J-S40040-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KIMBERLY N. REEVES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 883 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 10, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0000967-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2018

Kimberly Reeves appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, after a jury convicted her of one 

count of aggravated assault – serious bodily injury,1 one count of aggravated 

assault – serious bodily injury of an enumerated person,2two counts of 

aggravated assault – bodily injury of an enumerated person,3two counts of 

attempting to put an enumerated person in fear of imminent serious bodily

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(2).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(3).
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injury,

4

two counts of simple assault,5two counts of attempting to put another 

in fear of imminent serious bodily injury by physical menace,

6 and two counts 

of recklessly endangering another person.

7

 Upon careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts underlying this case as 

follows:

Briana Levanture (hereinafter [] Levanture) is employed by the 

Delaware County Children and Youth Services (hereinafter CYS) 

and has been so employed for the past three years. Through her 

employment, [] Levanture had the occasion to become involved 

with [Reeves] as her caseworker. On January 26, 2016, [] 

Levanture, along with her co-worker, [] Samantha Dawson 

(hereinafter [] Dawson), went to visit [Reeves] at her home, 

located at 279 Windermere Avenue in Lansdowne, PA. The visit 

was scheduled via appointment made with [] Levanture’s superior 

Kenneth Kelly; [] Levanture attempted an unannounced visit the 

week prior without success.

[] Levanture and [] Dawson timely arrived for the scheduled home 

visit at 3:00 p.m. [Reeves’] aunt, [Janet] McDaniel, let the 

women into [Reeves’] home; it was not unusual for [] McDaniel to 

be present during home visits. [Reeves], [] Dawson, [] Levanture, 

and [] McDaniel all sat around the dining room table. [] Levanture 

was aware that a [protection from abuse order (“PFA”)] had been 

issued against [Reeves] earlier that day; however, without any 

responsibility or authority to inform [Reeves] of the PFA, [] 

Levanture did not mention the PFA to [Reeves] during the 

beginning of the meeting.

Within the initial 40-45 minutes of the visit, [Reeves] did not 

inquire about the whereabouts of her children; however, once 

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4 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(6).

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1).

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3).

7 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
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[she] became concerned that the children were not home from 

school at their usual time, [] Levanture made the decision to 

inform [Reeves] that the children were with their father pursuant 

to the PFA issued against her.

After hearing the news, [Reeves] became increasingly agitated, 

got up from the table and started pacing around the dining room 

and living room using profanity. [Reeves] called [] Levanture and 

[] Dawson ‘bitches’ and accused them of using crack cocaine. 

[She] told the women to get the ‘fuck out of her house.’ 

At [Reeves’] demand, [] Levanture immediately began to gather 

her things and got up from the table. [] Dawson was in the 

process of answering a question posed by [] McDaniel when 

[Reeves] approached [] Levanture and punched her in the face, 

on the right side of her nose[,] causing [] Levanture to fall into 

the chair behind her. The assault did not stop there; [Reeves] 

continued to hit [] Levanture after she fell, leaving [] Levanture 

helpless and unable to exit the situation. [Reeves] did not stop 

assaulting [] Levanture despite [] Dawson and [] McDaniel yelling 

at [Reeves] to stop.

In order to help her co-worker, [] Dawson grabbed a hold of 

[Reeves’] shoulders, pulling her off of [] Levanture. [Reeves] then 

grabbed [] hold of [] Dawson’s hair and began punching her face 

several times. [] McDaniel attempted to pull [Reeves] off of [] 

Dawson, which caused [] Dawson to fall to the floor. With [] 

[Mc]Daniel restraining [Reeves’] hands, [Reeves] kicked [] 

Dawson in the jaw while she lay on the floor.

[] Dawson screamed for [] Levanture to call 911. With the 

commotion, [Reeves’] oldest daughter (not a subject of the PFA) 

came down from upstairs asking what was going on and 

attempting to control [Reeves]. When [] Levanture and [] Dawson 

were finally able to free themselves from [Reeves’] assault, they 

called 911 and reported the situation; Lansdowne Police 

Department responded to the call within minutes. After [Reeves’] 

arrest, [] Levanture and [] Dawson were taken to the Lansdowne 

Police Department where their injuries were photographed and 

then both women went to Delaware County Memorial Hospital for 

treatment. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/17, at 1-3 (internal citations omitted). 
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At trial, the Commonwealth presented medical records from Delaware 

County Memorial Hospital that showed Levanture suffered fractured nasal 

bones and a sprain to the left shoulder joint. As a result of these injuries, 

Levanture missed several days of work and required one month of physical 

therapy for her shoulder. Levanture eventually went out on medical leave for 

her mental health and wellbeing following this incident in Reeves’ home. 

Dawson’s medical records indicated she suffered sprains to the cervical and

thoracic spines and a laceration to her face. Therefore, Dawson missed 

several days of work for doctor’s appointments and physical therapy, and 

lacked a full range of motion in her neck for a period of time. As a result of 

this incident, Dawson no longer works for CYS for her own wellbeing.

After a trial, held December 6-7, 2016, a jury found Reeves guilty of the 

above charges. On February 10, 2017, the trial court sentenced Reeves to 

twenty-four to forty-eight months’ confinement and four years of consecutive 

probation. In March 2017, trial counsel filed a timely notice of appeal, but 

subsequently petitioned the trial court to withdraw, which request was

granted. The Office of the Public Defender was appointed to represent Reeves

and requested an extension of time to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 

Thereafter, the Office of the Public Defender filed an application to withdraw

its representation due to a conflict. New counsel was appointed to assist 

Reeves, who filed another conflict petition and application to withdraw, which 

the trial court granted. On June 27, 2017 new counsel was again appointed, 

and filed an application for an extension in which to file a Rule 1925(b) 
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statement. The trial court granted that request and, on September 12, 2017, 

counsel filed a timely statement of matters complained of on appeal.

Reeves presents the following issues for our consideration on appeal:

1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in denying [Reeves’] motion 

to charge the jury with [Reeves’] defense of [property 

justification], and denying [her] request to charge the jury with 

the definition of ‘trespass,’ when substantial evidence was 

adduced at trial to substantiate the giving of said instructions 

in that [Reeves] requested multiple times for the alleged 

victims to leave and said alleged victims did not leave upon 

request[?]

2. Whether the [t]rial [court] erred in not instructing the jury on 

the relationship between [Reeves’] requested charge of [a 

defense of property justification], and the instruction given for 

[the use of non-deadly force in self-defense justification], when 

the [t]rial [c]ourt denied [Reeves’] oral motion to charge the 

jury with [Reeve’s] [defense of property justification][?]

3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in limiting the jury’s 

consideration of the issues in [Reeves’] case in violation of 

[Reeves’] rights under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, and under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 

to the United States Constitution, when the [t]rial [j]udge 

instructed the jury that ‘[t]his case is about an alleged assault 

and Defendant’s contention that she acted in self-defense. 

That’s what this case is about, nothing else’[?]

4. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion in sustaining 

the Commonwealth’s objections on grounds of legal 

conclusions to [Reeves’] cross-examination, when said 

questions were proper subjects of cross-examination[?]

5. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in denying [Reeves’] request 

to treat [] Ken Kelly as a hostile witness pursuant to Pa.R.E. 

611(c) when [] Kelly was a hostile witness and/or a witness 

identified with an adverse party in that [] Kelly worked for the 

Delaware County Children and Youth Services, the same 

agency for which the alleged victims worked at the time of the 

alleged altercation[?] 
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6. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in sustaining the 

Commonwealth’s objection during [d]efense [c]ounsel’s closing 

argument, when the Commonwealth opened the door to 

[d]efense [c]ounsel’s comment on why the Commonwealth did 

not call the doctor who diagnosed the victims for purposes of 

worker’s compensation by eliciting testimony through the 

victims of said doctor’s diagnoses, respectively, and by 

mentioning in its opening statement that the alleged victims 

‘went to the hospital to have their injuries tended to’[?]

Appellant’s Brief, at 4-6. 

Reeves’ first two arguments concern the refusal of the trial court to 

administer jury instructions regarding her defense of property justification. 

Our standard of review is well-settled:

In reviewing a jury charge, we determine whether the trial court 

committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which 

controlled the outcome of the case. We must view the charge as 

a whole; the trial court is free to use its own form of expression 

in creating the charge. Our key inquiry is whether the instruction 

on a particular issue adequately, accurately and clearly presents 

the law to the jury, and is sufficient to guide the jury in its 

deliberations. 

Commonwealth v. Wise, 171 A.3d 784, 787-88 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). 

Defendants are generally entitled to jury instructions they request, so 

long as they are supported by the evidence. Commonwealth v. Hairston, 

84 A.3d 657, 668, (Pa. 2014). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has

explained:

[T]he reason for this rule is that instructing the jury on legal 

principles that cannot rationally be applied to the facts presented 

at trial may confuse them and place obstacles in the path of a just 

verdict. A criminal defendant must, therefore, establish that the 

trial evidence would reasonably support a verdict based on the 
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desired charge and may not claim entitlement to an instruction 

that has no basis in the evidence presented during trial. 

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). A trial court’s refusal to give 

a requested charge does not merit reversal unless the defendant was 

prejudiced by that refusal. Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 77 A.3d 663, 667 

(Pa. Super. 2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 904 A.2d 964, 970 

(Pa. Super. 2006). 

A defendant is entitled to the defense of property instruction where she 

believes force is immediately necessary “to prevent or terminate an unlawful 

entry or other trespass upon land.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 507(a)(1). Reeves has not 

demonstrated that she was entitled to such an instruction.

Levanture and Dawson were present in Reeves’ home for a pre-arranged 

visit. While Reeves herself did not physically admit the workers onto her 

property, the two were invited guests until about forty-five minutes into the 

meeting, when Levanture informed Reeves of the existence of the PFA against 

her. Once Reeves became angry and demanded that Levanture and Dawson 

leave, the CYS workers did not attempt to stay longer than the time necessary 

to collect their belongings. In the course of their attempted exit, Reeves 

began her assault. Reeves presented no evidence that the two women 

lingered on her property or showed any sign of refusing to leave. The sole

evidence conceivably supporting a defense of property instruction came from 

Reeves’ own testimony that she screamed for the women to leave. Morever, 

there was no evidence that the force used by Reeves was necessary to eject 

the workers from her home. Indeed, Reeves’s own testimony indicated that 
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Levanture began to place her belongings into her bag after being asked to 

leave. N.T. Trial, 12/7/16, at 125 (“And she’s sitting there with her legs 

crossed, and then I see her sliding what looks to be like her cell phone down 

in her bag.”). In light of the foregoing, it was not an abuse of discretion for 

the trial court to refuse to give the defense of property justification.8

Reeves next argues the trial court erred by sustaining the 

Commonwealth’s objections to defense counsel’s cross-examination of 

Levanture on the grounds that the questions called for legal conclusions. 

Reeves argues that, in sustaining the objections, Reeves was improperly 

prohibited from eliciting testimony from Levanture regarding her personal 

perception of her injuries. Reeves is entitled to no relief. 

Questions regarding the admission of evidence are left to the 

sound discretion of the trial court, and we, as an appellate court, 

will not disturb the trial court’s rulings regarding the admissibility 

of evidence absent an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of 

discretion is not merely an error of judgment; rather, discretion is 

abused when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment 

exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record.

Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1036 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

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8 Because we find that Reeves was not entitled to an instruction on defense of 

property, we need not address her next two claims that she was entitled to 

an instruction clarifying the interplay between the defenses of self-defense 

and defense of property and that the trial court improperly “limited” the jury’s 

consideration of the issues. 
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Here, trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s objections to the 

following questions on the basis that they called for legal conclusions because 

the phrasing of the questions tracked the statute:9

DEFENSE COUNSEL: At any point in time did you believe that you 

might lose the function of some type of body organ or—

. . .

DEFENSE COUNSEL: In regard to your injury, you really didn’t 

have any impairment [of] physical condition, did you?

N.T. Trial, 12/6/16, at 148, 149. After the court sustained the 

Commonwealth’s objections, counsel rephrased his questions as follows:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did you lose your sense of smell?

WITNESS: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: So your nose still works?

WITNESS: Yes.

Id. at 149. Because counsel was able to effectively cross-examine the witness 

regarding her injuries, Reeves suffered no prejudice.

Reeves also claims that the trial court improperly sustained the 

Commonwealth’s general objection to the following question:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: But you didn’t find your injuries severe 

enough to require you to go to the hospital—

COMMONWEALTH: Objection Judge.

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9 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 (defining serious bodily injury as “injury which creates 

a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement 

or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 

organ”).
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Id. at 150. Defense counsel immediately rephrased the question as follows: 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You didn’t request to the police officer to go 

to the hospital immediately?

WITNESS: No.

Id. 

Again, Reeves was able to elicit the desired information from Levanture 

upon rephrasing the questions. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in 

sustaining the Commonwealth’s non-specific objection, Reeves cannot 

demonstrate that she suffered any prejudice as a result of the court’s ruling.

Next, Reeves argues the trial court erred in denying her request to treat 

Ken Kelly as a hostile witness. Particularly, Reeves argues that Kelly should 

have been deemed a hostile witness based upon his employment at CYS, 

which rendered him “a witness identified with an adverse party.” Appellant’s 

Brief, at 37, quoting Pa.R.E. 611(c). Rule 611(c) provides:

Leading questions should not be used on direct or redirect 

examination except as necessary to develop the witness’s 

testimony. Ordinarily, the court should allow leading questions:

 (1) on cross-examination; and

 (2) when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a 

witness identified with an adverse party. A witness so examined 

should usually be interrogated by all other parties as to whom the 

witness is not hostile or adverse as if under redirect examination.

Pa.R.E. 611(c). 

A witness may be treated as hostile where “the testimony of the witness 

is unexpected, contradictory to earlier statements, and harmful to the party 

calling the witness, and where an injustice would result if the request to treat 
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the witness as hostile is denied.” Commonwealth v. Bibbs, 970 A.2d 440, 

453 (Pa. Super. 2009), citing Commonwealth v. Lambert, 765 A.2d 306, 

357-59 (Pa. Super. 2000). Trial courts have wide discretion in controlling the 

use of leading questions, and a court’s decision to allow or disallow them will 

not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 453.

Here, Reeves called Kelly to establish that Reeves had had previous, 

unfavorable interactions with Levanture in the course of Levanture’s 

employment with CYS. His testimony was elicited to lend credibility to the 

claim that Reeves’ assault was justified. The trial court observed that “Kelly’s 

testimony was cooperative, not biased or unexpected, and his demeanor 

towards counsel was professional and appropriate. There was no reason to 

treat [] Kelly as a hostile witness solely because he was employed by CYS as 

well.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/17, at 13. We can discern no abuse of 

discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing Reeves’ groundless request 

to treat Kelly as a hostile witness.

Finally, Reeves argues the trial court erred in sustaining a 

Commonwealth objection to defense counsel’s closing argument. The relevant 

portion of the closing is as follows:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: But, funny, the doctor [Levanture and 

Dawson] go to the [day after the assault] finds fractures, spinal 

injuries, and all these other injuries. This is a determination you 

can make, but I don’t think the emergency room would have 

missed those things. I don’t think they would have. If there were 

serious injuries, the emergency room would have caught that. 

They wouldn’t have discharged them with just ibuprofen . . .[.]

But funny, the doctor who’s responsible for putting people on 

worker’s [compensation] and some other things, he finds a host 
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of injuries. Why didn’t that doctor appear? I argue that he 

probably knew—

COMMONWEALTH: Objection, Judge.

THE COURT: Basis?

COMMONWEALTH: Speculation with regard to why evidence 

wasn’t presented.

THE COURT: Sustained.

N.T. Trial, 12/7/16, 205-06. 

At trial, both Levanture and Dawson testified as to their injuries and 

diagnoses; neither witness’s testimony provoked an objection from defense 

counsel. There is no evidence that Reeves ever subpoenaed the treating 

physicians to assess what they did or did not know, and they did not testify 

at trial. A closing argument must be based upon evidence in the record or 

reasonable inferences therefrom. Commonwealth v. Culver, 51 A.3d 866, 

878 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal citations omitted). Here, there was no 

evidence of record to support counsel’s speculative statements. Accordingly, 

the trial court properly sustained the Commonwealth’s objection, and Reeves’

final claim is meritless.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/31/18