PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

In Re: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE 

SERVICES, INCORPORATED,

Debtor.

MARYLAND PORT ADMINISTRATION,

 No. 06-2207 Movant-Appellee,

v.

PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES,

INCORPORATED,

Respondent-Appellant. 

PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, 

INCORPORATED,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROBERT L. FLANAGAN, Secretary,

Department of Transportation, State  No. 06-2208

of Maryland, and Chairman,

Maryland Port Commission; F.

BROOKS ROYSTER, III, Executive

Director, Maryland Port

Administration,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

William M. Nickerson, Senior District Judge.

(1:06-cv-01733-WMN; 1:06-cv-01761-WMN; 05-bk-20168-JS;

05-0137)
Argued: March 14, 2007

Decided: June 15, 2007

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Gregory and Judge Duncan joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Charles Samuel Fax, RIFKIN, LIVINGSTON, LEVITAN & SILVER, L.L.C., Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Philip

P. Whaling, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Maryland

Port Authority, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:

Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: 

These consolidated cases demonstrate, unfortunately, how the good

and useful ends of the bankruptcy process can be badly abused. The

Chapter 11 petition filed by the debtor, Premier Automotive Services,

pressed a variety of claims intended, not for the legitimate purposes

of bankruptcy, but to invoke the automatic stay and other bankruptcy

code protections in order to forestall eviction on an obviously expired

lease. The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition, finding that Premier had filed it in bad faith, solely "to prevent the State from evicting the debtor from [the State’s] property," and as a "means to the end

of tying up the State in endless, fruitless litigation." The district court

affirmed, noting that while Premier’s constitutional claims "abound in

legal creativity, they generally lack legal merit." We agree with both

courts and affirm the judgment.

2 IN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC.
I.

This dispute arises out of a commercial lease of approximately six

and one half acres of land ("Lot 90") owned by the Maryland Port

Administration ("MPA") and located on Dundalk Marine Terminal on

the Baltimore waterfront. Debtor-Plaintiff Premier Automotive Services ("Premier") is an import-export motor vehicle company which

processes trucks, as well as heavy military, agricultural, and construction equipment through Dundalk Marine Terminal. Premier has been

operating on Lot 90 for over forty years under a variety of leases and

is the current possessor of Lot 90. At the beginning of its occupancy,

Premier constructed a 27,500 square-foot building on Lot 90 which

contains an office, body shop, paint shop, and washline. 

Defendant MPA is an agency of the State of Maryland which oversees and operates port facilities. Md. Code Ann., Transp. 6-102(f)

(LexisNexis 2003). MPA’s purpose is to increase the waterborne

commerce of Maryland ports, and, by doing so, to benefit Maryland

residents. Id. § 6-102(c)(1). In this, the agency is granted statutory

authority to lease port facilities to private parties like Premier. Id. § 6-

204(i). 

Premier Automotive Services’ most recent lease for Lot 90 was

executed in July 1992 and expired on June 30, 2002. Before the July

1992 lease expired, MPA met with Premier to discuss lease renewal,

and tendered to Premier a five-year lease. Premier objected to a vehicle throughput requirement, which required Premier to guarantee that

it would move 1700 vehicles per acre per year through Lot 90, and

the lease was never executed. Premier did not, however, quit the

premises after the old lease expired. Instead, Premier remained in possession of Lot 90 as a holdover tenant on a month-to-month basis. 

In February 2004, following a year and a half of unsuccessful

negotiations over a long-term lease, MPA offered Premier a monthto-month lease. The February 2004 lease did not contain a throughput

requirement. Premier again rejected MPA’s proposal, deeming the

month-to-month lease unacceptable because it would not provide

long-term stability. 

In April of 2004, after further lease negotiations, MPA offered Premier a three-year lease with two one-year renewal options. In

IN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC. 3
response to Premier’s throughput objection, MPA informed Premier

that it had "committed every vehicle tenant at the Dundalk Marine

Terminal and other facilities to a throughput that makes the most efficient and effective use of our limited terminal land." In MPA’s view,

the 1,700 vehicle per acre per year requirement allocated to Premier

was "more than achievable since the [acreage] used to calculate the

guarantee is less than 50% of [Lot 90]." MPA requested that Premier

execute the lease by April 15. 

On April 30, 2004, MPA wrote to Premier expressing frustration

over the parties’ failure to come to terms on a new lease. The April

30 letter informed Premier that the Maryland Port Administration was

extending the signing deadline for the April 2004 lease until May 15,

2004, but noted that the lease must be signed by that date. The parties,

however, failed once again to reach agreement. 

On January 4, 2005, MPA entered into a five-year lease with Pasha

Automotive Services ("Pasha") for acreage on the Dundalk Marine

Terminal, and, on June 15, 2005, Lot 90 was designated for Pasha.

Pasha committed to a minimum throughput of 1,700 vehicles per acre

(on each of Lot 90’s 6.54 acres) and also agreed to a relocation

clause, which gave MPA the discretion to move Pasha to another

location on the Dundalk Marine Terminal at MPA’s expense. 

In March 2005, the Maryland Department of Transportation

advised Premier that MPA had entered into a long term lease with

another tenant — Pasha — for Lot 90. And, on March 29, 2005, MPA

sent Premier a letter which terminated Premier’s month-to-month tenancy effective May 1, 2005. MPA subsequently offered Premier a 60-

day extension (until June 30, 2005) in exchange for Premier waiving

any objection the company had to vacating Lot 90. Premier declined

the offer. 

On April 29, 2005, Premier filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition

in federal bankruptcy court in the District of Maryland. Premier

invoked the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000),

and alleged, in a related adversary proceeding, a variety of constitutional violations against MPA, then-Secretary of the Maryland

Department of Transportation Robert L. Flanagan, and MPA Executive Director F. Brooks Royster, III. The bankruptcy court held two

4 IN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC.
evidentiary hearings, and then granted MPA’s motion for summary

judgment in the adversary action, ordered the automatic stay lifted,

and dismissed Premier’s Chapter 11 petition. More specifically, the

bankruptcy court held that Premier had filed the bankruptcy petition

in bad faith — "for the sole purpose of halting and/or delaying [Premier’s] ultimate eviction from the Terminal by MPA." The court also

dismissed the petition on the grounds that an expired lease was not

"property of the estate" under 11 U.S.C. § 541(b): A "bankruptcy

court has no authority to resuscitate a lease of real property that

expired by its own terms prepetition," the court wrote. Premier

appealed to federal district court. 

While the bankruptcy proceedings were pending, Premier filed a

complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission ("FMC") based

upon the same facts underlying the bankruptcy case. Premier alleged

a number of violations of the Federal Shipping Act. See 46 App.

U.S.C. § 1709(d)(1), (3), (4) (now codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 41102(c),

41106(2)-(3)). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition

on sovereign immunity grounds. Premier appealed that decision to the

FMC, where it remains pending. Following dismissal of its FMC petition, Premier filed its second action in federal district court seeking

injunctive relief pending final judgment on the FMC appeal pursuant

to 46 U.S.C. App. § 1710(h)(2). 

The district court consolidated the bankruptcy appeal and the FMC

complaint. The district court then affirmed the bankruptcy court’s

grant of summary judgment against Premier finding that "Premier’s

constitutional claims are unsupportable." The court then concluded

that, because these unsupportable claims "were the only ‘property’ of

the bankruptcy estate" claimed by Premier, the petition must be dismissed and the automatic stay lifted. Finally, the district court dismissed Premier’s Shipping Act complaint for injunctive relief based

in part on its conclusion that Premier "clear[ly]" could not "demonstrat[e] its entitlement to an injunction." Premier now appeals.

II.

We must determine as an initial matter whether the bankruptcy

court properly dismissed Premier’s Chapter 11 petition as a bad faith

filing and an abuse of the bankruptcy process. "We review the bankIN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC. 5
ruptcy court’s ultimate finding that the filing was not in good faith as

one of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard." Carolin Corp.

v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 702 (4th Cir. 1989). 

A.

The right to file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition is conditioned

upon the debtor’s good faith — the absence of which is cause for

summary dismissal. Id. at 698; Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Charfoos (In re

Charfoos), 979 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1992). Indeed, the ability of

a bankruptcy court to conduct a threshold inquiry into the good faith

of a petitioner is "indispensable to proper accomplishment of the

basic purposes of Chapter 11 protection." Carolin, 886 F.2d at 698.

As this court has explained, "a good faith requirement ‘prevents abuse

of the bankruptcy process by debtors whose overriding motive is to

delay creditors without benefitting them in any way or to achieve reprehensible purposes.’" Id. (quoting In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779

F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986)). The good faith standard also "‘protects the jurisdictional integrity of the bankruptcy courts by rendering

their powerful equitable weapons (i.e., avoidance of liens, discharge

of debts, marshaling and turnover of assets) available only to those

debtors and creditors with clean hands.’" Id. (quoting In re Little

Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d at 1072). 

In this circuit, a lack of good faith in filing a Chapter 11 petition

requires a showing of "objective futility" and "subjective bad faith."

Id. at 700-01. The objective test focuses on whether "there exists the

‘realistic possibility of an effective reorganization.’" See Carolin, 886

F.2d at 698 (quoting In re Albany Partners, Ltd., 749 F.2d 670, 674

(11th Cir. 1984)); id. at 701-02; see also In re Coleman, 426 F.3d

719, 728 (4th Cir. 2005). The subjective test asks whether a Chapter

11 petition is motivated by an honest intent to effectuate reorganization or is instead motivated by some improper purpose. Carolin, 886

F.2d at 702. Subjective bad faith is shown where a petition is filed "to

abuse the reorganization process," or "to cause hardship or to delay

creditors by resort to the Chapter 11 device merely for the purpose of

invoking the automatic stay." Id.

B.

Premier contends that the bankruptcy court erred in dismissing its

petition as a bad faith filing under the criteria set forth in Carolin

6 IN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC.
Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1989). In Premier’s view, its

multi-pronged litigation strategy presents "a clear path towards reorganization of its business — namely, a reasonable and fair offer of a

lease." And, Premier asserts, "it is clear that Premier filed for protection under Chapter 11 in good faith" because "Premier needs Lot 90

and the Building, or their functional equivalent, in order to be in business." 

We disagree. There is substantial evidence in the record that supports the bankruptcy court’s findings of both objective futility and

subjective bad faith. With respect to Carolin’s objective futility

inquiry, Premier clearly had no "realistic possibility of an effective

reorganization." Carolin, 886 F.2d at 698. Premier in fact never filed

a proposed plan of reorganization. Instead, Premier maintains that its

"plan for reorganization is this litigation." Quite apart from the fact

that Premier had no cognizable property interest in its expired lease

of Lot 90, see Chesapeake Bank v. Monro Muffler/Brake, Inc., 891

A.2d 384, 391 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006), and no right to judicially

compelled negotiations, see infra Part III.A, its reorganization-qualitigation strategy was, as the bankruptcy court found, "wholly illusory." Indeed, even if Premier were somehow to get the relief it

requests, that relief would not lead to an effective reorganization.

Thus, the bankruptcy court concluded that Premier’s lease dispute

belonged in "the State [of Maryland’s] Courts" and there is "no possible mechanism in bankruptcy by which the debtor can achieve a legitimate reorganization." 

With respect to Carolin’s second prong of subjective bad faith, the

record also supports the bankruptcy court’s finding that Premier filed

its petition for an impermissible purpose. Premier had no demonstrable need to reorganize when it filed the petition: it was not, the bankruptcy court found, even "experiencing financial difficulties." Indeed,

Premier’s bankruptcy filings reveal a solvent business entity with no

unsecured creditors and few, if any, secured creditors. This fact alone

may justify dismissal of Premier’s Chapter 11 petition. As one of our

sister circuits has noted, courts "have consistently dismissed Chapter

11 petitions filed by financially healthy companies with no need to

reorganize under the protection of Chapter 11." In re SGL Carbon

Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 166 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing cases). 

IN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC. 7
Beyond Premier’s solvency, other circumstances support the bankruptcy court’s finding of subjective bad faith. The bankruptcy court

found that Premier’s "only nemesis" was MPA and that it was "not

the failure of the State to negotiate in good faith that created the

impasse between the parties, but the inability of the parties to come

to terms on a new lease." The court further found that Premier’s

adversary claims against MPA were dependent upon its right to a

lease of Lot 90 — a matter of state contract law. Premier did not,

however, choose to avail itself of the obvious state law remedies

before bringing its Chapter 11 petition, providing further evidence of

bad faith. The eleventh-hour filing of Premier’s bankruptcy petition

also supports the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Premier filed its petition

on April 29, 2005 — just one day before the company was legally

obligated to quit the premises. 

In light of all this evidence, the bankruptcy court concluded that

"Premier filed the instant bankruptcy case for the sole purpose of halting and/or delaying its ultimate eviction from the Terminal by MPA,"

"to compel the Maryland Port Administration to execute a new lease

to the debtor on terms more favorable than those the State found

acceptable," and as a "means to the end of tying up the State in endless, fruitless litigation." Holding an asset hostage is not a permissible

use of the bankruptcy process, however. Chapter 11 is not a procedural vehicle which may be commandeered solely for "the purpose of

invoking [its] automatic stay." Carolin, 886 F.2d at 702. The bankruptcy court properly assessed Premier’s Chapter 11 filing under the

Carolin criteria and properly found it wanting.

C.

Aside from this general deficiency, Premier’s bankruptcy petition

was properly dismissed on the particular grounds that property of the

estate does not include, and the automatic stay does not apply to, an

expired lease of nonresidential property. A mere possessory interest

under an expired lease is insufficient to trigger an automatic stay

under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(10) (2000). Section

362 excludes from its protections nonresidential real property leases

that expire "before the commencement of or during a case." The statute provides, in part: 

8 IN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC.
The filing of a petition . . . does not operate as a stay . . .

of any act by a lessor to the debtor under a lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated by the expiration of

the stated term of the lease before the commencement of or

during a case under this title to obtain possession of such

property.

Id.

Here, Premier’s lease expired on June 30, 2002, and Premier

remained as a month-to-month holdover tenant, whose tenancy was

terminable at the will of the State of Maryland as landlord. See Md.

Code Ann., Real Property § 8-402 (LexisNexis 2003). On March 29,

2005, MPA informed Premier that its month-to-month tenancy would

end effective May 1, 2005. Thus any leasehold interest that Premier

had in Lot 90 expired on that day. Since 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(10)

excludes nonresidential real property leases that expire "before the

commencement of or during a case" from Section 362(a)’s automatic

stay provisions, Premier’s Lot 90 lease is not subject to those provisions. 

Moreover, 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(2) excepts from "property of the

estate" any interest a debtor has in a nonresidential lease that has "terminated at the expiration of the stated term of such lease." 11 U.S.C.

§ 541(b)(2). It provides that:

Property of the estate . . . ceases to include any interest of

the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresidential real

property that has terminated at the expiration of the stated

term of such lease during the case.

Id. Here, because Premier’s month-to-month tenancy expired on May

1, 2005, the bankruptcy estate "cease[d] to include any interest" that

Premier had in the Lot 90 lease on that day. In sum, since an expired

lease is neither property of the estate nor subject to Section 362(a)’s

automatic stay provisions, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(10), 541(b)(2), we

must affirm the district court’s dismissal of the bankruptcy petition

and its order lifting the automatic stay.

IN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC. 9
III.

Premier contends that it may nonetheless maintain its bankruptcy

petition — its Lot 90 interests aside — because the constitutional

claims asserted in its adversary action are property of the bankruptcy

estate. The courts below, however, properly recognized Premier’s

constitutional claims as unsupportable attempts to circumvent the

bankruptcy law’s various bars to Premier’s filing.

A.

The first count of Premier’s adversary complaint alleges that MPA

denied it a property interest without due process of law in violation

of the Fourteenth Amendment. Premier no longer argues that it has

a property interest in the expired lease or the building located on Lot

90. Instead, Premier now claims a constitutional property interest in

the "right to fair negotiations with the state in the leasing of stateowned property" and in the "right to do business." It is elementary

that "[p]roperty interests are not created by the Constitution." Bd. of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Rather, they must arise

"from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlements to those benefits." Id.

It is anything but clear that Maryland would recognize a right to

fair negotiation in the absence of an existing contract. See, e.g., ABT

Assocs., Inc. v. JHPIEGO Corp., 104 F. Supp. 2d 523, 534 (D. Md.

2000); Parker v. Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521, 531 (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. 1992) (Motz, J.) (holding that although a duty of good faith and

fair dealing may be "implied in certain contracts," this duty only

requires a party to the contract "to exercise good faith in performing

its contractual obligations"). In all events, there is no "property right"

in one negotiating party to have another agree to contract on commercially disadvantageous terms. The essence of Premier’s claim is simply that MPA would not agree to what it wanted — that, at most, is

"a unilateral expectation" which the Supreme Court has held does not

create a constitutional property interest. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at

577. 

And even if Maryland law were construed to compel some sort of

supervised negotiation, the most Premier could claim would be a right

10 IN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC.
to process. But process is not property. Indeed, procedural rights have

not been held "property right[s] in the constitutional sense." Lim v.

Cent. Dupage Hosp., 871 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1989); Walentas v.

Lipper, 862 F.2d 414, 419 n.1 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a duty of

good faith and fair dealing was not a property interest under the due

process clause); Stone Mountain Game Ranch, Inc. v. Hunt, 746 F.2d

761, 764 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that tenants have "no

property right when renewal negotiations fail"). Thus Premier’s unilateral expectation that judicially compelled lease negotiations might

culminate in agreement "does not rise to the level of a constitutionally

protected interest." Stone Mountain Game Ranch, 746 F.2d at 765

(citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). In the case at hand, all Premier "can

claim to have lost is an entitlement [it] never had" to a lease that neither it nor MPA ever agreed to. Lim, 871 F.2d at 647.

Premier also argues that the "right to pursue a lawful business is

a constitutionally protected interest." The only interference with the

so-called "right to do business" that Premier has ever identified, however, is MPA’s failure to lease Lot 90 to Premier. But as found by the

district court, "Premier has no legitimate entitlement to a new lease

for Lot 90." The company is not, therefore, constitutionally entitled

to do business on Lot 90. See, e.g., Groos Nat. Bank v. Comptroller

of Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1978) (plaintiffs "cannot

claim a constitutionally protected right to do business with a particular bank"). The recognition of such a broad "right to do business,"

"would be akin to that [recognized] in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.

45 (1905), and its progeny, which the Supreme Court has long since

refused to recognize." Turner v. Dammon, 848 F.2d 440, 445 n.3 (4th

Cir. 1988). 

Premier’s substantive due process claims fail additionally for the

reason that the State of Maryland’s actions bespeak accommodation,

not arbitrary and unjustifiable governmental action. As the district

court found, the record reveals "no evidence to undermine the conclusion that, in negotiating with Premier, MPA was acting in a reasonable manner to advance legitimate goals, consistent with its legislated

purpose." MPA’s three year negotiation efforts do not, under any

view, fall "beyond the outer limits of legitimate governmental action."

See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 827 (4th Cir.

1995).

IN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC. 11
B.

Premier next claims that MPA violated the Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 According to Premier, MPA "intentionally singled out Premier" by refusing to offer it a "commercially

fair and reasonable lease." More specifically, Premier challenges as

unreasonable two terms which were included in the long-term lease

proposals tendered by MPA — the 1,700 vehicle per acre throughput

and the forced-relocation provisions. Because Premier is not a member of any suspect class and alleges no burden of any fundamental

right, it must prove that it has "been intentionally treated differently

from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the

difference in treatment." Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.

562, 564 (2000); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,

473 U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985); Tri-County Paving, Inc. v. Ashe County,

281 F.3d 430, 439 (4th Cir. 2002). 

Clearly the lease provisions challenged by Premier are rationally

related to a legitimate governmental objective. See FCC v. Beach

Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). The Maryland Port

Administration’s Organic Act reveals a number of legitimate government purposes. The MPA’s primary mission, for example, is to "increase the waterborne commerce of the ports in this State and, by

doing so, benefit the people of this State." Md. Ann. Code, Transp.

§ 6-102(c)(1). 

MPA’s lease proposals were rationally related to this purpose.

MPA could reasonably have concluded that a throughput guarantee

was necessary to insure that unproductive tenants did not lock up limited waterfront property and, in this, fail to provide jobs and revenues

for Marylanders. As MPA has explained, it "committed every vehicle

tenant at the Dundalk Marine Terminal and other facilities to a

1Premier also argues that MPA engaged in an unconstitutional taking

of its private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. But, like the

Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment protects property interests, it does not create them. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524

U.S. 156, 164 (1998). Because Premier advances no constitutionally protected property interest, its Fifth Amendment claim fails as a matter of

law. 

12 IN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC.
throughput that makes the most efficient and effective use of our limited terminal land." Similarly, MPA could have concluded that a relocation provision, which gives it the authority to move a tenant to a

new location, is a rational way to insure that waterfront property is

efficiently allocated. 

In any case, Premier’s claim that it was "treated differently" from

other similarly situated loan applicants who sought leases on the Baltimore waterfront fails on its own terms. First, as the district court

found, Premier’s competitor Pasha "was willing to enter a long term

lease, accepting provisions that are more favorable for MPA than

those that were rejected by Premier." Second, Premier has not identified any evidence of purposeful discrimination. See Sunrise Corp. v.

City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 329 (4th Cir. 2005). 

Above and beyond all that, Premier’s various constitutional claims

are not only tenuous at best, but carry us far afield from the purposes

of bankruptcy law in general and Chapter 11 petitions in particular.2

2Premier also alleges various claims under the Shipping Act and

requests that this court grant interim injunctive relief pending resolution

of its FMC appeal. See 46 App. U.S.C. §§ 1709(d)(1), (3), (4),

1710(h)(2). The Shipping Act does permit a plaintiff to file suit in district

court seeking "a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction"

when, as here, the plaintiff has a complaint pending before the FMC. See

id. § 1710(h)(2). The statute sets a high bar for such relief, however. It

states that a court may grant injunctive relief only "[u]pon a showing that

standards for granting injunctive relief by courts of equity are met." Id.

As this court has noted, "preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies involving the exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only

sparingly and in limited circumstances." MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola,

Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001). 

We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court in

declining to issue to Premier the "extraordinary remedy" of interim

injunctive relief. Premier has not made the requisite showing of a significant likelihood of success on the merits. See Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 814-15, 818 (4th Cir. 1991). Rather,

as the district court found, "it is clear" that Premier cannot "demonstrat[e] its entitlement to an injunction." Section 1709(d)(1)’s requirement that a marine terminal operator "establish, observe and enforce just

IN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC. 13
"The purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization is to assist financially distressed business enterprises by providing them with breathing space

in which to return to a viable state." In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779

F.2d at 1073 (quoting In re Winshall Settlor’s Trust, 758 F.2d 1136,

1137 (6th Cir. 1985)) (alteration omitted). To allow resort to the

bankruptcy process for plainly meritless constitutional claims

advanced solely to thwart lawful eviction would do nothing but subvert the purposes of a Chapter 11 reorganization. 

IV.

It is in the nature of litigation that parties may press claims that

turn out ultimately to have no merit. But this case went beyond that.

It was at bottom a straightforward contractual dispute between a landlord and tenant and should not have been creatively refashioned as a

bankruptcy matter or constitutional controversy brought "for the sole

purpose of halting and/or delaying [Premier’s] ultimate eviction from

the Terminal by MPA." If these sorts of suits are deemed proper subjects for bankruptcy, then those courts (to their own dismay) would

be well on their way to becoming courts of general jurisdiction. Both

the bankruptcy and district courts refused to permit this, and we

affirm the judgment.

AFFIRMED

and reasonable regulations and practices related to or connected with

receiving, handling, storing or delivering property," does not command

that MPA have regulations on the specific subject of the leasing of ports

facilities. And, for the reasons expressed above, MPA did not "unreasonably refuse to deal or negotiate," id. §§ 1709(d)(3), (b)(10), or give any

"undue or unreasonable preference" to another party, id. § 1709(d)(4).

Again, as the district court found, the record reveals "no evidence to

undermine the conclusion that, in negotiating with Premier, MPA was

acting in a reasonable manner to advance legitimate goals, consistent

with its legislated purpose." 

14 IN RE: PREMIER AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, INC.