United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

THE GERSON COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2018-1011

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:11-cv-00225-TCS, Chief Judge Timothy C. 

Stanceu.

______________________ 

Decided: August 6, 2018

______________________ 

RALPH H. SHEPPARD, Meeks, Sheppard, Leo & Pillsbury, Fairfield, CT, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

 HARDEEP KAUR JOSAN, International Trade Field 

Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, New York, NY, 

argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by AMY 

RUBIN, JEANNE DAVIDSON, CHAD A. READLER. 

 JOHN MICHAEL PETERSON, Neville Peterson LLP, New 

York, NY, for amici curiae Target General Merchandise 

Inc., Accent-Fairchild Group Inc., All Season Imports, 
2 GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES

Inc., American Lighting Inc., The Gordon Companies, 

Inc., Illumination International LLC, Imagine Nation 

Books, Ltd., Lamrite West Inc., LED Power Inc., Precision 

Lighting & Transformer, Inc., RDA Lighting Inc., Service 

Lighting & Electrical Supplies, Inc., US LED, Ltd. Also 

represented by RICHARD F. O'NEILL, RUSSELL ANDREW 

SEMMEL. 

 ______________________ 

Before LOURIE, O’MALLEY, and CHEN, Circuit Judges. 

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge. 

The Gerson Company appeals a decision of the United 

States Court of International Trade (“Trade Court”) 

granting summary judgment in favor of the government. 

See Gerson Co. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1271 (Ct. 

Int’l Trade 2017). In that decision, the court classified 

Gerson’s imported light-emitting diode (“LED”) candles 

under subheading 9405.40.80 of the Harmonized Tariff 

Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”)—which covers

certain “[l]amps . . . not elsewhere specified or included”—

rather than under subheading 8543.70.70—which covers

“[e]lectrical machines and apparatus,” including “[e]lectric 

luminescent lamps.” We agree with the Trade Court’s 

classification, and, accordingly, affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Subject Merchandise

Gerson’s imported merchandise consists of finished

decorative candle and tea light lamps made of plastic 

and/or wax. The lamps are designed to resemble ordinary 

candles, such as votive, pillar, taper, or tea light candles. 

Unlike ordinary candles, however—which generate light 

by using a wick to vaporize wax—Gerson’s candles use 

battery-operated LEDs. Gerson does not dispute that its 

candles serve both decorative and illuminative functions. 

See Oral Arg. at 1:10–25, Gerson Co. v. United States (No. 
GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES 3

2018-1011), http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/

default.aspx?fl=2018-1011.mp3.

Between January and October 2009, Gerson imported 

twenty-seven entries of its candles through the Port of 

Kansas City, Missouri. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) liquidated the merchandise under 

HTSUS subheading 9405.40.80, which imposes a duty 

rate of 3.9% ad valorem. That provision reads1: 

9405 Lamps and lighting fittings including 

searchlights and spotlights and parts thereof, not 

elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, 

illuminated nameplates and the like, having a 

permanently fixed light source, and parts thereof 

not elsewhere specified or included:

40 Other electric lamps and lighting fittings:

80 Other.......................................3.9% 

Gerson objected to Customs’ classification in four administrative protests, arguing that its candles should 

have been classified under subheading 8543.70.70, which 

imposes a duty rate of 2% ad valorem. That provision 

reads:

8543 Electrical machines and apparatus, having 

individual functions, not specified or included 

elsewhere in this chapter; parts thereof:

70 Other machines and apparatus:

70 Electric luminescent lamps...........2%

Customs denied each of Gerson’s protests, leading Gerson 

to file suit in the Trade Court.

 

1 We cite here to the 2009 version of the HTSUS in 

effect when Gerson imported the merchandise at issue.
4 GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES

B. Procedural History

Presented with cross-motions for summary judgment, 

the Trade Court granted judgment in favor of the government, finding that Customs properly classified Gerson’s candles under subheading 9405.40.80 (certain 

“[l]amps . . . not elsewhere specified or included”) rather 

than 8543.70.70 (“[e]lectrical machines and apparatus,” 

including “[e]lectric luminescent lamps”). Gerson, 254 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1281. 

The court observed that it is at least “plausible” to 

read heading 8543 as covering Gerson’s candles to the 

extent they qualify as “electrical machines and apparatus.” Id. at 1276. But the court rejected that reading as 

impermissibly expanding the scope of heading 8543 and 

unduly narrowing the scope of heading 9405. Id. at 1277–

78. The court also determined that such a reading would 

be inconsistent with the World Customs Organization’s 

Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System

(“HS”) Explanatory Notes (“ENs”), which suggest that 

chapter 94 is reserved for finished household lamps like 

Gerson’s candles, while chapter 85 is reserved for unfinished lamps used in conjunction with other electrical 

devices. Id. at 1278–80. The court therefore classified the 

candles under subheading 9405.40.80. Id. at 1281. 

Gerson timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

II. DISCUSSION

“We review a grant of summary judgment by the 

Court of International Trade for correctness as a matter of 

law and decide de novo the proper interpretation of the 

tariff provisions as well as whether there are genuine 

issues of material fact to preclude summary judgment.” 

Otter Prods., LLC v. United States, 834 F.3d 1369, 1374–

75 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “Although we review the decision[] of 

the [Trade Court] de novo, we give great weight to the 
GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES 5

informed opinion of the [Trade Court] and it is nearly 

always the starting point of our analysis.” Schlumberger 

Tech. Corp. v. United States, 845 F.3d 1158, 1162 (Fed. 

Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Classifying articles under the HTSUS is a two-step 

process. A court first determines the proper meaning of 

specific terms in the tariff provisions, which is a question 

of law that we review without deference. Otter Prods., 

834 F.3d at 1375. Next, the court determines under 

which subheading the subject merchandise is most appropriately classified, which is a question of fact that we 

review for clear error. Id. But when, as here, there is no 

dispute as to the nature of the merchandise, the two-step 

classification analysis “collapses entirely into a question 

of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

For the reasons stated below, we agree with the Trade 

Court that Gerson’s candles fall within heading 9405 

rather than heading 8543. We also agree with the court 

that Gerson cannot use subheading 8543.70.70 to expand 

the scope of heading 8543.

A. The Trade Court Correctly Classified Gerson’s Candles 

Under Heading 9405 Rather than Heading 8543

“The HTSUS scheme is organized by headings, each of 

which has one or more subheadings; the headings set 

forth general categories of merchandise, and the subheadings provide a more particularized segregation of the 

goods within each category.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “The proper classification of merchandise entering the United States is governed by the General Rules of Interpretation (‘GRIs’) of the HTSUS and the 

Additional United States Rules of Interpretation.”2 Id.

 

2 The Additional United States Rules of Interpretation are not relevant here because they govern particular 
6 GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES

We apply the GRIs in numerical order, beginning with 

GRI 1, which provides that “classification shall be determined according to the terms of the headings and any 

relative section or chapter notes.” La Crosse Tech., Ltd. v. 

United States, 723 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013). And, 

where an “imported article is described in whole by a 

single classification heading or subheading, then that 

single classification applies, and the succeeding GRIs are 

inoperative.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We therefore begin, as we must, “with the language of 

the headings.” Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 

F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The two competing 

headings at issue here are headings 9405 and 8543. The 

former covers “[l]amps and lighting fittings including 

searchlights and spotlights and parts thereof, not elsewhere specified or included.” The parties agree that 

Gerson’s candles qualify as “lamps,” as that term is commonly understood. For a lamp to be classifiable under 

heading 9405, however, the plain language of the heading 

requires that the lamp not be “elsewhere specified or 

included,” meaning that the lamp must not be covered by 

any other heading in any chapter of the HTSUS. This 

criterion is consistent with chapter 94’s Note 1(f), which 

excludes from chapter 94’s scope “[l]amps or lighting 

fittings of chapter 85.” Gerson does not contend on appeal 

that its candles fall within any chapter other than chapter 

85, nor does it contend that its candles fall within any 

heading other than 8543. Thus, if Gerson’s candles are 

classifiable under heading 8543, the terms of heading 

9405 and Note 1(f) preclude classification under heading 

9405.

Heading 8543 covers “[e]lectrical machines and apparatus, having individual functions, not specified or includ-

 

use and textile provisions not at issue in this case. See 

ARI 1(a)–(d); see also Schlumberger, 845 F.3d at 1163 n.5.
GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES 7

ed elsewhere in this chapter.” As an initial matter, the 

heading does not refer to “lamps,” which both parties 

agree Gerson’s candles are.3 And, as the Trade Court 

observed, the term “electrical machines and apparatus” 

recited in heading 8543 “is not free of ambiguity” standing 

alone. Gerson, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 1277. On the one hand, 

it is “plausible” to read heading 8543 broadly as encompassing Gerson’s candles, at least in a “hyper-technical 

sense,” because the candles use electricity to operate and 

therefore arguably qualify as “electrical machines and 

apparatus.” Id. at 1276–77. On the other hand, the

terms “machine” and “apparatus” generally connote 

equipment designed specifically to carry out a particular 

function. See Webster’s New World College Dictionary 67 

(4th ed. 2009) (defining “apparatus” to mean “any complex 

device or machine for a specific use”); id. at 860 (defining 

“machine” to mean “a structure consisting of a framework 

and various fixed and moving parts, for doing some kind 

of work” and “any device thought of as functioning in such 

a way, as . . . an electronic computer”).4 Those terms 

 

3 Given that heading 8543 does not refer to “lamps,” 

it is questionable whether the plain language of heading 

9405 and chapter 94’s Note 1(f)—which each exclude from 

chapter 94’s scope only “lamps” specified elsewhere—

preclude classification of Gerson’s lamps in heading 9405. 

In contrast to heading 8543, headings 8513 (certain 

“[p]ortable electric lamps designed to function by their 

own source of energy”) and 8539 (“[e]lectrical filament or 

discharge lamps, including sealed beam lamp units and 

ultraviolet or infrared lamps; arc lamps”) do refer to 

“lamps.” Gerson does not argue on appeal that its candles 

are classifiable under either of these headings, however. 4 The parties do not proffer dictionary definitions 

for the terms “machine” or “apparatus.” We nevertheless 

take judicial notice of the common dictionary definitions 
8 GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES

would seem not to cover Gerson’s candles, which are

decorative articles that also serve an illuminative function. Cf. La Crosse, 723 F.3d at 1359 (rejecting classification under GRI 3(b) predicated on a failure to 

acknowledge “the key function of the devices at issue”).

Heading 8543’s scope becomes clearer, however, when 

read in context of the HTSUS as a whole. The provision 

does not exist in a vacuum, and we must read it in conjunction with other relevant provisions to discern its 

meaning. See id. at 1361 (reading headings “together and 

viewed in light of their respective Explanatory Notes” to 

conclude that they “set out mutually exclusive categories 

of meteorological devices”); cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 

2480, 2489 (2015) (“[O]ftentimes the meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become 

evident when placed in context. So when deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words in their 

context and with a view to their place in the overall 

statutory scheme. Our duty, after all, is to construe 

statutes, not isolated provisions.” (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

When so read, the HTSUS makes clear that Gerson’s 

candles belong in heading 9405 rather than in heading 

8543. If one were to read heading 8543 as covering Gerson’s candles, it would cover every electric lamp, because 

all such lamps use electricity to generate light. And, by 

operation of Note 1(f), such lamps could not be classified 

under heading 9405. In other words, heading 9405 would 

be constrained to only non-electric lamps. That reading, 

as the Trade Court noted, “would impose a specific, and 

drastic, limitation on the scope of heading 9405, HTSUS

that the article description for that heading does not 

express or suggest.” Gerson, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 1278. In 

 

of those terms. See Stewart-Warner Corp. v. United 

States, 748 F.2d 663, 669 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES 9

fact, such a reading would effectively remove electric 

“searchlights” and “spotlights” from heading 9405 even 

though those devices are expressly provided for in that 

heading. See HTSUS Hdg. 9405 (“Lamps and lighting 

fittings including searchlights and spotlights and parts 

thereof” (emphasis added)). We agree with the Trade 

Court, therefore, that Gerson’s candles do not fall within 

heading 8543.

The ENs to the relevant chapters further support the 

Trade Court’s ruling.5 See Otter Prods., 834 F.3d at 1375 

(“After consulting the headings and section or chapter 

notes, we may also consult the World Customs Organization’s Explanatory Notes, which accompany each chapter 

of the HTSUS.”); StoreWALL, LLC v. United States, 644 

F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Although not binding, 

where a tariff term is ambiguous the Explanatory Notes 

may provide persuasive and clearly relevant guidance to 

the meaning of the term.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Explanatory Note 94.05, for example, states 

that the term “lamps” in heading 9405 refers to lamps 

“constituted of any material” and that use “any source of 

light,” including “electricity.” EN 94.05(I) (emphases 

added). That EN also provides examples of lamps that 

fall within the heading and includes those that are “normally used for the illumination of rooms” such as “chandeliers” and “table lamps,” as well as “[c]andelabra” and 

“candlesticks.” Id.; see also Pomeroy Collection, Ltd. v. 

 

5 Unlike the HTSUS section and chapter notes—

such as chapter 94’s Note 1(f)—the ENs “are not legally 

binding or dispositive, but they may be consulted for 

guidance and are generally indicative of the proper interpretation of the various HTSUS provisions.” BenQ Am. 

Corp. v. United States, 646 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 

2011). We cite here to the 2007 version of the ENs that 

were in effect when Gerson imported its merchandise. 
10 GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES

United States, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1386 (Ct. Int’l Trade

2008) (noting that heading 9405 covers “candle holders 

and candle lamps”). The notes therefore suggest that

chapter 94 was intended to include at least finished, 

standalone electric lamps used in the home.

Chapter 85’s ENs, by contrast, state that chapter 85 

includes “[c]ertain electrical goods not generally used 

independently, but designed to play a particular role as 

components, in electrical equipment,” including 

“[e]lectrical filament or discharge lamps.” EN 85(A)(6)

(emphasis added); HS Hdg. 85.39. These ENs therefore 

suggest that chapter 85 was intended to include at least 

unfinished lamps that are used in conjunction with other 

electrical equipment. As the Trade Court found, Gerson’s

candles more closely resemble the lamps described in 

chapter 94 than they do the lamps described in chapter 

85. Gerson, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 1277.

Gerson challenges the Trade Court’s ruling on several 

grounds. Gerson first argues that, by acknowledging that 

the candles “plausibly” fall within heading 8543, the 

Trade Court found that the candles are prima facie classifiable in that heading, which should have ended the 

inquiry. Gerson reads too much into the Trade Court’s 

choice of words. While the court did say that it was 

“plausible” to read heading 8543 as covering Gerson’s 

candles insofar as the candles, like all electrical lamps 

ever in existence, qualify in the abstract as electrical 

machines or apparatus, the court correctly and emphatically rejected that reading as nonsensical. The court 

noted that such a reading would impermissibly expand 

the scope of heading 8543 and diminish the scope of 

heading 9405. Thus, far from finding that the candles are 

classifiable under heading 8543, the court found that 

reading implausible. 

Gerson next argues that the Trade Court erred by allegedly using the ENs to displace the plain language of 
GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES 11

heading 8543. Gerson relies heavily on our decision in 

Midwest of Cannon Falls, Inc. v. United States, 122 F.3d 

1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997), superseded on other grounds as 

stated in WWRD US, LLC v. United States, 886 F.3d 1228 

(Fed. Cir. 2018), to support its argument. That case, 

however, is inapposite. There, the Trade Court held that 

earthenware jack-o’-lantern mugs and pitchers did not fall 

within a heading covering “other festive, carnival or other 

entertainment articles” because all the examples provided 

in the ENs for the relevant chapter were non-functional in 

nature. Id. at 1429. In other words, the Trade Court in 

Midwest used the ENs to hold “as a matter of law that 

when an item with a particular ornamentation . . . serves 

a utilitarian function . . . , it must be classified under the 

utilitarian article provision.” Id. at 1428–29. We reversed, holding that it was improper to employ the ENs’ 

“limiting characteristics to narrow the language of the 

classification heading itself,” which was otherwise unambiguous. Id. at 1429; see Airflow Tech., Inc. v. United 

States, 524 F.3d 1287, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen the 

language of the tariff provision is unambiguous and the 

Explanatory Notes contradictory, we do not afford [the 

Notes] any weight.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Trade Court committed no such error here. First, 

unlike in Midwest, the language of heading 8543 is ambiguous standing alone, as described above. Second, the 

court here construed heading 8543 in view of heading 

9405 to conclude that it does not cover Gerson’s candles. 

Only after having done that did the court note that the 

ENs supported its construction. In other words, the 

Trade Court did not begin its analysis by applying limiting characteristics gleaned from the ENs to heading 8543, 

as in Midwest. Third, the court here did not use the ENs 

to limit the scope of the headings. Rather, the court used

the ENs merely to “clarify the scope” of the language in 

heading 8534, which is “entirely proper.” See LeMans

Corp. v. United States, 660 F.3d 1311, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 
12 GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES

2011) (approving consideration of the ENs in a similar 

context, and noting that the Trade Court “did not find 

that the Explanatory Notes precluded classification of 

LeMans’ goods as sports equipment” but rather “found 

only that these examples informed its interpretation of 

the term ‘sports equipment’”); StoreWALL, 644 F.3d at 

1363 (“[T]he Court of International Trade’s importation of 

the ‘rack exclusion’ from the Explanatory Notes into its 

definition of ‘unit furniture’ does not contradict the common commercial meaning of ‘unit furniture,’ but instead 

clarifies the scope of the term.”). 

Finally, Gerson argues that the Trade Court erred to 

the extent it employed a “class or kind” analysis. Gerson 

pounces on the Trade Court’s statement that its candles 

“are within a class or kind of electric lamps that are selfcontained, i.e., independently used,” and therefore fall 

within chapter 94 rather than chapter 85. Gerson, 254 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1277. Gerson asserts that this type of “class 

or kind” analysis is only appropriate when the heading at 

issue is a “use” heading—i.e., one that refers to products 

by their use. See BenQ Am. Corp. v. United States, 646 

F.3d 1371, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here, Gerson asserts, the headings at issue are eo nomine provisions—i.e., 

ones that refer to products by their specific names. See 

La Crosse, 723 F.3d at 1358.

Regardless of whether these provisions are use or eo 

nomine provisions, the Trade Court did not perform a 

“class or kind” analysis, as evidenced by the fact that the 

court did not reference the factors that govern that analysis. See BenQ, 646 F.3d at 1377–80; United States v. 

Carborundum Co., 536 F.2d 373, 377 (CCPA 1976). 

Rather than using the phrase “class or kind” to invoke a 

legal doctrine, the Trade Court used the phrase for its 

ordinary meaning to make the point that Gerson’s candles 

are the type of articles classified under heading 9405 
GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES 13

rather than heading 8543. The court’s analysis was

proper.6

In sum, the Trade Court did not err in determining 

that Gerson’s candles fall within heading 9405 rather 

than heading 8543. Gerson does not dispute that, if its 

candles fall within heading 9405, the appropriate subheading is 9405.40.80, which covers “other” electric lamps 

not made of a “base metal.”

That conclusion alone precludes classification under 

subheading 8543.70.70. We nevertheless address below 

Gerson’s and its amici’s7 subheading-specific arguments 

 

6 Despite stating in its opening brief that heading 

9405 is eo nomine, Gerson argues in reply that the heading is in fact a “basket” provision insofar as it contains the 

qualifying phrase “not otherwise specified or included.” 

Reply Br. 2; see R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.3d 

1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that a heading “is a 

‘basket provision’” if it contains “the terms ‘not elsewhere 

specified or included’”). “[C]lassification of imported 

merchandise in a basket provision is only appropriate if 

there is no tariff category that covers the merchandise 

more specifically.” R.T. Foods, 757 F.3d at 1354 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). But this characterization does 

little to help Gerson. As explained above, heading 8543

does not cover Gerson’s candles. As a result, the candles 

fall within heading 9405, regardless of how that provision 

is characterized. Further, heading 8543 is also a “basket” 

provision because it covers only those electrical machines 

and apparatus “not specified or included elsewhere in” the 

chapter. Thus, according to Gerson’s logic, classification 

under heading 8543 would also be disfavored.

7 Target General Merchandise Inc. and twelve other 

companies whose imported LED devices were classified by 

Customs under heading 9405 filed an amicus brief in 

support of Gerson.
14 GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES

to clarify the role that subheadings play in the classification analysis. 

B. The Trade Court Correctly Found that Gerson’s Candles Are Not Classifiable Under Subheading 8543.70.70

Gerson and its amici ask us to look past heading 8543 

and to focus instead on subheading 8543.70.70, which 

covers “electric luminescent lamps.” They assert that 

Gerson’s candles use LEDs to produce light and therefore 

indisputably qualify as “electric luminescent lamps.” 

They argue, moreover, that the placement of subheading 

8543.70.70 within heading 8543 evidences Congress’s

intent for all “electric luminescent lamps” to qualify as 

“electrical machines and apparatus.” We disagree on all 

counts.

Gerson’s and its amici’s “bottom-up” analysis—which 

begins with a subheading and proceeds upward through 

the headings—is backwards. Classification under the 

GRIs must take a “top-down” approach, beginning, “as it 

must, with the language of the headings,” and ending 

with the language of the subheadings. Orlando Food, 140 

F.3d at 1440. In particular, under GRI 1, a court must 

first determine whether the merchandise is correctly 

classified under a particular heading of the HTSUS. See

Otter Prods., 834 F.3d at 1375 (“According to GRI 1, the 

HTSUS headings and section or chapter notes govern the 

classification of a product.”); BenQ, 646 F.3d at 1376 

(“When determining the correct classification for merchandise, a court first construes the language of the 

headings in question, in light of any related section or 

chapter notes.”); see also Orlando Food, 140 F.3d at 1440 

(“[W]hen determining which heading is the more specific, 

and hence the more appropriate for classification, a court 

should compare only the language of the headings and not 

the language of the subheadings.”). “Only after determining that a product is classifiable under the heading should 

the court look to the subheadings to find the correct 
GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES 15

classification for the merchandise.” Orlando Food, 140 

F.3d at 1440 (emphasis added); see LeMans, 660 F.3d at 

1316 (“We are first to look to headings, then subheadings, 

to determine the proper classification.” (emphasis added)). 

The reason for this analytic approach is simple—it 

ensures that the more specific subheading characterizations are informed by the more general headings in which 

they appear. Beginning the analysis with the subheading, as Gerson urges, would effectively divorce the analysis from the necessary context provided by the higherlevel headings. See Orlando Food, 140 F.3d at 1440

(holding that the Trade Court’s “analysis contradicted 

GRI 1” because “it construed only the language of the 

subheadings rather than the language of the headings in 

classifying the product”). Further, Gerson’s insistence 

that we consider only subheading 8543.70.70 would allow 

that provision to expand the scope of heading 8543, which 

would correspondingly diminish the scope of heading 

9405. Such a reading is impermissible, as headings “are 

to be evaluated without reference to their subheadings, 

which cannot be used to expand the scope of their respective headings.” R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.3d 

1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

Gerson and its amici next suggest that, under the 

Trade Court’s logic, no electric luminescent lamp would 

ever be classifiable under subheading 8543.70.70 because 

such lamps would not be considered “electrical machines 

and apparatus” as contemplated by heading 8543. They

assert that subheading 8543.70.70 “becomes a nullity, 

into which no product can ever fall.” Amici Br. 11. We 

find this argument both exaggerated and unpersuasive. 

While those products that would fall within subheading 

8543.70.70 are not before us, we are satisfied that the 

Trade Court’s holding leaves ample room in that subheading for certain electric luminescent devices that fall 

within the scope of heading 8543. See EN 85.43(16) 

(listing as examples “[e]lectro-luminescent devices, gener-
16 GERSON COMPANY v. UNITED STATES

ally in strips, plates, or panels, and based on electroluminescent substances (e.g., zinc sulphide) placed between two layers of conductive material”). 

We therefore reject Gerson’s and its amici’s subheading-specific arguments.

III. CONCLUSION

We have considered Gerson’s and its amici’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. The Trade 

Court correctly determined that Gerson’s candles are 

classifiable under subheading 9405.40.80, subject to a 

duty rate of 3.9% ad valorem. 

AFFIRMED