# Official Journal C 251/30 J

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 251 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6530 June 2022 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 251

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6530 June 2022

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| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | |
| | EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
  2021-2022 SESSIONSittings of 13 to 16 December 2021TEXTS ADOPTED | 1 |

Contents

page

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
  2021-2022 SESSIONSittings of 13 to 16 December 2021TEXTS ADOPTED

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

1

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| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| --- | --- |
| | RESOLUTIONS |
| | European Parliament |
| | Tuesday 14 December 2021 |
| 2022/C 251/01 | European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on combating gender-based violence: cyberviolence (2020/2035(INL)) | 2 |
| | Wednesday 15 December 2021 |
| 2022/C 251/02 | European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on equality between women and men in the European Union in 2018-2020 (2021/2020(INI)) | 23 |
| 2022/C 251/03 | European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the impact of organised crime on own resources of the EU and on the misuse of EU funds with a particular focus on shared management from an auditing and control perspective (2020/2221(INI)) | 37 |
| 2022/C 251/04 | European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas (2020/2222(INI)) | 48 |
| 2022/C 251/05 | European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the implementation of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (2021/2077(INI)) | 58 |
| 2022/C 251/06 | European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the challenges and prospects for multilateral weapons of mass destruction arms control and disarmament regimes (2020/2001(INI)) | 69 |
| 2022/C 251/07 | European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on new orientations for the EU’s humanitarian action (2021/2163(INI)) | 80 |
| 2022/C 251/08 | European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on cooperation on the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans (2021/2002(INI)) | 87 |
| | Thursday 16 December 2021 |
| 2022/C 251/09 | European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2020 (2021/2019(INI)) | 96 |
| 2022/C 251/10 | European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on democracy at work: a European framework for employees’ participation rights and the revision of the European Works Council Directive (2021/2005(INI)) | 104 |
| 2022/C 251/11 | European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the continuous crackdown on civil society and human rights defenders in Russia: the case of human rights organisation Memorial (2021/3018(RSP)) | 115 |
| 2022/C 251/12 | European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the situation in Cuba, namely the cases of José Daniel Ferrer, Lady in White Aymara Nieto, Maykel Castillo, Luis Robles, Félix Navarro, Luis Manuel Otero, Reverend Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo, Andy Dunier García and Yunior García Aguilera (2021/3019(RSP)) | 120 |
| 2022/C 251/13 | European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on forced labour in the Linglong factory and environmental protests in Serbia (2021/3020(RSP)) | 124 |
| 2022/C 251/14 | European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on fundamental rights and the rule of law in Slovenia, in particular the delayed nomination of EPPO prosecutors (2021/2978(RSP)) | 127 |
| 2022/C 251/15 | European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the situation in Nicaragua (2021/3000(RSP)) | 134 |
| 2022/C 251/16 | European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on MeToo and harassment — the consequences for the EU institutions (2021/2986(RSP)) | 138 |
| 2022/C 251/17 | European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the situation at the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine (2021/3010(RSP)) | 144 |
| 2022/C 251/18 | European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (2021/2885(RSP)) | 150 |

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Parliament

Tuesday 14 December 2021

2022/C 251/01

European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on combating gender-based violence: cyberviolence (2020/2035(INL))

2

Wednesday 15 December 2021

2022/C 251/02

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on equality between women and men in the European Union in 2018-2020 (2021/2020(INI))

23

2022/C 251/03

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the impact of organised crime on own resources of the EU and on the misuse of EU funds with a particular focus on shared management from an auditing and control perspective (2020/2221(INI))

37

2022/C 251/04

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas (2020/2222(INI))

48

2022/C 251/05

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the implementation of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (2021/2077(INI))

58

2022/C 251/06

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the challenges and prospects for multilateral weapons of mass destruction arms control and disarmament regimes (2020/2001(INI))

69

2022/C 251/07

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on new orientations for the EU’s humanitarian action (2021/2163(INI))

80

2022/C 251/08

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on cooperation on the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans (2021/2002(INI))

87

Thursday 16 December 2021

2022/C 251/09

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2020 (2021/2019(INI))

96

2022/C 251/10

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on democracy at work: a European framework for employees’ participation rights and the revision of the European Works Council Directive (2021/2005(INI))

104

2022/C 251/11

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the continuous crackdown on civil society and human rights defenders in Russia: the case of human rights organisation Memorial (2021/3018(RSP))

115

2022/C 251/12

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the situation in Cuba, namely the cases of José Daniel Ferrer, Lady in White Aymara Nieto, Maykel Castillo, Luis Robles, Félix Navarro, Luis Manuel Otero, Reverend Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo, Andy Dunier García and Yunior García Aguilera (2021/3019(RSP))

120

2022/C 251/13

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on forced labour in the Linglong factory and environmental protests in Serbia (2021/3020(RSP))

124

2022/C 251/14

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on fundamental rights and the rule of law in Slovenia, in particular the delayed nomination of EPPO prosecutors (2021/2978(RSP))

127

2022/C 251/15

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the situation in Nicaragua (2021/3000(RSP))

134

2022/C 251/16

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on MeToo and harassment — the consequences for the EU institutions (2021/2986(RSP))

138

2022/C 251/17

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the situation at the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine (2021/3010(RSP))

144

2022/C 251/18

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (2021/2885(RSP))

150

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| | III   Preparatory acts |
| --- | --- |
| | European Parliament |
| | Monday 13 December 2021 |
| 2022/C 251/19 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 December 2021 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on health technology assessment and amending Directive 2011/24/EU (10531/3/2021 — C9-0422/2021 — 2018/0018(COD)) | 153 |
| | Tuesday 14 December 2021 |
| 2022/C 251/20 | P9_TA(2021)0485Union tariff rate quota for high quality beef from Paraguay ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/216 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards Union tariff rate quota for high quality beef from Paraguay (COM(2021)0313 — C9-0228/2021 — 2021/0146(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0146Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 14 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/216 as regards the Union tariff rate quota for high-quality beef from Paraguay | 154 |
| 2022/C 251/21 | P9_TA(2021)0486European Year of Youth 2022 ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth 2022 (COM(2021)0634 — C9-0379/2021 — 2021/0328(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0328Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 14 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Decision (EU) 2021/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth (2022) | 155 |
| 2022/C 251/22 | P9_TA(2021)0487Joint investigation teams: alignment with Union rules on the protection of personal data ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, as regards its alignment with EU rules on the protection of personal data (COM(2021)0020 — C9-0005/2021 — 2021/0008(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0008Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 14 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, as regards its alignment with Union rules on the protection of personal data | 158 |
| 2022/C 251/23 | P9_TA(2021)0488European Investigation Order in criminal matters: alignment with Union rules on the protection of personal data ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/41/EU, as regards its alignment with EU rules on the protection of personal data (COM(2021)0021 — C9-0006/2021 — 2021/0009(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0009Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 14 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/41/EU, as regards its alignment with Union rules on the protection of personal data | 159 |
| 2022/C 251/24 | European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Croatia in relation to the series of earthquakes starting from 28 December 2020 (COM(2021)0963 — C9-0403/2021 — 2021/0359(BUD)) | 160 |
| 2022/C 251/25 | European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Italy — EGF/2021/003 IT Porto Canale (COM(2021)0935 — C9-0399/2021 — 2021/0337(BUD)) | 163 |
| 2022/C 251/26 | European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Italy — EGF/2021/002 IT/Air Italy (COM(2021)0936 — C9-0400/2021 — 2021/0338(BUD)) | 167 |
| 2022/C 251/27 | European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Spain — EGF/2021/004 ES Aragón automotive (COM(2021)0683 — C9-0404/2021 — 2021/0356(BUD)) | 171 |
| 2022/C 251/28 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 in order to enhance predictability for Member States and to clarify procedures for dispute resolution when making available the traditional, VAT and GNI based own resources (COM(2021)0327 — C9-0257/2021 — 2021/0161(NLE)) | 175 |
| 2022/C 251/29 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol to amend the Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community and its Member States (06385/2021 — C9-0368/2021 — 2010/0112(NLE)) | 181 |
| 2022/C 251/30 | European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the Gabonese Republic and the European Community (2021-2026) (09172/2021 — C9-0253/2021 — 2021/0127(NLE)) | 182 |
| 2022/C 251/31 | Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access of third-country goods and services to the Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods and services to the public procurement markets of third countries (COM(2016)0034 — C9-0018/2016 — 2012/0060(COD)) | 183 |
| | Wednesday 15 December 2021 |
| 2022/C 251/32 | P9_TA(2021)0498Transitional provisions for certain in vitro diagnostic medical devices and deferred application of requirements for in-house devices ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 15 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/746 as regards transitional provisions for certain in vitro diagnostic medical devices and deferred application of requirements for in-house devices (COM(2021)0627 — C9-0381/2021 — 2021/0323(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0323Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 15 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/746 as regards transitional provisions for certain in vitro diagnostic medical devices and the deferred application of conditions for in-house devices | 226 |
| 2022/C 251/33 | Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 15 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act) (COM(2020)0842 — C9-0419/2020 — 2020/0374(COD)) | 227 |

III   Preparatory acts

European Parliament

Monday 13 December 2021

2022/C 251/19

European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 December 2021 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on health technology assessment and amending Directive 2011/24/EU (10531/3/2021 — C9-0422/2021 — 2018/0018(COD))

153

Tuesday 14 December 2021

2022/C 251/20

P9_TA(2021)0485Union tariff rate quota for high quality beef from Paraguay ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/216 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards Union tariff rate quota for high quality beef from Paraguay (COM(2021)0313 — C9-0228/2021 — 2021/0146(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0146Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 14 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/216 as regards the Union tariff rate quota for high-quality beef from Paraguay

154

2022/C 251/21

P9_TA(2021)0486European Year of Youth 2022 ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth 2022 (COM(2021)0634 — C9-0379/2021 — 2021/0328(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0328Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 14 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Decision (EU) 2021/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth (2022)

155

2022/C 251/22

P9_TA(2021)0487Joint investigation teams: alignment with Union rules on the protection of personal data ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, as regards its alignment with EU rules on the protection of personal data (COM(2021)0020 — C9-0005/2021 — 2021/0008(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0008Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 14 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, as regards its alignment with Union rules on the protection of personal data

158

2022/C 251/23

P9_TA(2021)0488European Investigation Order in criminal matters: alignment with Union rules on the protection of personal data ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/41/EU, as regards its alignment with EU rules on the protection of personal data (COM(2021)0021 — C9-0006/2021 — 2021/0009(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0009Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 14 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/41/EU, as regards its alignment with Union rules on the protection of personal data

159

2022/C 251/24

European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Croatia in relation to the series of earthquakes starting from 28 December 2020 (COM(2021)0963 — C9-0403/2021 — 2021/0359(BUD))

160

2022/C 251/25

European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Italy — EGF/2021/003 IT Porto Canale (COM(2021)0935 — C9-0399/2021 — 2021/0337(BUD))

163

2022/C 251/26

European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Italy — EGF/2021/002 IT/Air Italy (COM(2021)0936 — C9-0400/2021 — 2021/0338(BUD))

167

2022/C 251/27

European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Spain — EGF/2021/004 ES Aragón automotive (COM(2021)0683 — C9-0404/2021 — 2021/0356(BUD))

171

2022/C 251/28

European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 in order to enhance predictability for Member States and to clarify procedures for dispute resolution when making available the traditional, VAT and GNI based own resources (COM(2021)0327 — C9-0257/2021 — 2021/0161(NLE))

175

2022/C 251/29

European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol to amend the Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community and its Member States (06385/2021 — C9-0368/2021 — 2010/0112(NLE))

181

2022/C 251/30

European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the Gabonese Republic and the European Community (2021-2026) (09172/2021 — C9-0253/2021 — 2021/0127(NLE))

182

2022/C 251/31

Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access of third-country goods and services to the Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods and services to the public procurement markets of third countries (COM(2016)0034 — C9-0018/2016 — 2012/0060(COD))

183

Wednesday 15 December 2021

2022/C 251/32

P9_TA(2021)0498Transitional provisions for certain in vitro diagnostic medical devices and deferred application of requirements for in-house devices ***IEuropean Parliament legislative resolution of 15 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/746 as regards transitional provisions for certain in vitro diagnostic medical devices and deferred application of requirements for in-house devices (COM(2021)0627 — C9-0381/2021 — 2021/0323(COD))P9_TC1-COD(2021)0323Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 15 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/746 as regards transitional provisions for certain in vitro diagnostic medical devices and the deferred application of conditions for in-house devices

in vitro

in vitro

226

2022/C 251/33

Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 15 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act) (COM(2020)0842 — C9-0419/2020 — 2020/0374(COD))

227

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| Key to symbols used






  - | Consultation procedure |
| --- | --- |
| *** | Consent procedure |
| ***I | Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading |
| ***II | Ordinary legislative procedure: second reading |
| ***III | Ordinary legislative procedure: third reading |

Key to symbols used

*

Consultation procedure

***

Consent procedure

***I

Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading

***II

Ordinary legislative procedure: second reading

***III

Ordinary legislative procedure: third reading

(The type of procedure depends on the legal basis proposed by the draft act.)

Amendments by Parliament:

New text is highlighted in
  bold italics
  . Deletions are indicated using either the ▌symbol or strikeout. Replacements are indicated by highlighting the new text in
  bold italics
  and by deleting or striking out the text that has been replaced.

bold italics

bold italics

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EN

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30.6.2022

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/1 |
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EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/1

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

2021-2022 SESSION

Sittings of 13 to 16 December 2021

TEXTS ADOPTED

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Parliament

Tuesday 14 December 2021

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/2

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P9_TA(2021)0489

Combating gender-based violence: cyberviolence

European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on combating gender-based violence: cyberviolence (2020/2035(INL))

(2022/C 251/01)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Article 2 and Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 2 and Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union,

| — | having regard to Article 8, Article 83(1) and Articles 84 and 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 8, Article 83(1) and Articles 84 and 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in particular Articles 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 47 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in particular Articles 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 47 thereof,

| — | having regard to the communication of the Commission of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, and, in particular, the objective of freeing women and girls from violence and stereotypes laid down therein, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the communication of the Commission of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, and, in particular, the objective of freeing women and girls from violence and stereotypes laid down therein,

| — | having regard to the communication of the Commission of 14 April 2021 on the EU Strategy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings 2021-2025, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the communication of the Commission of 14 April 2021 on the EU Strategy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings 2021-2025,

| — | having regard to the communication of the Commission of 28 September 2017 entitled ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online — Towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the communication of the Commission of 28 September 2017 entitled ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online — Towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms’,

| — | having regard to the communication of the Commission of 24 June 2020 entitled ‘EU Strategy on victims' rights (2020-2025)’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the communication of the Commission of 24 June 2020 entitled ‘EU Strategy on victims' rights (2020-2025)’,

| — | having regard to the communication of the Commission of 12 November 2020 entitled ‘Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the communication of the Commission of 12 November 2020 entitled ‘Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025’,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, by the European Union, of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, by the European Union, of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC,

| — | having regard to the Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, published by the Commission in May 2016 and to its fifth monitoring round, resulting in the document ‘Factsheet — 5th monitoring round of the Code of Conduct’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, published by the Commission in May 2016 and to its fifth monitoring round, resulting in the document ‘Factsheet — 5th monitoring round of the Code of Conduct’,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, which opened for signature in Istanbul on 11 May 2011, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, which opened for signature in Istanbul on 11 May 2011,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 23 November 2001 on Cybercrime, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 23 November 2001 on Cybercrime,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the EU Strategy for Gender Equality (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the EU Strategy for Gender Equality (1),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on promoting equality in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education and careers (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on promoting equality in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education and careers (2),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2021 on the declaration of the EU as an LGBTIQ Freedom Zone (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 11 March 2021 on the declaration of the EU as an LGBTIQ Freedom Zone (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims (4),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 February 2021 on challenges ahead for women’s rights in Europe: more than 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 11 February 2021 on challenges ahead for women’s rights in Europe: more than 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (5),

| — | having regard to is resolution of 21 January 2021 on the gender perspective in the COVID-19 crisis and post-crisis period (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to is resolution of 21 January 2021 on the gender perspective in the COVID-19 crisis and post-crisis period (6),

| — | having regards to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on closing the digital gender gap: women’s participation in the digital economy (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regards to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on closing the digital gender gap: women’s participation in the digital economy (7),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2020 on strengthening media freedom: the protection of journalists in Europe, hate speech, disinformation and the role of platforms (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2020 on strengthening media freedom: the protection of journalists in Europe, hate speech, disinformation and the role of platforms (8),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences (9),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention and other measures to combat gender-based violence (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention and other measures to combat gender-based violence (10),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 13 February 2019 on experiencing a backlash in women’s rights and gender equality in the EU (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 13 February 2019 on experiencing a backlash in women’s rights and gender equality in the EU (11),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 September 2018 on measures to prevent and combat mobbing and sexual harassment at workplace, in public spaces, and political life in the EU (12), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 11 September 2018 on measures to prevent and combat mobbing and sexual harassment at workplace, in public spaces, and political life in the EU (12),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2018 on empowering women and girls through the digital sector (13), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 17 April 2018 on empowering women and girls through the digital sector (13),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 26 October 2017 on combating sexual harassment and abuse in the EU (14), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 26 October 2017 on combating sexual harassment and abuse in the EU (14),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2017 on the fight against cybercrime (15), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2017 on the fight against cybercrime (15),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2017 on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, by the European Union, of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (16), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2017 on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, by the European Union, of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (16),

| — | having regard to the provisions of the United Nations legal instruments in the area of human rights, in particular those concerning women’s and children’s rights, and to other United Nations instruments on violence against women and children, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisions of the United Nations legal instruments in the area of human rights, in particular those concerning women’s and children’s rights, and to other United Nations instruments on violence against women and children,

| — | having regard to the United Nations General Assembly resolutions of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘Intensification of efforts to prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls’ (A/RES/75/161) and ‘The right to privacy in the digital age’ (A/RES/75/176), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the United Nations General Assembly resolutions of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘Intensification of efforts to prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls’ (A/RES/75/161) and ‘The right to privacy in the digital age’ (A/RES/75/176),

| — | having regard to the United Nations Human Rights Council resolution of 5 July 2018 entitled ‘Accelerating efforts to eliminate violence against women and girls: preventing and responding to violence against women and girls in digital contexts’ (A/HRC/RES/38/5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the United Nations Human Rights Council resolution of 5 July 2018 entitled ‘Accelerating efforts to eliminate violence against women and girls: preventing and responding to violence against women and girls in digital contexts’ (A/HRC/RES/38/5),

| — | having regard to the United Nations reports of Special Rapporteurs on violence against women, its causes and consequences, in particular the report of 18 June 2018 on online violence against women and girls from a human rights perspective (A/HRC/38/47), the report of 6 May 2020 on combating violence against women journalists (A/HRC/44/52) and the report of 24 July 2020 on intersection between the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the pandemic of gender-based violence against women, with a focus on domestic violence and the ‘peace in the home’ initiative, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the United Nations reports of Special Rapporteurs on violence against women, its causes and consequences, in particular the report of 18 June 2018 on online violence against women and girls from a human rights perspective (A/HRC/38/47), the report of 6 May 2020 on combating violence against women journalists (A/HRC/44/52) and the report of 24 July 2020 on intersection between the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the pandemic of gender-based violence against women, with a focus on domestic violence and the ‘peace in the home’ initiative,

| — | having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women of 20 December 1993, |
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—

having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women of 20 December 1993,

| — | having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984, |
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—

having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984,

| — | having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979, |
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—

having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

| — | having regard to General recommendation No. 35 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women of 14 July 2017 on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, |
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—

having regard to General recommendation No. 35 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women of 14 July 2017 on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19,

| — | having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, |
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—

having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989,

| — | having regard to General comment No. 13 (2011) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child of 18 April 2011 on the right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence, |
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—

having regard to General comment No. 13 (2011) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child of 18 April 2011 on the right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence,

| — | having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and, in particular, to Sustainable Development Goal 5 on gender equality, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and, in particular, to Sustainable Development Goal 5 on gender equality,

| — | having regard to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe report on the safety of female journalists online (17), |
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—

having regard to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe report on the safety of female journalists online (17),

| — | having regard to the European Parliamentary Research Service study on ‘Combating gender-based violence: Cyber violence — European added value assessment’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Parliamentary Research Service study on ‘Combating gender-based violence: Cyber violence — European added value assessment’,

| — | having regard to the European Parliamentary Research Service study entitled ‘Cyber violence and hate speech online against women’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Parliamentary Research Service study entitled ‘Cyber violence and hate speech online against women’,

| — | having regard to the Gender Equality Index of the European Institute for Gender Equality, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Gender Equality Index of the European Institute for Gender Equality,

| — | having regard to Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (18), |
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—

having regard to Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (18),

| — | having regard to the Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (19), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (19),

| — | having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on a temporary derogation from certain provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC as regards the use of technologies by providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services for the processing of personal and other data for the purpose of combating online child sexual abuse (20), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on a temporary derogation from certain provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC as regards the use of technologies by providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services for the processing of personal and other data for the purpose of combating online child sexual abuse (20),

| — | having regard to the report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights of 3 March 2014 entitled ‘Violence against women: an EU-wide survey’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights of 3 March 2014 entitled ‘Violence against women: an EU-wide survey’,

| — | having regard to the report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights of 14 May 2020 entitled ‘EU LGBTI II: A long way to go for LGBTI equality’ (21), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights of 14 May 2020 entitled ‘EU LGBTI II: A long way to go for LGBTI equality’ (21),

| — | having regard to the legal opinion of the Advocate-General at the Court of Justice of the European Union on the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, aimed at clarifying the legal uncertainty if and how the Union can conclude and ratify the Convention, delivered on 11 March 2021 (22), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the legal opinion of the Advocate-General at the Court of Justice of the European Union on the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, aimed at clarifying the legal uncertainty if and how the Union can conclude and ratify the Convention, delivered on 11 March 2021 (22),

| — | having regard to the work of the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), including the latter’s European Cybercrime Centre, and its Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the work of the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), including the latter’s European Cybercrime Centre, and its Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment,

| — | having regard to Rules 47 and 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 47 and 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (A9-0338/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (A9-0338/2021),

| A. | whereas gender equality is a fundamental value and a core objective of the Union and should be reflected in all Union policies; whereas the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 2 and Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), Articles 8, 10, 19 and 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’); whereas the first objective of the Union’s 2020-2025 Gender Equality Strategy focuses on ending gender-based violence and describes it as ‘one of our societies’ biggest challenges’, as it affects women at all levels of society, regardless of age, education, income, social background or country of origin or residence, and is one of the most serious obstacles to achieving gender equality; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas gender equality is a fundamental value and a core objective of the Union and should be reflected in all Union policies; whereas the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 2 and Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), Articles 8, 10, 19 and 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’); whereas the first objective of the Union’s 2020-2025 Gender Equality Strategy focuses on ending gender-based violence and describes it as ‘one of our societies’ biggest challenges’, as it affects women at all levels of society, regardless of age, education, income, social background or country of origin or residence, and is one of the most serious obstacles to achieving gender equality;

| B. | whereas violence against women and girls and other forms of gender-based violence are widespread in the Union and are to be understood as an extreme form of discrimination which has a huge impact on victims and their families and communities and a violation of human rights entrenched in gender inequality, which they contribute to, perpetuate and reinforce; whereas gender-based violence is rooted in the unequal distribution of power between women and men, in established patriarchal structures and practices and gender norms, sexism and harmful gender stereotypes, and prejudices which have led to domination over and discrimination by men against women and girls in all their diversity, including LGBTIQ people; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas violence against women and girls and other forms of gender-based violence are widespread in the Union and are to be understood as an extreme form of discrimination which has a huge impact on victims and their families and communities and a violation of human rights entrenched in gender inequality, which they contribute to, perpetuate and reinforce; whereas gender-based violence is rooted in the unequal distribution of power between women and men, in established patriarchal structures and practices and gender norms, sexism and harmful gender stereotypes, and prejudices which have led to domination over and discrimination by men against women and girls in all their diversity, including LGBTIQ people;

| C. | whereas violence against women should be understood to mean all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life or perpetrated online or offline; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas violence against women should be understood to mean all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life or perpetrated online or offline;

| D. | whereas women and girls in all their diversity and LGBTIQ people can be targeted by gender-based cyberviolence on the grounds of their gender, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics; whereas intersectional forms of discrimination, including discrimination based on race, language, religion, belief, national or social origin, belonging to a national or ethnic minority, birth, sexual orientation, age, state of health, disability, marital status or migrant or refugee status can exacerbate the consequences of gender-based cyberviolence; whereas the Union’s LGBTIQ Equality Strategy recalls that everyone has a right to safety, be it at home, in public or online; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas women and girls in all their diversity and LGBTIQ people can be targeted by gender-based cyberviolence on the grounds of their gender, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics; whereas intersectional forms of discrimination, including discrimination based on race, language, religion, belief, national or social origin, belonging to a national or ethnic minority, birth, sexual orientation, age, state of health, disability, marital status or migrant or refugee status can exacerbate the consequences of gender-based cyberviolence; whereas the Union’s LGBTIQ Equality Strategy recalls that everyone has a right to safety, be it at home, in public or online;

| E. | whereas the Union’s LGBTIQ Survey II conducted by FRA shows that 10 % of LGBTIQ people had experienced cyberharassment due to being LGBTIQ in the year prior to the survey, including on social media; whereas intersex and trans people are over-proportionally affected (16 %); whereas teenagers between the ages of 15 and 17 were the group that most experienced cyberharassment due to being LGBTIQ (15 %), compared with other age groups (7 %-12 %); |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the Union’s LGBTIQ Survey II conducted by FRA shows that 10 % of LGBTIQ people had experienced cyberharassment due to being LGBTIQ in the year prior to the survey, including on social media; whereas intersex and trans people are over-proportionally affected (16 %); whereas teenagers between the ages of 15 and 17 were the group that most experienced cyberharassment due to being LGBTIQ (15 %), compared with other age groups (7 %-12 %);

| F. | whereas violence against women and girls in all their diversity and gender-based violence present different but not mutually exclusive forms and manifestations; whereas online violence is often interlinked with, and inseparable from offline violence because the former can precede, accompany or continue the latter; whereas gender-based cyberviolence should therefore be understood as a continuum of offline gender-based violence in the online environment; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas violence against women and girls in all their diversity and gender-based violence present different but not mutually exclusive forms and manifestations; whereas online violence is often interlinked with, and inseparable from offline violence because the former can precede, accompany or continue the latter; whereas gender-based cyberviolence should therefore be understood as a continuum of offline gender-based violence in the online environment;

| G. | whereas the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) study entitled ‘Combating gender-based violence: Cyber violence — European added value assessment’ on gender-based cyberviolence estimates that 4 to 7 % of women in the Union have experienced cyberharassment during the 12 months prior to the assessment, while between 1 and 3 % have experienced cyberstalking; whereas cyberstalking takes multiple forms and is the most common form of sole or combined hate speech and has for too long been unrecognised and unacted upon; whereas the World Wide Web Foundation survey conducted in 2020 among respondents from 180 countries revealed that 52 % of young women and girls have experienced online abuse such as the sharing of private images, videos or messages without their consent, mean and humiliating messages, abusive and threatening language, sexual harassment and false content, and 64 % of respondents stated that they know someone who has experienced it; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) study entitled ‘Combating gender-based violence: Cyber violence — European added value assessment’ on gender-based cyberviolence estimates that 4 to 7 % of women in the Union have experienced cyberharassment during the 12 months prior to the assessment, while between 1 and 3 % have experienced cyberstalking; whereas cyberstalking takes multiple forms and is the most common form of sole or combined hate speech and has for too long been unrecognised and unacted upon; whereas the World Wide Web Foundation survey conducted in 2020 among respondents from 180 countries revealed that 52 % of young women and girls have experienced online abuse such as the sharing of private images, videos or messages without their consent, mean and humiliating messages, abusive and threatening language, sexual harassment and false content, and 64 % of respondents stated that they know someone who has experienced it;

| H. | whereas young women and girls are at a greater risk of encountering cyberviolence, particularly cyberharassment and cyberbullying; whereas at least 12,5 % of school bullying cases are online (23); whereas young people are now increasingly connected to social networks at an earlier age; whereas those forms of violence reinforce the weight of social inequalities because it is often the most disadvantaged young people who are the target; whereas according to UNICEF, girls are harassed twice as much as boys (24); whereas, according to that survey, women are more sceptical with regard to tech companies using their data responsibly; |
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H.

whereas young women and girls are at a greater risk of encountering cyberviolence, particularly cyberharassment and cyberbullying; whereas at least 12,5 % of school bullying cases are online (23); whereas young people are now increasingly connected to social networks at an earlier age; whereas those forms of violence reinforce the weight of social inequalities because it is often the most disadvantaged young people who are the target; whereas according to UNICEF, girls are harassed twice as much as boys (24); whereas, according to that survey, women are more sceptical with regard to tech companies using their data responsibly;

| I. | whereas in 2014, according to the report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) of 3 March 2014 entitled ‘Violence against women: an EU-wide survey’, 11 % of women had experienced cyberharassment and 14 % had experienced stalking since the age of 15 in the Union; |
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I.

whereas in 2014, according to the report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) of 3 March 2014 entitled ‘Violence against women: an EU-wide survey’, 11 % of women had experienced cyberharassment and 14 % had experienced stalking since the age of 15 in the Union;

| J. | whereas internet connectivity and the need to access the digital public sphere are becoming increasingly necessary for the development of our societies and economies; whereas jobs increasingly involve and become dependent on the digital solutions leading to an increasing risk of women encountering gender-based cyberviolence when engaging in the labour market and economic activity; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas internet connectivity and the need to access the digital public sphere are becoming increasingly necessary for the development of our societies and economies; whereas jobs increasingly involve and become dependent on the digital solutions leading to an increasing risk of women encountering gender-based cyberviolence when engaging in the labour market and economic activity;

| K. | whereas the increasing reach of the internet, the rapid spread of mobile information, and the use of social media, coupled with the continuum of multiple, recurring and interrelated forms of gender-based violence, has led to the proliferation of gender-based cyberviolence; whereas women and girls who have access to the internet face online violence more often than men; whereas the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences noted that new technologies ‘will inevitably give rise to different and new manifestations of online violence against women’; whereas innovation happens at a pace that often does not allow for reflecting on its long-term consequences and the prevalence of gender-based cyberviolence is likely to continue to rise in the coming years; whereas there is a need to adequately assess the impact of gender-based cyberviolence on victims and to understand the mechanisms that allow perpetrators of that form of gender-based violence to perpetrate violence in order to ensure redress, accountability and prevention; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the increasing reach of the internet, the rapid spread of mobile information, and the use of social media, coupled with the continuum of multiple, recurring and interrelated forms of gender-based violence, has led to the proliferation of gender-based cyberviolence; whereas women and girls who have access to the internet face online violence more often than men; whereas the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences noted that new technologies ‘will inevitably give rise to different and new manifestations of online violence against women’; whereas innovation happens at a pace that often does not allow for reflecting on its long-term consequences and the prevalence of gender-based cyberviolence is likely to continue to rise in the coming years; whereas there is a need to adequately assess the impact of gender-based cyberviolence on victims and to understand the mechanisms that allow perpetrators of that form of gender-based violence to perpetrate violence in order to ensure redress, accountability and prevention;

| L. | whereas, according to the World Health Organization (25), one in three women worldwide experience physical or sexual violence mostly by an intimate partner; whereas gender-based violence has increased during the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns have aggravated the risk of domestic violence and abuse; whereas the greater use of the internet during the COVID-19 pandemic has increased online and ICT-facilitated gender-based violence, since abusive partners and ex-partners also monitor, track and threaten their victims and perpetrate violence with digital tools; whereas that cyberviolence can coincide with and escalate to physical violence if not addressed early on; whereas in the EU Strategy on Victims' Rights (2020-2025), the Commission acknowledges that the current situation with the COVID-19 pandemic has occasioned an increase in cybercrimes, such as online sexual offences and hate crime; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas, according to the World Health Organization (25), one in three women worldwide experience physical or sexual violence mostly by an intimate partner; whereas gender-based violence has increased during the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns have aggravated the risk of domestic violence and abuse; whereas the greater use of the internet during the COVID-19 pandemic has increased online and ICT-facilitated gender-based violence, since abusive partners and ex-partners also monitor, track and threaten their victims and perpetrate violence with digital tools; whereas that cyberviolence can coincide with and escalate to physical violence if not addressed early on; whereas in the EU Strategy on Victims' Rights (2020-2025), the Commission acknowledges that the current situation with the COVID-19 pandemic has occasioned an increase in cybercrimes, such as online sexual offences and hate crime;

| M. | whereas the most common types of gender-based cyberviolence are crimes such as cyber harassment, cyberstalking, ICT-related violation of privacy, including the accessing, taking, recording, sharing and creation and manipulation of data or images, including intimate data, without consent, identity theft and online hate speech, coercive control by means of digital surveillance and control of communications via stalkerware and spyware apps, and the use of technological means for trafficking in human beings, including for the purposes of sexual exploitation; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the most common types of gender-based cyberviolence are crimes such as cyber harassment, cyberstalking, ICT-related violation of privacy, including the accessing, taking, recording, sharing and creation and manipulation of data or images, including intimate data, without consent, identity theft and online hate speech, coercive control by means of digital surveillance and control of communications via stalkerware and spyware apps, and the use of technological means for trafficking in human beings, including for the purposes of sexual exploitation;

| N. | whereas gender-based cyberviolence can be perpetrated using a range of online communication channels and tools, including social media, web content, discussion sites, dating websites, comment sections, and gaming chat rooms; whereas many types of gender-based cyberviolence can be perpetrated with far greater ease and scale than physical forms of gender-based violence; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas gender-based cyberviolence can be perpetrated using a range of online communication channels and tools, including social media, web content, discussion sites, dating websites, comment sections, and gaming chat rooms; whereas many types of gender-based cyberviolence can be perpetrated with far greater ease and scale than physical forms of gender-based violence;

| O. | whereas some Member States have adopted laws on only some specific forms of gender-based cyberviolence and, therefore, significant gaps remain; whereas there is currently no common definition or effective policy approach to combating gender-based cyberviolence at Union level; whereas such an absence of a harmonised definition at Union level leads to significant differences as to the extent to which Member States combat and prevent gender-based cyberviolence, leaving wide disparities and fragmentation in the level of protection afforded by them, despite the cross-border nature of the crime; whereas a harmonised legal definition of gender-based cyberviolence is therefore needed in order to ensure convergence both at national and Union levels; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas some Member States have adopted laws on only some specific forms of gender-based cyberviolence and, therefore, significant gaps remain; whereas there is currently no common definition or effective policy approach to combating gender-based cyberviolence at Union level; whereas such an absence of a harmonised definition at Union level leads to significant differences as to the extent to which Member States combat and prevent gender-based cyberviolence, leaving wide disparities and fragmentation in the level of protection afforded by them, despite the cross-border nature of the crime; whereas a harmonised legal definition of gender-based cyberviolence is therefore needed in order to ensure convergence both at national and Union levels;

| P. | whereas, according to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, the definition of ‘online violence against women’ extends to any act of gender-based violence against women that is committed, assisted or aggravated in part or fully by the use of ICT, such as mobile phones and smartphones, the internet, social media platforms or email, against a woman because she is a woman, or affects women disproportionately (26); |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas, according to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, the definition of ‘online violence against women’ extends to any act of gender-based violence against women that is committed, assisted or aggravated in part or fully by the use of ICT, such as mobile phones and smartphones, the internet, social media platforms or email, against a woman because she is a woman, or affects women disproportionately (26);

| Q. | whereas criminalising gender-based cyberviolence could have a deterrent effect on perpetrators due to the fear of penalties or the awareness that they are committing a crime; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas criminalising gender-based cyberviolence could have a deterrent effect on perpetrators due to the fear of penalties or the awareness that they are committing a crime;

| R. | new forms are emerging due to the rapid development and use of digital technologies and applications; whereas those different forms of gender-based cyberviolence and online harassment target all age groups, from early ages, to school and professional life, to later years; whereas the potential for violence in the cyber-sphere to manifest psychically should also not be discounted; |
| --- | --- |

R.

new forms are emerging due to the rapid development and use of digital technologies and applications; whereas those different forms of gender-based cyberviolence and online harassment target all age groups, from early ages, to school and professional life, to later years; whereas the potential for violence in the cyber-sphere to manifest psychically should also not be discounted;

| S. | whereas, according to the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), seven out of 10 women have experienced cyberstalking; whereas stalkerware is a software facilitating abuse by allowing a person’s device to be monitored without their consent and without making the monitoring activity known to the owner of the device and while the software stays hidden; whereas stalkerware is legally available for use and purchase in the Union, often marketed as parental control software; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas, according to the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), seven out of 10 women have experienced cyberstalking; whereas stalkerware is a software facilitating abuse by allowing a person’s device to be monitored without their consent and without making the monitoring activity known to the owner of the device and while the software stays hidden; whereas stalkerware is legally available for use and purchase in the Union, often marketed as parental control software;

| T. | whereas image-based sexual abuse is often weaponised to harass and humiliate victims; whereas ‘deepfakes’ are a relatively new way to deploy gender-based violence, harnessing artificial intelligence to exploit, humiliate and harass women; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas image-based sexual abuse is often weaponised to harass and humiliate victims; whereas ‘deepfakes’ are a relatively new way to deploy gender-based violence, harnessing artificial intelligence to exploit, humiliate and harass women;

| U. | whereas image-based sexual abuse and websites on which such abuse is disseminated is a growing form of intimate partner violence; whereas the consequences of image-based-sexual abuse can be sexual, in that the sexual encounter was recorded or disseminated without consent, psychological, as regards the impact on victims of having their private life become public, and economic, in that the image-based sexual abuse may potentially compromise the present and future professional life of victims; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas image-based sexual abuse and websites on which such abuse is disseminated is a growing form of intimate partner violence; whereas the consequences of image-based-sexual abuse can be sexual, in that the sexual encounter was recorded or disseminated without consent, psychological, as regards the impact on victims of having their private life become public, and economic, in that the image-based sexual abuse may potentially compromise the present and future professional life of victims;

| V. | whereas there is an increased risk that non-consensual intimate and sexual videos of women are disseminated on pornography websites and that they are disseminated for a monetary benefit; whereas the online dissemination of private content without the consent of the victim and, particularly, of sexual abuse brings an additional traumatic element to violence, often with dramatic consequences, including suicide; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas there is an increased risk that non-consensual intimate and sexual videos of women are disseminated on pornography websites and that they are disseminated for a monetary benefit; whereas the online dissemination of private content without the consent of the victim and, particularly, of sexual abuse brings an additional traumatic element to violence, often with dramatic consequences, including suicide;

| W. | whereas young women, and girls in particular, are subjected to gender-based cyberviolence involving the use of new technologies, including cyberharassment and cyberstalking by means of rape threats, death threats, ICT-related violations of privacy, and the publication of private information and photos; |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas young women, and girls in particular, are subjected to gender-based cyberviolence involving the use of new technologies, including cyberharassment and cyberstalking by means of rape threats, death threats, ICT-related violations of privacy, and the publication of private information and photos;

| X. | whereas, at present, 15 Member States do not include gender identity in hate speech law; whereas the Commission has committed in the Union’s 2020-2025 Gender Equality Strategy and in 2020-2025 LGBTIQ Equality Strategy to present an initiative with a view to extending the areas of crime where harmonisation is possible to include specific forms of gender-based violence in accordance with Article 83(1) TFEU; |
| --- | --- |

X.

whereas, at present, 15 Member States do not include gender identity in hate speech law; whereas the Commission has committed in the Union’s 2020-2025 Gender Equality Strategy and in 2020-2025 LGBTIQ Equality Strategy to present an initiative with a view to extending the areas of crime where harmonisation is possible to include specific forms of gender-based violence in accordance with Article 83(1) TFEU;

| Y. | whereas the statistics mentioned in this resolution show that hate speech against LGBTIQ people is pervasively common, in particular online, and there is a notable absence of laws in some Member States to prevent, address and penalise such forms of online abuse; |
| --- | --- |

Y.

whereas the statistics mentioned in this resolution show that hate speech against LGBTIQ people is pervasively common, in particular online, and there is a notable absence of laws in some Member States to prevent, address and penalise such forms of online abuse;

| Z. | whereas in 2017 the Union signed the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the ‘Istanbul Convention’), which remains the benchmark for international standards for the eradication of gender-based violence, and concluding the Union’s accession to that Convention is a key priority for the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

Z.

whereas in 2017 the Union signed the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the ‘Istanbul Convention’), which remains the benchmark for international standards for the eradication of gender-based violence, and concluding the Union’s accession to that Convention is a key priority for the Commission;

| AA. | whereas, in order to end gender-based violence, including gender-based cyberviolence, it is necessary to rely on consistent, tangible, representative and comparable administrative data, based on a robust and coordinated framework of data collection; whereas there is a lack of comprehensive and comparable disaggregated data on all forms of gender-based violence and its root causes; whereas despite a growing awareness of that phenomenon, the lack of data collection on all forms of gender-based violence prevents an accurate assessment of its prevalence; whereas such lack of available data is linked to the underreporting of cases of gender-based cyberviolence; whereas the Istanbul Convention and Directive 2012/29/EU require Member States to report statistical data and to produce gender-disaggregated data; |
| --- | --- |

AA.

whereas, in order to end gender-based violence, including gender-based cyberviolence, it is necessary to rely on consistent, tangible, representative and comparable administrative data, based on a robust and coordinated framework of data collection; whereas there is a lack of comprehensive and comparable disaggregated data on all forms of gender-based violence and its root causes; whereas despite a growing awareness of that phenomenon, the lack of data collection on all forms of gender-based violence prevents an accurate assessment of its prevalence; whereas such lack of available data is linked to the underreporting of cases of gender-based cyberviolence; whereas the Istanbul Convention and Directive 2012/29/EU require Member States to report statistical data and to produce gender-disaggregated data;

| AB. | whereas the criminal justice response to victims of gender-based cyberviolence is still lagging behind, demonstrating a lack of understanding and awareness of the seriousness of those offences and discouraging reporting in many Member States; whereas equipping police officers with the soft skills to carefully listen, understand and respect all victims of all forms of gender-based violence can help to address underreporting and re-victimisation; whereas ensuring accessible reporting procedures and mechanisms, as well as remedies, is indispensable to promoting a safer environment for all victims of gender-based violence; whereas information should be available for victims of cyberviolence as regards how and whom to contact in law enforcement services as well as regards the available remedies to help them through distressing situations’; |
| --- | --- |

AB.

whereas the criminal justice response to victims of gender-based cyberviolence is still lagging behind, demonstrating a lack of understanding and awareness of the seriousness of those offences and discouraging reporting in many Member States; whereas equipping police officers with the soft skills to carefully listen, understand and respect all victims of all forms of gender-based violence can help to address underreporting and re-victimisation; whereas ensuring accessible reporting procedures and mechanisms, as well as remedies, is indispensable to promoting a safer environment for all victims of gender-based violence; whereas information should be available for victims of cyberviolence as regards how and whom to contact in law enforcement services as well as regards the available remedies to help them through distressing situations’;

| AC. | whereas the Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) have conducted research on online cybercrime; whereas some women and LGBTIQ people such as feminist and LGBTIQ activists, artists, politicians, women in public positions, journalists, bloggers, human rights defenders and other public figures, are particularly impacted by gender-based cyberviolence, and whereas this causes them not only reputational damage, psychological harm and suffering but can also lead to disruption to a victim’s living situation, invasions of privacy and damage to personal relationships and family lives and can deter victims from participating digitally in political, social, economic and cultural life; |
| --- | --- |

AC.

whereas the Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) have conducted research on online cybercrime; whereas some women and LGBTIQ people such as feminist and LGBTIQ activists, artists, politicians, women in public positions, journalists, bloggers, human rights defenders and other public figures, are particularly impacted by gender-based cyberviolence, and whereas this causes them not only reputational damage, psychological harm and suffering but can also lead to disruption to a victim’s living situation, invasions of privacy and damage to personal relationships and family lives and can deter victims from participating digitally in political, social, economic and cultural life;

| AD. | whereas gender-based cyberviolence often leads to self-censorship and that situation can have a detrimental impact on the professional lives and reputations of victims of gender-based cyberviolence; whereas the violent and gendered nature of the threats means that victims often resort to the use of pseudonyms, maintain low online profiles, decide to suspend, deactivate or permanently delete their online accounts, or even to leave their profession entirely; whereas that can silence female voices and opinions and worsen an already present gender inequality in political, social and cultural life; whereas the growing gender-based cyberviolence faced by women can prevent them from further participating in the digital sector itself, thereby solidifying gender-biased conception, development, and implementation of new technologies and causing the replication of existing discriminatory practices and stereotypes contributing to the normalisation of gender-based cyberviolence; |
| --- | --- |

AD.

whereas gender-based cyberviolence often leads to self-censorship and that situation can have a detrimental impact on the professional lives and reputations of victims of gender-based cyberviolence; whereas the violent and gendered nature of the threats means that victims often resort to the use of pseudonyms, maintain low online profiles, decide to suspend, deactivate or permanently delete their online accounts, or even to leave their profession entirely; whereas that can silence female voices and opinions and worsen an already present gender inequality in political, social and cultural life; whereas the growing gender-based cyberviolence faced by women can prevent them from further participating in the digital sector itself, thereby solidifying gender-biased conception, development, and implementation of new technologies and causing the replication of existing discriminatory practices and stereotypes contributing to the normalisation of gender-based cyberviolence;

| AE. | whereas gender-based cyberviolence has a direct impact on women's sexual, physical and psychological health and well-being and has a negative social and economic impact; whereas gender-based cyberviolence negatively impacts the ability of victims to fully exercise their fundamental rights, which, therefore, has dire consequences for society and democracy as a whole; |
| --- | --- |

AE.

whereas gender-based cyberviolence has a direct impact on women's sexual, physical and psychological health and well-being and has a negative social and economic impact; whereas gender-based cyberviolence negatively impacts the ability of victims to fully exercise their fundamental rights, which, therefore, has dire consequences for society and democracy as a whole;

| AF. | whereas the detrimental economic impact of gender-based violence and the mental health issues it causes can have a severe impact on victims, including their ability to seek employment, and can cause financial burden; whereas the economic impact of gender-based violence can include an impact on employment, such as lower presence at work, a risk of employment status being compromised, inducing a risk of job loss or lower productivity; whereas the mental health impact of gender-based cyberviolence can be complex and long term; whereas the mental health impact of gender-based cyberviolence, such as anxiety, depression and ongoing symptoms of post-trauma, has detrimental interpersonal, social, legal, economic and political implications and ultimately affects young people’s livelihood and identity; whereas some of those impacts compound other forms of discrimination, exacerbating existing forms of discrimination and inequalities; |
| --- | --- |

AF.

whereas the detrimental economic impact of gender-based violence and the mental health issues it causes can have a severe impact on victims, including their ability to seek employment, and can cause financial burden; whereas the economic impact of gender-based violence can include an impact on employment, such as lower presence at work, a risk of employment status being compromised, inducing a risk of job loss or lower productivity; whereas the mental health impact of gender-based cyberviolence can be complex and long term; whereas the mental health impact of gender-based cyberviolence, such as anxiety, depression and ongoing symptoms of post-trauma, has detrimental interpersonal, social, legal, economic and political implications and ultimately affects young people’s livelihood and identity; whereas some of those impacts compound other forms of discrimination, exacerbating existing forms of discrimination and inequalities;

| AG. | whereas according to the EPRS study entitled ‘Combating gender-based violence: Cyber violence — European added value assessment’ the overall costs of cyberharassment and cyberstalking are estimated at between EUR 49 and 89,3 billion, with the largest cost category being the value of the loss in terms of quality of life, which accounted for more than half of the overall costs (about 60 % for cyberharassment and about 50 % for cyberstalking); |
| --- | --- |

AG.

whereas according to the EPRS study entitled ‘Combating gender-based violence: Cyber violence — European added value assessment’ the overall costs of cyberharassment and cyberstalking are estimated at between EUR 49 and 89,3 billion, with the largest cost category being the value of the loss in terms of quality of life, which accounted for more than half of the overall costs (about 60 % for cyberharassment and about 50 % for cyberstalking);

| AH. | whereas prevention, especially through education, including digital literacy and skills such as cyber hygiene and netiquette, must be a key element of any public policy aimed at tackling gender-based cyberviolence; |
| --- | --- |

AH.

whereas prevention, especially through education, including digital literacy and skills such as cyber hygiene and netiquette, must be a key element of any public policy aimed at tackling gender-based cyberviolence;

| 1. | Underlines that gender-based cyberviolence is a continuation of offline gender-based violence and that no policy alternative will be effective unless it takes that reality into consideration; stresses that existing Union legal acts do not provide the mechanisms needed to address gender-based cyberviolence adequately; calls on the Member States and the Commission to formulate and implement legislative and non-legislative measures, to address gender-based cyberviolence and to include the voices of victims of gender-based cyberviolence in the strategies for addressing it, coupling them with initiatives to eradicate gender stereotypes, sexist attitudes and discrimination against women; stresses that those future proposals should work in line with existing ones such as the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, as well as legal acts already in force, such as Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (27) and Directive 2012/29/EU; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Recalls that there is no common definition of gender-based cyberviolence, which leads to significant differences as to the extent to which Member States prevent and tackle it, leaving wide disparities in protection, support and compensation of the victims among Member States; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to define and adopt a common definition of gender-based cyberviolence which would facilitate the work of analysing the various forms of gender-based cyberviolence and countering it and would thus ensure that victims of gender-based cyberviolence in Member States have effective access to justice and specialised support services; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Stresses that the concept of gender-based cyberviolence cannot be limited to the use of computer systems, but should remain broad, thereby covering the use of ICT to cause, facilitate or threaten violence against individuals; |
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3.

| 4. | Welcomes the Union’s Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 which was put forward by the Commission as a tool to combat violence against women in all their diversity, to combat gender-based violence and to tackle the root causes of it; underlines that gender-based cyberviolence is deeply rooted in power dynamics, economic imbalances and gender norms; calls on the Member States and on the Commission to address the root causes of gender-based cyberviolence and to tackle gender roles and stereotypes that make violence against women acceptable; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Calls on the Member States to allocate appropriate human and financial resources to national, regional and local governance bodies and to legal aid, healthcare, in particular mental health, and social protection institutions, including women’s organisations, in order to effectively help to prevent and protect women from gender-based cyberviolence; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Calls on the Commission to ensure cyberviolence is also addressed, including the forms it takes through the sex industry; calls on the Commission and on the Member States to put an end to the pornography industry built based on sex trafficking, rape and other forms of assault and abuse of women and children; calls on the Commission and Member States to include misogyny in the forms of hate speech, and misogynistic assaults in hate crimes; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Highlights that systemic and social discrimination, including gender, racial and economic discrimination, are reproduced and exacerbated online; recalls that those forms of discrimination intersect, which results in more extreme consequences for people in vulnerable situations such as migrant women, women belonging to ethnic or religious communities, women with functional diversity, LGBTIQ people and teenagers; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Welcomes the Commission’s commitment under the 2020-2025 LGBTIQ Equality Strategy to extend the list of ‘Euro-crimes’ under Article 83(1) TFEU to cover hate crime and hate speech, including when targeted at LGBTIQ people; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Underlines the urgency to tackle the root causes of gender-based violence and calls on the Commission to take that approach into account in its future proposal; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Stresses that the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a dramatic increase of intimate partner violence and abuse, which has been called ‘the shadow pandemic’ and includes physical, psychological, sexual and economic violence and their online dimension, because much more of people's social lives have shifted online and victims were forced to spend more time with perpetrators, tending to be more isolated from support networks; highlights as well that during the COVID-19 lockdowns many LGBTIQ people were subjected to harassment or abuse or exposed to violence, including by family members, legal guardians or co-habitants; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Stresses that the ‘shadow pandemic’ made it difficult for women to access effective protection, support services and justice and revealed insufficient support resources and structures, leaving many women without adequate and timely protection; urges Member States to increase the assistance they offer through specialised shelters, helplines and support services to protect victims and facilitate redress and the reporting and prosecution of gender-based violence; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Expresses concern regarding the cases of hate crime and hate speech relating to incitement to discriminate or violence which occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, which lead to the stigmatisation of people from groups in a vulnerable situation; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Calls on the Commission to carry out a deeper analysis of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on all forms of gender-based cyberviolence and calls on the Member States to take effective action with the support of civil society organisations and Union bodies, offices and agencies such as the FRA and Europol (28); further encourages the Commission to develop a Union Protocol on gender-based violence in times of crisis and emergency in order to include protection services for victims as ‘essential services’ in the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Calls on the Commission and Member States to expand the scope of hate speech to include sexist hate speech; |
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14.

| 15. | Underlines the transnational nature of gender-based cyberviolence; stresses that gender-based cyberviolence has additional transnational implications considering that the use of ICT has a cross-border dimension; underlines that perpetrators use online platforms or mobile phones connected to or hosted by countries other than those in which the victims of gender-based cyberviolence are located; highlights that rapid technological developments and digitalisation might generate new forms of gender-based cyberviolence, which could result in perpetrators not being held responsible, reinforcing the culture of impunity; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls on the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and the Member States and their law enforcement agencies to cooperate and take concrete steps to coordinate their actions to address gender-based cyberviolence; |
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16.

| 17. | Stresses the importance of consider the overlap between gender-based cyberviolence and human trafficking based on sexual exploitation of women and girls, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic; underlines that awareness-raising in relation to online human trafficking on social media is essential in order to prevent new victims from entering into trafficking networks; further underlines that image-based sexual abuse is an extreme violation of privacy and also constitutes a form of gender-based violence, as exemplified for instance in Ireland in November 2020 when tens of thousands of sexually explicit images of women and girls were made public without their consent; strongly encourages, therefore, Member States to update their national law in order to include image-based sexual abuse or any non-consensual sharing of explicit intimate material in the list of sexual offences, separate to instances involving child sexual abuse material; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Encourages the Member States to duly and effectively adopt and implement adequate national law, including criminal justice law, and specific policies to promote awareness-raising and to set up campaigns, training and educational programmes, including on digital education, literacy and skills, which would also target younger generations; encourages the Commission to support the Member States in that regard; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Highlights the importance of gender equality in education curricula in order to address the root causes of gender-based violence by removing gender stereotypes and changing social and cultural attitudes that lead to harmful social and gender norms; underlines the role of qualified training professionals, such as educational staff, to support students in issues related to gender-based cyberviolence and the importance to invest in them; notes that particular attention should be given to the education of boys and men; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Calls on Member States to devise policies and programmes to support and ensure reparation for victims and to take appropriate measures against the impunity of the perpetrators of such acts, including by considering revising and amending their national law on judicial orders in order to include cyberviolence as one of the ways in which a judicial order can be breached; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Calls on the Member States to establish networks of national contact points and initiatives to improve the approximation of rules and strengthen the enforcement of existing rules to address gender-based cyberviolence; recalls that the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, the Council of Europe Convention on Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse and the Istanbul Convention require the criminalisation of specific conduct that includes or entails violence against women and children, such as gender-based cyberviolence; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide adequate funding for advocacy organisations and victim support organisations; emphasises the importance of research into the phenomenon of gender-based cyberviolence; further calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase the funds such as the ones devoted to awareness-raising campaigns and combating gender stereotypes; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Calls on the Member States to provide mandatory, continuous and gender-responsive capacity building, education and training for all relevant professionals, in particular for justice and law enforcement authorities in the fight against gender-based cyberviolence at all stages, to equip them with knowledge on gender-based cyberviolence and on how to better understand and take care of victims, particularly those who decide to file complaints, in order to avoid any secondary victimisation and re-traumatisation; stresses also the need for providing training in the investigation and prosecution of gender-based cyberviolence offences; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Recalls the need to provide support services, helplines, accessible reporting mechanisms and remedies which aim to protect and support victims of gender-based cyberviolence; calls on the Member States with the support of the Union to develop a harmonised, user-friendly, accessible and regularly updated directory of support services, helplines and reporting mechanisms available in individual cases of cyberviolence against women, which could be made available on a single platform and could also contain information on the support available for other forms of violence against women; notes that the problem of gender-based cyberviolence is probably more significant than what data currently suggests due to underreporting and the normalisation of gender-based cyberviolence; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Underlines the importance of media and social media in raising awareness about preventing and combating gender-based cyberviolence; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Calls on the Commission to promote awareness-raising, information and advocacy campaigns that tackle gender-based cyberviolence in all its forms and help to ensure a safe digital public space for everyone; considers that a Union-wide awareness-raising campaign on gender-based cyberviolence should contain, inter alia, information targeted at educating younger citizens of the Union on how to recognise and report forms of cyberviolence and on digital rights; notes that young women are particularly targeted by gender-based cyberviolence and also calls, in that regard, for the development of specific prevention and awareness-raising initiatives (29); |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Urges the Commission and the Member States to establish a reliable system for regularly collecting Union-wide statistical disaggregated, comparable and relevant data on gender-based violence, including cyberviolence and its prevalence, dynamics and consequences, and to develop indicators to measure progress; reaffirms the need to collect comprehensive disaggregated and comparable data, including scientific data, in order to measure the scale of gender-based violence, find solutions and measure progress; calls on the Member States to collect and provide the relevant data; recommends that the Commission and the Member States make use of the capacity and expertise of the EIGE, Eurostat, the FRA, Europol, Eurojust and ENISA; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to carry out a Union-wide survey on gender-based violence with the results to be presented in 2023; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Notes that gender-based cyberviolence can have a wide impact with severe and life-long consequences on victims, such as a physiological impact and an impact on mental health, including stress, concentration problems, anxiety, panic attacks, low self-esteem, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, social isolation, lack of trust and lack of sense of control, fear, self-harm and suicidal ideation; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Points out that the impact of gender-based cyberviolence on victims can lead to reputational damage, physical and medical issues, disruptions to a victim’s living situation, breaches of the right to privacy and withdrawal from online and offline environments; underlines that gender-based cyberviolence can also have a detrimental economic impact in terms of lower presence at work, risk of job loss, the ability to seek employment and reduced quality of life, and underlines that some of those impacts compound other forms of discrimination faced by women and LGBTIQ people on the labour market; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Is concerned by the effect that an impact on mental health can have on young people in particular, which can cause not only a significant detrimental decline in their schooling, but also their withdrawal from social and public life, including isolation from their families; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Underlines that gender-based cyberviolence generates a negative psychological, social and economic impact on women and girls’ lives both online and offline; notes that gender-based cyberviolence affects women and girls in different ways as a consequence of overlapping forms of discrimination based, in addition to their gender, on, inter alia, their sexual orientation, age, race, religion or disability, and recalls that an intersectional approach is crucial to understanding those specific forms of discrimination; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to pay particular attention to the intersectional forms of gender-based cyberviolence which can affect women and girls belonging to groups put in a vulnerable situation, such as those belonging to ethnic minorities, those with disabilities and LGBTIQ people; recalls that the labelling of LGBTIQ people as an ‘ideology’ is growing in online and offline communication and in campaigns against so-called ‘gender ideology’; highlights that feminists and LGBTIQ activists are often the targets of defamation campaigns, online hate speech and cyberbullying; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Calls on the Member States to develop specific free and accessible support services for groups put in a vulnerable situation, including emergency and long-term support, such as psychological, medical, legal, practical and socio-economic support, and programmes, particularly on digital education, literacy and skills; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in that regard; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Deplores the fact that gender-based cyberviolence is becoming increasingly common and reduces the participation of women and LGBTIQ people in public life and debate, which, as a consequence, erodes the Union’s democracy and its principles and prevents them from fully enjoying their fundamental rights and freedoms, particularly the freedom of speech; further deplores the fact that gender-based cyberviolence also leads to censorship; regrets that such a ‘silencing effect’ has been particularly aimed at targeting women activists, including feminist women and girls, LGBTIQ+ activists, artists, women in male-dominated industries, journalists, politicians, human rights defenders and bloggers with the effect of discouraging the presence of women in public life, including politics and decision-making spheres; is concerned that the chilling effect caused by gender-based cyberviolence often spills over into reality offline and that the normalisation of online violence towards women participating in public debate actively contributes to the underreporting of those crimes and limits the engagement of young women in particular; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Recalls the rise of misogyny, anti-gender and anti-feminist movements and their attacks on women’s rights; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Recalls that gender norms and stereotypes are at the core of gender discrimination; stresses the impact of the portrayal of gender stereotypes in the media and through advertising on gender equality; calls on media outlets and companies to strengthen self-regulatory mechanisms and codes of conduct to condemn and combat sexist advertising and media content, such as sexist imagery and language, sexist practices and gender stereotypes; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Notes that most perpetrators of gender-based violence are men; underlines the essential role of educating at an early age to promote and address the equal status and power relation between men and women and between boys and girls, to eliminate biases and gender stereotypes that lead to harmful social gender norms; is further concerned that men’s violence against women often starts with boys’ violence against girls; recalls that the language, curricula and books used in schools can reinforce gender stereotypes and further recalls the importance of education in digital skills, such as cyber hygiene and netiquette, as well as a respectful use of technology by men and boys and in how to behave towards women and girls online, and to ensure women’s freedom of expression and meaningful participation in public discourse; calls in that regard on Member States to develop strategies to combat gender stereotypes in education through pedagogical training and a review of curricula, materials and pedagogical practices; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Highlights that women, girls and LGBTIQ people face many barriers to entry to the ICT and digital fields; regrets the fact that that gender gap exists across all digital technology domains, including new technologies such as AI, and is especially concerned about the gender gap in the field of technological innovation and research; highlights that one of AI’s most critical weaknesses relates to certain types of bias such as gender, age, disability, religion, racial or ethnic origin, social background or sexual orientation; calls on the Commission and the Member States to step up measures to address such biases, specifically by tackling the gender gap in the sector and ensuring the full protection of fundamental rights; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Encourages Member States to promote the involvement of women in the ICT sector and to promote careers in that sector for women by providing sufficient incentives in their respective national, regional and local action plans or policies on gender; urges the Commission and the Member States to tackle the gender gap in the ICT and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) sectors through education, awareness-raising campaigns, professional training, appropriate funding, the promotion of the representation of women in those sectors, in particular in decision-making positions, improved work-life balance, equal opportunities, safe and enabling working environments, including zero tolerance sexual and moral harassment policies; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure a proper application of the Directive 2011/93/EU in order to raise awareness and reduce the risk of children becoming victims of online sexual abuse or exploitation; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Welcomes the announcement of the Commission, in its recent strategy for the victims’ rights, to launch a Union network on the prevention of gender-based violence and domestic violence and to take actions to protect the safety of victims of gender-based cybercrime by facilitating the development of a framework for cooperation between internet platforms and other stakeholders; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Takes note of the call, by the Commission’s Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, for legislation at Union level on combatting online violence against women; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Underlines the need to protect, empower, support and ensure reparation for victims of gender-based cyberviolence and to provide equal access to justice, in particular with regards to the provision of essential psychological and legal counselling, accessible to all victims of gender-based cyberviolence; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Calls on the Member States to ensure quality training with a gender-responsive approach for practitioners and other professionals, including social services staff, law enforcement officers, justice officials and educational staff, in cooperation with civil society organisations; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Recalls the importance in that context of equipping independent civil society organisations with the financial and human resources to provide support services, such as legal advice and psychological support, and counselling; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Calls on the Member States to make support services, including legal and psychological counselling, accessible to all victims, to establish a clear protocol to aid victims of gender-based cyberviolence and to prevent further harm and re-victimisation and to ensure that victims have an immediate access to justice; highlights the need to raise awareness amongst victims about the available support services in that regard; further calls on the Member States to develop and disseminate accessible information on the legal avenues and support services available to victims of gender-based cyberviolence and to create complaints mechanisms that are easily and immediately accessible to victims, including by digital means; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Is concerned about the marketing of technology to facilitate abuse, in particular the marketing of stalkerware software; dismisses the notion that stalkerware applications can be considered parental control applications; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Underlines the important role that online platforms must play in addressing and combating gender-based cyberviolence; stresses the need for Member States to cooperate with online platforms to adopt measures to ensure timely and accessible reporting mechanisms in the fight against cyberviolence and to secure online safety, women’s privacy online and appropriate redress mechanisms; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Calls for effective cooperation between law enforcement authorities and tech companies and service providers, which should be in full compliance with fundamental rights and freedoms and data protection rules, with a view to ensuring that the rights of victims are safeguarded and that they are protected; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Welcomes in that regard the proposal of the Commission for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, which aims to create a safer digital space, and in line with relevant Union legal acts, in which fundamental rights and freedoms are protected; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Urges the Council to urgently conclude the Union’s ratification of the Istanbul Convention on the basis of a broad accession without any limitations and to advocate for its ratification, swift and proper implementation and enforcement by all Member States; regrets the fact that to this date only 21 Member States have ratified it and calls on Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia to ratify the Convention; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Underlines that the Istanbul Convention is the most comprehensive international treaty addressing the root causes of gender-based violence in all its forms, ensuring legislative action as regards both online and offline gender-based violence, and should be understood as a minimum standard; strongly condemns the attempts by some Member States to discredit the Istanbul Convention and to set back progress made in the fight against gender-based violence; stresses the importance of effectively implementing the Convention across the Union and recalls that the failure to conclude its ratification undermines the Union’s credibility; highlights that this call does not detract from the call to adopt a Union legal act on combating gender-based violence but, rather, complements it; recalls that new legislative measures should in any case be coherent with the rights and obligations laid down in the Istanbul Convention and should be complementary to its ratification; urges, therefore, the Member States and the Union to adopt further measures, including binding legislative measures, to combat those forms of violence in the upcoming directive on preventing and combating all forms of gender-based violence; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Strongly reaffirms its commitment, as it has previously expressed, to tackling gender-based violence and reiterates its call as regards the need to have a comprehensive directive covering all forms of gender-based violence, including violations of women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights, cyberviolence and sexual exploitation and abuse as well as obligations to prevent, investigate and prosecute perpetrators, to protect victims and witnesses, and to collect data, as the best way to put an end to gender-based violence; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Urges the Commission to use the upcoming directive to criminalise gender-based cyberviolence, as a cornerstone for the harmonisation of existing and future legal acts; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Calls on the Council to activate a passerelle clause by adopting a decision identifying gender-based violence as an area of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension pursuant to Article 83(1), third subparagraph, TFEU; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Requests that the Commission submit, without undue delay, as a part of its upcoming legislative proposal and on the basis of Article 83(1), first subparagraph, TFEU, a proposal for an act establishing measures to combat gender-based cyberviolence following, the recommendations set out in the Annex hereto; indicates that that proposal should not undermine the efforts to identify gender-based violence as a new area of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension pursuant to Article 83(1), third subparagraph, TFEU or any derivative legal acts on gender-based violence as requested by Parliament in its previous calls; |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the accompanying recommendations to the Commission and the Council. |
| --- | --- |

57.

---

(1)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 208.

(2)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0296.

(3)  OJ C 474, 24.11.2021, p. 140.

(4)  OJ C 465, 17.11.2021, p. 30.

(5)  OJ C 465, 17.11.2021, p. 160.

(6)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 191.

(7)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 232.

(8)  OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 28.

(9)  OJ C 316, 6.8.2021, p. 2.

(10)  OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 48.

(11)  OJ C 449, 23.12.2020, p. 102.

(12)  OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 31.

(13)  OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 28.

(14)  OJ C 346, 27.9.2018, p. 192.

(15)  OJ C 346, 27.9.2018, p. 29.

(16)  OJ C 337, 20.9.2018, p. 167.

(17)  https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/9/468861_0.pdf

(18)  OJ L 335, 17.12.2011, p. 1.

(19)  OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57.

(20)  OJ L 274, 30.7.2021, p. 41.

(21)  https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-lgbti-equality-1_en.pdf

(22)  https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=238745&doclang=en

(23)  https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/OnlineViolence.aspx

(24)  https://www.coe.int/en/web/campaign-free-to-speak-safe-to-learn/-/bullying-perspectives-practices-and-insights-2017-

(25)  https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240022256

(26)  Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences of 18 June 2018 on online violence against women and girls from a human rights perspective (A/HRC/38/47).

(27)  Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA (
  OJ L 101, 15.4.2011, p. 1
  ).

(28)  https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/pandemic-profiteering-how-criminals-exploit-covid-19-crisis

(29)  FRA report of 3 March 2014 entitled ‘Violence against women: an EU-wide survey’.

---

ANNEX TO THE RESOLUTION:

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE REQUESTED PROPOSAL ON COMBATING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE: CYBERVIOLENCE

Recommendation 1 on the objective of the legislative proposal

The objective is to include in the upcoming directive on combating all forms of gender-based violence minimum rules, as a harmonised policy response, concerning the definition of the crime of gender-based cyberviolence and related sanctions, to establish measures to promote and support the action of Member States in the field of prevention of that crime and to establish measures to protect, support and ensure reparations for victims.

Additionally according to the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025, to include in the upcoming proposal the definition of online hate crime and hate speech when targeted at LGBTIQ people.

This proposal should not undermine any efforts to identify all forms of gender-based violence as a new area of particularly serious crime.

Recommendation 2 on the scope and definitions

The definition of gender-based cyberviolence should set out the scope, extent and gendered and intersectional nature of cyberviolence and underline that gender-based cyberviolence is part of the gender-based violence continuum.

The proposal should contain a definition based on the definitions in existing instruments, such as the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime or the Istanbul Convention, the definitions elaborated by the Cybercrime Convention Committee, the Commission’s Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences and definitions framed in the context of cybercrime or cyberviolence against children, or violence against women.

Based on existing instruments, a possible definition could be: ‘Gender-based cyberviolence is a form of gender-based violence and is any act of gender-based violence that is committed, assisted or aggravated in part or in full by the use of ICT, such as mobile phones and smartphones, the internet, social media platforms or email, against a woman because she is a woman or affects women disproportionately, or against LGBTIQ people because of their gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics, and results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm, including threats to carry out such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, in public or private life’.

—   which crimes?

The inclusion of the term ‘computer crime’ in Article 83(1) TFEU may also cover crimes committed against electronic communication networks or information systems or by using them, and serious forms of online gender-based violence with a cross-border dimension may fall within the scope of ‘computer crime’ within the meaning of Article 83(1) TFEU.

In addition, measures that aim to prevent gender-based cyberviolence and to assist victims could be established on the basis of Article 83(1) TFEU because they are secondary to the main objective of the legislative proposal.

The scope of the legislative proposal should cover any form of gender-based violence committed, assisted or aggravated in part or fully by the use of ICT, such as mobile phones and smartphones, the internet, social media platforms or email, against a woman because she is a woman, or affects women disproportionately or against LGBTIQ people on the grounds of gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics.

Although it is not possible to present an exhaustive typology of the different forms of gender-based cyberviolence because it is constantly evolving and new forms are emerging, the following types should be mentioned and defined:

| — | cyberharassment, including cyberbullying, online sexual harassment, unsolicited receipt of sexually explicit material, mobbing and dead naming; |
| --- | --- |

—

cyberharassment, including cyberbullying, online sexual harassment, unsolicited receipt of sexually explicit material, mobbing and dead naming;

| — | cyberstalking; |
| --- | --- |

—

cyberstalking;

| — | ICT-related violations of privacy, including the accessing, recording, sharing, creation and manipulation of private data or images, specifically, including image-based sexual abuse non-consensual creation or distribution of private sexual images, doxxing and identity theft; |
| --- | --- |

—

ICT-related violations of privacy, including the accessing, recording, sharing, creation and manipulation of private data or images, specifically, including image-based sexual abuse non-consensual creation or distribution of private sexual images, doxxing and identity theft;

| — | recording and sharing images of rapes or other forms of sexual assault; |
| --- | --- |

—

recording and sharing images of rapes or other forms of sexual assault;

| — | remote control or surveillance, including by means of spy applications on mobile devices; |
| --- | --- |

—

remote control or surveillance, including by means of spy applications on mobile devices;

| — | threats, including direct threats and threats of and calls to violence, such as rape threats, extortion, sextortion, blackmail directed at the victim, their children or at relatives or other persons who support the victim and who are indirectly affected; |
| --- | --- |

—

threats, including direct threats and threats of and calls to violence, such as rape threats, extortion, sextortion, blackmail directed at the victim, their children or at relatives or other persons who support the victim and who are indirectly affected;

| — | sexist hate speech, including posting and sharing content, inciting to violence or hatred against women or LGBTIQ people on the grounds of their gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics; |
| --- | --- |

—

sexist hate speech, including posting and sharing content, inciting to violence or hatred against women or LGBTIQ people on the grounds of their gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

| — | inducements to inflict violence on oneself, such as suicide or anorexia and psychic injury; |
| --- | --- |

—

inducements to inflict violence on oneself, such as suicide or anorexia and psychic injury;

| — | computer damage to files, programmes, devices, attacks on websites and other digital communication channels; |
| --- | --- |

—

computer damage to files, programmes, devices, attacks on websites and other digital communication channels;

| — | unlawful access to mobile phones, email, instant messaging messages or social media accounts; |
| --- | --- |

—

unlawful access to mobile phones, email, instant messaging messages or social media accounts;

| — | breach of the restrictions on communication imposed by means of judicial orders; |
| --- | --- |

—

breach of the restrictions on communication imposed by means of judicial orders;

| — | the use of technological means for trafficking in human beings, including for sexually exploiting women and girls. |
| --- | --- |

—

the use of technological means for trafficking in human beings, including for sexually exploiting women and girls.

—   which victims?

The personal scope of the proposal should cover all victims of gender-based cyberviolence, with a specific recognition of intersectional forms of discrimination and victims participating in public life, which include:

| — | women and girls in all their diversity; and |
| --- | --- |

—

women and girls in all their diversity; and

| — | LGBTIQ people on the grounds of gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics. |
| --- | --- |

—

LGBTIQ people on the grounds of gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics.

Recommendation 3 on preventive measures

Member States should implement a series of measures in order to prevent gender-based cyberviolence, all such measures should prevent re-traumatisation and stigmatisation of victims of gender-based cyberviolence, be victim-centred and have an intersectional approach. Those measures should include the following:

| — | awareness-raising and educational programmes including programmes addressed to boys and men, as well as campaigns involving all relevant actors and stakeholders to address the root causes of gender-based cyberviolence, within the general context of gender-based violence in order to bring about changes in social and cultural attitudes and remove gender norms and stereotypes, while promoting the respect of fundamental rights in the online space, with special regard to social media platforms and increasing literacy about the safe use of the internet |
| --- | --- |

—

awareness-raising and educational programmes including programmes addressed to boys and men, as well as campaigns involving all relevant actors and stakeholders to address the root causes of gender-based cyberviolence, within the general context of gender-based violence in order to bring about changes in social and cultural attitudes and remove gender norms and stereotypes, while promoting the respect of fundamental rights in the online space, with special regard to social media platforms and increasing literacy about the safe use of the internet

| — | research on gender-based cyberviolence (including aspects such as causes, prevalence, impact; victims, perpetrators, manifestations, channels and need for support services; such research should include studies and the adjustment of crime statistics on gender-based cyberviolence to identify legislative and non-legislative needs; such research should be supported by the collection of disaggregated, intersectional and comprehensive data; |
| --- | --- |

—

research on gender-based cyberviolence (including aspects such as causes, prevalence, impact; victims, perpetrators, manifestations, channels and need for support services; such research should include studies and the adjustment of crime statistics on gender-based cyberviolence to identify legislative and non-legislative needs; such research should be supported by the collection of disaggregated, intersectional and comprehensive data;

| — | mainstream digital education, literacy and skills such as cyber hygiene and netiquette, including in school curricula, in order to promote an enhanced understanding of digital technologies, in particular to prevent social media misuse and the empowerment of users, to improve digital inclusion, to ensure the respect for fundamental rights, to eliminate any gender inequality and biases in access to technologies and to ensure gender diversity in the technology sector, particularly in the development of new technologies, including training for teachers; |
| --- | --- |

—

mainstream digital education, literacy and skills such as cyber hygiene and netiquette, including in school curricula, in order to promote an enhanced understanding of digital technologies, in particular to prevent social media misuse and the empowerment of users, to improve digital inclusion, to ensure the respect for fundamental rights, to eliminate any gender inequality and biases in access to technologies and to ensure gender diversity in the technology sector, particularly in the development of new technologies, including training for teachers;

| — | facilitation of women’s access to education and academia in digital technology domains in order to remove the gender gap, including the digital gender gap, and ensure gender diversity in the tech sectors, such as ICT and STEM, particularly in the development of new technologies, including AI, and, in particular in decision-making positions; |
| --- | --- |

—

facilitation of women’s access to education and academia in digital technology domains in order to remove the gender gap, including the digital gender gap, and ensure gender diversity in the tech sectors, such as ICT and STEM, particularly in the development of new technologies, including AI, and, in particular in decision-making positions;

| — | the promotion and sharing of best practices in access to justice, sentencing and remedies that have a gender-responsive approach; |
| --- | --- |

—

the promotion and sharing of best practices in access to justice, sentencing and remedies that have a gender-responsive approach;

| — | the promotion of integrated and comprehensive educational and treatment programmes aimed at preventing perpetrators from re-offending as well as at shifting behaviour and mindset away from violence, in cooperation with relevant institutions and civil society organisations, taking into account community-based practices and transformative justice approaches, which are crucial to stopping the cycle of harm; |
| --- | --- |

—

the promotion of integrated and comprehensive educational and treatment programmes aimed at preventing perpetrators from re-offending as well as at shifting behaviour and mindset away from violence, in cooperation with relevant institutions and civil society organisations, taking into account community-based practices and transformative justice approaches, which are crucial to stopping the cycle of harm;

| — | the development of cooperation among Member States for the purposes of exchanging information, expertise and best practices, in particular through the European Crime Prevention Network, coordinating with the Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre and other related bodies, offices and agencies such as Eurojust in line with fundamental rights; |
| --- | --- |

—

the development of cooperation among Member States for the purposes of exchanging information, expertise and best practices, in particular through the European Crime Prevention Network, coordinating with the Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre and other related bodies, offices and agencies such as Eurojust in line with fundamental rights;

| — | for online platforms that are primarily used for the dissemination of user generated pornographic content, ensure that the platforms take the necessary technical and organisational measures to warrant that those users who disseminate content have verified themselves through a double opt-in e-mail and cell phone registration; |
| --- | --- |

—

for online platforms that are primarily used for the dissemination of user generated pornographic content, ensure that the platforms take the necessary technical and organisational measures to warrant that those users who disseminate content have verified themselves through a double opt-in e-mail and cell phone registration;

| — | recognising, supporting and providing information about civil society organisations working in the field of gender-based violence, prevention, including by ensuring that they have financial support; |
| --- | --- |

—

recognising, supporting and providing information about civil society organisations working in the field of gender-based violence, prevention, including by ensuring that they have financial support;

| — | the promotion of focused and continuous training for practitioners and other professionals, including social services staff law enforcement officers, justice officials and other relevant actors, to ensure that the causes and impact of gender-based cyberviolence are understood and victims are treated appropriately and to ensure that training for all practitioners has a gender-responsive approach; |
| --- | --- |

—

the promotion of focused and continuous training for practitioners and other professionals, including social services staff law enforcement officers, justice officials and other relevant actors, to ensure that the causes and impact of gender-based cyberviolence are understood and victims are treated appropriately and to ensure that training for all practitioners has a gender-responsive approach;

| — | a consideration of regulating the software development of monitoring applications, with the aim of considering possible misuse or abuse of those application and providing for adequate safeguards so as to protect fundamental rights and ensure compliance with applicable data protection law; the prohibition by the Commission of marketing of any monitoring software which engages in surveillance without the user’s consent and without clear indications of its activity; |
| --- | --- |

—

a consideration of regulating the software development of monitoring applications, with the aim of considering possible misuse or abuse of those application and providing for adequate safeguards so as to protect fundamental rights and ensure compliance with applicable data protection law; the prohibition by the Commission of marketing of any monitoring software which engages in surveillance without the user’s consent and without clear indications of its activity;

| — | a consideration of the code of practice for online platforms, taking into account its possible implication or role within the context of gender-based cyberviolence, and ensuring that civil society organisations can participate in the evaluation and review of the Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online; adoption of measures obliging IT companies to improve the feedback they provide to users via notifications which would allow them to react quickly and effectively as regards content flagged as illegal; |
| --- | --- |

—

a consideration of the code of practice for online platforms, taking into account its possible implication or role within the context of gender-based cyberviolence, and ensuring that civil society organisations can participate in the evaluation and review of the Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online; adoption of measures obliging IT companies to improve the feedback they provide to users via notifications which would allow them to react quickly and effectively as regards content flagged as illegal;

| — | the recognition of the digital dimension of gender-based violence in national strategies, programmes and action plans as part of a holistic response to all forms of gender-based violence; |
| --- | --- |

—

the recognition of the digital dimension of gender-based violence in national strategies, programmes and action plans as part of a holistic response to all forms of gender-based violence;

| — | the promotion of cooperation between Member States, internet intermediaries and NGOs working on the issue, such as by means of peer learning events or public conferences; |
| --- | --- |

—

the promotion of cooperation between Member States, internet intermediaries and NGOs working on the issue, such as by means of peer learning events or public conferences;

| — | multidisciplinary and stakeholder cooperation, including with technology companies, hosting service providers and competent authorities, on best practices to tackle gender-based violence in line with fundamental rights. |
| --- | --- |

—

multidisciplinary and stakeholder cooperation, including with technology companies, hosting service providers and competent authorities, on best practices to tackle gender-based violence in line with fundamental rights.

Recommendation 4 on protection of, support to and compensation of victims

The Commission and Member States should take the following actions, which should all be victim-centered and have an intersectional approach:

| — | promote mandatory specific and continuous training for practitioners and professionals dealing with victims of gender-based cyberviolence, including law enforcement authorities, social, child and healthcare staff, criminal justice actors and members of the judiciary; Union-wide training programmes could be implemented in the framework of the Justice and the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programmes and together with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and the European Judicial Training Network; in particular, emphasis should be given to secondary victimisation and how to avoid it, to the dual dimension of gender-based violence (online/offline) and to intersectional discrimination, as well as to the assistance provided to victims with special needs; |
| --- | --- |

—

promote mandatory specific and continuous training for practitioners and professionals dealing with victims of gender-based cyberviolence, including law enforcement authorities, social, child and healthcare staff, criminal justice actors and members of the judiciary; Union-wide training programmes could be implemented in the framework of the Justice and the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programmes and together with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and the European Judicial Training Network; in particular, emphasis should be given to secondary victimisation and how to avoid it, to the dual dimension of gender-based violence (online/offline) and to intersectional discrimination, as well as to the assistance provided to victims with special needs;

| — | ensure that all training for practitioners have a gender-responsive approach and that the programme includes actions to ensure that the victim is not re-victimised during criminal proceedings (re-victimisation and stigmatisation); |
| --- | --- |

—

ensure that all training for practitioners have a gender-responsive approach and that the programme includes actions to ensure that the victim is not re-victimised during criminal proceedings (re-victimisation and stigmatisation);

| — | for online platforms that are primarily used for the dissemination of user generated pornographic content, ensure that the platforms take the necessary technical and organisational measures to warrant the accessibility of a qualified notification procedure in the form that individuals may notify the platform with the claim that image material depicting them or purporting to be depicting them is being disseminated without their consent and supply the platform with prima facie evidence of their physical identity and that content notified through this procedure is to be suspended within 48 hours; |
| --- | --- |

—

for online platforms that are primarily used for the dissemination of user generated pornographic content, ensure that the platforms take the necessary technical and organisational measures to warrant the accessibility of a qualified notification procedure in the form that individuals may notify the platform with the claim that image material depicting them or purporting to be depicting them is being disseminated without their consent and supply the platform with prima facie evidence of their physical identity and that content notified through this procedure is to be suspended within 48 hours;

| — | for online platforms that are primarily used for the dissemination of user generated pornographic content, ensure that the platforms take the necessary technical and organisational measures to a warrant professional human-powered content moderation, where content having a high probability of being illegal, such as content depicting to be voyeuristic or enacting rape scenes, is reviewed; |
| --- | --- |

—

for online platforms that are primarily used for the dissemination of user generated pornographic content, ensure that the platforms take the necessary technical and organisational measures to a warrant professional human-powered content moderation, where content having a high probability of being illegal, such as content depicting to be voyeuristic or enacting rape scenes, is reviewed;

| — | set up national contact points in social services and law enforcement agencies with special staff trained on gender-based cyberviolence for victims to report gender-based cyberviolence in a safe environment; contact points should be coordinated through a network; those measures would contribute to addressing underreporting and re-victimisation and create a safer environment for victims of gender-based cyberviolence; |
| --- | --- |

—

set up national contact points in social services and law enforcement agencies with special staff trained on gender-based cyberviolence for victims to report gender-based cyberviolence in a safe environment; contact points should be coordinated through a network; those measures would contribute to addressing underreporting and re-victimisation and create a safer environment for victims of gender-based cyberviolence;

| — | facilitate access to information for victims in a simple and accessible language that the victim can understand, particularly on legal aid and actions as well as support services, and develop specific services for victims of cyberviolence (helplines, shelters, legal and psychological assistance; facilitate reporting by victims, allowing them to obtain protection orders, and develop redress mechanisms with adequate reparation compensation measures; |
| --- | --- |

—

facilitate access to information for victims in a simple and accessible language that the victim can understand, particularly on legal aid and actions as well as support services, and develop specific services for victims of cyberviolence (helplines, shelters, legal and psychological assistance; facilitate reporting by victims, allowing them to obtain protection orders, and develop redress mechanisms with adequate reparation compensation measures;

| — | equip national telephone helplines with the necessary resources and expertise to respond to the digital dimension of gender-based violence; |
| --- | --- |

—

equip national telephone helplines with the necessary resources and expertise to respond to the digital dimension of gender-based violence;

| — | set up a Union-wide telephone helpline as a contact point for victims and ensure that victims can easily and freely use it; develop a directory of support services, including helplines and reporting mechanisms available in individual cases of cyberviolence; |
| --- | --- |

—

set up a Union-wide telephone helpline as a contact point for victims and ensure that victims can easily and freely use it; develop a directory of support services, including helplines and reporting mechanisms available in individual cases of cyberviolence;

| — | ensure that victims of gender-based cyberviolence in Member States have access to specialised support services and to justice, remedies and safe and accessible reporting procedures and mechanisms independently of the filing of a complaint; remove all obstacles that victims who decide to file a complaint may face and create complaint mechanisms that are easily and immediately accessible to victims, including by digital means; |
| --- | --- |

—

ensure that victims of gender-based cyberviolence in Member States have access to specialised support services and to justice, remedies and safe and accessible reporting procedures and mechanisms independently of the filing of a complaint; remove all obstacles that victims who decide to file a complaint may face and create complaint mechanisms that are easily and immediately accessible to victims, including by digital means;

| — | develop cooperation mechanisms between Member States, internet intermediaries and NGOs working on the issue, as well as between relevant actors, such as the judiciary, public prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, local and regional authorities and civil society organisations; |
| --- | --- |

—

develop cooperation mechanisms between Member States, internet intermediaries and NGOs working on the issue, as well as between relevant actors, such as the judiciary, public prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, local and regional authorities and civil society organisations;

| — | support civil society organisations, particularly those that provide victim support services, including by providing financial support); |
| --- | --- |

—

support civil society organisations, particularly those that provide victim support services, including by providing financial support);

| — | promote the ethical development and use of technological solutions that support victims and that help identify perpetrators, while ensuring full compliance with fundamental rights. |
| --- | --- |

—

promote the ethical development and use of technological solutions that support victims and that help identify perpetrators, while ensuring full compliance with fundamental rights.

Commission should develop guiding principles for law enforcement officials when dealing with victims who report gender-based cyberviolence, which should equip them with the necessary soft skills to carefully listen, understand and respect all victims of gender-based cyberviolence; the guiding principles should have a gender-responsive approach.

Member States should develop specialised protection and support services which are accessible free of charge to all victims, including emergency and long-term support, such as psychological, medical, legal, practical and socio-economic support, taking into account the specific needs of the victims, and give particular attention to victims belonging to groups particularly exposed or in need. The Commission should support Member States in that regard.

Recommendation 5 on prosecution and criminalisation of gender-based cyberviolence

Based on the definition referred to in Recommendation 2 and considering that criminalisation of gender-based cyberviolence could have a deterrent effect on perpetrators, the criminalisation of gender-based cyberviolence should take into account the following criteria:

| — | the forms of gender-based cyberviolence to be criminalised by Member States (to cover also earlier phases of cybercrime — incitement, aiding, abetting and attempt); |
| --- | --- |

—

the forms of gender-based cyberviolence to be criminalised by Member States (to cover also earlier phases of cybercrime — incitement, aiding, abetting and attempt);

| — | minimum and maximum penalties (prison and fines); |
| --- | --- |

—

minimum and maximum penalties (prison and fines);

| — | cross-border investigation and prosecution; |
| --- | --- |

—

cross-border investigation and prosecution;

| — | specific provisions indicating the guidelines for investigation and prosecution mainly addressed to law enforcement and prosecutors, which should also contain specific indications for law enforcement on evidence collection; |
| --- | --- |

—

specific provisions indicating the guidelines for investigation and prosecution mainly addressed to law enforcement and prosecutors, which should also contain specific indications for law enforcement on evidence collection;

| — | effective cooperation between law enforcement authorities and tech companies and service providers, especially with regards to the identification of perpetrators and gathering of evidence, which should be in full compliance with fundamental rights and freedoms and data protection rules; |
| --- | --- |

—

effective cooperation between law enforcement authorities and tech companies and service providers, especially with regards to the identification of perpetrators and gathering of evidence, which should be in full compliance with fundamental rights and freedoms and data protection rules;

| — | any evidence should be gathered in a way that does not cause secondary victimisation or re-traumatisation of the victim; |
| --- | --- |

—

any evidence should be gathered in a way that does not cause secondary victimisation or re-traumatisation of the victim;

| — | aggravating circumstances, depending on the profile of the women, girl and LGBTIQ victims, e.g. exploiting specific characteristics or vulnerabilities of women, girls and LGBTIQ people online; |
| --- | --- |

—

aggravating circumstances, depending on the profile of the women, girl and LGBTIQ victims, e.g. exploiting specific characteristics or vulnerabilities of women, girls and LGBTIQ people online;

| — | risk assessments should include and consider behavioural patterns and gendered aspects of the incident such as stereotypes, discrimination, sexualised threats and intimidation; that information should be used to determine follow-up actions and to enhance the collection of data related to the different manifestations of gender-based cyberviolence; |
| --- | --- |

—

risk assessments should include and consider behavioural patterns and gendered aspects of the incident such as stereotypes, discrimination, sexualised threats and intimidation; that information should be used to determine follow-up actions and to enhance the collection of data related to the different manifestations of gender-based cyberviolence;

| — | providing evidence should not represent a burden for victims or contribute to further victimisation. |
| --- | --- |

—

providing evidence should not represent a burden for victims or contribute to further victimisation.

All the actions should be victim-centred and have an intersectional approach

Recommendation 6 on data collection and reporting

The Commission and Member States should regularly collect and publish comprehensive disaggregated and comparable data on the different forms of gender-based cyberviolence, not only on the basis of the law enforcement reports or civil society organisations but also on the basis of victims’ experiences. Those data could be followed by comprehensive studies. Member States’ data on gender-based cyberviolence should be collected and made available through the statistics databases of the EIGE, the FRA and Eurostat, and Member States should ensure that they make the best use of the EIGE’s capacity and resources. The FRA should conduct new extensive Union-wide research on all forms of gender-based cyberviolence, which should be based on the most recent Union data in order to provide an accurate response.

The Commission should submit a report on a regular basis to the European Parliament and to the Council assessing to what extent Member States have taken measures following this recommendation. The Commission should also improve gender-disaggregated data on the prevalence and harms of gender-based cyberviolence at Union level.

The Commission and the Member States should develop indicators to measure the effectiveness of their interventions to address gender-based cyberviolence.

Additional recommendations could include:

| — | the production of statistics on the prevalence and forms of cyberviolence, fostering at the same time the uniformity and comparability of data gathered by Member States, |
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the production of statistics on the prevalence and forms of cyberviolence, fostering at the same time the uniformity and comparability of data gathered by Member States,

| — | a Union-wide data collection programme, |
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a Union-wide data collection programme,

| — | the gathering of data on a regular basis for knowledge to keep up with the constant evolution in tools and technologies that can be used to perpetrate cyberviolence, |
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the gathering of data on a regular basis for knowledge to keep up with the constant evolution in tools and technologies that can be used to perpetrate cyberviolence,

| — | a recommendation to make use of the capacity and expertise of the EIGE, Eurostat, the FRA, Europol, Eurojust and ENISA. |
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a recommendation to make use of the capacity and expertise of the EIGE, Eurostat, the FRA, Europol, Eurojust and ENISA.

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Wednesday 15 December 2021

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/23 |
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30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/23

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P9_TA(2021)0500

Equality between women and men in the European Union in 2018-2020

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on equality between women and men in the European Union in 2018-2020 (2021/2020(INI))

(2022/C 251/02)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 6, 8, 10, 83, 153 and 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, |
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having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 6, 8, 10, 83, 153 and 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, |
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having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

| — | having regard to the EU directives from 1975 onwards on various aspects of equal treatment for women and men, namely Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security (1), Council Directive 86/613/EEC of 11 December 1986 on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a self-employed capacity, and on the protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood (2), Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (3), Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services (4), Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (5), Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC (6), and Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employment capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC (7), |
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having regard to the EU directives from 1975 onwards on various aspects of equal treatment for women and men, namely Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security (1), Council Directive 86/613/EEC of 11 December 1986 on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a self-employed capacity, and on the protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood (2), Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (3), Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services (4), Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (5), Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC (6), and Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employment capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC (7),

| — | having regard to the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others of 1949, |
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having regard to the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others of 1949,

| — | having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular goal 5 and its targets and indicators, |
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having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular goal 5 and its targets and indicators,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), |
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having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention),

| — | having regard to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women on 15 September 1995 and to the subsequent outcome documents adopted at the UN Beijing+5, + 10, + 15 and + 20 special sessions, |
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having regard to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women on 15 September 1995 and to the subsequent outcome documents adopted at the UN Beijing+5, + 10, + 15 and + 20 special sessions,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979, |
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having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

| — | having regard to Convention No 100 of the International Labour Organization concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, |
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having regard to Convention No 100 of the International Labour Organization concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value,

| — | having regard to Convention No 156 of the International Labour Organization concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities, |
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having regard to Convention No 156 of the International Labour Organization concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0152), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0152),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0698), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0698),

| — | having regard to the Commission staff working document of 5 March 2021 entitled ‘2021 report on gender equality in the EU’ (SWD(2021)0055), |
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having regard to the Commission staff working document of 5 March 2021 entitled ‘2021 report on gender equality in the EU’ (SWD(2021)0055),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 March 2021 entitled ‘EU Strategy on the rights of the child (2020-2025)’ (COM(2021)0142), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 24 March 2021 entitled ‘EU Strategy on the rights of the child (2020-2025)’ (COM(2021)0142),

| — | having regard to the study entitled ‘The gendered impact of the COVID-19 crisis and post-crisis period’, published by the Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs of its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 30 September 2020, |
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having regard to the study entitled ‘The gendered impact of the COVID-19 crisis and post-crisis period’, published by the Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs of its Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 30 September 2020,

| — | having regard to the 2019 and 2020 Gender Equality Index of the European Institute for Gender Equality, |
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having regard to the 2019 and 2020 Gender Equality Index of the European Institute for Gender Equality,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2015 on the EU Strategy for equality between women and men post 2015 (8), |
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having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2015 on the EU Strategy for equality between women and men post 2015 (8),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 14 June 2017 on the need for an EU strategy to end and prevent the gender pension gap (9), |
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having regard to its resolution of 14 June 2017 on the need for an EU strategy to end and prevent the gender pension gap (9),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the need for a dedicated Council configuration on gender equality (10), |
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having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the need for a dedicated Council configuration on gender equality (10),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the EU Strategy for Gender Equality (11), |
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having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the EU Strategy for Gender Equality (11),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the gender perspective in the COVID-19 crisis and post-crisis period (12), |
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having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the gender perspective in the COVID-19 crisis and post-crisis period (12),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 February 2021 on challenges ahead for women’s rights in Europe: more than 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (13), |
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having regard to its resolution of 11 February 2021 on challenges ahead for women’s rights in Europe: more than 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (13),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the situation of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the EU, in the frame of women’s health (14), |
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having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the situation of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the EU, in the frame of women’s health (14),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (A9-0315/2021), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (A9-0315/2021),

| A. | whereas women’s rights are human rights and thus universal and indivisible, as enshrined in the Treaty on European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights; whereas the struggle for gender equality and the promotion and protection of women’s rights is a truly collective responsibility that requires faster progress and efforts by EU institution and Member States; whereas the EU and its Member States must aim to combat inequalities and discrimination based on gender and sex, promote gender equality, and guarantee equal rights and treatment for women and men in all their diversity, as well as ensure that they have equal power and opportunities to shape society and their own lives; whereas according to the European Institute for Gender Equality, the EU is at least 60 years away from achieving complete gender equality; whereas gender equality in the EU has not yet been achieved and progress in this direction remains slow, stagnating or even regressing in certain regions and countries; whereas the EU’s score in the Gender Equality Index has increased by only 4.1 points since 2010 and 0.5 points since 2017 (15); whereas Member States achieved an average score of 67.9 out of 100 in 2020; |
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A.

whereas women’s rights are human rights and thus universal and indivisible, as enshrined in the Treaty on European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights; whereas the struggle for gender equality and the promotion and protection of women’s rights is a truly collective responsibility that requires faster progress and efforts by EU institution and Member States; whereas the EU and its Member States must aim to combat inequalities and discrimination based on gender and sex, promote gender equality, and guarantee equal rights and treatment for women and men in all their diversity, as well as ensure that they have equal power and opportunities to shape society and their own lives; whereas according to the European Institute for Gender Equality, the EU is at least 60 years away from achieving complete gender equality; whereas gender equality in the EU has not yet been achieved and progress in this direction remains slow, stagnating or even regressing in certain regions and countries; whereas the EU’s score in the Gender Equality Index has increased by only 4.1 points since 2010 and 0.5 points since 2017 (15); whereas Member States achieved an average score of 67.9 out of 100 in 2020;

| B. | whereas women must have the same opportunities as men for reaching economic independence; whereas although female employment rates have risen, gender inequality on the labour market remains a worrying reality and a significant challenge, while labour market trends in the light of the pandemic show a more significant impact on women than men (16); whereas the employment rate for men of working age in the EU-27 was 79 % in 2019, exceeding that of women by 11,7 percentage points; whereas with regard to labour market participation, 8 % of men in the EU are working part-time compared to 31 % of women, revealing persistent inequalities; whereas the gender gap in the full-time equivalent employment rate has increased in eight Member States since 2010; whereas too little progress has been made in challenging the sectoral and occupational gender segregation in the labour market; whereas the employment gap is particularly high for women of poor socioeconomic status, such as single mothers, female caregivers, women with disabilities, migrant and refugee women, women from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds and from religious minorities, women with low educational achievements, LGBTIQ+ women, as well as young and elderly women; |
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B.

whereas women must have the same opportunities as men for reaching economic independence; whereas although female employment rates have risen, gender inequality on the labour market remains a worrying reality and a significant challenge, while labour market trends in the light of the pandemic show a more significant impact on women than men (16); whereas the employment rate for men of working age in the EU-27 was 79 % in 2019, exceeding that of women by 11,7 percentage points; whereas with regard to labour market participation, 8 % of men in the EU are working part-time compared to 31 % of women, revealing persistent inequalities; whereas the gender gap in the full-time equivalent employment rate has increased in eight Member States since 2010; whereas too little progress has been made in challenging the sectoral and occupational gender segregation in the labour market; whereas the employment gap is particularly high for women of poor socioeconomic status, such as single mothers, female caregivers, women with disabilities, migrant and refugee women, women from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds and from religious minorities, women with low educational achievements, LGBTIQ+ women, as well as young and elderly women;

| C. | whereas women in the EU are paid 14 % less per hour than men on average and whereas the gender pay gap varies from between 3,3 % to 21,7 % across the Member States; whereas despite the fact that the principle of equal pay for men and women has been part of the EU acquis since 1957 and a significant amount of national legislation, and in spite of the action taken and resources spent trying to reduce these disparities, progress has been extremely slow and wage inequality has even got worse in several Member States; whereas far more women than men work part-time (8,9 million vs 560 000) owing to their care responsibilities; whereas the increasing long-term care needs and lack of care services exacerbate gender inequalities within families and in employment; whereas Eurostat figures show that unemployment among women grew from 6,9 % in April to 7,9 % in August 2020, while unemployment among men grew from 6,5 % to 7,1 % over the same period; |
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C.

whereas women in the EU are paid 14 % less per hour than men on average and whereas the gender pay gap varies from between 3,3 % to 21,7 % across the Member States; whereas despite the fact that the principle of equal pay for men and women has been part of the EU acquis since 1957 and a significant amount of national legislation, and in spite of the action taken and resources spent trying to reduce these disparities, progress has been extremely slow and wage inequality has even got worse in several Member States; whereas far more women than men work part-time (8,9 million vs 560 000) owing to their care responsibilities; whereas the increasing long-term care needs and lack of care services exacerbate gender inequalities within families and in employment; whereas Eurostat figures show that unemployment among women grew from 6,9 % in April to 7,9 % in August 2020, while unemployment among men grew from 6,5 % to 7,1 % over the same period;

| D. | whereas women face intersectional inequalities and discrimination, including on account of their race, ethnic or social origin, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, religion or belief, residence status and disability, and whereas efforts must be made to address all forms of discrimination to achieve gender equality for all women; whereas until now EU policies have not deployed an intersectional approach and have focused only on the individual dimension of discrimination, which downplays its institutional, structural and historical dimensions; whereas applying an intersectional analysis not only allows us to understand structural barriers, but also offers evidence to create benchmarks and set a path towards strategic and effective policies against systemic discrimination, exclusion and social inequalities; |
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D.

whereas women face intersectional inequalities and discrimination, including on account of their race, ethnic or social origin, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, religion or belief, residence status and disability, and whereas efforts must be made to address all forms of discrimination to achieve gender equality for all women; whereas until now EU policies have not deployed an intersectional approach and have focused only on the individual dimension of discrimination, which downplays its institutional, structural and historical dimensions; whereas applying an intersectional analysis not only allows us to understand structural barriers, but also offers evidence to create benchmarks and set a path towards strategic and effective policies against systemic discrimination, exclusion and social inequalities;

| E. | whereas the Commission’s 2021 report on gender equality in the EU concludes that the COVID-19 pandemic has greatly affected women’s lives and exacerbated existing gender inequalities in almost every respect; whereas at the forefront of efforts to combat the pandemic, around 70 % of workers in the social and health sectors are women, such as nurses, doctors or cleaning assistants; whereas the manifold impacts of the pandemic on women range from an increase in gender-based and domestic violence and harassment to a greater burden of unpaid care and domestic responsibilities, with women continuing to carry out the majority of household and family tasks, even more so when teleworking, unemployed or in part-time work; whereas in addition, women face economic disadvantages on the labour market, particularly healthcare workers, caregivers and workers in other female-dominated and precarious sectors, and restricted access to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR); whereas the economic impact of the pandemic threatens to reverse the hard-won progress with regard to women’s economic independence over the past decade; whereas women’s employment has fallen more sharply during the pandemic than it did during the 2008 recession (17), with significant consequences for women and their families and the wider economy, including reduced opportunities, freedoms, rights and well-being; whereas the Global Gender Gap report 2021 states that the time it will take to close the gender gap has increased by a generation from 99,5 years to 135,6 years as a result of the pandemic (18); |
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E.

whereas the Commission’s 2021 report on gender equality in the EU concludes that the COVID-19 pandemic has greatly affected women’s lives and exacerbated existing gender inequalities in almost every respect; whereas at the forefront of efforts to combat the pandemic, around 70 % of workers in the social and health sectors are women, such as nurses, doctors or cleaning assistants; whereas the manifold impacts of the pandemic on women range from an increase in gender-based and domestic violence and harassment to a greater burden of unpaid care and domestic responsibilities, with women continuing to carry out the majority of household and family tasks, even more so when teleworking, unemployed or in part-time work; whereas in addition, women face economic disadvantages on the labour market, particularly healthcare workers, caregivers and workers in other female-dominated and precarious sectors, and restricted access to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR); whereas the economic impact of the pandemic threatens to reverse the hard-won progress with regard to women’s economic independence over the past decade; whereas women’s employment has fallen more sharply during the pandemic than it did during the 2008 recession (17), with significant consequences for women and their families and the wider economy, including reduced opportunities, freedoms, rights and well-being; whereas the Global Gender Gap report 2021 states that the time it will take to close the gender gap has increased by a generation from 99,5 years to 135,6 years as a result of the pandemic (18);

| F. | whereas there has been an unprecedented focus on gender equality in sport over the last decade, but not always for the best reasons and purposes, especially as regards women’s rights in practice; |
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F.

whereas there has been an unprecedented focus on gender equality in sport over the last decade, but not always for the best reasons and purposes, especially as regards women’s rights in practice;

| G. | whereas the European Institute for Gender Equality defines gender-based violence against women as any form of violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately; whereas violence against women in all its forms (physical, sexual, psychological, economic or cyber-violence) is a violation of human rights, an extreme form of discrimination against women and one of the biggest obstacles to achieving gender equality; whereas gender-based violence is rooted in the unequal distribution of power between genders, patriarchal structures and gender stereotypes, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and can differ in appearance, intensity and form; whereas a society free from gender-based violence must be acknowledged as an absolute prerequisite for gender equality; |
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G.

whereas the European Institute for Gender Equality defines gender-based violence against women as any form of violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately; whereas violence against women in all its forms (physical, sexual, psychological, economic or cyber-violence) is a violation of human rights, an extreme form of discrimination against women and one of the biggest obstacles to achieving gender equality; whereas gender-based violence is rooted in the unequal distribution of power between genders, patriarchal structures and gender stereotypes, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and can differ in appearance, intensity and form; whereas a society free from gender-based violence must be acknowledged as an absolute prerequisite for gender equality;

| H. | whereas 31 % of women in Europe have experienced physical and/or sexual violence and whereas countless women experience sexual assault and harassment in intimate partnerships and public life (19); whereas reports and figures from several Member States show a worrying increase in gender-based violence during the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas according to the World Health Organization, some Member States have reported a 60 % increase in emergency calls from women subjected to violence by their intimate partner during the pandemic (20); whereas according to a report by Europol, child sexual abuse online has increased dramatically in the EU (21); whereas the impact of confinement on social, economic, psychological and democratic life has been disproportionally severe on people and women in vulnerable situations, with particular regard to exposure to violence, increased economic dependence and inequalities in the workplace and between caring roles; whereas in addition, lockdown measures made it more difficult for the victims of intimate partner violence to seek help as they were often confined with their abusers and had limited access to support services; whereas insufficient or inadequate support structures and resources have exacerbated an existing ‘shadow’ pandemic; |
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H.

whereas 31 % of women in Europe have experienced physical and/or sexual violence and whereas countless women experience sexual assault and harassment in intimate partnerships and public life (19); whereas reports and figures from several Member States show a worrying increase in gender-based violence during the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas according to the World Health Organization, some Member States have reported a 60 % increase in emergency calls from women subjected to violence by their intimate partner during the pandemic (20); whereas according to a report by Europol, child sexual abuse online has increased dramatically in the EU (21); whereas the impact of confinement on social, economic, psychological and democratic life has been disproportionally severe on people and women in vulnerable situations, with particular regard to exposure to violence, increased economic dependence and inequalities in the workplace and between caring roles; whereas in addition, lockdown measures made it more difficult for the victims of intimate partner violence to seek help as they were often confined with their abusers and had limited access to support services; whereas insufficient or inadequate support structures and resources have exacerbated an existing ‘shadow’ pandemic;

| I. | whereas there are worrying anti-gender and anti-feminist movements attacking women’s rights across Europe, challenging achievements and progress and thus undermining democratic values; where the backlash against gender equality policies and women’s rights is becoming a matter of grave concern; |
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I.

whereas there are worrying anti-gender and anti-feminist movements attacking women’s rights across Europe, challenging achievements and progress and thus undermining democratic values; where the backlash against gender equality policies and women’s rights is becoming a matter of grave concern;

| J. | whereas trafficking in human beings is a highly gendered phenomenon with nearly three quarters of the reported victims in the EU being women and girls, who were predominantly trafficked for sexual exploitation; whereas trafficking in human beings is a growing part of organised crime and a human rights violation; whereas 78 % of all children trafficked are girls and 68 % of adults trafficked are women; |
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J.

whereas trafficking in human beings is a highly gendered phenomenon with nearly three quarters of the reported victims in the EU being women and girls, who were predominantly trafficked for sexual exploitation; whereas trafficking in human beings is a growing part of organised crime and a human rights violation; whereas 78 % of all children trafficked are girls and 68 % of adults trafficked are women;

| K. | whereas access to SRHR, including sexuality and relationships education, family planning, contraceptive methods and safe and legal abortion, is essential to achieving gender equality and eliminating gender-based violence; whereas the autonomy and ability of girls and women to make free and independent decisions about their bodies and lives is a precondition for their economic independence and thus for gender equality and the elimination of gender-based violence; whereas it is unacceptable that several Member States are currently attempting to limit access to SRHR through highly restrictive laws, which lead to gender discrimination and have negative consequences for women’s health; |
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K.

whereas access to SRHR, including sexuality and relationships education, family planning, contraceptive methods and safe and legal abortion, is essential to achieving gender equality and eliminating gender-based violence; whereas the autonomy and ability of girls and women to make free and independent decisions about their bodies and lives is a precondition for their economic independence and thus for gender equality and the elimination of gender-based violence; whereas it is unacceptable that several Member States are currently attempting to limit access to SRHR through highly restrictive laws, which lead to gender discrimination and have negative consequences for women’s health;

| L. | whereas women in the EU are more disproportionally affected by poverty or the risk of social exclusion than men, notably women who experience intersectional forms of discrimination owing to structural factors, gender norms and stereotypes; whereas since 2010 the gender gap in earnings has increased in 17 Member States, while the gender gap in income has gone up in 19 Member States, leading to an overall increase in gender inequality in earnings and income in the EU (22); whereas 40,3 % of single-parent households in the EU were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2019 (23); whereas women are at greater risk of poverty and job insecurity, with those at risk often working in low-paid jobs with wages insufficient to overcome the poverty line and precarious working conditions; |
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L.

whereas women in the EU are more disproportionally affected by poverty or the risk of social exclusion than men, notably women who experience intersectional forms of discrimination owing to structural factors, gender norms and stereotypes; whereas since 2010 the gender gap in earnings has increased in 17 Member States, while the gender gap in income has gone up in 19 Member States, leading to an overall increase in gender inequality in earnings and income in the EU (22); whereas 40,3 % of single-parent households in the EU were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2019 (23); whereas women are at greater risk of poverty and job insecurity, with those at risk often working in low-paid jobs with wages insufficient to overcome the poverty line and precarious working conditions;

| M. | whereas it is important to guarantee the right to equal pay for equal work or work of equal value, as enshrined in the Treaties; |
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M.

whereas it is important to guarantee the right to equal pay for equal work or work of equal value, as enshrined in the Treaties;

| N. | whereas the EU gender pay gap is 14,1 %, with variations between the Member States; whereas this gender pay gap has a number of implications, not least a 29,5 % (24) difference in corresponding pension entitlements, leading to a gender pension gap that places older women at greater risk of poverty and social exclusion; whereas this is the result of career and employment gaps that have built up through care responsibilities and/or part-time work undertaken by women over time, and the ensuing repercussions for access to financial resources such as benefits and pension payments; whereas the right to equal pay for equal work or work of equal value is not always guaranteed and remains one of the biggest challenges to be met in efforts to combat pay discrimination (25); whereas gender-equal sharing of parental leave is important for tackling the gender pay gap; whereas although essential and of high socioeconomic value, work in highly female-dominated sectors such as care, cleaning, retail and education is often less valued and lower paid than work in male-dominated sectors; whereas this fact highlights the urgent need to reassess the adequacy of wages in female-dominated sectors; |
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N.

whereas the EU gender pay gap is 14,1 %, with variations between the Member States; whereas this gender pay gap has a number of implications, not least a 29,5 % (24) difference in corresponding pension entitlements, leading to a gender pension gap that places older women at greater risk of poverty and social exclusion; whereas this is the result of career and employment gaps that have built up through care responsibilities and/or part-time work undertaken by women over time, and the ensuing repercussions for access to financial resources such as benefits and pension payments; whereas the right to equal pay for equal work or work of equal value is not always guaranteed and remains one of the biggest challenges to be met in efforts to combat pay discrimination (25); whereas gender-equal sharing of parental leave is important for tackling the gender pay gap; whereas although essential and of high socioeconomic value, work in highly female-dominated sectors such as care, cleaning, retail and education is often less valued and lower paid than work in male-dominated sectors; whereas this fact highlights the urgent need to reassess the adequacy of wages in female-dominated sectors;

| O. | whereas 20,6 % of women with disabilities are in full-time employment in the EU, compared with 28,5 % of men with disabilities; whereas figures show that on average, 29,5 % of women with disabilities in the EU are at risk of falling victim to poverty and social exclusion, compared with 27,5 % of their male counterparts; |
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O.

whereas 20,6 % of women with disabilities are in full-time employment in the EU, compared with 28,5 % of men with disabilities; whereas figures show that on average, 29,5 % of women with disabilities in the EU are at risk of falling victim to poverty and social exclusion, compared with 27,5 % of their male counterparts;

| P. | whereas gender stereotypes still influence the division of labour at home, in education, in the workplace and in society; whereas unpaid care and domestic work, which is mostly carried out by women, imposes a disproportionate burden on women, who play a vital role in this respect; whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the shocking state of European care homes and the sector as a whole, which mostly employs women; whereas 80 % of care in the EU is provided by informal caregivers, 75 % of whom are women (26); whereas prior to the outbreak of COVID-19, women in the EU spent an average of 13 hours more than men on unpaid care and housework every week; whereas the unequal sharing of care responsibilities in the Member States is exacerbated by a limited or total lack of access to adequate and accessible care facilities, including public care facilities for children and older people, which leads to periods of absence from the labour market and widens the gender pay and pension gaps; whereas 7,7 million women aged between 20 and 64 were away from the EU labour market in 2019 because they were looking after children or other people with care needs, compared with 450 000 men; whereas investment in universal services, including care services, can alleviate the disproportionate care responsibilities placed on women and improve their ability to participate freely in the labour market; whereas everyone, regardless of gender, has the right to work and to balance their professional and private lives; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas gender stereotypes still influence the division of labour at home, in education, in the workplace and in society; whereas unpaid care and domestic work, which is mostly carried out by women, imposes a disproportionate burden on women, who play a vital role in this respect; whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the shocking state of European care homes and the sector as a whole, which mostly employs women; whereas 80 % of care in the EU is provided by informal caregivers, 75 % of whom are women (26); whereas prior to the outbreak of COVID-19, women in the EU spent an average of 13 hours more than men on unpaid care and housework every week; whereas the unequal sharing of care responsibilities in the Member States is exacerbated by a limited or total lack of access to adequate and accessible care facilities, including public care facilities for children and older people, which leads to periods of absence from the labour market and widens the gender pay and pension gaps; whereas 7,7 million women aged between 20 and 64 were away from the EU labour market in 2019 because they were looking after children or other people with care needs, compared with 450 000 men; whereas investment in universal services, including care services, can alleviate the disproportionate care responsibilities placed on women and improve their ability to participate freely in the labour market; whereas everyone, regardless of gender, has the right to work and to balance their professional and private lives;

| Q. | whereas measures to achieve a work-life balance are important in ensuring an equal division of caregiving responsibilities between women and men and addressing income and employment disparities; whereas the achievement of a work-life balance depends on the availability and accessibility of high-quality and affordable care services; whereas all maternity benefits should be ensured and upheld, with full implementation of the Work-Life Balance Directive (27) by the Member States; whereas public policies are required for the protection and promotion of nursing and breastfeeding, without prejudice to women’s choices; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas measures to achieve a work-life balance are important in ensuring an equal division of caregiving responsibilities between women and men and addressing income and employment disparities; whereas the achievement of a work-life balance depends on the availability and accessibility of high-quality and affordable care services; whereas all maternity benefits should be ensured and upheld, with full implementation of the Work-Life Balance Directive (27) by the Member States; whereas public policies are required for the protection and promotion of nursing and breastfeeding, without prejudice to women’s choices;

| R. | whereas the Commission adopted its Gender Equality Strategy for 2020-2025 on 5 March 2020, outlining an ambitious framework on how to advance gender equality in the EU; whereas policies must contribute more to advance gender equality; whereas women are disproportionately affected by rising unemployment, increased precariousness, low pay and budget cuts including in public services, notably health and education; whereas Parliament has called on the Commission to establish a concrete roadmap with timeframes, objectives, a yearly review and monitoring mechanism, clear and measurable indicators of success, and additional targeted actions; whereas through its policies, programmes and relations with the Member States, including close cooperation on the national recovery funds, the EU should assess the Member States carefully to ensure they are taking proper account of the gender dimension of the COVID-19 pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas the Commission adopted its Gender Equality Strategy for 2020-2025 on 5 March 2020, outlining an ambitious framework on how to advance gender equality in the EU; whereas policies must contribute more to advance gender equality; whereas women are disproportionately affected by rising unemployment, increased precariousness, low pay and budget cuts including in public services, notably health and education; whereas Parliament has called on the Commission to establish a concrete roadmap with timeframes, objectives, a yearly review and monitoring mechanism, clear and measurable indicators of success, and additional targeted actions; whereas through its policies, programmes and relations with the Member States, including close cooperation on the national recovery funds, the EU should assess the Member States carefully to ensure they are taking proper account of the gender dimension of the COVID-19 pandemic;

| S. | whereas the presence of women in both chambers of national parliaments in the EU has increased from 24 % in 2010 to 32 % in 2020; whereas the gender balance has improved among cabinet ministers in national governments, from 26 % in 2010 to 32 % in 2020; whereas there are significant differences between the Member States however, with only seven having achieved gender parity or a gender balance in their cabinets: whereas the pace of change continues to be extremely slow at regional and local levels, with only 29 % of positions represented by women in 2019 and Hungary, Slovakia and Romania having more than 80 % male representation in regional assemblies; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas the presence of women in both chambers of national parliaments in the EU has increased from 24 % in 2010 to 32 % in 2020; whereas the gender balance has improved among cabinet ministers in national governments, from 26 % in 2010 to 32 % in 2020; whereas there are significant differences between the Member States however, with only seven having achieved gender parity or a gender balance in their cabinets: whereas the pace of change continues to be extremely slow at regional and local levels, with only 29 % of positions represented by women in 2019 and Hungary, Slovakia and Romania having more than 80 % male representation in regional assemblies;

| T. | whereas the right to equal pay for equal work of equal value is not guaranteed in many circumstances, even where enshrined in law; whereas the root causes of such discrimination need to be tackled, whether by protecting and enhancing labour rights or by stepping up business monitoring, especially by national labour inspectorates; whereas collective bargaining is key to reversing and overcoming gender inequalities; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas the right to equal pay for equal work of equal value is not guaranteed in many circumstances, even where enshrined in law; whereas the root causes of such discrimination need to be tackled, whether by protecting and enhancing labour rights or by stepping up business monitoring, especially by national labour inspectorates; whereas collective bargaining is key to reversing and overcoming gender inequalities;

| U. | whereas gender equality is closely linked to the green and digital transitions and whereas the inclusion of women in decision-making is a prerequisite for sustainable development and the efficient management of both the green and digital transitions in order to achieve fair and just transitions that leave no one behind; whereas all climate action and digital policies must include a gender and intersectional perspective; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas gender equality is closely linked to the green and digital transitions and whereas the inclusion of women in decision-making is a prerequisite for sustainable development and the efficient management of both the green and digital transitions in order to achieve fair and just transitions that leave no one behind; whereas all climate action and digital policies must include a gender and intersectional perspective;

| V. | whereas the effects on families of involving men and of fatherhood show that caring men are important to the optimal development of children and can improve the work-life balance and help redress gender inequality in relationships; whereas male engagement can help to prevent violence in families and contribute to more equitable societies; |
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V.

whereas the effects on families of involving men and of fatherhood show that caring men are important to the optimal development of children and can improve the work-life balance and help redress gender inequality in relationships; whereas male engagement can help to prevent violence in families and contribute to more equitable societies;

| W. | whereas the persistence of gender stereotypes and expectations about the roles of men and boys can make them reluctant to show positive emotions and make them internalise negative emotions such as sadness and anxiety, which can result in men and boys displaying greater levels of aggression and anger than women; whereas this can make men and boys more likely to perpetrate violence such as gender-based violence; |
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W.

whereas the persistence of gender stereotypes and expectations about the roles of men and boys can make them reluctant to show positive emotions and make them internalise negative emotions such as sadness and anxiety, which can result in men and boys displaying greater levels of aggression and anger than women; whereas this can make men and boys more likely to perpetrate violence such as gender-based violence;

| X. | whereas gender imbalance is a persistent phenomenon in central banks, which are cornerstones of economic decision-making that shape social, political and economic realities; whereas all central banks of the Member States are currently governed by a man and whereas last year women occupied only a quarter (24,6 %) of the positions on key decision-making bodies of the EU’s national central banks; |
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X.

whereas gender imbalance is a persistent phenomenon in central banks, which are cornerstones of economic decision-making that shape social, political and economic realities; whereas all central banks of the Member States are currently governed by a man and whereas last year women occupied only a quarter (24,6 %) of the positions on key decision-making bodies of the EU’s national central banks;

| Y. | whereas the European Institute for Gender Equality has concluded that the performance of the Member States in gender mainstreaming has been getting worse since 2012; whereas despite slightly more ambitious commitments by governments to mainstream gender into public administrations, the availability of gender mainstreaming structures and the use of gender mainstreaming tools has waned; |
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Y.

whereas the European Institute for Gender Equality has concluded that the performance of the Member States in gender mainstreaming has been getting worse since 2012; whereas despite slightly more ambitious commitments by governments to mainstream gender into public administrations, the availability of gender mainstreaming structures and the use of gender mainstreaming tools has waned;

A gender-equal economy

| 1. | Stresses that respect for the right to work, as well as equal pay and equal treatment, is an essential precondition for women’s equal rights, economic independence and career fulfilment; underlines that equal opportunities and higher labour market participation of women increase economic prosperity in Europe; believes that combating gender inequalities must be a core consideration at the workplace; recalls that women are overrepresented among low and minimum wage earners, in part-time work and in precarious working conditions; recognises the equal right of women and men to fair remuneration for a decent standard of living for themselves and their families; insists, therefore, that the fight against precarious employment should be improved so that all workers receive fair remuneration sufficient for a decent standard of living for themselves and their families, through statutory minimum-wage-setting mechanisms or collective agreements in accordance with the principle that every permanent job must entail an effective employment relationship with recognition and enhancement of rights at the workplace; calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote policies that aim to eliminate precarious work and involuntary part-time work in order to improve the situation for women in the labour market; encourages the Member States, in collaboration with social partners, to tackle inequalities between men and women through policies that enhance the value of work, wages, labour conditions, and the living conditions of all workers and their families; |
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1.

| 2. | Points to the need to pay close attention to the situation and rights of professional and non-professional top-level athletes representing their countries in international and European competitions both during and after their sporting careers; urges the Member States to ensure that children and young people are fully entitled to participate in sport and to combat the widening social divide regarding access to sport; |
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2.

| 3. | Is concerned about the results of the 2020 and 2021 Gender Equality Index; stresses that more than a third of the Member States registered fewer than 60 points in 2018 (28); regrets the slow progress towards achieving equality and the fact that not all Member States make it a priority of their policymaking; regrets the fact that Slovenia has gone backwards on gender equality, with its score having fallen by 0,1 points in 2019; calls on the Member States to take practical measures to ensure that women have equal access to the labour market, employment and working conditions, including work with equal rights and equal pay as well as fair remuneration, notably in female-dominated sectors; acknowledges the role of social partners and collective bargaining in reversing and overcoming inequality in promoting gender equality and addressing pay discrimination against women in all their diversity and calls for de jure and de facto compliance with the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Welcomes the Commission’s proposal on binding pay transparency measures as an important initiative to combat and apply the principle of equal pay for equal work and work of equal value, but stresses that pay transparency alone will not address the deep-rooted gender inequalities behind it; calls on the Member States to define clear goals to address the gender pay and pension gaps; highlights the need to incorporate within this action plan an intersectional perspective and the diverse realities and experiences of discrimination faced by women from particular groups; |
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4.

| 5. | Stresses the importance for Member States to impose firm measures, including sanctions, when businesses fail to comply with labour legislation against gender discrimination and gender bias; highlights the need to ensure conditionality in the allocation of EU funds to companies that do not ensure workers’ rights, in particular by discriminating against women, in contravention of the legislation; calls on the Commission and the Council to ensure that all budget appropriations under the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework respect the principle of equality between men and women and promote gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting in all EU policies; calls for the Gender Equality Index to be incorporated within the Social Scoreboard and for the provision of gender-disaggregated data on the existing indicators in order to better address country-specific challenges; calls for support for actions for women’s economic independence through all EU programmes and structural funds, such as the strategic implementation of the European Social Fund, which should be used to promote gender equality, improve women’s access to and reintegration in the labour market and combat the unemployment, poverty and social exclusion of women and all forms of discrimination; calls on the Commission to propose proactive measures through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development to support women’s employment in rural areas; |
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5.

| 6. | Emphasises the importance of ensuring that everyone, regardless of gender, has the right to work and balance their professional and private lives; calls for the EU and its Member States to further underpin maternity and paternity entitlements by improving periods of equal and fully paid leave with a view to involving men equally in unpaid work including care responsibilities, while taking account of the World Health Organization recommendation; calls for the right to a flexible working arrangement following maternity, paternity and parental leave to be guaranteed in practice, enabling both parents to equally share and balance work with care responsibilities; calls for these measures to be backed up by investments in modern, high-quality and local infrastructure and funding for services and caregivers to ensure universal early childhood education and childcare, including from public services; |
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6.

| 7. | Notes that the COVID-19 pandemic has had a drastic impact on the lives of women, in particular working women; notes that a disproportionate share of the burden was borne by teleworking women whose lives were made harder by the need to combine work, childcare and domestic chores; points out that many women were faced with increased expenses on lower pay; |
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7.

| 8. | Stresses that the employment rate of women in the EU must increase; calls for measures to achieve work and pay enhancement, to combat unemployment effectively, and to promote full-time employment for all women; calls for the promotion of the existing national systems, placing particular emphasis on social dialogue, collective bargaining and its binding effect, the revitalisation of employment, and the fight against job insecurity; notes that men and women face different risks at work and stresses the importance, therefore, of a gender-sensitive approach to occupational health and safety by ensuring that working time is organised in such a way as to guarantee that both men and women can equally enjoy daily and weekly rest periods, breaks, and holidays, as well as ensuring adequate working conditions; calls for the EU and its Member States to encourage employers to adopt family-friendly measures such as the possibility of reducing working hours for men and women in order to guarantee care and education for children; |
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8.

| 9. | Urges the Commission and the Member States to better apply the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women across the different economic sectors; calls, to this end, for the creation of gender-neutral job evaluation tools and classification criteria, in close cooperation with social partners and with respect for their autonomy and for collective agreements and national labour market traditions and models, which can contribute to a better valuation and thus fairer remuneration of work in female-dominated sectors; |
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9.

| 10. | Call on the EU to put forward a set of policies, programmes, funding and recommendations to foster a transition towards a care economy with a view to progressing towards societies in which life and the well-being of all is prioritised and where the value of care work — both paid and unpaid — is put at the centre of our economies, while responding to the social impacts on those with caring responsibilities; |
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10.

| 11. | Calls for measures to be adopted to foster men and women’s entrepreneurship in the EU by promoting fiscal, economic and financial measures, thereby enabling this important initiative to create new jobs and alleviate the financial burden on entrepreneurs; |
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11.

| 12. | Stresses the paramount importance of eliminating tax-related gender biases and other inequalities, towards which tax schemes must make a contribution, including personal income tax schemes; calls on the Member States to ensure that fiscal policy, including taxation, serves to tackle and eliminate socioeconomic and gender inequalities in all their dimensions; |
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12.

| 13. | Points out that COVID-19 has brought to light the precarious situation of female intellectuals (researchers, architects and others) who, in the absence of a stable employment relationship, have been particularly affected; stresses the need for extraordinary measures to mitigate the consequences of the Member States’ containment measures and underlines the importance of structural measures that take into account equality at work and in everyday life and enforce women’s rights; |
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13.

| 14. | Stresses the role of women working in the social sector; recognises that their workload has been exacerbated by the pandemic and that low wages, increased exploitation (especially of migrant women) and the hiring of people without training or qualifications for the tasks to be performed are aggravating their working and living conditions; stresses the importance of enhancing working conditions and pay, respecting working hours and using collective bargaining as a guarantee of respect for working conditions; |
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14.

The eradication of gender-based violence

| 15. | Highlights the cases of unequal treatment and harassment of women at work and underlines the need to combat the exploitation, inequalities, discrimination and violence affecting women, noting that harassment in the workplace leads to women being excluded from their chosen careers and sectors and constitutes a serious assault on their psychological and physical health; notes that women are far more likely to be subjected to sexual harassment than men; calls on the Member States and the EU to ratify International Labour Organization Convention No 190 in order to comply with the global standards to end violence and harassment in the world of work and Convention No 189 on domestic workers, which has only been ratified by eight countries and aims to provide legal recognition for domestic work, to extend rights to all women domestic workers, notably those in the informal economy, and to prevent violations and abuses; urges the EU and its Member States to devise ‘Me Too’ legislation to combat sexual harassment in the workplace; calls on the Member States, employers and associations to ensure that they have proper procedures in place for preventing gender discrimination, sexual harassment and gender-based violence, which create a toxic environment, and insists that they protect the victims of and ensure accountability for gender-based violence committed at the workplace or their organisations; |
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15.

| 16. | Condemns all forms of violence against women and girls in all their diversity; strongly reaffirms its commitment to tackling gender-based violence; calls on the EU and the Member States, including Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, to ratify and/or duly implement the Istanbul Convention, which among other issues highlights misconceptions about gender roles in our society such as ‘traditional family values’ and seeks to combat repressive views about women; recalls that the convention should be regarded as a minimum standard and strongly reaffirms its previous call for comprehensive legislation covering all forms of gender-based violence as the best way to put an end to it; |
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16.

| 17. | Notes that violence between men and women increases during any kind of emergency, be it economic crisis, conflict or outbreak of disease; notes that inequalities and economic and social pressures caused by COVID-19 lockdown measures, which entailed restrictions on movement and social isolation, led to an increase in violence against women; highlights that many women were confined to their homes with their aggressors; notes that in general, domestic violence increased by as much as 30 % in some Member States during the first lockdown (29); calls on the Member States to devise and implement effective policies and measures to tackle violence against women and to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the perpetrators of abuse are identified and tracked by the police and other authorities to help prevent violence and deaths, as well as providing protection, support and reparations for the women subjected to it, ensuring the deployment of increased and adequate resources and more effective responses by the Member States; stresses the need for specific programmes to protect and monitor the victims of violence and for measures to strengthen social support and improve access to justice, shelter and mental healthcare in the fields of prevention, treatment and rehabilitation; |
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17.

| 18. | Welcomes the Commission’s intention to propose measures to tackle cyber-violence against women; considers that the cross-border nature of cyber-violence against women and girls requires a common EU response; stresses the need for the Member States to establish programmes to better flag up the risk of and prevent recurring incidences of domestic violence, recidivism and femicide and measures to eradicate all forms of online violence; stresses the urgent need to protect women and girls from violence offline and online and recalls that violence against women can take many different forms; recognises the structural nature of violence against women as gender-based violence and points out that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms whereby women are forced into a subordinate position to men; notes that this kind of violence is still going underreported and underreacted to; |
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18.

| 19. | Underlines that violence by men against women starts with violence by boys against girls; stresses that comprehensive, age-appropriate education on sexuality and relationships is key to preventing gender-based violence and giving children and young people the skills they need to build safe relationships free from sexual, gender-based and intimate partner violence; calls on the Member States to implement preventive programmes, including educational measures geared towards young people and implemented with their input on issues such as the skills needed to create safe and healthy relationships, awareness about the ingrained preconceptions about care responsibilities, equality between women and men, mutual respect, non-violent conflict resolution in interpersonal relationships, gender-based violence against women and the right to personal integrity; |
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19.

| 20. | Stresses that since 2010 gender segregation in education, notably the preponderance of one gender in certain skills, has increased slightly, with the situation worsening in 13 Member States and in other cases remaining almost unchanged (30); highlights that this remains a major barrier to gender equality in the EU; calls on the Member States to ensure that all people have full access to equal opportunities in order to achieve personal development without being hindered by structures, prejudices and stereotypical perceptions based on gender; calls on the Member States to tackle sexism and harmful gender stereotypes in their education systems and to combat gendered labour market segmentation in careers in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) by investing in formal, informal and non-formal education, lifelong learning and vocational training for women to ensure that they have access to high-quality employment and opportunities to reskill and upskill for future labour market demand and prevent a vicious circle of gendered labour market segregation; |
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20.

| 21. | Stresses that sexual exploitation constitutes a serious form of violence affecting mostly women and children; recalls, in particular, that nearly three quarters of all victims of human trafficking in the EU are women and girls, who are mainly trafficked for sexual exploitation; stresses that trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation, especially women and children, is a form of slavery and an affront to human dignity; highlights that trafficking in human beings is on the rise worldwide, fuelled by the rise of increasingly profitable organised crime; stresses the importance of a gender-sensitive approach to human trafficking and highlights the need for Member States to ensure adequate funding for social and psychological support and access to public services for victims of trafficking or sexual exploitation and specialised services dedicated to the social inclusion of vulnerable women and girls; calls on the Member States to implement the Anti-Trafficking Directive (31) in full and to desist from imprisoning or deporting potential victims as a matter of urgency; underlines, however, that sexual exploitation and human trafficking for sexual purposes are driven by demand and that efforts to combat them must be focused on preventive work and stopping demand; insists that all legislation on sexual offences must be based on consent; insists that only voluntary sexual acts should be considered legal; calls on the Commission to prioritise the prevention of trafficking for sexual exploitation, including through information, awareness-raising and education campaigns, by adopting measures and programmes to discourage and reduce demand, and by adopting dedicated legislation in future; |
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21.

| 22. | Stresses that gender-based violence intersects with multiple axes of oppression; underlines that women and girls with disabilities are two to five times more likely to experience various forms of violence; highlights that the EU is obliged, as a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to take measures to ensure the full and equal enjoyment by women and girls with disabilities of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; notes that the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities recommended in 2015 that the EU should advance its efforts in this direction, inter alia through ratification of the Istanbul Convention; |
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22.

| 23. | Applauds the unambiguous defence of all freedoms anywhere in the world, while condemning measures that undermine rights, freedoms and guarantees and deprecating all forms of prejudice and discrimination on all grounds; calls for the effective prevention of gender-based violence, including educational measures that are geared towards young people and implemented with their input, as well as ensuring that all young people benefit from comprehensive SRHR and relationship education; calls for further measures to combat gender stereotypes, including by focusing on men and boys and challenging toxic relationships and gender norms; calls on the Member States to implement clearer measures to target these norms, as gender stereotypes are a root cause of gender inequality and affect all areas of society; stresses the importance of addressing poverty and rising inequalities among women, especially those in vulnerable situations; |
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23.

| 24. | Stresses that any strategy designed to achieve gender equality must address all forms of violence against women, including the erosion of healthcare entitlements and SRHR acquired by women and infringements thereof; reiterates that access to healthcare and services, including public services, access to safe, legal and free abortion and psychological support for women who have been the victims of violence should be considered a priority; underlines that violations of SRHR, including the denial of safe and legal abortion care, constitute a form of violence against women and girls; stresses that the autonomy and ability of women and girls to make free and independent decisions about their bodies and lives are preconditions for their economic independence and thus for gender equality and the elimination of gender-based violence; calls on the Commission and the Member States to step up their political support for human rights defenders, healthcare providers working to advance SRHR and women’s rights and SRHR civil society organisations, which are key actors for gender-equal societies and crucial providers of services and information regarding sexual health and the market of reproductive health; |
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24.

Health, education, inclusion and poverty

| 25. | Stresses that access to sexual, reproductive and other forms of healthcare for women is a fundamental right that must be underpinned and may not be in any way watered down or withdrawn; recalls that SRHR services are essential healthcare services that should be available to all, including migrant and refugee women; condemns the actions of anti-gender and anti-feminist movements in Europe and worldwide that systematically attack women’s and LGBTIQ+ rights, including SRHR; calls on the Commission to strongly condemn the backsliding over women’s rights, SRHR and LGBTIQ+ people in some Member States and to use all the powers at its disposal to strengthen action to counter it, including strengthening support for women’s rights defenders and women’s rights organisations in the EU, as well as organisations working on SRHR and LGBTIQ+; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Stresses the need for Member States to adopt a policy placing special emphasis on better systems and services of healthcare and the prevention of diseases, including gender-specific aspects, by guaranteeing accessible and high-quality healthcare and ensuring the availability of the necessary resources to combat the main health problems such as those arising from the current pandemic crisis; stresses that health inequalities are accumulating for women with low levels of education and women with disabilities, with both categories experiencing poor health and limited access to health services; emphasises that access to healthcare in some Member States has been constrained by the COVID-19 lockdown measures and that consultations, treatment and diagnoses have not taken place; urges the Member States to strengthen healthcare systems including public services in order to expedite cancelled consultations, treatment and diagnoses; |
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26.

| 27. | Welcomes the upcoming review of the Barcelona targets and stresses the need to achieve these and to provide early childhood education and childcare, including public pre-school education; highlights the need to provide care services for early childhood education and care that is genuinely accessible to all children and has an overarching role in increasing women’s participation in the labour market, particularly in the light of the experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic; recognises the need to create and expand support facilities for older people and people with disabilities, in addition to developing long-term care facilities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to meet these objectives, which are key to boosting gender equality and the equal earner-equal carer model; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Stresses that poverty and social exclusion are exacerbated among some groups of women such as single mothers, women above the age of 65, women with disabilities, women with low levels of education, and women from migrant backgrounds; insists on the importance of fighting poverty and social exclusion and its multifaceted causes; urges the Member States to take specific measures to prevent and combat the risk of poverty for older and retired women in view of population ageing and the proportion of older women in disadvantaged or vulnerable positions; deems it imperative to address the work-life balance and overcome the gender pension gap by guaranteeing a fair pension for all women and access to universal and solidarity-based social security systems, and by better enforcing the principle of equal pay for equal work in order to close the gender pay gap and prevent its accumulation in women’s careers; is extremely concerned by the fact that the poverty gender gap has increased in 21 Member States since 2017 (32); |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Highlights that there is still a misconception that homelessness among women is a relatively minor social problem in Europe; points to the lack of basic data on the nature and extent of women’s homelessness, which makes the problem less visible; stresses the importance of recognising gender-based violence and the gendered experiences of trauma as a root cause of women’s homelessness, and of looking at wider societal problems intersecting with broader socioeconomic and structural barriers, such as poverty, the lack of affordable housing and other structural factors; urges the EU and its Member States to integrate a gender perspective into policies and practices addressing homelessness and to develop a specific strategy to combat women’s homeless and ensure that services work appropriately and effectively to meet the needs of homeless women; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Recalls the need to combat intersectional forms of discrimination, especially against marginalised groups, including women with disabilities, Black women, migrant, ethnic minority and Roma women, older women, single mothers, LGBTIQ+ people and homeless women; stresses the importance of addressing their needs and concerns in EU polices and initiatives; calls on the Commission to devise specific guidelines on the implementation of the intersectional framework and to present an EU action plan with specific measures to improve the socioeconomic situation of women who face intersectional forms of discrimination and combat the feminisation of poverty and precarious work; |
| --- | --- |

30.

Equality in everyday life

| 31. | Recognises that it is essential to ensure a broad set of effective, appropriate and targeted measures to combat discriminatory attitudes and practices, achieve equal opportunities and equal pay for equal work, and advance progress on gender equality, devoting particular focus to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, promoting the exchange of best practices in fighting discrimination, and enabling women to exercise their civic and political rights on an equal basis and to fully participate in all aspects of our society; stresses the need to ensure adequate investment in services of general interest and public services, in particular health, education and transport, in order to promote the independence, equality and emancipation of women; calls on the Member States to implement specific social and gender-responsive measures to combat the risk of social exclusion and poverty with regard to access to housing, transport and energy, particularly for women in vulnerable situations; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Is deeply concerned that the European Green Deal and related environmental and climate initiatives do not include a gender perspective; urges the Commission to meet its obligation to incorporate gender mainstreaming into all EU policies, including EU environmental and climate policies: urges that these policies be informed by rigorous gender analyses to ensure that they address gender inequalities and other forms of social exclusion; calls on the Commission to design a roadmap to deliver on the commitments of the Gender Action Plan agreed at COP25 to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and to appoint a permanent EU gender and climate change focal point, with sufficient budgetary resources, to implement and monitor gender-responsible climate action in the EU and worldwide; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Highlights the major contribution of women in the fields of employment, culture, education, science and research; recognises the profound deterioration in the living conditions of women employed in culture and the arts, women running micro and small businesses and women working on farms and living in rural communities, as a result of the suspension of economic and cultural activities during the COVID-19 pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Urges the Member States to reach a common position as soon as possible on the proposal for a Council directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (33), which has been blocked since its adoption by Parliament in April 2009; |
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34.

| 35. | Reiterates the importance of gender mainstreaming as a systematic approach to achieving gender equality; welcomes, therefore, the Commission’s established taskforce on equality; underlines the importance of transparency and the involvement of women’s rights and civil society organisations from diverse backgrounds; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Considers it essential to promote the participation of women in sporting activities, structures and development; recognises the need to address the inequalities regarding women’s access to sport and the presentation of awards; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Calls on the Member States and the Council to create a formal Council configuration on gender equality in order to provide the ministers and secretaries of state for gender equality with a dedicated forum for discussion so as to ensure that gender equality issues are discussed at the highest political level and better facilitate gender mainstreaming across all EU policies; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Stresses the importance of gender budgeting in order to apply the principle of gender mainstreaming in all budgetary processes; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Highlights the findings of the European Court of Auditors that the Commission has not yet lived up to its commitment to gender mainstreaming in the EU budget; calls on the Commission, therefore, to implement the Court of Auditors’ recommendations to strengthen the institutional framework for supporting gender budgeting, to carry out gender analyses of the needs and impacts and update its better regulation guidelines, to systematically collect, analyse and report on existing sex-disaggregated data for EU funding programmes, to make use of gender-related objectives and indicators to monitor progress, to develop a system for tracking the funds allocated and used to support gender equality, and to report annually on the results achieved in terms of gender equality; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Welcomes the commitment to take gender equality into account under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the largest part of the NextGenerationEU instrument; deeply regrets the fact, however, that it will be difficult to monitor the gender impact of these funds and follow up on the results given the lack of gender-specific indicators and objectives; calls on the Commission, therefore, to use gender-disaggregated data and indicators, notably in the recovery and resilience scoreboard, to assess the gender impact of the implemented measures and results during the evaluation of the Member States’ national plans setting out their reforms and investment agendas, and to impose gender-balanced governance of the Recovery and Resilience Facility and European Semester; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Regrets the weak link between the new EU Strategy for Gender Equality and the European Green Deal; calls on the Commission to strengthen the connection between climate change policies and gender equality in its upcoming proposals; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Calls on the Commission to mainstream gender equality into all policymaking and to carry out gender impact assessments when setting up any new policy to help ensure a more coherent and evidence-based EU policy response to gender equality challenges; calls on the Member States to undertake corresponding measures at national level; |
| --- | --- |

42.

o

o o

| 43. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

43.

---

(1)  OJ L 6, 10.1.1979, p. 24.

(2)  OJ L 359, 19.12.1986, p. 56.

(3)  OJ L 348, 28.11.1992, p. 1.

(4)  OJ L 373, 21.12.2004, p. 37.

(5)  OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, p. 23.

(6)  OJ L 68, 18.3.2010, p. 13.

(7)  OJ L 180, 15.7.2010, p. 1.

(8)  OJ C 407, 4.11.2016, p. 2.

(9)  OJ C 331, 18.9.2018, p. 60.

(10)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0379.

(11)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0025.

(12)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0024.

(13)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0058.

(14)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0314.

(15)  Gender Equality Index 2020 report.

(16)  Eurostat, May 2021 Euroindicator: Euro area unemployment at 7,9 %, EU at 7,3 %, 1 July 2021.

(17)  Gender Equality Index 2020.

(18)  World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap report 2021, 31 March 2021.

(19)  World Health Organization, Violence Against Women Prevalence Estimates, 2018: Global, regional and national prevalence estimates for intimate partner violence against women and global and regional prevalence estimates for non-partner sexual violence against women, 2021.

(20)  Statement to the press by Dr Hans Henri P. Kluge, World Health Organization Regional Director for Europe, 7 May 2020.

(21)  Europol, Exploiting isolation: Offenders and victims of online child sexual abuse during the COVID-19 pandemic, 19 June 2020.

(22)  Eurostat, Gender pay gap statistics, February 2021.

(23)  Eurostat, ‘Children at risk of poverty or social exclusion’, October 2020.

(24)  2021 Commission report on gender equality in the EU.

(25)  2021 Commission report on gender equality in the EU.

(26)  Eurocarers, The gender dimension of informal care, 2017.

(27)  Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU (OJ L 188, 12.7.2019, p. 79).

(28)  All Gender Equality Index rankings as follows (EU-28 and average): Sweden (83,9), Denmark (77,4), France (75,1), Finland (74,7), Netherlands (74,1), United Kingdom (72,7), Ireland (72,2), Spain (72,0), Belgium (71,4), Luxembourg (70,3), EU average (67,9), Slovenia (67,7), Germany (67,5), Austria (66,5), Italy (63,5), Malta (63,4), Portugal (61,3), Latvia (60,8), Estonia (60,7), Bulgaria (59,6), Croatia (57.9), Cyprus (56,9), Lithuania (56.3), Czechia (56,2), Poland (55,8), Slovakia (55,5), Romania (54,4), Hungary (53), Greece (52,2).

(29)  Gama, A., Pedro, A. R., de Carvalho, M. J. L., Guerreiro, A. E., Duarte, V., Quintas, J., Matias, A., Keygnaert, I. and Dias, S., ‘Domestic Violence during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Portugal’, Portuguese Journal of Public Health, 2020, 38 (Suppl. 1), pp. 32-40.

(30)  European Institute for Gender Equality, Gender segregation in education, training and the labour market: Review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in the EU Member States, 2017.

(31)  Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA (OJ L 101, 15.4.2011, p. 1).

(32)  Gender Equality Index 2020 report.

(33)  Commission proposal of 2 July 2008 (COM(2008)0426).

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/37

---

P9_TA(2021)0501

The impact of organised crime on own resources of the EU and on the misuse of EU funds

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the impact of organised crime on own resources of the EU and on the misuse of EU funds with a particular focus on shared management from an auditing and control perspective (2020/2221(INI))

(2022/C 251/03)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Articles 310, 317 and 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 310, 317 and 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (PIF Directive) (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (PIF Directive) (1),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (2),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/20121 (3) (Financial Regulation), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/20121 (3) (Financial Regulation),

| — | having regard to the OLAF Reports 2019 and 2020, and the 2019 and 2020 Activity Reports of the OLAF Supervisory Committee, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the OLAF Reports 2019 and 2020, and the 2019 and 2020 Activity Reports of the OLAF Supervisory Committee,

| — | having regard to Special Report No 01/2019 of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) entitled ‘Fighting fraud in EU spending: action needed’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Special Report No 01/2019 of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) entitled ‘Fighting fraud in EU spending: action needed’,

| — | having regard to Special Report No 06/2019 of the ECA entitled ‘Tackling fraud in EU cohesion spending: managing authorities need to strengthen detection, response and coordination’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Special Report No 06/2019 of the ECA entitled ‘Tackling fraud in EU cohesion spending: managing authorities need to strengthen detection, response and coordination’,

| — | having regard to Special Report No 13/2021 of the ECA entitled ‘EU efforts to combat money laundering in the banking sector are fragmented and implementation is insufficient’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Special Report No 13/2021 of the ECA entitled ‘EU efforts to combat money laundering in the banking sector are fragmented and implementation is insufficient’,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 28 April 2019 entitled ‘Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy: enhanced action to protect the EU budget’ (COM(2019)0196) and the accompanying staff working document entitled ‘Fraud risk assessment’ (SWD(2019)0171), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 28 April 2019 entitled ‘Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy: enhanced action to protect the EU budget’ (COM(2019)0196) and the accompanying staff working document entitled ‘Fraud risk assessment’ (SWD(2019)0171),

| — | having regard to the report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 3 September 2020 entitled ‘31st Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests — Fight against fraud — 2019’ (PIF Report) (COM(2020)0363) and the accompanying staff working documents (SWD(2020)0156, SWD(2020)0157, SWD(2020)0158, SWD(2020)0159 and SWD(2020)0160), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 3 September 2020 entitled ‘31st Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests — Fight against fraud — 2019’ (PIF Report) (COM(2020)0363) and the accompanying staff working documents (SWD(2020)0156, SWD(2020)0157, SWD(2020)0158, SWD(2020)0159 and SWD(2020)0160),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014 (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014 (4),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (5),

| — | having regard to Decision (EU) 2019/1798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 appointing the European Chief Prosecutor of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Decision (EU) 2019/1798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 appointing the European Chief Prosecutor of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (6),

| — | having regard to Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,

| — | having regard to the 2019 report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) entitled ‘Fraud and corruption in European Structural and Investment Funds — a spotlight on common schemes and preventive actions’ (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 2019 report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) entitled ‘Fraud and corruption in European Structural and Investment Funds — a spotlight on common schemes and preventive actions’ (7),

| — | having regard to the Guidelines on National Anti-Fraud Strategies developed by a working group of Member States’ experts, directed and coordinated by the Fraud Prevention, Reporting and Analysis unit in the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (8), published on 13 December 2016, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Guidelines on National Anti-Fraud Strategies developed by a working group of Member States’ experts, directed and coordinated by the Fraud Prevention, Reporting and Analysis unit in the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (8), published on 13 December 2016,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 entitled ‘The EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025’ (COM(2021)0170), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 entitled ‘The EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025’ (COM(2021)0170),

| — | having regard to the study published by the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 7 July 2021 entitled ‘The Impact of Organised Crime on the EU’s Financial Interests’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the study published by the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies on 7 July 2021 entitled ‘The Impact of Organised Crime on the EU’s Financial Interests’,

| — | having regard to the Commission’s package of four legislative proposals to harmonise the EU’s rules on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), published on 20 July 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s package of four legislative proposals to harmonise the EU’s rules on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), published on 20 July 2021,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on the protection of the EU’s financial interests — combating fraud — annual report 2019 (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on the protection of the EU’s financial interests — combating fraud — annual report 2019 (9),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0330/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0330/2021),

| A. | whereas financial and economic crime involves corruption, fraud, coercion, violence, collusion, obstruction and intimidation for unlawful gain, with monies of illegal origin being concealed by means of money laundering and, possibly, used for further unlawful purposes, including the financing of terrorism; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas financial and economic crime involves corruption, fraud, coercion, violence, collusion, obstruction and intimidation for unlawful gain, with monies of illegal origin being concealed by means of money laundering and, possibly, used for further unlawful purposes, including the financing of terrorism;

| B. | whereas, according to the ECA, fraud prevention has not received enough attention and the Commission lacks comprehensive information on the scale, nature and causes of fraud; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas, according to the ECA, fraud prevention has not received enough attention and the Commission lacks comprehensive information on the scale, nature and causes of fraud;

| C. | whereas a rising number of organised crime groups are active in the EU, often with cross-border reach; whereas the phenomenon is increasingly complex with new criminal markets and new ways of operating that are emerging due to globalisation and new technologies; whereas Mafia-style organisations are particularly active in their attempts to intercept EU funds in various Member States; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas a rising number of organised crime groups are active in the EU, often with cross-border reach; whereas the phenomenon is increasingly complex with new criminal markets and new ways of operating that are emerging due to globalisation and new technologies; whereas Mafia-style organisations are particularly active in their attempts to intercept EU funds in various Member States;

| D. | whereas technology brings new detection and monitoring capabilities, rendering the work of investigators more effective and enabling the design of smarter enforcement measures; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas technology brings new detection and monitoring capabilities, rendering the work of investigators more effective and enabling the design of smarter enforcement measures;

EU funds impacted by organised crime

| 1. | Stresses that organised crime has demonstrated a high degree of infiltration into the social, political, economic, financial, entrepreneurial and administrative structure of Member States, as well as an ability to launder in the legal economy the huge proceeds of crimes including those committed against the EU’s financial interests, thus representing a serious threat to EU citizens’ liberties; stresses, against that background, that organised crime represents a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law, and that the fight against corruption and the infiltration of the legal economy by organised crime is essential to guaranteeing equal treatment before the law, protecting citizens’ rights and welfare, preventing abuses and ensuring the accountability of public office-holders; believes that a common, coordinated response from the EU and its Member States is necessary; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Notes that revenue fraud is an area in which the harm done by organised crime is particularly significant, including customs fraud; notes that fraud is a substantial component of revenue fraud; notes that this type of fraud is often committed by falsifying import declarations, using fraudulent documents to declare goods, and falsely declaring the origin of goods to circumvent EU anti-dumping duties; notes that the ECA recently highlighted shortcomings in customs controls legislation and its application, which result in insufficient harmonisation, risk assessment and information exchange across the Union and between Member States; is concerned that this creates opportunities for organised crime to exploit weaknesses in the current system and defraud the Union and its Member States of income; notes that customs fraud is also frequently committed by under-declaring the value of goods imported into the EU, by which fraudsters can avoid paying higher rates of import duties; notes that the undervaluation schemes investigated by OLAF in recent years mainly concern goods imported from China; welcomes the work done by OLAF in investigating these cases, which has reduced the estimated EU budget losses from over EUR 1 billion in 2017 to EUR 180 million 2020 (10); underlines that despite these positive developments, efforts to fight undervaluation fraud must continue, as fraud schemes are evolving to develop new patterns, in particular in the area of e-commerce; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Notes that value-added tax (VAT) fraud is another major component of revenue fraud; notes that VAT fraud is defined as avoiding the payment of VAT or fraudulently claiming repayments of VAT from national authorities following an illicit chain of transactions; notes that the most common forms of VAT fraud are missing trader intra-Community fraud, e-commerce fraud, and fraud against customs procedure 42; points out that the fuel sector is one of the sectors most at risk from VAT fraud, whereby criminal networks abuse VAT exemption rules and price differences between different types of fuel, resulting in huge losses in tax revenue; is concerned by the fact that criminal groups have been proven to exchange knowledge, information and intelligence in the area of VAT fraud, making extensive use of new technologies, alternative cryptocurrencies and shortcomings in legal business structures to enhance and conceal their criminal activities, thereby generating multi-billion euro profits from VAT fraud; highlights the fact that, according to Europol’s European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 2021, VAT fraud is committed by people with good knowledge of the VAT system, legislation and tax procedures; finds regrettable the systemic weaknesses of the current intra-Community VAT system and the insufficient exchange of information between Member States; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Expresses its regret that subsidies are an area affected by fraud on the expenditure side of the Union budget; notes with deep concern that, according to Europol reports, the number of such cases has steadily increased over the years; notes that subsidy fraud happens in many areas of EU spending, such as agriculture policy, cohesion policy, research and development and environmental policy; notes with concern that fraudulent applications for EU grants and tenders are usually based on false declarations, progress reports and invoices; points out that many such fraudulent activities are carried out by organised crime gangs, including mafia-style gangs; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Notes that besides the obvious dangers to public policy and public security presented by the forms of violence which are typical of criminal organisations, organised crime may cause equally serious problems in the form of penetration into the legal economy and associated conduct which corrupts public officials, with the consequent infiltration of institutions and public administrations; reiterates its call for the EU to become a full member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) without delay; underlines the necessity to provide sufficient resources for the judiciary system and to use all available tools in a coherent manner across Member States to detect and tackle fraud and financial as well as economic crime; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Highlights that the common agricultural policy (CAP) is the largest item in the EU budget, representing 31 % of total budgetary expenditure for the 2021-2027 period; stresses that it is vital for the CAP control systems at EU and national level to work properly to ensure that the financial interests of the EU and its citizens are effectively protected against any misuse of EU funds; takes note of the special impact of organised crime in the misuse of CAP funds; reiterates its concern that the current structure of CAP subsidies incentivises land grabbing by criminal and oligarchic structures; stresses that oligarchic structures, in comparison with organised crime gangs, are equally or more financially detrimental to the CAP, and that the identification of these structures is essential to protect genuine farmers; underlines that farmers must be protected from intimidation by criminal gangs who seek to claim subsidies for their land; stresses that limited transparency in combination with corruption enables criminal organisations to keep their actions out of sight and prevent EU funding from reaching its intended beneficiaries; reiterates that the development of proper Union-level legal instruments against land grabbing and the enabling of effective information sharing are crucial in this regard; reiterates firmly the need for improved cooperation between the Commission and the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Stresses that the establishment of a centralised interoperable database with standardised and high-quality data displaying the direct and ultimate beneficiaries of EU subsidies is crucial in order to identify fraudsters, criminal networks and oligarchical structures, and to prevent them from misusing EU funds; highlights that such a database would substantially boost the capability of law enforcement to recover misused funds; underlines that in order to create such a database, the interoperability between existing national and EU-level databases must be improved; calls on the Commission and the Member States to cooperate in creating such a centralised database in line with the rulings of the European Court of Justice; emphasises that information must be of adequate quality and available in a standardised format, so that it can be exchanged and aggregated in an automated way; underlines that beneficiaries must have a unique identifier that ensures their traceability across Member States and funds, independent of the management method; highlights that the use of new technologies, such as comprehensive digital land registers, is essential in enhancing transparency, effective data collection and risk mitigation, thereby ultimately reducing opportunities for fraudsters; welcomes the Commission’s efforts to expand the use of such technologies and calls on all Member States to speed up the implementation of these solutions; points to the need for greater scrutiny by the Commission or the relevant agencies, including with regard to livestock, and, in particular, as regards the funds granted per head of cattle, the actual existence of which must be properly verified; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Points out that the concentration of agricultural income support is mainly driven by area-based direct payments; underlines the need for more targeted support and a better balance between large and small beneficiaries at Member State level; regrets that capping remains voluntary in the new CAP; calls on the Member States to use the different redistributive tools within the new CAP as a measure against the misuse of agricultural funds and for their fairer distribution; criticises the fact that, at the Special European Council of July 2020, Member States unilaterally decided not to introduce maximum amounts for natural persons under the first or second pillars, pre-empting a decision in the trilogue negotiations on the reform of the CAP; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Highlights that the Member States are responsible for the EU agricultural funds under shared management with the Commission; considers that the new delivery model and the new national strategic plans can be an opportunity to reinforce controls by the Member States and the Commission pertaining to the distribution and management of funds, provided that Member States have effective management and control systems in place, and to raise awareness among the authorities responsible for awarding grants of the opportunities for fraud; emphasises that the principle of the single audit should help relieve the pressure on farmers and that controls should not result in an unnecessary or additional administrative burden for small and medium-sized farmers; stresses, in this context, the importance of exchanges between European law enforcement actors and funding release authorities in order to ensure the highest possible level of prior awareness of possible fraud; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls on the Commission to raise the Member States’ awareness of organised criminals engaging in tax evasion, corruption and illegal practices (such as ‘pocket contracts’) in connection with land transactions, and to support them in combating such crime; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Considers that every effort should be made to ensure that the new delivery model for the CAP does not result in a reduction in the level of absorption of CAP funds by final beneficiaries as a consequence of unintentional errors, a lack of transparency in the rules or a lack of adequate information, particularly during the initial implementation period; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Stresses the need for a specifically tailored fraud prevention system to prevent any misuse of EU agricultural funds; points out that although the number of instances of fraud has been reduced considerably over recent years, anti-fraud measures should remain a high priority for the EU and the Member States; underlines that EU funds must be recovered in a timely manner and welcomes the provisions laid down in the CAP horizontal regulation on proportionate penalties as effective deterrents; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Notes that OLAF is responsible for combating fraud in CAP payments, and that open cases are based on information from Member States or reports from members of the public who have been affected and who may then face retaliation; emphasises, furthermore, that OLAF cases are highly confidential and are not widely publicised when they are closed; calls, therefore, for whistleblowers to be protected and for fraud investigation authorities in the Member States to share best practices in the area; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Stresses the need to monitor agricultural paying agencies in the Member States, to guarantee both their formal and informal independence, and to bring their work in line with EU rules, in connection with which spot inspections, among other measures, may lead to a better control system; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Stresses that the Financial Regulation, in particular Article 61 thereof, must be respected and implemented in all Member States and applied to all payments of EU funds, including direct payments for agriculture; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Urges the Commission to propose a centralised Union-wide complaints mechanism to support those individuals having to deal with unfair land-grabbing practices and intimidation by criminal organisations, by giving them the opportunity to lodge a complaint swiftly with the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Calls on Member States to rapidly implement Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (11) (the Whistleblower Directive) and to include, as part of the implementation process, legal safeguards for individuals and independent bodies who expose corruption, including journalists, whistleblowers, independent media, and anti-corruption NGOs; calls on all Member States to establish comprehensive whistleblower protection frameworks; reiterates the urgency of this demand given reporting of increased physical attacks on journalists, the rise of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP suits) and the use of fast-tracked security laws in certain Member States, which criminalise the dissemination of images of or data regarding law enforcement officers, thus blocking journalists’ work and limiting the accountability of national authorities; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Notes with concern that the Commission and OLAF have identified fraud in public tenders and procurement as a major trend among fraudsters; notes that collusion between individuals and organisations, the use of fake invoices, the creation of fake companies and credentials, and the redirection of funds from their original purpose are common ways to undermine public procurement procedures; points out that fraud schemes often take place on a transnational level and can span several (EU and non-EU) countries, making them difficult to identify and dissolve; expresses its regret that in many Member States there is no specific legislation against organised crime; highlights that timely cooperation between national law enforcement authorities is a key component of an effective response to transnational crime; calls on the relevant EU and national authorities to improve the interoperability of their systems, facilitating the timely exchange of information and enhancing cooperation and joint operations for tackling transnational organised crime; calls, therefore, for the transnational nature of the fight against fraud and the harmonisation of criminal laws in the Member States to combat organised crime to be reinforced, something which is of vital importance; encourages the Commission to develop a common rules framework that would allow Member States to transfer criminal proceedings to another Member State in order to avoid parallel investigations; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Notes that the COVID-19 pandemic creates new opportunities for fraudsters and organised crime; notes with concern that Europol observed a rise in coronavirus-related criminal activities in the form of cybercrime, fraud and counterfeiting, including that of medical equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE); recalls the scams and fake offers of vaccines detected by EU countries, as one of many harmful examples, where fraudsters tried to sell more than 1,1 billion vaccine doses for a total price of over EUR 15,4 billion; highlights that the threat of illicit sales of false COVID-19 digital certificates is rapidly growing, with numerous examples having been identified in several Member States; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Is concerned by the assessment of the PIF Report, which found that seven Member States detected fraud in relation to health infrastructure in 2019 and that health infrastructure was particularly affected by violations of public procurement rules; points out that the dependence on emergency procurement procedures in response to the COVID-19 crisis may have aggravated these problems; highlights that emergency procedures must respect the same standards of transparency and accountability as regular procedures; calls on the Commission and Member State authorities to complement these procedures through the use of risk mitigation tools, focusing on prevention, as well as through comprehensive ex post controls and scrutiny; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Is extremely worried by Europol’s expectation that the recession following the pandemic will create new opportunities for organised crime; warns that as organised crime follows the money, the unprecedented increase in EU spending in the context of the NextGenerationEU recovery plan offers major potential for misuse of funds by organised crime; highlights that this unprecedented increase in spending must be met with proper resources, to be allocated to the relevant institutions which constitute the EU and national frameworks for fighting corruption, fraud and organised crime; recalls, in this regard, that the use of new technologies, such as the Arachne database and the early-detection and exclusion system (EDES), should become compulsory elements of the EU budget’s implementation; reiterates its call on the Council to agree to the addition of 40 auditor posts at the ECA, and its call on OLAF and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) to ensure that they allocate sufficient resources to the discovery and prosecution of criminal activities targeting NextGenerationEU; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Stresses that organised criminals, in particular mafia-style criminals, are already known to have geared their business towards renewable energy in the past; warns that, since they are already active in this sector, criminal organisations can easily intercept funds earmarked for the ecological transition, which account for a significant percentage of NextGenerationEU funds; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Takes note with concern of the facilitators of organised crime, such as money laundering, cybercrime, document fraud, corruption, fake registration and the use of shell companies; stresses that these actions impact on the authorities’ ability to effectively monitor whether EU money is spent as intended; |
| --- | --- |

23.

Estimates of the financial impact of organised crime

| 24. | Is concerned that the task of estimating the extent and severity of the impact of organised crime on the EU budget has repeatedly been judged to be extremely difficult or even impossible, due, among other reasons, to the differing definitions of organised crime among the Member States and the lack of reliable estimates as regards assessing the situation, thereby complicating the efforts to coordinate measures and investigate and prosecute cases; expresses its regret that the Commission and national authorities lack insight into the scale, nature and causes of fraud, and have, to date, carried out no consistent assessments of undetected fraud; stresses that the lack of reliable estimates prevents an accurate assessment of the situation, which hampers the fight against organised crime; calls on the relevant national authorities to improve data collection and increase the reliability of data communicated to the Commission; calls on the Commission to coordinate and collaborate with Member State authorities in order to carry out a comprehensive EU-wide assessment into the actual size, nature and causes of fraud, involving the relevant EU agencies and collaborating with partners from the EU’s neighbouring countries; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Notes that the 2019 PIF Report counted 514 fraudulent irregularities on the expenditure side with a financial value of EUR 381,4 million, and 425 fraudulent irregularities on the revenue side, totalling EUR 79,7 million; emphasises that these numbers do not capture the true extent of fraud, which is likely to be significantly greater; further highlights that not all fraud is committed by organised crime gangs, especially on the expenditure side, where fraud is frequently committed by individuals or individual companies and can even include high-ranking public or government officials; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Notes that according to recent studies, organised crime penetration of EU public procurement lies between 2,7 % and 3,6 % of total spending; regrets that this indicates that from 2014-2020, EUR 1,9 billion to EUR 2,6 billion of EU Cohesion Funds may have been misappropriated by organised crime; notes that while data limitations impact the reliability of these estimates, they still give an indication of the seriousness of the problem; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Stresses with concern that corruption is an integral part of nearly all the activities of criminal organisations and that it poses a serious threat to the financial interests of the EU, with an estimated GDP loss ranging between EUR 170 billion and EUR 990 billion and a cost to the EU of more than EUR 5 billion per year for the public procurement part of the budget alone (12); |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Regrets that according to Europol, an estimated EUR 40 billion to EUR 60 billion is lost per annum to organised crime groups through a specific form of VAT fraud, namely missing trader intra-Community (MTIC) fraud; highlights that the majority of VAT losses are borne by the Member States, as only 0,3 % of VAT collected is transferred to the EU budget; emphasises that, nevertheless, VAT-based own resources constituted 11,97 % of total EU budget revenue in 2019, which indicates that VAT losses caused by criminal organisations have a serious impact on EU revenue; |
| --- | --- |

28.

Audit and control measures against organised crime

| 29. | Regrets that the Commission has identified shortcomings in its collection and analysis of data in the fight against fraud, the use of reporting systems (such as EDES and Arachne) by Member States, and the flow of information; notes that the EU legislation on exchanging information on cross-border crime was updated only recently and does not cover all relevant authorities, thereby hindering an effective information exchange across EU bodies and Member States; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Regards the PIF Directive as an important step towards protecting the EU budget, as it provides a common definition of criminal offences and the misuse of funds, and the harmonisation of sanctions for crimes against the EU’s financial interests; appreciates that the directive sets out clear reporting and investigation procedures, defines the monitoring of the fraud risk-management framework and promotes the use of information, databases and data analytics by the Member States; welcomes the Commission’s recent assessment on the implementation of the PIF Directive and the fact that all Member States have provided notification of their complete transposition of the PIF Directive (13); is concerned, however, about the degree to which the directive has been transposed into national law; recalls that the Commission identified conformity issues in several Member States; notes that these issues concern, inter alia, the definition of criminal offences (‘fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests’, ‘money laundering’, ‘corruption’, ‘misappropriation’), the liability of and sanctions against legal and natural persons, and the Member States’ obligation to annually report statistical data to the Commission; urges the Member States to fully align their national legislation with the requirements of the PIF Directive and urges the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ compliance, as proper transposition is of vital importance in enabling the EPPO to conduct effective investigations and prosecutions; urges the Commission to take all necessary steps to ensure correct and comprehensive transposition, including the possibility of infringement procedures; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Welcomes the establishment of the EPPO, with its mandate to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment crimes against the EU budget, as an important asset in the fight against fraud and organised crime in the EU; calls for effective funding and the appropriate allocation of human resources for the EPPO; regards the EPPO’s role as especially promising in the fight against cross-border crime related to the Union budget, as national authorities are limited by their borders in their prosecution and other EU bodies (such as Eurojust, Europol and OLAF) do not hold the required investigative and prosecuting powers; notes that the focus of the EPPO’s mandate is defined in the PIF Directive and includes the fight against fraud to EU expenditures and revenues, VAT fraud, money laundering, corruption and participation in criminal organisations; highlights that these focus points are crucial in the fight against organised crime, and trusts that the EPPO will therefore be an effective tool for fighting criminal organisations that impact the EU budget; regrets that five Member States have not yet joined the EPPO and calls on them to take the necessary steps towards joining it; calls on the Commission, in the meantime, to step up its oversight of those Member States’ regrets the lack of nominations of European delegated prosecutors, in particular by Slovenia, and considerable delays in many other Member States; highlights that this severely weakens the efficiency and effectiveness of the pan-European effective fight against cross-border crime; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Highlights the need to better tackle environmental crimes with a cross-border dimension and which affect biodiversity and natural resources, such as the illegal trade in plants and animals, illegal logging and timber trafficking, and illegal waste trafficking; calls on the Commission to initiate the extension of the EPPO’s mandate in order to cover cross-border environmental crimes; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Expresses its regret that the Commission established a staffing plan for the EPPO that does not allow it to fulfil its mandate efficiently; underlines that adequate staffing is necessary so that the EPPO can carry out its main task, namely the fight against cross-border crime affecting the EU budget; expresses its regret that the EPPO is currently equipped with an insufficient number of case analysts and financial investigators to support the prosecutorial activities of the European delegated prosecutors; expresses its regret that the EPPO’s operational staff are currently mainly focused on the registration of cases and not their prosecution; expresses its regret that the EPPO has indicated an urgent lack of additional qualified legal and IT experts, as well as administrative staff to enable operations to run smoothly; highlights that on top of its annual case load of 2 000 cases, the EPPO has to deal with a backlog of more than 3 000 cases; is concerned that the EPPO’s workload will increase even further in the coming years in light of the unprecedented amounts mobilised through the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the acceleration of procurement procedures during the COVID-19 crisis; emphasises that the Commission’s staffing plan for the EPPO for 2022 is insufficient to remedy the shortcomings identified by the EPPO; highlights that when fully functional, the EPPO’s benefits as regards protecting the EU budget will exceed its costs; strongly calls on the Commission to increase the budget and qualified staff available to the EPPO so that it can achieve its full potential in the fight against crime; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025 and its focus on boosting an effective and timely information exchange across EU bodies and Member States, for instance through better interoperability between EU information systems and ensuring connection to relevant databases across Member States; appreciates the Commission’s commitment to streamline law enforcement cooperation and to fully harness the potential of existing tools, such as the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT); welcomes the Commission’s aim to improve information exchange and cooperation between Europol, Eurojust and non-EU countries; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Welcomes the Commission’s focus on preventing the infiltration of organised crime into the legal economy, for instance by reviewing the EU Anti-Money Laundering Framework and the existing EU anti-corruption rules; welcomes the Commission’s focus on making law enforcement fit for the digital age; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Notes that money laundering enables criminals to keep their profits undetected, and that offering money laundering services has in itself become a profitable business for criminal organisations; emphasises that this significantly impacts the financial interests of the Union and Member States, as a devastating 98 % of estimated criminal proceeds are not confiscated and remain at the disposal of criminals; believes that the fight against money laundering is crucial to prevent the misuse of funds by criminal organisations; is deeply concerned by the ECA’s (14) findings that EU actions to prevent money laundering are fragmented and poorly coordinated, that the existing legal framework is inconsistent and still not fully transposed in all Member States and that this can be exploited by criminals; commends the Commission on the new legislative package aiming to revise the AML/CTF framework, a single set of rules that represents a major step forward in the fight against money laundering and that will allow for the uniform application of AML/CTF legislation; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Welcomes, in particular, the proposal for the creation of a new EU agency, the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA), and emphasises that the AMLA must be provided with adequate human and financial resources in order to be fully functional; expresses its regret that the establishment of the AMLA is not anticipated until 2023 and that it won’t be fully operational until 2026; underlines that the current issues as regards AML/CTF are pressing in nature and do not allow for more time to be lost; calls on the Commission to present concrete measures to address the current issues before the AMLA becomes fully operational; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Welcomes, furthermore, the Commission’s new proposals on crypto-assets, a largely unregulated sector widely exploited by organised criminals, who move large flows of illicit money with impunity on the cryptocurrency market; recalls that the anonymity surrounding certain cryptocurrencies is leading to an increase in their use for illegitimate activities; calls on the Member States to encourage cryptocurrency companies to use analysis tools to assess potential criminal activity associated with destination and recipient addresses and to ensure that they fully apply the anti-money laundering legislation when users convert cryptocurrencies to real currency; stresses that cryptocurrencies must be subject to the same supervisory bodies as traditional currencies; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Notes that financial intelligence units (FIUs) play a major part in detecting cross-border money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) cases; notes that in the EU, FIUs operate on a national level and that the Commission found the coordination and exchange of information among national FIUs to be insufficient (15); regrets that there are differences in the amount and type of data exchanged between FIUs; notes that this hampers cooperation between them, which in turn negatively impacts their capability to detect and persecute cross-border crime in a timely manner; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Regrets that the national approaches to tackle organised crime vary significantly across Member States in terms of legislation, strategies and operational capacity; notes that this is partly due to varying levels of adoption and implementation of EU legislation; is concerned by the varying role and capabilities of Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS) in Member States, possibly because EU legislation does not define their mandate precisely enough and complicate coordination at the national and EU level; Expresses concern at the fact that efforts to combat fraud involving EU funds tend not to be prioritised to the same extent as fraud involving national expenditures; this is highlighted by the fact that more than half of OLAF investigations are not followed up by Member States and even less reach the prosecution stage; regrets greatly that some Member States continuously choose not to implement OLAF’s recommendations following the conclusion of an investigation and do not launch judiciary actions aiming at recovering defrauded EU funds; calls on the Commission to make use of its prerogatives and take the necessary measures for ensuring the timely and correct implementation of EU legislation; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Expresses its regret that recent research indicates that some Member States do not prioritise fraud involving EU funds to the same extent as fraud affecting domestic spending; notes that although the Commission has encouraged Member States to develop national anti-fraud strategies (NAFS), only 13 Member States have done so and none of them used the template provided by the Commission; notes with concern that these differences across Member States pose obstacles for efficient cooperation; calls, therefore, on the Commission to take more resolute action with a view to making it mandatory for the Member States to lay down rules to prevent fraud against the EU; |
| --- | --- |

41.

Conclusions

| 42. | Calls on the Commission to develop a common approach for assessing the impact of organised crime on EU funds and evaluate the effectiveness of measures taken to tackle the problem across Member States; regards as crucial a timely, complete and effective exchange of information, and reiterates, therefore, the importance of harmonising definitions in order to achieve comparable data across EU bodies and Member States to estimate the impact of the activities of organised crime on EU finances and swift action to combat it; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Is concerned that the current system of differing national approaches prevents an effective, cross-border approach to address the problem, which gives criminals an opportunity to continue their actions without being held accountable; calls on the Member States to cooperate closely with EU bodies and each other and to make use of the Union’s tools and services in the fight against organised crime in order to maximise data exchange and facilitate cross-border operations targeting organised crime activities against the EU budget; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Calls on the Member States and the Commission to consider a more coherent use of all the available tools to detect and tackle fraud, in particular the Arachne IT platform and EDES; emphasises that the interoperability of Arachne, EDES and institutional and national databases is crucial for ensuring the effective exchange of information exchange aiming to prevent and identify fraud against the EU budget; expresses its regret that Arachne and EDES are currently limited in their scope and in the awareness and use thereof by Member States; highlights, in this regard, that EDES covers directly and indirectly managed funds but not funds under shared management, even though the latter represent roughly 80 % of EU expenditure; calls on the Commission to extend the application of EDES to these funds; reiterates its call on the Commission and, in particular, on the Member States in the Council, to make the use of Arachne compulsory; calls on the Commission to reassess the framework for data exchange across EU institutions and with the Member States, in order to maximise the degree of effective information exchange, while at the same time respecting data protection requirements; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Calls on the Commission to support Member States by providing training to national authorities to equip them with adequate knowledge for using tools such as EDES and Arachne in the most effective manner possible and in accordance with EU reporting standards; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to analyse difficulties that national authorities encounter when using EDES and Arachne and to issue specific recommendations and improve the existing general guidelines and the user-friendliness of these tools; expresses its regret that some Member States oppose using these tools for fear of increased bureaucratic burden; highlights that when properly integrated, these tools can in fact reduce bureaucracy; calls on the Member States to reconsider their position on this matter and on the Commission to further engage in promoting the advantages of EDES and Arachne to the Member States; calls for the introduction of anti-money laundering training schemes allowing authorities to detect the risk of potential fraud before funds are disbursed, in particular in the area of ‘know your client’ and the undisclosed involvement of politically exposed persons in CAP subsidies, projects and grants; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Regards the Common Provisions Regulation (16) (CPR Regulation), which lays down common rules applicable to European Structural and Investment Funds, the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus and the Cohesion Fund, as another important element for preventing misuse of EU funds by organised crime; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Highlights that an important step in fighting organised crime is making it less profitable; recalls, in this regard, the work of OLAF, whose investigations are a crucial tool in the fight against fraud; expresses its regret that the indictment rate following recommendations by OLAF to Member States is low and follows a downward trend, having decreased from 53 % in the 2007-2014 period to 37 % in the 2016-2020 period; further notes that the extent to which financial amounts recommended for recovery are actually recovered has not been assessed in recent years, and that the most recent assessment covering the years 2002 to 2016 indicates a recovery rate of 30 %; calls on OLAF and the Commission to investigate the underlying reasons and on the Member States to fulfil their legal obligation to recover the funds and to cooperate closely with the Union’s bodies to ensure that funds misused by organised crime are effectively recovered, as a devastating 98 % of estimated criminal proceeds are not confiscated and remain at the disposal of criminals; calls on OLAF to collect information on the rate of recovery following its financial recommendations and to publish this information in its annual reports; takes the view that decisive action to recover funds, including through preventive or value-based seizures, can deter criminal organisations from committing fraud against the EU, thereby protecting its financial interests; calls on the Member States to increase the confiscation rate of funds associated with fraud, with more emphasis on preventative measures; invites the Commission to assess the possibility of complementing the current fragmented approach towards asset recovery through an EU-wide body in charge of ensuring the timely and effective recovery of EU funds; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Believes that fraud prevention and the fight against fraud by organised crime should be a priority focus of managing, certifying and audit authorities, as well as being the subject of specialised financial investigations; believes that the fight against organised criminal groups also requires enhanced rules and measures regarding the freezing and confiscation of assets, including, where appropriate, the temporary seizure of property of equivalent value to the criminal proceeds in order to prevent the transfer or disposal of those proceeds of crime before criminal proceedings have been concluded; stresses that it is absolutely essential that every effort is made to recover EU funds obtained through fraudulent means; strongly supports more effective investigations in order to disrupt organised crime structures and stresses that law enforcement authorities have to be ahead of criminals who increasingly use new technologies and seize any opportunity to expand their illegal activities, online or offline; |
| --- | --- |

48.

o

o o

| 49. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

49.

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(1)  OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29.

(2)  OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 43.

(3)  OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1.

(4)  OJ L 172, 17.5.2021, p. 110.

(5)  OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1.

(6)  OJ L 274, 28.10.2019, p. 1.

(7)  https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/prevention-fraud-corruption-european-funds.pdf

(8)  https://ec.europa.eu/sfc/sites/default/files/EN-ORI-General%20Guidelines%20on%20National%20Anti-Fraud%20Strategies%20ARES%282016%296943965.pdf

(9)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0337.

(10)  The OLAF report 2020.

(11)  OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17.

(12)  Rand Europe, 2016, The Cost of Non-Europe in the area of Organised Crime and Corruption: Annex II: Corruption.

(13)  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (COM(2021)0536).

(14)  European Court of Auditors Special Report No 13/2021: ‘EU efforts to fight money laundering in the banking sector are fragmented and implementation is insufficient’.

(15)  Commission staff working document SWD(2021)0190. Impact assessment accompanying the Anti-money laundering package, 20.07.2021.

(16)  Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159).

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/48

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P9_TA(2021)0502

Avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas (2020/2222(INI))

(2022/C 251/04)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Articles 310, 317 and 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 310, 317 and 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (1),

| — | having regard to Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (2),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 14 February 2017 on the role of whistleblowers in the protection of EU’s financial interests (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 February 2017 on the role of whistleblowers in the protection of EU’s financial interests (3),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (PIF Directive) (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (PIF Directive) (4),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (5),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (6),

| — | having regard to the OLAF Report 2019 (7) and the 2019 Annual Activity Report of the OLAF Supervisory Committee, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the OLAF Report 2019 (7) and the 2019 Annual Activity Report of the OLAF Supervisory Committee,

| — | having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ special report No 01/2019 entitled ‘Fighting fraud in EU spending: action needed’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ special report No 01/2019 entitled ‘Fighting fraud in EU spending: action needed’,

| — | having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ special report No 06/2019 entitled ‘Tackling fraud in EU cohesion spending: managing authorities need to strengthen detection, response and coordination’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ special report No 06/2019 entitled ‘Tackling fraud in EU cohesion spending: managing authorities need to strengthen detection, response and coordination’,

| — | having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ review No 06/2020 entitled ‘Risks, challenges and opportunities in the EU’s economic policy response to the COVID-19 crisis’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Court of Auditors’ review No 06/2020 entitled ‘Risks, challenges and opportunities in the EU’s economic policy response to the COVID-19 crisis’,

| — | having regard to the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), and its 21st general activity report (2020), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), and its 21st general activity report (2020),

| — | having regard to the study entitled ‘Public Integrity for an Effective COVID-19 Response and Recovery’, published by the OECD in April 2020, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the study entitled ‘Public Integrity for an Effective COVID-19 Response and Recovery’, published by the OECD in April 2020,

| — | having regard to the study entitled ‘Corruption in the times of Pandemia’, published in May 2020 (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the study entitled ‘Corruption in the times of Pandemia’, published in May 2020 (8),

| — | having regard to the report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 3 September 2020 entitled ‘31st Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests — Fight against fraud — 2019’ (COM(2020)0363) and the accompanying staff working documents (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 3 September 2020 entitled ‘31st Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests — Fight against fraud — 2019’ (COM(2020)0363) and the accompanying staff working documents (9),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020, amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU) (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020, amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU) (10),

| — | having regard to the Emergency Support Instrument, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Emergency Support Instrument,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (11),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (12),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014 (13), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014 (13),

| — | having regard to Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,

| — | having regard to the Court of Auditors Opinion No 4/2020 concerning the proposal 2020/0101(COD) for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards exceptional additional resources and implementing arrangements under the Investment for growth and jobs goal to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU); and on the amended proposal 2018/0196(COD) for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum and Migration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Border Management and Visa Instrument (14), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Court of Auditors Opinion No 4/2020 concerning the proposal 2020/0101(COD) for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards exceptional additional resources and implementing arrangements under the Investment for growth and jobs goal to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU); and on the amended proposal 2018/0196(COD) for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum and Migration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Border Management and Visa Instrument (14),

| — | having regard to Europol’s press release of 5 June 2020, entitled ‘Europol launches the European Financial and Economic Crime Centre’ (15), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Europol’s press release of 5 June 2020, entitled ‘Europol launches the European Financial and Economic Crime Centre’ (15),

| — | having regard to Europol’s press release of 12 April 2021, entitled ‘Serious and organised crime in the EU: A corrupting influence’ (16), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Europol’s press release of 12 April 2021, entitled ‘Serious and organised crime in the EU: A corrupting influence’ (16),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 29 April 2021 on the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia and the rule of law in Malta (17), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 29 April 2021 on the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia and the rule of law in Malta (17),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on the protection of the EU’s financial interests — combating fraud — annual report 2019 (18), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on the protection of the EU’s financial interests — combating fraud — annual report 2019 (18),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the ongoing assessment by the Commission and the Council of the national recovery and resilience plans (19), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the ongoing assessment by the Commission and the Council of the national recovery and resilience plans (19),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0320/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0320/2021),

| A. | whereas financial and economic crime refers to illegal acts committed by an individual or a group of individuals to obtain economic or professional gain and includes, inter alia, corruption, fraud, coercion, collusion, obstruction, money laundering and financing of terrorism; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas financial and economic crime refers to illegal acts committed by an individual or a group of individuals to obtain economic or professional gain and includes, inter alia, corruption, fraud, coercion, collusion, obstruction, money laundering and financing of terrorism;

| B. | whereas the public health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the subsequent economic emergency and social turmoil, has pushed the EU and the public authorities in Member States to provide for or to be involved in the management of extra funding and substantially and swiftly increase spending; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the public health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the subsequent economic emergency and social turmoil, has pushed the EU and the public authorities in Member States to provide for or to be involved in the management of extra funding and substantially and swiftly increase spending;

| C. | whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility, with an envelope of more than EUR 670 billion, and REACT-EU, with an envelope of more than EUR 50 billion, are powerful tools to help EU countries recover; whereas, as early as spring 2020, the cohesion policy provided emergency response assistance to the value of EUR 11,2 billion in business support, EUR 7,6 billion in EU reallocations for health actions and EUR 4,1 billion in direct support for workers; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility, with an envelope of more than EUR 670 billion, and REACT-EU, with an envelope of more than EUR 50 billion, are powerful tools to help EU countries recover; whereas, as early as spring 2020, the cohesion policy provided emergency response assistance to the value of EUR 11,2 billion in business support, EUR 7,6 billion in EU reallocations for health actions and EUR 4,1 billion in direct support for workers;

| D. | whereas on 2 April 2020, as part of the EU response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the Commission proposed to activate the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI); |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas on 2 April 2020, as part of the EU response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the Commission proposed to activate the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI);

| E. | whereas the decision on its activation was taken by the Council alone, without Parliament’s involvement in compliance with the provisions for activation as stipulated in Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 (the ‘ESI Regulation’) (20); |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the decision on its activation was taken by the Council alone, without Parliament’s involvement in compliance with the provisions for activation as stipulated in Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 (the ‘ESI Regulation’) (20);

| F. | whereas NextGenerationEU is a temporary recovery instrument of some EUR 800 billion in current prices, established to support the EU’s recovery from the coronavirus pandemic and help build a greener, more digital and more resilient Europe; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas NextGenerationEU is a temporary recovery instrument of some EUR 800 billion in current prices, established to support the EU’s recovery from the coronavirus pandemic and help build a greener, more digital and more resilient Europe;

| G. | whereas because of the pressing nature of the crisis, procurement procedures and means of control have been made more flexible in many places in order to expedite implementation; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas because of the pressing nature of the crisis, procurement procedures and means of control have been made more flexible in many places in order to expedite implementation;

| H. | whereas response plans do not give enough consideration to governance and the problem of illegal activities such as corruption and fraud, and measures to avoid non-fraudulent irregularities; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas response plans do not give enough consideration to governance and the problem of illegal activities such as corruption and fraud, and measures to avoid non-fraudulent irregularities;

| I. | whereas crisis creates opportunities for numerous violations of integrity and could intensify fraud and corruption, as well as non-fraudulent irregularities, particularly in public procurement, economic stimulus packages and public organisations; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas crisis creates opportunities for numerous violations of integrity and could intensify fraud and corruption, as well as non-fraudulent irregularities, particularly in public procurement, economic stimulus packages and public organisations;

| J. | whereas, according to the Court of Auditors, fraud prevention has not received enough attention and the Commission lacks comprehensive information on the scale, nature and causes of fraud; whereas the official statistics on detected fraud are not complete and the Commission has so far not carried out any assessment of undetected fraud (21); |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas, according to the Court of Auditors, fraud prevention has not received enough attention and the Commission lacks comprehensive information on the scale, nature and causes of fraud; whereas the official statistics on detected fraud are not complete and the Commission has so far not carried out any assessment of undetected fraud (21);

| K. | whereas corruption is a major threat in the private and public spheres and has a disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable groups, as it causes a loss of resources that threatens long-term growth, social protection and equitable access to public services (including health, education and justice), all of which erode public trust, increase social inequalities and undermine the core values of the Union; whereas it is essential to better understand the causes of corruption in order to be able to fight effectively against this phenomenon and its harmful consequences; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas corruption is a major threat in the private and public spheres and has a disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable groups, as it causes a loss of resources that threatens long-term growth, social protection and equitable access to public services (including health, education and justice), all of which erode public trust, increase social inequalities and undermine the core values of the Union; whereas it is essential to better understand the causes of corruption in order to be able to fight effectively against this phenomenon and its harmful consequences;

| L. | whereas a rising number of organised crime groups are active in the EU, often with cross-border reach; whereas this phenomenon is becoming increasingly complex, with new criminal markets and modi operandi emerging as a result of globalisation and new technologies, which makes it possible to operate from anywhere in the world and at any time; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas a rising number of organised crime groups are active in the EU, often with cross-border reach; whereas this phenomenon is becoming increasingly complex, with new criminal markets and modi operandi emerging as a result of globalisation and new technologies, which makes it possible to operate from anywhere in the world and at any time;

| M. | whereas technology brings new detection and monitoring capabilities, reducing the burden on investigators and enabling the design of smarter enforcement measures; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas technology brings new detection and monitoring capabilities, reducing the burden on investigators and enabling the design of smarter enforcement measures;

| N. | whereas the integrity of the Union financial system is dependent on the transparency of corporate and other legal entities, trusts and similar legal arrangements; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the integrity of the Union financial system is dependent on the transparency of corporate and other legal entities, trusts and similar legal arrangements;

| O. | whereas the Commission has taken a number of measures to address risks related to corruption and the misuse of funds in the Union, including progress on its legislative proposals on anti-money laundering; whistleblower protection, public procurement and the European rule of law mechanism; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the Commission has taken a number of measures to address risks related to corruption and the misuse of funds in the Union, including progress on its legislative proposals on anti-money laundering; whistleblower protection, public procurement and the European rule of law mechanism;

| P. | whereas according to the latest report from Transparency International and the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre (WHO CC) (22), the European Commission is not entirely respecting its own commitments on transparency and international principles of ‘good practice’ on transparency of public contracts when it uses too much redaction to cover elements of text in the Advance Purchase Agreements (APA) contracts; whereas the Commission is, however, obliged by law to respect the provisions of the Financial Regulation, and a better and improved structure for a more rapid response from the Commission in future crises is necessary; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas according to the latest report from Transparency International and the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre (WHO CC) (22), the European Commission is not entirely respecting its own commitments on transparency and international principles of ‘good practice’ on transparency of public contracts when it uses too much redaction to cover elements of text in the Advance Purchase Agreements (APA) contracts; whereas the Commission is, however, obliged by law to respect the provisions of the Financial Regulation, and a better and improved structure for a more rapid response from the Commission in future crises is necessary;

| Q. | whereas curbing corruption requires government ownership of reforms, public support, political commitment, international cooperation, and a joint effort with civil society and the private sector; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas curbing corruption requires government ownership of reforms, public support, political commitment, international cooperation, and a joint effort with civil society and the private sector;

| R. | whereas in a situation of high expectation, severe pressure and unprecedented spending volumes, the responsibility for meeting this challenge rests with public officials, who need appropriate support to deal with both the increased professional standards and new difficulties in fulfilling their mission; whereas, furthermore, officials may not necessarily become promptly aware of conflict-of-interest situations; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas in a situation of high expectation, severe pressure and unprecedented spending volumes, the responsibility for meeting this challenge rests with public officials, who need appropriate support to deal with both the increased professional standards and new difficulties in fulfilling their mission; whereas, furthermore, officials may not necessarily become promptly aware of conflict-of-interest situations;

| S. | whereas there is evidence that professionalisation and adequate wages in public procurement positively influence public officials to refrain from corruption (23); |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas there is evidence that professionalisation and adequate wages in public procurement positively influence public officials to refrain from corruption (23);

| T. | whereas the Lisbon Treaty took the direction of reinforcing the role of the European Parliament, to bring about more coherence, parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas the Lisbon Treaty took the direction of reinforcing the role of the European Parliament, to bring about more coherence, parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability;

| U. | whereas the fight against corruption is essential for the protection of the financial interests of the EU and for the maintenance of citizens’ confidence in the EU institutions; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas the fight against corruption is essential for the protection of the financial interests of the EU and for the maintenance of citizens’ confidence in the EU institutions;

| 1. | Acknowledges that the recent crises have confirmed the need to be able to mobilise investment and frontload financial support as from the very first years of recovery; is aware that in times of crisis resources have to be made available within tight deadlines and in rapidly changing circumstances; remarks that a significant amount of additional resources to be spent in a short amount of time increases the pressure on control systems; stresses, nevertheless, that rapid deployment of funds and swift adoption of legislative acts need to be complemented by adequate administrative measures; points out that the pressure to provide relief and the urge to use the resources in the shortest time possible could result in increased risk of corruption, fraud and other irregularities, and that such a situation requires efficient preventive measures and control management processes; reiterates that all procurement procedures must abide by the highest standards of openness, transparency and accountability; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to include in their respective anti-corruption strategies targeted measures dedicated to spending public money in times of crisis; highlights, in this regard, that the rules on the protection of the financial interests of the Union apply equally also in the case of emergency support and emergency support instruments such as CRII, CRII+, REACT-EU and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Draws attention to the important role of preventive measures in anticipating and effectively responding to corruption risks in crisis situations and in strengthening anti-corruption and integrity policies, as well as the bodies that enforce them, and therefore in improving overall governance; believes, in this respect, that the COVID-19 crisis will sharpen our focus on governance in the years ahead as a result of the increased efforts to tackle the pandemic’s devastating effects and costs for people and economies; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Believes that the rule of law is an essential precondition for compliance with the principle of sound financial management of emergency funds as part of the EU budget; recalls that the rule of law applies at all times, including in times of crisis, and that emergency measures must ensure compliance with the rule of law and the principles of proportionality and necessity, and that they must be time-limited and regularly scrutinised for their impact; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Highlights that emergency situations, especially health and safety crises, also impact the functioning of public authorities and create opportunities for violations of integrity, which can lead to the misuse of funds and corruption at a time when public resources are already under pressure; encourages the Commission to address the resilience of the EU institutions in such situations in order to protect emergency funds; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Reiterates the need to increase the overall transparency of the economic and financial environment of the Union, as the prevention of economic and financial crimes cannot be effective unless criminals are prevented from seeking shelter for their acts through non-transparent structures; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Emphasises in this regard that the EU — both its institutions and the Member States — cannot afford to lose precious resources at the best of times, and even less so during and after the pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Acknowledges all the efforts undertaken by the Commission to increase transparency, control and anti-corruption reforms in the Member States through its enhanced rule of law toolbox; expresses its concern, however, that the implementation of these reforms has met a certain resistance in some Member States, which can be explained in most cases by legislative or institutional gaps or, in very specific ones, by the fact that they affect the personal interests of the law-makers and government officials in charge of enforcing them; insists that any actual or potential conflicts of interest affecting law-makers and government officials must be prevented and that Member States must put in place robust anti-corruption frameworks; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Recalls that more effort needs to be put into ex ante controls as regards the traceability of funds, especially in cases where such controls and evaluations have been carried out under exceptional measures; reiterates that governments and other public authorities need efficient and transparent reporting, independent ex post audits and accountability procedures, as well as open channels of communication with civil society and the private sector, to ensure that money and measures are indeed helping the people who need it most; points out the importance of providing up-to-date, transparent and reliable information to the public during crisis situations; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Emphasises the critical role of civil society organisations and investigative journalists in denouncing corruption; regrets, therefore, that during the COVID-19 pandemic, several Member States adopted measures that hampered public access to documents and that media professionals experienced difficulties and unjustified denials, as well as pressure and threats concerning access to public documents; believes that it is important to keep citizens both informed of and engaged in the fight against corruption, as well as fully protected from negative personal and professional consequences, especially in whistleblowing cases; reiterates, in this regard, the need for the swift implementation of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on whistleblower protection; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Underlines that citizen participation in public decision-making is key to a successful response in emergency situations; urges the Member States to develop comprehensive crisis management plans in order to prepare for similar situations in the future and to include safeguards for civil society’s role as public watchdog; recalls that public access to documents in a machine-readable format is a key component in ensuring transparency and scrutiny of public spending; calls on the Commission to provide the right platforms for engagement and recalls the current possibilities to report alleged cases of fraud to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF); |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Notes that in the midst of an economic, security or health-related crisis, governments have a tendency to make contracting procedures more flexible in order to promptly respond to that crisis; stresses the fact that the EU Public Procurement Directive already allows for much quicker and less administratively burdensome procedures and that Member States’ governments should manage these procedures in the framework of the legal requirements in place; highlights that any relaxation of procedures and simplification measures, which may be necessary during crisis situations to prevent costly errors and non-fraudulent irregularities due to the complexity of rules, should be complemented by specific guidance and closely scrutinised via ex post mechanisms; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Welcomes the coordinated and decisive action at EU level resulting in the adoption of a wide package of initiatives, NextGenerationEU, targeting the consequences of the disruptive COVID-19 pandemic for citizen’s health and businesses across the EU; stresses, however, that the unprecedented increase in EU funding is prone to increased risks of corruption and fraud, and brings additional challenges in terms of monitoring and accountability; calls on the Commission and the Member States to reinforce and implement effective anti-corruption policies; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Recalls, with a view to ensuring the transparency, accountability and efficiency of EU spending, the importance of the monitoring and audit systems under the shared management funds; reiterates that Parliament has an essential role in scrutinising the stimulus package and that the Commission must keep it regularly informed of its implementation; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Notes that the RRF (24), the key instrument at the heart of NextGenerationEU, makes it possible to offer Member States grants (of up to EUR 312 billion) and loans (of up to EUR 360 billion) (25) for public investments and reforms aimed at addressing structural weaknesses and making Member States’ economies more resilient, while focusing on sustainable transition, digital transformation, economic, social and territorial cohesion, institutional resilience and the Pillar of Social Rights; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Welcomes the delegation of powers to the Commission for the establishment, by means of a delegated act, of a scoreboard to closely monitor the implementation of the recovery and resilience plans of the Members States; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Recalls that the scoreboard will serve as a basis for the recovery and resilience dialogue and that the Commission should update it biannually; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to ensure that the progress achieved in the implementation of the milestones and targets set out is monitored thoroughly and strictly in line with the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) Regulation, on the basis of the established common indicators and reporting methodology; recalls moreover that the RRF is bound by conditions that guarantee the transparent use of the money disbursed and that should prevent corruption or fraud, double funding or conflicts of interest, and believes that controls should be extended also to costs actually incurred by the final beneficiaries; welcomes the fact that, thanks to the European Parliament, Member States are now obliged to provide information on final recipients; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Encourages EU and national authorities to take on board input by local and regional authorities when developing and implementing emergency and recovery measures; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Notes that Parliament insisted, in its resolution on the views of Parliament on the ongoing assessment by the Commission and the Council of the national recovery and resilience plans, on robust transparency and accountability by the Commission, the Member States and all implementing partners in the implementation process; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Calls on the Commission to thoroughly monitor the potential risks to the EU’s financial interests and not to proceed with any payments if the milestones linked to measures to prevent, detect and correct corruption and fraud are not met; calls, moreover, on the Commission to immediately inform the budgetary authorities about all situations where funds are not paid out due to allegations of misuse, corruption, fraud or breaches of rule of law, and where Member States do not have sufficient anti-fraud systems in place; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Believes that sound financial management should be pursued and that absorption, while remaining an important objective, should not be prioritised over performance, value for money considerations and the EU added value of programmes, and that, in case of irregularities, recoveries should be ensured by means of financial corrections; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Calls on the Member States to integrate corruption risk assessments throughout programme design and delivery phases, in the areas of economic stimuli and subsidies; notes that risk situations should be addressed comprehensively, using a whole-of-government approach where possible; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Is of the opinion that more transparency, coupled with technology and data science, is instrumental in preventing and reducing corruption; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in this regard, to make full use of the available tools, such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES), Arachne and the Irregularities Management System (IMS) to effectively and efficiently identify the problematic economic operators and the private individuals (or natural persons) linked to them in both direct and indirect management; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Highlights the added benefits that information sharing can bring to fighting corruption; urges the Commission and the Member States to make sure that this is done through a digital, interoperable and standardised system for data collection, and encourages Member States to exchange information both among themselves and with the relevant EU bodies (in particular the European Court of Auditors (ECA), OLAF, the EPPO and Europol) to cooperate more closely, especially in crisis situations, with a view to improving data collection, enhancing the effectiveness of controls and securing the recovery of misused funds; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Stresses that it is vital to know who is benefiting from EU funds in order to prevent corruption, irregular spending and the misuse of funds; regrets that currently, data for the identification of economic operators and their beneficial owners is either not easily or not at all accessible (26); believes that the establishment of a single, interoperable database displaying the direct and ultimate beneficiaries of EU subsidies would represent an important step towards remedying this situation; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Emphasises that beneficiaries must be identifiable across Member States and independent of funds, including those both under direct and shared management; underlines that the database should be limited to necessary information and that information may be published in accordance with the standing jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); urges the Member States to cooperate with the Commission in order to create such a single, centralised database to trace the flows of EU money flows; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Insists on the need to strengthen EDES and its scope in the context of a forthcoming targeted revision of the Financial Regulation; calls on the Commission to extend the scope of EDES to funds under shared management, with due respect for the principles of proportionality and appropriateness; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Regrets the fact that OLAF and the ECA do not have full access to the Arachne Risk Scoring Tool and are obliged to request access to Arachne’s risk calculation on a case-by-case basis, which complicates the process of information exchange, thereby hampering the detection of and reaction to emerging risk patterns; deems it necessary to find a solution for granting OLAF and the ECA access to the Arachne Risk Scoring Tool; is of the opinion that integrating Arachne in national management and control systems should be mandatory for all managing authorities; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Calls on the Commission to evaluate the response to the COVID-19 pandemic on several fronts, including as regards preventive anti-corruption measures, analysis of empirical evidence and the rate of payment claims absorption, to look at whether corruption affected the outcome and whether integrity was upheld or undermined, and to report back to Parliament on the main findings to allow it (as the discharge authority) to include a dedicated chapter on emergency funds and crises-related spending in the 2020 discharge; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Regrets the fact that the Commission makes extensive use of the redaction tool to cover parts of the APA contracts; insists, notwithstanding the sensitivity of the information, that such details are important in improving accountability and the global response to the virus; calls on the Commission to better address transparency and accountability aspects in response to future crises, thereby contributing to enhancing public trust, fuelling public debate and promoting EU values; notes that the Commission applies Article 38(3)(d) of the Financial Regulation, referring to the case where disclosure of data risks harming the commercial interests of the recipients, and calls for proportionality of effective scrutiny and full accountability of the use of the resources with the public interest; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Believes that if relevant data on public procurement were to be made publicly available for analysis, freely and easily accessible, in an open and standardised format, together with data on court convictions and on company registries, this could significantly foster the prevention and detection of potential cases of corruption; is of the opinion, therefore, that relevant information concerning all public procurement contracts (using public money) should be publicly available, published on a dedicated website and with the minimum of redaction, in full compliance with data protection and other legal requirements; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Notes that, in line with Regulation (EU) 2016/369 of 15 March 2016 on the provision of emergency support within the Union, the decision to activate the ESI is to be taken by the Council on the basis of a Commission proposal; criticises, however, the fact that, despite its strong links to the EU budget, the activation of the ESI was done without full respect and observance of Parliament’s prerogatives as budgetary authority and final supervisor of the EU budget; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Regrets the fact that, despite several attempts to get a clear overview, the Committees on Budgets and on Budgetary Control are not given access to relevant data on the EU funds spent under the ESI to finance the APA contracts, amounting to around EUR 2,5 billion for six APA contracts; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Acknowledges that the Joint Procurement Agreement (27) allows the Member States and EEA and other countries to jointly negotiate better terms for supplying medical equipment; calls on the Commission to assess, with a view to establishing good practices for future crises, the efficiency and effectiveness of the Joint Procurement Agreement and the rescEU stockpiling of medical equipment; urges the Commission, moreover, to put in place a solid and transparent EU public procurement framework, when funds from the EU budget are fully or partially involved, that would allow for comprehensive scrutiny by Parliament, especially concerning major economic, security or health crisis-related spending areas; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Urges the Commission to propose a review of the Financial Regulation to include a solid legal basis for the mandatory use of open and standardised public procurement data, and to make budgetary control IT systems mandatory, public and interoperable with national databases; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work together towards the adoption of robust National Anti-Fraud Strategies (NAFS), that offer the benefit of coordinating the actions of several entities and guaranteeing optimisation of resources and coverage of all the areas of interest (expenditures under indirect and shared management, national funds, etc.); notes that by the end of 2020, 14 Member States had adopted NAFS and 5 had launched procedures to do so; notes that this represents progress compared to 2019 but regrets the fact that not all Member States have yet adopted NAFS or intend to do so; is concerned that the existing strategies vary in scope and depth and need to be updated in this regard; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Urges the Member States to harmonise and align their standards and calls on the Commission to initiate infringement procedures against Member States refusing to do so; calls on the Commission to support Member States to improve their strategies to ensure the existence of robust NAFS throughout the Union; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Considers it important that the Commission assess not only the existence but also the effectiveness of NAFS in its upcoming report on the rule of law; is of the opinion, moreover, that future reports on the rule of law should build on good practices and provide country-specific recommendations on how to address the concerns identified or remedy breaches, including deadlines for implementation, where appropriate, and benchmarks to be followed up on; considers that the measures adopted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and which have an impact on the rule of law should also be looked into; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Recalls that the protection of the Union’s financial interests is of utmost importance and that continuous, strong efforts in this regard are necessary at all levels; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Insists on the need for collaborative work among EPPO and other EU bodies such as Eurojust, Europol and OLAF to carry out criminal investigations and prosecutions within the respective mandate/remit; emphasises the crucial role of the aforementioned institutions and bodies during emergency situations and crises to fight those who take advantage of EU funds, and acknowledges, in this regard, the working arrangements signed between them; stresses that efficient collaboration is only possible when EU bodies have political support and are equipped with sufficient human and financial resources; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Criticises the fact that the Commission ignored Parliament’s call to expand the EPPO staffing plan and that it did not implement the 2020 conciliation agreement; reiterates the need for increased resources and staff for both the EPPO and OLAF in order to facilitate the fight against corruption, fraud, irregular spending and the misuse of funds; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Alerts that organised criminal groups operate without borders and that, increasingly, they acquire assets in Member States other than those in which they are based and in third countries; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Calls for increased effective international cooperation on taking of evidence, mutual recognition, service of documents, and confiscation and freezing of assets, with a view to giving the competent authorities the means to trace, freeze, manage and confiscate the proceeds of crime; calls on the Commission, therefore, to support and promote the Union-wide harmonisation of definitions of corruption offenses and to make better use of the existing data sets and methodology to develop new ones in order to obtain comparative data from across the EU on the treatment of corruption cases; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Calls for greater cooperation between the representatives of national authorities and OLAF in order to ensure that the investigations carried out in relation to fraud to the detriment of the EU budget are duly considered; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Underlines that the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) has made comprehensive recommendations to Member States with respect to the use of public money in crisis and emergency situations; calls on all Member States to fully implement these recommendations, thereby enhancing transparency and accountability; welcomes, in this regard, the possibility for the EU to join GRECO as a full member; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Welcomes the package of legislative proposals presented by the Commission to strengthen the EU’s rules on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism; calls for the efficient and consistent implementation of the future framework, which anticipates emergency situations where stability and security in the EU may be compromised; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Observes with concern Europol’s conclusion that criminals are digital natives, which means that virtually all criminal activities now feature some online component and that many crimes have fully migrated online; is concerned that new technologies also allow traditional crimes to continue to be committed in a non-traditional way, from anywhere in the world and at any time; calls on the Commission and the Member States to make a decisive investment and a strong political commitment to meet these new challenges; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Is of the opinion that advances in the field of AI present a major opportunity for the public sector to detect and prevent fraud, for instance by strengthening the Commission’s central analytical capacity, as IT tools can easily scrape, link and analyse the necessary data and detect potential irregularities, fraud and corruption; calls on the Commission and the Member States to put into use a single integrated, interoperable information and monitoring system, including a single data-mining and risk-scoring tool to access and analyse the relevant data and increase control reliability, with a view to a generalised application, including with the help of the Technical Support Instrument; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Notes that the collection of data on those ultimately benefitting, directly or indirectly, from Union funding under shared management and for projects and reforms supported by the RRF, including data on beneficial owners of the recipients of the funding, is necessary to ensure effective controls and audits, and that the rules related to the collection and processing of such data should comply with the applicable data protection rules; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Highlights the benefits that digital land registers bring to transparency of ownership and to preventing and fighting corruption; welcomes the Commission initiatives to implement such programmes across the EU; calls on the national authorities to collaborate with the Commission towards the extensive implementation of these programmes; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Takes the view that a centralised information and monitoring system should include procurement requirements with EU-wide, country-by-country, publicly available data for contractors and contracting authorities to systematically report specific project data, progress in achieving milestones and the direct and ultimate beneficial owners (in a standardised format); believes that such a system should be created in order to facilitate data collection, interoperability and treatment at EU level, and to ensure effective controls and audits; underlines that the system should be limited to necessary information and that it should be possible to publish information in accordance with the standing jurisprudence of the CJEU; points out, however, that an intermediate level could be introduced at national level (i.e. decentralised collection point) in order to facilitate the data collection exercise, taking into consideration language differences and local characteristics (such as regional responsibilities); |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Suggests the use of financial disclosure / assets declaration systems for the prevention, detection and investigation and/or prosecution of corruption with a view to promoting accountability and awareness among public officials, thereby avoiding conflicts of interest; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Believes that data platforms can strengthen oversight mechanisms and enhance effective information sharing with other government departments; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Believes in the benefits of professionalisation and adequate wages in public procurement, namely that having specialised, well trained and well paid public procurement staff who share their expertise, knowledge and (market) intelligence, also across Member States’ borders, is a positive practice to be implemented together with other corruption prevention techniques; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Encourages the Member States to make good use of EU funding and programmes; calls on national authorities to collaborate with OLAF towards training staff with respect to the different fraud types, trends, threats and risks, corruption and other illegal activities affecting the EU’s financial interests; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

56.

---

(1)  OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65.

(3)  OJ C 252, 18.7.2018, p. 56.

(4)  OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29.

(5)  OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 43.

(6)  OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1.

(7)  OLAF, ‘Twentieth report of the European Anti-Fraud Office, 1 January to 31 December 2019’, 2020.

(8)  Gallego, J., Prem, M. and Vargas, J.F., ‘Corruption in the times of Pandemia’, May 2020.

(9)  SWD(2020)0156, SWD(2020)0157, SWD(2020)0158, SWD(2020)0159 and SWD(2020)0160.

(10)  OJ L 437, 28.12.2020, p. 30.

(11)  OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17.

(12)  OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 30.

(13)  OJ L 172, 17.5.2021, p. 110.

(14)  OJ C 272, 17.8.2020, p. 1.

(15)  https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-launches-european-financial-and-economic-crime-centre

(16)  https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/serious-and-organised-crime-in-eu-corrupting-influence

(17)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0148.

(18)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0337.

(19)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0288.

(20)  OJ L 70, 16.3.2016, p. 1.

(21)  Fighting fraud in EU spending: action needed (europa.eu)

(22)  http://ti-health.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/For-Whose-Benefit-Transparency-International.pdf

(23)  https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/309580

(24)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R0241

(25)  Both in 2018 prices.

(26)  Study — ‘The Largest 50 Beneficiaries in each EU Member State of CAP and Cohesion Funds’, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs, May 2021.

(27)  https://ec.europa.eu/health/security/preparedness_response_en

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/58 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/58

---

P9_TA(2021)0503

Implementation of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the implementation of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (2021/2077(INI))

(2022/C 251/05)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Article 194 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Article 194 thereof,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on maximising the energy efficiency potential of the EU building stock (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on maximising the energy efficiency potential of the EU building stock (1),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on access to decent and affordable housing for all (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on access to decent and affordable housing for all (2),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on a European strategy for energy system integration (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on a European strategy for energy system integration (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on a European Strategy for Hydrogen (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on a European Strategy for Hydrogen (4),

| — | having regard to Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings (5) (Energy Performance of Buildings Directive — EPBD), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings (5) (Energy Performance of Buildings Directive — EPBD),

| — | having regard to Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC (6) (Energy Efficiency Directive), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC (6) (Energy Efficiency Directive),

| — | having regard to Directive 2014/94/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure (7), and its planned review, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2014/94/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure (7), and its planned review,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/631 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 setting CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles (8) and the Commission proposal of 14 July 2021 to amend Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the aforementioned standards in line with the Union’s increased climate ambition (COM(2021)0556), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/631 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 setting CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles (8) and the Commission proposal of 14 July 2021 to amend Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the aforementioned standards in line with the Union’s increased climate ambition (COM(2021)0556),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’) (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’) (9),

| — | having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2019/786 of 8 May 2019 on building renovation (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2019/786 of 8 May 2019 on building renovation (10),

| — | having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2019/1019 of 7 June 2019 on building modernisation (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2019/1019 of 7 June 2019 on building modernisation (11),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640) and to Parliament’s resolution of 15 January 2020 (12) thereon, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640) and to Parliament’s resolution of 15 January 2020 (12) thereon,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 on a new Circular Economy Action Plan — For a cleaner and more competitive Europe (COM(2020)0098), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 on a new Circular Economy Action Plan — For a cleaner and more competitive Europe (COM(2020)0098),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 14 October 2020 on a Renovation Wave for Europe — greening our buildings, creating jobs, improving lives (COM(2020)0662), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 14 October 2020 on a Renovation Wave for Europe — greening our buildings, creating jobs, improving lives (COM(2020)0662),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2020 on a Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy — putting European transport on track for the future (COM(2020)0789), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2020 on a Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy — putting European transport on track for the future (COM(2020)0789),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 6 July 2021 on a Strategy for Financing the Transition to a Sustainable Economy (COM(2021)0390), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 6 July 2021 on a Strategy for Financing the Transition to a Sustainable Economy (COM(2021)0390),

| — | having regard to the Commission staff working document of 25 March 2021 entitled ‘Preliminary analysis of the long-term renovation strategies of 13 Member States’ (SWD(2021)0069), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission staff working document of 25 March 2021 entitled ‘Preliminary analysis of the long-term renovation strategies of 13 Member States’ (SWD(2021)0069),

| — | having regard to the recently published Fit for 55 package, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recently published Fit for 55 package,

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A9-0321/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A9-0321/2021),

| A. | whereas buildings are responsible for 36 % of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and whereas the building renovation sector is one of the key areas for reducing GHGs and reaching the EU’s climate neutrality, energy efficiency and European Green Deal objectives; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas buildings are responsible for 36 % of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and whereas the building renovation sector is one of the key areas for reducing GHGs and reaching the EU’s climate neutrality, energy efficiency and European Green Deal objectives;

| B. | whereas deep and staged deep renovations of the 210 million existing buildings will be crucial to any convincing strategy, as those are the most energy inefficient with up to 110 million buildings potentially in need of renovation (13); |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas deep and staged deep renovations of the 210 million existing buildings will be crucial to any convincing strategy, as those are the most energy inefficient with up to 110 million buildings potentially in need of renovation (13);

| C. | whereas 6 % of EU households were unable to pay their utility bills in 2019; whereas the energy efficiency of buildings can have a positive impact in combating energy poverty; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas 6 % of EU households were unable to pay their utility bills in 2019; whereas the energy efficiency of buildings can have a positive impact in combating energy poverty;

| D. | whereas the building renovation rate is currently very low at around 1 % per year, with the rate of deep renovations at 0,2 % per year; whereas renovation programmes do not always cover energy efficiency improvements and increases in renewable energy sources; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the building renovation rate is currently very low at around 1 % per year, with the rate of deep renovations at 0,2 % per year; whereas renovation programmes do not always cover energy efficiency improvements and increases in renewable energy sources;

| E. | whereas in accordance with the definition in Article 2(18) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (14) on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, ‘energy efficiency first’ is a guiding principle of EU energy policy to make energy demand and energy supply more efficient, in particular by means of cost-effective end use energy savings, demand-response initiatives and the more efficient conversion, transmission and distribution of energy; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas in accordance with the definition in Article 2(18) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (14) on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, ‘energy efficiency first’ is a guiding principle of EU energy policy to make energy demand and energy supply more efficient, in particular by means of cost-effective end use energy savings, demand-response initiatives and the more efficient conversion, transmission and distribution of energy;

| F. | whereas according to an assessment by the Commission, heating and hot water alone account for 79 % of total final energy use in EU households (192,5 Mtoe) (15); |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas according to an assessment by the Commission, heating and hot water alone account for 79 % of total final energy use in EU households (192,5 Mtoe) (15);

| G. | whereas the latest revision of the EPBD in 2018 through Directive (EU) 2018/844 (16) aimed to accelerate the renovation of existing buildings by 2050 and to support the modernisation of all buildings with smart technologies and a clearer link to clean mobility, as well as provide a stable environment for investment decisions and enable consumers and businesses to make more informed choices to save energy and money; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the latest revision of the EPBD in 2018 through Directive (EU) 2018/844 (16) aimed to accelerate the renovation of existing buildings by 2050 and to support the modernisation of all buildings with smart technologies and a clearer link to clean mobility, as well as provide a stable environment for investment decisions and enable consumers and businesses to make more informed choices to save energy and money;

| H. | whereas since the last revision of the EPBD, the EU has adopted the objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas since the last revision of the EPBD, the EU has adopted the objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest;

| I. | whereas the EPBD mandates Member States to adopt long-term renovation strategies (LTRSs), but without obliging them to renovate or setting out how to do so, and provides no clear means to check their strategies against results; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the EPBD mandates Member States to adopt long-term renovation strategies (LTRSs), but without obliging them to renovate or setting out how to do so, and provides no clear means to check their strategies against results;

| J. | whereas the LTRSs should adequately support the energy performance of social housing; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the LTRSs should adequately support the energy performance of social housing;

| K. | whereas the building automation and control system measures included in the revised EPBD have not yet been fully transposed in the Member States; whereas implementation would create more certainty for investors and professionals; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the building automation and control system measures included in the revised EPBD have not yet been fully transposed in the Member States; whereas implementation would create more certainty for investors and professionals;

| L. | whereas the Energy Efficiency Directive requires Member States to carry out comprehensive assessments on efficient and renewable heating and cooling with a view to identifying the potential for heating and cooling solutions in the building sector and proposing policies to deliver efficiency and renewable potential; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the Energy Efficiency Directive requires Member States to carry out comprehensive assessments on efficient and renewable heating and cooling with a view to identifying the potential for heating and cooling solutions in the building sector and proposing policies to deliver efficiency and renewable potential;

| M. | whereas the New European Bauhaus initiative aims to remove the divide between design and function, sustainable living, the smart use of resources, and innovative and inclusive solutions; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the New European Bauhaus initiative aims to remove the divide between design and function, sustainable living, the smart use of resources, and innovative and inclusive solutions;

| N. | whereas adequate funding and financing is key to unleashing the Renovation Wave; whereas renovation is a flagship area for investment and reform under the Recovery and Resilience Facility; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas adequate funding and financing is key to unleashing the Renovation Wave; whereas renovation is a flagship area for investment and reform under the Recovery and Resilience Facility;

| O. | whereas electric vehicles (EVs) are an important element of the EU’s clean energy transition based on energy efficiency measures, renewable energy, alternative fuels and innovative solutions for the management of energy flexibility and in order to achieve the objective of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas electric vehicles (EVs) are an important element of the EU’s clean energy transition based on energy efficiency measures, renewable energy, alternative fuels and innovative solutions for the management of energy flexibility and in order to achieve the objective of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest;

| P. | whereas the EPBD complements Directive 2014/94/EU on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure by providing a legal basis for the deployment of recharging points in residential and non-residential buildings; whereas the EPBD plays a key role at EU level to support smart, private recharging, given that the majority of recharging is likely to take place in private and on publicly accessible non-residential sites; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the EPBD complements Directive 2014/94/EU on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure by providing a legal basis for the deployment of recharging points in residential and non-residential buildings; whereas the EPBD plays a key role at EU level to support smart, private recharging, given that the majority of recharging is likely to take place in private and on publicly accessible non-residential sites;

| Q. | whereas private EV chargers often have different applications and technical requirements from public charging points, as they are supplied with less power and are used for longer charging periods, while remaining to a large extent the most affordable type of charging method; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas private EV chargers often have different applications and technical requirements from public charging points, as they are supplied with less power and are used for longer charging periods, while remaining to a large extent the most affordable type of charging method;

| R. | whereas the EPBD would need to reflect the requirements for the installation of a minimum number of recharging points for the parking spaces of buildings by mandating the deployment of adequate pre-cabling for EV charging; whereas from 2025 Member States must define a minimum requirement of recharging points for all non-residential buildings, both public and private, which have more than 20 parking spaces, according to the relevant national, regional and local conditions; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas the EPBD would need to reflect the requirements for the installation of a minimum number of recharging points for the parking spaces of buildings by mandating the deployment of adequate pre-cabling for EV charging; whereas from 2025 Member States must define a minimum requirement of recharging points for all non-residential buildings, both public and private, which have more than 20 parking spaces, according to the relevant national, regional and local conditions;

Observations

| 1. | Highlights that the provisions of Article 2a of the EPBD will need to be strengthened and implemented effectively to ensure that the building sector successfully contributes to achieving at least 55 % GHG reductions by 2030 and the EU’s target of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; believes that the main objective and intermediate milestones and indicators of the EPBD will also need to be adapted in consequence, as the LTRSs are not currently at the requisite levels to achieve the objectives of the EPBD; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Stresses that the EPBD and detailed LTRSs should be a driving force to increase the scale, speed, depth and quality of the renovation of Europe’s building stock through new innovative policy measures, as suggested in the Renovation Wave; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Regrets the fact that some Member States submitted their LTRSs late and one has yet to even submit theirs; points out that as a result it is difficult to compare the Member States’ plans; highlights the positive fact that late submissions were able to include links to national recovery plans adopted as a result of the COVID-19 crisis and the latest EU policy initiatives such as the European Green Deal and Renovation Wave; notes, however, that this created disparities between those Member States that submitted their LTRSs prior to their pandemic recovery plans; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Recalls the importance of making adequate financial resources available through NextGenerationEU in the area of the renovation and energy performance and efficiency of buildings; believes that linking building renovation to recovery funds provides an economic opportunity and a means for Member States to reduce GHG emissions; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Notes that the submitted LTRSs have in general broadly respected the requirements of Article 2a of the EPBD, providing information on the different categories laid down therein; regrets the fact, however, that the level of detail and ambition varies from one LTRS to another; regrets the fact that several Member States have not set clear milestones for 2030, 2040 and 2050 as required by Article 2a; regrets the fact, moreover, that not all LTRSs provide GHG reduction data, which makes it difficult to assess the ambition of the strategies in terms of climate mitigation; believes that the LTRSs should work to create clear measures and monitoring tools to triple the yearly renovation rate, taking into account the different starting points and building stocks across the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Points out that Member States broadly focused on decarbonising energy supply systems and on GHG emissions, rather than actively developing dedicated measures and policies aimed at improving the energy performance of buildings by applying the energy efficiency first principle and thereby reducing overall energy consumption in the sector as part of an integrated systems approach to energy; stresses that energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy should be maximised across the entire energy value chain, including electricity, heat and gas, and not only for individual buildings; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls on the Commission to closely monitor whether the objectives of the LTRSs are aligned with the Renovation Wave, the heating and cooling comprehensive assessments required by the Energy Efficiency Directive and Renewable Energy Directive (17), and the new climate and energy targets for each Member State according to their building stock; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Calls on the Member States to foster renovation that favours the energy system integration of renewables in buildings, such as the installation of EV charging infrastructure, thermal storage and connection to smart grids; encourages the Member States and the Commission to promote the sharing of best practices; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Believes that citizens’ engagement in the green transition and building renovations is key to their success; stresses that involving experts and harnessing public expertise can help to improve implementation; calls on the Member States to provide sufficient transparency throughout the public consultation process on LTRSs and to ensure that the process is inclusive by facilitating the involvement of all of the relevant stakeholders in accordance with the specific requirements of the EPBD; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Regrets the fact that the EU did not achieve its energy efficiency target in 2020; highlights that there is a collective ambition gap in terms of national contributions under the national energy and climate plans to achieve the energy efficiency target in 2030 and that Member States will therefore need to significantly ramp up their efforts; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Notes that construction is a complex activity that requires close coordination between a large number of professionals and craftspeople and relies on the use of a wide range of construction techniques and materials; believes that the review of the EPBD needs to consider the interaction with other sustainable construction policies and material neutrality in order to decarbonise European buildings efficiently; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Highlights the importance of sustainability in material use and resource consumption of a building’s lifecycle, from material extraction, construction and use, to end of use and demolition as well as recycling and reuse, including renewable and sustainable nature-based materials; highlights, moreover, that building planning should utilise the circular economy during the different stages of the construction process; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Supports the use of sustainable, innovative and non-toxic construction materials and highlights the importance of strengthening the circularity of building materials by implementing or creating a circular economy labelling system based on environmental standards and specific criteria for certain materials; notes that further research is required into sustainable materials and sustainable processes; highlights that wood-based materials can play a role in substituting fossil-based alternatives in the construction of buildings and highlights their long-term carbon storage potential; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Acknowledges that while deep renovations have the advantage of bringing about holistic change in a building’s energy performance, staged and staged deep renovations can allow for less disruptive and more cost-efficient renovation measures by aligning them with given ‘trigger points’; notes that such occasions are prompted by either practical opportunities, personal circumstances, change of ownership, or a change of tenant in rental properties; encourages the Member States to consider how to use ‘trigger points’ to incentivise renovations; notes that one-step and staged renovations are not in competition with each other, but are both suitable solutions depending on the particular situation; believes that staged and staged deep renovations must be carried out in line with deep renovation standards to avoid lock-in effects by ensuring a building renovation roadmap; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Notes that the current definition of nearly zero-energy buildings in the EPBD is of a qualitative nature and leaves a wide margin of discretion to the Member States in setting standards accordingly; calls on the Commission to introduce a ‘deep renovation’ standard to achieve energy savings and GHG emission reductions as well as a harmonised definition of nearly zero-energy buildings; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Believes that renovations and standards for new builds should address fire safety and risks related to intense seismic activity, which affect the energy efficiency and lifetime of buildings, and should incorporate high standards on health; calls on the Member States to develop an electrical inspection regime in view of the fact that 30 % of domestic fires and 50 % of domestic accidental fires have an electrical source (18); believes that renovations of the European building stock should integrate electrical safety checks and upgrades and ensure sufficient ventilation for smoke in case of fire; underlines that the LTRSs should also contribute to the static and structural reinforcement of building stocks; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Reiterates the need to take into account the presence of asbestos-containing products in buildings and to remove these products and protect buildings from the emission of asbestos into the environment when they are upgraded for energy efficiency purposes (19); |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Regrets the fact that although the deadline to transpose the EPBD expired on 10 March 2020, some Member States have still not fully implemented this legislation; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Recalls the importance of putting in place adequate incentives for the renovation of buildings as well as financial measures conditional on energy efficiency improvements and energy savings, in accordance with Article 10(6) of the EPDB and in order to ensure the affordability of renovations; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Highlights the importance of clear and accurate information on energy performance and energy costs for prospective buyers and prospective tenants; recognises the need to improve and better harmonise energy performance certificates (EPCs) across the Member States in order to make them easier to compare, of better quality and more reliable, while also taking into account the different starting points and building stocks across the Member States; believes, therefore, that the EPCs should be made easier to access and read, should display practical information on real energy performance, particularly on the actual carbon footprint of a building, should be digitised, and should integrate information from the local market at EU level and information regarding indoor environmental quality parameters such as thermal comfort; highlights that the EPCs could therefore be used for optional demand-response services as a reference for regulatory measures, funding programmes and integrated renovation policies; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Highlights the gap between real energy performance and performance calculated through the EPCs, which is a source of confusion for EPC users; highlights the need to integrate the building renovation passport, digital building logbook, and smart readiness indicator (SRI) within the EPC framework to avoid a multiplication of tools and bring more clarity to consumers; believes that this will facilitate renovation, increase its depth, ensure coordination between the different measures over time, and capture multiple benefits; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Recalls that the LTRSs should include the wider benefits of renovations such as health, safety, thermal comfort and indoor air quality; notes that according to a Commission study (20), health was the primary incentive of private homeowners when carrying out energy renovations, with a clear connection between home quality, energy poverty and health; believes that indoor air quality should be included when Member States promote building renovation through public incentive schemes and information campaigns, among other initiatives; encourages the Member States to improve data collection on indoor environmental quality parameters with a view to developing minimum indoor environmental quality standards; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Highlights that ambitious goals for deep and staged deep renovation of the existing building stock could create up to 2 million jobs (21), mostly local, non-outsourceable positions especially in small and medium-sized enterprises, and provide clean and affordable energy to consumers and deliver improvements to occupants’ living conditions; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Recalls that public buildings must lead the way in renovation rates and in achieving decarbonisation, energy efficiency and cost effectiveness, thereby helping to raise awareness and garner acceptance among the wider public; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Reiterates its call for the promotion of an EU skills initiative, including aspects to encourage gender inclusivity, together with national efforts in order to enable intermediaries such as installers, architects or contractors to advise, prescribe or install the requisite solutions, including digital solutions, to deliver energy efficiency programmes and a decarbonised building stock, as well as focusing on the upskilling and reskilling of all actors involved in the construction sector; deems it necessary that the Member States provide a clear link between their national LTRSs and adequate initiatives to promote skills and education in the construction and energy efficiency sectors; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Believes that the principles of cost efficiency and of cost neutrality whereby rent increases are balanced with energy savings will reduce energy bills for end-use consumers; encourages the Member States to systematically include in their LTRSs policies and actions to tackle energy poverty and the worst-performing buildings in their national building stocks and to counter market distortions and speculative acquisitions that lead to higher rents, which disproportionately affect low-income tenants; recalls that the burden placed on the most vulnerable consumers by variability in the energy markets can be significantly reduced by enhancing energy efficiency in buildings; emphasises the need to ensure flexible financial support and mechanisms for these consumers in order to help tackle energy poverty; notes, however, that incentives to reduce renovation costs for specific target groups and sectors should be considered; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Highlights that the EPBD should ensure that renovation delivers return on investment for homeowners and building owners by establishing real and measured improvements in the energy performance of buildings; underscores that an approach based on the measured energy saved as a result of renovation will drive down the cost and increase the depth, quality and scale of energy efficiency retrofits for existing buildings; asks the Commission to investigate whether a revision of the cost-optimal level, as defined in Article 2(14), is necessary as part of the EPBD review; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Welcomes the relative success of one-stop shops and emphasises the critical role they can play in connecting potential projects with market players, including citizens, public authorities and project developers, in particular smaller-scale projects; notes that there is no common understanding on what a one-stop shop is, as the existing models across the EU differ in terms of structure, management and the type of assistance provided; recalls the importance of increasing awareness of one-stop shops, including at local and regional levels; stresses that one-stop shops can play a considerable role in addressing the issue of lengthy and cumbersome permit procedures and in promoting access to funding for building renovation, helping to disseminate information on terms and conditions; believes that one-stop shops should advise and support both single-family homes and multi-unit buildings and provide support for accredited installers; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Recalls that Article 19 of the EPBD sets out a review clause, including an ex post evaluation to be carried out by 2026 at the latest; highlights that this should enable lessons to be learnt from the implementation of the EPBD and serve to assess the progress made in its application across the Union; |
| --- | --- |

29.

Recommendations

| 30. | Stresses that the EPBD is crucial to successfully delivering on the Renovation Wave and emissions reduction; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Calls on the Member States to ensure the proper implementation of the directive in all its aspects, with particular regard to the social housing stock; calls on the Commission to continue monitoring this implementation and to take action, where necessary, in the event of non-compliance; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Calls on the Commission to strengthen the current provisions of the EPBD to ensure that Member States’ LTRSs are consistent with the EU’s climate neutrality goals and energy targets; highlights that building renovations will need to be carried out at a rate of 3 % per year for deep and staged deep retrofits in order for the EU to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Calls on the Commission to investigate how to formulate a standard template that Member States could use to ensure they address all of the requirements of Article 2a of the EPBD and to harmonise the objectives and requirements to ensure better comparability of progress and results, and an assessment of national recovery and resilience plans, or any other EU funding, for which a complete LTRS is a condition; encourages the Commission to create an ad hoc network of experts to support Member States in the design, monitoring and implementation processes of their LTRSs; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Calls on the Commission to consider how to facilitate further the development of one-stop shops that provide advisory services to citizens and other stakeholders, including through more stringent measures in the EPBD; is convinced that additional guidance and support measures, notably technical assistance, information campaigns, training and project financing, can lead to a higher renovation rate; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Calls on the Member States to maximise synergies between their LTRSs, their national recovery and resilience plans and other recovery measures, thus ensuring that NextGenerationEU both provides immediate funding for deep and staged deep renovations, with particular regard to worst performing buildings and low income households, and creates the enabling framework for lead markets in sustainable renovation to continue growing beyond the end of the financing term; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Considers that the digitalisation of buildings and construction technologies, where feasible, can play an important role in increasing energy efficiency; believes that the revision of the EPBD should serve to further promote smart and flexible buildings technologies in line with the energy efficiency first principle and foster a data-centric approach; encourages the use and deployment of emerging technologies such as smart meters, smart charging, smart heating appliances, storage technologies and energy management systems that are interoperable with the energy grid, 3D modelling and simulation and artificial intelligence in order to drive carbon emissions reductions at every stage of a building’s lifecycle, beginning with the planning and design phases and continuing into construction, operations and retrofit; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Highlights that up-to-date, reliable and complete data on the performance of the entire European building stock is key to developing and implementing effective policies aimed at improving the energy efficiency of the sector; notes that digital technologies should also be used to support the mapping of the existing stock and support LTRS deployment; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Believes that a data-centric approach should be deployed to ensure a wider availability of aggregated and anonymised data for homeowners, tenants and third parties, who can use it to optimise energy consumption, including through GDPR-secure consent schemes, as well as for statistical and research purposes; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Encourages the Member States to ensure effective, ambitious and consistent implementation of the approved SRI scheme across the EU; points out that the SRI should serve to achieve the Renovation Wave and energy system integration by supporting the uptake of smart and flexible buildings; recognises that the SRI will help to further encourage the design and construction of new buildings as zero-energy buildings; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Believes that the LTRSs should provide more details for long-term action and integrated infrastructure planning based on a roadmap with concrete policies and a timeline with clear milestones for 2030, 2040 and 2050, in order to create a more stable environment for investors, developers, homeowners and tenants and address the entire lifecycle impact of buildings; stresses that the Member States must improve access to a range of financial and fiscal mechanisms to support the mobilisation of private investments and foster public and private partnerships; calls for action to promote loans that set energy efficiency as a criterion for lower interest rates; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Highlights that the EPBD should ensure that renovation delivers value for money and a return on investment for homeowners and building owners, reduced energy bills and improved sustainability by establishing real and measured improvements in the energy performance of buildings; underlines that an approach based on the actual energy saved as a result of renovation will drive down the cost and increase both the quality and scale of the energy efficiency retrofits for building renovations; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Highlights the potential of green infrastructure such as green roofs and walls in improving the energy performance of buildings and promoting climate adaptation and mitigation and biodiversity, particularly in urban areas; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Calls for the Member States to use the LTRSs to implement innovative policies to actively involve citizens in their establishment and implementation and in energy efficiency programmes; stresses the importance of involving and mobilising stakeholders, including citizens, local municipalities, housing associations and building professionals, in the creation of integrated plans and implementation strategies for the decarbonisation of buildings; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Acknowledges the different construction and renovation dynamics for different types of buildings (public and private, non-residential and residential) in the Member States; calls on the Commission to provide a framework to introduce minimum energy performance standards, accounting for different starting points and building stocks across the Member States, notably buildings of special architectural or historical merit, to accelerate renovation rates and provide visibility to the entire value chain about expected improvements and to stimulate innovation, while ensuring affordability, particularly for those on low incomes and in vulnerable situations; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Calls on the Member States to develop an integrated and embedded framework which includes relevant financing and technical assistance for the gradual introduction of minimum energy performance standards, which will ultimately ensure the achievement of the 2030, 2040 and 2050 milestones set out in their LTRSs; underlines that such minimum standards would help to roll out the pathway to climate neutrality in the building sector by 2050 at the latest, and could provide visibility and security for the market regarding the transformation of the existing building stock; recognises that the Member States have the flexibility to devise the requisite measures to accommodate different economic, climate, political, social and construction conditions; considers that specific financial instruments and incentives should be provided for buildings with technical, architectural, heritage-related and historical constraints that may not be renovated at a reasonable cost compared to the property’s value; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Calls on the Commission to link the LTRSs with the relevant provisions of the Energy Efficiency Directive and the Renewable Energy Directive on efficient district heating and cooling and on the promotion of renewable energy in the building sector, such as solar, thermal and geothermal energy, as well as a greater role for energy storage and self-consumption in response to grid and micro-grid signals, while recognising that fossil fuels, especially natural gas, are currently employed in heating systems for buildings; notes that consumers need support to switch away from fossil fuels; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Calls on the Member States to fully implement the provisions of Articles 14 and 15(4) of the EPBD, providing citizens and professionals with clear details on how the building, automation and control system can deliver the mandatory capabilities as soon as possible, in order to ensure that all of the preparatory action is taken without delay and before the 2025 deadline; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider using tools or checklists developed by experts and professionals when transposing those provisions; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Calls on the Member States to target the decarbonisation of heating and cooling in buildings, in line with the priorities of the Renovation Wave, and to consider incentive schemes, with a focus on the most vulnerable consumers, to replace old, fossil-based and inefficient heating systems in buildings, including by introducing replacement targets in line with the LTRSs; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Recalls its demand for the next revision to evaluate the need to increase the charging infrastructure requirements in the EPBD, taking into account the need to ensure grid stability, for instance by putting in place smart charging functionalities, and to foster sustainable mobility, as well as include an integrated, systematic and circular approach for both urban and rural developments, in accordance with proper urban planning and transport routes; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Encourages the Member States to consider how best to reap the benefits of a district-based approach for large-scale renovations in conjunction with stakeholders and local communities; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that charging points in buildings are ready for smart charging and to align the requirements with the revised Renewable Energy Directive; calls on the Member States to develop a framework to help to simplify and accelerate the deployment of charging points in new and existing residential and non-residential buildings, to address possible regulatory barriers, and to promote suitable ways to ensure easy access and storage for bicycles in building design; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Welcomes the Commission’s recognition of the importance of e-mobility by introducing minimum requirements for car parks over a certain size and other minimum infrastructure requirements for smaller buildings; emphasises that the roll-out of this recharging infrastructure must be further supported; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Emphasises the important role that the renovation of existing buildings and design of new buildings can play in encouraging the uptake of EVs such as cars, vans, bikes and motorcycles by providing both adequate parking spaces and charging infrastructure, thereby contributing to the overall decarbonisation of the transport sector; notes that with such an intervention buildings can be made healthier, greener and interconnected within a neighbourhood district, as well as more resilient to the negative impacts of climate change; calls on the Commission to consider extending the scope of mobility of the EPBD by introducing minimum requirements, where feasible, in different types of buildings for the parking infrastructure of bicycles and recharging points for electric bicycles; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Welcomes the recognition of the importance of the pre-cabling infrastructure requirements in new residential and non-residential buildings as one of the conditions for the rapid deployment of recharging points; calls on the Commission to encourage the inclusion of such requirements in the national policy frameworks; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Stresses that the availability of charging points is one of the incentives for a private residential or homeowner to opt for an e-mobility solution; notes, however, that the EPBD currently only lays down requirements on ducting infrastructure for new buildings and buildings undergoing major renovation with more than 10 parking spaces; points out that the directive provides for an opt-out if the cost of the recharging and ducting installations exceeds 7 % of the total cost of the overall renovation of the building; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to carry out a cost analysis to examine possible ways to encourage developers to deploy adequate infrastructure for EV users; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Recalls that the Member States must lay down requirements for the installation of a number of recharging points for all non-residential buildings with more than 20 parking spaces by 1 January 2025; notes the importance, in this regard, of identifying shortcomings with the implementation of the EPBD, the revision of which should incorporate provisions to further encourage and facilitate the deployment of private and public charging infrastructure in residential and non-residential buildings; |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | Emphasises that e-mobility solutions must be readily accessible to all people; highlights, in this regard, the need to renovate buildings including car parks in order to improve the accessibility of people with reduced mobility; stresses the need, moreover, to set aside storage space for mobility devices in renovated and new buildings, including for wheelchairs and pushchairs; |
| --- | --- |

57.

| 58. | Welcomes the recognition of the measures needed to facilitate and expedite the deployment of recharging infrastructure by addressing existing barriers such as split incentives and administrative burdens; points out, however, that administrative barriers continue to exist at national and local level with regard to infrastructural planning and permit procedures for recharging infrastructure, which are hampering the deployment of recharging infrastructure in new and existing residential and non-residential buildings; emphasises that further efforts are required to remove these clear administrative barriers; |
| --- | --- |

58.

| 59. | Underlines the notion that recharging EVs in residential and non-residential buildings needs to complement publicly accessible recharging infrastructure to ensure the recharging capacity of EVs; highlights the need to increase investment in e-mobility and to deploy charging infrastructure capable of smart charging, which can facilitate peak shifting and demand response, creating cheaper and more efficient energy electricity grids that require less generation capacity and infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

59.

| 60. | Believes that the deployment of public, semi-public and private smart charging infrastructure remains a core pre-condition to boost the market uptake of EVs; calls, therefore, for more investment in buildings and mobility, boosting innovation and the use of digital tools for e-mobility; |
| --- | --- |

60.

| 61. | Points out that the relevant EU laws should facilitate the introduction of charging points for EVs in conjunction with renovations, new builds and new installations; highlights the importance of investment in public charging stations along core network corridors and on the comprehensive network, but emphasises that these can only be in addition to the much larger number of charging points that will be needed in urban areas; points out that the most cost-effective and practical way of speeding up the shift to electric power of vehicle fleets is to make charging points available near households and workplaces, where they serve as a fundamental adjunct to the necessary but more costly fast-charging infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

61.

| 62. | Highlights the importance of ensuring inclusive, cohesive and sustainable mobility for all Europeans and regions, including the outermost regions; underlines the importance of promoting alternative, inclusive, safe and sustainable modes of transport and the requisite infrastructure for this; calls on the Member States to ascertain socioeconomic and territorial cohesion when designing their requirements for the installation of a minimum number of recharging points; urges the Member States to identify and address any social, economic, legal, regulatory and administrative barriers to the rapid development of recharging points; |
| --- | --- |

62.

| 63. | Recognises the importance of maintaining existing urban green spaces and sustainable urban drainage systems to the fullest possible extent when planning the construction of residential and non-residential charging infrastructure and parking spaces; |
| --- | --- |

63.

| 64. | Notes that only a few Member States have reported promising progress on EV recharging infrastructure in buildings and car parks; expresses concern at the lack of progress in other Member States and calls for a wider range of data to be made available more swiftly; notes that most Member States have provided estimates for the uptake of EVs and targets for the deployment of electric rechargers for the year 2020; points out, however, that just two thirds of the Member States provided data on targets for 2025 and 2030; |
| --- | --- |

64.

| 65. | Points out that several local authorities have started formulating decarbonisation plans that also include setting binding deadlines on banning the use of internal combustion engines in vehicles; calls on these authorities to ensure that their plans include dedicated financial and technical support to adapt their building stock in order to meet their decarbonisation plans; |
| --- | --- |

65.

o

o o

| 66. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

66.

---

(1)  OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 68.

(2)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 145.

(3)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0240.

(4)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0241.

(5)  OJ L 153, 18.6.2010, p. 13.

(6)  OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 1.

(7)  OJ L 307, 28.10.2014, p. 1.

(8)  OJ L 111, 25.4.2019, p. 13.

(9)  OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1.

(10)  OJ L 127, 16.5.2019, p. 34.

(11)  OJ L 165, 21.6.2019, p. 70.

(12)  OJ C 270, 7.7.2021, p. 2.

(13)  European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Economic and Scientific Policy, Boosting Building Renovation: What Potential and Value for Europe?, October 2016.

(14)  Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 1.).

(15)  Study entitled ‘Mapping and analyses of the current and future (2020-2030) heating/cooling fuel deployment (fossil/renewables), March 2017.

(16)  OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 75.

(17)  OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 82.

(18)  Forum for European Electrical Domestic Safety (FEEDS), ‘In the news: the European Parliament calls on Member States to develop an electrical inspection regime’.

(19)  European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on protecting workers from asbestos (Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0427).

(20)  Comprehensive study of building energy renovation activities and the uptake of nearly zero-energy buildings in the EU, November 2019.

(21)  Commission communication of 27 May 2020 entitled ‘Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation’ (COM(2020)0456).

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/69 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/69

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P9_TA(2021)0504

Challenges and prospects for multilateral weapons of mass destruction arms control and disarmament regime

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the challenges and prospects for multilateral weapons of mass destruction arms control and disarmament regimes (2020/2001(INI))

(2022/C 251/06)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 14 February 2019 on the future of the INF Treaty and the impact on the European Union (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 February 2019 on the future of the INF Treaty and the impact on the European Union (1),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a framework of ethical aspects of artificial intelligence, robotics and related technologies (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a framework of ethical aspects of artificial intelligence, robotics and related technologies (2),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2020 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the preparation of the 10th Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) review process, nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament options (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2020 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the preparation of the 10th Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) review process, nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament options (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 entitled ‘The implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2020’ (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 entitled ‘The implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2020’ (4),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on autonomous weapon systems (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on autonomous weapon systems (5),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2013 on the recommendations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference regarding the establishment of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2013 on the recommendations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference regarding the establishment of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (6),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 27 October 2016 on nuclear security and non-proliferation (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 27 October 2016 on nuclear security and non-proliferation (7),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (8) (‘Dual-Use Regulation’), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (8) (‘Dual-Use Regulation’),

| — | having regard to the annual progress reports on the implementation of the European Union strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (in particular those of 2019 (9) and 2020 (10)), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the annual progress reports on the implementation of the European Union strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (in particular those of 2019 (9) and 2020 (10)),

| — | having regard to Council Decision 2010/212/CFSP of 29 March 2010 relating to the position of the European Union for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision 2010/212/CFSP of 29 March 2010 relating to the position of the European Union for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (11),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (12),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/901 of 29 June 2020 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (13), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/901 of 29 June 2020 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (13),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (14), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (14),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542 of 15 October 2018 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons (15) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1480 of 14 October 2020 implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1542 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons (16), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542 of 15 October 2018 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons (15) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1480 of 14 October 2020 implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1542 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons (16),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/906 of 29 June 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (17), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/906 of 29 June 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (17),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (18), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (18),

| — | having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Enters Into Force of 15 December 2020, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Enters Into Force of 15 December 2020,

| — | having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement on the Extension of the New START Treaty of 3 February 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement on the Extension of the New START Treaty of 3 February 2021,

| — | having regard to the 16th Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of 10 November 2020, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 16th Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of 10 November 2020,

| — | having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on Open Skies of 18 June 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on Open Skies of 18 June 2021,

| — | having regard to the statement by NATO Secretary-General of 2 August 2019 on the demise of the INF Treaty, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement by NATO Secretary-General of 2 August 2019 on the demise of the INF Treaty,

| — | having regard to the speech by NATO Secretary-General of 10 November 2020 at the 16th Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the speech by NATO Secretary-General of 10 November 2020 at the 16th Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,

| — | having regard to the 2018 UN Agenda for Disarmament entitled ‘Securing our Common Future’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 2018 UN Agenda for Disarmament entitled ‘Securing our Common Future’,

| — | having regard to the statement by UN Secretary-General António Guterres of 24 October 2020 on the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement by UN Secretary-General António Guterres of 24 October 2020 on the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,

| — | having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in particular to SDG 16 aiming at the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in particular to SDG 16 aiming at the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development,

| — | having regard to the decision of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention of 21 April 2021 on addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the decision of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention of 21 April 2021 on addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic,

| — | having regard to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA — the Iran Nuclear Deal) of 2015, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA — the Iran Nuclear Deal) of 2015,

| — | having regard to the E3 (19) statement of 19 August 2021 on the JCPOA, |
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—

having regard to the E3 (19) statement of 19 August 2021 on the JCPOA,

| — | having regard to the 64th IAEA General Conference, held from 21 to 25 September 2020 in Vienna, |
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—

having regard to the 64th IAEA General Conference, held from 21 to 25 September 2020 in Vienna,

| — | having regard to the speech by the President of the French Republic of 7 February 2020 on the French defence and deterrence strategy, |
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—

having regard to the speech by the President of the French Republic of 7 February 2020 on the French defence and deterrence strategy,

| — | having regard to the joint statement by the presidents of the United States and Russia of 16 June 2021 on strategic stability, |
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—

having regard to the joint statement by the presidents of the United States and Russia of 16 June 2021 on strategic stability,

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0324/2021), |
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—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0324/2021),

| A. | whereas weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), in particular nuclear weapons, constitute a grave threat to long-term human security; whereas solid and comprehensive arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament architecture based on binding treaties and robust confidence-building mechanisms and reinforced by a reliable and transparent verification procedure are key to building and maintaining peace, stability, predictability, security, sustainable development and economic and social progress, de-escalating existing tensions between states and reducing the likelihood of armed conflict with unpredictable and catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, social and economic consequences; |
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A.

whereas weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), in particular nuclear weapons, constitute a grave threat to long-term human security; whereas solid and comprehensive arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament architecture based on binding treaties and robust confidence-building mechanisms and reinforced by a reliable and transparent verification procedure are key to building and maintaining peace, stability, predictability, security, sustainable development and economic and social progress, de-escalating existing tensions between states and reducing the likelihood of armed conflict with unpredictable and catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, social and economic consequences;

| B. | whereas in the current tense European and global geopolitical contexts, key arms control treaties that came into force at the end of the Cold War have recently been weakened or dismantled; whereas tensions and a lack of trust among the parties to the NPT have been increasing in recent years, exacerbated by a growing deterioration of bilateral US-Russian relations and the subsequent steps that Russia has taken to reassess the nuclear aspects of its military doctrine; whereas a new international climate based on increasing power struggles has emerged; whereas in this new environment, in which the necessary stability and predictability for European and global security architecture is not guaranteed, the EU has launched a reflection process on possible ways to strengthen its strategic autonomy; whereas, in a world of global interdependence, renewed global arms control and disarmament efforts are essential to the EU’s security; whereas the US and the Russian Federation committed to an integrated strategic stability dialogue on 16 June 2021; |
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B.

whereas in the current tense European and global geopolitical contexts, key arms control treaties that came into force at the end of the Cold War have recently been weakened or dismantled; whereas tensions and a lack of trust among the parties to the NPT have been increasing in recent years, exacerbated by a growing deterioration of bilateral US-Russian relations and the subsequent steps that Russia has taken to reassess the nuclear aspects of its military doctrine; whereas a new international climate based on increasing power struggles has emerged; whereas in this new environment, in which the necessary stability and predictability for European and global security architecture is not guaranteed, the EU has launched a reflection process on possible ways to strengthen its strategic autonomy; whereas, in a world of global interdependence, renewed global arms control and disarmament efforts are essential to the EU’s security; whereas the US and the Russian Federation committed to an integrated strategic stability dialogue on 16 June 2021;

| C. | whereas the EU aims to be a global actor for peace and supports the rules-based international order; whereas arms control and nuclear non-proliferation are at the very root of the EU project and have been from the start, notably through the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM); whereas the EU, through its strategy against proliferation of WMDs, contributes to WMD disarmament and preventing the use and proliferation of WMDs; whereas the strategy should also be focused on new threats such as autonomous weapon systems and other emerging and disruptive technologies; |
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C.

whereas the EU aims to be a global actor for peace and supports the rules-based international order; whereas arms control and nuclear non-proliferation are at the very root of the EU project and have been from the start, notably through the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM); whereas the EU, through its strategy against proliferation of WMDs, contributes to WMD disarmament and preventing the use and proliferation of WMDs; whereas the strategy should also be focused on new threats such as autonomous weapon systems and other emerging and disruptive technologies;

| D. | whereas in the more than 50 years of its existence, the NPT, with its three mutually reinforcing pillars, has proven to be and remains a cornerstone of global nuclear arms control architecture and an effective tool to uphold international peace and security by ensuring that the vast majority of signatory states comply with their non-proliferation obligations through the implementation of stringent safeguards and norms against the acquisition of nuclear weapons; whereas we expect Article 6 of the NPT to be fulfilled; whereas the 10th NPT Review Conference has been postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic; |
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D.

whereas in the more than 50 years of its existence, the NPT, with its three mutually reinforcing pillars, has proven to be and remains a cornerstone of global nuclear arms control architecture and an effective tool to uphold international peace and security by ensuring that the vast majority of signatory states comply with their non-proliferation obligations through the implementation of stringent safeguards and norms against the acquisition of nuclear weapons; whereas we expect Article 6 of the NPT to be fulfilled; whereas the 10th NPT Review Conference has been postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic;

| E. | whereas there is no international mechanism regulating the export of highly enriched uranium fuel for nuclear submarines; |
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E.

whereas there is no international mechanism regulating the export of highly enriched uranium fuel for nuclear submarines;

| F. | whereas the IAEA has been playing an instrumental role in the implementation of the NPT; whereas the additional protocol substantially expands the IAEA’s ability to check for clandestine nuclear facilities; |
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F.

whereas the IAEA has been playing an instrumental role in the implementation of the NPT; whereas the additional protocol substantially expands the IAEA’s ability to check for clandestine nuclear facilities;

| G. | whereas tensions and distrust among NPT parties have been increasing in recent years; |
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G.

whereas tensions and distrust among NPT parties have been increasing in recent years;

| H. | whereas the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021 as a result of a movement spanning different countries and regions aiming to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons; whereas three EU Member States are states parties to the TPNW; whereas six EU Member States participated in the TPNW negotiations in the UN General Assembly and five voted in favour of the adoption of the new treaty; whereas no NATO members and no states possessing nuclear weapons are states parties to the TPNW; whereas there is no Council position on the TPNW; whereas the involvement and active participation of all states parties to the NPT and all nuclear states is desirable to achieve meaningful results in global disarmament efforts; |
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H.

whereas the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021 as a result of a movement spanning different countries and regions aiming to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons; whereas three EU Member States are states parties to the TPNW; whereas six EU Member States participated in the TPNW negotiations in the UN General Assembly and five voted in favour of the adoption of the new treaty; whereas no NATO members and no states possessing nuclear weapons are states parties to the TPNW; whereas there is no Council position on the TPNW; whereas the involvement and active participation of all states parties to the NPT and all nuclear states is desirable to achieve meaningful results in global disarmament efforts;

| I. | whereas the JCPOA is an achievement of multilateral diplomacy led by the EU; whereas the parties to the 2015 JCPOA — the EU, China, Russia, Iran and the US — have begun indirect negotiations for Iran and the US to restart the implementation of the JCPOA; whereas in 2018, the US reimposed sanctions and Iran removed limits on its production of enriched uranium; whereas Iran has ceased to apply the additional protocol and implement amended Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, while intensifying its programmes to enrich uranium to weapon-grade level; whereas this constitutes a threat to regional and international peace and security, and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts; whereas the Government and new president of Iran still have to demonstrate their intention to comply with the JCPOA and seek constructive and peaceful engagement with the EU; |
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I.

whereas the JCPOA is an achievement of multilateral diplomacy led by the EU; whereas the parties to the 2015 JCPOA — the EU, China, Russia, Iran and the US — have begun indirect negotiations for Iran and the US to restart the implementation of the JCPOA; whereas in 2018, the US reimposed sanctions and Iran removed limits on its production of enriched uranium; whereas Iran has ceased to apply the additional protocol and implement amended Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, while intensifying its programmes to enrich uranium to weapon-grade level; whereas this constitutes a threat to regional and international peace and security, and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts; whereas the Government and new president of Iran still have to demonstrate their intention to comply with the JCPOA and seek constructive and peaceful engagement with the EU;

| J. | whereas the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet been universally ratified; whereas ratification by eight states, including the US and China, is still needed for the CTBT to enter into force; whereas the EU has consistently promoted the contribution of the CTBT to peace, security, disarmament and non-proliferation; |
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J.

whereas the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet been universally ratified; whereas ratification by eight states, including the US and China, is still needed for the CTBT to enter into force; whereas the EU has consistently promoted the contribution of the CTBT to peace, security, disarmament and non-proliferation;

| K. | whereas the Conference on Disarmament, after 25 years of stalled progress, has still not formally launched negotiations on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; |
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K.

whereas the Conference on Disarmament, after 25 years of stalled progress, has still not formally launched negotiations on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

| L. | whereas following the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as a result of the US withdrawal from it in August 2019, after Russia had persistently failed to comply with its obligations under the INF Treaty by deploying a nuclear-capable SSC-8 missile system, the US and Russia are now no longer prohibited from building and deploying this category of weapons and from engaging in a new arms race, especially in Europe and Asia; whereas Russia’s aggressive behaviour in its neighbourhood has increased the threat of military confrontation; whereas Russia recently moved several nuclear-capable, ballistic missile systems believed to be capable of exceeding the range of 500 km close to its border with the EU; |
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L.

whereas following the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as a result of the US withdrawal from it in August 2019, after Russia had persistently failed to comply with its obligations under the INF Treaty by deploying a nuclear-capable SSC-8 missile system, the US and Russia are now no longer prohibited from building and deploying this category of weapons and from engaging in a new arms race, especially in Europe and Asia; whereas Russia’s aggressive behaviour in its neighbourhood has increased the threat of military confrontation; whereas Russia recently moved several nuclear-capable, ballistic missile systems believed to be capable of exceeding the range of 500 km close to its border with the EU;

| M. | whereas the US and the Russian Federation have agreed to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty by five years; |
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M.

whereas the US and the Russian Federation have agreed to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty by five years;

| N. | whereas the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), which are voluntary unilateral measures, have led to substantial reductions of both the US- and Russian-deployed arsenals; |
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N.

whereas the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), which are voluntary unilateral measures, have led to substantial reductions of both the US- and Russian-deployed arsenals;

| O. | whereas ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5 500 km are considered to be particularly dangerous due to their short flying time, lethality and manoeuvrability, the difficulty of intercepting them, and their ability to carry nuclear warheads; whereas in recent years, a new generation of cruise and tactical missiles has emerged; |
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O.

whereas ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5 500 km are considered to be particularly dangerous due to their short flying time, lethality and manoeuvrability, the difficulty of intercepting them, and their ability to carry nuclear warheads; whereas in recent years, a new generation of cruise and tactical missiles has emerged;

| P. | whereas in recent years, China has substantially stepped up the development of its conventional, missile and nuclear capabilities; whereas China has shown a lack of transparency and reluctance to engage in talks on its potential participation in multilateral nuclear arms control instruments, which has allowed it to stockpile unhindered a large arsenal of technologically advanced intermediate-range ballistic missiles, such as Dong-Feng 26s; whereas the EU should coordinate with like-minded partners to engage in intensive diplomacy with China, in order to develop functional arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, and protect EU security interests; |
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P.

whereas in recent years, China has substantially stepped up the development of its conventional, missile and nuclear capabilities; whereas China has shown a lack of transparency and reluctance to engage in talks on its potential participation in multilateral nuclear arms control instruments, which has allowed it to stockpile unhindered a large arsenal of technologically advanced intermediate-range ballistic missiles, such as Dong-Feng 26s; whereas the EU should coordinate with like-minded partners to engage in intensive diplomacy with China, in order to develop functional arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, and protect EU security interests;

| Q. | whereas France and the UK, as the only European countries with nuclear weapons, both share the view that minimum, credible nuclear deterrence is essential to Europe and NATO’s collective security; whereas since the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, France is now the only nuclear EU Member State and continues to modernise its nuclear arsenal; whereas in 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed launching a ‘strategic dialogue’ with willing European partners on the potential role that France’s nuclear deterrence plays in ‘our collective security’; whereas the UK has announced that it will raise the ceiling for its overall nuclear stockpile size by more than 40 %, to 260 operationally available warheads and that it will make its nuclear position more opaque by no longer declaring stockpile numbers; |
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Q.

whereas France and the UK, as the only European countries with nuclear weapons, both share the view that minimum, credible nuclear deterrence is essential to Europe and NATO’s collective security; whereas since the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, France is now the only nuclear EU Member State and continues to modernise its nuclear arsenal; whereas in 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed launching a ‘strategic dialogue’ with willing European partners on the potential role that France’s nuclear deterrence plays in ‘our collective security’; whereas the UK has announced that it will raise the ceiling for its overall nuclear stockpile size by more than 40 %, to 260 operationally available warheads and that it will make its nuclear position more opaque by no longer declaring stockpile numbers;

| R. | whereas Israel is not party to the NPT; |
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R.

whereas Israel is not party to the NPT;

| S. | whereas a number of other states have acquired the scientific, technological and industrial capabilities required to produce ballistic and cruise missiles; whereas India and Pakistan have declared themselves to be in possession of nuclear weapons; whereas both countries are not party to the NPT; |
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S.

whereas a number of other states have acquired the scientific, technological and industrial capabilities required to produce ballistic and cruise missiles; whereas India and Pakistan have declared themselves to be in possession of nuclear weapons; whereas both countries are not party to the NPT;

| T. | whereas the risk of a nuclear arsenal being captured by terrorist organisations is an issue of concern; whereas clandestine proliferation among rogue regimes remains a risk, as demonstrated by the Abdul Qadeer Khan network; |
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T.

whereas the risk of a nuclear arsenal being captured by terrorist organisations is an issue of concern; whereas clandestine proliferation among rogue regimes remains a risk, as demonstrated by the Abdul Qadeer Khan network;

| U. | whereas The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) has a missile non-proliferation dimension despite its legally non-binding nature; |
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U.

whereas The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) has a missile non-proliferation dimension despite its legally non-binding nature;

| V. | whereas the Open Skies Treaty, which has been in force since 2002, was intended to build trust, confidence and mutual understanding between Russia and the US and its European allies; whereas Russia has failed for many years to comply with its obligations under the Open Skies Treaty; whereas the US and Russia successively withdrew from the treaty; |
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V.

whereas the Open Skies Treaty, which has been in force since 2002, was intended to build trust, confidence and mutual understanding between Russia and the US and its European allies; whereas Russia has failed for many years to comply with its obligations under the Open Skies Treaty; whereas the US and Russia successively withdrew from the treaty;

| W. | whereas the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the world’s first multilateral disarmament agreement to provide for the verifiable elimination of an entire WMD category; whereas in the past decade, the legal norm against the use of chemical weapons has been violated several times, including by the Syrian Government and Russia; whereas the CWC needs to adapt to new industrial production processes, an innovative chemical industry and the emergency of new actors; |
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W.

whereas the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the world’s first multilateral disarmament agreement to provide for the verifiable elimination of an entire WMD category; whereas in the past decade, the legal norm against the use of chemical weapons has been violated several times, including by the Syrian Government and Russia; whereas the CWC needs to adapt to new industrial production processes, an innovative chemical industry and the emergency of new actors;

| X. | whereas the EU has been fully engaged in international efforts to improve biosecurity and biodiversity through the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); whereas 13 countries are not yet party to the BWC; whereas the BWC was agreed on without verification mechanisms to ensure compliance; whereas negotiations on a verification protocol were halted 20 years ago; |
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X.

whereas the EU has been fully engaged in international efforts to improve biosecurity and biodiversity through the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); whereas 13 countries are not yet party to the BWC; whereas the BWC was agreed on without verification mechanisms to ensure compliance; whereas negotiations on a verification protocol were halted 20 years ago;

| Y. | whereas the ballistic missile, nuclear and WMD activities and programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as the proliferation and export of these weapons, represent a serious threat to international peace and security, and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts; whereas the leadership of the DPRK frequently tries to use its nuclear weapons programme to extort political and economic concessions from the international community while it continues to peddle its small- and medium-range missile technology along with its nuclear know-how; |
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Y.

whereas the ballistic missile, nuclear and WMD activities and programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as the proliferation and export of these weapons, represent a serious threat to international peace and security, and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts; whereas the leadership of the DPRK frequently tries to use its nuclear weapons programme to extort political and economic concessions from the international community while it continues to peddle its small- and medium-range missile technology along with its nuclear know-how;

| Z. | whereas the emergence of humanitarian disarmament has positively challenged the traditional disarmament practices inherited from the Cold War; |
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Z.

whereas the emergence of humanitarian disarmament has positively challenged the traditional disarmament practices inherited from the Cold War;

| AA. | whereas the number of women involved in efforts aimed at eliminating WMDs remains alarmingly low, including in the areas of non-proliferation and disarmament diplomacy; |
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AA.

whereas the number of women involved in efforts aimed at eliminating WMDs remains alarmingly low, including in the areas of non-proliferation and disarmament diplomacy;

| AB. | whereas climate-related risks may negatively affect the EU’s strategic security environment; whereas WMD disarmament and non-proliferation efforts strongly contribute to sustainable development, global security, predictability, long-term stability and the protection of livelihoods, the environment and the planet; |
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AB.

whereas climate-related risks may negatively affect the EU’s strategic security environment; whereas WMD disarmament and non-proliferation efforts strongly contribute to sustainable development, global security, predictability, long-term stability and the protection of livelihoods, the environment and the planet;

| AC. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the need to increase EU chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRN) preparedness and awareness, increase cooperation between and investments in CBRN civil and military sectors, develop preventive response and recovery measures under the existing EU Civil Protection Mechanism, build an EU CBRN pool of expertise and foster the link between health and security; |
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AC.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the need to increase EU chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRN) preparedness and awareness, increase cooperation between and investments in CBRN civil and military sectors, develop preventive response and recovery measures under the existing EU Civil Protection Mechanism, build an EU CBRN pool of expertise and foster the link between health and security;

| 1. | Reiterates its full commitment to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes as a cornerstone of global and European security; recalls its commitment to pursuing policies designed to move the reduction and elimination of all nuclear arsenals forward and to create conditions to achieve a world free of nuclear and CBRN weapons; calls for a renewed arms control and disarmament multilateral order that involves all players; |
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1.

| 2. | Is alarmed by the ongoing erosion of the global non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control architecture, which is worsened by the rapid development of new potentially destabilising systems, such as weapon systems enabled with artificial intelligence (AI) and hypersonic missile and drone technologies; highlights the need to address, in particular, the issue of hypersonic missile technology, which heightens the risk of nuclear weapons being used in response to an attack; fears that withdrawal from, or the non-extension of, major arms control treaties would seriously damage the international arms control regimes that have provided a certain stability, and would undermine relationships between nuclear-weapon states; underlines the urgent need to restore cross-border trust; is alarmed by and strongly opposed to any resort to WMDs as a means of resolving geopolitical disputes; |
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2.

| 3. | Is concerned about the reassessment decision taken by several states regarding the nuclear aspect of their military doctrines; calls on all nuclear states to live up to their responsibilities and consider decreasing the role and the salience of nuclear weapons in their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; welcomes the intention of the US to assess, as part of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review, possible ways to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy; |
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3.

| 4. | Reaffirms its full support for the NPT and its three mutually reinforcing pillars, as one of the most universally accepted legally binding instruments and as a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; recalls that the NPT has contributed to the upholding of a broad set of norms related to disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while enforcing the nuclear non-proliferation norm; expects nuclear-weapon states to take steps in good faith to fulfil their treaty obligations to demonstrate their genuine commitment to nuclear disarmament by taking the concrete actions laid out in the final 2010 NPT and by strengthening the non-proliferation norm and expanding the IAEA’s safeguards capacity; warns that the future of the NPT should not be taken for granted and exhorts states parties to do their utmost to contribute to a successful and ambitious outcome of the upcoming 10th Review Conference in all its pillars — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy — by agreeing on a substantive final declaration that further strengthens the NPT and helps to preserve strategic stability and inhibit a new arms race; calls on all states to sign, accede to and remain committed to the NPT: calls on the 10th NPT to discuss the NPT loophole on exports of nuclear propulsion reactors for military purposes; calls on the EU Member States to send their highest-ranking politicians to the Review Conference; invites all NPT states parties to therefore constructively engage in the NPT framework and agree on realistic, effective, tangible, reciprocal and verifiable measures conducive to achieving the shared goal of nuclear disarmament; |
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4.

| 5. | Insists on the need to ensure that the EU plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing the global rules-based non-proliferation efforts and arms control and disarmament architecture with the long-term goal of eliminating all CBRN weapons by fully using all available instruments; welcomes the work of the EU Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation on this issue; calls on the Council to advocate that the EU speak with one voice in international disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control forums and to promote confidence-building measures among all parties to the NPT with the aim of easing tensions and reducing distrust; underlines the need to use the work undertaken through the ‘Strategic Compass’ process to fully incorporate WMD-proliferation questions into the joint understanding of threats and to achieve a common strategic culture on this issue; invites the European External Action Service (EEAS) to launch a reflection process on the implications of Brexit for its disarmament and non-proliferation policy; |
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5.

| 6. | Welcomes the EU’s significant continued financial contribution to, inter alia, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the IAEA, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM); |
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6.

| 7. | Underlines the crucial importance of training and awareness raising; calls, therefore, for the available expertise in non-proliferation and arms control, including in the area of quantum computing in the EU, to be strengthened and the training of EU and Member State personnel to be improved; underlines the need to strengthen ties between the private and public sectors, academia, think tanks and civil society organisations; welcomes, in this respect, the continued financial support to the European Nuclear Education Network, the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium and the European Nuclear Security Training Centre; underlines the potential for cooperation in training and education projects with the European Security and Defence College; calls for further investment in disarmament education and facilitating youth engagement; |
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7.

| 8. | Underlines the widened mandate for transparency reporting, coordination and enforcement and the enlarged scope of obligations in the Dual-Use Regulation; |
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8.

| 9. | Calls on EU delegations to put the questions of global and regional disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control high on the agenda for political dialogue with non-EU countries, to ensure that the EU assists in efforts to universalise existing disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation treaties and instruments; asks the EEAS to work extensively on strengthening the training and capacity-building of our closest partners, particularly the neighbourhood and enlargement countries, in the areas of WMD disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control; welcomes the EU contribution to mitigating CBRN risks worldwide by providing assistance to partner countries and praises the EU CBRN risk mitigation centres of excellence initiative, funded under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument; |
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9.

| 10. | Calls on the EU to strengthen its leadership on victim assistance and environmental remediation in response to the consequences of nuclear testing in affected areas; asks the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to propose actions that the EU and its Member States can carry out in order to strengthen the EU’s role in that respect; |
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10.

| 11. | Welcomes NATO’s support and facilitation of dialogue among allies and partners to enable them to implement their non-proliferation obligations; underlines that NATO allies must remain committed to creating the conditions for the further reduction and long-term elimination of the nuclear arsenal and to a world without nuclear weapons on the basis of reciprocity and legally binding and verifiable treaties; underlines that all states must engage in constructive and trustworthy dialogue on this matter in the relevant international and bilateral forums; |
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11.

| 12. | Stresses its full support for the work of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, for the UN Secretary-General’s ambitious Agenda for Disarmament and for the multilateral deliberative processes and negotiations carried out under the auspices of the UN; underlines the need to ensure the involvement of all stakeholders, civil society and academia and the meaningful and diverse participation of citizens in disarmament and non-proliferation debates; |
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12.

| 13. | Supports the confidence-building measures adopted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe as important contributions to limiting misunderstandings or miscalculations and ensuring greater openness and transparency; encourages all nuclear-weapon states to take the requisite measures to increase transparency on their nuclear arsenals; |
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13.

| 14. | Welcomes the EU’s commitment to helping to establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, in accordance with the resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the EU’s promotion of confidence-building measures in support of this process in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; |
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14.

| 15. | Is concerned about the DPRK’s continued nuclear and ballistic activities in violation of numerous UN Security Council resolutions, and its development of new capabilities; reiterates its desire to work towards achieving a complete, irreversible and verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and believes the EU should continue its efforts towards the elimination of all WMDs in the Korean peninsula; urges the DPRK to immediately abandon its nuclear and missile activities and other WMD and delivery-system programmes, fully comply with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, swiftly sign and ratify the CTBT and return to the NPT; |
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15.

| 16. | Calls on the states outside of the NPT framework in possession of nuclear weapons to refrain from the proliferation of any military-related nuclear technology and to become party to the NPT; |
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16.

| 17. | Notes the entry into force of the TPNW and recognises its vision for a nuclear-weapon-free world; recalls that the role of the NPT as an indispensable forum for pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament and ensuring international stability and collective security, must not be weakened; underlines the importance of the NPT, to which 191 states are party, and highlights the need to ensure it is effective invites all NPT states parties to therefore constructively engage in the NPT framework, and agree on realistic, effective, tangible, reciprocal and verifiable measures conducive to the achievement of the ultimate shared long-term goal of nuclear disarmament; is of the opinion that the TPNW should not weaken the security of the Member States; |
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17.

| 18. | Recalls the central role played by the IAEA as a guarantor of compliance by participating states with the provisions of the NPT; highlights that the IAEA’s verification activities are instrumental in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; calls on the states that have not yet done so to ratify and implement the IAEA additional protocol without delay; calls on states that have ceased to apply the additional protocol to return to compliance; |
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18.

| 19. | Highlights the IAEA’s crucial role in monitoring and verifying Iran’s compliance with the Safeguards Agreement, and praises in particular the key role it has been playing since 23 February 2021, by implementing a temporary bilateral technical understanding reached with Iran, which allows the IAEA to continue its necessary verification and monitoring activities; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Reaffirms its full support for the JCPOA as a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture; stresses that full implementation of the agreement is crucial for European security and for stability and security in the Middle East and worldwide; welcomes the EU’s continued engagement with Iran on issues related to civil nuclear cooperation, and the measures taken to implement projects to improve nuclear safety under Annex III of the JCPOA; exhorts Iran to immediately cease its nuclear activities that violate the JCPOA, which should go hand-in-hand with the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions; calls on all parties to return to the negotiations with a view to re-establishing full and effective compliance with the agreement; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Confirms that the entry into force and ratification of the CTBT as a strong trust- and confidence-building instrument continues to be an important objective of the EU’s strategy against the proliferation of WMDs; notes that the CTBT has been ratified by 170 states and points out that eight countries still have to do so for the CTBT to enter into force; welcomes the EU’s diplomatic efforts to reach out to non-signatory countries to solicit their commitment to the ratification of the CTBT and universal adherence to it; welcomes the EU’s support, including via financial contribution, for the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization aimed at strengthening its verification and monitoring capabilities; calls on all states that have not signed the CTBT to accede to it and urges all states that have signed but not ratified the CTBT to do so; calls on all states to refrain from nuclear tests; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Reiterates its long-standing support for the launch of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and calls on all nuclear-weapon states that have not yet done so to adopt an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Reiterates its deep regret at the withdrawal from the INF Treaty by the US and the Russian Federation following Russia’s persistent failure to comply with it, and at the lack of communication between the parties; is particularly concerned about the possible re-emergence of ground-based intermediate-range missiles in the European theatre of operations in the post-INF context and about a new arms race and remilitarisation in Europe; welcomes the commitment made by the US and Russia to continue working towards the achievement of their stated common goals of ensuring predictability in the strategic domain and reducing the risks of armed conflict and the threat of nuclear war; urges both sides to use this momentum to set an ambitious basis for re-launching negotiations about new arms control architecture and risk reduction measures that would take into account the changing geopolitical context and emergence of new powers; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Calls on all other countries, particularly China, in possession of or in the process of developing intercontinental and intermediate-range missile systems, to engage in efforts to multilateralise and universalise the successor treaty to the INF, taking into account the latest developments in weapons systems, and to actively participate in talks about any other arms control agreements; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Notes with concerns the current modernisation and broadening of China’s nuclear arsenal, including hypersonic nuclear-capable missiles; calls on China to engage actively and in good faith in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Notes with concern Russia’s frequent violation of international norms and treaties along with its increasingly hostile nuclear rhetoric against Member States; urges Russia to abandon its hostile activities and return to compliance with international norms; is particularly concerned about Russia’s testing of nuclear weapons and building up of its fleet of nuclear- and conventionally-powered icebreakers in the Arctic; highlights that such activities go against the aim of maintaining stability and peace and can also be highly dangerous for the fragile environment in the Arctic; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Warmly welcomes the decision taken by the US and the Russian Federation to extend the New START Treaty as an important contribution to the upcoming 10th NPT Review Conference, and to the implementation of Article VI of the New START Treaty; highlights that its extension should provide the foundation for negotiations on a new arms control agreement that would encompass both deployed and non-deployed, as well as strategic and non-strategic, weapons; invites both signatories to thoroughly assess all options in relation to the scope, deployment and category of weapons to be covered, and calls for dialogue with other nuclear-weapon countries and their involvement in negotiations on any new arms control agreement, especially China, in the light of its continued increase and modernisation of its nuclear arsenal, and the UK and France; calls on all nuclear-weapon states to reaffirm the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Highlights the importance of the PNIs, which aim to reduce deployed short-range ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons; notes with concern Russia’s ongoing programmes to modernise its non-strategic nuclear weapons, which raise questions about its compliance with the objectives of the PNIs; recalls that the PNIs, despite their non-binding nature, have played an instrumental role in arms control architecture and calls on both the US and the Russian Federation to stick to their commitments in relation to non-strategic nuclear weapons and to increase transparency on arsenals, deployments and the status of their respective weapons, modernisation and new weapons developments; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Highlights that the international community must work on measures to counter the risk of missile proliferation; calls on states possessing significant numbers of cruise missiles to focus, as a first step, on confidence and transparency measures, including the negotiation and adoption of codes of conduct for the deployment and use of cruise missiles; calls on the VP/HR to engage in dialogue with exporting states to ensure they fully adhere to and coordinate efforts through the Missile Technology Control Regime, the only existing multilateral arrangement that covers the transfer of missiles and missile-related equipment; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Welcomes the efforts made by the VP/HR to promote the universalisation of the HCoC, the only multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument focusing on the proliferation of ballistic missiles, in order to further contribute to efforts to contain the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMDs; calls on the VP/HR to lead efforts for greater alignment between the HCoC and other arms control instruments; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Stresses the crucial role played by the Open Skies Treaty in transatlantic relations and its valuable contribution to global arms control architecture, trust-building, transparency about military activities carried out by signatory states, and long-term European and global stability; highlights that the Open Skies Treaty provided smaller European states with the capacity to monitor their neighbours and hold them accountable for their military activities; regrets the Russian State Duma’s recent adoption of a bill of withdrawal and the US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty; calls on the remaining signatories to continue implementing the treaty; urges the US and the Russian Federation to resume talks with a view to returning to the treaty and to its full, effective and verifiable implementation; urges the remaining states to further strengthen the treaty as a confidence-building measure by extending its scope to include scientist-to-scientist exchanges, emergency response cooperation, environmental monitoring and other missions; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Is alarmed at the threat posed by chemical warfare following the most significant and sustained use of chemical weapons in decades; is particularly worried by the increased capability of some state and non-state actors to produce forbidden chemical agents more rapidly, and with limited detection indicators; insists on the need to uphold the global ethical norm against chemical weapons by preventing impunity for their use; calls for the newly adopted EU global human rights sanction regime to be used effectively in order to uphold this norm; welcomes the Council’s adoption of a horizontal sanctions regime to address the growing violations in the production, storage, use and proliferation of chemical weapons; reiterates its grave concern at the attempted assassinations of Alexei Navalny and Sergei and Yulia Skripal, with the banned nerve agent Novichok, considered a chemical weapon under the CWC; welcomes the sanctions imposed on Russian officials on 14 October 2020 in response to this blatant violation of international norms and Russia’s international commitments; urges Russia to provide critical answers about the poisoning of Kremlin critic, Alexei Navalny, as requested by a group of group of 45 Western countries under the rules of the OPCW; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Praises the instrumental role that the OPCW has played in the verified destruction of chemical agents; condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the development and large-scale use of chemical weapons by states that are members of the CWC, and condemns the numerous human rights violations and atrocities committed by the regime of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian Arab Republic; underlines that accountability for such serious violations of the CWC must be ensured; welcomes the decision taken at the 25th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC to suspend certain rights and privileges of Syria under the OPCW; welcomes the EU’s continued support to the UNSGM, while underling the importance of safeguarding its accountability; condemns attempts to undermine the independent nature of the UNSGM by subordinating it to the UN Security Council; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Reiterates its full support for the BWC, which outlaws the use of dangerous viruses, bacteria and toxic substances against humans; welcomes the financial contribution provided by the EU directly to the BWC and in support of strengthening biosecurity outside the EU; calls on the VP/HR to continue his efforts to promote the universalisation of the BWC; points to the need to step up efforts to put in place a legally binding mechanism to verify compliance with the BWC; calls on all parties, including the US, to return to negotiations through the BWC ad hoc group; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Underlines the important work carried out by the EU Satellite Centre in using space assets, satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence to monitor compliance with WMD disarmament and non-proliferation commitments; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Points to the rapid advances in the development of AI-enabled systems in the military domain; reiterates, therefore, its call for the EU to take the lead on international regulatory efforts to ensure that the development and application of AI for military uses adhere to the strict limits set in international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law; call for the EU to also pave the way for global negotiations to update all existing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, so as to take AI-enabled systems used in warfare into account; underlines that emerging technologies not covered in international law should be judged by the principle of humanity and the dictates of public conscience; calls on the VP/HR, the Member States and the European Council to adopt a joint position on autonomous weapons systems that ensures meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapons systems; insists that the EU support the efforts of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, whereby the High Contracting Parties contribute to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies relating to lethal autonomous weapons systems, to reach a consensus on a legally binding instrument that would prohibit fully autonomous weapons without meaningful human control; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Calls on the EU to increase its investments in AI capabilities matched to Member States’ operating concepts; underlines that the growing significance of AI also requires enhanced cooperation with like-minded partners; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Stresses the need to ensure and mainstream the equal, full and meaningful participation of women in disarmament and non-proliferation conferences and forums, including disarmament diplomacy and all decision-making processes related to disarmament; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Points to the need to take additional measures to fight the financing of the proliferation of WMDs in order to disrupt technological and knowledge transfer to hostile non-state actors, and points to the potential threat that CBRN terrorism represents for our collective security; points to the need for the EU to foster responsible science, in order to prevent the misuse of scientific research and experimentation; underlines the need to combat CBRN material smuggling and illicit trafficking and to prevent diversion risks; invites the EEAS and the Commission to tackle this issue in their expected joint communication on a strategic approach to support the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Stresses the need to increase efforts to further strengthen the EU’s preparedness and actions against CBRN threats through the development of decontamination, stockpiling and monitoring capabilities under the existing EU Civil Protection Mechanism; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European External Action Service, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

41.

---

(1)  OJ C 449, 23.12.2020, p. 149.

(2)  OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 63.

(3)  OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 240.

(4)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 78.

(5)  OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 86.

(6)  OJ C 440, 30.12.2015, p. 97.

(7)  OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 202.

(8)  OJ L 206, 11.6.2021, p. 1.

(9)  OJ C 341, 13.10.2020, p. 1.

(10)  OJ C 298, 26.7.2021, p. 1.

(11)  OJ L 90, 10.4.2010, p. 8.

(12)  OJ L 372 I, 9.11.2020, p. 4.

(13)  OJ L 207, 30.6.2020, p. 15.

(14)  OJ L 149, 7.6.2019, p. 63.

(15)  OJ L 259, 16.10.2018, p. 12.

(16)  OJ L 341, 15.10.2020, p. 1.

(17)  OJ L 207, 30.6.2020, p. 36.

(18)  OJ L 19, 22.1.2019, p. 11.

(19)  France, Germany and the UK.

---

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/80 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/80

---

P9_TA(2021)0505

New orientations for the EU’s humanitarian action

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on new orientations for the EU’s humanitarian action (2021/2163(INI))

(2022/C 251/07)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Articles 208 and 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 208 and 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union,

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid (1),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/836 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 amending Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/836 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 amending Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (2),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (3),

| — | having regard to the Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, Parliament and the Commission on the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid of 2008 (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, Parliament and the Commission on the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid of 2008 (4),

| — | having regard to the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,

| — | having regard to Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (5),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 26 November 2018 on strengthening global food and nutrition security, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 26 November 2018 on strengthening global food and nutrition security,

| — | having regard to the EU guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (6),

| — | having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2286 of 3 May 2016 on the protection of the wounded and sick, medical personnel and humanitarian personnel in armed conflict, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2286 of 3 May 2016 on the protection of the wounded and sick, medical personnel and humanitarian personnel in armed conflict,

| — | having regard to the report of the UN Secretary-General of 23 August 2016 on the outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit and the commitments made by the participants at the summit, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the UN Secretary-General of 23 August 2016 on the outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit and the commitments made by the participants at the summit,

| — | having regard to the Grand Bargain agreement signed on 23 May 2016, to the annual independent reports thereon, notably the 2021 report, and to the Grand Bargain 2.0 framework and annexes presented at the Grand Bargain annual meeting of 15-17 June 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Grand Bargain agreement signed on 23 May 2016, to the annual independent reports thereon, notably the 2021 report, and to the Grand Bargain 2.0 framework and annexes presented at the Grand Bargain annual meeting of 15-17 June 2021,

| — | having regard to the report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees of July 2021 on the use of flexible funding in 2020, and the updates thereto, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees of July 2021 on the use of flexible funding in 2020, and the updates thereto,

| — | having regard to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction for 2015-2030 adopted at the third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held between 14 and 18 March 2015 in Sendai, Japan, and to the outcomes of the Global Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction held in Cancun in 2017 and Geneva in 2019, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction for 2015-2030 adopted at the third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held between 14 and 18 March 2015 in Sendai, Japan, and to the outcomes of the Global Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction held in Cancun in 2017 and Geneva in 2019,

| — | having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

| — | having regard to the 2021 Global Humanitarian Overview of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the monthly updates thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the 2021 Global Humanitarian Overview of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the monthly updates thereof,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 on the Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021)0101), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 on the Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021)0101),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2021 on the EU’s humanitarian action: new challenges, same principles (COM(2021)0110) and the subsequent Council conclusions of 20 May 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2021 on the EU’s humanitarian action: new challenges, same principles (COM(2021)0110) and the subsequent Council conclusions of 20 May 2021,

| — | having regard to its resolutions on humanitarian aid, in particular those of 11 December 2013 on the EU approach to resilience and disaster risk reduction in developing countries: learning from food security crises (7), of 26 November 2015 on education for children in emergency situations and protracted crises (8), of 16 December 2015 on preparing for the World Humanitarian Summit: Challenges and opportunities for humanitarian assistance (9), of 1 June 2017 on resilience as a strategic priority of the external action of the EU (10), and of 17 April 2018 on the implementation of the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Humanitarian Aid Instrument and the European Development Fund (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolutions on humanitarian aid, in particular those of 11 December 2013 on the EU approach to resilience and disaster risk reduction in developing countries: learning from food security crises (7), of 26 November 2015 on education for children in emergency situations and protracted crises (8), of 16 December 2015 on preparing for the World Humanitarian Summit: Challenges and opportunities for humanitarian assistance (9), of 1 June 2017 on resilience as a strategic priority of the external action of the EU (10), and of 17 April 2018 on the implementation of the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Humanitarian Aid Instrument and the European Development Fund (11),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Development (A9-0328/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Development (A9-0328/2021),

| A. | whereas humanitarian needs are at an all-time high, with 238 million people in need of assistance in 2021, due largely to conflicts but also systemic factors such as climate change, natural disasters, environmental degradation, global population growth, food insecurity, limited water resources and failed governance; whereas the burgeoning of humanitarian needs and their increasing complexity touches upon each of the SDGs and points to a worrying lack of global progress on the 2030 Agenda; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas humanitarian needs are at an all-time high, with 238 million people in need of assistance in 2021, due largely to conflicts but also systemic factors such as climate change, natural disasters, environmental degradation, global population growth, food insecurity, limited water resources and failed governance; whereas the burgeoning of humanitarian needs and their increasing complexity touches upon each of the SDGs and points to a worrying lack of global progress on the 2030 Agenda;

| B. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing fragilities and inequalities, amplified humanitarian needs — notably a sharp increase in hunger and a lack of food supply, with almost 300 million people at risk of becoming acutely food insecure and over 40 million facing emergency levels of food insecurity — and hampered the humanitarian response owing to border closures and other restrictions, such as those attempted by parties to armed conflicts; whereas the growth in humanitarian needs is, in part, a result of insufficient development assistance to address the drivers of fragility; whereas according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, humanitarian assistance for all fragile contexts increased by 38 % from 2015 to 2016, while programmable development aid for fragile contexts did not increase over the same period (12); whereas between 2014 and 2018, humanitarian assistance accounted for the second-largest share of overseas development assistance contributions across the 29 countries in the Development Assistance Committee (13); |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing fragilities and inequalities, amplified humanitarian needs — notably a sharp increase in hunger and a lack of food supply, with almost 300 million people at risk of becoming acutely food insecure and over 40 million facing emergency levels of food insecurity — and hampered the humanitarian response owing to border closures and other restrictions, such as those attempted by parties to armed conflicts; whereas the growth in humanitarian needs is, in part, a result of insufficient development assistance to address the drivers of fragility; whereas according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, humanitarian assistance for all fragile contexts increased by 38 % from 2015 to 2016, while programmable development aid for fragile contexts did not increase over the same period (12); whereas between 2014 and 2018, humanitarian assistance accounted for the second-largest share of overseas development assistance contributions across the 29 countries in the Development Assistance Committee (13);

| C. | whereas on the one hand, the COVID-19 pandemic has created a number of logistical obstacles for international organisations carrying out aid operations, while on the other hand, these logistical challenges have contributed to a number of changes in the way aid programmes are implemented, particularly in terms of boosting the importance of localising humanitarian aid; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas on the one hand, the COVID-19 pandemic has created a number of logistical obstacles for international organisations carrying out aid operations, while on the other hand, these logistical challenges have contributed to a number of changes in the way aid programmes are implemented, particularly in terms of boosting the importance of localising humanitarian aid;

| D. | whereas in 2018, approximately 108 million people required international humanitarian assistance as a result of storms, floods, droughts and wildfires; whereas by 2050, over 200 million people could be in need of humanitarian assistance every year as a result of climate-related disasters and the socioeconomic impact of climate change; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas in 2018, approximately 108 million people required international humanitarian assistance as a result of storms, floods, droughts and wildfires; whereas by 2050, over 200 million people could be in need of humanitarian assistance every year as a result of climate-related disasters and the socioeconomic impact of climate change;

| E. | whereas women and girls are the hardest hit by emergencies; whereas adolescent girls in conflict zones are 90 % more likely to be out of school, 70 % of women in humanitarian settings are more likely to experience gender-based violence, and more than 70 % of those facing chronic hunger are women; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas women and girls are the hardest hit by emergencies; whereas adolescent girls in conflict zones are 90 % more likely to be out of school, 70 % of women in humanitarian settings are more likely to experience gender-based violence, and more than 70 % of those facing chronic hunger are women;

| F. | whereas the EU Humanitarian Air Bridge, which was set up in response to the transport constraints caused by the pandemic, has greatly helped to plug critical gaps in the humanitarian response by facilitating the transport of aid, emergency assistance and humanitarian staff; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the EU Humanitarian Air Bridge, which was set up in response to the transport constraints caused by the pandemic, has greatly helped to plug critical gaps in the humanitarian response by facilitating the transport of aid, emergency assistance and humanitarian staff;

| G. | whereas the greater frequency and intensity of climate-induced disasters is fuelling conflict and keeping more people trapped in protracted displacement in ways never witnessed before, while a number of protracted crises remain unresolved; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the greater frequency and intensity of climate-induced disasters is fuelling conflict and keeping more people trapped in protracted displacement in ways never witnessed before, while a number of protracted crises remain unresolved;

| H. | whereas growing humanitarian needs have not been matched by adequate resources, leading to a rapidly increasing funding gap: in 2020, less than half of the UN humanitarian appeal was met, and as of August 2021, only USD 10,9 billion in funding was available for needs amounting to USD 36,6 billion (30 % of the total) (14); whereas in 2020, funding unrelated to the COVID-19 pandemic response from the largest 20 public donors fell below 2019 levels (15); |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas growing humanitarian needs have not been matched by adequate resources, leading to a rapidly increasing funding gap: in 2020, less than half of the UN humanitarian appeal was met, and as of August 2021, only USD 10,9 billion in funding was available for needs amounting to USD 36,6 billion (30 % of the total) (14); whereas in 2020, funding unrelated to the COVID-19 pandemic response from the largest 20 public donors fell below 2019 levels (15);

| I. | whereas global humanitarian funding continues to rely heavily on a very limited number of donors, with the 10 largest accounting for around 85 % of all funding; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas global humanitarian funding continues to rely heavily on a very limited number of donors, with the 10 largest accounting for around 85 % of all funding;

| J. | whereas humanitarian aid is a key pillar of the EU’s external action and whereas in 2020 the EU and Member States’ combined funding was 36 % of global humanitarian assistance — the largest share in the world; whereas the level of contributions varies within the EU, with four Member States and the Commission accounting for around 90 % of all EU humanitarian financing; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas humanitarian aid is a key pillar of the EU’s external action and whereas in 2020 the EU and Member States’ combined funding was 36 % of global humanitarian assistance — the largest share in the world; whereas the level of contributions varies within the EU, with four Member States and the Commission accounting for around 90 % of all EU humanitarian financing;

| K. | whereas the reaffirmed commitment by the signatories of Grand Bargain 2.0 to ensuring that the humanitarian response is as local as possible and as international as necessary entails undertaking to provide at least 25 % of humanitarian funding as directly as possible to local and national actors; whereas this target is far from being met, however; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the reaffirmed commitment by the signatories of Grand Bargain 2.0 to ensuring that the humanitarian response is as local as possible and as international as necessary entails undertaking to provide at least 25 % of humanitarian funding as directly as possible to local and national actors; whereas this target is far from being met, however;

| L. | whereas the current gap in development funding makes it imperative to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, visibility, risk sharing, transparency and accountability of the humanitarian system and to ensure that more countries contribute to the humanitarian effort so that aid meets the needs of the populations affected, as highlighted most recently by Grand Bargain 2.0, which focuses on localisation and quality funding as key enabling priorities; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the current gap in development funding makes it imperative to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, visibility, risk sharing, transparency and accountability of the humanitarian system and to ensure that more countries contribute to the humanitarian effort so that aid meets the needs of the populations affected, as highlighted most recently by Grand Bargain 2.0, which focuses on localisation and quality funding as key enabling priorities;

| M. | whereas ‘quality funding’ comprises one of the two enabling priorities of Grand Bargain 2.0; whereas pillar two of the 2016 High-Level Political Forum on Humanitarian Financing calls for a widening of the humanitarian resource base through partnerships with new or emerging bilateral donors and the private sector, facilitating remittance flows and Islamic social finance (16); whereas humanitarian assistance from private donors is already on the rise, having increased by 9 % from USD 6,2 billion in 2018 to a record USD 6,8 billion in 2019 (17); |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas ‘quality funding’ comprises one of the two enabling priorities of Grand Bargain 2.0; whereas pillar two of the 2016 High-Level Political Forum on Humanitarian Financing calls for a widening of the humanitarian resource base through partnerships with new or emerging bilateral donors and the private sector, facilitating remittance flows and Islamic social finance (16); whereas humanitarian assistance from private donors is already on the rise, having increased by 9 % from USD 6,2 billion in 2018 to a record USD 6,8 billion in 2019 (17);

| N. | whereas the Commission has proposed launching a pilot project on blending to significantly increase the resource base for humanitarian action and has called for the further involvement of the private sector to this end; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the Commission has proposed launching a pilot project on blending to significantly increase the resource base for humanitarian action and has called for the further involvement of the private sector to this end;

| O. | whereas the fragmentation of humanitarian aid remains a persistent challenge with a plethora of donors and aid agencies and a lack of coordination between their activities and projects; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the fragmentation of humanitarian aid remains a persistent challenge with a plethora of donors and aid agencies and a lack of coordination between their activities and projects;

| P. | whereas the use of consortium organisation is encouraged by donors in development cooperation and humanitarian aid; whereas in comparison to other methods, consortium organisation is typically characterised by larger-scale objectives and more resources; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the use of consortium organisation is encouraged by donors in development cooperation and humanitarian aid; whereas in comparison to other methods, consortium organisation is typically characterised by larger-scale objectives and more resources;

| Q. | whereas addressing humanitarian crises requires not only more funding but also decisive political efforts to reduce needs by preventing and ending conflicts, protecting basic human rights, promoting sustainable development, reducing risks and vulnerabilities, countering and adapting to climate change, tackling corruption in the allocation of funds, and addressing the lack of transparency in relations with local organisations; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas addressing humanitarian crises requires not only more funding but also decisive political efforts to reduce needs by preventing and ending conflicts, protecting basic human rights, promoting sustainable development, reducing risks and vulnerabilities, countering and adapting to climate change, tackling corruption in the allocation of funds, and addressing the lack of transparency in relations with local organisations;

| R. | whereas basic norms and principles are being challenged around the world through regular violations of international humanitarian law, including attacks on civilians and humanitarian and medical workers, in addition to growing obstacles to the provision of humanitarian aid; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas basic norms and principles are being challenged around the world through regular violations of international humanitarian law, including attacks on civilians and humanitarian and medical workers, in addition to growing obstacles to the provision of humanitarian aid;

| S. | whereas attacks against humanitarian personnel have dramatically increased in recent years; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas attacks against humanitarian personnel have dramatically increased in recent years;

| 1. | Welcomes the Commission communication on the EU’s humanitarian action: new challenges, same principles and its concrete proposals to improve the provision of humanitarian aid; calls for the swift implementation of these proposals in close consultation and cooperation with humanitarian partners to ensure that aid is predictable, not fragmented and does not duplicate other actions; reiterates that in accordance with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, the EU’s humanitarian aid must always be provided solely on the basis of well-defined and pre-assessed needs, must be fully in line with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, and must pay particular attention to the challenges faced by vulnerable groups, such as people with disabilities, minorities and other highly marginalised people, when accessing humanitarian assistance; calls on the Commission to put the principle of ‘no one left behind’ at the heart of the new approach to humanitarian action; welcomes the Commission’s initiative of integrating education in emergencies to prevent children from dropping out of school, particularly in cases of long-lasting conflict; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Notes with concern the sharp increase in the humanitarian funding gap, as major donors are reducing funding at a time of growing needs; underlines the stark differences in contributions both at a global level and from within the EU; calls for the Commission to provide a robust annual budget for EU humanitarian aid to guarantee timely, predictable and flexible funding for humanitarian aid from the start of each financial year, both for addressing protracted crises and for responding to new crises, and to keep a ring-fenced envelope within the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve for humanitarian crises outside the EU to maintain the existing capacity to rapidly mobilise additional funds in the case of emerging, escalating or sudden-onset emergencies; calls for the EU to advocate for greater international responsibility-sharing and an increase in humanitarian funding; urges the Member States to lead by example and contribute a fixed share of their gross national incomes to humanitarian aid; calls on the Commission to report annually on the amount of humanitarian funding disbursed from the EU in the global context; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to devise a strategy for long-term collaboration with third countries, in particular emerging donors, by leveraging the EU’s bilateral, regional and multilateral diplomacy to expand the range of donor countries which contribute to humanitarian aid on a voluntary basis; underlines that a contribution from additional donor countries would make it possible to raise the amount needed to address international humanitarian crises; notes with concern the lack of a formal arrangement in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement regarding humanitarian aid and calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards a formal EU-UK partnership on humanitarian aid; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Highlights the Commission’s commitment to leveraging private finance and further involving the private sector in EU humanitarian assistance and the launch of a pilot blending initiative from the EU’s humanitarian budget in 2021; calls on the Commission to provide Parliament with more information and a written assessment on the implementation of the pilot project for blending for humanitarian action, assessing the alignment with external action objectives; underlines the potential of blending initiatives, including humanitarian impact bonds and disaster risk insurance schemes, including making full use of the European Investment Bank and the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus for humanitarian purposes; stresses, however, that further engagement with the private sector requires an analysis of the results achieved through collaboration so far, and the exclusive promotion of partnerships which comply with the EU’s external action goals and international humanitarian principles; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Is alarmed at the growing number of serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law; calls for the establishment of an EU coordination mechanism in order to develop a coherent EU approach towards international humanitarian law, monitor violations and advocate for ensuring that international humanitarian law is respected, including by using the relevant political, development aid, trade and economic levers in the EU’s external action; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Calls on the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Member States to closely monitor international humanitarian law violations and to include international humanitarian law violations as a criterion for listing individuals or entities in the relevant EU sanctions regimes in line with the EU guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law; notes that sanctions and restrictive measures taken in the context of the EU’s common foreign and security policy must comply with international humanitarian law and must not hinder the provision of humanitarian activities; underlines the need to consistently include humanitarian exemptions in restrictive measures regimes and to provide the necessary support and guidance to partners to apply these exemptions effectively; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen international humanitarian law and to vigorously prosecute and sanction those who use starvation as a weapon of war in order to counteract the widespread violations of the right to food during conflicts, the recurring use of starvation as a method of warfare, and the denial of humanitarian access; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to swiftly fulfil the commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit and as part of the Grand Bargain; highlights the importance of making humanitarian aid more efficient and effective by increasing flexible funding through unearmarked, softly earmarked and multiannual funding that is tailored to local contexts, needs-based and people-centred, as well as reducing the administrative burden for humanitarian partners by harmonising and simplifying donor proposal and reporting requirements, funding national and local actors, and promoting innovative solutions, among other endeavours; recalls that protracted crises are still humanitarian contexts and calls for the EU and its Member States to envisage concrete solutions for the effective allocation of humanitarian and development funding for partners operating in these contexts; encourages the EU and its Member States to introduce measures in grant agreements with partners to ensure sufficient programme flexibility for those partners to rapidly shift from development activities to emergency response in case of a sudden emergency, including in the funding provided by the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to maintain and foster a realistic risk-sharing dialogue between the relevant departments, with their humanitarian partners and with other stakeholders, building on recent experiences and the lessons learnt in order to continuously strive to improve existing funding regulations by making them more efficient and effective, particularly at times of highly volatile humanitarian crises; points out that risk awareness has proven to be an effective tool for risk mitigation; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Stresses the particular importance of supporting local actors and urges the Commission to develop an ambitious localisation policy, including fostering transparency, making use of partners’ expertise and experience, and outlining how to provide more and better support for local respondents to strengthen their capacities, enable them to make use of all the instruments available and ensure their involvement in decision-making processes, while addressing the issue of mutual accountability and risk sharing, as reinforcing local respondents is a major factor to reduce the need for international humanitarian assistance in the future; calls on the Commission to ensure that women’s equal participation and empowerment is integrated explicitly into any new mechanisms to strengthen the role of local actors in humanitarian action; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Stresses that in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, localisation helps to deliver a health response that is adapted to the context of developing countries in order to avoid European bias, particularly with regard to containment protocols and prevention campaigns; calls for the prevalence of a Eurocentric perspective over emergency situations to be adequately challenged through the further localisation of humanitarian action; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Highlights the challenges posed by climate change and welcomes the commitments to further mainstream climate change impacts and environmental factors into humanitarian action, to strengthen the climate resilience of vulnerable regions and to build the resilience of vulnerable communities to climate change through disaster preparedness and anticipatory action via a triple nexus approach involving indigenous people and local communities, in view of the specific assistance and protection needs of populations affected by disasters and the adverse effects of climate change, in particular displaced persons and host communities; welcomes, in addition, the commitments to make the EU’s humanitarian aid more environmentally sustainable and to track climate-related spending; calls on the Commission to provide the necessary resources for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, among other tools, and to accelerate the implementation of the Sendai commitments in the EU’s external action; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Welcomes the concrete achievements of the EU Humanitarian Air Bridge and the idea of creating a European Humanitarian Response Capacity to plug the gaps in the EU’s humanitarian response; calls for the Member States and humanitarian partners to be regularly consulted on any new Commission initiatives, which should build on — not duplicate — existing capacities of humanitarian actors and EU mechanisms such as the Civil Protection Mechanism; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Underlines the fact that while humanitarian aid seeks to tackle immediate, life-threatening situations, crises are caused by drivers that require long-term solutions, as underlying fragility is a significant precursor to humanitarian crises; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to adopt a communication developing a clear policy on a humanitarian-development-peace nexus in order to bridge the gaps between the individual policy areas, while ensuring that the distinct legal character and principles of humanitarian aid are respected; stresses that this nexus approach should strengthen resilience and promote sustainable responses, while the SDGs should be used as a framework for such an approach, as the 2030 Agenda provides a unique opportunity to address the root causes of fragility and conflict, building on the practical experience of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), among others; calls for the EU and the Member States to swiftly implement this nexus approach, with a particular focus on tackling fragility, preventing conflicts, tackling hunger, addressing displacement related to disasters and the adverse effects of climate change, providing education and livelihood opportunities, supporting early recovery, enhancing response capacity, and forging self-reliance and resilience; calls on the Commission to publish an assessment of the operationalisation of the humanitarian-development nexus in the six pilot countries identified in 2017; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Calls on the Commission to assess past experiences and programmes on gender-related issues, as there is a growing need to address these given the prominent role of women as victims of conflicts and disasters; calls for more tangible elements of gender mainstreaming to be implemented in future humanitarian action, including context-specific, gender-sensitive analyses, while protecting the rights of vulnerable groups, including women, girls and persons from the LGBTIQ+ community; supports the provision of unhindered access to free public health services and efforts to reduce mortality and morbidity, and highlights the need to strengthen preparedness for pandemics and epidemics; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to implement and promote the Nansen Initiative Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change; highlights the importance of cooperation between humanitarian, development, disaster risk reduction and climate change actors to reduce the risk of displacement in the context of disasters and the adverse effects of climate change and to address assistance and protection needs; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Calls for particular emphasis to be devoted to nutrition, as a fundamental right for all, in order to ensure food security and bolster the resilience of food systems to economic, climate and human shocks; calls for the EU action plan on nutrition to be revised to address all forms of malnutrition in humanitarian and development contexts in line with the Council conclusions of November 2018; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Reiterates the Commission’s commitment and ongoing efforts to promote the visibility and awareness of EU humanitarian aid among different stakeholders throughout the EU, including NGOs, and to strengthen the EU’s visibility in its external action; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Welcomes the announcement on the first ever EU Humanitarian Forum, which is to be held in January 2022; stresses that the forum should be inclusive, accessible, involve humanitarian implementing partners, seek to increase the visibility of the EU’s humanitarian aid and the work of its partners, promote a strategic dialogue on the EU’s humanitarian policy, raise political support and awareness about the nature of principled and needs-based EU humanitarian assistance, and advance the implementation of the key actions set out in the Commission communication; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

20.

---

(1)  OJ L 163, 2.7.1996, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 185, 26.5.2021, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1.

(4)  OJ C 25, 30.1.2008, p. 1.

(5)  OJ L 118, 14.5.2003, p. 12.

(6)  OJ C 303, 15.12.2009, p. 12.

(7)  OJ C 468, 15.12.2016, p. 120.

(8)  OJ C 366, 27.10.2017, p. 151.

(9)  OJ C 399, 24.11.2017, p. 106.

(10)  OJ C 307, 30.8.2018, p. 177.

(11)  OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 33.

(12)  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, States of Fragility 2018, 17 July 2018.

(13)  Nomura, S., Sakamoto, H., Ishizuka, A., Shimizu, K. and Shibuya, K., ‘Tracking sectoral allocation of official development assistance: a comparative study of the 29 Development Assistance Committee countries, 2011-2018’, Global Health Action, January 2021.

(14)  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Financial Tracking Service, 2021 humanitarian aid contributions.

(15)  Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2021.

(16)  High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, report for the UN Secretary-General entitled ‘Too important to fail — addressing the humanitarian financing gap’, 17 January 2016.

(17)  Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2021.

---

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/87 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/87

---

P9_TA(2021)0506

Cooperation on the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on cooperation on the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans (2021/2002(INI))

(2022/C 251/08)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the relevant UN conventions, in particular the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the protocols thereto (the Palermo Protocol of 2000) and the United Nations Convention against Corruption, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the relevant UN conventions, in particular the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the protocols thereto (the Palermo Protocol of 2000) and the United Nations Convention against Corruption,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe criminal and civil law conventions on corruption, opened for signature in Strasbourg on 27 January 1999 and 4 November 1999, and to resolutions (98) 7 and (99) 5, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 5 May 1998 and 1 May 1999 respectively, establishing the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council of Europe criminal and civil law conventions on corruption, opened for signature in Strasbourg on 27 January 1999 and 4 November 1999, and to resolutions (98) 7 and (99) 5, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 5 May 1998 and 1 May 1999 respectively, establishing the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO),

| — | having regard to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,

| — | having regard to the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism,

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention),

| — | having regard to the activities of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) and the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the activities of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) and the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 26 June 2018, 18 June 2019 and 25 March 2020 on enlargement and the stabilisation and association process, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council conclusions of 26 June 2018, 18 June 2019 and 25 March 2020 on enlargement and the stabilisation and association process,

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 of 19 November 2018 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 of 19 November 2018 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans (1),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 6 February 2018 entitled ‘A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans’ (COM(2018)0065), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 6 February 2018 entitled ‘A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans’ (COM(2018)0065),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2020 on the EU Security Union Strategy (COM(2020)0605), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2020 on the EU Security Union Strategy (COM(2020)0605),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2020 entitled ‘2020-2025 EU action plan on firearms trafficking’ (COM(2020)0608), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2020 entitled ‘2020-2025 EU action plan on firearms trafficking’ (COM(2020)0608),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025 (COM(2021)0170) and the accompanying staff working document entitled ‘EMPACT, the flagship EU instrument for cooperation to fight organised and serious international crime’ (SWD(2021)0074), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025 (COM(2021)0170) and the accompanying staff working document entitled ‘EMPACT, the flagship EU instrument for cooperation to fight organised and serious international crime’ (SWD(2021)0074),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on the EU Strategy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings 2021-2025 (COM(2021)0171), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 14 April 2021 on the EU Strategy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings 2021-2025 (COM(2021)0171),

| — | having regard to the agreements on operational and strategic cooperation between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, and to the Working Arrangement establishing cooperative relations between the law enforcement authorities of Kosovo and Europol, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the agreements on operational and strategic cooperation between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, and to the Working Arrangement establishing cooperative relations between the law enforcement authorities of Kosovo and Europol,

| — | having regard to the cooperation agreements between Eurojust and Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the cooperation agreements between Eurojust and Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia,

| — | having regard to the agreements on border management cooperation between the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the agreements on border management cooperation between the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia,

| — | having regard to the Berlin Process and the anti-corruption pledges made by the Western Balkan countries in 2018, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Berlin Process and the anti-corruption pledges made by the Western Balkan countries in 2018,

| — | having regard to Europol’s Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment of 12 April 2021 and its Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment of 5 October 2020, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Europol’s Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment of 12 April 2021 and its Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment of 5 October 2020,

| — | having regard to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report entitled ‘Measuring Organized Crime in the Western Balkans’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report entitled ‘Measuring Organized Crime in the Western Balkans’,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 5 July 2016 on the fight against trafficking in human beings in the EU’s external relations (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 5 July 2016 on the fight against trafficking in human beings in the EU’s external relations (2),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Western Balkans, following the 2020 summit (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Western Balkans, following the 2020 summit (3),

| — | having regard to its 2019-2020 resolutions on the Commission reports on Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its 2019-2020 resolutions on the Commission reports on Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia,

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0298/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0298/2021),

| A. | whereas organised crime has become a central issue in international affairs and a threat to peace and development which necessitates a common and coordinated response from the EU, its Member States and international partners; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas organised crime has become a central issue in international affairs and a threat to peace and development which necessitates a common and coordinated response from the EU, its Member States and international partners;

| B. | whereas fighting organised crime effectively is part of the EU accession process, notably in the fundamentals cluster and negotiating Chapter 24 on justice, freedom and security; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas fighting organised crime effectively is part of the EU accession process, notably in the fundamentals cluster and negotiating Chapter 24 on justice, freedom and security;

| C. | whereas corruption and organised crime remain a serious concern across the Western Balkan region, which can also have negative impacts on EU Member States; whereas organised crime networks are closely interlinked and rooted both in EU Member States and non-EU states; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas corruption and organised crime remain a serious concern across the Western Balkan region, which can also have negative impacts on EU Member States; whereas organised crime networks are closely interlinked and rooted both in EU Member States and non-EU states;

| D. | whereas the European integration process of the Western Balkan countries is directly dependent on the normalisation of their relations both with each other and with the EU Member States; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the European integration process of the Western Balkan countries is directly dependent on the normalisation of their relations both with each other and with the EU Member States;

| E. | whereas organised crime in the Western Balkans is a structural problem with deeply rooted links to business and state institutions and one of the symptoms of state capture, which reforms relating to the EU integration process aim to overcome; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas organised crime in the Western Balkans is a structural problem with deeply rooted links to business and state institutions and one of the symptoms of state capture, which reforms relating to the EU integration process aim to overcome;

| F. | whereas organised crime and corruption go hand in hand with money laundering activities, tax evasion, clientelism and impunity; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas organised crime and corruption go hand in hand with money laundering activities, tax evasion, clientelism and impunity;

| G. | whereas organised criminal groups collaborate well across borders and ethnic lines, in comparison to the police and judicial authorities of the Western Balkan countries, which urgently need to improve such coordination; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas organised criminal groups collaborate well across borders and ethnic lines, in comparison to the police and judicial authorities of the Western Balkan countries, which urgently need to improve such coordination;

| H. | whereas organised crime groups cooperate with groups from countries in the wider European neighbourhood in activities such as human trafficking, migrant smuggling, the smuggling of artefacts and money laundering; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas organised crime groups cooperate with groups from countries in the wider European neighbourhood in activities such as human trafficking, migrant smuggling, the smuggling of artefacts and money laundering;

| I. | whereas harmonised legal frameworks and their effective implementation, independent anti-corruption and counter-crime bodies, and genuine political will are key to the eradication of organised crime; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas harmonised legal frameworks and their effective implementation, independent anti-corruption and counter-crime bodies, and genuine political will are key to the eradication of organised crime;

| J. | whereas according to the UNODC report entitled ‘Measuring Organized Crime in the Western Balkans’, prosecutions and convictions tend to focus on low ranks of criminal organisations with group leaders more often enjoying impunity in the Western Balkans; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas according to the UNODC report entitled ‘Measuring Organized Crime in the Western Balkans’, prosecutions and convictions tend to focus on low ranks of criminal organisations with group leaders more often enjoying impunity in the Western Balkans;

| K. | whereas civil society organisations (CSOs) have established themselves as important stakeholders in the fight against organised crime and corruption across the region and play a crucial role, particularly in monitoring and evaluating anti-corruption policies; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas civil society organisations (CSOs) have established themselves as important stakeholders in the fight against organised crime and corruption across the region and play a crucial role, particularly in monitoring and evaluating anti-corruption policies;

| L. | whereas more research and more reliable data on organised crime is needed to better design effective policy responses to organised crime and corruption in the region; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas more research and more reliable data on organised crime is needed to better design effective policy responses to organised crime and corruption in the region;

| M. | whereas education plays a key role in preventing crime and promoting a culture of lawfulness; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas education plays a key role in preventing crime and promoting a culture of lawfulness;

| N. | whereas the threat posed by organised crime groups originating from the Western Balkans has been wrongfully used as an argument against EU accession in some countries, and should therefore be properly addressed in order to advance further steps in the EU accession process of the Western Balkan countries; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the threat posed by organised crime groups originating from the Western Balkans has been wrongfully used as an argument against EU accession in some countries, and should therefore be properly addressed in order to advance further steps in the EU accession process of the Western Balkan countries;

| O. | whereas in order to meet the EU membership criteria, the Western Balkan countries need to implement comprehensive reforms in crucial areas and deliver concrete results in judicial reforms and the fight against corruption and organised crime; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas in order to meet the EU membership criteria, the Western Balkan countries need to implement comprehensive reforms in crucial areas and deliver concrete results in judicial reforms and the fight against corruption and organised crime;

| P. | whereas strengthening the rule of law and fighting corruption and organised crime are cornerstones of the 2018 EU Western Balkans strategy; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas strengthening the rule of law and fighting corruption and organised crime are cornerstones of the 2018 EU Western Balkans strategy;

| Q. | whereas around EUR 64 million was allocated for projects related to the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II), which has funded multiple national and multi-country projects supporting a more effective administration of justice in organised crime and corruption cases in the Western Balkans, including through trial monitoring; whereas IPA III also entails specific objectives to develop effective tools to prevent and fight organised crime, trafficking in human beings and illicit firearms, drug trafficking and money laundering; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas around EUR 64 million was allocated for projects related to the fight against organised crime in the Western Balkans under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II), which has funded multiple national and multi-country projects supporting a more effective administration of justice in organised crime and corruption cases in the Western Balkans, including through trial monitoring; whereas IPA III also entails specific objectives to develop effective tools to prevent and fight organised crime, trafficking in human beings and illicit firearms, drug trafficking and money laundering;

General situation

| 1. | Stresses that organised crime and corruption first and foremost hurt the citizens of the Western Balkan countries, as they undermine their right to safety and social cohesion as well as their trust in the democratic system, create obstacles to democratic reforms and hamper the accession process, while also having potential and actual negative impacts on the security and stability of EU Member States; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Underlines that depriving countries of the Western Balkans of a European perspective is worsening the situation as regards organised crime, and that it can be improved by fostering the EU integration process and cooperation with the Member States; stresses that fighting organised crime and advancing EU integration are mutually reinforcing processes, hence the need to accelerate the EU integration process; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Expresses its view that linking visa liberalisation for Kosovo with the fight against organised crime is counterproductive as isolation encourages criminal activities; underlines, once again, that Kosovo has fulfilled all criteria for visa liberalisation and calls on the Council to grant visa liberalisation without further delay; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Notes that the rule of law and the fight against corruption and organised crime are the crucial areas in which the Western Balkan countries need to show tangible results in order to make more progress on their EU path; urges them to significantly ramp up their efforts to advance the necessary reforms and calls for the EU to promote, as a priority of enlargement policy, the correct transposition and implementation of the relevant international instruments that support the rule of law and target corruption and organised crime through financial assistance and practical cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Welcomes the publication of the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025 on 14 April 2021 and urges the EU to step up international cooperation on combating organised crime, in particular with the Western Balkan countries, in order to address this transnational threat effectively; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Notes that the lack of employment opportunities, corruption, disinformation, elements of state capture, inequality, foreign interference from non-democratic regimes such as Russia and China, and the slow process of EU accession are among the factors that make Western Balkan societies vulnerable to organised crime; urges both the authorities of the Western Balkan countries and their international partners, especially the EU, to intensify their efforts in addressing these challenges, which foment instability, undermine integration, and delay democratic and economic development; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Regrets the lack of genuine political will among parts of the local political elites to fight organised crime and corruption and eliminate any elements of state capture; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Deplores the lack of independence and proper functioning, in many cases, of the judiciary in the Western Balkan countries and urges that a more strategic approach be adopted in addressing challenges posed by organised crime; calls for the EU to provide further assistance in order to stimulate a culture of criminal justice professionalism and performance and to improve the integrity of the judiciary; notes that although some progress has been made with judicial reforms, substantial efforts are still needed to achieve tangible results; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Urges the Western Balkan countries to fully address the shortcomings of their criminal justice systems, including the length of proceedings; calls on the EU and other international partners to provide further guidelines for law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to enhance the professionalism and performance of criminal justice; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Welcomes the transposition into national laws by the Western Balkan countries of EU and international standards on asset recovery as well as other efforts to fight organised crime in the region, such as the development of governmental coordination mechanisms and special courts and law enforcement units; regrets, however, that implementation remains low and urges Western Balkan authorities to establish a solid track record in recovering such assets for the benefit of all their citizens and to establish the confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime as a priority in the fight against corruption and organised crime; calls for EU assistance in supporting adequate capacities for law enforcement agencies as well as proper conditions and resources, highlighting in particular the need to increase expertise in financial forensics in public prosecutors’ offices; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls on the Western Balkan countries to focus their efforts on targeting criminal organisations as a whole in addition to individual cases, thereby establishing a decent track record in prosecuting and convicting high-profile criminals; notes that rightly identifying and accurately investigating criminal activity as ‘organised’ is essential to the criminal justice response; urges the relevant authorities to fill in the legislative gaps that expose informants and whistleblowers and to protect them and their close relatives from being harassed, sued or threatened in order to increase the capacity to dismantle organised criminal groups and to successfully fight corruption and organised crime; encourages an exchange of best practices with Member States that have been exceptionally successful in the fight against organised crime; calls on the Member States to support witness protection schemes, including through relocation; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Calls on the Western Balkan countries to keep a sustained track record in tackling organised crime, corruption and money laundering and to draw up periodic national reports on this matter as well as strengthening interinstitutional cooperation, including in intelligence gathering and sharing, in order to better understand and tackle organised crime; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Reiterates the need to eradicate political and administrative links to organised crime through clear anti-corruption safeguards and the effective prosecution of high-profile corruption cases; calls for the EU to increase support for the consolidation of merit-based public administrations; is highly alerted by reports and accusations of links between high-level political figures and organised crime groups, while the judicial system is ineffective at addressing these claims; underlines that the construction sector in the Western Balkans is among the most vulnerable to organised crime and corruption; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Is concerned that the COVID-19 pandemic has been exploited by criminal organisations, including through the misuse of direct public procurement for essential medical equipment and services to healthcare structures, the selling of falsified COVID-19 certificates and the increasing practice of loansharking; calls on the Western Balkan authorities to take action against counterfeit vaccines and vaccination cards; calls on the Commission to link budget support to clear anti-corruption objectives; stresses the need to set up robust mechanisms to monitor implementation to this end; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Recalls that IPA III provides for strong conditionality and that funding must be modulated or even suspended in the case of a significant regression or persistent lack of progress in the area of the so-called ‘fundamentals’, notably in the field of the rule of law and fundamental rights, including the fight against corruption and organised crime; stresses that it is in the EU’s own security interests and its responsibility to guarantee that EU funds do not become counterproductive by strengthening clientelist networks of corrupt politicians and privileged businesses; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Notes that links between organised crime, politics and businesses existed before the break-up of Yugoslavia and have continued since the 1990s; condemns the apparent lack of will of the responsible authorities to open the former Yugoslav archives; reiterates its call, therefore, for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Underlines the importance of cooperation and intelligence sharing with the Member States, with international partners like the Unites States, Canada and the United Kingdom, and with international organisations such as NATO, GRECO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UNODC; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Welcomes the renewed constructive US engagement in the Western Balkans, including their focus on the fight against corruption; highlights, in this context, the US executive order sanctioning persons contributing to the destabilising situation in the Western Balkans, as well as the US action targeting individuals and entities for significant acts of corruption; calls on the EU to thoroughly assess a possible alignment with such actions; |
| --- | --- |

18.

Specific types of organised crime

| 19. | Notes that the Western Balkan countries are countries of origin, destination and transit for trafficking in human beings, which involves mostly women and girls trafficked for sexual exploitation; notes that human trafficking is the crime with the highest proportional share of links to organised crime; calls on the relevant authorities to place more focus on prevention and strengthening the resilience of groups that are vulnerable to the risks of trafficking in human beings, while underlining the need for an intersectional gender-sensitive approach; welcomes joint actions carried out with international partners, including Interpol and Europol, which have led to the arrests of suspected traffickers and people smugglers; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Notes that the Western Balkan countries serve as a transit corridor for migrants and refugees and that the large population movements in recent years have posed an enormous challenge to the region and Member States; calls for enhanced efforts in addressing the smuggling of migrants and in protecting the fundamental rights of smuggled persons, in particular unaccompanied minors, and for greater exchange of information and enhanced coordination between the countries of the Western Balkans and with the Member States; encourages the EU and its Member States to provide more assistance in addressing these issues, such as financial and technical support, concluding informal and status agreements and fostering cooperation via the Joint Operational Office and the Operational Platform — Eastern Mediterranean Route, while taking into account the specificities and needs of the Western Balkan Route, as well as through assistance in establishing dignified reception conditions; calls for enhanced EU external border protection in cooperation with the Western Balkan states; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Underlines that tackling criminal finances is crucial to uncover criminal activities and prevent infiltration into the legal economy; highlights that beneficial ownership transparency is an important policy tool for combating corruption, stemming illicit financial flows and fighting tax evasion; welcomes the efforts of the governments of the Western Balkan countries to address money laundering, including through the adoption of revised anti-money laundering frameworks; expresses concern, however, that they are not being adequately implemented; reiterates the need to significantly improve the enforcement of due diligence provisions and the transparency of beneficial ownership, including in the banking sector; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Notes with concern the large share of the grey economy (estimated to be worth more than 30 % of the region’s GDP) and massive illicit cash payments flowing across the Western Balkans; calls on governments in the region to implement measures to reduce informality, where possible; underlines that insufficient regulation of online banking increases the risk of money laundering and calls on the Western Balkan states and the Commission to address the issue of international and regional harmonisation within the EU enlargement process; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Welcomes the Western Balkan countries’ commitment to combating illicit small arms and light weapons trafficking, notably through the adoption of a regional roadmap at the EU-Western Balkans Summit in London, which aims to tackle the illicit possession, use, manufacturing and trafficking of small arms and light weapons; stresses, however, that according to the 2020-2025 EU action plan on firearms trafficking, illicit firearms possession and trafficking remains a serious issue as many weapons that are found and used in organised crime throughout the EU come from the region; calls on the six Western Balkan states to invest in programmes to support disarmaments; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Highlights the important work of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) in strengthening the capacities of national and regional stakeholders to control and reduce the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons and urges greater cooperation and coordination with SEESAC; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Notes that the six Western Balkan countries remain a major transit region for the trafficking of drugs and that drug production and trafficking are the most commonly convicted crimes in the region; welcomes the increasing number of joint counter-narcotics operations; calls, in this respect, for cooperation to be intensified between EU law enforcement agencies such as Europol and the law enforcement bodies of the Member States and Western Balkan countries; underlines that law enforcement authorities must develop their capacities to better monitor and combat drug trafficking; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Notes the increase in organised cyber-criminal activities; welcomes the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to expand their capacity to fight cybercrime and the increase in prosecutions for cybercrime; encourages the EU to assist the Western Balkan countries with the appropriate tools and means for tackling cybercrime and other online threats, including through the newly established European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre; underlines the importance of fighting manipulative disinformation in close cooperation with European partners; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Calls on the EU and the Western Balkan countries to work together to address the consistent and growing threats to the protection and preservation of cultural heritage and smuggling of cultural goods, especially in conflict zones; urges greater cooperation between the different law enforcement agencies, including immediate information sharing between national intelligence agencies, and increased cooperation between law enforcement and the arts and archaeological communities; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Notes that Western Balkan countries have to increase their efforts to counter other illegal activities carried out by organised crime groups, which include among others labour exploitation, environmental crimes such as illegal logging and poaching, and extortion; |
| --- | --- |

28.

Cooperation with the EU (its Member States and agencies) and inter-regional cooperation

| 29. | Welcomes the increased cooperation between the EU and the Western Balkan countries in the fight against organised crime and encourages the EU to further support capacity-building in the Western Balkans and the facilitation of police and judicial cooperation in countering organised crime; stresses that any cooperation agreement with EU structures must fully respect fundamental rights and ensure an adequate level of data protection; calls on the Western Balkan countries to pursue further legislative harmonisation with the EU acquis on public procurement, the fight against organised crime and terrorism, money laundering and cybercrime; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Recommends strengthening the existing EU-sponsored structures such as the Regional Cooperation Council to ensure that they play a consistent role in encouraging further cooperation between the EU, its Member States and the Western Balkan countries; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Welcomes the conclusion of cooperation agreements between Eurojust and Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, as well as the authorisation to open negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina; urges the Council to authorise the opening of negotiations for a similar agreement with Kosovo as soon as possible, as judicial cooperation in criminal matters with all Western Balkan countries is crucial to fighting organised crime, especially human trafficking and drug smuggling, which account for the majority of criminal activities in the region; notes that Eurojust has facilitated approximately 200 joint criminal investigations between EU Member States and the Western Balkan countries; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Commends the successful cooperation with liaison prosecutors (LPs) from Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia seconded to Eurojust to provide support in cross-border investigations involving their countries and highlights the significant increase in casework after the appointment of LPs; encourages, in this respect, similar cooperation with the remaining Western Balkan countries; welcomes the rising number of cases in judicial cooperation since 2019 despite the challenging circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Underlines that the Western Balkans is a region of particular relevance for Europol; welcomes the agreements on operational cooperation between Europol and five Western Balkan countries, as well as the working arrangement with the law enforcement authorities of Kosovo; calls for the full implementation of these agreements and commends the successful operations led in the context of this cooperation; welcomes the opening of Europol’s liaison office in Albania in 2019 and the decision to open similar liaison offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia; encourages similar cooperation with the remaining Western Balkan countries; underlines, in addition, the importance of cooperating with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF); calls on the EU and the Western Balkan countries, in this context, to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the EPPO and the Western Balkan countries in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exert its competences in the area of EU funding, notably IPA III funds in the Western Balkan countries; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Welcomes the working agreements undertaken by the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) with the Western Balkan countries on specific topics related to combating organised crime; underlines the importance of strengthening further the established mechanisms between CEPOL and the Western Balkans region; takes note of the specialised country reports issued by GRECO and underlines the importance of the EU accession countries enhancing cooperation with GRECO and implementing its specific recommendations thoroughly; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Underlines that Interpol is an important instrument in the fight against organised crime; regrets the fact that Kosovo is not yet a member of Interpol despite its multiple attempts; calls on the Member States to proactively support Kosovo’s bid to join the organisation; believes that Interpol membership for all six Western Balkan countries would further improve the effectiveness of measures targeting transnational crime; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Welcomes the entry into force of the agreements on border management cooperation between the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and Albania, Montenegro and Serbia allowing Frontex to execute joint operations in these countries in order to improve the management of their borders, fight cross-border crime and control irregular migration in line with international standards and with full respect for human rights; welcomes the similar status agreements initiated with North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and calls for all sides to advance the ratification of these agreements as soon as possible and to work on a similar agreement with Kosovo; underlines the need to further develop cooperation between Frontex and the Western Balkan countries in matters related to the fight against organised crime; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Reiterates the need to increase the focus on prevention activities and education, particularly the negative societal impact of organised crime and human, drug and arms trafficking, as well as a proper understanding of citizenship, and to increase resilience, paying greater attention to socio-economic conditions, especially in suburban and rural areas, and providing support for local initiatives to reduce vulnerability to crime and corruption, while stressing the need for an intersectional gender-sensitive approach; underlines the importance of democratic capacity-building in the Western Balkans region, including through specialised programmes and pilot projects aimed at strengthening participative democracy and discussing issues linked to fighting organised crime and corruption; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Underlines the importance of monitoring links between organised crime groups and radicalised individuals and terrorist organisations; reiterates the importance of the EU’s role in countering terrorist financing and money laundering; encourages further cooperation in this regard, in particular through EU support for training financial experts in the region, information sharing and the exchange of best practices and know-how; welcomes the acknowledgment by the participants of the Western Balkans Summit in Berlin on 5 July 2021 of the need for a multi-agency response, including cooperation with the private sector and CSOs, in order to increase the effectiveness of joint work to tackle serious and organised crime, illicit finance, corruption and terrorism; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Underlines that regional cooperation is key to fighting organised crime effectively; commends the work of existing regional initiatives aimed at strengthening interinstitutional relations in the fight against corruption and organised crime between the Western Balkan countries, such as the Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre, and encourages further regional cooperation in combating trans-border organised crime more effectively; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Commends the role played by regional initiatives involving EU Member States and Western Balkan countries, such as the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR), the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, the Central European Initiative, and the Berlin Process; encourages both EU Member States and Western Balkan countries to take part in these initiatives and to exploit their potential fully; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Welcomes the funding under IPA for projects encompassing the whole region aimed at improving the capacities of the Western Balkan countries in fighting corruption and organised crime; commends, in particular, the Witness Protection IPA II programme, which has led to the creation of the ‘Balkan Network’; calls for this cooperation to be continued and for the Western Balkan Partners to take ownership to keep the network alive; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Expresses support for the IPA-funded multi-country programme ‘supporting a more effective administration of justice in corruption and organised crime cases in the Western Balkans through trial monitoring’ as a step towards a more effective judicial response by the authorities on corruption and organised crime in the Western Balkans; calls on the governments of the Western Balkan countries to fully implement the recommendations formulated as part of the peer reviews by the Member States’ experts; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Believes that the Western Balkan partners should actively engage in the Conference on the Future of Europe and should be included in a broader European debate on tackling organised crime; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Calls on international donors to ensure better coordination of the various programmes countering organised crime and corruption in the Western Balkans in order to avoid duplication and increase the effectiveness of international cooperation in these areas; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Notes with concern the lack of credible data on organised crime in the region and calls on the Western Balkan countries to increase the understanding of organised crime by enhancing their capacity to collect and process reliable data on organised crime; underlines the need for more in-depth interdisciplinary research and an intersectional gender-sensitive approach and encourages the Western Balkan countries to work together with international partners to establish national statistical systems that record and analyse organised crime in order to better design efficient, evidence-based policies to prevent and tackle organised crime and corruption; |
| --- | --- |

45.

Role of civil society and media

| 46. | Underlines the crucial role of CSOs, academics and journalists in monitoring the work of governments and judicial and law enforcement agencies and assessing track records in fighting organised crime; notes that legal and institutional frameworks for CSO participation are largely in place in the Western Balkan countries but regrets that their potential is not being used to the full extent and that CSOs focusing on corruption and organised crime are in some cases facing hostility from their governments; calls for CSOs to be more included in the legislative process and for them to be able to make a meaningful contribution to key pieces of legislation; calls on Western Balkan authorities, in this context, to urgently develop, adopt and implement better laws on free access to information through inclusive processes; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Commends the important role played by CSOs in doing preventive work, supporting vulnerable groups, formulating policies and taking on a role of oversight when there is a lack of independent public bodies; is concerned about smear campaigns, pressure and acts of intimidation, which accelerate the shrinking space for CSOs in which to operate; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Encourages CSOs in the Western Balkans to establish stronger networks among civil society actors, to identify local counterparts who work on similar issues, and to share further experiences and best practices with a view to understanding the nature and causes of organised crime and support the prevention of radicalisation in the region; welcomes the contributions to strategic communication campaigns by stakeholders such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network and European Strategic Communications Network; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Notes that many CSOs depend on private funding and face difficulties in raising enough funds to sustain their activities; recognises that grants are often given to short-term projects and that there is little support for activities to combat organised crime; recognises that short-term funding results in staff only being hired for project-specific purposes, which leads to a lack of stable employment standards and provides little space for staff to develop core skills, to the detriment of long-term strategic planning; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Commends the valuable work of investigative journalists reporting on high-profile cases and disclosing links between organised criminal groups, politicians and businesses; strongly condemns acts of aggression, including targeted killings, intimidation, hate speech and slander campaigns against investigative journalists and civil society; notes with particular concern cases of hate speech and slander campaigns by state officials, MPs and the representatives of governments, ruling parties and media owned or partially financed by the state; calls on the authorities and law enforcement to ensure that investigative journalists and civil society are protected and can work unhindered and urges that all forms of hate speech targeting minorities and vulnerable groups, especially those of national or ethnic origins, be punished; reiterates its call on the Commission and the European External Action Service to strengthen their cooperation with and support for civil society, NGOs, reform-oriented policymakers, academia and independent media on the ground; encourages the Commission and the local EU delegations to work together with local stakeholders to enhance procedures for the regular trial monitoring of corruption and organised crime cases; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Deeply regrets the increasing number of cases of strategic litigation against public participation (SLAPPs), which are often used to threaten journalists and individuals in order to prevent them from exposing the wrongdoings of those in power; calls on the Western Balkan authorities to significantly increase their work to ensure the transparency of media ownership and the independence of newsrooms and to safeguard media freedom from political interference, as key elements in a free and democratic society that are essential for the success of the fight against organised crime and corruption; |
| --- | --- |

51.

o

o o

| 52. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Western Balkan countries. |
| --- | --- |

52.

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(1)  OJ L 293, 20.11.2018, p. 11.

(2)  OJ C 101, 16.3.2018, p. 47.

(3)  OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 129.

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Thursday 16 December 2021

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/96 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/96

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P9_TA(2021)0507

Deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2020

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2020 (2021/2019(INI))

(2022/C 251/09)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on the deliberations of the Committee on Petitions, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on the deliberations of the Committee on Petitions,

| — | having regard to Articles 10 and 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 10 and 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

| — | having regard to Articles 20, 24 and 227 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which reflect the importance the Treaty attaches to the right of EU citizens and residents to bring their concerns to the attention of Parliament, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 20, 24 and 227 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which reflect the importance the Treaty attaches to the right of EU citizens and residents to bring their concerns to the attention of Parliament,

| — | having regard to Article 228 TFEU on the role and functions of the European Ombudsman, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 228 TFEU on the role and functions of the European Ombudsman,

| — | having regard to Article 44 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’) concerning the right to petition the European Parliament, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 44 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’) concerning the right to petition the European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the provisions of the TFEU relating to the infringement procedure and, in particular, to Articles 258 and 260 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisions of the TFEU relating to the infringement procedure and, in particular, to Articles 258 and 260 thereof,

| — | having regard to Rules 54 and 227(7) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 54 and 227(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Petitions (A9-0323/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Petitions (A9-0323/2021),

| A. | whereas in 2020, Parliament received 1 573 petitions, which represents an increase of 15,9 % as compared to the 1 357 petitions submitted in 2019 and an increase of 28,9 % as compared to the 1 220 petitions submitted in 2018; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas in 2020, Parliament received 1 573 petitions, which represents an increase of 15,9 % as compared to the 1 357 petitions submitted in 2019 and an increase of 28,9 % as compared to the 1 220 petitions submitted in 2018;

| B. | whereas in 2020, the number of users supporting one or more petitions on Parliament’s Petitions Web Portal was 48 882, which represents a considerable rise as compared to the 28 076 users recorded in 2019; whereas the number of clicks in support of petitions also increased in 2020, reaching a total of 55 129; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas in 2020, the number of users supporting one or more petitions on Parliament’s Petitions Web Portal was 48 882, which represents a considerable rise as compared to the 28 076 users recorded in 2019; whereas the number of clicks in support of petitions also increased in 2020, reaching a total of 55 129;

| C. | whereas the large number of petitions voicing citizens’ concerns over the public health and socio-economic emergencies resulting from the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic significantly contributed to the rise in the number of petitions registered in 2020 in comparison with previous years; whereas 13,23 % of the petitions received in 2020 related to the COVID-19 pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the large number of petitions voicing citizens’ concerns over the public health and socio-economic emergencies resulting from the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic significantly contributed to the rise in the number of petitions registered in 2020 in comparison with previous years; whereas 13,23 % of the petitions received in 2020 related to the COVID-19 pandemic;

| D. | whereas the high number of petitions submitted in 2020 reveals that, in times of crisis, citizens rely on their elected representatives at EU level by directly addressing their concerns and complaints to them; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the high number of petitions submitted in 2020 reveals that, in times of crisis, citizens rely on their elected representatives at EU level by directly addressing their concerns and complaints to them;

| E. | whereas, however, the overall number of petitions remains modest in relation to the total population of the EU, revealing that efforts still need to be stepped up even more to increase citizens’ awareness about their right to petition and encourage them to exercise it; whereas, in exercising the right to petition, citizens expect the EU institutions to provide added value by finding a solution to their problems; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas, however, the overall number of petitions remains modest in relation to the total population of the EU, revealing that efforts still need to be stepped up even more to increase citizens’ awareness about their right to petition and encourage them to exercise it; whereas, in exercising the right to petition, citizens expect the EU institutions to provide added value by finding a solution to their problems;

| F. | whereas the criteria for the admissibility of petitions are laid down in Article 227 TFEU and Rule 226 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, which require that petitions must be submitted by EU citizens or residents directly affected by matters falling within the EU’s fields of activity; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the criteria for the admissibility of petitions are laid down in Article 227 TFEU and Rule 226 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, which require that petitions must be submitted by EU citizens or residents directly affected by matters falling within the EU’s fields of activity;

| G. | whereas, of the 1 573 petitions submitted in 2020, 392 were declared inadmissible and 51 were withdrawn; whereas the relatively high percentage (24,92 %) of inadmissible petitions in 2020 demonstrates that there is still a widespread lack of clarity about the scope and limits of the Union’s areas of responsibility; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas, of the 1 573 petitions submitted in 2020, 392 were declared inadmissible and 51 were withdrawn; whereas the relatively high percentage (24,92 %) of inadmissible petitions in 2020 demonstrates that there is still a widespread lack of clarity about the scope and limits of the Union’s areas of responsibility;

| H. | whereas the right to petition the European Parliament is one of the fundamental rights of EU citizens; whereas the right to petition provides EU citizens and residents with an open, democratic and transparent mechanism to address their elected representatives directly and is therefore essential to enable citizens’ active participation in the Union’s fields of activity; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the right to petition the European Parliament is one of the fundamental rights of EU citizens; whereas the right to petition provides EU citizens and residents with an open, democratic and transparent mechanism to address their elected representatives directly and is therefore essential to enable citizens’ active participation in the Union’s fields of activity;

| I. | whereas the right to petition offers Parliament the opportunity to enhance its responsiveness to complaints and concerns relating to respect for EU fundamental rights and compliance with EU legislation in the Member States; whereas petitions are therefore a useful source of information on instances of misapplication or breaches of EU law, and thus enable Parliament and other EU institutions to assess the transposition and application of EU law and its possible impact on the rights of EU citizens and residents; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the right to petition offers Parliament the opportunity to enhance its responsiveness to complaints and concerns relating to respect for EU fundamental rights and compliance with EU legislation in the Member States; whereas petitions are therefore a useful source of information on instances of misapplication or breaches of EU law, and thus enable Parliament and other EU institutions to assess the transposition and application of EU law and its possible impact on the rights of EU citizens and residents;

| J. | whereas Parliament has long been at the forefront of the development of the petition process internationally and has the most open and transparent petition process in Europe, allowing petitioners to participate in its activities; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas Parliament has long been at the forefront of the development of the petition process internationally and has the most open and transparent petition process in Europe, allowing petitioners to participate in its activities;

| K. | whereas the Committee on Petitions carefully examines and deals with each petition submitted to Parliament; whereas each petitioner has the right to receive a reply informing them about the decision on admissibility and follow-up actions taken by the committee within a reasonable period of time, in their own language or in the language used in the petition; whereas any petitioner may request that their petition be reopened on the basis of any relevant developments; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the Committee on Petitions carefully examines and deals with each petition submitted to Parliament; whereas each petitioner has the right to receive a reply informing them about the decision on admissibility and follow-up actions taken by the committee within a reasonable period of time, in their own language or in the language used in the petition; whereas any petitioner may request that their petition be reopened on the basis of any relevant developments;

| L. | whereas the activities of the Committee on Petitions are based on the input provided by petitioners; whereas the information submitted by petitioners in their petitions and at committee meetings, along with the Commission’s assessment and the replies of the Member States and other bodies, are crucial for the work of the committee; whereas admissible petitions also provide valuable contributions to the work of the other parliamentary committees, given that they are forwarded by the Committee on Petitions to other committees for an opinion or for information; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the activities of the Committee on Petitions are based on the input provided by petitioners; whereas the information submitted by petitioners in their petitions and at committee meetings, along with the Commission’s assessment and the replies of the Member States and other bodies, are crucial for the work of the committee; whereas admissible petitions also provide valuable contributions to the work of the other parliamentary committees, given that they are forwarded by the Committee on Petitions to other committees for an opinion or for information;

| M. | whereas the Committee on Petitions attaches paramount importance to the examination and public discussion of petitions at its meetings; whereas petitioners have the right to present their petitions and frequently take the floor in the discussion, thereby actively contributing to the work of the committee; whereas in 2020, the Committee on Petitions held 13 committee meetings, at which 116 petitions were discussed with 110 petitioners present, with 78 petitioners actively participating by taking the floor; whereas the lower number of petitions discussed at meetings in 2020 as compared to 2019 is explained by the reduced timeslots for committee meetings, especially from April to July, owing to the limited interpretation facilities as a consequence of Parliament’s precautionary measures in the context of the pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the Committee on Petitions attaches paramount importance to the examination and public discussion of petitions at its meetings; whereas petitioners have the right to present their petitions and frequently take the floor in the discussion, thereby actively contributing to the work of the committee; whereas in 2020, the Committee on Petitions held 13 committee meetings, at which 116 petitions were discussed with 110 petitioners present, with 78 petitioners actively participating by taking the floor; whereas the lower number of petitions discussed at meetings in 2020 as compared to 2019 is explained by the reduced timeslots for committee meetings, especially from April to July, owing to the limited interpretation facilities as a consequence of Parliament’s precautionary measures in the context of the pandemic;

| N. | whereas the main subjects of concern raised in petitions submitted in 2020 relate to fundamental rights (in particular the impact of COVID-19 emergency measures on the rule of law and democracy, as well on the freedom of movement, the right to work, the right to information and the right to education, as well as a large number of petitions related to LGBTQ+ rights in the Union), health (notably questions on the public health crisis resulting from the pandemic, ranging from the protection of citizens’ health, including treatments and protective equipment, to the management of the health crisis in the Member States and the acquisition and distribution of vaccines), the environment (mostly mining activities and their impact on the environment, nuclear safety, air pollution and the deterioration of natural ecosystems), justice (notably issues related to access to justice or alleged procedural irregularities or concerns over the rule of law, along with cross-border cases of child abduction and custody rights), employment (in particular job market accessibility and precarious employment), education (in particular questions related to discriminatory access to education), and the internal market (in particular questions relating to national travel restrictions in the context of the pandemic and their impact on the freedom of movement of persons within and outside the EU), and the implementation of the agreement on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, in addition to many other areas of activity; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the main subjects of concern raised in petitions submitted in 2020 relate to fundamental rights (in particular the impact of COVID-19 emergency measures on the rule of law and democracy, as well on the freedom of movement, the right to work, the right to information and the right to education, as well as a large number of petitions related to LGBTQ+ rights in the Union), health (notably questions on the public health crisis resulting from the pandemic, ranging from the protection of citizens’ health, including treatments and protective equipment, to the management of the health crisis in the Member States and the acquisition and distribution of vaccines), the environment (mostly mining activities and their impact on the environment, nuclear safety, air pollution and the deterioration of natural ecosystems), justice (notably issues related to access to justice or alleged procedural irregularities or concerns over the rule of law, along with cross-border cases of child abduction and custody rights), employment (in particular job market accessibility and precarious employment), education (in particular questions related to discriminatory access to education), and the internal market (in particular questions relating to national travel restrictions in the context of the pandemic and their impact on the freedom of movement of persons within and outside the EU), and the implementation of the agreement on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, in addition to many other areas of activity;

| O. | whereas 79,7 % (1 254) of the petitions received in 2020 were submitted via Parliament’s Petitions Web Portal, as compared to 73,9 % (1 003 petitions) in 2019, thus confirming that Parliament’s Petitions Web Portal has become by far the most used channel for submitting citizens’ petitions to Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas 79,7 % (1 254) of the petitions received in 2020 were submitted via Parliament’s Petitions Web Portal, as compared to 73,9 % (1 003 petitions) in 2019, thus confirming that Parliament’s Petitions Web Portal has become by far the most used channel for submitting citizens’ petitions to Parliament;

| P. | whereas in 2020, the Petitions Web Portal was further developed into a more user-friendly, secure and accessible portal for citizens; whereas the frequently asked questions (FAQs) have been updated and a number of improvements on data protection have been made in order to implement the recommendations by the European Data Protection Supervisor and a new password recovery mechanism has been introduced; whereas the interconnection between the Petitions Web Portal, ePeti and PETIGREF has been further developed and work has been carried out to ensure the integration of external developments and Hermes; whereas a large number of individual support requests have been handled successfully; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas in 2020, the Petitions Web Portal was further developed into a more user-friendly, secure and accessible portal for citizens; whereas the frequently asked questions (FAQs) have been updated and a number of improvements on data protection have been made in order to implement the recommendations by the European Data Protection Supervisor and a new password recovery mechanism has been introduced; whereas the interconnection between the Petitions Web Portal, ePeti and PETIGREF has been further developed and work has been carried out to ensure the integration of external developments and Hermes; whereas a large number of individual support requests have been handled successfully;

| Q. | whereas, in 2020, many petitions concerning COVID-19 were placed on the agenda by means of the urgency procedure; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas, in 2020, many petitions concerning COVID-19 were placed on the agenda by means of the urgency procedure;

| R. | whereas in 2020, the Committee on Petitions held just one fact-finding visit; whereas no other fact-finding visit could take place due to the situation caused by the pandemic and the decision taken by Parliament’s President to cancel parliamentary events, including delegations, as one of the necessary precautionary measures adopted to reduce the spread of COVID-19 and minimise health risks for Parliament’s Members and staff; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas in 2020, the Committee on Petitions held just one fact-finding visit; whereas no other fact-finding visit could take place due to the situation caused by the pandemic and the decision taken by Parliament’s President to cancel parliamentary events, including delegations, as one of the necessary precautionary measures adopted to reduce the spread of COVID-19 and minimise health risks for Parliament’s Members and staff;

| S. | whereas the Committee on Petitions as an associated committee, together with the committees responsible for the subject-matter (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT)) organised a public hearing on the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) entitled ‘Minority Safepack — one million signatures for diversity in Europe’ on 15 October 2020; whereas owing to the pandemic, the hearing was held in hybrid format and the ECI’s organisers could take part at the meeting remotely, while the public could follow the meeting via webstreaming; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas the Committee on Petitions as an associated committee, together with the committees responsible for the subject-matter (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT)) organised a public hearing on the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) entitled ‘Minority Safepack — one million signatures for diversity in Europe’ on 15 October 2020; whereas owing to the pandemic, the hearing was held in hybrid format and the ECI’s organisers could take part at the meeting remotely, while the public could follow the meeting via webstreaming;

| T. | whereas the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, has an essential role in the work of the Committee on Petitions and the information provided by the petitioners is useful to discover possible breaches or misapplications of the European law; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, has an essential role in the work of the Committee on Petitions and the information provided by the petitioners is useful to discover possible breaches or misapplications of the European law;

| U. | whereas the Commission’s strategy in dealing with petitions is based on its 2016 Communication entitled ‘EU law: Better results through better application’ (C(2016)8600); |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas the Commission’s strategy in dealing with petitions is based on its 2016 Communication entitled ‘EU law: Better results through better application’ (C(2016)8600);

| V. | whereas the Commission’s annual reports on monitoring the application of EU law refer to petitions in a very general way, revealing the lack of a proper system to collect information on petitions and how they link with infringement procedures or EU acts; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas the Commission’s annual reports on monitoring the application of EU law refer to petitions in a very general way, revealing the lack of a proper system to collect information on petitions and how they link with infringement procedures or EU acts;

| W. | whereas under the Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Petitions is responsible for relations with the European Ombudsman, who investigates complaints about maladministration within the institutions and bodies of the EU; whereas the current European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, presented her Annual Report for 2019 to the Committee on Petitions at its meeting of 3 September 2020; |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas under the Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Petitions is responsible for relations with the European Ombudsman, who investigates complaints about maladministration within the institutions and bodies of the EU; whereas the current European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, presented her Annual Report for 2019 to the Committee on Petitions at its meeting of 3 September 2020;

| X. | whereas the Committee on Petitions is a member of the European Network of Ombudsmen, which also includes the European Ombudsman, national and regional ombudsmen and similar bodies in the Member States, the candidate countries and other European Economic Area countries, and which aims to promote the exchange of information about EU law and policy, and to share best practices; |
| --- | --- |

X.

whereas the Committee on Petitions is a member of the European Network of Ombudsmen, which also includes the European Ombudsman, national and regional ombudsmen and similar bodies in the Member States, the candidate countries and other European Economic Area countries, and which aims to promote the exchange of information about EU law and policy, and to share best practices;

| 1. | Emphasises the fundamental role of the Committee on Petitions in protecting and promoting the rights of EU citizens and residents by ensuring that petitioners’ concerns and complaints are examined in a timely and effective manner and that they are resolved, wherever possible, through an open, democratic, rapid and transparent petitions process; stresses the pivotal importance of petitions in promoting the principles of direct democracy and improving the active participation of EU citizens; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Stresses that the participation of citizens in the decision-making process of the Union is essential to the achievement of a more democratic, open and transparent Union; underlines that the Committee on Petitions plays a fundamental role in involving European citizens in the activities of the Union and represents a discussion forum in which citizens can make their voice heard in the EU institutions; calls on the EU institutions to improve their response to citizens’ problems in policy-making by taking into account the opinions and complaints expressed in petitions; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Reiterates the importance of a continuous public debate on the Union’s fields of activity in order to ensure that citizens are correctly informed about the scope of the Union’s competences and the different levels of decision-making; calls, in this regard, for effective awareness raising campaigns; stresses that the active involvement of the press and communications services at both European and national level and more active social media would enhance the visibility and the responsiveness of the work of the Committee on Petitions to public concerns; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Believes that this effort would also help avoid disinformation about the work of the Committee on Petitions in line with the fight against disinformation promoted by the Commission and would help increase citizens’ knowledge about their right to petition, as well as about the scope and limits of the Union’s responsibilities and of the competences of the Committee on Petitions, with a view to reducing the number of inadmissible petitions; believes that it is also important to highlight successful cases in which an issue raised by a petitioner has been solved with the support of the Committee on Petitions; stresses, in this regard, the importance of the multilingual communication policy of the EU in order to better connect with citizens from all Member States; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Emphasises that the Conference on the Future of Europe should be used as an opportunity to explain to EU citizens the role of the Committee on Petitions, in order to raise awareness of the right to petition and to encourage them to actively participate and voice their concerns and ideas to their elected representatives; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Points out that petitions constitute the door to the European institutions for citizens and a unique opportunity for Parliament and the other EU institutions to directly connect with EU citizens and residents, understand their problems and maintain a regular dialogue with them, particularly in cases where they are affected by the incorrect application of EU law; stresses the need for enhanced cooperation between the Committee on Petitions and lead committees, the Union institutions, bodies and agencies and national, regional and local authorities on inquiries and proposals regarding the implementation of and compliance with EU law, including necessary answers to the Committee; believes that such cooperation is crucial to address and resolve citizens’ concerns over the application of EU law and that it contributes to strengthening the democratic legitimacy and accountability of the Union; calls, therefore, for more active participation of Member States’ representatives in committee meetings and for swifter responses to the requests for clarification or information sent by the Committee on Petitions to the national authorities; calls on the Commission to take steps to ensure that the interpretation of the scope of Article 51 of the Charter is as coherent and wide as possible; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls on the Commission to play a more active role in the Committee on Petitions to ensure the citizens receive a detailed and understandable response; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Underlines the need to respect the approach and point of view expressed by the Commission in its replies to the Committee on Petitions and to respect its role as guardian of the Treaties; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Recalls that petitions contribute considerably to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties; stresses that reinforced cooperation between the Committee on Petitions and the Commission is essential to ensure the successful treatment of petitions; urges the Commission to refrain from general replies and to provide timely, precise, clear and targeted responses to efficiently answer the concrete requests of petitioners; calls on the Commission to ensure transparency and access to documents and information in the framework of the EU Pilot procedures in relation to petitions received, and of the EU Pilot and infringement procedures that have already been concluded, and to take into account any issues related to the breach of EU law that are raised through petitions as a matter of priority when considering whether to initiate an infringement procedure, especially when the issues are related to environmental legislation; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Asks the Commission to provide a clarification regarding its competence in relation to petitions, including those raising issues that fall under a field of activity of the EU but not under a policy where the EU has legislative competence; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls on national authorities to be proactive in taking the necessary measures to respond to citizens’ concerns as expressed in their petitions where cases of systemic failure in compliance with EU law occur; calls on the Commission to regularly follow up on progress in complying with EU legislation in the cases examined; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Highlights that the Committee on Petitions must respect the admissibility criteria established in Articles 226 and 227 TFEU and in the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Recalls that cooperation with other committees in Parliament is essential for the accurate and comprehensive treatment of petitions; notes that in 2020, 56 petitions were sent to other committees for opinion and 385 for information; welcomes the fact that 40 opinions and 60 acknowledgements of taking petitions into consideration in their work were received from other committees; notes that the public hearings organised jointly with other parliamentary committees facilitate a thorough examination of petitions; recalls that petitioners are informed of the decisions to request opinions from other committees for the treatment of their petitions; calls on parliamentary committees to step up their efforts to actively contribute to the examination of petitions — by proving their expertise — and thus enable Parliament to respond more swiftly and comprehensively to citizens’ concerns; regrets that the petitions network could not meet in 2020 due to the situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Believes that the petitions network is a useful tool for raising awareness of the issues brought up in petitions and to facilitate the treatment of petitions in other committees to which they are sent for opinion and for information; notes that there is a need to facilitate the following-up of petitions in parliamentary and legislative work; is of the opinion that this network should enhance dialogue and cooperation with the Commission and other EU institutions; trusts that regular meetings of the petitions network are crucial in order to strengthen cooperation between parliamentary committees through the exchange of information and sharing of best practices among the network’s members; calls on Parliament to draft a mechanism that enables the Committee on Petition to be directly involved in the legislative process; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Draws attention to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the outcome of the Committee on Petitions’ deliberations during 2019 (1); |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Underlines that despite the reduced timeslots for committee meetings in 2020 owing to Parliament’s precautionary measures to avoid the spread of COVID-19 within its premises and the consequent reduced interpretation facilities, the Committee on Petitions has expressed its opinion on important issues raised in petitions by contributing to a significant number of parliamentary reports, notably on the conclusion of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (2), on Monitoring the Application of EU Law 2017 and 2018 (3), on the Recommendations on the negotiations for a new partnership with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (4), on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the European Union — Annual Report for the years 2018-2019 (5), on Reducing inequalities with a special focus on in-work poverty (6), on Turkey — Annual progress report 2019 (7), and on the implementation of Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation in light of the UNCRPD (8); appreciates the activity of the Secretariat of the Committee on Petitions in general and, in particular, during the pandemic, as the working conditions became more complex; stresses the need to reflect on the challenges faced during the pandemic and look at ways to improve the committee’s work, especially during times of crisis; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Points out that in its recommendations for the negotiations on a new deal with the United Kingdom, the members of the Committee on Petitions stressed that any EU citizen residing in the United Kingdom had the right to petition the European Parliament pursuant to Article 227 TFEU, to participate in a European Citizens’ Initiative, and to apply to the European Ombudsman after the expected end of the transition period (31 December 2020), and called on the European Ombudsman to keep up her efforts, initiated during negotiations on the withdrawal agreement, to ensure the transparency of negotiations under the future EU-UK partnership; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Draws attention to the large number of petitions on COVID-19 that the Committee on Petitions examined and replied to in 2020, mostly by using its urgency procedure; stresses that most of these petitions called for the protection of citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms against the emergency measures including lockdowns as well as for transparency in the development, purchase and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines; underlines that these petitions also included questions on treatments and protective equipment, as well as the assessment of the management of the health crisis in the Member States; recalls, also, that many petitioners raised concerns over the impact of national emergency measures, including lockdowns, on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, calling into question travel and work restrictions, as well as the initial lack of coordination among Member States on internal border controls which posed obstacles to the freedom of movement within the Schengen area and a particular problem for many cross-border workers, students and binational couples, as well as the management of cancelled flights and trips during the pandemic and the refund policies of the airlines involved; recalls that all restrictive measures must be necessary, proportional and temporary; stresses that ensuring the effective, equal and uniform application of EU law is crucial for upholding the rule of law, which is one of the founding values of the Union and its Member States, pursuant to Article 2 TEU, even in a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic; takes the view that, particularly in times of major crisis, the rapid and effective handling of petitions is a prerequisite for earning citizens’ trust in the EU institutions; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Highlights the decision taken during the first months of the pandemic to prioritise petitions related to COVID-19 in the Committee on Petitions in order to address properly the urgent demands expressed by citizens during the first months of 2020; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Is seriously concerned about the public health and socio-economic damages caused by the COVID-19 pandemic; welcomes the excellent work done by the Committee on Petitions which, by voicing citizens’ concerns over the public health and socio-economic crises related to the COVID-19 pandemic, contributed to ensuring Parliament’s responsiveness to the needs and expectations of citizens, especially those particularly affected by the health crisis, as regards the Union’s capacity to address such a global challenge; draws attention, in this regard, to the important follow-up actions taken by the Committee on Petitions to respond to the issues raised in COVID-19-related petitions, which led to the adoption in plenary of the resolutions on the Schengen system and measures taken during the COVID-19 crisis (9), on the rights of persons with intellectual disabilities and their families in the COVID-19 crisis (10) and on tackling homelessness rates in the EU (11); |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Stresses the important contribution made by the Committee on Petitions to the protection of children’s rights, as revealed by its treatment of a number of petitions on parental child abduction in Japan; points, in this regard, to the resolution on the international and domestic parental abduction of EU children in Japan, the motion for which was adopted by the Committee on Petitions on 16 June 2020, adopted in plenary on 8 July 2020 (12); |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Draws attention to the hearing of 29 October 2020 on ‘Union citizenship: Empowerment, Inclusion, Participation’, which the Committee on Petitions held jointly with the Committee on Legal Affairs, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs; considers that this event represented a significant contribution by Parliament to the Commission’s 2020 EU Citizenship report and to the Committee on Petitions’ ongoing work on citizen involvement; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Takes note that, along with fundamental rights, health was the main area of concern for petitioners in 2020, while recognising that health concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic were at the centre of the Committee on Petitions’ work; draws attention to the resolution on additional funding for biomedical research on Myalgic Encephalomyelitis, the motion for which was adopted by the committee on 30 April 2020, adopted in plenary on 18 June 2020 (13); recalls that Parliament’s resolution has been warmly welcomed by the scientific and patients’ communities as it calls for awareness of this type of disease to be raised among Member States through the organisation of training courses tailored to public authorities, healthcare providers and public officials generally; reiterates, in this regard, its call for coordinated and enhanced research efforts and for additional funding, including under the Horizon Europe programme, to support progress in research in order to address the human and socio-economic consequences of the growing number of individuals living and working with long-term disabling and chronic conditions; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Notes that environmental issues remained an area of serious concern for petitioners in 2020; regrets that environmental rules are not always correctly implemented in the Member States, as described in numerous petitions raising complaints about air pollution, the deterioration of natural ecosystems, nuclear safety and the impact of mining activities on the environment; stresses the importance of delivering on EU citizens’ expectations on the protection of the environment; urges, therefore, the Commission, together with the Member States, to ensure the correct implementation of EU legislation in this field; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Welcomes the specific protection role played by the Committee on Petitions within the EU in the framework of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; points to the committee’s important ongoing work in connection with petitions concerning issues on disabilities; notes that the number of petitions on disability almost doubled in 2020 in comparison with the previous year; stresses that discrimination and access to education and employment remain among the main challenges faced by persons with disabilities and believes that the Commission and Member States need to do more to make essential services fully accessible; calls for the implementation of concrete proposals to foster inclusiveness and facilitate the recognition and portability of skills within the EU; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Recalls that in 2020, the Committee on Petitions paid specific attention to the discussion of petitions on the difficulties faced by people with intellectual disabilities and their families during the COVID-19 pandemic, especially regarding access to health services, personal assistance and contact with families and carers; draws attention in this regard to the resolution tabled by the Committee on Petitions on the rights of persons with intellectual disabilities and their families in the COVID-19 crisis, adopted in plenary on 8 July 2020; welcomes the outcome of the Committee on Petitions’ annual workshop on the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities — the new disability strategy — which took place at the committee meeting of 28 October 2020; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Recalls that relations with the European Ombudsman are one of the responsibilities conferred by Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on the Committee on Petitions; welcomes Parliament’s constructive cooperation with the European Ombudsman, as well as its involvement in the European Network of Ombudsmen; acknowledges the European Ombudsman’s regular contributions to the work of the Committee on Petitions throughout the year; firmly believes that the Union’s institutions, bodies and agencies must ensure consistent and effective follow-up to the recommendations of the Ombudsman; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Considers it essential that citizens are able to be involved directly in the initiation of legislative proposals; stresses that the ECI, is an important instrument of active citizenship as well as a unique tool of European participative democracy for the Committee on Petitions and therefore must be approached openly and responsively; underlines that the public hearing is a key opportunity for the organisers to publicly present their initiative to the EU institutions and experts enabling the Commission and the Parliament to obtain a thorough understanding of the desired ECI outcomes; calls on the Commission to consider initiating a legislative proposal on the basis of the content of any successful ECI; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Stresses that transparency and public access to the documents of the EU institutions are vital in order to ensure the highest levels of protection of the democratic rights of citizens and their trust in EU institutions; points out that the current Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents no longer reflects the actual situation; deeply regrets that the revision of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 has been stalled for years with no progress; calls on the Commission to submit a proposal for a recast of the 2001 regulation with a view to enhancing transparency and accountability by promoting good administrative practice, in line with requirements of the Lisbon Treaty; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Underlines that the Petitions Web Portal is an essential tool for ensuring a smooth, efficient and transparent petitions process; welcomes, in this regard, the improvements on data protection and on the security features which have made the portal more user-friendly and secure for citizens; stresses that efforts must be continued to make the portal widely known, through social media, easier to navigate and fully accessible to all citizens, especially to persons with disabilities, including by enabling the tabling of petitions in national sign languages; calls for more information to be published on the Petitions Web Portal, including the progress of petitions and inquiries with other institutions; calls for an assessment of how to prevent the use of stolen or fake identities and stresses the urgency of changing or updating the computerised registration and signature system so that it is truly agile and allows citizen participation in accordance with their needs, in real time; supports the creation of a single digital portal where citizens can access and find out about all the petitions procedures; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Notes that although the number of people supporting one or more petitions is very much on the rise, many petitioners are still saying that the steps to follow to show support for a petition on Parliament’s Petitions Web Portal are complicated; takes the view that simplifying the process would allow citizens to better exercise their right to petition; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of the Committee on Petitions to the Council, the Commission, the European Ombudsman, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Member States’ committees on petitions, and their national ombudsmen or similar competent bodies. |
| --- | --- |

32.

---

(1)  OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 168.

(2)  Opinion adopted on 21 January 2020.

(3)  Opinion adopted on 19 February 2020.

(4)  Opinion adopted on 30 April 2020.

(5)  Opinion adopted on 7 September 2020.

(6)  Opinion adopted on 7 September 2020.

(7)  Opinion adopted on 29 October 2020.

(8)  Opinion adopted on 3 December 2020.

(9)  OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 7.

(10)  OJ C 371, 15.9.2021, p. 6.

(11)  OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 2.

(12)  OJ C 371, 15.9.2021, p. 2.

(13)  OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 2.

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/104 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/104

---

P9_TA(2021)0508

European framework for employees' participation rights and the revision of the European Works Council Directive

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on democracy at work: a European framework for employees’ participation rights and the revision of the European Works Council Directive (2021/2005(INI))

(2022/C 251/10)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to recital four of the Preamble of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) confirming the European Union’s attachment to democracy, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to recital four of the Preamble of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) confirming the European Union’s attachment to democracy,

| — | having regard to Article 3(3) TEU, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 3(3) TEU,

| — | having regard to Article 9, Article 151 and Article 153(1) (e) and (f) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 9, Article 151 and Article 153(1) (e) and (f) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

| — | having regard to Articles 12, 27, 28, 30 and 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 12, 27, 28, 30 and 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’),

| — | having regard to Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies (1),

| — | having regard to Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (2),

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 November 2012 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures (Women on Boards Directive) (COM(2012)0614), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 November 2012 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures (Women on Boards Directive) (COM(2012)0614),

| — | having regard to Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (3),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (4),

| — | having regard to Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (5),

| — | having regard to Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European Company with regard to the involvement of employees (6) and Council Directive 2003/72/EC of 22 July 2003 supplementing the Statute for a European Cooperative Society with regard to the involvement of employees (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European Company with regard to the involvement of employees (6) and Council Directive 2003/72/EC of 22 July 2003 supplementing the Statute for a European Cooperative Society with regard to the involvement of employees (7),

| — | having regard to Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community (8),

| — | having regard to the study of its Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs of May 2012 on relations between company supervisory bodies and management, which proposes amending Directive 2002/14/EC on informing and generally consulting employees to include employee representatives in company boardrooms, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the study of its Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs of May 2012 on relations between company supervisory bodies and management, which proposes amending Directive 2002/14/EC on informing and generally consulting employees to include employee representatives in company boardrooms,

| — | having regard to Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids (9),

| — | having regard to Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies (10),

| — | having regard to Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees (11) (the European Works Council Directive), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees (11) (the European Works Council Directive),

| — | having regard to the European Added Value Assessment of January 2021 entitled ‘European works councils (EWCs) — legislative-initiative procedure: revision of European Works Councils Directive’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Added Value Assessment of January 2021 entitled ‘European works councils (EWCs) — legislative-initiative procedure: revision of European Works Councils Directive’,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 9 June 2021 on no green deal without a social deal (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 9 June 2021 on no green deal without a social deal (12),

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 2 December 2020 on an industrial transition towards a green and digital European economy: regulatory requirements and the role of social partners and civil society (13), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 2 December 2020 on an industrial transition towards a green and digital European economy: regulatory requirements and the role of social partners and civil society (13),

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 October 2020 on social dialogue as an important pillar of economic sustainability and the resilience of economies taking into account the influence of lively public debate in the Member States (14), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 October 2020 on social dialogue as an important pillar of economic sustainability and the resilience of economies taking into account the influence of lively public debate in the Member States (14),

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 31 August 2020 on an EU legal framework on safeguarding and strengthening workers’ information, consultation and participation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 31 August 2020 on an EU legal framework on safeguarding and strengthening workers’ information, consultation and participation,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 17 October 2018 on the package on European company law (15), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 17 October 2018 on the package on European company law (15),

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 16 March 2016 entitled ‘Upgrading the Single Market: more opportunities for people and businesses’ (16), which calls for greater worker involvement in business governance, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 16 March 2016 entitled ‘Upgrading the Single Market: more opportunities for people and businesses’ (16), which calls for greater worker involvement in business governance,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 20 March 2013 on employee involvement and participation as a pillar of sound business management and balanced approaches to overcoming the crisis (17), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 20 March 2013 on employee involvement and participation as a pillar of sound business management and balanced approaches to overcoming the crisis (17),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2009 on employees’ participation in companies with a European statute and other accompanying measures (18), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2009 on employees’ participation in companies with a European statute and other accompanying measures (18),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 14 June 2012 on the future of European company law (19), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 June 2012 on the future of European company law (19),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2013 with recommendations to the Commission on information and consultation of workers, anticipation and management of restructuring (20), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2013 with recommendations to the Commission on information and consultation of workers, anticipation and management of restructuring (20),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2013 on cross-border collective bargaining and transnational social dialogue (21), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2013 on cross-border collective bargaining and transnational social dialogue (21),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on a strong social Europe for Just Transitions (22), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on a strong social Europe for Just Transitions (22),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the new EU Strategy for Gender Equality (23), which calls for an urgent end to the deadlock in the Council in order to adopt the proposed directive on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures (COM(2012)0614), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the new EU Strategy for Gender Equality (23), which calls for an urgent end to the deadlock in the Council in order to adopt the proposed directive on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures (COM(2012)0614),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 12 December 2012 entitled ‘Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance — a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies’ (COM(2012)0740), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 12 December 2012 entitled ‘Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance — a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies’ (COM(2012)0740),

| — | having regard to the resolution of the European Trade Union Confederation of 22 October 2014 entitled ‘Towards a new framework for more democracy at work’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the resolution of the European Trade Union Confederation of 22 October 2014 entitled ‘Towards a new framework for more democracy at work’,

| — | having regard to the position of the European Trade Union Confederation of 9-10 December 2020 on a new EU framework on information, consultation and board-level representation for European company forms and for companies making use of EU company law instruments enabling company mobility, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the position of the European Trade Union Confederation of 9-10 December 2020 on a new EU framework on information, consultation and board-level representation for European company forms and for companies making use of EU company law instruments enabling company mobility,

| — | having regard to the University of Leuven research project of May 2016 entitled ‘European Works Councils on the Move: Management Perspectives on the Development of a Transnational Institution for Social Dialogue’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the University of Leuven research project of May 2016 entitled ‘European Works Councils on the Move: Management Perspectives on the Development of a Transnational Institution for Social Dialogue’,

| — | having regard to the position of the European Trade Union Confederation of 15-16 March 2017 on a modern European Works Council (EWC) Directive in the digital era, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the position of the European Trade Union Confederation of 15-16 March 2017 on a modern European Works Council (EWC) Directive in the digital era,

| — | having regard to the report of the European Women’s Lobby of February 2012 entitled ‘Women on boards in Europe: from a snail’s pace to a giant leap? Progress, gaps and good practice’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the European Women’s Lobby of February 2012 entitled ‘Women on boards in Europe: from a snail’s pace to a giant leap? Progress, gaps and good practice’,

| — | having regard to the study of the International Labour Organization (ILO) of February 2010 entitled ‘A comparative overview of terms and notions on employee participation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the study of the International Labour Organization (ILO) of February 2010 entitled ‘A comparative overview of terms and notions on employee participation,

| — | having regard to the ILO study of November 2018 on corporate governance models: structure, diversity, evaluation and prospects, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the ILO study of November 2018 on corporate governance models: structure, diversity, evaluation and prospects,

| — | having regard to the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 2015 and the statement of the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD of 28 May 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 2015 and the statement of the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD of 28 May 2021,

| — | having regard to the third Eurofound European Company Survey of 14 December 2015 on direct and indirect employee participation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the third Eurofound European Company Survey of 14 December 2015 on direct and indirect employee participation,

| — | having regard to the fourth Eurofound European Company Survey of 13 October 2020 on workplace practices unlocking employee potential, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the fourth Eurofound European Company Survey of 13 October 2020 on workplace practices unlocking employee potential,

| — | having regard to Principles 7 and 8 of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Principles 7 and 8 of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 on the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (COM(2021)0102), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 on the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (COM(2021)0102),

| — | having regard to the Porto Declaration and Porto Social Commitment, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Porto Declaration and Porto Social Commitment,

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A9-0331/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A9-0331/2021),

| A. | whereas democracy in general and democracy at work in particular are core values of the European Union and provide a very solid foundation on which to strengthen Europe’s resilience and social contract; whereas these core values are also incorporated in the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and the Charter and the EPSR; whereas work is a crucial activity that provides structure in society, providing not only a means for living, but also for individual development and connection with society; whereas action is needed to ensure the balance of bargaining power between employers and employees, which can be improved by strengthening democracy at work; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas democracy in general and democracy at work in particular are core values of the European Union and provide a very solid foundation on which to strengthen Europe’s resilience and social contract; whereas these core values are also incorporated in the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and the Charter and the EPSR; whereas work is a crucial activity that provides structure in society, providing not only a means for living, but also for individual development and connection with society; whereas action is needed to ensure the balance of bargaining power between employers and employees, which can be improved by strengthening democracy at work;

| B. | whereas social partnership and collective bargaining between representatives of employees and employers at national level and social dialogue at EU level are key elements of the European Social Model, whose shared legacy of social dialogue, workers’ participation, collective bargaining, employee representation on boards, health and safety representation, and tripartism are the building blocks of a diverse and economically, socially and environmentally sustainable future; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas social partnership and collective bargaining between representatives of employees and employers at national level and social dialogue at EU level are key elements of the European Social Model, whose shared legacy of social dialogue, workers’ participation, collective bargaining, employee representation on boards, health and safety representation, and tripartism are the building blocks of a diverse and economically, socially and environmentally sustainable future;

| C. | whereas the regulatory landscape of the Union in the field of employment law and company law remains excessively fragmented, which could result in a lack of legal certainty on applicable rules and rights for both employers and employees; whereas it is essential to reinforce the Union’s toolkit in these fields by introducing an ambitious framework directive that streamlines and simplifies the applicable legislation, and reinforces workers’ rights, notably the right to information, consultation and participation; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the regulatory landscape of the Union in the field of employment law and company law remains excessively fragmented, which could result in a lack of legal certainty on applicable rules and rights for both employers and employees; whereas it is essential to reinforce the Union’s toolkit in these fields by introducing an ambitious framework directive that streamlines and simplifies the applicable legislation, and reinforces workers’ rights, notably the right to information, consultation and participation;

| D. | whereas democracy at work plays a key role in strengthening human rights in the workplace and society, not least when workers’ representatives, including trade unions are actively involved in business due diligence processes; whereas more democracy at work, coupled with increased transparency, would be an effective way of addressing the inequalities at work and in society; whereas democracy at work can improve trust in democratic values and motivate workers to engage in democratic culture and practices; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas democracy at work plays a key role in strengthening human rights in the workplace and society, not least when workers’ representatives, including trade unions are actively involved in business due diligence processes; whereas more democracy at work, coupled with increased transparency, would be an effective way of addressing the inequalities at work and in society; whereas democracy at work can improve trust in democratic values and motivate workers to engage in democratic culture and practices;

| E. | whereas the promotion of democracy at work calls for the safeguarding and upholding of various social and labour rights and principles, including the right to collective organisation and action; whereas high levels of democracy at work are associated with better quality employment relationships, stability, higher wages and higher levels of health and safety protection, including harassment in the workplace; whereas social justice and, in particular, democracy at work are firmly embedded in international and European human rights instruments and standards; whereas democracy at work has been enlightening social progress in Europe and the world for more than a century; whereas the ILO was founded in 1919 with the firm belief that universal peace can be established only if it is based on social justice (24); whereas social dialogue, collective bargaining and workers’ representation form core ILO values and rights and are provided for in numerous ILO Conventions and Recommendations, whereas also the Council of Europe counts democracy at work amongst its core values as expressed by the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Social Charter; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the promotion of democracy at work calls for the safeguarding and upholding of various social and labour rights and principles, including the right to collective organisation and action; whereas high levels of democracy at work are associated with better quality employment relationships, stability, higher wages and higher levels of health and safety protection, including harassment in the workplace; whereas social justice and, in particular, democracy at work are firmly embedded in international and European human rights instruments and standards; whereas democracy at work has been enlightening social progress in Europe and the world for more than a century; whereas the ILO was founded in 1919 with the firm belief that universal peace can be established only if it is based on social justice (24); whereas social dialogue, collective bargaining and workers’ representation form core ILO values and rights and are provided for in numerous ILO Conventions and Recommendations, whereas also the Council of Europe counts democracy at work amongst its core values as expressed by the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Social Charter;

| F. | whereas workers’ representation and participation, as well as collective bargaining coverage, are essential for the enforcement of workers’ rights and the proper functioning of companies; whereas Eurofound reported (25) that fewer than one third (31 %) of companies in the EU facilitated the regular direct participation of employees in organisational decision-making in 2019; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas workers’ representation and participation, as well as collective bargaining coverage, are essential for the enforcement of workers’ rights and the proper functioning of companies; whereas Eurofound reported (25) that fewer than one third (31 %) of companies in the EU facilitated the regular direct participation of employees in organisational decision-making in 2019;

| G. | whereas, according to the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 2015, ‘[t]he degree to which employees participate in corporate governance depends on national laws and practices, and may vary from company to company as well’; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas, according to the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 2015, ‘[t]he degree to which employees participate in corporate governance depends on national laws and practices, and may vary from company to company as well’;

| H. | whereas trade unions and workers’ representatives have played a key role in mitigating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the workplace, from the introduction of measures to protect the health and safety of workers, notably essential workers in highly exposed workplaces, to the implementation of job retention schemes, such as short-time work, and new forms of work organisation, such as working from home; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas trade unions and workers’ representatives have played a key role in mitigating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the workplace, from the introduction of measures to protect the health and safety of workers, notably essential workers in highly exposed workplaces, to the implementation of job retention schemes, such as short-time work, and new forms of work organisation, such as working from home;

| I. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated pre-existing gender inequalities in the labour market and widened the gender gap in labour force participation; whereas this has affected, in particular, highly feminised sectors with low pay and poor working conditions, with a large number of women working on the frontline, especially as health professionals, care workers, cleaning and maintenance workers, domestic workers, fighting the virus while often also having to balance family responsibilities during lockdowns; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated pre-existing gender inequalities in the labour market and widened the gender gap in labour force participation; whereas this has affected, in particular, highly feminised sectors with low pay and poor working conditions, with a large number of women working on the frontline, especially as health professionals, care workers, cleaning and maintenance workers, domestic workers, fighting the virus while often also having to balance family responsibilities during lockdowns;

| J. | whereas a significant number of restructuring processes are currently underway as a result of the COVID-19 crisis; whereas the disruptive impact of the pandemic has temporarily accelerated the pace of company restructuring and enlarged the scope thereof, especially in certain sectors; whereas the consultation of workers and their participation and collective bargaining are essential to address the positive and negative impacts of restructuring; whereas technological developments, the transition to a low-carbon economy and the economic and social recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic provide an opportunity to transition workplaces into high-involvement forms of work organisation at all levels; whereas, according to Eurostat, Member States with well developed industrial relations systems, working arrangements and short-working schemes performed better than the EU average in 2020 and far fewer workers lost their job; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas a significant number of restructuring processes are currently underway as a result of the COVID-19 crisis; whereas the disruptive impact of the pandemic has temporarily accelerated the pace of company restructuring and enlarged the scope thereof, especially in certain sectors; whereas the consultation of workers and their participation and collective bargaining are essential to address the positive and negative impacts of restructuring; whereas technological developments, the transition to a low-carbon economy and the economic and social recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic provide an opportunity to transition workplaces into high-involvement forms of work organisation at all levels; whereas, according to Eurostat, Member States with well developed industrial relations systems, working arrangements and short-working schemes performed better than the EU average in 2020 and far fewer workers lost their job;

| K. | whereas research shows that participation in the workplace contributes to company performance, job quality and well-being; whereas, according to Eurofound (26), fewer than one third (31 %) of companies in the EU27 facilitated the regular direct participation of employees in organisational decision-making in 2019 and the strength of worker participation in the EU has declined over the past decade (27); whereas over half of establishments in Sweden (56 %) and Denmark (55 %) were characterised by regular, high-influence direct engagement with employees; whereas the same can be said of only around one fifth of establishments in Poland (20 %) and the Netherlands (21 %); |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas research shows that participation in the workplace contributes to company performance, job quality and well-being; whereas, according to Eurofound (26), fewer than one third (31 %) of companies in the EU27 facilitated the regular direct participation of employees in organisational decision-making in 2019 and the strength of worker participation in the EU has declined over the past decade (27); whereas over half of establishments in Sweden (56 %) and Denmark (55 %) were characterised by regular, high-influence direct engagement with employees; whereas the same can be said of only around one fifth of establishments in Poland (20 %) and the Netherlands (21 %);

| L. | whereas sustainable corporate governance can only be achieved with employee involvement; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas sustainable corporate governance can only be achieved with employee involvement;

| M. | whereas according to the ILO study of February 2010 entitled ‘A comparative overview of terms and notions on employee participation’, ‘there is a large variety of models dealing with workers’ participation or employee involvement’ and ‘in some national systems [...] workers have the right to elect representatives to the company’s supervisory or administrative organs’; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas according to the ILO study of February 2010 entitled ‘A comparative overview of terms and notions on employee participation’, ‘there is a large variety of models dealing with workers’ participation or employee involvement’ and ‘in some national systems [...] workers have the right to elect representatives to the company’s supervisory or administrative organs’;

| N. | whereas sustainable companies are distinguished by the fact that they have mechanisms for expressing the voice of workers and including workers’ views in the process of taking strategic decisions that have an impact on the workforce and entire communities and regions (28); |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas sustainable companies are distinguished by the fact that they have mechanisms for expressing the voice of workers and including workers’ views in the process of taking strategic decisions that have an impact on the workforce and entire communities and regions (28);

| O. | whereas studies have shown that worker participation enhances productivity, the engagement of workers, innovation and work organisation, supports the transition to a carbon-neutral, climate-neutral, resource-efficient and circular economy (29) and gender equality, improves good work organisation and decision making, and provides alternatives to crisis-induced employment reduction; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas studies have shown that worker participation enhances productivity, the engagement of workers, innovation and work organisation, supports the transition to a carbon-neutral, climate-neutral, resource-efficient and circular economy (29) and gender equality, improves good work organisation and decision making, and provides alternatives to crisis-induced employment reduction;

| P. | whereas gender and pay gaps continue to exist in decision-making bodies, preventing women’s full participation and their contribution to economic and social life, resulting in persistently high levels of under-employment of women, which have a severe impact on society and economic growth; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas gender and pay gaps continue to exist in decision-making bodies, preventing women’s full participation and their contribution to economic and social life, resulting in persistently high levels of under-employment of women, which have a severe impact on society and economic growth;

| Q. | whereas according to the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 17 October 2018 on the package on European company law, the role of European works councils should be enhanced in the event of large company transformations, in accordance with Directive 2009/38/EC; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas according to the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 17 October 2018 on the package on European company law, the role of European works councils should be enhanced in the event of large company transformations, in accordance with Directive 2009/38/EC;

| R. | whereas employees are not mere ‘stakeholders’ of companies, but ‘constituting parties’ alongside shareholders and managers; whereas worker participation in companies is a key component of a pluralistic model of corporate governance based on democratic principles, fairness and efficiency (30); |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas employees are not mere ‘stakeholders’ of companies, but ‘constituting parties’ alongside shareholders and managers; whereas worker participation in companies is a key component of a pluralistic model of corporate governance based on democratic principles, fairness and efficiency (30);

| S. | whereas the active inclusion of workers in companies’ decision-making processes will be essential to ensure the fast, substantial and sustainable policy and strategy changes required by the twin digital and green transitions, which will herald significant changes in the world of work; whereas it will also lead to better inclusion of the most vulnerable workers in the process of transitioning towards a green and digital economy; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas the active inclusion of workers in companies’ decision-making processes will be essential to ensure the fast, substantial and sustainable policy and strategy changes required by the twin digital and green transitions, which will herald significant changes in the world of work; whereas it will also lead to better inclusion of the most vulnerable workers in the process of transitioning towards a green and digital economy;

| T. | whereas the recovery plan offers to both employers and workers an unprecedented opportunity for innovation in financing sustainable and digital investments and projects; whereas the timely and effective involvement of employees in the programming and execution of these projects is essential in order to adequately identify, anticipate and manage their potential transformative effects on the workplace and relations between social partners; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas the recovery plan offers to both employers and workers an unprecedented opportunity for innovation in financing sustainable and digital investments and projects; whereas the timely and effective involvement of employees in the programming and execution of these projects is essential in order to adequately identify, anticipate and manage their potential transformative effects on the workplace and relations between social partners;

| U. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has shown a pressing need for much broader and stronger participation by social partners, especially if the green and digital transitions to a sustainable, fair and social future for the EU is to be achieved; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has shown a pressing need for much broader and stronger participation by social partners, especially if the green and digital transitions to a sustainable, fair and social future for the EU is to be achieved;

| V. | whereas the Conference on the Future of Europe offers an opportunity to move beyond crisis mode and involve the EU’s citizens in shaping its future, thereby strengthening democracy at all levels; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas the Conference on the Future of Europe offers an opportunity to move beyond crisis mode and involve the EU’s citizens in shaping its future, thereby strengthening democracy at all levels;

| W. | whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) provide 6 out of 10 jobs in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) provide 6 out of 10 jobs in the EU;

Workers’ participation in companies

| 1. | Notes the rich and interlocking network of workers’ participation at workplaces across the entire Union, from workers and workers’ representatives, including trade unions, elected by and from the workforce at the local level, to cross-site works councils in more complex companies, to dedicated health and safety representation, and employee representation on companies’ supervisory or administrative boards; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Acknowledges the different legal frameworks for board-level worker participation in 18 EU Member States; highlights that the scope and intensity of worker participation in company boardrooms varies greatly; highlights that the digital and green transitions are greatly affecting the world of work and that the more resilient and sustainable companies are those with well established systems of workers participation in company matters (31); |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Is convinced that the workers’ voice must be a key component of EU initiatives to ensure sustainable and democratic corporate governance and due diligence on human rights, including with regard to labour, and on climate change and the environment, as well as to reduce the use of unfair practices, such as labour exploitation and unfair competition in the internal market, also, where applicable, in the light of Article 154 TFEU; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Highlights the importance of continuously improving the education, training and skills policies of the EU and the Member States, including vocational training, in particular to ensure lifelong learning and training, as well as the upskilling and reskilling of all workers; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Calls on the Commission to respect the agreements between European social partners at both cross-industry and sectoral level, as laid down in the Treaties; highlights that respect for European social partner agreements includes their implementation, at the joint request of the signatory parties, in matters covered by Article 153 TFEU, by means of a Council decision following a proposal from the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Notes that through loopholes (32), the EU Statute for a European Company (Societas Europeae — SE) can inadvertently enable companies to circumvent national regulations, particularly on board-level employee representation; regrets the fact that the 2019 Company Law Package (33) has not resolved these shortcomings and invites the Commission to pursue an evaluation immediately following the Member States’ transposition of the package in order to assess the alleged loopholes; notes that some cross-border mergers can strengthen the single market by generating greater synergies between European companies, but that it can, sometimes, give rise to unfair practices that need to be addressed, and that it can also be used to avoid representation rights; stresses that special attention should be paid to complex corporate structures and supply or subcontracting chains in order to ensure respect for social standards; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Stresses that workers’ representatives must have the right to be informed about the use of posted workers in subcontracting chains and be able to contact these workers, in line with the obligation established in Article 8 of the Temporary Agency Work Directive (34), which obliges the user undertaking to provide information on the use of temporary agency workers to bodies representing workers; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Highlights that recital 35 of Directive (EU) 2019/2121 (35) amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions states that ‘[i]n certain circumstances, the right of companies to carry out a cross-border operation could be used for abusive or fraudulent purposes, such as for the circumvention of the rights of employees, social security payments or tax obligations, or for criminal purposes’; considers it essential, in this regard, to adequately define ambitious EU minimum standards for information, consultation and board-level representation and participation of workers in cases where companies restructure across borders; calls on the Commission, in the context of its forthcoming evaluation of Directive (EU) 2019/2121, to take account of the existence of good practices and the results of studies and assessments of the positive socioeconomic effects and consequences of employee representation in corporate bodies, while also amending existing directives affecting this issue, which can help improve corporate governance; calls on the Commission to develop initiatives to raise awareness and improve knowledge of national and EU rules governing employee representation in corporate bodies in the various Member States and to foster exchanges of best practices, assessing the different forms of worker participation and the socioeconomic effects thereof; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Reiterates that several EU legal acts concerning workers’ board-level representation rights do not establish minimum requirements for board-level representation in European companies in their various forms or for companies that use EU company law instruments to enable cross-border company mobility and legal reorganisation, including cross-border mergers, conversions and divisions (36); calls on the Commission and on the Member States to take urgent and decisive actions to ensure that European companies respect workers’ information, consultation and participation rights and that, accordingly, they comply with existing EU and national legal obligations; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls on the Commission to make the necessary improvements to the frameworks regulating SEs and European Cooperative Societies and, on the basis of a timely evaluation by the Commission, to the Company Law Package, and to amend them to introduce minimum EU rules governing employee participation and representation on supervisory boards, including on gender equality; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish the necessary conditions and requirements to ensure that at least 80 % of corporations in the EU are covered by sustainable corporate governance agreements by 2030 (37), while also recognising the particular administrative burden associated therewith for SMEs; calls, to this end, for the establishment of strategies agreed with workers to positively influence environmental, social and economic development through governance practices and market presence, to strengthen the role of directors in pursuing the long-term interests of their company, to improve directors’ accountability towards integrating sustainability into corporate decision-making, and to promote corporate governance practices that contribute to company sustainability, including corporate reporting, board remuneration, board composition and stakeholder involvement (38); |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Calls on the Commission to deliver on its commitment to put forward without further delay a directive on binding environmental and human rights due diligence and responsible business conduct, including workers’ rights such as the right to organise and collectively bargain, health and safety, and working conditions; stresses that this directive should establish mandatory due diligence requirements covering companies’ operations, activities and their business relationships, including supply and subcontracting chains, and should ensure the full involvement of trade unions and workers’ representatives throughout the due diligence process, including the development and implementation process; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Is convinced that introducing new digital technologies has the potential to have a positive impact on the work environment if they are implemented and monitored in a trustworthy manner, which will require timely and meaningful information and the consultation of workers’ representatives, including trade unions, to ensure full respect for their health and safety, data protection, equal treatment, employment stability, social protection and well-being at work, and to prevent undue exploitation and surveillance of workers, as well as discrimination and stigmatisation, in particular via management by algorithms; underlines the fact that trade unions and workers’ representatives should have the necessary access and means to assess and evaluate digital technology prior to their introduction; emphasises that new digital technologies and artificial intelligence should not replicate existing discrimination and societal biases but should help the social inclusion and participation of diverse groups; highlights the need to apply the ethics-by-default principle throughout the entire life cycle of the digital technologies in order to harness their full potential and avoid biases; stresses that social dialogue structures, sectoral collective bargaining, the provision of information to trade unions and workers’ representatives, and the consultation and participation thereof are key to providing the necessary support for workers to better build and participate in the uptake and monitoring by social partners of digital technology at the workplace; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Believes that workers’ rights to organise, to collective union representation, to freedom of assembly and association, and to collectively call for reforms within their workplaces are fundamental aspects of the European project and core principles of the social model, which are affirmed and legally upheld by the EU institutions; is concerned about the fact that some workers taking part in new forms of work do not enjoy effective representation and participation rights in the workplace; deplores the fact that this is the case, in particular, for sectors where the majority of workers are women (39); reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the right of workers to freedom of association and participation in the workplace, in all forms of employment; calls on the Commission to complement the activities of the Member States to protect workers in exercising their right to freedom of association and in participating in the workplace; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States, together with social partners, to commit to reaching collective bargaining coverage of 90 % by 2030 in those national systems that combine statutory and social partner regulation of employment and working conditions; stresses that collective bargaining contributes to the social market economy, as aimed for in the Lisbon Treaty; reiterates that the EU treaties, which explicitly protect the autonomy of social partners, and the self-regulatory systems in place in some Member States, must be protected in order for social partners to regulate autonomously, ensuring strong legitimacy and collective agreement coverage progress; calls on the Member States to remove any national legislation that hampers collective bargaining, including by ensuring trade unions’ access to workplaces for the purpose of organising; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Underlines that reforms in the Member States should not negatively affect collective bargaining, which needs to be promoted at sectoral level, including by supporting the capacity-building of social partners; urges the Commission and the Member States to fully involve social partners in EU policy-making; stresses that labour reforms at national level must contribute to the implementation of the EPSR, including Principle 8 on social dialogue and the involvement of workers, collective bargaining and respect for the autonomy of social partners and the rights to collective action and to be informed and consulted in good time on the transfer, restructuring and merging of undertakings, and on collective redundancies; calls on the Commission to analyse labour reforms in the national recovery and resilience plans on these specific aspects; |
| --- | --- |

16.

A new framework for information, consultation and board-level representation

| 17. | Stresses the need to thoroughly enforce, evaluate and — where necessary based on this evaluation — strengthen and consolidate all the relevant EU laws to ensure that informing and consulting employees is an integral part of company decision-making and that it takes place at the relevant level within companies; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Stresses the importance of ensuring timely and meaningful information and consultation across the EU, before management decisions are made which have a potential impact on workers, employment and working conditions, and about policies or measures, especially those with cross-border implications; emphasises that workers’ representatives, including trade unions, must have access to the requisite expertise and support documentation regarding management decisions to assess the implications of these cross-border policies and processes for the workforce and to propose alternatives; stresses that a genuine dialogue on those alternatives must take place between trade unions, workers’ representatives and management; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Highlights the importance of employees’ representatives, and in particular the European works councils, participating meaningfully, after having been effectively informed and consulted, in the drawing up and implementation of transnational matters which significantly affect workers’ interests; stresses that this should include matters which are of importance to the European workforce in terms of the scope of their potential effects or which involve transfers of activities between Member States; stresses that the EWC must be informed and consulted in matters relating, in particular, to the current situation and probable trends as regards employment and investments, and substantial changes concerning organisation, the introduction of new working methods or production processes, transfers of production, mergers, cut-backs, closures of undertakings, establishments or important parts thereof, and collective redundancies; stresses also that EWC engagement can develop and promote corporate culture and cohesion and that workers’ representatives should take part in the development of social plans, with the aim of regulating changes that may affect workers and generate redundancies; believes that it is essential to strengthen European works councils, taking into account the differences in industrial relations systems in the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Notes that divergences persist between EU countries regarding the quality, timing and effectiveness of information and consultation before corporate decisions are made, and that restructuring processes are carried out differently across Europe; notes that dialogue about alternatives to redundancies and plant closures vary within the EU; recalls that it already proposed a legal framework (40) in 2013 as regards informing and consulting workers, and the anticipation and management of restructuring, with a view to shaping sustainable and socially inclusive restructuring and leaving no worker behind; believes that a coherent EU strategy is essential in order to equip companies and workers to cope with a fair green and digital transition; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Stresses that the right of employees to information and consultation should always be ensured in a timely manner and address the potential quantitative and qualitative effects on employment and working conditions and the changes deriving from digital technologies and applications to improve existing business processes and workforce efficiency; points out that the informing of workers and their consultation and board-level participation are effective tools in enforcing workers’ rights; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Calls for the EU to ensure that employees are also represented on boards in companies that make use of EU legislation (41) for the purposes of cross-border company restructuring and mobility; stresses the need for gender-balanced boards, both in terms of employee seat numbers and the board overall; reiterates its call on the Council to end its blocking of the Women on Boards Directive, reflecting the fact that, in order to achieve participatory workplaces, gender equality must be ensured at all levels; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | States that much remains to be done to ensure gender equality and equal opportunities in all aspects of worker participation across the EU, as well as proper representation of employees with disabilities; notes that persistent gender inequality is also reflected in women’s limited access to leadership and representative positions in the workplace; reiterates that gender equality and diversity in boardrooms represent a key democratic principle with positive economic side effects; calls for the introduction of additional measures, in consultation with the social partners, to ensure balanced representation and gender equality; notes that gender quotas contribute to the achievement of more diversity, gender equality and equitability throughout all decision-making bodies; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Considers that companies should make progress in guaranteeing diversity and gender equality, including through equal pay in the workplace; urges the Council to make progress on the Women on Boards Directive; calls for the application of the 40 % quota to both non-executive and executive boards (independently considered), both in private and public owned companies, with national legislation to be adapted progressively; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Calls on the Commission to follow up on the priorities included in the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 and, in particular, to ensure that the proposal for a directive on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures is released in the Council; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Calls on the Commission, following its anticipated impact assessment and in consultation with social partners, to introduce a new framework directive on workers’ information, consultation and participation for European companies, and for companies that use EU company mobility instruments, in order to establish minimum standards on issues such as anticipating change, including with regard to measures concerning climate change, digital transformation and restructuring, in particular at company level; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Stresses that some shortcomings in EU law would be overcome by introducing thresholds for a minimum EU standard of board-level representation under this new framework directive; considers, to this end, that the number/proportion of seats on boards for workers’ representatives should range from a few seats to parity, depending on the number of employees in the company and its subsidiaries; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Recalls that the European Works Council Directive is part of the EU acquis on the right of employees to participation, information and consultation; expresses concern over shortcomings in the directive’s design, notably the enforcement and effectiveness of information and consultation rights, and deplores the opportunity missed in 2008 to further develop and significantly improve the directive; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Highlights the need to raise awareness of EWCs among employee and management representatives; stresses that EWCs are unique transnational bodies (42) set up for the purpose of informing and consulting employees and building and promoting corporate identity, and that they are affected by the level or intensity of industrial relations and policy frameworks; regrets the fact that the financial, material and legal resources needed to enable EWCs to perform their duties in an appropriate manner are not always provided by central management; calls on the Commission to explore the actions needed to improve workers’ participation and better enforcement of the European Works Council Directive, and, if needed, to propose a revision of the directive with a view to strengthening the right of employee representatives to information and consultation, particularly during restructuring processes; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote the strengthening of information and consultation rights to ensure that the EWC’s opinion is taken into account in company decisions and is delivered before consultation is completed at the respective level and before the governing bodies come to a decision; calls on the Commission, moreover, to strengthen enforcement mechanisms, on Member States to ensure effective access to justice for special negotiation bodies and for EWCs, to introduce effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalties in order to secure compliance, put an end, after more than 20 years, to exemptions for old, so-called voluntary pre-directive agreements, to aim to clarify the concept of the ‘transnational character of a matter’ in the context of the European Works Council Directive, to prevent the abuse of confidentiality rules as a means to limit access to information and effective participation, to strengthen the subsidiary requirements and to ensure the efficient coordination of information, consultation and participation at local, national and EU levels; |
| --- | --- |

30.

o

o o

| 31. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

31.

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(1)  OJ L 225, 12.8.1998, p. 16.

(2)  OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16.

(3)  OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22.

(4)  OJ L 141, 27.5.2011, p. 1.

(5)  OJ L 82, 22.3.2001, p. 16.

(6)  OJ L 294, 10.11.2001, p. 22.

(7)  OJ L 207, 18.8.2003, p. 25.

(8)  OJ L 80, 23.3.2002, p. 29.

(9)  OJ L 142, 30.4.2004, p. 12.

(10)  OJ L 310, 25.11.2005, p. 1.

(11)  OJ L 122, 16.5.2009, p. 28.

(12)  OJ C 341, 24.8.2021, p. 23.

(13)  OJ C 56, 16.2.2021, p. 10.

(14)  OJ C 10, 11.1.2021, p. 14.

(15)  OJ C 62, 15.2.2019, p. 24.

(16)  OJ C 177, 18.5.2016, p. 1.

(17)  OJ C 161, 6.6.2013, p. 35.

(18)  OJ C 87 E, 1.4.2010, p. 133.

(19)  OJ C 332 E, 15.11.2013, p. 78.

(20)  OJ C 440, 30.12.2015, p. 23.

(21)  OJ C 93, 9.3.2016, p. 161.

(22)  OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 75.

(23)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 208.

(24)  See: ILO Constitution of 1919 and ILO Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944.

(25)  https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/news/news-articles/companies-capitalise-on-direct-employee-involvement-to-enhance-performance-and-well-being

(26)  European Company Survey 2019.

(27)  European Trade Union Institute, 2021, ‘Benchmarking Working Europe 2020 — Covid-19 and the world of work: the impact of a pandemic’.

(28)  Rapp, M. S., Wolff, M., Udoieva, I., Hennig, J. C., ‘Mitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat und ihre Wirkung auf die Unternehmensführung’, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, No 424, June 2019; Ernst and Young, Study on directors’ duties and sustainable corporate governance, July 2020.

(29)  Guidelines for a just transition towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_432859.pdf; Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2021, see https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e823d46f-e518-11eb-a1a5-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

(30)  ILO study of November 2018 on corporate governance models: structure, diversity, evaluation and prospects.

(31)  https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/mbf_praes_arguments_co_determination.pdf

(32)  https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/R%20121%20Conchon%20BLER%20in% 20Europe%20EN%20WEB.pdf. As it stands, the SE legal framework does not help to safeguard pre-existing board-level employee representation (BLER) rights and even offers the possibility for companies to circumvent national BLER rights (Kluge and Stollt, 2011; Keller and Werner, 2010). It seems that the SE Statute could be used to further three potential bypass strategies, namely the avoidance of BLER; a ‘freeze’ of BLER; or a reduction in the number of seats allocated to board-level employee representatives, especially where these are occupied by external trade unionists.

(33)  Directive (EU) 2019/2121 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions (OJ L 321, 12.12.2019, p. 1).

(34)  Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work (OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, p. 9).

(35)  Directive (EU) 2019/2121 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions (OJ L 321, 12.12.2019, p. 1).

(36)  https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/directive-on-cross-border-mobility-of-companies

(37)  Commission staff working document of 4 March 2021 accompanying its European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (SWD(2021)0046).

(38)  Commission staff working document of 4 March 2021 accompanying its European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (SWD(2021)0046).

(39)  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/662491/IPOL_ STU(2020)662491_EN.pdf

(40)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2015.440.01.0023.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AC%3A2015%3A440%3ATOC

(41)  Directive (EU) 2019/2121; Directive 2001/86/EC; and Directive 2003/72/EC.

(42)  https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/european-works-councils: ‘European works councils (EWCs) are standing bodies that facilitate the information and consultation of employees in European companies and European groups of companies, as required by the 1994 European Works Council Directive’.

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/115 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/115

---

P9_TA(2021)0509

Continuous crackdown on civil society and human rights defenders in Russia: the case of human rights organisation Memorial

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the continuous crackdown on civil society and human rights defenders in Russia: the case of human rights organisation Memorial (2021/3018(RSP))

(2022/C 251/11)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions and reports on Russia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions and reports on Russia,

| — | having regard to the international human rights obligations to which Russia has committed itself to uphold as a member of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN), and as a signatory to other human rights treaties, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the international human rights obligations to which Russia has committed itself to uphold as a member of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN), and as a signatory to other human rights treaties,

| — | having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protocols thereto, in particular Article 10 on the right to freedom of expression and Article 11 on the right to freedom of assembly and association, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protocols thereto, in particular Article 10 on the right to freedom of expression and Article 11 on the right to freedom of assembly and association,

| — | having regard to the Venice Commission opinions on the Russian law on ‘foreign agents’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Venice Commission opinions on the Russian law on ‘foreign agents’,

| — | having regard to the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) of 13 November 2021 on legal steps against the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Memorial, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) of 13 November 2021 on legal steps against the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Memorial,

| — | having regard to the statement of 12 November 2021 by the Council of Europe Secretary General, Marija Pejčinović Burić, and to the letter of 30 November 2021 from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of 12 November 2021 by the Council of Europe Secretary General, Marija Pejčinović Burić, and to the letter of 30 November 2021 from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation,

| — | having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas Memorial is not only one of the oldest and most respected human rights organisations in Russia but also an international model for organisations working on the historical remembrance of political repression and the defence of human rights; whereas, for decades, Memorial has stood for a vibrant, humanistic culture of remembrance of the crimes of the Soviet regime against its own people and other peoples of the Soviet Union and other countries, as well as an active, civic commitment to human rights and the protection of victims and vulnerable groups; whereas Memorial continues to make an invaluable contribution to revealing the truth about Soviet crimes, historical reappraisal and rehabilitation of the politically persecuted and unjustly convicted, and is a symbol of the relentless fight for freedom, democracy and human rights in the post-Soviet area and beyond; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas Memorial is not only one of the oldest and most respected human rights organisations in Russia but also an international model for organisations working on the historical remembrance of political repression and the defence of human rights; whereas, for decades, Memorial has stood for a vibrant, humanistic culture of remembrance of the crimes of the Soviet regime against its own people and other peoples of the Soviet Union and other countries, as well as an active, civic commitment to human rights and the protection of victims and vulnerable groups; whereas Memorial continues to make an invaluable contribution to revealing the truth about Soviet crimes, historical reappraisal and rehabilitation of the politically persecuted and unjustly convicted, and is a symbol of the relentless fight for freedom, democracy and human rights in the post-Soviet area and beyond;

| B. | whereas Memorial has also built an impressive database of over 40 000 officers in the Soviet Union internal security forces and has documented crimes committed by them; whereas members of Putin’s regime, some of whom have professional and family links with the KGB, are trying to conceal the crimes uncovered; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas Memorial has also built an impressive database of over 40 000 officers in the Soviet Union internal security forces and has documented crimes committed by them; whereas members of Putin’s regime, some of whom have professional and family links with the KGB, are trying to conceal the crimes uncovered;

| C. | whereas Memorial played an important role in uncovering documents and facts about the 1940 Katyn massacre, a series of mass murders of nearly 22 000 Polish military officers and intelligentsia, the 1945 Augustów Roundup, and other Soviet-era repressions and victims of Josef Stalin’s Great Terror; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas Memorial played an important role in uncovering documents and facts about the 1940 Katyn massacre, a series of mass murders of nearly 22 000 Polish military officers and intelligentsia, the 1945 Augustów Roundup, and other Soviet-era repressions and victims of Josef Stalin’s Great Terror;

| D. | whereas Memorial is one of the last remaining organisations continuing work on human rights in Chechnya, a nearly totalitarian enclave within the Russian Federation, where the local Kremlin-sponsored leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been ruthlessly removing all forms of dissent through brutal repression; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas Memorial is one of the last remaining organisations continuing work on human rights in Chechnya, a nearly totalitarian enclave within the Russian Federation, where the local Kremlin-sponsored leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been ruthlessly removing all forms of dissent through brutal repression;

| E. | whereas the European Parliament named its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought after Memorial’s co-founder and first Chair, Andrei Sakharov, and awarded the 2009 Prize to Memorial, represented by Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Sergei Kovalev and Oleg Orlov; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the European Parliament named its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought after Memorial’s co-founder and first Chair, Andrei Sakharov, and awarded the 2009 Prize to Memorial, represented by Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Sergei Kovalev and Oleg Orlov;

| F. | whereas Memorial’s two legal entities, International Memorial and Memorial Human Rights Centre, are currently under threat of liquidation; whereas on 11 November 2021, International Memorial was notified about a lawsuit opened by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation seeking its closure for alleged repeated violations of the country’s legislation on ‘foreign agents’ and, in particular, for failure to mark some published materials with the ‘foreign agent’ label; whereas on 12 November 2021, Memorial Human Rights Centre was notified about a similar lawsuit filed by the Moscow City Prosecutor’s Office, based on additional claims that the Centre’s articles allegedly justified the activities of terrorist and extremist organisations, due to the publication on the NGO’s website of lists of political prisoners and statements, among others, defending the human rights of Crimean Tatars and Jehovah’s Witnesses; whereas court proceedings opened on 23 November 2021 for Memorial Human Rights Centre and on 25 November 2021 for International Memorial; whereas the next hearing for Memorial Human Rights Centre will take place on 16 December 2021 and the next hearing for International Memorial will take place on 28 December 2021; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas Memorial’s two legal entities, International Memorial and Memorial Human Rights Centre, are currently under threat of liquidation; whereas on 11 November 2021, International Memorial was notified about a lawsuit opened by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation seeking its closure for alleged repeated violations of the country’s legislation on ‘foreign agents’ and, in particular, for failure to mark some published materials with the ‘foreign agent’ label; whereas on 12 November 2021, Memorial Human Rights Centre was notified about a similar lawsuit filed by the Moscow City Prosecutor’s Office, based on additional claims that the Centre’s articles allegedly justified the activities of terrorist and extremist organisations, due to the publication on the NGO’s website of lists of political prisoners and statements, among others, defending the human rights of Crimean Tatars and Jehovah’s Witnesses; whereas court proceedings opened on 23 November 2021 for Memorial Human Rights Centre and on 25 November 2021 for International Memorial; whereas the next hearing for Memorial Human Rights Centre will take place on 16 December 2021 and the next hearing for International Memorial will take place on 28 December 2021;

| G. | whereas on 12 November 2021, even Russia’s Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights described the lawsuit as disproportionate, arguing that not a single legal violation by International Memorial had been detected in the preceding 14 months, and only two minor violations had been committed by Memorial Human Rights Centre; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas on 12 November 2021, even Russia’s Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights described the lawsuit as disproportionate, arguing that not a single legal violation by International Memorial had been detected in the preceding 14 months, and only two minor violations had been committed by Memorial Human Rights Centre;

| H. | whereas the move to liquidate these prominent NGOs comes after years of persecution of both organisations; whereas these organisations were labelled as ‘foreign agents’ in 2014 and 2016 and have faced extortionate fines for alleged non-compliance with the ‘foreign agents’ law and arbitrary criminal prosecution of their staff, who have also been subject to attacks and harassment; whereas these attacks, such as the 2009 killing of Memorial Human Rights Centre researcher Natalya Estemirova, have not been properly investigated and the perpetrators continue to enjoy impunity; whereas Oyub Titiev, head of Memorial Human Rights Centre’s office in Chechnya, and Yury Dmitriev, head of the Karelian branch of International Memorial, were imprisoned on politically motivated charges; whereas most recently, on 14 October 2021, the International Memorial office in Moscow was stormed by a violent mob and then raided by the police; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the move to liquidate these prominent NGOs comes after years of persecution of both organisations; whereas these organisations were labelled as ‘foreign agents’ in 2014 and 2016 and have faced extortionate fines for alleged non-compliance with the ‘foreign agents’ law and arbitrary criminal prosecution of their staff, who have also been subject to attacks and harassment; whereas these attacks, such as the 2009 killing of Memorial Human Rights Centre researcher Natalya Estemirova, have not been properly investigated and the perpetrators continue to enjoy impunity; whereas Oyub Titiev, head of Memorial Human Rights Centre’s office in Chechnya, and Yury Dmitriev, head of the Karelian branch of International Memorial, were imprisoned on politically motivated charges; whereas most recently, on 14 October 2021, the International Memorial office in Moscow was stormed by a violent mob and then raided by the police;

| I. | whereas the persecution of Memorial comes amid repeated and systematic attempts by the Russian Government to rewrite history and curtail free debate about the evaluation of historical crimes and events, especially those connected to the rule of the Soviet governments; whereas the authorities have falsified historical facts to deny the findings by Memorial Human Rights Centre on repression and persecution under Stalin; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the persecution of Memorial comes amid repeated and systematic attempts by the Russian Government to rewrite history and curtail free debate about the evaluation of historical crimes and events, especially those connected to the rule of the Soviet governments; whereas the authorities have falsified historical facts to deny the findings by Memorial Human Rights Centre on repression and persecution under Stalin;

| J. | whereas attempts to intimidate, silence and ultimately close Memorial are a symbol of the Russian authorities’ increasingly repressive policies, thereby adding a new chapter to Russia’s history of political repression; whereas between 1987 and 1992, Memorial was specifically established to document, research, commemorate and educate on topics related to the country’s past repressions and tragic historical legacy; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas attempts to intimidate, silence and ultimately close Memorial are a symbol of the Russian authorities’ increasingly repressive policies, thereby adding a new chapter to Russia’s history of political repression; whereas between 1987 and 1992, Memorial was specifically established to document, research, commemorate and educate on topics related to the country’s past repressions and tragic historical legacy;

| K. | whereas an active civil society is a crucial aspect of a democratic and open society, and is essential for safeguarding human rights and the rule of law; whereas NGOs play a crucial role in modern democratic societies and must therefore be able to operate freely without undue interference from public authorities; whereas the proceedings against Memorial are the most recent example of the Russian authorities’ crackdown on civil society and human rights defenders and ultimately harms the interests of the Russian people and the possibilities for open and free dialogue; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas an active civil society is a crucial aspect of a democratic and open society, and is essential for safeguarding human rights and the rule of law; whereas NGOs play a crucial role in modern democratic societies and must therefore be able to operate freely without undue interference from public authorities; whereas the proceedings against Memorial are the most recent example of the Russian authorities’ crackdown on civil society and human rights defenders and ultimately harms the interests of the Russian people and the possibilities for open and free dialogue;

| L. | whereas the Russian ‘foreign agents’ law was adopted in 2012 and expanded last year by the Russian Parliament in ways that could apply to any public critic or activist; whereas the number of organisations and individuals that the authorities have designated as ‘foreign agents’ has drastically increased in recent months; whereas this law has been used by the Russian authorities to facilitate the crackdown on independent civil society active in Russia, targeting NGOs, human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, women’s rights and LGBTIQ+ rights activists, and environmental activists; whereas this law, as well as legislation on ‘undesirable organisations’ and on ‘countering extremist activity’, violates Russia’s own Constitution and international human rights obligations, in particular concerning the freedom of association and expression, the right to privacy, the right to participate in public affairs and the prohibition of discrimination; whereas the example of Memorial clearly demonstrates how these laws are used by the Russian authorities as a tool to intimidate and silence critics and independent voices; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the Russian ‘foreign agents’ law was adopted in 2012 and expanded last year by the Russian Parliament in ways that could apply to any public critic or activist; whereas the number of organisations and individuals that the authorities have designated as ‘foreign agents’ has drastically increased in recent months; whereas this law has been used by the Russian authorities to facilitate the crackdown on independent civil society active in Russia, targeting NGOs, human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, women’s rights and LGBTIQ+ rights activists, and environmental activists; whereas this law, as well as legislation on ‘undesirable organisations’ and on ‘countering extremist activity’, violates Russia’s own Constitution and international human rights obligations, in particular concerning the freedom of association and expression, the right to privacy, the right to participate in public affairs and the prohibition of discrimination; whereas the example of Memorial clearly demonstrates how these laws are used by the Russian authorities as a tool to intimidate and silence critics and independent voices;

| 1. | Condemns the repeated persecution and the recent politically motivated attempts to shut down International Memorial and Memorial Human Rights Centre; calls on the Russian authorities to immediately drop all charges against Memorial and ensure that Memorial can continue to safely carry out their important work without interference from the state; demands that the authorities, in the meantime, ensure full protection of and access to all of Memorial’s material and immaterial assets, including its archives, as well as performances and works by independent theatres, journalists and artists; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Welcomes the letter of 30 November 2021 from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation; insists that the requests for liquidation lack any reasonable legal justification; calls on the Presidents of the Commission and the Council and on the EU Member States to issue open statements of support with demands that the Russian authorities ensure Memorial’s safety and acquittal of all charges; calls on the EU Delegation and Member States’ representations in Russia to publicly show solidarity with Memorial; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Calls on the VP/HR to impose sanctions under the EU global human rights sanctions regime on Russian officials involved in the unlawful repression of Memorial and in the judicial proceedings against its organisations and members; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Urges Russia to stop the ongoing crackdown on civil society, human rights defenders and independent media by repealing the ‘foreign agents’ and ‘undesirable organisations’ laws, ceasing to create special legislation or abuse existing criminal or administrative laws with the aim of targeting dissident voices in the country or abroad, and bringing its legislation in line with the commitments that Russia has voluntarily undertaken under international law and its own Constitution, including by fully reinstating freedom of association and expression, as well as media and internet freedom; calls on the Russian authorities to ensure that restitution and reparation measures are put in place to address the violations committed in the process of implementing the ‘foreign agents’ and ‘undesirable organisations’ laws; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Expresses its solidarity with the Russian people and urges the Russian authorities to stop persecuting Memorial, its staff, and all other NGOs, human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, scholars, historians, women’s rights and LGBTIQ+ rights activists and environmental activists in Russia; reiterates its support to Russia’s civil society and human rights defenders and calls on Russia to establish a clear legal framework and a safe working environment for civil society in line with international human rights standards; stresses the need to guarantee effective and efficient legal recourse procedures for civil society actors whose freedom to work has been compromised; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Reiterates that the free and independent work of civil society organisations and the media is a cornerstone of a democratic society based on the rule of law; calls therefore on the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Member States to increase support for civil society, independent NGOs, human rights defenders, historians and independent media outlets active in Russia, including sustainable and flexible financial support and emergency assistance, and to encourage greater international support for these actors and their broader inclusion in international civil society networks; appeals to the sense of responsibility of Russian academia to provide those researchers and historians with adequate and safe opportunities to pursue their academic activity; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Condemns the defamation campaigns waged by current Russian authorities against historians and scholars who speak openly about the crimes committed by the communist regime and who are uncovering direct links between that regime and people currently in power in Russia; regrets that Russia, which to this day remains the greatest victim of Soviet communist totalitarianism, is not yet able to come to terms with its gruesome past, and instead that its authorities are persecuting those who are working to shed light on Soviet totalitarian crimes; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Praises Memorial’s significant contribution to the documentation, research and education about political repression in the Soviet Union and highlights that this work established international standards; applauds its tireless work in defence of human rights in today’s Russia and beyond; commends in particular its initiatives such as the request for initiation of criminal proceedings against members of the Wagner Group on behalf of victims in Syria, and its sustained efforts for the criminal prosecution of crimes and human rights violations in Chechnya; pays tribute to members of Memorial, such as Natalya Estemirova, who paid the highest price for uncovering atrocities committed there; stresses that liquidation of International Memorial and Human Rights Centre Memorial would therefore have significant negative consequences for civil society as a whole and for the protection of human rights in Russia in particular; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Underlines that the liquidation of these organisations would also bring an end to Memorial’s unique databases and document collections and believes that these records are a unique heritage of humanity; stresses that it is paramount that they be protected and preserved and continue to be available to anyone interested, including students, researchers and families of victims; invites the Commission and the EEAS therefore to produce a comprehensive report together with civil society and Russian human rights experts on the living memory of the millions of victims of political terror in the Soviet Union, which would be based on the witness statements and databases collected by Memorial; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Condemns the policy of historical revisionism and glorification of Stalinism promoted by the Russian Government and authorities, used not only in the current attempts to liquidate Memorial Human Rights Centre, but also in numerous other cases, such as the discovery of mass graves in Sandarmokh in the Republic of Karelia and the subsequent politically motivated prison sentence, based on fabricated charges, of Yury Dmitriev, local leader of Memorial, as well as the confiscation of the book by Agnes Haikara on the tragic fate of Norwegian and Finnish colonists of the Kola peninsula; underlines that remembering the victims of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and recognising and raising awareness of the crimes committed by communist, Nazi and other dictatorships is of vital importance for the unity of Europe and for fostering resilience against modern threats to democracy, particularly among younger generations; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls on the EU Delegation and national diplomatic representations in Russia to closely monitor the situation and trials linked to Memorial on the ground, ensure that these efforts are visible, and offer them any support that they may need, including direct financial assistance in order to pay lawyers and experts, but also psychosocial and medical support for employees throughout this period of extreme pressure; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Calls on the EU Member States to continue to support the Memorial branches in their respective countries; urges the Member States to consider providing refuge for threatened or banned NGOs from Russia and to allow them to operate from EU territory if needed, and to provide emergency visas for Memorial employees and other threatened activists so that they can leave Russia and find temporary shelter in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to take coordinated action with like-minded countries to increase international scrutiny of Russia’s restrictive laws, policies and actions and to persistently raise and condemn the restrictions of fundamental freedoms and human rights by the Russian authorities, including through high-level and public interventions, coordinated action, sustained scrutiny in international and regional human rights forums and regular human rights impact assessments to ensure that engagement with Russia does not undermine human rights objectives or directly or indirectly contribute to human rights violations; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Encourages EU and Member State ambassadors to Russia to carry out a joint, publicised solidarity visit to the office of International Memorial and Memorial Human Rights Centre following the outcome of the court hearings; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Calls on the EEAS to continue to raise the issue of Russia’s unabated crackdown on civil society, human rights defenders and independent media, especially the recent case of Memorial, and to initiate monitoring and evaluation procedures in all relevant forums, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the UN Human Rights Council, and in particular to add Russia’s persistent crackdown on civil society to the agenda of the next session of the UN Human Rights Council starting in February 2022; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls on the EEAS and the Commission to closely monitor on an ongoing basis the impact of the ‘foreign agents’ law, in particular in order to maintain a detailed record of organisations and individuals declared as ‘foreign agents’ and sanctioned as such, and to assess the legal changes to the law and their effect on Russian civil society; calls for the EU and its Member States to systematically address concerns over the ‘foreign agents’ law and other restrictive legislation against civil society and human rights defenders in all meetings with Russian representatives and to call on Russia to immediate repeal its ‘foreign agents’ law and bring its legislation into line with its international commitments and with international human rights standards; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Calls on the Council, the EEAS and the Commission to mainstream human rights and civil society consultation across any dialogues and areas of engagement between the EU, its Member States and Russia, and to honour their commitment to gender mainstreaming; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, International Memorial and Memorial Human Rights Centre, and the President, Government and State Duma of the Russian Federation. |
| --- | --- |

18.

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/120 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/120

---

P9_TA(2021)0510

The situation in Cuba, namely the cases of José Daniel Ferrer, Lady in White Aymara Nieto, Maykel Castillo, Luis Robles, Félix Navarro, Luis Manuel Otero, Reverend Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo, Andy Dunier García and Yunior García Aguilera

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the situation in Cuba, namely the cases of José Daniel Ferrer, Lady in White Aymara Nieto, Maykel Castillo, Luis Robles, Félix Navarro, Luis Manuel Otero, Reverend Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo, Andy Dunier García and Yunior García Aguilera (2021/3019(RSP))

(2022/C 251/12)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular that of 16 September 2021 on the government crackdown on protests and citizens in Cuba (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular that of 16 September 2021 on the government crackdown on protests and citizens in Cuba (1),

| — | having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between the European Union and Cuba, signed in December 2016 and provisionally applied since 1 November 2017 (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between the European Union and Cuba, signed in December 2016 and provisionally applied since 1 November 2017 (2),

| — | having regard to the statement of 14 November 2021 of the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service (EEAS) on the decision to revoke the credentials of EFE journalists, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of 14 November 2021 of the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service (EEAS) on the decision to revoke the credentials of EFE journalists,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other international human rights treaties and instruments, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other international human rights treaties and instruments,

| — | having regard to the statement of 29 November 2021 from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression on the repressive actions by the State that prevented the civic march called for on 15 November 2021 in Cuba, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of 29 November 2021 from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression on the repressive actions by the State that prevented the civic march called for on 15 November 2021 in Cuba,

| — | having regard to the statement of 8 December 2021 by several artists together with PEN International, PEN America’s Artists at Risk Connection and Human Rights Watch on ending the repression against artists in Cuba, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of 8 December 2021 by several artists together with PEN International, PEN America’s Artists at Risk Connection and Human Rights Watch on ending the repression against artists in Cuba,

| — | having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which Cuba is a State Party, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which Cuba is a State Party,

| — | having regard to the letter of 10 May 2021 from the EEAS Deputy Managing Director for the Americas to representatives of civil society on their involvement in the implementation of the PDCA (ARES(2021)247104), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter of 10 May 2021 from the EEAS Deputy Managing Director for the Americas to representatives of civil society on their involvement in the implementation of the PDCA (ARES(2021)247104),

| — | having regard to the definition of ‘Civil Society Organisation’ published on the website of the Official Journal of the European Union (EUR-Lex), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the definition of ‘Civil Society Organisation’ published on the website of the Official Journal of the European Union (EUR-Lex),

| — | having regard to the Cuban Constitution and its Criminal Code, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Cuban Constitution and its Criminal Code,

| — | having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas on 11 July 2021, landmark demonstrations took place in more than 50 cities on the island, to peacefully protest against the dire socio-economic crisis, the chronic shortages of medicines and other essential goods, and the systematic restrictions on human rights; whereas these grievances, in parallel with COVID-19, have created an increase in the demands for civil and political rights, and for democracy; whereas in response to the demonstrations, the Cuban Government has systematically targeted protestors, political dissidents, religious leaders, human rights activists and independent artists, among others, some of whom are Sakharov Prize winners, for their peaceful pro-democracy and human rights activism; whereas several dozen have reportedly been arbitrarily arrested, detained or placed under house arrest subject to constant surveillance, and face bogus and abuse-riddled criminal charges; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas on 11 July 2021, landmark demonstrations took place in more than 50 cities on the island, to peacefully protest against the dire socio-economic crisis, the chronic shortages of medicines and other essential goods, and the systematic restrictions on human rights; whereas these grievances, in parallel with COVID-19, have created an increase in the demands for civil and political rights, and for democracy; whereas in response to the demonstrations, the Cuban Government has systematically targeted protestors, political dissidents, religious leaders, human rights activists and independent artists, among others, some of whom are Sakharov Prize winners, for their peaceful pro-democracy and human rights activism; whereas several dozen have reportedly been arbitrarily arrested, detained or placed under house arrest subject to constant surveillance, and face bogus and abuse-riddled criminal charges;

| B. | whereas José Daniel Ferrer, Lady in White Aymara Nieto, Maykel Castillo, Luis Robles, Félix Navarro, Luis Manuel Otero, Reverend Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo, Andy Dunier García and Yunior García Aguilera are but a few examples of the hundreds of Cubans facing the injustice and repression imposed by the Cuban regime; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas José Daniel Ferrer, Lady in White Aymara Nieto, Maykel Castillo, Luis Robles, Félix Navarro, Luis Manuel Otero, Reverend Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo, Andy Dunier García and Yunior García Aguilera are but a few examples of the hundreds of Cubans facing the injustice and repression imposed by the Cuban regime;

| C. | whereas those who have been arbitrarily imprisoned are subject to continuous isolation, including stays in punishment cells, cruel torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment without access to their lawyers and proper medical treatment; whereas some of them are detained in prisons far away from their homes, preventing their families from visiting them; whereas several of those detained are suffering from health concerns, making their release particularly urgent; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas those who have been arbitrarily imprisoned are subject to continuous isolation, including stays in punishment cells, cruel torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment without access to their lawyers and proper medical treatment; whereas some of them are detained in prisons far away from their homes, preventing their families from visiting them; whereas several of those detained are suffering from health concerns, making their release particularly urgent;

| D. | whereas many others who have fled the country or have been forced to leave the country have not been allowed to return and will remain in exile for the foreseeable future; whereas the crime of forced expatriation of dissidents in Cuba has already been denounced by four UN rapporteurs; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas many others who have fled the country or have been forced to leave the country have not been allowed to return and will remain in exile for the foreseeable future; whereas the crime of forced expatriation of dissidents in Cuba has already been denounced by four UN rapporteurs;

| E. | whereas on 21 September 2021, the Archipiélago platform and other civil society groups publicly and transparently requested authorisation from the competent authorities to carry out a peaceful demonstration on 15 November 2021 in favour of respect for human rights and the release of political prisoners in the country; whereas the Cuban authorities banned the planned protests, considering them unlawful and not recognising the legitimacy of the reasons given for the demonstration; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas on 21 September 2021, the Archipiélago platform and other civil society groups publicly and transparently requested authorisation from the competent authorities to carry out a peaceful demonstration on 15 November 2021 in favour of respect for human rights and the release of political prisoners in the country; whereas the Cuban authorities banned the planned protests, considering them unlawful and not recognising the legitimacy of the reasons given for the demonstration;

| F. | whereas on the eve of the peaceful demonstrations scheduled for 15 November 2021, the Cuban authorities revoked the credentials of the journalists working for the Spanish news agency, EFE, in the country in a clear move to stem the flow of open and accurate news from the island; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas on the eve of the peaceful demonstrations scheduled for 15 November 2021, the Cuban authorities revoked the credentials of the journalists working for the Spanish news agency, EFE, in the country in a clear move to stem the flow of open and accurate news from the island;

| G. | whereas the State of Cuba is under an obligation to acknowledge, protect and ensure the rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, without discrimination based on political views; whereas it is essential for the State’s law enforcement officers to act in strict compliance with international human rights standards with respect to the principles of legality, exceptionality, proportionality and necessity; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the State of Cuba is under an obligation to acknowledge, protect and ensure the rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, without discrimination based on political views; whereas it is essential for the State’s law enforcement officers to act in strict compliance with international human rights standards with respect to the principles of legality, exceptionality, proportionality and necessity;

| H. | whereas on 5 July 2017, Parliament gave its consent to the PDCA, with clear conditions linked to the improvement of human rights and democracy in Cuba, which include a suspension clause in the event of a violation of human rights provisions; whereas on 26 February 2021, the EU and Cuba held their third formal Human Rights Dialogue under the EU-Cuba PDCA; whereas the two sides discussed the issue of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; whereas the EU emphasised, in line with international human rights law, the importance of allowing all citizens to play an active part in society via civil society organisations and associations; whereas the EU recalled the need to respect international human rights law obligations; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas on 5 July 2017, Parliament gave its consent to the PDCA, with clear conditions linked to the improvement of human rights and democracy in Cuba, which include a suspension clause in the event of a violation of human rights provisions; whereas on 26 February 2021, the EU and Cuba held their third formal Human Rights Dialogue under the EU-Cuba PDCA; whereas the two sides discussed the issue of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; whereas the EU emphasised, in line with international human rights law, the importance of allowing all citizens to play an active part in society via civil society organisations and associations; whereas the EU recalled the need to respect international human rights law obligations;

| I. | whereas any political dialogue must include direct and intensive participation of independent civil society and all opposition political actors with no restrictions, as stressed in Article 36 of the PDCA; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas any political dialogue must include direct and intensive participation of independent civil society and all opposition political actors with no restrictions, as stressed in Article 36 of the PDCA;

| J. | whereas the European Parliament has repeatedly condemned human rights violations in Cuba, underscoring the breaches of the provisions of Articles 1(5), 2(c), 5, 22 and 43(2) of the PDCA between the European Union and Cuba, signed in 2016, in which the Cuban Government undertakes to respect human rights; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the European Parliament has repeatedly condemned human rights violations in Cuba, underscoring the breaches of the provisions of Articles 1(5), 2(c), 5, 22 and 43(2) of the PDCA between the European Union and Cuba, signed in 2016, in which the Cuban Government undertakes to respect human rights;

| K. | whereas Parliament has awarded its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Cuban activists on three occasions: Oswaldo Payá in 2002, the Ladies in White in 2005 and Guillermo Fariñas in 2010; whereas Sakharov laureates and their relatives are still being regularly harassed and intimidated, and impeded from leaving the country and participating in international events; whereas on 8 December 2021 Sakharov Prize laureates Berta Soler, leader of Ladies in White, and Guillermo Fariñas sent a letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy proposing the withdrawal of their award if civil society continues to be abandoned by the EEAS in the near future, while crimes against humanity are being perpetrated in Cuba; whereas on 9 December 2021, Guillermo Fariñas was kidnapped and taken to a hospital against his will; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas Parliament has awarded its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Cuban activists on three occasions: Oswaldo Payá in 2002, the Ladies in White in 2005 and Guillermo Fariñas in 2010; whereas Sakharov laureates and their relatives are still being regularly harassed and intimidated, and impeded from leaving the country and participating in international events; whereas on 8 December 2021 Sakharov Prize laureates Berta Soler, leader of Ladies in White, and Guillermo Fariñas sent a letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy proposing the withdrawal of their award if civil society continues to be abandoned by the EEAS in the near future, while crimes against humanity are being perpetrated in Cuba; whereas on 9 December 2021, Guillermo Fariñas was kidnapped and taken to a hospital against his will;

| 1. | Condemns in the strongest terms the systematic abuses against protestors, political dissidents, religious leaders, human rights activists and independent artists, among others, including their arbitrary detention and abusive restrictions on their movements and communications, such as house arrests and surveillance, and torture and ill-treatment perpetrated by the Cuban Government; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of José Daniel Ferrer, Lady in White Aymara Nieto, Maykel Castillo, Luis Robles, Félix Navarro, Luis Manuel Otero, Reverend Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo and Andy Dunier García, and of all those detained for the exercise of their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; calls on the Cuban authorities to drop abusive criminal charges and allow those in exile to return to their country, including, for example, Yunior García; condemns the use of systematic forced expatriations on grounds of conscience by the Cuban Government; denounces the recent abduction and arbitrary detention of the Sakharov Prize laureate Guillermo Fariñas and, in spite of his recent release, calls for the regular and persistent arbitrary arrests and harassment he faces to be put to an end; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Condemns the torture, inhuman, degrading and ill-treatment being carried out by the Cuban authorities; calls for prompt and impartial investigation of such cases and for the families of victims to be granted immediate access and for the victims to be given medical care of their choice; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Calls for credible guarantees of the right to a fair trial and of the independence of the judiciary, and calls for assurances that persons deprived of their liberty have access to an independent lawyer; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Urges the Cuban authorities to immediately put an end to the policy of repression, which maintains a culture of fear and quashes all forms of dialogue, as well as freedom of expression and assembly; expresses its condemnation of Cuba’s continued repressive and intimidating strategies aimed at obstructing any civil society pro-democracy initiatives, such as the civic march called for 15 November 2021, which did not take place as a result of threats, harassment, sieges, detentions and several other repressive actions against civilians; stresses that fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, association and assembly, must always be upheld and respected; calls on the Cuban authorities to ensure and guarantee the right to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly at all times by allowing peaceful demonstrations in the country; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Insists that the Cuban authorities ensure that the economic, social and cultural rights of the population are met, in order to address their need for greater access to food and medicines, and to provide an effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls on the Cuban authorities to immediately grant the UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders access to the country in order to document the human rights situation in Cuba; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Reiterates its call for the Member States, the EEAS and its delegation in Cuba to firmly and publicly condemn the arbitrary detention and confinement of Mr Ferrer, Ms Nieto, Mr Castillo, Mr Otero, Mr Robles, Mr Navarro, Reverend Rosales Fajardo, Mr García Lorenzo and the hundreds of peaceful demonstrators imprisoned as a consequence of the 11 July and 15 November 2021 demonstrations and to take all necessary action to defend democracy and human rights; sends the firmest support to the artists forced into expatriation, and to the journalists, human rights defenders and social and political activists suffering forced exile from Cuba, such as Mr García Aguilera; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Requests the Cuban authorities to grant access to an EU delegation and to representatives of the Member States, as well as to independent human rights organisations, to monitor the trials and conduct prison visits of the hundreds of activists and ordinary Cubans who continue to be detained for exercising their right to freedom of expression and assembly, including those charged with provisions of the criminal code such as ‘contempt’, ‘resistance’ and incitement to commit a crime’, among other charges; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Urges the Cuban Government to align its human rights policy with the international standards defined in the charters, declarations and international instruments to which Cuba is a signatory and to allow civil society and opposition political actors to actively participate in political and social life, without restrictions, while guaranteeing and implementing fundamental freedoms; calls on the Cuban authorities to listen to the voices of its citizens and to engage in a democratic national process; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Condemns the arbitrary revocation of EFE’s press credentials and all arbitrary restrictions on the work of international and Cuban press correspondents; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Recalls its strong support for human rights defenders in Cuba and their work; calls on all Member State representatives to raise human rights concerns and enhance their support for genuine and independent civil society during visits to the Cuban authorities, and to meet the Sakharov Prize laureates when visiting Cuba in order to ensure the consistent internal and external application of the EU’s human rights policy, thereby strengthening the participation of independent civil society representatives and improving the work of human rights defenders; regrets the fact that Cuban and European independent civil society representatives have been excluded from taking part in the dialogue, which is binding according to the provisions of the PDCA; regrets the divergence in positions and policies on Cuba between the EEAS and the European Parliament and strongly calls on the EEAS to not abandon the civil society of Cuba; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Deeply regrets the fact that the Cuban authorities are refusing to allow the European Parliament, its delegations and some political groups to visit Cuba in spite of Parliament having given its consent to the PDCA; calls on the authorities to immediately allow entry to the country; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Stresses the obligation for all parties to fulfil the binding provisions of the PDCA and the resolution of 5 July 2017; in this context, recalls that all dialogue between the European Union and Cuban civil society on funding opportunities must be held only with independent civil society organisations, making sure that any funding does not contribute to financing the Cuban regime and that it intends to improve the standard of living of Cuban people; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Expresses its regret that, in spite of the PDCA’s adoption, the situation of democracy and human rights has not improved but has, on the contrary, seriously deteriorated; recalls that in the light of the PDCA, Cuba must respect and consolidate the principles of the rule of law, democracy and human rights; deeply regrets the fact that all of the cases mentioned above constitute additional and permanent breaches of the Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Reiterates its call on the Council to adopt sanctions against those responsible for the persistent human rights violations in Cuba; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Recalls that the PDCA contains a ‘human rights clause’ as a standard essential component of EU international agreements, which allows the suspension of the Agreement in the event of violations of human rights provisions; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Reiterates its call for the European Union to trigger Article 85(3)(b) in order to call for an immediate meeting of the joint committee on the grounds of breaches of the agreement on the part of the Cuban Government, which constitute a ‘case of special urgency’, which may lead to the suspension of the agreement for continuous, serious and material violations of democratic principles and lack of respect for all basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which constitute an essential element of this Agreement, as enshrined in Article 1(5), and failure to address them in spite of the numerous calls to do so; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government and National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the governments of the member states of the countries of the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States. |
| --- | --- |

19.

---

(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0389.

(2)  OJ L 337 I, 13.12.2016, p. 1.

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/124 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/124

---

P9_TA(2021)0511

Forced labour in the Linglong factory and environmental protests in Serbia

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on forced labour in the Linglong factory and environmental protests in Serbia (2021/3020(RSP))

(2022/C 251/13)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia,

| — | having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part (1), which entered into force on 1 September 2013, and its candidate status, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part (1), which entered into force on 1 September 2013, and its candidate status,

| — | having regard to the Commission’s ‘Serbia 2021 Report’ of 19 October 2021 (SWD(2021)0288), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s ‘Serbia 2021 Report’ of 19 October 2021 (SWD(2021)0288),

| — | having regard to the conventions of the International Labour Organization, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the conventions of the International Labour Organization,

| — | having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

| — | having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas Serbia must be judged, as is any country aspiring to become a Member State of the EU, on its own merits in terms of the fulfilment and implementation of and compliance with the criteria and common values required for accession; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas Serbia must be judged, as is any country aspiring to become a Member State of the EU, on its own merits in terms of the fulfilment and implementation of and compliance with the criteria and common values required for accession;

| B. | whereas democracy, human rights and the rule of law are fundamental values on which the EU is founded and are at the heart of the enlargement, stabilisation and association processes; whereas sustainable reforms are needed to tackle the significant challenges that remain in these areas; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas democracy, human rights and the rule of law are fundamental values on which the EU is founded and are at the heart of the enlargement, stabilisation and association processes; whereas sustainable reforms are needed to tackle the significant challenges that remain in these areas;

| C. | whereas Serbia needs to develop an irreversible track record in adhering to, upholding and defending the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas Serbia needs to develop an irreversible track record in adhering to, upholding and defending the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights;

| D. | whereas freedom of expression and the independence of the media remain serious concerns which need to be addressed as a matter of priority; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas freedom of expression and the independence of the media remain serious concerns which need to be addressed as a matter of priority;

| E. | whereas Serbia is increasing the number of contracts it has with major Chinese industrialists and granting China more and more legal privileges, even when these are contrary to EU law; whereas the agreement between Belgrade and Beijing on the employment of foreigners allows Chinese labour law to be applied in Serbia; whereas in March 2021, there were press reports of mistreatment of employees of the Chinese company Zijin Mining, which took over a copper mine in eastern Serbia in 2018, while they were deprived of their passports and housed in precarious conditions; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas Serbia is increasing the number of contracts it has with major Chinese industrialists and granting China more and more legal privileges, even when these are contrary to EU law; whereas the agreement between Belgrade and Beijing on the employment of foreigners allows Chinese labour law to be applied in Serbia; whereas in March 2021, there were press reports of mistreatment of employees of the Chinese company Zijin Mining, which took over a copper mine in eastern Serbia in 2018, while they were deprived of their passports and housed in precarious conditions;

| F. | whereas there have been serious allegations against the Chinese tyre production company Linglong Tire in Zrenjanin, northern Serbia, regarding the working conditions of 500 workers from Vietnam; whereas these allegations include violations of human rights, human trafficking and conditions that could endanger human health and lives; whereas the workers’ passports were confiscated; whereas the contracts of the employees in the Linglong Tire factory include irregularities which indicate that labour exploitation has taken place in relation to salaries, leave and working hours, contrary to the applicable regulations of the Serbia Labour Law; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas there have been serious allegations against the Chinese tyre production company Linglong Tire in Zrenjanin, northern Serbia, regarding the working conditions of 500 workers from Vietnam; whereas these allegations include violations of human rights, human trafficking and conditions that could endanger human health and lives; whereas the workers’ passports were confiscated; whereas the contracts of the employees in the Linglong Tire factory include irregularities which indicate that labour exploitation has taken place in relation to salaries, leave and working hours, contrary to the applicable regulations of the Serbia Labour Law;

| G. | whereas widespread environmental protests have recently been reported across Serbia against the backdrop of the rushed adoption of two laws, the Law on Referendums and People’s Initiative and the Law on Land Expropriation; whereas the latter law is seen as opening space for controversial foreign investment projects, such as the Rio Tinto mine, with a heavy impact on the environment; whereas the citizens of Serbia exercised their fundamental human right to peaceful assembly; whereas strong allegations have stressed that police forces violated their obligation to protect the lives, rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as the protection of the rule of law; whereas the police used a serious amount of force and arrested several protesters; whereas protesters were attacked by unidentified armed groups, hooligans and bulldozers; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas widespread environmental protests have recently been reported across Serbia against the backdrop of the rushed adoption of two laws, the Law on Referendums and People’s Initiative and the Law on Land Expropriation; whereas the latter law is seen as opening space for controversial foreign investment projects, such as the Rio Tinto mine, with a heavy impact on the environment; whereas the citizens of Serbia exercised their fundamental human right to peaceful assembly; whereas strong allegations have stressed that police forces violated their obligation to protect the lives, rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as the protection of the rule of law; whereas the police used a serious amount of force and arrested several protesters; whereas protesters were attacked by unidentified armed groups, hooligans and bulldozers;

| H. | whereas the Serbian Government made a decision to withdraw the Law on Land Expropriation from the parliamentary procedure after the president returned it for reconsideration; whereas the government will analyse the law and introduce changes after a broad public debate; whereas on 10 December 2021, the national assembly adopted amendments to the Law on Referendums and People’s Initiative referring to the certification of signatures and the abolition of the fee for verifying signatures; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the Serbian Government made a decision to withdraw the Law on Land Expropriation from the parliamentary procedure after the president returned it for reconsideration; whereas the government will analyse the law and introduce changes after a broad public debate; whereas on 10 December 2021, the national assembly adopted amendments to the Law on Referendums and People’s Initiative referring to the certification of signatures and the abolition of the fee for verifying signatures;

| I. | whereas both the Linglong Tire factory and the environmental protests involve allegations of intimidation and physical attacks against media workers, activists, civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas both the Linglong Tire factory and the environmental protests involve allegations of intimidation and physical attacks against media workers, activists, civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs);

| J. | whereas cluster 4 in the accession negotiations with Serbia was opened on 14 December 2021 at an intergovernmental conference; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas cluster 4 in the accession negotiations with Serbia was opened on 14 December 2021 at an intergovernmental conference;

| 1. | Expresses deep concerns over the alleged forced labour, violation of human rights and human trafficking of around 500 Vietnamese people at the Chinese Linglong Tire factory construction site in Serbia; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Urges the Serbian authorities to investigate the case carefully and ensure respect for fundamental human rights in the factory, especially labour rights, to provide the EU with the conclusions of its investigations and to hold the perpetrators to account; calls on the Serbian authorities to allow free, meaningful and unhindered access to the Linglong Tire factory in Zrenjanin and the lodging facilities of the Vietnamese workers for NGOs, CSOs, EU officials and officials from other international organisations; urges the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia to closely follow up on these processes and the fate of the 500 Vietnamese workers; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Calls on Serbia to improve alignment with EU labour law, adopt a new law on the right to strike, tackle undeclared work and amend the law on inspection oversight to comply with the relevant International Labour Organization conventions, which it has ratified; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Expresses its deep concern over serious problems with corruption and the rule of law in the environment area, over the general lack of transparency and over environmental and social impact assessments of infrastructure projects, including from Chinese investments and loans as well as from multinational companies such as Rio Tinto; notes, in this context, the opening of Cluster 4 ‘Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity’ in the EU accession negotiations; calls on the EU and the Serbian authorities to follow up on the legitimate concerns expressed in the environmental protests and to urgently address these problems during the negotiations; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Expresses concern over China’s increasing influence in Serbia and across the Western Balkans; calls on Serbia to strengthen its legal compliance standards for Chinese business activities; emphasises that Serbian labour and environmental laws should also apply to Chinese companies operating in the country; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Expresses deep concern over the increasing violence by extremist and hooligan groups against peaceful environmental demonstrations; regrets the amount of force used by the police against protesters; condemns the violent behaviour of hooligans towards peaceful demonstrators; strongly condemns any violation of the fundamental right to peaceful assembly; stresses that freedom of assembly is a human right; urges the Serbian authorities to properly investigate recent cases of mass protests during which the police force allegedly overstepped its authority or failed to protect protesters from violence and protect their human right to peaceful assembly; calls on the Serbian authorities to publicly condemn the actions of these hooligans against the protesters; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Condemns also, in this context, the role of hooligan groups in the protection of the mural of the convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić in Belgrade, and corresponding incidents which have exposed close links between hooligans and the police; expresses concern over the authorities’ apparent unwillingness to ensure the permanent removal of the mural in opposition to both the wishes of tenants and formal municipal decisions; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Expresses concern over the limited time and space available to openly debate the Law on Referendums and People’s Initiative and amendments to the Law on Land Expropriation; takes note of the decision to withdraw and reconsider the Law on Land Expropriation and the adopted amendments to the Law on Referendums and People’s Initiative; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Regrets the long-term trends of media bias and the blurring of lines between the activities of state officials, police and party politicians; regrets the deterioration of media freedom and the increase in abusive language, intimidation and even hate speech towards members of the parliamentary opposition, independent intellectuals, NGOs, journalists and prominent individuals, including from members of the ruling parties, whose responsibility to act with respect towards all representatives of the media is of the utmost importance; urges the Serbian authorities to take immediate measures to guarantee freedom of expression and media independence and to ensure proper investigations into these cases; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Notes with concern that the work of CSOs and NGOs takes place in an environment that is not open to criticism; deplores the recent attacks on the leader of the United Opposition of Serbia, Marinika Tepić, based on her ethnic origin, which occurred on a government-sponsored TV channel; calls on the Serbian authorities to counter the shrinking of the space for civil society and independent media and ensure that they can work free from all restrictions, including intimidation or criminalisation of these organisations; urges the authorities to foster an atmosphere that is conducive to the work of all CSOs as soon as possible; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to strengthen their cooperation with and support for civil society, NGOs and the independent media on the ground; reiterates its support for the work of democratic European political foundations in strengthening Serbia’s democratic processes and fostering a new generation of political leaders; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Calls on the Serbian Government to work on effective and verifiable fundamental reforms, and to address structural reforms and shortcomings in the areas of the rule of law, fundamental rights, media freedom, the fight against corruption and the functioning of democratic institutions and the public administration; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Welcomes the fact that EU membership continues to be Serbia’s strategic goal and that it is among the priorities of the government; encourages the Serbian authorities to more actively and unambiguously communicate their commitment to EU values in the public debate and expects a clear and unambiguous commitment by Serbia, in both words and deeds, to fulfil its obligations under the EU accession process in a visible and verifiable way; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Expects that the opening of negotiations on cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity, (chapters 14, 15, 21 and 27) will be accomplished by a renewed drive to fully implement EU standards; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and Parliament of Serbia. |
| --- | --- |

15.

---

(1)  OJ L 278, 18.10.2013, p. 16.

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/127 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/127

---

P9_TA(2021)0512

Fundamental rights and Rule of Law in Slovenia, in particular the delayed nomination of EPPO prosecutors

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on fundamental rights and the rule of law in Slovenia, in particular the delayed nomination of EPPO prosecutors (2021/2978(RSP))

(2022/C 251/14)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Article 2 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Article 2 thereof,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and in particular Article 86 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and in particular Article 86 thereof,

| — | having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’),

| — | having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

| — | having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and to the related case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and to the related case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report of 30 September 2020 (COM(2020)0580), and to the 2021 Rule of Law Report of 20 July 2021 (COM(2021)0700), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report of 30 September 2020 (COM(2020)0580), and to the 2021 Rule of Law Report of 20 July 2021 (COM(2021)0700),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report (1),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (2),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (‘the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation’) (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (‘the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation’) (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights (4),

| — | having regard to the mission report of 17 November 2021 by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs following the visit of an ad hoc delegation to Slovenia of 13-15 October 2021 to assess respect for EU values and the rule of law, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the mission report of 17 November 2021 by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs following the visit of an ad hoc delegation to Slovenia of 13-15 October 2021 to assess respect for EU values and the rule of law,

| — | having regard to the work undertaken by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DFRMG), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the work undertaken by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DFRMG),

| — | having regard to the European Parliament plenary debate on 25 November 2020 on Hungarian interference in the media in Slovenia and North Macedonia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Parliament plenary debate on 25 November 2020 on Hungarian interference in the media in Slovenia and North Macedonia,

| — | having regard to the letters sent by the Commission on 15 February, 29 April and 23 June 2021 to the Minister of Justice expressing certain concerns regarding the finalisation of the pending national procedure for the nomination of the two European Delegated Prosecutors, raising concerns that the national procedure had not been properly followed, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letters sent by the Commission on 15 February, 29 April and 23 June 2021 to the Minister of Justice expressing certain concerns regarding the finalisation of the pending national procedure for the nomination of the two European Delegated Prosecutors, raising concerns that the national procedure had not been properly followed,

| — | having regard to the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia sent on 4 May 2020 to the Commissioner for Justice, reacting to the preparation of the Commission’s first Annual Rule of Law Report, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia sent on 4 May 2020 to the Commissioner for Justice, reacting to the preparation of the Commission’s first Annual Rule of Law Report,

| — | having regard to the letter of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia sent on 23 February 2021 to the President of the Commission, in preparation of the Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the EU, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia sent on 23 February 2021 to the President of the Commission, in preparation of the Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the EU,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas under Article 2 TEU, the EU is founded on respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, values which are shared by all Member States and which must be upheld by the EU and by each individual Member State in all their policies; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas under Article 2 TEU, the EU is founded on respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, values which are shared by all Member States and which must be upheld by the EU and by each individual Member State in all their policies;

| B. | whereas the rule of law is one of the common values on which the EU is founded; whereas the Commission, together with Parliament and the Council, is responsible under the Treaties for guaranteeing respect for the rule of law as a fundamental value of the Union and for making sure that EU law, values and principles are respected and adhered to; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the rule of law is one of the common values on which the EU is founded; whereas the Commission, together with Parliament and the Council, is responsible under the Treaties for guaranteeing respect for the rule of law as a fundamental value of the Union and for making sure that EU law, values and principles are respected and adhered to;

| C. | whereas an effective, independent and impartial judicial system is essential to ensure the rule of law and the protection of the fundamental rights and civil liberties of citizens in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas an effective, independent and impartial judicial system is essential to ensure the rule of law and the protection of the fundamental rights and civil liberties of citizens in the EU;

| D. | whereas the Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 establishing the EPPO on the basis of enhanced cooperation among 22 Member States, which included Slovenia, was adopted on 12 October 2017 and entered into force on 20 November 2017; whereas the EPPO, as an independent and decentralised prosecution office of the European Union, has the competence to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment crimes against the EU budget, such as fraud, corruption or serious cross-border VAT fraud; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 establishing the EPPO on the basis of enhanced cooperation among 22 Member States, which included Slovenia, was adopted on 12 October 2017 and entered into force on 20 November 2017; whereas the EPPO, as an independent and decentralised prosecution office of the European Union, has the competence to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment crimes against the EU budget, such as fraud, corruption or serious cross-border VAT fraud;

| E. | whereas the EPPO is organised at both central and national level; whereas the decentralised level consists of European Delegated Prosecutors in the participating EU countries, who deal with cases and carry out investigations and prosecutions in their Member States of origin; whereas the European Delegated Prosecutors are an integral part of the EPPO and, as such, are functionally and legally independent when investigating and prosecuting offences within the remit of the EPPO; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the EPPO is organised at both central and national level; whereas the decentralised level consists of European Delegated Prosecutors in the participating EU countries, who deal with cases and carry out investigations and prosecutions in their Member States of origin; whereas the European Delegated Prosecutors are an integral part of the EPPO and, as such, are functionally and legally independent when investigating and prosecuting offences within the remit of the EPPO;

| F. | whereas the EPPO assumed the investigative and prosecutorial tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 on 1 June 2021; whereas at least two European Delegated Prosecutors ought to have been appointed for each Member State before 1 June 2021; whereas Slovenia, as the last participating country and with a significant delay, nominated two Delegated Prosecutors on 22 November 2021; whereas in the view of the Slovenian Government these nominations were only temporary, pending the conclusion of the national selection procedure; whereas the College of the EPPO appointed two European Delegated Prosecutors from Slovenia on 24 November 2021 for a period of five years; whereas a Member State may not dismiss, or take disciplinary action against, a European Delegated Prosecutor for reasons connected with their responsibilities under the EPPO Regulation without the consent of the European Chief Prosecutor; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the EPPO assumed the investigative and prosecutorial tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 on 1 June 2021; whereas at least two European Delegated Prosecutors ought to have been appointed for each Member State before 1 June 2021; whereas Slovenia, as the last participating country and with a significant delay, nominated two Delegated Prosecutors on 22 November 2021; whereas in the view of the Slovenian Government these nominations were only temporary, pending the conclusion of the national selection procedure; whereas the College of the EPPO appointed two European Delegated Prosecutors from Slovenia on 24 November 2021 for a period of five years; whereas a Member State may not dismiss, or take disciplinary action against, a European Delegated Prosecutor for reasons connected with their responsibilities under the EPPO Regulation without the consent of the European Chief Prosecutor;

| G. | whereas in the wake of the appointment of the two Delegated Prosecutors to the EPPO, the Minister of Justice announced a legislative amendment, drafted by the office of the Prime Minister and passed in a fast-track procedure without the usual consultation of experts, which provides for discretionary powers for the Ministry of Justice to propose candidates in the event that an insufficient number of candidates had come forward in the public call, thereby shifting power from the State Prosecutorial Council to the government; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas in the wake of the appointment of the two Delegated Prosecutors to the EPPO, the Minister of Justice announced a legislative amendment, drafted by the office of the Prime Minister and passed in a fast-track procedure without the usual consultation of experts, which provides for discretionary powers for the Ministry of Justice to propose candidates in the event that an insufficient number of candidates had come forward in the public call, thereby shifting power from the State Prosecutorial Council to the government;

| H. | whereas the same legislative amendment provides for transitional provisions that would enable the replacement of Delegated Prosecutors to the EPPO within the three months following the entry into force of the law; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the same legislative amendment provides for transitional provisions that would enable the replacement of Delegated Prosecutors to the EPPO within the three months following the entry into force of the law;

| I. | whereas public prosecutors are an integral part of the justice system and play a key role in safeguarding the rule of law; whereas it is essential that public prosecutors are independent and are able to perform their duties and responsibilities without unjustified interference or pressure; whereas in Slovenia only 206 of the 258 available posts for prosecutors are currently occupied; whereas at least 15 state prosecutors-elect are awaiting to be appointed by the government; whereas in its country chapter on Slovenia in the 2021 Rule of Law Report, the Commission stated that the appointments of state prosecutors had been unjustifiably delayed; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas public prosecutors are an integral part of the justice system and play a key role in safeguarding the rule of law; whereas it is essential that public prosecutors are independent and are able to perform their duties and responsibilities without unjustified interference or pressure; whereas in Slovenia only 206 of the 258 available posts for prosecutors are currently occupied; whereas at least 15 state prosecutors-elect are awaiting to be appointed by the government; whereas in its country chapter on Slovenia in the 2021 Rule of Law Report, the Commission stated that the appointments of state prosecutors had been unjustifiably delayed;

| J. | whereas media freedom is one of the pillars and guarantees of a functioning democracy and the rule of law; whereas media freedom, pluralism and independence and the safety of journalists are crucial components of the right of freedom of expression and information, and are essential to the democratic functioning of the EU and its Member States; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas media freedom is one of the pillars and guarantees of a functioning democracy and the rule of law; whereas media freedom, pluralism and independence and the safety of journalists are crucial components of the right of freedom of expression and information, and are essential to the democratic functioning of the EU and its Member States;

| K. | whereas Slovenia ranks 36th worldwide in the 2021 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index (in 18th place within the EU), having dropped four places from 32nd place last year (5); whereas according to the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report, this means that the country is experiencing a deterioration in media freedom and the protection of journalists; whereas the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights notes in her memorandum of 4 June 2021 that Slovenia has ‘a vibrant media landscape and civil society. Civil and political rights, including the right to freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly, are generally protected in law and in reality’; whereas the Commissioner for Human Rights also notes ‘the deterioration in the conditions that underpin media freedom in Slovenia over the past year’, and that ‘in the past 13 months, 13 alerts concerning Slovenia have been published on the Council of Europe Platform’; whereas this represents a significant increase over past years (6); |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas Slovenia ranks 36th worldwide in the 2021 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index (in 18th place within the EU), having dropped four places from 32nd place last year (5); whereas according to the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report, this means that the country is experiencing a deterioration in media freedom and the protection of journalists; whereas the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights notes in her memorandum of 4 June 2021 that Slovenia has ‘a vibrant media landscape and civil society. Civil and political rights, including the right to freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly, are generally protected in law and in reality’; whereas the Commissioner for Human Rights also notes ‘the deterioration in the conditions that underpin media freedom in Slovenia over the past year’, and that ‘in the past 13 months, 13 alerts concerning Slovenia have been published on the Council of Europe Platform’; whereas this represents a significant increase over past years (6);

| L. | whereas the Slovenian Press Agency (STA), as the national and public information provider, has an important role in guaranteeing media freedom and media pluralism in the country; whereas the independence of the agency, without political interference and benefiting from stable financing, is paramount for the public service it provides; whereas Article 3 of the STA Act clearly establishes the state’s duty to ensure the STA’s institutional autonomy, editorial independence and adequate funding for the performance of its public service function; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the Slovenian Press Agency (STA), as the national and public information provider, has an important role in guaranteeing media freedom and media pluralism in the country; whereas the independence of the agency, without political interference and benefiting from stable financing, is paramount for the public service it provides; whereas Article 3 of the STA Act clearly establishes the state’s duty to ensure the STA’s institutional autonomy, editorial independence and adequate funding for the performance of its public service function;

| M. | whereas according to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the relevant legislation in Slovenia does not address the conflict of interest between media owners and political parties; whereas the lack of transparency and of specific obligations for state bodies to report on the amounts spent by the state or state-owned companies on advertising in the media raises the issue of the potential political instrumentalisation of state advertising; whereas a revision of the media and audiovisual services laws is still pending; whereas according to the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report, if the draft amendments to the Mass Media Act, which were published by the government in July 2020, were adopted, they would improve the transparency of media ownership; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas according to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the relevant legislation in Slovenia does not address the conflict of interest between media owners and political parties; whereas the lack of transparency and of specific obligations for state bodies to report on the amounts spent by the state or state-owned companies on advertising in the media raises the issue of the potential political instrumentalisation of state advertising; whereas a revision of the media and audiovisual services laws is still pending; whereas according to the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report, if the draft amendments to the Mass Media Act, which were published by the government in July 2020, were adopted, they would improve the transparency of media ownership;

| N. | whereas in spite of its legal obligation to pay a state subsidy, the Slovenian Government withheld for 312 days in 2021 the STA’s funding for providing its public service; whereas the STA filed a request in court for the execution of the payment for providing its public service; whereas on 8 November 2021, the STA and the Government Communication Office (UKOM) signed a public service contract for the provision of public services for November and December 2021; whereas on 17 November 2021, UKOM paid EUR 676 000 for the STA’s public service for the period from January to April; whereas, in addition, EUR 140 000 has been paid for the STA’s public service for the month of August; whereas at least EUR 507 000 of claims for public service funding remain unpaid; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas in spite of its legal obligation to pay a state subsidy, the Slovenian Government withheld for 312 days in 2021 the STA’s funding for providing its public service; whereas the STA filed a request in court for the execution of the payment for providing its public service; whereas on 8 November 2021, the STA and the Government Communication Office (UKOM) signed a public service contract for the provision of public services for November and December 2021; whereas on 17 November 2021, UKOM paid EUR 676 000 for the STA’s public service for the period from January to April; whereas, in addition, EUR 140 000 has been paid for the STA’s public service for the month of August; whereas at least EUR 507 000 of claims for public service funding remain unpaid;

| O. | whereas the Association of Slovenian Journalists, together with the STA, collected EUR 385 132 in its two crowdfunding campaigns entitled ‘#zaobSTAnek (7)’ in 2021 in order to avoid bankruptcy, as the survival of the professional and autonomous agency and the jobs of around 100 employees were at serious risk; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the Association of Slovenian Journalists, together with the STA, collected EUR 385 132 in its two crowdfunding campaigns entitled ‘#zaobSTAnek (7)’ in 2021 in order to avoid bankruptcy, as the survival of the professional and autonomous agency and the jobs of around 100 employees were at serious risk;

| P. | whereas the public service contract for 2022 is currently being negotiated between the STA and UKOM; whereas on 12 November 2021, in a joint statement (8) the Media Freedom Rapid Response signed by the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), Free Press Unlimited (FPU), the International Press Institute (IPI), and OBC Transeuropa (OBCT) issued a warning about the STA’s long-term financial viability and expressed concerns that UKOM’s new oversight of the STA’s financial activities could infringe editorial independence, while adding that the commercial conditions under the deal signed weaken the sustainability of the STA’s business model under the conditions of the current contract, as adequate and fair funding, while guaranteeing its editorial autonomy, as prescribed by law, is vital; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the public service contract for 2022 is currently being negotiated between the STA and UKOM; whereas on 12 November 2021, in a joint statement (8) the Media Freedom Rapid Response signed by the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), Free Press Unlimited (FPU), the International Press Institute (IPI), and OBC Transeuropa (OBCT) issued a warning about the STA’s long-term financial viability and expressed concerns that UKOM’s new oversight of the STA’s financial activities could infringe editorial independence, while adding that the commercial conditions under the deal signed weaken the sustainability of the STA’s business model under the conditions of the current contract, as adequate and fair funding, while guaranteeing its editorial autonomy, as prescribed by law, is vital;

| Q. | whereas online harassment, threats and lawsuits against journalists, targeting women journalists in particular, by prominent politicians and public figures, including members of the government, continue to increase in Slovenia; whereas instances of political interference in the media in Slovenia have been reported; whereas journalists continue to face obstacles in obtaining access to public information and documents; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas online harassment, threats and lawsuits against journalists, targeting women journalists in particular, by prominent politicians and public figures, including members of the government, continue to increase in Slovenia; whereas instances of political interference in the media in Slovenia have been reported; whereas journalists continue to face obstacles in obtaining access to public information and documents;

| R. | whereas there is no transparent and clear set of principles in place for the distribution of advertising to media outlets by national, regional and local governments; whereas the situation for local media is particularly lacking in transparency; whereas the economic situation of the media in Slovenia has worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic and no specific measures have been adopted to alleviate its impact on media outlets; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas there is no transparent and clear set of principles in place for the distribution of advertising to media outlets by national, regional and local governments; whereas the situation for local media is particularly lacking in transparency; whereas the economic situation of the media in Slovenia has worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic and no specific measures have been adopted to alleviate its impact on media outlets;

| S. | whereas the European University Institute Monitoring Media Pluralism Report 2021 and different stakeholders have reported concerns about the financial situation of the national broadcaster RTV Slovenia and about political pressure on it; whereas the EFJ and Media Freedom Rapid Response have expressed concerns about the proposed changes to news programming at the Slovenian public television station, RTV Slovenia, which could reduce the broadcaster’s ability to inform the public and exercise scrutiny over those in positions of power (9); |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas the European University Institute Monitoring Media Pluralism Report 2021 and different stakeholders have reported concerns about the financial situation of the national broadcaster RTV Slovenia and about political pressure on it; whereas the EFJ and Media Freedom Rapid Response have expressed concerns about the proposed changes to news programming at the Slovenian public television station, RTV Slovenia, which could reduce the broadcaster’s ability to inform the public and exercise scrutiny over those in positions of power (9);

| T. | whereas Slovenia, along with certain other Member States, has not yet implemented all of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (10) and the European Electronic Communications Code (11), in particular those regarding the independence of the national media market regulator, and the reinforced rules for combating incitement to violence or hatred or for promoting a safer, fairer and more diverse audiovisual landscape; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas Slovenia, along with certain other Member States, has not yet implemented all of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (10) and the European Electronic Communications Code (11), in particular those regarding the independence of the national media market regulator, and the reinforced rules for combating incitement to violence or hatred or for promoting a safer, fairer and more diverse audiovisual landscape;

| U. | whereas continuing concerns about pressure on independent public institutions and on the media have been reported, including smear campaigns, slander, criminal investigations, as well as strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) brought by prominent public figures and politicians, including members of the Government; whereas Slovenia has not fully decriminalised defamation, which can have a chilling effect on the freedom of expression and on the reporting of abuses by those in public office, and can lead to self-censorship; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas continuing concerns about pressure on independent public institutions and on the media have been reported, including smear campaigns, slander, criminal investigations, as well as strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) brought by prominent public figures and politicians, including members of the Government; whereas Slovenia has not fully decriminalised defamation, which can have a chilling effect on the freedom of expression and on the reporting of abuses by those in public office, and can lead to self-censorship;

| V. | whereas the restrictive measures to fight the spread of COVID-19 pandemic were mostly adopted in the form of ordinances and decrees, but less frequently in the form of laws and acts; whereas several Slovenian government decrees and legal provisions related to restrictive measures have been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, either because they are in breach of the principle of proportionality or because they lack a legal basis; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas the restrictive measures to fight the spread of COVID-19 pandemic were mostly adopted in the form of ordinances and decrees, but less frequently in the form of laws and acts; whereas several Slovenian government decrees and legal provisions related to restrictive measures have been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, either because they are in breach of the principle of proportionality or because they lack a legal basis;

| W. | whereas in the country chapter on Slovenia in its 2020 and 2021 Rule of Law Report, the Commission found that providing adequate resources for the Judicial Council and the State Prosecutorial Council is an important condition for the independent and effective functioning of these self-governance bodies; |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas in the country chapter on Slovenia in its 2020 and 2021 Rule of Law Report, the Commission found that providing adequate resources for the Judicial Council and the State Prosecutorial Council is an important condition for the independent and effective functioning of these self-governance bodies;

| X. | whereas a record number of cases have been brought before the Constitutional Court; whereas a number of Constitutional Court rulings were not implemented within the required time frame; |
| --- | --- |

X.

whereas a record number of cases have been brought before the Constitutional Court; whereas a number of Constitutional Court rulings were not implemented within the required time frame;

| Y. | whereas allegations have been reported of political interference in investigating and prosecuting authorities, in particular in the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); whereas in October 2020 the Administrative Court ruled on the illegality of the dismissal of the former Director of the NBI, and whereas this ruling is pending appeal; whereas according to the country chapter on Slovenia in the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report, concrete results of the investigations by the Bureau into high-level corruption cases are lacking; |
| --- | --- |

Y.

whereas allegations have been reported of political interference in investigating and prosecuting authorities, in particular in the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); whereas in October 2020 the Administrative Court ruled on the illegality of the dismissal of the former Director of the NBI, and whereas this ruling is pending appeal; whereas according to the country chapter on Slovenia in the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report, concrete results of the investigations by the Bureau into high-level corruption cases are lacking;

| Z. | whereas the government passed a new amended Law on Organisation and Work in the Police, in force since 13 November 2021, which includes transitional provisions stipulating that high-ranking police officers cease to hold their positions effective immediately, thereby terminating the employment of around 130 police chiefs, including the directors of the uniformed and criminal police, the directors of all eight police administrations and 110 police station commanders; whereas amendments to the police law change the procedures governing the moment when the Public Prosecutor takes charge of a case, which could have an effect on the independence of the public prosecutor’s office; whereas three directors of the NBI were dismissed in 2021 and there were several significant changes in the higher echelons of the police, including the unlawful dismissal of the Director of the National Police Unit; whereas the Minister of the Interior and the Director-General of the Police have so far failed to implement ruling No 82/2020-33 regarding this unlawful dismissal (12); |
| --- | --- |

Z.

whereas the government passed a new amended Law on Organisation and Work in the Police, in force since 13 November 2021, which includes transitional provisions stipulating that high-ranking police officers cease to hold their positions effective immediately, thereby terminating the employment of around 130 police chiefs, including the directors of the uniformed and criminal police, the directors of all eight police administrations and 110 police station commanders; whereas amendments to the police law change the procedures governing the moment when the Public Prosecutor takes charge of a case, which could have an effect on the independence of the public prosecutor’s office; whereas three directors of the NBI were dismissed in 2021 and there were several significant changes in the higher echelons of the police, including the unlawful dismissal of the Director of the National Police Unit; whereas the Minister of the Interior and the Director-General of the Police have so far failed to implement ruling No 82/2020-33 regarding this unlawful dismissal (12);

| AA. | whereas the space for civil society has ‘narrowed’ according to the country chapter on Slovenia in the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report; whereas smear campaigns against non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been reported, especially through the use social media; whereas civil society organisations dealing with migrants, media literacy or human trafficking have been particularly affected by these campaigns; whereas, according to data obtained by the Slovenian national NGO umbrella network, CNVOS, only NGOs that have been granted the status of operating in the public interest are successful in obtaining public funds; whereas funding for NGOs was increased from EUR 372 million in 2019 to EUR 416 million in 2020, and whereas the Government implemented several legislative changes to support NGOs during the pandemic (13); |
| --- | --- |

AA.

whereas the space for civil society has ‘narrowed’ according to the country chapter on Slovenia in the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report; whereas smear campaigns against non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been reported, especially through the use social media; whereas civil society organisations dealing with migrants, media literacy or human trafficking have been particularly affected by these campaigns; whereas, according to data obtained by the Slovenian national NGO umbrella network, CNVOS, only NGOs that have been granted the status of operating in the public interest are successful in obtaining public funds; whereas funding for NGOs was increased from EUR 372 million in 2019 to EUR 416 million in 2020, and whereas the Government implemented several legislative changes to support NGOs during the pandemic (13);

| AB. | whereas the Supreme Court of Slovenia has found that Slovenian police’s conduct in the case of an asylum seeker who had been a victim of a chain pushback to be illegal and in violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions, the prohibition of torture and the applicant’s right to access asylum procedures (14); |
| --- | --- |

AB.

whereas the Supreme Court of Slovenia has found that Slovenian police’s conduct in the case of an asylum seeker who had been a victim of a chain pushback to be illegal and in violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions, the prohibition of torture and the applicant’s right to access asylum procedures (14);

| AC. | whereas a DRFMG delegation visited Slovenia from 13 to 15 October 2021 and concluded that, overall, the public institutions work well, in particular the Constitutional Court, the Data Protection Commissioner and the Supreme State Prosecutor; whereas at the same time, it expressed deep concern about other issues addressed in this resolution; |
| --- | --- |

AC.

whereas a DRFMG delegation visited Slovenia from 13 to 15 October 2021 and concluded that, overall, the public institutions work well, in particular the Constitutional Court, the Data Protection Commissioner and the Supreme State Prosecutor; whereas at the same time, it expressed deep concern about other issues addressed in this resolution;

| 1. | Considers it essential to guarantee that the common European values listed in Article 2 TEU are upheld in full; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Is deeply concerned about the level of public debate, climate of hostility, distrust and deep polarisation in Slovenia, which has eroded trust in public bodies and between them; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians, including members of the government, have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful and civilised public debate, free from intimidation, attacks, slurs and harassment; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Welcomes, after a delay of six months, the appointment of the two Delegated Prosecutors from Slovenia to the EPPO College on 24 November 2021, which means that the EPPO has now been fully constituted and that Delegated Prosecutors have been appointed by all participating Member States; considers a fully functioning EPPO to be crucial for protecting the integrity of the EU’s budget and ensuring the prosecution of crimes against the EU’s financial interests; expresses concerns at the Ministry of Justice’s proposed changes to the legislation on State Prosecutors, which would allow retroactive changes to the appointment criteria for prosecutors, and lead to the risk of the two newly appointed EPPO Delegated Prosecutors from Slovenia being dismissed (15); calls on the Government of Slovenia to ensure the effective structural operation of the EPPO in Slovenia, in accordance with the rules stipulated in the EPPO Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Calls on the government to conclude the appointment process for the national prosecutors currently awaiting confirmation as soon as possible; notes the increase in resources of the Judicial Council and State Prosecutorial Council, and underlines the importance of these self-governing bodies' financial autonomy and of providing adequate resources for them; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Notes the resumption of state payments to the STA; underlines the importance of the agency’s long-term financial viability for it to be able to carry out its function independently; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Calls on the Government to resume its state funding of the STA, which it is under a legal obligation to provide, and to make these payments regularly and in full accordance with national law; calls on the Government to guarantee the editorial independence of the Agency; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Expresses its concern about all attacks, smear campaigns, slander, criminal investigations or SLAPPs by prominent public figures and politicians, including members of the government, in particular when these originate from authorities and public officials, and calls on all actors to cease such actions; calls on the Slovenian Government to secure sufficient funding for the public television RTV Slovenia, to cease all political interference and pressure on its editorial policy and to safeguard this broadcaster’s independence; calls on the authorities to improve media ownership transparency, establish clear rules on the amounts spent on advertising by the state or state-owned companies, and to ensure that the public and journalists can have proper access to public information; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Notes the amendments put forward by the Government in July 2020, which were meant to be adopted by the end of 2021, and if adopted, would increase media ownership transparency; calls on the Slovenian Government, National Assembly and National Council to speed up their deliberations on the pending Mass Media Act; underlines, further, the need for clear rules on the allocation of state advertising in order to ensure effective access to public information for the public and journalists; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Expresses its concern about the continuing practice of rule by decree, and therefore without parliamentary scrutiny, and is especially concerned about the necessity and proportionality of the current extraordinary measures in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic; notes that many governmental decrees lack a clear legal basis and are often not published in the Official Journal; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Notes that the legal and institutional framework for preventing and fighting corruption has continued to improve, which is reflected in particular in legislative amendments which have improved the independence, organisation and functioning of the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, although this body’s human resources remain limited, and which has strengthened the legal framework on lobbying, the protection of whistleblowers and the declaration of assets; notes that the previous strategy has largely been implemented, but remains concerned by the lack of effective enforcement of the anti-corruption rules and the fact that some actions remain pending and no new plan has been adopted, as well as about the capacity for effective investigations and the low number of convictions for corruption cases, especially for high-level cases; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls on the Slovenian Government to ensure that amendments to the police law will in no way lead to undue political interference or affect the capacity of the police forces and/or the role and independence of the Office of Public Prosecutor; calls on the Slovenian Government to provide sufficient funding to allow the authorities to carry out their tasks in full and without undue obstacles; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Recommends that the authorities step up their efforts to address major human rights issues affecting asylum seekers and migrants, Roma, the ‘erased’ and people living in poverty (16); |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Welcomes the new A-status national human rights institution accreditation of the Human Rights Ombudsperson, in compliance with the Paris Principles, following efforts to gain this status since 2015; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Calls on the Government to fully respect the Slovenian Constitution and EU and international law and obligations; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Believes that all Member States must fully comply with EU law in their legislative and administrative practices and must fully respect the rule of law and the principle of the separation of powers; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls on Slovenia to transpose into national law without delay the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and the European Electronic Communications Code; calls on Slovenia, further, to transpose into national law the EU Whistleblowers Directive (17); |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Calls on the Slovenian Government to swiftly and fully implement the rulings of the Constitutional Court; calls on Slovenian Government to ensure sufficient funding for the Judicial Council and State Prosecutorial Council, Constitutional Court and Supreme Court and to respect their financial autonomy so that these self-governance bodies and independent institutions can function independently and effectively; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and the Council, the President, Government and Parliament of Slovenia and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

18.

---

(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0313.

(2)  OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 1.

(4)  OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 2.

(5)  https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2021

(6)  https://rm.coe.int/memorandum-on-freedom-of-expression-and-media-freedom-in-slovenia/1680a2ae85

(7)  https://www.zaobstanek.si/en

(8)  https://ipi.media/slovenia-mfrr-welcomes-end-to-sta-funding-crisis/

(9)  https://www.ecpmf.eu/slovenia-concerns-over-controversial-changes-to-rtv-programming/

(10)  Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities (OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, p. 69).

(11)  Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36).

(12)  https://www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/spremembe-policija.html

(13)  https://www.cnvos.si/en/ngo-sector-slovenia/public-funding-aggregated-data/

(14)  https://www.sodnapraksa.si/?q=&advanceSerch=1&database[SOVS]=SOVS&database[IESP]=IESP&database[VDSS]=VDSS&database[UPRS]=UPRS&_submit=i%C5%A1%C4%8Di&doc_code=&task_code=23/2021&source2=&us_decision=&ecli=&meet_dateFrom=&meet_dateTo=&senat_judge=&areas=&institutes=&core_text=&decision=&description=&connection2=&publication=&rowsPerPage=20&page=0&id=2015081111448095

https://push-forward.org/novica/javno-pismo-ob-sodbi-vrhovnega-sodisca-glede-nezakonitosti-postopkov-slovenske-policije-na

(15)  https://www.gov.si/drzavni-organi/vlada/seje-vlade/gradiva-v-obravnavi/show/7833

(16)  https://rm.coe.int/report-on-the-visit-to-slovenia-from-20-to-23-march-2017-by-nils-muizn/1680730405

(17)  Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17).

---

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/134 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/134

---

P9_TA(2021)0513

The situation in Nicaragua

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the situation in Nicaragua (2021/3000(RSP))

(2022/C 251/15)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Nicaragua, and in particular that of 8 July 2021 on the situation in Nicaragua (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions on Nicaragua, and in particular that of 8 July 2021 on the situation in Nicaragua (1),

| — | having regard to the declarations by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on behalf of the EU, and in particular that of 8 November 2021 on Nicaragua, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the declarations by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on behalf of the EU, and in particular that of 8 November 2021 on Nicaragua,

| — | having regard to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and Central America on the other (2) (the Association Agreement between the EU and Central America), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and Central America on the other (2) (the Association Agreement between the EU and Central America),

| — | having regard to the Council regulations and decisions concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses in Nicaragua and to the Council decision of 11 October 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/1720 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Nicaragua, which renewed the sanctions until 15 October 2022 (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council regulations and decisions concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses in Nicaragua and to the Council decision of 11 October 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/1720 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Nicaragua, which renewed the sanctions until 15 October 2022 (3),

| — | having regard to the joint statement by 59 countries on Nicaragua of 22 June 2021 adopted at the 47th session of the UN Human Rights Council, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint statement by 59 countries on Nicaragua of 22 June 2021 adopted at the 47th session of the UN Human Rights Council,

| — | having regard to the oral update by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet at the 48th session of the Human Rights Council of 13 September 2021 on the human rights situation in Nicaragua, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the oral update by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet at the 48th session of the Human Rights Council of 13 September 2021 on the human rights situation in Nicaragua,

| — | having regard to the resolution of 12 November 2021 by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) on the situation in Nicaragua, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the resolution of 12 November 2021 by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) on the situation in Nicaragua,

| — | having regard to the presidential action by President Biden of the United States of 16 November 2021 entitled ‘A Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Non-immigrants of Persons Responsible for Policies or Actions That Threaten Democracy in Nicaragua’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the presidential action by President Biden of the United States of 16 November 2021 entitled ‘A Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Non-immigrants of Persons Responsible for Policies or Actions That Threaten Democracy in Nicaragua’,

| — | having regard to the statements of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), in particular those of 10 November 2021 condemning the human rights violations reported during the elections in Nicaragua, and of 20 November 2021 stressing its competent jurisdiction concerning Nicaragua and lamenting Nicaragua’s decision to denounce the OAS Charter in a context of serious human rights violations, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statements of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), in particular those of 10 November 2021 condemning the human rights violations reported during the elections in Nicaragua, and of 20 November 2021 stressing its competent jurisdiction concerning Nicaragua and lamenting Nicaragua’s decision to denounce the OAS Charter in a context of serious human rights violations,

| — | having regard to the OAS resolution of 8 December 2021 on the outcome of the Permanent Council’s deliberations of 29 November 2021 on the situation in Nicaragua, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the OAS resolution of 8 December 2021 on the outcome of the Permanent Council’s deliberations of 29 November 2021 on the situation in Nicaragua,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

| — | having regard to the Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, signed in Escazú, Costa Rica, on 4 March 2018, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, signed in Escazú, Costa Rica, on 4 March 2018,

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas on 7 November 2021 Ortega’s regime orchestrated a farce to give the appearance of an electoral process in Nicaragua, which was neither free nor fair, totally undemocratic, illegitimate and marred by fraud; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas on 7 November 2021 Ortega’s regime orchestrated a farce to give the appearance of an electoral process in Nicaragua, which was neither free nor fair, totally undemocratic, illegitimate and marred by fraud;

| B. | whereas the incumbent president, Daniel Ortega, who has ruled the country since 2007, re-elected himself for a fifth term — his fourth consecutive term — with approximately 75 % of the votes cast and 65 % turnout, according to the Supreme Electoral Council; whereas credible observations conducted by Nicaraguan civil society organisations estimated the turnout to be much lower, putting the abstention rate at around 81,5 %; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the incumbent president, Daniel Ortega, who has ruled the country since 2007, re-elected himself for a fifth term — his fourth consecutive term — with approximately 75 % of the votes cast and 65 % turnout, according to the Supreme Electoral Council; whereas credible observations conducted by Nicaraguan civil society organisations estimated the turnout to be much lower, putting the abstention rate at around 81,5 %;

| C. | whereas Daniel Ortega instructed all other Nicaraguan authorities to mobilise all available resources to rig the outcome of that process; whereas between May and November 2021 the Nicaraguan authorities effectively eliminated all credible electoral competition and crushed the integrity of the electoral process through the systematic arbitrary incarceration, harassment and intimidation of seven presidential pre-candidates and approximately 40 opposition leaders, student and rural leaders, journalists, human rights defenders and business representatives; whereas those arbitrarily arrested face fabricated, politically motivated and ambiguous criminal allegations without any evidence in a process marred by serious violations of procedural guarantees, which demonstrates the lack of independence of the judiciary; whereas the regime-led Supreme Electoral Council has revoked the legal personality of all independent opposition parties, including seven presidential pre-candidates; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas Daniel Ortega instructed all other Nicaraguan authorities to mobilise all available resources to rig the outcome of that process; whereas between May and November 2021 the Nicaraguan authorities effectively eliminated all credible electoral competition and crushed the integrity of the electoral process through the systematic arbitrary incarceration, harassment and intimidation of seven presidential pre-candidates and approximately 40 opposition leaders, student and rural leaders, journalists, human rights defenders and business representatives; whereas those arbitrarily arrested face fabricated, politically motivated and ambiguous criminal allegations without any evidence in a process marred by serious violations of procedural guarantees, which demonstrates the lack of independence of the judiciary; whereas the regime-led Supreme Electoral Council has revoked the legal personality of all independent opposition parties, including seven presidential pre-candidates;

| D. | whereas according to civil society organisations, 285 acts of political violence and acts of electoral coercion were registered on election day, including acts of intimidation, harassment, threats and blackmail which mainly targeted state workers, public sector employees, students and medical staff to force them to vote; whereas the Nicaraguan regime deprived the people of Nicaragua of their civil and political rights and the freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly, outlawed scores of civil society organisations and did not respect its commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms under Nicaragua’s Constitution, the Inter-American Democratic Charter and international covenants to which the country is a party; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas according to civil society organisations, 285 acts of political violence and acts of electoral coercion were registered on election day, including acts of intimidation, harassment, threats and blackmail which mainly targeted state workers, public sector employees, students and medical staff to force them to vote; whereas the Nicaraguan regime deprived the people of Nicaragua of their civil and political rights and the freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly, outlawed scores of civil society organisations and did not respect its commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms under Nicaragua’s Constitution, the Inter-American Democratic Charter and international covenants to which the country is a party;

| E. | whereas the regime has increasingly targeted and attacked journalism, freedom of the press and the right to information; whereas seven international media outlets were prevented from entering the country to cover the fraudulent elections; whereas independent journalism associations have denounced at least 52 attacks against independent journalists which took place between 25 October and 7 November 2021; whereas only official media outlets were accredited on 7 November 2021, in violation of the right to information and the freedom of expression, which had the effect of further increasing the censorship and media blackout; whereas there are similar patterns of repression against human rights defenders, environmental defenders, women and LGBTIQ activists, social and political leaders, business leaders, lawyers, and medical and NGO personnel, among others; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the regime has increasingly targeted and attacked journalism, freedom of the press and the right to information; whereas seven international media outlets were prevented from entering the country to cover the fraudulent elections; whereas independent journalism associations have denounced at least 52 attacks against independent journalists which took place between 25 October and 7 November 2021; whereas only official media outlets were accredited on 7 November 2021, in violation of the right to information and the freedom of expression, which had the effect of further increasing the censorship and media blackout; whereas there are similar patterns of repression against human rights defenders, environmental defenders, women and LGBTIQ activists, social and political leaders, business leaders, lawyers, and medical and NGO personnel, among others;

| F. | whereas between 3 and 7 November 2021, some 35 arbitrary detentions were reported in the country; whereas only nine of the prisoners have been released and 26 are still imprisoned; whereas this amounts to at least 170 people in total arbitrarily detained; whereas these violations of human rights, allegedly mostly perpetrated by police officers, municipal officials, para-state agents and civilian groups organised as militia supporters, increased in the days prior to the fraudulent elections; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas between 3 and 7 November 2021, some 35 arbitrary detentions were reported in the country; whereas only nine of the prisoners have been released and 26 are still imprisoned; whereas this amounts to at least 170 people in total arbitrarily detained; whereas these violations of human rights, allegedly mostly perpetrated by police officers, municipal officials, para-state agents and civilian groups organised as militia supporters, increased in the days prior to the fraudulent elections;

| G. | whereas the report of the IACHR of October 2021 stated that, in Nicaragua, a police state had been established through repression, corruption, electoral fraud and structural impunity designed by the government to achieve its ‘indefinite perpetuation in power and maintenance of privileges and immunities’; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the report of the IACHR of October 2021 stated that, in Nicaragua, a police state had been established through repression, corruption, electoral fraud and structural impunity designed by the government to achieve its ‘indefinite perpetuation in power and maintenance of privileges and immunities’;

| H. | whereas several international organisations and more than 40 nations have expressed strong disapproval of Nicaragua’s elections and refused to recognise them as democratic; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas several international organisations and more than 40 nations have expressed strong disapproval of Nicaragua’s elections and refused to recognise them as democratic;

| I. | whereas the Nicaraguan regime has adopted increasingly restrictive laws in the last few years, institutionalising repression and legalising the acts that have been committed in the country since their adoption; whereas Nicaragua has turned into a republic of fear, with more than 140 000 citizens obliged to seek refuge in exile and in very difficult socioeconomic living conditions; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the Nicaraguan regime has adopted increasingly restrictive laws in the last few years, institutionalising repression and legalising the acts that have been committed in the country since their adoption; whereas Nicaragua has turned into a republic of fear, with more than 140 000 citizens obliged to seek refuge in exile and in very difficult socioeconomic living conditions;

| J. | whereas the Nicaraguan regime has deforested and destroyed the territories of indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples through concessions to mining companies and support for settlers; whereas 12 environmental leaders were killed in Nicaragua in 2020, up from 5 in 2019, making the country the most dangerous per capita for land and environmental defenders in 2020; whereas homicides and acts of aggression perpetrated since January 2020 in relation to territorial disputes and against indigenous people in Nicaragua continue to go unpunished, especially in the Northern Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region, including the murder of nine indigenous people on 23 August 2020 and the sexual abuse of two women in an attack related to a land dispute over gold mining in the Sauni; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the Nicaraguan regime has deforested and destroyed the territories of indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples through concessions to mining companies and support for settlers; whereas 12 environmental leaders were killed in Nicaragua in 2020, up from 5 in 2019, making the country the most dangerous per capita for land and environmental defenders in 2020; whereas homicides and acts of aggression perpetrated since January 2020 in relation to territorial disputes and against indigenous people in Nicaragua continue to go unpunished, especially in the Northern Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region, including the murder of nine indigenous people on 23 August 2020 and the sexual abuse of two women in an attack related to a land dispute over gold mining in the Sauni;

| 1. | Condemns the electoral farce orchestrated by the Ortega-Murillo regime on 7 November 2021, which violated all international democratic standards for credible, inclusive, fair and transparent elections; rejects the legitimacy of the results of these fake elections, and therefore the democratic legitimacy of any institutional authorities emerging from this rigged vote; supports the statements affirming that these elections complete the conversion of Nicaragua into an autocratic regime; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Nicaraguan authorities to uphold and respect human rights and to allow the Nicaraguan people to exercise their civil and political rights; calls for the holding of elections in accordance with international standards and the Inter-American Democratic Charter to ensure that the democratic aspirations of the people of Nicaragua are realised, and for international organisations and civil society organisations to be allowed access to the country without restrictions; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Reaffirms its solidarity with the Nicaraguan population and condemns the violence, the systematic crackdown on political opposition leaders, the suppression of civil society actors, human rights defenders and media, as well as their family members, and in particular the deaths caused, the widespread impunity for crimes committed against them and the persistent corruption practised by officials of the Nicaraguan regime; recalls that these acts represent a clear breach of human rights, democracy and the rule of law and show the continued failure of President Daniel Ortega, Vice-President Rosario Murillo and Nicaraguan regime officials to defend those principles and values; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all arbitrarily detained political prisoners, opposition activists, human rights and environmental defenders, and journalists, and for the annulment of legal proceedings against them; condemns the continued psychological and physical abuse they face at the hands of police and prison authorities, of which women are particular targets, and the situation of incommunicado detention of some of them without access to their lawyers, families or medical care; recalls that Nicaragua must comply with UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), which remains an obligation under international law; demands that the regime immediately provide proof that those imprisoned are still alive and evidence of their whereabouts; rejects the Ortega regime’s decision to freeze the judicial processes against them, resulting in their indefinite pre-trial detention; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Demands justice and accountability for all victims, in line with Nicaragua’s laws, international commitments and obligations, through impartial, thorough and independent investigations; urges the Nicaraguan authorities to undertake deep structural reforms to ensure minimum legal guarantees and due process; condemns, furthermore, the increasing violence and intimidation faced by human rights defenders, LGBTIQ people, women and indigenous activists in the country, including femicides; urges the Nicaraguan authorities to put an end to repression and human rights violations and restore full respect for human rights, in particular through the repeal of all restrictive and illegitimate laws and the reinstatement of the legal personality of human rights defenders’ organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support the creation of an investigation and accountability mechanism within the UN Human Rights Council; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Reiterates that the only solution to the deep political crisis in Nicaragua is an inclusive and meaningful national dialogue, and regrets the repeated disengagement and unwillingness to do so on the part of the Nicaraguan regime; notes that the holding of free, fair and transparent elections, the restoration of the rule of law and freedoms, the cessation of repression and fear, the release of arbitrarily detained political prisoners, the reestablishment of the legal status of the political parties that were arbitrarily cancelled, the return of exiles without exclusions and with full guarantees and the return of international human rights bodies to the country are sine qua non conditions for any dialogue with the Nicaraguan regime; calls for the EU and its Member States to accompany current and future efforts of civil society to create the conditions for a dialogue leading to a democratic transition, in line with what was established in the March 2019 agreements; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Supports the declaration by the VP/HR considering all instruments at the EU’s disposal to take additional measures, including those that may go beyond individual restrictions, while at the same time aiming to avoid any measures that could potentially add to the hardship of the Nicaraguan people; welcomes the inclusion of Rosario Murillo along with several others on the list of sanctioned individuals that was renewed until October 2022; calls for Daniel Ortega to be added promptly to the list of sanctioned individuals; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Stresses that the corruption from which the Ortega-Murillo family directly benefits and the patrimonialism of the Nicaraguan regime, which also includes the devastation of the country’s natural resources are endemic and widespread and are leading the country to an economic and humanitarian collapse; points out that the EU and its Member States should maintain their humanitarian assistance to support the most vulnerable, while exploring alternative measures to tackle widespread corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States, in this regard, to monitor that European funds allocated, including through multilateral and financial institutions, do not contribute to strengthening the corruption of the regime; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Is appalled at the increasing criminalisation and persecution of environmental defenders in Nicaragua; condemns the continued attacks and acts of aggression against the indigenous people of Nicaragua; calls on the Government of Nicaragua to fulfil its obligations under the Escazú Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to closely monitor the situation on the ground through their representatives and embassies in Nicaragua, including through trial monitoring and by visiting critics and opposition leaders in prison or under house arrest, and to facilitate the issuance of emergency visas and provide temporary refuge for political reasons in the Member States; highlights and commends the key role played by civil society, human rights and environmental defenders and journalists in Nicaragua; requests that the European External Action Service reinforce its regular dialogue with civil society organisations and human rights defenders and strengthen mechanisms to support their indispensable work; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Regrets the denunciation of the OAS Charter issued on 19 November 2021 by the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, and highlights that this decision would also close off the country’s access to financing from the Inter-American Development Bank and imply the withdrawal from its regional mechanisms for the protection of human rights; recalls that despite its renunciation of the charter, Nicaragua is still bound by its obligations to other instruments of the OAS, including the American Convention on Human Rights; underlines that this withdrawal can take up to two years to come into effect; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Calls on the international community and democratic like-minded partners to increase their political pressure on the Nicaraguan regime in a coordinated fashion in multilateral forums in order to assist and lead to a swift transition in which the Nicaraguan people can fully recover democratic order and popular sovereignty; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Regrets that on 10 December 2021 the Nicaraguan regime broke diplomatic ties with the democratic Taiwan to seek the support of the totalitarian state of the People’s Republic of China; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Recalls that in the light of the Association Agreement between the EU and Central America, Nicaragua must respect and consolidate the principles of the rule of law, democracy and human rights; reiterates its demand that, in the light of the current circumstances, the democratic clause of the Association Agreement be triggered; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Reiterates its call for the immediate extradition of Alessio Casimirri to Italy; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, the Central American Parliament, the Lima Group, and the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Nicaragua. |
| --- | --- |

16.

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(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0359.

(2)  OJ L 346, 15.12.2012, p. 3.

(3)  OJ L 361, 12.10.2021, p. 52.

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/138 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/138

---

P9_TA(2021)0514

MeToo and harassment — the consequences for the EU institutions

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on MeToo and harassment — the consequences for the EU institutions (2021/2986(RSP))

(2022/C 251/16)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Articles 8, 10 and 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Articles 8, 10 and 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’),

| — | having regard to the International Labour Organization Violence and Harassment Convention and its main provisions (No 190), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the International Labour Organization Violence and Harassment Convention and its main provisions (No 190),

| — | having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), which entered into force on 1 August 2014, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention), which entered into force on 1 August 2014,

| — | having regard to Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (1),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0152), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2020 entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020)0152),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 26 October 2017 on combating sexual harassment and abuse in the EU (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 26 October 2017 on combating sexual harassment and abuse in the EU (2),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention and other measures to combat gender-based violence (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention and other measures to combat gender-based violence (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 14 May 2020 on Parliament’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2021 (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 14 May 2020 on Parliament’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2021 (4),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the gender perspective in the COVID-19 crisis and post-crisis period (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the gender perspective in the COVID-19 crisis and post-crisis period (5),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the EU Strategy for Gender Equality (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on the EU Strategy for Gender Equality (6),

| — | having regard to the European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender Equality Index 2020 report, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender Equality Index 2020 report,

| — | having regard to the European Ombudsman’s report of 17 December 2018 on dignity at work in the EU institutions and agencies, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the European Ombudsman’s report of 17 December 2018 on dignity at work in the EU institutions and agencies,

| — | having regard to Annex II of its Rules of Procedure entitled ‘Code of Appropriate Behaviour for Members of the European Parliament in Exercising their Duties’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Annex II of its Rules of Procedure entitled ‘Code of Appropriate Behaviour for Members of the European Parliament in Exercising their Duties’,

| — | having regard to Opinion SJ-0328/21 (D(2021)24350) of its Legal Service of 18 November 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Opinion SJ-0328/21 (D(2021)24350) of its Legal Service of 18 November 2021,

| — | having regard to the question to the Commission entitled ‘MeToo and harassment — the consequences for the EU institutions’ (O-000074/2021 — B9-0045/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the question to the Commission entitled ‘MeToo and harassment — the consequences for the EU institutions’ (O-000074/2021 — B9-0045/2021),

| — | having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

| A. | whereas gender equality is a core value of the Union enshrined in Article 2 of the TEU; whereas the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination is a fundamental right enshrined in the Treaties and in the Charter; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas gender equality is a core value of the Union enshrined in Article 2 of the TEU; whereas the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination is a fundamental right enshrined in the Treaties and in the Charter;

| B. | whereas sexual harassment is defined in EU law (7) as an incident ‘where any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature occurs, with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, in particular when creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’; whereas sexual harassment is a form of violence against women and girls and an extreme form of gender-based discrimination which affects women and girls disproportionally; whereas gender-based violence is rooted in the unequal distribution of power between women and men and in sexism and gender stereotypes, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men; whereas some 90 % of victims of sexual harassment are female and approximately 10 % are male; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas sexual harassment is defined in EU law (7) as an incident ‘where any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature occurs, with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, in particular when creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’; whereas sexual harassment is a form of violence against women and girls and an extreme form of gender-based discrimination which affects women and girls disproportionally; whereas gender-based violence is rooted in the unequal distribution of power between women and men and in sexism and gender stereotypes, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men; whereas some 90 % of victims of sexual harassment are female and approximately 10 % are male;

| C. | whereas according to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights report of 3 March 2014 entitled ‘Violence against women: an EU-wide survey, one in three women have experienced physical or sexual violence during their adult lives; whereas up to 55 % of women have been sexually harassed in the EU; whereas 32 % of all victims in the EU said the perpetrator was a superior, colleague or customer; whereas 75 % of women in professions requiring qualifications or top management jobs have been sexually harassed; whereas 61 % of women employed in the service sector have been subjected to sexual harassment; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas according to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights report of 3 March 2014 entitled ‘Violence against women: an EU-wide survey, one in three women have experienced physical or sexual violence during their adult lives; whereas up to 55 % of women have been sexually harassed in the EU; whereas 32 % of all victims in the EU said the perpetrator was a superior, colleague or customer; whereas 75 % of women in professions requiring qualifications or top management jobs have been sexually harassed; whereas 61 % of women employed in the service sector have been subjected to sexual harassment;

| D. | whereas cyber harassment, like other forms of gender-based cyber violence, has become increasingly common; whereas the European added value assessment on gender-based cyber violence (8) estimated that 4-7 % of women in the EU had experienced cyber harassment in the 12 months before the survey; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas cyber harassment, like other forms of gender-based cyber violence, has become increasingly common; whereas the European added value assessment on gender-based cyber violence (8) estimated that 4-7 % of women in the EU had experienced cyber harassment in the 12 months before the survey;

| E. | whereas the progress in addressing the issue of sexual harassment after three years of the MeToo movement is not sufficient and there is still a lot to be done, within the EU institutions and beyond; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the progress in addressing the issue of sexual harassment after three years of the MeToo movement is not sufficient and there is still a lot to be done, within the EU institutions and beyond;

| F. | whereas research shows that harassment is more widespread than commonly believed and is significantly under-reported (9); whereas harassment is often linked to other forms of discrimination in addition to gender-based discrimination, which has to be addressed with an intersectional approach and from all angles; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas research shows that harassment is more widespread than commonly believed and is significantly under-reported (9); whereas harassment is often linked to other forms of discrimination in addition to gender-based discrimination, which has to be addressed with an intersectional approach and from all angles;

| G. | whereas sexual violence and harassment in the workplace is a matter of health and safety and should be treated and prevented as such; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas sexual violence and harassment in the workplace is a matter of health and safety and should be treated and prevented as such;

| H. | whereas the victims of sexual harassment are often staff in the most vulnerable positions at Parliament, including young professionals, trainees, accredited parliamentary assistants (APAs) and contract agents; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the victims of sexual harassment are often staff in the most vulnerable positions at Parliament, including young professionals, trainees, accredited parliamentary assistants (APAs) and contract agents;

| I. | whereas one of the reasons for the under-reporting of sexual harassment is a lack of awareness, sometimes based on a low understanding of the gravity of the issue, a lack of knowledge of channels for victim support or of how the sensitivity of the issue is perceived, or a fear of victimisation or job loss; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas one of the reasons for the under-reporting of sexual harassment is a lack of awareness, sometimes based on a low understanding of the gravity of the issue, a lack of knowledge of channels for victim support or of how the sensitivity of the issue is perceived, or a fear of victimisation or job loss;

| J. | whereas the MeToo movement has pushed the EU institutions to plan and start to adapt their internal rules and procedures in order to better identify, counter and sanction harassment; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the MeToo movement has pushed the EU institutions to plan and start to adapt their internal rules and procedures in order to better identify, counter and sanction harassment;

| K. | whereas there is still a need to promote and further enhance gender equality and the implementation of gender mainstreaming in the EU, including in management positions in the institutions (10); |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas there is still a need to promote and further enhance gender equality and the implementation of gender mainstreaming in the EU, including in management positions in the institutions (10);

| L. | whereas whistle-blowers play a pivotal role in exposing sexual and psychological harassment, mismanagement and discrimination in the workplace; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas whistle-blowers play a pivotal role in exposing sexual and psychological harassment, mismanagement and discrimination in the workplace;

| M. | whereas in its earlier resolutions, Parliament called for numerous measures to ensure a zero-tolerance approach as the norm, but only a few of them were fully implemented in accordance with the demands of its resolution on combating sexual harassment and abuse in the EU, and therefore need to be followed up on; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas in its earlier resolutions, Parliament called for numerous measures to ensure a zero-tolerance approach as the norm, but only a few of them were fully implemented in accordance with the demands of its resolution on combating sexual harassment and abuse in the EU, and therefore need to be followed up on;

| N. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic and the new working methods of the European Parliament implemented during the pandemic might have made physical harassment less likely, yet have also made it difficult for victims of harassment to report their complaints and turn to a counsellor for guidance and support; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic and the new working methods of the European Parliament implemented during the pandemic might have made physical harassment less likely, yet have also made it difficult for victims of harassment to report their complaints and turn to a counsellor for guidance and support;

General remarks

| 1. | Strongly condemns all forms of gender-based violence, including sexual violence, and all forms of harassment, notably sexual harassment; strongly reaffirms its previously expressed commitment to tackle gender-based violence and its belief that a comprehensive directive covering all its forms is the best way to put an end to it; repeats its call for the Council to urgently conclude the EU’s ratification of the Istanbul Convention on the basis of a broad accession without any limitations; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Stresses that harassment, and notably sexual harassment, experienced in a workplace constitutes a violation of human rights and a serious attack on a person’s psychological and physical health, making them feel insecure at work and in some cases preventing them from doing their work; notes that women are far more likely to be exposed to sexual harassment than men; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Underlines that the key factor in creating a safe work environment is prevention, which should be achieved by providing information, raising awareness and promoting zero-harassment campaigns and policies, while at the same time building formal and informal structures to address harassment issues, notably sexual harassment issues, and to provide advisory and psychological assistance to victims, as well as advice on police contacts and referrals to providers of legal recourse; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Commends the efforts made by Parliament during the MeToo campaign, which contribute to breaking the silence and raising awareness of the need to implement better working conditions for all staff; |
| --- | --- |

4.

Ensure zero tolerance towards harassment as an important aspect of Parliament’s gender equality policy

| 5. | Considers that despite some efforts taken so far to introduce a zero-harassment policy, there are still cases of sexual harassment in Parliament and victims do not always dare to use the existing channels, meaning that efforts to prevent sexual harassment need to be stepped up; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Welcomes the 2018 decision of the Bureau laying down the procedure and measures for the prevention of harassment, notably sexual harassment, such as the code of appropriate behaviour for Members, which was incorporated into the Rules of Procedure in January 2019; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Welcomes the adoption of the European Parliament’s Gender Action Plan in 2020 and the roadmap for its implementation in 2021; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Regrets, however, that the measures to address sexual harassment are not strong enough and do not include all actions requested in previous resolutions, and therefore:






  a) | calls for Parliament services to make anti-harassment training available in all official languages or with interpretation and to target outreach activities at individual delegations and political groups; |
| --- | --- | --- |

8.

a)

calls for Parliament services to make anti-harassment training available in all official languages or with interpretation and to target outreach activities at individual delegations and political groups;

| b) | calls for Parliament services to create a public list of Members who have participated in these anti-harassment training sessions to be published on the website of the European Parliament as a good example for other Members; |
| --- | --- |

b)

calls for Parliament services to create a public list of Members who have participated in these anti-harassment training sessions to be published on the website of the European Parliament as a good example for other Members;

| c) | calls again (11) for stronger measures to prevent all forms of harassment, notably sexual harassment, and in particular calls for the introduction of mandatory anti-harassment training for all Members at the earliest convenience and the very beginning of the mandates of newly elected Members in line with the legal advice received, because voluntary harassment prevention training has proven to be insufficient; |
| --- | --- |

c)

calls again (11) for stronger measures to prevent all forms of harassment, notably sexual harassment, and in particular calls for the introduction of mandatory anti-harassment training for all Members at the earliest convenience and the very beginning of the mandates of newly elected Members in line with the legal advice received, because voluntary harassment prevention training has proven to be insufficient;

| d) | calls for Parliament services to assess potential consequences, such as the possibility of limiting the recruitment of staff without infringing on the right of Members to the defrayal of parliamentary assistance, among other possible measures, in the event of non-compliance with the obligation set out in paragraph 8(c) of this resolution, when a Member refuses to participate in mandatory anti-harassment training; |
| --- | --- |

d)

calls for Parliament services to assess potential consequences, such as the possibility of limiting the recruitment of staff without infringing on the right of Members to the defrayal of parliamentary assistance, among other possible measures, in the event of non-compliance with the obligation set out in paragraph 8(c) of this resolution, when a Member refuses to participate in mandatory anti-harassment training;

| 9. | Calls for the improvement of awareness-raising and the introduction of compulsory training on Parliament’s zero-harassment policy for all people working in its premises on a regular basis, providing them with tools to recognise all forms of harassment, including sexual harassment in particular, and to report it, as well as with tailored information about available support structures; underlines the necessity of making these support structures more widely known and easily accessible; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Also calls for measures to aim to provide protection against victimisation of or retaliation against complainants, victims, witnesses and whistle-blowers; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls for Parliament to continue to condemn sexual harassment publicly and design an awareness-raising campaign aimed at combating all forms of harassment within the European Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Welcomes the introduction of confidential counsellors for victims of harassment, notably sexual harassment, as they are a valuable source of support and advice, and invites the relevant bodies within Parliament to ensure that they are accessible to everyone in need and capable of providing all necessary assistance; underlines the importance of a transparent selection procedure and a time frame for the mandates of members of the anti-harassment committees and confidential counsellors; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Calls for the introduction of professional mechanisms by the relevant bodies within Parliament intended to support and help victims of sexual harassment by making them more accessible and visible and by ending stigmatisation; underlines the need to avoid victimisation and calls for those bodies to ensure that the career progression of victims is not impaired; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Calls for more targeted training for all levels of management regarding their institutional role in incorporating the zero-harassment policy into their daily practices, with a special focus on groups in the most vulnerable positions, such as trainees, APAs and contract agents; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Recognises the efforts made so far to try to ensure gender equality and gender mainstreaming in Parliament, including gender balance in management positions, and stresses that the full implementation of the roadmap and the planned regular revisions to improve Parliament’s Gender Action Plan could contribute to creating a culture of mutual respect, preventing any form of harassment and making Parliament gender-sensitive; stresses the importance of raising awareness of the Gender Action Plan and its roadmap to ensure its effective implementation; asks for them to be published on Parliament’s website; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Notes the work of the Advisory Committee on Harassment and its Prevention in the Workplace and the Advisory Committee dealing with complaints between Accredited Parliamentary Assistants and Members of the European Parliament concerning Harassment and its Prevention at the Workplace; calls for full transparency on how Parliament is addressing issues of harassment while protecting the identity of those affected, and invites both committees to draft and publish their monitoring reports and risk assessments annually on the European Parliament website, to implement control mechanisms, and, in particular, to publish the external assessment carried out on the Advisory Committee dealing with complaints between Accredited Parliamentary Assistants and Members of the European Parliament concerning Harassment and its Prevention at the Workplace; calls again (12) for an independent evaluation by external and transparently chosen auditors of the current system with regard to its effectiveness and, if necessary, for modifications to be proposed as soon as possible and before the end of this legislative term in order to ensure independence and gender balance and avoid conflicts of interest in the existing structures, and therefore:






  a) | asks for the composition of the two committees to be changed to ensure that independent experts with proven expertise in tackling harassment issues in the workplace, including doctors, therapists and legal experts in the domain of harassment are formal members with voting rights; |
| --- | --- | --- |

16.

a)

asks for the composition of the two committees to be changed to ensure that independent experts with proven expertise in tackling harassment issues in the workplace, including doctors, therapists and legal experts in the domain of harassment are formal members with voting rights;

| b) | points out that Members of the European Parliament could be victims of sexual harassment and calls for concrete action in this regard by the relevant Parliament services and political groups; |
| --- | --- |

b)

points out that Members of the European Parliament could be victims of sexual harassment and calls for concrete action in this regard by the relevant Parliament services and political groups;

| c) | recommends that a task force of independent experts be set up with a mandate to examine the situation of sexual harassment and abuse in Parliament, in order to carry out an evaluation of its existing Advisory Committee dealing with complaints between Accredited Parliamentary Assistants and Members of the European Parliament concerning Harassment and its Prevention at the Workplace and the Staff Advisory Committee for Parliament Staff on Harassment Prevention, and propose adequate changes; |
| --- | --- |

c)

recommends that a task force of independent experts be set up with a mandate to examine the situation of sexual harassment and abuse in Parliament, in order to carry out an evaluation of its existing Advisory Committee dealing with complaints between Accredited Parliamentary Assistants and Members of the European Parliament concerning Harassment and its Prevention at the Workplace and the Staff Advisory Committee for Parliament Staff on Harassment Prevention, and propose adequate changes;

| 17. | Recommends that the European Ombuds(wo)man provide Parliament’s High-Level Group on Gender Equality and Diversity, once a year, with data on complaints about maladministration relating to cases of alleged harassment in Parliament brought before it; |
| --- | --- |

17.

Cooperation between the EU institutions

| 18. | Calls on all EU institutions and agencies to regularly exchange their best practices in tackling harassment, including anti-harassment policies, guidelines or any new provisions on how to deal with it; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Calls for all EU institutions to introduce a network of confidential counsellors or external mediators to provide guidance and support to victims of sexual harassment and encourages cooperation between confidential counsellors in different EU bodies, which is essential for smaller bodies with fewer staff members available to provide adequate support; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Calls for all EU institutions to assess and adapt their internal policies accordingly in order to allow everyone, not just permanent staff, but also trainees and external contractors, to use both formal and informal structures to bring attention to harassment cases and to seek advisory and psychological assistance; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Calls on the European Parliamentary Research Service to commission a study on the added value of whistle-blower platforms in workplaces and how it could be applicable within the EU institutions, the outcomes and recommendations of which should be presented in a workshop or hearing with exchanges of views in relevant Parliament committees; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Calls on the Commission to provide sufficient instruments for dealing with cases of harassment, avoiding secondary victimisation and ensuring timely responses when reviewing the EU Staff Regulations; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Calls on the EU agencies and bodies to adapt their internal rules combating all forms of harassment, notably sexual harassment, and to ensure that they also implement the fundamental principle of gender equality throughout their staff and management levels, also taking into account the new remote working conditions and the related lessons learnt during the COVID-19 pandemic; calls on the Commission to monitor the implementation of these rules against harassment and the principle of gender equality action plans to promote and further enhance gender equality in EU agencies and bodies; |
| --- | --- |

23.

o

o o

| 24. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the EU agencies and bodies, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. |
| --- | --- |

24.

---

(1)  OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, p. 23.

(2)  OJ C 346, 27.9.2018, p. 192.

(3)  OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 48.

(4)  OJ C 323, 11.8.2021, p. 33.

(5)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0024.

(6)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0025.

(7)  Directive 2006/54/EC.

(8)  European Parliament study of March 2021 entitled ‘Combating gender-based violence: Cyber violence — European added value assessment’.

(9)  Report of the European Ombudsman on dignity at work in the EU institutions and agencies.

(10)  Commission communication entitled ‘A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025’.

(11)  Resolution on the EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention and other measures to combat gender-based violence, paragraph 16: ‘Calls on the President of the European Parliament, the Bureau and Parliament’s administration to continue working to ensure that the European Parliament is a workspace free from harassment and sexism, and to implement the following measures, in line with the demands adopted in the 2017 resolution on combating sexual harassment and abuse in the EU: ... to implement mandatory training courses on respect and dignity in the workplace for all MEPs and all categories of staff’; Resolution on combating sexual harassment and abuse in the EU, paragraph 17.

(12)  Resolution on Parliament’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2021, paragraph 55.

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/144 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/144

---

P9_TA(2021)0515

Situation at the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the situation at the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine (2021/3010(RSP))

(2022/C 251/17)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions and reports on Ukraine and Russia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its previous resolutions and reports on Ukraine and Russia,

| — | having regard to the UN Charter, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN Charter, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

| — | having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and its subsequent documents, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and its subsequent documents,

| — | having regard to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 19-21 November 1990, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 19-21 November 1990,

| — | having regard to the Minsk Memorandum of 19 September 2014. and the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, adopted and signed in Minsk on 12 February 2015, and endorsed as a whole by UN Security Council resolution 2202 (2015) of 17 February 2015, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Minsk Memorandum of 19 September 2014. and the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, adopted and signed in Minsk on 12 February 2015, and endorsed as a whole by UN Security Council resolution 2202 (2015) of 17 February 2015,

| — | having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, and in particular Title II thereof on political dialogue and convergence in the field of foreign affairs and security (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, and in particular Title II thereof on political dialogue and convergence in the field of foreign affairs and security (1),

| — | having regard to the first EU-Ukraine dialogue on cyber security held on 3 June 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the first EU-Ukraine dialogue on cyber security held on 3 June 2021,

| — | having regard to the US-Ukraine Charter for Strategic Partnership signed on 10 November 2021 by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the US-Ukraine Charter for Strategic Partnership signed on 10 November 2021 by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba,

| — | having regard to the statement of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, following the Foreign Affairs Council of 13 December 2021 that any aggression against Ukraine will come with political consequences and at a high economic cost for Russia, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, following the Foreign Affairs Council of 13 December 2021 that any aggression against Ukraine will come with political consequences and at a high economic cost for Russia,

| — | having regard to the statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 30 November 2021, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 30 November 2021,

| — | having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statement of 12 December 2021 on Russia and Ukraine, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statement of 12 December 2021 on Russia and Ukraine,

| — | having regard to the joint statement of Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, European Council President, Charles Michel, and Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, of 12 October 2021, following the 23rd EU-Ukraine Summit, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the joint statement of Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, European Council President, Charles Michel, and Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, of 12 October 2021, following the 23rd EU-Ukraine Summit,

| — | having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 9 December 2021 entitled ‘Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov’, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 9 December 2021 entitled ‘Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov’,

| — | having regard to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of 5 December 1994, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of 5 December 1994,

| — | having regard to the EU’s policy in response to the crisis in Ukraine, including its restrictive measures, which have been in force since 2014, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the EU’s policy in response to the crisis in Ukraine, including its restrictive measures, which have been in force since 2014,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas in line with the UN Charter and the principles of international law, all states ‘shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas in line with the UN Charter and the principles of international law, all states ‘shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’;

| B. | whereas against the backdrop of a crisis on the EU-Belarusian border, the Russian Federation has been steadily increasing its military presence along the borders of Ukraine, amassing a current total of around 100 000 troops, and in the Donetsk and Luhansk areas of Ukraine that are currently occupied by Russian-backed forces, and has significantly increased the scale of its military activities in occupied Crimea, as well as in the Black Sea basin; whereas this military build-up was confirmed by recent commercial satellite imagery; whereas the recent build-up is considered to be more substantial that the previous military build-up of spring this year; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas against the backdrop of a crisis on the EU-Belarusian border, the Russian Federation has been steadily increasing its military presence along the borders of Ukraine, amassing a current total of around 100 000 troops, and in the Donetsk and Luhansk areas of Ukraine that are currently occupied by Russian-backed forces, and has significantly increased the scale of its military activities in occupied Crimea, as well as in the Black Sea basin; whereas this military build-up was confirmed by recent commercial satellite imagery; whereas the recent build-up is considered to be more substantial that the previous military build-up of spring this year;

| C. | whereas US intelligence reports assess that Russia could this time be deploying up to 175 000 troops by early 2022; whereas these offensive developments may be interpreted either as preparations for a multi-front military offensive aggression or as a threat to use force against neighbouring Ukraine with the aim of interfering with the latter’s sovereignty and political independence, which is in contradiction with the Russian Federation’s international obligations; whereas Aliaksandr Lukashenka has announced full-scale support for Russia in the event of military action against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas US intelligence reports assess that Russia could this time be deploying up to 175 000 troops by early 2022; whereas these offensive developments may be interpreted either as preparations for a multi-front military offensive aggression or as a threat to use force against neighbouring Ukraine with the aim of interfering with the latter’s sovereignty and political independence, which is in contradiction with the Russian Federation’s international obligations; whereas Aliaksandr Lukashenka has announced full-scale support for Russia in the event of military action against Ukraine;

| D. | whereas the recent movements of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border have been matched by enhanced interference and disinformation campaigns by Russian proxies and media outlets in the EU, Ukraine and Russia itself; whereas such hybrid tactics have included an increase in denigrating content towards NATO and Ukraine, attempts to assign the blame for potential future Russian military escalation on Ukraine and NATO, and the spread of false narratives, including by President Putin and former President Medvedev personally; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the recent movements of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border have been matched by enhanced interference and disinformation campaigns by Russian proxies and media outlets in the EU, Ukraine and Russia itself; whereas such hybrid tactics have included an increase in denigrating content towards NATO and Ukraine, attempts to assign the blame for potential future Russian military escalation on Ukraine and NATO, and the spread of false narratives, including by President Putin and former President Medvedev personally;

| E. | whereas it has been over six years since the adoption of the Minsk Agreements and over seven years since the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation and the start of the war in Ukraine waged by Russia; whereas more than 14 000 people have lost their lives during the ongoing conflict; whereas the conflict has resulted in close to two million people becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs); whereas the livelihoods of the population of the Russian-controlled and annexed territories in Ukraine and the surrounding regions continue to be severely affected; whereas Russia is a party to the conflict, and cannot therefore present itself as a mediator; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas it has been over six years since the adoption of the Minsk Agreements and over seven years since the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation and the start of the war in Ukraine waged by Russia; whereas more than 14 000 people have lost their lives during the ongoing conflict; whereas the conflict has resulted in close to two million people becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs); whereas the livelihoods of the population of the Russian-controlled and annexed territories in Ukraine and the surrounding regions continue to be severely affected; whereas Russia is a party to the conflict, and cannot therefore present itself as a mediator;

| F. | whereas the implementation of the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements of February 2015 has suffered serious setbacks, in particular due to unilateral measures taken by the Russian Federation in contradiction with its commitments under the agreements; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the implementation of the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements of February 2015 has suffered serious setbacks, in particular due to unilateral measures taken by the Russian Federation in contradiction with its commitments under the agreements;

| G. | whereas the presence of employees from the Russian private military company the Wagner Group alongside pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine has been reported since 2014, beginning with around 250 fighters initially and now amounting to 2 500 individuals; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the presence of employees from the Russian private military company the Wagner Group alongside pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine has been reported since 2014, beginning with around 250 fighters initially and now amounting to 2 500 individuals;

| H. | whereas the latest report of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine published on 1 December 2021 noted an escalation of hostilities in the Donbas conflict zone, an increase in civilian casualties on the Ukrainian side and damage to infrastructure; whereas the report also noted that the courts of the self-proclaimed Donbas republics continued to sentence civilians for conflict-related crimes without a fair trial; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the latest report of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine published on 1 December 2021 noted an escalation of hostilities in the Donbas conflict zone, an increase in civilian casualties on the Ukrainian side and damage to infrastructure; whereas the report also noted that the courts of the self-proclaimed Donbas republics continued to sentence civilians for conflict-related crimes without a fair trial;

| I. | whereas there are more than 160 illegal prisons in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where more than 3 000 people have been illegally held captive and subjected to torture and inhuman treatment since the beginning of the conflict; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas there are more than 160 illegal prisons in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where more than 3 000 people have been illegally held captive and subjected to torture and inhuman treatment since the beginning of the conflict;

| J. | whereas Russia continues to violate the ceasefire in Donbas, with 2 346 attacks launched against Ukrainian positions, leaving 65 Ukrainian soldiers dead and 261 wounded, including 29 servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces killed by snipers between 27 July 2020 and 2 December 2021; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas Russia continues to violate the ceasefire in Donbas, with 2 346 attacks launched against Ukrainian positions, leaving 65 Ukrainian soldiers dead and 261 wounded, including 29 servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces killed by snipers between 27 July 2020 and 2 December 2021;

| K. | whereas in April 2021 the Russian Ministry of Defence unilaterally closed the waters around the Kerch Strait to non-commercial vessels from other countries, thereby obstructing the free passage of ships to and from the Sea of Azov; whereas although Russia had announced it would lift the restrictions in October 2021, they are still in place; whereas these impediments have negative consequences for Ukraine’s ports in the Sea of Azov and for international maritime transit in the Black Sea; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas in April 2021 the Russian Ministry of Defence unilaterally closed the waters around the Kerch Strait to non-commercial vessels from other countries, thereby obstructing the free passage of ships to and from the Sea of Azov; whereas although Russia had announced it would lift the restrictions in October 2021, they are still in place; whereas these impediments have negative consequences for Ukraine’s ports in the Sea of Azov and for international maritime transit in the Black Sea;

| L. | whereas Russian President Putin signed a decree on 15 November 2021 on simplified trade rules allowing access of goods to and from the temporarily non-government-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk areas of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas Russian President Putin signed a decree on 15 November 2021 on simplified trade rules allowing access of goods to and from the temporarily non-government-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk areas of Ukraine;

| M. | whereas the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership of 10 November 2021 stipulates that the United States and Ukraine intend to continue a range of substantive measures to prevent external direct and hybrid aggression against Ukraine and hold Russia accountable for such aggression and violations of international law; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership of 10 November 2021 stipulates that the United States and Ukraine intend to continue a range of substantive measures to prevent external direct and hybrid aggression against Ukraine and hold Russia accountable for such aggression and violations of international law;

| N. | whereas on 1 December 2021 President Putin demanded legally binding guarantees from NATO that it will not conduct any further eastern enlargements; whereas NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on 30 November 2021, after the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, that Russia has ‘no veto, no right to interfere in that process’ in reference to Ukraine’s potential membership of NATO; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas on 1 December 2021 President Putin demanded legally binding guarantees from NATO that it will not conduct any further eastern enlargements; whereas NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on 30 November 2021, after the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, that Russia has ‘no veto, no right to interfere in that process’ in reference to Ukraine’s potential membership of NATO;

| 1. | Supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders; reiterates its strong support for the EU’s policy of non-recognition of the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol; condemns Russia’s direct and indirect involvement in the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, as well as the persistent human rights violations carried out in these territories and in annexed Crimea; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Condemns the current large Russian military build-up along the borders with Ukraine and rejects any Russian justification for it; recalls that this is the second such occurrence this year; underscores that this military build-up has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in belligerent rhetoric on the Russian side; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Demands that the Russian Federation immediately and fully withdraw its military forces, cease its threat against the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which has a destabilising effect for the whole region and beyond, stop all measures that further aggravate the conflict and de-escalate tensions in line with Russia’s international obligations; emphasises the need for a peaceful political solution to the conflict; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Underlines that the Russian military build-up also presents a threat to the overall peace, stability and security of Europe and calls on Russia to abide by its international obligations, such as the principles and commitments of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the transparency of military movements, including the Vienna Document; urges Russia, furthermore, to uphold its obligation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and guarantee the freedom of navigation and transit passage through the international Kerch Strait to the ports of the Sea of Azov; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Is gravely concerned about the continued militarisation of the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea region, particularly about the militarisation of the Kaliningrad District and the illegally occupied Crimea, including the development of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities by the Russian Federation, which involve the use of new S-400 anti-aircraft systems, and an unprecedented build-up of conventional forces and preparations for possible deployment of nuclear weapons; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Expresses its solidarity with the people of Ukraine, who have suffered greatly since 2014 as a result of the war, accompanied by a severe economic crisis, and are now living under the threat of a full-scale military offensive threatening the lives of all its citizens; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Reiterates that an EU security dialogue with Ukraine should be ambitious and contribute to a convergent assessment of the security challenges on the ground; stresses that friendly countries should step up their military support to Ukraine and their provision of defensive weapons, which is in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter that allows individual and collective self-defence; welcomes the decision taken on 2 December 2021 by the Council of the EU to provide Ukraine with a package of EUR 31 million under the European Peace Facility (EPF) to help strengthen resilience and defence capabilities; notes that Ukraine’s potential future participation in permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) projects would significantly improve Ukraine’s national defence capabilities in line with EU best practices and standards, as declared in the Association Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Underlines that recurring Russian military build-ups at the Ukrainian border are a tool to extract political concessions from the West at the expense of Ukraine; emphasises that any country’s choice of alliances must not be subject to a third country’s approval, and therefore rejects any attempts by Russia to include some countries in its ‘sphere of influence’ and thus shape their future; recalls that acts of compromise or appeasement by the West would be perceived as weakness by the Russian side and only embolden it to further escalate its aggressive approach; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Highlights that the Russian military build-ups also form part of a wider strategy, which also includes elements of hybrid warfare, waged by Russia against the European Union and its likeminded partners, by causing chaos and confusion in its neighbourhoods, at its borders and within the European Union; reiterates that Russia is using a confluence of threats, such as military, digital, energy and disinformation, taking advantage of the open system of the EU to weaken it; believes that the EU needs to be aware of its own vulnerabilities and those of its partners in the neighbourhood, and to strengthen resilience in order to be able to effectively counter any hybrid attacks and improve cooperation with partners, in particular on disinformation, as well as enhancing capabilities aimed at peaceful conflict resolution, with a special focus on the situation of women and vulnerable groups in conflict areas; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Underlines that the European Union must be ready to send the Russian Federation a very stark warning that military hostilities will not only be unacceptable, but also come at a high economic and political price; welcomes the latest statements by the EU and the G7 Foreign Ministers expressing firm support for coordinated international action against a potential military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Urges the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to ensure that the Council remains informed of military actions by the Russian Federation and remains prepared to agree swiftly on further joint action, in particular the adoption of severe economic and financial sanctions in close coordination with the United States, NATO and other partners, in order to address the immediate and credible threats posed by Russia, rather than wait for another invasion to take place before taking action; Underlines the need for a unified approach on deterrence by the EU and its partners; underlines that all action should be taken in coordination with Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Underscores that the new package of sanctions should include the Russian officer corps and flag officers involved in the planning of a possible invasion, and the immediate circle and oligarchs in the orbit of the Russian President and their families; demands that such sanctions entail the freezing of financial and physical assets in the EU, travel bans and the exclusion of Russia from the SWIFT payment system, thereby excluding Russian companies from the international financial market and prohibiting the purchase of Russian sovereign debt on the primary and secondary markets, and that they target important sectors of the Russian economy and disrupt the financing of intelligence services and the military; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Underlines that in the event of a Russian attack on Ukraine, the EU’s first and immediate course of action should be to cancel all travel opportunities and withdraw the visa exemption for Russian diplomatic passport holders, with the exception of accredited diplomats; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Demands that the EU take urgent and credible steps to reduce its dependence on Russian energy imports and asks that the EU show stronger energy solidarity with Ukraine, in accordance with the Association Agreement, by increasing interlinkages of energy infrastructures; urges the EU institutions and all Member States, therefore, to make sure that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is not operationalised, regardless of whether it at some point fulfils the provisions of the EU Gas Directive (2); reiterates its long-term, fundamental concerns about the political, economic and security risks related to the Nord Stream 2 project; underlines the need to stop the construction of the controversial Rosatom-built nuclear power plants; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Underlines that the Member States should ensure that they are no longer welcoming places for Russian wealth and investments of unclear origin, including by establishing a Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Mechanism, and consistently implementing and enforcing existing anti-money-laundering directives; calls on the Commission and the Council to increase efforts to curb the Kremlin’s strategic investments within the EU for the purposes of subversion, undermining democratic processes and institutions, and spreading corruption, and to create greater transparency, especially in relation to the funds deposited or spent in the EU by the Russian elite; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Underscores the importance of taking resolute measures to deter Russia from circumventing existing EU sanctions; believes that, to this end, the EU should review and update its applicable regulations to close multiple loopholes in order to render sanctions more efficient and make Russia pay a genuinely higher price for its hostile acts; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Calls on the European Council to discuss and thoroughly evaluate, in its meeting of 16 December 2021, any possible reactions to the threats against European security posed by the Russian Federation and to continue its previous discussions on a comprehensive EU strategy towards Russia; calls for the EU and European partners to discuss long-term plans for European security with a view to dealing jointly with future military threats on the continent; expresses its concern about the ongoing deterioration of the core pillars of international security and arms control architecture, which have been subjected to manipulation and repeated violations by Russia; calls on the Council and the Commission, in this regard, to accordingly assess Russia as a major threat to the European continent in the Strategic Compass, as was also stated in the NATO Reflection Group’s report; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | calls on the Russian Federation to cease taking unilateral measures that contradict the commitments made under the Minsk Agreements, impede their further implementation, aggravate the conflict in eastern Ukraine and raise doubts internationally about the political will and capacity of the Russian Federation to honour its commitments; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Urges Russia and Russian-backed separatists to adhere to the ceasefire agreement; calls on Russia to engage constructively in the Normandy Format and the Trilateral Contact Group and to implement its international obligations, particularly under the Minsk Agreements and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; calls for the immediate release of all illegally detained and imprisoned Ukrainian citizens; encourages the Council to also broaden the scope of its sanctions to cover ‘passportisation’, the organisation of illegal elections in Crimea and the decision to involve residents of the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the State Duma elections of September 2021, and to increase the price Russia pays for blocking the implementation of the Minsk Agreements and the Normandy Format talks; invites the International Criminal Court to investigate the crimes committed by the Russian side and its proxies in the Crimean peninsula and in eastern Ukraine; highlights the role that the International Court of Justice and universal jurisdiction cases can play in this regard; considers that the political and military leadership of the de facto authorities of the Luhansk and Donetsk so-called People’s Republics should be sanctioned in the framework of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Stresses the importance of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and of it being able to continue its work beyond March 2022, when its mandate is currently expected to end, and without restrictions; strongly condemns Russia’s actions preventing the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission from performing its role by jamming the Mission’s unmanned aerial vehicles and blocking observers’ access to the occupied territories; deplores Russia’s decision to close the OSCE observer mission at the Gukovo and Donetsk Russian checkpoints; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Strongly supports Ukraine’s efforts to bring Russian mercenaries who committed war crimes to justice and urges the EU and its Member States to increase their cooperation to that end; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Reiterates its support for the international investigation into the circumstances of the tragic downing of the Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17, which could constitute a war crime, and reiterates its call to bring the people responsible to justice; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Condemns the signing by President Putin of the decree on simplified trade rules to allow access measures to increase access of goods to and from the temporarily non-government-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk areas of Ukraine, and calls on Russia to revoke it; underscores that such unilateral measures violate Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including with regard to customs control, and could increase tensions and prolong the status quo, while impeding the future reintegration process; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Welcomes the establishment and activities of the International Crimea Platform; considers it an important tool to keep the topic of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula high on the international agenda; expresses satisfaction at the strong EU support for this initiative and calls for the EU to further contribute to the development of its consultation and coordination format; deplores the fact that international organisations and human rights defenders are still denied access to Crimea; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Calls on the Russian people not to believe in the omnipresent official propaganda depicting the West as enemies of the Russian people and the Russian State; recalls that democracy and freedom are a threat only to corrupt Russian elites and not to the people; expresses a wish to engage in dialogue and build future relations with a democratic Russia; recalls that the externally and internally aggressive policy of ‘Kremlin first and foremost’ victimises the Russian people; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Supports the Ukrainian authorities in their efforts to reform the country in line with the provisions of the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area; calls for the EU institutions to maintain a credible long-term perspective for Ukraine’s EU accession in line with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, as for any European state; underlines that such efforts are necessary to increase Ukrainian resilience and to more effectively counter current and future Russian aggression; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the President, Government and State Duma of the Russian Federation. |
| --- | --- |

27.

---

(1)  OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3.

(2)  Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 94).

---

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/150 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/150

---

P9_TA(2021)0516

Implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification scheme

European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2021 on the implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (2021/2885(RSP))

(2022/C 251/18)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2368/2002 of 20 December 2002 implementing the Kimberley Process certification scheme for the international trade in rough diamonds (1) and the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council implementing the Kimberley Process certification scheme for the international trade in rough diamonds (COM(2021)0115), which aims to recast the subsequent amendments in the interests of clarity, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2368/2002 of 20 December 2002 implementing the Kimberley Process certification scheme for the international trade in rough diamonds (1) and the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council implementing the Kimberley Process certification scheme for the international trade in rough diamonds (COM(2021)0115), which aims to recast the subsequent amendments in the interests of clarity,

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (2), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (2),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 entitled ‘Establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe’ (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 entitled ‘Establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe’ (3),

| — | having regard to the question to the Commission on the implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (O-000073/2021 — B9-0044/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the question to the Commission on the implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (O-000073/2021 — B9-0044/2021),

| — | having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 136(5) and 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on International Trade, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on International Trade,

| A. | whereas the KPCS was established as a UN-mandated certification scheme in 2003 to stop the trade in conflict diamonds, which was fuelling civil wars; whereas the KPCS has a tripartite structure involving governments as decision-makers and international diamond industry and civil society representatives as observers; whereas decisions in the KPCS are made by an absolute consensus of its 56 participating members, which represent 82 countries, with the EU and its 27 Member States counting as a single participant; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the KPCS was established as a UN-mandated certification scheme in 2003 to stop the trade in conflict diamonds, which was fuelling civil wars; whereas the KPCS has a tripartite structure involving governments as decision-makers and international diamond industry and civil society representatives as observers; whereas decisions in the KPCS are made by an absolute consensus of its 56 participating members, which represent 82 countries, with the EU and its 27 Member States counting as a single participant;

| B. | whereas the KPCS defines conflict diamonds as ‘rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments’; whereas the KPCS claims to have been effective in almost completely stopping the trade in conflict diamonds as originally defined, with it now representing less than 1 % of the trade in rough diamonds, compared to 15 % in 2003; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the KPCS defines conflict diamonds as ‘rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments’; whereas the KPCS claims to have been effective in almost completely stopping the trade in conflict diamonds as originally defined, with it now representing less than 1 % of the trade in rough diamonds, compared to 15 % in 2003;

| C. | whereas human rights abuses continue to occur in relation to diamond mining across diamond-rich conflict-affected and high-risk areas and may include child and forced labour, beatings, torture, sexual violence, the forced disappearance of people, forced evictions and resettlement, illegal land grabs and the destruction of ritually or culturally significant sites; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas human rights abuses continue to occur in relation to diamond mining across diamond-rich conflict-affected and high-risk areas and may include child and forced labour, beatings, torture, sexual violence, the forced disappearance of people, forced evictions and resettlement, illegal land grabs and the destruction of ritually or culturally significant sites;

| D. | whereas since the entry into force of the KPCS as a global initiative in 2003, the nature of the conflicts and the realities on ground have changed; whereas the KPCS does not capture situations where public or private security forces, companies, criminals or armed groups use widespread or systematic violence to secure their economic interests in diamond production; whereas the desire of consumers to have certainty about the origin and ethical nature of diamonds cannot currently be met; whereas this results in declining demand for natural diamonds and consequently has negative implications for the legitimate diamond industry and artisanal miners; whereas mechanisms such as the KPCS need to be regularly reviewed and updated to ensure they are able to meet consumer expectations and international obligations relating to corporate social responsibility and sustainable development; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas since the entry into force of the KPCS as a global initiative in 2003, the nature of the conflicts and the realities on ground have changed; whereas the KPCS does not capture situations where public or private security forces, companies, criminals or armed groups use widespread or systematic violence to secure their economic interests in diamond production; whereas the desire of consumers to have certainty about the origin and ethical nature of diamonds cannot currently be met; whereas this results in declining demand for natural diamonds and consequently has negative implications for the legitimate diamond industry and artisanal miners; whereas mechanisms such as the KPCS need to be regularly reviewed and updated to ensure they are able to meet consumer expectations and international obligations relating to corporate social responsibility and sustainable development;

| E. | whereas the EU has worked towards widening the scope of the original definition of conflict diamonds set out in the KPCS Core Document in order to include human rights abuses, but a successful outcome could not be reached due to the consensual nature of the decision-making process and opposition from some major producer, trading and consumer countries; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the EU has worked towards widening the scope of the original definition of conflict diamonds set out in the KPCS Core Document in order to include human rights abuses, but a successful outcome could not be reached due to the consensual nature of the decision-making process and opposition from some major producer, trading and consumer countries;

| F. | whereas the World Diamond Council’s System of Warranties is an industry-wide voluntary self-regulation programme that tracks Kimberley-Process-certified diamonds through the supply chain down to the trading of cut and polished stones; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the World Diamond Council’s System of Warranties is an industry-wide voluntary self-regulation programme that tracks Kimberley-Process-certified diamonds through the supply chain down to the trading of cut and polished stones;

| 1. | Stresses the urgent need to revise the definition of conflict diamonds to include human rights and the social and environmental conflict-related dimensions of diamond production to ensure that diamonds coming into the EU market are not linked to any human rights abuses or environmental crimes, whether committed by rebel groups, governments or private companies; stresses that the KPCS should apply, in addition to rough diamonds, to cut and polished stones; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls for the KPCS to be more effectively implemented to ensure that no conflict diamonds enter legitimate supply chains; calls for the strengthening and improved monitoring and enforcement of the internal controls of participating states; urges the parties to the KPCS to create an independent monitoring mechanism, as the recommendations issued by peer review visits are of a non-binding nature and often fail to address weaknesses in the implementation of internal controls or bring meaningful change in cases of non-compliance with KPCS minimum requirements; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Is deeply concerned by recent reports about the attempts to silence civil society observers at the last Kimberley Process inter-sessional meeting; reiterates the central role of civil society in the tripartite structure of the KPCS and calls for full respect for the freedom of speech of civil society representatives; notes the importance of providing reliable financing to civil society organisations working in the field of conflict minerals and diamonds; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Welcomes the commitment by the legitimate diamond industry to the KPCS and the establishment of the World Diamond Council’s System of Warranties; notes that job creation and income for mining communities is dependent on stable, transparent and responsible supply chains in the diamond sector; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Points out that it is essential to be able to track diamonds from mine to market through more than just the paper trail accompanying diamond shipments; is fully receptive to the idea of using new technologies such as blockchain to improve traceability; welcomes the work towards the digitalisation of Kimberley Process certificates; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Stresses the importance of addressing the root causes of diamond-related conflict and violence throughout the supply chain; calls for the Commission and the European External Action Service to ensure that sufficient funds are allocated for capacity-building under the Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention thematic programme to support the sustainable and conflict-sensitive management of natural resources and compliance with the Kimberley Process and other similar initiatives applicable to conflict minerals, in order to improve the livelihoods of mining communities and enhance artisanal mining; calls for those who allocate geographic funds to also take capacity-building and conflict prevention activities into account; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls for the EU to continue to be a global leader in implementing responsible sourcing initiatives such as the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas and the updated OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; reiterates that responsible sourcing and due diligence must consistent with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Calls for the EU to lead by example and continue to implement its value-driven trade agenda to affect positive change in non-EU countries; notes, in this regard, that EU rules on the trade in diamonds must reflect the highest level of ambition; calls for the EU to consider additional autonomous measures to ensure that rough, cut and polished diamonds linked to human rights abuses are not placed on the EU market, in order to overcome the shortcomings of the KPCS; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the European External Action Service and the current Chair and Vice-Chair of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. |
| --- | --- |

9.

---

(1)  OJ L 358, 31.12.2002, p. 28.

(2)  OJ L 130, 19.5.2017, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1.

---

III Preparatory acts

European Parliament

Monday 13 December 2021

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/153 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/153

---

P9_TA(2021)0484

Health technology assessment ***II

European Parliament legislative resolution of 13 December 2021 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on health technology assessment and amending Directive 2011/24/EU (10531/3/2021 — C9-0422/2021 — 2018/0018(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: second reading)

(2022/C 251/19)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Council position at first reading (10531/3/2021 — C9-0422/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Council position at first reading (10531/3/2021 — C9-0422/2021),

| — | having regard to the reasoned opinions submitted, within the framework of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, by the Czech Chamber of Deputies, the German Bundestag, the French Senate and the Polish Sejm, asserting that the draft legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the reasoned opinions submitted, within the framework of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, by the Czech Chamber of Deputies, the German Bundestag, the French Senate and the Polish Sejm, asserting that the draft legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 23 May 2018 and of 27 April 2021 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 23 May 2018 and of 27 April 2021 (1),

| — | having regard to its position at first reading (2) on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2018)0051), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its position at first reading (2) on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2018)0051),

| — | having regard to Article 294(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to Rule 67 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 67 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A9-0334/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A9-0334/2021),

| 1. | Approves the Council position at first reading; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Notes that the act is adopted in accordance with the Council position; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to sign the act with the President of the Council, in accordance with Article 297(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Instructs its Secretary-General to sign the act, once it has been verified that all the procedures have been duly completed, and, in agreement with the Secretary-General of the Council, to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

5.

---

(1)  OJ C 283, 10.8.2018, p. 28 and OJ C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 95.

(2)  OJ C 449, 23.12.2020, p. 638.

---

Tuesday 14 December 2021

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/154 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/154

---

P9_TA(2021)0485

Union tariff rate quota for high quality beef from Paraguay ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/216 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards Union tariff rate quota for high quality beef from Paraguay (COM(2021)0313 — C9-0228/2021 — 2021/0146(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2022/C 251/20)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0313), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0313),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 207(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0228/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 207(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0228/2021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 8 December 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 8 December 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0333/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0333/2021),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2021)0146

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 14 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/216 as regards the Union tariff rate quota for high-quality beef from Paraguay

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/111.)

---

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/155 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/155

---

P9_TA(2021)0486

European Year of Youth 2022 ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth 2022 (COM(2021)0634 — C9-0379/2021 — 2021/0328(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2022/C 251/21)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0634), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0634),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 165(4) and 166(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0379/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 165(4) and 166(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0379/2021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 8 December 2021 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 8 December 2021 (1),

| — | after consulting the Committee of the Regions, |
| --- | --- |

—

after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 10 December 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 10 December 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the letter from the Committee on Budgets of 17 November 2021 on the outcome of budget conciliation with respect to the Commission proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth 2022, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter from the Committee on Budgets of 17 November 2021 on the outcome of budget conciliation with respect to the Commission proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth 2022,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Culture and Education (A9-0322/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Culture and Education (A9-0322/2021),

| A. | Whereas for reasons of urgency it is justified to proceed to the vote before the expiry of the deadline of eight weeks laid down in Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; |
| --- | --- |

A.

Whereas for reasons of urgency it is justified to proceed to the vote before the expiry of the deadline of eight weeks laid down in Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Approves the joint statement by Parliament and the Council annexed to this resolution, which will be published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Takes note of the statement by the Commission annexed to this resolution, which will be published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

5.

---

(1)  Not yet published in the Official Journal.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2021)0328

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 14 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Decision (EU) 2021/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth (2022)

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Decision (EU) 2021/2316.)

---

ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Joint statement by the European Parliament and the Council on the financing of the European Year of Youth (2022) — Decision (EU) 2021/2316

The European Parliament and the Council agree that the minimum operational budget for the implementation of the European Year of Youth (2022) shall be set at EUR 8 million. Of that amount, EUR 3 million will come from the annual budget for 2022 of the European Solidarity Corps and EUR 5 million will come from the annual budget for 2022 of the Erasmus + programme.

Furthermore, the co-legislators are committed to leaving a lasting legacy of the European Year, beyond 2022. Without prejudice to the powers of the budgetary authority, in accordance with Article 314 TFEU, any additional funding beyond 2022 should be identified within the MFF 2021 — 2027.

Statement by the Commission on the financing of the European Year of Youth (2022) — Decision (EU) 2021/2316...

The Commission takes note of the agreement of the co-legislators to introduce a minimum operational budget of EUR 8 million for the implementation of the European Year of Youth (2022), without prejudice to the possibility of complementary contributions from other relevant Union programmes and instruments in addition to this amount of EUR 8 million.

In addition, the Commission will carry out a mapping exercise throughout the Year and will regularly update it outlining the possible and actual contributions by EU programmes and instruments to the implementation of the European Year of Youth and reporting on the activities. The progress in the deployment of contributions by the Union programmes will be regularly presented to the European Parliament and the Council. These contributions should be considered as complementary and above the minimum operational budget of EUR 8 million.

---

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/158 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/158

---

P9_TA(2021)0487

Joint investigation teams: alignment with Union rules on the protection of personal data ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, as regards its alignment with EU rules on the protection of personal data (COM(2021)0020 — C9-0005/2021 — 2021/0008(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2022/C 251/22)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0020), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0020),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 16(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0005/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 16(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0005/2021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 17 November 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 17 November 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0236/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0236/2021),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2021)0008

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 14 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, as regards its alignment with Union rules on the protection of personal data

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Directive (EU) 2022/211.)

---

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/159 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/159

---

P9_TA(2021)0488

European Investigation Order in criminal matters: alignment with Union rules on the protection of personal data ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/41/EU, as regards its alignment with EU rules on the protection of personal data (COM(2021)0021 — C9-0006/2021 — 2021/0009(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2022/C 251/23)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0021), |
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—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 16(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0006/2021), |
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—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 16(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0006/2021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 17 November 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 17 November 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0237/2021), |
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—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0237/2021),

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
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1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
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2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
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3.

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P9_TC1-COD(2021)0009

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 14 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/41/EU, as regards its alignment with Union rules on the protection of personal data

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Directive (EU) 2022/228.)

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/160 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/160

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P9_TA(2021)0490

Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Croatia

European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Croatia in relation to the series of earthquakes starting from 28 December 2020 (COM(2021)0963 — C9-0403/2021 — 2021/0359(BUD))

(2022/C 251/24)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0963 — C9-0403/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0963 — C9-0403/2021),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (1),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (2), and in particular Article 9 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (2), and in particular Article 9 thereof,

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (3), and in particular point 10 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (3), and in particular point 10 thereof,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on mitigating the consequences of earthquakes in Croatia (4), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on mitigating the consequences of earthquakes in Croatia (4),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on the effectiveness of Member States’ use of EU Solidarity Fund money in cases of natural disasters (5), |
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—

having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2021 on the effectiveness of Member States’ use of EU Solidarity Fund money in cases of natural disasters (5),

| — | having regard to the letter from the Committee on Regional Development, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter from the Committee on Regional Development,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0343/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0343/2021),

| 1. | Expresses its deepest solidarity and sympathy with all the individuals affected by the earthquakes, with their families, and with Croatia’s national, regional and local authorities involved in relief efforts; |
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1.

| 2. | Welcomes the decision as a tangible and visible form of the Union’s solidarity with its citizens and the regions in Croatia affected by the earthquakes between 28 December 2020 and 21 February 2021; |
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2.

| 3. | Stresses the urgent need to release financial assistance through the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) to ensure that support can reach the affected regions in good time; |
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3.

| 4. | Regrets the considerable time taken from Croatia’s application for financial assistance, on 18 March 2021 to the Commission proposal for mobilisation at the end of October 2021; underlines, again, the importance of rapid mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund in future to provide relief to people and regions in need; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Highlights that the EUSF has been under considerable strain in the first year of the MFF 2021-2027, that natural disasters are inherently unpredictable and that, due to climate change, their number and severity will likely increase over time and become costlier; underlines, therefore, its growing concern regarding the scarcity of the resources available to the EUSF over the period 2021-2027; considers that the overall funding amount and allocation arrangements for the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) do not ensure optimal effectiveness of the EUSF and calls for a revision of SEAR at the next review of the MFF 2021-2027; |
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5.

| 6. | Approves the decision annexed to this resolution; |
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6.

| 7. | Instructs its President to sign the decision with the President of the Council and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union; |
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7.

| 8. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission. |
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8.

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(1)  OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3.

(2)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11.

(3)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.

(4)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0023.

(5)  Text adopted, P9_TA(2021)0429.

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ANNEX

DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Croatia in relation to the series of earthquakes starting from 28 December 2020

(The text of this annex is not reproduced here since it corresponds to the final act, Decision (EU) 2022/49.)

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/163 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/163

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P9_TA(2021)0491

Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: application EGF/2021/003 IT/Porto Canale — Italy

European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Italy — EGF/2021/003 IT Porto Canale (COM(2021)0935 — C9-0399/2021 — 2021/0337(BUD))

(2022/C 251/25)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0935 — C9-0399/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0935 — C9-0399/2021),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/691 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 (1) (‘EGF Regulation’), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/691 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 (1) (‘EGF Regulation’),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 (2), and in particular Article 8 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 (2), and in particular Article 8 thereof,

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (3), and in particular point 9 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (3), and in particular point 9 thereof,

| — | having regard to the letter from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs,

| — | having regard to the letter from the Committee on Regional Development, |
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—

having regard to the letter from the Committee on Regional Development,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0345/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0345/2021),

| A. | whereas the Union has set up legislative and budgetary instruments to provide additional support to workers who are suffering from the consequences of globalisation and of technological and environmental changes, such as changes in world trade patterns, trade disputes, significant changes in the trade relations of the Union or the composition of the internal market and financial or economic crises, as well as the transition to a low-carbon economy, or as a consequence of digitisation or automation; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the Union has set up legislative and budgetary instruments to provide additional support to workers who are suffering from the consequences of globalisation and of technological and environmental changes, such as changes in world trade patterns, trade disputes, significant changes in the trade relations of the Union or the composition of the internal market and financial or economic crises, as well as the transition to a low-carbon economy, or as a consequence of digitisation or automation;

| B. | whereas on 15 July 2021 Italy submitted application EGF/2021/003 IT/Porto Canale for a financial contribution from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), following the displacement of 190 workers in the company Porto Industriale di Cagliari SpA in the economic sector classified under the NACE Revision 2 Division 52 (Warehousing and support activities for transportation), in the NUTS 2 region of Sardegna (ITG2) in Italy, within a reference period for the application from 1 September 2020 to 1 January 2021; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas on 15 July 2021 Italy submitted application EGF/2021/003 IT/Porto Canale for a financial contribution from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), following the displacement of 190 workers in the company Porto Industriale di Cagliari SpA in the economic sector classified under the NACE Revision 2 Division 52 (Warehousing and support activities for transportation), in the NUTS 2 region of Sardegna (ITG2) in Italy, within a reference period for the application from 1 September 2020 to 1 January 2021;

| C. | whereas the application is based on the intervention criteria of Article 4(3), derogating from the criteria of Article 4(2), point (a), of the EGF Regulation, which requires the cessation of activity of at least 200 displaced workers over a reference period of four months in an enterprise in a Member State, including workers displaced in suppliers and downstream producers and/or self-employed persons whose activity has ceased; |
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C.

whereas the application is based on the intervention criteria of Article 4(3), derogating from the criteria of Article 4(2), point (a), of the EGF Regulation, which requires the cessation of activity of at least 200 displaced workers over a reference period of four months in an enterprise in a Member State, including workers displaced in suppliers and downstream producers and/or self-employed persons whose activity has ceased;

| D. | whereas even though fewer than 200 displacements occurred within the reference period of four months, the derogation to Article 4(2), point (a), could be granted as they took place in a small labour market, with a GDP per capita of EUR 21 600 in 2018 compared to the European average of EUR 31 000 (4), and which was severely affected by the 2008 crisis (5) and the pandemic crisis (6); |
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D.

whereas even though fewer than 200 displacements occurred within the reference period of four months, the derogation to Article 4(2), point (a), could be granted as they took place in a small labour market, with a GDP per capita of EUR 21 600 in 2018 compared to the European average of EUR 31 000 (4), and which was severely affected by the 2008 crisis (5) and the pandemic crisis (6);

| E. | whereas the activity in the Port of Cagliari had been declining between 2011 and 2018 and traffic fell by 90 % in 2018, due to its lack of land connection to the rest of Italy and the gradual shifting of container volumes and operations to hubs located at the edges of the Mediterranean basin; |
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E.

whereas the activity in the Port of Cagliari had been declining between 2011 and 2018 and traffic fell by 90 % in 2018, due to its lack of land connection to the rest of Italy and the gradual shifting of container volumes and operations to hubs located at the edges of the Mediterranean basin;

| F. | whereas in 2019 Contship Italia Group, the sole shareholder of Porto Industriale di Cagliari S.p.A, the concessionaire of the container terminal, decided to end its operations in Cagliari and to voluntarily liquidate its subsidiary Porto Industriale di Cagliari SpA, and no new concessionaire was found despite three extensions, leading to the laying off of the 190 workers who were still part of the enterprise in September 2020; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas in 2019 Contship Italia Group, the sole shareholder of Porto Industriale di Cagliari S.p.A, the concessionaire of the container terminal, decided to end its operations in Cagliari and to voluntarily liquidate its subsidiary Porto Industriale di Cagliari SpA, and no new concessionaire was found despite three extensions, leading to the laying off of the 190 workers who were still part of the enterprise in September 2020;

| G. | whereas the EGF shall not exceed a maximum annual amount of EUR 186 million (in 2018 prices), as laid down in Article 8 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the EGF shall not exceed a maximum annual amount of EUR 186 million (in 2018 prices), as laid down in Article 8 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027;

| 1. | Agrees with the Commission that the conditions set out in Article 4(3) of the EGF Regulation are met and that Italy is entitled to a financial contribution of EUR 1 493 407 under that Regulation, which represents 85 % of the total cost of EUR 1 756 950, comprising expenditure for personalised services of EUR 1 686 750 and expenditure for implementing the EGF (7) of EUR 70 200; |
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1.

| 2. | Notes that the Italian authorities submitted the application on 15 July 2021, and that the Commission finalised its assessment on 28 October 2021 and notified it to Parliament on the same day; |
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2.

| 3. | Notes that the application relates in total to 190 displaced workers whose activity has ceased in the company Porto Industriale di Cagliari SpA; further notes that Italy expects that all of the total eligible beneficiaries will participate in the measures (targeted beneficiaries); |
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3.

| 4. | Recalls that the social impacts of the redundancies are expected to be considerable for the Sardinian economy, which was also significantly affected by the COVID-19 crisis, and where employment numbers fell by 4,6 % in 2020 compared to a decrease of 2,0 % in Italy as a whole (8); further notes that another ongoing EGF application concerns displacements in Air Italy in Sardegna; |
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4.

| 5. | Stresses that because of the pandemic, the number of Sardinian households without labour income increased up to 16,5 % in 2020 (+3,5 pp from 2019); |
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5.

| 6. | Points out that most of the displaced workers are men (90,5 %) between 30 and 54 years old (98,4 %) and with upper secondary or post-secondary education (83,7 %); |
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6.

| 7. | Notes that Italy started providing personalised services to the targeted beneficiaries on 8 October 2020 and that the period of eligibility for a financial contribution from the EGF will therefore be from 8 October 2020 until 24 months after the date of the entry into force of the financing decision; |
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7.

| 8. | Recalls that personalised services to be provided to the workers and self-employed persons consist of the following actions: general information and vocational guidance, counselling for career development, job-search assistance, mentoring for adjusting to a new job, tutoring for business creation, financial contribution to business creation, training, as well as incentives and contribution to specific costs; |
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8.

| 9. | Welcomes the possibility for special time-limited measures within the coordinated package including, inter alia, to pay childcare allowances, as provided in Article 7(2), point (b), of the EGF Regulation in order to facilitate job seekers’ participation in the activities proposed and their transition to work; |
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9.

| 10. | Welcomes that training will focus on the green economy, blue economy, personal services, health and social services, promotion of cultural heritage and cultural activities; |
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10.

| 11. | Notes that Italy started incurring administrative expenditure to implement the EGF on 18 January 2021 and that expenditure on preparatory, management, information and publicity, control and reporting activities will therefore be eligible for a financial contribution from the EGF from 18 January 2021 until 31 months after the date of the entry into force of the financing decision; |
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11.

| 12. | Welcomes that the measures were planned to be in line with the Italian National Strategy for Sustainable Development (SNSvS) (9) and that the co-ordinated package of personalised services was drawn up through a consultation between the Sardegna Region, ASPAL (10), the Municipality of Cagliari, the Cagliari Port Authority and trade unions; notes that the social partners were fully involved in planning and fine-tuning the package of measures; |
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12.

| 13. | Stresses that the Italian authorities have confirmed that the eligible actions do not receive assistance from other Union funds or financial instruments; |
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13.

| 14. | Reiterates that assistance from the EGF must not replace actions which are the responsibility of companies, by virtue of national law or collective agreements, or any allowances or rights of the recipients of the EGF allocation to ensure full additionality of the allocation; |
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14.

| 15. | Notes that all the procedural requirements were met; |
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15.

| 16. | Approves the decision annexed to this resolution; |
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16.

| 17. | Instructs its President to sign the decision with the President of the Council and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union; |
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17.

| 18. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission; |
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18.

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(1)  OJ L 153, 3.5.2021, p. 48.

(2)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11.

(3)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.

(4)  https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/regional-innovation-monitor/base-profile/sardinia

(5)  https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/regional-innovation-monitor/base-profile/sardinia

(6)  Banca d’Italia. L'economia della Sardegna. Rapporto annuale, giugno 2021.

(7)  In accordance with Article 7(5) of the EGF Regulation.

(8)  Banca d’Italia. L'economia della Sardegna. Rapporto annuale, giugno 2021.

(9)  Strategia Nazionale per lo Sviluppo sostenibile (SNSvS).

(10)  The regional public employment services.

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ANNEX

DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Italy — EGF/2021/003 IT/Porto Canale

(The text of this annex is not reproduced here since it corresponds to the final act, Decision (EU) 2022/48.)

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/167 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/167

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P9_TA(2021)0492

Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: application EGF/2021/002 IT/Air Italy — Italy

European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Italy — EGF/2021/002 IT/Air Italy (COM(2021)0936 — C9-0400/2021 — 2021/0338(BUD))

(2022/C 251/26)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0936– C9-0400/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0936– C9-0400/2021),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/691 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 (1) (‘EGF Regulation’), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/691 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 (1) (‘EGF Regulation’),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 (2), and in particular Article 8 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 (2), and in particular Article 8 thereof,

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (3), and in particular point 9 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (3), and in particular point 9 thereof,

| — | having regard to the letter of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs,

| — | having regard to the letter of the Committee on Regional Development, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter of the Committee on Regional Development,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0346/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0346/2021),

| A. | whereas the Union has set up legislative and budgetary instruments to provide additional support to workers who are suffering from the consequences of globalisation and of technological and environmental changes, such as changes in world trade patterns, trade disputes, significant changes in the trade relations of the Union or the composition of the internal market and financial or economic crises, as well as the transition to a low-carbon economy, or as a consequence of digitisation or automation; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the Union has set up legislative and budgetary instruments to provide additional support to workers who are suffering from the consequences of globalisation and of technological and environmental changes, such as changes in world trade patterns, trade disputes, significant changes in the trade relations of the Union or the composition of the internal market and financial or economic crises, as well as the transition to a low-carbon economy, or as a consequence of digitisation or automation;

| B. | whereas on 15 July 2021 Italy submitted application EGF/2021/002 IT/Air Italy for a financial contribution from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), following the displacement of 466 workers in the company Air Italy SpA in the economic sector classified under the NACE Revision 2 Division 51 (Air transport), in the NUTS 2 region of Sardegna (ITG2) in Italy, within a reference period for the application from 1 September 2020 to 1 January 2021; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas on 15 July 2021 Italy submitted application EGF/2021/002 IT/Air Italy for a financial contribution from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), following the displacement of 466 workers in the company Air Italy SpA in the economic sector classified under the NACE Revision 2 Division 51 (Air transport), in the NUTS 2 region of Sardegna (ITG2) in Italy, within a reference period for the application from 1 September 2020 to 1 January 2021;

| C. | whereas the application relates to 466 displaced workers whose activity has ceased during the reference period in the company Air Italy SpA, while 145 workers were displaced before or after the reference period as a consequence of the same events that triggered the cessations of activity of the displaced workers during the reference period and will thus also be considered eligible beneficiaries; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the application relates to 466 displaced workers whose activity has ceased during the reference period in the company Air Italy SpA, while 145 workers were displaced before or after the reference period as a consequence of the same events that triggered the cessations of activity of the displaced workers during the reference period and will thus also be considered eligible beneficiaries;

| D. | whereas the application is based on the intervention criteria of Article 4(2), point (a), of the EGF Regulation, which requires the cessation of activity of at least 200 displaced workers over a reference period of four months in an enterprise in a Member State; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the application is based on the intervention criteria of Article 4(2), point (a), of the EGF Regulation, which requires the cessation of activity of at least 200 displaced workers over a reference period of four months in an enterprise in a Member State;

| E. | whereas Air Italy had faced various difficulties (4) since its inception in 2018 from the merger of Meridiana Fly and Air Italy, leading from losses of EUR 160 million in 2018 to losses of EUR 230 million in 2019; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas Air Italy had faced various difficulties (4) since its inception in 2018 from the merger of Meridiana Fly and Air Italy, leading from losses of EUR 160 million in 2018 to losses of EUR 230 million in 2019;

| F. | whereas on 11 February 2020, Air Italy’s shareholders approved a voluntary liquidation and the cancellation of all operations as from 25 February 2020; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas on 11 February 2020, Air Italy’s shareholders approved a voluntary liquidation and the cancellation of all operations as from 25 February 2020;

| G. | whereas the collective redundancy procedure for the 1 453 employees of Air Italy was put on hold until September 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic (5); |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the collective redundancy procedure for the 1 453 employees of Air Italy was put on hold until September 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic (5);

| H. | whereas the EGF shall not exceed a maximum annual amount of EUR 186 million (in 2018 prices), as laid down in Article 8 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (6); |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the EGF shall not exceed a maximum annual amount of EUR 186 million (in 2018 prices), as laid down in Article 8 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (6);

| 1. | Agrees with the Commission that the conditions set out in Article 4(2), point (a), of the EGF Regulation are met and that Italy is entitled to a financial contribution of EUR 3 874 640 under that Regulation, which represents 85 % of the total cost of EUR 4 558 400, comprising expenditure for personalised services of EUR 4 376 000 and expenditure for implementing the EGF (7) of EUR 182 400; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Notes that the Italian authorities submitted the application on 15 July 2021, and that the Commission finalised its assessment on 28 October 2021 and notified it to Parliament on the same day; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Notes that the total number of eligible and targeted beneficiaries is 611 and points out that almost half of the eligible persons are women (48,11 %); |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Recalls that the social impacts of the redundancies are expected to be considerable for the Sardinian economy, which was also significantly affected by the COVID-19 crisis, and where employment numbers fell by 4,6 % in 2020 compared to a decrease of 2,0 % in Italy as a whole (8); further notes that another ongoing EGF application concerns displacements in Porto Canale in Sardegna; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Stresses that because of the pandemic, the number of Sardinian households without labour income increased up to 16,5 % in 2020 (+3,5 pp from 2019); |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Points out that most of the displaced workers have an upper secondary or post-secondary education (93,3 %) and have between 30 and 54 years (69,23 %); notes that the second largest age group is over 54 years (30,77 %), which may face additional challenges in re-integrating into the labour market; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Notes that Italy started providing personalised services to the targeted beneficiaries on 4 November 2020 and that the period of eligibility for a financial contribution from the EGF will therefore be from 4 November 2020 until 24 months after the date of the entry into force of the financing decision; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Recalls that personalised services to be provided to the workers consist of the following actions: general information and vocational guidance, job search assistance, training, tutoring for business creation, financial contribution to business startup, as well as incentives and contribution to specific costs; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Welcomes the possibility for special time-limited measures within the coordinated package including, inter alia, to pay childcare allowances, as provided in Article 7(2), point (b), of the EGF Regulation in order to facilitate job seekers’ participation in the activities proposed and their transition to work; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Considers it to be a social responsibility of the European Union to provide displaced workers with the necessary qualifications for the ecological and just transformation in line with the European Green Deal, especially for employees with qualifications relevant for sectors that are currently highly carbon intensive; welcomes, therefore, that training will focus on the green economy, blue economy, personal services, health and social services, promotion of cultural heritage and cultural activities; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Notes that Italy started incurring administrative expenditure to implement the EGF on 4 November 2020 and that expenditure on preparatory, management, information and publicity, control and reporting activities will therefore be eligible for a financial contribution from the EGF from 4 November 2020 until 31 months after the date of the entry into force of the financing decision; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Welcomes that the measures were planned to be in line with the Italian National Strategy for Sustainable Development (SNSvS) and that the co-ordinated package of personalised services was discussed between ASPAL, the regional public employment services, the Regione Sardegna and the relevant trade unions; notes that the social partners were fully involved in planning the measures; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Stresses that the Italian authorities have confirmed that the eligible actions do not receive assistance from other Union funds or financial instruments; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Reiterates that assistance from the EGF must not replace actions which are the responsibility of companies, by virtue of national law or collective agreements, or any allowances or rights of the recipients of the EGF allocation to ensure full additionality of the allocation; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Notes that all the procedural requirements were met; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Approves the decision annexed to this resolution; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Instructs its President to sign the decision with the President of the Council and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

18.

---

(1)  OJ L 153, 3.5.2021, p. 48.

(2)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11.

(3)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.

(4)  Such as disputes with Alitalia over routes between mainland Italy and Sardinia: www.quifinanza.it/soldi/air-italy; the opposition of three American carriers to the increase of Air Italy’s nonstop flights between the U.S. and Europe: https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000016a-26c5-d80c-a7ea-7fc56fae0000; or the grounding of three new Boeing 737 Max due to security flaws: www.quifinanza.it/soldi/air-italy.

(5)  Decreto Legge 17 marzo 2020, n.18. art. 46.

(6)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11.

(7)  In accordance with Article 7(5) of the EGF Regulation.

(8)  Banca d’Italia. L'economia della Sardegna. Rapporto annuale, giugno 2021.

---

ANNEX

DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Italy — EGF/2021/002 IT/Air Italy

(The text of this annex is not reproduced here since it corresponds to the final act, Decision (EU) 2022/51.)

---

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/171 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/171

---

P9_TA(2021)0493

Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: application EGF/2021/004 ES/Aragón automotive — Spain

European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Spain — EGF/2021/004 ES Aragón automotive (COM(2021)0683 — C9-0404/2021 — 2021/0356(BUD))

(2022/C 251/27)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0683 — C9-0404/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0683 — C9-0404/2021),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/691 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 (1) (‘EGF Regulation’), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/691 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 (1) (‘EGF Regulation’),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 (2) (‘MFF Regulation’), and in particular Article 8 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 (2) (‘MFF Regulation’), and in particular Article 8 thereof,

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (3), and in particular point 9 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (3), and in particular point 9 thereof,

| — | having regard to the letter from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs,

| — | having regard to the letter from the Committee on Regional Development, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the letter from the Committee on Regional Development,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0344/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0344/2021),

| A. | whereas the Union has set up legislative and budgetary instruments to provide additional support to workers who are suffering from the consequences of globalisation and of technological and environmental changes, such as changes in world trade patterns, trade disputes, significant changes in the trade relations of the Union or the composition of the internal market and financial or economic crises, as well as the transition to a low-carbon economy, or as a consequence of digitisation or automation; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the Union has set up legislative and budgetary instruments to provide additional support to workers who are suffering from the consequences of globalisation and of technological and environmental changes, such as changes in world trade patterns, trade disputes, significant changes in the trade relations of the Union or the composition of the internal market and financial or economic crises, as well as the transition to a low-carbon economy, or as a consequence of digitisation or automation;

| B. | whereas Spain submitted application EGF/2021/004 ES/Aragón automotive for a financial contribution from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), following the displacement of 592 workers in the economic sector classified under the NACE Revision 2 Division 29 (Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers), in the NUTS 2 region of Aragón (ES24) in Spain, within a reference period for the application from 1 November 2020 to 1 May 2021; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas Spain submitted application EGF/2021/004 ES/Aragón automotive for a financial contribution from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), following the displacement of 592 workers in the economic sector classified under the NACE Revision 2 Division 29 (Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers), in the NUTS 2 region of Aragón (ES24) in Spain, within a reference period for the application from 1 November 2020 to 1 May 2021;

| C. | whereas the application relates to 592 displaced workers whose activity has ceased during the reference period in fifty companies (4), while 460 workers were displaced before or after the reference period as a consequence of the same events that triggered the cessations of activity of the displaced workers during the reference period and will thus also be considered eligible beneficiaries; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the application relates to 592 displaced workers whose activity has ceased during the reference period in fifty companies (4), while 460 workers were displaced before or after the reference period as a consequence of the same events that triggered the cessations of activity of the displaced workers during the reference period and will thus also be considered eligible beneficiaries;

| D. | whereas the application is based on the intervention criteria of Article 4(2), point (b), of the EGF Regulation, which requires the cessation of activity of at least 200 displaced workers over a reference period of six months in enterprises operating in the same economic sector defined at NACE Revision 2 division and located in one region or two contiguous regions defined at NUTS 2 level in a Member State; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the application is based on the intervention criteria of Article 4(2), point (b), of the EGF Regulation, which requires the cessation of activity of at least 200 displaced workers over a reference period of six months in enterprises operating in the same economic sector defined at NACE Revision 2 division and located in one region or two contiguous regions defined at NUTS 2 level in a Member State;

| E. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic, the strict lockdown measures implemented in Q2 2020 in Spain (5) and the subsequent shortage of semiconductors (6) have adversely affected the automotive sector in the country, so that over January-June 2021, the production of vehicles in Spain (1,2 million units) was still lower by 21,6 % than the production in the same period of 2019 (7); |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic, the strict lockdown measures implemented in Q2 2020 in Spain (5) and the subsequent shortage of semiconductors (6) have adversely affected the automotive sector in the country, so that over January-June 2021, the production of vehicles in Spain (1,2 million units) was still lower by 21,6 % than the production in the same period of 2019 (7);

| F. | whereas in Aragón, the automotive sectors represents 2,42 % of the net employment and about 6 % of the regional GDP (8), and registered unemployment is now 26 % higher than pre-pandemic levels (75 578 job seekers in June 2021 compared to 60 000 in June 2019) (9); |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas in Aragón, the automotive sectors represents 2,42 % of the net employment and about 6 % of the regional GDP (8), and registered unemployment is now 26 % higher than pre-pandemic levels (75 578 job seekers in June 2021 compared to 60 000 in June 2019) (9);

| G. | whereas the EGF shall not exceed a maximum annual amount of EUR 186 million (in 2018 prices), as laid down in Article 8 of the MFF Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the EGF shall not exceed a maximum annual amount of EUR 186 million (in 2018 prices), as laid down in Article 8 of the MFF Regulation;

| 1. | Agrees with the Commission that the conditions set out in Article 4(2), point (b), of the EGF Regulation are met and that Spain is entitled to a financial contribution of EUR 1 404 863 under that Regulation, which represents 85 % of the total cost of EUR 1 652 780, comprising expenditure for personalised services of EUR 1 600 280 and expenditure for implementing the EGF (10) of EUR 52 500; notes that all the procedural requirements were met; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Notes that the Spanish authorities submitted the application on 26 July 2021, and that the Commission finalised its assessment on 8 November 2021 and notified it to Parliament on the same day; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Notes that the application relates in total to 1 052 workers made redundant in the Spanish automotive sector; regrets that Spain expects that only 320 out of the total eligible beneficiaries will participate in the measures (targeted beneficiaries); encourages local authorities to more pro-actively motivate displaced people to take part in proposed actions; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Points out that a third of the targeted beneficiaries are women (34,1 %) and almost 40 % are over 54 years old (39,7 %); |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Recalls that the social impacts of the redundancies are expected to be considerable for the economy of Aragón, where 60 % of the job seekers are women and 49 % of all job seekers are over 50 years old (11); thus regrets that the dismissals will particularly affect two categories of workers who are already at a disadvantage on the regional labour market; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Notes that Spain started providing personalised services to the targeted beneficiaries on 15 October 2021 and that the period of eligibility for a financial contribution from the EGF will therefore be from 15 October 2021 until 24 months after the date of the entry into force of the financing decision; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Recalls that personalised services to be provided to the workers and self-employed persons consist of the following actions: general information and welcome sessions, occupational guidance, intensive job-search assistance, horizontal, re-skilling and up-skilling trainings, as well as monetary incentives; since 34,1 % of the targeted beneficiaries are women, encourages the authorities to focus more on programs and actions designed with the interests of women in mind; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Notes that the measures planned should be implemented in line with the Spanish Circular Economy Strategy based on non-toxic material cycles and that training measures should cater to the requirement of disseminating the skills required in the digital industrial age and in a resource-efficient economy, in line with Article 7(2) of the EGF Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Notes that Spain started incurring administrative expenditure to implement the EGF on 1 October 2021 and that expenditure on preparatory, management, information and publicity, control and reporting activities will therefore be eligible for a financial contribution from the EGF from 1 October 2021 until 31 months after the date of the entry into force of the financing decision; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Welcomes that the co-ordinated package of personalised services was drawn up in consultation with the social partners (UGT (12), CCOO (13), CEPYME (14) and CEOE (15)); |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Stresses that the Spanish authorities have confirmed that the eligible actions do not receive assistance from other Union funds or financial instruments; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Reiterates that assistance from the EGF must not replace actions which are the responsibility of companies, by virtue of national law or collective agreements, or any allowances or rights of the recipients of the EGF allocation to ensure full additionality of the allocation; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Approves the decision annexed to this resolution; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Instructs its President to sign the decision with the President of the Council and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

15.

---

(1)  OJ L 153, 3.5.2021, p. 48.

(2)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11.

(3)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.

(4)  Adieconti S.L., Lear Corporation Asientos S.L., Adient Automotive S.L., Lecitrailer Post Venta Zaragoza S.L., Adient Seating Spain S.L., Lecitrailer S.A., Af Aftermarket Iberica S.L. , Magna Automotive Spain S.A.U., Android Industries Zaragoza S.L., Mahle Behr Spain S.A., Arcelormital Tailored Blanks Zaragoza S.L., Majorel Sp Solutions S.A.U, Carrocerías Moncayo S.L., Mann-Hummel Iberica S.A., Carrocerías Vicam S.L., Modulos Ribera Alta S.L.U., Carrocerías Vicente Salomon Sanz S.L., Opel España S.L.U., Casting Ros S.A., Proma Hispania S.A.Ad, Celulosa Fabril S.A., Remolques Jalon S.L., Cooper Estándar Automotive España Slu, Rhenus Automotive Systems Zaragoza, Copo Aragón S.L.U., Rigual S.A., Copo Zaragoza S.A., Ronal Iberica S.A. Unipersonal, Dana Automoción S.A., Schmitz Cargobull Iberica S.A., Faurecia Automotive España S.A., Seguridad De Servicio Movil S.L., Faurecia Sistemas de Escape, Talleres Emilio Montañes S.A., Flexngate Aragón S.L., Ti Group Automotive Systems S.A., Gestamp Aragón S.A., Traf Automotions S.L., Gestamp Manufacturing Autochasis S.L., Tristone Flowtech Spain S.A., Icer Brakes S.A., Union Tecnológica del Automóvil S.L., Ilunion Servicios Industriales Aragón S.L., Valeo Térmico S.A., Ilunion Servicios Industriales S.L., Zanini Epila S.L., Insonorizantes Pelzer S.A., ZF-Aftermarket Ibérica SL., Kdk-Dongkook Automotive Spain S.A., and Zfoam España SL.

(5)  According to data from Confemetal and Anfac, the pandemic had a significant impact on the activity and turnover of the enterprises operating in the automotive sector in Spain, which resulted in a decline in sales (32,3 %) , production (18,9 %), and turnover (11,3 %) in 2020 compared to 2019: https://anfac.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Informe-Anual-ANFAC-2020.pdf

(6)  At the beginning of 2021, the chip-crisis was forecast to lead to losses of approximately EUR 60 billion in the automotive sector. The figure has been revised upwards to over EUR 90 billion: https://www.consultancy.eu/news/6273/global-chip-shortage-costs-automotive-sector-90-billion

(7)  https://cincodias.elpais.com/cincodias/2021/07/22/companias/1626961844_041144.html

(8)  https://caaragon.com/

(9)  https://www.facebook.com/GobAragon/posts/6537004519658572

(10)  In accordance with Article 7(5) of the EGF Regulation.

(11)  http://www.aragon.es/iaest (Registered unemployment, June 2021)

(12)  http://www.ugt.es

(13)  https://www.ccoo.es

(14)  https://www.cepyme.es

(15)  https://www.ceoe.es

---

ANNEX

DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Spain — EGF/2021/004 ES/Aragón automotive

(The text of this annex is not reproduced here since it corresponds to the final act, Decision (EU) 2022/50.)

---

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/175 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/175

---

P9_TA(2021)0494

Predictability for Member States and procedures for dispute resolution when making available the traditional, VAT and GNI based own resources *

European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 in order to enhance predictability for Member States and to clarify procedures for dispute resolution when making available the traditional, VAT and GNI based own resources (COM(2021)0327 — C9-0257/2021 — 2021/0161(NLE))

(Consultation)

(2022/C 251/28)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2021)0327), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2021)0327),

| — | having regard to Article 322(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9-0257/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 322(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C9-0257/2021),

| — | having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (1),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom (2), and in particular Article 10 thereof, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom (2), and in particular Article 10 thereof,

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2021/770 of 30 April 2021 on the calculation of the own resource based on plastic packaging waste that is not recycled, on the methods and procedure for making available that own resource, on the measures to meet cash requirements, and on certain aspects of the own resource based on gross national income (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2021/770 of 30 April 2021 on the calculation of the own resource based on plastic packaging waste that is not recycled, on the methods and procedure for making available that own resource, on the measures to meet cash requirements, and on certain aspects of the own resource based on gross national income (3),

| — | having regard to the Court of Auditors’ Opinion No 2/2021 concerning the Commission’s proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 in order to enhance predictability for Member States and to clarify procedures for dispute resolution when making available the traditional, VAT and GNI based own resources (COM(2021) 327 final of 25 June 2021, 2021/0161 (NLE)) (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Court of Auditors’ Opinion No 2/2021 concerning the Commission’s proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 in order to enhance predictability for Member States and to clarify procedures for dispute resolution when making available the traditional, VAT and GNI based own resources (COM(2021) 327 final of 25 June 2021, 2021/0161 (NLE)) (4),

| — | having regard to its legislative resolution of 25 March 2021 on the draft Council regulation on the calculation of the own resource based on plastic packaging waste that is not recycled, on the methods and procedure for making available that own resource, on the measures to meet cash requirements, and on certain aspects of the own resource based on gross national income (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to its legislative resolution of 25 March 2021 on the draft Council regulation on the calculation of the own resource based on plastic packaging waste that is not recycled, on the methods and procedure for making available that own resource, on the measures to meet cash requirements, and on certain aspects of the own resource based on gross national income (5),

| — | having regard to Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 82 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0347/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0347/2021),

| 1. | Approves the Commission proposal as amended; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to alter its proposal accordingly, in accordance with Article 293(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the Commission proposal; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Amendment 1

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1. | While Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 (11) has provided a solid and stable anchor for the financing mechanics of the Union,
  the
  provisions on the making available of own resources need to be improved to enhance predictability for Member States
  and to clarify procedures for dispute resolution
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1.

While Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 (11) has provided a solid and stable anchor for the financing mechanics of the Union,
  the
  provisions on the making available of own resources need to be improved to enhance predictability for Member States
  and to clarify procedures for dispute resolution
  .

| 1. | While Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 (11) has provided a solid and stable anchor for the financing mechanics of the Union,
  certain
  provisions on the making available of own resources need to be improved to enhance predictability for Member States. |
| --- | --- |

1.

While Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 (11) has provided a solid and stable anchor for the financing mechanics of the Union,
  certain
  provisions on the making available of own resources need to be improved to enhance predictability for Member States.

Amendment 2

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 7

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 7. | In order to ensure the proportionality of the system while maintaining the deterrent effect, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 limits the increase in interest above the base rate to 16 percentage points. This ‘capping’ of 16 percentage points is only applicable to all cases that became known after the entry into force of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/804

   (12)

  . Consequently, cases already known before the entry into force of Regulation 2016/804, where particularly high amount of interest are at stake, cannot benefit from that limit regardless of whether the amount of interest has already been notified to the Member States. In those cases, Member States are still required to pay amounts of interest that are not proportional compared to the amount of the principal due. In order to clarify and simplify the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014, the limitation of the increase to 16 percentage points should be applied to any amount of interest not notified to the Member State before the entry into force of this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

7.

In order to ensure the proportionality of the system while maintaining the deterrent effect, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 limits the increase in interest above the base rate to 16 percentage points. This ‘capping’ of 16 percentage points is only applicable to all cases that became known after the entry into force of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/804

   (12)

  . Consequently, cases already known before the entry into force of Regulation 2016/804, where particularly high amount of interest are at stake, cannot benefit from that limit regardless of whether the amount of interest has already been notified to the Member States. In those cases, Member States are still required to pay amounts of interest that are not proportional compared to the amount of the principal due. In order to clarify and simplify the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014, the limitation of the increase to 16 percentage points should be applied to any amount of interest not notified to the Member State before the entry into force of this Regulation.

deleted

Amendment 3

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 10

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 10. | In case of disagreement between Member States and the Commission regarding the making available of traditional own resources, a review procedure should be formalised and introduced in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 to improve transparency and to clarify Member States’ rights of defense. Provisions should also be introduced to reflect the current practice of the payment under reservation, which opens the possibility to initiate an action for unjust enrichment against the Commission in accordance with Article 268 TFEU and Article 340(2) TFEU. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

10.

In case of disagreement between Member States and the Commission regarding the making available of traditional own resources, a review procedure should be formalised and introduced in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 to improve transparency and to clarify Member States’ rights of defense. Provisions should also be introduced to reflect the current practice of the payment under reservation, which opens the possibility to initiate an action for unjust enrichment against the Commission in accordance with Article 268 TFEU and Article 340(2) TFEU.

deleted

Amendment 4

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 1 — point 4 — point b

Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014

Article 10b — paragraph 7

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | the following paragraph 7 is added: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b)

the following paragraph 7 is added:

deleted

| | ‘7.
     
  If the Member State and the Commission cannot agree on particular adjustments to the VAT based own resources, as referred to in paragraph 2, first subparagraph, point (c), of this Article, the Member State may request the Commission to review its assessment in accordance with Article 13b.’; |
| --- | --- |

‘7.
     
  If the Member State and the Commission cannot agree on particular adjustments to the VAT based own resources, as referred to in paragraph 2, first subparagraph, point (c), of this Article, the Member State may request the Commission to review its assessment in accordance with Article 13b.’;

Amendment 5

Amendment 5

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 1 — point 5 — point b

Article 1 — paragraph 1 — point 5 — point b

Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014

Article 12 — paragraph 5 — subparagraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | in paragraph 5, the third subparagraph is replaced by the following: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

(b)

in paragraph 5, the third subparagraph is replaced by the following:

in paragraph 5, the third subparagraph is replaced by the following:

deleted

deleted

| | ‘The total increase pursuant to the first and the second subparagraphs shall not exceed 16 percentage points. The limitation of the increase to 16 percentage points shall apply to any case for which the amount of interest has not been communicated to a Member State before ... [insert date — the entry into force of this (amending) Regulation]. The increased rate shall be applied to the entire period of delay.’; |
| --- | --- |

‘The total increase pursuant to the first and the second subparagraphs shall not exceed 16 percentage points. The limitation of the increase to 16 percentage points shall apply to any case for which the amount of interest has not been communicated to a Member State before ... [insert date — the entry into force of this (amending) Regulation]. The increased rate shall be applied to the entire period of delay.’;

Amendment 6

Amendment 6

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 1 — point 6 — point c

Article 1 — paragraph 1 — point 6 — point c

Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014

Article 13 — paragraph 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | the following paragraph 5 is added: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(c)

(c)

the following paragraph 5 is added:

the following paragraph 5 is added:

deleted

deleted

| | ‘5.
     
  If the Member State and the Commission cannot agree on the reasons referred to in paragraph 2, first subparagraph, of this Article, the Member State may request the Commission to review its assessment in accordance with Article 13b.’; |
| --- | --- |

‘5.
     
  If the Member State and the Commission cannot agree on the reasons referred to in paragraph 2, first subparagraph, of this Article, the Member State may request the Commission to review its assessment in accordance with Article 13b.’;

Amendment 7

Amendment 7

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 1 — point 7

Article 1 — paragraph 1 — point 7

Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014

Article 13b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Article 13b | deleted |
| Review procedure | |
| 1.
     
  In case of a disagreement between a Member State and the Commission referred to in Article 13(5), or concerning other traditional own resources amounts due to the budget of the Union, the Member State may request the Commission to review its assessment within three months from its receipt. In case of a disagreement between a Member State and the Commission referred to in Article 10b(7), the Member State may request the Commission to review its assessment within two months from its receipt. Except for cases referred to in Article 10b(7) such request shall provide reasons for the review requested, and include supporting documents. The request and the ensuing procedure shall not change the obligation of the Member States to make available own resources when they are due to the budget of the Union. | |
| 2.
     
  Within six months from the receipt of the request provided for in paragraph 1, the Commission shall communicate to the Member State its comments on the reasons provided in the request. Where the Commission finds it necessary to request additional information, the six-month time-limit shall run from the date of receipt of the requested additional information. The Member State concerned shall provide the additional information within three months. In case of a disagreement between a Member State and the Commission referred to in Article 10b(7), the Commission shall communicate to the Member State its comments on the reasons provided in the request within three months from the receipt of the request. | |
| 3.
     
  Where the Member State cannot provide any further relevant information for the review procedure, it may request the Commission to reply on the basis of the information available. The six-month time-limit shall in that case run from the date of receipt of that request. | |
| 4.
     
  In case a Member State files an action for annulment against a decision adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 9(1a) of Regulation 1553/89, and if the Commission has not replied yet under the review procedure concerning the same VAT correction, the Commission shall suspend the review procedure pending the final judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union. | |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 13b

Article 13b

deleted

deleted

Review procedure

Review procedure

1.
     
  In case of a disagreement between a Member State and the Commission referred to in Article 13(5), or concerning other traditional own resources amounts due to the budget of the Union, the Member State may request the Commission to review its assessment within three months from its receipt. In case of a disagreement between a Member State and the Commission referred to in Article 10b(7), the Member State may request the Commission to review its assessment within two months from its receipt. Except for cases referred to in Article 10b(7) such request shall provide reasons for the review requested, and include supporting documents. The request and the ensuing procedure shall not change the obligation of the Member States to make available own resources when they are due to the budget of the Union.

2.
     
  Within six months from the receipt of the request provided for in paragraph 1, the Commission shall communicate to the Member State its comments on the reasons provided in the request. Where the Commission finds it necessary to request additional information, the six-month time-limit shall run from the date of receipt of the requested additional information. The Member State concerned shall provide the additional information within three months. In case of a disagreement between a Member State and the Commission referred to in Article 10b(7), the Commission shall communicate to the Member State its comments on the reasons provided in the request within three months from the receipt of the request.

3.
     
  Where the Member State cannot provide any further relevant information for the review procedure, it may request the Commission to reply on the basis of the information available. The six-month time-limit shall in that case run from the date of receipt of that request.

4.
     
  In case a Member State files an action for annulment against a decision adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 9(1a) of Regulation 1553/89, and if the Commission has not replied yet under the review procedure concerning the same VAT correction, the Commission shall suspend the review procedure pending the final judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

---

(1)  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.

1

(2)  OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1.

2

(3)  OJ L 165, 11.5.2021, p. 15.

3

(4)  OJ C 402 I, 5.10.2021, p. 1.

4

(5)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0104.

5

(11)  Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 of 26 May 2014 on the methods and procedure for making available the traditional, VAT and GNI-based own resources and on the measures to meet cash requirements (OJ L 168, 7.6.2014, p. 39).

11

(11)  Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 of 26 May 2014 on the methods and procedure for making available the traditional, VAT and GNI-based own resources and on the measures to meet cash requirements (OJ L 168, 7.6.2014, p. 39).

11

(12)  
  Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/804 of 17 May 2016 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 on the methods and procedure for making available the traditional, VAT and GNI-based own resources and on the measures to meet cash requirements (OJ L 132, 21.5.2016, p. 85).

12

Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/804 of 17 May 2016 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 on the methods and procedure for making available the traditional, VAT and GNI-based own resources and on the measures to meet cash requirements (OJ L 132, 21.5.2016, p. 85).

---

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/181 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/181

---

P9_TA(2021)0495

EU-US air transport agreement ***

European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol to amend the Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community and its Member States (06385/2021 — C9-0368/2021 — 2010/0112(NLE))

(Consent)

(2022/C 251/29)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the draft Council decision (06385/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Council decision (06385/2021),

| — | having regard to the draft Protocol to amend the Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community and its Members States (1) (09913/2010), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Protocol to amend the Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and the European Community and its Members States (1) (09913/2010),

| — | having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 100(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0368/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 100(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0368/2021),

| — | having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4) and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A9-0335/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A9-0335/2021),

| 1. | Gives its consent to the conclusion of the Protocol; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the United States of America. |
| --- | --- |

2.

---

(1)  OJ L 223, 25.8.2010, p. 3.

---

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/182 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/182

---

P9_TA(2021)0496

EC/Gabon Fisheries Partnership Agreement: Implementing Protocol ***

European Parliament legislative resolution of 14 December 2021 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the Gabonese Republic and the European Community (2021-2026) (09172/2021 — C9-0253/2021 — 2021/0127(NLE))

(Consent)

(2022/C 251/30)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the draft Council decision (09172/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the draft Council decision (09172/2021),

| — | having regard to the Implementing Protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the Gabonese Republic and the European Community (2021-2026) (09171/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Implementing Protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the Gabonese Republic and the European Community (2021-2026) (09171/2021),

| — | having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 43(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a) (v), and paragraph 7, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0253/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 43(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a) (v), and paragraph 7, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C9-0253/2021),

| — | having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4), and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 105(1) and (4), and Rule 114(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets,

| — | having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0316/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Fisheries (A9-0316/2021),

1.

Gives its consent to the conclusion of the protocol;

2.

Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Gabonese Republic.

---

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/183 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/183

---

P9_TA(2021)0497

International procurement instrument ***I

Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 14 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access of third-country goods and services to the Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods and services to the public procurement markets of third countries (COM(2016)0034 — C9-0018/2016 — 2012/0060(COD)) (1)

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2022/C 251/31)

Amendment 1

Proposal for a regulation

Title of the Regulation

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Amended proposal for a
  REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the access of third-country goods and services to the Union’s
  internal market in public
  procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods and services to the
  public
  procurement markets of third countries | REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the access of third-country
  economic operators,
  goods and services to the Union’s procurement
  market
  and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union
  economic operators,
  goods and services to the procurement markets of third countries |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amended proposal for a
  REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the access of third-country goods and services to the Union’s
  internal market in public
  procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods and services to the
  public
  procurement markets of third countries

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the access of third-country
  economic operators,
  goods and services to the Union’s procurement
  market
  and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union
  economic operators,
  goods and services to the procurement markets of third countries

Amendment 2

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (5) | The revised plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement provides only for limited market access for Union companies to the public procurement markets of third countries and applies only to a limited number of WTO Members, which are parties to that Agreement. The revised Agreement on Government Procurement was concluded by the Union in December 2013. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(5)

The revised plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement provides only for limited market access for Union companies to the public procurement markets of third countries and applies only to a limited number of WTO Members, which are parties to that Agreement. The revised Agreement on Government Procurement was concluded by the Union in December 2013.

deleted

Amendment 3

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 6

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (6) | Within the context of the WTO and through its bilateral relations, the Union advocates an ambitious opening of international
  public
  procurement markets of the Union and its trading partners, in a spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6)

Within the context of the WTO and through its bilateral relations, the Union advocates an ambitious opening of international
  public
  procurement markets of the Union and its trading partners, in a spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit.

| (6) | Within the context of the WTO and through its bilateral relations, the Union advocates an ambitious opening of international procurement markets of the Union and its trading partners, in a spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Within the context of the WTO and through its bilateral relations, the Union advocates an ambitious opening of international procurement markets of the Union and its trading partners, in a spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit

Amendment 4

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 6 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (6a) | The plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement and EU trade agreements that include provisions on procurement provide for market access for Union economic operators only to the procurement markets of third countries that are parties to those agreements. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6a)

The plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement and EU trade agreements that include provisions on procurement provide for market access for Union economic operators only to the procurement markets of third countries that are parties to those agreements.

Amendment 5

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 7

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (7) | If
  the
  country
  concerned
  is a Party to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement or has concluded a trade agreement with the EU that includes provisions on
  public
  procurement, the Commission should follow the consultation mechanisms and/or dispute settlement procedures set out in
  that agreement
  when the restrictive practices relate to procurement covered by market access commitments undertaken by
  the
  country
  concerned
  towards the Union. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(7)

If
  the
  country
  concerned
  is a Party to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement or has concluded a trade agreement with the EU that includes provisions on
  public
  procurement, the Commission should follow the consultation mechanisms and/or dispute settlement procedures set out in
  that agreement
  when the restrictive practices relate to procurement covered by market access commitments undertaken by
  the
  country
  concerned
  towards the Union.

| (7) | If
  a third
  country is a Party to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement or has concluded a trade agreement with the EU that includes provisions on procurement, the Commission should follow the consultation mechanisms and/or dispute settlement procedures set out in
  those agreements
  when the restrictive practices relate to procurement covered by market access commitments undertaken by
  that third
  country towards the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

If
  a third
  country is a Party to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement or has concluded a trade agreement with the EU that includes provisions on procurement, the Commission should follow the consultation mechanisms and/or dispute settlement procedures set out in
  those agreements
  when the restrictive practices relate to procurement covered by market access commitments undertaken by
  that third
  country towards the Union.

Amendment 6

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 8

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (8) | Many third countries are reluctant to open their
  public
  procurement and
  their
  concessions markets to international competition, or to open those markets further than what they have already done. As a result, Union economic operators face restrictive procurement practices in many of the trading
  partner
  of the Union. Those restrictive procurement practices result in the loss of substantial trading opportunities. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(8)

Many third countries are reluctant to open their
  public
  procurement and
  their
  concessions markets to international competition, or to open those markets further than what they have already done. As a result, Union economic operators face restrictive procurement practices in many of the trading
  partner
  of the Union. Those restrictive procurement practices result in the loss of substantial trading opportunities.

| (8) | Many third countries are reluctant to open their procurement and concessions markets to international competition, or to open those markets further than what they have already done. As a result, Union economic operators face restrictive procurement practices in many of the trading
  partners
  of the Union. Those restrictive procurement practices result in the loss of substantial trading opportunities. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Many third countries are reluctant to open their procurement and concessions markets to international competition, or to open those markets further than what they have already done. As a result, Union economic operators face restrictive procurement practices in many of the trading
  partners
  of the Union. Those restrictive procurement practices result in the loss of substantial trading opportunities.

Amendment 7

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 9

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (9) | Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council

   (16)

  contains only a few provisions concerning the external dimension of the public procurement policy of the Union, in particular Articles 85 and 86 . These provisions have a limited scope and should be replaced. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(9)

Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council

   (16)

  contains only a few provisions concerning the external dimension of the public procurement policy of the Union, in particular Articles 85 and 86 . These provisions have a limited scope and should be replaced.

deleted

Amendment 8

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 10

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (10) | Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (17) lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the exercise of the Union's rights under international trade agreements concluded by the Union. No rules and procedures exist for the treatment of goods and services not covered by such international agreements. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10)

Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (17) lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the exercise of the Union's rights under international trade agreements concluded by the Union. No rules and procedures exist for the treatment of goods and services not covered by such international agreements.

| (10) | Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the exercise of the Union's rights under international trade agreements concluded by the Union. No
  such
  rules and procedures exist for the treatment of
  economic operators,
  goods and services not covered by such international agreements. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the exercise of the Union's rights under international trade agreements concluded by the Union. No
  such
  rules and procedures exist for the treatment of
  economic operators,
  goods and services not covered by such international agreements.

Amendment 9

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (11) | In the interest of legal certainty for Union and third-country economic operators, contracting authorities and contracting entities, the
  international market access commitments undertaken by the Union towards third countries in the field of
  public
  procurement and concessions
  should be reflected in the legal order
  of the
  EU, thereby ensuring effective
  application
  thereof
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11)

In the interest of legal certainty for Union and third-country economic operators, contracting authorities and contracting entities, the
  international market access commitments undertaken by the Union towards third countries in the field of
  public
  procurement and concessions
  should be reflected in the legal order
  of the
  EU, thereby ensuring effective
  application
  thereof
  .

| (11) | International market access commitments undertaken by the Union towards third countries in the field of
  procurement and concessions require, inter alia, the equal treatment of economic operators from those countries. Consequently, measures adopted under this Regulation can only apply to economic operators, goods or services from countries that are not parties to the plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement or to bilateral or multilateral trade agreements with the Union that include commitments on access to
  procurement and concessions
  markets, or from countries that are parties to such agreements but only regarding procurement procedures for goods, services or concessions that are not covered by those agreements. Irrespective
  of the application
  of measures adopted under this Regulation and in accordance with the European Commission's Communication of 24 July 2019 on ‘Guidance on the participation of third-country bidders and goods in the EU procurement market’

   (1a)

  and Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, economic operators from third countries which do not have any agreement providing for the opening of the EU procurement market or whose goods, services and works are not covered by such an agreement, do not have secured access to procurement procedures in the EU and could be excluded
  . |
| --- | --- |

(11)

International market access commitments undertaken by the Union towards third countries in the field of
  procurement and concessions require, inter alia, the equal treatment of economic operators from those countries. Consequently, measures adopted under this Regulation can only apply to economic operators, goods or services from countries that are not parties to the plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement or to bilateral or multilateral trade agreements with the Union that include commitments on access to
  procurement and concessions
  markets, or from countries that are parties to such agreements but only regarding procurement procedures for goods, services or concessions that are not covered by those agreements. Irrespective
  of the application
  of measures adopted under this Regulation and in accordance with the European Commission's Communication of 24 July 2019 on ‘Guidance on the participation of third-country bidders and goods in the EU procurement market’

   (1a)

  and Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, economic operators from third countries which do not have any agreement providing for the opening of the EU procurement market or whose goods, services and works are not covered by such an agreement, do not have secured access to procurement procedures in the EU and could be excluded
  .

Amendment 10

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 12

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (12) | The
  objectives of
  improving the access of Union economic operators to the
  public
  procurement and concessions markets of certain third countries
  protected by restrictive and discriminatory procurement measures or practices and of preserving equal conditions of competition within the internal market require to refer to the non-preferential
  rules of origin
  established in the EU customs legislation
  ,
  so that contracting authorities and contracting entities know whether
  goods and services
  are covered by the international commitments of the Union
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(12)

The
  objectives of
  improving the access of Union economic operators to the
  public
  procurement and concessions markets of certain third countries
  protected by restrictive and discriminatory procurement measures or practices and of preserving equal conditions of competition within the internal market require to refer to the non-preferential
  rules of origin
  established in the EU customs legislation
  ,
  so that contracting authorities and contracting entities know whether
  goods and services
  are covered by the international commitments of the Union
  .

| (12) | The
  effective application of any measure adopted under this Regulation with a view to
  improving the access of Union economic operators to the procurement and concessions markets of certain third countries
  requires a clear set of
  rules of origin
  for economic operators
  , goods and services. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The
  effective application of any measure adopted under this Regulation with a view to
  improving the access of Union economic operators to the procurement and concessions markets of certain third countries
  requires a clear set of
  rules of origin
  for economic operators
  , goods and services.

Amendment 11

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 13

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (13) | The origin of a good should be determined in accordance with Article
  22
  to
  26
  of
  Council
  Regulation
  (EEC)
  No
  2913/1992

   (5). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(13)

The origin of a good should be determined in accordance with Article
  22
  to
  26
  of
  Council
  Regulation
  (EEC)
  No
  2913/1992

   (5).

| (13) | The origin of a good should be determined in accordance with Articles
  59
  to
  62
  of Regulation
  (EU)
  No
  952/2013

   (5)

  of the European Parliament and of the Council
  . |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The origin of a good should be determined in accordance with Articles
  59
  to
  62
  of Regulation
  (EU)
  No
  952/2013

   (5)

  of the European Parliament and of the Council
  .

Amendment 12

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 14

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (14) | The origin of a service should be determined on the basis of the origin of the natural or legal person providing it. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14)

The origin of a service should be determined on the basis of the origin of the natural or legal person providing it.

| (14) | The origin of a service should be determined on the basis of the origin of the natural or legal person providing it.
  The origin of a legal person should be considered to be the country under the laws of which a legal person is constituted or organised and in the territory of which the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations. The criterion of substantive business operations should not allow the potential circumvention of any measure adopted under this Regulation by the creation of letterbox companies.


  The term ‘substantive business operations’ is a concept used in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services. In Union law it is equivalent to the term ‘effective and continuous link with the economy’ and is closely linked to the right of establishment set out in Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Commission regularly publishes guidelines based on the case law related to the right of establishment, addressing, inter alia, the concept of an effective or stable and continuous link with the economy. Article 86 of Directive 2014/25/EU also refers to the concept of a ‘direct and effective link with the economy’ which is equivalent to the concept of ‘substantive business operations’. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The origin of a service should be determined on the basis of the origin of the natural or legal person providing it.
  The origin of a legal person should be considered to be the country under the laws of which a legal person is constituted or organised and in the territory of which the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations. The criterion of substantive business operations should not allow the potential circumvention of any measure adopted under this Regulation by the creation of letterbox companies.


  The term ‘substantive business operations’ is a concept used in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services. In Union law it is equivalent to the term ‘effective and continuous link with the economy’ and is closely linked to the right of establishment set out in Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Commission regularly publishes guidelines based on the case law related to the right of establishment, addressing, inter alia, the concept of an effective or stable and continuous link with the economy. Article 86 of Directive 2014/25/EU also refers to the concept of a ‘direct and effective link with the economy’ which is equivalent to the concept of ‘substantive business operations’.

Amendment 13

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 15

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (15) | In the light of the overall policy objective of the Union to support the economic growth of developing countries and their integration into the global value chain, which is the basis for the establishment by the Union of a generalised system of preferences as outlined in Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council

   (6)

  , this Regulation should not apply to tenders where more than 50 % of the total value of the tender is made up of goods and services originating, in accordance with the Union’s non-preferential rules of origin, in least-developed countries benefitting from the ‘Everything But Arms’ arrangement or in developing countries considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system as defined respectively in Annexes IV and VII to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(15)

In the light of the overall policy objective of the Union to support the economic growth of developing countries and their integration into the global value chain, which is the basis for the establishment by the Union of a generalised system of preferences as outlined in Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council

   (6)

  , this Regulation should not apply to tenders where more than 50 % of the total value of the tender is made up of goods and services originating, in accordance with the Union’s non-preferential rules of origin, in least-developed countries benefitting from the ‘Everything But Arms’ arrangement or in developing countries considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system as defined respectively in Annexes IV and VII to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012.

deleted

Amendment 14

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 16

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (16) | In the light of the overall policy objective of the Union to support small and medium-sized enterprises, this Regulation should also not apply to tenders submitted by SMEs established in the Union and in engaged in substantive business operations entailing a direct and effective link with the economy of at least one Member State. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(16)

In the light of the overall policy objective of the Union to support small and medium-sized enterprises, this Regulation should also not apply to tenders submitted by SMEs established in the Union and in engaged in substantive business operations entailing a direct and effective link with the economy of at least one Member State.

deleted

Amendment 15

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 17

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (17) | When assessing whether
  restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement
  measures or practices exists in a third country, the Commission should examine to what degree laws on
  public
  procurement and concessions of the country concerned ensure transparency in line with international standards
  in the field of public procurement
  and
  preclude any discrimination
  against Union goods, services
  and
  economic operators. In addition, it should examine to what degree individual contracting authorities or contracting entities maintain or adopt
  discriminatory
  practices against Union goods, services
  and
  economic operators. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(17)

When assessing whether
  restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement
  measures or practices exists in a third country, the Commission should examine to what degree laws on
  public
  procurement and concessions of the country concerned ensure transparency in line with international standards
  in the field of public procurement
  and
  preclude any discrimination
  against Union goods, services
  and
  economic operators. In addition, it should examine to what degree individual contracting authorities or contracting entities maintain or adopt
  discriminatory
  practices against Union goods, services
  and
  economic operators.

| (17) | When assessing whether
  specific
  measures or practices exist in a third country
  that could result in the impairment of access of Union goods, services or economic operators to the procurement or concession markets
  , the Commission should examine to what degree laws,
  rules or other measures
  on procurement and concessions of the country concerned ensure transparency in line with international standards, and
  do not result in serious and recurring restrictions
  against Union goods, services
  or
  economic operators. In addition, it should examine to what degree individual contracting authorities or contracting entities maintain or adopt
  restrictive
  practices against Union goods, services
  or
  economic operators. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

When assessing whether
  specific
  measures or practices exist in a third country
  that could result in the impairment of access of Union goods, services or economic operators to the procurement or concession markets
  , the Commission should examine to what degree laws,
  rules or other measures
  on procurement and concessions of the country concerned ensure transparency in line with international standards, and
  do not result in serious and recurring restrictions
  against Union goods, services
  or
  economic operators. In addition, it should examine to what degree individual contracting authorities or contracting entities maintain or adopt
  restrictive
  practices against Union goods, services
  or
  economic operators.

Amendment 16

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (19) | The Commission should be able
  , on its own initiative or at the application of interested parties or a Member State,
  to initiate at any time an investigation into restrictive procurement measures or practices allegedly adopted or maintained by a third country.
  Such investigative procedures should be without prejudice to Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(19)

The Commission should be able
  , on its own initiative or at the application of interested parties or a Member State,
  to initiate at any time an investigation into restrictive procurement measures or practices allegedly adopted or maintained by a third country.
  Such investigative procedures should be without prejudice to Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

| (19) | The Commission should be able to initiate at any time
  a transparent
  investigation into restrictive or
  discriminatory
  procurement measures or practices allegedly adopted or maintained by a third country
  , if it considers that such an investigation is in the interest of the Union
  . |
| --- | --- |

(19)

The Commission should be able to initiate at any time
  a transparent
  investigation into restrictive or
  discriminatory
  procurement measures or practices allegedly adopted or maintained by a third country
  , if it considers that such an investigation is in the interest of the Union
  .

Amendment 17

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (19a) | The determination of whether an investigation is in the interest of the Union should be based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interests of the Union’s industry, users, consumers, workers and social partners. The Commission should weigh the consequences of starting or not starting an investigation against its impact, and the potential measures that could be adopted under this Regulation, in the Union’s broader interests. The general objective of achieving reciprocity by opening third-country markets and improving market access opportunities for Union economic operators should be given special consideration, and in that context the presence of third country bidders on EU procurement market could be taken into account. The objective of limiting any unnecessary administrative burden for contracting authorities and contracting entities as well as economic operators should also be taken into account. The Commission should pay particular attention to sectors that are considered strategic in respect of EU public procurement. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(19a)

The determination of whether an investigation is in the interest of the Union should be based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interests of the Union’s industry, users, consumers, workers and social partners. The Commission should weigh the consequences of starting or not starting an investigation against its impact, and the potential measures that could be adopted under this Regulation, in the Union’s broader interests. The general objective of achieving reciprocity by opening third-country markets and improving market access opportunities for Union economic operators should be given special consideration, and in that context the presence of third country bidders on EU procurement market could be taken into account. The objective of limiting any unnecessary administrative burden for contracting authorities and contracting entities as well as economic operators should also be taken into account. The Commission should pay particular attention to sectors that are considered strategic in respect of EU public procurement.

Amendment 18

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 19 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (19b) | Given the overall policy objective of the Union to support the economic growth of least developed countries (LDCs), of low and lower-middle income countries, and their integration into global value chains, it would not be in the Union’s interest to start an investigation against such countries under this Regulation, unless there are reasonable indications of circumvention of any adopted IPI measures. Consequently, this Regulation is not intended to apply to LDCs benefitting from the ‘Everything But Arms’ arrangement, developing countries considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system, as defined in Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, as well as to countries beneficiaries of the general arrangement referred to in that Regulation, unless the economy of such countries is considered to be competitive in the sectors concerned. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(19b)

Given the overall policy objective of the Union to support the economic growth of least developed countries (LDCs), of low and lower-middle income countries, and their integration into global value chains, it would not be in the Union’s interest to start an investigation against such countries under this Regulation, unless there are reasonable indications of circumvention of any adopted IPI measures. Consequently, this Regulation is not intended to apply to LDCs benefitting from the ‘Everything But Arms’ arrangement, developing countries considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system, as defined in Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, as well as to countries beneficiaries of the general arrangement referred to in that Regulation, unless the economy of such countries is considered to be competitive in the sectors concerned.

Amendment 19

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (20) | If the existence of a restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement measure or practice in a third country is confirmed,
  the Commission should invite the country concerned to enter into consultations with a view to improving the tendering opportunities for Union economic operators, goods and services
  in respect of public
  procurement in that country. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(20)

If the existence of a restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement measure or practice in a third country is confirmed,
  the Commission should invite the country concerned to enter into consultations with a view to improving the tendering opportunities for Union economic operators, goods and services
  in respect of public
  procurement in that country.

| (20) | When conducting the investigation,
  the Commission should invite the
  third
  country concerned to enter into consultations with a view to
  eliminating and remedying any restrictive measures or practices and effectively
  improving the tendering opportunities for Union economic operators, goods and services
  regarding
  procurement
  and concessions markets
  in that country. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

When conducting the investigation,
  the Commission should invite the
  third
  country concerned to enter into consultations with a view to
  eliminating and remedying any restrictive measures or practices and effectively
  improving the tendering opportunities for Union economic operators, goods and services
  regarding
  procurement
  and concessions markets
  in that country.

Amendment 20

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 22

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (22) | If the consultations with the country concerned do not lead to
  sufficient
  improvements to the tendering opportunities for Union economic operators, goods and services within a reasonable timeframe, the Commission should be able to adopt
  , where appropriate, price adjustment measures applying to tenders submitted by economic operators originating in that country and/or including goods and services originating in that country. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(22)

If the consultations with the country concerned do not lead to
  sufficient
  improvements to the tendering opportunities for Union economic operators, goods and services within a reasonable timeframe, the Commission should be able to adopt
  , where appropriate, price adjustment measures applying to tenders submitted by economic operators originating in that country and/or including goods and services originating in that country.

| (22) | If
  the investigation confirms the existence of restrictive measures or practices, and
  the consultations with the country concerned do not lead to
  satisfactory corrective actions that result in effectively remedying the serious and recurrent impairment of access
  for Union economic operators, goods and services within a reasonable timeframe
  or the third country concerned declines to enter into consultations,
  the Commission should adopt,
  under this Regulation, IPI measures in the form of a score adjustment or exclusion of tenders. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

If
  the investigation confirms the existence of restrictive measures or practices, and
  the consultations with the country concerned do not lead to
  satisfactory corrective actions that result in effectively remedying the serious and recurrent impairment of access
  for Union economic operators, goods and services within a reasonable timeframe
  or the third country concerned declines to enter into consultations,
  the Commission should adopt,
  under this Regulation, IPI measures in the form of a score adjustment or exclusion of tenders.

Amendment 21

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 23

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (23) | Such measures should be applied only for the purpose of the evaluation of tenders comprising goods or services originating in the country concerned. To avoid circumvention of those measures, it may also be necessary to target certain foreign- controlled or owned legal persons that, although established in the European Union, are not engaged in substantive business operations that have a direct and effective link with the economy of at least one Member State. Appropriate measures should not be disproportionate to the restrictive procurement practices to which they respond. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23)

Such measures should be applied only for the purpose of the evaluation of tenders comprising goods or services originating in the country concerned. To avoid circumvention of those measures, it may also be necessary to target certain foreign- controlled or owned legal persons that, although established in the European Union, are not engaged in substantive business operations that have a direct and effective link with the economy of at least one Member State. Appropriate measures should not be disproportionate to the restrictive procurement practices to which they respond.

| (23) | A score adjustment measure should be applied only for the purpose of the evaluation of tenders submitted by economic operators originating in the country concerned. It should not affect the price actually due to be paid under the contract to be concluded with the successful tenderer. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

A score adjustment measure should be applied only for the purpose of the evaluation of tenders submitted by economic operators originating in the country concerned. It should not affect the price actually due to be paid under the contract to be concluded with the successful tenderer.

Amendment 22

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 23 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (23a) | IPI measures should apply to procurement procedures falling under the scope of this Regulation, including framework agreements and dynamic purchasing systems. IPI measures should also apply in the case of specific contracts awarded under a dynamic purchasing system, where those dynamic purchasing systems are subject to an IPI measure. However, they should not apply to such contracts below a certain threshold with a view to limiting the overall administrative burden for contracting authorities and contracting entities. In order to avoid a possible double application of IPI measures, such measures should not apply to contracts awarded based on a framework agreement, once IPI measures have already been applied at the stage of concluding that framework agreement. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23a)

IPI measures should apply to procurement procedures falling under the scope of this Regulation, including framework agreements and dynamic purchasing systems. IPI measures should also apply in the case of specific contracts awarded under a dynamic purchasing system, where those dynamic purchasing systems are subject to an IPI measure. However, they should not apply to such contracts below a certain threshold with a view to limiting the overall administrative burden for contracting authorities and contracting entities. In order to avoid a possible double application of IPI measures, such measures should not apply to contracts awarded based on a framework agreement, once IPI measures have already been applied at the stage of concluding that framework agreement.

Amendment 23

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 23 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (23b) | In light of the overall policy objective of the Union to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the Commission and contracting authorities and contracting entities should duly consider the effects of this Regulation, with a view to preventing an overburdening of SMEs. The Commission in cooperation with the Member States should make available guidelines for best practices to achieve this objective, in order to ensure the efficiency of this Regulation and the consistency of its implementation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23b)

In light of the overall policy objective of the Union to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the Commission and contracting authorities and contracting entities should duly consider the effects of this Regulation, with a view to preventing an overburdening of SMEs. The Commission in cooperation with the Member States should make available guidelines for best practices to achieve this objective, in order to ensure the efficiency of this Regulation and the consistency of its implementation.

Amendment 24

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 23 c (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (23c) | To avoid a possible circumvention of an IPI measure, additional contractual obligations should be imposed on successful tenderers. Those obligations should apply only in case of procurement procedures to which an IPI measure is applicable, as well as to contracts awarded based on a framework agreement where such contracts are equal to or above a certain threshold and when that framework agreement is subject to an IPI measure. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23c)

To avoid a possible circumvention of an IPI measure, additional contractual obligations should be imposed on successful tenderers. Those obligations should apply only in case of procurement procedures to which an IPI measure is applicable, as well as to contracts awarded based on a framework agreement where such contracts are equal to or above a certain threshold and when that framework agreement is subject to an IPI measure.

Amendment 25

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 24

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (24) | Price adjustment measures should not have a negative impact on on-going trade negotiations with the country concerned. Therefore, where a country is engaging in substantive negotiations with the Union concerning market access in the field of public procurement, the Commission may suspend the measures during the negotiations. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(24)

Price adjustment measures should not have a negative impact on on-going trade negotiations with the country concerned. Therefore, where a country is engaging in substantive negotiations with the Union concerning market access in the field of public procurement, the Commission may suspend the measures during the negotiations.

deleted

Amendment 26

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 25

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (25) | In order to simplify the application of a price adjustment measure by contracting authorities or contracting entities, there should be a presumption that all economic operators originating in a targeted third country with which there is no agreement on procurement will be subject to the measure, unless they can demonstrate that less than 50 % of the total value of their tender is made up of goods or services originating in the third country concerned. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(25)

In order to simplify the application of a price adjustment measure by contracting authorities or contracting entities, there should be a presumption that all economic operators originating in a targeted third country with which there is no agreement on procurement will be subject to the measure, unless they can demonstrate that less than 50 % of the total value of their tender is made up of goods or services originating in the third country concerned.

deleted

Amendment 27

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 26

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (26) | Member States are best placed to identify the contracting authorities or contracting entities, or categories of contracting authorities or contracting entities, which should apply the price adjustment measure. To ensure that an appropriate level of action is taken and that a fair distribution of the burden among Member States is achieved, the Commission should take the final decision, based on a list submitted by each Member State. Where necessary, the Commission may establish a list on its own initiative. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(26)

Member States are best placed to identify the contracting authorities or contracting entities, or categories of contracting authorities or contracting entities, which should apply the price adjustment measure. To ensure that an appropriate level of action is taken and that a fair distribution of the burden among Member States is achieved, the Commission should take the final decision, based on a list submitted by each Member State. Where necessary, the Commission may establish a list on its own initiative.

deleted

Amendment 28

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 27

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (27) | It is imperative that contracting authorities and contracting entities have access to a range of high-quality products meeting their purchasing requirements at a competitive price. Therefore contracting authorities and contracting entities should be able
  not to
  apply
  price adjustment
  measures limiting access of non-covered goods and services
  in case
  there are no Union and/or covered goods or services available which meet the requirements of the contracting authority or contracting entity to
  safeguard
  essential public needs, for example
  in the fields of health and public safety, or where the
  application of
  the measure would lead to a disproportionate increase in the price or costs of the contract. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(27)

It is imperative that contracting authorities and contracting entities have access to a range of high-quality products meeting their purchasing requirements at a competitive price. Therefore contracting authorities and contracting entities should be able
  not to
  apply
  price adjustment
  measures limiting access of non-covered goods and services
  in case
  there are no Union and/or covered goods or services available which meet the requirements of the contracting authority or contracting entity to
  safeguard
  essential public needs, for example
  in the fields of health and public safety, or where the
  application of
  the measure would lead to a disproportionate increase in the price or costs of the contract.

| (27) | It is imperative that contracting authorities and contracting entities have access to a range of high-quality products meeting their purchasing requirements at a competitive price. Therefore, contracting authorities and contracting entities should be able
  , on an exceptional basis, to not
  apply
  IPI
  measures limiting access of non-covered goods and services
  where
  there are no Union and/or covered goods or services available which meet the requirements of the contracting authority or contracting entity
  or where such action relates
  to
  safeguarding
  essential public
  policy
  needs, for example
  regarding public health or protection of the environment. The
  application of
  these exceptions should require the approval of the Commission. The contracting authorities and contracting entities should notify the Commission in a timely and comprehensive manner to allow for the appropriate monitoring of the implementation of this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

It is imperative that contracting authorities and contracting entities have access to a range of high-quality products meeting their purchasing requirements at a competitive price. Therefore, contracting authorities and contracting entities should be able
  , on an exceptional basis, to not
  apply
  IPI
  measures limiting access of non-covered goods and services
  where
  there are no Union and/or covered goods or services available which meet the requirements of the contracting authority or contracting entity
  or where such action relates
  to
  safeguarding
  essential public
  policy
  needs, for example
  regarding public health or protection of the environment. The
  application of
  these exceptions should require the approval of the Commission. The contracting authorities and contracting entities should notify the Commission in a timely and comprehensive manner to allow for the appropriate monitoring of the implementation of this Regulation.

Amendment 29

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 28

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (28) | In case of misapplication by contracting authorities or contracting entities of exceptions to
  price adjustment
  measures limiting access of non-covered goods and services, the Commission should be able to apply the corrective mechanism of Article 3 of Council Directive 89/665/EEC (20) or Article 8 of Council Directive 92/13/EEC (21) . In addition, contracts concluded with an economic operator by contracting authorities or contracting entities in violation of
  price adjustment
  measures limiting access of non-covered goods and services should be ineffective. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(28)

In case of misapplication by contracting authorities or contracting entities of exceptions to
  price adjustment
  measures limiting access of non-covered goods and services, the Commission should be able to apply the corrective mechanism of Article 3 of Council Directive 89/665/EEC (20) or Article 8 of Council Directive 92/13/EEC (21) . In addition, contracts concluded with an economic operator by contracting authorities or contracting entities in violation of
  price adjustment
  measures limiting access of non-covered goods and services should be ineffective.

| (28) | In case of misapplication by contracting authorities or contracting entities of exceptions to
  IPI
  measures limiting access of non-covered goods and services, the Commission should be able to apply the corrective mechanism of Article 3 of Council Directive 89/665/EEC (20) or Article 8 of Council Directive 92/13/EEC (21). In addition, contracts concluded with an economic operator by contracting authorities or contracting entities in violation of
  IPI
  measures limiting access of non-covered goods and services should be ineffective. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In case of misapplication by contracting authorities or contracting entities of exceptions to
  IPI
  measures limiting access of non-covered goods and services, the Commission should be able to apply the corrective mechanism of Article 3 of Council Directive 89/665/EEC (20) or Article 8 of Council Directive 92/13/EEC (21). In addition, contracts concluded with an economic operator by contracting authorities or contracting entities in violation of
  IPI
  measures limiting access of non-covered goods and services should be ineffective.

Amendment 30

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 30

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (30) | The examination procedure should be used for the adoption of implementing acts regarding the adoption, withdrawal,
  or
  suspension or reinstatement of
  a the price adjustment
  measure. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(30)

The examination procedure should be used for the adoption of implementing acts regarding the adoption, withdrawal,
  or
  suspension or reinstatement of
  a the price adjustment
  measure.

| (30) | The examination procedure should be used for the adoption of implementing acts regarding the adoption, withdrawal, suspension or reinstatement of
  an IPI
  measure
  and the Commission should be assisted by the Committee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1843 of the European Parliament and of the Council

   (22)

  (the ‘Trade Barriers Regulation’). If necessary and for matters affecting the Union’s legal framework on public procurement, the Commission should be able to also seek the advice of the Advisory Committee on Public Procurement established by Council Decision 71/306/EEC. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The examination procedure should be used for the adoption of implementing acts regarding the adoption, withdrawal, suspension or reinstatement of
  an IPI
  measure
  and the Commission should be assisted by the Committee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1843 of the European Parliament and of the Council

   (22)

  (the ‘Trade Barriers Regulation’). If necessary and for matters affecting the Union’s legal framework on public procurement, the Commission should be able to also seek the advice of the Advisory Committee on Public Procurement established by Council Decision 71/306/EEC.

Amendment 31

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 30 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (30a) | Information received pursuant to this Regulation should only be used for the purpose for which it was requested and with due respect to the applicable Union and national data protection and confidentiality requirements. Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 as well as Article 28 of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 21 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 39 of Directive 2014/25/EU, should apply accordingly. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(30a)

Information received pursuant to this Regulation should only be used for the purpose for which it was requested and with due respect to the applicable Union and national data protection and confidentiality requirements. Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 as well as Article 28 of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 21 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 39 of Directive 2014/25/EU, should apply accordingly.

Amendment 32

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 32

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (32) | Regular reporting by
  the Commission should
  make it possible to monitor
  the
  application
  and efficiency of
  the procedures established by
  this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(32)

Regular reporting by
  the Commission should
  make it possible to monitor
  the
  application
  and efficiency of
  the procedures established by
  this Regulation.

| (32) | In line with the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making

   (1a)

  and with a view, inter alia, to reduce administrative burdens, in particular on Member States
  , the Commission should
  regularly review
  the
  scope, functioning
  and efficiency of this Regulation.
  The Commission should report on its assessment to the European Parliament and the Council. The review may be followed up by appropriate legislative proposals. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (hereinafter the Financial Regulation) provides that procurement rules and principles applicable to public contracts awarded by Union institutions on their own account should be based on the rules set out in the relevant EU acquis on public procurement. When reviewing the Financial Regulation, it is therefore appropriate to provide for the application of the IPI Regulation also to public contracts awarded by Union institutions.

Amendment 33

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 33

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (33) | In accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate for achievement of the basic objective of establishing a common external policy in the field of public procurement to lay down common rules on the treatment of tenders which include goods and services not covered by the international commitments of the Union. This Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives pursued, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(33)

In accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate for achievement of the basic objective of establishing a common external policy in the field of public procurement to lay down common rules on the treatment of tenders which include goods and services not covered by the international commitments of the Union. This Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives pursued, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union,

deleted

Amendment 34

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   This Regulation establishes measures intended to improve the access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the
  public
  procurement and concessions markets of third countries. It lays down procedures for the Commission to undertake investigations into alleged
  restrictive and discriminatory procurement
  measures or practices
  adopted or maintained by third countries
  against Union economic operators, goods and services, and to enter into consultations with the third countries concerned. | 1.   This Regulation establishes measures intended to improve the access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the procurement and concessions markets of third countries
  , regarding non-covered procurement
  . It lays down procedures for the Commission to undertake investigations into alleged
  third-country
  measures or practices against Union economic operators, goods and services, and to enter into consultations with the third countries concerned. |
| It
  provides for the possibility
  of applying price adjustment
  measures
  to certain tenders for contracts for the execution of works or a work, for
  the
  supply of goods and/or the provision of services and for concessions, on the basis of the origin of the
  economic operators, goods or services
  concerned
  . | This Regulation
  provides for the possibility
  for the Commission to impose IPI
  measures
  , by means of implementing acts, in relation to such third country measures or practices to restrict
  the
  access of
  economic operators, goods or services
  from third countries to Union procurement procedures
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1.   This Regulation establishes measures intended to improve the access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the
  public
  procurement and concessions markets of third countries. It lays down procedures for the Commission to undertake investigations into alleged
  restrictive and discriminatory procurement
  measures or practices
  adopted or maintained by third countries
  against Union economic operators, goods and services, and to enter into consultations with the third countries concerned.

1.   This Regulation establishes measures intended to improve the access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the procurement and concessions markets of third countries
  , regarding non-covered procurement
  . It lays down procedures for the Commission to undertake investigations into alleged
  third-country
  measures or practices against Union economic operators, goods and services, and to enter into consultations with the third countries concerned.

It
  provides for the possibility
  of applying price adjustment
  measures
  to certain tenders for contracts for the execution of works or a work, for
  the
  supply of goods and/or the provision of services and for concessions, on the basis of the origin of the
  economic operators, goods or services
  concerned
  .

It

of applying price adjustment

to certain tenders for contracts for the execution of works or a work, for

supply of goods and/or the provision of services and for concessions, on the basis of the origin of the

concerned

This Regulation
  provides for the possibility
  for the Commission to impose IPI
  measures
  , by means of implementing acts, in relation to such third country measures or practices to restrict
  the
  access of
  economic operators, goods or services
  from third countries to Union procurement procedures
  .

This Regulation

for the Commission to impose IPI

, by means of implementing acts, in relation to such third country measures or practices to restrict

access of

from third countries to Union procurement procedures

Amendment 35

Amendment 35

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 2 — introductory part

Article 1 — paragraph 2 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   This Regulation shall apply to
  contracts
  covered by the following acts: | 2.   This Regulation shall apply to
  procurement procedures
  covered by the following acts: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   This Regulation shall apply to
  contracts
  covered by the following acts:

2.   This Regulation shall apply to
  procurement procedures
  covered by the following acts:

Amendment 36

Amendment 36

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 3

Article 1 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.
     
  This Regulation shall apply to the award of contracts for the supply of goods and/or services and to the award of works and services concessions. It shall only apply where the goods or services are procured for governmental purposes. It shall not apply where the goods are purchased with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale. It shall not apply where the services are purchased with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the supply of services for commercial sale. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.
     
  This Regulation shall apply to the award of contracts for the supply of goods and/or services and to the award of works and services concessions. It shall only apply where the goods or services are procured for governmental purposes. It shall not apply where the goods are purchased with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale. It shall not apply where the services are purchased with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the supply of services for commercial sale.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 37

Amendment 37

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 4

Article 1 — paragraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.
     
  This Regulation shall apply only with regard to restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement measures or practices implemented by a third country in respect of purchases of non-covered goods and services. The application of this Regulation shall be without prejudice to any international obligations of the Union. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.
     
  This Regulation shall apply only with regard to restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement measures or practices implemented by a third country in respect of purchases of non-covered goods and services. The application of this Regulation shall be without prejudice to any international obligations of the Union.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 38

Amendment 38

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 4 a (new)

Article 1 — paragraph 4 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 4a.
     
  This Regulation shall be without prejudice to any international obligations of the Union or measures that Member States and their contracting authorities and contracting entities may take in accordance with the acts referred to in paragraph 2. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4a.
     
  This Regulation shall be without prejudice to any international obligations of the Union or measures that Member States and their contracting authorities and contracting entities may take in accordance with the acts referred to in paragraph 2.

Amendment 39

Amendment 39

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 5 a (new)

Article 1 — paragraph 5 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 5a.
     
  This Regulation shall only apply to procurement procedures launched after its entry into force. An IPI measure shall only apply to procurement procedures covered by the IPI measure and launched at any moment between the entry into force of that IPI measure and its expiry, withdrawal or suspension. A reference to the application of this Regulation and any applicable IPI measure shall be included by contracting authorities and contracting entities in the procurement documents for procedures falling within the scope of an IPI measure. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

5a.
     
  This Regulation shall only apply to procurement procedures launched after its entry into force. An IPI measure shall only apply to procurement procedures covered by the IPI measure and launched at any moment between the entry into force of that IPI measure and its expiry, withdrawal or suspension. A reference to the application of this Regulation and any applicable IPI measure shall be included by contracting authorities and contracting entities in the procurement documents for procedures falling within the scope of an IPI measure.

Amendment 40

Amendment 40

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 5 b (new)

Article 1 — paragraph 5 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 5b.
     
  Contracting authorities and contracting entities shall, in order to appropriately integrate environmental, social and labour requirements into public procurement and concession award procedures, take relevant measures to ensure that environmental, social and labour obligations resulting from laws, regulations or administrative provisions, at both Union and national level, as well as from collective agreements compatible with Union law, applicable to the procurement contract, are complied with. Equally, obligations stemming from international conventions ratified by all Member States and listed in Annex X to Directive 2014/23/EU, Annex X to Directive 2014/24/EU and Annex XIV to Directive 2014/25/EU shall apply during the execution of the contract. |
| | Member States shall inform the Commission of any difficulties, in law or in fact, encountered and reported by their economic operators and which are due to the non-observance of the international environmental, social and labour law referred to in subparagraph 1, when those undertakings have tried to secure the award of contracts within the EU or in third countries. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

5b.
     
  Contracting authorities and contracting entities shall, in order to appropriately integrate environmental, social and labour requirements into public procurement and concession award procedures, take relevant measures to ensure that environmental, social and labour obligations resulting from laws, regulations or administrative provisions, at both Union and national level, as well as from collective agreements compatible with Union law, applicable to the procurement contract, are complied with. Equally, obligations stemming from international conventions ratified by all Member States and listed in Annex X to Directive 2014/23/EU, Annex X to Directive 2014/24/EU and Annex XIV to Directive 2014/25/EU shall apply during the execution of the contract.

Member States shall inform the Commission of any difficulties, in law or in fact, encountered and reported by their economic operators and which are due to the non-observance of the international environmental, social and labour law referred to in subparagraph 1, when those undertakings have tried to secure the award of contracts within the EU or in third countries.

Member States shall inform the Commission of any difficulties, in law or in fact, encountered and reported by their economic operators and which are due to the non-observance of the international environmental, social and labour law referred to in subparagraph 1, when those undertakings have tried to secure the award of contracts within the EU or in third countries.

Amendment 41

Amendment 41

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1– point a

Article 2 — paragraph 1– point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | ‘economic operator’ means
  any natural or legal person or public entity or group of such persons and/or entities, including any temporary association of undertakings, which submits a tender for the execution of works and/or a work, the supply of goods or the provision of services on the market; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

‘economic operator’ means
  any natural or legal person or public entity or group of such persons and/or entities, including any temporary association of undertakings, which submits a tender for the execution of works and/or a work, the supply of goods or the provision of services on the market;

any natural or legal person or public entity or group of such persons and/or entities, including any temporary association of undertakings, which submits a tender for the execution of works and/or a work, the supply of goods or the provision of services on the market;

| (a) | ‘economic operator’ means
  an economic operator as defined in Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

‘economic operator’ means
  an economic operator as defined in Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU;

an economic operator as defined in Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU;

Amendment 42

Amendment 42

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1– point a a (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1– point a a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (aa) | ‘goods’ means goods referred to in the object of the public procurement tender and in the specifications of the contract, but does not cover any input, material or ingredient incorporated in the supplied goods; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(aa)

(aa)

‘goods’ means goods referred to in the object of the public procurement tender and in the specifications of the contract, but does not cover any input, material or ingredient incorporated in the supplied goods;

‘goods’ means goods referred to in the object of the public procurement tender and in the specifications of the contract, but does not cover any input, material or ingredient incorporated in the supplied goods;

Amendment 43

Amendment 43

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1– point a b (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1– point a b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ab) | ‘estimated value’ means the estimated value of a contract calculated in accordance with Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ab)

(ab)

‘estimated value’ means the estimated value of a contract calculated in accordance with Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU;

‘estimated value’ means the estimated value of a contract calculated in accordance with Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU;

Amendment 44

Amendment 44

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1– point a c (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1– point a c (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ac) | ‘evidence’ means any information, certificate, supporting document, statement and other means of proof aimed at proving compliance with the obligations set out in Article 9a(1)(c), such as:










  (i) | certificates of origin, supplier declarations or import declarations for goods originating in third countries; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ac)

(ac)

‘evidence’ means any information, certificate, supporting document, statement and other means of proof aimed at proving compliance with the obligations set out in Article 9a(1)(c), such as:

‘evidence’ means any information, certificate, supporting document, statement and other means of proof aimed at proving compliance with the obligations set out in Article 9a(1)(c), such as:

(i)

(i)

certificates of origin, supplier declarations or import declarations for goods originating in third countries;

certificates of origin, supplier declarations or import declarations for goods originating in third countries;

| (ii) | a description of manufacturing processes (including samples, descriptions or photographs) for goods to be supplied; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

(ii)

a description of manufacturing processes (including samples, descriptions or photographs) for goods to be supplied;

a description of manufacturing processes (including samples, descriptions or photographs) for goods to be supplied;

| (iii) | an extract of relevant registers or of financial statements for the origin of services, including a VAT identification number; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

(iii)

an extract of relevant registers or of financial statements for the origin of services, including a VAT identification number;

an extract of relevant registers or of financial statements for the origin of services, including a VAT identification number;

Amendment 45

Amendment 45

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1– point a d (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1– point a d (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ad) | ‘score adjustment measure’ means the relative diminution by a given percentage of the score of a tender, resulting from its evaluation by a contracting authority or a contracting entity, on the basis of the contract award criteria defined in the procurement documents. In cases where price or cost is the only contract award criterion, the score adjustment measure means the relative increase, for the purpose of the evaluation of tenders, by a given percentage of the price offered by a tenderer; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ad)

(ad)

‘score adjustment measure’ means the relative diminution by a given percentage of the score of a tender, resulting from its evaluation by a contracting authority or a contracting entity, on the basis of the contract award criteria defined in the procurement documents. In cases where price or cost is the only contract award criterion, the score adjustment measure means the relative increase, for the purpose of the evaluation of tenders, by a given percentage of the price offered by a tenderer;

‘score adjustment measure’ means the relative diminution by a given percentage of the score of a tender, resulting from its evaluation by a contracting authority or a contracting entity, on the basis of the contract award criteria defined in the procurement documents. In cases where price or cost is the only contract award criterion, the score adjustment measure means the relative increase, for the purpose of the evaluation of tenders, by a given percentage of the price offered by a tenderer;

Amendment 46

Amendment 46

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point b

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | contracting authority means ‘contracting authority’ as defined in
  Article 2(1) of Directive
  2014/24/EU; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

contracting authority means ‘contracting authority’ as defined in
  Article 2(1) of Directive
  2014/24/EU;

Article 2(1) of Directive

| (b) | ‘contracting authority’ means
  a
  contracting authority as defined in
  Directives 2014/23/EU,
  2014/24/EU
  and 2014/25/EU
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

‘contracting authority’ means
  a
  contracting authority as defined in
  Directives 2014/23/EU,
  2014/24/EU
  and 2014/25/EU
  ;

a

Directives 2014/23/EU,

and 2014/25/EU

Amendment 47

Amendment 47

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point c

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point c

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | ‘contracting entity’ means ‘contracting entity’ as defined in
  Article 4(1) of
  Directive
  2014/25/EU
  and
  Article 7 of Directive 2014/23/EU
  ; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(c)

‘contracting entity’ means ‘contracting entity’ as defined in
  Article 4(1) of
  Directive
  2014/25/EU
  and
  Article 7 of Directive 2014/23/EU
  ;

Article 4(1) of

2014/25/EU

Article 7 of Directive 2014/23/EU

| (c) | ‘contracting entity’ means
  a
  contracting entity as defined in Directives
  2014/23/EU
  and
  2014/25/EU
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

‘contracting entity’ means
  a
  contracting entity as defined in Directives
  2014/23/EU
  and
  2014/25/EU
  ;

a

2014/23/EU

2014/25/EU

Amendment 48

Amendment 48

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point c a (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point c a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ca) | ‘interested party’ means any person or entity whose interest might be affected by a third country measure, such as undertakings, an association of undertakings, trade associations, trade unions, or civil society organisations, including consumers organisations; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ca)

(ca)

‘interested party’ means any person or entity whose interest might be affected by a third country measure, such as undertakings, an association of undertakings, trade associations, trade unions, or civil society organisations, including consumers organisations;

‘interested party’ means any person or entity whose interest might be affected by a third country measure, such as undertakings, an association of undertakings, trade associations, trade unions, or civil society organisations, including consumers organisations;

Amendment 49

Amendment 49

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point d

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point d

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (d) | ‘covered goods or services’ means a goods or services originating in a country with which the Union has concluded an international agreement in the field of public procurement and/or concessions including market access commitments and in respect of which the relevant agreement applies; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(d)

(d)

‘covered goods or services’ means a goods or services originating in a country with which the Union has concluded an international agreement in the field of public procurement and/or concessions including market access commitments and in respect of which the relevant agreement applies;

‘covered goods or services’ means a goods or services originating in a country with which the Union has concluded an international agreement in the field of public procurement and/or concessions including market access commitments and in respect of which the relevant agreement applies;

deleted

deleted

Amendment 50

Amendment 50

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point e

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point e

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (e) | ‘non-covered goods or services’ means a goods or services originating in a country with which the Union has not concluded an international agreement in the field of public procurement or concessions including market access commitments, as well as goods or services originating in a country with which the Union has concluded such an agreement but in respect of which the relevant agreement does not apply; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(e)

(e)

‘non-covered goods or services’ means a goods or services originating in a country with which the Union has not concluded an international agreement in the field of public procurement or concessions including market access commitments, as well as goods or services originating in a country with which the Union has concluded such an agreement but in respect of which the relevant agreement does not apply;

‘non-covered goods or services’ means a goods or services originating in a country with which the Union has not concluded an international agreement in the field of public procurement or concessions including market access commitments, as well as goods or services originating in a country with which the Union has concluded such an agreement but in respect of which the relevant agreement does not apply;

deleted

deleted

Amendment 51

Amendment 51

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point f

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point f

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (f) | ‘restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement
  measure or practice’ means any legislative, regulatory or administrative measure, procedure or practice, or combination thereof, adopted or maintained by public authorities or individual contracting authorities or contracting entities in a third country, that result in a serious and recurrent impairment of access of Union goods, services and/or economic operators to the
  public
  procurement or concession
  market of that country
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(f)

‘restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement
  measure or practice’ means any legislative, regulatory or administrative measure, procedure or practice, or combination thereof, adopted or maintained by public authorities or individual contracting authorities or contracting entities in a third country, that result in a serious and recurrent impairment of access of Union goods, services and/or economic operators to the
  public
  procurement or concession
  market of that country
  .

‘restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement

public

market of that country

| (f) | ‘third-country
  measure or practice’ means any legislative, regulatory or administrative measure, procedure or practice, or combination thereof
  , of a general nature, stemming from a national or sub-national policy,
  adopted or maintained by public authorities or individual contracting authorities or contracting entities in a third country, that results in a serious and recurrent impairment of access of Union goods, services and/or economic operators to the procurement or concession
  markets
  . |
| --- | --- |

(f)

‘third-country
  measure or practice’ means any legislative, regulatory or administrative measure, procedure or practice, or combination thereof
  , of a general nature, stemming from a national or sub-national policy,
  adopted or maintained by public authorities or individual contracting authorities or contracting entities in a third country, that results in a serious and recurrent impairment of access of Union goods, services and/or economic operators to the procurement or concession
  markets
  .

‘third-country

, of a general nature, stemming from a national or sub-national policy,

markets

Amendment 52

Amendment 52

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point f a (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point f a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (fa) | ‘IPI measure’ means a measure adopted by the Commission under this Regulation limiting the access of economic operators and/or goods and services originating in third countries to the Union procurement or concessions market in the area of non-covered procurement; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(fa)

(fa)

‘IPI measure’ means a measure adopted by the Commission under this Regulation limiting the access of economic operators and/or goods and services originating in third countries to the Union procurement or concessions market in the area of non-covered procurement;

‘IPI measure’ means a measure adopted by the Commission under this Regulation limiting the access of economic operators and/or goods and services originating in third countries to the Union procurement or concessions market in the area of non-covered procurement;

Amendment 53

Amendment 53

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point f b (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point f b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (fb) | ‘non-covered procurement’ means procurement procedures for goods, services or concessions regarding which the Union has not undertaken market access commitments in an international agreement in the field of procurement or concessions; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(fb)

(fb)

‘non-covered procurement’ means procurement procedures for goods, services or concessions regarding which the Union has not undertaken market access commitments in an international agreement in the field of procurement or concessions;

‘non-covered procurement’ means procurement procedures for goods, services or concessions regarding which the Union has not undertaken market access commitments in an international agreement in the field of procurement or concessions;

Amendment 54

Amendment 54

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point f c (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point f c (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (fc) | ‘contracts’ means ‘public contracts’ as defined in Directive 2014/24/EU, ‘concessions’ as defined in Directive 2014/23/EU and ‘supply, works and service contracts’ as defined in Directive 2014/25/EU; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(fc)

(fc)

‘contracts’ means ‘public contracts’ as defined in Directive 2014/24/EU, ‘concessions’ as defined in Directive 2014/23/EU and ‘supply, works and service contracts’ as defined in Directive 2014/25/EU;

‘contracts’ means ‘public contracts’ as defined in Directive 2014/24/EU, ‘concessions’ as defined in Directive 2014/23/EU and ‘supply, works and service contracts’ as defined in Directive 2014/25/EU;

Amendment 55

Amendment 55

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point f d (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point f d (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (fd) | ‘tenderer’ means a tenderer as defined in Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(fd)

(fd)

‘tenderer’ means a tenderer as defined in Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU;

‘tenderer’ means a tenderer as defined in Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU;

Amendment 56

Amendment 56

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point g a (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point g a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ga) | ‘subcontracting’ means arranging the part execution of a contract by a third party; the simple delivery of goods or parts necessary for the provision of a service is not considered to be subcontracting. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ga)

(ga)

‘subcontracting’ means arranging the part execution of a contract by a third party; the simple delivery of goods or parts necessary for the provision of a service is not considered to be subcontracting.

‘subcontracting’ means arranging the part execution of a contract by a third party; the simple delivery of goods or parts necessary for the provision of a service is not considered to be subcontracting.

Amendment 57

Amendment 57

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point h

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point h

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (h) | SME means SME as defined in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC

   (23)

  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(h)

(h)

SME means SME as defined in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC

   (23)

  .

SME means SME as defined in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC

23

.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 58

Amendment 58

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 2

Article 2 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   For the purpose of this Regulation, the execution of works
  and/
  or a work within the meaning of Directives
  2014/25/EU
  , 2014/24/EU and Directive
  2014/23/EU
  shall be considered as the provision of a service. | 2.   For the purpose of this Regulation,
  except for Articles 8a(3) and 8a(7)thereof,
  the execution of works or a work within the meaning of Directives
  2014/23/EU
  , 2014/24/EU and Directive
  2014/25/EU
  shall be considered as the provision of a service. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   For the purpose of this Regulation, the execution of works
  and/
  or a work within the meaning of Directives
  2014/25/EU
  , 2014/24/EU and Directive
  2014/23/EU
  shall be considered as the provision of a service.

2.   For the purpose of this Regulation,
  except for Articles 8a(3) and 8a(7)thereof,
  the execution of works or a work within the meaning of Directives
  2014/23/EU
  , 2014/24/EU and Directive
  2014/25/EU
  shall be considered as the provision of a service.

Amendment 59

Amendment 59

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — title

Article 3 — title

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Rules
  of origin | Determination
  of origin |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Rules
  of origin

Rules

Determination
  of origin

Determination

Amendment 60

Amendment 60

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 1

Article 3 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.
     
  The origin of a good shall be determined in accordance with Article 22 to 26 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/1992

   (24)

  . | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.
     
  The origin of a good shall be determined in accordance with Article 22 to 26 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/1992

   (24)

  .

deleted

deleted

Amendment 61

Amendment 61

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 2

Article 3 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.
     
  The origin of a service shall be determined on the basis of the origin of economic operator providing it. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.
     
  The origin of a service shall be determined on the basis of the origin of economic operator providing it.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 62

Amendment 62

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 3 –subparagraph 1 — point a

Article 3 — paragraph 3 –subparagraph 1 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | in the case of a natural person, the country of which the person is a national or where
  he
  has a right of permanent residence; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

in the case of a natural person, the country of which the person is a national or where
  he
  has a right of permanent residence;

he

| (a) | in the case of a natural person, the country of which the person is a national or where
  that person
  has a right of permanent residence; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

in the case of a natural person, the country of which the person is a national or where
  that person
  has a right of permanent residence;

that person

Amendment 63

Amendment 63

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 1 — point b — subpoint i

Article 3 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 1 — point b — subpoint i

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (i) | if the service is not provided through a commercial presence within the Union,
  the country under the laws of which the legal person is constituted or otherwise organised and in the territory of which the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(i)

if the service is not provided through a commercial presence within the Union,
  the country under the laws of which the legal person is constituted or otherwise organised and in the territory of which the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations;

if the service is not provided through a commercial presence within the Union,

| (i) | the country under the laws of which the legal person is constituted or otherwise organised and in the territory of which the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations
  , entailing a direct and effective link with the economy of the country concerned
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

the country under the laws of which the legal person is constituted or otherwise organised and in the territory of which the legal person is engaged in substantive business operations
  , entailing a direct and effective link with the economy of the country concerned
  ;

, entailing a direct and effective link with the economy of the country concerned

Amendment 64

Amendment 64

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 1 — point b — subpoint ii

Article 3 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 1 — point b — subpoint ii

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (ii) | the Member State where the legal person is established and engaged in substantive business operations entailing a direct and effective link with the economy of the Member State concerned. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ii)

the Member State where the legal person is established and engaged in substantive business operations entailing a direct and effective link with the economy of the Member State concerned.

| (ii) | if
  the legal person is
  not
  engaged in substantive business operations
  in the territory of the country in which it is constituted or otherwise engaged, the origin of the legal person shall be that of the person or persons which may exercise, directly or indirectly, a dominant influence on the legal person by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation therein, or the rules which govern it. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

if
  the legal person is
  not
  engaged in substantive business operations
  in the territory of the country in which it is constituted or otherwise engaged, the origin of the legal person shall be that of the person or persons which may exercise, directly or indirectly, a dominant influence on the legal person by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation therein, or the rules which govern it.

if

not

in the territory of the country in which it is constituted or otherwise engaged, the origin of the legal person shall be that of the person or persons which may exercise, directly or indirectly, a dominant influence on the legal person by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation therein, or the rules which govern it.

Amendment 65

Amendment 65

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 2

Article 3 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| For the purposes of point (b) (ii) of the first subparagraph if the legal person is not engaged in substantive business operations entailing a direct and effective link with the economy of a Member State, the origin of a legal person shall be that of the person or persons which own or control the legal person. | For the purposes of point (b) (ii) of the first subparagraph
  , that person or persons shall be presumed as having a dominant influence on
  the legal
  person in any of the following cases in which they, directly or indirectly: |
| | (a) | hold the majority of the legal person’s subscribed capital; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

For the purposes of point (b) (ii) of the first subparagraph if the legal person is not engaged in substantive business operations entailing a direct and effective link with the economy of a Member State, the origin of a legal person shall be that of the person or persons which own or control the legal person.

For the purposes of point (b) (ii) of the first subparagraph
  , that person or persons shall be presumed as having a dominant influence on
  the legal
  person in any of the following cases in which they, directly or indirectly:

, that person or persons shall be presumed as having a dominant influence on

person in any of the following cases in which they, directly or indirectly:

(a)

(a)

hold the majority of the legal person’s subscribed capital;

hold the majority of the legal person’s subscribed capital;

| (b) | control the majority of the votes attaching to shares issued by the legal person; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

control the majority of the votes attaching to shares issued by the legal person;

control the majority of the votes attaching to shares issued by the legal person;

| (c) | can appoint more than half of the legal person’s administrative, management or supervisory body. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

(c)

can appoint more than half of the legal person’s administrative, management or supervisory body.

can appoint more than half of the legal person’s administrative, management or supervisory body.

Amendment 66

Amendment 66

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 3

Article 3 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| A legal person shall be considered to be ‘owned’ by persons of a given country where more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

A legal person shall be considered to be ‘owned’ by persons of a given country where more than 50 % of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country.

A legal person shall be considered to be ‘owned’ by persons of a given country where more than 50

of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that country.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 67

Amendment 67

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 4

Article 3 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| A legal person shall be considered to be ‘controlled’ by persons of a given country where such persons have the power to appoint a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

A legal person shall be considered to be ‘controlled’ by persons of a given country where such persons have the power to appoint a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions.

A legal person shall be considered to be ‘controlled’ by persons of a given country where such persons have the power to appoint a majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 68

Amendment 68

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 3 a (new)

Article 3 — paragraph 3 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3a.
     
  Where an economic operator is a group of natural or legal persons and/or of public entities, and at least one of such persons or entities originates from a third country whose economic operators and goods and services are subject to an IPI measure, that IPI measure shall equally apply to tenders submitted by that group. This shall not apply if the participation of those persons or entities in a group amounts to less than 15 % of the value of the tender in question, unless those persons or entities are necessary for fulfilling the majority of at least one of the selection criteria in a procurement procedure. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3a.
     
  Where an economic operator is a group of natural or legal persons and/or of public entities, and at least one of such persons or entities originates from a third country whose economic operators and goods and services are subject to an IPI measure, that IPI measure shall equally apply to tenders submitted by that group. This shall not apply if the participation of those persons or entities in a group amounts to less than 15 % of the value of the tender in question, unless those persons or entities are necessary for fulfilling the majority of at least one of the selection criteria in a procurement procedure.

Amendment 69

Amendment 69

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 3 b (new)

Article 3 — paragraph 3 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3b.
     
  Contracting authorities or contracting entities may at any time during the procurement procedure request the economic operator to submit, clarify or complete the information or documentation related to the verification of the economic operator's origin within an appropriate time limit, provided that such requests are made in full compliance with the principles of equal treatment and transparency. Tenders from economic operators that fail to provide such information or documentation shall be rejected in accordance with the rules applicable to the award procedure. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3b.
     
  Contracting authorities or contracting entities may at any time during the procurement procedure request the economic operator to submit, clarify or complete the information or documentation related to the verification of the economic operator's origin within an appropriate time limit, provided that such requests are made in full compliance with the principles of equal treatment and transparency. Tenders from economic operators that fail to provide such information or documentation shall be rejected in accordance with the rules applicable to the award procedure.

Amendment 70

Amendment 70

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 3 c (new)

Article 3 — paragraph 3 c (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3c.
     
  For the application of the additional contractual obligations upon the successful tenderer set out in Article 9a, the origin of a good shall be determined in accordance with Articles 59 to 62 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, while the origin of a service shall be determined on the basis of the origin of the economic operator providing it. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3c.
     
  For the application of the additional contractual obligations upon the successful tenderer set out in Article 9a, the origin of a good shall be determined in accordance with Articles 59 to 62 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013, while the origin of a service shall be determined on the basis of the origin of the economic operator providing it.

Amendment 71

Amendment 71

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Chapter 2 — title

Chapter 2 — title

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

deleted

deleted

Amendment 72

Amendment 72

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 — paragraph 1

Article 4 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Tenders shall be exempted from this Regulation where
  more than 50 % of the total value of the tender is made up of goods and/or services
  originating in least-developed countries listed in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 (27), and in developing countries considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system as defined in Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012. | Tenders shall be exempted from this Regulation where
  they have been submitted by an economic operator
  originating in least-developed countries listed in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 (27), and in developing countries considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system as defined in Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012.
  The Commission may exempt tenders submitted by an economic operator originating in developing countries that are beneficiaries of the general arrangement referred to in point (a) of Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, unless the economy of such countries is considered to be competitive in the sectors concerned. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Tenders shall be exempted from this Regulation where
  more than 50 % of the total value of the tender is made up of goods and/or services
  originating in least-developed countries listed in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 (27), and in developing countries considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system as defined in Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012.

more than 50 % of the total value of the tender is made up of goods and/or services

27

Tenders shall be exempted from this Regulation where
  they have been submitted by an economic operator
  originating in least-developed countries listed in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 (27), and in developing countries considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system as defined in Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012.
  The Commission may exempt tenders submitted by an economic operator originating in developing countries that are beneficiaries of the general arrangement referred to in point (a) of Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, unless the economy of such countries is considered to be competitive in the sectors concerned.

they have been submitted by an economic operator

27

The Commission may exempt tenders submitted by an economic operator originating in developing countries that are beneficiaries of the general arrangement referred to in point (a) of Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, unless the economy of such countries is considered to be competitive in the sectors concerned.

Amendment 73

Amendment 73

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5

Article 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Article 5 | deleted |
| Exemption for tenders submitted by SMEs | |
| Tenders submitted by SMEs

   (28)

  established in the Union and engaged in substantive business operations entailing a direct and effective link with the economy of at least one Member State, shall be exempted from this Regulation. | |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 5

Article 5

deleted

deleted

Exemption for tenders submitted by SMEs

Exemption for tenders submitted by SMEs

Tenders submitted by SMEs

   (28)

  established in the Union and engaged in substantive business operations entailing a direct and effective link with the economy of at least one Member State, shall be exempted from this Regulation.

Tenders submitted by SMEs

28

established in the Union and engaged in substantive business operations entailing a direct and effective link with the economy of at least one Member State, shall be exempted from this Regulation.

Amendment 74

Amendment 74

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Chapter III– title

Chapter III– title

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Investigations, consultations and
  price adjustement
  measures | Investigations, consultations, measures
  and additional contractual obligations |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Investigations, consultations and
  price adjustement
  measures

price adjustement

Investigations, consultations, measures
  and additional contractual obligations

and additional contractual obligations

Amendment 75

Amendment 75

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — title

Article 6 — title

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Investigations | Investigations
  and consultations |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Investigations

Investigations
  and consultations

and consultations

Amendment 76

Amendment 76

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1

Article 6 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   
  Where
  the Commission considers it to be in the interest of the Union, it
  may at any time,
  on its own initiative or upon
  application
  of interested
  parties
  or a Member State, initiate an investigation into alleged
  restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement measures or practices. If an investigation is initiated, the Commission shall publish
  a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union

  , inviting
  interested parties and Member States to provide
  all relevant
  information to the Commission within a specified period of time. | 1.   
  If
  the Commission considers it to be in the interest of the Union, it
  shall
  on its own initiative or upon
  a substantiated complaint
  of
  a Union
  interested
  party, the European Parliament,
  or a Member State, initiate an investigation into
  an
  alleged
  third-country measure or practice by publishing
  a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.
  The notice of initiation shall include the Commission's preliminary assessment of the third-country measure or practice and invite Union
  interested parties and Member States to provide information to the Commission within a specified period of time. |
| | The Commission shall make available on its website the form which the interested parties or Member States are required to complete in order to submit a substantiated complaint. |
| | A determination as to whether the Union's interest calls for an investigation shall be based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumers. An investigation may not be started where the Commission, on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly conclude that it is not in the Union's interest to start such an investigation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   
  Where
  the Commission considers it to be in the interest of the Union, it
  may at any time,
  on its own initiative or upon
  application
  of interested
  parties
  or a Member State, initiate an investigation into alleged
  restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement measures or practices. If an investigation is initiated, the Commission shall publish
  a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union

  , inviting
  interested parties and Member States to provide
  all relevant
  information to the Commission within a specified period of time.

1.   
  If
  the Commission considers it to be in the interest of the Union, it
  shall
  on its own initiative or upon
  a substantiated complaint
  of
  a Union
  interested
  party, the European Parliament,
  or a Member State, initiate an investigation into
  an
  alleged
  third-country measure or practice by publishing
  a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.
  The notice of initiation shall include the Commission's preliminary assessment of the third-country measure or practice and invite Union
  interested parties and Member States to provide information to the Commission within a specified period of time.

The Commission shall make available on its website the form which the interested parties or Member States are required to complete in order to submit a substantiated complaint.

The Commission shall make available on its website the form which the interested parties or Member States are required to complete in order to submit a substantiated complaint

A determination as to whether the Union's interest calls for an investigation shall be based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumers. An investigation may not be started where the Commission, on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly conclude that it is not in the Union's interest to start such an investigation.

A determination as to whether the Union's interest calls for an investigation shall be based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumers. An investigation may not be started where the Commission, on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly conclude that it is not in the Union's interest to start such an investigation.

Amendment 77

Amendment 77

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 6 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1a.
     
  Upon publication of the notice, the Commission shall invite the third country concerned to submit its views, provide information and enter into consultations with the Commission in order to remedy the alleged third-country measure or practice. The Commission shall regularly inform interested parties, the European Parliament, and Member States within the Committee established by Article 7 of the Trade Barriers Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1a.
     
  Upon publication of the notice, the Commission shall invite the third country concerned to submit its views, provide information and enter into consultations with the Commission in order to remedy the alleged third-country measure or practice. The Commission shall regularly inform interested parties, the European Parliament, and Member States within the Committee established by Article 7 of the Trade Barriers Regulation.

Amendment 78

Amendment 78

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 2

Article 6 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   
  The assessment by the Commission of whether the alleged restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement measures or practices have been adopted or are maintained by the third country concerned shall be made on the basis of the information supplied by interested parties and Member States, of facts collected by the Commission during its investigation, or both.
  The
  assessment
  shall be concluded within a period of
  eight
  months after the initiation
  of the investigation.
  In duly justified cases,
  this period
  may
  be extended
  by
  four
  months. | 2.   The
  investigation and consultations
  shall be concluded within a period of
  six
  months after the
  date of the publication in the Official Journal of the
  initiation
  notice.
  In duly justified cases,
  the Commission
  may
  , before the end of the initial six months, extend that period
  by
  three
  months,
  by publishing a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union and informing the third country, interested parties, the European Parliament, and Member States
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   
  The assessment by the Commission of whether the alleged restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement measures or practices have been adopted or are maintained by the third country concerned shall be made on the basis of the information supplied by interested parties and Member States, of facts collected by the Commission during its investigation, or both.
  The
  assessment
  shall be concluded within a period of
  eight
  months after the initiation
  of the investigation.
  In duly justified cases,
  this period
  may
  be extended
  by
  four
  months.

2.   The
  investigation and consultations
  shall be concluded within a period of
  six
  months after the
  date of the publication in the Official Journal of the
  initiation
  notice.
  In duly justified cases,
  the Commission
  may
  , before the end of the initial six months, extend that period
  by
  three
  months,
  by publishing a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union and informing the third country, interested parties, the European Parliament, and Member States
  .

Amendment 79

Amendment 79

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 2 a (new)

Article 6 — paragraph 2 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 2a.
     
  Upon conclusion of the investigation and consultations, the Commission shall make publicly available a report recording the main findings of the investigation and a proposed course of action. The Commission shall present the report to the European Parliament. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2a.
     
  Upon conclusion of the investigation and consultations, the Commission shall make publicly available a report recording the main findings of the investigation and a proposed course of action. The Commission shall present the report to the European Parliament.

Amendment 80

Amendment 80

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 3

Article 6 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   Where the Commission
  concludes as a result of
  its investigation that the alleged
  restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement measures or practices are
  not maintained or that
  they do
  not result in
  restrictions to
  access
  by
  Union economic operators or Union goods
  and
  services to the
  public
  procurement or concession
  markets
  of the third country
  concerned
  , the Commission shall terminate the investigation. | 3.   Where the Commission
  finds, following
  its investigation, that the alleged
  third-country measure or practice is
  not maintained or that
  it does
  not result in
  a serious and recurrent impairment of
  access
  of
  Union economic operators, Union goods
  or
  services to the procurement or concession
  market
  of the third country, the Commission shall terminate the investigation,
  and publish a notice of termination in the Official Journal of the European Union
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   Where the Commission
  concludes as a result of
  its investigation that the alleged
  restrictive and/or discriminatory procurement measures or practices are
  not maintained or that
  they do
  not result in
  restrictions to
  access
  by
  Union economic operators or Union goods
  and
  services to the
  public
  procurement or concession
  markets
  of the third country
  concerned
  , the Commission shall terminate the investigation.

3.   Where the Commission
  finds, following
  its investigation, that the alleged
  third-country measure or practice is
  not maintained or that
  it does
  not result in
  a serious and recurrent impairment of
  access
  of
  Union economic operators, Union goods
  or
  services to the procurement or concession
  market
  of the third country, the Commission shall terminate the investigation,
  and publish a notice of termination in the Official Journal of the European Union
  .

Amendment 81

Amendment 81

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 4

Article 6 — paragraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.
     
  When the Commission has concluded its investigation, it shall make publicly available a report recording its main findings. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.
     
  When the Commission has concluded its investigation, it shall make publicly available a report recording its main findings.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 82

Amendment 82

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 4 a (new)

Article 6 — paragraph 4 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 4a.
     
  The Commission may suspend the investigation and consultations at any time if the third country: |
| | (a) | takes satisfactory corrective measures remedying the serious and recurrent impairment of access of Union economic operators or Union goods or services and effectively improving such an access, or |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4a.
     
  The Commission may suspend the investigation and consultations at any time if the third country:

(a)

(a)

takes satisfactory corrective measures remedying the serious and recurrent impairment of access of Union economic operators or Union goods or services and effectively improving such an access, or

takes satisfactory corrective measures remedying the serious and recurrent impairment of access of Union economic operators or Union goods or services and effectively improving such an access, or

| (b) | undertakes commitments towards the Union to end or phase out the third-country measure or practice within a reasonable period of time and no later than three months. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

undertakes commitments towards the Union to end or phase out the third-country measure or practice within a reasonable period of time and no later than three months.

undertakes commitments towards the Union to end or phase out the third-country measure or practice within a reasonable period of time and no later than three months.

The Commission shall resume the investigation and consultations at any time if it concludes that the reasons for the suspension are no longer valid.

The Commission shall resume the investigation and consultations at any time if it concludes that the reasons for the suspension are no longer valid.

The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union in case of suspension or resumption of the investigation and consultations.

The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union in case of suspension or resumption of the investigation and consultations.

Amendment 83

Amendment 83

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7

Article 7

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| [...] | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

[...]

deleted

deleted

Amendment 84

Amendment 84

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8

Article 8

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| [...] | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

[...]

deleted

deleted

Amendment 85

Amendment 85

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 a (new)

Article 8 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 8 a |
| | IPI measures |
| | 1.
     
  Where the Commission finds, following an investigation and consultations pursuant to Article 6, that a third-country measure or practice exists, it shall impose an IPI measure by means of an implementing act. An IPI measure shall only apply if the main object of the procurement procedure falls within the scope of the implementing act, as specified in accordance with paragraph 7 point (a). The procurement procedure shall not be designed with the intention of excluding that procedure from the scope of this Regulation. |
| | 2.
     
  The IPI measure shall be determined on the basis of the following criteria, in light of available information: |
| | (a) | the proportionality of the IPI measure with regard to the third-country measure or practice; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 8 a

Article 8 a

IPI measures

IPI measures

1.
     
  Where the Commission finds, following an investigation and consultations pursuant to Article 6, that a third-country measure or practice exists, it shall impose an IPI measure by means of an implementing act. An IPI measure shall only apply if the main object of the procurement procedure falls within the scope of the implementing act, as specified in accordance with paragraph 7 point (a). The procurement procedure shall not be designed with the intention of excluding that procedure from the scope of this Regulation.

2.
     
  The IPI measure shall be determined on the basis of the following criteria, in light of available information:

(a)

(a)

the proportionality of the IPI measure with regard to the third-country measure or practice;

the proportionality of the IPI measure with regard to the third-country measure or practice;

| (b) | the availability of alternative sources of supply for the goods and services concerned, in order to avoid or minimise a significant negative impact on contracting authorities or contracting entities. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

the availability of alternative sources of supply for the goods and services concerned, in order to avoid or minimise a significant negative impact on contracting authorities or contracting entities.

the availability of alternative sources of supply for the goods and services concerned, in order to avoid or minimise a significant negative impact on contracting authorities or contracting entities.

| (c) | the engagement of undertakings from the targeted third country in procurement activities in the internal market, benefiting from the lack of reciprocity. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

(c)

the engagement of undertakings from the targeted third country in procurement activities in the internal market, benefiting from the lack of reciprocity.

the engagement of undertakings from the targeted third country in procurement activities in the internal market, benefiting from the lack of reciprocity.

3.
     
  The IPI measure shall only apply to procurement procedures with an estimated value of at least EUR 10 000 000 net of value-added tax for works and concessions, and of at least EUR 5 000 000 net of value-added tax for goods and services.

4.
     
  The IPI measure shall also apply in the case of specific contracts awarded under a dynamic purchasing system, where those dynamic purchasing systems are subject to the IPI measure, with the exception of specific contracts the estimated value of which is below the respective values set out in Article 8 of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 4 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 15 of Directive 2014/25/EU.

The IPI measure shall not apply to procedures for the award of contracts based on a framework agreement. The IPI measure shall also not apply to individual lots to be awarded according to Article 5 (10) of Directive 2014/24/EU or Article 16 (10) of Directive 2014/25/EU.

The IPI measure shall not apply to procedures for the award of contracts based on a framework agreement. The IPI measure shall also not apply to individual lots to be awarded according to Article 5 (10) of Directive 2014/24/EU or Article 16 (10) of Directive 2014/25/EU.

5.
     
  In its implementing act, the Commission may decide, within the scope established in paragraph 7 of this Article, to restrict the access of operators, goods or services from third countries to procurement procedures by requiring contracting authorities or contracting entities to:

| (a) | impose a score adjustment measure on tenders submitted by economic operators originating in that third country; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

(a)

impose a score adjustment measure on tenders submitted by economic operators originating in that third country;

impose a score adjustment measure on tenders submitted by economic operators originating in that third country;

| (b) | exclude tenders submitted by economic operators originating in that third country; or |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

exclude tenders submitted by economic operators originating in that third country; or

exclude tenders submitted by economic operators originating in that third country; or

| (c) | impose a combination of (a) and (b), if different sectors or categories of goods and services are subject to IPI measures. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

(c)

impose a combination of (a) and (b), if different sectors or categories of goods and services are subject to IPI measures.

impose a combination of (a) and (b), if different sectors or categories of goods and services are subject to IPI measures.

6.
     
  The score adjustment measure referred to in paragraph 5 point (a) shall apply only for the purpose of the evaluation and ranking of the tenders. It shall not affect the price due to be paid under the contract to be concluded with the successful tenderer.

7.
     
  The implementing act, adopted in accordance with Article 14(2), shall specify the scope of application of the IPI measure, including:

| (a) | the sectors or the categories of goods, services and concessions based on the Common Procurement Vocabulary as well as any applicable exceptions; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

(a)

the sectors or the categories of goods, services and concessions based on the Common Procurement Vocabulary as well as any applicable exceptions;

the sectors or the categories of goods, services and concessions based on the Common Procurement Vocabulary as well as any applicable exceptions;

| (b) | specific categories of contracting authorities or contracting entities; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

specific categories of contracting authorities or contracting entities;

specific categories of contracting authorities or contracting entities;

| (c) | specific categories of economic operators; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

(c)

specific categories of economic operators;

specific categories of economic operators;

| (d) | as regards the score adjustment measure referred to in paragraph 5 point (a), the percentage value of the adjustment, set up to 100 % of the evaluation score of the tender depending on the third country and sector of goods, services, works or concessions envisaged. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

(d)

as regards the score adjustment measure referred to in paragraph 5 point (a), the percentage value of the adjustment, set up to 100 % of the evaluation score of the tender depending on the third country and sector of goods, services, works or concessions envisaged.

as regards the score adjustment measure referred to in paragraph 5 point (a), the percentage value of the adjustment, set up to 100 % of the evaluation score of the tender depending on the third country and sector of goods, services, works or concessions envisaged.

8.
     
  When determining the IPI measure based on the options under points (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 5, the Commission shall opt for the kind of measure that would most effectively remedy the level of impairment of EU operators on third country markets.

9.
     
  The Commission may either withdraw the IPI measure or suspend its application if the third country takes satisfactory corrective actions remedying the impairment of access of Union goods, services or economic operators to its procurement or concession markets, or if it undertakes commitments to end the measure or practice in question. If the Commission considers that the corrective actions or commitments undertaken have been rescinded, suspended or improperly implemented, it shall make publicly available its findings and reinstate the application of the IPI measure at any time. The Commission may withdraw, suspend or reinstate an IPI measure in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 14(2) and followed by the publication of a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

10.
     
  An IPI measure shall expire five years from its entry into force. An IPI measure may be extended for a duration of five years. Nine months before the date of expiry of the IPI measure, the Commission, at its own initiative, shall initiate a review of the IPI measure in question by publishing a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. Such a review shall be concluded within six months. Following such a review, the Commission may extend the duration of the IPI measure, adjust it appropriately or replace it by a different IPI measure.

Amendment 86

Amendment 86

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9

Article 9

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Article 9 | deleted |
| Authorities or entities concerned | |
| The Commission shall determine the contracting authorities or entities or categories of contracting authorities or entities, listed by Member State, whose procurement is concerned by the measure. To provide the basis for this determination, each Member State shall submit a list of appropriate contracting authorities or entities or categories of contracting authorities or entities. The Commission shall ensure that an appropriate level of action is taken and that a fair distribution of the burden among Member States is achieved. | |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 9

Article 9

deleted

deleted

Authorities or entities concerned

Authorities or entities concerned

The Commission shall determine the contracting authorities or entities or categories of contracting authorities or entities, listed by Member State, whose procurement is concerned by the measure. To provide the basis for this determination, each Member State shall submit a list of appropriate contracting authorities or entities or categories of contracting authorities or entities. The Commission shall ensure that an appropriate level of action is taken and that a fair distribution of the burden among Member States is achieved.

The Commission shall determine the contracting authorities or entities or categories of contracting authorities or entities, listed by Member State, whose procurement is concerned by the measure. To provide the basis for this determination, each Member State shall submit a list of appropriate contracting authorities or entities or categories of contracting authorities or entities. The Commission shall ensure that an appropriate level of action is taken and that a fair distribution of the burden among Member States is achieved.

Amendment 87

Amendment 87

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 a (new)

Article 9 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 9a |
| | Additional contractual obligations upon the successful tenderer |
| | 1.
     
  In the case of procurement procedures to which an IPI measure is applicable, as well as in the case of contracts awarded based on a framework agreement where the estimated value of those contracts is equal or above the values set out in Article 8 of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 4 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 15 of Directive 2014/25/EU, respectively, and where those framework agreements were subject to the IPI measure, contracting authorities and contracting entities shall also include, among the conditions of the contract with the successful tenderer: |
| | (a) | an obligation not to subcontract, including through the delivery of goods and parts, more than 25 % of the total value of the contract to economic operators originating in a third country which is subject to an IPI measure; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 9a

Article 9a

Additional contractual obligations upon the successful tenderer

Additional contractual obligations upon the successful tenderer

1.
     
  In the case of procurement procedures to which an IPI measure is applicable, as well as in the case of contracts awarded based on a framework agreement where the estimated value of those contracts is equal or above the values set out in Article 8 of Directive 2014/23/EU, Article 4 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 15 of Directive 2014/25/EU, respectively, and where those framework agreements were subject to the IPI measure, contracting authorities and contracting entities shall also include, among the conditions of the contract with the successful tenderer:

(a)

(a)

an obligation not to subcontract, including through the delivery of goods and parts, more than 25 % of the total value of the contract to economic operators originating in a third country which is subject to an IPI measure;

an obligation not to subcontract, including through the delivery of goods and parts, more than 25 % of the total value of the contract to economic operators originating in a third country which is subject to an IPI measure;

| (b) | for contracts whose subject matter covers the supply of goods, a commitment that, for the duration of the contract, goods supplied and/or services provided in the execution of the contract and originating in a third country which is subject to the IPI measure represent no more than 25 % of the total value of the contract, whether such goods and/or services are supplied or provided directly by the tenderer or by a subcontractor; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

for contracts whose subject matter covers the supply of goods, a commitment that, for the duration of the contract, goods supplied and/or services provided in the execution of the contract and originating in a third country which is subject to the IPI measure represent no more than 25 % of the total value of the contract, whether such goods and/or services are supplied or provided directly by the tenderer or by a subcontractor;

for contracts whose subject matter covers the supply of goods, a commitment that, for the duration of the contract, goods supplied and/or services provided in the execution of the contract and originating in a third country which is subject to the IPI measure represent no more than 25 % of the total value of the contract, whether such goods and/or services are supplied or provided directly by the tenderer or by a subcontractor;

| (c) | an obligation to provide, upon request, adequate evidence corresponding to points (a) or (b) to the contracting authority or the contracting entity at the latest upon completion of the execution of the contract; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

(c)

an obligation to provide, upon request, adequate evidence corresponding to points (a) or (b) to the contracting authority or the contracting entity at the latest upon completion of the execution of the contract;

an obligation to provide, upon request, adequate evidence corresponding to points (a) or (b) to the contracting authority or the contracting entity at the latest upon completion of the execution of the contract;

| (d) | a proportionate charge, in case of non-observance of the commitments referred in points (a) or (b) of 25 % of the total value of the contract. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

(d)

a proportionate charge, in case of non-observance of the commitments referred in points (a) or (b) of 25 % of the total value of the contract.

a proportionate charge, in case of non-observance of the commitments referred in points (a) or (b) of 25 % of the total value of the contract.

2.
     
  For the purposes of paragraph 1 point (c), it is sufficient to provide evidence that more than 75 % of the total value of the contract originates in countries other than the third country subject to the IPI measure. The contracting authority or contracting entity shall request evidence in case of reasonable indications of non-compliance with points (a) or (b) of paragraph 1 or if the contract is awarded to a group of economic operators comprising a legal person originating in a third country subject to an IPI measure.

3.
     
  For tenders submitted by autonomous SMEs, as defined in the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, originating in the Union or in a third country with which the Union has concluded an international agreement in the field of procurement, the Commission and the Member States shall make available guidelines for best practices to ensure the efficiency of this Regulation and the consistency of its implementation. Those guidelines shall take into account, in particular, the information needs of SMEs.

4.
     
  Contracting authorities and contracting entities shall include a reference to the additional conditions laid down in this Article in the documents for procurement procedures to which an IPI measure is applicable.

Amendment 88

Amendment 88

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 10

Article 10

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| [...] | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

[...]

deleted

deleted

Amendment 89

Amendment 89

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 11

Article 11

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| [...] | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

[...]

deleted

deleted

Amendment 90

Amendment 90

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   Contracting authorities and contracting entities may decide not to apply the
  price adjustment
  measure with respect to a procurement
  or a concession
  procedure if: | 1.   Contracting authorities and contracting entities may,
  on an exceptional basis,
  decide not to apply the
  IPI
  measure to a procurement procedure if: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   Contracting authorities and contracting entities may decide not to apply the
  price adjustment
  measure with respect to a procurement
  or a concession
  procedure if:

1.   Contracting authorities and contracting entities may,
  on an exceptional basis,
  decide not to apply the
  IPI
  measure to a procurement procedure if:

Amendment 91

Amendment 91

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point a

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | there are no Union and/or covered goods or services available which meet the requirements of the contracting authority or contracting entity; or |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

(a)

there are no Union and/or covered goods or services available which meet the requirements of the contracting authority or contracting entity; or

there are no Union and/or covered goods or services available which meet the requirements of the contracting authority or contracting entity; or

deleted

deleted

Amendment 92

Amendment 92

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point a a (new)

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point a a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (aa) | there are only tenders from economic operators originating in a third country subject to an IPI measure, or if only such tenders meet the tender requirements; or |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(aa)

(aa)

there are only tenders from economic operators originating in a third country subject to an IPI measure, or if only such tenders meet the tender requirements; or

there are only tenders from economic operators originating in a third country subject to an IPI measure, or if only such tenders meet the tender requirements; or

Amendment 93

Amendment 93

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point a b (new)

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — point a b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ab) | this is justified for overriding reasons relating to the public interest, such as public health or protection of the environment; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ab)

(ab)

this is justified for overriding reasons relating to the public interest, such as public health or protection of the environment;

this is justified for overriding reasons relating to the public interest, such as public health or protection of the environment;

Amendment 94

Amendment 94

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 1 –point b

Article 12 — paragraph 1 –point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | the application of the measure would lead to a disproportionate increase in the price or costs of the contract. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

(b)

the application of the measure would lead to a disproportionate increase in the price or costs of the contract.

the application of the measure would lead to a disproportionate increase in the price or costs of the contract.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 95

Amendment 95

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 2

Article 12 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   Where a contracting authority or contracting entity intends not to apply
  a price adjustment measure, it shall indicate its intention in the contract notice that it publishes pursuant to Article 49 of Directive 2014/24/EU or Article 69 of Directive 2014/25/EU or in the concession notice pursuant to Article 31 of Directive 2014/23/EU. It
  shall notify the Commission no later than
  ten calendar
  days
  after the publication
  of the contract
  notice
  . | 2.   Where a contracting authority or contracting entity intends not to apply
  an IPI measure, it
  shall notify the Commission
  without delay and in any case
  no later than
  thirty
  days
  before the award
  of the contract
  , and provide a detailed justification for the use of the exception
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   Where a contracting authority or contracting entity intends not to apply
  a price adjustment measure, it shall indicate its intention in the contract notice that it publishes pursuant to Article 49 of Directive 2014/24/EU or Article 69 of Directive 2014/25/EU or in the concession notice pursuant to Article 31 of Directive 2014/23/EU. It
  shall notify the Commission no later than
  ten calendar
  days
  after the publication
  of the contract
  notice
  .

2.   Where a contracting authority or contracting entity intends not to apply
  an IPI measure, it
  shall notify the Commission
  without delay and in any case
  no later than
  thirty
  days
  before the award
  of the contract
  , and provide a detailed justification for the use of the exception
  .

Amendment
  96

Amendment

96

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 1 — point d

Article 12 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 1 — point d

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (d) | the ground on which the decision not to apply the
  price adjustment
  measure is based, and a detailed justification for the use of the exception; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(d)

the ground on which the decision not to apply the
  price adjustment
  measure is based, and a detailed justification for the use of the exception;

price adjustment

| (d) | the ground on which the decision not to apply the
  IPI
  measure is based, and a detailed justification for the use of the exception; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the ground on which the decision not to apply the
  IPI
  measure is based, and a detailed justification for the use of the exception;

IPI

Amendment 97

Amendment 97

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 3 a (new)

Article 12 — paragraph 3 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3a.
     
  Any request for an exception based on this Article shall require the approval by the Commission before the award of the contract. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3a.
     
  Any request for an exception based on this Article shall require the approval by the Commission before the award of the contract.

Amendment 98

Amendment 98

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 3 b (new)

Article 12 — paragraph 3 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3b.
     
  The Commission may object to a request for an exception to an IPI measure if the notification lacks a sufficiently detailed justification. The Commission shall inform the contracting authority or contracting entity about its decision without undue delay. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3b.
     
  The Commission may object to a request for an exception to an IPI measure if the notification lacks a sufficiently detailed justification. The Commission shall inform the contracting authority or contracting entity about its decision without undue delay.

Amendment 99

Amendment 99

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 4

Article 12 — paragraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.
     
  In the event that a contracting authority or contracting entity conducts a negotiated procedure without prior publication, under Article 2 of Directive 2014/24/EU or under Article 50 of Directive 2014/25/EU and decides not to apply a price adjustment measure, it shall indicate this in the contract award notice it publishes pursuant to Article 50 of Directive 2014/24/EU or Article 70 of Directive 2014/25/EU or in the concession award notice it publishes pursuant to Article 32 of Directive 2014/23/EU and notify the Commission no later than ten calendar days after the publication of the contract award notice. | deleted |
| The notification shall contain the following information: | |
| (a) | the name and contact details of the contracting authority or contracting entity; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.
     
  In the event that a contracting authority or contracting entity conducts a negotiated procedure without prior publication, under Article 2 of Directive 2014/24/EU or under Article 50 of Directive 2014/25/EU and decides not to apply a price adjustment measure, it shall indicate this in the contract award notice it publishes pursuant to Article 50 of Directive 2014/24/EU or Article 70 of Directive 2014/25/EU or in the concession award notice it publishes pursuant to Article 32 of Directive 2014/23/EU and notify the Commission no later than ten calendar days after the publication of the contract award notice.

deleted

deleted

The notification shall contain the following information:

The notification shall contain the following information:

(a)

(a)

the name and contact details of the contracting authority or contracting entity;

the name and contact details of the contracting authority or contracting entity;

| (b) | a description of the object of the contract or the concession; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

a description of the object of the contract or the concession;

a description of the object of the contract or the concession;

| (c) | information on the origin of the economic operators, the goods and/or services admitted; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

(c)

information on the origin of the economic operators, the goods and/or services admitted;

information on the origin of the economic operators, the goods and/or services admitted;

| (d) | the justification for the use of the exception; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

(d)

the justification for the use of the exception;

the justification for the use of the exception;

| (e) | where appropriate, any other information deemed useful by the contracting authority or contracting entity. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

(e)

where appropriate, any other information deemed useful by the contracting authority or contracting entity.

where appropriate, any other information deemed useful by the contracting authority or contracting entity.

Amendment 100

Amendment 100

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 13 — paragraph 2

Article 13 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   Contracts concluded with an economic operator in violation of
  price adjustment
  measures adopted or reinstated by the Commission pursuant to this Regulation shall be ineffective. | 2.   Contracts concluded with an economic operator in violation of
  IPI
  measures adopted or reinstated by the Commission pursuant to this Regulation shall be ineffective. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   Contracts concluded with an economic operator in violation of
  price adjustment
  measures adopted or reinstated by the Commission pursuant to this Regulation shall be ineffective.

2.   Contracts concluded with an economic operator in violation of
  IPI
  measures adopted or reinstated by the Commission pursuant to this Regulation shall be ineffective.

Amendment 101

Amendment 101

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 13 a (new)

Article 13 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 13a




  Resources




  The Commission shall make sure that an adequate amount of resources is allocated to the implementation and enforcement of this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 13a

Resources

The Commission shall make sure that an adequate amount of resources is allocated to the implementation and enforcement of this Regulation.

Amendment 102

Amendment 102

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 15

Article 15

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| [...] | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

[...]

deleted

deleted

Amendment 103

Amendment 103

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 16 — paragraph 1

Article 16 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| By 31 December 2018
  and at least every three years thereafter, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Regulation and on progress made in international negotiations regarding access for Union economic operators to
  public contract or concession award procedures in
  third countries undertaken under this Regulation.
  To this effect,
  Member States shall upon request provide the Commission with appropriate information. | Two years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation
  and at least every
  two
  years thereafter, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Regulation and on progress made in international negotiations regarding access for Union economic operators to
  procurement and concession markets of
  third countries undertaken under this Regulation. Member States shall, upon request, provide the Commission with appropriate information
  on the application of measures under this Regulation, including as regards the number of procurement procedures at central and sub-central level in which a given IPI measure was applied, the number of tenders received from third countries subject to that IPI measure, as well as cases in which a specific exception from the IPI measure was applied
  .
  The report shall be made public. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

By 31 December 2018
  and at least every three years thereafter, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Regulation and on progress made in international negotiations regarding access for Union economic operators to
  public contract or concession award procedures in
  third countries undertaken under this Regulation.
  To this effect,
  Member States shall upon request provide the Commission with appropriate information.

By 31 December 2018

public contract or concession award procedures in

To this effect,

Two years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation
  and at least every
  two
  years thereafter, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Regulation and on progress made in international negotiations regarding access for Union economic operators to
  procurement and concession markets of
  third countries undertaken under this Regulation. Member States shall, upon request, provide the Commission with appropriate information
  on the application of measures under this Regulation, including as regards the number of procurement procedures at central and sub-central level in which a given IPI measure was applied, the number of tenders received from third countries subject to that IPI measure, as well as cases in which a specific exception from the IPI measure was applied
  .
  The report shall be made public.

Two years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation

two

procurement and concession markets of

on the application of measures under this Regulation, including as regards the number of procurement procedures at central and sub-central level in which a given IPI measure was applied, the number of tenders received from third countries subject to that IPI measure, as well as cases in which a specific exception from the IPI measure was applied

The report shall be made public.

Amendment 104

Amendment 104

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 16 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 16 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | The Commission shall establish at Union level a database of public procurement contracts or concession award procedures with third countries and the application of IPI measures under this Regulation, based on the information received from Member States. The Commission shall update the database annually. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The Commission shall establish at Union level a database of public procurement contracts or concession award procedures with third countries and the application of IPI measures under this Regulation, based on the information received from Member States. The Commission shall update the database annually.

The Commission shall establish at Union level a database of public procurement contracts or concession award procedures with third countries and the application of IPI measures under this Regulation, based on the information received from Member States. The Commission shall update the database annually.

Amendment 105

Amendment 105

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 17

Article 17

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Article 17 | deleted |
| Amendment of Directive 2014/25/EU | |
| Articles 85 and 86 of Directive 2014/25/EU shall be deleted with effect from the entry into force of this Regulation. | |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 17

Article 17

deleted

deleted

Amendment of Directive 2014/25/EU

Amendment of Directive 2014/25/EU

Articles 85 and 86 of Directive 2014/25/EU shall be deleted with effect from the entry into force of this Regulation.

Articles 85 and 86 of Directive 2014/25/EU shall be deleted with effect from the entry into force of this Regulation.

Amendment 106

Amendment 106

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 17 a (new)

Article 17 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 17a




  Review




  No later than three years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall review the scope, functioning and efficiency of this Regulation, and shall report its findings to the European Parliament and the Council. In duly justified cases, the Commission may extend the timeframe for the second review up to five years. In the event of such an extension, the Commission shall, in advance, inform the European Parliament and the Council. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 17a

Review

No later than three years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall review the scope, functioning and efficiency of this Regulation, and shall report its findings to the European Parliament and the Council. In duly justified cases, the Commission may extend the timeframe for the second review up to five years. In the event of such an extension, the Commission shall, in advance, inform the European Parliament and the Council.

---

(1)  The matter was referred back for interinstitutional negotiations to the committee responsible, pursuant to Rule 59(4), fourth subparagraph (A9-0337/2021).

1

(16)  
  Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 243).

16

Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 243).

(17)  Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 concerning the exercise of the Union's rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 laying down Community procedures in the field of common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community’s rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 50.)

17

(4)  Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 concerning the exercise of the Union's rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 laying down Community procedures in the field of common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community’s rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 50.)

4

(1a)  
  C(2019)5494

1a

C(2019)5494

(5)  
  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/1992 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ L 302, 19.10.1992, p. 1).

5

Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/1992 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ L 302, 19.10.1992, p. 1).

(5)  
  Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1).

5

Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 269, 10.10.2013, p. 1).

(6)  
  Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 (OJ L 303, 31.10.2012, p. 1).

6

Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 (OJ L 303, 31.10.2012, p. 1).

(20)  Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 33).

20

(21)  Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors (OJ L 76, 23.3.1992, p. 14).

21

(20)  Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 33).

20

(21)  Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors (OJ L 76, 23.3.1992, p. 14).

21

(22)  
  Regulation (EU) 2015/1843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 laying down Union procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Union’s rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (OJ L 272, 16.10.2015, p. 1).

22

Regulation (EU) 2015/1843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 laying down Union procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Union’s rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (OJ L 272, 16.10.2015, p. 1).

(1a)  

  OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1.

1a

OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1.

(23)  
  Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).

23

Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).

(24)  
  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/1992 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ L 302, 19.10.1992, p. 1).

24

Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/1992 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ L 302, 19.10.1992, p. 1).

(27)  Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 (OJ L 303, 31.10.2012, p. 1).

27

(27)  Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 (OJ L 303, 31.10.2012, p. 1).

27

(28)  
  As defined in the Commission recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).

28

As defined in the Commission recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).

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Wednesday 15 December 2021

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/226 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/226

---

P9_TA(2021)0498

Transitional provisions for certain in vitro diagnostic medical devices and deferred application of requirements for in-house devices ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 15 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/746 as regards transitional provisions for certain in vitro diagnostic medical devices and deferred application of requirements for in-house devices (COM(2021)0627 — C9-0381/2021 — 2021/0323(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2022/C 251/32)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0627), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2021)0627),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 114 and 168(4)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0381/2021), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 114 and 168(4)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0381/2021),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 8 December 2021 (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 8 December 2021 (1),

| — | after consulting the Committee of the Regions, |
| --- | --- |

—

after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

| — | having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 24 November 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 24 November 2021 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

(1)  Not yet published in the Official Journal.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2021)0323

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 15 December 2021 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/746 as regards transitional provisions for certain in vitro diagnostic medical devices and the deferred application of conditions for in-house devices

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/112.)

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| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/227 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/227

---

P9_TA(2021)0499

Digital Markets Act ***I

Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 15 December 2021 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act) (COM(2020)0842 — C9-0419/2020 — 2020/0374(COD)) (1)

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2022/C 251/33)

Amendment 1

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (1) | Digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy, in particular in the internal market, by providing
  new
  business
  opportunities in
  the Union and facilitating cross-border
  trading
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(1)

Digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy, in particular in the internal market, by providing
  new
  business
  opportunities in
  the Union and facilitating cross-border
  trading
  .

| (1) | Digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy, in particular in the internal market, by providing business
  users with gateways to reach end users throughout
  the Union and
  beyond, by
  facilitating cross-border
  trade and by opening entirely new business opportunities to a large number of companies in the Union to the benefit of Union’s consumers
  . |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy, in particular in the internal market, by providing business
  users with gateways to reach end users throughout
  the Union and
  beyond, by
  facilitating cross-border
  trade and by opening entirely new business opportunities to a large number of companies in the Union to the benefit of Union’s consumers
  .

Amendment 2

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (2) | Core platform services, at the same time, feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. These characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies, which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. Other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects, an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services, a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users, lock-in effects, a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users, vertical integration, and data driven-advantages. All these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services, as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users, leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice, and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(2)

Core platform services, at the same time, feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. These characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies, which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. Other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects, an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services, a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users, lock-in effects, a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users, vertical integration, and data driven-advantages. All these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services, as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users, leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice, and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper.

| (2) | Core platform services, at the same time, feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. These characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies, which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. Other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects, an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services, a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users, lock-in effects, a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users, vertical integration, and data driven-advantages. All these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services, as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users, leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice, and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper.
  At the same time, it should be recognised that services acting in a non-commercial purpose capacity such as collaborative projects should not be considered as core services for the purpose of this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Core platform services, at the same time, feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. These characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies, which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. Other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects, an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services, a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users, lock-in effects, a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users, vertical integration, and data driven-advantages. All these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services, as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users, leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice, and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper.
  At the same time, it should be recognised that services acting in a non-commercial purpose capacity such as collaborative projects should not be considered as core services for the purpose of this Regulation.

Amendment 3

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (4) | The combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and, consequently, to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers, to the detriment of prices, quality, choice and innovation therein. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(4)

The combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and, consequently, to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers, to the detriment of prices, quality, choice and innovation therein.

| (4) | The combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and, consequently, to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers, to the detriment of prices, quality,
  privacy and security standards, fair competition,
  choice and innovation therein. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and, consequently, to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers, to the detriment of prices, quality,
  privacy and security standards, fair competition,
  choice and innovation therein.

Amendment 4

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 6

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (6) | Gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market, providing gateways for a large number of business users, to reach end users, everywhere in the Union and on different markets. The adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services, including their negative societal and economic implications, have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. A number of
  national
  regulatory solutions have already been adopted or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. This has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market, thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6)

Gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market, providing gateways for a large number of business users, to reach end users, everywhere in the Union and on different markets. The adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services, including their negative societal and economic implications, have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. A number of
  national
  regulatory solutions have already been adopted or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. This has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market, thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements.

| (6) | Gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market, providing gateways for a large number of business users, to reach end users, everywhere in the Union and on different markets. The adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services, including their negative societal and economic implications, have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. A number of regulatory solutions have already been adopted
  at national level
  or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. This has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market, thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market, providing gateways for a large number of business users, to reach end users, everywhere in the Union and on different markets. The adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services, including their negative societal and economic implications, have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. A number of regulatory solutions have already been adopted
  at national level
  or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. This has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market, thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements.

Amendment 5

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 8

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (8) | By approximating diverging national laws, obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services, including retail services, within the internal market should be eliminated. A targeted set of harmonised
  mandatory rules
  should therefore be established at Union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(8)

By approximating diverging national laws, obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services, including retail services, within the internal market should be eliminated. A targeted set of harmonised
  mandatory rules
  should therefore be established at Union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market.

| (8) | By approximating diverging national laws, obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services, including retail services, within the internal market should be eliminated. A targeted set of harmonised
  legal obligations
  should therefore be established at Union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market
  to the benefit of Union’s economy as whole and Union’s consumers in particular
  . |
| --- | --- |

(8)

By approximating diverging national laws, obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services, including retail services, within the internal market should be eliminated. A targeted set of harmonised
  legal obligations
  should therefore be established at Union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market
  to the benefit of Union’s economy as whole and Union’s consumers in particular
  .

Amendment 6

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 9

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (9) | A fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if Member States are prevented from applying
  national
  rules
  which are specific
  to the
  types of undertakings and services covered by this Regulation
  . At the same time, since this Regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law, it should be specified that this Regulation is without prejudice to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour, including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour, and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. However, the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this Regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(9)

A fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if Member States are prevented from applying
  national
  rules
  which are specific
  to the
  types of undertakings and services covered by this Regulation
  . At the same time, since this Regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law, it should be specified that this Regulation is without prejudice to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour, including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour, and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. However, the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this Regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market.

| (9) | A fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if Member States are prevented from applying
  on gatekeepers further
  rules
  or obligations for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. This is without prejudice
  to the
  ability of Member States to impose the same, stricter or different obligations on gatekeepers in order to pursue other legitimate public interests, in compliance with Union law. Those legitimate public interests can be, among others, consumer protection, fight against acts of unfair competition and fostering media freedom and pluralism, freedom of expression, as well as diversity in culture or in languages
  . At the same time, since this Regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law, it should be specified that this Regulation is without prejudice to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour, including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour, and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. However, the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations
  and prohibitions
  imposed on gatekeepers under this Regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

A fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if Member States are prevented from applying
  on gatekeepers further
  rules
  or obligations for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. This is without prejudice
  to the
  ability of Member States to impose the same, stricter or different obligations on gatekeepers in order to pursue other legitimate public interests, in compliance with Union law. Those legitimate public interests can be, among others, consumer protection, fight against acts of unfair competition and fostering media freedom and pluralism, freedom of expression, as well as diversity in culture or in languages
  . At the same time, since this Regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law, it should be specified that this Regulation is without prejudice to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour, including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour, and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. However, the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations
  and prohibitions
  imposed on gatekeepers under this Regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market.

Amendment 7

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 10

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (10) | Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. This Regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to, but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market, as defined in competition-law terms, which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair, independently from the actual, likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this Regulation on competition on a given market. This Regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(10)

Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. This Regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to, but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market, as defined in competition-law terms, which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair, independently from the actual, likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this Regulation on competition on a given market. This Regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application.

| (10) | Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. This Regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to, but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market, as defined in competition-law terms, which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair,
  and to protect the respective rights of business users and end users,
  independently from the actual, likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this Regulation on competition on a given market. This Regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. This Regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to, but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market, as defined in competition-law terms, which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair,
  and to protect the respective rights of business users and end users,
  independently from the actual, likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this Regulation on competition on a given market. This Regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application.

Amendment 8

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 11

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (11) | This Regulation should also complement, without prejudice to their application, the rules resulting from other acts of Union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this Regulation, in particular Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council (26), Regulation (EU) xx/xx/EU [DSA] of the European Parliament and of the Council (27), Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (28), Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council (29), Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council (30), and Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (31), as well as national
  rules aimed at enforcing or, as the case may be, implementing that
  Union legislation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(11)

This Regulation should also complement, without prejudice to their application, the rules resulting from other acts of Union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this Regulation, in particular Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council (26), Regulation (EU) xx/xx/EU [DSA] of the European Parliament and of the Council (27), Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (28), Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council (29), Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council (30), and Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (31), as well as national
  rules aimed at enforcing or, as the case may be, implementing that
  Union legislation.

| (11) | This Regulation should also complement, without prejudice to their application, the rules resulting from other acts of Union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this Regulation, in particular Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council (26). Regulation (EU) xx/xx/EU [DSA] of the European Parliament and of the Council (27), Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (28), Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council (29)

  , Directive 2002/58/EC
  , Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council (30),
  Directive (EU) 2019/882, Directive(EU) 2018/1808
  and Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (31),
  Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 93/13/EEC
  as well as
  rules at
  national
  level adopted in accordance with
  Union legislation.
  Concerning specifically rules on consent to the processing of personal data set out in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, this Regulation applies these rules without affecting them. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

This Regulation should also complement, without prejudice to their application, the rules resulting from other acts of Union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this Regulation, in particular Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council (26). Regulation (EU) xx/xx/EU [DSA] of the European Parliament and of the Council (27), Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (28), Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council (29)

  , Directive 2002/58/EC
  , Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council (30),
  Directive (EU) 2019/882, Directive(EU) 2018/1808
  and Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (31),
  Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Directive 93/13/EEC
  as well as
  rules at
  national
  level adopted in accordance with
  Union legislation.
  Concerning specifically rules on consent to the processing of personal data set out in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, this Regulation applies these rules without affecting them.

Amendment 9

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 12

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (12) | Weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. This is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies, very strong network effects, an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services, lock-in effects, a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. Often, there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. These providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts, gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. Accordingly, it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where
  , based on current market conditions,
  concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(12)

Weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. This is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies, very strong network effects, an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services, lock-in effects, a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. Often, there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. These providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts, gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. Accordingly, it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where
  , based on current market conditions,
  concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective.

| (12) | Weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. This is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies, very strong network effects, an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services, lock-in effects, a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. Often, there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. These providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts, gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. Accordingly, it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. This is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies, very strong network effects, an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services, lock-in effects, a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. Often, there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. These providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts, gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. Accordingly, it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective.

Amendment 10

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 13

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (13) | In particular, online intermediation services, online search engines, operating systems, online social networking, video sharing platform services, number-independent interpersonal communication services, cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike, which entails a risk of unfair business practices. They therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this Regulation. Online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services, and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in Annex II to Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council (32). In certain circumstances, the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users, but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users, such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(13)

In particular, online intermediation services, online search engines, operating systems, online social networking, video sharing platform services, number-independent interpersonal communication services, cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike, which entails a risk of unfair business practices. They therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this Regulation. Online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services, and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in Annex II to Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council (32). In certain circumstances, the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users, but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users, such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.

| (13) | In particular, online intermediation services, online search engines, operating systems
  such as on smart devices, internet of things or embedded digital services in vehicles
  , online social networking, video sharing platform services, number-independent interpersonal communication services, cloud computing services
  , virtual assistant services, web browsers, connected TV
  and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike, which entails a risk of unfair business practices. They therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this Regulation. Online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services, and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in Annex II to Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council (32). In certain circumstances, the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users, but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users, such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

In particular, online intermediation services, online search engines, operating systems
  such as on smart devices, internet of things or embedded digital services in vehicles
  , online social networking, video sharing platform services, number-independent interpersonal communication services, cloud computing services
  , virtual assistant services, web browsers, connected TV
  and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike, which entails a risk of unfair business practices. They therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this Regulation. Online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services, and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in Annex II to Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council (32). In certain circumstances, the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users, but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users, such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.

Amendment 11

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 14

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (14) | A number of other ancillary services, such as identification
  or
  payment services
  and
  technical services which support the provision of payment services, may be provided by gatekeepers together with their core platform services. As gatekeepers frequently provide the portfolio of their services as part of an integrated ecosystem to which third-party providers of such ancillary services do not have access, at least not subject to equal conditions, and can link the access to the core platform service to take-up of one or more ancillary services, the gatekeepers are likely to have an increased ability and incentive to leverage their gatekeeper power from their core platform services to these ancillary services, to the detriment of choice and contestability of these services. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14)

A number of other ancillary services, such as identification
  or
  payment services
  and
  technical services which support the provision of payment services, may be provided by gatekeepers together with their core platform services. As gatekeepers frequently provide the portfolio of their services as part of an integrated ecosystem to which third-party providers of such ancillary services do not have access, at least not subject to equal conditions, and can link the access to the core platform service to take-up of one or more ancillary services, the gatekeepers are likely to have an increased ability and incentive to leverage their gatekeeper power from their core platform services to these ancillary services, to the detriment of choice and contestability of these services.

| (14) | A number of other ancillary services, such as identification
  services,
  payment services, technical services which support the provision of payment services
  or in-app payment systems
  , may be provided by gatekeepers together with their core platform services. As gatekeepers frequently provide the portfolio of their services as part of an integrated ecosystem to which third-party providers of such ancillary services do not have access, at least not subject to equal conditions, and can link the access to the core platform service to take-up of one or more ancillary services, the gatekeepers are likely to have an increased ability and incentive to leverage their gatekeeper power from their core platform services to these ancillary services, to the detriment of choice and contestability of these services. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

A number of other ancillary services, such as identification
  services,
  payment services, technical services which support the provision of payment services
  or in-app payment systems
  , may be provided by gatekeepers together with their core platform services. As gatekeepers frequently provide the portfolio of their services as part of an integrated ecosystem to which third-party providers of such ancillary services do not have access, at least not subject to equal conditions, and can link the access to the core platform service to take-up of one or more ancillary services, the gatekeepers are likely to have an increased ability and incentive to leverage their gatekeeper power from their core platform services to these ancillary services, to the detriment of choice and contestability of these services.

Amendment 244

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 14 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (14a) | Gatekeepers may also provide other ancillary services, for instance retailing or distribution activities, that are targeted at end users alongside their core platform services. Such ancillary services can compete with business users of the core platform service and contribute significantly to the imbalance in a given market and ultimately increase unfairly the gatekeeper’s power, including in relation to the gatekeeper’s business partners, such as suppliers of goods or services, relying on such ancillary service. To prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefiting from the leverage provided by provision of parallel services, such ancillary services should also be subject to the obligations applicable to core platform services. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(14a)

Gatekeepers may also provide other ancillary services, for instance retailing or distribution activities, that are targeted at end users alongside their core platform services. Such ancillary services can compete with business users of the core platform service and contribute significantly to the imbalance in a given market and ultimately increase unfairly the gatekeeper’s power, including in relation to the gatekeeper’s business partners, such as suppliers of goods or services, relying on such ancillary service. To prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefiting from the leverage provided by provision of parallel services, such ancillary services should also be subject to the obligations applicable to core platform services.

Amendment 12

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (20) | A very high number of business users that depend on a core platform service to reach a very high number of monthly
  active
  end users allow the provider of that service to influence the operations of a substantial part of business users to its advantage and indicate in principle that the provider serves as an important gateway. The respective relevant levels for those numbers should be set representing a substantive percentage of the entire population of the Union when it comes to end users and of the entire population of businesses using platforms to determine the threshold for business users. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(20)

A very high number of business users that depend on a core platform service to reach a very high number of monthly
  active
  end users allow the provider of that service to influence the operations of a substantial part of business users to its advantage and indicate in principle that the provider serves as an important gateway. The respective relevant levels for those numbers should be set representing a substantive percentage of the entire population of the Union when it comes to end users and of the entire population of businesses using platforms to determine the threshold for business users.

| (20) | A very high number of business users that depend on a core platform service to reach a very high number of monthly end users allow the provider of that service to influence the operations of a substantial part of business users to its advantage and indicate in principle that the provider serves as an important gateway. The respective relevant levels for those numbers should be set representing a substantive percentage of the entire population of the Union when it comes to end users and of the entire population of businesses using platforms to determine the threshold for business users. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

A very high number of business users that depend on a core platform service to reach a very high number of monthly end users allow the provider of that service to influence the operations of a substantial part of business users to its advantage and indicate in principle that the provider serves as an important gateway. The respective relevant levels for those numbers should be set representing a substantive percentage of the entire population of the Union when it comes to end users and of the entire population of businesses using platforms to determine the threshold for business users.

Amendment 13

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 21

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (21) | An entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. This is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three Member States to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(21)

An entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. This is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three Member States to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years.

| (21) | An entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. This is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three Member States to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years.
  A list of indicators to be used by the providers of core platforms services when measuring monthly end users and yearly business users should be provided in an Annex to this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

An entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. This is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three Member States to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years.
  A list of indicators to be used by the providers of core platforms services when measuring monthly end users and yearly business users should be provided in an Annex to this Regulation.

Amendment 14

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 22

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (22) | Such thresholds can be impacted by market and technical developments. The Commission should therefore be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met, and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary. This is particularly relevant in relation to the threshold referring to market capitalisation, which should be indexed in appropriate intervals. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(22)

Such thresholds can be impacted by market and technical developments. The Commission should therefore be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met, and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary. This is particularly relevant in relation to the threshold referring to market capitalisation, which should be indexed in appropriate intervals.

| (22) | Such thresholds can be impacted by market and technical developments. The Commission should therefore be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met
  and update the list of indicators set out in the Annex to this Regulation
  , and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary. This is particularly relevant in relation to the threshold referring to market capitalisation, which should be indexed in appropriate intervals. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Such thresholds can be impacted by market and technical developments. The Commission should therefore be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met
  and update the list of indicators set out in the Annex to this Regulation
  , and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary. This is particularly relevant in relation to the threshold referring to market capitalisation, which should be indexed in appropriate intervals.

Amendment 15

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 23

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (23) | Providers of core platform services
  which meet
  the quantitative thresholds
  but are able to present sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that, in the circumstances
  in which the relevant core platform service operates, they do not fulfil the objective requirements
  for
  a gatekeeper
  , should not be designated directly, but only subject to a further investigation
  . The burden of adducing evidence that the presumption deriving from the fulfilment of quantitative thresholds should not apply to a specific provider should be borne by that provider
  In its assessment, the Commission should take into account only the elements which directly relate to the requirements for constituting a gatekeeper, namely whether it is an important gateway which is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market with an entrenched and durable position, either actual or foreseeable. Any justification on economic grounds seeking to demonstrate efficiencies deriving from a specific type of behaviour by the provider of core platform services should be discarded, as it is not relevant to the designation as a gatekeeper
  . The Commission should be able to take a decision by relying on the quantitative thresholds where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the Commission. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(23)

Providers of core platform services
  which meet
  the quantitative thresholds
  but are able to present sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that, in the circumstances
  in which the relevant core platform service operates, they do not fulfil the objective requirements
  for
  a gatekeeper
  , should not be designated directly, but only subject to a further investigation
  . The burden of adducing evidence that the presumption deriving from the fulfilment of quantitative thresholds should not apply to a specific provider should be borne by that provider
  In its assessment, the Commission should take into account only the elements which directly relate to the requirements for constituting a gatekeeper, namely whether it is an important gateway which is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market with an entrenched and durable position, either actual or foreseeable. Any justification on economic grounds seeking to demonstrate efficiencies deriving from a specific type of behaviour by the provider of core platform services should be discarded, as it is not relevant to the designation as a gatekeeper
  . The Commission should be able to take a decision by relying on the quantitative thresholds where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the Commission.

| (23) | Providers of core platform services
  should be able to demonstrate that, despite meeting
  the quantitative thresholds
  , due to the exceptional circumstances
  in which the relevant core platform service operates, they do not fulfil the objective requirements
  to qualify as
  a gatekeeper
  only if they are able to present sufficiently compelling arguments to demonstrate this
  . The burden of adducing
  compelling
  evidence that the presumption deriving from the fulfilment of quantitative thresholds should not apply to a specific provider should be borne by that provider. The Commission should be able to take a decision by relying on the quantitative thresholds
  and facts available
  where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the Commission.
  In view of improving market transparency, the Commission may require that information provided regarding business and end users is verified by third party audience measurement providers qualified to provide such services in accordance with market standards and codes of conduct applicable in the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Providers of core platform services
  should be able to demonstrate that, despite meeting
  the quantitative thresholds
  , due to the exceptional circumstances
  in which the relevant core platform service operates, they do not fulfil the objective requirements
  to qualify as
  a gatekeeper
  only if they are able to present sufficiently compelling arguments to demonstrate this
  . The burden of adducing
  compelling
  evidence that the presumption deriving from the fulfilment of quantitative thresholds should not apply to a specific provider should be borne by that provider. The Commission should be able to take a decision by relying on the quantitative thresholds
  and facts available
  where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the Commission.
  In view of improving market transparency, the Commission may require that information provided regarding business and end users is verified by third party audience measurement providers qualified to provide such services in accordance with market standards and codes of conduct applicable in the Union.

Amendment 16

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 29

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (29) | Designated gatekeepers should comply with the obligations laid down in this Regulation in respect of each of the core platform services listed in the relevant designation decision. The mandatory rules should apply taking into account the conglomerate position of gatekeepers, where applicable. Furthermore, implementing measures that the Commission may by decision impose on the gatekeeper
  following a regulatory dialogue
  should be designed in an effective manner, having regard to the features of core platform services as well as possible circumvention risks and in compliance with the principle of proportionality and the fundamental rights of the undertakings concerned as well as those of third parties. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(29)

Designated gatekeepers should comply with the obligations laid down in this Regulation in respect of each of the core platform services listed in the relevant designation decision. The mandatory rules should apply taking into account the conglomerate position of gatekeepers, where applicable. Furthermore, implementing measures that the Commission may by decision impose on the gatekeeper
  following a regulatory dialogue
  should be designed in an effective manner, having regard to the features of core platform services as well as possible circumvention risks and in compliance with the principle of proportionality and the fundamental rights of the undertakings concerned as well as those of third parties.

| (29) | Designated gatekeepers should comply with the obligations laid down in this Regulation in respect of each of the core platform services listed in the relevant designation decision. The mandatory rules should apply taking into account the conglomerate position of gatekeepers, where applicable. Furthermore, implementing measures that the Commission may by decision impose on the gatekeeper should be designed in an effective manner, having regard to the features of core platform services as well as possible circumvention risks and in compliance with the principle of proportionality and the fundamental rights of the undertakings concerned as well as those of third parties. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Designated gatekeepers should comply with the obligations laid down in this Regulation in respect of each of the core platform services listed in the relevant designation decision. The mandatory rules should apply taking into account the conglomerate position of gatekeepers, where applicable. Furthermore, implementing measures that the Commission may by decision impose on the gatekeeper should be designed in an effective manner, having regard to the features of core platform services as well as possible circumvention risks and in compliance with the principle of proportionality and the fundamental rights of the undertakings concerned as well as those of third parties.

Amendment 17

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 30

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (30) | The very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers, including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. To provide all of the market participants, including the gatekeepers, with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations, a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. It is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every
  two years
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(30)

The very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers, including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. To provide all of the market participants, including the gatekeepers, with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations, a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. It is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every
  two years
  .

| (30) | The very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers, including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. To provide all of the market participants, including the gatekeepers, with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations, a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. It is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every
  year
  . |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers, including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. To provide all of the market participants, including the gatekeepers, with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations, a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. It is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every
  year
  .

Amendment 18

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 31

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (31) | To ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper, the gatekeepers should inform the Commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. Such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above, regarding the status of individual gatekeepers, but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(31)

To ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper, the gatekeepers should inform the Commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. Such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above, regarding the status of individual gatekeepers, but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this Regulation.

| (31) | To ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper, the gatekeepers should inform the Commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. Such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above, regarding the status of individual gatekeepers, but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this Regulation.
  The Commission should inform competent national authorities of such notifications. The information gathered may be used to trigger the referral system set out in Article 22 of the Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

To ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper, the gatekeepers should inform the Commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. Such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above, regarding the status of individual gatekeepers, but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this Regulation.
  The Commission should inform competent national authorities of such notifications. The information gathered may be used to trigger the referral system set out in Article 22 of the Regulation (EC) No 139/2004.

Amendment 19

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 32

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (32) | To safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers, it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. Such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers, to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned, to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. Given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets, and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers, it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. To that end, the obligations in question should apply to any
  practices
  by a gatekeeper, irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual, commercial, technical or any other nature, insofar as
  a
  practice
  corresponds
  to the
  type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of
  this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(32)

To safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers, it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. Such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers, to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned, to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. Given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets, and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers, it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. To that end, the obligations in question should apply to any
  practices
  by a gatekeeper, irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual, commercial, technical or any other nature, insofar as
  a
  practice
  corresponds
  to the
  type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of
  this Regulation.

| (32) | To safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers, it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. Such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers, to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned, to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. Given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets, and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers, it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. To that end, the obligations in question should apply to any
  behaviour
  by a gatekeeper, irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual, commercial, technical or any other nature, insofar as
  it could, in
  practice
  , have an equivalent object or effect
  to the
  practices that are prohibited under
  this Regulation.
  Such behaviour includes the design used by the gatekeeper, the presentation of end-user choices in a non-neutral manner, or using the structure, function or manner of operation of a user interface or a part thereof to subvert or impair user autonomy, decision-making, or choice. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

To safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers, it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. Such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers, to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned, to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. Given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets, and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers, it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. To that end, the obligations in question should apply to any
  behaviour
  by a gatekeeper, irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual, commercial, technical or any other nature, insofar as
  it could, in
  practice
  , have an equivalent object or effect
  to the
  practices that are prohibited under
  this Regulation.
  Such behaviour includes the design used by the gatekeeper, the presentation of end-user choices in a non-neutral manner, or using the structure, function or manner of operation of a user interface or a part thereof to subvert or impair user autonomy, decision-making, or choice.

Amendment 20

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 33

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (33) | The obligations laid down in this Regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. Therefore, the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained, for example in the enforcement of the EU competition rules, shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. In addition, it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. The obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified,
  following an in-depth investigation,
  as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this Regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(33)

The obligations laid down in this Regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. Therefore, the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained, for example in the enforcement of the EU competition rules, shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. In addition, it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. The obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified,
  following an in-depth investigation,
  as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this Regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations.

| (33) | The obligations laid down in this Regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. Therefore, the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained, for example in the enforcement of the EU competition rules, shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users.
  The obligations laid down in the Regulation should take into account the nature of the core platform services provided and the presence of different business models.
  In addition, it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. The obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified, as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this Regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The obligations laid down in this Regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. Therefore, the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained, for example in the enforcement of the EU competition rules, shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users.
  The obligations laid down in the Regulation should take into account the nature of the core platform services provided and the presence of different business models.
  In addition, it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. The obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified, as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this Regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations.

Amendment 21

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 36

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (36) | The conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data, thereby raising barriers to entry. To ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services, they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. The possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data, including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites, and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit, clear and straightforward manner. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(36)

The conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data, thereby raising barriers to entry. To ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services, they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. The possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data, including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites, and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit, clear and straightforward manner.

| (36) | The conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data, thereby raising barriers to entry. To ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services, they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised
  but equivalent
  alternative
  . The less personalized alternative should not be different or of degraded quality compared to the service offered to the end users who provide consent to the combining of their personal data
  . The possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data, including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites, and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit, clear and straightforward manner. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data, thereby raising barriers to entry. To ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services, they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised
  but equivalent
  alternative
  . The less personalized alternative should not be different or of degraded quality compared to the service offered to the end users who provide consent to the combining of their personal data
  . The possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data, including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites, and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit, clear and straightforward manner.

Amendment 22

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 36 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (36a) | Minors merit specific protection with regard to their personal data, in particular as regards the use for the purposes of marketing or creating personality or user profiles and the collection of personal data. Therefore, personal data of minors collected or otherwise generated by gatekeepers should not be processed for commercial purposes, such as direct marketing, profiling and behaviourally targeted advertising. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(36a)

Minors merit specific protection with regard to their personal data, in particular as regards the use for the purposes of marketing or creating personality or user profiles and the collection of personal data. Therefore, personal data of minors collected or otherwise generated by gatekeepers should not be processed for commercial purposes, such as direct marketing, profiling and behaviourally targeted advertising.

Amendment 23

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 36 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (36b) | In order to safeguard a fair end user choice, refusing consent should not be more difficult than giving consent. In addition, to safeguard the end users rights and freedoms, the processing of personal data for advertising purposes should be in line with the requirements of data minimisation under Article 5 (1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Furthermore, the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, as well as the data concerning health or a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation should be strictly limited and subject to the appropriate safeguards as outlined in Article 9 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(36b)

In order to safeguard a fair end user choice, refusing consent should not be more difficult than giving consent. In addition, to safeguard the end users rights and freedoms, the processing of personal data for advertising purposes should be in line with the requirements of data minimisation under Article 5 (1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Furthermore, the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, as well as the data concerning health or a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation should be strictly limited and subject to the appropriate safeguards as outlined in Article 9 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

Amendment 24

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 37

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (37) | Because of their position, gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions, including price, through other online intermediation services. Such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services, limiting inter-platform contestability, which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. To ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users, it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions, including price. Such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect, such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(37)

Because of their position, gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions, including price, through other online intermediation services. Such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services, limiting inter-platform contestability, which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. To ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users, it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions, including price. Such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect, such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users.

| (37) | Because of their position, gatekeepers might in certain cases
  , through the imposition of contractual terms and conditions,
  restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions, including price, through other online intermediation services
  or through direct business channels
  . Such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services
  or direct distribution channels
  , limiting inter-platform contestability, which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. To ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services
  or other direct distribution channels
  and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users, it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions, including price. Such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect, such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Because of their position, gatekeepers might in certain cases
  , through the imposition of contractual terms and conditions,
  restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions, including price, through other online intermediation services
  or through direct business channels
  . Such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services
  or direct distribution channels
  , limiting inter-platform contestability, which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. To ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services
  or other direct distribution channels
  and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users, it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions, including price. Such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect, such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users.

Amendment 25

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 38

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (38) | To prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers, the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper. Conversely, end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper, if applicable, or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. This should apply to the promotion of offers and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. Moreover, the ability of end users to freely acquire content, subscriptions, features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined or restricted. In particular, it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such services via a software application running on their core platform service. For example, subscribers to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented from accessing such online content on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(38)

To prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers, the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper. Conversely, end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper, if applicable, or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. This should apply to the promotion of offers and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. Moreover, the ability of end users to freely acquire content, subscriptions, features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined or restricted. In particular, it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such services via a software application running on their core platform service. For example, subscribers to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented from accessing such online content on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store.

| (38) | To prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers, the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper
  or through other channels. An acquired end user is an end user who has already entered into a contractual relationship with the business user. Such contractual relationships may be on either a paid or a free basis (e.g., free trials, free service tiers) and may have been entered into either on the gatekeeper’s core platform service or through any other channel
  . Conversely, end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper, if applicable, or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. This should apply to the promotion of offers
  , communication
  and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. Moreover, the ability of end users to freely acquire content, subscriptions, features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined or restricted. In particular, it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such services via a software application running on their core platform service. For example, subscribers to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented from accessing such online content on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

To prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers, the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper
  or through other channels. An acquired end user is an end user who has already entered into a contractual relationship with the business user. Such contractual relationships may be on either a paid or a free basis (e.g., free trials, free service tiers) and may have been entered into either on the gatekeeper’s core platform service or through any other channel
  . Conversely, end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper, if applicable, or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. This should apply to the promotion of offers
  , communication
  and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. Moreover, the ability of end users to freely acquire content, subscriptions, features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined or restricted. In particular, it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such services via a software application running on their core platform service. For example, subscribers to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented from accessing such online content on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store.

Amendment 26

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 39

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (39) | To safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. For example, business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices, such as discriminatory access conditions, unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. Any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress, for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms, should therefore be prohibited. This should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms, including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective Union and national law This should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(39)

To safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. For example, business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices, such as discriminatory access conditions, unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. Any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress, for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms, should therefore be prohibited. This should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms, including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective Union and national law This should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.

| (39) | To safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users
  and end users, including whistleblowers
  to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. For example, business
  users or end
  users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices, such as discriminatory access conditions, unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. Any practice that would in any way inhibit
  or hinder
  such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress, for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms, should therefore be prohibited. This should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms, including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective Union and national law This should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

To safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users
  and end users, including whistleblowers
  to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. For example, business
  users or end
  users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices, such as discriminatory access conditions, unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. Any practice that would in any way inhibit
  or hinder
  such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress, for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms, should therefore be prohibited. This should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms, including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective Union and national law This should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.

Amendment 27

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 40

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (40) | Identification
  services
  are
  crucial
  for
  business users to conduct their business, as these can allow them not only to optimise services, to the extent allowed under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (33) , but also to inject trust in online transactions, in compliance with Union or national law. Gatekeepers should therefore not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users, where other identification services are available to such business users. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(40)

Identification
  services
  are
  crucial
  for
  business users to conduct their business, as these can allow them not only to optimise services, to the extent allowed under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (33) , but also to inject trust in online transactions, in compliance with Union or national law. Gatekeepers should therefore not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users, where other identification services are available to such business users.

| (40) | Gatekeepers offer a range of ancillary
  services
  . To ensure contestability, it is
  crucial
  that
  business users
  are free to choose such ancillary services without having to fear any detrimental effects for the provision of the core platform service and
  to conduct their business, as these can allow them not only to optimise services, to the extent allowed under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (33), but also to inject trust in online transactions, in compliance with Union or national law. Gatekeepers should therefore
  not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to use, offer or include any ancillary service provided by the gatekeeper or a particular third party, where other ancillary services are available to such business users. Gatekeepers should eventually
  not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users, where other identification services are available to such business users. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Gatekeepers offer a range of ancillary
  services
  . To ensure contestability, it is
  crucial
  that
  business users
  are free to choose such ancillary services without having to fear any detrimental effects for the provision of the core platform service and
  to conduct their business, as these can allow them not only to optimise services, to the extent allowed under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (33), but also to inject trust in online transactions, in compliance with Union or national law. Gatekeepers should therefore
  not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to use, offer or include any ancillary service provided by the gatekeeper or a particular third party, where other ancillary services are available to such business users. Gatekeepers should eventually
  not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users, where other identification services are available to such business users.

Amendment 28

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 41

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (41) | Gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. Gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching
  impossible
  or ineffective. The mere offering of a given product or service to end users, including by means of pre-installation, as well the improvement of end user offering, such as better prices or increased quality, would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(41)

Gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. Gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching
  impossible
  or ineffective. The mere offering of a given product or service to end users, including by means of pre-installation, as well the improvement of end user offering, such as better prices or increased quality, would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching.

| (41) | Gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. Gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching
  more difficult
  or ineffective. The mere offering of a given product or service to end users, including by means of pre-installation, as well the improvement of end user offering, such as better prices or increased quality, would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. Gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching
  more difficult
  or ineffective. The mere offering of a given product or service to end users, including by means of pre-installation, as well the improvement of end user offering, such as better prices or increased quality, would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching.

Amendment 29

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 42

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (42) | The conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. This opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms, but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. The sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation, and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. This often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. Furthermore, the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer, more transparent and contestable platform environment. These higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. Transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services, when requested and to the extent possible, with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(42)

The conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. This opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms, but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. The sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation, and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. This often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. Furthermore, the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer, more transparent and contestable platform environment. These higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. Transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services, when requested and to the extent possible, with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain.

| (42) | The conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. This opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms, but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. The sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation, and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. This often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. Furthermore, the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer, more transparent and contestable platform environment. These higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. Transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services,
  with free of charge, effective, high-quality, continuous and real-time
  when requested and to the extent possible, with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain
  and the availability and visibility of advertisement
  . |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. This opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms, but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. The sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation, and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. This often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. Furthermore, the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer, more transparent and contestable platform environment. These higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. Transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services,
  with free of charge, effective, high-quality, continuous and real-time
  when requested and to the extent possible, with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain
  and the availability and visibility of advertisement
  .

Amendment 30

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 44

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (44) | Business users may also purchase advertising services from a provider of core platform services for the purpose of providing goods and services to end users. In this case, it may occur that the data are not generated on the core platform service, but are provided to the core platform service by the business user or are generated based on its operations through the core platform service concerned. In certain instances, that core platform service providing advertising may have a dual role, as intermediary and as provider of advertising services. Accordingly, the obligation prohibiting a dual role gatekeeper from using data of business users should apply also with respect to the data that a core platform service has received from businesses for the purpose of providing advertising services related to that core platform service. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(44)

Business users may also purchase advertising services from a provider of core platform services for the purpose of providing goods and services to end users. In this case, it may occur that the data are not generated on the core platform service, but are provided to the core platform service by the business user or are generated based on its operations through the core platform service concerned. In certain instances, that core platform service providing advertising may have a dual role, as intermediary and as provider of advertising services. Accordingly, the obligation prohibiting a dual role gatekeeper from using data of business users should apply also with respect to the data that a core platform service has received from businesses for the purpose of providing advertising services related to that core platform service.

| (44) | Business users may also purchase advertising services from a provider of core platform services for the purpose of providing goods and services to end users. In this case, it may occur that the data are not generated on the core platform service, but are provided to the core platform service by the business user or are generated based on its operations through the core platform service concerned. In certain instances, that core platform service providing advertising may have a dual role, as intermediary and as provider of advertising services. Accordingly, the obligation prohibiting a dual role gatekeeper from using data of business users should apply also with respect to the data that a core platform service has received from businesses for the purpose of providing advertising services related to that core platform service.
  Moreover the gatekeeper should refrain from disclosing any commercially sensitive information obtained in connection with one of its advertising services to any third party belonging to the same undertaking and from using such commercially sensitive information for any purposes other than the provision of the specific advertising service unless this is necessary for carrying out a business transaction. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

Business users may also purchase advertising services from a provider of core platform services for the purpose of providing goods and services to end users. In this case, it may occur that the data are not generated on the core platform service, but are provided to the core platform service by the business user or are generated based on its operations through the core platform service concerned. In certain instances, that core platform service providing advertising may have a dual role, as intermediary and as provider of advertising services. Accordingly, the obligation prohibiting a dual role gatekeeper from using data of business users should apply also with respect to the data that a core platform service has received from businesses for the purpose of providing advertising services related to that core platform service.
  Moreover the gatekeeper should refrain from disclosing any commercially sensitive information obtained in connection with one of its advertising services to any third party belonging to the same undertaking and from using such commercially sensitive information for any purposes other than the provision of the specific advertising service unless this is necessary for carrying out a business transaction.

Amendment 31

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 46

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (46) | A gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service, to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. This may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. To enable end user choice, gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(46)

A gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service, to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. This may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. To enable end user choice, gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications.

| (46) | A gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service, to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. This may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. To enable end user choice, gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications.
  The gatekeeper may restrict such un-installation when such applications are essential to the functioning of the operating system or the device. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

A gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service, to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. This may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. To enable end user choice, gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications.
  The gatekeeper may restrict such un-installation when such applications are essential to the functioning of the operating system or the device.

Amendment 32

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 47

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (47) | The rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. Such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. In order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(47)

The rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. Such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. In order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system.

| (47) | The rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. Such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services.
  To ensure contestability, the gatekeeper should prompt where relevant the end user to decide whether the downloaded application or app store should become the default.
  In order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. Such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services.
  To ensure contestability, the gatekeeper should prompt where relevant the end user to decide whether the downloaded application or app store should become the default.
  In order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system.

Amendment 33

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 48

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (48) | Gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services, or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. This can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. When offering those products or services on the core platform service, gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering, in terms of ranking, as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. This can occur for instance with products or services, including other core platform services, which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines, or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results, groups of results specialised in a certain topic, displayed along with the results of an online search engine, which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. Other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores, or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network, or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. In those circumstances, the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. Consequently, these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services, to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(48)

Gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services, or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. This can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. When offering those products or services on the core platform service, gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering, in terms of ranking, as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. This can occur for instance with products or services, including other core platform services, which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines, or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results, groups of results specialised in a certain topic, displayed along with the results of an online search engine, which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. Other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores, or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network, or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. In those circumstances, the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. Consequently, these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services, to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.

| (48) | Gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services, or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. This can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. When offering those products or services on the core platform service, gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering, in terms of ranking, as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. This can occur for instance with products or services, including other core platform services, which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines, or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results, groups of results specialised in a certain topic, displayed along with the results of an online search engine, which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine.
  Such preferential or embedded display of a separate online intermediation service should constitute a favouring irrespective of whether the information or results within the favoured groups of specialised results may also be provided by competing services and are as such ranked in a non-discriminatory way.
  Other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores, or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network, or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. In those circumstances, the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper
  leading to conflicts of interest
  . Consequently, these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services, to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

Gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services, or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. This can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. When offering those products or services on the core platform service, gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering, in terms of ranking, as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. This can occur for instance with products or services, including other core platform services, which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines, or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results, groups of results specialised in a certain topic, displayed along with the results of an online search engine, which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine.
  Such preferential or embedded display of a separate online intermediation service should constitute a favouring irrespective of whether the information or results within the favoured groups of specialised results may also be provided by competing services and are as such ranked in a non-discriminatory way.
  Other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores, or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network, or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. In those circumstances, the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper
  leading to conflicts of interest
  . Consequently, these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services, to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.

Amendment 34

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 49

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (49) | In such situations, the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service, whether through legal, commercial or technical means, in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. To ensure that this obligation is effective, it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. Ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence, including display, rating, linking or voice results. To ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. The guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation (34). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(49)

In such situations, the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service, whether through legal, commercial or technical means, in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. To ensure that this obligation is effective, it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. Ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence, including display, rating, linking or voice results. To ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. The guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation (34).

| (49) | In such situations, the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service, whether through legal, commercial or technical means, in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. To ensure that this obligation is effective, it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. Ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence, including display, rating, linking or voice results. To ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking.
  In addition, to avoid any conflicts of interest, gatekeepers should be required to treat its own product or services, as a separate commercial entity that is commercially viable as a stand-alone service.
  The guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation (34). |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In such situations, the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service, whether through legal, commercial or technical means, in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. To ensure that this obligation is effective, it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. Ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence, including display, rating, linking or voice results. To ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking.
  In addition, to avoid any conflicts of interest, gatekeepers should be required to treat its own product or services, as a separate commercial entity that is commercially viable as a stand-alone service.
  The guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation (34).

Amendment 35

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 52 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (52a) | The lack of interconnection features among the gatekeeper services may substantially affect users choice and ability to switch due to the incapacity for end user to reconstruct social connections and networks provided by the gatekeeper even if multi-homing is possible. Therefore, it should be allowed for any providers of equivalent core platform services to interconnect with the gatekeepers number independent interpersonal communication services or social network services upon their request and free of charge. Interconnection should be provided under the conditions and quality that are available or used by the gatekeeper, while ensuring a high level of security and personal data protection. In the particular case of number-dependant intercommunication services, interconnection requirements should mean giving the possibility for third-party providers to request access and interconnection for features such as text, video, voice and picture, while it should provide access and interconnection on basic features such as posts, likes and comments for social networking services. Interconnection measures of number-independent interpersonal communication services should be imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Electronic Communications Code and particularly the conditions and procedures laid down in Article 61 thereof. It should nevertheless presume that the providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services that has been designated as a gatekeeper, reaches the conditions required to trigger the procedures, namely they reach a significant level of coverage and user uptake, and should therefore provide for minimum applicable interoperability requirements. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(52a)

The lack of interconnection features among the gatekeeper services may substantially affect users choice and ability to switch due to the incapacity for end user to reconstruct social connections and networks provided by the gatekeeper even if multi-homing is possible. Therefore, it should be allowed for any providers of equivalent core platform services to interconnect with the gatekeepers number independent interpersonal communication services or social network services upon their request and free of charge. Interconnection should be provided under the conditions and quality that are available or used by the gatekeeper, while ensuring a high level of security and personal data protection. In the particular case of number-dependant intercommunication services, interconnection requirements should mean giving the possibility for third-party providers to request access and interconnection for features such as text, video, voice and picture, while it should provide access and interconnection on basic features such as posts, likes and comments for social networking services. Interconnection measures of number-independent interpersonal communication services should be imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Electronic Communications Code and particularly the conditions and procedures laid down in Article 61 thereof. It should nevertheless presume that the providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services that has been designated as a gatekeeper, reaches the conditions required to trigger the procedures, namely they reach a significant level of coverage and user uptake, and should therefore provide for minimum applicable interoperability requirements.

Amendment 36

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 53

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (53) | The conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. This often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. To further enhance fairness, transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this Regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider, the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers, when requested, with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers, advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising, as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(53)

The conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. This often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. To further enhance fairness, transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this Regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider, the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers, when requested, with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers, advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising, as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services.

| (53) | The conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. This often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. To further enhance fairness, transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this Regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider, the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers
  for entire disclosure and transparency of the parameters and data used for decision making
  ,
  execution and measurement of the intermediation services. A gatekeeper should further provide
  when requested, with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers, advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising, as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. This often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. To further enhance fairness, transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this Regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider, the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers
  for entire disclosure and transparency of the parameters and data used for decision making
  ,
  execution and measurement of the intermediation services. A gatekeeper should further provide
  when requested, with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers, advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising, as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services.

Amendment 37

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 57

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (57) | In particular gatekeepers which provide access to
  software application stores
  serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. In view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their
  software application stores
  , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions, including pricing conditions, that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. Pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. The following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of
  software application stores
  ; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. This obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of
  software application stores
  to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in Regulation [Digital Services Act]. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(57)

In particular gatekeepers which provide access to
  software application stores
  serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. In view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their
  software application stores
  , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions, including pricing conditions, that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. Pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. The following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of
  software application stores
  ; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. This obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of
  software application stores
  to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in Regulation [Digital Services Act].

| (57) | In particular gatekeepers which provide access to
  core platform services
  serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. In view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their
  core platform services
  , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions, including pricing conditions, that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. Pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. The following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of
  core platform services
  ; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. This obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of
  core platform services
  to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in Regulation [Digital Services Act]. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In particular gatekeepers which provide access to
  core platform services
  serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. In view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their
  core platform services
  , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions, including pricing conditions, that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. Pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. The following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of
  core platform services
  ; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. This obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of
  core platform services
  to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in Regulation [Digital Services Act].

Amendment 38

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 57 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (57a) | The implementation of gatekeepers’ obligations related to access, installation, portability or interoperability could be facilitated by the use of technical standards. In this respect the Commission should identify appropriate, widely-used ICT technical standards from standards organisations as provided for under Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 or where appropriate ask/ request European standardisation bodies to develop them. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(57a)

The implementation of gatekeepers’ obligations related to access, installation, portability or interoperability could be facilitated by the use of technical standards. In this respect the Commission should identify appropriate, widely-used ICT technical standards from standards organisations as provided for under Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 or where appropriate ask/ request European standardisation bodies to develop them.

Amendment 39

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 58

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (58) | To ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this Regulation, while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers, it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them, in full respect of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, consumer protection, cyber security and product safety. The gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this Regulation by design. The necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. However, it may in certain cases be appropriate for the Commission, following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned, to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. This possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(58)

To ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this Regulation, while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers, it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them, in full respect of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, consumer protection, cyber security and product safety. The gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this Regulation by design. The necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. However, it may in certain cases be appropriate for the Commission, following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned, to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. This possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the Regulation.

| (58) | This aim of this Regulation is to ensure that the digital economy remains fair and contestable in order to promote innovation, high quality of digital products and services, fair and competitive prices and a high quality and choice for end users in the digital sector.
  To ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this Regulation, while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers, it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them, in full respect of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, consumer protection, cyber security and product safety
  as well as with accessibility requiremenst for the persons with disabilities in accordance with the Directive (EU) 2019/882
  . The gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this Regulation by design. The necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. However, it may in certain cases be appropriate for the Commission, following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned,
  and, where appropriate, a consultation of interested third parties,
  to further specify
  in a decision
  some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. This possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

This aim of this Regulation is to ensure that the digital economy remains fair and contestable in order to promote innovation, high quality of digital products and services, fair and competitive prices and a high quality and choice for end users in the digital sector.
  To ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this Regulation, while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers, it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them, in full respect of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, consumer protection, cyber security and product safety
  as well as with accessibility requiremenst for the persons with disabilities in accordance with the Directive (EU) 2019/882
  . The gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this Regulation by design. The necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. However, it may in certain cases be appropriate for the Commission, following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned,
  and, where appropriate, a consultation of interested third parties,
  to further specify
  in a decision
  some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. This possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the Regulation.

Amendment 40

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 59

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (59) | As an additional element to ensure proportionality, gatekeepers should be given an opportunity to request the suspension, to the extent necessary, of a specific obligation in exceptional circumstances that lie beyond the control of the gatekeeper, such as for example an unforeseen external shock that has temporarily eliminated a significant part of end user demand for the relevant core platform service, where compliance with a specific obligation is shown by the gatekeeper to endanger the economic viability of the Union operations of the gatekeeper concerned. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(59)

As an additional element to ensure proportionality, gatekeepers should be given an opportunity to request the suspension, to the extent necessary, of a specific obligation in exceptional circumstances that lie beyond the control of the gatekeeper, such as for example an unforeseen external shock that has temporarily eliminated a significant part of end user demand for the relevant core platform service, where compliance with a specific obligation is shown by the gatekeeper to endanger the economic viability of the Union operations of the gatekeeper concerned.

| (59) | As an additional element to ensure proportionality, gatekeepers should be given an opportunity to request the suspension, to the extent necessary, of a specific obligation in exceptional circumstances that lie beyond the control of the gatekeeper, such as for example an unforeseen external shock that has temporarily eliminated a significant part of end user demand for the relevant core platform service, where compliance with a specific obligation is shown by the gatekeeper to endanger the economic viability of the Union operations of the gatekeeper concerned.
  The Commission should state in its decision the reasons for granting the suspension and review it on a regular basis to assess whether the conditions for granting it are still viable or not. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

As an additional element to ensure proportionality, gatekeepers should be given an opportunity to request the suspension, to the extent necessary, of a specific obligation in exceptional circumstances that lie beyond the control of the gatekeeper, such as for example an unforeseen external shock that has temporarily eliminated a significant part of end user demand for the relevant core platform service, where compliance with a specific obligation is shown by the gatekeeper to endanger the economic viability of the Union operations of the gatekeeper concerned.
  The Commission should state in its decision the reasons for granting the suspension and review it on a regular basis to assess whether the conditions for granting it are still viable or not.

Amendment 41

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 60

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (60) | In exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality, public health or public security, the Commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. Affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. The regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this Regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(60)

In exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality, public health or public security, the Commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. Affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. The regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this Regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability.

| (60) | In exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality, public health or public security, the Commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. Affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. The regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited
  and duly justified
  suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this Regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability.
  Where such an exemption is granted, the Commission should review its decision every year. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

In exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality, public health or public security, the Commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. Affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. The regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited
  and duly justified
  suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this Regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability.
  Where such an exemption is granted, the Commission should review its decision every year.

Amendment 42

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 61

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (61) | The data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. Ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services, by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard, given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth, and at a similar scale. Enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. To ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation, gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed, including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on, the processing applied, the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used, the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services, and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling, as well as to seek their consent. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(61)

The data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. Ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services, by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard, given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth, and at a similar scale. Enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. To ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation, gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed, including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on, the processing applied, the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used, the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services, and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling, as well as to seek their consent.

| (61) | The data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. Ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services, by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard, given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth, and at a similar scale. Enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. To ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation, gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed, including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on, the processing applied, the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used, the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services, and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling, as well as to seek their consent.
  The expertise of consumer protection authorities', as members of the High Level Group of Digital Regulators, should be especially taken into consideration for assessing consumer profiling techniques. The Commission should develop, in consultation with the EU Data Protection Supervisor, the European Data Protection Board, civil society and experts, the standards and process of the audit. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. Ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services, by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard, given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth, and at a similar scale. Enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. To ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation, gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed, including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on, the processing applied, the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used, the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services, and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling, as well as to seek their consent.
  The expertise of consumer protection authorities', as members of the High Level Group of Digital Regulators, should be especially taken into consideration for assessing consumer profiling techniques. The Commission should develop, in consultation with the EU Data Protection Supervisor, the European Data Protection Board, civil society and experts, the standards and process of the audit.

Amendment 43

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 62

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (62) | In order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this Regulation, the Commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this Regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies;
  and
  whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets
  should be identified
  . Such assessment should be based on market investigations to be
  run
  in an appropriate timeframe, by using clear procedures and deadlines, in order to support the ex ante effect of this Regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector, and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(62)

In order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this Regulation, the Commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this Regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies;
  and
  whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets
  should be identified
  . Such assessment should be based on market investigations to be
  run
  in an appropriate timeframe, by using clear procedures and deadlines, in order to support the ex ante effect of this Regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector, and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty.

| (62) | In order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this Regulation, the Commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this Regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed; and
  whether
  additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets
  need to be investigated
  . Such assessment should be based on market investigations to be
  carried out
  in an appropriate timeframe, by using clear procedures and
  binding
  deadlines, in order to support the ex ante effect of this Regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector, and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

In order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this Regulation, the Commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this Regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed; and
  whether
  additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets
  need to be investigated
  . Such assessment should be based on market investigations to be
  carried out
  in an appropriate timeframe, by using clear procedures and
  binding
  deadlines, in order to support the ex ante effect of this Regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector, and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty.

Amendment 44

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 64

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (64) | The Commission should investigate and assess whether additional behavioural, or, where appropriate, structural remedies are justified, in order to ensure that the gatekeeper cannot frustrate the objectives of this Regulation by
  systematic non-compliance
  with one or several of the obligations laid down in this Regulation
  , which has further strengthened its gatekeeper position. This would be the case if the gatekeeper’s size in the internal market has further increased, economic dependency of business users and end users on the gatekeeper’s core platform services has further strengthened as their number has further increased and the gatekeeper benefits from increased entrenchment of its position
  . The Commission should therefore in such cases have the power to impose any remedy, whether behavioural or structural
  , having due regard to the principle of proportionality. Structural remedies, such as legal, functional or structural separation, including the divestiture of a business, or parts of it, should only be imposed either where there is no equally
  effective
  behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. Changes
  to the
  structure of an undertaking as it existed before the systematic non-compliance was established would only be
  proportionate
  where there is a substantial risk that this systematic non-compliance results from the very structure
  of the
  undertaking concerned
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(64)

The Commission should investigate and assess whether additional behavioural, or, where appropriate, structural remedies are justified, in order to ensure that the gatekeeper cannot frustrate the objectives of this Regulation by
  systematic non-compliance
  with one or several of the obligations laid down in this Regulation
  , which has further strengthened its gatekeeper position. This would be the case if the gatekeeper’s size in the internal market has further increased, economic dependency of business users and end users on the gatekeeper’s core platform services has further strengthened as their number has further increased and the gatekeeper benefits from increased entrenchment of its position
  . The Commission should therefore in such cases have the power to impose any remedy, whether behavioural or structural
  , having due regard to the principle of proportionality. Structural remedies, such as legal, functional or structural separation, including the divestiture of a business, or parts of it, should only be imposed either where there is no equally
  effective
  behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. Changes
  to the
  structure of an undertaking as it existed before the systematic non-compliance was established would only be
  proportionate
  where there is a substantial risk that this systematic non-compliance results from the very structure
  of the
  undertaking concerned
  .

| (64) | The Commission should investigate and assess whether additional behavioural, or, where appropriate, structural remedies are justified, in order to ensure that the gatekeeper cannot frustrate the objectives of this Regulation by
  systematically failing to comply
  with one or several of the obligations laid down in this Regulation. The Commission should therefore in such cases
  of systematic non-compliance
  have the power to impose any remedy, whether behavioural or structural
  that is necessary to ensure
  effective
  compliance with this Regulation. The Commission might prohibit gatekeepers from engaging on acquisitions (including ‘killer-acquisitions’) in the areas relevant to this regulation such as digital or
  to the
  use of data related sectors e.g. gaming, research institutes, consumer goods, fitness devices, health tracking financial services, and for a limited period of time where this is necessary and
  proportionate
  to undue the damage caused by repeated infringements or to prevent further damage to the contestability and fairness
  of the
  internal market
  .
  In doing so, the Commission might take into account different elements, such as likely network effects, data consolidation, and possible long-term effects or whether and when the acquisition of targets with specific data resources can significantly put in danger the contestability and the competitiveness of the markets through horizontal, vertical or conglomerate effects. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Commission should investigate and assess whether additional behavioural, or, where appropriate, structural remedies are justified, in order to ensure that the gatekeeper cannot frustrate the objectives of this Regulation by
  systematically failing to comply
  with one or several of the obligations laid down in this Regulation. The Commission should therefore in such cases
  of systematic non-compliance
  have the power to impose any remedy, whether behavioural or structural
  that is necessary to ensure
  effective
  compliance with this Regulation. The Commission might prohibit gatekeepers from engaging on acquisitions (including ‘killer-acquisitions’) in the areas relevant to this regulation such as digital or
  to the
  use of data related sectors e.g. gaming, research institutes, consumer goods, fitness devices, health tracking financial services, and for a limited period of time where this is necessary and
  proportionate
  to undue the damage caused by repeated infringements or to prevent further damage to the contestability and fairness
  of the
  internal market
  .
  In doing so, the Commission might take into account different elements, such as likely network effects, data consolidation, and possible long-term effects or whether and when the acquisition of targets with specific data resources can significantly put in danger the contestability and the competitiveness of the markets through horizontal, vertical or conglomerate effects.

Amendment 45

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 65 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (65a) | Interim measures can be an important tool to ensure that, while an investigation is ongoing, the infringement being investigated does not lead to serious and immediate damage for business users or end users of gatekeepers. In case of urgency, where a risk of serious and immediate damage for business users or end-users of gatekeepers could result from new practices that may undermine contestability of core platform services, the Commission should be empowered to impose interim measures by temporarily imposing obligations to the gatekeeper concerned. These interim measures should be limited to what is necessary and justified. They should apply pending the conclusion of the market investigation and the corresponding final decision of the Commission pursuant to Article 17. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(65a)

Interim measures can be an important tool to ensure that, while an investigation is ongoing, the infringement being investigated does not lead to serious and immediate damage for business users or end users of gatekeepers. In case of urgency, where a risk of serious and immediate damage for business users or end-users of gatekeepers could result from new practices that may undermine contestability of core platform services, the Commission should be empowered to impose interim measures by temporarily imposing obligations to the gatekeeper concerned. These interim measures should be limited to what is necessary and justified. They should apply pending the conclusion of the market investigation and the corresponding final decision of the Commission pursuant to Article 17.

Amendment 46

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 67

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (67) | Where, in the course of a proceeding into non-compliance or an investigation into systemic non-compliance, a gatekeeper offers commitments to the Commission, the latter should be able to adopt a decision making these commitments binding on the gatekeeper concerned, where it finds that the commitments ensure effective compliance with the obligations of this Regulation. This decision should also find that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(67)

Where, in the course of a proceeding into non-compliance or an investigation into systemic non-compliance, a gatekeeper offers commitments to the Commission, the latter should be able to adopt a decision making these commitments binding on the gatekeeper concerned, where it finds that the commitments ensure effective compliance with the obligations of this Regulation. This decision should also find that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission.

deleted

Amendment 47

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 70

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (70) | The Commission should be able to directly request that undertakings or association of undertakings provide any relevant evidence, data and information. In addition, the Commission should be able to request any relevant information from any public authority, body or agency within the Member State, or from any natural person or legal person for the purpose of this Regulation. When complying with a decision of the Commission, undertakings are obliged to answer factual questions and to provide documents. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(70)

The Commission should be able to directly request that undertakings or association of undertakings provide any relevant evidence, data and information. In addition, the Commission should be able to request any relevant information from any public authority, body or agency within the Member State, or from any natural person or legal person for the purpose of this Regulation. When complying with a decision of the Commission, undertakings are obliged to answer factual questions and to provide documents.

| (70) | The Commission should be able to directly request that undertakings or association of undertakings provide any relevant evidence, data and information
  . The time limits fixed by the Commission for the request of information should respect the size and capabilities of an undertaking or association of undertakings
  . In addition, the Commission should be able to request any relevant information from any public authority, body or agency within the Member State, or from any natural person or legal person for the purpose of this Regulation. When complying with a decision of the Commission, undertakings are obliged to answer factual questions and to provide documents. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The Commission should be able to directly request that undertakings or association of undertakings provide any relevant evidence, data and information
  . The time limits fixed by the Commission for the request of information should respect the size and capabilities of an undertaking or association of undertakings
  . In addition, the Commission should be able to request any relevant information from any public authority, body or agency within the Member State, or from any natural person or legal person for the purpose of this Regulation. When complying with a decision of the Commission, undertakings are obliged to answer factual questions and to provide documents.

Amendment 48

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 75

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (75) | In the context of proceedings carried out under this Regulation, the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the Commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. While ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned, in particular, the right of access to the file and the right to be heard, it is essential that confidential information be protected. Furthermore, while respecting the confidentiality of the information, the Commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. Finally, under certain conditions certain business records, such as communication between lawyers and their clients, may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(75)

In the context of proceedings carried out under this Regulation, the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the Commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. While ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned, in particular, the right of access to the file and the right to be heard, it is essential that confidential information be protected. Furthermore, while respecting the confidentiality of the information, the Commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. Finally, under certain conditions certain business records, such as communication between lawyers and their clients, may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met.

| (75) | In the context of proceedings carried out under this Regulation, the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the Commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. While ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned, in particular, the right of access to the file and the right to be heard, it is essential that confidential
  and sensitive commercial
  information
  , which could affect the privacy of trade secrets,
  be protected. Furthermore, while respecting the confidentiality of the information, the Commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. Finally, under certain conditions certain business records, such as communication between lawyers and their clients, may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

In the context of proceedings carried out under this Regulation, the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the Commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. While ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned, in particular, the right of access to the file and the right to be heard, it is essential that confidential
  and sensitive commercial
  information
  , which could affect the privacy of trade secrets,
  be protected. Furthermore, while respecting the confidentiality of the information, the Commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. Finally, under certain conditions certain business records, such as communication between lawyers and their clients, may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met.

Amendment 49

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 75 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (75a) | In order to facilitate cooperation and coordination between the Commission and Member States in their enforcement actions, a high-level group of regulators with responsibilities in the digital sector should be established with the power to advise the Commission. Establishing that group of regulators should enable the exchange of information and best practices among the Members States, and enhance better monitoring and thus strengthen the implementation of this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(75a)

In order to facilitate cooperation and coordination between the Commission and Member States in their enforcement actions, a high-level group of regulators with responsibilities in the digital sector should be established with the power to advise the Commission. Establishing that group of regulators should enable the exchange of information and best practices among the Members States, and enhance better monitoring and thus strengthen the implementation of this Regulation.

Amendment 50

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 75 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (75b) | The Commission should apply the provisions of this Regulation in close cooperation with the competent national authorities, to ensure effective enforceability as well as coherent implementation of this Regulation and to facilitate the cooperation with national authorities. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(75b)

The Commission should apply the provisions of this Regulation in close cooperation with the competent national authorities, to ensure effective enforceability as well as coherent implementation of this Regulation and to facilitate the cooperation with national authorities.

Amendment 51

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 76

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (76) | In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of Articles 3, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 25 and 30, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (35) . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(76)

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of Articles 3, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 25 and 30, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (35) .

| (76) | In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of Articles 3
  , 5
  , 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 25 and 30, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (35). |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of Articles 3
  , 5
  , 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 25 and 30, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (35).

Amendment 52

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 77

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (77) | The advisory committee established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the Commission issued under this Regulation. In order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are present, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty should be delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation. In particular, delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this Regulation
  and in respect of the update of the obligations laid down in this Regulation where, based on a market investigation the Commission has identified the need for updating the obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair
  . It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016 (36) . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(77)

The advisory committee established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the Commission issued under this Regulation. In order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are present, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty should be delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation. In particular, delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this Regulation
  and in respect of the update of the obligations laid down in this Regulation where, based on a market investigation the Commission has identified the need for updating the obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair
  . It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016 (36) . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

| (77) | The advisory committee established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the Commission issued under this Regulation. In order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are present, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty should be delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation. In particular, delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this Regulation. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016 (36). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The advisory committee established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the Commission issued under this Regulation. In order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are present, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty should be delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation. In particular, delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this Regulation. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016 (36). In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

Amendment 53

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 77 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (77a) | National courts will have an important role in applying this Regulation and should be allowed to ask the Commission to send them information or opinions on questions concerning the application of this Regulation. At the same time, the Commission should be able to submit oral or written observations to courts of the Member States. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(77a)

National courts will have an important role in applying this Regulation and should be allowed to ask the Commission to send them information or opinions on questions concerning the application of this Regulation. At the same time, the Commission should be able to submit oral or written observations to courts of the Member States.

Amendment 54

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 77 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (77b) | Whistleblowers can bring new information to the attention of competent authorities which helps them in detecting infringements of this Regulation and imposing penalties. This Regulation should therefore ensure that adequate arrangements are in place to enable whistleblowers to alert competent authorities to actual or potential infringements of this Regulation and to protect them from retaliation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(77b)

Whistleblowers can bring new information to the attention of competent authorities which helps them in detecting infringements of this Regulation and imposing penalties. This Regulation should therefore ensure that adequate arrangements are in place to enable whistleblowers to alert competent authorities to actual or potential infringements of this Regulation and to protect them from retaliation.

Amendment 55

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 77 c (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (77c) | End users should be entitled to enforce their rights in relation to the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this Regulation through representative actions in accordance with Directive (EU) 2020/1828. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(77c)

End users should be entitled to enforce their rights in relation to the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this Regulation through representative actions in accordance with Directive (EU) 2020/1828.

Amendment 56

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 78

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (78) | The Commission should periodically evaluate this Regulation and closely monitor its effects on the contestability and fairness of commercial relationships in the online platform economy, in particular with a view to determining the need for amendments in light of relevant technological or commercial developments. This evaluation should include the regular review of the list of core platform services
  and the obligations addressed to gatekeepers
  as well as enforcement of these, in view of ensuring that digital markets across the Union are contestable and fair. In order to obtain a broad view of developments in the sector, the evaluation should take into account the experiences of Member States and relevant stakeholders. The Commission may in this regard also consider the opinions and reports presented to it by the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy that was first established by Commission Decision C(2018)2393 of 26 April 2018. Following the evaluation, the Commission should take appropriate measures. The Commission should
  to
  maintain a high level of protection and respect for the common EU rights and values, particularly equality and non-discrimination, as an objective when conducting the assessments and reviews of the practices and obligations provided in this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(78)

The Commission should periodically evaluate this Regulation and closely monitor its effects on the contestability and fairness of commercial relationships in the online platform economy, in particular with a view to determining the need for amendments in light of relevant technological or commercial developments. This evaluation should include the regular review of the list of core platform services
  and the obligations addressed to gatekeepers
  as well as enforcement of these, in view of ensuring that digital markets across the Union are contestable and fair. In order to obtain a broad view of developments in the sector, the evaluation should take into account the experiences of Member States and relevant stakeholders. The Commission may in this regard also consider the opinions and reports presented to it by the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy that was first established by Commission Decision C(2018)2393 of 26 April 2018. Following the evaluation, the Commission should take appropriate measures. The Commission should
  to
  maintain a high level of protection and respect for the common EU rights and values, particularly equality and non-discrimination, as an objective when conducting the assessments and reviews of the practices and obligations provided in this Regulation.

| (78) | The Commission should periodically evaluate this Regulation and closely monitor its effects on the contestability and fairness of commercial relationships in the online platform economy, in particular with a view to determining the need for amendments in light of relevant technological or commercial developments. This evaluation should include the regular review of the list of core platform services as well as enforcement of these, in view of ensuring that digital markets across the Union are contestable and fair. In order to obtain a broad view of developments in the sector, the evaluation should take into account the experiences of Member States and relevant stakeholders. The Commission may in this regard also consider the opinions and reports presented to it by the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy that was first established by Commission Decision C(2018)2393 of 26 April 2018. Following the evaluation, the Commission should take appropriate measures. The Commission should maintain a high level of protection and respect for the common EU rights and values, particularly equality and non-discrimination, as an objective when conducting the assessments and reviews of the practices and obligations provided in this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Commission should periodically evaluate this Regulation and closely monitor its effects on the contestability and fairness of commercial relationships in the online platform economy, in particular with a view to determining the need for amendments in light of relevant technological or commercial developments. This evaluation should include the regular review of the list of core platform services as well as enforcement of these, in view of ensuring that digital markets across the Union are contestable and fair. In order to obtain a broad view of developments in the sector, the evaluation should take into account the experiences of Member States and relevant stakeholders. The Commission may in this regard also consider the opinions and reports presented to it by the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy that was first established by Commission Decision C(2018)2393 of 26 April 2018. Following the evaluation, the Commission should take appropriate measures. The Commission should maintain a high level of protection and respect for the common EU rights and values, particularly equality and non-discrimination, as an objective when conducting the assessments and reviews of the practices and obligations provided in this Regulation.

Amendment 57

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 78 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (78a) | Without prejudice to the budgetary procedure and through existing financial instruments, adequate human, financial and technical resources should be allocated to the Commission to ensure that it can effectively perform its duties and exercise its powers in respect of the enforcement of this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(78a)

Without prejudice to the budgetary procedure and through existing financial instruments, adequate human, financial and technical resources should be allocated to the Commission to ensure that it can effectively perform its duties and exercise its powers in respect of the enforcement of this Regulation.

Amendment 58

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 79

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Articles 16, 47 and 50 thereof. Accordingly, this Regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and principles. | (79) | This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Articles 16, 47 and 50 thereof. Accordingly, this Regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and principles. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Articles 16, 47 and 50 thereof. Accordingly, this Regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and principles.

(79)

This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Articles 16, 47 and 50 thereof. Accordingly, this Regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and principles.

Amendment 59

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   This Regulation
  lays
  down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are present. | 1.   
  The purpose of
  this Regulation
  is to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by laying
  down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets
  for all businesses to the benefit of both business users and end users
  in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are present
  so as to foster innovation and increase consumer welfare
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1.   This Regulation
  lays
  down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are present.

1.   
  The purpose of
  this Regulation
  is to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by laying
  down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets
  for all businesses to the benefit of both business users and end users
  in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are present
  so as to foster innovation and increase consumer welfare
  .

Amendment 231

Amendment 231

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 2

Article 1 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   This Regulation shall apply to core platform services provided or offered by gatekeepers to
  business users established in the Union or
  end users established or located in the Union, irrespective of the place of establishment or residence of the gatekeepers and irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the provision of service. | 2.   This Regulation shall apply to core platform services provided or offered by gatekeepers to end users established or located in the Union
  and business users
  , irrespective of the place of establishment or residence of the gatekeepers
  or business users
  and irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the provision of service.
  This Regulation shall apply and be interpreted in full respect of fundamental rights and the principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Articles 11, 16, 47 and 50 thereof. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   This Regulation shall apply to core platform services provided or offered by gatekeepers to
  business users established in the Union or
  end users established or located in the Union, irrespective of the place of establishment or residence of the gatekeepers and irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the provision of service.

2.   This Regulation shall apply to core platform services provided or offered by gatekeepers to end users established or located in the Union
  and business users
  , irrespective of the place of establishment or residence of the gatekeepers
  or business users
  and irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the provision of service.
  This Regulation shall apply and be interpreted in full respect of fundamental rights and the principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Articles 11, 16, 47 and 50 thereof.

Amendment 60

Amendment 60

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 3 — point b

Article 1 — paragraph 3 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | related to electronic communications services as defined in point (4) of Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 other than those related to interpersonal communication services as defined in point
  (4)(b)
  of Article 2 of that Directive. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

related to electronic communications services as defined in point (4) of Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 other than those related to interpersonal communication services as defined in point
  (4)(b)
  of Article 2 of that Directive.

(4)(b)

| (b) | related to electronic communications services as defined in point (4) of Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 other than those related to
  number-independent
  interpersonal communication services as defined in point
  (7)
  of Article 2 of that Directive. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

related to electronic communications services as defined in point (4) of Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 other than those related to
  number-independent
  interpersonal communication services as defined in point
  (7)
  of Article 2 of that Directive.

number-independent

(7)

Amendment 61

Amendment 61

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 5

Article 1 — paragraph 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 5.   Member States shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws, regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. This is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests, in compliance with Union law. In particular, nothing in this Regulation precludes Member States from imposing obligations, which are compatible with Union law, on undertakings, including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this Regulation in order to protect consumers
  or
  to fight against acts of unfair competition. | 5.   
  In order to avoid the fragmentation of the internal market,
  Member States shall not impose on gatekeepers
  within the meaning of this Regulation
  further obligations by way of laws, regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. This is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests, in compliance with Union law. In particular, nothing in this Regulation precludes Member States from imposing obligations, which are compatible with Union law, on undertakings, including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this Regulation in order to protect consumers, to fight against acts of unfair competition
  or to pursue other legitimate public interests
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

5.   Member States shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws, regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. This is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests, in compliance with Union law. In particular, nothing in this Regulation precludes Member States from imposing obligations, which are compatible with Union law, on undertakings, including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this Regulation in order to protect consumers
  or
  to fight against acts of unfair competition.

5.   
  In order to avoid the fragmentation of the internal market,
  Member States shall not impose on gatekeepers
  within the meaning of this Regulation
  further obligations by way of laws, regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. This is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests, in compliance with Union law. In particular, nothing in this Regulation precludes Member States from imposing obligations, which are compatible with Union law, on undertakings, including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this Regulation in order to protect consumers, to fight against acts of unfair competition
  or to pursue other legitimate public interests
  .

Amendment 62

Amendment 62

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 6

Article 1 — paragraph 6

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 6.   This Regulation is without prejudice to the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings, concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as
  they
  are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers or amount to imposing additional obligations on gatekeepers; Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (38) and national rules concerning merger control; Regulation (EU) 2019/1150
  and Regulation (EU) ...
  .
  /.. of the European Parliament and of the Council

   (39)

  . | 6.   This Regulation is without prejudice to the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings, concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as
  these rules
  are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers
  within the meaning of this Regulation
  or amount to imposing additional obligations on gatekeepers; Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (38) and national rules concerning merger control
  and
  Regulation (EU) 2019/1150. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

6.   This Regulation is without prejudice to the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings, concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as
  they
  are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers or amount to imposing additional obligations on gatekeepers; Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (38) and national rules concerning merger control; Regulation (EU) 2019/1150
  and Regulation (EU) ...
  .
  /.. of the European Parliament and of the Council

   (39)

  .

6.   This Regulation is without prejudice to the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings, concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as
  these rules
  are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers
  within the meaning of this Regulation
  or amount to imposing additional obligations on gatekeepers; Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (38) and national rules concerning merger control
  and
  Regulation (EU) 2019/1150.

Amendment 63

Amendment 63

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 1 — paragraph 7

Article 1 — paragraph 7

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 7.   National authorities shall not take decisions which would run counter to a decision adopted by the Commission under this Regulation. The Commission and Member States shall work in close cooperation and coordination in their enforcement actions. | 7.   National authorities shall not take decisions which would run counter to a decision adopted by the Commission under this Regulation. The Commission and Member States shall work in close cooperation and coordination in their enforcement actions
  on the basis of the principles established in Article 31d
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

7.   National authorities shall not take decisions which would run counter to a decision adopted by the Commission under this Regulation. The Commission and Member States shall work in close cooperation and coordination in their enforcement actions.

7.   National authorities shall not take decisions which would run counter to a decision adopted by the Commission under this Regulation. The Commission and Member States shall work in close cooperation and coordination in their enforcement actions
  on the basis of the principles established in Article 31d
  .

Amendment 64

Amendment 64

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 2 — point f a (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 2 — point f a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (fa) | web browsers; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(fa)

(fa)

web browsers;

web browsers;

Amendment 65

Amendment 65

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 2 — point f b (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 2 — point f b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (fb) | virtual assistants; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(fb)

(fb)

virtual assistants;

virtual assistants;

Amendment 66

Amendment 66

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 2 — point f c (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 2 — point f c (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (fc) | connected TV; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(fc)

(fc)

connected TV;

connected TV;

Amendment 67

Amendment 67

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 2 — point h

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 2 — point h

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (h) | advertising services, including any advertising networks, advertising exchanges and any other advertising intermediation services, provided by a provider of any of the core platform services listed in points (a) to (g); |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(h)

advertising services, including any advertising networks, advertising exchanges and any other advertising intermediation services, provided by a provider of any of the core platform services listed in points (a) to (g);

| (h) | online
  advertising services, including any advertising networks, advertising exchanges and any other advertising intermediation services, provided by a provider
  where the undertaking to which it belongs is also a provider
  of any of the core platform services listed in points (a) to (g); |
| --- | --- |

(h)

online
  advertising services, including any advertising networks, advertising exchanges and any other advertising intermediation services, provided by a provider
  where the undertaking to which it belongs is also a provider
  of any of the core platform services listed in points (a) to (g);

online

where the undertaking to which it belongs is also a provider

Amendment 68

Amendment 68

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 6

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 6

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (6) | ‘Online search engine’ means a digital service as defined in point 5 of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(6)

‘Online search engine’ means a digital service as defined in point 5 of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150;

| (6) | ‘Online search engine’ means a digital service as defined in point 5 of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150
  thus excluding the search functions on other online intermediation services
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(6)

‘Online search engine’ means a digital service as defined in point 5 of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150
  thus excluding the search functions on other online intermediation services
  ;

thus excluding the search functions on other online intermediation services

Amendment 69

Amendment 69

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 10 a (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 10 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (10a) | Web browser’ means software application that enables users to access and interact with web content hosted on servers that are connected to networks such as the Internet, including standalone web browsers as well as web browsers integrated or embedded in software or similar |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(10a)

(10a)

Web browser’ means software application that enables users to access and interact with web content hosted on servers that are connected to networks such as the Internet, including standalone web browsers as well as web browsers integrated or embedded in software or similar

Amendment 70

Amendment 70

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 10 b (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 10 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (10b) | ‘Virtual assistants’ means software that is incorporated or inter-connected with a good, within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2019/771, that can process demands, tasks or questions based on audio, imaging or other cognitive-computing technologies, including augmented reality services, and based on those demands, tasks or questions access their own and third party services or control their own and third party devices. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(10b)

(10b)

‘Virtual assistants’ means software that is incorporated or inter-connected with a good, within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2019/771, that can process demands, tasks or questions based on audio, imaging or other cognitive-computing technologies, including augmented reality services, and based on those demands, tasks or questions access their own and third party services or control their own and third party devices.

Amendment 71

Amendment 71

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 10 c (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 10 c (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (10c) | ‘connected TV’ means a system software or software application that controls a television set connected to the internet that enables software applications to run on it including for the provision of music and video streaming, or viewing of pictures; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(10c)

(10c)

‘connected TV’ means a system software or software application that controls a television set connected to the internet that enables software applications to run on it including for the provision of music and video streaming, or viewing of pictures;

Amendment 72

Amendment 72

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 14

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 14

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (14) | ‘Ancillary service’ means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services, including payment services as defined in point 3 of Article 4
  and
  technical services which support the provision of payment services as defined in Article 3(j) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366, fulfilment, identification or advertising services; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(14)

‘Ancillary service’ means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services, including payment services as defined in point 3 of Article 4
  and
  technical services which support the provision of payment services as defined in Article 3(j) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366, fulfilment, identification or advertising services;

and

| (14) | ‘Ancillary service’ means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services, including payment services as defined in point 3 of Article 4, technical services which support the provision of payment services as defined in Article 3(j) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366,
  in-app payment systems,
  fulfilment
  , including parcel delivery as defined in Article 2 paragraph 2 of Regulation (EU) 2018/644, freight transport
  , identification or advertising services; |
| --- | --- |

(14)

‘Ancillary service’ means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services, including payment services as defined in point 3 of Article 4, technical services which support the provision of payment services as defined in Article 3(j) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366,
  in-app payment systems,
  fulfilment
  , including parcel delivery as defined in Article 2 paragraph 2 of Regulation (EU) 2018/644, freight transport
  , identification or advertising services;

in-app payment systems,

, including parcel delivery as defined in Article 2 paragraph 2 of Regulation (EU) 2018/644, freight transport

Amendment 73

Amendment 73

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 14 a (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 14 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (14a) | In-app payment system’ means an application, service or user interface to process the payments from users of an app. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(14a)

(14a)

In-app payment system’ means an application, service or user interface to process the payments from users of an app.

Amendment 74

Amendment 74

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 18

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 18

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (18) | ‘Ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered through
  online intermediation services or online social networking
  services, or the relevance given to search results by online search engines, as presented, organised or communicated by the
  providers of online intermediation services or of online social networking services or by
  providers of
  online search engines, respectively, whatever
  the technological means used for such presentation, organisation or communication; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(18)

‘Ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered through
  online intermediation services or online social networking
  services, or the relevance given to search results by online search engines, as presented, organised or communicated by the
  providers of online intermediation services or of online social networking services or by
  providers of
  online search engines, respectively, whatever
  the technological means used for such presentation, organisation or communication;

online intermediation services or online social networking

providers of online intermediation services or of online social networking services or by

online search engines, respectively, whatever

| (18) | ‘Ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered through
  core platform
  services, or the relevance given to search results by online search engines, as presented, organised or communicated by the
  core platform service
  providers
  , irrespectively
  of the technological means used for such presentation, organisation or communication; |
| --- | --- |

(18)

‘Ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered through
  core platform
  services, or the relevance given to search results by online search engines, as presented, organised or communicated by the
  core platform service
  providers
  , irrespectively
  of the technological means used for such presentation, organisation or communication;

core platform

core platform service

, irrespectively

Amendment 75

Amendment 75

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 18 a (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 18 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (18a) | ‘Search results’ means any information in any format, including texts, graphics, voice or other output, returned in response and related to a written or oral search query, irrespective of whether the information is an organic result, a paid result, a direct answer or any product, service or information offered in connection with, or displayed along with, or partly or entirely embedded in, the organic results; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(18a)

(18a)

‘Search results’ means any information in any format, including texts, graphics, voice or other output, returned in response and related to a written or oral search query, irrespective of whether the information is an organic result, a paid result, a direct answer or any product, service or information offered in connection with, or displayed along with, or partly or entirely embedded in, the organic results;

Amendment 76

Amendment 76

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 23 a (new)

Article 2 — paragraph 1 — point 23 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (23a) | ‘Interoperability’ means the ability to exchange information and mutually use the information which has been exchanged so that all elements of hardware or software relevant for a given service and used by its provider effectively work with hardware or software relevant for a given services provided by third party providers different from the elements through which the information concerned is originally provided. This shall include the ability to access such information without having to use an application software or other technologies for conversion. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(23a)

(23a)

‘Interoperability’ means the ability to exchange information and mutually use the information which has been exchanged so that all elements of hardware or software relevant for a given service and used by its provider effectively work with hardware or software relevant for a given services provided by third party providers different from the elements through which the information concerned is originally provided. This shall include the ability to access such information without having to use an application software or other technologies for conversion.

Amendment 77

Amendment 77

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

Article 3 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   
  A provider of core platform services
  shall be designated as gatekeeper if: | 1.   
  An undertaking
  shall be designated as gatekeeper if: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   
  A provider of core platform services
  shall be designated as gatekeeper if:

1.   
  An undertaking
  shall be designated as gatekeeper if:

Amendment 78

Amendment 78

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 1 — point b

Article 3 — paragraph 1 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and

| (b) | it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users
  and end users
  to reach
  other
  end users; and |
| --- | --- |

(b)

it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users
  and end users
  to reach
  other
  end users; and

and end users

other

Amendment 79

Amendment 79

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 2 — introductory part

Article 3 — paragraph 2 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   
  A provider of core platform services
  shall be presumed to satisfy: | 2.   
  An undertaking
  shall be presumed to satisfy: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   
  A provider of core platform services
  shall be presumed to satisfy:

2.   
  An undertaking
  shall be presumed to satisfy:

Amendment 80

Amendment 80

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 2 — point a

Article 3 — paragraph 2 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where
  the undertaking to which it belongs
  achieves an annual EEA turnover equal to or above EUR
  6.5
  billion in the last three financial years, or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking
  to which it belongs
  amounted to at least EUR
  65
  billion in the last financial year, and it provides a core platform service in at least three Member States; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where
  the undertaking to which it belongs
  achieves an annual EEA turnover equal to or above EUR
  6.5
  billion in the last three financial years, or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking
  to which it belongs
  amounted to at least EUR
  65
  billion in the last financial year, and it provides a core platform service in at least three Member States;

the undertaking to which it belongs

6.5

to which it belongs

65

| (a) | the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where
  it
  achieves an annual EEA turnover equal to or above EUR
  8
  billion in the last three financial years, or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking amounted to at least EUR
  80
  billion in the last financial year, and it provides a core platform service in at least three Member States; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where
  it
  achieves an annual EEA turnover equal to or above EUR
  8
  billion in the last three financial years, or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking amounted to at least EUR
  80
  billion in the last financial year, and it provides a core platform service in at least three Member States;

it

8

80

Amendment 81

Amendment 81

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 2 — point b — subparagraph 1

Article 3 — paragraph 2 — point b — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides
  a
  core platform
  service that
  has more than 45 million monthly
  active
  end users established or located in the
  Union
  and more than 10 000 yearly
  active
  business users established in the
  Union
  in the last financial year; | the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides
  one or more
  core platform
  services each of which
  has more than 45 million monthly end users established or located in the
  EEA
  and more than 10 000 yearly business users established in the
  EEA
  in the last financial year. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides
  a
  core platform
  service that
  has more than 45 million monthly
  active
  end users established or located in the
  Union
  and more than 10 000 yearly
  active
  business users established in the
  Union
  in the last financial year;

a

service that

active

Union

active

Union

the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides
  one or more
  core platform
  services each of which
  has more than 45 million monthly end users established or located in the
  EEA
  and more than 10 000 yearly business users established in the
  EEA
  in the last financial year.

one or more

services each of which

EEA

EEA

Amendment 82

Amendment 82

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 2 — point b — subparagraph 2

Article 3 — paragraph 2 — point b — subparagraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| for the purpose of the first subparagraph, monthly active end users shall refer to the average number of monthly active end users throughout the largest part of the last financial year; | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

for the purpose of the first subparagraph, monthly active end users shall refer to the average number of monthly active end users throughout the largest part of the last financial year;

for the purpose of the first subparagraph, monthly active end users shall refer to the average number of monthly active end users throughout the largest part of the last financial year;

deleted

deleted

Amendment 83

Amendment 83

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 2 — point c

Article 3 — paragraph 2 — point c

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | the requirement in paragraph 1 point (c) where the thresholds in point (b) were met in each of the last
  three
  financial years. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(c)

the requirement in paragraph 1 point (c) where the thresholds in point (b) were met in each of the last
  three
  financial years.

three

| (c) | the requirement in paragraph 1 point (c) where the thresholds in point (b) were met in each of the last
  two
  financial years. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the requirement in paragraph 1 point (c) where the thresholds in point (b) were met in each of the last
  two
  financial years.

two

Amendment 84

Amendment 84

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1 a (new)

Article 3 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | For the purpose of point (b), |
| | (i) | monthly end users and yearly business users shall be measured taking into account the indicators set out in the Annex to this Regulation; and |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

For the purpose of point (b),

For the purpose of point (b),

(i)

(i)

monthly end users and yearly business users shall be measured taking into account the indicators set out in the Annex to this Regulation; and

monthly end users and yearly business users shall be measured taking into account the indicators set out in the Annex to this Regulation; and

| (ii) | monthly end users shall refer to the average number of monthly end users during a period of at least six months within the last financial year; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

(ii)

monthly end users shall refer to the average number of monthly end users during a period of at least six months within the last financial year;

monthly end users shall refer to the average number of monthly end users during a period of at least six months within the last financial year;

Amendment 85

Amendment 85

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 3

Article 3 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   Where
  a provider of
  core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2, it shall notify the Commission thereof within
  three
  months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. That notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the
  provider
  that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). The notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). | 3.   Where
  an undertaking providing
  core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2, it shall notify the Commission thereof
  without delay and in any case
  within
  two
  months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2. That notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the
  undertaking
  that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). The notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). |
| A failure by a relevant
  provider of
  core platform service to notify the required information pursuant to this paragraph shall not prevent the Commission from designating these
  providers
  as gatekeepers pursuant to paragraph 4 at any time. | A failure by a relevant
  undertaking providing
  core platform service to notify the required information pursuant to this paragraph shall not prevent the Commission from designating these
  undertakings
  as gatekeepers pursuant to paragraph 4 at any time. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   Where
  a provider of
  core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2, it shall notify the Commission thereof within
  three
  months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. That notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the
  provider
  that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). The notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b).

3.   Where
  an undertaking providing
  core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2, it shall notify the Commission thereof
  without delay and in any case
  within
  two
  months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2. That notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the
  undertaking
  that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). The notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b).

A failure by a relevant
  provider of
  core platform service to notify the required information pursuant to this paragraph shall not prevent the Commission from designating these
  providers
  as gatekeepers pursuant to paragraph 4 at any time.

provider of

providers

A failure by a relevant
  undertaking providing
  core platform service to notify the required information pursuant to this paragraph shall not prevent the Commission from designating these
  undertakings
  as gatekeepers pursuant to paragraph 4 at any time.

undertaking providing

undertakings

Amendment 86

Amendment 86

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 1

Article 3 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The Commission shall, without undue delay and at the latest 60 days after receiving the complete information referred to in paragraph 3, designate the
  provider of
  core platform services that meets all the thresholds of paragraph 2 as a gatekeeper
  , unless that provider
  , with its notification,
  presents sufficiently substantiated
  arguments to demonstrate that, in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates,
  and taking into account the elements listed in paragraph 6, the provider
  does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1. | The Commission shall, without undue delay and at the latest 60 days after receiving the complete information referred to in paragraph 3, designate the
  undertaking providing
  core platform services that meets all the thresholds of paragraph 2 as a gatekeeper
  . The undertaking may present
  , with its notification,
  compelling
  arguments to demonstrate that, in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates,
  the undertaking
  does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The Commission shall, without undue delay and at the latest 60 days after receiving the complete information referred to in paragraph 3, designate the
  provider of
  core platform services that meets all the thresholds of paragraph 2 as a gatekeeper
  , unless that provider
  , with its notification,
  presents sufficiently substantiated
  arguments to demonstrate that, in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates,
  and taking into account the elements listed in paragraph 6, the provider
  does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1.

provider of

, unless that provider

presents sufficiently substantiated

and taking into account the elements listed in paragraph 6, the provider

The Commission shall, without undue delay and at the latest 60 days after receiving the complete information referred to in paragraph 3, designate the
  undertaking providing
  core platform services that meets all the thresholds of paragraph 2 as a gatekeeper
  . The undertaking may present
  , with its notification,
  compelling
  arguments to demonstrate that, in the circumstances in which the relevant core platform service operates,
  the undertaking
  does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1.

undertaking providing

. The undertaking may present

compelling

the undertaking

Amendment 87

Amendment 87

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 2

Article 3 — paragraph 4 — subparagraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Where the gatekeeper presents such sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that it does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1, the Commission shall apply paragraph 6 to assess whether the criteria in paragraph 1 are met. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Where the gatekeeper presents such sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that it does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1, the Commission shall apply paragraph 6 to assess whether the criteria in paragraph 1 are met.

Where the gatekeeper presents such sufficiently substantiated arguments to demonstrate that it does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1, the Commission shall apply paragraph 6 to assess whether the criteria in paragraph 1 are met.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 88

Amendment 88

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 4 a (new)

Article 3 — paragraph 4 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 4a.
     
  Where the undertaking providing the core platform service fails to notify the Commission, to provide the information required in paragraph 3 or to provide within the deadline set by the Commission all the relevant information that is required to assess its designation as gatekeeper pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (6), the Commission shall be entitled to designate that undertaking as a gatekeeper at any time based on information available to the Commission pursuant to paragraph 4. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4a.
     
  Where the undertaking providing the core platform service fails to notify the Commission, to provide the information required in paragraph 3 or to provide within the deadline set by the Commission all the relevant information that is required to assess its designation as gatekeeper pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (6), the Commission shall be entitled to designate that undertaking as a gatekeeper at any time based on information available to the Commission pursuant to paragraph 4.

Amendment 89

Amendment 89

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 5

Article 3 — paragraph 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 5.   The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 37 to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 are met, and to regularly adjust
  it
  to market and technological developments where necessary
  , in particular as regards the threshold in paragraph 2, point (a)
  . | 5.   The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 37 to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds laid down in paragraph 2
  of this Article
  are met, and to regularly adjust
  the methodology
  to market and technological developments where necessary
  . The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 37 to update the list of indicators set out in the Annex to this Regulation
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

5.   The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 37 to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 are met, and to regularly adjust
  it
  to market and technological developments where necessary
  , in particular as regards the threshold in paragraph 2, point (a)
  .

5.   The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 37 to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds laid down in paragraph 2
  of this Article
  are met, and to regularly adjust
  the methodology
  to market and technological developments where necessary
  . The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 37 to update the list of indicators set out in the Annex to this Regulation
  .

Amendment 90

Amendment 90

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 1

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The Commission
  may
  identify as a gatekeeper, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15, any
  provider of
  core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1, but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2
  , or has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4
  . | The Commission
  shall
  identify as a gatekeeper, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15, any
  undertaking providing
  core platform services
  , excluding Medium-sized, Small or Micro enterprises as defined in the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC,
  that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1
  of this Article
  , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2
  of this Article
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The Commission
  may
  identify as a gatekeeper, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15, any
  provider of
  core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1, but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2
  , or has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4
  .

may

provider of

, or has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4

The Commission
  shall
  identify as a gatekeeper, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15, any
  undertaking providing
  core platform services
  , excluding Medium-sized, Small or Micro enterprises as defined in the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC,
  that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1
  of this Article
  , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2
  of this Article
  .

shall

undertaking providing

, excluding Medium-sized, Small or Micro enterprises as defined in the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC,

of this Article

of this Article

Amendment 91

Amendment 91

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 2 — point a

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 2 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | the size, including turnover and market capitalisation, operations and position of the
  provider of
  core platform services; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

the size, including turnover and market capitalisation, operations and position of the
  provider of
  core platform services;

provider of

| (a) | the size, including turnover and market capitalisation, operations and position of the
  undertaking providing
  core platform services; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the size, including turnover and market capitalisation, operations and position of the
  undertaking providing
  core platform services;

undertaking providing

Amendment 92

Amendment 92

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 2 — point c

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 2 — point c

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | entry barriers derived from network effects and data driven advantages, in particular in relation to the
  provider’s
  access to and collection of personal and non-personal data or analytics capabilities; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(c)

entry barriers derived from network effects and data driven advantages, in particular in relation to the
  provider’s
  access to and collection of personal and non-personal data or analytics capabilities;

provider’s

| (c) | entry barriers derived from network effects and data driven advantages, in particular in relation to the
  undertaking’s
  access to and collection of personal and non-personal data or analytics capabilities; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

entry barriers derived from network effects and data driven advantages, in particular in relation to the
  undertaking’s
  access to and collection of personal and non-personal data or analytics capabilities;

undertaking’s

Amendment 93

Amendment 93

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 2 — point d

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 2 — point d

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (d) | scale and scope effects the
  provider
  benefits from, including with regard to data; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(d)

scale and scope effects the
  provider
  benefits from, including with regard to data;

provider

| (d) | scale and scope effects the
  undertaking
  benefits from, including with regard to data; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

scale and scope effects the
  undertaking
  benefits from, including with regard to data;

undertaking

Amendment 94

Amendment 94

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 2 — point e a (new)

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 2 — point e a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ea) | the degree of multi-homing among business; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ea)

(ea)

the degree of multi-homing among business;

the degree of multi-homing among business;

Amendment 95

Amendment 95

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 2 — point e b (new)

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 2 — point e b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (eb) | the ability of the undertaking to implement conglomerate strategies, in particular through its vertical integration or its significant leverage in related markets; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(eb)

(eb)

the ability of the undertaking to implement conglomerate strategies, in particular through its vertical integration or its significant leverage in related markets;

the ability of the undertaking to implement conglomerate strategies, in particular through its vertical integration or its significant leverage in related markets;

Amendment 96

Amendment 96

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 3

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| In conducting its assessment, the Commission shall take into account foreseeable developments of these elements. | In conducting its assessment, the Commission shall take into account foreseeable developments of these elements
  including any planned concentrations involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

In conducting its assessment, the Commission shall take into account foreseeable developments of these elements.

In conducting its assessment, the Commission shall take into account foreseeable developments of these elements
  including any planned concentrations involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector
  .

including any planned concentrations involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector

Amendment 97

Amendment 97

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 4

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the Commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations, the Commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the Commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations, the Commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper.

Where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the Commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations, the Commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 98

Amendment 98

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 5

Article 3 — paragraph 6 — subparagraph 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the Commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations, the Commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the Commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations, the Commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available.

Where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the Commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations, the Commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 99

Amendment 99

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 7

Article 3 — paragraph 7

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 7.   For each gatekeeper
  identified
  pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6, the Commission shall identify
  the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list
  the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b). | 7.   For each
  undertaking designated as
  gatekeeper pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6, the Commission shall identify
  within the deadline set under paragraph 4
  the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

7.   For each gatekeeper
  identified
  pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6, the Commission shall identify
  the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list
  the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b).

7.   For each
  undertaking designated as
  gatekeeper pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6, the Commission shall identify
  within the deadline set under paragraph 4
  the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b).

Amendment 100

Amendment 100

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 3 — paragraph 8

Article 3 — paragraph 8

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 8.   The gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6
  within six
  months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Article. | 8.   The gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6
  as soon as possible, and in any case no later than four
  months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Article. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

8.   The gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6
  within six
  months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Article.

8.   The gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6
  as soon as possible, and in any case no later than four
  months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Article.

Amendment 101

Amendment 101

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1

Article 4 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The Commission shall regularly, and at least every
  2
  years, review whether the designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in Article 3(1),
  or
  whether new
  providers of
  core platform services satisfy those requirements. The regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted. | The Commission shall regularly, and at least every
  three
  years, review whether the designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in Article 3(1),
  and at least every year
  whether new core platform services satisfy those requirements. The regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted.
  The review shall have no suspending effect on the gatekeeper’s obligations. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The Commission shall regularly, and at least every
  2
  years, review whether the designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in Article 3(1),
  or
  whether new
  providers of
  core platform services satisfy those requirements. The regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted.

2

or

providers of

The Commission shall regularly, and at least every
  three
  years, review whether the designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in Article 3(1),
  and at least every year
  whether new core platform services satisfy those requirements. The regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted.
  The review shall have no suspending effect on the gatekeeper’s obligations.

three

and at least every year

The review shall have no suspending effect on the gatekeeper’s obligations.

Amendment 102

Amendment 102

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 2

Article 4 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Where the Commission, on the basis of that review pursuant to the first subparagraph, finds that the facts on which the designation of the
  providers of
  core platform services as gatekeepers was based, have changed, it shall adopt a corresponding decision. | Where the Commission, on the basis of that review pursuant to the first subparagraph, finds that the facts on which the designation of the
  undertakings providing
  core platform services as gatekeepers was based, have changed, it shall adopt a corresponding decision. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Where the Commission, on the basis of that review pursuant to the first subparagraph, finds that the facts on which the designation of the
  providers of
  core platform services as gatekeepers was based, have changed, it shall adopt a corresponding decision.

providers of

Where the Commission, on the basis of that review pursuant to the first subparagraph, finds that the facts on which the designation of the
  undertakings providing
  core platform services as gatekeepers was based, have changed, it shall adopt a corresponding decision.

undertakings providing

Amendment 103

Amendment 103

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 4 — paragraph 3

Article 4 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   The Commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis. | 3.   The Commission shall publish and update the list of
  undertakings designated as
  gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis.
  The Commission shall publish an annual report setting out the findings of its monitoring activities including the impact on business-users especially small and medium-sized enterprises and end-users and present it to the European Parliament and the Council. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   The Commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis.

3.   The Commission shall publish and update the list of
  undertakings designated as
  gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis.
  The Commission shall publish an annual report setting out the findings of its monitoring activities including the impact on business-users especially small and medium-sized enterprises and end-users and present it to the European Parliament and the Council.

Amendment 104

Amendment 104

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point a

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services, and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data, unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice
  and
  provided consent in the sense of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services, and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data, unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice
  and
  provided consent in the sense of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.;

and

| (a) | refrain from combining
  and cross-using
  personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services, and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data, unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice
  in a explicit and clear manner, and has
  provided consent in the sense of Regulation (EU) 2016/679; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

refrain from combining
  and cross-using
  personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services, and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data, unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice
  in a explicit and clear manner, and has
  provided consent in the sense of Regulation (EU) 2016/679;

and cross-using

in a explicit and clear manner, and has

Amendment 105

Amendment 105

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point b

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | allow
  business users
  to offer
  the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

allow
  business users
  to offer
  the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;

allow

to offer

| (b) | refrain from applying contractual obligations that prevent
  business users
  from offering
  the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services
  or through their own direct online sales channel
  at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

refrain from applying contractual obligations that prevent
  business users
  from offering
  the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services
  or through their own direct online sales channel
  at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;

refrain from applying contractual obligations that prevent

from offering

or through their own direct online sales channel

Amendment 106

Amendment 106

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point c

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point c

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service, and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose
  they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not, and allow end users to access and use, through the core platform services of the gatekeeper, content, subscriptions, features or other items by using the software application of a business user, where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using
  the core platform services of the gatekeeper; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(c)

allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service, and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose
  they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not, and allow end users to access and use, through the core platform services of the gatekeeper, content, subscriptions, features or other items by using the software application of a business user, where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using
  the core platform services of the gatekeeper;

they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not, and allow end users to access and use, through the core platform services of the gatekeeper, content, subscriptions, features or other items by using the software application of a business user, where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using

| (c) | allow business users to
  communicate and
  promote offers
  including under different purchasing conditions
  to end users acquired via the core platform service
  or through other channels
  , and to conclude contracts with these end users
  or receive payments for services provided
  regardless of whether
  they use
  for that purpose the core platform services of the gatekeeper; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

allow business users to
  communicate and
  promote offers
  including under different purchasing conditions
  to end users acquired via the core platform service
  or through other channels
  , and to conclude contracts with these end users
  or receive payments for services provided
  regardless of whether
  they use
  for that purpose the core platform services of the gatekeeper;

communicate and

including under different purchasing conditions

or through other channels

or receive payments for services provided

they use

Amendment 107

Amendment 107

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point c a (new)

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point c a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ca) | allow end users to access and use, through the core platform services of the gatekeeper, content, subscriptions, features or other items by using the software application of a business user, including where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper, unless the gatekeeper can demonstrate that such access undermines end users data protection or cybersecurity; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ca)

(ca)

allow end users to access and use, through the core platform services of the gatekeeper, content, subscriptions, features or other items by using the software application of a business user, including where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper, unless the gatekeeper can demonstrate that such access undermines end users data protection or cybersecurity;

allow end users to access and use, through the core platform services of the gatekeeper, content, subscriptions, features or other items by using the software application of a business user, including where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper, unless the gatekeeper can demonstrate that such access undermines end users data protection or cybersecurity;

Amendment 108

Amendment 108

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point d

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point d

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (d) | refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(d)

refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers;

| (d) | refrain from
  directly or indirectly
  preventing or restricting business
  users or end
  users from raising issues with any relevant public authority
  , including national courts,
  relating to any practice of gatekeepers; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

refrain from
  directly or indirectly
  preventing or restricting business
  users or end
  users from raising issues with any relevant public authority
  , including national courts,
  relating to any practice of gatekeepers;

directly or indirectly

users or end

, including national courts,

Amendment 109

Amendment 109

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point e

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point e

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (e) | refrain from requiring business users to use, offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(e)

refrain from requiring business users to use, offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;

| (e) | refrain from requiring business users to use, offer or interoperate with an identification
  service or any other ancillary
  service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

refrain from requiring business users to use, offer or interoperate with an identification
  service or any other ancillary
  service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;

service or any other ancillary

Amendment 110

Amendment 110

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point f

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point f

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (f) | refrain from requiring
  business users or end users to subscribe to or register with any other core platform services
  identified pursuant to Article 3 or which meets the thresholds in Article 3(2)(b)
  as a condition
  to
  access, sign up
  or register to
  any of their core platform services identified pursuant to that Article; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(f)

refrain from requiring
  business users or end users to subscribe to or register with any other core platform services
  identified pursuant to Article 3 or which meets the thresholds in Article 3(2)(b)
  as a condition
  to
  access, sign up
  or register to
  any of their core platform services identified pursuant to that Article;

refrain from requiring

identified pursuant to Article 3 or which meets the thresholds in Article 3(2)(b)

to

or register to

| (f) | not require
  business users or end users to subscribe to or register with any other core platform services as a condition
  for being able to use,
  access, sign up
  for or registering with
  any of their core platform services identified pursuant to that Article; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

not require
  business users or end users to subscribe to or register with any other core platform services as a condition
  for being able to use,
  access, sign up
  for or registering with
  any of their core platform services identified pursuant to that Article;

not require

for being able to use,

for or registering with

Amendment 111

Amendment 111

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (g) | provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services,
  upon their request,
  with information
  concerning the price paid by the advertiser and publisher, as well as the amount or remuneration paid to the publisher, for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(g)

provide advertisers and publishers to which it supplies advertising services,
  upon their request,
  with information
  concerning the price paid by the advertiser and publisher, as well as the amount or remuneration paid to the publisher, for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper.

upon their request,

concerning the price paid by the advertiser and publisher, as well as the amount or remuneration paid to the publisher, for the publishing of a given ad and for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper.

| (g) | provide advertisers and publishers
  or third parties authorised by the advertisers or publishers,
  to which it supplies
  digital
  advertising services, with
  free of charge, high-quality, effective, continuous and real-time access to full
  information
  on the visibility and availability of advertisement portfolio, including: |
| --- | --- |

(g)

provide advertisers and publishers
  or third parties authorised by the advertisers or publishers,
  to which it supplies
  digital
  advertising services, with
  free of charge, high-quality, effective, continuous and real-time access to full
  information
  on the visibility and availability of advertisement portfolio, including:

or third parties authorised by the advertisers or publishers,

digital

free of charge, high-quality, effective, continuous and real-time access to full

on the visibility and availability of advertisement portfolio, including:

Amendment 112

Amendment 112

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g — point i (new)

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g — point i (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | i) | the pricing conditions concerning the bids placed by advertisers and advertising intermediaries; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

i)

i)

the pricing conditions concerning the bids placed by advertisers and advertising intermediaries;

the pricing conditions concerning the bids placed by advertisers and advertising intermediaries;

Amendment 113

Amendment 113

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g — point ii (new)

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g — point ii (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | ii) | the price-setting mechanisms and schemes for the calculation of the fees including the non-price criteria in the auction process; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

ii)

ii)

the price-setting mechanisms and schemes for the calculation of the fees including the non-price criteria in the auction process;

the price-setting mechanisms and schemes for the calculation of the fees including the non-price criteria in the auction process;

Amendment 114

Amendment 114

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g — point iii (new)

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g — point iii (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | iii) | the price and fees paid by the advertiser and publisher, including any deductions and surcharges; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

iii)

iii)

the price and fees paid by the advertiser and publisher, including any deductions and surcharges;

the price and fees paid by the advertiser and publisher, including any deductions and surcharges;

Amendment 115

Amendment 115

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g — point iv (new)

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g — point iv (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | iv) | the amount and remuneration paid to the publisher, for the publishing of a given advertisement; and |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

iv)

iv)

the amount and remuneration paid to the publisher, for the publishing of a given advertisement; and

the amount and remuneration paid to the publisher, for the publishing of a given advertisement; and

Amendment 116

Amendment 116

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g — point v (new)

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g — point v (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | v) | the amount and remuneration paid to the publisher for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

v)

v)

the amount and remuneration paid to the publisher for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper.

the amount and remuneration paid to the publisher for each of the relevant advertising services provided by the gatekeeper.

Amendment 117

Amendment 117

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g a (new)

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ga) | refrain from using, in competition with business users, any data not publicly available, which is generated through or in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services or ancillary services by those business users including by the end users of these business users of its core platform services or ancillary services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or ancillary services or by the end users of these business users; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ga)

(ga)

refrain from using, in competition with business users, any data not publicly available, which is generated through or in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services or ancillary services by those business users including by the end users of these business users of its core platform services or ancillary services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or ancillary services or by the end users of these business users;

refrain from using, in competition with business users, any data not publicly available, which is generated through or in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services or ancillary services by those business users including by the end users of these business users of its core platform services or ancillary services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or ancillary services or by the end users of these business users;

Amendment 235

Amendment 235

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g b(new)

Article 5 — paragraph 1 — point g b(new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (gb) | from the moment of end users’ first use of any pre-installed core platform service on an operating system, prompt end-users to change the default settings for that core platform service to another option from among a list of the main third-party services available, and allow and technically enable end users to un-install pre-installed software applications on a core platform service at any stage without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un-installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third-parties; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(gb)

(gb)

from the moment of end users’ first use of any pre-installed core platform service on an operating system, prompt end-users to change the default settings for that core platform service to another option from among a list of the main third-party services available, and allow and technically enable end users to un-install pre-installed software applications on a core platform service at any stage without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un-installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third-parties;

from the moment of end users’ first use of any pre-installed core platform service on an operating system, prompt end-users to change the default settings for that core platform service to another option from among a list of the main third-party services available, and allow and technically enable end users to un-install pre-installed software applications on a core platform service at any stage without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un-installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third-parties;

Amendment 119

Amendment 119

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point a

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | refrain from using, in competition with business users, any data not publicly available, which is generated through activities by those business users, including by the end users of these business users, of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

(a)

refrain from using, in competition with business users, any data not publicly available, which is generated through activities by those business users, including by the end users of these business users, of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users;

refrain from using, in competition with business users, any data not publicly available, which is generated through activities by those business users, including by the end users of these business users, of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users;

deleted

deleted

Amendment 120

Amendment 120

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point a a (new)

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point a a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (aa) | for its own commercial purposes, and the placement of third-party advertising in its own services, refrain from combining personal data for the purpose of delivering targeted or micro-targeted advertising, except if a clear, explicit, renewed, informed consent has been given to the gatekeeper in line with the procedure laid down in the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 by an end-user that is not a minor. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(aa)

(aa)

for its own commercial purposes, and the placement of third-party advertising in its own services, refrain from combining personal data for the purpose of delivering targeted or micro-targeted advertising, except if a clear, explicit, renewed, informed consent has been given to the gatekeeper in line with the procedure laid down in the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 by an end-user that is not a minor.

for its own commercial purposes, and the placement of third-party advertising in its own services, refrain from combining personal data for the purpose of delivering targeted or micro-targeted advertising, except if a clear, explicit, renewed, informed consent has been given to the gatekeeper in line with the procedure laid down in the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 by an end-user that is not a minor.

Amendment 121

Amendment 121

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point b

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | allow end users to un-install any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un-installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third-parties; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

(b)

allow end users to un-install any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un-installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third-parties;

allow end users to un-install any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service without prejudice to the possibility for a gatekeeper to restrict such un-installation in relation to software applications that are essential for the functioning of the operating system or of the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third-parties;

deleted

deleted

Amendment 122

Amendment 122

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point c

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point c

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | allow the installation and effective use of third party software applications or software application stores using, or interoperating with, operating systems of that gatekeeper and allow these software applications or software application stores to be accessed by means other than the core platform services of that gatekeeper. The gatekeeper shall not be prevented from taking proportionate
  measures
  to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(c)

allow the installation and effective use of third party software applications or software application stores using, or interoperating with, operating systems of that gatekeeper and allow these software applications or software application stores to be accessed by means other than the core platform services of that gatekeeper. The gatekeeper shall not be prevented from taking proportionate
  measures
  to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper;

measures

| (c) | allow
  and technically enable
  the installation and effective use of third party software applications or software application stores using, or interoperating with, operating systems of that gatekeeper and allow these software applications or software application stores to be accessed by means other than the
  relevant
  core platform services of that gatekeeper. The gatekeeper shall
  , where relevant, ask the end users to decide whether they want to make the downloaded application or application store their default setting. The gatekeeper shall
  not be prevented from taking
  measures that are both necessary and
  proportionate to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper
  or undermine end-user data protection or cyber security provided that such necessary and proportionate measures are duly justified by the gatekeeper
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

allow
  and technically enable
  the installation and effective use of third party software applications or software application stores using, or interoperating with, operating systems of that gatekeeper and allow these software applications or software application stores to be accessed by means other than the
  relevant
  core platform services of that gatekeeper. The gatekeeper shall
  , where relevant, ask the end users to decide whether they want to make the downloaded application or application store their default setting. The gatekeeper shall
  not be prevented from taking
  measures that are both necessary and
  proportionate to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper
  or undermine end-user data protection or cyber security provided that such necessary and proportionate measures are duly justified by the gatekeeper
  ;

and technically enable

relevant

, where relevant, ask the end users to decide whether they want to make the downloaded application or application store their default setting. The gatekeeper shall

measures that are both necessary and

or undermine end-user data protection or cyber security provided that such necessary and proportionate measures are duly justified by the gatekeeper

Amendment 123

Amendment 123

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point d

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point d

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (d) | refrain from treating
  more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such
  ranking
  ; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(d)

refrain from treating
  more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such
  ranking
  ;

refrain from treating

ranking

| (d) | not treat
  more favourably in ranking
  or other settings,
  services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply
  transparent,
  fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such
  third party services or products
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

not treat
  more favourably in ranking
  or other settings,
  services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply
  transparent,
  fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such
  third party services or products
  ;

not treat

or other settings,

transparent,

third party services or products

Amendment 124

Amendment 124

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point e

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point e

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (e) | refrain from
  technically
  restricting
  the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services
  to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper
  , including as regards the choice of Internet access provider for end users; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(e)

refrain from
  technically
  restricting
  the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services
  to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper
  , including as regards the choice of Internet access provider for end users;

refrain from

restricting

to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper

| (e) | not restrict
  technically
  or otherwise
  the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services, including as regards the choice of Internet access provider for end users; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

not restrict
  technically
  or otherwise
  the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services, including as regards the choice of Internet access provider for end users;

not restrict

or otherwise

Amendment 125

Amendment 125

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point e a (new)

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point e a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ea) | refrain from practices that obstruct the possibility for the end-user to unsubscribe from a core platform service; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ea)

(ea)

refrain from practices that obstruct the possibility for the end-user to unsubscribe from a core platform service;

refrain from practices that obstruct the possibility for the end-user to unsubscribe from a core platform service;

Amendment 126

Amendment 126

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point f

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point f

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (f) | allow business users
  and
  providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system, hardware or software features that are available
  or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any
  ancillary services; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(f)

allow business users
  and
  providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system, hardware or software features that are available
  or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any
  ancillary services;

and

or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any

| (f) | allow business users
  , providers of services and providers of hardware free of charge access to and interoperability with the same hardware and software features accessed or controlled via an operating system, provided that the operating system is identified pursuant to Article 3(7), that are available to services or hardware provided by the gatekeeper.
  Providers of ancillary services
  shall further be allowed
  access to and interoperability with the same operating system, hardware or software features
  , regardless of whether those software features are part of an operating system,
  that are available
  to
  ancillary services
  provided by a gatekeeper. The gatekeeper shall not be prevented from taking indispensable measures to ensure that interoperability does not compromise the integrity of the operating system, hardware or software features provided by the gatekeeper or undermine end-user data protection or cyber security provided that such indispensable measures are duly justified by the gatekeeper. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

allow business users
  , providers of services and providers of hardware free of charge access to and interoperability with the same hardware and software features accessed or controlled via an operating system, provided that the operating system is identified pursuant to Article 3(7), that are available to services or hardware provided by the gatekeeper.
  Providers of ancillary services
  shall further be allowed
  access to and interoperability with the same operating system, hardware or software features
  , regardless of whether those software features are part of an operating system,
  that are available
  to
  ancillary services
  provided by a gatekeeper. The gatekeeper shall not be prevented from taking indispensable measures to ensure that interoperability does not compromise the integrity of the operating system, hardware or software features provided by the gatekeeper or undermine end-user data protection or cyber security provided that such indispensable measures are duly justified by the gatekeeper.

, providers of services and providers of hardware free of charge access to and interoperability with the same hardware and software features accessed or controlled via an operating system, provided that the operating system is identified pursuant to Article 3(7), that are available to services or hardware provided by the gatekeeper.

shall further be allowed

, regardless of whether those software features are part of an operating system,

to

provided by a gatekeeper. The gatekeeper shall not be prevented from taking indispensable measures to ensure that interoperability does not compromise the integrity of the operating system, hardware or software features provided by the gatekeeper or undermine end-user data protection or cyber security provided that such indispensable measures are duly justified by the gatekeeper.

Amendment 127

Amendment 127

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point f a (new)

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point f a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (fa) | allow any providers of number independent interpersonal communication services upon their request and free of charge to interconnect with the gatekeepers number independent interpersonal communication services identified pursuant to Article 3(7). Interconnection shall be provided under objectively the same conditions and quality that are available or used by the gatekeeper, its subsidiaries or its partners, thus allowing for a functional interaction with these services, while guaranteeing a high level of security and personal data protection; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(fa)

(fa)

allow any providers of number independent interpersonal communication services upon their request and free of charge to interconnect with the gatekeepers number independent interpersonal communication services identified pursuant to Article 3(7). Interconnection shall be provided under objectively the same conditions and quality that are available or used by the gatekeeper, its subsidiaries or its partners, thus allowing for a functional interaction with these services, while guaranteeing a high level of security and personal data protection;

allow any providers of number independent interpersonal communication services upon their request and free of charge to interconnect with the gatekeepers number independent interpersonal communication services identified pursuant to Article 3(7). Interconnection shall be provided under objectively the same conditions and quality that are available or used by the gatekeeper, its subsidiaries or its partners, thus allowing for a functional interaction with these services, while guaranteeing a high level of security and personal data protection;

Amendment 128

Amendment 128

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point f b (new)

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point f b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (fb) | allow any providers of social network services upon their request and free of charge to interconnect with the gatekeepers social network services identified pursuant to Article 3(7). Interconnection shall be provided under objectively the same conditions and quality that are available or used by the gatekeeper, its subsidiaries or its partners, thus allowing for a functional interaction with these services, while guaranteeing a high level of security and personal data protection. The implementation of this obligation is subjected to the Commission's specification under Article 10(2a); |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(fb)

(fb)

allow any providers of social network services upon their request and free of charge to interconnect with the gatekeepers social network services identified pursuant to Article 3(7). Interconnection shall be provided under objectively the same conditions and quality that are available or used by the gatekeeper, its subsidiaries or its partners, thus allowing for a functional interaction with these services, while guaranteeing a high level of security and personal data protection. The implementation of this obligation is subjected to the Commission's specification under Article 10(2a);

allow any providers of social network services upon their request and free of charge to interconnect with the gatekeepers social network services identified pursuant to Article 3(7). Interconnection shall be provided under objectively the same conditions and quality that are available or used by the gatekeeper, its subsidiaries or its partners, thus allowing for a functional interaction with these services, while guaranteeing a high level of security and personal data protection. The implementation of this obligation is subjected to the Commission's specification under Article 10(2a);

Amendment 129

Amendment 129

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point g

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point g

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (g) | provide advertisers and publishers, upon their request and free of charge, with access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the ad inventory; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(g)

provide advertisers and publishers, upon their request and free of charge, with access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the ad inventory;

| (g) | provide advertisers and publishers,
  and third parties authorised by advertisers and publishers
  upon their request and free of charge, with access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the ad inventory
  including aggregated and non-aggregated data and performance data in a manner that would allow advertisers and publishers to run their own verification and measurement tools to assess performance of the core services provided for by the gatekeepers
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(g)

provide advertisers and publishers,
  and third parties authorised by advertisers and publishers
  upon their request and free of charge, with access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the ad inventory
  including aggregated and non-aggregated data and performance data in a manner that would allow advertisers and publishers to run their own verification and measurement tools to assess performance of the core services provided for by the gatekeepers
  ;

and third parties authorised by advertisers and publishers

including aggregated and non-aggregated data and performance data in a manner that would allow advertisers and publishers to run their own verification and measurement tools to assess performance of the core services provided for by the gatekeepers

Amendment 130

Amendment 130

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point h

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point h

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (h) | provide effective portability of data generated through
  the
  activity
  of a business user or end user and shall, in particular, provide
  tools
  for end users
  to facilitate the exercise of data portability, in line with Regulation EU 2016/679, including by the provision of continuous and real-time access; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(h)

provide effective portability of data generated through
  the
  activity
  of a business user or end user and shall, in particular, provide
  tools
  for end users
  to facilitate the exercise of data portability, in line with Regulation EU 2016/679, including by the provision of continuous and real-time access;

the

of a business user or end user and shall, in particular, provide

for end users

| (h) | provide
  end users or third parties authorised by an end user, upon their request and free of charge, with
  effective portability of data
  provided by the end user or
  generated through
  their
  activity
  in the context of the use on the relevant core platform service including by providing free of charge
  tools to facilitate the
  effective
  exercise of
  such
  data portability, in line with Regulation (EU) 2016/679,
  and
  including by the provision of continuous and real-time access; |
| --- | --- |

(h)

provide
  end users or third parties authorised by an end user, upon their request and free of charge, with
  effective portability of data
  provided by the end user or
  generated through
  their
  activity
  in the context of the use on the relevant core platform service including by providing free of charge
  tools to facilitate the
  effective
  exercise of
  such
  data portability, in line with Regulation (EU) 2016/679,
  and
  including by the provision of continuous and real-time access;

end users or third parties authorised by an end user, upon their request and free of charge, with

provided by the end user or

their

in the context of the use on the relevant core platform service including by providing free of charge

effective

such

and

Amendment 131

Amendment 131

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point i

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point i

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (i) | provide business users, or third parties authorised by a business user, free of charge, with
  effective, high-quality,
  continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated
  or
  non-aggregated data, that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data, provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service, and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(i)

provide business users, or third parties authorised by a business user, free of charge, with
  effective, high-quality,
  continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated
  or
  non-aggregated data, that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data, provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service, and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679;

effective, high-quality,

or

| (i) | provide business users, or third parties authorised by a business user,
  upon their request,
  free of charge, with continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated
  and
  non-aggregated data, that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services
  or ancillary services offered by the gatekeeper
  by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users;
  this shall include, at the request of the business user, the possibility and necessary tools to access and analyse data ‘in-situ’ without a transfer from the gatekeeper;
  for personal data, provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service, and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

provide business users, or third parties authorised by a business user,
  upon their request,
  free of charge, with continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated
  and
  non-aggregated data, that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services
  or ancillary services offered by the gatekeeper
  by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users;
  this shall include, at the request of the business user, the possibility and necessary tools to access and analyse data ‘in-situ’ without a transfer from the gatekeeper;
  for personal data, provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service, and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679;

upon their request,

and

or ancillary services offered by the gatekeeper

this shall include, at the request of the business user, the possibility and necessary tools to access and analyse data ‘in-situ’ without a transfer from the gatekeeper;

Amendment 132

Amendment 132

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point k

Article 6 — paragraph 1 — point k

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (k) | apply
  fair
  and non-discriminatory general conditions of access for business users to its
  software application store
  designated pursuant to Article 3 of this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(k)

apply
  fair
  and non-discriminatory general conditions of access for business users to its
  software application store
  designated pursuant to Article 3 of this Regulation.

fair

software application store

| (k) | apply
  transparent, fair, reasonable
  and non-discriminatory general conditions of access
  and conditions that are not less favourable than the conditions applied to its own service
  for business users to its
  core platform services
  designated pursuant to Article 3 of this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(k)

apply
  transparent, fair, reasonable
  and non-discriminatory general conditions of access
  and conditions that are not less favourable than the conditions applied to its own service
  for business users to its
  core platform services
  designated pursuant to Article 3 of this Regulation.

transparent, fair, reasonable

and conditions that are not less favourable than the conditions applied to its own service

core platform services

Amendment 133

Amendment 133

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 6 — paragraph 2

Article 6 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Article
  6 –
  paragraph 2 | Article
  5 –
  paragraph 2 |
| 2.   For the purposes of point
  (a)
  of paragraph 1 data that is not publicly available shall include any aggregated and non-aggregated data generated by business users that can be inferred from, or collected through, the commercial activities of business users or their customers on the core platform service of the gatekeeper. | 2.   For the purposes of point
  (g a)
  of paragraph 1 data that is not publicly available shall include any aggregated and non-aggregated data generated by business users that can be inferred from, or collected through, the commercial activities of business users or their customers on the core platform service
  or ancillary services
  of the gatekeeper. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article
  6 –
  paragraph 2

6 –

Article
  5 –
  paragraph 2

5 –

2.   For the purposes of point
  (a)
  of paragraph 1 data that is not publicly available shall include any aggregated and non-aggregated data generated by business users that can be inferred from, or collected through, the commercial activities of business users or their customers on the core platform service of the gatekeeper.

2.   For the purposes of point
  (g a)
  of paragraph 1 data that is not publicly available shall include any aggregated and non-aggregated data generated by business users that can be inferred from, or collected through, the commercial activities of business users or their customers on the core platform service
  or ancillary services
  of the gatekeeper.

Amendment 134

Amendment 134

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 — paragraph 1

Article 7 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   
  The measures implemented by
  the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 shall
  be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation
  . The gatekeeper shall ensure that
  these
  measures
  are implemented in compliance
  with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, and with legislation on cyber security, consumer protection and product safety. | 1.   The gatekeeper
  shall implement effective measures
  to ensure
  its
  compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6
  , and
  shall
  demonstrate that compliance, when called upon to do so
  . The gatekeeper shall ensure that
  the
  measures
  that it implements comply
  with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, and Directive 2002/58/EC, and with legislation on cyber security, consumer protection and product safety
  as well as with accessibility requirements for the persons with disabilities in accordance with Directive (EU) 2019/882
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   
  The measures implemented by
  the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 shall
  be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation
  . The gatekeeper shall ensure that
  these
  measures
  are implemented in compliance
  with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, and with legislation on cyber security, consumer protection and product safety.

1.   The gatekeeper
  shall implement effective measures
  to ensure
  its
  compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6
  , and
  shall
  demonstrate that compliance, when called upon to do so
  . The gatekeeper shall ensure that
  the
  measures
  that it implements comply
  with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, and Directive 2002/58/EC, and with legislation on cyber security, consumer protection and product safety
  as well as with accessibility requirements for the persons with disabilities in accordance with Directive (EU) 2019/882
  .

Amendment 135

Amendment 135

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 7 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1a.
     
  Within six months after its designation and in application of paragraph 8 of Article 3, the gatekeeper shall provide the Commission with a report describing in a detailed and transparent manner the measures implemented to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6. This report shall be updated at least annually. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1a.
     
  Within six months after its designation and in application of paragraph 8 of Article 3, the gatekeeper shall provide the Commission with a report describing in a detailed and transparent manner the measures implemented to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6. This report shall be updated at least annually.

Amendment 136

Amendment 136

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 — paragraph 1 b (new)

Article 7 — paragraph 1 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1b.
     
  Along with the report mentioned in paragraph 1a and within the same timeframe, the gatekeeper shall provide the Commission with a non-confidential summary of its report that will be published by the Commission without delay. The non-confidential summary shall be updated at least annually according to the detailed report. |
| | In order to comply with the obligations laid down in Article 6 and where the gatekeeper holds reasonable doubt as to the appropriate method or methods of compliance, the gatekeeper may request that the Commission engage in a process to receive and address requests for clarification and thereafter further specify relevant measures that the gatekeeper shall adopt in order to comply in an effective and proportionate manner with those obligations. Further specification of obligations laid down in Article 6 shall be limited to issues relating to ensuring effective and proportionate compliance with the obligations. When doing so, the Commission may decide to consult third parties whose views it considers necessary in relation to the measures that the gatekeeper is expected to implement. The duration of the process shall not extend beyond the period set out in Article 3(8), with the possibility for an extension of two months, at the discretion of the Commission, should the dialogue process have not been concluded prior to the expiry of the said period. |
| | The Commission shall retain discretion in deciding whether to engage in such a process, with due regard to principles of equal treatment, proportionality and due process. Where the Commission decides not to engage in such a process, it shall provide a written justification to the relevant gatekeeper. At the end of this process, the Commission may also by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned is to implement arising from the conclusion of this process set out in paragraph 1b. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1b.
     
  Along with the report mentioned in paragraph 1a and within the same timeframe, the gatekeeper shall provide the Commission with a non-confidential summary of its report that will be published by the Commission without delay. The non-confidential summary shall be updated at least annually according to the detailed report.

In order to comply with the obligations laid down in Article 6 and where the gatekeeper holds reasonable doubt as to the appropriate method or methods of compliance, the gatekeeper may request that the Commission engage in a process to receive and address requests for clarification and thereafter further specify relevant measures that the gatekeeper shall adopt in order to comply in an effective and proportionate manner with those obligations. Further specification of obligations laid down in Article 6 shall be limited to issues relating to ensuring effective and proportionate compliance with the obligations. When doing so, the Commission may decide to consult third parties whose views it considers necessary in relation to the measures that the gatekeeper is expected to implement. The duration of the process shall not extend beyond the period set out in Article 3(8), with the possibility for an extension of two months, at the discretion of the Commission, should the dialogue process have not been concluded prior to the expiry of the said period.

In order to comply with the obligations laid down in Article 6 and where the gatekeeper holds reasonable doubt as to the appropriate method or methods of compliance, the gatekeeper may request that the Commission engage in a process to receive and address requests for clarification and thereafter further specify relevant measures that the gatekeeper shall adopt in order to comply in an effective and proportionate manner with those obligations. Further specification of obligations laid down in Article 6 shall be limited to issues relating to ensuring effective and proportionate compliance with the obligations. When doing so, the Commission may decide to consult third parties whose views it considers necessary in relation to the measures that the gatekeeper is expected to implement. The duration of the process shall not extend beyond the period set out in Article 3(8), with the possibility for an extension of two months, at the discretion of the Commission, should the dialogue process have not been concluded prior to the expiry of the said period.

The Commission shall retain discretion in deciding whether to engage in such a process, with due regard to principles of equal treatment, proportionality and due process. Where the Commission decides not to engage in such a process, it shall provide a written justification to the relevant gatekeeper. At the end of this process, the Commission may also by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned is to implement arising from the conclusion of this process set out in paragraph 1b.

The Commission shall retain discretion in deciding whether to engage in such a process, with due regard to principles of equal treatment, proportionality and due process. Where the Commission decides not to engage in such a process, it shall provide a written justification to the relevant gatekeeper. At the end of this process, the Commission may also by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned is to implement arising from the conclusion of this process set out in paragraph 1b.

Amendment 137

Amendment 137

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 — paragraph 2

Article 7 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   Where the Commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1, or has implemented, do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in Article 6, it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned
  shall
  implement. The Commission shall adopt such a decision
  within six
  months
  from
  the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18. | 2.   Where the Commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1, or has implemented, do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in Article 6, it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned
  is to
  implement. The Commission shall adopt such a decision
  as soon as possible and in any event no later than four
  months
  after
  the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   Where the Commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1, or has implemented, do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in Article 6, it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned
  shall
  implement. The Commission shall adopt such a decision
  within six
  months
  from
  the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18.

2.   Where the Commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1, or has implemented, do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in Article 6, it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned
  is to
  implement. The Commission shall adopt such a decision
  as soon as possible and in any event no later than four
  months
  after
  the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18.

Amendment 138

Amendment 138

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 — paragraph 4

Article 7 — paragraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.   
  In view of
  adopting the decision under paragraph 2, the Commission shall communicate its preliminary findings
  within three
  months from the opening of the proceedings. In the preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain the measures
  it considers to take or
  it considers that the provider of core platform services concerned should take in order to effectively address the preliminary findings. | 4.   
  With a view to
  adopting the decision under paragraph 2, the Commission shall communicate its preliminary findings
  and publish a concise summary as soon as possible and, in any event no later than two
  months from the opening of the proceedings. In the preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain the measures
  that it is considering taking or that
  it considers that the provider of core platform services concerned should take in order to effectively address the preliminary findings.
  The Commission may decide to invite interested third parties to submit their observations within a time limit, which is fixed by the Commission in its publication. When publishing, due regard shall be given by the Commission to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.   
  In view of
  adopting the decision under paragraph 2, the Commission shall communicate its preliminary findings
  within three
  months from the opening of the proceedings. In the preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain the measures
  it considers to take or
  it considers that the provider of core platform services concerned should take in order to effectively address the preliminary findings.

4.   
  With a view to
  adopting the decision under paragraph 2, the Commission shall communicate its preliminary findings
  and publish a concise summary as soon as possible and, in any event no later than two
  months from the opening of the proceedings. In the preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain the measures
  that it is considering taking or that
  it considers that the provider of core platform services concerned should take in order to effectively address the preliminary findings.
  The Commission may decide to invite interested third parties to submit their observations within a time limit, which is fixed by the Commission in its publication. When publishing, due regard shall be given by the Commission to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.

Amendment 139

Amendment 139

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 7 — paragraph 7

Article 7 — paragraph 7

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 7.   A gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18 for the Commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under Article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.
  A gatekeeper may, with
  its request, provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. | 7.   A gatekeeper may request
  within the implementation deadline of Article 3 (8)
  the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18 for the Commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under Article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.
  In
  its request,
  the gatekeeper shall
  provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.
  The Commission shall adopt its decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

7.   A gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18 for the Commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under Article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.
  A gatekeeper may, with
  its request, provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.

7.   A gatekeeper may request
  within the implementation deadline of Article 3 (8)
  the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18 for the Commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under Article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.
  In
  its request,
  the gatekeeper shall
  provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.
  The Commission shall adopt its decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18.

Amendment 140

Amendment 140

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 — paragraph 1

Article 8 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   The Commission may, on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper,
  exceptionally
  suspend, in whole or in part, a specific obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 for a core platform
  service by
  decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger, due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper, the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union, and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. The Commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest
  3
  months
  following
  receipt of a complete reasoned request. | 1.   The Commission may, on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper, suspend
  , on an exceptional basis
  , in whole or in part, a specific obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 for a core platform
  serviceby
  decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger, due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper, the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union, and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. The Commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest
  within three
  months
  after
  receipt of a complete reasoned request.
  The suspension decision shall be accompanied by a reasoned statement explaining the grounds for the suspension. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   The Commission may, on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper,
  exceptionally
  suspend, in whole or in part, a specific obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 for a core platform
  service by
  decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger, due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper, the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union, and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. The Commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest
  3
  months
  following
  receipt of a complete reasoned request.

1.   The Commission may, on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper, suspend
  , on an exceptional basis
  , in whole or in part, a specific obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 for a core platform
  serviceby
  decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger, due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper, the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union, and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. The Commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest
  within three
  months
  after
  receipt of a complete reasoned request.
  The suspension decision shall be accompanied by a reasoned statement explaining the grounds for the suspension.

Amendment 141

Amendment 141

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 — paragraph 2

Article 8 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   Where
  the
  suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall review its suspension decision every year. Following such a review the Commission shall either lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met. | 2.   Where suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall review its suspension decision every year. Following such a review the Commission shall either
  wholly or partly
  lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   Where
  the
  suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall review its suspension decision every year. Following such a review the Commission shall either lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met.

2.   Where suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall review its suspension decision every year. Following such a review the Commission shall either
  wholly or partly
  lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met.

Amendment 142

Amendment 142

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 1

Article 8 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper, provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1. | In cases of urgency,
  the Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper, provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper, provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1.

In cases of urgency,
  the Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper, provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1.

In cases of urgency,

Amendment 143

Amendment 143

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 8 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 2

Article 8 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| In assessing the request, the Commission shall take into account, in particular, the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union as well as on third parties. The suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the Commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this Regulation. Such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 1. | In assessing the request, the Commission shall take into account, in particular, the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union as well as on third parties
  , in particular smaller business users and consumers
  . The suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the Commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this Regulation. Such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 1. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

In assessing the request, the Commission shall take into account, in particular, the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union as well as on third parties. The suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the Commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this Regulation. Such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 1.

In assessing the request, the Commission shall take into account, in particular, the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the Union as well as on third parties
  , in particular smaller business users and consumers
  . The suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the Commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this Regulation. Such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 1.

, in particular smaller business users and consumers

Amendment 144

Amendment 144

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 — title

Article 9 — title

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Exemption
  for overriding reasons
  of public
  interest | Exemption
  on grounds
  of public
  morality, public health or public security |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Exemption
  for overriding reasons
  of public
  interest

for overriding reasons

interest

Exemption
  on grounds
  of public
  morality, public health or public security

on grounds

morality, public health or public security

Amendment 145

Amendment 145

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 — paragraph 1

Article 9 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), exempt it, in whole or in part, from a specific obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to Article 3(7), where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this Article. The Commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest
  3
  months after receiving a complete reasoned request. | 1.   The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), exempt it, in whole or in part, from a specific obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to Article 3(7), where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this Article. The Commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest
  three
  months after receiving a complete reasoned request.
  Such decision shall be accompanied by a reasoned statement explaining the grounds for the exemption. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), exempt it, in whole or in part, from a specific obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to Article 3(7), where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this Article. The Commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest
  3
  months after receiving a complete reasoned request.

1.   The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), exempt it, in whole or in part, from a specific obligation laid down in Articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to Article 3(7), where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this Article. The Commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest
  three
  months after receiving a complete reasoned request.
  Such decision shall be accompanied by a reasoned statement explaining the grounds for the exemption.

Amendment 146

Amendment 146

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 9 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1a.
     
  Where the exemption is granted pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall review its exemption decision every year. Following such a review the Commission shall either wholly or partially lift the exemption or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1a.
     
  Where the exemption is granted pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall review its exemption decision every year. Following such a review the Commission shall either wholly or partially lift the exemption or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met.

Amendment 147

Amendment 147

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 9 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 1

Article 9 — paragraph 3 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1. | In cases of urgency,
  the Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1.

In cases of urgency,
  the Commission may, acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative, provisionally suspend the application of the relevant obligation to one or more individual core platform services already prior to the decision pursuant to paragraph 1.

In cases of urgency,

Amendment 148

Amendment 148

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 10 — paragraph 1

Article 10 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article
  34 to update the obligations laid down in
  Articles 5 and 6 where, based on a market investigation pursuant to Article 17, it has identified
  the need for new obligations addressing
  practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6. | 1.   The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article
  37 amending
  Articles 5 and 6
  by adding obligations
  where, based on a market investigation pursuant to Article 17, it has identified
  that this is needed in order to address
  practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6.
  Those delegated acts may only add new obligations to those listed under Articles 5 and 6. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article
  34 to update the obligations laid down in
  Articles 5 and 6 where, based on a market investigation pursuant to Article 17, it has identified
  the need for new obligations addressing
  practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6.

1.   The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article
  37 amending
  Articles 5 and 6
  by adding obligations
  where, based on a market investigation pursuant to Article 17, it has identified
  that this is needed in order to address
  practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6.
  Those delegated acts may only add new obligations to those listed under Articles 5 and 6.

Amendment 149

Amendment 149

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 10 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 10 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1a.
     
  The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 37 supplementing this Regulation in respect of the obligations laid down in Article 5 and 6. Those delegated acts shall provide for only the following: |
| | (a) | the extent to which an obligation applies to certain core platform services; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1a.
     
  The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 37 supplementing this Regulation in respect of the obligations laid down in Article 5 and 6. Those delegated acts shall provide for only the following:

(a)

(a)

the extent to which an obligation applies to certain core platform services;

the extent to which an obligation applies to certain core platform services;

| (b) | the extent to which an obligation applies only to a subset of business users or end users; or |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

the extent to which an obligation applies only to a subset of business users or end users; or

the extent to which an obligation applies only to a subset of business users or end users; or

| (c) | how the obligations shall be performed in order to ensure the effectiveness of those obligations |
| --- | --- |

(c)

(c)

how the obligations shall be performed in order to ensure the effectiveness of those obligations

how the obligations shall be performed in order to ensure the effectiveness of those obligations

Amendment 150

Amendment 150

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 10 — paragraph 2 — point a

Article 10 — paragraph 2 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or

| (a) | there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users
  or end users
  ; or |
| --- | --- |

(a)

there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users
  or end users
  ; or

or end users

Amendment 151

Amendment 151

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 10 — paragraph 2 a (new)

Article 10 — paragraph 2 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 2a.
     
  In relation to the obligation laid down in article 6(1) fb, the Commission shall adopt by ... [18 months after the entry into force of this Regulation] a delegated act in accordance with Article 37 supplementing this Regulation by defining the appropriate scope and features for the interconnection of the gatekeepers online social networking services as well as standards or technical specifications of such interconnection. Such standards or technical specifications shall ensure high level of security and protection of personal data. When developing standards or technical specifications the Commission may consult standardisation bodies or other relevant stakeholders as foreseen in the in Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2a.
     
  In relation to the obligation laid down in article 6(1) fb, the Commission shall adopt by ... [18 months after the entry into force of this Regulation] a delegated act in accordance with Article 37 supplementing this Regulation by defining the appropriate scope and features for the interconnection of the gatekeepers online social networking services as well as standards or technical specifications of such interconnection. Such standards or technical specifications shall ensure high level of security and protection of personal data. When developing standards or technical specifications the Commission may consult standardisation bodies or other relevant stakeholders as foreseen in the in Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012.

Amendment 152

Amendment 152

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 11

Article 11

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Article
  11 | Article
  6a |
| Anti-circumvention | Anti-circumvention |
| 1.   A gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of Articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with.
  While the obligations of Articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to Article 3, their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs, regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual, commercial, technical or any other nature. | 1.   A gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of Articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. |
| | 1a.
     
  While the obligations of Articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to Article 3, a gatekeeper, including any undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs, shall not engage in any behaviour regardless of whether is of a contractual, commercial, technical or any other nature, that, while formally, conceptually or technically distinct to a behaviour prohibited pursuant to Articles 5 and 6, is capable in practice of having an equivalent object or effect. |
| | 1b.
     
  The gatekeeper shall not engage in any behaviour discouraging interoperability by using technical protection measures, discriminatory terms of service, subjecting application programming interfaces to copyright or providing misleading information. |
| 2.   Where consent for collecting
  and
  processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this Regulation, a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps
  to
  either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing, where required under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, or to comply with Union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate.
  The gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. | 2.   Where consent for collecting, processing
  and sharing
  of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this Regulation, a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps either
  to
  enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing, where required
  to do so
  under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, or to comply with Union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. |
| 3.   A gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in Articles 5 and 6, or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. | 3.   A gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in Articles 5 and 6, or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult
  including by offering choices to the end-user in a non-neutral manner, or by subverting user's autonomy, decision-making, or choice via the structure, design, function or manner of operation of a user interface or a part thereof
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article
  11

11

Article
  6a

6a

Anti-circumvention

Anti-circumvention

1.   A gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of Articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with.
  While the obligations of Articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to Article 3, their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs, regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual, commercial, technical or any other nature.

1.   A gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of Articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with.

1a.
     
  While the obligations of Articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to Article 3, a gatekeeper, including any undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs, shall not engage in any behaviour regardless of whether is of a contractual, commercial, technical or any other nature, that, while formally, conceptually or technically distinct to a behaviour prohibited pursuant to Articles 5 and 6, is capable in practice of having an equivalent object or effect.

1b.
     
  The gatekeeper shall not engage in any behaviour discouraging interoperability by using technical protection measures, discriminatory terms of service, subjecting application programming interfaces to copyright or providing misleading information.

2.   Where consent for collecting
  and
  processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this Regulation, a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps
  to
  either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing, where required under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, or to comply with Union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate.
  The gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services.

2.   Where consent for collecting, processing
  and sharing
  of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this Regulation, a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps either
  to
  enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing, where required
  to do so
  under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2002/58/EC, or to comply with Union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate.

3.   A gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in Articles 5 and 6, or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult.

3.   A gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in Articles 5 and 6, or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult
  including by offering choices to the end-user in a non-neutral manner, or by subverting user's autonomy, decision-making, or choice via the structure, design, function or manner of operation of a user interface or a part thereof
  .

Amendment 153

Amendment 153

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 1 –subparagraph 1

Article 12 — paragraph 1 –subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| A gatekeeper shall inform the Commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004
  involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector
  irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a Union competition authority under Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. | A gatekeeper shall inform the Commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a Union competition authority under Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

A gatekeeper shall inform the Commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004
  involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector
  irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a Union competition authority under Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.

involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector

A gatekeeper shall inform the Commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a Union competition authority under Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.

Amendment 154

Amendment 154

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 a (new)

Article 12 — paragraph 1 — subparagraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | The Commission shall inform competent national authorities of such notifications. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The Commission shall inform competent national authorities of such notifications.

The Commission shall inform competent national authorities of such notifications.

Amendment 155

Amendment 155

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 3

Article 12 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   If, following any concentration as provided in paragraph 1, additional core platform services individually satisfy the thresholds in point (b) of Article 3(2), the gatekeeper concerned shall inform the Commission thereof within three months from the implementation of the concentration and provide the Commission with the information referred to in Article 3(2). | 3.   If, following any concentration as provided in paragraph 1,
  it is demonstrated that
  additional core platform services individually satisfy the thresholds in point (b) of Article 3(2), the gatekeeper concerned shall inform the Commission thereof within three months from the implementation of the concentration and provide the Commission with the information referred to in Article 3(2). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   If, following any concentration as provided in paragraph 1, additional core platform services individually satisfy the thresholds in point (b) of Article 3(2), the gatekeeper concerned shall inform the Commission thereof within three months from the implementation of the concentration and provide the Commission with the information referred to in Article 3(2).

3.   If, following any concentration as provided in paragraph 1,
  it is demonstrated that
  additional core platform services individually satisfy the thresholds in point (b) of Article 3(2), the gatekeeper concerned shall inform the Commission thereof within three months from the implementation of the concentration and provide the Commission with the information referred to in Article 3(2).

Amendment 156

Amendment 156

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 3 a (new)

Article 12 — paragraph 3 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3a.
     
  The competent national authorities may use the information received under paragraph 1 to request the Commission to examine the concentration pursuant to Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3a.
     
  The competent national authorities may use the information received under paragraph 1 to request the Commission to examine the concentration pursuant to Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004.

Amendment 157

Amendment 157

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 12 — paragraph 3 b (new)

Article 12 — paragraph 3 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3b.
     
  The Commission shall publish annually the list of acquisitions of which it has been informed by gatekeepers. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3b.
     
  The Commission shall publish annually the list of acquisitions of which it has been informed by gatekeepers.

Amendment 158

Amendment 158

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 13 — paragraph 1

Article 13 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Within six months after its designation pursuant to Article 3, a gatekeeper shall submit to the Commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to Article 3. This description shall be updated at least annually. | Within six months after its designation pursuant to Article 3, a gatekeeper shall submit to the Commission
  and the Hight Level Group of Digital Regulators
  an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to Article 3. This description shall be updated at least annually.
  The Commission shall develop, in consultation with the EU Data Protection Supervisor, the European Data Protection Board, civil society and experts, the standards and procedure of the audit. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Within six months after its designation pursuant to Article 3, a gatekeeper shall submit to the Commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to Article 3. This description shall be updated at least annually.

Within six months after its designation pursuant to Article 3, a gatekeeper shall submit to the Commission
  and the Hight Level Group of Digital Regulators
  an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to Article 3. This description shall be updated at least annually.
  The Commission shall develop, in consultation with the EU Data Protection Supervisor, the European Data Protection Board, civil society and experts, the standards and procedure of the audit.

and the Hight Level Group of Digital Regulators

The Commission shall develop, in consultation with the EU Data Protection Supervisor, the European Data Protection Board, civil society and experts, the standards and procedure of the audit.

Amendment 159

Amendment 159

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 13 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 13 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | The gatekeeper shall make publicly available an overview of the audited description referred to in the first paragraph, taking into account the need to respect business secrecy. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The gatekeeper shall make publicly available an overview of the audited description referred to in the first paragraph, taking into account the need to respect business secrecy.

The gatekeeper shall make publicly available an overview of the audited description referred to in the first paragraph, taking into account the need to respect business secrecy.

Amendment 160

Amendment 160

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 14 — paragraph 3 — point a

Article 14 — paragraph 3 — point a

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (a) | there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(a)

there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based;

| (a) | there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based;
  or |
| --- | --- |

(a)

there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based;
  or

or

Amendment 161

Amendment 161

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 14 — paragraph 3 a (new)

Article 14 — paragraph 3 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3a.
     
  The Commission may also ask one or more competent national authorities to support its market investigation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3a.
     
  The Commission may also ask one or more competent national authorities to support its market investigation.

Amendment 162

Amendment 162

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 15 — paragraph 1

Article 15 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   The Commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(6), or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(7).
  It
  shall
  endeavour to
  conclude its investigation by adopting a decision
  in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4)
  within twelve months
  from the opening of the market investigation
  . | 1.   The Commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(6), or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(7).
  The Commission
  shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   The Commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(6), or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(7).
  It
  shall
  endeavour to
  conclude its investigation by adopting a decision
  in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4)
  within twelve months
  from the opening of the market investigation
  .

1.   The Commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(6), or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(7).
  The Commission
  shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months.

Amendment 163

Amendment 163

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 15 — paragraph 2

Article 15 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   In the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall
  endeavour to
  communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned
  within
  six months from the opening of the investigation. In the preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain whether it considers, on a provisional basis, that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(6). | 2.   In the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned
  as soon as possible and in any case no later than
  six months from the opening of the investigation. In the preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain whether it considers, on a provisional basis, that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(6). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   In the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall
  endeavour to
  communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned
  within
  six months from the opening of the investigation. In the preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain whether it considers, on a provisional basis, that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(6).

2.   In the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned
  as soon as possible and in any case no later than
  six months from the opening of the investigation. In the preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain whether it considers, on a provisional basis, that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to Article 3(6).

Amendment 164

Amendment 164

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 15 — paragraph 3

Article 15 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   
  Where the provider of core platform services satisfies the thresholds set out in Article 3(2), but has presented significantly substantiated arguments in accordance with Article 3(4), the Commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation within five months from the opening of the market investigation by a decision pursuant to paragraph 1. In that case the Commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 to the provider of core platform services within three months from the opening of the investigation. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   
  Where the provider of core platform services satisfies the thresholds set out in Article 3(2), but has presented significantly substantiated arguments in accordance with Article 3(4), the Commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation within five months from the opening of the market investigation by a decision pursuant to paragraph 1. In that case the Commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 to the provider of core platform services within three months from the opening of the investigation.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 165

Amendment 165

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 15 — paragraph 4

Article 15 — paragraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.   When the Commission pursuant to Article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations, but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future, it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper
  only
  obligations laid down in Article
  5(b)
  and Article
  6(1) points (e), (f), (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. The Commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations
  . The Commission shall review such a designation in accordance with
  the procedure laid down in
  Article 4. | 4.   When the Commission pursuant to Article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations, but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future, it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper
  the
  obligations laid down in Article
  5
  and Article
  6
  . The Commission shall review such a designation in accordance with Article 4. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.   When the Commission pursuant to Article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations, but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future, it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper
  only
  obligations laid down in Article
  5(b)
  and Article
  6(1) points (e), (f), (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. The Commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations
  . The Commission shall review such a designation in accordance with
  the procedure laid down in
  Article 4.

4.   When the Commission pursuant to Article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations, but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future, it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper
  the
  obligations laid down in Article
  5
  and Article
  6
  . The Commission shall review such a designation in accordance with Article 4.

Amendment 166

Amendment 166

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 16 — paragraph 1

Article 16 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   Where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6
  and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under Article 3(1)
  , the Commission may
  by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4)
  impose on
  such
  gatekeeper
  any
  behavioural or structural remedies which are
  proportionate to the infringement committed
  and necessary to ensure compliance with this Regulation. The Commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision
  within
  twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. | 1.   
  The Commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a gatekeeper has engaged in systematic non-compliance.
  Where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, the Commission may impose on
  that
  gatekeeper
  such
  behavioural or structural remedies which are
  effective
  and necessary to ensure compliance with this Regulation. The Commission shall
  , where appropriate, be entitled to require the remedies to be tested to optimise their effectiveness. The Commission shall
  conclude its investigation by adopting a decision
  as soon as possible and in any event no later than
  twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   Where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6
  and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under Article 3(1)
  , the Commission may
  by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4)
  impose on
  such
  gatekeeper
  any
  behavioural or structural remedies which are
  proportionate to the infringement committed
  and necessary to ensure compliance with this Regulation. The Commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision
  within
  twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.

1.   
  The Commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a gatekeeper has engaged in systematic non-compliance.
  Where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, the Commission may impose on
  that
  gatekeeper
  such
  behavioural or structural remedies which are
  effective
  and necessary to ensure compliance with this Regulation. The Commission shall
  , where appropriate, be entitled to require the remedies to be tested to optimise their effectiveness. The Commission shall
  conclude its investigation by adopting a decision
  as soon as possible and in any event no later than
  twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.

Amendment 167

Amendment 167

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 16 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 16 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1a.
     
  Pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission may for a limited period restrict gatekeepers from making acquisitions in areas relevant to this Regulation provided that such restrictions are proportionate, and necessary in order to remedy the damage caused by repeated infringements or to prevent further damage to the contestability and fairness of the internal market. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1a.
     
  Pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission may for a limited period restrict gatekeepers from making acquisitions in areas relevant to this Regulation provided that such restrictions are proportionate, and necessary in order to remedy the damage caused by repeated infringements or to prevent further damage to the contestability and fairness of the internal market.

Amendment 168

Amendment 168

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 16 — paragraph 2

Article 16 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   
  The Commission may only impose structural remedies pursuant to paragraph 1 either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the gatekeeper concerned than the structural remedy. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   
  The Commission may only impose structural remedies pursuant to paragraph 1 either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the gatekeeper concerned than the structural remedy.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 169

Amendment 169

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 16 — paragraph 3

Article 16 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   A gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, where the Commission has issued at least
  three
  non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to Articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of
  five
  years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this Article. | 3.   A gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, where the Commission has issued at least
  two
  non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to Articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of
  ten
  years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this Article. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   A gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, where the Commission has issued at least
  three
  non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to Articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of
  five
  years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this Article.

3.   A gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, where the Commission has issued at least
  two
  non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to Articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of
  ten
  years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this Article.

Amendment 170

Amendment 170

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 16 — paragraph 4

Article 16 — paragraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.   
  A gatekeeper shall be deemed to have further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under Article 3(1), where its impact on the internal market has further increased, its importance as a gateway for business users to reach end users has further increased or the gatekeeper enjoys a further entrenched and durable position in its operations. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.   
  A gatekeeper shall be deemed to have further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under Article 3(1), where its impact on the internal market has further increased, its importance as a gateway for business users to reach end users has further increased or the gatekeeper enjoys a further entrenched and durable position in its operations.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 171

Amendment 171

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 16 — paragraph 5

Article 16 — paragraph 5

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 5.   The Commission shall communicate its objections to the gatekeeper concerned
  within six
  months from the opening of the investigation. In its objections, the Commission shall explain whether it preliminarily considers that the conditions of paragraph 1 are met and which remedy or remedies it
  preliminarily
  considers necessary
  and proportionate
  . | 5.   The Commission shall communicate its objections to the gatekeeper concerned
  as soon as possible and in any event no later than four
  months from the opening of the investigation. In its objections, the Commission shall explain whether it preliminarily considers that the conditions of paragraph 1 are met and which remedy or remedies it considers
  on a preliminary basis, to be effective and
  necessary. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

5.   The Commission shall communicate its objections to the gatekeeper concerned
  within six
  months from the opening of the investigation. In its objections, the Commission shall explain whether it preliminarily considers that the conditions of paragraph 1 are met and which remedy or remedies it
  preliminarily
  considers necessary
  and proportionate
  .

5.   The Commission shall communicate its objections to the gatekeeper concerned
  as soon as possible and in any event no later than four
  months from the opening of the investigation. In its objections, the Commission shall explain whether it preliminarily considers that the conditions of paragraph 1 are met and which remedy or remedies it considers
  on a preliminary basis, to be effective and
  necessary.

Amendment 172

Amendment 172

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 16 — paragraph 6

Article 16 — paragraph 6

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 6.   
  The Commission may at any time during
  the market investigation extend its duration where
  the
  extension is justified on objective grounds and proportionate. The extension may apply to the deadline by which the Commission has to issue its objections, or to the deadline for adoption of the final decision. The total duration of any extension or extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed six
  months.The Commission may consider commitments pursuant to Article 23 and make them binding in its decision
  . | 6.   
  In the course of
  the market investigation
  , the Commission may
  extend its duration where
  such
  extension is justified on objective grounds and proportionate. The extension may apply to the deadline by which the Commission has to issue its objections, or to the deadline for adoption of the final decision. The total duration of any extension or extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed six
  months
  . |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

6.   
  The Commission may at any time during
  the market investigation extend its duration where
  the
  extension is justified on objective grounds and proportionate. The extension may apply to the deadline by which the Commission has to issue its objections, or to the deadline for adoption of the final decision. The total duration of any extension or extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed six
  months.The Commission may consider commitments pursuant to Article 23 and make them binding in its decision
  .

6.   
  In the course of
  the market investigation
  , the Commission may
  extend its duration where
  such
  extension is justified on objective grounds and proportionate. The extension may apply to the deadline by which the Commission has to issue its objections, or to the deadline for adoption of the final decision. The total duration of any extension or extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed six
  months
  .

Amendment 173

Amendment 173

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 16 — paragraph 6 a (new)

Article 16 — paragraph 6 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 6a.
     
  In order to ensure effective compliance by the gatekeeper with its obligations laid down in Articles 5 or 6, the Commission shall regularly review the remedies that it imposes in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. The Commission shall be entitled to modify those remedies if, following an investigation, it finds that they are not effective. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

6a.
     
  In order to ensure effective compliance by the gatekeeper with its obligations laid down in Articles 5 or 6, the Commission shall regularly review the remedies that it imposes in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. The Commission shall be entitled to modify those remedies if, following an investigation, it finds that they are not effective.

Amendment 174

Amendment 174

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 17 — paragraph 1

Article 17 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The Commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this Regulation. It shall issue a public report at the latest within
  24
  months from the opening of the market investigation. | The Commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this Regulation. It shall issue a public report at the latest within
  18
  months from the opening of the market investigation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The Commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this Regulation. It shall issue a public report at the latest within
  24
  months from the opening of the market investigation.

24

The Commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this Regulation. It shall issue a public report at the latest within
  18
  months from the opening of the market investigation.

18

Amendment 175

Amendment 175

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 17 — paragraph 2 — point b a (new)

Article 17 — paragraph 2 — point b a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ba) | The Commission shall be entitled to impose interim measures if there is a risk of serious and immediate damage for business users or end users of gatekeepers. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ba)

(ba)

The Commission shall be entitled to impose interim measures if there is a risk of serious and immediate damage for business users or end users of gatekeepers.

The Commission shall be entitled to impose interim measures if there is a risk of serious and immediate damage for business users or end users of gatekeepers.

Amendment 176

Amendment 176

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 19 — paragraph 1

Article 19 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   The Commission may by simple request or by decision require information from undertakings and associations of undertakings to provide all necessary information, including for the purpose of monitoring, implementing and enforcing the rules laid down in this Regulation. The Commission may also request access to data bases
  and
  algorithms of undertakings and request explanations on those by a simple request or by a decision. | 1.   The Commission may by simple request or by decision require information from undertakings and associations of undertakings to provide all necessary information, including for the purpose of monitoring, implementing and enforcing the rules laid down in this Regulation. The Commission may also request access to data bases, algorithms of undertakings
  and information about testings
  and request explanations on those by a simple request or by a decision. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   The Commission may by simple request or by decision require information from undertakings and associations of undertakings to provide all necessary information, including for the purpose of monitoring, implementing and enforcing the rules laid down in this Regulation. The Commission may also request access to data bases
  and
  algorithms of undertakings and request explanations on those by a simple request or by a decision.

1.   The Commission may by simple request or by decision require information from undertakings and associations of undertakings to provide all necessary information, including for the purpose of monitoring, implementing and enforcing the rules laid down in this Regulation. The Commission may also request access to data bases, algorithms of undertakings
  and information about testings
  and request explanations on those by a simple request or by a decision.

Amendment 177

Amendment 177

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 19 — paragraph 2

Article 19 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   The Commission may request information from undertakings and associations of undertakings pursuant to paragraph 1 also prior to opening a market investigation pursuant to Article 14
  or proceedings pursuant to Article 18
  . | 2.   The Commission may request information from undertakings and associations of undertakings pursuant to paragraph 1 also prior to opening a market investigation pursuant to Article 14. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   The Commission may request information from undertakings and associations of undertakings pursuant to paragraph 1 also prior to opening a market investigation pursuant to Article 14
  or proceedings pursuant to Article 18
  .

2.   The Commission may request information from undertakings and associations of undertakings pursuant to paragraph 1 also prior to opening a market investigation pursuant to Article 14.

Amendment 178

Amendment 178

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 19 — paragraph 4

Article 19 — paragraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.   Where the Commission requires undertakings and associations of undertakings to supply information by decision, it shall state the purpose of the request, specify what information is required and fix the time-limit within which it is to be provided. Where the Commission requires undertakings to provide access to its data-bases and algorithms, it shall state the
  legal basis and the
  purpose of the request, and fix the time-limit within which it is to be provided. It shall also indicate the penalties provided for in Article 26 and indicate or impose the periodic penalty payments provided for in Article 27. It shall further indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice. | 4.   Where the Commission requires undertakings and associations of undertakings to supply information by decision, it shall state the purpose of the request, specify what information is required and fix the time-limit within which it is to be provided. Where the Commission requires undertakings to provide access to its data-bases and algorithms, it shall state the purpose of the request,
  specify what information is required
  and fix the time-limit within which it is to be provided. It shall also indicate the penalties provided for in Article 26 and indicate or impose the periodic penalty payments provided for in Article 27. It shall further indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.   Where the Commission requires undertakings and associations of undertakings to supply information by decision, it shall state the purpose of the request, specify what information is required and fix the time-limit within which it is to be provided. Where the Commission requires undertakings to provide access to its data-bases and algorithms, it shall state the
  legal basis and the
  purpose of the request, and fix the time-limit within which it is to be provided. It shall also indicate the penalties provided for in Article 26 and indicate or impose the periodic penalty payments provided for in Article 27. It shall further indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice.

4.   Where the Commission requires undertakings and associations of undertakings to supply information by decision, it shall state the purpose of the request, specify what information is required and fix the time-limit within which it is to be provided. Where the Commission requires undertakings to provide access to its data-bases and algorithms, it shall state the purpose of the request,
  specify what information is required
  and fix the time-limit within which it is to be provided. It shall also indicate the penalties provided for in Article 26 and indicate or impose the periodic penalty payments provided for in Article 27. It shall further indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice.

Amendment 179

Amendment 179

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 20 — paragraph 1

Article 20 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The Commission may interview any natural or legal person which consents to being interviewed for the purpose of collecting information, relating to the subject-matter of an investigation, including in relation to the monitoring, implementing and enforcing of the rules laid down in this Regulation. | The Commission
  , and the national competent authorities in accordance with Article 31c,
  may interview any natural or legal person which consents to being interviewed for the purpose of collecting information, relating to the subject-matter of an investigation, including in relation to the monitoring, implementing and enforcing of the rules laid down in this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

The Commission may interview any natural or legal person which consents to being interviewed for the purpose of collecting information, relating to the subject-matter of an investigation, including in relation to the monitoring, implementing and enforcing of the rules laid down in this Regulation.

The Commission
  , and the national competent authorities in accordance with Article 31c,
  may interview any natural or legal person which consents to being interviewed for the purpose of collecting information, relating to the subject-matter of an investigation, including in relation to the monitoring, implementing and enforcing of the rules laid down in this Regulation.

, and the national competent authorities in accordance with Article 31c,

Amendment 180

Amendment 180

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 21 — paragraph 2

Article 21 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   On-site inspections may also be carried out with the assistance of auditors or experts appointed by the Commission pursuant to Article 24(2). | 2.   On-site inspections may also be carried out with the assistance of
  rotating
  auditors or experts appointed by the Commission pursuant to Article 24(2). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   On-site inspections may also be carried out with the assistance of auditors or experts appointed by the Commission pursuant to Article 24(2).

2.   On-site inspections may also be carried out with the assistance of
  rotating
  auditors or experts appointed by the Commission pursuant to Article 24(2).

Amendment 181

Amendment 181

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 22 — paragraph 1

Article 22 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   In
  case
  of urgency due to the risk of serious and
  irreparable
  damage for business users or end users of gatekeepers, the Commission may, by decision adopt in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), order interim measures
  against
  a gatekeeper on the basis of a prima facie finding of an infringement of Articles 5 or 6. | 1.   In
  cases
  of urgency due to the risk of serious and
  immediate
  damage for business users or end users of gatekeepers, the Commission may, by decision adopt in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), order interim measures
  on
  a gatekeeper on the basis of a prima facie finding of an infringement of Articles 5 or 6. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   In
  case
  of urgency due to the risk of serious and
  irreparable
  damage for business users or end users of gatekeepers, the Commission may, by decision adopt in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), order interim measures
  against
  a gatekeeper on the basis of a prima facie finding of an infringement of Articles 5 or 6.

1.   In
  cases
  of urgency due to the risk of serious and
  immediate
  damage for business users or end users of gatekeepers, the Commission may, by decision adopt in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4), order interim measures
  on
  a gatekeeper on the basis of a prima facie finding of an infringement of Articles 5 or 6.

Amendment 182

Amendment 182

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 22 — paragraph 2

Article 22 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   A decision pursuant to paragraph 1
  may
  only be adopted in the context of proceedings opened
  in view of
  the possible adoption of a decision of non-compliance pursuant to Article 25(1).
  This
  decision shall apply for a specified period of time and may be renewed in so far this is necessary and appropriate. | 2.   A decision pursuant to paragraph 1
  shall
  only be adopted in the context of proceedings opened
  with a view to
  the possible adoption of a decision of non-compliance pursuant to Article 25(1).
  That
  decision shall apply for a specified period of time and may be renewed in so far this is necessary and appropriate. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   A decision pursuant to paragraph 1
  may
  only be adopted in the context of proceedings opened
  in view of
  the possible adoption of a decision of non-compliance pursuant to Article 25(1).
  This
  decision shall apply for a specified period of time and may be renewed in so far this is necessary and appropriate.

2.   A decision pursuant to paragraph 1
  shall
  only be adopted in the context of proceedings opened
  with a view to
  the possible adoption of a decision of non-compliance pursuant to Article 25(1).
  That
  decision shall apply for a specified period of time and may be renewed in so far this is necessary and appropriate.

Amendment 183

Amendment 183

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 22 — paragraph 2 a (new)

Article 22 — paragraph 2 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 2a.
     
  In cases of urgency due to the risk of serious and immediate damage to business users or end users of gatekeepers, resulting from new practices implemented by one or more gatekeepers that could undermine contestability of core platform services or that could be unfair pursuant to Article 10(2), the Commission may impose interim measures on the gatekeepers concerned in order to prevent such a risk materialising. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2a.
     
  In cases of urgency due to the risk of serious and immediate damage to business users or end users of gatekeepers, resulting from new practices implemented by one or more gatekeepers that could undermine contestability of core platform services or that could be unfair pursuant to Article 10(2), the Commission may impose interim measures on the gatekeepers concerned in order to prevent such a risk materialising.

Amendment 184

Amendment 184

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 22 — paragraph 2 b (new)

Article 22 — paragraph 2 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 2b.
     
  A decision referred to in paragraph 2a of this Article shall only be adopted in the context of a market investigation pursuant to Article 17 and within 6 months of the opening of such an investigation. The interim measures shall apply for a specified period of time and, in any case, shall be renewed or withdrawn in order to take account of the final decision resulting from the market investigation pursuant to Article 17. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2b.
     
  A decision referred to in paragraph 2a of this Article shall only be adopted in the context of a market investigation pursuant to Article 17 and within 6 months of the opening of such an investigation. The interim measures shall apply for a specified period of time and, in any case, shall be renewed or withdrawn in order to take account of the final decision resulting from the market investigation pursuant to Article 17.

Amendment 185

Amendment 185

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 23

Article 23

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Article 23 | deleted |
| Commitments | |
| 1.
     
  If during proceedings under Articles 16 or 25 the gatekeeper concerned offers commitments for the relevant core platform services to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, the Commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) make those commitments binding on that gatekeeper and declare that there are no further grounds for action. | |
| 2.
     
  The Commission may, upon request or on its own initiative, reopen by decision the relevant proceedings, where: | |
| (a) | there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 23

Article 23

deleted

deleted

Commitments

Commitments

1.
     
  If during proceedings under Articles 16 or 25 the gatekeeper concerned offers commitments for the relevant core platform services to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, the Commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) make those commitments binding on that gatekeeper and declare that there are no further grounds for action.

2.
     
  The Commission may, upon request or on its own initiative, reopen by decision the relevant proceedings, where:

(a)

(a)

there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based;

there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based;

| (b) | the gatekeeper concerned acts contrary to its commitments; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

the gatekeeper concerned acts contrary to its commitments;

the gatekeeper concerned acts contrary to its commitments;

| (c) | the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the parties. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

(c)

the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the parties.

the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the parties.

3.
     
  Should the Commission consider that the commitments submitted by the gatekeeper concerned cannot ensure effective compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6, it shall explain the reasons for not making those commitments binding in the decision concluding the relevant proceedings.

Amendment 186

Amendment 186

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 24 — paragraph 1

Article 24 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   The Commission
  may
  take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 and the decisions taken pursuant to Articles 7, 16, 22 and 23. | 1.   The Commission
  shall
  take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 and the decisions taken pursuant to Articles 7, 16, 22 and 23. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   The Commission
  may
  take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 and the decisions taken pursuant to Articles 7, 16, 22 and 23.

1.   The Commission
  shall
  take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5 and 6 and the decisions taken pursuant to Articles 7, 16, 22 and 23.

Amendment 187

Amendment 187

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 24 a (new)

Article 24 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 24a




  Complaint mechanism





  1.
     
  Business users, competitors, end-users of the core platform services as well as their representatives or other person with a legitimate interest may complain to the competent national authorities about any practice or behaviour by gatekeepers that falls into the scope of this Regulation, including non-compliance.




  The competent national authorities shall assess such complaints and shall report them to the Commission.




  The Commission shall examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open proceedings pursuant to Article 18 or a market investigation pursuant to Article 14.






  2.
     
  Directive (EU) 2019/1937 shall apply to the complaints and the reporting of breaches of this Regulation and the protection of persons reporting such breaches. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 24a

Complaint mechanism

1.
     
  Business users, competitors, end-users of the core platform services as well as their representatives or other person with a legitimate interest may complain to the competent national authorities about any practice or behaviour by gatekeepers that falls into the scope of this Regulation, including non-compliance.

The competent national authorities shall assess such complaints and shall report them to the Commission.

The Commission shall examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open proceedings pursuant to Article 18 or a market investigation pursuant to Article 14.

2.
     
  Directive (EU) 2019/1937 shall apply to the complaints and the reporting of breaches of this Regulation and the protection of persons reporting such breaches.

Amendment 188

Amendment 188

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 24 b (new)

Article 24 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 24b |
| | Compliance function |
| | 1.
     
  Gatekeepers shall establish a compliance function, which is independent from the operational functions of the gatekeeper and appoint one or more compliance officers, including the head of the compliance function. |
| | 2.
     
  The gatekeeper shall ensure that compliance function pursuant to paragraph 1 has sufficient authority, stature and resources, as well as access to the management body of the gatekeeper to monitor the compliance of the gatekeeper with this Regulation. |
| | 3.
     
  Gatekeeper shall ensure that compliance officers appointed pursuant to paragraph 1 have the professional qualifications, knowledge, experience and ability necessary to fulfil the tasks referred to in paragraph 4. |
| | Gatekeeper shall also ensure that the head of the compliance function appointed pursuant to paragraph 1 is a senior manager with distinct responsibility for the compliance function and shall be independent from the operational functions and management body of the gatekeeper. |
| | 4.
     
  The head of the compliance function shall report directly to the management body of the gatekeeper and shall have the powers to raise concerns and warn that body where risks of non-compliance with this Regulation arise, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the management body in its supervisory and managerial functions. |
| | The head of the compliance function shall not be removed without prior approval of the management body of the gatekeeper. |
| | 5.
     
  Compliance officers appointed by the gatekeeper pursuant to paragraph 1 shall oversee compliance of the gatekeeper with the obligations in this Regulation, including at least the following tasks: |
| | (a) | organising, monitoring and supervising the measures and activities of the gatekeepers that aim to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in this Regulation; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 24b

Article 24b

Compliance function

Compliance function

1.
     
  Gatekeepers shall establish a compliance function, which is independent from the operational functions of the gatekeeper and appoint one or more compliance officers, including the head of the compliance function.

2.
     
  The gatekeeper shall ensure that compliance function pursuant to paragraph 1 has sufficient authority, stature and resources, as well as access to the management body of the gatekeeper to monitor the compliance of the gatekeeper with this Regulation.

3.
     
  Gatekeeper shall ensure that compliance officers appointed pursuant to paragraph 1 have the professional qualifications, knowledge, experience and ability necessary to fulfil the tasks referred to in paragraph 4.

Gatekeeper shall also ensure that the head of the compliance function appointed pursuant to paragraph 1 is a senior manager with distinct responsibility for the compliance function and shall be independent from the operational functions and management body of the gatekeeper.

Gatekeeper shall also ensure that the head of the compliance function appointed pursuant to paragraph 1 is a senior manager with distinct responsibility for the compliance function and shall be independent from the operational functions and management body of the gatekeeper.

4.
     
  The head of the compliance function shall report directly to the management body of the gatekeeper and shall have the powers to raise concerns and warn that body where risks of non-compliance with this Regulation arise, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the management body in its supervisory and managerial functions.

The head of the compliance function shall not be removed without prior approval of the management body of the gatekeeper.

The head of the compliance function shall not be removed without prior approval of the management body of the gatekeeper.

5.
     
  Compliance officers appointed by the gatekeeper pursuant to paragraph 1 shall oversee compliance of the gatekeeper with the obligations in this Regulation, including at least the following tasks:

(a)

(a)

organising, monitoring and supervising the measures and activities of the gatekeepers that aim to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in this Regulation;

organising, monitoring and supervising the measures and activities of the gatekeepers that aim to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in this Regulation;

| (b) | informing and advising the management and employees of the gatekeeper about relevant obligations under this Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

informing and advising the management and employees of the gatekeeper about relevant obligations under this Regulation;

informing and advising the management and employees of the gatekeeper about relevant obligations under this Regulation;

| (c) | where applicable, monitoring compliance with commitments made binding pursuant to Article 23, without prejudice to the Commission being able to appoint independent external experts pursuant to Article 24(2). |
| --- | --- |

(c)

(c)

where applicable, monitoring compliance with commitments made binding pursuant to Article 23, without prejudice to the Commission being able to appoint independent external experts pursuant to Article 24(2).

where applicable, monitoring compliance with commitments made binding pursuant to Article 23, without prejudice to the Commission being able to appoint independent external experts pursuant to Article 24(2).

| (d) | cooperating with the Commission for the purpose of this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

(d)

cooperating with the Commission for the purpose of this Regulation.

cooperating with the Commission for the purpose of this Regulation.

6.
     
  Gatekeepers shall communicate the name and contact details of the head of the compliance function to the Commission.

7.
     
  The management body of the gatekeeper shall define, oversee and be accountable for the implementation of the governance arrangements of the gatekeeper that ensure independence of the compliance function, including the segregation of duties in the organisation of the gatekeeper and the prevention of conflicts of interest.

Amendment 189

Amendment 189

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 25 — paragraph 1 — point e

Article 25 — paragraph 1 — point e

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (e) | commitments made legally binding pursuant to Article 23. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(e)

(e)

commitments made legally binding pursuant to Article 23.

commitments made legally binding pursuant to Article 23.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 190

Amendment 190

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 25 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 25 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1a.
     
  The Commission shall adopt its decision within 12 months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1a.
     
  The Commission shall adopt its decision within 12 months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to Article 18.

Amendment 191

Amendment 191

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 25 — paragraph 2

Article 25 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   Before adopting the decision pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the gatekeeper concerned. In
  the
  preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain the measures it
  considers to take or
  it considers that the gatekeeper should take in order to effectively address the preliminary findings. | 2.   Before adopting the decision pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the gatekeeper concerned. In
  those
  preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain the measures it
  is considering taking or that
  it considers that the gatekeeper should take in order to effectively address the preliminary findings. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   Before adopting the decision pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the gatekeeper concerned. In
  the
  preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain the measures it
  considers to take or
  it considers that the gatekeeper should take in order to effectively address the preliminary findings.

2.   Before adopting the decision pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the gatekeeper concerned. In
  those
  preliminary findings, the Commission shall explain the measures it
  is considering taking or that
  it considers that the gatekeeper should take in order to effectively address the preliminary findings.

Amendment 192

Amendment 192

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 25 — paragraph 4

Article 25 — paragraph 4

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 4.   The gatekeeper shall provide the Commission with the description of the measures
  it took
  to ensure compliance with the decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1. | 4.   The gatekeeper shall provide the Commission with the description of the measures
  that it has taken
  to ensure compliance with the decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4.   The gatekeeper shall provide the Commission with the description of the measures
  it took
  to ensure compliance with the decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1.

4.   The gatekeeper shall provide the Commission with the description of the measures
  that it has taken
  to ensure compliance with the decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1.

Amendment 193

Amendment 193

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 26 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

Article 26 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   In the decision pursuant to Article 25, the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding
  10 %
  of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper, intentionally or negligently, fails to comply with: | 1.   In the decision pursuant to Article 25, the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not
  less than 4 % and not
  exceeding
  20 %
  of its total
  worldwide
  turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper, intentionally or negligently, fails to comply with: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   In the decision pursuant to Article 25, the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding
  10 %
  of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper, intentionally or negligently, fails to comply with:

1.   In the decision pursuant to Article 25, the Commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not
  less than 4 % and not
  exceeding
  20 %
  of its total
  worldwide
  turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper, intentionally or negligently, fails to comply with:

Amendment 194

Amendment 194

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 26 — paragraph 1 — point a a (new)

Article 26 — paragraph 1 — point a a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (aa) | the obligation to notify information that is required pursuant to Article 12; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(aa)

(aa)

the obligation to notify information that is required pursuant to Article 12;

the obligation to notify information that is required pursuant to Article 12;

Amendment 195

Amendment 195

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 26 — paragraph 1 — point a b (new)

Article 26 — paragraph 1 — point a b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ab) | the obligation to notify information that is required pursuant to Article 13 or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ab)

(ab)

the obligation to notify information that is required pursuant to Article 13 or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information;

the obligation to notify information that is required pursuant to Article 13 or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information;

Amendment 196

Amendment 196

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 26 — paragraph 1 — point e

Article 26 — paragraph 1 — point e

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (e) | a commitment made binding by a decision pursuant to Article 23. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(e)

(e)

a commitment made binding by a decision pursuant to Article 23.

a commitment made binding by a decision pursuant to Article 23.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 197

Amendment 197

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 26 — paragraph 2 — point b

Article 26 — paragraph 2 — point b

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (b) | fail to notify information that is required pursuant to Article 12 or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(b)

(b)

fail to notify information that is required pursuant to Article 12 or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information;

fail to notify information that is required pursuant to Article 12 or supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information;

deleted

deleted

Amendment 198

Amendment 198

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 26 — paragraph 2 — point c

Article 26 — paragraph 2 — point c

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | fail to submit the description that is required pursuant to Article 13; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(c)

(c)

fail to submit the description that is required pursuant to Article 13;

fail to submit the description that is required pursuant to Article 13;

deleted

deleted

Amendment 199

Amendment 199

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 27 — paragraph 2

Article 27 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   Where the undertakings have satisfied the obligation which the periodic penalty payment was intended to enforce, the Commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) set the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment
  at a figure lower than that which would arise under the original decision
  . | 2.   Where the undertakings have satisfied the obligation which the periodic penalty payment was intended to enforce, the Commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) set the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   Where the undertakings have satisfied the obligation which the periodic penalty payment was intended to enforce, the Commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) set the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment
  at a figure lower than that which would arise under the original decision
  .

2.   Where the undertakings have satisfied the obligation which the periodic penalty payment was intended to enforce, the Commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4) set the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment.

Amendment 200

Amendment 200

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 28 — paragraph 1

Article 28 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   The powers conferred on the Commission by Articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a 
  three
  year limitation period. | 1.   The powers conferred on the Commission by Articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a 
  five
  year limitation period. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   The powers conferred on the Commission by Articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a 
  three
  year limitation period.

1.   The powers conferred on the Commission by Articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a 
  five
  year limitation period.

Amendment 201

Amendment 201

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 30 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

Article 30 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   Before adopting a decision pursuant to Article 7, Article 8(1), Article 9(1), Articles 15, 16, 22, 23, 25 and 26 and Article 27(2), the Commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned the opportunity of being heard on: | 1.   Before adopting a decision pursuant to Article 7, Article 8(1), Article 9(1), Articles 15, 16, 22, 23, 25 and 26 and Article 27(2), the Commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned
  including third parties with a legitimate interest,
  the opportunity of being heard on: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   Before adopting a decision pursuant to Article 7, Article 8(1), Article 9(1), Articles 15, 16, 22, 23, 25 and 26 and Article 27(2), the Commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned the opportunity of being heard on:

1.   Before adopting a decision pursuant to Article 7, Article 8(1), Article 9(1), Articles 15, 16, 22, 23, 25 and 26 and Article 27(2), the Commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned
  including third parties with a legitimate interest,
  the opportunity of being heard on:

Amendment 202

Amendment 202

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 30 — paragraph 2

Article 30 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   Gatekeepers, undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned may submit their observations to the Commission’s preliminary findings within a time limit which shall be fixed by the Commission in its preliminary findings and which may not be less than 14 days. | 2.   Gatekeepers, undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned
  including third parties with a legitimate interest
  may submit their observations to the Commission’s preliminary findings within a time limit which shall be fixed by the Commission in its preliminary findings and which may not be less than 14 days. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   Gatekeepers, undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned may submit their observations to the Commission’s preliminary findings within a time limit which shall be fixed by the Commission in its preliminary findings and which may not be less than 14 days.

2.   Gatekeepers, undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned
  including third parties with a legitimate interest
  may submit their observations to the Commission’s preliminary findings within a time limit which shall be fixed by the Commission in its preliminary findings and which may not be less than 14 days.

Amendment 203

Amendment 203

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 30 — paragraph 3

Article 30 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   The Commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which gatekeepers, undertakings
  and
  associations of undertakings concerned have been able to comment. | 3.   The Commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which gatekeepers, undertakings, associations of undertakings concerned
  and third parties with a legitimate interest
  have been able to comment. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   The Commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which gatekeepers, undertakings
  and
  associations of undertakings concerned have been able to comment.

3.   The Commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which gatekeepers, undertakings, associations of undertakings concerned
  and third parties with a legitimate interest
  have been able to comment.

Amendment 233

Amendment 233

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 30 a (new)

Article 30 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 30a |
| | Accountability |
| | 1.
     
  The Commission shall adopt an annual report on the state of the digital economy. This report shall provide an analysis of the market position, influence and business models of the gatekeepers in the common market. The report shall include a summary of its activities, in particular supervisory measures adopted under Chapter II and IV of this Regulation as well as an assessment on whether competition rules, the provisions of this Regulation (and Regulation XX/2021 DSA) and current enforcement levels are adequate to address anticompetitive conduct and ensure the contestability and fairness of digital markets. This annual report shall also include an assessment of the audit reports foreseen in Article 13 and a social impact assessment, which assesses new digital products and services and their potential impact on mental health, user behaviour, disinformation, polarisation and democracy. In the fulfilment of this mandate, the Commission shall coordinate its supervisory and monitoring efforts with those foreseen under the Digital Services Act, so as to achieve the best possible synergies. |
| | 2.
     
  The European Parliament through its competent committees may provide an opinion on an annual basis on the report by the Commission including proposals for market investigations into new services and new practices under Article 17. |
| | 3.
     
  The Commission shall reply in writing to the opinion adopted by the European Parliament as well as respond to any call for action concerning Article 17 therein, including providing justifications for foreseen inaction, and to any question addressed to it by the European Parliament or by the Council within five weeks of its receipt. |
| | 4.
     
  At the request of the European Parliament, the Commission shall participate in a hearing before the European Parliament. A hearing shall take place at least bi-annually. The respective Commissioner shall make a statement before the European Parliament and answer any questions from its members, whenever so requested. In addition, a continuous, high-level dialogue between the European Parliament and the Commission shall be ensured through exchanges, which take place no less than four times a year. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 30a

Article 30a

Accountability

Accountability

1.
     
  The Commission shall adopt an annual report on the state of the digital economy. This report shall provide an analysis of the market position, influence and business models of the gatekeepers in the common market. The report shall include a summary of its activities, in particular supervisory measures adopted under Chapter II and IV of this Regulation as well as an assessment on whether competition rules, the provisions of this Regulation (and Regulation XX/2021 DSA) and current enforcement levels are adequate to address anticompetitive conduct and ensure the contestability and fairness of digital markets. This annual report shall also include an assessment of the audit reports foreseen in Article 13 and a social impact assessment, which assesses new digital products and services and their potential impact on mental health, user behaviour, disinformation, polarisation and democracy. In the fulfilment of this mandate, the Commission shall coordinate its supervisory and monitoring efforts with those foreseen under the Digital Services Act, so as to achieve the best possible synergies.

2.
     
  The European Parliament through its competent committees may provide an opinion on an annual basis on the report by the Commission including proposals for market investigations into new services and new practices under Article 17.

3.
     
  The Commission shall reply in writing to the opinion adopted by the European Parliament as well as respond to any call for action concerning Article 17 therein, including providing justifications for foreseen inaction, and to any question addressed to it by the European Parliament or by the Council within five weeks of its receipt.

4.
     
  At the request of the European Parliament, the Commission shall participate in a hearing before the European Parliament. A hearing shall take place at least bi-annually. The respective Commissioner shall make a statement before the European Parliament and answer any questions from its members, whenever so requested. In addition, a continuous, high-level dialogue between the European Parliament and the Commission shall be ensured through exchanges, which take place no less than four times a year.

Amendment 204

Amendment 204

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 31 — paragraph 1

Article 31 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   The information collected pursuant to Articles 3,
  12, 13,
  19, 20
  and 21
  shall be used only for the purposes of this Regulation. | 1.   The information collected pursuant to Articles 3, 19, 20
  , 21 and 31d
  shall be used only for the purposes of this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   The information collected pursuant to Articles 3,
  12, 13,
  19, 20
  and 21
  shall be used only for the purposes of this Regulation.

1.   The information collected pursuant to Articles 3, 19, 20
  , 21 and 31d
  shall be used only for the purposes of this Regulation.

Amendment 205

Amendment 205

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 31 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 31 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1a.
     
  The information collected pursuant to Article 12 shall be used only for the purposes of this Regulation and Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1a.
     
  The information collected pursuant to Article 12 shall be used only for the purposes of this Regulation and Regulation (EC) No 139/2004.

Amendment 206

Amendment 206

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 31 — paragraph 1 b (new)

Article 31 — paragraph 1 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1b.
     
  The information collected pursuant to Article 13 shall be used only for the purposes of this Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2016/679. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1b.
     
  The information collected pursuant to Article 13 shall be used only for the purposes of this Regulation and Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

Amendment 207

Amendment 207

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 31 — paragraph 2

Article 31 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   Without prejudice to the exchange and to the use of information provided for the purpose of use pursuant to Articles 32 and 33, the Commission, the authorities of the Member States, their officials, servants and other persons working under the supervision of these authorities and any natural or legal person, including auditors and experts appointed pursuant to Article 24(2), shall not disclose information acquired or exchanged by them pursuant to this Regulation and of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. This obligation shall also apply to all representatives and experts of Member States participating in any of the activities of the Digital Markets Advisory Committee pursuant to Article 32. | 2.   Without prejudice to the exchange and to the use of information provided for the purpose of use pursuant to Articles
  12, 13, 31d,
  32 and 33, the Commission, the authorities of the Member States, their officials, servants and other persons working under the supervision of these authorities and any natural or legal person, including auditors and experts appointed pursuant to Article 24(2), shall not disclose information acquired or exchanged by them pursuant to this Regulation and of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. This obligation shall also apply to all representatives and experts of Member States participating in any of the activities of the Digital Markets Advisory Committee pursuant to Article 32. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   Without prejudice to the exchange and to the use of information provided for the purpose of use pursuant to Articles 32 and 33, the Commission, the authorities of the Member States, their officials, servants and other persons working under the supervision of these authorities and any natural or legal person, including auditors and experts appointed pursuant to Article 24(2), shall not disclose information acquired or exchanged by them pursuant to this Regulation and of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. This obligation shall also apply to all representatives and experts of Member States participating in any of the activities of the Digital Markets Advisory Committee pursuant to Article 32.

2.   Without prejudice to the exchange and to the use of information provided for the purpose of use pursuant to Articles
  12, 13, 31d,
  32 and 33, the Commission, the authorities of the Member States, their officials, servants and other persons working under the supervision of these authorities and any natural or legal person, including auditors and experts appointed pursuant to Article 24(2), shall not disclose information acquired or exchanged by them pursuant to this Regulation and of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. This obligation shall also apply to all representatives and experts of Member States participating in any of the activities of the Digital Markets Advisory Committee pursuant to Article 32.

Amendment 208

Amendment 208

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 31 a (new)

Article 31 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 31a




  European High-Level Group of Digital Regulators





  1.
     
  The Commission shall establish a European High-Level Group of Digital Regulators (the ‘Group’) in the form of an expert group, consisting of a representative of the Commission, a representative of relevant Union bodies, representatives of national competition authorities and representatives of other national competent authorities in specific sectors including data protection, electronic communications and consumer protection authorities.






  2.
     
  For the purposes of paragraph 1, the relevant national competent authorities shall be represented in the group by their respective heads. In order to facilitate the work of the Group, the Commission shall provide it with a secretariat.






  3.
     
  The work of the Group may be organised into expert working groups building cross-regulator specialist teams that provide the Commission with high level of expertise. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 31a

European High-Level Group of Digital Regulators

1.
     
  The Commission shall establish a European High-Level Group of Digital Regulators (the ‘Group’) in the form of an expert group, consisting of a representative of the Commission, a representative of relevant Union bodies, representatives of national competition authorities and representatives of other national competent authorities in specific sectors including data protection, electronic communications and consumer protection authorities.

2.
     
  For the purposes of paragraph 1, the relevant national competent authorities shall be represented in the group by their respective heads. In order to facilitate the work of the Group, the Commission shall provide it with a secretariat.

3.
     
  The work of the Group may be organised into expert working groups building cross-regulator specialist teams that provide the Commission with high level of expertise.

Amendment 209

Amendment 209

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 31 b (new)

Article 31 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 31b |
| | Tasks of the European High-Level Group of Digital Regulators |
| | 1.
     
  The Group shall assist the Commission in ensuring the consistent application of this Regulation and monitoring its compliance by means of advice, expertise and recommendations. To that end, the Group shall have the following tasks: |
| | (a) | to consider matters related to cooperation and coordination between the Commission and Member States in their enforcement actions by promoting the exchange of information and best practices about their work and decision-making principles and practices with the aim of developing a consistent regulatory approach; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 31b

Article 31b

Tasks of the European High-Level Group of Digital Regulators

Tasks of the European High-Level Group of Digital Regulators

1.
     
  The Group shall assist the Commission in ensuring the consistent application of this Regulation and monitoring its compliance by means of advice, expertise and recommendations. To that end, the Group shall have the following tasks:

(a)

(a)

to consider matters related to cooperation and coordination between the Commission and Member States in their enforcement actions by promoting the exchange of information and best practices about their work and decision-making principles and practices with the aim of developing a consistent regulatory approach;

to consider matters related to cooperation and coordination between the Commission and Member States in their enforcement actions by promoting the exchange of information and best practices about their work and decision-making principles and practices with the aim of developing a consistent regulatory approach;

| (b) | to make recommendations to the Commission on the need to conduct market investigations under Articles 14, 15, 16 and 17; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

to make recommendations to the Commission on the need to conduct market investigations under Articles 14, 15, 16 and 17;

to make recommendations to the Commission on the need to conduct market investigations under Articles 14, 15, 16 and 17;

| (c) | to make recommendations to the Commission on the need to update the obligations of the Regulation under Articles 5 and 6; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

(c)

to make recommendations to the Commission on the need to update the obligations of the Regulation under Articles 5 and 6;

to make recommendations to the Commission on the need to update the obligations of the Regulation under Articles 5 and 6;

| (d) | to provide advice and expertise to the Commission in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives including under Article 38; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

(d)

to provide advice and expertise to the Commission in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives including under Article 38;

to provide advice and expertise to the Commission in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives including under Article 38;

| (e) | to provide advice and expertise to the Commission in the preparation of delegated acts; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

(e)

to provide advice and expertise to the Commission in the preparation of delegated acts;

to provide advice and expertise to the Commission in the preparation of delegated acts;

| (f) | where necessary, to provide advice and expertise in the early preparation of implementing acts, before submission to the committee in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011; and |
| --- | --- |

(f)

(f)

where necessary, to provide advice and expertise in the early preparation of implementing acts, before submission to the committee in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011; and

where necessary, to provide advice and expertise in the early preparation of implementing acts, before submission to the committee in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011; and

| (g) | at the request of the Commission, to provide technical advice and expertise before the adoption of a specification decision under Article 7. |
| --- | --- |

(g)

(g)

at the request of the Commission, to provide technical advice and expertise before the adoption of a specification decision under Article 7.

at the request of the Commission, to provide technical advice and expertise before the adoption of a specification decision under Article 7.

2.
     
  The Group shall report every year on its activities to the European Parliament and offer recommendations and policy suggestions related to the enforcement of this Regulation and other matters contributing to the development of a consistent regulatory approach to the digital single market.

3.
     
  The Group shall establish its rules of procedure in line with Commission expert groups rules established by Commission decision C(2016)3301.

4.
     
  The Group meetings with stakeholders and gatekeepers shall be registered and published on a monthly basis in line with the EU transparency register.

Amendment 210

Amendment 210

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 31 c (new)

Article 31 c (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 31c




  Role of national competition authorities and other competent authorities





  1.
     
  National competition authorities as well as other competent authorities designated by the Member State shall support the Commission in monitoring compliance with and enforcement of the obligations laid down in this Regulation and report regularly to the Commission on compliance with this Regulation.






  2.
     
  National competition authorities as well as other competent authorities may, under the coordination of the Commission, provide support to a market investigation or proceedings pursuant to Article 7(2), 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 by collecting information and providing expertise.






  3.
     
  National competition authorities as well as other competent authorities may collect complaints in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24a. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 31c

Role of national competition authorities and other competent authorities

1.
     
  National competition authorities as well as other competent authorities designated by the Member State shall support the Commission in monitoring compliance with and enforcement of the obligations laid down in this Regulation and report regularly to the Commission on compliance with this Regulation.

2.
     
  National competition authorities as well as other competent authorities may, under the coordination of the Commission, provide support to a market investigation or proceedings pursuant to Article 7(2), 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 by collecting information and providing expertise.

3.
     
  National competition authorities as well as other competent authorities may collect complaints in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24a.

Amendment 211

Amendment 211

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 31 d (new)

Article 31 d (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 31d |
| | Cooperation and coordination with Member States |
| | 1.
     
  The Commission and Member States shall work in close cooperation and coordinate their enforcement actions to ensure coherent, effective and complementary enforcement of this Regulation. |
| | 2.
     
  Where a national authority intends to launch an investigation on gatekeepers based on national laws referred to in Article 1(6), it shall inform the Commission in writing of the first formal investigative measure, before or immediately after the start of such measure. This information may also be made available to the national competition authorities as well as other competent authorities of the other Member States. |
| | 3.
     
  Where a national authority intends to impose obligations on gatekeepers based on national laws referred to in Article 1(6), it shall, no later than 60 days before its adoption, communicate the draft measure to the Commission stating the reasons for the measure. This information may also be made available to the national competition authorities as well as other competent authorities of the other Member States. Where the Commission within those 60 days indicates to the national authority concerned that the draft measure runs counter to this Regulation or to a decision adopted by the Commission under this Regulation or contemplated in proceedings initiated by the Commission, that national authority shall not adopt the measure. |
| | 4.
     
  The Commission and the national competition authorities as well as other competent authorities of the Member States enforcing the rules referred to in Article 1(6) shall have the power to provide one another with any matter of fact or of law, including confidential information. |
| | 5.
     
  The national competition authorities as well as other competent authorities of the Member States enforcing the rules referred to in Article 1(6) may consult the Commission on any matter relating to the application of this Regulation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 31d

Article 31d

Cooperation and coordination with Member States

Cooperation and coordination with Member States

1.
     
  The Commission and Member States shall work in close cooperation and coordinate their enforcement actions to ensure coherent, effective and complementary enforcement of this Regulation.

2.
     
  Where a national authority intends to launch an investigation on gatekeepers based on national laws referred to in Article 1(6), it shall inform the Commission in writing of the first formal investigative measure, before or immediately after the start of such measure. This information may also be made available to the national competition authorities as well as other competent authorities of the other Member States.

3.
     
  Where a national authority intends to impose obligations on gatekeepers based on national laws referred to in Article 1(6), it shall, no later than 60 days before its adoption, communicate the draft measure to the Commission stating the reasons for the measure. This information may also be made available to the national competition authorities as well as other competent authorities of the other Member States. Where the Commission within those 60 days indicates to the national authority concerned that the draft measure runs counter to this Regulation or to a decision adopted by the Commission under this Regulation or contemplated in proceedings initiated by the Commission, that national authority shall not adopt the measure.

4.
     
  The Commission and the national competition authorities as well as other competent authorities of the Member States enforcing the rules referred to in Article 1(6) shall have the power to provide one another with any matter of fact or of law, including confidential information.

5.
     
  The national competition authorities as well as other competent authorities of the Member States enforcing the rules referred to in Article 1(6) may consult the Commission on any matter relating to the application of this Regulation.

Amendment 212

Amendment 212

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 32 — paragraph 1 a (new)

Article 32 — paragraph 1 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 1a.
     
  For meetings in which specific issues are to bediscussed, Member States shall be entitled to appoint an additional representative from an authority with the relevant expertise for those issues. This is without prejudice to the right of members of the Committee to be assisted by other experts from the Member States. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1a.
     
  For meetings in which specific issues are to bediscussed, Member States shall be entitled to appoint an additional representative from an authority with the relevant expertise for those issues. This is without prejudice to the right of members of the Committee to be assisted by other experts from the Member States.

Amendment 213

Amendment 213

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 32 — paragraph 4 a (new)

Article 32 — paragraph 4 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 4a.
     
  Meetings of the Digital Markets Advisory Committee and the Commission with representatives of gatekeepers and other stakeholders shall be registered and published on a monthly basis in line with the EU transparency register. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

4a.
     
  Meetings of the Digital Markets Advisory Committee and the Commission with representatives of gatekeepers and other stakeholders shall be registered and published on a monthly basis in line with the EU transparency register.

Amendment 214

Amendment 214

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 33 — paragraph 1

Article 33 — paragraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   
  When three
  or more
  Member States
  request the Commission to open an investigation pursuant to
  Article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper,
  the Commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. | 1.   
  Two
  or more
  national competition authorities or other competent national authorities may
  request the Commission to open an investigation pursuant to
  Articles 15, 16, 17 or 25. Competent authority (ies) shall submit evidence in support of their request.
  The Commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.
  Where the Commission considers that there are insufficient grounds for initiating proceedings, it may reject such request and inform the respective competent authority (ies) of its reasons. The Commission shall publish the results of its assessment. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   
  When three
  or more
  Member States
  request the Commission to open an investigation pursuant to
  Article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper,
  the Commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.

1.   
  Two
  or more
  national competition authorities or other competent national authorities may
  request the Commission to open an investigation pursuant to
  Articles 15, 16, 17 or 25. Competent authority (ies) shall submit evidence in support of their request.
  The Commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.
  Where the Commission considers that there are insufficient grounds for initiating proceedings, it may reject such request and inform the respective competent authority (ies) of its reasons. The Commission shall publish the results of its assessment.

Amendment 215

Amendment 215

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 33 — paragraph 2

Article 33 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.
     
  Member States shall submit evidence in support of their request. | deleted |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.
     
  Member States shall submit evidence in support of their request.

deleted

deleted

Amendment 216

Amendment 216

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 36 — title

Article 36 — title

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Amendment 217

Amendment 217

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 36 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

Article 36 — paragraph 1 — introductory part

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   The Commission may adopt implementing acts
  concerning: 3, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 25 and 30 | 1.   The Commission may adopt implementing acts
  laying down detailed arrangements for the application of the following: |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

1.   The Commission may adopt implementing acts
  concerning: 3, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 25 and 30

1.   The Commission may adopt implementing acts
  laying down detailed arrangements for the application of the following:

Amendment 218

Amendment 218

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 36 — paragraph 1 — point a a (new)

Article 36 — paragraph 1 — point a a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (aa) | the form, content and other details on how choice is to be provided and consent is to be given, pursuant to Article 5 point (a); |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(aa)

(aa)

the form, content and other details on how choice is to be provided and consent is to be given, pursuant to Article 5 point (a);

the form, content and other details on how choice is to be provided and consent is to be given, pursuant to Article 5 point (a);

Amendment 219

Amendment 219

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 36 — paragraph 1 — point a b (new)

Article 36 — paragraph 1 — point a b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ab) | the form, content and other details on how information on price and remuneration are to be given, pursuant to Article 5 point (g); |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ab)

(ab)

the form, content and other details on how information on price and remuneration are to be given, pursuant to Article 5 point (g);

the form, content and other details on how information on price and remuneration are to be given, pursuant to Article 5 point (g);

Amendment 220

Amendment 220

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 36 — paragraph 1 — point g a (new)

Article 36 — paragraph 1 — point g a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (ga) | the practical arrangements for the cooperation and coordination between the Commission and Member States provided for in Article 31d. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

(ga)

(ga)

the practical arrangements for the cooperation and coordination between the Commission and Member States provided for in Article 31d.

the practical arrangements for the cooperation and coordination between the Commission and Member States provided for in Article 31d.

Amendment 221

Amendment 221

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 36 — paragraph 2

Article 36 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   
  the practical arrangements for the cooperation and coordination between the Commission and Member States provided for in Article 1(7).
  Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4). Before the adoption of any measures pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall publish a draft thereof and invite all interested parties to submit their comments within the time limit it lays down, which may not be less than one month. | 2.   Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4). Before the adoption of any measures pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall publish a draft thereof and invite all interested parties to submit their comments within the time limit it lays down, which may not be less than one month. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   
  the practical arrangements for the cooperation and coordination between the Commission and Member States provided for in Article 1(7).
  Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4). Before the adoption of any measures pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall publish a draft thereof and invite all interested parties to submit their comments within the time limit it lays down, which may not be less than one month.

2.   Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 32(4). Before the adoption of any measures pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission shall publish a draft thereof and invite all interested parties to submit their comments within the time limit it lays down, which may not be less than one month.

Amendment 222

Amendment 222

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 36 a (new)

Article 36 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 36a




  Guidelines




  To facilitate the compliance of gatekeepers with and the enforcement of the obligations in Articles 5, 6, 12 and 13, the Commission may accompany the obligations set out in those Articles with guidelines, where the Commission deems that this is appropriate. Where appropriate and necessary, the Commission may mandate the standardisation bodies to facilitate the implementation of the obligations by developing appropriate standards. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 36a

Guidelines

To facilitate the compliance of gatekeepers with and the enforcement of the obligations in Articles 5, 6, 12 and 13, the Commission may accompany the obligations set out in those Articles with guidelines, where the Commission deems that this is appropriate. Where appropriate and necessary, the Commission may mandate the standardisation bodies to facilitate the implementation of the obligations by developing appropriate standards.

Amendment 223

Amendment 223

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 37 — paragraph 2

Article 37 — paragraph 2

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 3(6) and
  9(1)
  shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of five years from DD/MM/YYYY. The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not later than nine months before the end of the five-year period. The delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period. | 2.   The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 3(6) and
  10
  shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of five years from DD/MM/YYYY. The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not later than nine months before the end of the five-year period. The delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

2.   The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 3(6) and
  9(1)
  shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of five years from DD/MM/YYYY. The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not later than nine months before the end of the five-year period. The delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period.

2.   The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 3(6) and
  10
  shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of five years from DD/MM/YYYY. The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not later than nine months before the end of the five-year period. The delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period.

Amendment 224

Amendment 224

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 37 — paragraph 3

Article 37 — paragraph 3

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   The delegation of power referred to in Articles 3(6) and
  9(1)
  may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. | 3.   The delegation of power referred to in Articles 3(6) and
  10
  may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

3.   The delegation of power referred to in Articles 3(6) and
  9(1)
  may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.

3.   The delegation of power referred to in Articles 3(6) and
  10
  may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.

Amendment 225

Amendment 225

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 37 a (new)

Article 37 a (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 37a




  Amendment to Directive (EU) 2019/1937




  In Part XX of the Annex to Directive (EU) 2019/1937, the following point is added:





  "Regulation (EU) ..../... of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... on XX (EU) 2021/XXX, and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (OJ L ...). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 37a

Amendment to Directive (EU) 2019/1937

In Part XX of the Annex to Directive (EU) 2019/1937, the following point is added:

"Regulation (EU) ..../... of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... on XX (EU) 2021/XXX, and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (OJ L ...).

Amendment 226

Amendment 226

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 37 b (new)

Article 37 b (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | Article 37b




  Amendments to Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on Representative Actions for the Protection of the Collective Interests of Consumers




  The following is added to Annex I:





  ‘(X)


  Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act)’ |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

Article 37b

Amendments to Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on Representative Actions for the Protection of the Collective Interests of Consumers

The following is added to Annex I:

‘(X)


  Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act)’

Amendment 227

Amendment 227

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Article 39 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1

Article 39 — paragraph 2 — subparagraph 1

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| This Regulation shall apply from
  six
  months after its entry into force. | This Regulation shall apply from
  two
  months after its entry into force. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

This Regulation shall apply from
  six
  months after its entry into force.

six

This Regulation shall apply from
  two
  months after its entry into force.

two

Amendment 228

Amendment 228

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex 1 (new)

Annex 1 (new)

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | a. | ‘General’ |

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

a.

a.

‘General’

‘General’

| 1. | The present annex aims at specifying the methodology for identifying and calculating the ‘end users’ and the ‘business users’ for each core platform service defined in Article 2(2) for the purpose of point (b) of Article 3(2). It provides a reference to enable an undertaking to assess whether its core platforms services meet the quantitative thresholds set out in Article 3(2)(b) and would therefore be presumed to meet the requirement in Article 3(1)(b). It will therefore equally be of relevance to any broader assessment under Article 3(6). It is the responsibility of the undertaking to come to the best approximation possible in line with the common principles and specific methodology set out in this annex. Nothing in this annex precludes the Commission from requiring the undertaking providing core platform services to provide any information necessary to identify and calculate the ‘end users’ and the ‘business users’. In doing so, the Commission is bound by the timelines laid down in the relevant provisions of this Regulation. Nothing in the present annex should constitute a legal basis for tracking users. The methodology contained in this annex is also without prejudice to any of the obligations in the Regulation, notably including those laid down in Article 3(3), Article 3(6) and Article 11(1). In particular, the required compliance with Article 11(1) also means identifying and calculating end users and business users based either on a precise measurement or on the best approximation available — in line with the actual identification and calculation capacities that the undertaking providing core platform services possesses at the relevant point in time. These measurements or the best approximation available shall be consistent with, and include, those reported under Article 13. |
| --- | --- |

1.

1.

The present annex aims at specifying the methodology for identifying and calculating the ‘end users’ and the ‘business users’ for each core platform service defined in Article 2(2) for the purpose of point (b) of Article 3(2). It provides a reference to enable an undertaking to assess whether its core platforms services meet the quantitative thresholds set out in Article 3(2)(b) and would therefore be presumed to meet the requirement in Article 3(1)(b). It will therefore equally be of relevance to any broader assessment under Article 3(6). It is the responsibility of the undertaking to come to the best approximation possible in line with the common principles and specific methodology set out in this annex. Nothing in this annex precludes the Commission from requiring the undertaking providing core platform services to provide any information necessary to identify and calculate the ‘end users’ and the ‘business users’. In doing so, the Commission is bound by the timelines laid down in the relevant provisions of this Regulation. Nothing in the present annex should constitute a legal basis for tracking users. The methodology contained in this annex is also without prejudice to any of the obligations in the Regulation, notably including those laid down in Article 3(3), Article 3(6) and Article 11(1). In particular, the required compliance with Article 11(1) also means identifying and calculating end users and business users based either on a precise measurement or on the best approximation available — in line with the actual identification and calculation capacities that the undertaking providing core platform services possesses at the relevant point in time. These measurements or the best approximation available shall be consistent with, and include, those reported under Article 13.

| 2. | Article 2(16) and (17) set out the definitions of ‘end user’ and ‘business user’, which are common to all core platform services. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Article 2(16) and (17) set out the definitions of ‘end user’ and ‘business user’, which are common to all core platform services.

| 3. | In order to identify and calculate the number of ‘end users’ and ‘business users’, the present annex refers to the concept of ‘unique users’. The concept of ‘unique users’ encompasses ‘end users’ and ‘business users’ counted only once, for the relevant core platform service, over the course of a specified time period (i.e. month in case of ‘end users’ and year in case of ‘business users’), no matter how many times they engaged with the relevant core platform service over that period. This is without prejudice to the fact that the same natural or legal person can simultaneously constitute an end user or business user for different core platform services. |
| --- | --- |

3.

3.

In order to identify and calculate the number of ‘end users’ and ‘business users’, the present annex refers to the concept of ‘unique users’. The concept of ‘unique users’ encompasses ‘end users’ and ‘business users’ counted only once, for the relevant core platform service, over the course of a specified time period (i.e. month in case of ‘end users’ and year in case of ‘business users’), no matter how many times they engaged with the relevant core platform service over that period. This is without prejudice to the fact that the same natural or legal person can simultaneously constitute an end user or business user for different core platform services.

| b. | ‘end users’ |
| --- | --- |

b.

b.

‘end users’

‘end users’

| 4. | Number of ‘unique users’ as regards ‘end users’: unique users shall be identified according to the most accurate metric reported by the undertaking providing any of the core platform services, specifically: |
| --- | --- |

4.

4.

Number of ‘unique users’ as regards ‘end users’: unique users shall be identified according to the most accurate metric reported by the undertaking providing any of the core platform services, specifically:

| | a. | It is considered that collecting data about the use of core platform services from signed-in or logged-in environments would prima facie present the lowest risk of duplication, for example in relation to user behaviour across devices or platforms. Hence, the undertaking shall submit aggregate anonymized data on the number of unique users per respective core platform service based on signed-in or logged-in environments if such data exists. |
| --- | --- | --- |

a.

a.

It is considered that collecting data about the use of core platform services from signed-in or logged-in environments would prima facie present the lowest risk of duplication, for example in relation to user behaviour across devices or platforms. Hence, the undertaking shall submit aggregate anonymized data on the number of unique users per respective core platform service based on signed-in or logged-in environments if such data exists.

It is considered that collecting data about the use of core platform services from signed-in or logged-in environments would prima facie present the lowest risk of duplication, for example in relation to user behaviour across devices or platforms. Hence, the undertaking shall submit aggregate anonymized data on the number of unique users per respective core platform service based on signed-in or logged-in environments if such data exists.

| b. | In the case of core platform services which are (also) accessed by end users outside signed-in or logged-in environments, the undertaking shall additionally submit aggregate anonymized data on the number of unique end users of the respective core platform service based on an alternate metric capturing also end users outside signed-in or logged-in environments such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags provided that those addresses or identifiers are (objectively) necessary for the provision of the core platform services. |
| --- | --- |

b.

b.

In the case of core platform services which are (also) accessed by end users outside signed-in or logged-in environments, the undertaking shall additionally submit aggregate anonymized data on the number of unique end users of the respective core platform service based on an alternate metric capturing also end users outside signed-in or logged-in environments such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags provided that those addresses or identifiers are (objectively) necessary for the provision of the core platform services.

In the case of core platform services which are (also) accessed by end users outside signed-in or logged-in environments, the undertaking shall additionally submit aggregate anonymized data on the number of unique end users of the respective core platform service based on an alternate metric capturing also end users outside signed-in or logged-in environments such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags provided that those addresses or identifiers are (objectively) necessary for the provision of the core platform services.

| 5. | Article 3(2) also requires that the number of ‘monthly end users’ is based on the average number of monthly end users during a period of at least six months within the last financial year. An undertaking providing core platform service(s) can discount outlier figures in a given year. Outlier figures inherently mean figures that fall outside the normal values such as a sales peak that occurred during a single month in a given year but do not include the annual regular and predictable sales. |
| --- | --- |

5.

5.

Article 3(2) also requires that the number of ‘monthly end users’ is based on the average number of monthly end users during a period of at least six months within the last financial year. An undertaking providing core platform service(s) can discount outlier figures in a given year. Outlier figures inherently mean figures that fall outside the normal values such as a sales peak that occurred during a single month in a given year but do not include the annual regular and predictable sales.

| c. | ‘business users’ |
| --- | --- |

c.

c.

‘business users’

‘business users’

| 6. | Number of ‘unique users’ as regards ‘business users’, ‘unique users’ are to be determined, where applicable, at the account level with each distinct business account associated with the use of a core platform service provided by the undertaking constituting one unique business user of that respective core platform service. If the notion of ‘business account’ does not apply to a given core platform service, the relevant undertaking providing core platform services shall determine the number of unique business users by referring to the relevant undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

6.

6.

Number of ‘unique users’ as regards ‘business users’, ‘unique users’ are to be determined, where applicable, at the account level with each distinct business account associated with the use of a core platform service provided by the undertaking constituting one unique business user of that respective core platform service. If the notion of ‘business account’ does not apply to a given core platform service, the relevant undertaking providing core platform services shall determine the number of unique business users by referring to the relevant undertaking.

| d. | ‘Submission of information’ |
| --- | --- |

d.

d.

‘Submission of information’

‘Submission of information’

| 7. | The undertaking submitting information concerning the number of end users and business users per core platform service shall be responsible for ensuring the completeness and accuracy of that information. In that regard: |
| --- | --- |

7.

7.

The undertaking submitting information concerning the number of end users and business users per core platform service shall be responsible for ensuring the completeness and accuracy of that information. In that regard:

| | a. | The undertaking shall be responsible for submitting data for a respective core platform service that avoids under-counting and over-counting the number of end users and business users (for example where users access the core platform services across different platforms or devices) in the information provided to the Commission. |
| --- | --- | --- |

a.

a.

The undertaking shall be responsible for submitting data for a respective core platform service that avoids under-counting and over-counting the number of end users and business users (for example where users access the core platform services across different platforms or devices) in the information provided to the Commission.

The undertaking shall be responsible for submitting data for a respective core platform service that avoids under-counting and over-counting the number of end users and business users (for example where users access the core platform services across different platforms or devices) in the information provided to the Commission.

| b. | The undertaking shall be responsible for providing precise and succinct explanations about the methodology used to arrive at the information provided to the Commission and of any risk of under-counting or over-counting of the number of end users and business users for a respective core platform service and of the solutions adopted to address that risk. |
| --- | --- |

b.

b.

The undertaking shall be responsible for providing precise and succinct explanations about the methodology used to arrive at the information provided to the Commission and of any risk of under-counting or over-counting of the number of end users and business users for a respective core platform service and of the solutions adopted to address that risk.

The undertaking shall be responsible for providing precise and succinct explanations about the methodology used to arrive at the information provided to the Commission and of any risk of under-counting or over-counting of the number of end users and business users for a respective core platform service and of the solutions adopted to address that risk.

| c. | The undertaking shall provide the Commission data that is based on an alternative metric when the Commission has concerns about the accuracy of data provided by the undertaking providing core platform service(s). |
| --- | --- |

c.

c.

The undertaking shall provide the Commission data that is based on an alternative metric when the Commission has concerns about the accuracy of data provided by the undertaking providing core platform service(s).

The undertaking shall provide the Commission data that is based on an alternative metric when the Commission has concerns about the accuracy of data provided by the undertaking providing core platform service(s).

| 8. | For the purpose of calculating the number of ‘end users’ and ‘business users’: |
| --- | --- |

8.

8.

For the purpose of calculating the number of ‘end users’ and ‘business users’:

| | a. | The undertaking providing core platform service(s) shall not identify core platform services that belong to the same category of core platform services pursuant to Article 2(2) as distinct mainly on the basis that they are provided using different domain names — whether country code top-level domains (ccTLDs) or generic top-level domains (gTLDs) — or any geographic attributes. |
| --- | --- | --- |

a.

a.

The undertaking providing core platform service(s) shall not identify core platform services that belong to the same category of core platform services pursuant to Article 2(2) as distinct mainly on the basis that they are provided using different domain names — whether country code top-level domains (ccTLDs) or generic top-level domains (gTLDs) — or any geographic attributes.

The undertaking providing core platform service(s) shall not identify core platform services that belong to the same category of core platform services pursuant to Article 2(2) as distinct mainly on the basis that they are provided using different domain names — whether country code top-level domains (ccTLDs) or generic top-level domains (gTLDs) — or any geographic attributes.

| b. | The undertaking providing core platform service(s) shall consider as distinct core platform services those core platform services, which despite belonging to the same category of core platform services pursuant to Article 2(2) are used for different purposes by either their end users or their business users, or both, even if their end users and business users may be the same. |
| --- | --- |

b.

b.

The undertaking providing core platform service(s) shall consider as distinct core platform services those core platform services, which despite belonging to the same category of core platform services pursuant to Article 2(2) are used for different purposes by either their end users or their business users, or both, even if their end users and business users may be the same.

The undertaking providing core platform service(s) shall consider as distinct core platform services those core platform services, which despite belonging to the same category of core platform services pursuant to Article 2(2) are used for different purposes by either their end users or their business users, or both, even if their end users and business users may be the same.

| c. | The undertaking providing core platform service(s) shall consider as distinct core platform services those services which the relevant undertaking offers in an integrated way but which (i) do not belong to the same category of core platform services pursuant to Article 2(2) or (ii) despite belonging to the same category of core platform services pursuant to Article 2(2), are used for different purposes by either their end users or their business users, or both, even if their end users and business users may be the same. |
| --- | --- |

c.

c.

The undertaking providing core platform service(s) shall consider as distinct core platform services those services which the relevant undertaking offers in an integrated way but which (i) do not belong to the same category of core platform services pursuant to Article 2(2) or (ii) despite belonging to the same category of core platform services pursuant to Article 2(2), are used for different purposes by either their end users or their business users, or both, even if their end users and business users may be the same.

The undertaking providing core platform service(s) shall consider as distinct core platform services those services which the relevant undertaking offers in an integrated way but which (i) do not belong to the same category of core platform services pursuant to Article 2(2) or (ii) despite belonging to the same category of core platform services pursuant to Article 2(2), are used for different purposes by either their end users or their business users, or both, even if their end users and business users may be the same.

| e. | ‘Specific definitions’ |
| --- | --- |

e.

e.

‘Specific definitions’

‘Specific definitions’

| 9. | Specific definitions per core platform service: The below list sets out specific definitions of ‘end users’ and ‘business users’ for each core platform service. |
| --- | --- |

9.

9.

Specific definitions per core platform service: The below list sets out specific definitions of ‘end users’ and ‘business users’ for each core platform service.

Amendment 229

Amendment 229

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for a regulation

Annex 1 — table (new)

Annex 1 — table (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Amendment

| Core platform service | end users | business users |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Online intermediation services | Number of unique end users who engaged with the online intermediation service at least once in the month for example through actively logging-in, , making a query, clicking or scrolling or concluded a transaction through the online intermediation service at least once in the month. | Number of unique business users who had at least one item listed in the online intermediation service during the whole year or concluded a transaction enabled by the online intermediation service during the year. |
| Online search engines | Number of unique end users who engaged with the online search engine at least once in the month, for example through making a query. | Number of unique business users with business websites (i.e. website used in commercial or professional capacity) indexed by or part of the index of the online search engine during the year. |
| Online social networking services | Number of unique end users who engaged with the online social networking service at least once in the month, for example through actively logging-in, opening a page, scrolling, clicking, liking, making a query, posting or commenting. | Number of unique business users who have a business listing or business account in the online social networking service and have engaged in any way with the service at least once during the year, for example through actively logging-in, opening a page, scrolling, clicking, liking, making a query, posting, commenting or using its tools for businesses. |
| Video-sharing platform services | Number of unique end users who engaged with the video-sharing platform service at least once in the month, for example through playing a segment of audiovisual content, making a query or uploading a piece of audiovisual content, notably including user-generated videos. | Number of unique business users who provided at least one piece of audiovisual content uploaded or played on the video-sharing platform service during the year. |
| Number-independent interpersonal communication services | Number of unique end users who initiated or participated in any way in a communication through the number-independent interpersonal communication service at least once in the month. | Number of unique business users who used a business account or otherwise initiated or participated in any way in a communication through the number-independent interpersonal communication service to communicate directly with an end user at least once during the year. |
| Operating systems | Number of unique end users who utilised a device with the operating system, which has been activated, updated or used at least once in the month. | Number of unique developers who published, updated or offered at least one software application or software program using the programming language or any software development tools of, or running in any way on, the operating system during the year. |
| Cloud computing services | Number of unique end users who engaged with any cloud computing services from the relevant provider of cloud computing services at least once in the month, in return for any type of remuneration, regardless of whether this remuneration occurs in the same month. | Number of unique business users who provided any cloud computing services hosted in the cloud infrastructure of the relevant provider of cloud computing services during the year. |
| Advertising services | Proprietary sales of advertising space




  Number of unique end users who were exposed to an advertisement impression at least once in the month.




  Advertising intermediation (including advertising networks, advertising exchanges and any other advertising intermediation services)




  Number of unique end users who were exposed to an advertisement impression which triggered the advertising intermediation service at least once in the month. | Proprietary sales of advertising space




  Number of unique advertisers who had at least one advertisement impression displayed during the year.




  Advertising intermediation (including advertising networks, advertising exchanges and any other advertising intermediation services)




  Number of unique business users (including advertisers, publishers or other intermediators) who interacted via or were served by the advertising intermediation service during the year. |

Core platform service

Core platform service

end users

end users

business users

business users

Online intermediation services

Online intermediation services

Number of unique end users who engaged with the online intermediation service at least once in the month for example through actively logging-in, , making a query, clicking or scrolling or concluded a transaction through the online intermediation service at least once in the month.

Number of unique end users who engaged with the online intermediation service at least once in the month for example through actively logging-in, , making a query, clicking or scrolling or concluded a transaction through the online intermediation service at least once in the month.

Number of unique business users who had at least one item listed in the online intermediation service during the whole year or concluded a transaction enabled by the online intermediation service during the year.

Number of unique business users who had at least one item listed in the online intermediation service during the whole year or concluded a transaction enabled by the online intermediation service during the year.

Online search engines

Online search engines

Number of unique end users who engaged with the online search engine at least once in the month, for example through making a query.

Number of unique end users who engaged with the online search engine at least once in the month, for example through making a query.

Number of unique business users with business websites (i.e. website used in commercial or professional capacity) indexed by or part of the index of the online search engine during the year.

Number of unique business users with business websites (i.e. website used in commercial or professional capacity) indexed by or part of the index of the online search engine during the year.

Online social networking services

Online social networking services

Number of unique end users who engaged with the online social networking service at least once in the month, for example through actively logging-in, opening a page, scrolling, clicking, liking, making a query, posting or commenting.

Number of unique end users who engaged with the online social networking service at least once in the month, for example through actively logging-in, opening a page, scrolling, clicking, liking, making a query, posting or commenting.

Number of unique business users who have a business listing or business account in the online social networking service and have engaged in any way with the service at least once during the year, for example through actively logging-in, opening a page, scrolling, clicking, liking, making a query, posting, commenting or using its tools for businesses.

Number of unique business users who have a business listing or business account in the online social networking service and have engaged in any way with the service at least once during the year, for example through actively logging-in, opening a page, scrolling, clicking, liking, making a query, posting, commenting or using its tools for businesses.

Video-sharing platform services

Video-sharing platform services

Number of unique end users who engaged with the video-sharing platform service at least once in the month, for example through playing a segment of audiovisual content, making a query or uploading a piece of audiovisual content, notably including user-generated videos.

Number of unique end users who engaged with the video-sharing platform service at least once in the month, for example through playing a segment of audiovisual content, making a query or uploading a piece of audiovisual content, notably including user-generated videos.

Number of unique business users who provided at least one piece of audiovisual content uploaded or played on the video-sharing platform service during the year.

Number of unique business users who provided at least one piece of audiovisual content uploaded or played on the video-sharing platform service during the year.

Number-independent interpersonal communication services

Number-independent interpersonal communication services

Number of unique end users who initiated or participated in any way in a communication through the number-independent interpersonal communication service at least once in the month.

Number of unique end users who initiated or participated in any way in a communication through the number-independent interpersonal communication service at least once in the month.

Number of unique business users who used a business account or otherwise initiated or participated in any way in a communication through the number-independent interpersonal communication service to communicate directly with an end user at least once during the year.

Number of unique business users who used a business account or otherwise initiated or participated in any way in a communication through the number-independent interpersonal communication service to communicate directly with an end user at least once during the year.

Operating systems

Operating systems

Number of unique end users who utilised a device with the operating system, which has been activated, updated or used at least once in the month.

Number of unique end users who utilised a device with the operating system, which has been activated, updated or used at least once in the month.

Number of unique developers who published, updated or offered at least one software application or software program using the programming language or any software development tools of, or running in any way on, the operating system during the year.

Number of unique developers who published, updated or offered at least one software application or software program using the programming language or any software development tools of, or running in any way on, the operating system during the year.

Cloud computing services

Cloud computing services

Number of unique end users who engaged with any cloud computing services from the relevant provider of cloud computing services at least once in the month, in return for any type of remuneration, regardless of whether this remuneration occurs in the same month.

Number of unique end users who engaged with any cloud computing services from the relevant provider of cloud computing services at least once in the month, in return for any type of remuneration, regardless of whether this remuneration occurs in the same month.

Number of unique business users who provided any cloud computing services hosted in the cloud infrastructure of the relevant provider of cloud computing services during the year.

Number of unique business users who provided any cloud computing services hosted in the cloud infrastructure of the relevant provider of cloud computing services during the year.

Advertising services

Advertising services

Proprietary sales of advertising space

Proprietary sales of advertising space

Number of unique end users who were exposed to an advertisement impression at least once in the month.

Number of unique end users who were exposed to an advertisement impression at least once in the month.

Advertising intermediation (including advertising networks, advertising exchanges and any other advertising intermediation services)

Advertising intermediation (including advertising networks, advertising exchanges and any other advertising intermediation services)

Number of unique end users who were exposed to an advertisement impression which triggered the advertising intermediation service at least once in the month.

Number of unique end users who were exposed to an advertisement impression which triggered the advertising intermediation service at least once in the month.

Proprietary sales of advertising space

Proprietary sales of advertising space

Number of unique advertisers who had at least one advertisement impression displayed during the year.

Number of unique advertisers who had at least one advertisement impression displayed during the year.

Advertising intermediation (including advertising networks, advertising exchanges and any other advertising intermediation services)

Advertising intermediation (including advertising networks, advertising exchanges and any other advertising intermediation services)

Number of unique business users (including advertisers, publishers or other intermediators) who interacted via or were served by the advertising intermediation service during the year.

Number of unique business users (including advertisers, publishers or other intermediators) who interacted via or were served by the advertising intermediation service during the year.

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(1)  The matter was referred back for interinstitutional negotiations to the committee responsible, pursuant to Rule 59(4), fourth subparagraph (A9-0332/2021).

1

(26)  Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 57).

26

(27)  Regulation (EU) .../.. of the European Parliament and of the Council — proposal on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC.

27

(28)  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).

28

(29)  Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC (OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92.).

29

(30)  Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35).

30

(31)  Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1).

31

(26)  Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 57).

26

(27)  Regulation (EU) .../.. of the European Parliament and of the Council — proposal on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC.

27

(28)  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).

28

(29)  Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC (OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92.).

29

(30)  Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35).

30

(31)  Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1).

31

(32)  Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services, OJ L 241, 17.9.2015, p. 1.

32

(32)  Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services, OJ L 241, 17.9.2015, p. 1.

32

(33)  Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37).

33

(33)  Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37).

33

(34)  Commission Notice: Guidelines on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 424, 8.12.2020, p. 1).

34

(34)  Commission Notice: Guidelines on ranking transparency pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ C 424, 8.12.2020, p. 1).

34

(35)  Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).

35

(35)  Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).

35

(36)  Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making (OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1).

36

(36)  Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making (OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1).

36

(38)  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1).

38

(39)  
  Regulation (EU) .../.. of the European Parliament and of the Council — proposal on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC.

39

Regulation (EU) .../.. of the European Parliament and of the Council — proposal on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC.

(38)  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1).

38

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