement as to one or the 

other or both; that if all of you do not agree that 

the [d]efendant made a false statement in at least 
- 38 - 

one of these documents and which one, you must find 

him not guilty. 

No more was required.31 

c. Government waiver. Finally, to the extent that Karani 

argues that the court's instructions failed to account for the 

government's abandonment of the Certification Letter as a basis 

for conviction on Count 1, his argument fails. Although the 

government did not use the phrase "Certification Letter" in its 

closing argument, the government referred generally to the 

substance of the Certification Letter and referenced the Letter 

itself consistently throughout trial -- in its opening statement, 

in direct examination of the various witnesses, and in crossexamination of Karani. Accordingly, the government did not abandon 

reliance on the Certification Letter, and Karani's argument that 

the court committed plain error in failing to so instruct the jury 

fails. 

Affirmed. 

31 Any error resulting from the court's pronouncement that 

there is a general indictment convention that, without limitation,

"'and' means 'or' and 'or' also means 'and,'" was harmless because 

the court properly addressed the duplicitous indictment by 

instructing the jury in the disjunctive and providing a unanimity 

instruction. See Newell, 658 F.3d at 28.