# Official Journal C 293/18 A

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 293 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6618 August 2023 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 293

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6618 August 2023

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| | OPINIONS |
| | European Economic and Social Committee |
| | 579th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.6.2023-15.6.2023 |
| 2023/C 293/01 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee: Towards a European Food Policy Council as a new governance model in the future EU framework on Sustainable Food Systems (own-initiative opinion) | 1 |
| 2023/C 293/02 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the impact of the energy crisis on the European economy (own-initiative opinion) | 8 |
| 2023/C 293/03 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the second set of new own resources (exploratory opinion) | 13 |
| 2023/C 293/04 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: EU Policy on Cyber Defence (own initiative opinion) | 21 |
| 2023/C 293/05 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on green collective bargaining: good practices and future prospects (exploratory opinion) | 27 |
| 2023/C 293/06 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the measures to fight stigma against HIV (exploratory opinion at the request of the Spanish Presidency) | 34 |
| 2023/C 293/07 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on monitoring the EU’s extraordinary measures and resilience in the field of energy (exploratory opinion requested by the Spanish Presidency) | 42 |
| 2023/C 293/08 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the equal treatment of young people in the labour market (own-initiative opinion) | 48 |
| 2023/C 293/09 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Social Progress Protocol (exploratory opinion at the request of the Spanish Presidency) | 58 |
| 2023/C 293/10 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on cooperation on youth (exploratory opinion requested by the Spanish Presidency) | 68 |

Contents

page

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

OPINIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

579th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.6.2023-15.6.2023

2023/C 293/01

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee: Towards a European Food Policy Council as a new governance model in the future EU framework on Sustainable Food Systems (own-initiative opinion)

1

2023/C 293/02

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the impact of the energy crisis on the European economy (own-initiative opinion)

8

2023/C 293/03

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the second set of new own resources (exploratory opinion)

13

2023/C 293/04

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: EU Policy on Cyber Defence (own initiative opinion)

21

2023/C 293/05

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on green collective bargaining: good practices and future prospects (exploratory opinion)

27

2023/C 293/06

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the measures to fight stigma against HIV (exploratory opinion at the request of the Spanish Presidency)

34

2023/C 293/07

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on monitoring the EU’s extraordinary measures and resilience in the field of energy (exploratory opinion requested by the Spanish Presidency)

42

2023/C 293/08

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the equal treatment of young people in the labour market (own-initiative opinion)

48

2023/C 293/09

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Social Progress Protocol (exploratory opinion at the request of the Spanish Presidency)

58

2023/C 293/10

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on cooperation on youth (exploratory opinion requested by the Spanish Presidency)

68

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| | III   Preparatory acts |
| --- | --- |
| | European Economic and Social Committee |
| | 579th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.6.2023-15.6.2023 |
| 2023/C 293/11 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules promoting the repair of goods and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directives (EU) 2019/771 and (EU) 2020/1828 (COM(2023) 155 final — 2023/0083 (COD)) | 77 |
| 2023/C 293/12 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2009/102/EC and (EU) 2017/1132 as regards further expanding and upgrading the use of digital tools and processes in company law (COM(2023) 177 final — 2023/0089 (COD)) | 82 |
| 2023/C 293/13 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on substantiation and communication of explicit environmental claims (Green Claims Directive) (COM(2023) 166 final — 2023/0085 (COD)) | 86 |
| 2023/C 293/14 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of EU macro-regional strategies (COM(2022) 705 final) | 91 |
| 2023/C 293/15 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Harnessing talent in Europe’s regions (COM(2023) 32 final) | 100 |
| 2023/C 293/16 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1009 as regards the digital labelling of EU fertilising products (COM(2023) 98 final — 2023/0049 (COD)) | 108 |
| 2023/C 293/17 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) No 2019/942 as well as Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 to improve the Union’s electricity market design (COM(2023) 148 final — 2023/0077 (COD)) | 112 |
| 2023/C 293/18 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Hydrogen Bank (COM(2023) 156 final) | 127 |
| 2023/C 293/19 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on driving licences, amending Directive (EU) 2022/2561 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Regulation (EU) No 383/2012 (COM(2023) 127 final — 2023/0053 (COD)) and on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Union-wide effect of certain driving disqualifications (COM(2023) 128 final — 2023/0055 (COD)) | 133 |
| 2023/C 293/20 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011 and (EU) 2019/942 to improve the Union’s protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market (COM(2023) 147 final) | 138 |
| 2023/C 293/21 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approval and market surveillance of non-road mobile machinery circulating on public roads and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 (COM(2023) 178 final — 2023/0090 (COD)) | 142 |
| 2023/C 293/22 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (COM(2023) 237final — 2023/0140 (COD)) | 143 |
| 2023/C 293/23 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/833 laying down conservation and enforcement measures applicable in the Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (COM(2023) 108 final — 2023/0056 (COD)) | 144 |

III   Preparatory acts

European Economic and Social Committee

579th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.6.2023-15.6.2023

2023/C 293/11

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules promoting the repair of goods and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directives (EU) 2019/771 and (EU) 2020/1828 (COM(2023) 155 final — 2023/0083 (COD))

77

2023/C 293/12

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2009/102/EC and (EU) 2017/1132 as regards further expanding and upgrading the use of digital tools and processes in company law (COM(2023) 177 final — 2023/0089 (COD))

82

2023/C 293/13

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on substantiation and communication of explicit environmental claims (Green Claims Directive) (COM(2023) 166 final — 2023/0085 (COD))

86

2023/C 293/14

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of EU macro-regional strategies (COM(2022) 705 final)

91

2023/C 293/15

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Harnessing talent in Europe’s regions (COM(2023) 32 final)

100

2023/C 293/16

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1009 as regards the digital labelling of EU fertilising products (COM(2023) 98 final — 2023/0049 (COD))

108

2023/C 293/17

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) No 2019/942 as well as Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 to improve the Union’s electricity market design (COM(2023) 148 final — 2023/0077 (COD))

112

2023/C 293/18

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Hydrogen Bank (COM(2023) 156 final)

127

2023/C 293/19

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on driving licences, amending Directive (EU) 2022/2561 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Regulation (EU) No 383/2012 (COM(2023) 127 final — 2023/0053 (COD)) and on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Union-wide effect of certain driving disqualifications (COM(2023) 128 final — 2023/0055 (COD))

133

2023/C 293/20

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011 and (EU) 2019/942 to improve the Union’s protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market (COM(2023) 147 final)

138

2023/C 293/21

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approval and market surveillance of non-road mobile machinery circulating on public roads and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 (COM(2023) 178 final — 2023/0090 (COD))

142

2023/C 293/22

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (COM(2023) 237final — 2023/0140 (COD))

143

2023/C 293/23

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/833 laying down conservation and enforcement measures applicable in the Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (COM(2023) 108 final — 2023/0056 (COD))

144

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| | Corrigenda |
| --- | --- |
| 2023/C 293/24 | Corrigendum to the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Social Imbalances Procedure (exploratory opinion at the request of the Spanish Presidency) ( OJ C 228, 29.6.2023 ) | 147 |

Corrigenda

2023/C 293/24

Corrigendum to the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Social Imbalances Procedure (exploratory opinion at the request of the Spanish Presidency) ( OJ C 228, 29.6.2023 )

( OJ C 228, 29.6.2023 )

147

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| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

OPINIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

579th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.6.2023-15.6.2023

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/1

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee: ‘Towards a European Food Policy Council as a new governance model in the future EU framework on Sustainable Food Systems’

(own-initiative opinion)

(2023/C 293/01)

| Rapporteur: | Piroska KÁLLAY |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Piroska KÁLLAY

Piroska KÁLLAY

| Plenary Assembly decision | 25.1.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Agriculture, rural development and the environment |
| Adopted in section | 1.6.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 179/1/2 |

Plenary Assembly decision

25.1.2023

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Agriculture, rural development and the environment

Adopted in section

1.6.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

179/1/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EU food system is at a crossroads, facing a polycrisis that includes various interrelated environmental, climate, health and social challenges. Given the urgency of the food system crisis and the need for rapid behavioural change, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) believes that its call for the creation of a ‘European Food Policy Council’ (EFPC) is more timely than ever. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The EU food system is at a crossroads, facing a polycrisis that includes various interrelated environmental, climate, health and social challenges. Given the urgency of the food system crisis and the need for rapid behavioural change, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) believes that its call for the creation of a ‘European Food Policy Council’ (EFPC) is more timely than ever.

| 1.2. | The EESC considers that an EFPC would help achieve a more integrated and participatory approach to food policymaking, would accelerate the alignment of policies at EU, national and local levels and, most importantly, would increase the quality and legitimacy of EU food policy. This would also contribute to fostering more sustainable and balanced rural and urban development. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC considers that an EFPC would help achieve a more integrated and participatory approach to food policymaking, would accelerate the alignment of policies at EU, national and local levels and, most importantly, would increase the quality and legitimacy of EU food policy. This would also contribute to fostering more sustainable and balanced rural and urban development.

| 1.3. | The EESC welcomes the announcement of an EU framework for sustainable food systems (FSFS), which will lay the foundations for the systemic changes that need to be made by all stakeholders across the value chain; highlights that the framework should be proposed without delay by the current Commission to address the challenges of food systems in a timely manner — any delay would risk the success of the Farm to Fork strategy; calls on the Commission to commit to the structured engagement of stakeholders and civil society in the new governance of this FSFS, and points out that the idea of an EFPC would adequately fit into it. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

The EESC welcomes the announcement of an EU framework for sustainable food systems (FSFS), which will lay the foundations for the systemic changes that need to be made by all stakeholders across the value chain; highlights that the framework should be proposed without delay by the current Commission to address the challenges of food systems in a timely manner — any delay would risk the success of the Farm to Fork strategy; calls on the Commission to commit to the structured engagement of stakeholders and civil society in the new governance of this FSFS, and points out that the idea of an EFPC would adequately fit into it.

| 1.4. | The EESC notes the existence of food-related platforms at local, regional and national levels, but believes that these existing forums are not sufficient to effectively achieve a sustainable and just food system and resilience preparedness at EU level. The EESC therefore considers that food democracy needs to be strengthened further and embedded in the food policy process. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

The EESC notes the existence of food-related platforms at local, regional and national levels, but believes that these existing forums are not sufficient to effectively achieve a sustainable and just food system and resilience preparedness at EU level. The EESC therefore considers that food democracy needs to be strengthened further and embedded in the food policy process.

| 1.5. | The EESC sees the European Food Policy Council as a science-based, multi-stakeholder and multi-level platform and as an institutional, independent structure, with the following potential composition:






  — | academic experts and scientists, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.5.

The EESC sees the European Food Policy Council as a science-based, multi-stakeholder and multi-level platform and as an institutional, independent structure, with the following potential composition:

—

academic experts and scientists,

| — | food supply chain actors (farmers, food businesses and processors, retailers, trade unions, etc.), education system actors and civil society organisations (anti-poverty networks, food banks, social platforms, environmental and development NGOs); youth representatives. The social partners’ participation in the EFPC is also highly recommended to reflect on the needed changes in the labour market, |
| --- | --- |

—

food supply chain actors (farmers, food businesses and processors, retailers, trade unions, etc.), education system actors and civil society organisations (anti-poverty networks, food banks, social platforms, environmental and development NGOs); youth representatives. The social partners’ participation in the EFPC is also highly recommended to reflect on the needed changes in the labour market,

| — | institutional representatives (Parliament, Council, Commission, EESC, European Committee of the Regions (CoR). |
| --- | --- |

—

institutional representatives (Parliament, Council, Commission, EESC, European Committee of the Regions (CoR).

After the initial phase, the EFPC should also include representatives from local, regional and national levels and food policy councils, ensuring organised connectivity between relevant levels and the right to equal participation of Member States’ representatives at EU level. At the moment, national food policy councils are not widespread enough to ensure that all countries are equally represented.

| 1.6. | The EFPC would have to be a trusted and transparent structure and contribute to the food issues identified as challenges in the UN 2030 Agenda Sustainable Development Goals. In particular, the EFPC should: |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The EFPC would have to be a trusted and transparent structure and contribute to the food issues identified as challenges in the UN 2030 Agenda Sustainable Development Goals. In particular, the EFPC should:

| 1.6.1. | be an institutional body to which the EU institutions should be committed and ensure political buy-in; |
| --- | --- |

1.6.1.

be an institutional body to which the EU institutions should be committed and ensure political buy-in;

| 1.6.2. | be a constant source of sound advice and evidence-based policy options and recommendations about the direction of the EU food system, to which the EU institutions should be bound to provide feedback and reasoned answers; |
| --- | --- |

1.6.2.

be a constant source of sound advice and evidence-based policy options and recommendations about the direction of the EU food system, to which the EU institutions should be bound to provide feedback and reasoned answers;

| 1.6.3. | improve coherence between policy areas (such as the common agricultural policy, the common fisheries policy, the right to food, legislation related to healthy diets, public procurement, education policies, etc.) and promote social innovations towards the wellbeing of all food chain actors, taking into account the need for the generational renewal of farmers. In particular, the EESC considers it important to establish priority content on food in the education system, involving both the agri-food sector and the relevant education authorities; |
| --- | --- |

1.6.3.

improve coherence between policy areas (such as the common agricultural policy, the common fisheries policy, the right to food, legislation related to healthy diets, public procurement, education policies, etc.) and promote social innovations towards the wellbeing of all food chain actors, taking into account the need for the generational renewal of farmers. In particular, the EESC considers it important to establish priority content on food in the education system, involving both the agri-food sector and the relevant education authorities;

| 1.6.4. | eventually provide for a network of food policy councils (FPCs) at EU level, creating a platform of exchanges of best practices and insights to inform and influence EU policy. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.4.

eventually provide for a network of food policy councils (FPCs) at EU level, creating a platform of exchanges of best practices and insights to inform and influence EU policy.

| 1.7. | The EESC stands prepared to provide a convening space for the European Food Policy Council. A successful example already exists with the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform, a joint initiative by the EESC and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

The EESC stands prepared to provide a convening space for the European Food Policy Council. A successful example already exists with the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform, a joint initiative by the EESC and the Commission.

2.   Background

Background

| 2.1. | Our food systems are facing a polycrisis that consists of various interrelated challenges including (1): environmental (greenhouse gas emissions linked to how we produce, process and consume our food, loss of biodiversity, depletion of fish stocks, loss of soil organic matter and soil erosion, among others), health (increase of diet-related diseases), disappearance of farms, lack of access to sustainable and healthy food and poor labour conditions. At the same time, food systems are already suffering under the pressure of multiple climate shocks, changing weather patterns, ecosystem collapse and degradation of land, soils and waterways. Lastly, debates about food systems are increasingly subject to misleading information and communication. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

Our food systems are facing a polycrisis that consists of various interrelated challenges including (1

| 2.2. | The European Commission is currently drawing up a new EU framework for sustainable food systems (FSFS), which was provided for in the Farm to Fork Strategy and is due for publication by the end of 2023. The framework will lay the foundations for the systemic changes that need to be made by all stakeholders in the food system, including policymakers, business operators and consumers, in order to accelerate the transition to a sustainable EU food system. The framework will also provide a foundation for the future governance model for food systems and will contribute to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which requires cooperative, comprehensive solutions involving various departments, ministries, sectors and the whole food supply chain. The EESC calls for the urgent adoption of the FSFS to address the challenges of food systems in a timely manner — any delay would risk the success of the Farm to Fork strategy. The framework should include time-bound objectives, indicators that allow for measuring progress, and corrective mechanisms to be taken if the targets are missed. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

The European Commission is currently drawing up a new EU framework for sustainable food systems (FSFS), which was provided for in the Farm to Fork Strategy and is due for publication by the end of 2023. The framework will lay the foundations for the systemic changes that need to be made by all stakeholders in the food system, including policymakers, business operators and consumers, in order to accelerate the transition to a sustainable EU food system. The framework will also provide a foundation for the future governance model for food systems and will contribute to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which requires cooperative, comprehensive solutions involving various departments, ministries, sectors and the whole food supply chain. The EESC calls for the urgent adoption of the FSFS to address the challenges of food systems in a timely manner — any delay would risk the success of the Farm to Fork strategy. The framework should include time-bound objectives, indicators that allow for measuring progress, and corrective mechanisms to be taken if the targets are missed.

| 2.3. | In order to foster a food system transition towards more sustainable outcomes, previous EESC opinions (2), as well as other experts and civil society organisations, have increasingly pointed to the need to strengthen food democracy. Given the urgency of the food system crisis (3), undoubtedly also caused by the war in Ukraine, and the need for rapid behavioural change, there is little time to lose in fostering more effective and legitimate governance arrangements. It is believed that, by increasing the participation of the general public and food system stakeholders, democratic innovations, such as FPCs, will promote the quality and legitimacy of food policymaking (4). |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

In order to foster a food system transition towards more sustainable outcomes, previous EESC opinions (2

3

4

| 2.4. | FPCs are defined as community-based coalitions of diverse stakeholders who work together to address food-related issues in a particular geographical region (5). The accuracy of the qualifier ‘policy’ has been called into question as some of these councils, food coalitions or committees wish to avoid being perceived as political, whereas others focus on programmes as well as policy. These organisations aspiring to inclusiveness and democratic principles involve stakeholders from across the food system, bringing together individuals, local governments, non-profit organisations and representatives of various economic sectors — agriculture, healthcare and education — to collaborate on food policy initiatives that promote access to healthy, affordable and sustainable food for all members of the community where they are established. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

FPCs are defined as community-based coalitions of diverse stakeholders who work together to address food-related issues in a particular geographical region (5

| 2.5. | The first FPCs appeared in the United States in the 1980s (6) and they have been growing in number and becoming more diverse ever since. Although Europe has been a latecomer to the FPC movement, over the past decade, FPCs have been emerging rapidly across Europe (7). According to the academic literature, the creation of FPCs in Europe really took off with the ratification in 2015 of the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (MUFPP), an international agreement on urban food policies signed by more than 260 cities worldwide, which has supported the founding of FPCs in several European cities/regions. FPCs have also emerged in rural or sub-urban regions, without being directly linked to a city (8). |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

The first FPCs appeared in the United States in the 1980s (6

7

8

| 2.6. | FPCs usually operate at regional and/or local level, although there are some FPCs at state/provincial and national level. They are often a way to reconnect cities to food production in the surrounding regions and ensure effective governance of local and regional food policies, but they can also be relevant to non-urban communities. They can be interpreted as networks that connect the objective of sustainability with the goals of democracy and good governance by initiating participatory, collaborative and deliberative processes among farmers, food entrepreneurs, consumers and others. Major examples in the European Union include the Catalonian FPC (9) (created in 2017), with a managing body composed of 33 members, including regional and local authorities, key players of the food chain, people from rural areas (but looking at enlargement with five new members representing, among others, the ministries for education, culture and equality and feminism) and working with 42 towns, and the Network of Food Policy Councils (2016) that brings together 30 local FPCs based on bottom-up approaches (mostly from Germany) and 40 founding initiatives. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

FPCs usually operate at regional and/or local level, although there are some FPCs at state/provincial and national level. They are often a way to reconnect cities to food production in the surrounding regions and ensure effective governance of local and regional food policies, but they can also be relevant to non-urban communities. They can be interpreted as networks that connect the objective of sustainability with the goals of democracy and good governance by initiating participatory, collaborative and deliberative processes among farmers, food entrepreneurs, consumers and others. Major examples in the European Union include the Catalonian FPC (9

| 2.7. | Examples of national FPCs are more limited in the EU. In France, the National Food Council (CNA (10)) is an independent advisory body to ministers that is consulted on food policy developments and issues opinions to inform both public decisions and the various stakeholders in the food chain on topics such as food quality, consumer information, nutrition, health security, access to food and crisis prevention. Terres en ville, the French network for stakeholders in urban agricultural and food policy (11), established in 2000, brings together French cities and chambers of agriculture (12) with shared goals, to co-construct metropolitan agricultural and food policies between local elected officials and professionals. These territorial food projects are financed and driven by public authorities, which sometimes leads to tensions with other institutional levels. The experience shows the lack of involvement of citizens in the design of food policies (at local and national level). In Portugal, a National Council of Food Security and Nutrition (CONSANP) was established in 2018 (13). In Luxembourg, the creation of a multi-stakeholder organism called the National Food Policy Council was planned in Luxembourg’s 2018-2023 Coalition Agreement (14) but has not yet been officially settled. In the Netherlands, a citizen summit on the future of agriculture has been in the making, but has so far received no backing/funding from political decision-makers (15). |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

Examples of national FPCs are more limited in the EU. In France, the National Food Council (CNA (10

11

12

13

14

15

| 2.8. | The Nordic Food Policy Lab created by and for the Nordic Council of Ministers (16) is also worth mentioning, with the goal to ‘help address the food issues identified as challenges in the UN Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals’. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

The Nordic Food Policy Lab created by and for the Nordic Council of Ministers (16

| 2.9. | In its opinions (17), the EESC has called for the creation of a ‘European Food Policy Council’ that would help achieve a more integrated and participatory approach to food policymaking, would accelerate the alignment of policies at EU, national and local levels, would provide a platform for stakeholders to learn from each other through the sharing of good practices, and would ensure that all points of view from the various sectors are taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

In its opinions (17

| 2.10. | This own-initiative opinion aims to provide concrete ideas for the governance of food systems and meaningful and structured civil society engagement, including of young people, in the development, monitoring and implementation of food policies. The opinion also looks at how to involve the authorities responsible for education and the civil society representatives of schools and pupils’ parents in order to foster the early education of future generations on sustainable and healthy food, based on recent work on youth education (18) and on the EU school scheme (19). |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

This own-initiative opinion aims to provide concrete ideas for the governance of food systems and meaningful and structured civil society engagement, including of young people, in the development, monitoring and implementation of food policies. The opinion also looks at how to involve the authorities responsible for education and the civil society representatives of schools and pupils’ parents in order to foster the early education of future generations on sustainable and healthy food, based on recent work on youth education (18

19

3.   Lessons learned from existing FPCs at local and national level

Lessons learned from existing FPCs at local and national level

| 3.1. | Existing FPCs show a patchwork of organisations with a variety of legal and organisational forms and structures, missions, objectives and activities that are tailored to the needs and priorities of the urban community they serve, ranging from non-profit organisations through hybrid forms to (local) government bodies. They have different participatory approaches and methodologies for developing and transforming urban food systems. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

Existing FPCs show a patchwork of organisations with a variety of legal and organisational forms and structures, missions, objectives and activities that are tailored to the needs and priorities of the urban community they serve, ranging from non-profit organisations through hybrid forms to (local) government bodies. They have different participatory approaches and methodologies for developing and transforming urban food systems.

| 3.2. | A common goal seems to prevail across all these organisations, namely the need to build a sustainable, healthier, transparent and fairer food system for all. Other objectives of regional and local FPCs include achieving food sovereignty, developing shorter and local food supply chains, reducing food waste, putting in place community gardens, connecting cities and rural areas, developing local food markets, promoting urban agriculture and fostering a vibrant food culture. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

A common goal seems to prevail across all these organisations, namely the need to build a sustainable, healthier, transparent and fairer food system for all. Other objectives of regional and local FPCs include achieving food sovereignty, developing shorter and local food supply chains, reducing food waste, putting in place community gardens, connecting cities and rural areas, developing local food markets, promoting urban agriculture and fostering a vibrant food culture.

| 3.3. | To achieve this goal, these organisations engage in a wide range of activities that do not always involve policy development, policy advice or policy change. Most FPCs arise from bottom-up approaches and support networking, advocacy, education, awareness-raising and project development. Others are policy-driven, like in France. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

To achieve this goal, these organisations engage in a wide range of activities that do not always involve policy development, policy advice or policy change. Most FPCs arise from bottom-up approaches and support networking, advocacy, education, awareness-raising and project development. Others are policy-driven, like in France.

| 3.4. | Community-based FPCs aim to make ‘food democracy’ a procedural guiding principle. Organisational structures for coordination, advice, and so on allow different stakeholders to engage in leadership, assistance, partnerships and other self-governing roles. Membership in FPCs is most often open to anyone with an interest in sustainable food system issues and willing to abide by democratic principles. Outside of regular membership, FPCs often build institutional partnerships with government agencies, businesses and civil society organisations that are active in transforming current food systems towards sustainability; these partnerships are also based on democratic practices, including collective control and decision-making. Last but not least, FPCs partner with the (local) government, as a major manifestation of democratic governance. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

Community-based FPCs aim to make ‘food democracy’ a procedural guiding principle. Organisational structures for coordination, advice, and so on allow different stakeholders to engage in leadership, assistance, partnerships and other self-governing roles. Membership in FPCs is most often open to anyone with an interest in sustainable food system issues and willing to abide by democratic principles. Outside of regular membership, FPCs often build institutional partnerships with government agencies, businesses and civil society organisations that are active in transforming current food systems towards sustainability; these partnerships are also based on democratic practices, including collective control and decision-making. Last but not least, FPCs partner with the (local) government, as a major manifestation of democratic governance.

| 3.5. | From FPCs’ point of view, food system sustainability is the overarching goal, working on strategic (general) goals such as supporting resilient food systems, increasing access to and knowledge of healthy and sustainable diets, fighting food waste using circular economy, supporting economic development, promoting equity in the food system, promoting environmental sustainability, and increasing knowledge of and demand for healthy food. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

From FPCs’ point of view, food system sustainability is the overarching goal, working on strategic (general) goals such as supporting resilient food systems, increasing access to and knowledge of healthy and sustainable diets, fighting food waste using circular economy, supporting economic development, promoting equity in the food system, promoting environmental sustainability, and increasing knowledge of and demand for healthy food.

| 3.6. | Two types of legal forms are dominant in European FPCs: associations and non-profit organisations, bottom-up structures created by civil society and top-down structures established by the local municipal authorities. Besides citizens, most FPCs bring together a wide variety of members, including private businesses, public administrations and stakeholders in the food, health and education sectors. They also bring together a broad representation of social groups from the local community. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

Two types of legal forms are dominant in European FPCs: associations and non-profit organisations, bottom-up structures created by civil society and top-down structures established by the local municipal authorities. Besides citizens, most FPCs bring together a wide variety of members, including private businesses, public administrations and stakeholders in the food, health and education sectors. They also bring together a broad representation of social groups from the local community.

| 3.7. | Funding and financing of FPCs vary significantly. Some FPCs have paid staff and/or (large) funded programmes and projects, others rely completely on contributions and volunteers. Funding sources vary from annual government support to membership fees, research or other grants, private foundation support and donations. Fundraising activities, members’ contributions, donations and public subsidies/grants are the main funding sources for FPCs established as non-profit organisations or associations, while FPCs founded by municipal authorities mostly rely on an annual budget from the city council. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

Funding and financing of FPCs vary significantly. Some FPCs have paid staff and/or (large) funded programmes and projects, others rely completely on contributions and volunteers. Funding sources vary from annual government support to membership fees, research or other grants, private foundation support and donations. Fundraising activities, members’ contributions, donations and public subsidies/grants are the main funding sources for FPCs established as non-profit organisations or associations, while FPCs founded by municipal authorities mostly rely on an annual budget from the city council.

| 3.8. | There are also potential pitfalls: research shows that FPCs may also have downsides and/or may not always function optimally (20), e.g. if the most vulnerable groups are underrepresented or if vested interests have a large influence. Another important challenge is that the quality of deliberation is conditional on equal participation, good process facilitation and a focus on knowledge/values rather than interests. The EESC therefore stresses the need for real inclusiveness and quality deliberations in FPCs, which requires going beyond open membership in ensuring genuine representativity, in particular of traditionally under-represented groups in society. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

There are also potential pitfalls: research shows that FPCs may also have downsides and/or may not always function optimally (20

| 3.9. | The EESC further believes that FPCs should engage with young generations, including through education. Sustainable food systems education should be prioritised in future generations, focusing on knowledge of sustainable and healthy diets, of the production chain from the beginning to the end to identify who and how it is produced and explain what is the distribution that takes place in our food system, from the farmer or livestock breeders, until the final product is consumed by the citizen. The EESC therefore recommends involving the competent education authorities in FPCs, which, in coordination with the agri-food sector, can establish the priority food content for the education system. Moreover, education of children should be supported by lifelong learning for parents and citizens’ education (21). |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

The EESC further believes that FPCs should engage with young generations, including through education. Sustainable food systems education should be prioritised in future generations, focusing on knowledge of sustainable and healthy diets, of the production chain from the beginning to the end to identify who and how it is produced and explain what is the distribution that takes place in our food system, from the farmer or livestock breeders, until the final product is consumed by the citizen. The EESC therefore recommends involving the competent education authorities in FPCs, which, in coordination with the agri-food sector, can establish the priority food content for the education system. Moreover, education of children should be supported by lifelong learning for parents and citizens’ education (21

4.   Call for a European Food Policy Council

Call for a European Food Policy Council

| 4.1. | The bottom-up tradition of FPCs has been rich but has not been able to influence progress and resilience at European level. Governance reform of food systems is inevitable and must be undertaken in a way that restores democracy and accountability to food systems. The future FSFS requires careful steering, ensuring coordinated change across sectors. It is by increasing accountability and participation that the veto of incumbents with little interest in change can be most effectively circumvented, and the impacts of a really comprehensive food policy can be regularly assessed, revised and improved. This is why the EESC believes that the establishment of a European Food Policy Council will be such a crucial step towards fulfilling a comprehensive food policy vision (22). |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

The bottom-up tradition of FPCs has been rich but has not been able to influence progress and resilience at European level. Governance reform of food systems is inevitable and must be undertaken in a way that restores democracy and accountability to food systems. The future FSFS requires careful steering, ensuring coordinated change across sectors. It is by increasing accountability and participation that the veto of incumbents with little interest in change can be most effectively circumvented, and the impacts of a really comprehensive food policy can be regularly assessed, revised and improved. This is why the EESC believes that the establishment of a European Food Policy Council will be such a crucial step towards fulfilling a comprehensive food policy vision (22

| 4.2. | A European Food Policy Council should: |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

A European Food Policy Council should:

| 4.2.1. | be science-based and ensure a scientific advice mechanism; be a trusted and trustworthy source of research and scientific advice; |
| --- | --- |

4.2.1.

be science-based and ensure a scientific advice mechanism; be a trusted and trustworthy source of research and scientific advice;

| 4.2.2. | have the following composition:






  — | academic experts and scientists (within the EFPC or as an advisory board); |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.2.2.

have the following composition:

—

academic experts and scientists (within the EFPC or as an advisory board);

| — | food supply chain actors (farmers, food businesses and processors, retailers, trade-unions, etc.), education system actors and civil society organisations (anti-poverty networks, food banks, social platforms, environmental and development NGOs); youth representatives; social partners; |
| --- | --- |

—

food supply chain actors (farmers, food businesses and processors, retailers, trade-unions, etc.), education system actors and civil society organisations (anti-poverty networks, food banks, social platforms, environmental and development NGOs); youth representatives; social partners;

| — | institutional representatives (Parliament, Council, Commission, EESC, CoR); |
| --- | --- |

—

institutional representatives (Parliament, Council, Commission, EESC, CoR);

| 4.2.3. | after the initial phase, the EFPC should also include representatives from local, regional and national levels and food policy councils with organised connectivity between relevant levels. At the moment, national food policy councils are not widespread enough to ensure that all countries are equally represented; |
| --- | --- |

4.2.3.

after the initial phase, the EFPC should also include representatives from local, regional and national levels and food policy councils with organised connectivity between relevant levels. At the moment, national food policy councils are not widespread enough to ensure that all countries are equally represented;

| 4.2.4. | be an institutional body to which the EU institutions should be committed and ensure political buy-in: an independent, authoritative body for long-term planning, a non-departmental body, to be trusted (flagship body), with the aim of helping to face the food future towards sustainable food systems and act as leverage; |
| --- | --- |

4.2.4.

be an institutional body to which the EU institutions should be committed and ensure political buy-in: an independent, authoritative body for long-term planning, a non-departmental body, to be trusted (flagship body), with the aim of helping to face the food future towards sustainable food systems and act as leverage;

| 4.2.5. | be a constant source of sound advice and evidence-based policy options and recommendations about the direction of the EU food system to which the EU institutions should be bound to provide feedback and reasoned answers. It should explore options for how to meet and monitor existing EU commitments, also assessing national food policy plans, and translate these into policy terms which provide social progress through food. It should finally engage in discussion on the functioning of global food systems; |
| --- | --- |

4.2.5.

be a constant source of sound advice and evidence-based policy options and recommendations about the direction of the EU food system to which the EU institutions should be bound to provide feedback and reasoned answers. It should explore options for how to meet and monitor existing EU commitments, also assessing national food policy plans, and translate these into policy terms which provide social progress through food. It should finally engage in discussion on the functioning of global food systems;

| 4.2.6. | improve the coherence between policy areas (such as the common agricultural policy, the common fisheries policy, the right to food, legislation related to healthy diets, public procurement, education policies, etc.) and promote social innovations towards the wellbeing of all food chain actors, taking into account the need for the generational renewal of farmers; |
| --- | --- |

4.2.6.

improve the coherence between policy areas (such as the common agricultural policy, the common fisheries policy, the right to food, legislation related to healthy diets, public procurement, education policies, etc.) and promote social innovations towards the wellbeing of all food chain actors, taking into account the need for the generational renewal of farmers;

| 4.2.7. | in relation to FPCs, support (financially and structurally) and foster bottom-up approaches towards sustainable local/regional/national food systems, combatting the rural/urban divide and polarisation between producers and consumers by supporting civil dialogue (including representatives of youth, the vulnerable and marginalised groups of society, rural actors, social partners), enable systematic development of FPCs, fostering synergies between local authorities and civil society; |
| --- | --- |

4.2.7.

in relation to FPCs, support (financially and structurally) and foster bottom-up approaches towards sustainable local/regional/national food systems, combatting the rural/urban divide and polarisation between producers and consumers by supporting civil dialogue (including representatives of youth, the vulnerable and marginalised groups of society, rural actors, social partners), enable systematic development of FPCs, fostering synergies between local authorities and civil society;

| 4.2.8. | eventually provide for a network of FPCs at EU level, creating a platform of exchanges of best practices and insights to inform and influence EU policy; |
| --- | --- |

4.2.8.

eventually provide for a network of FPCs at EU level, creating a platform of exchanges of best practices and insights to inform and influence EU policy;

| 4.2.9. | provide synergies with other existing EU platforms such as the EU Food Policy Coalition (23), the Food Waste Platform (24), the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform (ECESP) (25) and the EU Rural Pact (26). |
| --- | --- |

4.2.9.

provide synergies with other existing EU platforms such as the EU Food Policy Coalition (23

24

25

26

| 4.3. | The EESC stands ready to provide a convening space for the European Food Policy Council. A successful example already exists with the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform, a joint initiative by the EESC and the Commission (27). |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

The EESC stands ready to provide a convening space for the European Food Policy Council. A successful example already exists with the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform, a joint initiative by the EESC and the Commission (27

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  Transforming Europe's food system — Assessing the EU policy mix — European Environment Agency (europa.eu) and Prof. De Schutter, presentation at the EESC on 14 April 2023.

1

(2)  Among others: Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Civil society’s contribution to the development of a comprehensive food policy in the EU’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 129, 11.4.2018, p. 18) and Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A From Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020) 381) (OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 268).

2

(3)  See the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports: www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-cycle/

3

(4)  
  Power to the people? Food democracy initiatives’ contributions to democratic goods, Jeroen J. L. Candel, May 2022.

4

Power to the people? Food democracy initiatives’ contributions to democratic goods

(5)  See definitions in the following academic articles: Opportunities and challenges of food policy councils in pursuit of food system sustainability and food democracy–a comparative case study from the Upper-Rhine region (Mooney, 2022) and Food Policy Councils: Lessons learned (Harper et al., 2009).

5

(6)  The first US Food Policy Council was established in Knoxville, Tennessee, in 1982.

6

(7)  Examples of European FPCs or similar urban food initiatives can be seen in Horizon2020 and Horizon Europe projects that focus on agri-food policies and tools to improve food systems such as Cities2030, FoodSHIFT 2030, FoodCLIC, FEAST and FOOD TRAILS.

7

(8)  Franzen-Castle, L. et al. Engaging Rural Community Members with Food Policy Councils to Improve Food Access: Facilitators and Barriers. Journal of Hunger & Environmental Nutrition 17, 207–223 (2022).

8

et al.

Journal of Hunger & Environmental Nutrition

(9)  Consell Català de l'Alimentació.

9

(10)  Le CNA: www.cna-alimentation.fr/

10

(11)  Terres en villes: www.terresenvilles.org/

11

(12)  Montpellier, Rouen, Voiron, Le Havre, Artois (Béthune, Bruay-en-Artois), Douai, Angers, Rennes, Saint-Nazaire, Nantes, Lorient, Toulouse, Grenoble, Saint-Étienne, Lyon, Besançon, Dijon, Nancy, Metz, Amiens, Lille, Auxerre, Poitiers (2022).

12

(13)  Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional entra em funcionamento.

13

(14)  Food Policy Council: https://food.uni.lu/projects/research-projects/food-policy-council/

14

(15)  https://g1000landbouw.nl/

15

(16)  Nordic Food Policy Lab: www.norden.org/en/nordic-food-policy-lab

16

(17)  Among others: OJ C 129, 11.4.2018, p. 18 and OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 268.

17

(18)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Empowering youth to achieve sustainable development through education’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 100, 16.3.2023, p. 38).

18

(19)  EESC information report on Evaluation of the EU school scheme.

19

(20)  Power to the people? Food democracy initiatives’ contributions to democratic goods.

20

(21)  
  OJ C 100, 16.3.2023, p. 38.

21

(22)  IPES food report: CFP_FullReport.pdf (ipes-food.org), and De Schutter, O., Jacobs, N. and Clément, C., 2020, ‘A “Common Food Policy” for Europe: How governance reforms can spark a shift to healthy diets and sustainable food systems’, Food Policy 96.

22

Food Policy 96

(23)  EU Food Policy Coalition.

23

(24)  EU Platform on Food Losses and Food Waste.

24

(25)  European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform.

25

(26)  The rural pact. https://rural-vision.europa.eu/rural-pact_en

26

(27)  European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform.

27

---

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/8

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the impact of the energy crisis on the European economy

(own-initiative opinion)

(2023/C 293/02)

| Rapporteur: | Alena MASTANTUONO |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Alena MASTANTUONO

Alena MASTANTUONO

| Plenary Assembly decision | 25.1.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Adopted in section | 16.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 194/4/10 |

Plenary Assembly decision

25.1.2023

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Adopted in section

16.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

194/4/10

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The biggest impacts of the energy crisis are inflation and the strain on public finances. Energy prices driven by gas and oil prices were the catalyst for inflation and severely impacted low- and middle-income households and energy-intensive businesses. High inflation was the most visible phenomenon of the 2022 economic performance, with a knock-on effect on other elements of the consumer basket and a strong impact on consumption and behaviour. The very high level of bankruptcy declarations in the EU also shows the seriousness of the situation. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The biggest impacts of the energy crisis are inflation and the strain on public finances. Energy prices driven by gas and oil prices were the catalyst for inflation and severely impacted low- and middle-income households and energy-intensive businesses. High inflation was the most visible phenomenon of the 2022 economic performance, with a knock-on effect on other elements of the consumer basket and a strong impact on consumption and behaviour. The very high level of bankruptcy declarations in the EU also shows the seriousness of the situation.

| 1.2. | Adding to the impact of the energy crisis were the previous negative consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, which significantly weakened the EU’s economic performance after the biggest drop in GDP growth for many decades. Some sectors might suffer more from this cumulative effect. It also makes it difficult to have the overall picture of the impact of the energy crisis on the economy, due to the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The fact that today’s statistical data in some areas, such as employment, are somewhat positive certainly does not mean that the situation is perfect. A clear analysis of the economic impact can only be carried out when the crisis is over and when all detailed data are available. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

Adding to the impact of the energy crisis were the previous negative consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, which significantly weakened the EU’s economic performance after the biggest drop in GDP growth for many decades. Some sectors might suffer more from this cumulative effect. It also makes it difficult to have the overall picture of the impact of the energy crisis on the economy, due to the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The fact that today’s statistical data in some areas, such as employment, are somewhat positive certainly does not mean that the situation is perfect. A clear analysis of the economic impact can only be carried out when the crisis is over and when all detailed data are available.

| 1.3. | The energy crisis has impacted the economy in terms of high inflation, weak economic growth, strong pressure on public finances, and the purchasing power of households and businesses, as well as a loss of external economic competitiveness. Building on the European Central Bank (ECB) recommendations, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) suggests establishing a ‘Green triple-T’ criterion so that future interventions are tailored, targeted and transition-proof. Untargeted price measures would only prolong the period of elevated inflation in the longer run. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

The energy crisis has impacted the economy in terms of high inflation, weak economic growth, strong pressure on public finances, and the purchasing power of households and businesses, as well as a loss of external economic competitiveness. Building on the European Central Bank (ECB) recommendations, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) suggests establishing a ‘Green triple-T’ criterion so that future interventions are tailored, targeted and transition-proof. Untargeted price measures would only prolong the period of elevated inflation in the longer run.

| 1.4. | The EESC is convinced that the lesson to be learned from the negative effects of the energy crisis on the EU’s economic performance must be reflected in the next policy steps. The energy crisis, mainly triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, revealed and identified some of the substantial weaknesses and disruptions in the EU economic system, which must be structurally improved and adjusted so that it can face similar exogenous shocks more effectively, mainly in terms of resilience, efficiency and strategic autonomy. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

The EESC is convinced that the lesson to be learned from the negative effects of the energy crisis on the EU’s economic performance must be reflected in the next policy steps. The energy crisis, mainly triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, revealed and identified some of the substantial weaknesses and disruptions in the EU economic system, which must be structurally improved and adjusted so that it can face similar exogenous shocks more effectively, mainly in terms of resilience, efficiency and strategic autonomy.

| 1.5. | The EESC believes the EU needs to move beyond emergency fiscal responses and focus on structural changes to allow it to decouple from fossil fuels more quickly. To ensure its smooth and competitive economic development, the EU needs reliable and secure deliveries of affordable energy based on an integrated energy market with a large share of clean energy, which is resilient and able to face disruptions and shocks. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

The EESC believes the EU needs to move beyond emergency fiscal responses and focus on structural changes to allow it to decouple from fossil fuels more quickly. To ensure its smooth and competitive economic development, the EU needs reliable and secure deliveries of affordable energy based on an integrated energy market with a large share of clean energy, which is resilient and able to face disruptions and shocks.

| 1.6. | It strongly endorses all policy steps to reduce inflation sustainably over the course of this year and is in favour of economic recovery based on investments in the green, digital and strategically important sectors and industries, supporting the EU industrial base and global competitiveness, while using all of advantages of the single market. It is absolutely vital that production of clean technologies becomes a business case for Europe. The social partners want to ensure, at all costs, that knowledge, skills and the production base do not leave Europe. To ensure smart independence, industry — and the jobs it creates — has to stay in Europe. Therefore, being competitive and creating quality jobs must become a way of life and central to making and implementing our policies. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

It strongly endorses all policy steps to reduce inflation sustainably over the course of this year and is in favour of economic recovery based on investments in the green, digital and strategically important sectors and industries, supporting the EU industrial base and global competitiveness, while using all of advantages of the single market. It is absolutely vital that production of clean technologies becomes a business case for Europe. The social partners want to ensure, at all costs, that knowledge, skills and the production base do not leave Europe. To ensure smart independence, industry — and the jobs it creates — has to stay in Europe. Therefore, being competitive and creating quality jobs must become a way of life and central to making and implementing our policies.

| 1.7. | The implementation of the Green Deal including the transition to a carbon neutral economy and maintenance of a competitive EU industry requires vast investments from public and private sources. However, the EU lacks a long-term framework for robust financing of the Green Deal implementation. The EESC therefore asks for an adequate framework in order to support measures financing the transition to a climate neutral economy in a simple and efficient manner. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

The implementation of the Green Deal including the transition to a carbon neutral economy and maintenance of a competitive EU industry requires vast investments from public and private sources. However, the EU lacks a long-term framework for robust financing of the Green Deal implementation. The EESC therefore asks for an adequate framework in order to support measures financing the transition to a climate neutral economy in a simple and efficient manner.

| 1.8. | In times of crisis and uncertainty, objective information and strong political leadership are crucial. The EESC therefore recommends continuing to ensure appropriate communication, including throughout the period when the consequences of the crisis are being addressed. The reform of the energy market and system will have an impact on all industries and consumers; it is absolutely essential for stakeholders to have their say in the legislative process, and be adequately informed about this fundamental transition. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

In times of crisis and uncertainty, objective information and strong political leadership are crucial. The EESC therefore recommends continuing to ensure appropriate communication, including throughout the period when the consequences of the crisis are being addressed. The reform of the energy market and system will have an impact on all industries and consumers; it is absolutely essential for stakeholders to have their say in the legislative process, and be adequately informed about this fundamental transition.

2.   Basic facts and context

Basic facts and context

| 2.1. | The energy crisis and its impact on people’s lives and business prosperity is still ongoing. This makes it difficult to measure its final overall impact on the economy. We can, however, surely declare that the biggest impact of the crisis has been reflected in inflation (the highest for many decades) and the public finances (having played a strong role in mitigating the impacts of high prices and costs and massively supporting investments to make them less vulnerable). The cause of high energy prices was the skyrocketing gas prices (1). |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

The energy crisis and its impact on people’s lives and business prosperity is still ongoing. This makes it difficult to measure its final overall impact on the economy. We can, however, surely declare that the biggest impact of the crisis has been reflected in inflation (the highest for many decades) and the public finances (having played a strong role in mitigating the impacts of high prices and costs and massively supporting investments to make them less vulnerable). The cause of high energy prices was the skyrocketing gas prices (1

| 2.2. | It is appropriate to recall the Energy Union’s key milestones which have specifically set the course of the energy system’s future development. Some of its pillars, especially those relating to energy security, have been recently underestimated, mainly owing to a strong focus on and preference for cheap Russian gas, at the time considered a temporary source during the green economic transition and to the purely political hasty exit from stable clean sources. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

It is appropriate to recall the Energy Union’s key milestones which have specifically set the course of the energy system’s future development. Some of its pillars, especially those relating to energy security, have been recently underestimated, mainly owing to a strong focus on and preference for cheap Russian gas, at the time considered a temporary source during the green economic transition and to the purely political hasty exit from stable clean sources.

| 2.3. | Regarding the different energy mix in the EU Member States, which reflects, among other aspects, their geomorphologic conditions, meeting the Energy Union’s targets is strongly influenced by national circumstances. This factor is visibly reflected in the speed of the EU’s green transition. One thing, however, remains clear: the key priority of the Energy Union during the crisis was the security of supply, which was sometimes at odds with the green transition targets. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

Regarding the different energy mix in the EU Member States, which reflects, among other aspects, their geomorphologic conditions, meeting the Energy Union’s targets is strongly influenced by national circumstances. This factor is visibly reflected in the speed of the EU’s green transition. One thing, however, remains clear: the key priority of the Energy Union during the crisis was the security of supply, which was sometimes at odds with the green transition targets.

| 2.4. | The current energy crisis has revealed how serious the vulnerability of the EU energy system is and how important it is to pursue the open strategic energy autonomy of the whole energy industry chain. At the same time, it has demonstrated its ability to face and absorb robust exogenous shocks and their consequences. The energy crisis was triggered by a mix of economic, political and technical elements. The crisis began with economic upheaval following the COVID-19 pandemic which pushed up global energy demand, while third country interference and low levels of gas storage in some European countries during the 2021/2022 winter season combined with higher demand underlined the gravity of the situation. The already difficult situation then worsened with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, exacerbated by the EU’s dependence on fossil energy sources, with a strong direct influence on energy prices and supply security. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

The current energy crisis has revealed how serious the vulnerability of the EU energy system is and how important it is to pursue the open strategic energy autonomy of the whole energy industry chain. At the same time, it has demonstrated its ability to face and absorb robust exogenous shocks and their consequences. The energy crisis was triggered by a mix of economic, political and technical elements. The crisis began with economic upheaval following the COVID-19 pandemic which pushed up global energy demand, while third country interference and low levels of gas storage in some European countries during the 2021/2022 winter season combined with higher demand underlined the gravity of the situation. The already difficult situation then worsened with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, exacerbated by the EU’s dependence on fossil energy sources, with a strong direct influence on energy prices and supply security.

| 2.5. | The impact of the energy crisis on the EU economy has been damaging. In 2022, it directly contributed to all-time record inflation in the recent history of EU integration, with average EU inflation at 9,2 % (2), which is expected to fall to 6,7 % (still very high) in 2023 and 3,1 % a year later (3). High inflation had been the most visible phenomenon of the 2022 economic performance, with a knock-on effect on other elements of the consumer basket and a strong impact on consumption and behaviour. This has had an enormous impact on households and businesses. It is not only the most vulnerable who have suffered because of price hikes. Low- and middle-income households have been heavily affected and energy poverty rates might rise. All this deeply affected personal finance and consumer confidence in the EU; most consumers have adapted their habits to cope during the energy crisis. Consumer sentiment hit a record low in September 2022 and then slightly recovered thereafter. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

The impact of the energy crisis on the EU economy has been damaging. In 2022, it directly contributed to all-time record inflation in the recent history of EU integration, with average EU inflation at 9,2 % (2

3

| 2.6. | The situation has also negatively influenced the position of businesses. With a substantial increase of 26,8 % compared with the previous quarter, bankruptcy declarations in the EU reached 113,1 — the highest level ever recorded, following an index used by Eurostat to gauge the bankruptcy level in the EU compared to the benchmark of 100 in 2015. Data show that the index started to increase in the second quarter of 2020 and went up significantly throughout 2022. The figure in the fourth quarter of 2022 reflected a deteriorating situation in which companies, especially SMEs, were grappling with falling demand, tighter credit standards (4), and a gloomy and uncertain future. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

The situation has also negatively influenced the position of businesses. With a substantial increase of 26,8 % compared with the previous quarter, bankruptcy declarations in the EU reached 113,1 — the highest level ever recorded, following an index used by Eurostat to gauge the bankruptcy level in the EU compared to the benchmark of 100 in 2015. Data show that the index started to increase in the second quarter of 2020 and went up significantly throughout 2022. The figure in the fourth quarter of 2022 reflected a deteriorating situation in which companies, especially SMEs, were grappling with falling demand, tighter credit standards (4

| 2.7. | The energy crisis has also had negative effect on the EU’s economic performance, mainly in terms of private consumption (its decrease is considered to be the main reason behind the GDP stagnation), investments (despite huge potential in investment activity, the investment gap has actually been increasing since 2021), and external competitiveness (with a substantial worsening in comparison with the pre-2020 period.). Overall EU GDP, after a solid performance of 3,5 % growth in 2022, is predicted to grow slightly (1,0 %) in 2023 and modestly accelerate (1,7 %) in 2024. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

The energy crisis has also had negative effect on the EU’s economic performance, mainly in terms of private consumption (its decrease is considered to be the main reason behind the GDP stagnation), investments (despite huge potential in investment activity, the investment gap has actually been increasing since 2021), and external competitiveness (with a substantial worsening in comparison with the pre-2020 period.). Overall EU GDP, after a solid performance of 3,5 % growth in 2022, is predicted to grow slightly (1,0 %) in 2023 and modestly accelerate (1,7 %) in 2024.

| 2.8. | Another additional burden coming directly from the energy crisis is the performance of public finances. In 2022, the average budget deficit amounted to 3,4 % of GDP (5), and quite similar figures (exceeding the Stability and Growth Pact requirements) are estimated for the next two years as well. The energy crisis together with the green transition place significant pressure on public spending, while a prudent approach should be used in order to maintain fiscal balance. A broader utilisation of private investment leveraging based on guarantee schemes (EFSI-type) should be the model for allocating sufficient investments in a fiscally prudent way. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

Another additional burden coming directly from the energy crisis is the performance of public finances. In 2022, the average budget deficit amounted to 3,4 % of GDP (5

| 2.9. | So far, the aggregated statistic data regarding the impact of the energy crisis on the labour market have not been negative. In December 2022, the unemployment rate was 6,1 % in the EU (unchanged since April). These were the lowest figures since 2000. However, the slowdown in economic activity estimated at the end of last year and projected in early 2023 is set to hinder the pace of employment growth. Energy-intensive companies were hit hard by the crisis and major challenges are expected for the future labour market. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

So far, the aggregated statistic data regarding the impact of the energy crisis on the labour market have not been negative. In December 2022, the unemployment rate was 6,1 % in the EU (unchanged since April). These were the lowest figures since 2000. However, the slowdown in economic activity estimated at the end of last year and projected in early 2023 is set to hinder the pace of employment growth. Energy-intensive companies were hit hard by the crisis and major challenges are expected for the future labour market.

| 2.10. | In 2022, the energy crisis combined with a mild winter, savings and interrupted business operations led to a decrease in electricity consumption (-4,6 %). According to the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the fall in demand accelerated throughout the year; it was five times higher in the fourth quarter of 2022 than in the first quarter. The drop in demand increased from -1,8 % in the first quarter to -9,5 % in the fourth quarter, when compared with the same periods in 2021. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

In 2022, the energy crisis combined with a mild winter, savings and interrupted business operations led to a decrease in electricity consumption (-4,6 %). According to the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the fall in demand accelerated throughout the year; it was five times higher in the fourth quarter of 2022 than in the first quarter. The drop in demand increased from -1,8 % in the first quarter to -9,5 % in the fourth quarter, when compared with the same periods in 2021.

| 2.11. | At the same time, the crisis has had some positive aspects. Firstly, in terms of new solutions offering a breakthrough for increased energy efficiency and a boost to (or ‘renaissance’ of, in some cases) clean technologies. Some companies brought innovative solutions to the market. Secondly, it has highlighted a need for better interconnection of energy markets and solidarity across Member States. The EU institutions as well as the Member States were able to take steps and to react quite quickly and accept the new situation very flexibly. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

At the same time, the crisis has had some positive aspects. Firstly, in terms of new solutions offering a breakthrough for increased energy efficiency and a boost to (or ‘renaissance’ of, in some cases) clean technologies. Some companies brought innovative solutions to the market. Secondly, it has highlighted a need for better interconnection of energy markets and solidarity across Member States. The EU institutions as well as the Member States were able to take steps and to react quite quickly and accept the new situation very flexibly.

| 2.12. | The crisis has also led to a need to adjust and redefine the main pillars of the EU energy policy: the Energy Union, the Green Deal and its specific elements (especially the Fit for 55 package), and the framework of EU Taxonomy. Responses to the serious situation in 2022 include long-term structural tools such as REPowerEU and the Green Deal Industrial Policy for the Net-Zero-Age, as well as the immediate/short-term measures to prevent the most painful consequences of the crisis from affecting households and businesses. |
| --- | --- |

2.12.

The crisis has also led to a need to adjust and redefine the main pillars of the EU energy policy: the Energy Union, the Green Deal and its specific elements (especially the Fit for 55 package), and the framework of EU Taxonomy. Responses to the serious situation in 2022 include long-term structural tools such as REPowerEU and the Green Deal Industrial Policy for the Net-Zero-Age, as well as the immediate/short-term measures to prevent the most painful consequences of the crisis from affecting households and businesses.

3.   General comments

General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC stresses that the main cause of the crisis was the EU’s high dependence on Russia’s gas supplies and proposes setting a long-term vision which will make the EU less energy-dependent on third countries; this also includes independence with regard to clean technologies. The EESC underscores that all EU and national measures must incentivise this strategic shift to secure Europe’s strategic autonomy. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

The EESC stresses that the main cause of the crisis was the EU’s high dependence on Russia’s gas supplies and proposes setting a long-term vision which will make the EU less energy-dependent on third countries; this also includes independence with regard to clean technologies. The EESC underscores that all EU and national measures must incentivise this strategic shift to secure Europe’s strategic autonomy.

| 3.2. | The EESC is well aware that the main priority is to address not only the consequences, but above all the reasons and causes of the crisis, and is ready to discuss and propose solutions. This requires gradually moving away from the emergency measures to market-compatible and evidence-based reforms and investments, underpinned by sustainable and feasible strategic concepts. Those strategic concepts must strike a balance between their priorities, financial sources (public and private) and the institutional environment and administrative conditions (permissions, compliance with EU and national legislation), and be based on adequate public support. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

The EESC is well aware that the main priority is to address not only the consequences, but above all the reasons and causes of the crisis, and is ready to discuss and propose solutions. This requires gradually moving away from the emergency measures to market-compatible and evidence-based reforms and investments, underpinned by sustainable and feasible strategic concepts. Those strategic concepts must strike a balance between their priorities, financial sources (public and private) and the institutional environment and administrative conditions (permissions, compliance with EU and national legislation), and be based on adequate public support.

| 3.3. | The energy-saving measures made by households and businesses helped avert any serious risk of energy shortages. However, it should not go unnoticed that some savings were made only because of the shutdown of business activities. The most vulnerable industries in the crisis logically include the most energy-intensive ones (chemical industry, producers of fertilisers, steel industry and ironworks). Special attention should be paid to them in terms of their energy transition as well as the risk of EU deindustrialisation (carbon leakage). |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

The energy-saving measures made by households and businesses helped avert any serious risk of energy shortages. However, it should not go unnoticed that some savings were made only because of the shutdown of business activities. The most vulnerable industries in the crisis logically include the most energy-intensive ones (chemical industry, producers of fertilisers, steel industry and ironworks). Special attention should be paid to them in terms of their energy transition as well as the risk of EU deindustrialisation (carbon leakage).

| 3.4. | The basis of the green transition is a strong and interconnected energy infrastructure, which has suffered severe underinvestment in recent years. Infrastructure investment and upgrading will play a key role in the coming years. Therefore, it is important that new rules send a clear and long-term signal to investors. However, the capacity of SMEs to invest in the energy transition has been very limited since the initial crisis (COVID-19) broke out. The reforms must respect the goals of the EU energy policy in terms of the green transition, resilience and social welfare, as well as the huge differences among the energy mix structures of particular Member States. The crisis has had a serious impact on investment certainty. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

The basis of the green transition is a strong and interconnected energy infrastructure, which has suffered severe underinvestment in recent years. Infrastructure investment and upgrading will play a key role in the coming years. Therefore, it is important that new rules send a clear and long-term signal to investors. However, the capacity of SMEs to invest in the energy transition has been very limited since the initial crisis (COVID-19) broke out. The reforms must respect the goals of the EU energy policy in terms of the green transition, resilience and social welfare, as well as the huge differences among the energy mix structures of particular Member States. The crisis has had a serious impact on investment certainty.

| 3.5. | The EESC is convinced that the key reform requirements primarily include an update of the energy market design to allow for a sustainable green transition. The EESC calls upon the co-legislators to reach a consensus on the main market design categories, directly influencing the future propensity to invest in this sector, including long-term contracts; supportive and incentive instruments for renewables; a model forming the basis of energy price generation and the issue of overall flexibility. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

The EESC is convinced that the key reform requirements primarily include an update of the energy market design to allow for a sustainable green transition. The EESC calls upon the co-legislators to reach a consensus on the main market design categories, directly influencing the future propensity to invest in this sector, including long-term contracts; supportive and incentive instruments for renewables; a model forming the basis of energy price generation and the issue of overall flexibility.

| 3.6. | The EU Green Deal, supplemented by the REPowerEU initiative, has the potential to invest approximately EUR 350 billion of yearly investments until the end of the decade (more than 2 % of the EU’s annual GDP). The short-term EU investment forecast remains substantially weaker. This requires additional financial resources to be mobilised in order to accommodate the priority investment needs. These types of investments could be the trigger for a more robust EU economic recovery and for additional investment in infrastructure, digitalisation of energy networks, interconnection and storage capacities. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

The EU Green Deal, supplemented by the REPowerEU initiative, has the potential to invest approximately EUR 350 billion of yearly investments until the end of the decade (more than 2 % of the EU’s annual GDP). The short-term EU investment forecast remains substantially weaker. This requires additional financial resources to be mobilised in order to accommodate the priority investment needs. These types of investments could be the trigger for a more robust EU economic recovery and for additional investment in infrastructure, digitalisation of energy networks, interconnection and storage capacities.

| 3.7. | The EESC is well aware that huge financial resources are needed for this process. The green transition will not be possible without investment in research, innovation, infrastructure and people who should be properly prepared via education, upskilling and reskilling. Despite the large sums under new EU financing programmes proposed for this purpose, national public and private sources are absolutely essential to make this a reality. The EESC highlights a need for simple, efficient and easy-access financing and calls for innovative methods to engage private capital via financial instruments. The EESC also takes into account the broadened role of State aid support and financing for a targeted purpose, but recommends ensuring a level playing field in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

The EESC is well aware that huge financial resources are needed for this process. The green transition will not be possible without investment in research, innovation, infrastructure and people who should be properly prepared via education, upskilling and reskilling. Despite the large sums under new EU financing programmes proposed for this purpose, national public and private sources are absolutely essential to make this a reality. The EESC highlights a need for simple, efficient and easy-access financing and calls for innovative methods to engage private capital via financial instruments. The EESC also takes into account the broadened role of State aid support and financing for a targeted purpose, but recommends ensuring a level playing field in the EU.

| 3.8. | EU governments earmarked and allocated EUR 758 billion to shield households and firms between September 2021 and January 2023. Only a third of the fiscal interventions put in place by Member States were aimed at vulnerable categories. The EESC recommends building on the ECB recommendations; a ‘Green triple-T’ criterion so that future interventions are tailored, targeted and transition-proof should be established. Untargeted price measures were also defined by the IMF as setting the conditions for an extended period of higher inflation in the longer run. Delaying their phasing out might compromise the ECB’s ability to achieve its medium-term objectives, resulting in monetary tightening for longer than is otherwise desirable. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

EU governments earmarked and allocated EUR 758 billion to shield households and firms between September 2021 and January 2023. Only a third of the fiscal interventions put in place by Member States were aimed at vulnerable categories. The EESC recommends building on the ECB recommendations; a ‘Green triple-T’ criterion so that future interventions are tailored, targeted and transition-proof should be established. Untargeted price measures were also defined by the IMF as setting the conditions for an extended period of higher inflation in the longer run. Delaying their phasing out might compromise the ECB’s ability to achieve its medium-term objectives, resulting in monetary tightening for longer than is otherwise desirable.

| 3.9. | The EESC is convinced that the economic recovery could therefore lead to the creation of new job opportunities and improve the external competitiveness of the EU economy, via the creation of new industries and business projects needed to make the transition to a climate neutral economy successful. Quality upskilling and reskilling will be decisive in order to manage the transition process. It is absolutely vital that production of clean technologies becomes a business case for Europe. The social partners want to ensure, at all costs, that knowledge, skills and the production base do not leave Europe. To ensure smart independence, industry — and the jobs it creates — has to stay in Europe. There is an urgent need to regain ground and the transition to the green economy provides us with such an opportunity provided that it is managed well. Therefore, being competitive and creating quality jobs must become a way of life and central to making and implementing our policies. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

The EESC is convinced that the economic recovery could therefore lead to the creation of new job opportunities and improve the external competitiveness of the EU economy, via the creation of new industries and business projects needed to make the transition to a climate neutral economy successful. Quality upskilling and reskilling will be decisive in order to manage the transition process. It is absolutely vital that production of clean technologies becomes a business case for Europe. The social partners want to ensure, at all costs, that knowledge, skills and the production base do not leave Europe. To ensure smart independence, industry — and the jobs it creates — has to stay in Europe. There is an urgent need to regain ground and the transition to the green economy provides us with such an opportunity provided that it is managed well. Therefore, being competitive and creating quality jobs must become a way of life and central to making and implementing our policies.

| 3.10. | Beside the new reform measures, the EU must first focus on implementing and enforcing adopted legislation within the Green Deal. There is also the question of why these measures have not been implemented by the Member States. One of the reasons is that the capacity of Member States to absorb the wave of legislation is very low. The same goes for companies, mainly SMEs. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

Beside the new reform measures, the EU must first focus on implementing and enforcing adopted legislation within the Green Deal. There is also the question of why these measures have not been implemented by the Member States. One of the reasons is that the capacity of Member States to absorb the wave of legislation is very low. The same goes for companies, mainly SMEs.

4.   Specific comments

Specific comments

| 4.1. | The EESC calls upon the European Commission and its co-legislators to do their utmost to secure a consensus on the key market design parameters and categories. For example, in the case of power purchase agreements (PPAs), it would be a good idea to define common EU rules on public tenders for them, requirements for related state guarantees, or a framework for incentives for business to utilise the full potential of PPAs. The EESC would like to see results soon. Otherwise, owing to the lack of transparency and long-term predictability, investors will postpone their investment decisions or leave the market and the investments will not be made until the framework is absolutely clear to them. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

The EESC calls upon the European Commission and its co-legislators to do their utmost to secure a consensus on the key market design parameters and categories. For example, in the case of power purchase agreements (PPAs), it would be a good idea to define common EU rules on public tenders for them, requirements for related state guarantees, or a framework for incentives for business to utilise the full potential of PPAs. The EESC would like to see results soon. Otherwise, owing to the lack of transparency and long-term predictability, investors will postpone their investment decisions or leave the market and the investments will not be made until the framework is absolutely clear to them.

| 4.2. | The EESC is very concerned about the EU’s macroeconomic performance in many decades and is well aware of its seriousness. However, it is also aware that the game is not over and that action is needed to improve the situation. The EESC hopes that the biggest danger, inflation, is being brought under control, and if there is no other external shock, the period of a new clean, just and resilient energy system could begin soon. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

The EESC is very concerned about the EU’s macroeconomic performance in many decades and is well aware of its seriousness. However, it is also aware that the game is not over and that action is needed to improve the situation. The EESC hopes that the biggest danger, inflation, is being brought under control, and if there is no other external shock, the period of a new clean, just and resilient energy system could begin soon.

| 4.3. | The EESC strongly recommends making extraordinary measures concerning revenues strictly temporary. To use them for a longer period than necessary may lead to some behavioural changes, social effects and unnecessary market distortion, and act as a disincentive to invest for investors from the industries concerned. For a temporary period, capping policy should flexibly reflect the economic reality and be adjusted to market developments; otherwise it could harm consumers in the event of a drop in electricity prices. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

The EESC strongly recommends making extraordinary measures concerning revenues strictly temporary. To use them for a longer period than necessary may lead to some behavioural changes, social effects and unnecessary market distortion, and act as a disincentive to invest for investors from the industries concerned. For a temporary period, capping policy should flexibly reflect the economic reality and be adjusted to market developments; otherwise it could harm consumers in the event of a drop in electricity prices.

| 4.4. | The EESC firmly supports a strengthened system of consumer protection as a lesson from the impact of the current energy crisis on customers. This means a comprehensive service, including legal protection, information and advisory services, detailed instructions, best practice sharing, etc. Special attention should be paid to those at risk of energy poverty. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

The EESC firmly supports a strengthened system of consumer protection as a lesson from the impact of the current energy crisis on customers. This means a comprehensive service, including legal protection, information and advisory services, detailed instructions, best practice sharing, etc. Special attention should be paid to those at risk of energy poverty.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

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(1)  Electricity prices sharply increased, with a varied impact depending on the local importance of gas in the generation portfolio, reaching 150-300 EUR/MWh in 2022.

1

(2)  EC Harmonised Index of Consumer Energy Prices 2023 Edition shows that the annual rate in 2022 reached 20 % on average. However, the picture across Member States was different, with a maximum level recorded in Italy of 65 %.

2

(3)  Spring 2023 Economic Forecast: Eurostat.

3

(4)  According to the January 2023 ECB Lending Survey, lending standards continued to tighten strongly in the fourth quarter of 2022 for both firms and households. Enterprises saw the largest net tightening in credit standards since the euro area sovereign debt crisis in 2011.

4

(5)  Spring 2023 Economic Forecast: Eurostat.

5

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| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/13

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the second set of new own resources

(exploratory opinion)

(2023/C 293/03)

| Rapporteur: | Philip VON BROCKDORFF |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Philip VON BROCKDORFF

Philip VON BROCKDORFF

| Referral | 20.1.2023, Letter from Maroš ŠEFČOVIČ, Vice-President of the European Commission for Interinstitutional Relations and Foresight |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion |
| Adopted in section | 30.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 140/67/12 |

Referral

20.1.2023, Letter from Maroš ŠEFČOVIČ, Vice-President of the European Commission for Interinstitutional Relations and Foresight

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion

Adopted in section

30.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

140/67/12

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | As stated by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in its previous opinion on this matter (1), Member States’ agreement is necessary to add new own resources to cover the debt repayment resulting from borrowing under the NextGenerationEU Recovery Plan without jeopardising the budgets of EU programmes or substantially increasing the Gross National Income (GNI)-based resource contribution. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

As stated by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in its previous opinion on this matter (1

| 1.2. | The EESC emphasises that the designing of proposals for new sources of own revenues should be done in context of the budgetary pressures faced by Member States following the pandemic and the ongoing international tensions. This has become all the more important in the current higher interest rate environment, which may lead to the new own resources proposed in the 2021 Commission package falling short of covering the cost of repaying NextGenerationEU. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC emphasises that the designing of proposals for new sources of own revenues should be done in context of the budgetary pressures faced by Member States following the pandemic and the ongoing international tensions. This has become all the more important in the current higher interest rate environment, which may lead to the new own resources proposed in the 2021 Commission package falling short of covering the cost of repaying NextGenerationEU.

| 1.3. | The EESC notes that the own resource based on plastic packaging waste that is not recycled is in force. It emphasises the importance of adopting and transposing the new legislative proposal on packaging and packaging waste related to non-recycled plastic packing waste in a harmonised manner. The EESC also considers an own resource calculated on the basis of the volume of municipal waste as another implementable option (assuming it is technically and environmentally feasible), which would also support the circular economy. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

The EESC notes that the own resource based on plastic packaging waste that is not recycled is in force. It emphasises the importance of adopting and transposing the new legislative proposal on packaging and packaging waste related to non-recycled plastic packing waste in a harmonised manner. The EESC also considers an own resource calculated on the basis of the volume of municipal waste as another implementable option (assuming it is technically and environmentally feasible), which would also support the circular economy.

| 1.4. | The EESC urges the Commission to develop the proposals concerning Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT) as soon as possible. In this regard, the EESC calls on the Commission to set clear aims in relation to simplifying the tax landscape and ensuring the competitiveness of existing and new tax directives. In particular, the EESC highlights the need to base the BEFIT rules on harmonised definitions and standards as well as a more refined estimation of the potential additional revenues linked to its implementation. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

The EESC urges the Commission to develop the proposals concerning Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT) as soon as possible. In this regard, the EESC calls on the Commission to set clear aims in relation to simplifying the tax landscape and ensuring the competitiveness of existing and new tax directives. In particular, the EESC highlights the need to base the BEFIT rules on harmonised definitions and standards as well as a more refined estimation of the potential additional revenues linked to its implementation.

| 1.5. | The EESC deems it reasonable to explore the possibility of including financial services within BEFIT or of developing a global financial transaction tax (FTT) as proposed by the European Parliament while at the same time assessing impacts of the proposal. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

The EESC deems it reasonable to explore the possibility of including financial services within BEFIT or of developing a global financial transaction tax (FTT) as proposed by the European Parliament while at the same time assessing impacts of the proposal.

| 1.6. | The EESC welcomes the agreement between the Council and the European Parliament on the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Moreover, with the aim of achieving a more level playing field in terms of labour conditions, the Commission may consider an additional levy targeting EU companies importing products from third-country manufacturers that do not ensure proper protection of workers, assuming this is in line with the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and subject to clear criteria to its application. At the same time, the EESC re-emphasises the need for some export relief for EU companies to compete on third markets. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The EESC welcomes the agreement between the Council and the European Parliament on the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Moreover, with the aim of achieving a more level playing field in terms of labour conditions, the Commission may consider an additional levy targeting EU companies importing products from third-country manufacturers that do not ensure proper protection of workers, assuming this is in line with the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and subject to clear criteria to its application. At the same time, the EESC re-emphasises the need for some export relief for EU companies to compete on third markets.

| 1.7. | Pursuant to the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, the EESC notes that a standstill and withdrawal period concerning digital taxes had been agreed. An EU-wide tax on digital transactions could however be potentially considered to increase own resources in case the agreed rules of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework are not respected by other major trading partners. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

Pursuant to the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, the EESC notes that a standstill and withdrawal period concerning digital taxes had been agreed. An EU-wide tax on digital transactions could however be potentially considered to increase own resources in case the agreed rules of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework are not respected by other major trading partners.

| 1.8. | The EESC also emphasises that the second set of own resources measures should be in line with the proportionality and social fairness principles. In addition, the EESC reiterates that all of the proposals regarding own resources should be supported by an impact assessment of their effectiveness. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

The EESC also emphasises that the second set of own resources measures should be in line with the proportionality and social fairness principles. In addition, the EESC reiterates that all of the proposals regarding own resources should be supported by an impact assessment of their effectiveness.

2.   Background

Background

| 2.1. | Article 311 TFEU stipulates that, without prejudice to other revenue, the EU budget should be financed wholly with EU own resources. These resources can be defined as revenue streams directly assigned to the EU without the need for any additional decisions by the Member States. However, the major part of EU revenues consists, in practice, of contributions from the Member States (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

Article 311 TFEU stipulates that, without prejudice to other revenue, the EU budget should be financed wholly with EU own resources. These resources can be defined as revenue streams directly assigned to the EU without the need for any additional decisions by the Member States. However, the major part of EU revenues consists, in practice, of contributions from the Member States (2

| 2.2. | Presenting its Work Programme for 2023, the European Commission announced a proposal for a second basket of new own resources, currently planned for the third quarter of 2023 and building, inter alia, on the announced legislative proposal concerning a single set of tax rules for doing business in Europe (BEFIT). This advances the schedule of the interinstitutional agreement presented in December 2020 by one year (3). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

Presenting its Work Programme for 2023, the European Commission announced a proposal for a second basket of new own resources, currently planned for the third quarter of 2023 and building, inter alia, on the announced legislative proposal concerning a single set of tax rules for doing business in Europe (BEFIT). This advances the schedule of the interinstitutional agreement presented in December 2020 by one year (3

| 2.3. | The second basket of own resources follows the first one, presented during December 2021 (4), which was based on three new sources of revenue. The first source is based on revenues from emissions trading (ETS), the second draws on the resources generated by the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and the third is based on the share of residual profits from multinationals that will be reallocated to EU Member States under the OECD/G20 agreement on a reallocation of taxing rights (‘Pillar One’). |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

The second basket of own resources follows the first one, presented during December 2021 (4

| 2.4. | The aim of the new own resource proposal is to ensure a resilient and diversified flow of revenues for the EU, avoiding both cuts to EU programmes and an excessive increase in the contributions to the EU budget based on the GNI of Member States. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

The aim of the new own resource proposal is to ensure a resilient and diversified flow of revenues for the EU, avoiding both cuts to EU programmes and an excessive increase in the contributions to the EU budget based on the GNI of Member States.

| 2.5. | The long-term impact on the EU budget of the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) Recovery Plan — implemented to cope with the economic and social disruption caused by the pandemic — will be considered within the new framework, which is designed to duly utilise the new set of own resources to steadily repay the funds borrowed on the capital markets by the Commission for the grant component of NextGenerationEU by 2058 at the latest. It should be pointed out that the repayment of the principal and interest have to be financed from the EU budget in line with the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

The long-term impact on the EU budget of the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) Recovery Plan — implemented to cope with the economic and social disruption caused by the pandemic — will be considered within the new framework, which is designed to duly utilise the new set of own resources to steadily repay the funds borrowed on the capital markets by the Commission for the grant component of NextGenerationEU by 2058 at the latest. It should be pointed out that the repayment of the principal and interest have to be financed from the EU budget in line with the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

| 2.6. | Ahead of its proposal on the second set of new own resources, the Commission asked the European Economic and Social Committee to put forward its point of view and recommendations in order to enrich its proposal with the EESC’s perspective. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

Ahead of its proposal on the second set of new own resources, the Commission asked the European Economic and Social Committee to put forward its point of view and recommendations in order to enrich its proposal with the EESC’s perspective.

| 2.7. | The current EESC opinion supplements the previous one issued by the Committee on the same topic (5) with some adaptations to consider the ongoing institutional debate and most recent developments. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

The current EESC opinion supplements the previous one issued by the Committee on the same topic (5

3.   General comments

General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC is appreciative of having the possibility to again voice its position on a crucial and strategic matter for the future of the EU integration process. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

The EESC is appreciative of having the possibility to again voice its position on a crucial and strategic matter for the future of the EU integration process.

| 3.2. | In this respect, the EESC would like to underline that the debate about the origins of own resources, and their use for the EU budget respecting the principle of universality, should be carried out not just among the European institutions, but also generally involving the business community, other social partners and civil society, including representatives of as many categories of EU citizens as possible, thereby also involving older age groups and vulnerable groups. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

In this respect, the EESC would like to underline that the debate about the origins of own resources, and their use for the EU budget respecting the principle of universality, should be carried out not just among the European institutions, but also generally involving the business community, other social partners and civil society, including representatives of as many categories of EU citizens as possible, thereby also involving older age groups and vulnerable groups.

| 3.3. | As pointed out in its opinion on the Proposal for an own resources decision, the EESC agrees that it is necessary to provide for new own resources to duly sustain the EU agenda and objectives without jeopardising the budgets of the EU programmes under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 and without substantially increasing the GNI-based resources contribution. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

As pointed out in its opinion on the Proposal for an own resources decision, the EESC agrees that it is necessary to provide for new own resources to duly sustain the EU agenda and objectives without jeopardising the budgets of the EU programmes under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 and without substantially increasing the GNI-based resources contribution.

| 3.4. | At the same time, the EESC notes that, with the introduction of the own resource based on non-recycled plastic packing waste, the high share of the GNI contribution on the part of Member States has been reduced. In this context, the EESC emphasises the importance of adopting and transposing the new legislative proposal on packaging and packaging waste in a harmonised manner with a view to reducing the compliance burden. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

At the same time, the EESC notes that, with the introduction of the own resource based on non-recycled plastic packing waste, the high share of the GNI contribution on the part of Member States has been reduced. In this context, the EESC emphasises the importance of adopting and transposing the new legislative proposal on packaging and packaging waste in a harmonised manner with a view to reducing the compliance burden.

| 3.5. | The EESC hopes that the announced second set of own resources measures will be in line with the proportionality and social fairness principles, striking an appropriate balance between the need to have a strong financial budget able to sustain the EU’s objectives, on the one hand, and social cohesion as well as a business-friendly environment, on the other hand. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

The EESC hopes that the announced second set of own resources measures will be in line with the proportionality and social fairness principles, striking an appropriate balance between the need to have a strong financial budget able to sustain the EU’s objectives, on the one hand, and social cohesion as well as a business-friendly environment, on the other hand.

| 3.6. | The EESC highlights the importance of distinguishing between EU own resources and EU tax policies: whereas the former utilise tax tools to ensure appropriate revenue streams to fund the EU budget, the tax policies of the EU should aim to promote economic integration, as well as to enhance and further develop the single market, rather than increasing tax burdens and undermining social and economic integration. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

The EESC highlights the importance of distinguishing between EU own resources and EU tax policies: whereas the former utilise tax tools to ensure appropriate revenue streams to fund the EU budget, the tax policies of the EU should aim to promote economic integration, as well as to enhance and further develop the single market, rather than increasing tax burdens and undermining social and economic integration.

| 3.7. | The EESC would like to emphasise that the Commission proposal will have to carefully consider the adverse impact of the Russian attack on Ukraine, which is persisting over time, with its related consequences in terms of global economic downturn, impact on supply chains, and international tensions, thus creating a complex context to cope with. Such a context includes, inter alia, high, persistent inflation and rising interest rates in order to ease inflation itself. All of this creates a very challenging economic environment for the Commission’s proposal. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

The EESC would like to emphasise that the Commission proposal will have to carefully consider the adverse impact of the Russian attack on Ukraine, which is persisting over time, with its related consequences in terms of global economic downturn, impact on supply chains, and international tensions, thus creating a complex context to cope with. Such a context includes, inter alia, high, persistent inflation and rising interest rates in order to ease inflation itself. All of this creates a very challenging economic environment for the Commission’s proposal.

| 3.8. | In light of the abovementioned context, the EESC observes that the budgetary pressures faced by Member States after the pandemic and during the ongoing international tensions should be taken into proper consideration for the purpose of developing proposals for new sources of EU budget revenues. The EESC notes that collecting revenues at EU level puts a further strain on national budgets. Moreover, the repayment of NGEU borrowing from the EU budget is a given commitment, possibly leading to higher Member State contributions in the absence of new own resources. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

In light of the abovementioned context, the EESC observes that the budgetary pressures faced by Member States after the pandemic and during the ongoing international tensions should be taken into proper consideration for the purpose of developing proposals for new sources of EU budget revenues. The EESC notes that collecting revenues at EU level puts a further strain on national budgets. Moreover, the repayment of NGEU borrowing from the EU budget is a given commitment, possibly leading to higher Member State contributions in the absence of new own resources.

| 3.9. | At the same time, the EESC points out that the new own resources proposed in the first Commission package on 14 December 2021 will probably not be sufficient to cover the whole of the EU’s current obligations given also the higher interest rate environment. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

At the same time, the EESC points out that the new own resources proposed in the first Commission package on 14 December 2021 will probably not be sufficient to cover the whole of the EU’s current obligations given also the higher interest rate environment.

| 3.10. | The EESC deems it important to have a sound and strong EU budget able not only to ensure the strategic autonomy of the European Union, but also to properly support the twin green and digital transitions with all the challenges and adaptations that this will involve for Member States, regions and local communities, as well as businesses across Europe. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

The EESC deems it important to have a sound and strong EU budget able not only to ensure the strategic autonomy of the European Union, but also to properly support the twin green and digital transitions with all the challenges and adaptations that this will involve for Member States, regions and local communities, as well as businesses across Europe.

| 3.11. | The EESC observes that, in order to effectively reinforce the EU budget and multiannual financial framework, the NGEU grants will need to be repaid over the specified period of time without further extension in order to avoid the risk of excessive borrowing costs stemming from an excessively protracted duration, which would be detrimental to economic growth and social well-being for future generations. That is especially true during the current period of rising interest rates, which are making indebtedness more difficult to sustain in the long run and financing costs rather unpredictable. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

The EESC observes that, in order to effectively reinforce the EU budget and multiannual financial framework, the NGEU grants will need to be repaid over the specified period of time without further extension in order to avoid the risk of excessive borrowing costs stemming from an excessively protracted duration, which would be detrimental to economic growth and social well-being for future generations. That is especially true during the current period of rising interest rates, which are making indebtedness more difficult to sustain in the long run and financing costs rather unpredictable.

| 3.12. | As a prerequisite to propose an own resource based on corporate taxation, the EESC calls for the Commission to further develop, with urgency, the proposal concerning a common set of rules to estimate the corporate taxable base for EU-based entities that are part of a group with global consolidated revenues above a certain threshold. BEFIT will also include provisions for the allocation of profits to Member States based on an apportionment formula. Once allocated, profits would be subject to the corporate income tax rate of the respective Member States. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

As a prerequisite to propose an own resource based on corporate taxation, the EESC calls for the Commission to further develop, with urgency, the proposal concerning a common set of rules to estimate the corporate taxable base for EU-based entities that are part of a group with global consolidated revenues above a certain threshold. BEFIT will also include provisions for the allocation of profits to Member States based on an apportionment formula. Once allocated, profits would be subject to the corporate income tax rate of the respective Member States.

| 3.13. | The EESC notes the Commission’s announcement that it will seek to build on the BEFIT proposal to develop an additional stream of EU own resources. However, finding a political agreement on such a proposal might be quite difficult, as the 2011 and 2016 CCCTB (6) proposals have shown in the past. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

The EESC notes the Commission’s announcement that it will seek to build on the BEFIT proposal to develop an additional stream of EU own resources. However, finding a political agreement on such a proposal might be quite difficult, as the 2011 and 2016 CCCTB (6

| 3.14. | The EESC calls for a debate involving all stakeholders with respect to BEFIT, as this will help to ensure transparency regarding its impact. Moreover, the EESC highlights that BEFIT needs clear aims and key principles in order to deliver simplification of the tax landscape and ensure the competitiveness of existing and new tax directives. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

The EESC calls for a debate involving all stakeholders with respect to BEFIT, as this will help to ensure transparency regarding its impact. Moreover, the EESC highlights that BEFIT needs clear aims and key principles in order to deliver simplification of the tax landscape and ensure the competitiveness of existing and new tax directives.

| 3.15. | The EESC highlights that the potential rules on BEFIT should be based on harmonised definitions and standards in order to enable the proper functioning of the proposal across the entire internal market, as well as a more refined estimation of the potential additional revenues linked to the implementation of BEFIT, if such revenues do actually materialise (7). |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

The EESC highlights that the potential rules on BEFIT should be based on harmonised definitions and standards in order to enable the proper functioning of the proposal across the entire internal market, as well as a more refined estimation of the potential additional revenues linked to the implementation of BEFIT, if such revenues do actually materialise (7

| 3.16. | The EESC points out that, in any case, there is an intrinsic volatility associated with corporate tax revenues, resulting in complexity when it comes to precisely estimating future fiscal revenues to be deployed into own resources. That is especially true in the current economic context with high inflation and interest rate increases. As to the matter at hand, the EESC encourages the Commission to carry out dedicated studies and impact assessment simulations aimed at establishing a reliable range of own resources that could be collected through BEFIT. However, the EESC cautions about any additional compliance costs for businesses. |
| --- | --- |

3.16.

The EESC points out that, in any case, there is an intrinsic volatility associated with corporate tax revenues, resulting in complexity when it comes to precisely estimating future fiscal revenues to be deployed into own resources. That is especially true in the current economic context with high inflation and interest rate increases. As to the matter at hand, the EESC encourages the Commission to carry out dedicated studies and impact assessment simulations aimed at establishing a reliable range of own resources that could be collected through BEFIT. However, the EESC cautions about any additional compliance costs for businesses.

| 3.17. | Since the Commission’s proposal on BEFIT will build on the Inclusive Framework two-pillar approach embraced by the OECD and the G20 with regard to the allocation of profits (pillar 1) and on the complementary rules (pillar 2), the EESC encourages the Commission to continue working in close coordination with international initiatives both to develop the BEFIT proposal. |
| --- | --- |

3.17.

Since the Commission’s proposal on BEFIT will build on the Inclusive Framework two-pillar approach embraced by the OECD and the G20 with regard to the allocation of profits (pillar 1) and on the complementary rules (pillar 2), the EESC encourages the Commission to continue working in close coordination with international initiatives both to develop the BEFIT proposal.

| 3.18. | As also suggested by the European Parliament, the possibility to include financial services within BEFIT, or the development of a global financial transaction tax, could be explored while assessing possible impacts. The new tax provisions should then be combined with targeted rules aimed at devoting part of the additional tax revenues expected to EU own resources. |
| --- | --- |

3.18.

As also suggested by the European Parliament, the possibility to include financial services within BEFIT, or the development of a global financial transaction tax, could be explored while assessing possible impacts. The new tax provisions should then be combined with targeted rules aimed at devoting part of the additional tax revenues expected to EU own resources.

| 3.19. | The EESC recalls that the sole objective of the CBAM agreed between the Council and the European Parliament was to motivate the EU’s trading partners to decarbonise their production alongside the EU. This was proposed as an own resource in the first package. Further to this, the Commission may consider the possibility of an additional levy targeted at EU companies importing products from third-country manufacturers that do not ensure proper protection of workers. This option would only be considered as long as it is compatible with WTO rules and subject to clear criteria to its application. This levy could provide some protection to workers in third countries and progressively facilitate the achievement of a level playing field in terms of labour conditions between the EU and other trading blocs. At the same time, the EESC calls for some form of export relief so that EU companies can compete on third markets. This was highlighted in a previous EESC opinion on the CBAM. |
| --- | --- |

3.19.

The EESC recalls that the sole objective of the CBAM agreed between the Council and the European Parliament was to motivate the EU’s trading partners to decarbonise their production alongside the EU. This was proposed as an own resource in the first package. Further to this, the Commission may consider the possibility of an additional levy targeted at EU companies importing products from third-country manufacturers that do not ensure proper protection of workers. This option would only be considered as long as it is compatible with WTO rules and subject to clear criteria to its application. This levy could provide some protection to workers in third countries and progressively facilitate the achievement of a level playing field in terms of labour conditions between the EU and other trading blocs. At the same time, the EESC calls for some form of export relief so that EU companies can compete on third markets. This was highlighted in a previous EESC opinion on the CBAM.

| 3.20. | Pursuant to the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, whereby a standstill and withdrawal period concerning digital taxes had been agreed, the EESC is of the view that an EU-wide tax on digital transactions to increase own resources could be potentially considered. However, this would only apply in case the agreed rules of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework are not respected by other major trading partners. |
| --- | --- |

3.20.

Pursuant to the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework, whereby a standstill and withdrawal period concerning digital taxes had been agreed, the EESC is of the view that an EU-wide tax on digital transactions to increase own resources could be potentially considered. However, this would only apply in case the agreed rules of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework are not respected by other major trading partners.

| 3.21. | In cases where it is technically and environmentally feasible to recycle municipal waste, a statistics-based own resource based on the volume of municipal waste is another option to making landfilling and incineration more expensive than recycling, thereby supporting the circular economy across the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

3.21.

In cases where it is technically and environmentally feasible to recycle municipal waste, a statistics-based own resource based on the volume of municipal waste is another option to making landfilling and incineration more expensive than recycling, thereby supporting the circular economy across the internal market.

| 3.22. | As pointed out in its previous opinion on the proposal for an own resources decision, the EESC maintains that efficiency and effectiveness in the collection, administration and subsequent expenditure of own resources is key at all stages and strategic to ensuring a proper and productive harnessing of own resources to achieve the ambitious objectives set forth by the Commission agenda. |
| --- | --- |

3.22.

As pointed out in its previous opinion on the proposal for an own resources decision, the EESC maintains that efficiency and effectiveness in the collection, administration and subsequent expenditure of own resources is key at all stages and strategic to ensuring a proper and productive harnessing of own resources to achieve the ambitious objectives set forth by the Commission agenda.

| 3.23. | Finally, and also in line with the previous opinion on the proposal for an own resources decision, the EESC reiterates the importance of all of the proposals regarding own resources being supported by an impact assessment on the effectiveness of the proposed measures, and, in particular, on the revenues such measures are expected to generate. |
| --- | --- |

3.23.

Finally, and also in line with the previous opinion on the proposal for an own resources decision, the EESC reiterates the importance of all of the proposals regarding own resources being supported by an impact assessment on the effectiveness of the proposed measures, and, in particular, on the revenues such measures are expected to generate.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The next generation of own resources for the EU Budget (COM(2021) 566 final), Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (COM(2021) 569 final — 2021/0429 (APP)), Proposal for a Council Decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021) 570 final — 2021/0430 (CNS)) (OJ C 323, 26.8.2022, p. 48).

1

(2)  European Parliamentary Research Service.

2

(3)  Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources of 16 December 2020 (L433I/28).

3

(4)  COM(2021) 566 final.

4

(5)  EESC opinion on the Proposal for an own resources decision (OJ C 323, 26.8.2022, p. 48).

5

Proposal for an own resources decision

(6)  Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base.

6

(7)  The purpose of BEFIT is to simplify and to allow for effective consolidation of profits and losses, and not necessarily to collect more revenues.

7

---

ANNEX

The following amendments, which received at least a quarter of the votes cast, were rejected in the course of the debate (Rule 74(3) of the Rules of Procedure):

AMENDMENT 3

ECO/617 — Second set of new own resources

Paragraph 3.18

Amend as follows

| Section opinion | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| As also suggested by the European Parliament, the possibility to include financial services within BEFIT, or the development of a global financial transaction tax, could be explored. The new tax provisions should then be combined with targeted rules aimed at devoting part of the additional tax revenues expected to EU own resources. However, the EESC understands that a financial transaction tax could possibly make the EU less competitive, especially if applied only within the EU. Moreover, a broad-based Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) is unlikely to collect much in terms of revenue but could still adversely impact European businesses and households, potentially reducing growth with a further strain on public finances. | As also suggested by the European Parliament, the possibility to include financial services within BEFIT, or the development of a global financial transaction tax, could be explored (9). The new tax provisions should then be combined with targeted rules aimed at devoting part of the additional tax revenues expected to EU own resources. However, the EESC understands that a financial transaction tax could possibly make the EU less competitive, especially if applied only within the EU. Moreover, a broad-based Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) is unlikely to collect much in terms of revenue but could still adversely impact European businesses and households, potentially reducing growth with a further strain on public finances. |

Section opinion

Amendment

As also suggested by the European Parliament, the possibility to include financial services within BEFIT, or the development of a global financial transaction tax, could be explored. The new tax provisions should then be combined with targeted rules aimed at devoting part of the additional tax revenues expected to EU own resources. However, the EESC understands that a financial transaction tax could possibly make the EU less competitive, especially if applied only within the EU. Moreover, a broad-based Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) is unlikely to collect much in terms of revenue but could still adversely impact European businesses and households, potentially reducing growth with a further strain on public finances.

As also suggested by the European Parliament, the possibility to include financial services within BEFIT, or the development of a global financial transaction tax, could be explored (9). The new tax provisions should then be combined with targeted rules aimed at devoting part of the additional tax revenues expected to EU own resources. However, the EESC understands that a financial transaction tax could possibly make the EU less competitive, especially if applied only within the EU. Moreover, a broad-based Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) is unlikely to collect much in terms of revenue but could still adversely impact European businesses and households, potentially reducing growth with a further strain on public finances.

Reason

This is very important background information to add, explaining to the reader of the opinion, how politically complicated introducing the FTT across EU Member States still is, despite the fact that the Commission’s legislative initiative was already proposed almost 12 years ago. This only proves that benefits of introducing the FTT only in the EU or only among some of EU Member States, are highly questionable.

Outcome of the vote:

| In favour: | 80 |
| --- | --- |
| Against: | 122 |
| Abstention: | 14 |

In favour:

80

Against:

122

Abstention:

14

AMENDMENT 4

ECO/617 — Second set of new own resources

Paragraph 3.19

Amend as follows

| Section opinion | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The EESC recalls that the sole objective of the CBAM agreed between the Council and the European Parliament was to motivate the EU’s trading partners to decarbonise their production alongside the EU. This was proposed as an own resource in the first package.
  Further to this, the Commission may consider the possibility of an additional levy targeted at EU companies importing products from third-country manufacturers that do not ensure proper protection of workers. This option would only be considered as long as it is compatible with WTO rules and subject to clear criteria to its application. This levy could provide some protection to workers in third countries and progressively facilitate the achievement of a level playing field in terms of labour conditions between the EU and other trading blocs.
  At the same time, the EESC calls for some form of export relief so that EU companies can compete on third markets. This was highlighted in a previous EESC opinion on the CBAM. | The EESC recalls that the sole objective of the CBAM agreed between the Council and the European Parliament was to motivate the EU’s trading partners to decarbonise their production alongside the EU. This was proposed as an own resource in the first package. At the same time, the EESC calls for some form of export relief so that EU companies can compete on third markets. This was highlighted in a previous EESC opinion on the CBAM. |

Section opinion

Amendment

The EESC recalls that the sole objective of the CBAM agreed between the Council and the European Parliament was to motivate the EU’s trading partners to decarbonise their production alongside the EU. This was proposed as an own resource in the first package.
  Further to this, the Commission may consider the possibility of an additional levy targeted at EU companies importing products from third-country manufacturers that do not ensure proper protection of workers. This option would only be considered as long as it is compatible with WTO rules and subject to clear criteria to its application. This levy could provide some protection to workers in third countries and progressively facilitate the achievement of a level playing field in terms of labour conditions between the EU and other trading blocs.
  At the same time, the EESC calls for some form of export relief so that EU companies can compete on third markets. This was highlighted in a previous EESC opinion on the CBAM.

The EESC recalls that the sole objective of the CBAM agreed between the Council and the European Parliament was to motivate the EU’s trading partners to decarbonise their production alongside the EU. This was proposed as an own resource in the first package. At the same time, the EESC calls for some form of export relief so that EU companies can compete on third markets. This was highlighted in a previous EESC opinion on the CBAM.

Reason

The same as in paragraph 1.6.

Outcome of the vote:

| In favour: | 78 |
| --- | --- |
| Against: | 129 |
| Abstention: | 11 |

In favour:

78

Against:

129

Abstention:

11

The following amendments were adopted in the course of the debate, but received at least a quarter of the votes cast in favour of retention of the original text (Rule 74(4) of the Rules of Procedure):

AMENDMENT 1

ECO/617 — Second set of new own resources

Paragraph 3.18

Amend as follows

| Section opinion | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| As also suggested by the European Parliament, the possibility to include financial services within BEFIT, or the development of a global financial transaction tax, could be explored. The new tax provisions should then be combined with targeted rules aimed at devoting part of the additional tax revenues expected to EU own resources
  . However, the EESC understands that a financial transaction tax could possibly make the EU less competitive, especially if applied only within the EU. Moreover, a broad-based Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) is unlikely to collect much in terms of revenue but could still adversely impact European businesses and households, potentially reducing growth with a further strain on public finances
  . | As also suggested by the European Parliament, the possibility to include financial services within BEFIT, or the development of a global financial transaction tax, could be explored
  while assessing possible impacts
  . The new tax provisions should then be combined with targeted rules aimed at devoting part of the additional tax revenues expected to EU own resources. |

Section opinion

Amendment

As also suggested by the European Parliament, the possibility to include financial services within BEFIT, or the development of a global financial transaction tax, could be explored. The new tax provisions should then be combined with targeted rules aimed at devoting part of the additional tax revenues expected to EU own resources
  . However, the EESC understands that a financial transaction tax could possibly make the EU less competitive, especially if applied only within the EU. Moreover, a broad-based Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) is unlikely to collect much in terms of revenue but could still adversely impact European businesses and households, potentially reducing growth with a further strain on public finances
  .

As also suggested by the European Parliament, the possibility to include financial services within BEFIT, or the development of a global financial transaction tax, could be explored
  while assessing possible impacts
  . The new tax provisions should then be combined with targeted rules aimed at devoting part of the additional tax revenues expected to EU own resources.

Outcome of the vote:

| In favour: | 96 |
| --- | --- |
| Against: | 91 |
| Abstention: | 15 |

In favour:

96

Against:

91

Abstention:

15

AMENDMENT 2

ECO/617 — Second set of new own resources

Paragraph 1.5

Amend as follows

| Section opinion | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The EESC deems it reasonable to explore the possibility of including financial services within BEFIT or of developing a global financial transaction tax (FTT) as proposed by the European Parliament
  . However,
  the
  EESC understands that an FTT could possibly affect competitiveness, and may not result in significant additional revenue
  . | The EESC deems it reasonable to explore the possibility of including financial services within BEFIT or of developing a global financial transaction tax (FTT) as proposed by the European Parliament
  while at
  the
  same time assessing impacts of the proposal
  . |

Section opinion

Amendment

The EESC deems it reasonable to explore the possibility of including financial services within BEFIT or of developing a global financial transaction tax (FTT) as proposed by the European Parliament
  . However,
  the
  EESC understands that an FTT could possibly affect competitiveness, and may not result in significant additional revenue
  .

The EESC deems it reasonable to explore the possibility of including financial services within BEFIT or of developing a global financial transaction tax (FTT) as proposed by the European Parliament
  while at
  the
  same time assessing impacts of the proposal
  .

Outcome of the vote:

| In favour: | 126 |
| --- | --- |
| Against: | 79 |
| Abstention: | 8 |

In favour:

126

Against:

79

Abstention:

8

---

(9)  

  0n 28 September 2011 the Commission tabled a proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax (FTT) and amending Directive 2008/7/EC. It was not agreed to in Council and on 14 February 2013, the Commission tabled a proposal aimed at introducing a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) in eleven Member States through the instrument of ‘enhanced cooperation’. The issue remains at a standstill also among these Member States even though the dossier has been regularly discussed at the ECOFIN
  .

---

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/21

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: EU Policy on Cyber Defence

(own initiative opinion)

(2023/C 293/04)

| Rapporteur: | Anastasis YIAPANIS |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Alberto MAZZOLA |

Rapporteur:

Anastasis YIAPANIS

Anastasis YIAPANIS

Co-rapporteur:

Alberto MAZZOLA

Alberto MAZZOLA

| Plenary Assembly decision | 20.9.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCMI) |
| Adopted in section | 27.3.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 208/1/2 |

Plenary Assembly decision

20.9.2022

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCMI)

Adopted in section

27.3.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

208/1/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) supports the proposed EU policy on cyber defence, but would have expected organised civil society to be granted a more prominent role in developing these proposals. The Committee finds it difficult to assess at this point if the future initiatives outlined in the joint communication will be implemented and achieve their intended results. It urges the EU institutions and Member States to prioritise and swiftly advance the announced initiatives. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) supports the proposed EU policy on cyber defence, but would have expected organised civil society to be granted a more prominent role in developing these proposals. The Committee finds it difficult to assess at this point if the future initiatives outlined in the joint communication will be implemented and achieve their intended results. It urges the EU institutions and Member States to prioritise and swiftly advance the announced initiatives.

| 1.2. | The EESC emphasises the need for additional measures to enhance the EU’s ability to detect cyber threats and calls for R & D funding to be directed towards developing cutting-edge EU capabilities. Cooperation between private and public sectors is essential and must not be unidirectional. The EESC considers that EU coordination is necessary to address fragmentation and ensure cooperation and joint investment among Member States. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC emphasises the need for additional measures to enhance the EU’s ability to detect cyber threats and calls for R & D funding to be directed towards developing cutting-edge EU capabilities. Cooperation between private and public sectors is essential and must not be unidirectional. The EESC considers that EU coordination is necessary to address fragmentation and ensure cooperation and joint investment among Member States.

| 1.3. | The EESC supports the creation of the EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre and recommends that Member States commit to 24/7 rapid response, evaluate cyber-readiness and performance of EU cyber crisis response mechanisms, with focus on both military capabilities and critical sectors as identified by the Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council1 (NIS2 Directive) (1). The Committee endorses the expansion of the mandate of the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre (ECCC) to assist the work of the EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

The EESC supports the creation of the EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre and recommends that Member States commit to 24/7 rapid response, evaluate cyber-readiness and performance of EU cyber crisis response mechanisms, with focus on both military capabilities and critical sectors as identified by the Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council1 (NIS2 Directive) (1

| 1.4. | To enhance the Union’s cybersecurity strategic autonomy and sovereignty, the EESC believes that a dynamic, real-time testing and information sharing platform should be developed, or adopted, from the private sector, in order to identify current gaps in existing capabilities. It can also be used for sharing best practices, reporting cyber incidents and to create an EU list of all cyber criminals. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

To enhance the Union’s cybersecurity strategic autonomy and sovereignty, the EESC believes that a dynamic, real-time testing and information sharing platform should be developed, or adopted, from the private sector, in order to identify current gaps in existing capabilities. It can also be used for sharing best practices, reporting cyber incidents and to create an EU list of all cyber criminals.

| 1.5. | The EESC highlights the need for better preparation against cyberattacks such as the Russian ones in Ukraine, targeting critical infrastructure in particular. Cooperation between civilian and military ecosystems is crucial for efficient crisis management, interoperability and avoiding duplication of efforts and investments, including through simulated test cyberattacks. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

The EESC highlights the need for better preparation against cyberattacks such as the Russian ones in Ukraine, targeting critical infrastructure in particular. Cooperation between civilian and military ecosystems is crucial for efficient crisis management, interoperability and avoiding duplication of efforts and investments, including through simulated test cyberattacks.

| 1.6. | The EESC believes that investments in cyber defence should prioritise the protection of EU citizens and critical infrastructure, including by using trusted hardware and software suppliers. It insists on having timely updates to priorities and investment, to be agreed upon by the EU and Member States, with the participation of relevant private stakeholders. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The EESC believes that investments in cyber defence should prioritise the protection of EU citizens and critical infrastructure, including by using trusted hardware and software suppliers. It insists on having timely updates to priorities and investment, to be agreed upon by the EU and Member States, with the participation of relevant private stakeholders.

| 1.7. | The EU must retain and develop the necessary capacities to secure its digital economy, society, democracy and critical technologies, and to provide key cybersecurity services. To ensure EU strategic autonomy, reducing dependencies on third countries is vital. The EESC considers it essential for the EU to adopt a medium-term approach towards autonomy as regards key technologies, and strongly advocates for research and production facilities to be established by EU-based companies, with an appropriate European industrial policy focused on an autonomous cyber ecosystem. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

The EU must retain and develop the necessary capacities to secure its digital economy, society, democracy and critical technologies, and to provide key cybersecurity services. To ensure EU strategic autonomy, reducing dependencies on third countries is vital. The EESC considers it essential for the EU to adopt a medium-term approach towards autonomy as regards key technologies, and strongly advocates for research and production facilities to be established by EU-based companies, with an appropriate European industrial policy focused on an autonomous cyber ecosystem.

| 1.8. | SMEs should receive targeted support and have access to financing programmes that increase their resilience to cyberattacks, as well as assistance, training and education opportunities on cyber risks and how to safeguard against them. The EU should provide an incentive mechanism that fosters progressive familiarisation for SMEs and development of innovative SMEs. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

SMEs should receive targeted support and have access to financing programmes that increase their resilience to cyberattacks, as well as assistance, training and education opportunities on cyber risks and how to safeguard against them. The EU should provide an incentive mechanism that fosters progressive familiarisation for SMEs and development of innovative SMEs.

| 1.9. | The EESC supports the plan to establish a Cyber Skills Academy, and asks the European Commission to coordinate and fund large-scale training and vocational education training programmes that involve all Member States and aim to create a skilled workforce for all agencies and organisations involved in cyber defence, as well as for private civilian networks. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

The EESC supports the plan to establish a Cyber Skills Academy, and asks the European Commission to coordinate and fund large-scale training and vocational education training programmes that involve all Member States and aim to create a skilled workforce for all agencies and organisations involved in cyber defence, as well as for private civilian networks.

| 1.10. | The Committee considers raising citizens’ awareness of cybersecurity crucial in reducing exposure to cyberattacks, and calls for cybersecurity education curricula and lifelong training programmes that will focus on improving cyber skills and knowledge. The EESC supports mainstreaming cybersecurity in all future EU public policies, and informing the public at large about cyber threats. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

The Committee considers raising citizens’ awareness of cybersecurity crucial in reducing exposure to cyberattacks, and calls for cybersecurity education curricula and lifelong training programmes that will focus on improving cyber skills and knowledge. The EESC supports mainstreaming cybersecurity in all future EU public policies, and informing the public at large about cyber threats.

| 1.11. | The EESC believes that strong cooperation with NATO allies in military areas must focus on full coordination and reciprocity, joint R & D&I projects, best practice sharing, large training programmes and simulations of cyberattacks, with the main objective being to extend the common response capacity. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

The EESC believes that strong cooperation with NATO allies in military areas must focus on full coordination and reciprocity, joint R & D&I projects, best practice sharing, large training programmes and simulations of cyberattacks, with the main objective being to extend the common response capacity.

| 1.12. | The Committee calls on the High Representative to examine the current bilateral cyber dialogues and engage in additional discussions with other countries and relevant international organisations to establish a worldwide framework for the adherence to international law in cyberspace, with a strong emphasis on reciprocity. The Committee considers that the EU is well-suited to take the lead in international discussions on the future of cybersecurity, particularly within the United Nations, as it has a strong foundation in fundamental democratic freedoms. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

The Committee calls on the High Representative to examine the current bilateral cyber dialogues and engage in additional discussions with other countries and relevant international organisations to establish a worldwide framework for the adherence to international law in cyberspace, with a strong emphasis on reciprocity. The Committee considers that the EU is well-suited to take the lead in international discussions on the future of cybersecurity, particularly within the United Nations, as it has a strong foundation in fundamental democratic freedoms.

| 1.13. | The EU should take a strong stance against any kind of social scoring system against citizens. The EESC makes it clear that true democracy cannot exist without effective personal data protection and believes that responsible and efficient data management is essential to turn hyperconnectivity into a competitive advantage. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

The EU should take a strong stance against any kind of social scoring system against citizens. The EESC makes it clear that true democracy cannot exist without effective personal data protection and believes that responsible and efficient data management is essential to turn hyperconnectivity into a competitive advantage.

2.   Introduction and general comments

Introduction and general comments

| 2.1. | The digital expansion of societies comes with a large number of cybersecurity threats generated by technological upgrades. Cyberattacks have grown significantly in number and sophistication in the past few years, undermining the security of both public and private entities. Whether we are talking about ransomware, malware, email attacks, data breaches, disinformation, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks or other forms of attacks, they all pose a consistent and continuous threat to EU security as a whole. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

The digital expansion of societies comes with a large number of cybersecurity threats generated by technological upgrades. Cyberattacks have grown significantly in number and sophistication in the past few years, undermining the security of both public and private entities. Whether we are talking about ransomware, malware, email attacks, data breaches, disinformation, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks or other forms of attacks, they all pose a consistent and continuous threat to EU security as a whole.

| 2.2. | The EESC welcomes the Joint Communication on EU Policy on Cyber Defence (2) and considers that the time to act is now, with urgency and in a coordinated manner at EU level, involving both the civilian and military cyberspace ecosystems and ensuring the proper investment framework for cyber defence capabilities. However, the Committee notes that the communication is merely a statement of determination to act and a list of future EU initiatives that should deliver, and finds it impossible to assess whether these future commitments will actually be put in place, since future negotiations between the co-legislators will naturally influence the final outcome of the EU cybersecurity action plan. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

The EESC welcomes the Joint Communication on EU Policy on Cyber Defence

2

| 2.3. | The Russian attack on the KA-SAT satellite network, which disrupted communication between Ukrainian military forces and the recent scandal involving Éric Léandri being contracted by some defence companies to cyber-spy on their behalf, is putting cybersecurity at the top of the list of security threats in the EU. Although the GDPR is a solid piece of EU legislation and has been in force for several years, it is clear that the increasing amount of data available is vulnerable and the risk of third parties crossing the boundary of legality is getting higher each day. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

The Russian attack on the KA-SAT satellite network, which disrupted communication between Ukrainian military forces and the recent scandal involving Éric Léandri being contracted by some defence companies to cyber-spy on their behalf, is putting cybersecurity at the top of the list of security threats in the EU. Although the GDPR is a solid piece of EU legislation and has been in force for several years, it is clear that the increasing amount of data available is vulnerable and the risk of third parties crossing the boundary of legality is getting higher each day.

| 2.4. | Given the transnational nature of cyberattacks, EU coordination is necessary to reduce the current fragmentation and ensure that the Member States are prepared to cooperate and invest jointly. This is particularly important for future cases in which one Member State could be targeted and all others should have the opportunity to provide immediate support. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

Given the transnational nature of cyberattacks, EU coordination is necessary to reduce the current fragmentation and ensure that the Member States are prepared to cooperate and invest jointly. This is particularly important for future cases in which one Member State could be targeted and all others should have the opportunity to provide immediate support.

3.   Act together for stronger cyber defence

Act together for stronger cyber defence

| 3.1. | The Committee takes note of the announced ambitious initiatives to establish an EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre, to develop the CyDEf-X project, to create cyber rapid reaction teams, to develop an EU Cyber Solidarity Initiative and to explore the development of cybersecurity certification schemes for ICT products, services and processes. The EESC recommends that all Member States should commit to being ready to provide a 24/7 rapid response, with the EU Coordination Centre involved in assessing and developing regular reports on the cyber-readiness of Member States and the effectiveness of the European cyber crisis response mechanism, focusing both on military capabilities and on critical sectors identified by the NIS2 Directive. Each Member State should have specialists specifically trained to intervene in case of cyber incidents, and should regularly test their capability of intervention in other Member States. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

The Committee takes note of the announced ambitious initiatives to establish an EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre, to develop the CyDEf-X project, to create cyber rapid reaction teams, to develop an EU Cyber Solidarity Initiative and to explore the development of cybersecurity certification schemes for ICT products, services and processes. The EESC recommends that all Member States should commit to being ready to provide a 24/7 rapid response, with the EU Coordination Centre involved in assessing and developing regular reports on the cyber-readiness of Member States and the effectiveness of the European cyber crisis response mechanism, focusing both on military capabilities and on critical sectors identified by the NIS2 Directive. Each Member State should have specialists specifically trained to intervene in case of cyber incidents, and should regularly test their capability of intervention in other Member States.

| 3.2. | While the communication provides a long list of step-by-step improvements, the EESC would have hoped to see an explicit roadmap on the implementation of these initiatives, with clear governance and deadlines for submission and adoption. Furthermore, the Committee would have expected organised civil society to be granted a more prominent role in developing these proposals. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

While the communication provides a long list of step-by-step improvements, the EESC would have hoped to see an explicit roadmap on the implementation of these initiatives, with clear governance and deadlines for submission and adoption. Furthermore, the Committee would have expected organised civil society to be granted a more prominent role in developing these proposals.

| 3.3. | The EESC considers that Member States need to strengthen their internal capacity to counteract cyber threats while engaging in cooperation projects and sharing information and best practices with their counterparts in other Member States. There is a need for rapid investment in cyber defence capabilities and for accelerated technology deployment (3) in all Member States and in common preparedness to detect, recover from and defend against cyberattacks. In order to support the cybersecurity autonomy of the Union, the Committee considers that a dynamic real-time testing and information sharing platform must be developed, or adopted from the private sector, focused on identifying current missing capabilities. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

The EESC considers that Member States need to strengthen their internal capacity to counteract cyber threats while engaging in cooperation projects and sharing information and best practices with their counterparts in other Member States. There is a need for rapid investment in cyber defence capabilities and for accelerated technology deployment (3

| 3.4. | The EESC shares the view that, at this stage, military cyberspace operations should remain strictly the competence of Member States; the Committee supports the announced cooperation between EU military Computer Emergency Response Teams (milCERTs), the Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) and the Computer Emergency Response Team of the EUIBAs (CERT-EU). |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

The EESC shares the view that, at this stage, military cyberspace operations should remain strictly the competence of Member States; the Committee supports the announced cooperation between EU military Computer Emergency Response Teams (milCERTs), the Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) and the Computer Emergency Response Team of the EUIBAs (CERT-EU).

| 3.5. | The recently adopted NIS2 Directive and the Directive on the resilience of critical entities (CER) (4) already put in place specific national and sectoral obligations for the EU cyber defence framework. Further action is needed to improve the EU’s collective detection capacity, and the EESC calls for R & D investment for developing cutting-edge EU capabilities. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

The recently adopted NIS2 Directive and the Directive on the resilience of critical entities (CER) (4

4.   Secure the EU defence ecosystem

Secure the EU defence ecosystem

| 4.1. | The EESC believes that inherent complexities and fast-evolving technological challenges have transformed the defence ecosystem, and that cybersecurity has become a common subject for both military and civilian sectors, as well as for EU citizens. Cooperation between civilian and military ecosystems is now more important than ever and should bring benefits in terms of more effective crisis management, as well as continuous progress and interoperability, avoiding duplication or multiplication of the same efforts and investments. Member States should be ready to conduct national critical infrastructure stress tests in order to assess and increase resilience to future cyberattacks. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

The EESC believes that inherent complexities and fast-evolving technological challenges have transformed the defence ecosystem, and that cybersecurity has become a common subject for both military and civilian sectors, as well as for EU citizens. Cooperation between civilian and military ecosystems is now more important than ever and should bring benefits in terms of more effective crisis management, as well as continuous progress and interoperability, avoiding duplication or multiplication of the same efforts and investments. Member States should be ready to conduct national critical infrastructure stress tests in order to assess and increase resilience to future cyberattacks.

| 4.2. | The EESC considers that investments in cyber defence must, as a priority, be targeted towards protecting EU citizens and critical infrastructure. Given the fast pace of digital transformation and the rapid evolution of the threat landscape, the Committee strongly urges that timely updates to priorities and investment should be agreed between the EU and Member States, with thorough consultation of relevant private stakeholders. Internet of Things (IoT) devices are often not as well protected as traditional devices, and the EESC calls for a minimum-security level to be ensured through IDAM platforms. Also, since certification is a key method of providing a higher level of security, the Committee calls for the new EU certification approach to place more emphasis on IoT security. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

The EESC considers that investments in cyber defence must, as a priority, be targeted towards protecting EU citizens and critical infrastructure. Given the fast pace of digital transformation and the rapid evolution of the threat landscape, the Committee strongly urges that timely updates to priorities and investment should be agreed between the EU and Member States, with thorough consultation of relevant private stakeholders. Internet of Things (IoT) devices are often not as well protected as traditional devices, and the EESC calls for a minimum-security level to be ensured through IDAM platforms. Also, since certification is a key method of providing a higher level of security, the Committee calls for the new EU certification approach to place more emphasis on IoT security.

| 4.3. | The EU must build resilience to cyberattacks and create effective cyber deterrence. Critical infrastructure must be protected against cyberattacks of all kind, including by EU defence systems. The Committee considers it to be in the EU’s strategic interest to ensure that the Union retains and develops the essential capacities to secure its digital economy, society and democracy, to achieve full digital sovereignty as the only way to protect critical technologies and to provide effective key cybersecurity services. Reducing dependencies on third countries is also vital for the EU strategic autonomy. The EESC believes that sectoral EU agencies (ENISA, EASA, ERA, EMA, EBA, ESA, HADEA, etc.) should be involved in the process and provide guidance in developing cybersecurity schemes. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

The EU must build resilience to cyberattacks and create effective cyber deterrence. Critical infrastructure must be protected against cyberattacks of all kind, including by EU defence systems. The Committee considers it to be in the EU’s strategic interest to ensure that the Union retains and develops the essential capacities to secure its digital economy, society and democracy, to achieve full digital sovereignty as the only way to protect critical technologies and to provide effective key cybersecurity services. Reducing dependencies on third countries is also vital for the EU strategic autonomy. The EESC believes that sectoral EU agencies (ENISA, EASA, ERA, EMA, EBA, ESA, HADEA, etc.) should be involved in the process and provide guidance in developing cybersecurity schemes.

| 4.4. | The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the digital transition and transformed traditional labour into hybrid and/or remote, creating new working relations and expectations as well as a new class of digital nomads, who are increasing in number. The EESC notes the rapid changes in the labour market, which have generated the adoption of ‘Zero Trust’ Architecture by companies, via IAM (Identity Access Management) and PAM (Privileged Access Management) solutions. The Committee considers that this type of management of companies’ resources brings new solutions related to cyber threats and deems that the private sector must be supported in strengthening the security level of their innovative digital solutions. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the digital transition and transformed traditional labour into hybrid and/or remote, creating new working relations and expectations as well as a new class of digital nomads, who are increasing in number. The EESC notes the rapid changes in the labour market, which have generated the adoption of ‘Zero Trust’ Architecture by companies, via IAM (Identity Access Management) and PAM (Privileged Access Management) solutions. The Committee considers that this type of management of companies’ resources brings new solutions related to cyber threats and deems that the private sector must be supported in strengthening the security level of their innovative digital solutions.

| 4.5. | The EESC is rather disappointed with the Commission’s statement that ‘an implementation plan could be established in cooperation with Member States’ and considers such an implementation plan mandatory. It believes it should be drafted jointly with Member States and implemented as soon as possible. The Committee is concerned about the light-touch stance adopted by the Commission, and urges the EU institutions and Member States to facilitate rapid progress on the announced initiatives. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

The EESC is rather disappointed with the Commission’s statement that ‘an implementation plan could be established in cooperation with Member States’ and considers such an implementation plan mandatory. It believes it should be drafted jointly with Member States and implemented as soon as possible. The Committee is concerned about the light-touch stance adopted by the Commission, and urges the EU institutions and Member States to facilitate rapid progress on the announced initiatives.

5.   Invest in cyber defence capabilities

Invest in cyber defence capabilities

| 5.1. | As the technological development is rapidly advancing, cyberspace has become the newest domain of warfare, after land, sea, air and space. It has also generated large crime opportunities for malicious cyber actors ranging from independent hackers to professional criminals and even state actors. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

As the technological development is rapidly advancing, cyberspace has become the newest domain of warfare, after land, sea, air and space. It has also generated large crime opportunities for malicious cyber actors ranging from independent hackers to professional criminals and even state actors.

| 5.2. | Investment in R & D is vital and the EESC welcomes the existing dedicated funds within the Digital Europe Programme, European Defence Fund, Horizon Europe and national recovery programmes. However, the Committee would appreciate more transnational projects that focus on cooperation and interoperability between cyber defence systems in all Member States, as well as more synergies between funding instruments, especially accompanying innovative SMEs. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

Investment in R & D is vital and the EESC welcomes the existing dedicated funds within the Digital Europe Programme, European Defence Fund, Horizon Europe and national recovery programmes. However, the Committee would appreciate more transnational projects that focus on cooperation and interoperability between cyber defence systems in all Member States, as well as more synergies between funding instruments, especially accompanying innovative SMEs.

| 5.3. | As announced in the EU Cybersecurity Strategy back in 2020, the Committee notes that the deadline to create the Joint Cyber Unit is this year, and is awaiting news on the finalisation of the process and the EU’s preparedness to respond to large-scale cyber incidents. The EESC expects it to improve the EU’s situational awareness and the overall capacity to respond and recover. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

As announced in the EU Cybersecurity Strategy back in 2020, the Committee notes that the deadline to create the Joint Cyber Unit is this year, and is awaiting news on the finalisation of the process and the EU’s preparedness to respond to large-scale cyber incidents. The EESC expects it to improve the EU’s situational awareness and the overall capacity to respond and recover.

| 5.4. | The EESC supports the extension of the mandate of the ECCC to support the activity of the EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre. In addition, this network could support European digital sovereignty by developing a competitive European industrial base for key technological capabilities, based in part on work developed by contractual public-private partnerships (PPP). PPPs have proven to be the most effective approach to improving the cybersecurity of the entire digital ecosystem, but it cannot be unidirectional: public institutions must also share their intelligence with the private sector. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

The EESC supports the extension of the mandate of the ECCC to support the activity of the EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre. In addition, this network could support European digital sovereignty by developing a competitive European industrial base for key technological capabilities, based in part on work developed by contractual public-private partnerships (PPP). PPPs have proven to be the most effective approach to improving the cybersecurity of the entire digital ecosystem, but it cannot be unidirectional: public institutions must also share their intelligence with the private sector.

| 5.5. | The EESC notes that, in order to address future hacking attempts from quantum computers, the EU must immediately invest in cutting-edge technologies such as post-quantum cryptography. It believes that it is indispensable for Europe to take a medium-term approach to autonomy, and advocates strongly for research and production facilities to be developed by EU-based companies. The EESC considers it important to increase EU resources for digital R&I and to support operator and supplier investment in new technical security functionalities, also related to new trends such as augmented reality and the metaverse. In particular, it is essential to build up a European distributed cloud infrastructure based on European rules on topics such as data storage and processing (5). |
| --- | --- |

5.5.

The EESC notes that, in order to address future hacking attempts from quantum computers, the EU must immediately invest in cutting-edge technologies such as post-quantum cryptography. It believes that it is indispensable for Europe to take a medium-term approach to autonomy, and advocates strongly for research and production facilities to be developed by EU-based companies. The EESC considers it important to increase EU resources for digital R&I and to support operator and supplier investment in new technical security functionalities, also related to new trends such as augmented reality and the metaverse. In particular, it is essential to build up a European distributed cloud infrastructure based on European rules on topics such as data storage and processing (5

| 5.6. | SMEs should be given specific attention and have access to financing programmes that enhance their readiness against cyberattacks, as well as to assistance, training and education programmes that helps them understand the cyber risks and how to protect themselves. The EU should provide an incentive mechanism that fosters progressive familiarisation for SMEs. |
| --- | --- |

5.6.

SMEs should be given specific attention and have access to financing programmes that enhance their readiness against cyberattacks, as well as to assistance, training and education programmes that helps them understand the cyber risks and how to protect themselves. The EU should provide an incentive mechanism that fosters progressive familiarisation for SMEs.

| 5.7. | The Commission estimates the existing skills shortage in cybersecurity at half a million people, and the EESC appreciates the proposal to create a Cyber Skills Academy. It is clear that efforts at Member State level are not enough to reduce the skills gap, so the Committee suggests that, together with launching the Academy, the Commission uses the momentum offered by the European Year of Skills and coordinates and finances large-scale training programmes and VET programmes at EU level that involve all the Member States and focus on delivering a skilled labour force for all the agencies and bodies involved in cyber defence, as well as for private civilian networks. Particular emphasis must be placed on training the workforce, in particular in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). |
| --- | --- |

5.7.

The Commission estimates the existing skills shortage in cybersecurity at half a million people, and the EESC appreciates the proposal to create a Cyber Skills Academy. It is clear that efforts at Member State level are not enough to reduce the skills gap, so the Committee suggests that, together with launching the Academy, the Commission uses the momentum offered by the European Year of Skills and coordinates and finances large-scale training programmes and VET programmes at EU level that involve all the Member States and focus on delivering a skilled labour force for all the agencies and bodies involved in cyber defence, as well as for private civilian networks. Particular emphasis must be placed on training the workforce, in particular in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM).

| 5.8. | Furthermore, the EESC considers that it is vital to raise citizens’ awareness of cybersecurity in order to reduce exposure to cyberattacks, especially regarding basic cyber-crimes targeting the population at large. The Committee calls for cybersecurity education curricula and lifelong cybersecurity training programmes that will focus on improving cyber skills and make cybersecurity more familiar and attractive to citizens, especially the younger generation. The EESC favours mainstreaming cybersecurity reflections in all future EU public policies and informing the public at large about cyber threats, including through free training programmes for the population at large, free information cell-phone apps, or by communicating during prime-time TV times. Widespread cultural advancement at every level of society, towards a ‘cybersecurity-oriented’ approach, must be promoted in parallel with these actions. |
| --- | --- |

5.8.

Furthermore, the EESC considers that it is vital to raise citizens’ awareness of cybersecurity in order to reduce exposure to cyberattacks, especially regarding basic cyber-crimes targeting the population at large. The Committee calls for cybersecurity education curricula and lifelong cybersecurity training programmes that will focus on improving cyber skills and make cybersecurity more familiar and attractive to citizens, especially the younger generation. The EESC favours mainstreaming cybersecurity reflections in all future EU public policies and informing the public at large about cyber threats, including through free training programmes for the population at large, free information cell-phone apps, or by communicating during prime-time TV times. Widespread cultural advancement at every level of society, towards a ‘cybersecurity-oriented’ approach, must be promoted in parallel with these actions.

| 5.9. | The EESC believes that it is vital to assess the risk profile of suppliers and apply relevant restrictions to those considered to be high risk, including necessary bans on key assets and applications defined as critical and sensitive in the EU coordinated risk assessment, as well as certifying trusted hardware and software providers. |
| --- | --- |

5.9.

The EESC believes that it is vital to assess the risk profile of suppliers and apply relevant restrictions to those considered to be high risk, including necessary bans on key assets and applications defined as critical and sensitive in the EU coordinated risk assessment, as well as certifying trusted hardware and software providers.

6.   Partner to address common challenges

Partner to address common challenges

| 6.1. | The level of preparedness for future cyberattacks differs widely from one Member State to another. The EESC considers that the immediate first step is to set up an intra-EU best practices communication platform, where the most cyber-advanced Member States can share their knowledge with and facilitate immediate uptake by the other countries. This would help improve mutual trust between national entities. Secondly, the Committee believes that stronger cooperation is needed between state and non-state actors across the EU in order to improve the cybersecurity of products and services within the internal market. The EESC also suggests the creation of a common EU platform for reporting cyber incidents, including an EU black list of all cyber-crime activists. |
| --- | --- |

6.1.

The level of preparedness for future cyberattacks differs widely from one Member State to another. The EESC considers that the immediate first step is to set up an intra-EU best practices communication platform, where the most cyber-advanced Member States can share their knowledge with and facilitate immediate uptake by the other countries. This would help improve mutual trust between national entities. Secondly, the Committee believes that stronger cooperation is needed between state and non-state actors across the EU in order to improve the cybersecurity of products and services within the internal market. The EESC also suggests the creation of a common EU platform for reporting cyber incidents, including an EU black list of all cyber-crime activists.

| 6.2. | The EESC is of the opinion that strong cooperation with our NATO allies in the military area must be focused not only on capacity building and early detection, but also on joint R & D&I projects, best practice sharing and exchanges between experts, large training programmes and simulations of cyberattacks. The main objective should be to extend the common response capacity and create synergies for countering future hybrid threats, following the 2016 Warsaw and 2018 Brussels Joint Declarations. The cooperation between the EU and NATO still has a number of avenues that can be exploited, and immediate progress can make a real difference in terms of ensuring security for our citizens and societies. |
| --- | --- |

6.2.

The EESC is of the opinion that strong cooperation with our NATO allies in the military area must be focused not only on capacity building and early detection, but also on joint R & D&I projects, best practice sharing and exchanges between experts, large training programmes and simulations of cyberattacks. The main objective should be to extend the common response capacity and create synergies for countering future hybrid threats, following the 2016 Warsaw and 2018 Brussels Joint Declarations. The cooperation between the EU and NATO still has a number of avenues that can be exploited, and immediate progress can make a real difference in terms of ensuring security for our citizens and societies.

| 6.3. | The Committee believes that discussions at global level and with our international partners should set the scene to promote a global and open cyberspace that protects human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, and focuses on developing binding international standards in sectors with fast digital development. The EESC advises the High Representative to review the existing bilateral cyber dialogues and engage in further negotiations with other countries and relevant international organisations in order to promote a global framework for the application of international law in cyberspace, based on a strict condition of reciprocity. |
| --- | --- |

6.3.

The Committee believes that discussions at global level and with our international partners should set the scene to promote a global and open cyberspace that protects human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, and focuses on developing binding international standards in sectors with fast digital development. The EESC advises the High Representative to review the existing bilateral cyber dialogues and engage in further negotiations with other countries and relevant international organisations in order to promote a global framework for the application of international law in cyberspace, based on a strict condition of reciprocity.

| 6.4. | Finally, the Committee believes that the EU is best placed to lead the international debates on the future of cybersecurity, especially within UN discussions, due to its solid foundation on core democratic freedoms. The EU must also engage in combating totalitarian regimes that exercise citizen data monitoring and breach their rights and freedoms, and should position itself strongly against any kind of social scoring system against citizens. The EESC makes a clear statement that there cannot be a real democracy without effective personal data protection, and considers that responsible and efficient data management is vital to turn hyperconnectivity into an asset. |
| --- | --- |

6.4.

Finally, the Committee believes that the EU is best placed to lead the international debates on the future of cybersecurity, especially within UN discussions, due to its solid foundation on core democratic freedoms. The EU must also engage in combating totalitarian regimes that exercise citizen data monitoring and breach their rights and freedoms, and should position itself strongly against any kind of social scoring system against citizens. The EESC makes a clear statement that there cannot be a real democracy without effective personal data protection, and considers that responsible and efficient data management is vital to turn hyperconnectivity into an asset.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

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(1)  Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80).

1

(2)  Commission Communication on EU Policy on Cyber Defence.

2

(3)  Such as NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic initiative (DIANA).

3

(4)  CER Directive.

4

(5)  Such as Gaia-X, the Franco-German initiative.

5

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| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/27

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on green collective bargaining: good practices and future prospects

(exploratory opinion)

(2023/C 293/05)

Rapporteur:
  María del Carmen BARRERA CHAMORRO

Rapporteur:

María del Carmen BARRERA CHAMORRO

Co-rapporteur:
  Marinel Dănuț MUREŞAN

Co-rapporteur:

Marinel Dănuț MUREŞAN

| Referral | Letter from the Spanish Presidency of the Council, 27.7.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 31.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 196/2/11 |

Referral

Letter from the Spanish Presidency of the Council, 27.7.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

31.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

196/2/11

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) asserts that businesses and workers must have proper channels for participating in efforts to support environmental protection and combat climate change. While respecting the role of national industrial relations systems and the autonomy of the social partners, the EESC considers that issues related to the green transition could be a stronger focus of collective bargaining at the appropriate levels. It believes that promoting green collective bargaining at all levels is an appropriate way of achieving this. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) asserts that businesses and workers must have proper channels for participating in efforts to support environmental protection and combat climate change. While respecting the role of national industrial relations systems and the autonomy of the social partners, the EESC considers that issues related to the green transition could be a stronger focus of collective bargaining at the appropriate levels. It believes that promoting green collective bargaining at all levels is an appropriate way of achieving this.

| 1.2. | The EESC considers that the discussion of green issues within collective bargaining is about negotiable clauses between the social partners within collective agreements that have a direct and indirect effect on the environment. Such clauses can cover, but are not limited to:






  (a) | the impact of companies’ activity on the environment; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC considers that the discussion of green issues within collective bargaining is about negotiable clauses between the social partners within collective agreements that have a direct and indirect effect on the environment. Such clauses can cover, but are not limited to:

(a)

the impact of companies’ activity on the environment;

| (b) | the protection of workers from the effects of the environment and climate change; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the protection of workers from the effects of the environment and climate change;

| (c) | the impact of the green transformation on a company’s activity as regards work organisation, changing occupational profiles and the skills of employees; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the impact of the green transformation on a company’s activity as regards work organisation, changing occupational profiles and the skills of employees;

| (d) | internal monitoring of the implementation of points (a), (b), and (c). |
| --- | --- |

(d)

internal monitoring of the implementation of points (a), (b), and (c).

The EESC wants to highlight collective bargaining as a key tool that can help companies and workers face the challenges of the climate crisis, including the derived costs for companies.

| 1.3. | The EESC stresses that all the issues discussed in this opinion are approached from the point of view of recognising and fully respecting the autonomy of the will of the social partners, which is independent and sovereign. It therefore states that under no circumstances should this opinion be understood to mean that negotiators of collective agreements must be subject to any imposed obligation or external constraint in their role of contractual self-regulation. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

The EESC stresses that all the issues discussed in this opinion are approached from the point of view of recognising and fully respecting the autonomy of the will of the social partners, which is independent and sovereign. It therefore states that under no circumstances should this opinion be understood to mean that negotiators of collective agreements must be subject to any imposed obligation or external constraint in their role of contractual self-regulation.

| 1.4. | The EESC believes that civil society, which is not directly concerned by collective bargaining, (i.e. as regards the negotiating of collective agreements, which is undertaken by the social partners) can help to find democratic solutions to the challenges and problems arising from the green transition, but can also contribute to it by being involved in designing and implementing fair measures to ensure that green transitions are socially just. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

The EESC believes that civil society, which is not directly concerned by collective bargaining, (i.e. as regards the negotiating of collective agreements, which is undertaken by the social partners) can help to find democratic solutions to the challenges and problems arising from the green transition, but can also contribute to it by being involved in designing and implementing fair measures to ensure that green transitions are socially just.

| 1.5. | The EESC has already highlighted the significant impact which the green transition is having on workers’ jobs and working and living conditions in its opinion on energy transition and labour market policies (1). Therefore, its impact on employment and on territorial and social cohesion, the creation of jobs, transitions between different sectors of activity and the training and reskilling of workers, the particular vulnerability of older workers, health and safety at work, mobility in cities to access workplaces, and energy efficiency in productive activity and in the performance of work are issues that can be addressed in collective bargaining, always playing due attention to gender. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

The EESC has already highlighted the significant impact which the green transition is having on workers’ jobs and working and living conditions in its opinion on energy transition and labour market policies (1

| 1.6. | The EESC has seen growing scientific evidence (2) of the great potential and numerous benefits of green collective bargaining in promoting environmental sustainability, decarbonising the economy, boosting the circular economy and combating climate change, given the substantial contribution that factors specifically relating to its qualities make to achieving these objectives, such as the mobility of employees, ways of organising work, training staff to facilitate green transition processes, ensuring safe and healthy environments. gender issues, etc. This is reflected in the European Social Partners’ Statement of 30 May 2017 on tapping the potential from greening the economy for jobs creation, and in their Joint Recommendation of 7 October 2021 on the circular economy in the framework of social dialogue (3). |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The EESC has seen growing scientific evidence (2

3

| 1.7. | The EESC welcomes the Recommendation on ensuring a just transition towards climate neutrality, adopted by the Council (EPSCO) last June (4), which recognises the importance of actively involving the social partners, while respecting their autonomy, in all stages of the design and implementation of various public policies, including through social dialogue and collective bargaining. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

The EESC welcomes the Recommendation on ensuring a just transition towards climate neutrality, adopted by the Council (EPSCO) last June (4

| 1.8. | The green transition, decarbonisation and the circular economy, along with digitalisation, are all having an impact on the world of work in terms of changing the nature of jobs and tasks, and creating new occupations, while eliminating others. These transitions are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. However, the EESC has noted that, so far, the EU and the Member States still have limited — and very inconsistent — experience of green bargaining. In stark contrast to the digital transition, less attention has been paid to green issues as part of collective bargaining. The EESC therefore calls on the EU and the Member States and the social partners, with full respect for collective autonomy, to take more committed and effective measures to further the development of, and raise the importance of greening in collective bargaining at the various appropriate levels. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

The green transition, decarbonisation and the circular economy, along with digitalisation, are all having an impact on the world of work in terms of changing the nature of jobs and tasks, and creating new occupations, while eliminating others. These transitions are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. However, the EESC has noted that, so far, the EU and the Member States still have limited — and very inconsistent — experience of green bargaining. In stark contrast to the digital transition, less attention has been paid to green issues as part of collective bargaining. The EESC therefore calls on the EU and the Member States and the social partners, with full respect for collective autonomy, to take more committed and effective measures to further the development of, and raise the importance of greening in collective bargaining at the various appropriate levels.

| 1.9. | The EESC points out that collective bargaining is an instrument that is particularly well-suited to achieving balanced rules in order to move progressively and fairly towards an economy of greater well-being and productivity. It therefore calls for faster and more effective progress towards green collective bargaining in which the social partners, at the different levels of bargaining, have an ongoing, significant role in helping to achieve the balanced solutions that businesses need in order to be more sustainable, resilient and productive, as well as firmly rooted in decent work. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

The EESC points out that collective bargaining is an instrument that is particularly well-suited to achieving balanced rules in order to move progressively and fairly towards an economy of greater well-being and productivity. It therefore calls for faster and more effective progress towards green collective bargaining in which the social partners, at the different levels of bargaining, have an ongoing, significant role in helping to achieve the balanced solutions that businesses need in order to be more sustainable, resilient and productive, as well as firmly rooted in decent work.

| 1.10. | The EESC believes that businesses and workers must have appropriate channels for feeding into discussions around the green transition. Indeed, the speed and scale of the impact of greening, as well as digitalisation, on the transformation of labour markets requires the early and effective involvement of the social partners, in line with national industrial relation systems, in order to identify solutions that can be tailored to sectors at the local level. It therefore considers it useful and important to promote not only social dialogue, but also collective bargaining, as appropriate, at all levels of the EU and Member States, and even at global level, while fully respecting the autonomy of the social partners. The EU and the Member States must also promote the development of more effective information, consultation and collective expression rights for trade union and worker representatives regarding the environmental impact of business activity. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

The EESC believes that businesses and workers must have appropriate channels for feeding into discussions around the green transition. Indeed, the speed and scale of the impact of greening, as well as digitalisation, on the transformation of labour markets requires the early and effective involvement of the social partners, in line with national industrial relation systems, in order to identify solutions that can be tailored to sectors at the local level. It therefore considers it useful and important to promote not only social dialogue, but also collective bargaining, as appropriate, at all levels of the EU and Member States, and even at global level, while fully respecting the autonomy of the social partners. The EU and the Member States must also promote the development of more effective information, consultation and collective expression rights for trade union and worker representatives regarding the environmental impact of business activity.

| 1.11. | The EESC notes that successful green collective bargaining experiences have been recorded for a decade, at both national and EU level. At European level, the European chemical industry’s Responsible Care (5) negotiating practice should be singled out. With regard to national best practices, the EESC notes the usefulness of the contractual clauses found in agreements such as those in Italy, Spain and France, where in businesses and/or sectors of activity the role of delegated environmental workers is promoted, along with joint environmental management committees (also provided for in certification standards such as EMAS and ISO 14001), clauses on sustainable labour mobility, or recognition of trade unions’ rights to issue environmental alerts, etc. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

The EESC notes that successful green collective bargaining experiences have been recorded for a decade, at both national and EU level. At European level, the European chemical industry’s Responsible Care (5

| 1.12. | The EESC calls on the EU and the Member States to further support actions and initiatives that will incentivise employers and workers to adapt to the green transition, and to consider developing, among other measures, a concept of designated employees that act as environmental transition representatives or contact points for matters related to the environmental and ecological transition of the workplace. Within the workplace setting, managers and worker representatives could consider whether to designate people to the specific role (in addition to their core tasks) of helping with issues related to the adaptation of the company to the green transition. The EESC calls on the Member States to create the necessary incentives for businesses and/or sectors of activity to designate the aforementioned environmental transition representatives or contact points. Environmental training in the form of vocational training is also recommended. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

The EESC calls on the EU and the Member States to further support actions and initiatives that will incentivise employers and workers to adapt to the green transition, and to consider developing, among other measures, a concept of designated employees that act as environmental transition representatives or contact points for matters related to the environmental and ecological transition of the workplace. Within the workplace setting, managers and worker representatives could consider whether to designate people to the specific role (in addition to their core tasks) of helping with issues related to the adaptation of the company to the green transition. The EESC calls on the Member States to create the necessary incentives for businesses and/or sectors of activity to designate the aforementioned environmental transition representatives or contact points. Environmental training in the form of vocational training is also recommended.

| 1.13. | As part of their joint work programme for 2022–2024 (6), the EU social partners will work on a Framework of Actions on the Green Transition. With regard to the Member States, they should create the right framework to facilitate implementation and to promote, with full respect for collective autonomy, cross-industry agreements in order to facilitate the establishment of appropriate and equitable recommendations, guidelines and standards to make green collective bargaining a key tool for ensuring balanced production models that protect the environment. Given the scale and complexity of the challenge, the EESC is convinced of the need to involve all levels of collective bargaining — sectors and businesses, EU and state, and even international — in achieving a green productive economy. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

As part of their joint work programme for 2022–2024 (6

| 1.14. | The EESC considers that air quality is an important aspect of health and safety and recognises that the WHO has set new values and global guidelines. The EESC proposes that these should be taken into account as part of green collective bargaining. Taking into account the EMAS and the Directive on corporate social sustainability reporting, it is important to promote the participation of employees and training programmes for environmental management. |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

The EESC considers that air quality is an important aspect of health and safety and recognises that the WHO has set new values and global guidelines. The EESC proposes that these should be taken into account as part of green collective bargaining. Taking into account the EMAS and the Directive on corporate social sustainability reporting, it is important to promote the participation of employees and training programmes for environmental management.

| 1.15. | The EESC calls on the Member States to fully transpose Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7) on the protection of persons who report possible breaches of EU law, including in the area of environmental law. |
| --- | --- |

1.15.

The EESC calls on the Member States to fully transpose Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7

2.   Background, purpose and gist of the opinion

Background, purpose and gist of the opinion

| 2.1. | The EESC supports the EU’s aim of leading the green transition by speeding up the deployment of the policies, resources — including financial resources — and technologies needed to achieve speedy decarbonisation of the production system. A just transition must be guaranteed, as suggested in the EESC opinion on Energy policy and the labour market (8). Social dialogue and collective bargaining, with full respect for the autonomy of the social partners and the characteristics of national industrial relations systems, are essential to this end. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

The EESC supports the EU’s aim of leading the green transition by speeding up the deployment of the policies, resources — including financial resources — and technologies needed to achieve speedy decarbonisation of the production system. A just transition must be guaranteed, as suggested in the EESC opinion on Energy policy and the labour market

8

| 2.2. | The EESC is aware that the ecological transition and decarbonising the economy in the European Union will impact jobs and people’s living conditions, especially when it comes to the most vulnerable people. It is imperative that the transition takes place in a fair way, to mitigate its impact on businesses, workers and the general public. This should also be an opportunity for improvements for the most vulnerable people. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

The EESC is aware that the ecological transition and decarbonising the economy in the European Union will impact jobs and people’s living conditions, especially when it comes to the most vulnerable people. It is imperative that the transition takes place in a fair way, to mitigate its impact on businesses, workers and the general public. This should also be an opportunity for improvements for the most vulnerable people.

| 2.3. | The EESC stresses that the ILO Guidelines for a just transition towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all (2015) (9) underline the role of governments and the social partners in creating policy coherence and institutional arrangements for sustainable development for all and reflect the need to facilitate the incorporation of environmental provisions into collective bargaining at all levels. It also underlines the benefits of specific training commitments in this field for managers and employees. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

The EESC stresses that the ILO Guidelines for a just transition towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all (2015)

9

| 2.4. | In its EMAS guidelines on voluntary environmental management systems, the European Commission recognises the importance of effective channels for involving workers and their representatives in green management of companies. In this regard, the most appropriate way forward for this labour involvement in environmental management is through the involvement of the social partners and, as appropriate, collective bargaining, in line with national industrial relations systems and practices. Principle 8 of the European Pillar of Social Rights highlights the need to promote social dialogue and the involvement of workers in social, economic and employment policies, and encourages the social partners to negotiate collective agreements. Additionally, the Council Recommendation of 16 June 2022 on ensuring a just transition towards climate neutrality stresses the important role of the social partners in managing the employment effects of this transition (recital 18). |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

In its EMAS guidelines on voluntary environmental management systems, the European Commission recognises the importance of effective channels for involving workers and their representatives in green management of companies. In this regard, the most appropriate way forward for this labour involvement in environmental management is through the involvement of the social partners and, as appropriate, collective bargaining, in line with national industrial relations systems and practices. Principle 8 of the European Pillar of Social Rights highlights the need to promote social dialogue and the involvement of workers in social, economic and employment policies, and encourages the social partners to negotiate collective agreements. Additionally, the Council Recommendation of 16 June 2022 on ensuring a just transition towards climate neutrality stresses the important role of the social partners in managing the employment effects of this transition (recital 18).

| 2.5. | Taking as a basis the need for recognition and full respect for the autonomy of the social partners, EESC notes the statement by the Spanish government, which is taking over the EU presidency and has asked for this exploratory opinion, with a view to promoting a regulatory framework and an incentives policy that favour green collective bargaining. This opinion sets out the EESC’s response to and proposals regarding the request from the Spanish Presidency. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

Taking as a basis the need for recognition and full respect for the autonomy of the social partners, EESC notes the statement by the Spanish government, which is taking over the EU presidency and has asked for this exploratory opinion, with a view to promoting a regulatory framework and an incentives policy that favour green collective bargaining. This opinion sets out the EESC’s response to and proposals regarding the request from the Spanish Presidency.

3.   European context and scientific data input on the role of collective bargaining in the green transition

European context and scientific data input on the role of collective bargaining in the green transition

| 3.1. | The EESC has seen growing scientific evidence of the great potential and numerous benefits of green collective bargaining in promoting environmental sustainability, decarbonising the economy, boosting the circular economy and combating climate change, given the substantial contribution that the various facets of this bargaining make to achieving these objectives, such as the mobility of employees, ways of organising work, training staff to facilitate green transition processes, ensuring safe and healthy environments, gender issues, etc. This is reflected in the European Social Partners’ Statement of 30 May 2017 (10) on tapping the potential from greening the economy for job creation, and in their joint project and recommendations of 7 October 2021 (11) on the circular economy. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

The EESC has seen growing scientific evidence of the great potential and numerous benefits of green collective bargaining in promoting environmental sustainability, decarbonising the economy, boosting the circular economy and combating climate change, given the substantial contribution that the various facets of this bargaining make to achieving these objectives, such as the mobility of employees, ways of organising work, training staff to facilitate green transition processes, ensuring safe and healthy environments, gender issues, etc. This is reflected in the European Social Partners’ Statement of 30 May 2017 (10

11

| 3.2. | The EESC considers that green collective bargaining at all levels is an essential part of the principle of democratic citizen participation, in this case expressed through the specific labour market role played by the social partners, which is key to tackling the climate emergency and the green transition of the economy and society effectively and in a socially fair way. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

The EESC considers that green collective bargaining at all levels is an essential part of the principle of democratic citizen participation, in this case expressed through the specific labour market role played by the social partners, which is key to tackling the climate emergency and the green transition of the economy and society effectively and in a socially fair way.

| 3.3. | Renewable energy policies in the European Union require balances to be sought between economic, environmental and social objectives. As a result, these green transition processes in the EU require new tools to ensure appropriate coherence between them and to promote the integration of individuals and the active population into work. Green collective bargaining is a good tool for striking these balances. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

Renewable energy policies in the European Union require balances to be sought between economic, environmental and social objectives. As a result, these green transition processes in the EU require new tools to ensure appropriate coherence between them and to promote the integration of individuals and the active population into work. Green collective bargaining is a good tool for striking these balances.

| 3.4. | In a context of accelerating climate change, it is essential to identify which sectors of economic activity and employment are, or will be most affected by the climate crisis and its direct effects, in terms of both economic, working, health and social protection conditions and expectations, including business and labour mobility, in order to establish appropriate measures to mitigate its consequences. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

In a context of accelerating climate change, it is essential to identify which sectors of economic activity and employment are, or will be most affected by the climate crisis and its direct effects, in terms of both economic, working, health and social protection conditions and expectations, including business and labour mobility, in order to establish appropriate measures to mitigate its consequences.

| 3.5. | The EU is leading on innovative clean energy production processes to reverse environmental and social imbalances, with economic transformations that bring new decent employment opportunities, such as renewable energy. The EESC calls for more research in this area, as well as for financial support to help the companies involved invest. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

The EU is leading on innovative clean energy production processes to reverse environmental and social imbalances, with economic transformations that bring new decent employment opportunities, such as renewable energy. The EESC calls for more research in this area, as well as for financial support to help the companies involved invest.

| 3.6. | The EESC notes with satisfaction that more and more companies are adopting a corporate social responsibility (CSR) system that includes effective commitments to sustainable environmental management. The EESC takes note of the studies that show how CSR programmes participated in through agreements or conventions offer greater guarantees of seriousness and effectiveness. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

The EESC notes with satisfaction that more and more companies are adopting a corporate social responsibility (CSR) system that includes effective commitments to sustainable environmental management. The EESC takes note of the studies that show how CSR programmes participated in through agreements or conventions offer greater guarantees of seriousness and effectiveness.

| 3.7. | The main way to structure the participation of workers in the just transition processes is through the inclusion of such clauses in the collective agreements of the different levels and characteristics of the different labour relations systems. Collective agreements can play an important role in fostering cooperation between employers and workers in shaping a joint response to the green transition. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

The main way to structure the participation of workers in the just transition processes is through the inclusion of such clauses in the collective agreements of the different levels and characteristics of the different labour relations systems. Collective agreements can play an important role in fostering cooperation between employers and workers in shaping a joint response to the green transition.

| 3.8. | Social responsibility clauses are currently being included in collective bargaining agreements. In this way, collective bargaining becomes a complement to the green public procurement included in social responsibility. As an example, the chemical sector is a pioneer in this matter. Implementation of the European Green Deal requires a new, specific, homogeneous labelling framework that provides economic and ecological information relevant to public and private decision-making. This European eco-labelling strategy would improve sustainable public procurement and has the potential to support circularity and information flow; however, important conditions must be met such as cost-efficiency, confidentiality and proportionality. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

Social responsibility clauses are currently being included in collective bargaining agreements. In this way, collective bargaining becomes a complement to the green public procurement included in social responsibility. As an example, the chemical sector is a pioneer in this matter. Implementation of the European Green Deal requires a new, specific, homogeneous labelling framework that provides economic and ecological information relevant to public and private decision-making. This European eco-labelling strategy would improve sustainable public procurement and has the potential to support circularity and information flow; however, important conditions must be met such as cost-efficiency, confidentiality and proportionality.

| 3.9. | Air quality is an important aspect of health and safety in indoor and outdoor work areas; it therefore affects working conditions and should also be taken into account as part of collective bargaining. Recently, the WHO set new values and global guidelines for air quality and its effects on human health, including the occupational health of people working in outdoor environments. This may result in the need to amend the rules currently in force in the EU. As well as collective bargaining on working environments and environmental service provision conditions, these changes will also affect the cost of investing. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

Air quality is an important aspect of health and safety in indoor and outdoor work areas; it therefore affects working conditions and should also be taken into account as part of collective bargaining. Recently, the WHO set new values and global guidelines for air quality and its effects on human health, including the occupational health of people working in outdoor environments. This may result in the need to amend the rules currently in force in the EU. As well as collective bargaining on working environments and environmental service provision conditions, these changes will also affect the cost of investing.

| 3.10. | The EU has regulatory frameworks that favour integrating environmental management into companies. For these to be truly effective, employees and their representatives must be actively involved. This is the case with the voluntary eco-management schemes (EMAS (12)) and Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (13) (the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive). Here, the emphasis is on promoting the participation of employees and training programmes for environmental management. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

The EU has regulatory frameworks that favour integrating environmental management into companies. For these to be truly effective, employees and their representatives must be actively involved. This is the case with the voluntary eco-management schemes (EMAS (12

13

| 3.11. | The EESC notes the increasing number of European studies which highlight the virtues of green collective bargaining as a tool for promoting sustainable production processes through agreements that include green self-regulatory clauses. Collective bargaining, in line with the features of national industrial relations systems and respecting the autonomy of the social partners, can help to facilitate consensus-building on specific measures to be taken by companies to promote the just transition. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

The EESC notes the increasing number of European studies which highlight the virtues of green collective bargaining as a tool for promoting sustainable production processes through agreements that include green self-regulatory clauses. Collective bargaining, in line with the features of national industrial relations systems and respecting the autonomy of the social partners, can help to facilitate consensus-building on specific measures to be taken by companies to promote the just transition.

4.   General comments

General comments

| 4.1. | The EESC notes that studies on collective bargaining in EU countries conclude that inclusion of environmental issues in collective agreements is poor. The EESC calls on the EU and the Member States to further support actions and initiatives that will incentivise employers and workers to adapt to the green transition, taking into account practices of workplace information and consultation. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

The EESC notes that studies on collective bargaining in EU countries conclude that inclusion of environmental issues in collective agreements is poor. The EESC calls on the EU and the Member States to further support actions and initiatives that will incentivise employers and workers to adapt to the green transition, taking into account practices of workplace information and consultation.

| 4.2. | A well-managed transition to a zero-emission economy is not only vital in order to respond to the climate emergency, it can stimulate a sustainable and inclusive economic recovery. However, long-term measures are needed, requiring strong, sustainable financing mechanisms and participatory and stable governance. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

A well-managed transition to a zero-emission economy is not only vital in order to respond to the climate emergency, it can stimulate a sustainable and inclusive economic recovery. However, long-term measures are needed, requiring strong, sustainable financing mechanisms and participatory and stable governance.

| 4.3. | In this participatory governance model, collective bargaining is a tool for adapting the world of work to the new challenge of a fully sustainable production model. This is because of its ability to respond immediately, its closeness to sectoral realities and its potential to provide tailored solutions, including the protection of jobs and businesses. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

In this participatory governance model, collective bargaining is a tool for adapting the world of work to the new challenge of a fully sustainable production model. This is because of its ability to respond immediately, its closeness to sectoral realities and its potential to provide tailored solutions, including the protection of jobs and businesses.

| 4.4. | The EESC recommends that the Commission and the Member States explore with sectoral social partners the potential added value of carrying out studies on the impact of the climate emergency and green transitions on the employment sector across different production sectors, to identify and propose measures to respond effectively to the needs of economic environments and help the various collective bargaining units to manage the just transition in their collective agreements. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

The EESC recommends that the Commission and the Member States explore with sectoral social partners the potential added value of carrying out studies on the impact of the climate emergency and green transitions on the employment sector across different production sectors, to identify and propose measures to respond effectively to the needs of economic environments and help the various collective bargaining units to manage the just transition in their collective agreements.

| 4.5. | The EESC encourages the social partners to include green transition processes in collective agreements, in line with their cross-industry and sectoral priorities, as appropriate. A European example is the inclusion of the global Responsible Care programme in European chemical sector collective agreements. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

The EESC encourages the social partners to include green transition processes in collective agreements, in line with their cross-industry and sectoral priorities, as appropriate. A European example is the inclusion of the global Responsible Care programme in European chemical sector collective agreements.

5.   Specific comments

Specific comments

| 5.1. | The EESC considers that the discussion of green issues within collective bargaining is about negotiable clauses between the social partners within collective agreements that have a direct and indirect effect on the environment. Collective agreements can cover, but are not limited to:






  (a) | the impact of companies’ activity on the environment; |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.1.

The EESC considers that the discussion of green issues within collective bargaining is about negotiable clauses between the social partners within collective agreements that have a direct and indirect effect on the environment. Collective agreements can cover, but are not limited to:

(a)

the impact of companies’ activity on the environment;

| (b) | the protection of workers from the effects of the environment and climate change; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the protection of workers from the effects of the environment and climate change;

| (c) | the impact of the green transformation on a company’s activity as regards work organisation, changing occupational profiles and the skills of employees; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the impact of the green transformation on a company’s activity as regards work organisation, changing occupational profiles and the skills of employees;

| (d) | internal monitoring of implementation of points (a), (b), and (c). |
| --- | --- |

(d)

internal monitoring of implementation of points (a), (b), and (c).

The EESC wants to highlight collective bargaining as a key tool that can help companies and workers face the challenges of the climate crisis, including the derived costs for companies.

| 5.2. | The EESC considers it necessary for the European Commission, within the framework of Articles 154, 155 and 156 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to encourage the Member States to promote the inclusion of companies’ environmental management in social dialogue and collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is a good vehicle for facilitating the adaptation of organisations and employment, as well as working conditions, to the effects of climate change, and it makes it possible to assess and present companies’ investment costs in order to maintain them and adapt them to the requirements of fair competitiveness. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

The EESC considers it necessary for the European Commission, within the framework of Articles 154, 155 and 156 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to encourage the Member States to promote the inclusion of companies’ environmental management in social dialogue and collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is a good vehicle for facilitating the adaptation of organisations and employment, as well as working conditions, to the effects of climate change, and it makes it possible to assess and present companies’ investment costs in order to maintain them and adapt them to the requirements of fair competitiveness.

| 5.3. | While respecting the autonomy of the social partners and the diversity of the Member States’ collective bargaining systems, the EESC considers it appropriate for national legal frameworks and cross-industry agreements to provide a suitable framework for taking into account the aim of achieving a socially just green transition, making productive change (including cost assessment, both business and social, as well as fair cost allocation) compatible with quality and security in as many jobs as possible. Taking into account the various industrial relations systems, consideration could be given to:






  (a) | promoting labour representatives’ rights to be informed and consulted with regard to the company’s behaviour in adapting to climate change, in accordance with national rules and practices; |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.3.

While respecting the autonomy of the social partners and the diversity of the Member States’ collective bargaining systems, the EESC considers it appropriate for national legal frameworks and cross-industry agreements to provide a suitable framework for taking into account the aim of achieving a socially just green transition, making productive change (including cost assessment, both business and social, as well as fair cost allocation) compatible with quality and security in as many jobs as possible. Taking into account the various industrial relations systems, consideration could be given to:

(a)

promoting labour representatives’ rights to be informed and consulted with regard to the company’s behaviour in adapting to climate change, in accordance with national rules and practices;

| (b) | promoting training of workers in this area; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

promoting training of workers in this area;

| (c) | including clauses to encourage employee participation in environmental matters and in committees with responsibility for the environment, where these exist for companies in each sector that have acquired environmental certification in accordance with ISO 14001 or EMAS standards; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

including clauses to encourage employee participation in environmental matters and in committees with responsibility for the environment, where these exist for companies in each sector that have acquired environmental certification in accordance with ISO 14001 or EMAS standards;

| (d) | promoting the establishment of specific joint environmental bodies, where possible, or the health and safety committee being given responsibility for the environment and the just transition. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

promoting the establishment of specific joint environmental bodies, where possible, or the health and safety committee being given responsibility for the environment and the just transition.

| 5.4. | The EESC calls on the EU and the Member States to further support actions and initiatives that will incentivise employers and workers to adapt to the green transition and to consider developing, among other measures, a concept of designated employees that act as environmental transition representatives or contact points for matters related to the environmental and ecological transition of the workplace. Within the workplace setting, managers and worker representatives could consider whether to designate people to a specific role (in addition to their core tasks) in helping with issues related to the adaptation of the company to the green transition. The EESC calls on the Member States to create the necessary incentives for businesses and/or sectors of activity to designate the aforementioned environmental transition representatives or contact points. Environmental training in the form of vocational training is also recommended. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

The EESC calls on the EU and the Member States to further support actions and initiatives that will incentivise employers and workers to adapt to the green transition and to consider developing, among other measures, a concept of designated employees that act as environmental transition representatives or contact points for matters related to the environmental and ecological transition of the workplace. Within the workplace setting, managers and worker representatives could consider whether to designate people to a specific role (in addition to their core tasks) in helping with issues related to the adaptation of the company to the green transition. The EESC calls on the Member States to create the necessary incentives for businesses and/or sectors of activity to designate the aforementioned environmental transition representatives or contact points. Environmental training in the form of vocational training is also recommended.

| 5.5. | The EESC calls on the Member States to create an appropriate framework and conditions to promote mobility clauses in collective agreements to include schemes for labour mobility that is sustainable, healthy and safe throughout the working environment, in order to reduce the use of private vehicles and thus emissions. The Member States should put in place effective and efficient systems for setting them up. |
| --- | --- |

5.5.

The EESC calls on the Member States to create an appropriate framework and conditions to promote mobility clauses in collective agreements to include schemes for labour mobility that is sustainable, healthy and safe throughout the working environment, in order to reduce the use of private vehicles and thus emissions. The Member States should put in place effective and efficient systems for setting them up.

| 5.6. | The EESC calls on the Member States to fully transpose Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report possible breaches of EU law, including in the area of environmental law. These rights would be an important contribution to monitoring compliance with European recovery policies based on an ecologically sustainable and socially just economic transition. |
| --- | --- |

5.6.

The EESC calls on the Member States to fully transpose Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report possible breaches of EU law, including in the area of environmental law. These rights would be an important contribution to monitoring compliance with European recovery policies based on an ecologically sustainable and socially just economic transition.

| 5.7. | The EESC calls on the social partners to consider and facilitate the establishment of appropriate relationships and equitable recommendations, guidelines and policies to make green collective bargaining one of the best, quality tools to ensure and promote a balanced production model that combines competitive capacity with protection of the whole local and global environment. |
| --- | --- |

5.7.

The EESC calls on the social partners to consider and facilitate the establishment of appropriate relationships and equitable recommendations, guidelines and policies to make green collective bargaining one of the best, quality tools to ensure and promote a balanced production model that combines competitive capacity with protection of the whole local and global environment.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Energy policy and the labour market: consequences for employment in regions undergoing energy transitions’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 146, 27.4.2023, p. 4). https://www.eesc.europa.eu/lt/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/energy-policy-and-labour-market-consequences-employment-regions-undergoing-energy-transitions

1

(2)  https://www.epsu.org/article/what-green-collective-bargaining

2

(3)  https://www.businesseurope.eu/sites/buseur/files/media/reports_and_studies/2021-09-24_final_report_sp_project_on_circular_ecenomy_and_the_world_of_work.pdf

3

(4)  This Recommendation states, inter alia, that ‘To advance the green transition in an inclusive and democratic way, integrating fair transition objectives from the outset into policy-making at all levels and ensuring an effective whole-of-society approach to fair transition policies, Member States are invited to: actively involve social partners at national, regional and local levels, while respecting their autonomy, in all stages of policy-making and implementation provided for under this Recommendation, including through social dialogue and collective bargaining where appropriate; in addition, promote further the full involvement of social partners in the design and implementation of transition pathways for industrial ecosystems under the Updated New Industrial Strategy’.

4

(5)  With the purpose of continuously improving the performance of the activities of the chemical industry on safety, health protection and the environment, in accordance with the principles of sustainable development and beyond compliance with current legislation and the provisions of this Agreement, the signatory parties undertake to promote and collaborate on the adherence of companies to the international programme of the chemical industry ‘Responsible Care’ and the achievement of the objectives sought with this voluntary, public and active initiative of chemical companies. https://www.feique.org/programa-responsible-care/

5

(6)  https://www.businesseurope.eu/publications/european-social-dialogue-work-programme-2022-2024

6

(7)  Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 17).

7

(8)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Energy policy and the labour market: consequences for employment in regions undergoing energy transitions’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 146, 27.4.2023, p. 4).

8

(9)  https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_432859.pdf

9

(10)  https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2017-05-29_kick_off_draft_declaration_eu_social_partners_on_green_jobs_final.pdf

10

(11)  https://www.businesseurope.eu/sites/buseur/files/media/reports_and_studies/2021-09-24_final_report_sp_project_on_circular_ecenomy_and_the_world_of_work.pdf

11

(12)  Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/2026 of 19 December 2018 amending Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 1221/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the voluntary participation by organisations in a Community eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS) (OJ L 325, 20.12.2018, p. 18).

12

(13)  Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups (OJ L 330, 15.11.2014, p. 1).

13

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| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/34

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the measures to fight stigma against HIV

(exploratory opinion at the request of the Spanish Presidency)

(2023/C 293/06)

| Rapporteur: | Pietro Vittorio BARBIERI |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Nicoletta MERLO |

Rapporteur:

Pietro Vittorio BARBIERI

Pietro Vittorio BARBIERI

Co-rapporteur:

Nicoletta MERLO

Nicoletta MERLO

| Request by the Spanish Presidency of the Council | Letter, 8.12.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
  Exploratory opinion |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 31.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 201/0/6 |

Request by the Spanish Presidency of the Council

Letter, 8.12.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Exploratory opinion

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

31.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

201/0/6

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the Spanish Presidency’s initiative of setting the goal to eliminate HIV related stigma and discrimination in Europe by 2030. The issue has been neglected for too long, even though the available data unequivocally show the continuation of its harmful consequences in various parts of the world, in specific social contexts and key populations. Therefore, the EESC shares the Spanish Presidency’s view that ending HIV-related stigma and discrimination should be considered one of the political priorities of the EU agenda. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the Spanish Presidency’s initiative of setting the goal to eliminate HIV related stigma and discrimination in Europe by 2030. The issue has been neglected for too long, even though the available data unequivocally show the continuation of its harmful consequences in various parts of the world, in specific social contexts and key populations. Therefore, the EESC shares the Spanish Presidency’s view that ending HIV-related stigma and discrimination should be considered one of the political priorities of the EU agenda.

| 1.2. | The EESC shares the need for a high-level declaration from the European institutions, to be presented to the European Parliament on 1 December 2023, and undertakes to support it and take part in it at every possible level, way and forum. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC shares the need for a high-level declaration from the European institutions, to be presented to the European Parliament on 1 December 2023, and undertakes to support it and take part in it at every possible level, way and forum.

| 1.3. | In order to overcome stigma, discrimination and false stereotypes, the EESC considers it essential to promote awareness-raising, training and information actions, especially in schools, involving organised civil society, youth and student organisations. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

In order to overcome stigma, discrimination and false stereotypes, the EESC considers it essential to promote awareness-raising, training and information actions, especially in schools, involving organised civil society, youth and student organisations.

| 1.4. | Identification and removal of barriers to pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) for greater access to drugs and progress in implementing PrEP are required to reach a wider population, in order accelerate progress towards ending the AIDS epidemic by 2030. Preventive interventions such as pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis and TasP may have a significant impact on controlling HIV and other sexually transmitted infections. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

Identification and removal of barriers to pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) for greater access to drugs and progress in implementing PrEP are required to reach a wider population, in order accelerate progress towards ending the AIDS epidemic by 2030. Preventive interventions such as pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis and TasP may have a significant impact on controlling HIV and other sexually transmitted infections.

| 1.5. | People with HIV must have equal opportunities for access and professional growth in the world of work. They should also be able to benefit from specific arrangements such as flexible working hours or extended leave for medical visits with guaranteed confidentiality. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

People with HIV must have equal opportunities for access and professional growth in the world of work. They should also be able to benefit from specific arrangements such as flexible working hours or extended leave for medical visits with guaranteed confidentiality.

| 1.6. | The EESC stresses the importance of taking specific measures for key populations: for the HIV epidemic to be effectively addressed, targeted information and institutionally implemented prevention programmes need to reach these population groups so that specific services can make contact with them proactively, possibly through non-governmental, community-based associations. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The EESC stresses the importance of taking specific measures for key populations: for the HIV epidemic to be effectively addressed, targeted information and institutionally implemented prevention programmes need to reach these population groups so that specific services can make contact with them proactively, possibly through non-governmental, community-based associations.

| 1.7. | In view of the fact that Ukraine has the second largest AIDS epidemic in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region, the EESC stresses the importance for host countries to ensure continuity and free HIV testing and treatment for Ukrainian refugees, improving the chances to get tested regardless of residency status. Since most refugees are women and children, expanded testing in hospitals, primary care and community settings may be the most appropriate settings for Ukrainian refugee. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

In view of the fact that Ukraine has the second largest AIDS epidemic in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region, the EESC stresses the importance for host countries to ensure continuity and free HIV testing and treatment for Ukrainian refugees, improving the chances to get tested regardless of residency status. Since most refugees are women and children, expanded testing in hospitals, primary care and community settings may be the most appropriate settings for Ukrainian refugee.

| 1.8. | Antiretroviral treatment (ART) can play a dual role in improving the health of people living with HIV and effectively prevent HIV transmission, as it is highly effective in suppressing HIV viral load. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

Antiretroviral treatment (ART) can play a dual role in improving the health of people living with HIV and effectively prevent HIV transmission, as it is highly effective in suppressing HIV viral load.

| 1.9. | The timely diagnosis of HIV infection, the early start of therapy and retention in care (continuum of care) are the cornerstones of controlling the spread of infection. As several countries have already reached the target, the EESC calls for a more ambitious new target for all countries to be achieved by 2030, improving coverage levels to as high as 95 % for testing, treatment and virological suppression. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

The timely diagnosis of HIV infection, the early start of therapy and retention in care (continuum of care) are the cornerstones of controlling the spread of infection. As several countries have already reached the target, the EESC calls for a more ambitious new target for all countries to be achieved by 2030, improving coverage levels to as high as 95 % for testing, treatment and virological suppression.

| 1.10. | Both the continuum of care and the prevention continuum can synergistically represent a comprehensive response to combat the HIV epidemic, and should therefore be developed and implemented. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

Both the continuum of care and the prevention continuum can synergistically represent a comprehensive response to combat the HIV epidemic, and should therefore be developed and implemented.

| 1.11. | The EESC calls for new and innovative strategies to improve early diagnosis and make more people aware of their infection by expanding diversified and user-friendly approaches to more widely available HIV testing such as rapid testing, community testing and self-testing, and an integrated approach to HIV and hepatitis B and C testing. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

The EESC calls for new and innovative strategies to improve early diagnosis and make more people aware of their infection by expanding diversified and user-friendly approaches to more widely available HIV testing such as rapid testing, community testing and self-testing, and an integrated approach to HIV and hepatitis B and C testing.

| 1.12. | Communities play vital roles in the HIV response, promoting accountability, driving prevention activism, implementing activities and contributing innovations that are crucial for sustainable progress. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

Communities play vital roles in the HIV response, promoting accountability, driving prevention activism, implementing activities and contributing innovations that are crucial for sustainable progress.

| 1.13. | To sustain and accelerate progress towards achieving these goals, the EESC urges further efforts in designing and implementing new programmes to extend knowledge of the HIV-positive status and treatment coverage, to reduce the circulation of the virus and thus the transmission of HIV, and to limit grounds for discrimination such as access to employment or to financial services. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

To sustain and accelerate progress towards achieving these goals, the EESC urges further efforts in designing and implementing new programmes to extend knowledge of the HIV-positive status and treatment coverage, to reduce the circulation of the virus and thus the transmission of HIV, and to limit grounds for discrimination such as access to employment or to financial services.

2.   HIV in Europe

HIV in Europe

| 2.1. | HIV transmission remains a major public health concern affecting more than 36 million people in the world, of whom 2,3 million people live in the WHO European Region, particularly in the eastern part of the region. Nearly 107 000 people were diagnosed with HIV in the European Region in 2021, including around 17 000 in the EU/EEA. The trend in HIV diagnoses has been on the decline since 2012; a more marked decrease in HIV diagnoses was observed in 2020 and 2021 (- 24 %), possibly due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on utilisation of health services, and/or as a result of reduced transmission due to the public health measures implemented during the period of the COVID-19 pandemic. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

HIV transmission remains a major public health concern affecting more than 36 million people in the world, of whom 2,3 million people live in the WHO European Region, particularly in the eastern part of the region. Nearly 107 000 people were diagnosed with HIV in the European Region in 2021, including around 17 000 in the EU/EEA. The trend in HIV diagnoses has been on the decline since 2012; a more marked decrease in HIV diagnoses was observed in 2020 and 2021 (- 24 %), possibly due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on utilisation of health services, and/or as a result of reduced transmission due to the public health measures implemented during the period of the COVID-19 pandemic.

| 2.2. | HIV in Europe disproportionally affects populations that are socially marginalised and people whose behaviour is socially stigmatised such as: people who use intravenous drugs and their sexual partners, men who have sex with men, transgender people, sex workers, prisoners and migrants. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

HIV in Europe disproportionally affects populations that are socially marginalised and people whose behaviour is socially stigmatised such as: people who use intravenous drugs and their sexual partners, men who have sex with men, transgender people, sex workers, prisoners and migrants.

| 2.3. | Data document different epidemic patterns and trends across countries in the WHO European Region: the main transmission mode is sexual transmission between men in the EU/EEA and western part while heterosexual transmission and intravenous drug use were the main reported transmission modes in the eastern part of the region. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

Data document different epidemic patterns and trends across countries in the WHO European Region: the main transmission mode is sexual transmission between men in the EU/EEA and western part while heterosexual transmission and intravenous drug use were the main reported transmission modes in the eastern part of the region.

| 2.4. | Late HIV diagnosis remains a challenge for most countries in the region: more than 50 % received the HIV diagnosis when the CD4 cell count was lower than 350/mmc. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

Late HIV diagnosis remains a challenge for most countries in the region: more than 50 % received the HIV diagnosis when the CD4 cell count was lower than 350/mmc.

3.   HIV continuum of care for Ukrainian refugees

HIV continuum of care for Ukrainian refugees

| 3.1. | Since the start of the war on 24 February 2022, more than 13,5 million people have been internally displaced or forced to flee to neighbouring countries as refugees, including people living with HIV (estimated to be between 10 000–30 000 people) and key populations. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

Since the start of the war on 24 February 2022, more than 13,5 million people have been internally displaced or forced to flee to neighbouring countries as refugees, including people living with HIV (estimated to be between 10 000–30 000 people) and key populations.

| 3.2. | Ukraine is the country with the second-largest AIDS epidemic in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region. The number of new HIV diagnoses rose from 14 240 in 2016 to 16 270 in 2019, falling slightly to 15 660 in 2020, probably due to the COVID-19 crisis. Of these, surveillance data reported 9 000–10 000 cases acquired through heterosexual contact and around 5 000 acquired through intravenous drug use. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

Ukraine is the country with the second-largest AIDS epidemic in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region. The number of new HIV diagnoses rose from 14 240 in 2016 to 16 270 in 2019, falling slightly to 15 660 in 2020, probably due to the COVID-19 crisis. Of these, surveillance data reported 9 000–10 000 cases acquired through heterosexual contact

around 5 000 acquired through intravenous drug use

| 3.3. | Before the start of the war, the country was making strong progress in the AIDS response: HIV care and treatment were provided for free at governmental HIV clinics throughout the country and an increasing number of people living with HIV were on antiretroviral treatment (ART). In 2021, it was estimated that out of 240 000 people living with HIV (0,6 % of the Ukrainian population) more than 150 000 people were on ART (62 %), and 94 % of those receiving treatment were virally suppressed. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

Before the start of the war, the country was making strong progress in the AIDS response: HIV care and treatment were provided for free at governmental HIV clinics throughout the country and an increasing number of people living with HIV were on antiretroviral treatment (ART). In 2021, it was estimated that out of 240 000 people living with HIV (0,6 % of the Ukrainian population) more than 150 000 people were on ART (62 %), and 94 % of those receiving treatment were virally suppressed.

| 3.4. | In the country, UN agencies and partners on the ground such as the UNAIDS Emergency Fund, have been working closely with local authorities to reach and help people in need. More recently they have delivered humanitarian assistance to hard-hit territories in the country that have only now become accessible. A coalition of government, civil society and international organisations has been and continues to be a cornerstone of the effective HIV response in Ukraine during the war. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

In the country, UN agencies and partners on the ground such as the UNAIDS Emergency Fund, have been working closely with local authorities to reach and help people in need. More recently they have delivered humanitarian assistance to hard-hit territories in the country that have only now become accessible. A coalition of government, civil society and international organisations has been and continues to be a cornerstone of the effective HIV response in Ukraine during the war.

| 3.5. | UNAIDS will continue to support HIV prevention, testing, treatment, care and support for people across Ukraine affected by the war and people displaced by the conflict. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

UNAIDS will continue to support HIV prevention, testing, treatment, care and support for people across Ukraine affected by the war and people displaced by the conflict.

| 3.6. | A document from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) (1), published in July 2022, outlines key considerations to inform decision-making and practical service implementation to maintain quality standards of HIV care to Ukrainian refugees in particular the importance for host countries to ensure continuity and free HIV testing and treatment for Ukrainian refugees, improving the chances to get tested regardless of residency status, because restricted access to ART leads to an increased risk of illness, death, emergence of resistant strains and potential onward transmission. Since most refugees are women and children, expanded testing in hospitals, primary care and community settings may be the most appropriate settings for Ukrainian refugees. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

A document from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) (1

4.   HIV in the world

HIV in the world

| 4.1. | There is a strong global consensus that the tools now exist to end the AIDS epidemic. Over the last two decades, a growing number of studies in diverse settings have demonstrated that antiretroviral treatment (ART) can play a dual role in improving the health of people living with HIV (PLHIV) and effectively prevent HIV transmission (Treatment as Prevention — TasP), as it is highly effective in suppressing HIV viral load (defined as under 200 copies/mL). |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

There is a strong global consensus that the tools now exist to end the AIDS epidemic. Over the last two decades, a growing number of studies in diverse settings have demonstrated that antiretroviral treatment (ART) can play a dual role in improving the health of people living with HIV (PLHIV) and effectively prevent HIV transmission (Treatment as Prevention — TasP), as it is highly effective in suppressing HIV viral load (defined as under 200 copies/mL).

| 4.2. | In recent years, a strategy has been widely established that sees the timely diagnosis of HIV infection, the early start of therapy and retention in care (continuum of care) as the cornerstones of controlling the spread of infection. In 2014 UNAIDS launched the target of 90-90-90 (90 % of people with HIV diagnosed, 90 % of these treated and 90 % of those treated with suppressed viraemia). If these targets are met, 73 % of all those living with HIV will have suppressed viral load, and people with suppressed viral load cannot pass on HIV. |
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4.2.

In recent years, a strategy has been widely established that sees the timely diagnosis of HIV infection, the early start of therapy and retention in care (continuum of care) as the cornerstones of controlling the spread of infection. In 2014 UNAIDS launched the target of 90-90-90 (90 % of people with HIV diagnosed, 90 % of these treated and 90 % of those treated with suppressed viraemia). If these targets are met, 73 % of all those living with HIV will have suppressed viral load, and people with suppressed viral load cannot pass on HIV.

| 4.3. | There is evidence that at the end of 2020 several countries, with diverse geography, income status and epidemiology, have already reached the target. Experts believe that these results could potentially show that a more ambitious new target for all countries could be achieved by 2030, improving coverage levels to as high as 95 % for testing, treatment and virological suppression. To sustain and accelerate progress towards achieving these goals in the HIV epidemic response, further efforts in designing and implementing new programmes are needed to extend the knowledge of HIV-positive status and the treatment coverage (Universal Testing and Treatment (UTT) approach) to reduce the circulation of the virus and therefore the transmission of HIV. Such new programmes should not focus exclusively on standard measures to be applied, but should also be implemented according to the needs and the specific demands of people living with HIV. |
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4.3.

There is evidence that at the end of 2020 several countries, with diverse geography, income status and epidemiology, have already reached the target. Experts believe that these results could potentially show that a more ambitious new target for all countries could be achieved by 2030, improving coverage levels to as high as 95 % for testing, treatment and virological suppression. To sustain and accelerate progress towards achieving these goals in the HIV epidemic response, further efforts in designing and implementing new programmes are needed to extend the knowledge of HIV-positive status and the treatment coverage (Universal Testing and Treatment (UTT) approach) to reduce the circulation of the virus and therefore the transmission of HIV. Such new programmes should not focus exclusively on standard measures to be applied, but should also be implemented according to the needs and the specific demands of people living with HIV.

| 4.4. | More recently, an approach similar to the HIV care continuum, the HIV continuum of prevention, is being increasingly proposed, aimed at the population at risk of HIV infection to ensure that individuals remain uninfected by HIV. The HIV prevention continuum builds on HIV testing as its foundation followed by linking HIV-uninfected persons to prevention services, retention in services and adherence to services to receive ongoing risk reduction counselling and consistent condom use to prevent HIV acquisition and transmission. Retention is also important to ensure repeat HIV testing and early diagnosis of HIV infection if HIV acquisition occurs. Newly infected individuals must be promptly connected to HIV care and treatment and other prevention methods including partner testing, condom use and antiretroviral drugs for prevention. Several studies have shown that at the population level both the continuum of care and that of prevention can synergistically represent a complete response to fight the HIV epidemic. |
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4.4.

More recently, an approach similar to the HIV care continuum, the HIV continuum of prevention, is being increasingly proposed, aimed at the population at risk of HIV infection to ensure that individuals remain uninfected by HIV. The HIV prevention continuum builds on HIV testing as its foundation followed by linking HIV-uninfected persons to prevention services, retention in services and adherence to services to receive ongoing risk reduction counselling and consistent condom use to prevent HIV acquisition and transmission. Retention is also important to ensure repeat HIV testing and early diagnosis of HIV infection if HIV acquisition occurs. Newly infected individuals must be promptly connected to HIV care and treatment and other prevention methods including partner testing, condom use and antiretroviral drugs for prevention. Several studies have shown that at the population level both the continuum of care and that of prevention can synergistically represent a complete response to fight the HIV epidemic.

| 4.5. | New and innovative strategies are required to improve early diagnosis and make more people aware of their infection by expanding diversified and user-friendly approaches to more widely available HIV testing such as rapid testing, community testing and self-testing, and an integrated approach to HIV and hepatitis B and C testing. |
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4.5.

New and innovative strategies are required to improve early diagnosis and make more people aware of their infection by expanding diversified and user-friendly approaches to more widely available HIV testing such as rapid testing, community testing and self-testing, and an integrated approach to HIV and hepatitis B and C testing.

| 4.6. | The WHO recommends a comprehensive package of health services for HIV prevention with a particular focus on reaching key populations. Of particular relevance is the integration of HIV prevention services with services for sexual and reproductive health, mental health, prevention and care of sexual and gender-based violence, drug dependence treatment, hepatitis C prevention and care, tuberculosis control, prison health, noncommunicable diseases and legal and social support services. |
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4.6.

The WHO recommends a comprehensive package of health services for HIV prevention with a particular focus on reaching key populations. Of particular relevance is the integration of HIV prevention services with services for sexual and reproductive health, mental health, prevention and care of sexual and gender-based violence, drug dependence treatment, hepatitis C prevention and care, tuberculosis control, prison health, noncommunicable diseases and legal and social support services.

| 4.7. | The availability of different ways of accessing an HIV test can provide the opportunity for timely diagnosis to various populations vulnerable to HIV infection. |
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4.7.

The availability of different ways of accessing an HIV test can provide the opportunity for timely diagnosis to various populations vulnerable to HIV infection.

| 4.8. | UNAIDS recommends a ‘combination prevention’ approach to HIV prevention. As no single prevention strategy is sufficient to contain the spread of the disease, the approach requires biomedical, behavioural and structural interventions that are specifically selected and tailored to suit local needs, as articulated by affected communities. And to succeed, these must be coordinated, efficient, consistent and inspired by a shared commitment to common goals. |
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4.8.

UNAIDS recommends a ‘combination prevention’ approach to HIV prevention. As no single prevention strategy is sufficient to contain the spread of the disease, the approach requires biomedical, behavioural and structural interventions that are specifically selected and tailored to suit local needs, as articulated by affected communities. And to succeed, these must be coordinated, efficient, consistent and inspired by a shared commitment to common goals.

5.   Community response to HIV

Community response to HIV

| 5.1. | Historically, the role of communities of people living with HIV (PLHIV), marginalised and vulnerable groups, women and young people in HIV service delivery, research and drug development, advocacy, social and political accountability, resource mobilisation and social and human rights protection is well documented and recognised by UNAIDS (2). The past three decades have demonstrated that communities of PLHIV and their peers are instrumental in sustaining engagement and advocacy for health equity and financing for health and ensuring that the human rights of all people are recognised and upheld. Quality and effective integration of health systems and universal healthcare can be more effectively designed, implemented and sustained with communities of PLHIV and peers at their centre. The leadership and engagement of communities have contributed directly to improved outcomes in access to HIV treatment, prevention, support and care services around the world. |
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5.1.

Historically, the role of communities of people living with HIV (PLHIV), marginalised and vulnerable groups, women and young people in HIV service delivery, research and drug development, advocacy, social and political accountability, resource mobilisation and social and human rights protection is well documented and recognised by UNAIDS (2

| 5.2. | Communities play vital roles in the HIV response by promoting accountability, driving prevention activism, implementing activities and contributing innovations that are crucial for sustainable progress. Community-led service delivery platforms are often more effective than formal health facility-based platforms for reaching marginalised and under-served populations, especially in settings where stigma and discrimination are rife. Community-led organisations are well placed to identify gaps in services, constraints that hold back service delivery and uptake, but also opportunities to acknowledge services as part of the fundamental rights of the individual and to make them more people-centred, convenient and effective. |
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5.2.

Communities play vital roles in the HIV response by promoting accountability, driving prevention activism, implementing activities and contributing innovations that are crucial for sustainable progress. Community-led service delivery platforms are often more effective than formal health facility-based platforms for reaching marginalised and under-served populations, especially in settings where stigma and discrimination are rife. Community-led organisations are well placed to identify gaps in services, constraints that hold back service delivery and uptake, but also opportunities to acknowledge services as part of the fundamental rights of the individual and to make them more people-centred, convenient and effective.

| 5.3. | The community (understood as the group of non-governmental associations and organisations involved in combating AIDS and in defending the rights of people with HIV on a daily basis) plays a crucial role in giving a voice to the most vulnerable and at-risk populations, and provides effective solutions to contain the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It does so to such an extent that, in 2019, the World Health Organization (UNAIDS) dedicated World AIDS Day to it (1 December) with the slogan ‘Communities make the difference’. |
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5.3.

The community (understood as the group of non-governmental associations and organisations involved in combating AIDS and in defending the rights of people with HIV on a daily basis) plays a crucial role in giving a voice to the most vulnerable and at-risk populations, and provides effective solutions to contain the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It does so to such an extent that, in 2019, the World Health Organization (UNAIDS) dedicated World AIDS Day to it (1 December) with the slogan ‘Communities make the difference’.

| 5.4. | Consideration should also be given to ensuring constant monitoring and carrying out impact assessments of the various health policies and legislative frameworks adopted in each Member State, through the involvement of independent and impartial actors, including with a view to bringing out best practices to be shared and proposed at European level. |
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5.4.

Consideration should also be given to ensuring constant monitoring and carrying out impact assessments of the various health policies and legislative frameworks adopted in each Member State, through the involvement of independent and impartial actors, including with a view to bringing out best practices to be shared and proposed at European level.

| 5.5. | Even with the awareness and the objective of wanting to ‘normalise’ the HIV-positive condition, it is recommended that each individual’s privacy be respected both during contacts with health facilities for access to services and in areas relating to activities of daily life (school, work, etc.). Therefore, in all Member States the rules must be aimed at guaranteeing the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms, as well as the inherent dignity, of the person with HIV. |
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5.5.

Even with the awareness and the objective of wanting to ‘normalise’ the HIV-positive condition, it is recommended that each individual’s privacy be respected both during contacts with health facilities for access to services and in areas relating to activities of daily life (school, work, etc.). Therefore, in all Member States the rules must be aimed at guaranteeing the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms, as well as the inherent dignity, of the person with HIV.

| 5.6. | In order to overcome stigma, discrimination and false stereotypes, awareness-raising, training and information actions should be promoted, especially in schools, involving organised civil society, such as local associations and communities, youth and student organisations. |
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5.6.

In order to overcome stigma, discrimination and false stereotypes, awareness-raising, training and information actions should be promoted, especially in schools, involving organised civil society, such as local associations and communities, youth and student organisations.

6.   Pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) for prevention of HIV infection

Pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) for prevention of HIV infection

| 6.1. | Pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) is a biomedical approach to HIV prevention that involves people at high risk of acquiring HIV taking oral antiretroviral drugs. The efficacy of PrEP is well-documented, when taken as prescribed. It is an essential element in the ‘combination prevention’ necessary to reach the Sustainable Development Goal of ending the AIDS epidemic by 2030 and its use is recommended by national and international guidelines. According to the ECDC opinion, EU countries should consider integrating PrEP into their existing HIV prevention programmes for key populations and those most at risk of HIV infection. |
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6.1.

Pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) is a biomedical approach to HIV prevention that involves people at high risk of acquiring HIV taking oral antiretroviral drugs. The efficacy of PrEP is well-documented, when taken as prescribed. It is an essential element in the ‘combination prevention’ necessary to reach the Sustainable Development Goal of ending the AIDS epidemic by 2030 and its use is recommended by national and international guidelines. According to the ECDC opinion, EU countries should consider integrating PrEP into their existing HIV prevention programmes for key populations and those most at risk of HIV infection.

| 6.2. | Several studies have described a slow uptake of PrEP in clinical settings and a suboptimal retention in care. Ensuring persistence with PrEP was associated with the biggest impact on HIV incidence, yet many users discontinue PrEP within the first year after initiation, and it was found that less than half were retained. The reasons for stopping PrEP are diverse: change in sexual behaviours during certain periods of life, adverse drug effects, but also low risk perception, fears of insufficient protection by PrEP, experiencing stigma, disruptions in daily routine and substance use, cost and lack of insurance coverage and financial support and frequent visits to the doctor. |
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6.2.

Several studies have described a slow uptake of PrEP in clinical settings and a suboptimal retention in care. Ensuring persistence with PrEP was associated with the biggest impact on HIV incidence, yet many users discontinue PrEP within the first year after initiation, and it was found that less than half were retained. The reasons for stopping PrEP are diverse: change in sexual behaviours during certain periods of life, adverse drug effects, but also low risk perception, fears of insufficient protection by PrEP, experiencing stigma, disruptions in daily routine and substance use, cost and lack of insurance coverage and financial support and frequent visits to the doctor.

| 6.3. | The availability of PrEP in Europe is fragmented, complex and in flux. The geographical breakdown of PrEP provision shows substantial diversity across Europe and Central Asia. Identification and removal of barriers to PrEP for greater access to drugs and progress in implementing PrEP are required to reach a wider population in order accelerate progress toward ending the AIDS epidemic by 2030. |
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6.3.

The availability of PrEP in Europe is fragmented, complex and in flux. The geographical breakdown of PrEP provision shows substantial diversity across Europe and Central Asia. Identification and removal of barriers to PrEP for greater access to drugs and progress in implementing PrEP are required to reach a wider population in order accelerate progress toward ending the AIDS epidemic by 2030.

| 6.4. | Preventive interventions such as pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis and TasP may have a significant impact on controlling HIV and other sexually transmitted infections. |
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6.4.

Preventive interventions such as pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis and TasP may have a significant impact on controlling HIV and other sexually transmitted infections.

7.   Key populations

Key populations

| 7.1. | Despite excellent results in reducing HIV infection in various parts of the world (with a significant reduction in deaths from AIDS) in recent decades, the comprehensive range of combined HIV prevention measures is far from being ‘universally’ available. And where there is no AIDS treatment, HIV infections continue to spread disproportionately, and people continue to die. |
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7.1.

Despite excellent results in reducing HIV infection in various parts of the world (with a significant reduction in deaths from AIDS) in recent decades, the comprehensive range of combined HIV prevention measures is far from being ‘universally’ available. And where there is no AIDS treatment, HIV infections continue to spread disproportionately, and people continue to die.

| 7.2. | HIV infection continues to spread in populations that, for various reasons, preventative measures are not able to reach, or that once infected, are not able to benefit from the antiretroviral treatment currently available. These populations, which are more vulnerable to HIV such as drug addicts, sex workers, gay men and men who have sex with other men (MSM), prisoners, transgender people, migrants, and their respective partners, are referred to as ‘key populations’ and are characterised by higher morbidity and mortality rates than the general population, lower access to health services, and also play a key role in the spread of the epidemic. Yet, combined HIV prevention services have only managed to reach less than half of the people in these groups, which proves that these populations are still marginalised and left behind when it comes to the latest progress in the fight against AIDS. |
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7.2.

HIV infection continues to spread in populations that, for various reasons, preventative measures are not able to reach, or that once infected, are not able to benefit from the antiretroviral treatment currently available. These populations, which are more vulnerable to HIV such as drug addicts, sex workers, gay men and men who have sex with other men (MSM), prisoners, transgender people, migrants, and their respective partners, are referred to as ‘key populations’ and are characterised by higher morbidity and mortality rates than the general population, lower access to health services, and also play a key role in the spread of the epidemic. Yet, combined HIV prevention services have only managed to reach less than half of the people in these groups, which proves that these populations are still marginalised and left behind when it comes to the latest progress in the fight against AIDS.

| 7.3. | The vulnerability of these subgroups of the population can depend both on specific practices among these groups, and on the difficulty in accessing HIV services due to poverty and conditions brought on by marginalisation and isolation suffered in different social contexts for various reasons, such as cultural, religious, and even legal reasons. |
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7.3.

The vulnerability of these subgroups of the population can depend both on specific practices among these groups, and on the difficulty in accessing HIV services due to poverty and conditions brought on by marginalisation and isolation suffered in different social contexts for various reasons, such as cultural, religious, and even legal reasons.

| 7.4. | In order to more easily reach every key population, including those living in peripheral areas, the use of street units should be disseminated and strengthened, including to provide basic services such as rapid tests. Mobile services will also be able to act as a first contact for more effective and sustained care of the individual in more appropriate territorial locations for people living in peripheral or hard-to-reach areas. |
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7.4.

In order to more easily reach every key population, including those living in peripheral areas, the use of street units should be disseminated and strengthened, including to provide basic services such as rapid tests. Mobile services will also be able to act as a first contact for more effective and sustained care of the individual in more appropriate territorial locations for people living in peripheral or hard-to-reach areas.

| 7.5. | In some situations, women are at a further disadvantage than men, are more economically disadvantaged, are not always able to negotiate sex, and are frequently victims of violence (3). In other situations, the discrimination associated with certain practices, as well as prejudice, intolerance or even punitive laws criminalising homosexuality prevent free access to services. We very often also see an overlap in various different factors that amplify vulnerability. |
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7.5.

In some situations, women are at a further disadvantage than men, are more economically disadvantaged, are not always able to negotiate sex, and are frequently victims of violence (3

| 7.6. | People with HIV must have equal opportunities for access and professional growth in the world of work. They should also be able to benefit from specific arrangements such as flexible working hours or extended leave for medical visits with guaranteed confidentiality. In some countries, there are bans barring HIV-infected people from certain jobs such as police, customs services and detention facilities (4). People affected by HIV still encounter difficulties and higher rates when applying for insurance, mortgages and loans, even if in some Member States measures have been taken that facilitate access and limit rate increases for people with severe health conditions. The EESC calls for conditions that reflect the improvement in treatment, health and life expectancy. The anonymised statistical evidence available through the EU Health Data Space should therefore be used to improve access to such financial services. |
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7.6.

People with HIV must have equal opportunities for access and professional growth in the world of work. They should also be able to benefit from specific arrangements such as flexible working hours or extended leave for medical visits with guaranteed confidentiality. In some countries, there are bans barring HIV-infected people from certain jobs such as police, customs services and detention facilities (4

| 7.7. | The COVID-19 epidemiological emergency has had a profound impact on health systems around the world, further exacerbating existing inequalities and making it harder to reach the WHO targets, especially in countries with limited resources. Similarly, disruptions to prevention measures are believed to have led to an inevitable increase in HIV cases; enough to have cancelled out all progress achieved through efforts made in previous years. |
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7.7.

The COVID-19 epidemiological emergency has had a profound impact on health systems around the world, further exacerbating existing inequalities and making it harder to reach the WHO targets, especially in countries with limited resources. Similarly, disruptions to prevention measures are believed to have led to an inevitable increase in HIV cases; enough to have cancelled out all progress achieved through efforts made in previous years.

| 7.8. | In Europe, the key populations most affected by HIV are drug addicts, MSM and migrants. Prevalence varies geographically, depending on the countries concerned. For the HIV epidemic to be effectively addressed, targeted information and institutionally implemented prevention programmes need to reach these population groups, so that specific services can make contact with them proactively, possibly through non-governmental, community-based associations. |
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7.8.

In Europe, the key populations most affected by HIV are drug addicts, MSM and migrants. Prevalence varies geographically, depending on the countries concerned. For the HIV epidemic to be effectively addressed, targeted information and institutionally implemented prevention programmes need to reach these population groups, so that specific services can make contact with them proactively, possibly through non-governmental, community-based associations.

| 7.9. | Healthcare is an inalienable right of every individual (5). Therefore access to medical care and to a minimum common standard of quality services for the wellbeing of people affected by HIV must be free and guaranteed for all people living with HIV without discrimination and limitations, following the recommendations of the International Classification of Diseases, as is the case for any other disease. Compliance with the principles of equality and effectiveness must be carefully monitored and controlled. |
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7.9.

Healthcare is an inalienable right of every individual (5

8.   Drug addicts

Drug addicts

| 8.1. | Intravenous drug dependence has always been associated with HIV transmission, due to the exchange of infected material used for drug use. However, non-intravenous drug use can also be associated with unsafe sexual practices, and thus with a potential risk of contracting and transmitting HIV, as well as other sexually transmitted infections. In particular, the use of stimulants such as cocaine, crack and methamphetamine is often associated with high-risk sexual practices. Sexual transmission of HIV among drug addicts should therefore not be underestimated. |
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8.1.

Intravenous drug dependence has always been associated with HIV transmission, due to the exchange of infected material used for drug use. However, non-intravenous drug use can also be associated with unsafe sexual practices, and thus with a potential risk of contracting and transmitting HIV, as well as other sexually transmitted infections. In particular, the use of stimulants such as cocaine, crack and methamphetamine is often associated with high-risk sexual practices. Sexual transmission of HIV among drug addicts should therefore not be underestimated.

| 8.2. | More than 80 % of HIV infections in eastern Europe in 2018 involved drug addicts, mostly very young, and mostly women. Young women are more affected than men, including due to prostitution, which is closely linked with drug use. Localised HIV epidemics have also been documented among marginalised populations of injecting-drug users in western Europe. |
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8.2.

More than 80 % of HIV infections in eastern Europe in 2018 involved drug addicts, mostly very young, and mostly women. Young women are more affected than men, including due to prostitution, which is closely linked with drug use. Localised HIV epidemics have also been documented among marginalised populations of injecting-drug users in western Europe.

| 8.3. | Prisoners have higher rates of drug use and more harmful consumption patterns than the general population, including parenteral consumption, making incarcerated drug addicts particularly vulnerable. |
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8.3.

Prisoners have higher rates of drug use and more harmful consumption patterns than the general population, including parenteral consumption, making incarcerated drug addicts particularly vulnerable.

| 8.4. | Drug addicts have low rates of access to testing, and are more likely to receive late diagnoses. Even in Italy, drug addicts tested for HIV made up a low percentage of all local addiction-service users, with a low propensity to offer testing in the absence of HIV-related symptoms. |
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8.4.

Drug addicts have low rates of access to testing, and are more likely to receive late diagnoses. Even in Italy, drug addicts tested for HIV made up a low percentage of all local addiction-service users, with a low propensity to offer testing in the absence of HIV-related symptoms.

| 8.5. | Access to treatment for drug users is undeniably very low, although it varies from country to country. Overall, it is estimated that only 8 % of drug addicts are in antiretroviral treatment, and that of all people in treatment, only 20 % are drug addicts. In comparison to those with HIV in the general population, drug addicts are also less likely to achieve virological suppression. This is due to the fact that drug addicts have a lower rate of adhering to treatment and often stop treatment altogether. This leads to a higher risk of death from AIDS among the HIV-positive population of drug addicts. |
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8.5.

Access to treatment for drug users is undeniably very low, although it varies from country to country. Overall, it is estimated that only 8 % of drug addicts are in antiretroviral treatment, and that of all people in treatment, only 20 % are drug addicts. In comparison to those with HIV in the general population, drug addicts are also less likely to achieve virological suppression. This is due to the fact that drug addicts have a lower rate of adhering to treatment and often stop treatment altogether. This leads to a higher risk of death from AIDS among the HIV-positive population of drug addicts.

| 8.6. | Programmes aimed at reaching drug addicts more effectively are necessary if we are to aspire to reaching the goal of ensuring universal access to HIV treatment, both within Europe and beyond. |
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8.6.

Programmes aimed at reaching drug addicts more effectively are necessary if we are to aspire to reaching the goal of ensuring universal access to HIV treatment, both within Europe and beyond.

9.   Men who have sex with men, MSM

Men who have sex with men, MSM

| 9.1. | Overall, MSM, or men who have sex with men, are 27 times more at risk of contracting HIV than the general population (6). Some biological factors make it easier to contract HIV. Most MSM contract HIV through unprotected anal sex, which poses the most high-risk way of contracting HIV compared to other sexual practices. In this population group, high numbers of sexual partners and the widespread use of recreational substances, including intravenous drugs (which often involves sex, called ‘chemsex’) can also contribute to the high prevalence of HIV in MSM. |
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9.1.

Overall, MSM, or men who have sex with men, are 27 times more at risk of contracting HIV than the general population (6

| 9.2. | The increasing availability of antiretroviral treatment, which has led to a significant decline in the spread of HIV overall, has not had the same effect among MSM. On the contrary, there has been an increase in HIV prevalence in this population in many western countries over recent years (7) and there has also been a gradual increase in the proportion of cases attributable to MSM transmission. |
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9.2.

The increasing availability of antiretroviral treatment, which has led to a significant decline in the spread of HIV overall, has not had the same effect among MSM. On the contrary, there has been an increase in HIV prevalence in this population in many western countries over recent years (7

| 9.3. | Condoms help to prevent HIV transmission and other sexually transmitted infections as well; however the use of condoms is not that widespread due to cultural, educational and supply barriers that reflect different social contexts and health services. |
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9.3.

Condoms help to prevent HIV transmission and other sexually transmitted infections as well; however the use of condoms is not that widespread due to cultural, educational and supply barriers that reflect different social contexts and health services.

| 9.4. | There are various barriers to accessing prevention tools in many countries and in many individual circumstances due to stigma, homophobia and discrimination, which make it difficult to access health services and proper information. There are many cases whereby punitive laws criminalise those who have sex with people of the same sex, forcing them to go underground and to hide their sexual orientation or, worse yet, their identity. Even where laws are not openly discriminatory, stigma and fear discourage people from accessing HIV services, leaving them unaware of the tools available for preventing HIV infection. |
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9.4.

There are various barriers to accessing prevention tools in many countries and in many individual circumstances due to stigma, homophobia and discrimination, which make it difficult to access health services and proper information. There are many cases whereby punitive laws criminalise those who have sex with people of the same sex, forcing them to go underground and to hide their sexual orientation or, worse yet, their identity. Even where laws are not openly discriminatory, stigma and fear discourage people from accessing HIV services, leaving them unaware of the tools available for preventing HIV infection.

| 9.5. | Stigma also has an impact on access to testing and diagnosis. Many MSM report fearing judgement from healthcare professionals and hold off on testing, often resulting in late diagnoses. Being unaware of their infection status means they do not have access to antiretroviral drugs which, in addition to having effects on the health of those concerned, would reduce the risk of transmission to sexual partners. |
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9.5.

Stigma also has an impact on access to testing and diagnosis. Many MSM report fearing judgement from healthcare professionals and hold off on testing, often resulting in late diagnoses. Being unaware of their infection status means they do not have access to antiretroviral drugs which, in addition to having effects on the health of those concerned, would reduce the risk of transmission to sexual partners.

| 9.6. | Many men report they would prefer to be tested outside traditional healthcare facilities. Community-supported testing programmes (non-governmental associations) could be a great way, in various situations, of promoting prevention and providing access to testing for those most at risk, where infection rates are higher. |
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9.6.

Many men report they would prefer to be tested outside traditional healthcare facilities. Community-supported testing programmes (non-governmental associations) could be a great way, in various situations, of promoting prevention and providing access to testing for those most at risk, where infection rates are higher.

| 9.7. | To ensure that the 90-90-90 target can also be reached among the MSM population, cooperation between communities and institutions is essential. |
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9.7.

To ensure that the 90-90-90 target can also be reached among the MSM population, cooperation between communities and institutions is essential.

10.   Migrants

Migrants

| 10.1. | It is estimated that there are around 231 million migrants worldwide. Migration puts people in situations of extreme vulnerability to HIV infection due to socioeconomic and political factors, and, in some countries, it has even been identified as the highest risk factor for HIV. Migrants face obstacles on a daily basis that make access to health and social services difficult. Social exclusion in particular makes migrants extremely vulnerable to HIV. |
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10.1.

It is estimated that there are around 231 million migrants worldwide. Migration puts people in situations of extreme vulnerability to HIV infection due to socioeconomic and political factors, and, in some countries, it has even been identified as the highest risk factor for HIV. Migrants face obstacles on a daily basis that make access to health and social services difficult. Social exclusion in particular makes migrants extremely vulnerable to HIV.

| 10.2. | More than one third of new HIV diagnoses in the EU concern migrants (8). Although this number is decreasing, half of migrants diagnosed with HIV come from high endemic countries (sub-Saharan Africa, for example), which point to infection originating in their continent of origin. There is still growing evidence that a considerable proportion of infections are contracted after migration, in the host country (9). Additionally, the possibility of infection during temporary return visits to the country of origin should not be underestimated. |
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10.2.

More than one third of new HIV diagnoses in the EU concern migrants (8

9

| 10.3. | Women account for a significant proportion of foreigners with HIV. While the proportion of women with new HIV diagnoses among EU citizens sits at 16 %, this number jumps to 40 % among foreigners — mainly African women. |
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10.3.

Women account for a significant proportion of foreigners with HIV. While the proportion of women with new HIV diagnoses among EU citizens sits at 16 %, this number jumps to 40 % among foreigners — mainly African women.

| 10.4. | A report by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) published in 2017 (focused entirely on the issue of migrants with HIV) showed that foreigners in Europe have difficulty accessing HIV preventative services and HIV testing. Stigma and discrimination, especially towards people from countries with high infection prevalence (including stigma and discrimination from healthcare professionals) are reported as the main barriers. As a result, foreigners with HIV receive their diagnoses later than European citizens, when symptoms of immunodeficiency are already present. Once diagnosed, foreigners, especially those who do not have legal resident permits, also have problems accessing treatment. Fifteen countries do not provide them with the right antiretroviral treatment, again failing to meet the commitments made in 2004 in the Dublin Convention to combat discrimination and rights violations of the weakest and most vulnerable populations, who have always been less protected. |
| --- | --- |

10.4.

A report by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) published in 2017 (focused entirely on the issue of migrants with HIV) showed that foreigners in Europe have difficulty accessing HIV preventative services and HIV testing. Stigma and discrimination, especially towards people from countries with high infection prevalence (including stigma and discrimination from healthcare professionals) are reported as the main barriers. As a result, foreigners with HIV receive their diagnoses later than European citizens, when symptoms of immunodeficiency are already present. Once diagnosed, foreigners, especially those who do not have legal resident permits, also have problems accessing treatment. Fifteen countries do not provide them with the right antiretroviral treatment, again failing to meet the commitments made in 2004 in the Dublin Convention to combat discrimination and rights violations of the weakest and most vulnerable populations, who have always been less protected.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

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(1)  European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Operational considerations for the provision of the HIV continuum of care for refugees from Ukraine in the EU/EEA, 5 July 2022, Stockholm: ECDC; 2022.

1

Operational considerations for the provision of the HIV continuum of care for refugees from Ukraine in the EU/EEA

(2)  In 2016, world leaders signed the United Nations Political Declaration on Ending AIDS, which recognised the essential role played by communities in advocacy, participation in the coordination of AIDS responses and service delivery. Moreover, they recognised that community responses to HIV must be scaled up and committed to at least 30 % of services being community-led by 2030.

2

(3)  Although the EU signed the Istanbul Convention in 2017, it still lacks ratification by some Member States.

3

(4)  Regulations often dating back to the early years of the HIV epidemic, when less was known about transmission and no treatment.

4

(5)  As expressed by Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by Article 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

5

(6)  While the risk of contracting HIV is higher for MSM worldwide, infection rates vary between geographical areas: MSM represent 50 % of all newly reported HIV cases in North America and Western Europe, 47 % of those reported in Latin America, around 20 % of those reported in eastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and 12 % of those reported in Africa.

6

(7)  In western Europe, the number of HIV-positive people among the MSM population increased by almost 20 % between 2010 and 2014. Among men in Italy, most new HIV diagnoses are made among the MSM population.

7

(8)  The proportion of migrants among newly diagnosed HIV cases varies from country to country, ranging from 70 % in Luxembourg and Sweden, to 5 % in some eastern countries such as Poland, Lithuania and Romania. In more than 10 countries, they make up more than 50 %.

8

(9)  Post-migration HIV infection estimates range from a minimum of 2 % among sub-Saharan African migrants to Switzerland, to 62 % among black MSM from the Caribbean migrating to the UK.

9

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| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/42 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/42

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on monitoring the EU’s extraordinary measures and resilience in the field of energy

(exploratory opinion requested by the Spanish Presidency)

(2023/C 293/07)

| Rapporteur: | Andrés BARCELÓ DELGADO |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Andrés BARCELÓ DELGADO

BARCELÓ DELGADO

| Referral | Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU, 8.12.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
  Exploratory opinion |
| Plenary Assembly decision | 13.12.2022 |
| Section responsible | Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Adopted in section | 16.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 198/2/5 |

Referral

Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU, 8.12.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Exploratory opinion

Plenary Assembly decision

13.12.2022

Section responsible

Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Adopted in section

16.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

198/2/5

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The COVID-19 pandemic recovery process and Russia’s unjustified aggression towards Ukraine have caused serious disruptions in the European energy system, increasing energy security concerns, sending energy prices rocketing to record heights, and highlighting the EU’s excessive dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The COVID-19 pandemic recovery process and Russia’s unjustified aggression towards Ukraine have caused serious disruptions in the European energy system, increasing energy security concerns, sending energy prices rocketing to record heights, and highlighting the EU’s excessive dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal.

| 1.2. | EU society is greatly concerned with the issue of how to address these disruptions to allow for substantial and sustainable growth and social cohesion in the EU. This challenge relates not only to energy, but also to the resilience of the EU, the EU’s open strategic autonomy, society, and the competitiveness of European industry. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

EU society is greatly concerned with the issue of how to address these disruptions to allow for substantial and sustainable growth and social cohesion in the EU. This challenge relates not only to energy, but also to the resilience of the EU, the EU’s open strategic autonomy, society, and the competitiveness of European industry.

| 1.3. | Once the energy crisis had caused gas and electricity prices to reach record levels and sparked major concerns about the security of the energy supply, the immediate reaction of the European Commission and the Council was to launch several toolboxes and emergency measures to reduce dependency on Russian fossil fuels and mitigate energy price increases. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

Once the energy crisis had caused gas and electricity prices to reach record levels and sparked major concerns about the security of the energy supply, the immediate reaction of the European Commission and the Council was to launch several toolboxes and emergency measures to reduce dependency on Russian fossil fuels and mitigate energy price increases.

| 1.4. | The extraordinary measures adopted by the EU have proven to be effective in diversifying EU fossil fuel sources and moving away from Russian fossil fuels, but less effective when it comes to tackling energy bills, leading to a drop in energy demand, also favoured by the mild winter season. Furthermore, the impact of high gas and electricity prices has mainly impacted industrial energy demand and low-income households, which are more vulnerable to volatile market prices. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

The extraordinary measures adopted by the EU have proven to be effective in diversifying EU fossil fuel sources and moving away from Russian fossil fuels, but less effective when it comes to tackling energy bills, leading to a drop in energy demand, also favoured by the mild winter season. Furthermore, the impact of high gas and electricity prices has mainly impacted industrial energy demand and low-income households, which are more vulnerable to volatile market prices.

| 1.5. | For the sake of effectiveness, it is more appropriate to adopt uniform measures among the Member States to ensure a level playing-field, except in those aspects relating to essential facilities or infrastructure. Measures adopted at national level differ from country to country, thereby allowing for different tax, subsidy and regulatory policies, while energy prices remain at high levels. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

For the sake of effectiveness, it is more appropriate to adopt uniform measures among the Member States to ensure a level playing-field, except in those aspects relating to essential facilities or infrastructure. Measures adopted at national level differ from country to country, thereby allowing for different tax, subsidy and regulatory policies, while energy prices remain at high levels.

| 1.6. | The consequence of ineffective measures taken to tackle high energy prices is the erosion of both industrial competitiveness and households’ disposable income owing to impacts on inflation rates. This seriously hinders the ability to ensure sustainable economic growth, employment and social welfare. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The consequence of ineffective measures taken to tackle high energy prices is the erosion of both industrial competitiveness and households’ disposable income owing to impacts on inflation rates. This seriously hinders the ability to ensure sustainable economic growth, employment and social welfare.

| 1.7. | EU policy must reinforce its long-term vision for achieving the twin transition with a strong commitment to avoiding leaving people behind, going beyond the adoption of temporary measures to alleviate the surge in short-term energy prices. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) stresses the importance of accelerating the large-scale deployment of carbon-free energy sources by simplifying permitting processes to make it possible to rapidly replace dependency on third-party fossil fuels, comply with climate change commitments, and enhance competitiveness. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

EU policy must reinforce its long-term vision for achieving the twin transition with a strong commitment to avoiding leaving people behind, going beyond the adoption of temporary measures to alleviate the surge in short-term energy prices. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) stresses the importance of accelerating the large-scale deployment of carbon-free energy sources by simplifying permitting processes to make it possible to rapidly replace dependency on third-party fossil fuels, comply with climate change commitments, and enhance competitiveness.

| 1.8. | The transition to fully decarbonised energy consumption should be accompanied by affordable and stable energy prices that allow for massive investment in the decarbonisation of large industries, SMEs and households. Stable and predictable remuneration schemes for renewables must therefore be geared towards real long-term production costs and be decoupled from fossil fuel prices. This strategy makes a positive contribution to improving resilience and energy autonomy. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

The transition to fully decarbonised energy consumption should be accompanied by affordable and stable energy prices that allow for massive investment in the decarbonisation of large industries, SMEs and households. Stable and predictable remuneration schemes for renewables must therefore be geared towards real long-term production costs and be decoupled from fossil fuel prices. This strategy makes a positive contribution to improving resilience and energy autonomy.

| 1.9. | Affordable prices would enable fossil fuels to be replaced with electrification as much as possible and would permit the use of renewable gases in hard-to-abate industries. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

Affordable prices would enable fossil fuels to be replaced with electrification as much as possible and would permit the use of renewable gases in hard-to-abate industries.

| 1.10. | Access to critical raw materials is essential to ensure that industries operate in a stable environment, advance towards decarbonisation, and avoid supply disruptions, thereby protecting the supply chain. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

Access to critical raw materials is essential to ensure that industries operate in a stable environment, advance towards decarbonisation, and avoid supply disruptions, thereby protecting the supply chain.

2.   Gist of the presidency request

Gist of the presidency request

| 2.1. | The incoming Spanish Presidency has asked the EESC to produce an exploratory opinion on Monitoring the EU’s extraordinary measures and resilience in the field of energy. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

The incoming Spanish Presidency has asked the EESC to produce an exploratory opinion on Monitoring the EU’s extraordinary measures and resilience in the field of energy

| 2.2. | The request comes in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and in the fallout of Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, which has caused serious disruptions in the global energy system, increasing energy security concerns, sending energy prices rocketing to record heights, and highlighting the EU’s excessive dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

The request comes in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and in the fallout of Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, which has caused serious disruptions in the global energy system, increasing energy security concerns, sending energy prices rocketing to record heights, and highlighting the EU’s excessive dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal.

| 2.3. | The cost of foreign supplies in the EU, for example energy, food and commodities, including critical raw materials, has risen, and EU society is now concerned with how to handle this challenge to allow for sustainable growth in the EU economy. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

The cost of foreign supplies in the EU, for example energy, food and commodities, including critical raw materials, has risen, and EU society is now concerned with how to handle this challenge to allow for sustainable growth in the EU economy.

| 2.4. | The scope of the requested opinion shall cover the measures adopted to deal with the energy crisis, the resilience of the EU, the EU’s open strategic autonomy, society, and the competitiveness of European industry. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

The scope of the requested opinion shall cover the measures adopted to deal with the energy crisis, the resilience of the EU, the EU’s open strategic autonomy, society, and the competitiveness of European industry.

| 2.5. | Recent developments in the USA will almost certainly have an impact on the deployment of renewable energy sources, including their industrial base, but this will be covered in a separate opinion. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

Recent developments in the USA will almost certainly have an impact on the deployment of renewable energy sources, including their industrial base, but this will be covered in a separate opinion.

| 2.6. | The concept of strategic autonomy is now broader than it used to be, with industry, energy, technology and trade having been added to the traditional issues of security and defence. The EU recovery and resilience plan, Next Generation EU, will surely provide a substantial impulse towards developing the EU’s open strategic autonomy in the various fields identified. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

The concept of strategic autonomy is now broader than it used to be, with industry, energy, technology and trade having been added to the traditional issues of security and defence. The EU recovery and resilience plan, Next Generation EU, will surely provide a substantial impulse towards developing the EU’s open strategic autonomy in the various fields identified.

| 2.7. | In comparison with its main trade partners, the EU is a champion of real, effective and rules-based free and fair trade, and is a prime promoter of an open economy, avoiding protectionism. However, the need to balance an autonomous industrial policy and an openness to trade is a serious challenge in the current international framework.
  The European Union needs to attract investment to enhance industrial production, secure the supply of energy and critical raw materials and, at the same time, promote the industrial transition to a decarbonised society, sustaining technological leadership in strategic areas and preserving the single market, the precious cornerstone of the European Union, as the best way to guarantee a wealthier EU society, protecting and promoting high quality jobs in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

In comparison with its main trade partners, the EU is a champion of real, effective and rules-based free and fair trade, and is a prime promoter of an open economy, avoiding protectionism. However, the need to balance an autonomous industrial policy and an openness to trade is a serious challenge in the current international framework.

The European Union needs to attract investment to enhance industrial production, secure the supply of energy and critical raw materials and, at the same time, promote the industrial transition to a decarbonised society, sustaining technological leadership in strategic areas and preserving the single market, the precious cornerstone of the European Union, as the best way to guarantee a wealthier EU society, protecting and promoting high quality jobs in the EU.

| 2.8. | The necessary twin green and digital industrial and social transition must protect the European model, ensuring that the focus remains on citizens: protecting jobs and promoting new, high-quality jobs means reskilling and upskilling the workforce, with a strong commitment to avoiding leaving people behind. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

The necessary twin green and digital industrial and social transition must protect the European model, ensuring that the focus remains on citizens: protecting jobs and promoting new, high-quality jobs means reskilling and upskilling the workforce, with a strong commitment to avoiding leaving people behind.

| 2.9. | The current industrial alliances promoted by the Commission must channel investment and innovation to help secure the availability of raw materials, boost recycling, and promote technology in specific fields. At the same time, it must always be ensured that the necessary global supply chains follow EU and OECD rules and guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

The current industrial alliances promoted by the Commission must channel investment and innovation to help secure the availability of raw materials, boost recycling, and promote technology in specific fields. At the same time, it must always be ensured that the necessary global supply chains follow EU and OECD rules and guidelines.

| 2.10. | In conclusion, in this new geopolitical scenario, these three issues — critical dependencies, strategic autonomy, and the safeguarding of supply chains for strategic and energy resources — are proving to be strategic issues that will define the relationships between states and blocs. Europe needs to become more autonomous when it comes to access to sustainable energy resources and raw materials with the aim of procuring a competitive level-playing field for industry. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

In conclusion, in this new geopolitical scenario, these three issues — critical dependencies, strategic autonomy, and the safeguarding of supply chains for strategic and energy resources — are proving to be strategic issues that will define the relationships between states and blocs. Europe needs to become more autonomous when it comes to access to sustainable energy resources and raw materials with the aim of procuring a competitive level-playing field for industry.

| 2.11. | This is why the Spanish presidency has requested an opinion on resilience, strategic autonomy, society and the competitiveness of industry, so that it can lead to reshoring to the single market, better coordination, and an industrial policy that is more integrated into strategic dependencies, creating solid foundations for the twin transition. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

This is why the Spanish presidency has requested an opinion on resilience, strategic autonomy, society and the competitiveness of industry, so that it can lead to reshoring to the single market, better coordination, and an industrial policy that is more integrated into strategic dependencies, creating solid foundations for the twin transition.

| 2.12. | However, this pursuit of industrial strengthening must go hand in hand with efforts to defend free and fair international trade with minimum social standards. It is essential to safeguard the EU’s level playing-field by improving the EU’s toolbox for addressing the distortive effects of foreign subsidies on the single market. |
| --- | --- |

2.12.

However, this pursuit of industrial strengthening must go hand in hand with efforts to defend free and fair international trade with minimum social standards. It is essential to safeguard the EU’s level playing-field by improving the EU’s toolbox for addressing the distortive effects of foreign subsidies on the single market.

| 2.13. | Finally, energy resilience and the current energy regulatory model, which fails to address calls from consumers (households and businesses) for guaranteed, clean and affordable energy, should be monitored. |
| --- | --- |

2.13.

Finally, energy resilience and the current energy regulatory model, which fails to address calls from consumers (households and businesses) for guaranteed, clean and affordable energy, should be monitored.

3.   Background

Background

| 3.1. | Europe is involved in an unprecedented energy crisis characterised by extremely high gas and electricity prices and major concerns regarding the security of the energy supply, with subsequent effects on the entire economy because of the importance of energy consumption as a massive input in the production of most goods and services and exacerbated by the lack of access to raw materials. The Russian aggression towards Ukraine has exacerbated the impact of energy prices, putting European industry’s competitiveness and households’ incomes and livelihoods at risk. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

Europe is involved in an unprecedented energy crisis characterised by extremely high gas and electricity prices and major concerns regarding the security of the energy supply, with subsequent effects on the entire economy because of the importance of energy consumption as a massive input in the production of most goods and services and exacerbated by the lack of access to raw materials. The Russian aggression towards Ukraine has exacerbated the impact of energy prices, putting European industry’s competitiveness and households’ incomes and livelihoods at risk.

| 3.2. | This has led to the implementation of different policies in both areas at European and national levels with the aim of mitigating the social and economic consequences of the impact of the energy price surge. In addition, the energy crisis has sparked a public debate not only on energy dependency, but also on strategic autonomy. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

This has led to the implementation of different policies in both areas at European and national levels with the aim of mitigating the social and economic consequences of the impact of the energy price surge. In addition, the energy crisis has sparked a public debate not only on energy dependency, but also on strategic autonomy.

| 3.3. | The common understanding that the European economy must accelerate the ‘green’ and ‘just’ transition to a fully decarbonised economy and society to reduce our external energy dependency is one of the pillars behind the measures adopted in 2022. Direct benefits derived from the massive deployment of renewable energy sources include affordable and stable energy prices, and leadership in renewable energy technologies, with subsequent benefits from the retention of value creation in the EU, thus allowing for sustainable economic growth and social cohesion. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

The common understanding that the European economy must accelerate the ‘green’ and ‘just’ transition to a fully decarbonised economy and society to reduce our external energy dependency is one of the pillars behind the measures adopted in 2022. Direct benefits derived from the massive deployment of renewable energy sources include affordable and stable energy prices, and leadership in renewable energy technologies, with subsequent benefits from the retention of value creation in the EU, thus allowing for sustainable economic growth and social cohesion.

| 3.4. | Energy prices started to rise significantly in the second half of 2021 once the EU economies began to recover their pre-pandemic activity. However, the EU has also been impacted as a consequence of Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, with its undesirable effects on critical aspects such as the security of the energy supply. This risk has been translated into the energy markets as a result of Russia’s decision to suspend gas deliveries to several EU Member States. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

Energy prices started to rise significantly in the second half of 2021 once the EU economies began to recover their pre-pandemic activity. However, the EU has also been impacted as a consequence of Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, with its undesirable effects on critical aspects such as the security of the energy supply. This risk has been translated into the energy markets as a result of Russia’s decision to suspend gas deliveries to several EU Member States.

| 3.5. | The EU’s response followed immediately at the end of March 2022 when it was agreed to phase out the EU’s external dependency on Russian fossil fuels. This initiative finally ended with the May 2022 Council agreement to ban almost 90 % of all Russian oil imports by the end of 2022. This measure was accompanied by a call to diversify energy supplies and sources, accelerate the large-scale deployment of renewables, improve energy efficiency, and improve energy infrastructure, as included in the REPower EU plan. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

The EU’s response followed immediately at the end of March 2022 when it was agreed to phase out the EU’s external dependency on Russian fossil fuels. This initiative finally ended with the May 2022 Council agreement to ban almost 90 % of all Russian oil imports by the end of 2022. This measure was accompanied by a call to diversify energy supplies and sources, accelerate the large-scale deployment of renewables, improve energy efficiency, and improve energy infrastructure, as included in the REPower EU plan.

| 3.6. | The first measure was the promotion of solidarity among EU Member States in the case of gas shortages. Joint gas purchases were also promoted to diversify and secure gas supplies, with the aim of limiting the impact of gas prices in both gas and electricity markets, with a new gas price reference that better reflects the move from the use of gas pipelines to LNG terminals. The commonly accepted Title Transfer Facility (TTF) virtual gas hub was deemed to be no longer effective. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

The first measure was the promotion of solidarity among EU Member States in the case of gas shortages. Joint gas purchases were also promoted to diversify and secure gas supplies, with the aim of limiting the impact of gas prices in both gas and electricity markets, with a new gas price reference that better reflects the move from the use of gas pipelines to LNG terminals. The commonly accepted Title Transfer Facility (TTF) virtual gas hub was deemed to be no longer effective.

| 3.7. | Additionally, a direct mechanism to reduce external gas dependency is the move to reduce gas demand, with effects not only in terms of conventional gas consumption but also in terms of electricity production coming from combined cycle marginal units. Hence, an agreement was reached on a 15 % reduction in gas demand. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

Additionally, a direct mechanism to reduce external gas dependency is the move to reduce gas demand, with effects not only in terms of conventional gas consumption but also in terms of electricity production coming from combined cycle marginal units. Hence, an agreement was reached on a 15 % reduction in gas demand.

| 3.8. | Finally, a key critical aspect in order to secure the gas supply was the replenishment of gas storage facilities with a view to ensuring the energy supply through the winter season. In the end, an 80 % filling rate requirement for winter 2022/2023 and a 90 % requirement for future winter seasons were adopted. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

Finally, a key critical aspect in order to secure the gas supply was the replenishment of gas storage facilities with a view to ensuring the energy supply through the winter season. In the end, an 80 % filling rate requirement for winter 2022/2023 and a 90 % requirement for future winter seasons were adopted.

| 3.9. | In parallel to the measures envisaged to secure gas supplies, the dramatic increase in energy prices also required action to avoid the loss of industrial competitiveness and households' disposal income. On 6 October 2022, the Council adopted three measures with the aim of addressing high energy prices. The first one related to electricity demand, by setting a 10 % voluntary target for demand reduction and a 5 % mandatory target for demand reduction in peak hours until the end of the winter season. Secondly, a 180 EUR/MWh price cap was set for inframarginal technologies to avoid the phenomenon of windfall profits due to high gas prices, so that any extra revenues above the price cap must be redistributed to end-users in order to alleviate their energy bills. Thirdly, a solidarity levy for the fossil fuel sector was approved for those companies with benefits above a 20 % increase on average since 2018. All these measures relating to energy bills were finally complemented by a mechanism to limit TTF gas prices to 180 EUR/MWh under certain conditions approved on 19 December 2022, in conjunction with an oil price cap on Russian oil at USD 60 per barrel. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

In parallel to the measures envisaged to secure gas supplies, the dramatic increase in energy prices also required action to avoid the loss of industrial competitiveness and households' disposal income. On 6 October 2022, the Council adopted three measures with the aim of addressing high energy prices. The first one related to electricity demand, by setting a 10 % voluntary target for demand reduction and a 5 % mandatory target for demand reduction in peak hours until the end of the winter season. Secondly, a 180 EUR/MWh price cap was set for inframarginal technologies to avoid the phenomenon of windfall profits due to high gas prices, so that any extra revenues above the price cap must be redistributed to end-users in order to alleviate their energy bills. Thirdly, a solidarity levy for the fossil fuel sector was approved for those companies with benefits above a 20 % increase on average since 2018. All these measures relating to energy bills were finally complemented by a mechanism to limit TTF gas prices to 180 EUR/MWh under certain conditions approved on 19 December 2022, in conjunction with an oil price cap on Russian oil at USD 60 per barrel.

| 3.10. | It should be highlighted that a certain scope for action was generally left to the Member States when it came to implementing these rules. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

It should be highlighted that a certain scope for action was generally left to the Member States when it came to implementing these rules.

| 3.11. | The underlying idea that the most effective measures to reduce external energy dependency are those relating to the deployment of renewables is also encouraged by efforts to facilitate the permitting of renewables. Thus, faster permitting procedures were temporarily approved for renewable assets. Furthermore, a wide-ranging debate has already been sparked regarding the current electricity market design and its ability to provide the right incentives to attract investment while securing the energy supply and price affordability for end-users. Finally, this scheme is completed by the Net-Zero Industry Act proposal with the aim of strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology products manufacturing ecosystem. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

The underlying idea that the most effective measures to reduce external energy dependency are those relating to the deployment of renewables is also encouraged by efforts to facilitate the permitting of renewables. Thus, faster permitting procedures were temporarily approved for renewable assets. Furthermore, a wide-ranging debate has already been sparked regarding the current electricity market design and its ability to provide the right incentives to attract investment while securing the energy supply and price affordability for end-users. Finally, this scheme is completed by the Net-Zero Industry Act proposal with the aim of strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology products manufacturing ecosystem.

4.   Security of supply, energy demand and prices

Security of supply, energy demand and prices

| 4.1. | Once the energy crisis had caused gas and electricity prices to reach record levels, the Commission and the Council decided to use the emergency measures set out in Article 122 and Article 194 of the Treaty (TFEU), launching several toolboxes and emergency measures that had a minor impact on energy price volatility in the Member States. In fact, extreme market volatility exposure has been fully absorbed by final-users’ energy prices since most market contracts typically cover 1-year periods. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

Once the energy crisis had caused gas and electricity prices to reach record levels, the Commission and the Council decided to use the emergency measures set out in Article 122 and Article 194 of the Treaty (TFEU), launching several toolboxes and emergency measures that had a minor impact on energy price volatility in the Member States. In fact, extreme market volatility exposure has been fully absorbed by final-users’ energy prices since most market contracts typically cover 1-year periods.

| 4.2. | The CO2 market has exploded since 2020: the average price in 2020 was 24,84 EUR/EUA compared to 80,87 EUR/EUA in 2022 and 89,23 EUR/EUA in March 2023, with an average monthly record price in February 2022 of 91,82 EUR/EUA, a long way from the record average low of a mere 19,83 EUR/EUA seen in March 2020 during the COVID-19 lockdown. No extraordinary measures have been adopted to tackle this impact on end-users’ energy prices. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

The CO2

| 4.3. | The EESC supports the initiative focused on ensuring energy supplies and, more specifically, gas supplies. Thus, priority actions that tried to appropriately address the main concerns surrounding gas sources and the ability to substitute Russian gas pipeline imports with LNG supplies are viewed positively in the short term. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

The EESC supports the initiative focused on ensuring energy supplies and, more specifically, gas supplies. Thus, priority actions that tried to appropriately address the main concerns surrounding gas sources and the ability to substitute Russian gas pipeline imports with LNG supplies are viewed positively in the short term.

| 4.4. | Monthly EU gas source statistics clearly show the significant replacement of gas supplies from Russian gas pipelines since May 2022, well below historical flows, with increasing LNG supplies, mainly from the USA. Therefore, actions taken by market agents are perfectly aligned with EU extraordinary measures aimed at fully replacing Russian gas with other sources in the short term. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

Monthly EU gas source statistics clearly show the significant replacement of gas supplies from Russian gas pipelines since May 2022, well below historical flows, with increasing LNG supplies, mainly from the USA. Therefore, actions taken by market agents are perfectly aligned with EU extraordinary measures aimed at fully replacing Russian gas with other sources in the short term.

| 4.5. | However, the EESC also observes that gas and electricity demand has decreased substantially since the beginning of the war. The rise in European energy prices and major concerns regarding security of supply are likely to explain this reduction as the reduced demand coincides with extremely high price spikes in the third quarter. In addition, mild weather conditions in the winter season have favoured this drop in demand. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

However, the EESC also observes that gas and electricity demand has decreased substantially since the beginning of the war. The rise in European energy prices and major concerns regarding security of supply are likely to explain this reduction as the reduced demand coincides with extremely high price spikes in the third quarter. In addition, mild weather conditions in the winter season have favoured this drop in demand.

| 4.6. | It should be highlighted that electricity demand is proportionately higher at SME level, while conventional gas demand mainly serves industrial purposes and heating. This implies that the impact of high gas and electricity prices has mainly affected industrial energy demand, which is more vulnerable to volatile market prices. At household level, vulnerable customers have been massively affected by the increase in both energy vector prices. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

It should be highlighted that electricity demand is proportionately higher at SME level, while conventional gas demand mainly serves industrial purposes and heating. This implies that the impact of high gas and electricity prices has mainly affected industrial energy demand, which is more vulnerable to volatile market prices. At household level, vulnerable customers have been massively affected by the increase in both energy vector prices.

| 4.7. | The EESC concludes that the extraordinary measures adopted by the EU have proven to be effective in diversifying gas sources, but less effective when it comes to tackling energy bills, with subsequent effects on energy demand. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

The EESC concludes that the extraordinary measures adopted by the EU have proven to be effective in diversifying gas sources, but less effective when it comes to tackling energy bills, with subsequent effects on energy demand.

| 4.8. | The EESC fully recognises the enormous challenge of ensuring gas supplies that is arising as the 2022/2023 winter season comes to an end. The 90 % fill-rate requirement for gas storage for future winter seasons is essential in order to secure energy supplies. At present, EU gas storage capacity is at historically high levels for Q1. In addition, the joint purchases of gas initiative may help mitigate this risk. However, the EU must be primarily focused on reducing dependency on natural gas to zero. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

The EESC fully recognises the enormous challenge of ensuring gas supplies that is arising as the 2022/2023 winter season comes to an end. The 90 % fill-rate requirement for gas storage for future winter seasons is essential in order to secure energy supplies. At present, EU gas storage capacity is at historically high levels for Q1. In addition, the joint purchases of gas initiative may help mitigate this risk. However, the EU must be primarily focused on reducing dependency on natural gas to zero.

| 4.9. | The EESC considers that it would be more appropriate to adopt uniform measures among the Member States to ensure a level playing-field, except in those aspects relating to essential facilities or infrastructure. The measures adopted at EU level to tackle energy bills are not aligned with those adopted at national level, thereby allowing for different tax, subsidy and regulatory policies, while energy prices remain at high levels. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

The EESC considers that it would be more appropriate to adopt uniform measures among the Member States to ensure a level playing-field, except in those aspects relating to essential facilities or infrastructure. The measures adopted at EU level to tackle energy bills are not aligned with those adopted at national level, thereby allowing for different tax, subsidy and regulatory policies, while energy prices remain at high levels.

5.   Resilience, energy autonomy and the role of industry

Resilience, energy autonomy and the role of industry

| 5.1. | Energy prices are the main drivers of the inflation rates observed across the EU. This is eroding both industrial competitiveness and households' disposable income, thereby seriously damaging the ability to ensure sustainable economic growth, employment and social welfare. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

Energy prices are the main drivers of the inflation rates observed across the EU. This is eroding both industrial competitiveness and households' disposable income, thereby seriously damaging the ability to ensure sustainable economic growth, employment and social welfare.

| 5.2. | A rapid response, involving the implementation of extraordinary measures, has been proven to be effective at the EU level in mitigating energy price increases across the economy as a whole. Alternatively, a good example of national initiatives is the Iberian exception, which allowed for an 18 % wholesale market price reduction in 2022. As a result, Spain has one of the lowest inflation rates at present. However, it has been clearly shown that energy prices are responsible for rising inflation and temporary measures have not been sufficient to reduce this trend. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

A rapid response, involving the implementation of extraordinary measures, has been proven to be effective at the EU level in mitigating energy price increases across the economy as a whole. Alternatively, a good example of national initiatives is the Iberian exception, which allowed for an 18 % wholesale market price reduction in 2022. As a result, Spain has one of the lowest inflation rates at present. However, it has been clearly shown that energy prices are responsible for rising inflation and temporary measures have not been sufficient to reduce this trend.

| 5.3. | In this respect, the adoption of temporary measures has been fully devoted to alleviating the surge in energy prices in the short term; however, EU policy requires a long-term vision to adequately pave the way for the twin transition. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

In this respect, the adoption of temporary measures has been fully devoted to alleviating the surge in energy prices in the short term; however, EU policy requires a long-term vision to adequately pave the way for the twin transition.

| 5.4. | The EESC stresses the importance of stepping up the large-scale deployment of carbon-free energy sources as an urgent matter to be addressed by facilitating permitting processes. In practice, this must lead to the rapid replacement of dependency on third-party fossil fuels, comply with climate change commitments, and enhance competitiveness. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

The EESC stresses the importance of stepping up the large-scale deployment of carbon-free energy sources as an urgent matter to be addressed by facilitating permitting processes. In practice, this must lead to the rapid replacement of dependency on third-party fossil fuels, comply with climate change commitments, and enhance competitiveness.

| 5.5. | The EESC emphasises that the transition to fully decarbonised energy consumption should be accompanied by affordable energy prices that allow for massive investment in the decarbonisation of large industries, SMEs and households. |
| --- | --- |

5.5.

The EESC emphasises that the transition to fully decarbonised energy consumption should be accompanied by affordable energy prices that allow for massive investment in the decarbonisation of large industries, SMEs and households.

| 5.6. | Price affordability will only be feasible by fostering large-scale investment in mature renewables technologies and flexibility through a competitive framework. This strategy makes a positive contribution to improving resilience and energy autonomy. |
| --- | --- |

5.6.

Price affordability will only be feasible by fostering large-scale investment in mature renewables technologies and flexibility through a competitive framework. This strategy makes a positive contribution to improving resilience and energy autonomy.

| 5.7. | The EESC believes that, to take full advantage of this strategy, remuneration schemes for renewable energy sources must be oriented towards real long-term production costs. Decoupling electricity prices from fossil fuels prices is therefore the key driver of affordability. In addition, the elimination of barriers to long-term contracts is a key driver of stability and predictability. |
| --- | --- |

5.7.

The EESC believes that, to take full advantage of this strategy, remuneration schemes for renewable energy sources must be oriented towards real long-term production costs. Decoupling electricity prices from fossil fuels prices is therefore the key driver of affordability. In addition, the elimination of barriers to long-term contracts is a key driver of stability and predictability.

| 5.8. | Under this new paradigm, households and industries would be better placed to bear the expenses associated with reaching the energy transition goals. This process basically consists of replacing fossil fuels with electrification as much as possible and the use of renewable gases in hard-to-abate industries. |
| --- | --- |

5.8.

Under this new paradigm, households and industries would be better placed to bear the expenses associated with reaching the energy transition goals. This process basically consists of replacing fossil fuels with electrification as much as possible and the use of renewable gases in hard-to-abate industries.

| 5.9. | It must be highlighted that new uses of electricity and renewable gases require access to critical raw materials in many critical processes, not only in the area of energy production and consumption, but across the whole supply chain. Hence, ensuring that industries operate in a good environment to avoid supply disruptions must be the key focus of EU policy. |
| --- | --- |

5.9.

It must be highlighted that new uses of electricity and renewable gases require access to critical raw materials in many critical processes, not only in the area of energy production and consumption, but across the whole supply chain. Hence, ensuring that industries operate in a good environment to avoid supply disruptions must be the key focus of EU policy.

| 5.10. | Industry plays a key role in two vital ways: firstly, it has to ensure the use of critical raw materials in commodities to procure assets for producing energy and other essential goods for the economy and, secondly, as one of the main greenhouse gases emitters, it has to use decarbonised energy in its internal processes. In this connection, it must always be led by the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle. |
| --- | --- |

5.10.

Industry plays a key role in two vital ways: firstly, it has to ensure the use of critical raw materials in commodities to procure assets for producing energy and other essential goods for the economy and, secondly, as one of the main greenhouse gases emitters, it has to use decarbonised energy in its internal processes. In this connection, it must always be led by the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle.

| 5.11. | Finally, the transformation of industry must meet two additional requirements to achieve the green, digital and just transitions that cannot be postponed. One critical aspect is the protection of the supply chain, as already pointed out; the other one is to ensure the workforce is sufficiently qualified to adapt to ongoing changes, specifically oriented to include training and qualification programmes as well as job guarantees and opportunities for retraining and further education. |
| --- | --- |

5.11.

Finally, the transformation of industry must meet two additional requirements to achieve the green, digital and just transitions that cannot be postponed. One critical aspect is the protection of the supply chain, as already pointed out; the other one is to ensure the workforce is sufficiently qualified to adapt to ongoing changes, specifically oriented to include training and qualification programmes as well as job guarantees and opportunities for retraining and further education.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

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| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/48

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the equal treatment of young people in the labour market

(own-initiative opinion)

(2023/C 293/08)

| Rapporteur: | Michael McLOUGHLIN |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Michael McLOUGHLIN

Michael McLOUGHLIN

| Plenary Assembly decision
  Legal basis | 20.1.2022
  Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| --- | --- |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 31.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 217/0/6 |

Plenary Assembly decision

Legal basis

20.1.2022

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

31.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

217/0/6

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The recent Directive on the adequacy of minimum wages in the EU did not consider substantially the issue of ‘youth minimum wages’. It is not a one-size-fits-all approach. On the contrary, as a horizontal framework it catered for different traditions and starting points, and strengthened the role of the social partners and collective bargaining. Thus, ‘youth minimum wages’ are treated differently in different Member States, a matter which needs consideration. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) recommends that the European Commission, Member States and the social partners consider this issue in line with the Directive and in the spirit of the proposed Council recommendation on the strengthening of the social dialogue in the EU. The EESC calls on the Member States and social partners to exercise their discretion in a non-discriminatory manner. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The recent Directive on the adequacy of minimum wages in the EU did not consider substantially the issue of ‘youth minimum wages’. It is not a one-size-fits-all approach. On the contrary, as a horizontal framework it catered for different traditions and starting points, and strengthened the role of the social partners and collective bargaining. Thus, ‘youth minimum wages’ are treated differently in different Member States, a matter which needs consideration. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) recommends that the European Commission, Member States and the social partners consider this issue in line with the Directive and in the spirit of the proposed Council recommendation on the strengthening of the social dialogue in the EU. The EESC calls on the Member States and social partners to exercise their discretion in a non-discriminatory manner.

| 1.2. | In the EESC’s opinion, the European Year of Youth 2022 offered an opportunity to look at significant issues that impact on young people and to take significant policy initiatives that benefit or seek to influence their position in society. Given the importance of young people’s fruitful participation in the labour market, their first participation should be a positive one and measures that treat them less favourably solely on the basis of their age are counterproductive. In this respect the EESC welcomes the EU Year of Skills, launched officially on 9 May 2023, as a political impetus for lifelong learning creating a new momentum to reach EU 2030 social targets. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

In the EESC’s opinion, the European Year of Youth 2022 offered an opportunity to look at significant issues that impact on young people and to take significant policy initiatives that benefit or seek to influence their position in society. Given the importance of young people’s fruitful participation in the labour market, their first participation should be a positive one and measures that treat them less favourably solely on the basis of their age are counterproductive. In this respect the EESC welcomes the EU Year of Skills, launched officially on 9 May 2023, as a political impetus for lifelong learning creating a new momentum to reach EU 2030 social targets.

| 1.3. | Differential rules for young people regarding unemployment benefits and assistance payments have the potential to shape young people’s labour market situation and impact on their ability to exercise their rights to free movement in the EU. The Member States have the competence to decide on the structure and content of their social security systems. The EESC calls on them to respect the principle of non-discrimination when doing this, particularly in the case of free movement. The EESC recommends that the Commission work closely with the Member States and social partners to collect the data and national practices, also in light of the newly proposed Council Recommendation on the strengthening of the social dialogue in the EU in further examining this matter. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

Differential rules for young people regarding unemployment benefits and assistance payments have the potential to shape young people’s labour market situation and impact on their ability to exercise their rights to free movement in the EU. The Member States have the competence to decide on the structure and content of their social security systems. The EESC calls on them to respect the principle of non-discrimination when doing this, particularly in the case of free movement. The EESC recommends that the Commission work closely with the Member States and social partners to collect the data and national practices, also in light of the newly proposed Council Recommendation on the strengthening of the social dialogue in the EU in further examining this matter.

| 1.4. | Internships in a professional environment offered to young people are often a decisive step for professional integration. Unpaid or not compensated internships can have a very negative impact on young people’s experience of the labour market. We note the resolution passed by the Committee at its December 2022 plenary session and that of the European Parliament, and recommend that the other EU institutions and bodies, including the Commission, take a greater interest in this matter as a tangible symbol of their commitment to young people following the European Year of Youth. Periods of very short work experience and officially recognised and agreed education placements may sometimes not be paid. However, longer term internships, analogous to work done by paid employees, should be paid. The Eurobarometer survey says that the majority of trainees were remunerated and had access to social protection (1). |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

Internships in a professional environment offered to young people are often a decisive step for professional integration. Unpaid or not compensated internships can have a very negative impact on young people’s experience of the labour market. We note the resolution passed by the Committee at its December 2022 plenary session and that of the European Parliament, and recommend that the other EU institutions and bodies, including the Commission, take a greater interest in this matter as a tangible symbol of their commitment to young people following the European Year of Youth. Periods of very short work experience and officially recognised and agreed education placements may sometimes not be paid. However, longer term internships, analogous to work done by paid employees, should be paid. The Eurobarometer survey says that the majority of trainees were remunerated and had access to social protection (1

| 1.5. | Following on from the European Year of Youth and other initiatives, more focus has been placed on youth issues recently. One proposal has been the idea of a European Youth Test that would mainstream the assessment of the impact on young people of all new policy. The idea has been promoted by the European Youth Forum and was the subject of an EESC opinion in 2022. The EESC strongly supports this approach to policy-making as set out in our 2022 opinion (2). |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

Following on from the European Year of Youth and other initiatives, more focus has been placed on youth issues recently. One proposal has been the idea of a European Youth Test that would mainstream the assessment of the impact on young people of all new policy. The idea has been promoted by the European Youth Forum and was the subject of an EESC opinion in 2022. The EESC strongly supports this approach to policy-making as set out in our 2022 opinion (2

| 1.6. | The COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine have significantly undermined the European economy. Even if the companies did their best to maintain employment, it has had consequences on European citizens and particularly on young people. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine have significantly undermined the European economy. Even if the companies did their best to maintain employment, it has had consequences on European citizens and particularly on young people.

| 1.7. | Traineeships have become an important gateway through which young people enter the labour market. To facilitate access to employment, traineeships should offer good quality learning content and adequate working conditions, and should not be a substitute for regular jobs or a precondition for a job placement, The current situation suggests that there are growing concerns, especially among young people, that the health crisis and the consequences of the war in Ukraine could lead to deteriorating conditions for trainees. The aim of the Commission is to review whether the quality framework for traineeships (QFT) is being properly implemented. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

Traineeships have become an important gateway through which young people enter the labour market. To facilitate access to employment, traineeships should offer good quality learning content and adequate working conditions, and should not be a substitute for regular jobs or a precondition for a job placement, The current situation suggests that there are growing concerns, especially among young people, that the health crisis and the consequences of the war in Ukraine could lead to deteriorating conditions for trainees. The aim of the Commission is to review whether the quality framework for traineeships (QFT) is being properly implemented.

2.   Introduction

Introduction

| 2.1. | 2022 was designated the European Year of Youth, and in the EESC opinon on the Year the Committee expressed its desire for the Year to focus on key policy areas for young people and to go beyond events and publicity opportunities. Young people have expressed similar feelings and views, particularly given the rather rushed fashion in which the Year was introduced. Young people’s experience with entry into and particiption in the labour market is clearly one of the critical policy issues for that generation, both at national and at European level. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

2022 was designated the European Year of Youth, and in the EESC opinon on the Year the Committee expressed its desire for the Year to focus on key policy areas for young people and to go beyond events and publicity opportunities. Young people have expressed similar feelings and views, particularly given the rather rushed fashion in which the Year was introduced. Young people’s experience with entry into and particiption in the labour market is clearly one of the critical policy issues for that generation, both at national and at European level.

| 2.2. | In the post-COVID-19 world, there is a new emphasis on the changing needs of the labour market, new forms of work, new skills, the challenge of returning to the workplace, and the potential hybrid environment, with all the opportunities and risks this entails. More importantly, we know that young people suffered greatly during the COVID-19 pandemic and this was one of the reasons why 2022 was named the European Year of Youth. Young people missed out on some critical milestones in their personal and social development during the pandemic. However, the pandemic also had a major impact on young people’s education and their participation in the labour market. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

In the post-COVID-19 world, there is a new emphasis on the changing needs of the labour market, new forms of work, new skills, the challenge of returning to the workplace, and the potential hybrid environment, with all the opportunities and risks this entails. More importantly, we know that young people suffered greatly during the COVID-19 pandemic and this was one of the reasons why 2022 was named the European Year of Youth. Young people missed out on some critical milestones in their personal and social development during the pandemic. However, the pandemic also had a major impact on young people’s education and their participation in the labour market.

| 2.3. | The European Union has several relevant policies concerning young people and ensuring they are included as fully as possible in society and benefit from the same opportunities as all other parts of society. In the Bratislava Declaration of 2016, EU leaders called for the creation of a promising economic future for all, safeguards for our way of life, and the provision of better opportunities for young people. Similarly, the preamble to the Pillar of Social Rights stated that ‘challenges, such as significant inequality, long-term and youth unemployment or intergenerational solidarity, are often similar across Member States, although in varying degrees’. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

The European Union has several relevant policies concerning young people and ensuring they are included as fully as possible in society and benefit from the same opportunities as all other parts of society. In the Bratislava Declaration of 2016, EU leaders called for the creation of a promising economic future for all, safeguards for our way of life, and the provision of better opportunities for young people. Similarly, the preamble to the Pillar of Social Rights stated that ‘challenges, such as significant inequality, long-term and youth unemployment or intergenerational solidarity, are often similar across Member States, although in varying degrees’.

| 2.4. | The key policy in relation to young people in the European Union is the EU Youth Strategy. The main aim of the strategy is to empower young people and build their resilience by focusing on three areas of action under the headings of ‘Engage, Connect and Empower’. The strategy recognises that providing pathways of engagement for young people in democratic life is vital for a functioning democracy and for society at large. Under the ‘Engage’ heading, the EU Youth Strategy aims to support the meaningful civic, economic, social, cultural, and political participation of young people. The strategy sees the mobility of young people as an opportunity for them to:






  — | develop and strengthen personal, social and civic competencies; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.4.

The key policy in relation to young people in the European Union is the EU Youth Strategy. The main aim of the strategy is to empower young people and build their resilience by focusing on three areas of action under the headings of ‘Engage, Connect and Empower’. The strategy recognises that providing pathways of engagement for young people in democratic life is vital for a functioning democracy and for society at large. Under the ‘Engage’ heading, the EU Youth Strategy aims to support the meaningful civic, economic, social, cultural, and political participation of young people. The strategy sees the mobility of young people as an opportunity for them to:

—

develop and strengthen personal, social and civic competencies;

| — | develop critical thinking and creativity; |
| --- | --- |

—

develop critical thinking and creativity;

| — | enhance their employability; |
| --- | --- |

—

enhance their employability;

| — | become active European citizens. |
| --- | --- |

—

become active European citizens.

| 2.5. | The European Youth Strategy particularly recognises the role of youth work as a ‘catalyst for empowerment’ of young people, stating that youth work brings unique benefits to young people in their transition to adulthood by providing a safe environment for them to gain self-confidence and learn in a non-formal way (3). |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

The European Youth Strategy particularly recognises the role of youth work as a ‘catalyst for empowerment’ of young people, stating that youth work brings unique benefits to young people in their transition to adulthood by providing a safe environment for them to gain self-confidence and learn in a non-formal way (3

| 2.6. | The EESC expressed its view that the Strategy should focus on the cross-sectoral approach, taking a holistic view of young people and their needs and rights across policy areas, and that the new EU Youth Coordinator should primarily lead on cross-sectoral work and expressed a wish that the EU youth policy be included in the European semester process to focus more on delivery, particularly in cross-sectoral areas (4). |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

The EESC expressed its view that the Strategy should focus on the cross-sectoral approach, taking a holistic view of young people and their needs and rights across policy areas, and that the new EU Youth Coordinator should primarily lead on cross-sectoral work and expressed a wish that the EU youth policy be included in the European semester process to focus more on delivery, particularly in cross-sectoral areas (4

| 2.7. | The EESC recommended that the Strategy have high-level aspirations for cross-sectoral work regarding other relevant EU policy areas, including employment, education, health, migration and equality. The Committee further advocated that the Strategy pay more attention to employment and education issues affecting young people, particularly in terms of the discussion on the future of work, as well as to skills development and to other social issues such as mental health and equality. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

The EESC recommended that the Strategy have high-level aspirations for cross-sectoral work regarding other relevant EU policy areas, including employment, education, health, migration and equality. The Committee further advocated that the Strategy pay more attention to employment and education issues affecting young people, particularly in terms of the discussion on the future of work, as well as to skills development and to other social issues such as mental health and equality.

3.   Young people, the labour market and skills

Young people, the labour market and skills

| 3.1. | Young people and their employment prospects are usually given a lot of attention when looking at the labour market. Principally, this is because the early experiences that people face in relation to their labour market participation can have a long-term impact in later years. This has particularly been seen to be the case with early school leaving. Dropping out of school also affects almost 20 % of people with disabilities, which is more than double the rate for other young people aged 18 to 24 (5). We have also seen with COVID-19 and the previous financial crash that young people are more vulnerable to economic shocks and downturns, that they are often the first to lose their jobs and, in both instances, work in sectors such as services, and that they are overrepresented in insecure employment. The ILO has found that the majority of workers in online work platforms and localised work are under 35 years old and that young workers have greater work insecurity. Greece’s tourism sector employs the largest share of young workers, who were massively hit by the pandemic. In Spain, Italy and Portugal, we find an extremely high share of temporary contracts among young people (over 60 %), which may lead to rapid unemployment in the event of a crisis. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

Young people and their employment prospects are usually given a lot of attention when looking at the labour market. Principally, this is because the early experiences that people face in relation to their labour market participation can have a long-term impact in later years. This has particularly been seen to be the case with early school leaving. Dropping out of school also affects almost 20 % of people with disabilities, which is more than double the rate for other young people aged 18 to 24 (5

| 3.2. | Our current priority must be to restore the European economy through the consistent implementation of the National Recovery Plan (6) and the creation of conditions that enable companies to grow again and create quality jobs. At a time when companies are suffering from labour shortages, cannot find skills, and are facing serious hiring difficulties, it is in their interest to harness the potential of all people, including young people. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

Our current priority must be to restore the European economy through the consistent implementation of the National Recovery Plan (6

| 3.3. | One of the greatest sources of life security and prospects for most people, but especially for young people, are job opportunities and the corresponding skills. The consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the effects of the war in Ukraine have affected not only citizens but also businesses, undermining their ability to create value and jobs and ensure an effective job-to-job transition. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

One of the greatest sources of life security and prospects for most people, but especially for young people, are job opportunities and the corresponding skills. The consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the effects of the war in Ukraine have affected not only citizens but also businesses, undermining their ability to create value and jobs and ensure an effective job-to-job transition.

| 3.4. | We can see that young people who do not make the transition from school or college to the workplace may struggle in later years. While unemployment presents challenges to anybody experiencing it, these challenges can be far greater for young people, who may not possess the same networks needed to make progress in a rapidly changing labour market. Similarly, having a disproportionate amount of one segment of a society out of work impacts on social cohesion and our democratic values and, in extreme circumstances, could lead to potential social disorder, which has been the case in parts of the developing world. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

We can see that young people who do not make the transition from school or college to the workplace may struggle in later years. While unemployment presents challenges to anybody experiencing it, these challenges can be far greater for young people, who may not possess the same networks needed to make progress in a rapidly changing labour market. Similarly, having a disproportionate amount of one segment of a society out of work impacts on social cohesion and our democratic values and, in extreme circumstances, could lead to potential social disorder, which has been the case in parts of the developing world.

| 3.5. | It is therefore important to see equal treatment of young people in the labour market as part of a broader need for civic and democratic participation. In the same way as we see the need for young people to be part of the community and to participate in sporting activity as active citizens, their ability to understand their role and place in the labour market, and indeed advocate for themselves, is an important element of citizenship. Similarly, the labour market should be a place of intergenerational solidarity where there is proper work-life balance and people can feel they are contributing to society. While youth unemployment is a structural problem in many countries, in countries like Spain, aid is being given for late retirement (up to EUR 12 000) to make the pension system sustainable. In this way, the economy runs the risk of not absorbing the greater productivity that young people can generate, as stated in the opinion. In addition, there are jobs in which it is very difficult to work beyond the age of 65. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

It is therefore important to see equal treatment of young people in the labour market as part of a broader need for civic and democratic participation. In the same way as we see the need for young people to be part of the community and to participate in sporting activity as active citizens, their ability to understand their role and place in the labour market, and indeed advocate for themselves, is an important element of citizenship. Similarly, the labour market should be a place of intergenerational solidarity where there is proper work-life balance and people can feel they are contributing to society. While youth unemployment is a structural problem in many countries, in countries like Spain, aid is being given for late retirement (up to EUR 12 000) to make the pension system sustainable. In this way, the economy runs the risk of not absorbing the greater productivity that young people can generate, as stated in the opinion. In addition, there are jobs in which it is very difficult to work beyond the age of 65.

| 3.6. | At an economic level, high youth unemployment and an absence of effective intergenerational approaches at company level can result in lower productivity as there are fewer young workers introducing new skills and innovation into production processes. There is also the economic cost to the state of large numbers of unemployed people, in terms of lost tax income, welfare payments, and the costs of related schemes. Eurofound has found that the economic costs of young people not being in employment, education or training (NEET) was in the region of EUR 153 billion in 2011. These concerns have been reflected in EESC opinions on Precarious work and mental health (7), and on Democracy at work (8). Finally, the unemployment rate of young people with disabilities aged 25 to 34 is almost twice as high as that of people without disabilities (18 % versus 9,7 %) (9). |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

At an economic level, high youth unemployment and an absence of effective intergenerational approaches at company level can result in lower productivity as there are fewer young workers introducing new skills and innovation into production processes. There is also the economic cost to the state of large numbers of unemployed people, in terms of lost tax income, welfare payments, and the costs of related schemes. Eurofound has found that the economic costs of young people not being in employment, education or training (NEET) was in the region of EUR 153 billion in 2011. These concerns have been reflected in EESC opinions on Precarious work and mental health

7

Democracy at work

8

9

| 3.7. | At the individual level, the impacts of youth unemployment can include poor mental health and wellbeing as well as lower rates of happiness, and can potentially result in increased demand for public health services. Additionally, there is a greater risk of a fragmented society resulting from the various forms of social exclusion which young unemployed people can experience. Being unemployed when young increases the chances of being unemployed in later life, and impacts negatively on the amount of money earned later in life if and when employment is secured. Young unemployed people are also more likely to experience de-skilling or social exclusion across a number of dimensions. The impact of COVID-19 on young people’s mental health has been well documented. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

At the individual level, the impacts of youth unemployment can include poor mental health and wellbeing as well as lower rates of happiness, and can potentially result in increased demand for public health services. Additionally, there is a greater risk of a fragmented society resulting from the various forms of social exclusion which young unemployed people can experience. Being unemployed when young increases the chances of being unemployed in later life, and impacts negatively on the amount of money earned later in life if and when employment is secured. Young unemployed people are also more likely to experience de-skilling or social exclusion across a number of dimensions. The impact of COVID-19 on young people’s mental health has been well documented.

| 3.8. | It is also important to address the situation of ‘discouraged’ young workers and young people in great difficulty of professional integration. Early school leaving and changes in schooling are challenging. As a result, young people can lose contact with the reality of the labour market. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

It is also important to address the situation of ‘discouraged’ young workers and young people in great difficulty of professional integration. Early school leaving and changes in schooling are challenging. As a result, young people can lose contact with the reality of the labour market.

| 3.9. | One of the ways to increase the economic activity of young people is to motivate them to become entrepreneurs by supporting their entrepreneurial mind-set, creativity and innovative approaches. Activities in the European Year of Skills can mainstream education on entrepreneurship and build on some models of good practice like young entrepreneur programmes and competitions. |
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3.9.

One of the ways to increase the economic activity of young people is to motivate them to become entrepreneurs by supporting their entrepreneurial mind-set, creativity and innovative approaches. Activities in the European Year of Skills can mainstream education on entrepreneurship and build on some models of good practice like young entrepreneur programmes and competitions.

| 3.10. | The EU has taken the challenge of youth employment seriously, with its main policy response being the ‘reinforced’ Youth Guarantee. Originally, the purpose of the Youth Guarantee was to ensure an offer to young people aged 18 to 24 of a job, work experience, an apprenticeship, training, or combined work and training, within a defined period of time after leaving school or becoming unemployed. It was recommended by the European Commission that the Youth Guarantee should be offered to young people within four months of becoming unemployed. The reinforced Youth Guarantee is a commitment by all Member States to ensuring that all young people under the age of 30 receive a good quality offer of employment, continued education, an apprenticeship, or a traineeship. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

The EU has taken the challenge of youth employment seriously, with its main policy response being the ‘reinforced’ Youth Guarantee. Originally, the purpose of the Youth Guarantee was to ensure an offer to young people aged 18 to 24 of a job, work experience, an apprenticeship, training, or combined work and training, within a defined period of time after leaving school or becoming unemployed. It was recommended by the European Commission that the Youth Guarantee should be offered to young people within four months of becoming unemployed. The reinforced Youth Guarantee is a commitment by all Member States to ensuring that all young people under the age of 30 receive a good quality offer of employment, continued education, an apprenticeship, or a traineeship.

| 3.11. | To ensure an effective job-to-job transition it is necessary to progress in education reform, addressing skills mismatches and focusing on lifelong learning, adult education, reskilling and upskilling. The EESC notes the Commission’s progress in creating a European education area, fostering the framework for European cooperation on VET and progressing in the application of the Digital Education Action Plan. |
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3.11.

To ensure an effective job-to-job transition it is necessary to progress in education reform, addressing skills mismatches and focusing on lifelong learning, adult education, reskilling and upskilling. The EESC notes the Commission’s progress in creating a European education area, fostering the framework for European cooperation on VET and progressing in the application of the Digital Education Action Plan.

| 3.12. | The EESC also notes the new Commission initiative on individual learning accounts (ILAs), particularly microcredits and the new Universities package. There is new momentum aimed at equipping young people with adequate skills and supporting the mobility of young students, apprentices and entrepreneurs. |
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3.12.

The EESC also notes the new Commission initiative on individual learning accounts (ILAs), particularly microcredits and the new Universities package. There is new momentum aimed at equipping young people with adequate skills and supporting the mobility of young students, apprentices and entrepreneurs.

4.   Impact of COVID-19

Impact of COVID-19

| 4.1. | According to Eurostat, young people have been more heavily impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic than older people. The employment rate in the EU among young people (aged 15-29) in the third quarter of 2020 was -2,8 percentage points compared with the pre-pandemic third quarter of 2019. However, the third quarter of 2021 saw a recovery, with an employment rate down 0,1 percentage points compared with the third quarter of 2019. Comparing the third quarter of 2020 with the third quarter of 2019, all countries recorded a drop in the employment rate of young people. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

According to Eurostat, young people have been more heavily impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic than older people. The employment rate in the EU among young people (aged 15-29) in the third quarter of 2020 was -2,8 percentage points compared with the pre-pandemic third quarter of 2019. However, the third quarter of 2021 saw a recovery, with an employment rate down 0,1 percentage points compared with the third quarter of 2019. Comparing the third quarter of 2020 with the third quarter of 2019, all countries recorded a drop in the employment rate of young people.

| 4.2. | Eurostat also found a difference within the EU in these trends. In the third quarter of 2021, a majority of EU Member States (16 out of 27) did not yet show full recovery, as the employment rate for young people was still below the rate recorded in the third quarter of 2019. The largest decreases were recorded in Portugal, Bulgaria, Latvia, Czechia and Poland (all at least 3 percentage points down in Q3 2021 compared with Q3 2019). In contrast, the largest increases in the share of employed people aged 15-29 in the third quarter of 2021, compared with the pre-COVID-19 situation, were seen in Ireland, France and Slovenia (all at least 2 percentage points up in Q3 2021 compared with Q3 2019). |
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4.2.

Eurostat also found a difference within the EU in these trends. In the third quarter of 2021, a majority of EU Member States (16 out of 27) did not yet show full recovery, as the employment rate for young people was still below the rate recorded in the third quarter of 2019. The largest decreases were recorded in Portugal, Bulgaria, Latvia, Czechia and Poland (all at least 3 percentage points down in Q3 2021 compared with Q3 2019). In contrast, the largest increases in the share of employed people aged 15-29 in the third quarter of 2021, compared with the pre-COVID-19 situation, were seen in Ireland, France and Slovenia (all at least 2 percentage points up in Q3 2021 compared with Q3 2019).

| 4.3. | Eurofound has reported that, despite EU and Member State policy efforts to support young people in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, young people were also hardest hit by job losses during the COVID-19 crisis. They were overrepresented in the sectors most impacted by pandemic restrictions and more likely to work part-time or on temporary contracts, with 12 % of 18-to-29-year-olds who responded to at least two rounds of the Living, Working and COVID-19 e-survey reporting that they had lost their job, and 12 % of students also facing unemployment. Similar impacts were reported with respect to savings, mental health, and poverty. |
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4.3.

Eurofound has reported that, despite EU and Member State policy efforts to support young people in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, young people were also hardest hit by job losses during the COVID-19 crisis. They were overrepresented in the sectors most impacted by pandemic restrictions and more likely to work part-time or on temporary contracts, with 12 % of 18-to-29-year-olds who responded to at least two rounds of the Living, Working and COVID-19 e-survey reporting that they had lost their job, and 12 % of students also facing unemployment. Similar impacts were reported with respect to savings, mental health, and poverty.

| 4.4. | According to the Insee survey (10), the first lockdown associated with the COVID-19 epidemic in spring 2020 already resulted in an unprecedented drop in activity: 73 % of companies reported that their sales fell by over 10 %, and 35 % by over 50 % during this period. One third of companies closed for an average period of 57 days, most often as a result of administrative restrictions on admitting the public (65 %), but also due to issues relating to supply (8 %) or opportunities (7 %). This suspension of activity primarily affected activities involving the closest contact with the public: food and beverage service activities, accommodation, personal services, cultural and recreational activities, and air transport. By September 2020, 1 % of companies were still closed. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

According to the Insee survey (10

| 4.5. | To cope with the sudden fall in activity, over 4 in 5 companies applied for the support put in place by the public authorities: short-time working (70 % of companies), deferred payment of social security contributions (53 %) and State-guaranteed loans (41 %). The food and beverage service activities sector (97 %), motor trade and repair sector (96 %) and accommodation sector (95 %) relied on these measures particularly frequently. |
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4.5.

To cope with the sudden fall in activity, over 4 in 5 companies applied for the support put in place by the public authorities: short-time working (70 % of companies), deferred payment of social security contributions (53 %) and State-guaranteed loans (41 %). The food and beverage service activities sector (97 %), motor trade and repair sector (96 %) and accommodation sector (95 %) relied on these measures particularly frequently.

| 4.6. | Another wave of the pandemic followed in 2021, and in February 2022 the European economy was hit by the military conflict in Ukraine and the associated high energy prices, limited access to raw materials and supply chain shortages, and the associated high rate of inflation. |
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4.6.

Another wave of the pandemic followed in 2021, and in February 2022 the European economy was hit by the military conflict in Ukraine and the associated high energy prices, limited access to raw materials and supply chain shortages, and the associated high rate of inflation.

| 4.7. | Despite these facts, the companies operating in the EU single market did their best to maintain jobs and create new ones. |
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4.7.

Despite these facts, the companies operating in the EU single market did their best to maintain jobs and create new ones.

| 4.8. | On education, the European Youth Forum reported that the quality of remote education during the pandemic was variable, with nearly one in 10 young students not getting any courses, teaching or testing. Around two-thirds of students believed they were learning ‘slightly less’ or ‘significantly less’. Three-quarters of marginalised young people believe they were learning ‘slightly less’ or ‘significantly less’. However, individual circumstances may have varied considerably. Educational uncertainty and the challenges of online learning were a source of stress and wellbeing issues for young people. Although the scale of the impact is not clear, the educational disruption is likely to lead to long-term negative effects in employment, educational outcomes, and health and wellbeing. There is a possibility that this situation also has positive side effects, opening the door to a combined education system using different forms of learning and technological tools accessible to all young people, including young people with disabilities and those in remote regions. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

On education, the European Youth Forum reported that the quality of remote education during the pandemic was variable, with nearly one in 10 young students not getting any courses, teaching or testing. Around two-thirds of students believed they were learning ‘slightly less’ or ‘significantly less’. Three-quarters of marginalised young people believe they were learning ‘slightly less’ or ‘significantly less’. However, individual circumstances may have varied considerably. Educational uncertainty and the challenges of online learning were a source of stress and wellbeing issues for young people. Although the scale of the impact is not clear, the educational disruption is likely to lead to long-term negative effects in employment, educational outcomes, and health and wellbeing. There is a possibility that this situation also has positive side effects, opening the door to a combined education system using different forms of learning and technological tools accessible to all young people, including young people with disabilities and those in remote regions.

| 4.9. | Some of the most dramatic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, have been on young people’s mental health. Depressive symptoms, such as anxiety, exhaustion, isolation, and suicidal thoughts, are on the increase. Worrying about the future is a concern. Research in Austria shows that most of those young people have not received any assistance. This is due to a lack of knowledge about such opportunities, but it is also a matter of regional and economic inequalities. Suicide has become the leading cause of death among the youngest in Spain. The pandemic has uncovered psychological suffering, with 3 941 suicides in 2020, of which 300 were between 14 and 29 years old. Public health systems do not have the resources to help young people with mental health issues. The latest instalment of a longitudinal study of young people and children in Ireland has shown an effective doubling of depression and mental illness among young people. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

Some of the most dramatic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, have been on young people’s mental health. Depressive symptoms, such as anxiety, exhaustion, isolation, and suicidal thoughts, are on the increase. Worrying about the future is a concern. Research in Austria shows that most of those young people have not received any assistance. This is due to a lack of knowledge about such opportunities, but it is also a matter of regional and economic inequalities. Suicide has become the leading cause of death among the youngest in Spain. The pandemic has uncovered psychological suffering, with 3 941 suicides in 2020, of which 300 were between 14 and 29 years old. Public health systems do not have the resources to help young people with mental health issues. The latest instalment of a longitudinal study of young people and children in Ireland has shown an effective doubling of depression and mental illness among young people.

| 4.10. | Similarly, those young people in the labour market that have disabilities, whether intellectual or physical, should clearly not be subject to less favourable treatment based on their age in addition to, or separately from, their disability. Similarly, attention must be paid to those from remote rural areas and those subjected to gender discrimination. |
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4.10.

Similarly, those young people in the labour market that have disabilities, whether intellectual or physical, should clearly not be subject to less favourable treatment based on their age in addition to, or separately from, their disability. Similarly, attention must be paid to those from remote rural areas and those subjected to gender discrimination.

| 4.11. | Statistical data on the employment of young people with disabilities are also patchy: quantitative indicators such as the unemployment rate should be supplemented by other indicators such as the level of training, the nature of the contracts offered (fixed-term, open-ended, temporary), the rate of employment in a mainstream environment, the rate of supported employment or the rate of long-term unemployment, combined with the social and financial situation of these young people. |
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4.11.

Statistical data on the employment of young people with disabilities are also patchy: quantitative indicators such as the unemployment rate should be supplemented by other indicators such as the level of training, the nature of the contracts offered (fixed-term, open-ended, temporary), the rate of employment in a mainstream environment, the rate of supported employment or the rate of long-term unemployment, combined with the social and financial situation of these young people.

5.   Equal treatment of young people in the labour market

Equal treatment of young people in the labour market

| 5.1. | Equality is one of the key principles and rights of the EU based on the Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and underpinned by secondary EU legislation. A general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation is given by Council Directive 2000/78/EC (11), which is still fit for purpose. |
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5.1.

Equality is one of the key principles and rights of the EU based on the Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and underpinned by secondary EU legislation. A general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation is given by Council Directive 2000/78/EC (11

| 5.2. | We can see then that young people’s future is a key concern of the EU and that young people’s labour market prospects are a very important part of their development. The EU has a range of policies and instruments targeting young people and their labour market position. In line with the TFEU and the principle of subsidiarity, the Member States have competences regarding many of these issues and thus their policies are are a key focus of this report. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

We can see then that young people’s future is a key concern of the EU and that young people’s labour market prospects are a very important part of their development. The EU has a range of policies and instruments targeting young people and their labour market position. In line with the TFEU and the principle of subsidiarity, the Member States have competences regarding many of these issues and thus their policies are are a key focus of this report.

| 5.3. | Young people suffered more than other groups in a variety of ways during the pandemic. Given the importance attached to this topic, it would therefore be fair to examine any specific aspects of labour market policy and, on the basis of this evidence, to determine whether young people are treated in any way less favourably than others based solely on their age. Given the potential breadth of the topic, it is important to be clear as to what is examined in this opinion. The focus here is the more obvious and direct less favourable treatment of young people in laws or policies based solely upon their age. Inevitably, there is more focus on the areas where most information and clarity is available. These are as follows: minimum wages, social security and social assistance rules and, to a lesser extent (due to work already done), unpaid internships. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

Young people suffered more than other groups in a variety of ways during the pandemic. Given the importance attached to this topic, it would therefore be fair to examine any specific aspects of labour market policy and, on the basis of this evidence, to determine whether young people are treated in any way less favourably than others based solely on their age. Given the potential breadth of the topic, it is important to be clear as to what is examined in this opinion. The focus here is the more obvious and direct less favourable treatment of young people in laws or policies based solely upon their age. Inevitably, there is more focus on the areas where most information and clarity is available. These are as follows: minimum wages, social security and social assistance rules and, to a lesser extent (due to work already done), unpaid internships.

6.   Minimum wages

Minimum wages

| 6.1. | In line with the TFEU (12) and the subsidiarity principle, minimum wages are a Member State competence, but the European Union may adopt measures designed to encourage cooperation among Member States incl. directives. In preparation for the already adopted Directive (EU) 2022/2041 of the European Parliament and of the Council (13) on adequate minimum wages in the European Union, the Commission has said that, in the majority of Member States, the adequacy of the minimum wage is insufficient and/or there are gaps in the coverage of minimum wage protection, even though minimum wage protection exists in all EU Member States, either through legislative provisions (‘statutory minimum wages’) and/or through collective agreements. The proposal arises from the European Pillar of Social Rights. |
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6.1.

In line with the TFEU (12

13

| 6.2. | The Directive aims to ensure that workers in the EU are protected by adequate minimum wages that allow for a decent living, regardless of where they work. In order to reach this general objective, the proposal establishes a framework to improve the adequacy of minimum wages and to increase the access of workers to minimum wage protection. These objectives are relevant both for statutory minimum wage systems and for those relying on collective bargaining. The Directive is designed to achieve these objectives while taking into account and fully respecting the specificities of national systems, national competencies, the autonomy of the social partners, and contractual freedom. |
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6.2.

The Directive aims to ensure that workers in the EU are protected by adequate minimum wages that allow for a decent living, regardless of where they work. In order to reach this general objective, the proposal establishes a framework to improve the adequacy of minimum wages and to increase the access of workers to minimum wage protection. These objectives are relevant both for statutory minimum wage systems and for those relying on collective bargaining. The Directive is designed to achieve these objectives while taking into account and fully respecting the specificities of national systems, national competencies, the autonomy of the social partners, and contractual freedom.

| 6.3. | Minimum wages are one of the areas where there is a considerable amount of unequal treatment of young people in the EU Member States. Young people are particularly dependent on the minimum wage, with more than 1 in 4 being minimum wage earners, compared to 1 in 10 adults, according to the European Youth Forum. A number of Member States set specific ‘youth minimum wages’, which are in all cases lower than the general minimum wage for particular age groups, while others exclude under 18s from minimum wage legislation. This is the case in Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, Malta, and the Netherlands. France’s provisions may not be overly age dependent, but by implication impact on many young people. There are other reduced rates for apprenticeships, but these are not the subject of this report and are usually determined by agreement between the social partners. The UK also has sub-minimum wages for young people. Full details are available in the Annex. |
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6.3.

Minimum wages are one of the areas where there is a considerable amount of unequal treatment of young people in the EU Member States. Young people are particularly dependent on the minimum wage, with more than 1 in 4 being minimum wage earners, compared to 1 in 10 adults, according to the European Youth Forum. A number of Member States set specific ‘youth minimum wages’, which are in all cases lower than the general minimum wage for particular age groups, while others exclude under 18s from minimum wage legislation. This is the case in Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, Malta, and the Netherlands. France’s provisions may not be overly age dependent, but by implication impact on many young people. There are other reduced rates for apprenticeships, but these are not the subject of this report and are usually determined by agreement between the social partners. The UK also has sub-minimum wages for young people. Full details are available in the Annex.

| 6.4. | These youth minimum wages disregard young people’s right to equal pay for equal work, whilst ILO research has repeatedly shown that they are also ineffective at boosting youth employment rates. The core issue is equal pay for equal work. Indeed, youth organisations have been informed by young people that, after a period of employment, they may supervise or train colleagues older than them at the same job, but receive lower pay, or are even asked to take supervisory roles for lower pay than their colleagues due to these regulations. |
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6.4.

These youth minimum wages disregard young people’s right to equal pay for equal work, whilst ILO research has repeatedly shown that they are also ineffective at boosting youth employment rates. The core issue is equal pay for equal work. Indeed, youth organisations have been informed by young people that, after a period of employment, they may supervise or train colleagues older than them at the same job, but receive lower pay, or are even asked to take supervisory roles for lower pay than their colleagues due to these regulations.

| 6.5. | As such, whilst in these Member States young people are allowed to drive, vote, and join the army, and are treated as adults in all other senses, they are not entitled to receive the full adult minimum wage. Youth minimum wages are set as low as 30 % of the adult minimum wage rate for the youngest age group in the Netherlands, which presents a serious barrier for their ability to lead an independent life and enjoy a decent standard of living. Despite the EU declaring 2022 to be the Year of Youth, the agreed political position in the legislative process reported did not substantially consider the differential issues for young people. |
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6.5.

As such, whilst in these Member States young people are allowed to drive, vote, and join the army, and are treated as adults in all other senses, they are not entitled to receive the full adult minimum wage. Youth minimum wages are set as low as 30 % of the adult minimum wage rate for the youngest age group in the Netherlands, which presents a serious barrier for their ability to lead an independent life and enjoy a decent standard of living. Despite the EU declaring 2022 to be the Year of Youth, the agreed political position in the legislative process reported did not substantially consider the differential issues for young people.

| 6.6. | A recent meta-analysis by the ILO on the impact of youth minimum wages, examining 43 scientific papers published since 1990, found that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the effects of minimum wages on youth employment are either zero or very small. In some cases, raising the minimum wage rate for young people even increased the employment rate of young people. In its impact assessment for the Directive, the European Commission described research findings from Portugal, Belgium and The Netherlands showing that youth minimum wages have no significant effects on youth employment rates. |
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6.6.

A recent meta-analysis by the ILO on the impact of youth minimum wages, examining 43 scientific papers published since 1990, found that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the effects of minimum wages on youth employment are either zero or very small. In some cases, raising the minimum wage rate for young people even increased the employment rate of young people. In its impact assessment for the Directive, the European Commission described research findings from Portugal, Belgium and The Netherlands showing that youth minimum wages have no significant effects on youth employment rates.

7.   Unemployment payments

Unemployment payments

| 7.1. | Another area where there can be differential treatment of young people is during periods of unemployment. Once again, these are largely Member State competences, particularly when it comes to payment rates, payout periods, and criteria. There is a high level of diversity and complexity among the national systems across Europe. However, we can imagine instances where these differentials will impact on issues such as employment and free movement within the EU. Young people may also be disadvantaged by unemployment benefit systems, as they may not have completed the required qualifying period of ‘paying in’ to the relevant systems. |
| --- | --- |

7.1.

Another area where there can be differential treatment of young people is during periods of unemployment. Once again, these are largely Member State competences, particularly when it comes to payment rates, payout periods, and criteria. There is a high level of diversity and complexity among the national systems across Europe. However, we can imagine instances where these differentials will impact on issues such as employment and free movement within the EU. Young people may also be disadvantaged by unemployment benefit systems, as they may not have completed the required qualifying period of ‘paying in’ to the relevant systems.

| 7.2. | Beyond these schemes, the Member States provide social assistance payments, which vary considerably, with social assistance systems also being a national competence. Some are subject to means testing and some are not. Then there is a rather complex picture when it comes to age, and these payments and this report cannot do the topic justice. There are inevitably variations in qualifying periods and duration, as well as several other factors. There is certainly a need for better and clearer data to enable more research to be done. A few brief observations can be made:






  — | In some systems, special arrangements are made for the over 45s or for other age groups. A limited number of countries provide shorter qualifying periods for the under 25s. |
| --- | --- | --- |

7.2.

Beyond these schemes, the Member States provide social assistance payments, which vary considerably, with social assistance systems also being a national competence. Some are subject to means testing and some are not. Then there is a rather complex picture when it comes to age, and these payments and this report cannot do the topic justice. There are inevitably variations in qualifying periods and duration, as well as several other factors. There is certainly a need for better and clearer data to enable more research to be done. A few brief observations can be made:

—

In some systems, special arrangements are made for the over 45s or for other age groups. A limited number of countries provide shorter qualifying periods for the under 25s.

| — | In Sweden, young unemployed persons (18-24) participating in labour market policy programmes receiving an ‘activity grant’ (aktivitetsstöd in Swedish), with an underlying entitlement to unemployment benefits, will be subject to a steeper decline in the amount of benefits payable, according to the provisions of the unemployment benefits scheme. |
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—

In Sweden, young unemployed persons (18-24) participating in labour market policy programmes receiving an ‘activity grant’ (aktivitetsstöd in Swedish), with an underlying entitlement to unemployment benefits, will be subject to a steeper decline in the amount of benefits payable, according to the provisions of the unemployment benefits scheme.

aktivitetsstöd

| — | In Luxembourg, an allowance amounting to 70 % and 40 % of the social minimum wage (salaire social minimum in French) for young people aged 18 and aged 16/17, respectively, is granted after a waiting period of 36 weeks, which can be reduced to 26 weeks if the applicant is studying. |
| --- | --- |

—

In Luxembourg, an allowance amounting to 70 % and 40 % of the social minimum wage (salaire social minimum in French) for young people aged 18 and aged 16/17, respectively, is granted after a waiting period of 36 weeks, which can be reduced to 26 weeks if the applicant is studying.

salaire social minimum

| — | Ireland’s Job Seekers Allowance (an assistance payment) is approximately 60 % of the adult allowance for those age 18-24 who are not ‘living independently’. The full rate is paid for those who follow relevant courses and training. |
| --- | --- |

—

Ireland’s Job Seekers Allowance (an assistance payment) is approximately 60 % of the adult allowance for those age 18-24 who are not ‘living independently’. The full rate is paid for those who follow relevant courses and training.

8.   Unpaid internships

Unpaid internships

| 8.1. | The European Parliament has called for a ban on unpaid internships and the Council of Europe’s Committee of Social Rights has determined that gaps in Belgium’s legislation allow young people to be exploited as free labour through unpaid internships. The Committee’s ruling, which came as the result of a collective complaint submitted by the European Youth Forum, found that current labour inspection systems in Belgium fail to offer enough protection to vulnerable and disadvantaged young workers.
  Member States’ regulatory frameworks in general and the strictness of the regulation in particular varies widely both among the different types of traineeships and across Member States. In some Member States, no legal definition of traineeships exists. |
| --- | --- |

8.1.

The European Parliament has called for a ban on unpaid internships and the Council of Europe’s Committee of Social Rights has determined that gaps in Belgium’s legislation allow young people to be exploited as free labour through unpaid internships. The Committee’s ruling, which came as the result of a collective complaint submitted by the European Youth Forum, found that current labour inspection systems in Belgium fail to offer enough protection to vulnerable and disadvantaged young workers.

Member States’ regulatory frameworks in general and the strictness of the regulation in particular varies widely both among the different types of traineeships and across Member States. In some Member States, no legal definition of traineeships exists.

| 8.2. | The Council Recommendation on QFT, adopted in 2013, seeks to ensure that traineeships efficiently ease education-to-work transitions and thus increase young people’s employability. The proposal sets out guidelines that can ensure high-quality learning content and adequate working conditions. |
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8.2.

The Council Recommendation on QFT, adopted in 2013, seeks to ensure that traineeships efficiently ease education-to-work transitions and thus increase young people’s employability. The proposal sets out guidelines that can ensure high-quality learning content and adequate working conditions.

| 8.3. | Unpaid internships can be defined as periods of work, similar to those carried out by paid employees, that are not linked to a formalised and explicit process of education, training, volunteering or placement. |
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8.3.

Unpaid internships can be defined as periods of work, similar to those carried out by paid employees, that are not linked to a formalised and explicit process of education, training, volunteering or placement.

| 8.4. | While work experience and learning through experience are vital to young people starting out in the labour market, those calling for action on unpaid internships believe that too many young people are on a roundabout of unpaid intershsips and low quality work experience, which creates considerable disillusionment about the labour market in this age group. |
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8.4.

While work experience and learning through experience are vital to young people starting out in the labour market, those calling for action on unpaid internships believe that too many young people are on a roundabout of unpaid intershsips and low quality work experience, which creates considerable disillusionment about the labour market in this age group.

| 8.5. | The European Youth Forum examined a selection of countries and their policies on unpaid internships. In France, internships are strictly regulated and can only take place within formal education curricula. Internships lasting two months or less as part of education can be unpaid. In Romania, internships are highly regulated with specific legislation. Interns are entitled to 50 % of the minimum wage. Unpaid internships on the open labour market are illegal, although the laws are often circumvented. |
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8.5.

The European Youth Forum examined a selection of countries and their policies on unpaid internships. In France, internships are strictly regulated and can only take place within formal education curricula. Internships lasting two months or less as part of education can be unpaid. In Romania, internships are highly regulated with specific legislation. Interns are entitled to 50 % of the minimum wage. Unpaid internships on the open labour market are illegal, although the laws are often circumvented.

| 8.6. | Open labour market internships are not defined or regulated by law and are also not common in Croatia, but other forms of internships exist and are subject to regulation. In Bulgaria, unpaid internships taking place outside the framework of the dedicated internship laws are legal and a common occurrence. For open labour market internships that follow the internship laws, interns are entitled to at least the national minimum wage. |
| --- | --- |

8.6.

Open labour market internships are not defined or regulated by law and are also not common in Croatia, but other forms of internships exist and are subject to regulation. In Bulgaria, unpaid internships taking place outside the framework of the dedicated internship laws are legal and a common occurrence. For open labour market internships that follow the internship laws, interns are entitled to at least the national minimum wage.

| 8.7. | In Austria, internships on the open labour market should in theory be remunerated according to sector-specific collective bargaining agreements. However, internships on the open labour market can be legally unpaid if categorised as an educational relationship and this is a common occurrence. Unpaid work is illegal in Ireland; however, the law is often not enforced when it comes to internships, with unpaid internships a common practice and often advertised publicly. |
| --- | --- |

8.7.

In Austria, internships on the open labour market should in theory be remunerated according to sector-specific collective bargaining agreements. However, internships on the open labour market can be legally unpaid if categorised as an educational relationship and this is a common occurrence. Unpaid work is illegal in Ireland; however, the law is often not enforced when it comes to internships, with unpaid internships a common practice and often advertised publicly.

Brussels, 15 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  A recent Eurobarometer survey Integration of young people into the labour market with particular focus on traineeships, April 2023, Eurobarometer survey (europa.eu).

1

Integration of young people into the labour market with particular focus on traineeships,

(2)  Opinion on the European Economic and Social Committee on The EU Youth Test (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 46).

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth 2022’ (COM(2021) 634 final — 2021/0328(COD)) (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 122).

3

(4)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth 2022’ (COM(2021) 634 final — 2021/0328(COD)) (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 122).

4

(5)  https://www.disability-europe.net/downloads/1046-ede-task-2-1-statistical-indicators-tables-eu-silc-2018

5

(6)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘How to guarantee decent work for young people and ensure the inclusion of NEETs through the proper elaboration of National Recovery Plans’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 27), NEETs and NRRPs.

6

(7)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Precarious work and mental health (exploratory opinion requested by the Spanish Presidency) (OJ C 228, 29.6.2023, p. 28)

7

(8)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on democracy at work (exploratory opinion requested by the Spanish Presidency) (OJ C 228, 29.6.2023, p. 43).

8

(9)  https://www.disability-europe.net/downloads/1046-ede-task-2-1-statistical-indicators-tables-eu-silc-2018

9

(10)  Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/5018508

10

(11)  Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16).

11

(12)  TFEU 153/points 2a, 2b.

12

(13)  Directive (EU) 2022/2041 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on adequate minimum wages in the European Union (OJ L 275, 25.10.2022, p. 33).

13

---

ANNEX (1)

Table

Sub-minimum rates for selected EU Member States and the UK as of January 2021

| Country | Groups of workers | % of full rate | Minimum wage level in 2021 (EUR unless otherwise stated) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Belgium | Workers aged 16 or younger (without student contract) | 70 | 1 138 /month |
| Workers aged 17 (without student contract) | 76 | 1 236 /month |
| Workers aged 18 (with student contract) | 82 | 1 333 /month |
| Workers aged 19 (with student contract) | 88 | 1 431 /month |
| Workers aged 20 (with student contract) | 94 | 1 528 /month |
| France | Workers with fewer than six months of experience in the sector aged 15 and 16; workers under 16 working during summer holidays | 80 | 1 244 /month |
| Workers with fewer than six months of experience in the sector aged 17 | 90 | 1 399 /month |
| Young people on alternating professional contracts (2), depending on age and previous qualifications | 55 to 100 | 855 to 1 555 /month |
| Apprentices, depending on age, seniority and the applicable sectoral agreement | 27 to 78 | 420 to 1 213 /month |
| Trainees (3) | n/a | 3,70 /hour |
| Workers with disabilities employed in specific centres dedicated to the inclusion of such workers | 55 to 100 | 855 to 1 555 /month |
| Germany | Minimum wage not applicable to under 18s. | n/a | 550/month |
| Ireland | Workers aged under 18 | 70 | 7,14 /hour |
| Workers aged 18 | 80 | 8,16 /hour |
| Workers aged 19 | 90 | 9,18 /hour |
| Latvia | Convicted people (serving sentence in a prison) | 50 | 250/month |
| Luxembourg | Workers aged 15 to less than 17 | 75 | 1 651 /month; 9,55 /hour |
| Workers aged 17 to less than 18 | 80 | 1 762 /month;
  10,18 /hour |
| Non-qualified workers aged 18+ | 100 | 2 202 /month;
  12,73 /hour |
| Malta | Workers aged under 17 | 95 | 171/week |
| Workers aged 17 | 96 | 174/week |
| Netherlands | Workers aged 15 | 30 | 505/month |
| Workers aged 16 | 34,5 | 581/month |
| Workers aged 17 | 39,5 | 666/month |
| Workers aged 18 | 50 | 842/month |
| Workers aged 19 | 60 | 1 011 /month |
| Workers aged 20 | 80 | 1 348 /month |
| Workers aged 21 | 100 | 1 685 /month |
| Portugal | Workers in apprenticeships and internships | 80 | 621/month |
| Workers with disabilities | 50 | 388/month |
| UK | Workers aged under 18 | 47,6 | GBP 4,15 (EUR 4,62 )/hour |
| Workers aged 18 to 20 | 52,2 | GBP 4,55 (EUR 5,06 )/hour |
| Workers aged 21 to 24 | 74 | GBP 6,45 (EUR 7,17 )/hour |
| Apprentices aged under 19, or aged 19 or over in the first year of their apprenticeship | 94 | GBP 8,20 (EUR 9,12 )/hour |
| Notes: | Germany has not included hourly rates or their comparison with minimum wage levels. This is because the minimum amount is calculated per month, not per hour. Apprenticeship payments are not considered wages in Germany. Apprenticeships include school time. In legal terms, apprenticeship payments are comparable to stipends for university students. n/a = not applicable. |

Country

Groups of workers

% of full rate

Minimum wage level in 2021 (EUR unless otherwise stated)

Belgium

Workers aged 16 or younger (without student contract)

70

1 138 /month

Workers aged 17 (without student contract)

76

1 236 /month

Workers aged 18 (with student contract)

82

1 333 /month

Workers aged 19 (with student contract)

88

1 431 /month

Workers aged 20 (with student contract)

94

1 528 /month

France

Workers with fewer than six months of experience in the sector aged 15 and 16; workers under 16 working during summer holidays

80

1 244 /month

Workers with fewer than six months of experience in the sector aged 17

90

1 399 /month

Young people on alternating professional contracts (2), depending on age and previous qualifications

55 to 100

855 to 1 555 /month

Apprentices, depending on age, seniority and the applicable sectoral agreement

27 to 78

420 to 1 213 /month

Trainees (3)

n/a

3,70 /hour

Workers with disabilities employed in specific centres dedicated to the inclusion of such workers

55 to 100

855 to 1 555 /month

Germany

Minimum wage not applicable to under 18s.

n/a

550/month

Ireland

Workers aged under 18

70

7,14 /hour

Workers aged 18

80

8,16 /hour

Workers aged 19

90

9,18 /hour

Latvia

Convicted people (serving sentence in a prison)

50

250/month

Luxembourg

Workers aged 15 to less than 17

75

1 651 /month; 9,55 /hour

Workers aged 17 to less than 18

80

1 762 /month;

10,18 /hour

Non-qualified workers aged 18+

100

2 202 /month;

12,73 /hour

Malta

Workers aged under 17

95

171/week

Workers aged 17

96

174/week

Netherlands

Workers aged 15

30

505/month

Workers aged 16

34,5

581/month

Workers aged 17

39,5

666/month

Workers aged 18

50

842/month

Workers aged 19

60

1 011 /month

Workers aged 20

80

1 348 /month

Workers aged 21

100

1 685 /month

Portugal

Workers in apprenticeships and internships

80

621/month

Workers with disabilities

50

388/month

UK

Workers aged under 18

47,6

GBP 4,15 (EUR 4,62 )/hour

Workers aged 18 to 20

52,2

GBP 4,55 (EUR 5,06 )/hour

Workers aged 21 to 24

74

GBP 6,45 (EUR 7,17 )/hour

Apprentices aged under 19, or aged 19 or over in the first year of their apprenticeship

94

GBP 8,20 (EUR 9,12 )/hour

Notes:

| Source: | Network of Eurofound Correspondents, based on national official sources. |
| --- | --- |

Source:

---

(1)  Adapted from: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef21015en.pdf

(2)  
  In France, these contracts allow young employees to acquire a professional qualification and promote their professional integration or reintegration.

(3)  
  May be unpaid, if less than two months.

---

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/58 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/58

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Social Progress Protocol

(exploratory opinion at the request of the Spanish Presidency)

(2023/C 293/09)

| Rapporteur: | María del Carmen BARRERA CHAMORRO |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Diego DUTTO |

Rapporteur:

María del Carmen BARRERA CHAMORRO

María del Carmen BARRERA CHAMORRO

Co-rapporteur:

Diego DUTTO

Diego DUTTO

| Request from the Spanish Presidency of the Council | Letter, 8.12.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| | Exploratory opinion |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 31.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 134/100/7 |

Request from the Spanish Presidency of the Council

Letter, 8.12.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Exploratory opinion

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

31.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

134/100/7

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) points out that, according to the Treaties, achieving a ‘highly competitive social market economy’ (Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)) requires the promotion of the single market and social policy under the so-called ‘horizontal social clause’ (Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). According to the latter, each and every EU policy and action plan should be designed and implemented in a way that promotes inclusive labour markets as well as adequate social protection systems. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) points out that, according to the Treaties, achieving a ‘highly competitive social market economy’ (Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)) requires the promotion of the single market and social policy under the so-called ‘horizontal social clause’ (Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). According to the latter, each and every EU policy and action plan should be designed and implemented in a way that promotes inclusive labour markets as well as adequate social protection systems.

| 1.2. | The EESC agrees with the proposal in the final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE, May 2022) to include, with a view to advancing the social market economy (1), a call for the EU, the Member States and the social partners to, among other things, introduce measures to ensure the full implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR, November 2017) and its action plan (March 2021), especially the most relevant objectives for the 2030 Agenda, at EU, national and regional level, by adding a social progress protocol (SPP) to the Treaties. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC agrees with the proposal in the final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE, May 2022) to include, with a view to advancing the social market economy (1

| 1.3. | The EESC welcomes the fact that, through the SPP, the CoFoE promotes better guarantees ensuring that social rights are effectively protected in the event of conflict with economic freedoms (see measure 5, proposal 13), avoiding any backsliding with respect to those rights (measure 2, proposal 14). |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

The EESC welcomes the fact that, through the SPP, the CoFoE promotes better guarantees ensuring that social rights are effectively protected in the event of conflict with economic freedoms (see measure 5, proposal 13), avoiding any backsliding with respect to those rights (measure 2, proposal 14).

| 1.4. | The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s proposal to open up the possibility of Treaty reform, as endorsed in the latest State of the Union address, and, in line with the European Parliament’s proposal, considers it appropriate to include the SPP among the aspects to be reformed. The EESC believes that the CoFoE conclusions provide an appropriate roadmap for implementing this reform. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s proposal to open up the possibility of Treaty reform, as endorsed in the latest State of the Union address, and, in line with the European Parliament’s proposal, considers it appropriate to include the SPP among the aspects to be reformed. The EESC believes that the CoFoE conclusions provide an appropriate roadmap for implementing this reform.

| 1.5. | The aim of the SPP would be threefold:






  (1) | to ensure that, in the event of conflict, fundamental and social rights take priority over economic freedoms and other EU policies; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.5.

The aim of the SPP would be threefold:

(1)

to ensure that, in the event of conflict, fundamental and social rights take priority over economic freedoms and other EU policies;

| (2) | to guarantee respect for the autonomy of the social partners and the proper functioning of national social dialogue and industrial relations systems; and |
| --- | --- |

(2)

to guarantee respect for the autonomy of the social partners and the proper functioning of national social dialogue and industrial relations systems; and

| (3) | to ensure social progress by ensuring the promotion and protection of the highest standards of social rights, whether derived from national, European or international law, as well as preventing any backsliding or circumvention of that law. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

to ensure social progress by ensuring the promotion and protection of the highest standards of social rights, whether derived from national, European or international law, as well as preventing any backsliding or circumvention of that law.

| 1.6. | The EESC considers the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU a great opportunity to push forward this proposal and urges the EU institutions, in the framework of European social dialogue, to make progress with respect to this process. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The EESC considers the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU a great opportunity to push forward this proposal and urges the EU institutions, in the framework of European social dialogue, to make progress with respect to this process.

| 1.7. | To this end, the EESC encourages the Spanish Presidency to promote, following appropriate analysis by high-level experts, including the social partners, a Council of Social Affairs Ministers that would agree on a joint proposal and enable a specific EU summit to be held to adopt it, where appropriate. The importance of this issue calls for maximum institutional involvement across the various levels of EU competence. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

To this end, the EESC encourages the Spanish Presidency to promote, following appropriate analysis by high-level experts, including the social partners, a Council of Social Affairs Ministers that would agree on a joint proposal and enable a specific EU summit to be held to adopt it, where appropriate. The importance of this issue calls for maximum institutional involvement across the various levels of EU competence.

| 1.8. | The EESC appreciates that, while the proposal from the CoFoE and the European Parliament would have to be introduced either in the form of a protocol (added to the TFEU) or in the form of a cross-cutting clause (reform of Article 9 TFEU), there are other policy instruments that could contribute to the aims of the SPP. Furthermore, the EESC considers this SPP to be essential in order to strengthen the autonomy of the social partners, thereby maintaining an inseparable link between, on the one hand, ensuring the proper functioning of the single market and economic freedoms, including fair competition between the Member States and, on the other hand, respecting and promoting collective social rights. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

The EESC appreciates that, while the proposal from the CoFoE and the European Parliament would have to be introduced either in the form of a protocol (added to the TFEU) or in the form of a cross-cutting clause (reform of Article 9 TFEU), there are other policy instruments that could contribute to the aims of the SPP. Furthermore, the EESC considers this SPP to be essential in order to strengthen the autonomy of the social partners, thereby maintaining an inseparable link between, on the one hand, ensuring the proper functioning of the single market and economic freedoms, including fair competition between the Member States and, on the other hand, respecting and promoting collective social rights.

| 1.9. | The EESC is convinced that including the SPP will enable the EU to be a leader when it comes to economic growth, promoting the well-being of as many of its citizens as possible, which will also lead to the creation and development of more robust and sustainable businesses. To this end, the SPP should make it clear that economic freedoms in the single market do not mean prohibiting restrictions, but provide for equal treatment of economic operators as a means of ensuring fair competition and a level playing field in any given market. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

The EESC is convinced that including the SPP will enable the EU to be a leader when it comes to economic growth, promoting the well-being of as many of its citizens as possible, which will also lead to the creation and development of more robust and sustainable businesses. To this end, the SPP should make it clear that economic freedoms in the single market do not mean prohibiting restrictions, but provide for equal treatment of economic operators as a means of ensuring fair competition and a level playing field in any given market.

| 1.10. | The EESC regrets that the EU has not yet fulfilled its obligation under the Lisbon Treaty to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights, as laid down in Article 6(2) TEU. This accession is key to subjecting the EU legal order to external oversight of human rights, in the same way as any legal order based on democracy and the rule of law. To this end, the EESC also recommends that the EU accede to the Council of Europe’s European Social Charter, in order to promote a harmonious coexistence between EU law and Council of Europe law in the social sphere. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

The EESC regrets that the EU has not yet fulfilled its obligation under the Lisbon Treaty to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights, as laid down in Article 6(2) TEU. This accession is key to subjecting the EU legal order to external oversight of human rights, in the same way as any legal order based on democracy and the rule of law. To this end, the EESC also recommends that the EU accede to the Council of Europe’s European Social Charter, in order to promote a harmonious coexistence between EU law and Council of Europe law in the social sphere.

2.   Background, purpose and gist of the opinion

Background, purpose and gist of the opinion

| 2.1. | The EESC notes that, in line with the history and culture of the EU, as codified in its Treaties, one of the EU’s main contributions to the advancement of humanity and peace is its ‘European social model’. The latter refers to an economic paradigm according to which maximising economic performance is inextricably linked to well-being and social progress. Achieving this ‘highly competitive social market economy’ (Article 3(3) TEU), which is now constitutional in nature, is not intended as an end in itself, but rather, and above all, as an instrument of well-being for all European citizens (Articles 9 and 151 TFEU). |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

The EESC notes that, in line with the history and culture of the EU, as codified in its Treaties, one of the EU’s main contributions to the advancement of humanity and peace is its ‘European social model’. The latter refers to an economic paradigm according to which maximising economic performance is inextricably linked to well-being and social progress. Achieving this ‘highly competitive social market economy’ (Article 3(3) TEU), which is now constitutional in nature, is not intended as an end in itself, but rather, and above all, as an instrument of well-being for all European citizens (Articles 9 and 151 TFEU).

| 2.2. | The EESC also considers it necessary to draw attention to the cross-cutting nature of this close link between promoting the single market and social policy, in line with the ‘horizontal social clause’ in Article 9 TFEU. According to the latter, each and every EU policy and action plan should be designed and implemented in a way that promotes inclusive labour markets as well as adequate social protection systems. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

The EESC also considers it necessary to draw attention to the cross-cutting nature of this close link between promoting the single market and social policy, in line with the ‘horizontal social clause’ in Article 9 TFEU. According to the latter, each and every EU policy and action plan should be designed and implemented in a way that promotes inclusive labour markets as well as adequate social protection systems.

| 2.3. | The social market economy is based on two distinct but complementary pillars: firstly, the enforcement of competition and, secondly, social policy measures to ensure social justice by correcting negative outcomes and strengthening social protection (2). However, the EESC also notes institutional, legal and policy constraints when it comes to ensuring this appropriate balance between the economic dimension of the EU (priority of economic freedoms, in particular freedom of competition) and the social dimension (effective guarantee of fundamental social rights and prohibition of social dumping). |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

The social market economy is based on two distinct but complementary pillars: firstly, the enforcement of competition and, secondly, social policy measures to ensure social justice by correcting negative outcomes and strengthening social protection (2

| 2.4. | In this context, and in order to address this imbalance, the aim of the SPP would be threefold:






  (1) | to ensure that, in the event of conflict, fundamental and social rights take priority over economic freedoms and other EU policies; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.4.

In this context, and in order to address this imbalance, the aim of the SPP would be threefold:

(1)

to ensure that, in the event of conflict, fundamental and social rights take priority over economic freedoms and other EU policies;

| (2) | to guarantee respect for the autonomy of the social partners and the proper functioning of national social dialogue and industrial relations systems; and |
| --- | --- |

(2)

to guarantee respect for the autonomy of the social partners and the proper functioning of national social dialogue and industrial relations systems; and

| (3) | to ensure social progress, ensuring the promotion and protection of the highest standards of social rights, whether derived from national, European or international law, as well as preventing backsliding or the circumvention of these rights. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

to ensure social progress, ensuring the promotion and protection of the highest standards of social rights, whether derived from national, European or international law, as well as preventing backsliding or the circumvention of these rights.

| 2.5. | Moreover, the austerity policies adopted in the EU and in the Member States via the ‘Troika’ method (also criticised by the European Parliament) (3) in order to tackle the Global Financial Crisis renewed this risk of social rights being eroded, with financial stability and economic growth being prioritised over social progress. This situation contrasts with the principle of social progress set out in the European Social Charter. This was reflected in the Council of Europe’s condemnation of several EU countries for implementing these austerity policies and laws to the detriment of social rights. In contrast, the CJEU did not find any incompatibility with the social clause. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

Moreover, the austerity policies adopted in the EU and in the Member States via the ‘Troika’ method (also criticised by the European Parliament) (3

| 2.6. | Cases of conflict between economic freedoms and other EU policies, on the one hand, and social rights, on the other, raise important questions concerning the risk of inconsistency between the EU legal order and EU and international human rights instruments and standards. In such situations, the Member States find themselves faced with conflicting obligations in their efforts to comply with EU law, on the one hand, and their commitments under applicable EU and international human rights instruments, on the other. The SPP seeks to resolve this dilemma by clarifying that, where there is a conflict, the economic freedoms guaranteed under the EU Treaties are not a fundamental right to counterbalance fundamental human rights, including fundamental social and labour rights. This need for a balance between economic and social interests that respects human rights in cases of conflict is essential to ensure that the principle of primacy of EU law is not applied if it would violate EU and international human rights standards. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

Cases of conflict between economic freedoms and other EU policies, on the one hand, and social rights, on the other, raise important questions concerning the risk of inconsistency between the EU legal order and EU and international human rights instruments and standards. In such situations, the Member States find themselves faced with conflicting obligations in their efforts to comply with EU law, on the one hand, and their commitments under applicable EU and international human rights instruments, on the other. The SPP seeks to resolve this dilemma by clarifying that, where there is a conflict, the economic freedoms guaranteed under the EU Treaties are not a fundamental right to counterbalance fundamental human rights, including fundamental social and labour rights. This need for a balance between economic and social interests that respects human rights in cases of conflict is essential to ensure that the principle of primacy of EU law is not applied if it would violate EU and international human rights standards.

| 2.7. | The conclusions and recommendations of the final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE, May 2022) include, among the 49 proposals and 300 measures, that of improving the functioning of markets in order to ensure socially fairer living and working conditions, in particular for young people and vulnerable groups (proposals 13 and 14 (4)).
  The EESC welcomes the fact that the CoFoE report includes, to this end, a call for the EU, the Member States and the social partners to, among other things, introduce measures to ensure the full implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, adopted in November 2017, and its action plan of March 2021, in particular the objectives most relevant to the 2030 Agenda, at EU, national and regional level, by adding an SPP to the Treaties. It is proposed that this include more effective safeguards to ensure that social rights are fully protected in cases where they conflict with economic freedoms (see measure 5, proposal 13), avoiding any backsliding with respect to those rights (measure 2, proposal 14). |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

The conclusions and recommendations of the final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE, May 2022) include, among the 49 proposals and 300 measures, that of improving the functioning of markets in order to ensure socially fairer living and working conditions, in particular for young people and vulnerable groups (proposals 13 and 14 (4

The EESC welcomes the fact that the CoFoE report includes, to this end, a call for the EU, the Member States and the social partners to, among other things, introduce measures to ensure the full implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, adopted in November 2017, and its action plan of March 2021, in particular the objectives most relevant to the 2030 Agenda, at EU, national and regional level, by adding an SPP to the Treaties. It is proposed that this include more effective safeguards to ensure that social rights are fully protected in cases where they conflict with economic freedoms (see measure 5, proposal 13), avoiding any backsliding with respect to those rights (measure 2, proposal 14).

| 2.8. | In view of the current and recent crises, and in order to fulfil the proposals and measures set out in the aforementioned CoFoE report, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in June 2022 calling on the European Council to initiate the process of revising the EU’s founding texts. The EESC welcomes the fact that the proposed reforms include ensuring that the European Pillar of Social Rights is fully implemented, and that social progress linked to a Social Progress Protocol is incorporated into the Treaties, without prejudice to the respective competences and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The EESC notes that the European Parliament also put forward similar calls for an SPP in its December 2020 resolution on a strong social Europe for just transitions. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

In view of the current and recent crises, and in order to fulfil the proposals and measures set out in the aforementioned CoFoE report, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in June 2022 calling on the European Council to initiate the process of revising the EU’s founding texts. The EESC welcomes the fact that the proposed reforms include ensuring that the European Pillar of Social Rights is fully implemented, and that social progress linked to a Social Progress Protocol is incorporated into the Treaties, without prejudice to the respective competences and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The EESC notes that the European Parliament also put forward similar calls for an SPP in its December 2020 resolution on a strong social Europe for just transitions.

| 2.9. | The EESC is drawing up this opinion following an express request from the incoming Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU (second half of 2023) for an exploratory opinion setting out its position on this SPP. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

The EESC is drawing up this opinion following an express request from the incoming Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU (second half of 2023) for an exploratory opinion setting out its position on this SPP.

3.   European context and institutional, legal and scientific input on the value of adding a social progress protocol to the Treaties

European context and institutional, legal and scientific input on the value of adding a social progress protocol to the Treaties

| 3.1. | The EESC welcomes the willingness of the three EU institutions to focus their attention on the follow-up to the CoFoE and its proposals, in line with their respective competences under the EU Treaties. The EESC notes that active steps are being taken towards implementing the proposals of the Conference in order to improve citizens’ daily lives in various areas, including the promotion of a socially fair and environmentally sustainable competitive economy (CoFoE thematic area 9). |
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3.1.

The EESC welcomes the willingness of the three EU institutions to focus their attention on the follow-up to the CoFoE and its proposals, in line with their respective competences under the EU Treaties. The EESC notes that active steps are being taken towards implementing the proposals of the Conference in order to improve citizens’ daily lives in various areas, including the promotion of a socially fair and environmentally sustainable competitive economy (CoFoE thematic area 9).

| 3.2. | The EESC also points out that the report on the final outcome of the CoFoE (November 2022 (5)) contains an updated preliminary analysis of the proposals and measures, drawn up by the General Secretariat of the Council. It is clear from this analysis that:






  — | the General Secretariat of the Council understands the balance between social rights and the four economic freedoms to be already secure (e.g. Articles 9, 151 and 153 TFEU); |
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3.2.

The EESC also points out that the report on the final outcome of the CoFoE (November 2022 (5

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the General Secretariat of the Council understands the balance between social rights and the four economic freedoms to be already secure (e.g. Articles 9, 151 and 153 TFEU);

| — | while not rejecting the desirability of exploring the possibilities already provided for within the scope of the Treaties in order to ensure the social objectives (e.g. Article 153), the Council considers it unnecessary to restructure the Treaties in order to create a new SPP; |
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while not rejecting the desirability of exploring the possibilities already provided for within the scope of the Treaties in order to ensure the social objectives (e.g. Article 153), the Council considers it unnecessary to restructure the Treaties in order to create a new SPP;

| — | the Commission has announced that it intends to propose a Council recommendation on the development of framework conditions for the social economy in the second quarter of 2023; |
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the Commission has announced that it intends to propose a Council recommendation on the development of framework conditions for the social economy in the second quarter of 2023;

| 3.3. | The EESC notes that the CoFoE calls for more ambitious and assertive action by the EU, the Member States and the social partners in order to improve European citizens’ well-being, in the framework of a renewed social contract, and ensure the continuous improvement of living and working conditions. To this end, the current regulatory framework allows for more committed social policies, while according to the CoFoE Final Report (6) other measures require Treaty reform. |
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3.3.

The EESC notes that the CoFoE calls for more ambitious and assertive action by the EU, the Member States and the social partners in order to improve European citizens’ well-being, in the framework of a renewed social contract, and ensure the continuous improvement of living and working conditions. To this end, the current regulatory framework allows for more committed social policies, while according to the CoFoE Final Report (6

| 3.4. | Similarly, giving the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU) the same legal value as the Treaties, despite not being incorporated into them, improves the constitutional balance between social rights and economic freedoms, without the former being exceptions to the latter. Likewise, as stated in its preamble, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) reaffirms the rights derived in particular from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, including the European Convention on Human Rights and the Council of Europe’s Social Charter. The constitutional balance improved with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which gave the CFREU the same legal value as the Treaties. However, experience shows that, in the event of conflict, the trend persists whereby economic freedoms prevail over social rights. |
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3.4.

Similarly, giving the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU) the same legal value as the Treaties, despite not being incorporated into them, improves the constitutional balance between social rights and economic freedoms, without the former being exceptions to the latter. Likewise, as stated in its preamble, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) reaffirms the rights derived in particular from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, including the European Convention on Human Rights and the Council of Europe’s Social Charter. The constitutional balance improved with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which gave the CFREU the same legal value as the Treaties. However, experience shows that, in the event of conflict, the trend persists whereby economic freedoms prevail over social rights.

| 3.5. | The EESC is also aware of the positive development of EU law and CJEU case-law towards the prohibition of social dumping, in order to ensure a model of economic competition that is not only free but also fair. The judgment of the CJEU (Grand Chamber) of 8 December 2020 (Case C-620/18) is a clear example of the need to ensure a level playing field in the exercise of economic freedoms (in the case of providing services). However, experience shows that, in the event of conflict, the trend persists whereby economic freedoms prevail over social rights. |
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3.5.

The EESC is also aware of the positive development of EU law and CJEU case-law towards the prohibition of social dumping, in order to ensure a model of economic competition that is not only free but also fair. The judgment of the CJEU (Grand Chamber) of 8 December 2020 (Case C-620/18) is a clear example of the need to ensure a level playing field in the exercise of economic freedoms (in the case of providing services). However, experience shows that, in the event of conflict, the trend persists whereby economic freedoms prevail over social rights.

4.   General comments

General comments

| 4.1. | The EESC notes that, while binding and non-binding minimum standards at European level do exist, in order to advance the implementation of the EPSR, promoting and guaranteeing a truly competitive and sustainable social market economy requires an SPP in order to reinforce the strengths of our European social market economy system, while eliminating weaknesses and adapting it to meet the challenges ahead. The EESC believes that the CoFoE conclusions provide an appropriate roadmap through which to promote it. It therefore calls on the European institutions to take the necessary steps to ensure that this CoFoE proposal is implemented. |
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4.1.

The EESC notes that, while binding and non-binding minimum standards at European level do exist, in order to advance the implementation of the EPSR, promoting and guaranteeing a truly competitive and sustainable social market economy requires an SPP in order to reinforce the strengths of our European social market economy system, while eliminating weaknesses and adapting it to meet the challenges ahead. The EESC believes that the CoFoE conclusions provide an appropriate roadmap through which to promote it. It therefore calls on the European institutions to take the necessary steps to ensure that this CoFoE proposal is implemented.

| 4.2. | The EESC believes that, while this proposal from the CoFoE and the European Parliament would have to be introduced either in the form of a protocol (added to the TFEU) or in the form of a cross-cutting clause (reform of Article 9 TFEU), there are other policy instruments that could contribute to the aims of the SPP. |
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4.2.

The EESC believes that, while this proposal from the CoFoE and the European Parliament would have to be introduced either in the form of a protocol (added to the TFEU) or in the form of a cross-cutting clause (reform of Article 9 TFEU), there are other policy instruments that could contribute to the aims of the SPP.

| 4.3. | Furthermore, the EESC thinks that an SPP — as a fundamental aspect of social progress — would safeguard and strengthen the autonomy of the social partners, thereby establishing a clear link between, on the one hand, ensuring the proper functioning of the single market and economic freedoms, including fair competition between the Member States and, on the other hand, respecting and promoting collective social rights. This guarantee must always be understood in accordance with the autonomy of the social partners and the proper functioning of national systems of social dialogue and industrial relations. |
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4.3.

Furthermore, the EESC thinks that an SPP — as a fundamental aspect of social progress — would safeguard and strengthen the autonomy of the social partners, thereby establishing a clear link between, on the one hand, ensuring the proper functioning of the single market and economic freedoms, including fair competition between the Member States and, on the other hand, respecting and promoting collective social rights. This guarantee must always be understood in accordance with the autonomy of the social partners and the proper functioning of national systems of social dialogue and industrial relations.

| 4.4. | The EESC considers it necessary, and not simply desirable, to guarantee, within this SPP, a principle of non-regression of social standards, as already recognised in the law of the European Social Charter and in the case-law of the European Committee of Social Rights, albeit not in EU law or by the CJEU. |
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4.4.

The EESC considers it necessary, and not simply desirable, to guarantee, within this SPP, a principle of non-regression of social standards, as already recognised in the law of the European Social Charter and in the case-law of the European Committee of Social Rights, albeit not in EU law or by the CJEU.

| 4.5. | The EESC sees this protocol as a key component of a new EU economic and governance model, which should be based on going beyond GDP and building socially just (inclusive) and sustainable well-being in Europe. |
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4.5.

The EESC sees this protocol as a key component of a new EU economic and governance model, which should be based on going beyond GDP and building socially just (inclusive) and sustainable well-being in Europe.

5.   Specific comments

Specific comments

| 5.1. | The EESC is convinced that including the SPP will allow the EU to converge on progress as well as on economic growth, promoting the well-being of as many of its citizens as possible (preserving the European social model), which will also lead to the creation and development of more robust and sustainable businesses. To this end, the SPP would also contribute significantly to achieving the EU’s Sustainable Development Goals under the UN 2030 Agenda. |
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5.1.

The EESC is convinced that including the SPP will allow the EU to converge on progress as well as on economic growth, promoting the well-being of as many of its citizens as possible (preserving the European social model), which will also lead to the creation and development of more robust and sustainable businesses. To this end, the SPP would also contribute significantly to achieving the EU’s Sustainable Development Goals under the UN 2030 Agenda.

| 5.2. | The EESC believes that the EU should have sufficient competence to act, if necessary, to ensure the effectiveness of social progress, and in analogy with Protocol 27 on the single market and competition, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties, including Article 352 TFEU. |
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5.2.

The EESC believes that the EU should have sufficient competence to act, if necessary, to ensure the effectiveness of social progress, and in analogy with Protocol 27 on the single market and competition, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties, including Article 352 TFEU.

| 5.3. | The EESC recommends that the EU fulfil its obligation under the Lisbon Treaty to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. The EU must also accede to the Council of Europe’s European Social Charter, in order to promote a harmonious coexistence between EU law and Council of Europe law in the social sphere. |
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5.3.

The EESC recommends that the EU fulfil its obligation under the Lisbon Treaty to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. The EU must also accede to the Council of Europe’s European Social Charter, in order to promote a harmonious coexistence between EU law and Council of Europe law in the social sphere.

Brussels, 15 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

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(1)  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/media/20220509RES29121/20220509RES29121.pdf

1

(2)  Building a social market economy in the European Union, László Andor, Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion.

2

(3)  See the Resolution of 13 March 2014 on Employment and social aspects of the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to euro-area programme countries (2014/2007(INI)).

3

(4)  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10033-2022-ADD-1-REV-1/en/pdf

4

(5)  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/conference-on-the-future-of-europe/

5

(6)  Report on the final outcome of CoFoE, see e.g. p. 53.

6

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ANNEX

The following amendment, which received at least a quarter of the votes cast, was rejected in the course of the debate (Rule 74(3) of the Rules of Procedure):

AMENDMENT 1

SOC/756 — Social Progress Protocol

Replace the whole opinion presented by the SOC section with the following text (explanation/reason at the end of the document):

| Amendment |
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| 1.   Conclusions and recommendations







  1.1. | The EESC notes that opinions differ among Member States and stakeholders as to whether a Treaty reform to add a Social Progress Protocol is appropriate or necessary. As indicated in the Council’s preliminary technical assessment of the report on the final outcome of the CoFoE, the balance between social rights and the four economic freedoms is secured in the Treaties. The EESC believes it is important to keep this balance in the Treaties, without creating a hierarchy between social rights and economic freedoms. Furthermore, giving precedence to fundamental social rights over internal market economic freedoms by adding the Social Progress Protocol to the Treaties aims to change the fundamental principles that the EU is founded on and also amounts to an attack on the foundation of our economy, which has brought prosperity and wellbeing to the EU and its Member States. Thus, such a protocol would risk undermining the very basis for social progress. |

Amendment

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

1.1.

The EESC notes that opinions differ among Member States and stakeholders as to whether a Treaty reform to add a Social Progress Protocol is appropriate or necessary. As indicated in the Council’s preliminary technical assessment of the report on the final outcome of the CoFoE, the balance between social rights and the four economic freedoms is secured in the Treaties. The EESC believes it is important to keep this balance in the Treaties, without creating a hierarchy between social rights and economic freedoms. Furthermore, giving precedence to fundamental social rights over internal market economic freedoms by adding the Social Progress Protocol to the Treaties aims to change the fundamental principles that the EU is founded on and also amounts to an attack on the foundation of our economy, which has brought prosperity and wellbeing to the EU and its Member States. Thus, such a protocol would risk undermining the very basis for social progress.

| 1.2. | Just as there are numerous limitations on economic freedoms, there can also be limits on the exercise of fundamental social rights such as the right to take collective action. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), a restriction on economic freedoms can be accepted only if it pursues a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaties and is justified by overriding reasons of public interest. Even in this case, it still needs to be suitable for achieving the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective. This can be guaranteed by applying the existing principles of proportionality and subsidiarity at EU level. |
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1.2.

Just as there are numerous limitations on economic freedoms, there can also be limits on the exercise of fundamental social rights such as the right to take collective action. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), a restriction on economic freedoms can be accepted only if it pursues a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaties and is justified by overriding reasons of public interest. Even in this case, it still needs to be suitable for achieving the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective. This can be guaranteed by applying the existing principles of proportionality and subsidiarity at EU level.

| 1.3. | The EESC considers that the employment and social policy objectives should continue to be addressed within the current Treaties and the existing legislative and policy framework at EU and national level, while fully respecting the autonomy of the social partners; the Committee is at the disposal of the upcoming Spanish Presidency to contribute to this process. |
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1.3.

The EESC considers that the employment and social policy objectives should continue to be addressed within the current Treaties and the existing legislative and policy framework at EU and national level, while fully respecting the autonomy of the social partners; the Committee is at the disposal of the upcoming Spanish Presidency to contribute to this process.

| 1.4. | Rather than the EU coming up with a Social Progress Protocol which would distort the balance between economic freedoms and social rights and interfere with well-defined EU and national competences, it is important to progress towards a shared understanding of what constitutes the added value of the EU in terms of employment and social policies. |
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1.4.

Rather than the EU coming up with a Social Progress Protocol which would distort the balance between economic freedoms and social rights and interfere with well-defined EU and national competences, it is important to progress towards a shared understanding of what constitutes the added value of the EU in terms of employment and social policies.

| 1.5. | It is essential for the EU to continue developing in a way that addresses economic and social challenges in an integrated manner. As already stated by the EESC, competitiveness and higher productivity based on skills and knowledge represent a sound recipe for maintaining the well-being of European societies. Economic growth and a well-functioning internal market are an important element for strengthening the social dimension of the EU. We need to reinforce the strengths of our European social market economy system while removing its weaknesses, and thus adapt it to face the challenges ahead (1). |
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1.5.

It is essential for the EU to continue developing in a way that addresses economic and social challenges in an integrated manner. As already stated by the EESC, competitiveness and higher productivity based on skills and knowledge represent a sound recipe for maintaining the well-being of European societies. Economic growth and a well-functioning internal market are an important element for strengthening the social dimension of the EU. We need to reinforce the strengths of our European social market economy system while removing its weaknesses, and thus adapt it to face the challenges ahead (1).

| 1.6. | Social policy decisions should be taken as close as possible to the citizens of the EU and with full respect for the competences shared between the EU, the Member States and the social partners. This is what is needed to achieve positive outcomes for citizens, workers, businesses and society as whole. Well-articulated and well-balanced policy debates on the economic and social dimensions of the EU should be secured in future. The fact that economic development in the Member States is heterogeneous should also be better accounted for in European debates on the social dimension, to allow for realistic expectations and progress in terms of European economic and social convergence. It also means that measures leading to a regression of labour and social standards might sometimes be necessary in the short term, to allow governments to avoid even worse consequences of serious economic and fiscal downturns at national level. The assessment of the need for such measures should continue to be at the discretion of the national authorities. |
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1.6.

Social policy decisions should be taken as close as possible to the citizens of the EU and with full respect for the competences shared between the EU, the Member States and the social partners. This is what is needed to achieve positive outcomes for citizens, workers, businesses and society as whole. Well-articulated and well-balanced policy debates on the economic and social dimensions of the EU should be secured in future. The fact that economic development in the Member States is heterogeneous should also be better accounted for in European debates on the social dimension, to allow for realistic expectations and progress in terms of European economic and social convergence. It also means that measures leading to a regression of labour and social standards might sometimes be necessary in the short term, to allow governments to avoid even worse consequences of serious economic and fiscal downturns at national level. The assessment of the need for such measures should continue to be at the discretion of the national authorities.

| 1.7. | For the reasons described above, the proposal to revise the Treaties in order to create a Social Progress Protocol is unacceptable and is not supported by the EESC Employers’ Group. |
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1.7.

For the reasons described above, the proposal to revise the Treaties in order to create a Social Progress Protocol is unacceptable and is not supported by the EESC Employers’ Group.

2.   Background, EU and national context and institutional and legal framework

| 2.1. | The EESC has prepared opinion SOC/756 following a request for an exploratory opinion by the upcoming Spanish Presidency of the EU Council, in order to provide responses to the questions presented in that request (2). |
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2.1.

The EESC has prepared opinion SOC/756 following a request for an exploratory opinion by the upcoming Spanish Presidency of the EU Council, in order to provide responses to the questions presented in that request (2).

| 2.2. | The upcoming Spanish Presidency’s request refers to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) proposal for a Social Progress Protocol (3), in the context of the outcomes of the Conference on the Future of Europe (4), and the European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties (5), which calls on the Council, amongst other things, ‘to adapt the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties [...] in social and economic policies; to ensure the European Pillar of Social Rights is fully implemented and to incorporate social progress in Article 9 TFEU linked to a Social Progress Protocol into the Treaties’. |
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2.2.

The upcoming Spanish Presidency’s request refers to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) proposal for a Social Progress Protocol (3), in the context of the outcomes of the Conference on the Future of Europe (4), and the European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties (5), which calls on the Council, amongst other things, ‘to adapt the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties [...] in social and economic policies; to ensure the European Pillar of Social Rights is fully implemented and to incorporate social progress in Article 9 TFEU linked to a Social Progress Protocol into the Treaties’.

| 2.3. | The ETUC proposal (6) for a Social Progress Protocol contains four main provisions to be annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It establishes the principles (Article 1), the definition of social progress and its implementation (Article 2), the relation between fundamental social rights and other Union policies (Article 3) and the EU competences (Article 4) to ensure social progress. |
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2.3.

The ETUC proposal (6) for a Social Progress Protocol contains four main provisions to be annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It establishes the principles (Article 1), the definition of social progress and its implementation (Article 2), the relation between fundamental social rights and other Union policies (Article 3) and the EU competences (Article 4) to ensure social progress.

| 2.4. | According to the ETUC proposal:






  — | ‘Nothing in the Treaties, and in particular neither economic freedoms nor internal market, competition or other Union policy measures, shall have priority over fundamental social rights and social progress as defined in Article 2 of this Protocol. In case of conflict, fundamental social rights shall take precedence.’ (Article 3) |
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2.4.

According to the ETUC proposal:

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‘Nothing in the Treaties, and in particular neither economic freedoms nor internal market, competition or other Union policy measures, shall have priority over fundamental social rights and social progress as defined in Article 2 of this Protocol. In case of conflict, fundamental social rights shall take precedence.’ (Article 3)

| — | ‘No Union policy measure, in particular in relation to the economic freedoms, shall be interpreted in such a way as restricting or adversely affecting the exercise of fundamental social rights as recognised in the Member States, by Union law as well as by any other international instrument, in particular the ILO Conventions and the Council of Europe European Social Charter.’ (Article 3) |
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‘No Union policy measure, in particular in relation to the economic freedoms, shall be interpreted in such a way as restricting or adversely affecting the exercise of fundamental social rights as recognised in the Member States, by Union law as well as by any other international instrument, in particular the ILO Conventions and the Council of Europe European Social Charter.’ (Article 3)

| 2.5. | The EESC notes that ETUC’s initial proposal for a Social Progress Protocol in 2008 was developed as a result of CJEU rulings in the Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg cases. It also notes that, in 2010, the European cross-industry social partners issued a report on joint work of the European social partners on those rulings, in which they agreed that economic freedoms and fundamental social rights interact within their own field of competence. They have different views on the concrete implications of this interaction and especially what this would mean in terms of setting limitations on the right to take collective action and/or the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (7). |
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2.5.

The EESC notes that ETUC’s initial proposal for a Social Progress Protocol in 2008 was developed as a result of CJEU rulings in the Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg cases. It also notes that, in 2010, the European cross-industry social partners issued a report on joint work of the European social partners on those rulings, in which they agreed that economic freedoms and fundamental social rights interact within their own field of competence. They have different views on the concrete implications of this interaction and especially what this would mean in terms of setting limitations on the right to take collective action and/or the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (7).

| 2.6. | The EESC also draws attention to the failure of the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation COM(2012) 130 (‘Monti II’) (8) and the strong reaction this initiative provoked from national parliaments in 2012 (9): they defended national competences, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, which shows the continued validity of Article 153(5) TFEU. That article makes it clear that the EU has no competence on the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs. |
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2.6.

The EESC also draws attention to the failure of the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation COM(2012) 130 (‘Monti II’) (8) and the strong reaction this initiative provoked from national parliaments in 2012 (9): they defended national competences, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, which shows the continued validity of Article 153(5) TFEU. That article makes it clear that the EU has no competence on the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs.

| 2.7. | In the context described above, the EESC notes that views differ among Member States and stakeholders as to whether a Treaty reform to add a Social Progress Protocol is appropriate or necessary. This has been reflected for instance by the Danish Minister of Justice Peter Hummelgaard: ‘I have on numerous occasions in meetings with my European colleagues and the Commission highlighted the government’s long-term vision to introduce a social protocol. The introduction of a social protocol in the treaties requires a treaty change. The government does not think that the time is ripe for a drawn-out treaty change process, but instead we want to deliver concrete results on the challenges faced by European citizens and companies’ (10). |
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2.7.

In the context described above, the EESC notes that views differ among Member States and stakeholders as to whether a Treaty reform to add a Social Progress Protocol is appropriate or necessary. This has been reflected for instance by the Danish Minister of Justice Peter Hummelgaard: ‘I have on numerous occasions in meetings with my European colleagues and the Commission highlighted the government’s long-term vision to introduce a social protocol. The introduction of a social protocol in the treaties requires a treaty change. The government does not think that the time is ripe for a drawn-out treaty change process, but instead we want to deliver concrete results on the challenges faced by European citizens and companies’ (10).

| 2.8. | The EESC points out that the issues that emerged in the context of the Viking, Laval, and Rüffert rulings in 2007-2008 were resolved through the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive in 2018. As the revised Posting of Workers Directive includes the principle of equal pay for equal work at the same location, in a situation similar to those referred to in the Viking and Laval judgments it would be legitimate to have recourse to the right of workers to take collective action to seek equal pay with local workers. |
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2.8.

The EESC points out that the issues that emerged in the context of the Viking, Laval, and Rüffert rulings in 2007-2008 were resolved through the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive in 2018. As the revised Posting of Workers Directive includes the principle of equal pay for equal work at the same location, in a situation similar to those referred to in the Viking and Laval judgments it would be legitimate to have recourse to the right of workers to take collective action to seek equal pay with local workers.

| 2.9. | The request to include a Social Progress Protocol was once again put forward in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe. In this respect, the EESC highlights the view, set out in the Council’s preliminary technical assessment of the CoFoE, that the balance between social rights and the four economic freedoms is already secured (e.g. Article 3 TEU, Articles 9, 151 and 153 TFEU). The EESC fully shares this view expressed in the Council’s preliminary technical assessment and does not consider it necessary to revise the Treaties in order to create a Social Progress Protocol. |
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2.9.

The request to include a Social Progress Protocol was once again put forward in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe. In this respect, the EESC highlights the view, set out in the Council’s preliminary technical assessment of the CoFoE, that the balance between social rights and the four economic freedoms is already secured (e.g. Article 3 TEU, Articles 9, 151 and 153 TFEU). The EESC fully shares this view expressed in the Council’s preliminary technical assessment and does not consider it necessary to revise the Treaties in order to create a Social Progress Protocol.

| 2.10. | The EESC regards this opinion as an opportunity to reconfirm what is stated in Article 3(3) TEU, i.e. that the EU shall establish an internal market and it shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and, ‘a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’. |
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2.10.

The EESC regards this opinion as an opportunity to reconfirm what is stated in Article 3(3) TEU, i.e. that the EU shall establish an internal market and it shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and, ‘a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’.

| 2.11. | The proposal to incorporate the Social Progress Protocol in the Treaties would change the nature and functioning of our EU social market economy by introducing the primacy of social rights over economic freedoms. By contrast, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has followed the right approach by protecting social rights and economic freedoms as part of the same instrument of the same legal value. Giving general priority to social rights over economic freedoms would be as wrong as giving general priority to economic freedoms. |
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2.11.

The proposal to incorporate the Social Progress Protocol in the Treaties would change the nature and functioning of our EU social market economy by introducing the primacy of social rights over economic freedoms. By contrast, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has followed the right approach by protecting social rights and economic freedoms as part of the same instrument of the same legal value. Giving general priority to social rights over economic freedoms would be as wrong as giving general priority to economic freedoms.

| 2.12. | The EESC underlines the importance of keeping the existing balance in the Treaties between social rights and economic freedoms, without creating a hierarchy between them. As stated for example in the Laval case (11), while the protection of fundamental rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, could justify a restriction of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, such as the freedom of establishment or freedom to provide services, the exercise of the fundamental rights does not fall outside the scope of the provisions of the Treaties, and such exercise must be reconciled in accordance with the principle of proportionality
   (12). |
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2.12.

The EESC underlines the importance of keeping the existing balance in the Treaties between social rights and economic freedoms, without creating a hierarchy between them. As stated for example in the Laval case (11), while the protection of fundamental rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, could justify a restriction of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, such as the freedom of establishment or freedom to provide services, the exercise of the fundamental rights does not fall outside the scope of the provisions of the Treaties, and such exercise must be reconciled in accordance with the principle of proportionality
   (12).

| 2.13. | Giving precedence to fundamental social rights over the internal market economic freedoms by adding the Social Progress Protocol to the Treaties aims to change the fundamental principles on which the EU is founded and also amounts to an attack on the foundation of our economy, which has brought prosperity and wellbeing to the EU and its Member States. Thus, such a protocol would risk undermining the very basis for social progress. Rather than the EU starting the process with the intention of coming up with a Social Progress Protocol which would distort the balance between economic freedoms and social rights, and interfere with well-defined EU and national competences, it is important to progress towards a shared understanding of what constitutes the added value of EU in terms of employment and social policies. |
| --- | --- |

2.13.

Giving precedence to fundamental social rights over the internal market economic freedoms by adding the Social Progress Protocol to the Treaties aims to change the fundamental principles on which the EU is founded and also amounts to an attack on the foundation of our economy, which has brought prosperity and wellbeing to the EU and its Member States. Thus, such a protocol would risk undermining the very basis for social progress. Rather than the EU starting the process with the intention of coming up with a Social Progress Protocol which would distort the balance between economic freedoms and social rights, and interfere with well-defined EU and national competences, it is important to progress towards a shared understanding of what constitutes the added value of EU in terms of employment and social policies.

| 2.14. | The EESC has already acknowledged that the European economic and social model is based on the shared understanding of the importance of increasing employment, social progress and productivity, as the underlying key factors for sustainable economic growth, which benefits everyone in a fair manner (13). The employment and social policy objectives should continue to be addressed within the current Treaties and the existing legislative and policy framework at EU and national level while fully respecting the autonomy of the social partners. |
| --- | --- |

2.14.

The EESC has already acknowledged that the European economic and social model is based on the shared understanding of the importance of increasing employment, social progress and productivity, as the underlying key factors for sustainable economic growth, which benefits everyone in a fair manner (13). The employment and social policy objectives should continue to be addressed within the current Treaties and the existing legislative and policy framework at EU and national level while fully respecting the autonomy of the social partners.

| 2.15. | It is essential for the EU to continue developing in a way that addresses economic and social challenges in an integrated way. This is what is needed to achieve positive outcomes for citizens, workers, businesses and society as whole. Well-articulated and well-balanced policy debates on the economic and social dimensions of the EU should be secured in future. The fact that economic development in the Member States is heterogeneous should also be better accounted for in European debates on the social dimension, to allow for realistic expectations and progress in terms of European economic and social convergence. |
| --- | --- |

2.15.

It is essential for the EU to continue developing in a way that addresses economic and social challenges in an integrated way. This is what is needed to achieve positive outcomes for citizens, workers, businesses and society as whole. Well-articulated and well-balanced policy debates on the economic and social dimensions of the EU should be secured in future. The fact that economic development in the Member States is heterogeneous should also be better accounted for in European debates on the social dimension, to allow for realistic expectations and progress in terms of European economic and social convergence.

| 2.16. | While striving to achieve social progress, we must also admit that there are situations where measures must be taken to address economic and fiscal situations at national level in order to prevent serious distortions on the labour market and economic development in the medium term. This may in some cases lead to a regression of social rights. Although lowering level of social standards is not the main goal, national governments sometimes need to be able to make use of this instrument in order to avoid even worse consequences of economic and fiscal downturns. |
| --- | --- |

2.16.

While striving to achieve social progress, we must also admit that there are situations where measures must be taken to address economic and fiscal situations at national level in order to prevent serious distortions on the labour market and economic development in the medium term. This may in some cases lead to a regression of social rights. Although lowering level of social standards is not the main goal, national governments sometimes need to be able to make use of this instrument in order to avoid even worse consequences of economic and fiscal downturns.

| 2.17. | Rather than trying to solve labour market challenges across the board at European level, the EU’s primary role is to provide information, possible solutions, incentives and know-how to help Member States and social partners to design, implement and evaluate policies that really address the structural labour market challenges they face, in a way that is understood by and acceptable to their societies. |
| --- | --- |

2.17.

Rather than trying to solve labour market challenges across the board at European level, the EU’s primary role is to provide information, possible solutions, incentives and know-how to help Member States and social partners to design, implement and evaluate policies that really address the structural labour market challenges they face, in a way that is understood by and acceptable to their societies.

| 2.18. | Social policy decisions should be taken as close as possible to the citizens of the Union and with full respect for the competences of the Member States and social partners. On the labour market in particular, many decisions are best taken by or as close as possible to the employer and employees concerned. |
| --- | --- |

2.18.

Social policy decisions should be taken as close as possible to the citizens of the Union and with full respect for the competences of the Member States and social partners. On the labour market in particular, many decisions are best taken by or as close as possible to the employer and employees concerned.

| 2.19. | In this respect, the recently published EU social dialogue initiative (14) is a step in the right direction, as it can pave the way to stronger social partners’ organisations where this is needed in the EU, and can create more space for social partners to negotiate autonomously at the appropriate levels in the Member States with the support of their national governments. |
| --- | --- |

2.19.

In this respect, the recently published EU social dialogue initiative (14) is a step in the right direction, as it can pave the way to stronger social partners’ organisations where this is needed in the EU, and can create more space for social partners to negotiate autonomously at the appropriate levels in the Member States with the support of their national governments.

| 2.20. | Furthermore, it is important to adapt to the diverse ways in which Member States prioritise and shape social policy interventions in light of deeply rooted constitutional setups, political choices, policy approaches and cultural traditions in the Member States. That is why the subsidiarity principle, as enshrined in the Treaty, should remain at the centre of policy orientation. |
| --- | --- |

2.20.

Furthermore, it is important to adapt to the diverse ways in which Member States prioritise and shape social policy interventions in light of deeply rooted constitutional setups, political choices, policy approaches and cultural traditions in the Member States. That is why the subsidiarity principle, as enshrined in the Treaty, should remain at the centre of policy orientation.

| 2.21. | As part of this, it is essential to recognise that the EU has a different nature than international organisations such as the Council of Europe and the International Labour Organisation. Therefore, it is not a relevant benchmark to use the frameworks deriving from these international organisations as a basis for implementation in the EU. The EU should come up with policies that are well in line with its own specific nature. At the same time, as stated in Article 6(3) TEU, fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law. |
| --- | --- |

2.21.

As part of this, it is essential to recognise that the EU has a different nature than international organisations such as the Council of Europe and the International Labour Organisation. Therefore, it is not a relevant benchmark to use the frameworks deriving from these international organisations as a basis for implementation in the EU. The EU should come up with policies that are well in line with its own specific nature. At the same time, as stated in Article 6(3) TEU, fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.

Reason

This text comprises an amendment which aims to set out a generally divergent view to an opinion presented by the section and is therefore to be described as a counter-opinion. It sets out the reasons why the EESC considers it unnecessary to revise the Treaties in order to create a Social Progress Protocol. Rather than the EU coming up with a Social Progress Protocol which would distort the balance between economic freedoms and social rights, and interfere with well-defined national competences, it is important to progress towards a shared understanding of what constitutes the added value of EU in terms of employment and social policies.

Outcome of the vote:

| In favour: | 101 |
| --- | --- |
| Against: | 133 |
| Abstention: | 7 |

In favour:

101

Against:

133

Abstention:

7

---

(1)  EESC contribution to the Porto Social Summit, point 7.

(2)

| ‘1. | What is the EESC’s assessment and position on this proposal, at a time when the current President of the European Commission has opened up the possibility of discussing reform of the treaties in the latest EU speech? |
| --- | --- |

‘1.

| 2. | Does it consider it opportune and convenient for the progress of this proposal to introduce this aspiration on the Spanish Presidency’s agenda? |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | If so, at what competence levels would it be interesting to include it (European Summit, Council of Ministers for Social Affairs, expert level, technical level?)’ |
| --- | --- |

3.

(3)  Initially proposed in 2008 and updated in 2022.

3

(4)  Report on the final outcome.

4

(5)  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0244_EN.html

5

(6)  ETUC proposal for a Social Progress Protocol, updated in 2022.

6

(7)  Report on joint work of the European social partners on the ECJ rulings in the Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg cases.

7

(8)  Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.

8

(9)  Twelve out of 40 national parliaments or chambers of parliaments (19 out of 54 votes allocated) considered that the content of the proposal was not consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. The Commission ultimately withdrew its proposal.

9

(10)  At a discussion in the Danish Parliament’s EU committee.

10

(11)  Case C/341/05, points 91 and 93.

11

(12)  Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.

12

(13)  
  OJ C 125, 21.4.2017, p. 10, point 2.6.

13

(14)  See also the EESC opinion on Strengthening social dialogue (not yet published in the OJ).

14

Strengthening social dialogue

---

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/68 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/68

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on cooperation on youth

(exploratory opinion requested by the Spanish Presidency)

(2023/C 293/10)

| Rapporteur: | Nicoletta MERLO |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Nicoletta MERLO

Nicoletta MERLO

| Referral by the Spanish Presidency of the Council | Letter of 8.12.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
  Exploratory opinion |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 31.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 224/3/10 |

Referral by the Spanish Presidency of the Council

Letter of 8.12.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Exploratory opinion

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

31.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

224/3/10

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | In order to ensure that the EU youth strategy’s implementation is successful and provide a framework and reference for promoting youth agendas across all Member States, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) underlines the importance of having accurate, up-to-date data. This will make it possible to monitor and evaluate the asymmetric impact of crises such as COVID-19 (1) and the impact of policies on youth (2) and define good practices which address young people directly and exclusively or which have a significant impact on them. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

In order to ensure that the EU youth strategy’s implementation is successful and provide a framework and reference for promoting youth agendas across all Member States, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) underlines the importance of having accurate, up-to-date data. This will make it possible to monitor and evaluate the asymmetric impact of crises such as COVID-19 (1

2

| 1.2. | The EESC appreciates the continuous improvements to the EU Youth Dialogue and considers that it is crucial to strengthen this dialogue and involve bodies representing young people meaningfully throughout the policymaking process, acknowledging their role and taking into due account the new ways in which young people today engage, debate and mobilise, often through the use of technology and social media. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC appreciates the continuous improvements to the EU Youth Dialogue and considers that it is crucial to strengthen this dialogue and involve bodies representing young people meaningfully throughout the policymaking process, acknowledging their role and taking into due account the new ways in which young people today engage, debate and mobilise, often through the use of technology and social media.

| 1.3. | The EU Youth Dialogue should be closely linked to the EU’s agenda. Events such as ‘Your Europe, Your Say!’ and the EU Youth Event should be better integrated with the EU Youth Dialogue and youth organisations and networks contributing to it should be better supported financially and on a longer-term. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

The EU Youth Dialogue should be closely linked to the EU’s agenda. Events such as ‘Your Europe, Your Say!’ and the EU Youth Event should be better integrated with the EU Youth Dialogue and youth organisations and networks contributing to it should be better supported financially and on a longer-term.

| 1.4. | To increase youth participation in politics, the EESC is keen to work with the forthcoming trio of presidencies (ES-BE-HU) on strategies to activate first-time voters and improve youth turnout and youth participation as candidates across Europe. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

To increase youth participation in politics, the EESC is keen to work with the forthcoming trio of presidencies (ES-BE-HU) on strategies to activate first-time voters and improve youth turnout and youth participation as candidates across Europe.

| 1.5. | The EESC is committed to strengthening social dialogue in line with the European Commission’s proposal on strengthening social dialogue in the EU. More support should be dedicated to building the capacity of the social partners, particularly among young members, with a view to social dialogue and collective bargaining. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

The EESC is committed to strengthening social dialogue in line with the European Commission’s proposal on strengthening social dialogue in the EU. More support should be dedicated to building the capacity of the social partners, particularly among young members, with a view to social dialogue and collective bargaining.

| 1.6. | The EESC considers it essential that all Member States’ laws, legally binding acts, policies, strategies, programmes, measures and public investments be subject to a Youth Test consultation, impact assessment, policy design and proposals for mitigation and that they prevent infringements of rights and discrimination against young people. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The EESC considers it essential that all Member States’ laws, legally binding acts, policies, strategies, programmes, measures and public investments be subject to a Youth Test consultation, impact assessment, policy design and proposals for mitigation and that they prevent infringements of rights and discrimination against young people.

| 1.7. | With a view to breaking down economic barriers, the EU and the Member States should give priority to both integrating young people into the labour market through quality jobs and improving outreach to NEET (not in employment, education or training). |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

With a view to breaking down economic barriers, the EU and the Member States should give priority to both integrating young people into the labour market through quality jobs and improving outreach to NEET (not in employment, education or training).

| 1.8. | Referring to the European Year of Skills, the EESC stresses the importance of lifelong learning and the need for transversal skills. Young people need to acquire financial literacy, knowledge of workers’ rights and entrepreneurial skills. Greater attention must be paid to promoting digital and STEM skills, especially among girls. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

Referring to the European Year of Skills, the EESC stresses the importance of lifelong learning and the need for transversal skills. Young people need to acquire financial literacy, knowledge of workers’ rights and entrepreneurial skills. Greater attention must be paid to promoting digital and STEM skills, especially among girls.

| 1.9. | In order to promote mental health and combat violence and bullying, the EESC stresses the importance of ensuring that adolescents acquire socio-emotional skills and providing free psychological and social support in schools and other large groups. A European Year of Mental Health would be helpful in raising awareness of such issues. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

In order to promote mental health and combat violence and bullying, the EESC stresses the importance of ensuring that adolescents acquire socio-emotional skills and providing free psychological and social support in schools and other large groups. A European Year of Mental Health would be helpful in raising awareness of such issues.

| 1.10. | In order to achieve better psychological and physical health, the EESC considers it important that all young people have the opportunity to play sports and engage in society and in cultural activities. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

In order to achieve better psychological and physical health, the EESC considers it important that all young people have the opportunity to play sports and engage in society and in cultural activities.

| 1.11. | The EESC considers it crucial to help young people with housing costs and to foster public housing policies so as to guarantee access to decent housing, encouraging them to live independently and supporting them as they plan their family life. Member States must step up their efforts to implement the Work-Life Balance Directive, particularly as regards the availability and accessibility of early childcare and facilities that are crucial for young families. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

The EESC considers it crucial to help young people with housing costs and to foster public housing policies so as to guarantee access to decent housing, encouraging them to live independently and supporting them as they plan their family life. Member States must step up their efforts to implement the Work-Life Balance Directive, particularly as regards the availability and accessibility of early childcare and facilities that are crucial for young families.

| 1.12. | The EESC calls for more meaningful engagement of young people in climate action and environmental issues and stresses the importance of skills development in these fields. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

The EESC calls for more meaningful engagement of young people in climate action and environmental issues and stresses the importance of skills development in these fields.

| 1.13. | The EESC calls on the EU and its Member States to take proper account of the correlation between climate issues and mental health as regards young people and to increase research in and government responsiveness to climate action. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

The EESC calls on the EU and its Member States to take proper account of the correlation between climate issues and mental health as regards young people and to increase research in and government responsiveness to climate action.

| 1.14. | Working with the abovementioned topics, it is important to be aware of marginalised young people and to take an intersectional approach, paying attention to gender, ethnicity, disability and so on. |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

Working with the abovementioned topics, it is important to be aware of marginalised young people and to take an intersectional approach, paying attention to gender, ethnicity, disability and so on.

2.   Background

Background

| 2.1. | The EU has been running an EU youth policy cooperation scheme based on the principles of active participation and equal access to opportunities since 2002 (3).
  In December 2018, the Council of the European Union adopted the European Union Youth Strategy 2019–2027 (4). This provides a framework of objectives, principles, priorities and measures for youth policy cooperation for all relevant stakeholders with due regard for their respective competences and the principle of subsidiarity (5). Its implementation and that of its 11 Youth Goals is facilitated by the regular EU Youth Dialogue (6). This is a dialogue mechanism between young people and decision-makers at both national and EU level. It is necessary to strengthen this process and implement the EU Youth Dialogue recommendations even at national level. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

The EU has been running an EU youth policy cooperation scheme based on the principles of active participation and equal access to opportunities since 2002 (3

In December 2018, the Council of the European Union adopted the European Union Youth Strategy 2019–2027 (4). This provides a framework of objectives, principles, priorities and measures for youth policy cooperation for all relevant stakeholders with due regard for their respective competences and the principle of subsidiarity (5). Its implementation and that of its 11 Youth Goals is facilitated by the regular EU Youth Dialogue (6). This is a dialogue mechanism between young people and decision-makers at both national and EU level. It is necessary to strengthen this process and implement the EU Youth Dialogue recommendations even at national level.

4

5

6

| 2.2. | The Spanish Presidency has therefore asked the EESC to draft an exploratory opinion identifying the main challenges, issues, and difficulties young Europeans are facing, focusing on what is stopping them from leading a full and inclusive life, with unfettered enjoyment of their fundamental rights and equal opportunities and free from all negative impacts. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

The Spanish Presidency has therefore asked the EESC to draft an exploratory opinion identifying the main challenges, issues, and difficulties young Europeans are facing, focusing on what is stopping them from leading a full and inclusive life, with unfettered enjoyment of their fundamental rights and equal opportunities and free from all negative impacts.

| 2.3. | The EESC believes that the ongoing and future EU Youth Agenda should address the main challenges, issues and obstacles young Europeans are facing (identified through the EU Youth Dialogue and Eurobarometer). It should also determine how the EU can help young people overcome them. The EU should encourage the Member States to bolster the measures directly designed to mitigate intergenerational unfairness and foster intergenerational justice, with strong coordination and oversight mechanisms to ensure policy coherence (7). The Member States also need to reinforce cross-sectoral measures that have a positive impact on young people by potentially affecting mainly young beneficiaries (8) and reducing the generational divide (9). |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

The EESC believes that the ongoing and future EU Youth Agenda should address the main challenges, issues and obstacles young Europeans are facing (identified through the EU Youth Dialogue and Eurobarometer). It should also determine how the EU can help young people overcome them. The EU should encourage the Member States to bolster the measures directly designed to mitigate intergenerational unfairness and foster intergenerational justice, with strong coordination and oversight mechanisms to ensure policy coherence (7

8

9

| 2.4. | Another aspect that the EESC considers fundamental is data acquisition: acquiring quality disaggregated data on young people, accessible and measurable at European and national level, is a prerequisite for analysing the current situation from different perspectives, evaluating the steps to be taken and verifying their impacts. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

Another aspect that the EESC considers fundamental is data acquisition: acquiring quality disaggregated data on young people, accessible and measurable at European and national level, is a prerequisite for analysing the current situation from different perspectives, evaluating the steps to be taken and verifying their impacts.

3.   General comments

General comments

3.1.   The improvement of the EU Youth Dialogue and youth participation

The improvement of the EU Youth Dialogue and youth participation

| 3.1.1. | Young people have the right to participate in the framing of youth policies and, more generally, of all policies. The EESC appreciates the continuous improvements to the EU Youth Dialogue and considers that it is crucial to strengthen it and involve bodies representing young people meaningfully throughout the policymaking process, from policy definition to implementation, evaluation and follow-up. Making sure to include marginalised groups of young people and taking an intersectional approach are equally essential. This will ensure real and effective cooperation between young people and public institutions at all levels. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.1.

Young people have the right to participate in the framing of youth policies and, more generally, of all policies. The EESC appreciates the continuous improvements to the EU Youth Dialogue and considers that it is crucial to strengthen it and involve bodies representing young people meaningfully throughout the policymaking process, from policy definition to implementation, evaluation and follow-up. Making sure to include marginalised groups of young people and taking an intersectional approach are equally essential. This will ensure real and effective cooperation between young people and public institutions at all levels.

| 3.1.2. | The EU Youth Dialogue should be closely linked to the EU’s agenda and events such as ‘Your Europe, Your Say!’ and the EU Youth Event should be better integrated with the EU Youth Dialogue. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.2.

The EU Youth Dialogue should be closely linked to the EU’s agenda and events such as ‘Your Europe, Your Say!’ and the EU Youth Event should be better integrated with the EU Youth Dialogue.

| 3.1.3. | The EESC calls for better and long-term financial support for youth organisations and networks which contribute to the EU Youth Dialogue and/or promote EU values such as active citizenship. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.3.

The EESC calls for better and long-term financial support for youth organisations and networks which contribute to the EU Youth Dialogue and/or promote EU values such as active citizenship.

| 3.1.4. | The EESC considers that it is imperative that European, national and local institutions acknowledge the importance of and the role played by all types of youth organisations. Taking due account of the new, often informal ways in which young people today engage, debate and mobilise, often through the use of technology and social media, is also crucial. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.4.

The EESC considers that it is imperative that European, national and local institutions acknowledge the importance of and the role played by all types of youth organisations. Taking due account of the new, often informal ways in which young people today engage, debate and mobilise, often through the use of technology and social media, is also crucial.

| 3.1.5. | In order to ensure the active participation of the younger generation, the EESC considers it important to identify and overcome social, economic and cultural obstacles to the full participation of young people, especially the most vulnerable. In addition, the EU and the Member States should identify ways to fund youth work and safeguard the civic space for young people in Europe, where they can exercise their rights to expression, information, association, peaceful assembly and other related freedoms. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.5.

In order to ensure the active participation of the younger generation, the EESC considers it important to identify and overcome social, economic and cultural obstacles to the full participation of young people, especially the most vulnerable. In addition, the EU and the Member States should identify ways to fund youth work and safeguard the civic space for young people in Europe, where they can exercise their rights to expression, information, association, peaceful assembly and other related freedoms.

| 3.1.6. | The young generation is proving to be pro-European, but youth turnout and their active participation as candidates are traditionally very low at local, regional, national and European elections. The EESC is keen to work with the forthcoming trio of presidencies (ES-BE-HU) on strategies to activate first-time voters and improve youth turnout and youth participation as candidates across Europe. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.6.

The young generation is proving to be pro-European, but youth turnout and their active participation as candidates are traditionally very low at local, regional, national and European elections. The EESC is keen to work with the forthcoming trio of presidencies (ES-BE-HU) on strategies to activate first-time voters and improve youth turnout and youth participation as candidates across Europe.

| 3.1.7. | Effective communication is crucial to reach the younger generation: the EESC recommends that all public institutions use accessible and youth-friendly language and make more efficient use of social media to convey essential information and communicate their actions and policies. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.7.

Effective communication is crucial to reach the younger generation: the EESC recommends that all public institutions use accessible and youth-friendly language and make more efficient use of social media to convey essential information and communicate their actions and policies.

| 3.1.8. | The EESC is committed to strengthening social dialogue in line with the European Commission’s proposal on strengthening social dialogue in the EU (January 2023). More support should be dedicated to building the capacity of the social partners, particularly among young members, with a view to social dialogue and collective bargaining and the implementation of EU-level Autonomous Social Partner Agreements. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.8.

The EESC is committed to strengthening social dialogue in line with the European Commission’s proposal on strengthening social dialogue in the EU (January 2023). More support should be dedicated to building the capacity of the social partners, particularly among young members, with a view to social dialogue and collective bargaining and the implementation of EU-level Autonomous Social Partner Agreements.

| 3.1.9. | At the same time, the EESC recognises the role that other civil society organisations, such as chambers of commerce and industry, are playing in developing and updating professional skills and delivering VET policies, as well as in other areas. Key competences for active and effective participation in civil society and civil dialogue can also be gained in youth organisations. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.9.

At the same time, the EESC recognises the role that other civil society organisations, such as chambers of commerce and industry, are playing in developing and updating professional skills and delivering VET policies, as well as in other areas. Key competences for active and effective participation in civil society and civil dialogue can also be gained in youth organisations.

| 3.1.10. | The EESC would like to stress the importance of strengthening cooperation with civil society organisations representing young people from countries that are willing to join the EU, particularly those on the accession path. Cooperation should also include capacity building and continuous exchange of information. The importance of young people in the context of further European integration is crucial, as they are the ones most in favour of EU membership. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.10.

The EESC would like to stress the importance of strengthening cooperation with civil society organisations representing young people from countries that are willing to join the EU, particularly those on the accession path. Cooperation should also include capacity building and continuous exchange of information. The importance of young people in the context of further European integration is crucial, as they are the ones most in favour of EU membership.

3.2.   The generational impact of policies

The generational impact of policies

| 3.2.1. | The EESC considers it essential that all Member States’ laws, legally binding acts, policies, strategies, programmes, measures and public investments be subject to a Youth Test consultation, impact assessment, policy design (10) and proposals for mitigation and that they prevent the infringement of rights and discrimination against young people within the economies of a Super-Ageing Society (11) and globalisation (12). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.1.

The EESC considers it essential that all Member States’ laws, legally binding acts, policies, strategies, programmes, measures and public investments be subject to a Youth Test consultation, impact assessment, policy design (10

11

12

| 3.2.2. | Several pilot schemes have been conducted in this field in Europe, resulting in scientific impact studies, monitoring studies (13) or even ex post evaluations on draft laws for young people. Two European countries — Austria and Germany (14) — have carried out ex ante and ex post evaluations that are particularly interesting. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.2.

Several pilot schemes have been conducted in this field in Europe, resulting in scientific impact studies, monitoring studies (13

ex post

14

ex ante

ex post

| 3.2.3. | The EESC would point at its opinion on the EU Youth Test (15), which encourages European and national institutions to ensure the appropriate involvement of youth organisations, to implement measures and mechanisms to ensure that the youth perspective is taken into account, and to carry out a systematic assessment of the impact of policies by fully implementing the Youth Test. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.3.

The EESC would point at its opinion on the EU Youth Test (15

3.3.   Breaking down economic barriers

Breaking down economic barriers

| 3.3.1. | Even if youth unemployment fell to a rate lower than before the COVID-19 pandemic (16), youth employment is still too often precarious (17) (temporary jobs, voucher-based work, platform work, gig economy, collaborative work, etc.). Such jobs tend to be poorly paid, with irregular working hours and limited or no social protection (paid leave, pension, sick leave, etc.). |
| --- | --- |

3.3.1.

Even if youth unemployment fell to a rate lower than before the COVID-19 pandemic (16

17

| 3.3.2. | Integrating young people into the labour market through quality jobs and improving the outreach to NEETs should be a priority for the EU and the Member States. In this regard, the EESC urges the Spanish Presidency to consider youth demands regarding the ongoing legislative files that are particularly relevant to young Europeans: binding measures to guarantee quality traineeships (18) and the Directive on Improving Working Conditions in Platform Work, upholding the subsidiarity principle and the autonomy of the social partners. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.2.

Integrating young people into the labour market through quality jobs and improving the outreach to NEETs should be a priority for the EU and the Member States. In this regard, the EESC urges the Spanish Presidency to consider youth demands regarding the ongoing legislative files that are particularly relevant to young Europeans: binding measures to guarantee quality traineeships (18

| 3.3.3. | The EESC urges the Member States to use funds under the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRP), ESF+ and other existing funds for developing economic activity, especially in SMEs and sectors that are key for the strategic autonomy of Europe (such as the twin transitions), for the promotion of self-employment and entrepreneurship, and the creation of full and productive employment jobs and upskilling of young people where needed, with a particular focus on open-ended contracts and decent working conditions that limit the risk of unstable living and working conditions (19), bearing in mind national legal frameworks and collective agreements. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.3.

The EESC urges the Member States to use funds under the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRP), ESF+ and other existing funds for developing economic activity, especially in SMEs and sectors that are key for the strategic autonomy of Europe (such as the twin transitions), for the promotion of self-employment and entrepreneurship, and the creation of full and productive employment jobs and upskilling of young people where needed, with a particular focus on open-ended contracts and decent working conditions that limit the risk of unstable living and working conditions (19

| 3.3.4. | Rapid labour market changes, brought about partly by the green and digital transitions emphasise the need to ensure that education and training programmes and qualifications remain up to date and relevant to employers’ evolving skills needs. It is crucial to develop both the skills required for the green and digital transition and bottom-up approaches to updating curricula. Young people need to be equipped with a range of digital, STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) and transversal skills, and the capacity to adapt. Enhancing digital and STEM skills is vital for effective gender equality, as more women could compete for the jobs of the future and narrow the gender wage gap. The topic of gender equality should be part of the educational pathways. It is necessary to develop and implement strategies that promote gender mainstreaming. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.4.

Rapid labour market changes, brought about partly by the green and digital transitions emphasise the need to ensure that education and training programmes and qualifications remain up to date and relevant to employers’ evolving skills needs. It is crucial to develop both the skills required for the green and digital transition and bottom-up approaches to updating curricula. Young people need to be equipped with a range of digital, STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) and transversal skills, and the capacity to adapt. Enhancing digital and STEM skills is vital for effective gender equality, as more women could compete for the jobs of the future and narrow the gender wage gap. The topic of gender equality should be part of the educational pathways. It is necessary to develop and implement strategies that promote gender mainstreaming.

| 3.3.5. | The entrepreneurial mindset in the EU should be improved. About 40–45 % of young people are interested in entrepreneurship, but only 7 % are self-employed. Young people account for 11 % of ‘missing’ entrepreneurs in the EU (20). They face various key barriers to business creation including a lack of entrepreneurial skills. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.5.

The entrepreneurial mindset in the EU should be improved. About 40–45 % of young people are interested in entrepreneurship, but only 7 % are self-employed. Young people account for 11 % of ‘missing’ entrepreneurs in the EU (20

| 3.3.6. | Referring to the European Year of Skills, the EESC stresses the importance of lifelong learning and the need for transversal skills (21). Financial literacy and knowledge of workers’ rights are skills that all young people must acquire and master in order to fulfil their potential. The introduction of flexible learning pathways (22) and improved recognition of skills acquired through non-formal education and informal learning should be taken into consideration by Member States. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.6.

Referring to the European Year of Skills, the EESC stresses the importance of lifelong learning and the need for transversal skills (21

22

| 3.3.7. | Many young women still have to choose between family and career due to the objectively difficult task of achieving work-life balance. Young women who have less access to employment for family reasons are therefore also more likely to fall into poverty, and have fewer tools to climb out of it. Investing in tangible and intangible infrastructure (23) for childcare and long-term care facilities could greatly benefit women’s full employment. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.7.

Many young women still have to choose between family and career due to the objectively difficult task of achieving work-life balance. Young women who have less access to employment for family reasons are therefore also more likely to fall into poverty, and have fewer tools to climb out of it. Investing in tangible and intangible infrastructure (23

| 3.3.8. | It is crucial for young people to achieve economic autonomy as this also enables them to become active citizens. In Italy, the generational divide index (24) measures the scale of the obstacles young people are facing in achieving economic and social autonomy and is the key framework for the future Youth Test (25). A similar project, using a slightly different taxonomy and indicators (26), was carried out in the United Kingdom (Intergenerational Fairness Index) and paints an increasingly bleak picture of the prospects of young people across Europe (27). Germany (28), Austria (29) and Flanders already have experience of the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) for young people (30). The EESC recognises the importance of these practices and encourages all Member States to be inspired by these good examples. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.8.

It is crucial for young people to achieve economic autonomy as this also enables them to become active citizens. In Italy, the generational divide index (24

25

26

27

28

29

30

3.4.   Sexual and gender-based violence

Sexual and gender-based violence

| 3.4.1. | Although much progress has been made in recent years, many young people still report acts of violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The EESC considers that facilities such as shelters and projects reintegrating people into society should be improved to ensure that there are tools available for people to process the resulting trauma and to support victims of violence and all forms of discrimination. Legal, health, psychological and social mediation services are also essential. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.1.

Although much progress has been made in recent years, many young people still report acts of violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The EESC considers that facilities such as shelters and projects reintegrating people into society should be improved to ensure that there are tools available for people to process the resulting trauma and to support victims of violence and all forms of discrimination. Legal, health, psychological and social mediation services are also essential.

| 3.4.2. | Educational campaigns on these topics promoting respect for diversity should be starting in schools and the workplace. As well as exploring these issues, the campaigns should provide opportunities for listening to and talking with victims of gender-based violence and discrimination. For these initiatives to be successful, the EESC stresses the importance of giving an active role to the social partners, organised civil society and educational institutions. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.2.

Educational campaigns on these topics promoting respect for diversity should be starting in schools and the workplace. As well as exploring these issues, the campaigns should provide opportunities for listening to and talking with victims of gender-based violence and discrimination. For these initiatives to be successful, the EESC stresses the importance of giving an active role to the social partners, organised civil society and educational institutions.

| 3.4.3. | In the EU and worldwide, one in three women has experienced physical or sexual violence. To date, one in five girls is a victim of sexual abuse. Online violence is on the rise; one in two young people are victims of online gender-based violence (31). The EESC urges those Member States that have not yet done so to ratify the Istanbul Convention (32) as soon as possible. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.3.

In the EU and worldwide, one in three women has experienced physical or sexual violence. To date, one in five girls is a victim of sexual abuse. Online violence is on the rise; one in two young people are victims of online gender-based violence (31

32

3.5.   Psychological and emotional constraints and discrimination

Psychological and emotional constraints and discrimination

| 3.5.1. | As clearly stipulated in the Geneva Charter for Well-being, the outcome of the 10th Global Conference on Health Promotion (2021) (33), promoted by the World Health Organization, a positive view of health combines physical well-being with mental and social well-being. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.1.

As clearly stipulated in the Geneva Charter for Well-being, the outcome of the 10th Global Conference on Health Promotion (2021) (33

| 3.5.2. | Many factors affect young people’s well-being and mental health. Exclusion, stigma, a fragile family environment and precarious jobs are factors that can increase the risk of developing mental health problems. Lack of treatment can lead to consequences in adolescence that extend to adulthood and beyond, compromising physical and mental health and limiting opportunities to lead a satisfactory life. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.2.

Many factors affect young people’s well-being and mental health. Exclusion, stigma, a fragile family environment and precarious jobs are factors that can increase the risk of developing mental health problems. Lack of treatment can lead to consequences in adolescence that extend to adulthood and beyond, compromising physical and mental health and limiting opportunities to lead a satisfactory life.

| 3.5.3. | The EESC stresses the importance of ensuring that adolescents acquire socio-emotional skills and providing free psychological and social support in schools and other large groups, to promote good mental health and combat violence and bullying that can occur anywhere and by any means (including online). |
| --- | --- |

3.5.3.

The EESC stresses the importance of ensuring that adolescents acquire socio-emotional skills and providing free psychological and social support in schools and other large groups, to promote good mental health and combat violence and bullying that can occur anywhere and by any means (including online).

| 3.5.4. | Young people often refer to collective loneliness, whereby people today feel alone in a crowd. However, this hides another problem: inactivity due to defensive isolation. This is a rapidly growing social phobia, often accompanied by more or less acute forms of depression that build up over time. The EESC welcomes the conclusions of the European Year of Youth’s closing conference on ‘Claim the Future’ on 6 December 2022 calling for increased focus on preventive health care, combating mental illness and loneliness. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.4.

Young people often refer to collective loneliness, whereby people today feel alone in a crowd. However, this hides another problem: inactivity due to defensive isolation. This is a rapidly growing social phobia, often accompanied by more or less acute forms of depression that build up over time. The EESC welcomes the conclusions of the European Year of Youth’s closing conference on ‘Claim the Future’ on 6 December 2022 calling for increased focus on preventive health care, combating mental illness and loneliness.

| 3.5.5. | Mental health can also affect the body’s ability to nourish itself properly, which in serious cases can have consequences for physical health. In recent years, there has been an increase in uncontrolled eating — ‘binge eating’ — often associated with obesity and metabolic syndrome, but also a result of mood disorders and increased stress and social anxiety. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.5.

Mental health can also affect the body’s ability to nourish itself properly, which in serious cases can have consequences for physical health. In recent years, there has been an increase in uncontrolled eating — ‘binge eating’ — often associated with obesity and metabolic syndrome, but also a result of mood disorders and increased stress and social anxiety.

| 3.5.6. | Adopting healthy lifestyles helps prevent some chronic, non-communicable diseases, such as diabetes, cardiovascular diseases and some forms of cancer. Having the opportunity to play sports and engage in society and in cultural activities is not only an extremely valuable part of the personal development process, it is also closely linked to better psychological and physical health: all young people must have these opportunities. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.6.

Adopting healthy lifestyles helps prevent some chronic, non-communicable diseases, such as diabetes, cardiovascular diseases and some forms of cancer. Having the opportunity to play sports and engage in society and in cultural activities is not only an extremely valuable part of the personal development process, it is also closely linked to better psychological and physical health: all young people must have these opportunities.

3.6.   Social challenges

Social challenges

| 3.6.1. | Young people are often prevented by the lack of a decent or at least adequate wage from reaching certain key stages in their lives, such as buying or renting a house for themselves or to start a family. This is leading to an irreversible destabilisation of the continent’s demographic balance, as more and more young people are foregoing starting a family. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.1.

Young people are often prevented by the lack of a decent or at least adequate wage from reaching certain key stages in their lives, such as buying or renting a house for themselves or to start a family. This is leading to an irreversible destabilisation of the continent’s demographic balance, as more and more young people are foregoing starting a family.

| 3.6.2. | The situation is exacerbated by the housing crisis, especially in big cities where prices are much higher than wages, and young people find it difficult to obtain funding from banks unless they can offer some form of guarantee. The EESC considers it crucial to help young people with housing costs and to foster public housing policies that guarantee access to decent housing, encouraging them to live independently and supporting them as they plan their family life. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.2.

The situation is exacerbated by the housing crisis, especially in big cities where prices are much higher than wages, and young people find it difficult to obtain funding from banks unless they can offer some form of guarantee. The EESC considers it crucial to help young people with housing costs and to foster public housing policies that guarantee access to decent housing, encouraging them to live independently and supporting them as they plan their family life.

| 3.6.3. | On the other hand, we must not forget that families, in the most diverse forms we can imagine, are the basis of modern society: families and demographic progress (or at least stability) underpin our economic and development model. If we are not able to properly support and encourage young families, our entire welfare system — to name just one issue — will have to be rethought. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.3.

On the other hand, we must not forget that families, in the most diverse forms we can imagine, are the basis of modern society: families and demographic progress (or at least stability) underpin our economic and development model. If we are not able to properly support and encourage young families, our entire welfare system — to name just one issue — will have to be rethought.

| 3.6.4. | In Europe, where an ageing population and lack of generational renewal are reversing demographic trends, there is a need to focus on families and reconcile work and parenthood. Increasing parental leave and speeding up the development of accessible childcare facilities in Member States where they are not available are key tools for strengthening and promoting gender equality, as they ensure that both parents have the opportunity to spend more time with their children and encourage equal participation in the labour market. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.4.

In Europe, where an ageing population and lack of generational renewal are reversing demographic trends, there is a need to focus on families and reconcile work and parenthood. Increasing parental leave and speeding up the development of accessible childcare facilities in Member States where they are not available are key tools for strengthening and promoting gender equality, as they ensure that both parents have the opportunity to spend more time with their children and encourage equal participation in the labour market.

3.7.   Ecological and environmental challenges

Ecological and environmental challenges

| 3.7.1. | Young people are key agents of change and innovation and essential partners in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development and other multilateral agreements and instruments, including the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the European Green Deal. The EESC calls for more meaningful engagement of young people in climate action and environmental issues. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.1.

Young people are key agents of change and innovation and essential partners in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development and other multilateral agreements and instruments, including the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the European Green Deal. The EESC calls for more meaningful engagement of young people in climate action and environmental issues.

| 3.7.2. | Education is key to achieving sustainable development: the importance of skills development for young people in the field of climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation, as well as in the circular economy, needs to be taken into account. Moreover, education of children on sustainability should be supported by lifelong learning for parents and civic education (34). |
| --- | --- |

3.7.2.

Education is key to achieving sustainable development: the importance of skills development for young people in the field of climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation, as well as in the circular economy, needs to be taken into account. Moreover, education of children on sustainability should be supported by lifelong learning for parents and civic education (34

| 3.7.3. | Rural areas are currently at risk of depopulation due to a lack or shortage of services and infrastructure. Targeted investments in these areas can lead to increased competitiveness, job creation and improved quality of life, reversing this trend and encouraging young people to move there. Moreover, developing smart synergies between sustainability, local food production and tourism could offer young people new opportunities to engage in meaningful and impactful jobs in rural areas, contributing to the growth and vitality of these regions. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.3.

Rural areas are currently at risk of depopulation due to a lack or shortage of services and infrastructure. Targeted investments in these areas can lead to increased competitiveness, job creation and improved quality of life, reversing this trend and encouraging young people to move there. Moreover, developing smart synergies between sustainability, local food production and tourism could offer young people new opportunities to engage in meaningful and impactful jobs in rural areas, contributing to the growth and vitality of these regions.

| 3.7.4. | Young people are some of the most vulnerable and sensitive to the environmental effects caused by climate change (35). If global warming continues unabated, it will have devastating health consequences for children and young people, from rises in sea levels, heatwaves, diseases, malnutrition, and more. Nearly 70 % of people under 18 are most likely to believe climate change is a global emergency (36), and such concerns are having a negative impact on young people’s emotional and psychological wellbeing. A 2021 study of 10 000 young people from across the globe found that over 50 % of young people surveyed felt sad, anxious, angry, powerless, helpless, and/or guilty about climate change while 45 % said their feelings about climate change negatively affected their daily life and functioning (37). The EESC calls on the EU and its Member States to take proper account of this correlation and to increase research in and government responsiveness to climate action. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.4.

Young people are some of the most vulnerable and sensitive to the environmental effects caused by climate change (35

36

37

| 3.7.5. | The EESC recalls its opinion on the role of young people in the green transition (38), which advocates a series of actions aimed at ensuring that the young generations take the lead in the climate and environmental transition. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.5.

The EESC recalls its opinion on the role of young people in the green transition (38

Brussels, 15 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  OECD (2020), Survey on COVID-19 and Youth, Paris.

1

Survey on COVID-19 and Youth

(2)  WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (2017), The Inclusive Growth and Development Report, Geneva, January 2017.

2

The Inclusive Growth and Development Report

(3)  Council Resolution of 27 November 2009 on a renewed framework for European cooperation in the youth field (2010-2018) (OJ C 311, 19.12.2009, p. 1). Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council of 27 June 2002 regarding the framework of European cooperation in the youth field (OJ C 168, 13.7.2002, p. 2).

3

(4)  Resolution of the Council of the European Union and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on a framework for European cooperation in the youth field: The European Union Youth Strategy 2019-2027 (OJ C 456, 18.12.2018, p. 1).

4

(5)  Resolution of the Council of the European Union and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on a framework for European cooperation in the youth field: The European Union Youth Strategy 2019-2027 (OJ C 456, 18.12.2018, p. 1), see point 2 under ‘Recognise that’.

5

(6)  https://youth.europa.eu/eu-youth-dialogue_en

6

(7)  OECD (2020), Governance for Youth, Trust and Intergenerational Justice: Fit for All Generations?, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c3e5cb8a-en

7

Governance for Youth, Trust and Intergenerational Justice: Fit for All Generations?, OECD Public Governance Reviews

(8)  This approach was recently adopted in Italy by the Italian Presidency of the Council of Ministers’ Youth Department. See Linee guida per la valutazione dell’impatto generazionale delle politiche pubbliche, July 2022. For a literature review see: MONTI L., The NRRP and the generational divide. From measuring to the impact assessment of youth policies, Social Policies, Year IX, 1/2022 Jan-Apr. p. 113; CHEVALIER, T., — LONCLE, P. (2021). Introduction: the Development of Youth Policies in Europe in Past Decades, Youth and Globalization, 3(1), 1-11.; WALTHER, A. (2021). et al. Regimes of youth participation? Comparative analysis of youth policies and participation across European cities. Young, 2021, 29.2: 191-209; WALLACE C. — BENDIT R. (2009) Youth Policies in Europe: Towards a Classification of Different Tendencies in Youth Policies in the European Union, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 10:3, 441-458.

8

Linee guida per la valutazione dell’impatto generazionale delle politiche pubbliche,

The NRRP and the generational divide. From measuring to the impact assessment of youth policies

Introduction: the Development of Youth Policies in Europe in Past Decades, Youth and Globalization

Regimes of youth participation? Comparative analysis of youth policies and participation across European cities

Youth Policies in Europe: Towards a Classification of Different Tendencies in Youth Policies in the European Union, Perspectives on European Politics and Society

(9)  ROSOLIA A., TORRINI R. (2016), The generation gap: a cohort analysis of earnings levels, dispersion and initial labor market conditions in Italy, 1974-2014, Occasional paper N. 366, Banca D’Italia, Roma (original title Il gap generazionale: Un’analisi di coorte dei livelli e della dispersione dei salari e delle condizioni iniziali nel mercato del lavoro in Italia, 1974-2014); MONTI L. (2022). The Italian Puzzle of the European Youth Guarantee. International Development Policy, vol. July 2022.

9

The generation gap: a cohort analysis of earnings levels, dispersion and initial labor market conditions in Italy,

Il gap generazionale: Un’analisi di coorte dei livelli e della dispersione dei salari e delle condizioni iniziali nel mercato del lavoro in Italia

The Italian Puzzle of the European Youth Guarantee

International Development Policy

(10)  ATKINSON A.B (2011). Prosperity and fairness, Revised version of paper presented at the ECFIN Annual Research Conference, November 2011.

10

Prosperity and fairness

(11)  WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (2023), The Economy of a Super-Ageing Society, Longevity Economy Initiative, Annual meeting, Davos, January 18, 2023. https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2023/sessions/the-economy-of-a-super-ageing-society

11

The Economy of a Super-Ageing Society,

(12)  JOSEFSSON J., WALL J. (2020) Empowered inclusion: theorizing global justice for children and youth, Globalizations, 17:6, 1043-1060, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2020.1736853.

12

Empowered inclusion: theorizing global justice for children and youth

(13)  See Martinelli and L. Monti, Misurare l’impatto generazionale delle politiche pubbliche: una sfida, un metodo, in Amministrazione in Cammino, 29.03.21; L. Monti, La valutazione di impatto generazionale delle politiche pubbliche: dalle linee guida del COVIGE al possibile Youth-check in Italia, in Amministrazione in Cammino, 30 December 2022.

13

Misurare l’impatto generazionale delle politiche pubbliche: una sfida, un metodo

La valutazione di impatto generazionale delle politiche pubbliche: dalle linee guida del COVIGE al possibile Youth-check in Italia,

(14)  Cioffi C., Pierattini S., Contrastare il divario generazionale attraverso la valutazione delle politiche pubbliche rivolte ai giovani (Bridging the generational gap through the evaluation of youth policies), Amministrazione in Cammino, 2023.

14

Amministrazione in Cammino

(15)  Opinion on the European Economic and Social Committee on The EU Youth Test (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 46).

15

(16)  Eurofound Yearbook 2022 Living and working in Europe, 4 May 2023 https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/annual-report/2023/living-and-working-in-europe-2022

16

(17)  https://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/tools/skills-intelligence/involuntary-part-time-employment?year=2020&country=EU#2; https://www.youthforum.org/topics/platform-work#:~:text=Young%20workers%20who%20are%20at,any%20policies%20on%20this%20topic

17

(18)  https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/documents/resolution/long-lasting-legacy-european-year-youth-youth-mainstreaming-and-empowerment ‘Unpaid or uncompensated internships can have a very negative impact on young peoples’ experience of the labour market and must be banned’.

18

(19)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘How to guarantee decent work for young people and ensure the inclusion of NEETs through the proper elaboration of National Recovery Plans’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 27).

19

(20)  OECD/European Commission (2021), The Missing Entrepreneurs 2021: Policies for Inclusive Entrepreneurship and Self-employment.

20

(21)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Skills 2023’ (COM(2022) 526 final — (2022)0326 (COD)) (OJ C 100, 16.3.2023, p. 123).

21

(22)  https://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/international-policy-forum-flexible-learning-pathways-higher-education-13759#:~:text=What%20are%20flexible%20learning%20pathways,the%20needs%20of%20diverse%20students

22

(23)  We refer here both to physical infrastructures (corporate nurseries, nurseries etc.) and to specific services (economic support, digital services or otherwise), which could be invested in directly or ‘indirectly’ by involving and acknowledging the third sector and care work.

23

(24)  Fondazione Bruno Visentini, Il Divario generazionale. La generazione Z e la permacrisi, V Rapporto 2022 (The generational divide. Generation Z and the perma-crisis). https://www.osservatoriopolitichegiovanili.it/v-rapporto-2022; MONTI L., MARTINELLI V (2021), Misurare l’impatto generazionale delle politiche pubbliche: una sfida, un metodo, Amministrazione in Cammino, 29.03.21.

24

Il Divario generazionale. La generazione Z e la permacrisi, V Rapporto 2022

Misurare l’impatto generazionale delle politiche pubbliche: una sfida, un metodo

(25)  CIOFFI C., PIERATTINI S, (2023), Contrastare il divario generazionale attraverso la valutazione delle politiche pubbliche rivolte ai giovani, Amministrazione in Cammino, Roma.

25

Contrastare il divario generazionale attraverso la valutazione delle politiche pubbliche rivolte ai giovani

(26)  MONTI L (2017). Diminishing prospects for young people: A comparison of the intergenerational fairness index and generational divide index in addressing the problem. Review of European Studies, vol. Vol. 9, No 4, December 2017, pp. 160-164, ISSN: 1918-7173.

26

Diminishing prospects for young people: A comparison of the intergenerational fairness index and generational divide index in addressing the problem

(27)  LEACH J-BROCKS M., OSTENSVIK K, KLINGMAN D. (2016), European Intergenerational Fairness Index: A crisis for the young, Intergenerational Foundation, London https://www.if.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/European-Intergenerational-Fairness-Index_Final-2016.pdf; LEACH J-HANTON A. (2014), The IF Intergenerational Fairness Index:2014 Edition, London, The Intergenerational Foundation.

27

), European Intergenerational Fairness Index: A crisis for the young,

(28)  Kompentenzzentrum Jugend-Check (2022), The Youth-Check in German Regulatory Impact Assessment for the Young Generation. The Youth-Check in Germany. April 2022.

28

The Youth-Check in German Regulatory Impact Assessment for the Young Generation. The Youth-Check in Germany

(29)  https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/agenda/jugend/jugendpolitik/jugend-check.html. See also Bundesrecht konsolidiert: Gesamte Rechtsvorschrift für WFA-Grundsatz-Verordnung, Fassung vom 1. 5.2023.

29

(30)  Kompentenzzentrum Jugend-Check (2022), International Conference on Regulatory Impact Assessment for the Young Generation, 9 May 2022 in Berlin, June 2022.

30

(31)  https://italy.representation.ec.europa.eu/notizie-ed-eventi/notizie/violenza-contro-le-donne-lue-istituisce-un-numero-di-assistenza-telefonica-livello-di-unione-e-2022-11-24_it#:~:text=%E2%80%9CLa%20violenza%20contro%20le%20donne,di%20violenza%20di%20genere%20online

31

(32)  The Istanbul Convention recognises violence against women as a human rights violation and helps create a legal framework at European level to protect women from violence and prevent, prosecute and eliminate violence against women and domestic violence.

32

(33)  Global Conference on Health Promotion — World Health Organization, Geneva, 13–15 December 2021.

33

(34)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Empowering youth to achieve sustainable development through education’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 100, 16.3.2023, p. 38).

34

(35)  https://www.undp.org/publications/aiming-higher-elevating-meaningful-youth-engagement-climate-action

35

(36)  UNDP and University of Oxford, 2021.

36

(37)  Marks, et al, 2021.

37

(38)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Young people’s role in the green transition’ (Exploratory opinion at the request of the Swedish presidency) (OJ C 184, 25.5.2023, p. 13).

38

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ANNEX

The following amendment, which received at least a quarter of the votes cast, was rejected during the discussion (Rule 74(3) of the Rules of Procedure):

AMENDMENT 2

SOC/759 — Cooperation on youth

Paragraph 3.3.2

Amend as follows

| Section opinion | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Integrating young people into the labour market through quality jobs and improving the outreach to NEET (not in employment, education or training) should be a priority for the EU and the Member States. In this regard, the EESC urges the Spanish Presidency to consider youth demands regarding the ongoing legislative files that are particularly relevant to young Europeans:
  binding
  measures to guarantee quality traineeships (1)‘Unpaid or uncompensated internships can have a very negative impact on young peoples’ experience of the labour market and must be banned’.. and the Directive on Improving Working Conditions in Platform Work, upholding the subsidiarity principle and the autonomy of the social partners. | Integrating young people into the labour market through quality jobs and improving the outreach to NEET (not in employment, education or training) should be a priority for the EU and the Member States. In this regard, the EESC urges the Spanish Presidency to consider youth demands regarding the ongoing legislative files that are particularly relevant to young Europeans: measures
  , allowing through the definition of objectives in line with training and professional integration,
  to guarantee quality traineeships (1)‘Unpaid or uncompensated internships can have a very negative impact on young peoples’ experience of the labour market and must be banned’. and
  the application of
  the Directive on Improving Working Conditions in Platform Work, upholding the subsidiarity principle and the autonomy of the social partners. |

Section opinion

Amendment

Integrating young people into the labour market through quality jobs and improving the outreach to NEET (not in employment, education or training) should be a priority for the EU and the Member States. In this regard, the EESC urges the Spanish Presidency to consider youth demands regarding the ongoing legislative files that are particularly relevant to young Europeans:
  binding
  measures to guarantee quality traineeships (1)‘Unpaid or uncompensated internships can have a very negative impact on young peoples’ experience of the labour market and must be banned’.. and the Directive on Improving Working Conditions in Platform Work, upholding the subsidiarity principle and the autonomy of the social partners.

Integrating young people into the labour market through quality jobs and improving the outreach to NEET (not in employment, education or training) should be a priority for the EU and the Member States. In this regard, the EESC urges the Spanish Presidency to consider youth demands regarding the ongoing legislative files that are particularly relevant to young Europeans: measures
  , allowing through the definition of objectives in line with training and professional integration,
  to guarantee quality traineeships (1)‘Unpaid or uncompensated internships can have a very negative impact on young peoples’ experience of the labour market and must be banned’. and
  the application of
  the Directive on Improving Working Conditions in Platform Work, upholding the subsidiarity principle and the autonomy of the social partners.

Outcome of the vote:

| In favour: | 89 |
| --- | --- |
| Against: | 137 |
| Abstentions: | 10 |

In favour:

89

Against:

137

Abstentions:

10

---

(1)  https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/documents/resolution/long-lasting-legacy-european-year-youth-youth-mainstreaming-and-empowerment

(1)  https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/documents/resolution/long-lasting-legacy-european-year-youth-youth-mainstreaming-and-empowerment

---

III Preparatory acts

European Economic and Social Committee

579th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.6.2023-15.6.2023

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/77 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/77

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules promoting the repair of goods and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directives (EU) 2019/771 and (EU) 2020/1828

(COM(2023) 155 final — 2023/0083 (COD))

(2023/C 293/11)

| Rapporteur: | Thierry LIBAERT |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Émilie PROUZET |

Rapporteur:

Thierry LIBAERT

Thierry LIBAERT

Co-rapporteur:

Émilie PROUZET

Émilie PROUZET

| Referral | European Parliament, 17.4.2023
  Council of the European Union, 12.4.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Section for Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 2.6.2023 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 66/0/0 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 178/1/1 |

Referral

European Parliament, 17.4.2023

Council of the European Union, 12.4.2023

Legal basis

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Section for Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

2.6.2023

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

66/0/0

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

178/1/1

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the Commission’s package of proposals aimed at facilitating product repairability and at making the possibility to repair effective and timely, by taking action from the design stage to the end of a product’s life cycle. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the Commission’s package of proposals aimed at facilitating product repairability and at making the possibility to repair effective and timely, by taking action from the design stage to the end of a product’s life cycle.

| 1.2. | The EESC believes that some of the measures described in more detail below could help to strengthen the effectiveness of this right to repair. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC believes that some of the measures described in more detail below could help to strengthen the effectiveness of this right to repair.

| 1.3. | Ensuring that consumers are better informed can undoubtedly help strengthen the right to repair. The establishment of a national platform compiling all this information is therefore a positive move, but the conditions for setting it up and updating it need to be set out in more detail. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

Ensuring that consumers are better informed can undoubtedly help strengthen the right to repair. The establishment of a national platform compiling all this information is therefore a positive move, but the conditions for setting it up and updating it need to be set out in more detail.

| 1.4. | Secondly, in order to make access to repairs easier, the EESC welcomes the balance that has been struck between measures relating to the legal guarantee, which strengthens the obligation to repair while also retaining consumers’ right to replace in the case of major inconveniences. However, the Committee believes that this strengthening of distributors’ obligation to repair should come with proper implementation of distributors’ right to full recourse against manufacturers, especially with regard to spare parts and costs. Distributors act as an interface with consumers, and it must be possible to support them in this regard. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

Secondly, in order to make access to repairs easier, the EESC welcomes the balance that has been struck between measures relating to the legal guarantee, which strengthens the obligation to repair while also retaining consumers’ right to replace in the case of major inconveniences. However, the Committee believes that this strengthening of distributors’ obligation to repair should come with proper implementation of distributors’ right to full recourse against manufacturers, especially with regard to spare parts and costs. Distributors act as an interface with consumers, and it must be possible to support them in this regard.

| 1.5. | In order to facilitate access to repairs outside the legal guarantee, it is essential to support repair service providers in setting up, for example in the form of professional training and by ensuring that all repairers have access to essential information on repair and maintenance, as well as to the necessary parts at a reasonable price. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

In order to facilitate access to repairs outside the legal guarantee, it is essential to support repair service providers in setting up, for example in the form of professional training and by ensuring that all repairers have access to essential information on repair and maintenance, as well as to the necessary parts at a reasonable price.

| 1.6. | Promoting the repairability of products by design is the subject of a separate draft regulation. Repairability should also be supported beyond the design stage, after the sale has taken place. To this end, the EESC calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of supporting data sharing for spare parts and product repairability, as part of the ongoing modernisation of the intellectual property framework (1). Additionally, access to 3D-printed parts or to reliable second-hand parts and support for refurbished products also need to be strengthened. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

Promoting the repairability of products by design is the subject of a separate draft regulation. Repairability should also be supported beyond the design stage, after the sale has taken place. To this end, the EESC calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of supporting data sharing for spare parts and product repairability, as part of the ongoing modernisation of the intellectual property framework (1

| 1.7. | For the sake of consistency, this right to repair should also involve a ban on intentional practices, such as serialisation, which hinder the right to repair, in those cases where it is obvious that these practices are applied in order to obstruct competition in the spare parts market. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

For the sake of consistency, this right to repair should also involve a ban on intentional practices, such as serialisation, which hinder the right to repair, in those cases where it is obvious that these practices are applied in order to obstruct competition in the spare parts market.

| 1.8. | In short, the quality, safety and cost of repair need to be addressed. Competitive tendering between repair service providers using the harmonised form on the basis of comparative information would be a good tool for developing the market. However, the EESC believes that it is essential to go further, and that there is a need to determine which financial tools are most likely to encourage consumers to have their products repaired, based on past experiences at national level. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

In short, the quality, safety and cost of repair need to be addressed. Competitive tendering between repair service providers using the harmonised form on the basis of comparative information would be a good tool for developing the market. However, the EESC believes that it is essential to go further, and that there is a need to determine which financial tools are most likely to encourage consumers to have their products repaired, based on past experiences at national level.

| 1.9. | The EESC points out that the issue of repair concerns not only businesses but all stakeholders. It calls on the Commission to promote consumer awareness-raising campaigns on product maintenance and use, as well as on repair. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

The EESC points out that the issue of repair concerns not only businesses but all stakeholders. It calls on the Commission to promote consumer awareness-raising campaigns on product maintenance and use, as well as on repair.

2.   Gist of the Commission document

Gist of the Commission document

| 2.1. | The proposal for a Directive is part of a group of texts designed to foster the consumer’s role in the green transition. It is consistent with a series of texts, including the European Green Deal (December 2019), the circular economy action plan (March 2020) and the new consumer agenda (November 2020). |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

The proposal for a Directive is part of a group of texts designed to foster the consumer’s role in the green transition. It is consistent with a series of texts, including the European Green Deal (December 2019), the circular economy action plan (March 2020) and the new consumer agenda (November 2020).

| 2.2. | In order to foster the practice of repairing non-compliant goods, the European Commission is seeking to give power back to consumers by providing them the tools to choose the circular economy at two key stages:






  1. | at the time of purchase, pursuant to:






  (a) | the proposal for an ecodesign for sustainable products regulation, including requirements on product design and the availability of spare parts; and |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.2.

In order to foster the practice of repairing non-compliant goods, the European Commission is seeking to give power back to consumers by providing them the tools to choose the circular economy at two key stages:

1.

at the time of purchase, pursuant to:

(a)

the proposal for an ecodesign for sustainable products regulation, including requirements on product design and the availability of spare parts; and

| (b) | the proposal for a Directive on empowering consumers for the green transition, which includes requirements for information on the durability and repairability of products at the point of sale; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the proposal for a Directive on empowering consumers for the green transition, which includes requirements for information on the durability and repairability of products at the point of sale;

| 2. | and after purchase:






  (a) | pursuant to the Directive laying down the legal guarantee, during the guarantee period following purchase of the product, consumers may, in cases involving a defective product, choose between repairing or replacing non-compliant products free of charge. A choice not to repair can be made in cases where it is not possible or where the cost to do so for the distributor is disproportionate, or where it causes significant inconvenience for the consumer; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

and after purchase:

(a)

pursuant to the Directive laying down the legal guarantee, during the guarantee period following purchase of the product, consumers may, in cases involving a defective product, choose between repairing or replacing non-compliant products free of charge. A choice not to repair can be made in cases where it is not possible or where the cost to do so for the distributor is disproportionate, or where it causes significant inconvenience for the consumer;

| (b) | this initiative on repairability also covers the after-sale period. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

this initiative on repairability also covers the after-sale period.

| 2.3. | The proposal for a Directive establishing common rules promoting the repair of goods concerns cases which involve product defects or damage to products in parallel with and beyond the legal guarantee period. It primarily lays down four obligations:






  — | a general obligation to repair; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.3.

The proposal for a Directive establishing common rules promoting the repair of goods concerns cases which involve product defects or damage to products in parallel with and beyond the legal guarantee period. It primarily lays down four obligations:

—

a general obligation to repair;

| — | the requirement to provide information forms on repairs and repairers; |
| --- | --- |

—

the requirement to provide information forms on repairs and repairers;

| — | the requirement to provide information on repairing; |
| --- | --- |

—

the requirement to provide information on repairing;

| — | the requirement to create a national platform for information on repairs and on repairers. |
| --- | --- |

—

the requirement to create a national platform for information on repairs and on repairers.

There is also an Article amending Directive (EU) 2019/771 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) on consumer remedies provisions for non-conformity (legal guarantee). Priority is given to repair over replacement where the cost of repair would be lower or equal to replacing the product.

2

3.   General comments

General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC welcomes the objectives of the proposal for a Directive, specifically to promote a true European right to repair. It considers that this text builds on previous texts on product ecodesign, on empowering European consumers, and on information for consumers about environmental claims. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

The EESC welcomes the objectives of the proposal for a Directive, specifically to promote a true European right to repair. It considers that this text builds on previous texts on product ecodesign, on empowering European consumers, and on information for consumers about environmental claims.

| 3.2. | However, developing the repair sector must be made a European priority, as the Commission has well understood. Repairing is at the heart of the economic model that the EU needs to promote, together with economic operators (manufacturers, distributors, etc.), consumers, and, more broadly, European citizens. The EESC would thus like to share a vision on the ‘right to repair’: this cannot simply be a ‘formal’ or ‘theoretical’ right. European legislation must be based on the principle of safeguarding the availability of and the demand for quality repairs by ensuring effective access to repairs and encouraging consumers to avail of it. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

However, developing the repair sector must be made a European priority, as the Commission has well understood. Repairing is at the heart of the economic model that the EU needs to promote, together with economic operators (manufacturers, distributors, etc.), consumers, and, more broadly, European citizens. The EESC would thus like to share a vision on the ‘right to repair’: this cannot simply be a ‘formal’ or ‘theoretical’ right. European legislation must be based on the principle of safeguarding the availability of and the demand for quality repairs by ensuring effective access to repairs and encouraging consumers to avail of it.

| 3.3. | From an environmental point of view, extending product lifespans is a key measure in reducing the impact of consumption. Of course, this extension must take into account life-cycle analyses, as not all products can be used for prolonged periods of time. The EESC therefore supports the measure linking the right to repair to the lifespan of products defined by product category in the delegated acts adopted in the framework of the future regulation on the ecodesign of products. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

From an environmental point of view, extending product lifespans is a key measure in reducing the impact of consumption. Of course, this extension must take into account life-cycle analyses, as not all products can be used for prolonged periods of time. The EESC therefore supports the measure linking the right to repair to the lifespan of products defined by product category in the delegated acts adopted in the framework of the future regulation on the ecodesign of products.

| 3.4. | Additionally, the EESC endorses the first list of products concerned set out in Annex 2. It also supports the idea to include in this list product categories defined in the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 3.3. Product design and repairability would thus automatically be linked to the information provided to consumers and to the right to repair. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

Additionally, the EESC endorses the first list of products concerned set out in Annex 2. It also supports the idea to include in this list product categories defined in the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 3.3. Product design and repairability would thus automatically be linked to the information provided to consumers and to the right to repair.

| 3.5. | From a social and economic point of view, the repair sector creates value and high-quality jobs in Europe. According to a GAIA study (3), the repair sector created 404 jobs per 10 000 tonnes of repaired materials — 50 times more than disposing as waste. However, the EESC is concerned that the vocational training and technical skills needed to make this right to repair effective are currently insufficient. It therefore calls on the Commission to implement, in close cooperation with professional organisations, all the tools necessary to develop initial and continuing training in the repair business. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

From a social and economic point of view, the repair sector creates value and high-quality jobs in Europe. According to a GAIA study (3

| 3.6. | Additionally, choosing to repair has great potential to boost purchasing power, particularly for the most disadvantaged groups, who are generally forced to re-purchase goods prematurely. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

Additionally, choosing to repair has great potential to boost purchasing power, particularly for the most disadvantaged groups, who are generally forced to re-purchase goods prematurely.

| 3.7. | The EESC welcomes the fact that in the proposal for a Directive, the Commission has taken due account of the need to take action both on the guarantee framework and on the non-guarantee period. This is all the more important given that the framework regulating the duration of the legal guarantee varies across the EU (two years in most countries, three years in Greece, and for the product’s estimated lifespan in Finland and the Netherlands). Greater transparency and clarity concerning repair practices at European level — or even top-down harmonisation of the legal frameworks — is also essential in order to lay the ground for the right to repair. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

The EESC welcomes the fact that in the proposal for a Directive, the Commission has taken due account of the need to take action both on the guarantee framework and on the non-guarantee period. This is all the more important given that the framework regulating the duration of the legal guarantee varies across the EU (two years in most countries, three years in Greece, and for the product’s estimated lifespan in Finland and the Netherlands). Greater transparency and clarity concerning repair practices at European level — or even top-down harmonisation of the legal frameworks — is also essential in order to lay the ground for the right to repair.

4.   Specific comments

Specific comments

This section sets out avenues for improvement based on the Commission’s proposals in light of the objective to make repair more appealing than replacement in the eyes of consumers.

4.1.   Improving information for consumers

Improving information for consumers

| 4.1.1. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s proposal to improve information for consumers by ensuring, in each Member State, a platform to identify repair solutions. It is important to specify the conditions for setting up and managing this platform to ensure that the information is complete and up to date. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.1.

The EESC welcomes the Commission’s proposal to improve information for consumers by ensuring, in each Member State, a platform to identify repair solutions. It is important to specify the conditions for setting up and managing this platform to ensure that the information is complete and up to date.

| 4.1.2. | In order to repair, the conditions associated with repairing (as opposed to replacing) need to be understood. Opening repair services up to competition and ensuring transparency in the pricing, terms and conditions, and quality of repairs through the obligation to provide a repair form will improve the offer of repair work available to consumers, and thus increase the number of repairs. The EESC therefore welcomes the willingness to harmonise the information provided by repairers by proposing a European repair form. It invites co-legislators to ensure consistency between this proposal, the proposal concerning the ecodesign of sustainable products, and those on environmental claims. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.2.

In order to repair, the conditions associated with repairing (as opposed to replacing) need to be understood. Opening repair services up to competition and ensuring transparency in the pricing, terms and conditions, and quality of repairs through the obligation to provide a repair form will improve the offer of repair work available to consumers, and thus increase the number of repairs. The EESC therefore welcomes the willingness to harmonise the information provided by repairers by proposing a European repair form. It invites co-legislators to ensure consistency between this proposal, the proposal concerning the ecodesign of sustainable products, and those on environmental claims.

| 4.1.3. | The EESC also supports the creation of a common repairability index at EU level for each product category, as provided for by the draft regulation on product ecodesign and in line with the EESC’s recommendations. It calls on the Member States to commit to setting up this index in line with the European project, otherwise it will lead to increased costs for stakeholders and confusion among consumers. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.3.

The EESC also supports the creation of a common repairability index at EU level for each product category, as provided for by the draft regulation on product ecodesign and in line with the EESC’s recommendations. It calls on the Member States to commit to setting up this index in line with the European project, otherwise it will lead to increased costs for stakeholders and confusion among consumers.

| 4.1.4. | In short, an information and awareness-raising campaign at EU level is needed to raise awareness of the benefits of repairing and of the ‘don’t buy more, buy better’ principle. This awareness-raising campaign should aim to clarify information on the maintenance that consumers need to carry out. In this vein, the EESC supports the measures put forward by the proposal for a directive on green claims. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.4.

In short, an information and awareness-raising campaign at EU level is needed to raise awareness of the benefits of repairing and of the ‘don’t buy more, buy better’ principle. This awareness-raising campaign should aim to clarify information on the maintenance that consumers need to carry out. In this vein, the EESC supports the measures put forward by the proposal for a directive on green claims.

4.2.   Facilitating repair work

Facilitating repair work

| 4.2.1. | Repair works may be first carried out during the guarantee period. In this respect, the prevalence of repair over buying new (which is already supported by the EESC in its opinion on empowering consumers for the green transition (4)), is being implemented at a convenient moment. Sellers must repair goods at a cost equivalent to or lower than replacing them, unless the costs for doing so are disproportionate or the goods are irreparable. The choice of consumers to either replace or repair is therefore also affected. However, they are still able to request a replacement in the event of significant inconvenience, which could arise in cases involving products they need for their daily or professional lives. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.1.

Repair works may be first carried out during the guarantee period. In this respect, the prevalence of repair over buying new (which is already supported by the EESC in its opinion on empowering consumers for the green transition (4

| 4.2.2. | Additionally, the EESC believes that the possibility for distributors to have recourse against manufacturers should be embedded in mandatory law and therefore guaranteed in order for this measure to work and be economically viable. Distributors’ obligation to repair, whatever the cost, must come with effective recourse for them against manufacturers with respect to access to spare parts and cost sharing. This obligation must be simple enough to implement that SMEs are able to comply with it. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.2.

Additionally, the EESC believes that the possibility for distributors to have recourse against manufacturers should be embedded in mandatory law and therefore guaranteed in order for this measure to work and be economically viable. Distributors’ obligation to repair, whatever the cost, must come with effective recourse for them against manufacturers with respect to access to spare parts and cost sharing. This obligation must be simple enough to implement that SMEs are able to comply with it.

| 4.2.3. | Another of the key steps forward of the text is that of the obligation for producers to repair their goods beyond the legal guarantee period. For reasons of competitiveness, it is essential that this obligation also apply to non-EU producers. The EESC therefore reiterates the need to implement liability for authorised representatives and fulfilment centres. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.3.

Another of the key steps forward of the text is that of the obligation for producers to repair their goods beyond the legal guarantee period. For reasons of competitiveness, it is essential that this obligation also apply to non-EU producers. The EESC therefore reiterates the need to implement liability for authorised representatives and fulfilment centres.

| 4.2.4. | The territorial coverage of repair services is also a strong factor in encouraging people to repair. In the EESC’s view, more repairers are needed in Europe, which requires a proactive policy on vocational repair training. This policy is all the more necessary now that the job profile of repairers has evolved considerably, following the rise of the digital sphere and of connected devices. Apart from training, there will also be a need for well-paid quality jobs, as many Member States are already suffering from a shortage of skilled workers, particularly when it comes to crafts and skilled trades. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.4.

The territorial coverage of repair services is also a strong factor in encouraging people to repair. In the EESC’s view, more repairers are needed in Europe, which requires a proactive policy on vocational repair training. This policy is all the more necessary now that the job profile of repairers has evolved considerably, following the rise of the digital sphere and of connected devices. Apart from training, there will also be a need for well-paid quality jobs, as many Member States are already suffering from a shortage of skilled workers, particularly when it comes to crafts and skilled trades.

| 4.2.5. | Developing repair services means affording independent repairers the same opportunities as repairers authorised by producers. The EESC also believes that the Commission should help and encourage the development of new economic models, such as professional repair services, repair shops, ‘repair cafés’, etc. The EESC therefore calls for more access points for repairs. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.5.

Developing repair services means affording independent repairers the same opportunities as repairers authorised by producers. The EESC also believes that the Commission should help and encourage the development of new economic models, such as professional repair services, repair shops, ‘repair cafés’, etc. The EESC therefore calls for more access points for repairs.

4.3.   Promoting product repairability at the design stage and beyond

Promoting product repairability at the design stage and beyond

| 4.3.1. | Although planned obsolescence practices are indeed obstacles to repair, the EESC believes they are more specifically addressed by other Directives. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.1.

Although planned obsolescence practices are indeed obstacles to repair, the EESC believes they are more specifically addressed by other Directives.

| 4.3.2. | However, it would be consistent for the Commission to build on this text in the area of repair by asking Member States to prohibit any practice of intentionally making products irreparable. There can be no right to repair if objects are designed to be irreparable. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.2.

However, it would be consistent for the Commission to build on this text in the area of repair by asking Member States to prohibit any practice of intentionally making products irreparable. There can be no right to repair if objects are designed to be irreparable.

| 4.3.3. | The practices of serialisation and part pairing hinder or prevent the replacement of components of a product by marking certain parts with a serial number. When a serialised part is replaced, if the serial number does not correspond to the one registered on the motherboard, the motherboard changes the way the device works, or blocks it. This practice means that only the technical network approved or certified by the manufacturer can carry out repairs, to the detriment of independent repairers and refurbishers, and makes it impossible to use parts from the circular economy The EESC calls on the Commission and the Member States to prohibit and sanction such practices, which clearly present a barrier to repair. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.3.

The practices of serialisation and part pairing hinder or prevent the replacement of components of a product by marking certain parts with a serial number. When a serialised part is replaced, if the serial number does not correspond to the one registered on the motherboard, the motherboard changes the way the device works, or blocks it. This practice means that only the technical network approved or certified by the manufacturer can carry out repairs, to the detriment of independent repairers and refurbishers, and makes it impossible to use parts from the circular economy The EESC calls on the Commission and the Member States to prohibit and sanction such practices, which clearly present a barrier to repair.

| 4.3.4. | The draft Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation lays down the period during which spare parts, by product category, are to be available. However, in view of the challenges linked to the shortage of raw materials, the EESC calls on the Commission to promote the production of spare parts using 3D printing. This implies producers publishing their 3D models when they stop producing the parts themselves; a practice that some producers have already taken up in recent years. As part of the forthcoming revision of the intellectual property framework, the EESC calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of supporting data sharing for these parts, and of supporting the dissemination of this information through the platform. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.4.

The draft Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation lays down the period during which spare parts, by product category, are to be available. However, in view of the challenges linked to the shortage of raw materials, the EESC calls on the Commission to promote the production of spare parts using 3D printing. This implies producers publishing their 3D models when they stop producing the parts themselves; a practice that some producers have already taken up in recent years. As part of the forthcoming revision of the intellectual property framework, the EESC calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of supporting data sharing for these parts, and of supporting the dissemination of this information through the platform.

| 4.3.5. | The EESC calls for the EU to support device refurbishing practices, to the extent that these pursue the same economic and environmental objectives as repairing. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.5.

The EESC calls for the EU to support device refurbishing practices, to the extent that these pursue the same economic and environmental objectives as repairing.

4.4.   Acting on the cost of repairs

Acting on the cost of repairs

| 4.4.1. | Costs are one of the main barriers to repairing. It is therefore necessary to supplement the provisions of the proposal for a Directive with proposals to reduce the cost of repairs for consumers. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.1.

Costs are one of the main barriers to repairing. It is therefore necessary to supplement the provisions of the proposal for a Directive with proposals to reduce the cost of repairs for consumers.

| 4.4.2. | Outside the legal guarantee framework, the EESC believes that the widespread use of an information form to communicate the price of repairs and to give fair competition to repairers encourages repair and lowers its cost. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.2.

Outside the legal guarantee framework, the EESC believes that the widespread use of an information form to communicate the price of repairs and to give fair competition to repairers encourages repair and lowers its cost.

| 4.4.3. | To reduce the cost of repair, the EU could encourage the use of second-hand spare parts. The EESC regrets that the market for second-hand product materials and safe and recycled spare parts is currently rather limited and not very competitive due to a lack of infrastructure and of adequate legislation. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.3.

To reduce the cost of repair, the EU could encourage the use of second-hand spare parts. The EESC regrets that the market for second-hand product materials and safe and recycled spare parts is currently rather limited and not very competitive due to a lack of infrastructure and of adequate legislation.

| 4.4.4. | However, the Commission must go further by taking active steps to ensure that the price signal for repairs is more favourable. It must also require Member States to take measures in this direction. The EESC therefore considers it essential to promote tax incentives or other compensatory measures to promote repairs. On the basis of experience already gained at national level, the most appropriate tools for stimulating the second-hand and repair market should be identified. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.4.

However, the Commission must go further by taking active steps to ensure that the price signal for repairs is more favourable. It must also require Member States to take measures in this direction. The EESC therefore considers it essential to promote tax incentives or other compensatory measures to promote repairs. On the basis of experience already gained at national level, the most appropriate tools for stimulating the second-hand and repair market should be identified.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/strategy/intellectual-property/industrial-design-protection_en

1

(2)  Directive (EU) 2019/771 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sale of goods, amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC, and repealing Directive 1999/44/EC (OJ L 136, 22.5.2019, p. 28).

2

(3)  GAIA, Zero Waste and Economic Recovery, The job creation potential of zero waste solutions, 2021.

3

Zero Waste and Economic Recovery, The job creation potential of zero waste solutions

(4)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU as regards empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices and better information (COM(2022) 143 final — 2022/0092 (COD)) (OJ C 443, 22.11.2022, p. 75).

4

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| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/82 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/82

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2009/102/EC and (EU) 2017/1132 as regards further expanding and upgrading the use of digital tools and processes in company law

(COM(2023) 177 final — 2023/0089 (COD))

(2023/C 293/12)

| Rapporteur: | Franca SALIS-MADINIER |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Franca SALIS-MADINIER

Franca SALIS-MADINIER

| Referral | European Parliament, 17.4.2023
  Council of the European Union, 21.4.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 2.6.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 199/2/7 |

Referral

European Parliament, 17.4.2023

Council of the European Union, 21.4.2023

Legal basis

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

2.6.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

199/2/7

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the Commission’s proposal, which aims to improve both the amount of information publicly available on companies through the Business Registers Interconnection System (BRIS) and the reliability and trustworthiness of this information. This proposal should benefit not only SMEs needing reliable information to support their cross-border activities but also other stakeholders with an interest in business transparency, such as large businesses, shareholders, creditors, consumers and employees. The proposal should also help undertakings reduce costs and save time in supplying the information needed in cross-border situations. The proposal will continue to facilitate the full use of the single market and digital single market. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the Commission’s proposal, which aims to improve both the amount of information publicly available on companies through the Business Registers Interconnection System (BRIS) and the reliability and trustworthiness of this information. This proposal should benefit not only SMEs needing reliable information to support their cross-border activities but also other stakeholders with an interest in business transparency, such as large businesses, shareholders, creditors, consumers and employees. The proposal should also help undertakings reduce costs and save time in supplying the information needed in cross-border situations. The proposal will continue to facilitate the full use of the single market and digital single market.

| 1.2. | The EESC supports further expansion of the use of digital tools to ensure communication between companies and authorities involved in cross-border activities, as well as the promotion of the ‘digital by default’ principle, providing that nobody is left behind. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC supports further expansion of the use of digital tools to ensure communication between companies and authorities involved in cross-border activities, as well as the promotion of the ‘digital by default’ principle, providing that nobody is left behind.

| 1.3. | The EESC supports the proposal to expand the scope covered to include partnerships, business groups and third-country company branches (Articles 7, 13, 13a, 14 and 36). As cooperatives and foundations also account for a substantial amount of business, the EESC recommends expanding the scope further to include these types of undertakings in the Directive and to require access to BRIS where information on these types of companies is already included in national registers. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

The EESC supports the proposal to expand the scope covered to include partnerships, business groups and third-country company branches (Articles 7, 13, 13a, 14 and 36). As cooperatives and foundations also account for a substantial amount of business, the EESC recommends expanding the scope further to include these types of undertakings in the Directive and to require access to BRIS where information on these types of companies is already included in national registers.

| 1.4. | The EESC supports the requirement for undertakings to make information on place of management and place of the main economic activity available in national registers and BRIS (Article 14). The EESC supports further expanding the list of information that must be provided and updated on an annual basis to include the number of employees, the sectors of activity (NACE code) and, in the case of undertakings formed by EU company law (Cross-border Conversions, Mergers and Divisions Directive, SE and SCE legislation), agreements on worker information, consultation and participation rights. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

The EESC supports the requirement for undertakings to make information on place of management and place of the main economic activity available in national registers and BRIS (Article 14). The EESC supports further expanding the list of information that must be provided and updated on an annual basis to include the number of employees, the sectors of activity (NACE code) and, in the case of undertakings formed by EU company law (Cross-border Conversions, Mergers and Divisions Directive, SE and SCE legislation), agreements on worker information, consultation and participation rights.

| 1.5. | The EESC supports interconnecting BRIS with the beneficial ownership registers interconnection system (BORIS) and the Insolvency Registers Interconnection (IRI) system, and using the EUID (European unique company identifier) to link information stored in different systems (Article 22). BRIS should also include information on disqualified directors and enable more effective searches for companies by sector of activity (NACE code) and size (employee numbers and revenues). |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

The EESC supports interconnecting BRIS with the beneficial ownership registers interconnection system (BORIS) and the Insolvency Registers Interconnection (IRI) system, and using the EUID (European unique company identifier) to link information stored in different systems (Article 22). BRIS should also include information on disqualified directors and enable more effective searches for companies by sector of activity (NACE code) and size (employee numbers and revenues).

| 1.6. | The EESC supports the obligation to check a harmonised list of items when companies are formed (Article 10 on Preventive control), but recommends adding a verification of the identity of persons involved in its formation, including information on whether they have been disqualified from acting as a director in any EU Member State (‘disqualified director’). It also recommends extending preventive control to the reorganisation of undertakings through EU company law (Cross-border Conversions, Mergers and Divisions Directive, SE and SCE legislation) and expanding the list of items to include a check that the agreements on worker information, consultation and participation required by such legislation have been concluded. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The EESC supports the obligation to check a harmonised list of items when companies are formed (Article 10 on Preventive control), but recommends adding a verification of the identity of persons involved in its formation, including information on whether they have been disqualified from acting as a director in any EU Member State (‘disqualified director’). It also recommends extending preventive control to the reorganisation of undertakings through EU company law (Cross-border Conversions, Mergers and Divisions Directive, SE and SCE legislation) and expanding the list of items to include a check that the agreements on worker information, consultation and participation required by such legislation have been concluded.

| 1.7. | Reliable and trustworthy information is an important precondition for the smooth operation of the single market and companies’ cross-border activities. The EESC supports the obligation for registers to provide up-to-date data (Article 15) but recommends strengthening Articles 28 and 40 to ensure that penalties for non-compliance are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

Reliable and trustworthy information is an important precondition for the smooth operation of the single market and companies’ cross-border activities. The EESC supports the obligation for registers to provide up-to-date data (Article 15) but recommends strengthening Articles 28 and 40 to ensure that penalties for non-compliance are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

| 1.8. | The EESC supports the introduction of a European Company Certificate (Article 16b). However, it recommends that the list of items include the number of employees and the NACE sector(s) of activity, which should be updated on an annual basis. The list of information to be provided for partnerships should be harmonised with the list required from limited liability companies. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

The EESC supports the introduction of a European Company Certificate (Article 16b). However, it recommends that the list of items include the number of employees and the NACE sector(s) of activity, which should be updated on an annual basis. The list of information to be provided for partnerships should be harmonised with the list required from limited liability companies.

| 1.9. | The EESC recommends strengthening Article 16c (Digital EU power of attorney) to require use of the highest level of assurance to verify the identity of persons authorised to represent a company and a check on whether this person has been disqualified as a director in EU Member States. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

The EESC recommends strengthening Article 16c (Digital EU power of attorney) to require use of the highest level of assurance to verify the identity of persons authorised to represent a company and a check on whether this person has been disqualified as a director in EU Member States.

| 1.10. | The EESC conditionally supports the once-only principle (no resubmission of company information) when a company from one Member State sets up subsidiaries or branches in another Member State. To prevent Member States from being forced to forego validity checks where there is a reasonable doubt that another Member State has not provided adequate levels of assurance of the reliability of information in its register, Article 16e (Safeguards in case of reasonable doubt) should be expanded to allow a Member State to decline accepting information from another Member State in such a case. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

The EESC conditionally supports the once-only principle (no resubmission of company information) when a company from one Member State sets up subsidiaries or branches in another Member State. To prevent Member States from being forced to forego validity checks where there is a reasonable doubt that another Member State has not provided adequate levels of assurance of the reliability of information in its register, Article 16e (Safeguards in case of reasonable doubt) should be expanded to allow a Member State to decline accepting information from another Member State in such a case.

2.   General comments

General comments

| 2.1. | The proposal aims to enhance transparency about companies and trust between Member States as well as to create more connected public administrations, while reducing the administrative burden for companies and other stakeholders in cross-border situations. In particular, the proposal aims to make more information about companies publicly available through BRIS, ensure that company data in business registers is accurate, reliable and up-to-date, and cut red tape when companies use company information from business registers in cross-border situations. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

The proposal aims to enhance transparency about companies and trust between Member States as well as to create more connected public administrations, while reducing the administrative burden for companies and other stakeholders in cross-border situations. In particular, the proposal aims to make more information about companies publicly available through BRIS, ensure that company data in business registers is accurate, reliable and up-to-date, and cut red tape when companies use company information from business registers in cross-border situations.

| 2.2. | The proposal aims to cut red tape and reduce the administrative burden by introducing an EU Company Certificate, a multilingual standard model for a digital EU power of attorney, expanding the use of the ‘once-only principle’ when setting up a company in other EU Member States and removing formalities such as the need for an apostille or certified translations for company documents. The impact assessment showed that the above-mentioned changes will reduce costs to EU businesses caused by administrative requirements by around EUR 437 million per year. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

The proposal aims to cut red tape and reduce the administrative burden by introducing an EU Company Certificate, a multilingual standard model for a digital EU power of attorney, expanding the use of the ‘once-only principle’ when setting up a company in other EU Member States and removing formalities such as the need for an apostille or certified translations for company documents. The impact assessment showed that the above-mentioned changes will reduce costs to EU businesses caused by administrative requirements by around EUR 437 million per year.

| 2.3. | One relevant initiative for the proposal is the EU’s digitalisation objectives, set out in the Commission Communication 2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade (1). The proposal responds to the widely-seen need to upgrade the way that registries function and how they interact with undertakings, users and public authorities, including in cross-border contexts. A second initiative is the effort to reduce barriers preventing SMEs from conducting cross-border business, as outlined in the Commission Communications Updating the 2020 New Industrial Strategy (2) and SME Strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe (3). Both the ‘once-only’ principle to providing information and the reduction in translation and apostille requirements help SMEs achieve these goals. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

One relevant initiative for the proposal is the EU’s digitalisation objectives, set out in the Commission Communication 2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade

1

Updating the 2020 New Industrial Strategy

2

SME Strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe

3

| 2.4. | Corporate transparency has been acknowledged as an effective means of deterring corporate abuse. This proposal helps by addressing the need for more reliable information on companies and for greater transparency and trustworthiness in the information that is provided. The proposal also addresses the widespread problem of corporate abuse, including evasion of taxes and labour standards, money laundering, terrorism finance and consumer fraud (4) (5). Such corporate abuse is enabled through mechanisms such as letterbox companies, identity theft, lack of transparency in corporate groups and the chain of ownership, exploitation of differences in national regulatory regimes and difficulties in cross-border cooperation in enforcement (6). A recent study demonstrated that letterbox companies are a widespread phenomenon in the EU (7). Key information for stakeholders, such as place of management and place of the main economic activity, is rarely found in company registers. Furthermore, the information that is provided is often out of date and it is not clear how trustworthy the information is. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

Corporate transparency has been acknowledged as an effective means of deterring corporate abuse. This proposal helps by addressing the need for more reliable information on companies and for greater transparency and trustworthiness in the information that is provided. The proposal also addresses the widespread problem of corporate abuse, including evasion of taxes and labour standards, money laundering, terrorism finance and consumer fraud (4

5

6

7

| 2.5. | In the interests of improving transparency even further, the proposal should also include cooperatives and foundations in the scope of the Directive, and information on them should be made available through BRIS insofar as this information is contained in national company registers. As these legal forms account for a significant proportion of business in the EU, there would be a major gap in transparency if they were not included in the scope. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

In the interests of improving transparency even further, the proposal should also include cooperatives and foundations in the scope of the Directive, and information on them should be made available through BRIS insofar as this information is contained in national company registers. As these legal forms account for a significant proportion of business in the EU, there would be a major gap in transparency if they were not included in the scope.

| 2.6. | Expanding the list of items to be provided by undertakings to include the place of management and the place of main economic activity is justified by the need for competent authorities to identify letterbox companies and possible corporate abuse before a pre-conversion certificate may be issued for a cross-border conversion (Article 86m) or a pre-division certificate for a cross-border division (Article 160m). These locations are also relevant in determining applicable national law in the case of insolvency. As noted in the impact assessment, many stakeholders have requested additional information and expanded search capabilities in BRIS. Workers’ representatives need information on the number of employees, as employee number thresholds trigger many workers’ rights, such as the rights to found a works council or have representation on a company’s board. Partnerships should also disclose the same types of information that limited liability companies do. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

Expanding the list of items to be provided by undertakings to include the place of management and the place of main economic activity is justified by the need for competent authorities to identify letterbox companies and possible corporate abuse before a pre-conversion certificate may be issued for a cross-border conversion (Article 86m) or a pre-division certificate for a cross-border division (Article 160m). These locations are also relevant in determining applicable national law in the case of insolvency. As noted in the impact assessment, many stakeholders have requested additional information and expanded search capabilities in BRIS. Workers’ representatives need information on the number of employees, as employee number thresholds trigger many workers’ rights, such as the rights to found a works council or have representation on a company’s board. Partnerships should also disclose the same types of information that limited liability companies do.

| 2.7. | Expanding the list of items for ‘preventive control’ for company formations to include checking the identity of key persons is justified by the prevalence of fraud through identity theft. ‘Preventive control’ should also apply to cross-border corporate reorganisations through cross-border mergers, conversions, divisions or conversions into SEs or SCEs. Research by the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) shows that, though required by EU law, negotiations with workers’ representatives over worker information, consultation and participation rights are often not concluded or even started before such reorganisations are approved by the competent authority. A completed agreement with workers’ representatives should be included in this minimum list. In general, the Directive should require people to be identified at the highest assurance level, as lower levels of electronic identification reduce the effectiveness of these checks against identity fraud. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

Expanding the list of items for ‘preventive control’ for company formations to include checking the identity of key persons is justified by the prevalence of fraud through identity theft. ‘Preventive control’ should also apply to cross-border corporate reorganisations through cross-border mergers, conversions, divisions or conversions into SEs or SCEs. Research by the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) shows that, though required by EU law, negotiations with workers’ representatives over worker information, consultation and participation rights are often not concluded or even started before such reorganisations are approved by the competent authority. A completed agreement with workers’ representatives should be included in this minimum list. In general, the Directive should require people to be identified at the highest assurance level, as lower levels of electronic identification reduce the effectiveness of these checks against identity fraud.

| 2.8. | Up-to-date data are a significant benefit for a secure business environment and play a significant role in reducing costs for companies’ cross-border activities and ensuring corporate social responsibility. Penalties required by EU law but left to the discretion of Member States to define may not satisfy the need for effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness (cf. current discussion on EU Consumer Law). Articles 28 and 40 should be strengthened to ensure that penalties are effective, proportionate and dissuasive and to ensure a competitive and balanced business environment throughout the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

Up-to-date data are a significant benefit for a secure business environment and play a significant role in reducing costs for companies’ cross-border activities and ensuring corporate social responsibility. Penalties required by EU law but left to the discretion of Member States to define may not satisfy the need for effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness (cf. current discussion on EU Consumer Law). Articles 28 and 40 should be strengthened to ensure that penalties are effective, proportionate and dissuasive and to ensure a competitive and balanced business environment throughout the European Union.

| 2.9. | The recommendation to apply the same reporting requirements to partnerships as to limited liability companies is based on the principle of creating a level playing field for different company forms. This principle also backs up the recommendation to include foundations and cooperatives in the scope of the Directive. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

The recommendation to apply the same reporting requirements to partnerships as to limited liability companies is based on the principle of creating a level playing field for different company forms. This principle also backs up the recommendation to include foundations and cooperatives in the scope of the Directive.

| 2.10. | While the once-only principle and the abolition of apostille, requirements are important measures to reduce red tape, their implementation needs to be balanced by safeguarding the trustworthiness of information provided through Member States’ company registers. Electronic identification of individuals should be done at the highest level of assurance, and Member States should have the right of refusal for information provided by company registers in Member States which have not achieved a proper balance, for example by not yet having transposed key elements of the Digital Tools Directive (8) or this proposed Directive (once passed). |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

While the once-only principle and the abolition of apostille, requirements are important measures to reduce red tape, their implementation needs to be balanced by safeguarding the trustworthiness of information provided through Member States’ company registers. Electronic identification of individuals should be done at the highest level of assurance, and Member States should have the right of refusal for information provided by company registers in Member States which have not achieved a proper balance, for example by not yet having transposed key elements of the Digital Tools Directive (8

| 2.11. | In order to avoid additional costs for business, it is of the responsibility of Member States and national business registry, not to increase fees to cover costs for filling new information set by the Directive updating. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

In order to avoid additional costs for business, it is of the responsibility of Member States and national business registry, not to increase fees to cover costs for filling new information set by the Directive updating.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  COM(2021) 118 final.

1

(2)  COM(2021) 350 final.

2

(3)  COM(2020) 103 final.

3

(4)  European Parliamentary Research Service (2018), An overview of shell companies in the European Union, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e8534eeb-e071-11e8-b690-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search

4

An overview of shell companies in the European Union

(5)  
  The impact of letterbox-type practices on labour rights and public revenue (2016), SOMO and ETUC, with the support of the European Commission.

5

The impact of letterbox-type practices on labour rights and public revenue

(6)  European Commission/ICF SA in cooperation with Wavestone, the Center for the Study of Democracy, the University of Trento and Victims Support Europe (2022), Study on online identity theft and identity-related crime, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f85399b3-abed-11ec-83e1-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search

6

Study on online identity theft and identity-related crime

(7)  European Commission/ICF Consulting Services (2021), Letterbox companies: overview of the phenomenon and existing measures, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/66764f95-5191-11ec-91ac-01aa75ed71a1

7

Letterbox companies: overview of the phenomenon and existing measures

(8)  Directive (EU) 2019/1151 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards the use of digital tools and processes in company law (OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 80).

8

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| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/86 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/86

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on substantiation and communication of explicit environmental claims (Green Claims Directive)

(COM(2023) 166 final — 2023/0085 (COD))

(2023/C 293/13)

| Rapporteur: | Angelo PAGLIARA |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Angelo PAGLIARA

Angelo PAGLIARA

| Referral | European Parliament, 1.6.2023
  Council, 2.6.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 2.6.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 205/2/3 |

Referral

European Parliament, 1.6.2023

Council, 2.6.2023

Legal basis

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

2.6.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

205/2/3

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) firmly believes that sustainability is one of the pillars of the European Union’s future development and that this new proposal provides an opportunity to strengthen the active role of public authorities and society in moving quickly toward a circular economy (1) and developing a circular culture. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) firmly believes that sustainability is one of the pillars of the European Union’s future development and that this new proposal provides an opportunity to strengthen the active role of public authorities and society in moving quickly toward a circular economy (1

| 1.2. | The EESC would encourage the Commission to continue to systematically involve the social partners and civil society organisations, in particular consumer organisations, in this process, so as to protect consumers and companies from greenwashing. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC would encourage the Commission to continue to systematically involve the social partners and civil society organisations, in particular consumer organisations, in this process, so as to protect consumers and companies from greenwashing.

| 1.3. | The EESC urges the Commission to ensure that the requirements set out in the Green Claims Directive become a model for a minimum level of protection against greenwashing, to be reflected in sectoral legislation excluded from the scope of this Directive when covering certain voluntary claims and labelling. The introduction of sectoral legislation should not become a way to opt out of the provisions of the Green Claims Directive, introduce loopholes or reduce consumer protection. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

The EESC urges the Commission to ensure that the requirements set out in the Green Claims Directive become a model for a minimum level of protection against greenwashing, to be reflected in sectoral legislation excluded from the scope of this Directive when covering certain voluntary claims and labelling. The introduction of sectoral legislation should not become a way to opt out of the provisions of the Green Claims Directive, introduce loopholes or reduce consumer protection.

| 1.4. | The EESC points to a growing concern about the proliferation of environmental claims based on compensation via the use of offsetting credits and calls on the Commission to introduce a clear ban on claims based on offsetting. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

The EESC points to a growing concern about the proliferation of environmental claims based on compensation via the use of offsetting credits and calls on the Commission to introduce a clear ban on claims based on offsetting.

| 1.5. | The EESC welcomes the intention that has been announced to increase the legal certainty of environmental claims and calls on the Commission to ensure that the right conditions are in place for strengthening the competitiveness of the Single Market, notably via the introduction of common methodologies for substantiating different types of claims. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

The EESC welcomes the intention that has been announced to increase the legal certainty of environmental claims and calls on the Commission to ensure that the right conditions are in place for strengthening the competitiveness of the Single Market, notably via the introduction of common methodologies for substantiating different types of claims.

| 1.6. | The EESC takes note of the opt-in option for microenterprises and asks the Commission to put in place all the measures necessary to include them in the checks carried out by the Member States. In addition, the EESC welcomes the attention being paid to market enforcement and stresses the need to ensure that the Directive is fully enforced. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The EESC takes note of the opt-in option for microenterprises and asks the Commission to put in place all the measures necessary to include them in the checks carried out by the Member States. In addition, the EESC welcomes the attention being paid to market enforcement and stresses the need to ensure that the Directive is fully enforced.

| 1.7. | The EESC would draw attention to the growing awareness of environmental issues and would encourage the Commission to develop specific tools to support those economic operators that intend to increase the environmental and social sustainability of their production methods and products. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

The EESC would draw attention to the growing awareness of environmental issues and would encourage the Commission to develop specific tools to support those economic operators that intend to increase the environmental and social sustainability of their production methods and products.

2.   Gist of the Commission document

Gist of the Commission document

| 2.1. | This proposal for a Directive aims to supplement the regulatory framework for supporting sustainable consumption by addressing specific aspects of and requirements for explicit environmental claims as regards their substantiation, communication and verification. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

This proposal for a Directive aims to supplement the regulatory framework for supporting sustainable consumption by addressing specific aspects of and requirements for explicit environmental claims as regards their substantiation, communication and verification.

| 2.2. | The proposal was one of the initiatives listed by the Commission for implementing the European Green Deal, supplementing the regulatory framework for environmental claims, thus ensuring that reliable, comparable and verifiable information is available to buyers so that they can make more sustainable decisions (2). The need to address greenwashing is also reflected in both the New Circular Economy Action Plan (3) and the New Consumer Agenda (4). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

The proposal was one of the initiatives listed by the Commission for implementing the European Green Deal, supplementing the regulatory framework for environmental claims, thus ensuring that reliable, comparable and verifiable information is available to buyers so that they can make more sustainable decisions (2

3

4

| 2.3. | The proposal complements the proposal for a Directive on empowering consumers for the green transition (5), amending Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (6). Together they establish a clear system for environmental claims, including environmental labels. |
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2.3.

The proposal complements the proposal for a Directive on empowering consumers for the green transition (5

6

| 2.4. | The proposal includes minimum sets of criteria for the substantiation and communication of environmental claims; new provisions on environmental labels and labelling schemes; the introduction of ex ante verification of environmental claims and labelling schemes; and enforcement measures such as regular compliance checks and sanctions. |
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2.4.

The proposal includes minimum sets of criteria for the substantiation and communication of environmental claims; new provisions on environmental labels and labelling schemes; the introduction of ex ante

| 2.5. | However, the Directive does not include harmonised methodologies. It does introduce the possibility to adopt delegated acts or amendments at a later date to provide further requirements on specific issues such as climate claims, durability, reusability, reparability, recyclability, recycled content, use of natural content, including fibres, environmental performance and sustainability, bio-based elements, biodegradability, biodiversity, waste prevention and reduction. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

However, the Directive does not include harmonised methodologies. It does introduce the possibility to adopt delegated acts or amendments at a later date to provide further requirements on specific issues such as climate claims, durability, reusability, reparability, recyclability, recycled content, use of natural content, including fibres, environmental performance and sustainability, bio-based elements, biodegradability, biodiversity, waste prevention and reduction.

3.   General comments

General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC urges the European Commission to develop specific instruments to promote a culture of circular economy and in particular to set up information campaigns to disseminate a ‘circular culture’, especially among the younger generation. The EESC would also encourage the Commission to collect the good practices in this domain that Member States have developed in their activities, and to consider disseminating them. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

The EESC urges the European Commission to develop specific instruments to promote a culture of circular economy and in particular to set up information campaigns to disseminate a ‘circular culture’, especially among the younger generation. The EESC would also encourage the Commission to collect the good practices in this domain that Member States have developed in their activities, and to consider disseminating them.

| 3.2. | The general public, especially the younger generation, is now more attentive to environmental issues (7) (8) and for this reason green marketing is increasingly used as a competitive advantage. |
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3.2.

The general public, especially the younger generation, is now more attentive to environmental issues (7

8

| 3.3. | Consumer and stakeholder expectations regarding sustainability and environmental protection are increasing, but there is not much trust in environmental claims (9). Beyond the trust issue, there is widespread misunderstanding as to what these claims mean. This finding has been reflected in multiple studies conducted not only by the European Commission but also by national agencies, notably on the issue of climate claims (10). Enabling consumers now to make informed purchasing decisions based on reliable information is therefore of paramount importance. |
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3.3.

Consumer and stakeholder expectations regarding sustainability and environmental protection are increasing, but there is not much trust in environmental claims (9

10

| 3.4. | The impact assessment identified a series of problems that give rise to growing concerns amongst consumers, such as: misleading commercial practices related to the sustainability of products; unclear or poorly substantiated environmental claims; and sustainability labels that are not always transparent or credible. In view of the results of the impact assessment, the EESC supports the Commission’s initiative and believes that resolute action is needed in this field. |
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3.4.

The impact assessment identified a series of problems that give rise to growing concerns amongst consumers, such as: misleading commercial practices related to the sustainability of products; unclear or poorly substantiated environmental claims; and sustainability labels that are not always transparent or credible. In view of the results of the impact assessment, the EESC supports the Commission’s initiative and believes that resolute action is needed in this field.

| 3.5. | The EESC believes that consumers, if better informed, can play an active and crucial role in the environmental transition, helping achieve the objectives of the Green Deal. It is critical to ensure that sustainability plays a bigger part in consumers’ decision-making processes, so that it has an impact both at the moment they make the purchase and later on (if necessary opting for repair, where available, rather than a new purchase, for example). This will complement new requirements for environmental information on products, stemming from initiatives such as the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation. It will ensure common rules for labels beyond existing legislation such as the EU Ecolabel Regulation, the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and regulations on the organic farming label, energy labelling and CE marking. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

The EESC believes that consumers, if better informed, can play an active and crucial role in the environmental transition, helping achieve the objectives of the Green Deal. It is critical to ensure that sustainability plays a bigger part in consumers’ decision-making processes, so that it has an impact both at the moment they make the purchase and later on (if necessary opting for repair, where available, rather than a new purchase, for example). This will complement new requirements for environmental information on products, stemming from initiatives such as the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation. It will ensure common rules for labels beyond existing legislation such as the EU Ecolabel Regulation, the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and regulations on the organic farming label, energy labelling and CE marking.

| 3.6. | Article 1 of the proposal excludes much sectoral legislation from the scope of the Directive, where the legislation concerned contains its own requirements on claims and labelling schemes. The EESC suggests that at least the same level of protection against greenwashing be reflected in sector-specific legislation. This should include, at the very least, an equivalent level of substantiation, communication (supporting documents) and (third-party) verification. Moreover, there is a need to clarify that only the claims covered in these pieces of legislation are excluded, rather than any claim regarding the products targeted by the sectoral legislation. If certain claims do not involve specific requirements, they should fall under the scope of the Green Claims Directive. For example, Article 1 excludes legislation on packaging and packaging waste, and that legislation only covers claims regarding recyclability and recycled content. This should mean that other claims (such as the life-cycle impact of certain packaging) should fall under the Green Claims Directive. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

Article 1 of the proposal excludes much sectoral legislation from the scope of the Directive, where the legislation concerned contains its own requirements on claims and labelling schemes. The EESC suggests that at least the same level of protection against greenwashing be reflected in sector-specific legislation. This should include, at the very least, an equivalent level of substantiation, communication (supporting documents) and (third-party) verification. Moreover, there is a need to clarify that only the claims covered in these pieces of legislation are excluded, rather than any claim regarding the products targeted by the sectoral legislation. If certain claims do not involve specific requirements, they should fall under the scope of the Green Claims Directive. For example, Article 1 excludes legislation on packaging and packaging waste, and that legislation only covers claims regarding recyclability and recycled content. This should mean that other claims (such as the life-cycle impact of certain packaging) should fall under the Green Claims Directive.

| 3.7. | The EESC acknowledges that there are growing concerns about the proliferation of environmental claims based on compensation via the use of offsetting credits (‘climate-neutral’, ‘plastic-compensated’, etc.), which have been recognised by several consumer authorities — and in several court cases — as scientifically incorrect and always misleading to consumers. The EESC therefore urges the Commission to take these lessons fully on board and to introduce a clear ban on claims based on offsetting, in addition to requirements regarding the way that companies communicate their contributions to sustainability projects rather than claiming compensation. In particular, the Green Claims Directive must be fully aligned with the Directive on Empowering consumers for the green transition. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

The EESC acknowledges that there are growing concerns about the proliferation of environmental claims based on compensation via the use of offsetting credits (‘climate-neutral’, ‘plastic-compensated’, etc.), which have been recognised by several consumer authorities — and in several court cases — as scientifically incorrect and always misleading to consumers. The EESC therefore urges the Commission to take these lessons fully on board and to introduce a clear ban on claims based on offsetting, in addition to requirements regarding the way that companies communicate their contributions to sustainability projects rather than claiming compensation. In particular, the Green Claims Directive must be fully aligned with the Directive on Empowering consumers for the green transition.

| 3.8. | The EESC notes the decision to exclude microenterprises from some of the legislation’s provisions on the grounds that the procedures require the companies making the claims to invest time and resources in gathering the necessary information and in going through the verification process. The EESC takes note of the opt-in option for microenterprises, allowing them to take advantage of the benefits flowing from certificates of conformity, should they decide to invest resources in these going through the verification procedure. The EESC also notes the provisions on supporting SMEs in general when applying the requirements flowing from the legislation. Nonetheless, the EESC recognises that there is a need to ensure that no companies feel that they are allowed to mislead consumers; it fully supports the fact that the opt-in element in the Green Claims Directive does not mean an opt-in to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. The Commission should introduce specific requirements to ensure that microenterprises are properly included in the checks carried out by Member States, as they are not de facto exempt from the broader legislation on unfair commercial practices. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

The EESC notes the decision to exclude microenterprises from some of the legislation’s provisions on the grounds that the procedures require the companies making the claims to invest time and resources in gathering the necessary information and in going through the verification process. The EESC takes note of the opt-in option for microenterprises, allowing them to take advantage of the benefits flowing from certificates of conformity, should they decide to invest resources in these going through the verification procedure. The EESC also notes the provisions on supporting SMEs in general when applying the requirements flowing from the legislation. Nonetheless, the EESC recognises that there is a need to ensure that no companies feel that they are allowed to mislead consumers; it fully supports the fact that the opt-in element in the Green Claims Directive does not mean an opt-in to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. The Commission should introduce specific requirements to ensure that microenterprises are properly included in the checks carried out by Member States, as they are not de facto exempt from the broader legislation on unfair commercial practices.

| 3.9. | The EESC would encourage the Commission to start work on the adoption of common rules to substantiate claims, as proposed in Article 3, which opens the door for the Commission to develop and adopt common methodologies for the substantiation of specific claims, based on the results of regular monitoring. The EESC believes that the Commission should already draw up a priority list of claims for which there is a need for common rules, based on information currently available, and start developing common methodologies, over and above life-cycle assessment. These are needed to ensure harmonised implementation across Europe, with clear rules for verifiers on how to assess the supporting documentation provided by companies. This would avert the risk of companies choosing to get their claims verified in countries where they know they have better chances of their claims being certified. It would also provide legal clarity for companies and avoid creating an asymmetry between, on the one hand, those companies that are able to develop in-house methods or access external services to tailor methodologies to their marketing strategies and, on the other, companies that do not have resources to do so. |
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3.9.

The EESC would encourage the Commission to start work on the adoption of common rules to substantiate claims, as proposed in Article 3, which opens the door for the Commission to develop and adopt common methodologies for the substantiation of specific claims, based on the results of regular monitoring. The EESC believes that the Commission should already draw up a priority list of claims for which there is a need for common rules, based on information currently available, and start developing common methodologies, over and above life-cycle assessment. These are needed to ensure harmonised implementation across Europe, with clear rules for verifiers on how to assess the supporting documentation provided by companies. This would avert the risk of companies choosing to get their claims verified in countries where they know they have better chances of their claims being certified. It would also provide legal clarity for companies and avoid creating an asymmetry between, on the one hand, those companies that are able to develop in-house methods or access external services to tailor methodologies to their marketing strategies and, on the other, companies that do not have resources to do so.

| 3.10. | The EESC notes the Commission’s decision not to introduce the Product and Organisation Environmental Footprint methods as requirements for the substantiation of claims. However, in those cases where it is relevant, the EESC would encourage best use to be made of these methods when defining common methods for substantiation. Regarding Article 3.1(c) on the requirement to demonstrate that given elements of claims are significant from a life-cycle perspective, the EESC urges the Commission to further specify how this significance should be assessed. |
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3.10.

The EESC notes the Commission’s decision not to introduce the Product and Organisation Environmental Footprint methods as requirements for the substantiation of claims. However, in those cases where it is relevant, the EESC would encourage best use to be made of these methods when defining common methods for substantiation. Regarding Article 3.1(c) on the requirement to demonstrate that given elements of claims are significant from a life-cycle perspective, the EESC urges the Commission to further specify how this significance should be assessed.

| 3.11. | The EESC strongly recommends that the Commission further specify the requirements regarding claims about the future environmental performance of a product or trader, set out in Article 5.4. First of all, the requirements should be fully aligned with the provisions of the Directive on Empowering consumers for the green transition. Secondly, the requirements should specify that such claims will only be accepted when they are not solely based on offsetting and when they are supported by clear, understandable supplementary information provided by the trader, setting out clear, objective, science-based and verifiable commitments and targets, as well as an implementation plan at trader level that includes implementing measures and concrete, verifiable interim targets that do not rely on offsets and that are consistent with achieving a long-term commitment. The implementation plan should have an adequate budget allocated to it and be based only on existing economically and technically viable technologies. The implementation plan, as well as progress achieved, should be made publicly available and included in the claim as supplementary information, and regular reports on this should be submitted. Claims relating to future environmental performance should also be subject to independent monitoring in order to verify the claims and to monitor traders’ progress in respect of their commitments and targets, in addition to the certification process set out in Article 10. Claims relating to future environmental performance should only be allowed at trader level and not at product level, otherwise the environmental claims concerned could mislead consumers. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

The EESC strongly recommends that the Commission further specify the requirements regarding claims about the future environmental performance of a product or trader, set out in Article 5.4. First of all, the requirements should be fully aligned with the provisions of the Directive on Empowering consumers for the green transition. Secondly, the requirements should specify that such claims will only be accepted when they are not solely based on offsetting and when they are supported by clear, understandable supplementary information provided by the trader, setting out clear, objective, science-based and verifiable commitments and targets, as well as an implementation plan at trader level that includes implementing measures and concrete, verifiable interim targets that do not rely on offsets and that are consistent with achieving a long-term commitment. The implementation plan should have an adequate budget allocated to it and be based only on existing economically and technically viable technologies. The implementation plan, as well as progress achieved, should be made publicly available and included in the claim as supplementary information, and regular reports on this should be submitted. Claims relating to future environmental performance should also be subject to independent monitoring in order to verify the claims and to monitor traders’ progress in respect of their commitments and targets, in addition to the certification process set out in Article 10. Claims relating to future environmental performance should only be allowed at trader level and not at product level, otherwise the environmental claims concerned could mislead consumers.

| 3.12. | The EESC welcomes Article 7’s ban on ratings and scores based on an aggregated indicator of environmental impacts, unless they are introduced in EU legislation. While their clear-cut communication is appealing to consumers, the lack of clarity as to the methodologies behind the scores, and the increasing number thereof, result in confusion and misunderstanding. The EESC would encourage the Commission to clarify what is covered in the scope of this ban, and especially what is deemed to be an ‘environmental impact’. For example, it is understood that reparability scores are not included in the scope. This should be further clarified to ensure legal certainty. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

The EESC welcomes Article 7’s ban on ratings and scores based on an aggregated indicator of environmental impacts, unless they are introduced in EU legislation. While their clear-cut communication is appealing to consumers, the lack of clarity as to the methodologies behind the scores, and the increasing number thereof, result in confusion and misunderstanding. The EESC would encourage the Commission to clarify what is covered in the scope of this ban, and especially what is deemed to be an ‘environmental impact’. For example, it is understood that reparability scores are not included in the scope. This should be further clarified to ensure legal certainty.

| 3.13. | The EESC welcomes the measures proposed in Article 8 for ending the proliferation of claims and labels that are introduced. They will provide greater clarity to consumers and ensure that only valuable and reliable information is communicated. |
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3.13.

The EESC welcomes the measures proposed in Article 8 for ending the proliferation of claims and labels that are introduced. They will provide greater clarity to consumers and ensure that only valuable and reliable information is communicated.

| 3.14. | The EESC welcomes the importance attached to enforcement. While detailed requirements on claims substantiation do represent a clear step forward, one of the key persistent issues that consumers face is a lack of enforcement of regulations that they should be able to take for granted. The verification system has the potential to diminish the number of false claims on the market, but this will only be successful if enough resources are allocated to the work of the market monitoring authorities. The EESC urges the Commission to explore all possible channels for supporting national authorities and to encourage Member States to provide the necessary resources for monitoring. The obligation to report on enforcement activities is welcomed by the EESC. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

The EESC welcomes the importance attached to enforcement. While detailed requirements on claims substantiation do represent a clear step forward, one of the key persistent issues that consumers face is a lack of enforcement of regulations that they should be able to take for granted. The verification system has the potential to diminish the number of false claims on the market, but this will only be successful if enough resources are allocated to the work of the market monitoring authorities. The EESC urges the Commission to explore all possible channels for supporting national authorities and to encourage Member States to provide the necessary resources for monitoring. The obligation to report on enforcement activities is welcomed by the EESC.

| 3.15. | The EESC also welcomes Article 16’s provisions on access to justice for consumers and civil society organisations. Ensuring that consumer organisations can take legal action against misleading and unsubstantiated claims in order to protect consumers’ collective interests is an effective way to support enforcement. |
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3.15.

The EESC also welcomes Article 16’s provisions on access to justice for consumers and civil society organisations. Ensuring that consumer organisations can take legal action against misleading and unsubstantiated claims in order to protect consumers’ collective interests is an effective way to support enforcement.

| 3.16. | The EESC welcomes the provisions of Article 17, specifying the penalties that Member States should introduce. The Commission should consider some good practices in this domain. |
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3.16.

The EESC welcomes the provisions of Article 17, specifying the penalties that Member States should introduce. The Commission should consider some good practices in this domain.

| 3.17. | The EESC would encourage the Commission to adopt all measures necessary — including involving the social partners in the process — to protect consumers and companies from greenwashing. In particular, the EESC suggests that provision be made for regular cross-checks between national authorities on the one hand, and social partners and civil society at national level on the other. On European-level measures, the EESC welcomes the committee procedure provided for in Article 19 and requests that it be able to participate in the committee as the European representative of civil society. Besides this committee procedure, there is a need for stakeholders to be properly involved, notably in the discussions on common methods for substantiation. The EESC suggests involving participatory forums, such as the Consultation Forum for Ecodesign and the EU Eco-labelling Board, or establishing a new round table specifically for the purpose of this legislation. |
| --- | --- |

3.17.

The EESC would encourage the Commission to adopt all measures necessary — including involving the social partners in the process — to protect consumers and companies from greenwashing. In particular, the EESC suggests that provision be made for regular cross-checks between national authorities on the one hand, and social partners and civil society at national level on the other. On European-level measures, the EESC welcomes the committee procedure provided for in Article 19 and requests that it be able to participate in the committee as the European representative of civil society. Besides this committee procedure, there is a need for stakeholders to be properly involved, notably in the discussions on common methods for substantiation. The EESC suggests involving participatory forums, such as the Consultation Forum for Ecodesign and the EU Eco-labelling Board, or establishing a new round table specifically for the purpose of this legislation.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “A new Circular Economy Action Plan For a cleaner and more competitive Europe”
  ’ (COM(2020) 98 final) (OJ C 364, 28.10.2020, p. 94) and Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Consumers in the circular economy’ (OJ C 353, 18.10.2019, p. 11).

1

(2)  COM(2019) 640 final, 11 December 2019.

2

(3)  COM(2020) 98 final, 11 March 2020.

3

(4)  COM(2020) 696 final, 13 November 2020.

4

(5)  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU as regards empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices and better information, COM(2022) 143 final.

5

(6)  Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive) (OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22).

6

(7)  European Commission, Behavioural Study on Consumers’ engagement in the circular economy, 2018, p. 10.

7

(8)  The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, An Eco-wakening: Measuring global awareness, engagement and action for nature, 2021 (WWF).

8

(9)  Environmental claims for non-food products, study commissioned by DG JUST (2014) https://commission.europa.eu/publications/environmental-claims-non-food-products_en

9

(10)  Authority for Consumers & Markets: ACM consumers find claims regarding carbon offset unclear (accessed January 2023) https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/acm-consumers-find-claims-regarding-carbon-offset-unclear

10

Verbraucherzentrale (September 2022) Klimaneutrale Produkte: 89 Prozent für klare Regeln und geprüftes Siegel https://www.verbraucherzentrale.nrw/pressemeldungen/presse-nrw/klimaneutrale-produkte-89-prozent-fuer-klare-regeln-und-geprueftes-siegel-77472

ASA (October 2022) New Research into understanding of environmental claims https://www.asa.org.uk/news/new-research-into-understanding-of-environmental-claims.html

Kantar Public (2022) CO2 Offset claims — Consumer survey https://www.acm.nl/system/files/documents/acm-publishes-behavioral-research-into-co2-compensation-when-purchasing-airline-tickets.pdf

2

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| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/91 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/91

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of EU macro-regional strategies

(COM(2022) 705 final)

(2023/C 293/14)

| Rapporteur: | Stefano PALMIERI |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Dimitris DIMITRIADIS |

Rapporteur:

Stefano PALMIERI

Stefano PALMIERI

Co-rapporteur:

Dimitris DIMITRIADIS

Dimitris DIMITRIADIS

| Referral | European Commission, 2.5.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion |
| Adopted in section | 30.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 169/1/2 |

Referral

European Commission, 2.5.2023

Legal basis

Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion

Adopted in section

30.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

169/1/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) acknowledges that macro-regional strategies (MRS) play an important role in the social, territorial and economic cohesion of the regions, and contribute to the European integration of neighbouring countries. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) acknowledges that macro-regional strategies (MRS) play an important role in the social, territorial and economic cohesion of the regions, and contribute to the European integration of neighbouring countries.

| 1.2. | The EESC points out that MRS address issues requiring several countries (and different actors within them) to cooperate based on a cross-sectoral and multi-level governance approach. Thus, the different actors should try to: make the coexistence between national interest and the principle of cooperation possible while also mitigating bureaucratic and complex procedures that makes MRS less attractive. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC points out that MRS address issues requiring several countries (and different actors within them) to cooperate based on a cross-sectoral and multi-level governance approach. Thus, the different actors should try to: make the coexistence between national interest and the principle of cooperation possible while also mitigating bureaucratic and complex procedures that makes MRS less attractive.

| 1.3. | The EESC believes more efforts should be made in order to strengthen MRS so that they can be leaders for change, inspire confidence and promote European values, especially with respect to the social, territorial and economic cohesion of the regions and the integration of neighbouring countries, as well as the 2030 Agenda. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

The EESC believes more efforts should be made in order to strengthen MRS so that they can be leaders for change, inspire confidence and promote European values, especially with respect to the social, territorial and economic cohesion of the regions and the integration of neighbouring countries, as well as the 2030 Agenda.

| 1.4. | The EESC notes that the MRS have been useful tools in dealing with the health crisis and the effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, the EUSDR and the EUSBR have played an important role in increasing links between Ukraine and the EU for the integration of Ukrainian refugees and creating safe freight corridors. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

The EESC notes that the MRS have been useful tools in dealing with the health crisis and the effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, the EUSDR and the EUSBR have played an important role in increasing links between Ukraine and the EU for the integration of Ukrainian refugees and creating safe freight corridors.

| 1.5. | Considering the green, digital and social transitions, the EESC notes that the implementation process varies between the various MRS because of different levels and capacities for sectoral policy implementation and non-EU countries’ level of preparedness. The EESC believes it is relevant to address disparities through specific measures, especially with regard to the regions most disadvantaged, to prevent turning economic competitiveness and social cohesion into something problematic that will lead to bigger gaps between regions that are more ‘developed’ and those that are less so. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

Considering the green, digital and social transitions, the EESC notes that the implementation process varies between the various MRS because of different levels and capacities for sectoral policy implementation and non-EU countries’ level of preparedness. The EESC believes it is relevant to address disparities through specific measures, especially with regard to the regions most disadvantaged, to prevent turning economic competitiveness and social cohesion into something problematic that will lead to bigger gaps between regions that are more ‘developed’ and those that are less so.

| 1.6. | The EESC believes it is pivotal to strengthen the link between the green, digital and social transitions to shift the focus from producing ‘more’ to producing ‘better’, thus avoiding the waste of overproduction, in full compliance with the principle of strategic autonomy. In this sense, it is important to valorise smart specialisation and clustering approaches, as well as to supply proper and thorough, relevant education and training. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The EESC believes it is pivotal to strengthen the link between the green, digital and social transitions to shift the focus from producing ‘more’ to producing ‘better’, thus avoiding the waste of overproduction, in full compliance with the principle of strategic autonomy. In this sense, it is important to valorise smart specialisation and clustering approaches, as well as to supply proper and thorough, relevant education and training.

| 1.7. | The EESC takes into consideration the fact that civil society organisations and social partners play a vital role in contributing to better decision-making, in particular by bringing local and regional communities closer to the MRS, and encourages the Member States, but also the European Commission, to make civil society organisations, social partners and regional and local governance even more involved, so that the sense of ownership of the programmes can be strengthened. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

The EESC takes into consideration the fact that civil society organisations and social partners play a vital role in contributing to better decision-making, in particular by bringing local and regional communities closer to the MRS, and encourages the Member States, but also the European Commission, to make civil society organisations, social partners and regional and local governance even more involved, so that the sense of ownership of the programmes can be strengthened.

| 1.8. | Moreover, it becomes important for the efficiency and effectiveness of the four MRS to strengthen the capacity building of local state and non-state actors. The EESC considers it important that information and training processes are launched for these actors. In this context, the EESC proposes establishing a system for the short- and medium-duration exchange of civil servants between the regions of the MRS, similar to the Erasmus programme. The EESC welcomes the initiative to establish an institutionalised citizen’s dialogue across macro-regions, and believes that it could help in this respect. It is also important that the EESC, the house of organised civil society and social partners, play a more active role and be part of the governing board of all MRS. In this way, synergies and cooperation can become more effective and visible. In this regard, the EESC the EESC proposes organising forums with the representatives of civil society and social partners in MRS Member States. |
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1.8.

Moreover, it becomes important for the efficiency and effectiveness of the four MRS to strengthen the capacity building of local state and non-state actors. The EESC considers it important that information and training processes are launched for these actors. In this context, the EESC proposes establishing a system for the short- and medium-duration exchange of civil servants between the regions of the MRS, similar to the Erasmus programme. The EESC welcomes the initiative to establish an institutionalised citizen’s dialogue across macro-regions, and believes that it could help in this respect. It is also important that the EESC, the house of organised civil society and social partners, play a more active role and be part of the governing board of all MRS. In this way, synergies and cooperation can become more effective and visible. In this regard, the EESC the EESC proposes organising forums with the representatives of civil society and social partners in MRS Member States.

| 1.9. | Moreover, the EESC calls on all MRS to explore the possibilities for reversing the lacking involvement of local key drivers for development (SMEs, existing industrial clusters, local bank, social enterprises, trade unions, academia, NGOs, and other CSOs), and of multinational corporations and international financial institutions and banks, which is crucial. In the context of MRS, the adoption of the partnership principle should be fully implemented with the full involvement of the stakeholders concerned. |
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1.9.

Moreover, the EESC calls on all MRS to explore the possibilities for reversing the lacking involvement of local key drivers for development (SMEs, existing industrial clusters, local bank, social enterprises, trade unions, academia, NGOs, and other CSOs), and of multinational corporations and international financial institutions and banks, which is crucial. In the context of MRS, the adoption of the partnership principle should be fully implemented with the full involvement of the stakeholders concerned.

| 1.10. | The EESC points out the relevance of aligning the MRS with the objectives of the 2030 Agenda and creating complementarity with those of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy to make the macro-regional initiatives more effective. |
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1.10.

The EESC points out the relevance of aligning the MRS with the objectives of the 2030 Agenda and creating complementarity with those of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy to make the macro-regional initiatives more effective.

| 1.11. | Despite the European Commission’s efforts to increase the visibility of the MRS, the EESC believes that better communication does not depend on one key actor only, but on a greater engagement of Member States and third countries participating in the MRS. The EESC can help in this direction, and the multilevel participation of civil society in this can be essential. |
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1.11.

Despite the European Commission’s efforts to increase the visibility of the MRS, the EESC believes that better communication does not depend on one key actor only, but on a greater engagement of Member States and third countries participating in the MRS. The EESC can help in this direction, and the multilevel participation of civil society in this can be essential.

| 1.12. | The EESC suggests that a different approach to MRS governance should be considered. As the political level is represented by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the operational level should be strengthened with enhanced cooperation with the Ministries of EU Affairs and the Ministries for EU Funds. Participation of regional authorities, empowering their administrational capacity and reinforcing spatial planning, is also crucial for the implementation of the MRS. |
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1.12.

The EESC suggests that a different approach to MRS governance should be considered. As the political level is represented by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the operational level should be strengthened with enhanced cooperation with the Ministries of EU Affairs and the Ministries for EU Funds. Participation of regional authorities, empowering their administrational capacity and reinforcing spatial planning, is also crucial for the implementation of the MRS.

| 1.13. | The EESC hopes that, with the approval of the Report by the European Parliament’s Regional Development Committee, the conditions will be ripe for an MRS to be implemented in the western Mediterranean regions as well. |
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1.13.

The EESC hopes that, with the approval of the Report by the European Parliament’s Regional Development Committee, the conditions will be ripe for an MRS to be implemented in the western Mediterranean regions as well.

| 1.14. | As part of the evaluation process of the future cohesion policy, it will be necessary to carefully evaluate the improvements to be made to the MRS in order to unleash their full potential. |
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1.14.

As part of the evaluation process of the future cohesion policy, it will be necessary to carefully evaluate the improvements to be made to the MRS in order to unleash their full potential.

2.   Introduction

Introduction

| 2.1. | Since 2009, the European Union (EU) has defined macro-regional strategies as integrated, enhanced cooperation frameworks that enable countries located in the same area to jointly address common challenges, or to make the most of their common potential. |
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2.1.

Since 2009, the European Union (EU) has defined macro-regional strategies as integrated, enhanced cooperation frameworks that enable countries located in the same area to jointly address common challenges, or to make the most of their common potential.

| 2.2. | Member States and non-EU countries sharing the same geographical area initiate a macro-regional strategy and set its objectives; the area covered by the strategy is identified on the basis of physical characteristics (a river basin, sea basin, mountain range, etc.) and builds upon pre-existing, historical socioeconomic and cultural links as the necessary response to the challenges resulting from a rapid evolving expansion of the EU. |
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2.2.

Member States and non-EU countries sharing the same geographical area initiate a macro-regional strategy and set its objectives; the area covered by the strategy is identified on the basis of physical characteristics (a river basin, sea basin, mountain range, etc.) and builds upon pre-existing, historical socioeconomic and cultural links as the necessary response to the challenges resulting from a rapid evolving expansion of the EU.

| 2.3. | Macro-regional strategies provide integrated, enhanced cooperation frameworks for jointly addressing challenges and opportunities in specific areas of the EU, where these cannot be addressed individually with common tools. Moreover, given present circumstances, they can be a significant instrument to promote the spatial expansion of EU-outreach. |
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2.3.

Macro-regional strategies provide integrated, enhanced cooperation frameworks for jointly addressing challenges and opportunities in specific areas of the EU, where these cannot be addressed individually with common tools. Moreover, given present circumstances, they can be a significant instrument to promote the spatial expansion of EU-outreach.

| 2.4. | With this opinion, the EESC will provide its assessment of the 4th report on the implementation of European Union macro-regional strategies, taking account of the fact that during the reporting period, from mid-2020 to mid-2022, the 19 EU Member States and 10 non-EU countries that are part of the EU macro-regional strategies have shown remarkable resilience in severe and continuous external shocks, and had to transform their regular cooperation actions into solidarity activities in order to tackle together the effects of COVID-19 and Russia’s unjustified military aggression against Ukraine. |
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2.4.

With this opinion, the EESC will provide its assessment of the 4th report on the implementation of European Union macro-regional strategies, taking account of the fact that during the reporting period, from mid-2020 to mid-2022, the 19 EU Member States and 10 non-EU countries that are part of the EU macro-regional strategies have shown remarkable resilience in severe and continuous external shocks, and had to transform their regular cooperation actions into solidarity activities in order to tackle together the effects of COVID-19 and Russia’s unjustified military aggression against Ukraine.

3.   General assessment of the implementation of the macro-regional strategies

General assessment of the implementation of the macro-regional strategies

3.1.   The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR)

The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR)

| 3.1.1. | The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, launched in 2009, involves eight EU Member States and four neighbouring third countries. The strategy has three key objectives — save the sea; connect the region; and increase prosperity — and is subdivided thematically into 14 interconnected policy areas, including risks, the bioeconomy, health and education. |
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3.1.1.

The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, launched in 2009, involves eight EU Member States and four neighbouring third countries. The strategy has three key objectives — save the sea; connect the region; and increase prosperity — and is subdivided thematically into 14 interconnected policy areas, including risks, the bioeconomy, health and education.

| 3.1.2. | In terms of funding, the Interreg Baltic Sea Region programme has played a key role in financing the implementation of the macro-region from the beginning. From 2014-2020, the Interreg programme contributed around EUR 278 million to the implementation of projects in the region. For the period 2021-2027, the Interreg Baltic Sea Region programme will have a budget of EUR 259 million. |
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3.1.2.

In terms of funding, the Interreg Baltic Sea Region programme has played a key role in financing the implementation of the macro-region from the beginning. From 2014-2020, the Interreg programme contributed around EUR 278 million to the implementation of projects in the region. For the period 2021-2027, the Interreg Baltic Sea Region programme will have a budget of EUR 259 million.

| 3.1.3. | In 2021, the EUSBSR Action Plan was revised. The number of actions was reduced, a system to facilitate closer cooperation between stakeholders (including economic and social partners) was introduced, and a new tool — the Baltic Sea Strategy Point (BSP) — was established to provide administrative and technical support for managing, developing and communicating the strategy. |
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3.1.3.

In 2021, the EUSBSR Action Plan was revised. The number of actions was reduced, a system to facilitate closer cooperation between stakeholders (including economic and social partners) was introduced, and a new tool — the Baltic Sea Strategy Point (BSP) — was established to provide administrative and technical support for managing, developing and communicating the strategy.

| 3.1.4. | The EUSBSR has supported the regions involved in achieving the sustainable and smart growth targets set. Despite the fact that suspending cooperation with Russia and Belarus following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has created an obstacle to solving the main problems in the region, the strategy has the potential to address emerging challenges. |
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3.1.4.

The EUSBSR has supported the regions involved in achieving the sustainable and smart growth targets set. Despite the fact that suspending cooperation with Russia and Belarus following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has created an obstacle to solving the main problems in the region, the strategy has the potential to address emerging challenges.

3.2.   The European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR)

The European Union Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR)

| 3.2.1. | The EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR), launched in December 2010 and updated in 2020, includes 14 countries (9 EU Member States and 5 non-EU countries) and is structured around four main pillars: (1) connecting the region; (2) protecting the environment; (3) building prosperity; and (4) strengthening the region. These four objectives are further divided into 12 priority areas. |
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3.2.1.

The EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR), launched in December 2010 and updated in 2020, includes 14 countries (9 EU Member States and 5 non-EU countries) and is structured around four main pillars: (1) connecting the region; (2) protecting the environment; (3) building prosperity; and (4) strengthening the region. These four objectives are further divided into 12 priority areas.

| 3.2.2. | As regards funding, during the 2014-2020 period, primary support was provided by the Interreg Danube Transnational Programme amounting to a total of EUR 231 million. For the period 2021-2027 however, the programme is providing a total of EUR 213,1 million. |
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3.2.2.

As regards funding, during the 2014-2020 period, primary support was provided by the Interreg Danube Transnational Programme amounting to a total of EUR 231 million. For the period 2021-2027 however, the programme is providing a total of EUR 213,1 million.

| 3.2.3. | In 2020, the Action Plan was modified to put its activities on a strategic footing and reorganise the objectives. The purpose of the update was three-fold: to streamline the actions by reducing the number of them from 137 to 85; to make the action plan a document that provides strategic guidance for the implementation of the EUSDR; to make the action plan more consistent with other financing programmes and instruments, in particular with cohesion policy programmes, but also other EU funding programmes and instruments, and with national, regional and local funding from Danube countries. The revision of the action plan aligned the actions provided for by the EUSDR with the EU’s new priorities, including the European Green Deal. Considerable steps have been made through youth involvement activities and strengthening cooperation with EU funds. |
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3.2.3.

In 2020, the Action Plan was modified to put its activities on a strategic footing and reorganise the objectives. The purpose of the update was three-fold: to streamline the actions by reducing the number of them from 137 to 85; to make the action plan a document that provides strategic guidance for the implementation of the EUSDR; to make the action plan more consistent with other financing programmes and instruments, in particular with cohesion policy programmes, but also other EU funding programmes and instruments, and with national, regional and local funding from Danube countries. The revision of the action plan aligned the actions provided for by the EUSDR with the EU’s new priorities, including the European Green Deal. Considerable steps have been made through youth involvement activities and strengthening cooperation with EU funds.

| 3.2.4. | Nevertheless, despite this update, the Danube macro-regional strategy faces a number of issues that are slowing down its implementation: tangible socioeconomic differences across the Danube region, a lack of financial resources and weak political commitment among the countries involved. Moreover, participating countries have to contend with broader global challenges such as the post-pandemic recovery, climate change and the digital transition, all of which could divert their attention from their efforts to improve the implementation of the EUSDR. |
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3.2.4.

Nevertheless, despite this update, the Danube macro-regional strategy faces a number of issues that are slowing down its implementation: tangible socioeconomic differences across the Danube region, a lack of financial resources and weak political commitment among the countries involved. Moreover, participating countries have to contend with broader global challenges such as the post-pandemic recovery, climate change and the digital transition, all of which could divert their attention from their efforts to improve the implementation of the EUSDR.

3.3.   The EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR)

The EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR)

| 3.3.1. | Launched in 2014, the EUSAIR brings together ten countries (four EU Member States and six non-EU countries). The strategy is built on four main pillars: blue growth; connecting the region; environmental quality; and sustainable tourism. The EUSAIR Facility Point provides operational support for coordination and implementation. |
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3.3.1.

Launched in 2014, the EUSAIR brings together ten countries (four EU Member States and six non-EU countries). The strategy is built on four main pillars: blue growth; connecting the region; environmental quality; and sustainable tourism. The EUSAIR Facility Point provides operational support for coordination and implementation.

| 3.3.2. | With regard to funding for the 2014-2020 period, the Interreg ADRION programme made EUR 118 million available to finance projects under the four EUSAIR pillars, including support for EUSAIR governance under priority axis 4. For the period 2021-2027, EUR 136,7 million will be available under the Interreg Adriatic-Ionian programme. |
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3.3.2.

With regard to funding for the 2014-2020 period, the Interreg ADRION programme made EUR 118 million available to finance projects under the four EUSAIR pillars, including support for EUSAIR governance under priority axis 4. For the period 2021-2027, EUR 136,7 million will be available under the Interreg Adriatic-Ionian programme.

| 3.3.3. | The EESC notes with satisfaction the efforts in the EUSAIR for the set-up of a Youth Council in this strategy. It calls on the other MRS to strengthen the functioning of Youth Councils. It calls on all MRS to empower the Youth Councils and institutionalise the dialogue with them, probably in the framework of the annual fora. |
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3.3.3.

The EESC notes with satisfaction the efforts in the EUSAIR for the set-up of a Youth Council in this strategy. It calls on the other MRS to strengthen the functioning of Youth Councils. It calls on all MRS to empower the Youth Councils and institutionalise the dialogue with them, probably in the framework of the annual fora.

| 3.3.4. | In November 2021, the EU reshaped the EUSAIR brand identity through the ‘Report on the repositioning of the European Union Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR)’, with the aim of making it more comprehensible to its target audience. It recommends further aligning EUSAIR with the EU’s political priorities such as the European Green Deal and the digital transition, while placing civil society and young people at the centre of its own priorities. |
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3.3.4.

In November 2021, the EU reshaped the EUSAIR brand identity through the ‘Report on the repositioning of the European Union Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR)’, with the aim of making it more comprehensible to its target audience. It recommends further aligning EUSAIR with the EU’s political priorities such as the European Green Deal and the digital transition, while placing civil society and young people at the centre of its own priorities.

| 3.3.5. | With reference to the progress EUSAIR has made, despite the results achieved in terms of stability in the region and convergence between countries, there are still some untapped opportunities for achieving synergies with other multilateral initiatives in the macro-region, and disparities between the EU and non-EU countries. The strategy encompasses too many dimensions, covers a very complex and diverse geography and has too many objectives. |
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3.3.5.

With reference to the progress EUSAIR has made, despite the results achieved in terms of stability in the region and convergence between countries, there are still some untapped opportunities for achieving synergies with other multilateral initiatives in the macro-region, and disparities between the EU and non-EU countries. The strategy encompasses too many dimensions, covers a very complex and diverse geography and has too many objectives.

3.4.   The EU strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP)

The EU strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP)

| 3.4.1. | The macro-regional strategy for the Alpine region (EUSALP), launched in 2015, is the most recent strategy to be approved by the EU. It involves seven countries, of which five are EU Member States and two are non-EU countries. The strategy has three thematic areas: economic growth and innovation; mobility and connectivity; and environment and energy. The three thematic areas are complemented by a cross-cutting policy on governance which aims to provide a sound macro-regional governance model for the region. |
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3.4.1.

The macro-regional strategy for the Alpine region (EUSALP), launched in 2015, is the most recent strategy to be approved by the EU. It involves seven countries, of which five are EU Member States and two are non-EU countries. The strategy has three thematic areas: economic growth and innovation; mobility and connectivity; and environment and energy. The three thematic areas are complemented by a cross-cutting policy on governance which aims to provide a sound macro-regional governance model for the region.

| 3.4.2. | As regards funding from 2014-2020, the Interreg Alpine Space programme made EUR 139 million available for the region, while for the period 2021-2027, a total of EUR 107 million is available for four priority areas aimed at achieving a climate-resilient, green and carbon-neutral Alpine region. |
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3.4.2.

As regards funding from 2014-2020, the Interreg Alpine Space programme made EUR 139 million available for the region, while for the period 2021-2027, a total of EUR 107 million is available for four priority areas aimed at achieving a climate-resilient, green and carbon-neutral Alpine region.

| 3.4.3. | Despite the clear divide between urban and rural mountainous areas, the macro-region has a strong socioeconomic interdependence. Some of the countries participating in EUSALP (Germany, Italy, Austria, and Slovenia) are involved in other macro-regional strategies, which has led to challenges. More engagement in governance processes is clearly needed to transform overlaps into complementarities. |
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3.4.3.

Despite the clear divide between urban and rural mountainous areas, the macro-region has a strong socioeconomic interdependence. Some of the countries participating in EUSALP (Germany, Italy, Austria, and Slovenia) are involved in other macro-regional strategies, which has led to challenges. More engagement in governance processes is clearly needed to transform overlaps into complementarities.

| 3.4.4. | Compared to the other macro-regional strategies, the EUSALP is well structured. This is due to the fact that the Alpine region has a structured, institutional fabric and a long-standing tradition of cooperation through the Alpine Convention and other initiatives such as Arge Alp, Euromontana, Alliance in the Alps (local authorities), ALPARC (network of protected areas) and the International Scientific Committee for Research in the Alps, as well as other organisations operating in the region. The two non-EU countries, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, have a high institutional and administrative capacity that enables them to cooperate with the EU Member States at the same level. |
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3.4.4.

Compared to the other macro-regional strategies, the EUSALP is well structured. This is due to the fact that the Alpine region has a structured, institutional fabric and a long-standing tradition of cooperation through the Alpine Convention and other initiatives such as Arge Alp, Euromontana, Alliance in the Alps (local authorities), ALPARC (network of protected areas) and the International Scientific Committee for Research in the Alps, as well as other organisations operating in the region. The two non-EU countries, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, have a high institutional and administrative capacity that enables them to cooperate with the EU Member States at the same level.

4.   The macro-regional landscape and the war in Ukraine

The macro-regional landscape and the war in Ukraine

| 4.1. | The macro-regional strategies have been directly and indirectly affected by the war in Ukraine. The EU macro-regional strategies’ cooperation activities have had to focus on solidarity initiatives to jointly address the effects of Russia’s unjustified military aggression against Ukraine. |
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4.1.

The macro-regional strategies have been directly and indirectly affected by the war in Ukraine. The EU macro-regional strategies’ cooperation activities have had to focus on solidarity initiatives to jointly address the effects of Russia’s unjustified military aggression against Ukraine.

| 4.2. | Of the four macro-regional strategies, the EUSDR and the EUSBSR are the ones that have definitely had a ‘direct’ influence on the implementation of cooperation activities;






  — | the EUSDR and the EUSBR (including their CSOs and social partners), have played an important role in supporting Ukraine since the war, helping to increase links between Ukraine and the EU. The activities have focused on the integration of Ukrainian refugees and on creating safe freight corridors. This commitment was strongly demonstrated by the Ukrainian presidency of the Danube Strategy in 2022. Despite the war, Ukraine has considerably increased its involvement in all priority areas of the Danube Strategy; |
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4.2.

Of the four macro-regional strategies, the EUSDR and the EUSBSR are the ones that have definitely had a ‘direct’ influence on the implementation of cooperation activities;

—

the EUSDR and the EUSBR (including their CSOs and social partners), have played an important role in supporting Ukraine since the war, helping to increase links between Ukraine and the EU. The activities have focused on the integration of Ukrainian refugees and on creating safe freight corridors. This commitment was strongly demonstrated by the Ukrainian presidency of the Danube Strategy in 2022. Despite the war, Ukraine has considerably increased its involvement in all priority areas of the Danube Strategy;

| — | the EUSBSR has suspended all cooperation with Russia and Belarus. This is also why the strategy is now moving in the direction of further strengthening its role as a strategic interface for cooperation between the EU Member States, Norway and Iceland. |
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—

the EUSBSR has suspended all cooperation with Russia and Belarus. This is also why the strategy is now moving in the direction of further strengthening its role as a strategic interface for cooperation between the EU Member States, Norway and Iceland.

| 4.2.1. | Nevertheless, although the long-term orientation of macro-regional strategies should not be easily adjusted, specifically, the structural changes in the global geopolitical scene — the war in Ukraine is a main incident in this frame — affects the content of all four MRS, since they reinstate the significance of cross-regional/cross-border cohesion and collaboration in Europe itself, and the Eurasian space as well. |
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4.2.1.

Nevertheless, although the long-term orientation of macro-regional strategies should not be easily adjusted, specifically, the structural changes in the global geopolitical scene — the war in Ukraine is a main incident in this frame — affects the content of all four MRS, since they reinstate the significance of cross-regional/cross-border cohesion and collaboration in Europe itself, and the Eurasian space as well.

5.   The role and impact of the macro-regional strategies in the implementation of the green, digital and social transition processes

The role and impact of the macro-regional strategies in the implementation of the green, digital and social transition processes

| 5.1. | Despite the fact that the four macro-regional strategies (MRS) support the achievement of the targets set for the EU’s green, digital and social transitions, it is clear that the implementation process varies between the various MRS because of different levels and capacities for sectoral policy implementation (environment, digital/innovation and social) and non-EU countries’ level of preparedness for dealing with the challenges of the ‘transitions’. |
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5.1.

Despite the fact that the four macro-regional strategies (MRS) support the achievement of the targets set for the EU’s green, digital and social transitions, it is clear that the implementation process varies between the various MRS because of different levels and capacities for sectoral policy implementation (environment, digital/innovation and social) and non-EU countries’ level of preparedness for dealing with the challenges of the ‘transitions’.

| 5.2. | It should be pointed out that if such differences are not addressed through specific support and funding measures, especially with regard to the MRS in most difficulty, then something that has the potential to drive economic competitiveness and social cohesion risks turning into something problematic that will lead to bigger gaps between regions that are more ‘developed’ and those that are less so. This is also challenging in case of the peripheral or remote regions that are always disadvantaged compared to central, urban or metropolitan-region ones. Here the support and incentives for regional, cross-border cooperation can be very beneficial. |
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5.2.

It should be pointed out that if such differences are not addressed through specific support and funding measures, especially with regard to the MRS in most difficulty, then something that has the potential to drive economic competitiveness and social cohesion risks turning into something problematic that will lead to bigger gaps between regions that are more ‘developed’ and those that are less so. This is also challenging in case of the peripheral or remote regions that are always disadvantaged compared to central, urban or metropolitan-region ones. Here the support and incentives for regional, cross-border cooperation can be very beneficial.

| 5.3. | A close look at the 4th report, and an analysis of the projects funded by Interreg programmes active from 2014-2020, reveals that there is a close link between the green and digital transitions. Various projects were launched and implemented, but it is not clear whether these initiatives were actually effective in bringing about change. The EESC believes that the results achieved should be capitalised on through the opportunities available under 2021-2027 Interreg programmes. |
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5.3.

A close look at the 4th report, and an analysis of the projects funded by Interreg programmes active from 2014-2020, reveals that there is a close link between the green and digital transitions. Various projects were launched and implemented, but it is not clear whether these initiatives were actually effective in bringing about change. The EESC believes that the results achieved should be capitalised on through the opportunities available under 2021-2027 Interreg programmes.

| 5.4. | For the EESC, where all MRS fall short is the fact that the green and digital transition processes are less linked to the social ones, limiting, in many cases, the social dimension to forms of involvement and participation of groups that do not fully represent the needs and interests of civil society and social partners. In its exploratory opinion on Towards a better economic convergence and competitiveness within macro-regions, such as the European Strategy for the Danube region — the role of transnational clusters (1), the EESC pointed out that performance, in terms of reducing social and spatial disparities and boosting environmental sustainability, remains modest, most likely due to the complexity of governance and intergovernmental arrangements, the level of bureaucracy, the lack of cross-regional homogeneity and the insufficient involvement of social partners, socioeconomic agents and civil society organisations. |
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5.4.

For the EESC, where all MRS fall short is the fact that the green and digital transition processes are less linked to the social ones, limiting, in many cases, the social dimension to forms of involvement and participation of groups that do not fully represent the needs and interests of civil society and social partners. In its exploratory opinion on Towards a better economic convergence and competitiveness within macro-regions, such as the European Strategy for the Danube region — the role of transnational clusters

1

| 5.5. | The aim of the green and digital transition strategies is to shift the focus from producing ‘more’ to producing ‘better’. Although this approach is correct and in line with the EESC’s guidelines, it poses problems that, if not addressed, could transform added value into something detrimental. Employment levels and tax revenues are closely related to GDP growth; if GDP shrinks, it is more difficult to fund health, education and social justice. |
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5.5.

The aim of the green and digital transition strategies is to shift the focus from producing ‘more’ to producing ‘better’. Although this approach is correct and in line with the EESC’s guidelines, it poses problems that, if not addressed, could transform added value into something detrimental. Employment levels and tax revenues are closely related to GDP growth; if GDP shrinks, it is more difficult to fund health, education and social justice.

| 5.6. | The EU’s response to this paradox is the European Green Deal, a set of measures to support sustainable economic growth, taking account of the environment, natural resources and social cohesion. Despite the strategic nature of the European Green Deal, there are many factors that could jeopardise its success to support the transitions. The reduction in available human resources and the increase in health and pension expenditure risk reducing the resources needed to support investments in the ‘green and digital transitions’ in the MRS. |
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5.6.

The EU’s response to this paradox is the European Green Deal, a set of measures to support sustainable economic growth, taking account of the environment, natural resources and social cohesion. Despite the strategic nature of the European Green Deal, there are many factors that could jeopardise its success to support the transitions. The reduction in available human resources and the increase in health and pension expenditure risk reducing the resources needed to support investments in the ‘green and digital transitions’ in the MRS.

| 5.7. | The twin transitions (green and digital), especially at MRS level, risks being a necessary but inadequate tool that requires additional measures to achieve the holistic, sustainable economic development of society alongside economic growth. |
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5.7.

The twin transitions (green and digital), especially at MRS level, risks being a necessary but inadequate tool that requires additional measures to achieve the holistic, sustainable economic development of society alongside economic growth.

| 5.7.1. | Smart specialisation and clusters are important for the twin transition: (i) promoting networking and establishing clusters amongst companies has been one of the most successful ways to support innovation and development among SMEs; (ii) intermediation in the form of consulting and administrative services (through regional development agencies, chambers of commerce, cluster managers, etc.) boosts the effectiveness of networking and clustering (compared to the content of the EESC exploratory opinion (2)). |
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5.7.1.

Smart specialisation and clusters are important for the twin transition: (i) promoting networking and establishing clusters amongst companies has been one of the most successful ways to support innovation and development among SMEs; (ii) intermediation in the form of consulting and administrative services (through regional development agencies, chambers of commerce, cluster managers, etc.) boosts the effectiveness of networking and clustering (compared to the content of the EESC exploratory opinion (2

| 5.8. | Additionally, the EESC supports the fact that in order to help transform the digital and green transitions from challenges into real opportunities, we have to strengthen the social transition, creating co-development platforms where civil society and social partners are given a leading role, so that social and economic partners’ needs and issues can be at the core of development and cohesion choices. |
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5.8.

Additionally, the EESC supports the fact that in order to help transform the digital and green transitions from challenges into real opportunities, we have to strengthen the social transition, creating co-development platforms where civil society and social partners are given a leading role, so that social and economic partners’ needs and issues can be at the core of development and cohesion choices.

| 5.9. | The MRS should be used as test platforms for shaping innovative instruments such as ‘sustainable taxation and incentives systems’ initiatives, or the creation of a tax system that helps to provide for society’s needs, even in the face of weak or negative economic growth. Such measures are evolved forms of resilience that are capable of anticipating crises, which now regularly affect the regions of the MRS. |
| --- | --- |

5.9.

The MRS should be used as test platforms for shaping innovative instruments such as ‘sustainable taxation and incentives systems’ initiatives, or the creation of a tax system that helps to provide for society’s needs, even in the face of weak or negative economic growth. Such measures are evolved forms of resilience that are capable of anticipating crises, which now regularly affect the regions of the MRS.

| 5.10. | MRS should be used as tools to support ‘cultural change’, to plan strategies and implement measures that can help to achieve cohesion policy and Agenda 2030 objectives. In this regard, the EESC highlights the low level of cooperation between the various MRS and, consequently, the need to strengthen and promote trans-macro-regional capacity building tools. |
| --- | --- |

5.10.

MRS should be used as tools to support ‘cultural change’, to plan strategies and implement measures that can help to achieve cohesion policy and Agenda 2030 objectives. In this regard, the EESC highlights the low level of cooperation between the various MRS and, consequently, the need to strengthen and promote trans-macro-regional capacity building tools.

| 5.11. | In order to adapt to the digital transition especially, MRS should be supported, mainly through the supply of proper and thorough education and training. Given the variety of MRS participating countries (EU Member States, candidate countries, etc.), there is a need to close the gap between them with respect to this. In his exploratory opinion (3), the EESC supports that, in the future, MRS will significantly benefit from efficient networks for educational activities with respect to the digitalisation of production, as well as from initiatives towards effective interregional research and innovation ecosystems, in basic and applied R & D activities. |
| --- | --- |

5.11.

In order to adapt to the digital transition especially, MRS should be supported, mainly through the supply of proper and thorough education and training. Given the variety of MRS participating countries (EU Member States, candidate countries, etc.), there is a need to close the gap between them with respect to this. In his exploratory opinion (3

6.   The territorial dimension of macro-regional strategies and the involvement of civil society and social partners

The territorial dimension of macro-regional strategies and the involvement of civil society and social partners

| 6.1. | Although the macro-regional strategies are aligned with the overall objective of cohesion policy, the EESC believes that in order to help boost economic, social and territorial cohesion, bottom-up initiatives need to be consolidated and improved. This especially concerns programming and planning activities, such as setting up implementation tools for indirectly managed EU funds. |
| --- | --- |

6.1.

Although the macro-regional strategies are aligned with the overall objective of cohesion policy, the EESC believes that in order to help boost economic, social and territorial cohesion, bottom-up initiatives need to be consolidated and improved. This especially concerns programming and planning activities, such as setting up implementation tools for indirectly managed EU funds.

| 6.2. | The EESC believes that the territorial approach should become the focus when implementing MRS, in contrast to certain situations where MRS seem to be the tool for applying European strategies at regional and local level. Rather, European strategies should be the receptacles for launching initiatives similar to CLLD (Community-led local development) so that measures can be identified on the basis of the territories where action is needed. |
| --- | --- |

6.2.

The EESC believes that the territorial approach should become the focus when implementing MRS, in contrast to certain situations where MRS seem to be the tool for applying European strategies at regional and local level. Rather, European strategies should be the receptacles for launching initiatives similar to CLLD (Community-led local development) so that measures can be identified on the basis of the territories where action is needed.

| 6.3. | Citizens’ involvement, ownership and motivation can be enhanced by stronger involvement of local and regional governance and by small regional or cross-border regional projects where the results are direct and visible. Good examples are the health-emergency and hospital urgency cooperation projects or the similarly structured catastrophe-defence cooperation project facing the same type of problems to solve, but also providing similar benefits. |
| --- | --- |

6.3.

Citizens’ involvement, ownership and motivation can be enhanced by stronger involvement of local and regional governance and by small regional or cross-border regional projects where the results are direct and visible. Good examples are the health-emergency and hospital urgency cooperation projects or the similarly structured catastrophe-defence cooperation project facing the same type of problems to solve, but also providing similar benefits.

| 6.4. | In addition to strong political support, the challenges that macro-regions have faced, including COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, and those that they will have to face in the coming years, require the greater involvement of civil society and social partners in the governance and implementation process, as well as a business system boosted by measures to help the competitiveness of SMEs. |
| --- | --- |

6.4.

In addition to strong political support, the challenges that macro-regions have faced, including COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, and those that they will have to face in the coming years, require the greater involvement of civil society and social partners in the governance and implementation process, as well as a business system boosted by measures to help the competitiveness of SMEs.

| 6.5. | While initiatives have indeed been carried out in each of the MRS, it is clear that whatever has been done must be implemented so that each of the MRS can be given a real cross-cutting dimension (participation of civil society) that complements and enhances the ‘vertical dimension’ (participation of regions and local bodies) and the multilevel governance in full compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, to avoid the objectives of individual States and regions prevailing over common interests. |
| --- | --- |

6.5.

While initiatives have indeed been carried out in each of the MRS, it is clear that whatever has been done must be implemented so that each of the MRS can be given a real cross-cutting dimension (participation of civil society) that complements and enhances the ‘vertical dimension’ (participation of regions and local bodies) and the multilevel governance in full compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, to avoid the objectives of individual States and regions prevailing over common interests.

| 6.6. | The EESC believes that the broadest possible process for training, discussion and sharing of economic, social and environment choices concerning the macro-regions, should be promoted at regional and local level. This could be achieved using certain methods already tested in other contests, based on engagement between local bodies, social and economic partners and other civil society organisations. |
| --- | --- |

6.6.

The EESC believes that the broadest possible process for training, discussion and sharing of economic, social and environment choices concerning the macro-regions, should be promoted at regional and local level. This could be achieved using certain methods already tested in other contests, based on engagement between local bodies, social and economic partners and other civil society organisations.

| 6.7. | Each MRS should ensure the launch of a civil society and social partners forum whose work should dovetail with that of other stakeholder platforms and develop within an operating model that enables the real involvement of representatives of economic and social partners in implementing the strategies at macro-regional, regional and local level. Annual fora of this type may ensure continuity of the MRS, offer opportunities for new innovative ideas as well as for business to business (B-2-B) meetings. Finally, they shall enhance the visibility and communication of the MRS and strengthen the cooperation among macro-regional strategies through the exchange of good practices, primarily among neighbouring ones. The EESC proposes that the specific forums be hosted on rotation in different locations in the regions participating in MRS, and states its willingness to actively support these specific events. |
| --- | --- |

6.7.

Each MRS should ensure the launch of a civil society and social partners forum whose work should dovetail with that of other stakeholder platforms and develop within an operating model that enables the real involvement of representatives of economic and social partners in implementing the strategies at macro-regional, regional and local level. Annual fora of this type may ensure continuity of the MRS, offer opportunities for new innovative ideas as well as for business to business (B-2-B) meetings. Finally, they shall enhance the visibility and communication of the MRS and strengthen the cooperation among macro-regional strategies through the exchange of good practices, primarily among neighbouring ones. The EESC proposes that the specific forums be hosted on rotation in different locations in the regions participating in MRS, and states its willingness to actively support these specific events.

| 6.8. | It is crucial to promote capacity-building activities to support both regional and local authorities, and enhance the proactive participation of organised civil society and social partners in the development processes of MRS. In this context, the partnership principle should apply to SMR projects to ensure local stakeholders are able to actively participate. This should also support awareness-raising and increasing knowledge among citizens of the main topics and activities concerning the MRS. |
| --- | --- |

6.8.

It is crucial to promote capacity-building activities to support both regional and local authorities, and enhance the proactive participation of organised civil society and social partners in the development processes of MRS. In this context, the partnership principle should apply to SMR projects to ensure local stakeholders are able to actively participate. This should also support awareness-raising and increasing knowledge among citizens of the main topics and activities concerning the MRS.

| 6.9. | In particular, the EESC proposes establishing a system for the short- and medium-duration exchange of civil servants between the regions of the MRS, similar to the Erasmus programme, and expresses its willingness to be one of the facilitators of this initiative. We strongly believe that this will considerably help capacity building and awareness raising, and also help to gradually overcome the bureaucratic issues resulting from the various cross-country disparities. |
| --- | --- |

6.9.

In particular, the EESC proposes establishing a system for the short- and medium-duration exchange of civil servants between the regions of the MRS, similar to the Erasmus programme, and expresses its willingness to be one of the facilitators of this initiative. We strongly believe that this will considerably help capacity building and awareness raising, and also help to gradually overcome the bureaucratic issues resulting from the various cross-country disparities.

7.   Other priorities for improving the effectiveness of macro-regional strategies

Other priorities for improving the effectiveness of macro-regional strategies

| 7.1. | Ensuring that MRS are consistent with and aligned to cohesion policy and the 2030 Agenda is a priority to ensure that specific interests do not prevail over common ones. While consistency with cohesion policy priorities is an obligation in the planning and development process of MRS, some MRS have limited alignment with the 2030 Agenda. |
| --- | --- |

7.1.

Ensuring that MRS are consistent with and aligned to cohesion policy and the 2030 Agenda is a priority to ensure that specific interests do not prevail over common ones. While consistency with cohesion policy priorities is an obligation in the planning and development process of MRS, some MRS have limited alignment with the 2030 Agenda.

| 7.2. | As regards the consistency and complementarity of macro-regional strategies with the 2030 Agenda, a positive trajectory has been embarked on by the EUSBSR, through the ‘Baltic 2030 — Bumps on the Road’ initiative. As well as identifying the SDGs that are most consistent with the macro-regional strategy’s priorities, this initiative has established an effective system to support the planning of initiatives and measurement of performance. |
| --- | --- |

7.2.

As regards the consistency and complementarity of macro-regional strategies with the 2030 Agenda, a positive trajectory has been embarked on by the EUSBSR, through the ‘Baltic 2030 — Bumps on the Road’ initiative. As well as identifying the SDGs that are most consistent with the macro-regional strategy’s priorities, this initiative has established an effective system to support the planning of initiatives and measurement of performance.

| 7.3. | Aligning the MRS with the objectives of the 2030 Agenda, and creating complementarity with those of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy, is most certainly a strategic activity that can make the macro-regional initiatives more effective. The following SDGs should be taken into consideration, as a priority:
  3. Good health and well-being; 4. Quality Education; 5 Gender equality; 7. Affordable and clean energy; 8. Decent work and economic growth; 9. Industry, innovation and infrastructure; 11. Sustainable cities and communities; 12. Responsible consumption and production; 13. Climate action; 14. Life below water; 15. Life on land
  . |
| --- | --- |

7.3.

Aligning the MRS with the objectives of the 2030 Agenda, and creating complementarity with those of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy, is most certainly a strategic activity that can make the macro-regional initiatives more effective. The following SDGs should be taken into consideration, as a priority:
  3. Good health and well-being; 4. Quality Education; 5 Gender equality; 7. Affordable and clean energy; 8. Decent work and economic growth; 9. Industry, innovation and infrastructure; 11. Sustainable cities and communities; 12. Responsible consumption and production; 13. Climate action; 14. Life below water; 15. Life on land

| 7.3.1. | Taking into account, however, the high number of areas to address, as well as the limited available resources, a reasonable prioritisation of tasks is advisable along two main distinctive aspects:






  — | Sequencing by actuality, urgency and leadtime. |
| --- | --- | --- |

7.3.1.

Taking into account, however, the high number of areas to address, as well as the limited available resources, a reasonable prioritisation of tasks is advisable along two main distinctive aspects:

—

Sequencing by actuality, urgency and leadtime.

| — | Ranking by the most value-added expected from the macroregional approach. |
| --- | --- |

—

Ranking by the most value-added expected from the macroregional approach.

| 7.4. | The success of macro-regional strategies is clearly linked to their ability to ensure that EU, national, regional and other public and private funds can fund the priorities of the MRS, by supporting projects. It is clear that this priority will need to be strengthened by complementary plans and by synergies between the various financing opportunities, encouraging, where possible, the integration of transnational and cross-border funding with government and regional funding, including through a multi-sectoral approach. |
| --- | --- |

7.4.

The success of macro-regional strategies is clearly linked to their ability to ensure that EU, national, regional and other public and private funds can fund the priorities of the MRS, by supporting projects. It is clear that this priority will need to be strengthened by complementary plans and by synergies between the various financing opportunities, encouraging, where possible, the integration of transnational and cross-border funding with government and regional funding, including through a multi-sectoral approach.

| 7.5. | The direction taken in all MRS, as well as networks of dialogue and cooperation, should be promoted between the managing authorities of the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF), in order to identify problems and opportunities concerning specific topics that can be addressed through different sources of funding. |
| --- | --- |

7.5.

The direction taken in all MRS, as well as networks of dialogue and cooperation, should be promoted between the managing authorities of the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF), in order to identify problems and opportunities concerning specific topics that can be addressed through different sources of funding.

| 7.6. | Finally, the real involvement in the MRS of local key drivers for development (SMEs, existing industrial clusters, local bank, social enterprises, trade union, academia, NGOs, and the others CSOs), and of multinational corporations and international financial institutions and banks, is crucial. In the context of MRS, the adoption of the partnership principle should be fully implemented with the full involvement of the stakeholders concerned. |
| --- | --- |

7.6.

Finally, the real involvement in the MRS of local key drivers for development (SMEs, existing industrial clusters, local bank, social enterprises, trade union, academia, NGOs, and the others CSOs), and of multinational corporations and international financial institutions and banks, is crucial. In the context of MRS, the adoption of the partnership principle should be fully implemented with the full involvement of the stakeholders concerned.

| 7.6.1. | For SMEs, the problem is the limited ability to get the relevant information and the lacking technical ability to utilise the resulting opportunities. Development of business to business and business to governance clusters could be a way to overcome the issue. |
| --- | --- |

7.6.1.

For SMEs, the problem is the limited ability to get the relevant information and the lacking technical ability to utilise the resulting opportunities. Development of business to business and business to governance clusters could be a way to overcome the issue.

8.   The way forward

The way forward

| 8.1. | The future has tougher challenges in store for MRS; if they are not properly addressed at territorial level, they could quickly turn into problems. The EESC takes account of the fact that civil society organisations and social partners play a key role in contributing to improving the decision-making process, particularly by bringing local and regional communities closer to the macro-regional strategies and encouraging Member States, but also the European Commission, to involve civil society and social partners even more, to boost the sense of belonging to the programmes. |
| --- | --- |

8.1.

The future has tougher challenges in store for MRS; if they are not properly addressed at territorial level, they could quickly turn into problems. The EESC takes account of the fact that civil society organisations and social partners play a key role in contributing to improving the decision-making process, particularly by bringing local and regional communities closer to the macro-regional strategies and encouraging Member States, but also the European Commission, to involve civil society and social partners even more, to boost the sense of belonging to the programmes.

| 8.2. | The EESC recognises the fact that macro-regional strategies deal with issues that require multi-country cooperation based on an intersectoral and multi-level governance approach. Macro-regional strategies should enhance the identity of their areas by increasing the responsibility and active involvement of citizens. Although the ‘soft’ nature of MRS cooperation should be considered an advantage in that it opens up solutions that are often difficult to achieve in more formalised contexts with competing national interests, in reality this is not the case. National and centralised authorities are responsible for the implementation of macro-regional strategies, which leads to bureaucratic and complex procedures and ultimately makes macro-regional strategies less attractive. |
| --- | --- |

8.2.

The EESC recognises the fact that macro-regional strategies deal with issues that require multi-country cooperation based on an intersectoral and multi-level governance approach. Macro-regional strategies should enhance the identity of their areas by increasing the responsibility and active involvement of citizens. Although the ‘soft’ nature of MRS cooperation should be considered an advantage in that it opens up solutions that are often difficult to achieve in more formalised contexts with competing national interests, in reality this is not the case. National and centralised authorities are responsible for the implementation of macro-regional strategies, which leads to bureaucratic and complex procedures and ultimately makes macro-regional strategies less attractive.

| 8.3. | The EESC welcomes the initiative to set up an institutional citizens’ dialogue between the macro-regions, and considers that it could be useful in this regard. It is also important for the EESC, the home of organised civil society, to play a more active role and be part of the management boards of all macro-regional strategies. Thus, synergies and collaborations can become more effective. |
| --- | --- |

8.3.

The EESC welcomes the initiative to set up an institutional citizens’ dialogue between the macro-regions, and considers that it could be useful in this regard. It is also important for the EESC, the home of organised civil society, to play a more active role and be part of the management boards of all macro-regional strategies. Thus, synergies and collaborations can become more effective.

| 8.4. | The EESC suggests that a different approach be considered in the governance of macro-regional strategies. Since the political level is represented by the foreign affairs ministers, the operational level should be boosted through enhanced cooperation with the ministries of EU affairs and EU funds. Involving regional authorities by empowering their administrative capacity is also crucial for the implementation of macro-regional strategies. |
| --- | --- |

8.4.

The EESC suggests that a different approach be considered in the governance of macro-regional strategies. Since the political level is represented by the foreign affairs ministers, the operational level should be boosted through enhanced cooperation with the ministries of EU affairs and EU funds. Involving regional authorities by empowering their administrative capacity is also crucial for the implementation of macro-regional strategies.

| 8.5. | The EESC believes that there should be more interconnection between the energy/digital transition and the social dimension of EU policy. Given that 2023 is the European Year of Skills, more focus should be given to how the energy transition can be achieved through the development of workers’ skills and competencies. |
| --- | --- |

8.5.

The EESC believes that there should be more interconnection between the energy/digital transition and the social dimension of EU policy. Given that 2023 is the European Year of Skills, more focus should be given to how the energy transition can be achieved through the development of workers’ skills and competencies.

| 8.6. | MRS stakeholders are encouraged to run closer follow-ups, set less abstract and more targeted projects, programs and actions with measurable starting and resulting points, thus monitoring the progress made between them. |
| --- | --- |

8.6.

MRS stakeholders are encouraged to run closer follow-ups, set less abstract and more targeted projects, programs and actions with measurable starting and resulting points, thus monitoring the progress made between them.

| 8.7. | The EESC notes that the European Commission has made considerable efforts to raise the profile of macro-regional strategies. However, better communication is not just down to one key player, but also depends on the Member States and the macro-regional strategies. In this regard, the EESC can help through the involvement of civil society and social partners, which could be crucial. |
| --- | --- |

8.7.

The EESC notes that the European Commission has made considerable efforts to raise the profile of macro-regional strategies. However, better communication is not just down to one key player, but also depends on the Member States and the macro-regional strategies. In this regard, the EESC can help through the involvement of civil society and social partners, which could be crucial.

| 8.8. | The EESC believes that macro-regional strategies play an important role in the social, territorial and economic cohesion of the regions, but also contribute to the European integration of neighbouring countries. In this context, there needs to be more emphasis on transforming macro-regional strategies so that they can become leaders for change, inspire trust and promote European values. Moreover, sustainability, continuity and interrelation of cross-regional and cross-border initiatives and projects have to be enhanced. In this vein, other types of institutionalised cross-regional and cross-border cooperation like EGTCs and Euroregions should be used in a comprehensive way, in line with the scopes of macro-regional strategies. |
| --- | --- |

8.8.

The EESC believes that macro-regional strategies play an important role in the social, territorial and economic cohesion of the regions, but also contribute to the European integration of neighbouring countries. In this context, there needs to be more emphasis on transforming macro-regional strategies so that they can become leaders for change, inspire trust and promote European values. Moreover, sustainability, continuity and interrelation of cross-regional and cross-border initiatives and projects have to be enhanced. In this vein, other types of institutionalised cross-regional and cross-border cooperation like EGTCs and Euroregions should be used in a comprehensive way, in line with the scopes of macro-regional strategies.

| 8.9. | In terms of the environment, it will be crucial to boost the operational capacity of MRS to support the fight against climate change, providing civil society with useful tools to deal with risks and adopt sustainable lifestyles. |
| --- | --- |

8.9.

In terms of the environment, it will be crucial to boost the operational capacity of MRS to support the fight against climate change, providing civil society with useful tools to deal with risks and adopt sustainable lifestyles.

| 8.10. | With regard to the economy, supporting a change in economic model at territorial and local level, with a view to reducing consumption of natural resources and raw materials, will be a priority. It will be necessary to support the shift towards initiatives on zero emissions, sustainable mobility, the circular economy, sustainable tourism and boosting the local economy. |
| --- | --- |

8.10.

With regard to the economy, supporting a change in economic model at territorial and local level, with a view to reducing consumption of natural resources and raw materials, will be a priority. It will be necessary to support the shift towards initiatives on zero emissions, sustainable mobility, the circular economy, sustainable tourism and boosting the local economy.

| 8.11. | In order for technological innovations such as digitalisation, robotisation and biotechnology to be promoted and made available to all, upskilling, more investments in safe and sustainable digital infrastructure, and support initiatives for businesses, public administration and citizens are needed, especially in view of the digitalisation of public services. |
| --- | --- |

8.11.

In order for technological innovations such as digitalisation, robotisation and biotechnology to be promoted and made available to all, upskilling, more investments in safe and sustainable digital infrastructure, and support initiatives for businesses, public administration and citizens are needed, especially in view of the digitalisation of public services.

| 8.12. | Demographic and social trends are mutually reinforcing. Ageing populations, as well as internal and intra-European migration, the falling birth rate and decline in families, pose challenges for welfare systems and local and regional development. These demographic trends have serious social implications, including increasing social exclusion and inequalities, as well as economic implications, including a shortage of workers in labour-intensive sectors such as tourism. A stronger focus on quality of life, decent work, well-being and youth involvement is another challenge of primary importance. |
| --- | --- |

8.12.

Demographic and social trends are mutually reinforcing. Ageing populations, as well as internal and intra-European migration, the falling birth rate and decline in families, pose challenges for welfare systems and local and regional development. These demographic trends have serious social implications, including increasing social exclusion and inequalities, as well as economic implications, including a shortage of workers in labour-intensive sectors such as tourism. A stronger focus on quality of life, decent work, well-being and youth involvement is another challenge of primary importance.

| 8.13. | With the approval of the Report on the role of Cohesion Policy in addressing multidimensional environmental challenges in the Mediterranean basin (2022/2059(INI) by the Regional Development Committee of the European Parliament, the EESC believes and hopes that the conditions for the implementation of an MRS will also mature in the western Mediterranean regions. |
| --- | --- |

8.13.

With the approval of the Report on the role of Cohesion Policy in addressing multidimensional environmental challenges in the Mediterranean basin (2022/2059(INI) by the Regional Development Committee of the European Parliament, the EESC believes and hopes that the conditions for the implementation of an MRS will also mature in the western Mediterranean regions.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  
  OJ C 282, 20.8.2019, p. 14.

1

(2)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee ‘Towards a better economic convergence and competitiveness within macro-regions, such as the European Strategy for the Danube region — the role of transnational clusters’ (exploratory opinion) (OJ C 282, 20.8.2019, p. 14).

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee ‘Towards a better economic convergence and competitiveness within macro-regions, such as the European Strategy for the Danube region — the role of transnational clusters’ (exploratory opinion) (OJ C 282, 20.8.2019, p. 14).

3

---

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/100 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/100

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Harnessing talent in Europe’s regions

(COM(2023) 32 final)

(2023/C 293/15)

| Rapporteur: | Tatjana BABRAUSKIENĖ |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Tatjana BABRAUSKIENĖ

Tatjana BABRAUSKIENĖ

| Referral | European Commission, 8.3.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion |
| Adopted in section | 30.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 181/0/3 |

Referral

European Commission, 8.3.2023

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion

Adopted in section

30.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

181/0/3

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the fact that the communication on Harnessing talent in Europe’s regions (1) commits to support the design and implementation of targeted regional and territorial strategies that are based on regions’ specific situation and assets, and by the ambitious implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and the long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas, together with targeted use of existing EU funds, aiming to adapt their deployment to the demographic trends experienced in the EU. It should also put a quality labour market at the centre of the identified policy measures, covering inclusive labour market policies, supporting workers, attractive business environments, fair mobility, social cohesion, essential services, and access to quality training and skills development to boost European competitiveness. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the fact that the communication on Harnessing talent in Europe’s regions

1

| 1.2. | The EESC points out that the fundamental aspect of European integration — freedom of movement — needs to be ensured for all in the EU, while focusing on a long-term and holistic approach to regional development and labour market integration. Freedom of movement of people in the European labour market also needs to be protected; it needs to remain a choice and an opportunity, rather than a pressure weighing on people facing a lack of prospects or opportunities in their own region, due to socioeconomic reasons. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC points out that the fundamental aspect of European integration — freedom of movement — needs to be ensured for all in the EU, while focusing on a long-term and holistic approach to regional development and labour market integration. Freedom of movement of people in the European labour market also needs to be protected; it needs to remain a choice and an opportunity, rather than a pressure weighing on people facing a lack of prospects or opportunities in their own region, due to socioeconomic reasons.

| 1.3. | The EESC stresses that in order to better address the labour and skills shortages, long-term solutions are needed to support regional development, such as better infrastructure, sustainable resources, improved job quality, effective support to those not in employment, education, or training (NEETs) and the unemployed, targeted support for the fair integration of third-country nationals into the labour market, access to quality public services, including access to high-quality and inclusive public education and lifelong learning, and access to quality and inclusive up- and re-skilling for all workers, as well as the involvement of trade unions and employers in skills-forecasting, pinpointing skills needs in the regions and providing skills development. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

The EESC stresses that in order to better address the labour and skills shortages, long-term solutions are needed to support regional development, such as better infrastructure, sustainable resources, improved job quality, effective support to those not in employment, education, or training (NEETs) and the unemployed, targeted support for the fair integration of third-country nationals into the labour market, access to quality public services, including access to high-quality and inclusive public education and lifelong learning, and access to quality and inclusive up- and re-skilling for all workers, as well as the involvement of trade unions and employers in skills-forecasting, pinpointing skills needs in the regions and providing skills development.

| 1.4. | The EESC welcomes the deployment of a number of EU funding tools under cohesion policy (the ERDF, ESF+, Cohesion Fund and Just Transition Fund) for the 2021–2027 programming period with a view to reducing regional disparities and implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR). The EESC calls for stronger complementarity and coordination among the EU’s recovery, resilience and cohesion funds, including the Just Transition Fund, with a view to ensuring that the funds are used to stimulate job creation, create quality employment opportunities, and ensure progress in material infrastructure, by reducing socioeconomic divides and closing the gap in development between EU regions. Cross-border cooperation, supported by the Interreg programmes, contributes to increasing the attractiveness of border regions and such programmes should be further supported. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

The EESC welcomes the deployment of a number of EU funding tools under cohesion policy (the ERDF, ESF+, Cohesion Fund and Just Transition Fund) for the 2021–2027 programming period with a view to reducing regional disparities and implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR). The EESC calls for stronger complementarity and coordination among the EU’s recovery, resilience and cohesion funds, including the Just Transition Fund, with a view to ensuring that the funds are used to stimulate job creation, create quality employment opportunities, and ensure progress in material infrastructure, by reducing socioeconomic divides and closing the gap in development between EU regions. Cross-border cooperation, supported by the Interreg programmes, contributes to increasing the attractiveness of border regions and such programmes should be further supported.

| 1.5. | The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to put in place cohesion policies and EU funds to support the shaping of labour market transitions in a way that no worker or region is left behind. It is essential to ensure attractive conditions for companies, while acknowledging the need for investment by companies in innovation and competitiveness and to adapt to the changing needs. The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to take these points into consideration in the mid-term review of the MFF. |
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1.5.

The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to put in place cohesion policies and EU funds to support the shaping of labour market transitions in a way that no worker or region is left behind. It is essential to ensure attractive conditions for companies, while acknowledging the need for investment by companies in innovation and competitiveness and to adapt to the changing needs. The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to take these points into consideration in the mid-term review of the MFF.

| 1.6. | To ensure the fair allocation of the Cohesion Fund to effective and quality regional development, the EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to start discussions about the next processes supporting the MFF with regard to ensuring the evaluation of the needs and funds at EU level and delivering effective regional development and active job creation. |
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1.6.

To ensure the fair allocation of the Cohesion Fund to effective and quality regional development, the EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to start discussions about the next processes supporting the MFF with regard to ensuring the evaluation of the needs and funds at EU level and delivering effective regional development and active job creation.

| 1.7. | The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to ensure that European labour market and cohesion policies are based on sustainable investment in quality jobs, access to training and essential services, social dialogue, and collective bargaining, in accordance with respecting the autonomy of the social partners and in accordance with national industrial relations systems. |
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1.7.

The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to ensure that European labour market and cohesion policies are based on sustainable investment in quality jobs, access to training and essential services, social dialogue, and collective bargaining, in accordance with respecting the autonomy of the social partners and in accordance with national industrial relations systems.

| 1.8. | The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to respect human rights and fight effectively against corruption, and thus uphold the rule of law — which plays a key role in making regions attractive to labour market players — and to ensure better monitoring of the effective use of EU funds, especially decentralised ones, by means of European Commission audits. |
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1.8.

The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to respect human rights and fight effectively against corruption, and thus uphold the rule of law — which plays a key role in making regions attractive to labour market players — and to ensure better monitoring of the effective use of EU funds, especially decentralised ones, by means of European Commission audits.

| 1.9. | The EESC calls for the efficient social dialogue and effective participation of civil society organisations (CSO) on all matters related with this strategy to achieve quality regional development that responds to the needs of those living in and wishing to live in the regions concerned and to the needs of companies, especially regarding effective allocation of the ESF+ fund to combat youth unemployment. |
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1.9.

The EESC calls for the efficient social dialogue and effective participation of civil society organisations (CSO) on all matters related with this strategy to achieve quality regional development that responds to the needs of those living in and wishing to live in the regions concerned and to the needs of companies, especially regarding effective allocation of the ESF+ fund to combat youth unemployment.

| 1.10. | The EESC stresses the need to ensure democratic governance in regional development policies, and close cooperation among regional authorities, social partner organisations, employment services, and education and training providers in the regions. Social dialogue needs to be used effectively to attract companies to disadvantaged regions and ensure quality jobs; good wages; job security via standard employment and access to social protection; lifelong learning opportunities; good working conditions in safe and healthy workplaces; reasonable working time with a good work-life balance; and trade union representation and bargaining rights. |
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1.10.

The EESC stresses the need to ensure democratic governance in regional development policies, and close cooperation among regional authorities, social partner organisations, employment services, and education and training providers in the regions. Social dialogue needs to be used effectively to attract companies to disadvantaged regions and ensure quality jobs; good wages; job security via standard employment and access to social protection; lifelong learning opportunities; good working conditions in safe and healthy workplaces; reasonable working time with a good work-life balance; and trade union representation and bargaining rights.

| 1.11. | The EESC calls on the European Commission to use the European Semester and the EU Social Scoreboard as tools to provide targeted recommendations to the Member States to combat regional inequalities. |
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1.11.

The EESC calls on the European Commission to use the European Semester and the EU Social Scoreboard as tools to provide targeted recommendations to the Member States to combat regional inequalities.

| 1.12. | The EESC calls on the Member States to ensure that their policies on climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, under the European Climate Law, and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism supported by the Green Deal Industrial Plan (2), provide effective support to regions (3), and to involve the social partners and civil society in regular socioeconomic impact assessments to anticipate changes and create alternative job opportunities in those regions and sectors that will be affected by these changes. |
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1.12.

The EESC calls on the Member States to ensure that their policies on climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction, under the European Climate Law, and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism supported by the Green Deal Industrial Plan (2

3

| 1.13. | The EESC calls on the Member States to ensure the effective implementation of the EU Directive on adequate minimum wages and the Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and self-employed (2019) (4), and to improve working conditions and wages by increasing bargaining coverage, and ensuring equal access to social protection regardless of employment status, which play a key role in making regions attractive to workers at all skill levels with attractive jobs and salaries. |
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1.13.

The EESC calls on the Member States to ensure the effective implementation of the EU Directive on adequate minimum wages and the Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and self-employed (2019) (4

| 1.14. | The EESC stresses the need for governments, local and regional authorities, social services, companies and trade unions to work together in the framework of social dialogue to provide effective solutions to workers concerning their parenting and caregiving needs by making quality and inclusive childcare and long-term care services guaranteed (5). |
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1.14.

The EESC stresses the need for governments, local and regional authorities, social services, companies and trade unions to work together in the framework of social dialogue to provide effective solutions to workers concerning their parenting and caregiving needs by making quality and inclusive childcare and long-term care services guaranteed (5

| 1.15. | The EESC underlines the important role that could be played by the European Platform tackling undeclared work under the European Labour Authority (ELA) in promoting the transformation of undeclared work into declared decent jobs, and thus also contributing to regional development by strengthening the tax base and improving workers’ access to social protection. |
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1.15.

The EESC underlines the important role that could be played by the European Platform tackling undeclared work under the European Labour Authority (ELA) in promoting the transformation of undeclared work into declared decent jobs, and thus also contributing to regional development by strengthening the tax base and improving workers’ access to social protection.

| 1.16. | The EESC points out that effective social protection coverage and social security coordination are key in ensuring the equal treatment of mobile workers. The EESC calls on the European Commission to improve its tools to better support employability in regions. |
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1.16.

The EESC points out that effective social protection coverage and social security coordination are key in ensuring the equal treatment of mobile workers. The EESC calls on the European Commission to improve its tools to better support employability in regions.

| 1.17. | The EESC calls on the Member States to develop skills and lifelong learning policies for regional development coupled with investment and complementary policy measures to improve the quality of and access to education and training for all, preparing people for life and the labour market, and to improve the attractiveness of regions for learners, workers and business. High-quality career and lifelong learning guidance should be available to everyone in Europe, providing trustworthy information about regional job and learning possibilities. |
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1.17.

The EESC calls on the Member States to develop skills and lifelong learning policies for regional development coupled with investment and complementary policy measures to improve the quality of and access to education and training for all, preparing people for life and the labour market, and to improve the attractiveness of regions for learners, workers and business. High-quality career and lifelong learning guidance should be available to everyone in Europe, providing trustworthy information about regional job and learning possibilities.

| 1.18. | The EESC stresses the need to ensure equal access to quality public services (such as long-term care, affordable housing and cultural services, transport, energy supply and access to the internet) and quality education and infrastructure, such as early childhood education and care, and education, training and lifelong learning for regional development, while implementing effective human rights and anti-discrimination policies. The EESC calls on the Member States to ensure sustainable public investment in quality public education. |
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1.18.

The EESC stresses the need to ensure equal access to quality public services (such as long-term care, affordable housing and cultural services, transport, energy supply and access to the internet) and quality education and infrastructure, such as early childhood education and care, and education, training and lifelong learning for regional development, while implementing effective human rights and anti-discrimination policies. The EESC calls on the Member States to ensure sustainable public investment in quality public education.

| 1.19. | The EESC calls on the Member States to reduce teacher shortages (6) and to make the teaching profession attractive, with fair salaries, decent working conditions, quality initial and continuous teacher education, and career development, in order to improve the quality of education in the regions. Social dialogue is essential in the design and implementation of education reforms regarding the green and digital transition of education institutions and systems and when it comes to improving the skills and competences that teachers and trainers need to acquire within initial and continuous professional development, including for the green and digital transition. |
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1.19.

The EESC calls on the Member States to reduce teacher shortages (6

2.   Background

Background

| 2.1. | On 17 January 2023, the European Commission published a communication on Harnessing Talent in Europe’s Regions (7) putting forward targeted measures to promote and retain talent in underdeveloped regions, and turn those regions into more attractive locations. This is the first key initiative in 2023 stemming from the European Year of Skills (8). The focus of the Commission’s new policy is mainly on regions experiencing an accelerated decrease in their working age population, with a low share of university graduates, as well as on regions experiencing a significant departure of young people. |
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2.1.

On 17 January 2023, the European Commission published a communication on Harnessing Talent in Europe’s Regions

7

8

| 2.2. | Having decreased by 3,5 million people between 2015 and 2020, the EU working age population is expected to lose an additional 35 million people by 2050. The EU’s rural areas are home to 137 million people: approximately 30 % of the EU population. Yet 22 % of respondents to the recent Eurobarometer survey said that their job opportunities in rural areas had worsened in the last 10 years (9). The proportion of young people neither in employment nor in education or training (NEETs) is significantly higher in the regions concerned (at 19 %, compared to the EU average of 13 %). Too many young people do not complete upper secondary education and are left with poor employment prospects. In other regions, a lack of career prospects may be discouraging young people from attaining higher education and leading some to seek job opportunities elsewhere, resulting in an unemployment rate (15–34) of 14,6 %, significantly higher than that of the EU as a whole (11,1 %). |
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2.2.

Having decreased by 3,5 million people between 2015 and 2020, the EU working age population is expected to lose an additional 35 million people by 2050. The EU’s rural areas are home to 137 million people: approximately 30 % of the EU population. Yet 22 % of respondents to the recent Eurobarometer survey said that their job opportunities in rural areas had worsened in the last 10 years (9

| 2.3. | According to the Eighth Cohesion Report (2022) (10) the major reason for migration and brain-drain from some EU regions is a lack of public and social services, especially in care, healthcare and education, a lack of job opportunities and territorial deficiency in connections and material infrastructure such as transport. The Commission’s policy aim is to promote development in these regions through the provision of quality jobs and by improving public services, and, in particular, education systems. Moreover, it focuses on developing better digital connectivity of underdeveloped regions, especially rural and remote areas. For these purposes, the Communication identifies specific areas in the EU Rural Action Plan and sets out an eight pillar-mechanism to boost talent in underdeveloped regions, called the ‘Talent Booster Mechanism’. |
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2.3.

According to the Eighth Cohesion Report (2022) (10

3.   General comments

General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC welcomes the fact that the communication commits to the effective implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR). However, the communication does not sufficiently put a quality labour market, and in particular support to workers, at the centre of the identified policy measures. Ensuring quality jobs for all workers and regions requires a more holistic response covering fair labour market policies, fair mobility, social cohesion, essential services, and access to quality training and skills. While regional development should indeed be a priority, freedom of movement of people in the European labour market also needs to be protected. Regional development should be achieved with due regard to the demographic, economic, and social perspectives and the reasons for the depopulation of certain regions. Social, economic, and ecological aspects and sustainability should be pivotal when shaping effective regional strategies to reverse trends of demographic loss and make regions attractive to people. |
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3.1.

The EESC welcomes the fact that the communication commits to the effective implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR). However, the communication does not sufficiently put a quality labour market, and in particular support to workers, at the centre of the identified policy measures. Ensuring quality jobs for all workers and regions requires a more holistic response covering fair labour market policies, fair mobility, social cohesion, essential services, and access to quality training and skills. While regional development should indeed be a priority, freedom of movement of people in the European labour market also needs to be protected. Regional development should be achieved with due regard to the demographic, economic, and social perspectives and the reasons for the depopulation of certain regions. Social, economic, and ecological aspects and sustainability should be pivotal when shaping effective regional strategies to reverse trends of demographic loss and make regions attractive to people.

| 3.2. | The EESC points out that the fundamental aspect of European integration — freedom of movement — needs to be ensured for all in the EU. However, labour mobility cannot be a quick fix to remedy labour shortages, without considering underlying issues such as the need for improved job quality and access to training. In fact, most Member States experience the same skills gaps. Reducing labour mobility to a simple issue of supply and demand runs the risk of exacerbating inequalities and labour market divergences across the EU and its regions. Thus, it is necessary to ensure that EU and national policies focus on a more long-term and holistic approach to regional development and labour market integration. Likewise, filling labour shortages in labour-intensive industries by passing on precarious jobs to foreign workers and marginalised groups without improving the attractiveness of such sectors only risks cementing social inequalities, depriving societies and economies of inclusive progress. |
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3.2.

The EESC points out that the fundamental aspect of European integration — freedom of movement — needs to be ensured for all in the EU. However, labour mobility cannot be a quick fix to remedy labour shortages, without considering underlying issues such as the need for improved job quality and access to training. In fact, most Member States experience the same skills gaps. Reducing labour mobility to a simple issue of supply and demand runs the risk of exacerbating inequalities and labour market divergences across the EU and its regions. Thus, it is necessary to ensure that EU and national policies focus on a more long-term and holistic approach to regional development and labour market integration. Likewise, filling labour shortages in labour-intensive industries by passing on precarious jobs to foreign workers and marginalised groups without improving the attractiveness of such sectors only risks cementing social inequalities, depriving societies and economies of inclusive progress.

| 3.3. | Climate policies will have a strong impact on workers and industries and will require massive training, reskilling and upskilling. This transition should be used as an opportunity to create quality jobs with good working conditions in all sectors and regions. Climate strategies need to take into account regional and local differences and not only the global data, and to support the most impacted regions. It should also be ensured that workers can find alternative quality jobs in the same region they are working in today, in order not to jeopardise communities’ support for the necessary transition. |
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3.3.

Climate policies will have a strong impact on workers and industries and will require massive training, reskilling and upskilling. This transition should be used as an opportunity to create quality jobs with good working conditions in all sectors and regions. Climate strategies need to take into account regional and local differences and not only the global data, and to support the most impacted regions. It should also be ensured that workers can find alternative quality jobs in the same region they are working in today, in order not to jeopardise communities’ support for the necessary transition.

| 3.4. | Regions should exchange experiences on how to develop rural areas as places to learn, work and live in with a good quality of life and services by supporting the economic diversification of rural and lagging areas. Smart specialisation strategies as a tool for creating diverse and skilled jobs continue to remain too often focused on traditional sectors. There are, however, good examples of industrial transitions that are the outcome of social dialogue, which are worth considering. |
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3.4.

Regions should exchange experiences on how to develop rural areas as places to learn, work and live in with a good quality of life and services by supporting the economic diversification of rural and lagging areas. Smart specialisation strategies as a tool for creating diverse and skilled jobs continue to remain too often focused on traditional sectors. There are, however, good examples of industrial transitions that are the outcome of social dialogue, which are worth considering.

| 3.5. | The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to set up cohesion policies and EU funds to support the shaping of labour market transitions in a way that no worker or region is left behind. It is essential to ensure attractive conditions for companies while acknowledging the need for investment by companies in innovation and competitiveness and to adapt to the changing needs. Workers must be able to live in all regions of Europe, and all regions must be able to prosper from work and be attractive for companies and workers. |
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3.5.

The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to set up cohesion policies and EU funds to support the shaping of labour market transitions in a way that no worker or region is left behind. It is essential to ensure attractive conditions for companies while acknowledging the need for investment by companies in innovation and competitiveness and to adapt to the changing needs. Workers must be able to live in all regions of Europe, and all regions must be able to prosper from work and be attractive for companies and workers.

| 3.6. | In order to successfully manage the transitions for a fair and inclusive recovery, it is essential that the European labour market and cohesion policies are based on long-term and stable investment in quality jobs, access to training and essential services, social dialogue, and collective bargaining. The European Semester and the EU Social Scoreboard are important tools to provide targeted recommendations to the Member States so as to combat regional inequalities and to ensure that quality jobs and services are available in every region. |
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3.6.

In order to successfully manage the transitions for a fair and inclusive recovery, it is essential that the European labour market and cohesion policies are based on long-term and stable investment in quality jobs, access to training and essential services, social dialogue, and collective bargaining. The European Semester and the EU Social Scoreboard are important tools to provide targeted recommendations to the Member States so as to combat regional inequalities and to ensure that quality jobs and services are available in every region.

| 3.6.1. | The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to ensure that European labour market and cohesion policies are based on sustainable investment in quality jobs, access to training and essential services, social dialogue, and collective bargaining, in accordance with respecting the autonomy of the social partners and national industrial relations systems. |
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3.6.1.

The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to ensure that European labour market and cohesion policies are based on sustainable investment in quality jobs, access to training and essential services, social dialogue, and collective bargaining, in accordance with respecting the autonomy of the social partners and national industrial relations systems.

| 3.7. | In addition to quality job opportunities offering attractive salaries, working conditions, quality training and career development, regional attractiveness depends on decent living standards, including, for example, access to affordable housing, high-quality education and public services, as well as good infrastructure. While acknowledging the role of national legislation and industrial relations systems, different social and labour standards, low collective bargaining coverage, a lack of investment and low trust in institutions can easily become drivers for structural divides between regions, hampering the positive development of a well-balanced European labour market. |
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3.7.

In addition to quality job opportunities offering attractive salaries, working conditions, quality training and career development, regional attractiveness depends on decent living standards, including, for example, access to affordable housing, high-quality education and public services, as well as good infrastructure. While acknowledging the role of national legislation and industrial relations systems, different social and labour standards, low collective bargaining coverage, a lack of investment and low trust in institutions can easily become drivers for structural divides between regions, hampering the positive development of a well-balanced European labour market.

| 3.8. | The EESC welcomes the fact that the Communication aims to develop close cooperation between regional authorities, social partner organisations, employment services, and education and training providers. Social dialogue needs to be used effectively in order to attract companies to the disadvantaged regions and ensure quality jobs; good wages; job security via standard employment and access to social protection; lifelong learning opportunities; good working conditions in safe and healthy workplaces; reasonable working time with a good work-life balance; and trade union representation and bargaining rights. |
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3.8.

The EESC welcomes the fact that the Communication aims to develop close cooperation between regional authorities, social partner organisations, employment services, and education and training providers. Social dialogue needs to be used effectively in order to attract companies to the disadvantaged regions and ensure quality jobs; good wages; job security via standard employment and access to social protection; lifelong learning opportunities; good working conditions in safe and healthy workplaces; reasonable working time with a good work-life balance; and trade union representation and bargaining rights.

| 3.9. | The EESC believes that the objective of the communication should be broader than only attracting highly skilled workers (‘talent’) to disadvantaged regions for economic development. Workers in general are in short supply in the labour market in many regions of the EU, while 26,4 % of the inactive European workforce resides in disadvantaged regions, due to a lack of opportunities for quality employment or distrust in state institutions, for family reasons, or due to being employed in the grey economy, etc. Companies need good conditions, workers and infrastructure to innovate and be competitive, and must reskill and upskill their workers and seek to attract skilled workers to good jobs. The focus of the communication and the actions flowing from it should be shifted to how the just transition to a green and digital economy can support the upskilling of all workers. |
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3.9.

The EESC believes that the objective of the communication should be broader than only attracting highly skilled workers (‘talent’) to disadvantaged regions for economic development. Workers in general are in short supply in the labour market in many regions of the EU, while 26,4 % of the inactive European workforce resides in disadvantaged regions, due to a lack of opportunities for quality employment or distrust in state institutions, for family reasons, or due to being employed in the grey economy, etc. Companies need good conditions, workers and infrastructure to innovate and be competitive, and must reskill and upskill their workers and seek to attract skilled workers to good jobs. The focus of the communication and the actions flowing from it should be shifted to how the just transition to a green and digital economy can support the upskilling of all workers.

| 3.10. | We welcome the deployment of several EU funding tools under cohesion policy funding (ERDF, ESF+, Cohesion Fund and Just Transition Fund) for the 2021–2027 programming period with a view to reducing regional disparities and implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights. Employability and economic development in rural and non-urbanised areas can be boosted with targeted interventions. To that end, stronger complementarity and coordination between EU recovery, resilience and cohesion funds, including the Just Transition Fund need to be ensured to stimulate job creation, quality employment opportunities, and progress in material infrastructure. Cohesion funds should be enhanced in their effectiveness to reduce the socioeconomic divides and close the gap in development between EU regions. To promote decent jobs, State aid and the use of funds under the EU budget should be subject to strong social conditionalities, requiring recipients to comply with applicable labour laws and collective agreements. |
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3.10.

We welcome the deployment of several EU funding tools under cohesion policy funding (ERDF, ESF+, Cohesion Fund and Just Transition Fund) for the 2021–2027 programming period with a view to reducing regional disparities and implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights. Employability and economic development in rural and non-urbanised areas can be boosted with targeted interventions. To that end, stronger complementarity and coordination between EU recovery, resilience and cohesion funds, including the Just Transition Fund need to be ensured to stimulate job creation, quality employment opportunities, and progress in material infrastructure. Cohesion funds should be enhanced in their effectiveness to reduce the socioeconomic divides and close the gap in development between EU regions. To promote decent jobs, State aid and the use of funds under the EU budget should be subject to strong social conditionalities, requiring recipients to comply with applicable labour laws and collective agreements.

| 3.11. | Efforts to combat corruption and uphold the rule of law play a key role in making regions attractive to labour market players. It is essential to ensure better monitoring of the effective use of EU funds, especially the decentralised ones, by the European Commission and by the EU’s audit institutions (e.g. the European Court of Auditors and OLAF). In order to ensure the fair allocation of the Cohesion Fund to effective and quality regional development, the EESC considers it important that the European Commission and Member States start a discussion about the next processes supporting the MFF to ensure the evaluation of the needs and funds at EU level. |
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3.11.

Efforts to combat corruption and uphold the rule of law play a key role in making regions attractive to labour market players. It is essential to ensure better monitoring of the effective use of EU funds, especially the decentralised ones, by the European Commission and by the EU’s audit institutions (e.g. the European Court of Auditors and OLAF). In order to ensure the fair allocation of the Cohesion Fund to effective and quality regional development, the EESC considers it important that the European Commission and Member States start a discussion about the next processes supporting the MFF to ensure the evaluation of the needs and funds at EU level.

| 3.12. | Democratic governance in managing and properly allocating EU funds can be achieved by the effective involvement of the social partners and relevant stakeholders in decisions on the use of EU funds for regional development. Social dialogue and civic dialogue need to be effectively used in order to achieve quality regional development that responds to the needs of those living and wishing to live in the regions concerned and of the companies. |
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3.12.

Democratic governance in managing and properly allocating EU funds can be achieved by the effective involvement of the social partners and relevant stakeholders in decisions on the use of EU funds for regional development. Social dialogue and civic dialogue need to be effectively used in order to achieve quality regional development that responds to the needs of those living and wishing to live in the regions concerned and of the companies.

| 3.13. | The green and digital transitions are having major impacts on industries in the regions. A competitive environment for businesses geared towards sustainable growth can help to attract people to the regions and to make the EU competitive and attractive globally. Regions urgently need to establish effective strategies, together with the social partners and stakeholders, considering the needs and possibilities of economic development, to make regions attractive to people and companies. A balance between EU and regional policies needs to be ensured, respecting the subsidiarity of the regions. |
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3.13.

The green and digital transitions are having major impacts on industries in the regions. A competitive environment for businesses geared towards sustainable growth can help to attract people to the regions and to make the EU competitive and attractive globally. Regions urgently need to establish effective strategies, together with the social partners and stakeholders, considering the needs and possibilities of economic development, to make regions attractive to people and companies. A balance between EU and regional policies needs to be ensured, respecting the subsidiarity of the regions.

| 3.13.1. | The recently announced Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) and Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA) initiatives — with the development of skills being one of the four pillars of the GDIP — should be implemented with a strong regional dimension in mind, especially when it comes to the establishment of the planned Net-Zero Industry Academies. |
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3.13.1.

The recently announced Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) and Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA) initiatives — with the development of skills being one of the four pillars of the GDIP — should be implemented with a strong regional dimension in mind, especially when it comes to the establishment of the planned Net-Zero Industry Academies.

| 3.14. | The ESF+ — with its obligation to spend a minimum of 12 % of the funds in Member States where the number of NEETs is above the EU average — is the main policy tool to combat youth unemployment and ensure the implementation of the European Youth Guarantee. However, the Member States need to make more efforts to make all regions, including the disadvantaged ones, attractive to young students and workers. Social partners and other stakeholders should be meaningfully involved in its design and implementation, and in assessing the use of the ESF+ funds in order to ensure that these funds provide effective support for the creation of quality jobs, paid quality apprenticeships and traineeships for young unemployed people. Shortage occupations should be taken into account to make jobs and education attractive and the social partners need to be empowered and supported to implement certain policies and specific measures to make shortage occupations attractive. |
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3.14.

The ESF+ — with its obligation to spend a minimum of 12 % of the funds in Member States where the number of NEETs is above the EU average — is the main policy tool to combat youth unemployment and ensure the implementation of the European Youth Guarantee. However, the Member States need to make more efforts to make all regions, including the disadvantaged ones, attractive to young students and workers. Social partners and other stakeholders should be meaningfully involved in its design and implementation, and in assessing the use of the ESF+ funds in order to ensure that these funds provide effective support for the creation of quality jobs, paid quality apprenticeships and traineeships for young unemployed people. Shortage occupations

| 3.15. | Regions can be attractive for workers at all skills levels with attractive jobs and salaries. In this regard the effective implementation of the EU Directive on adequate minimum wages, and improving working conditions and wages by bargaining coverage play a key role. Governments, local and regional authorities, social services, companies and trade unions should work together in the framework of social dialogue to provide effective solutions to workers concerning their parenting and caregiving needs by making quality and inclusive childcare and long-term care services guaranteed. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

Regions can be attractive for workers at all skills levels with attractive jobs and salaries. In this regard the effective implementation of the EU Directive on adequate minimum wages, and improving working conditions and wages by bargaining coverage play a key role. Governments, local and regional authorities, social services, companies and trade unions should work together in the framework of social dialogue to provide effective solutions to workers concerning their parenting and caregiving needs by making quality and inclusive childcare and long-term care services guaranteed.

| 3.16. | The European Platform tackling undeclared work under the European Labour Authority (ELA) could promote the transformation of undeclared work into declared decent jobs and thus also contribute to regional development by strengthening the tax base and improving workers’ access to social protection. Equal access to social protection must be ensured regardless of employment status, building on the Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and self-employed (2019) (11). |
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3.16.

The European Platform tackling undeclared work under the European Labour Authority (ELA) could promote the transformation of undeclared work into declared decent jobs and thus also contribute to regional development by strengthening the tax base and improving workers’ access to social protection. Equal access to social protection must be ensured regardless of employment status, building on the Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and self-employed (2019) (11

| 3.17. | Effective social protection coverage and social security coordination is key to ensuring equal treatment of mobile workers. Digital tools such as the European Social Security Pass can improve cross-border identification and verification, helping workers to trace, export, and claim their aggregated social security entitlements. In order to attract workers to work in disadvantaged regions, unfair treatment such as double taxation or social security exemptions for mobile workers need to be abolished, to ensure that workers who have exercised their freedom of movement are not being punished by the host Member State or upon return to their country of origin. |
| --- | --- |

3.17.

Effective social protection coverage and social security coordination is key to ensuring equal treatment of mobile workers. Digital tools such as the European Social Security Pass can improve cross-border identification and verification, helping workers to trace, export, and claim their aggregated social security entitlements. In order to attract workers to work in disadvantaged regions, unfair treatment such as double taxation or social security exemptions for mobile workers need to be abolished, to ensure that workers who have exercised their freedom of movement are not being punished by the host Member State or upon return to their country of origin.

| 3.18. | Skills policies play an important part in regional development, but this also needs to be coupled with investment and complementary policy measures to improve the attractiveness of regions for workers and business. The labour market needs workers at all skill levels and regional development should attract all workers, including low- and mid-qualified workers, not only ‘talents’ and high-skilled workers. |
| --- | --- |

3.18.

Skills policies play an important part in regional development, but this also needs to be coupled with investment and complementary policy measures to improve the attractiveness of regions for workers and business. The labour market needs workers at all skill levels and regional development should attract all workers, including low- and mid-qualified workers, not only ‘talents’ and high-skilled workers.

| 3.19. | The EESC welcomes the fact that the communication aims to grant equal access to quality public services (such as long-term care, affordable housing and cultural services, transport, energy supply and access to the internet) and quality education services and infrastructure such as early childhood education and care, education and training. Education services should benefit and be attractive to not only highly skilled workers but workers at any skill level. |
| --- | --- |

3.19.

The EESC welcomes the fact that the communication aims to grant equal access to quality public services (such as long-term care, affordable housing and cultural services, transport, energy supply and access to the internet) and quality education services and infrastructure such as early childhood education and care, education and training. Education services should benefit and be attractive to not only highly skilled workers but workers at any skill level.

| 3.20. | The Europass Portal needs to be improved to provide clear information to individuals on job and learning possibilities, access to guidance services and recognition processes. Within this, EURES could further contribute to fair labour mobility, including by promoting fair recruitment practices, direct and quality jobs as well as tackling abusive mobility practices across borders. Private employment services should be able to demonstrate a serious track record before participating in EURES. As part of its mandate to ensure fair and effective labour mobility, the European Labour Authority must not only support workers wishing to exercise their freedom of movement, but also returners who intend to return to their home Member State. |
| --- | --- |

3.20.

The Europass Portal needs to be improved to provide clear information to individuals on job and learning possibilities, access to guidance services and recognition processes. Within this, EURES could further contribute to fair labour mobility, including by promoting fair recruitment practices, direct and quality jobs as well as tackling abusive mobility practices across borders. Private employment services should be able to demonstrate a serious track record before participating in EURES. As part of its mandate to ensure fair and effective labour mobility, the European Labour Authority must not only support workers wishing to exercise their freedom of movement, but also returners who intend to return to their home Member State.

| 3.21. | The EESC welcomes the fact that the Commission is calling for the promotion of quality education, training and lifelong learning in relation to regional development. It is vital to provide equal access to adult learning for all workers in both the public and private sectors, but also for adults not active in the labour market, by considering the implementation of the Council Resolution on a new European agenda for adult learning 2021–2030 (12), the Council Recommendation on Individual Learning Accounts (13) and the Council Recommendation on Micro-credentials (14) to meet the 60 % target of participation in adult learning (15). It is also important to provide effective support to workers to access employee training and paid training leave by ensuring that the different funding systems are co-governed with the involvement of the social partners. People should have access to entrepreneurship skills and receive financial support to establish their own businesses. |
| --- | --- |

3.21.

The EESC welcomes the fact that the Commission is calling for the promotion of quality education, training and lifelong learning in relation to regional development. It is vital to provide equal access to adult learning for all workers in both the public and private sectors, but also for adults not active in the labour market, by considering the implementation of the Council Resolution on a new European agenda for adult learning 2021–2030 (12

13

14

15

| 3.22. | Education and training and lifelong learning from a holistic perspective need to be improved in these regions and be attractive for learners and parents where key competences, in particular democratic citizenship, and basic and transversal skills, in particular science, technology, engineering, arts and mathematics (STEAM), play a crucial role alongside labour-market-relevant skills. In order to motivate young people in disadvantaged regions to attain higher education qualifications, quality jobs should also be available. Regions also need to improve the quality of education to build democratic citizenship and common European values. The importance to Europe of skilled and knowledgeable citizens extends beyond formal education to learning acquired in non-formal or informal ways. Citizens must be able to demonstrate what they have learned, to use this learning in their career and for further education and training. Validation of non-formal and informal learning should be improved. |
| --- | --- |

3.22.

Education and training and lifelong learning from a holistic perspective need to be improved in these regions and be attractive for learners and parents where key competences, in particular democratic citizenship, and basic and transversal skills, in particular science, technology, engineering, arts and mathematics (STEAM), play a crucial role alongside labour-market-relevant skills. In order to motivate young people in disadvantaged regions to attain higher education qualifications, quality jobs should also be available. Regions also need to improve the quality of education to build democratic citizenship and common European values. The importance to Europe of skilled and knowledgeable citizens extends beyond formal education to learning acquired in non-formal or informal ways. Citizens must be able to demonstrate what they have learned, to use this learning in their career and for further education and training. Validation of non-formal and informal learning should be improved.

| 3.23. | The European Commission suggests deploying EU funds to improve digital connectivity in rural and remote areas to facilitate remote education and training and reduce skills gaps. The EESC reiterates (16) that it is imperative that high-speed internet connectivity be ensured in disadvantaged regions by utilising at least 10 % of NextGenerationEU funds specifically for rural digital development. It is important to provide education and training institutions, students, teachers and trainers with digital equipment, as tools for virtual cooperation would contribute to facilitating access to learning in remote areas, and for family carers and people with disabilities. However, quality education and combating early school leaving can be achieved only by in-person relationships between students, teachers and parents, to better support the individual needs of students. To this end, jobs in schools need to be attractive to highly qualified teachers and trainers. |
| --- | --- |

3.23.

The European Commission suggests deploying EU funds to improve digital connectivity in rural and remote areas to facilitate remote education and training and reduce skills gaps. The EESC reiterates (16

| 3.24. | In order to improve the quality of education in these regions the role of teachers is essential. Effective support should be granted to teachers in every education sector, and to trainers, to improve the quality of education for ensuring skills development within the green and digital transformations of education. Social dialogue is essential in the design and implementation of reforms on the green and digital transition of schools and on defining the necessary skills and competences for teachers and trainers to be acquired within initial and continuous professional development. |
| --- | --- |

3.24.

In order to improve the quality of education in these regions the role of teachers is essential. Effective support should be granted to teachers in every education sector, and to trainers, to improve the quality of education for ensuring skills development within the green and digital transformations of education. Social dialogue is essential in the design and implementation of reforms on the green and digital transition of schools and on defining the necessary skills and competences for teachers and trainers to be acquired within initial and continuous professional development.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  COM(2023) 32 final.

1

(2)  The Green Deal Industrial Plan (europa.eu), COM(2023) 62 final.

2

(3)  Europe’s changing climate hazards — an index-based interactive EEA report — European Environment Agency (europa.eu).

3

(4)  Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed, 2019/C 387/01 (OJ C 387, 15.11.2019, p. 1).

4

(5)  Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on access to affordable high-quality long-term care, 2022/C 476/01 (OJ C 476, 15.12.2022, p. 1) and Council Recommendation of 22 May 2019 on High-Quality Early Childhood Education and Care Systems (OJ C 189, 5.6.2019, p. 4).

5

(6)  Education and Training Monitor 2022 (europa.eu)

6

(7)  COM(2023) 32 final.

7

(8)  Commission kick-starts work on the European Year of Skills — Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion — European Commission.

8

(9)  Rural vision.

9

(10)  Inforegio — Eighth Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion.

10

(11)  Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed, 2019/C 387/01 (OJ C 387, 15.11.2019, p. 1).

11

(12)  Council Resolution on a new European agenda for adult learning 2021–2030, 2021/C 504/02 (OJ C 504, 14.12.2021, p. 9).

12

(13)  Council Recommendation on individual learning accounts to boost training of working-age adults.

13

(14)  Council Recommendation of 16 June 2022 on a European approach to micro-credentials for lifelong learning and employability, 2022/C 243/02 (OJ C 243, 27.6.2022, p. 10).

14

(15)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan, COM(2021) 102 final.

15

(16)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The energy and digital transition of rural areas (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 59).

16

---

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/108 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/108

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1009 as regards the digital labelling of EU fertilising products

(COM(2023) 98 final — 2023/0049 (COD))

(2023/C 293/16)

| Rapporteur: | John COMER |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

John COMER

John COMER

| Referral | European Parliament, 13.3.2023
  Council, 6.3.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Articles 114 and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment |
| Adopted in section | 1.6.2023 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 38/0/2 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 209/0/4 |

Referral

European Parliament, 13.3.2023

Council, 6.3.2023

Legal basis

Articles 114 and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment

Adopted in section

1.6.2023

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

38/0/2

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

209/0/4

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) considers that

| 1.1. | The provision of voluntary digital labelling for fertilising products is a very positive development and every effort should be made to encourage economic operators to move to digital labelling. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The provision of voluntary digital labelling for fertilising products is a very positive development and every effort should be made to encourage economic operators to move to digital labelling.

| 1.2. | The risk of the digital divide needs to be carefully monitored. Digitalisation could leave some vulnerable groups further behind despite the provision that an alternative must be available on request. It would be advisable if there was a timeline and greater clarity as to how this alternative would operate effectively. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The risk of the digital divide needs to be carefully monitored. Digitalisation could leave some vulnerable groups further behind despite the provision that an alternative must be available on request. It would be advisable if there was a timeline and greater clarity as to how this alternative would operate effectively.

| 1.3. | Economic operators who adopt digital labelling should take specific action in addition to what is proposed by the Commission to recommend and encourage end users to consult the digital label. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

Economic operators who adopt digital labelling should take specific action in addition to what is proposed by the Commission to recommend and encourage end users to consult the digital label.

| 1.4. | Some end users have concerns about excessive tracking being attached to the digital labelling sites. Adequate assurance needs to be provided that unnecessary tracking will not occur. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

Some end users have concerns about excessive tracking being attached to the digital labelling sites. Adequate assurance needs to be provided that unnecessary tracking will not occur.

| 1.5. | The EESC welcomes this proposal because it focuses on improving the efficient use of fertilising products, reduces costs and promotes the digitalisation of the agricultural sector, which is welcomed. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

The EESC welcomes this proposal because it focuses on improving the efficient use of fertilising products, reduces costs and promotes the digitalisation of the agricultural sector, which is welcomed.

| 1.6. | A recommendation to engage in soil sampling before applying fertilising products should be highlighted on the physical label as well as the digital label. Such action would be good for the environment and save money. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

A recommendation to engage in soil sampling before applying fertilising products should be highlighted on the physical label as well as the digital label. Such action would be good for the environment and save money.

| 1.7. | The design and format including minimum font size of physical labels should be specified in the proposal to ensure clearer communication. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

The design and format including minimum font size of physical labels should be specified in the proposal to ensure clearer communication.

| 1.8. | It is recommended that packages of fertilising products of 1 000 kg or more should only require a digital label where economic operators decide to use digital labelling. Packages of fertilising products under 1 000 kg should always require a physical label, even where economic operators decide to use a digital label. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

It is recommended that packages of fertilising products of 1 000 kg or more should only require a digital label where economic operators decide to use digital labelling. Packages of fertilising products under 1 000 kg should always require a physical label, even where economic operators decide to use a digital label.

2.   Background

Background

| 2.1. | Regulation EU 2019/1009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) introduced labelling requirements that are much more extensive than those contained in Regulation (EC) No 2003/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2). This new regulation reflected new social demands and concerns as well as the fact that these new rules open the EU market to fertilising products that are innovative and unknown and require more detailed end user instructions. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

Regulation EU 2019/1009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1

2

| 2.2. | Overloaded labels are difficult to read. Too much detail can obscure the essential message that the end user requires. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

Overloaded labels are difficult to read. Too much detail can obscure the essential message that the end user requires.

| 2.3. | Economic operators find such labels difficult to manage and they are linked to increased costs due to the need to frequently update labels. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

Economic operators find such labels difficult to manage and they are linked to increased costs due to the need to frequently update labels.

| 2.4. | The proposed amendment to Regulation (EU) 2019/1009 is governed by the same general objectives of the existing Regulation (EU) 2019/1009, which is to ensure a high level of protection of human health and the environment and a well-functioning internal market. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

The proposed amendment to Regulation (EU) 2019/1009 is governed by the same general objectives of the existing Regulation (EU) 2019/1009, which is to ensure a high level of protection of human health and the environment and a well-functioning internal market.

| 2.5. | The Commission identified two specific problems which this proposal attempts to address:






  — | improving the readability of physical labels and |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.5.

The Commission identified two specific problems which this proposal attempts to address:

—

improving the readability of physical labels and

| — | facilitating the management of labels by economic operators. |
| --- | --- |

—

facilitating the management of labels by economic operators.

| 2.6. | According to Article 6(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1009, all the labelling requirements in Annex III must be set out on the physical label. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

According to Article 6(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1009, all the labelling requirements in Annex III must be set out on the physical label.

| 2.7. | This proposal introduces the voluntary digitisation of labels for EU fertilising products. Manufacturers, importers or distributors can decide whether to introduce digital labels for EU fertilising products. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

This proposal introduces the voluntary digitisation of labels for EU fertilising products. Manufacturers, importers or distributors can decide whether to introduce digital labels for EU fertilising products.

| 2.8. | Economic operators opting for digital labelling can put all the labelling elements under Annex III in a digital label when suppling fertilising products to other economic operators which are not end users. Fertilising products supplied in bulk or in packages over 1 000 kg can also be supplied with a digital label only to any entity, including end users. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

Economic operators opting for digital labelling can put all the labelling elements under Annex III in a digital label when suppling fertilising products to other economic operators which are not end users. Fertilising products supplied in bulk or in packages over 1 000 kg can also be supplied with a digital label only to any entity, including end users.

| 2.9. | Economic operators using a digital label when supplying fertilising products to end users in packages of 1 000 kg or less will have to provide a physical label in addition to the digital label. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

Economic operators using a digital label when supplying fertilising products to end users in packages of 1 000 kg or less will have to provide a physical label in addition to the digital label.

| 2.10. | The physical label must contain all the information concerning the protection of human health and the environment, as well as the most important information on the agronomic efficiency and content of the product, or other information needed after purchase such as information on safe storage and disposal. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

The physical label must contain all the information concerning the protection of human health and the environment, as well as the most important information on the agronomic efficiency and content of the product, or other information needed after purchase such as information on safe storage and disposal.

| 2.11. | The proposal lays down general rules regarding the digitisation of labels without making a distinction between professional and non-professional end users. In particular, economic operators will have to ensure that the digital label can be accessed free of charge and is easily accessible throughout the EU for a period of five years after the product has been placed on the market. The physical label must contain a data carrier (for example QR code or URL) so as to easily access the digital label without the need for a special or unique application. The digital label site must contain the information required by Annex III separate from other information about marketing or other special offers. No unnecessary tracking must be attached to the digital label site. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

The proposal lays down general rules regarding the digitisation of labels without making a distinction between professional and non-professional end users. In particular, economic operators will have to ensure that the digital label can be accessed free of charge and is easily accessible throughout the EU for a period of five years after the product has been placed on the market. The physical label must contain a data carrier (for example QR code or URL) so as to easily access the digital label without the need for a special or unique application. The digital label site must contain the information required by Annex III separate from other information about marketing or other special offers. No unnecessary tracking must be attached to the digital label site.

| 2.12. | The information on digital labels must also be made available by alternative means if requested so as to facilitate the needs of vulnerable users who are not familiar with or willing to use digital labels. |
| --- | --- |

2.12.

The information on digital labels must also be made available by alternative means if requested so as to facilitate the needs of vulnerable users who are not familiar with or willing to use digital labels.

| 2.13. | If for some reason the digital label becomes temporarily unavailable, an alternative must be provided without the need to request it. |
| --- | --- |

2.13.

If for some reason the digital label becomes temporarily unavailable, an alternative must be provided without the need to request it.

| 2.14. | The proposal confers an empowerment on the Commission to further adapt Annex III by deciding which labelling elements could be provided in digital form to end users in packages of 1 000 kg or less depending on the development of society. |
| --- | --- |

2.14.

The proposal confers an empowerment on the Commission to further adapt Annex III by deciding which labelling elements could be provided in digital form to end users in packages of 1 000 kg or less depending on the development of society.

| 2.15. | The Commission states the proposal is consistent with the EU’s broader policy for the European Green Deal, which aims to tackle the twin challenges of the green and digital transitions. |
| --- | --- |

2.15.

The Commission states the proposal is consistent with the EU’s broader policy for the European Green Deal, which aims to tackle the twin challenges of the green and digital transitions.

| 2.16. | The proposal is intended to improve the efficient use of fertilising products, reduce labelling costs and promote the digitisation of the agricultural sector while ensuring consistency with the EU’s broader policy for a sustainable and smart future. |
| --- | --- |

2.16.

The proposal is intended to improve the efficient use of fertilising products, reduce labelling costs and promote the digitisation of the agricultural sector while ensuring consistency with the EU’s broader policy for a sustainable and smart future.

3.   General comments

General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC welcomes this proposal to introduce digital labelling for fertilising products. It forms part of a general trend to expand the digitalisation of product information and product labels. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

The EESC welcomes this proposal to introduce digital labelling for fertilising products. It forms part of a general trend to expand the digitalisation of product information and product labels.

| 3.2. | Supplies of fertilising products that meet EU-wide health and safety and environmental standards (CE marked) will be allowed to be accompanied by information on a digital label. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

Supplies of fertilising products that meet EU-wide health and safety and environmental standards (CE marked) will be allowed to be accompanied by information on a digital label.

| 3.3. | The problem of overloaded labels is a major issue. Essential information is often difficult to find and so end users sometimes tend to ignore labels with excessive amounts of detail. Annex III as currently implemented is clearly trying to put too much information into a physical label. The possibility of digital labels is a major step forward. With digital labelling the physical label can contain the really essential information plus a link to the digital label. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

The problem of overloaded labels is a major issue. Essential information is often difficult to find and so end users sometimes tend to ignore labels with excessive amounts of detail. Annex III as currently implemented is clearly trying to put too much information into a physical label. The possibility of digital labels is a major step forward. With digital labelling the physical label can contain the really essential information plus a link to the digital label.

| 3.4. | The proposal empowers the Commission to further adapt Annex III by deciding which labelling elements can be provided digitally. The empowerment allows the Commission to move existing elements from the physical label to the digital label. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

The proposal empowers the Commission to further adapt Annex III by deciding which labelling elements can be provided digitally. The empowerment allows the Commission to move existing elements from the physical label to the digital label.

| 3.5. | The digital label must include information allowing the manufacturer of the product to be identified and contacted, the CE marking, and any corresponding reference to a notified body. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

The digital label must include information allowing the manufacturer of the product to be identified and contacted, the CE marking, and any corresponding reference to a notified body.

| 3.6. | There is no provision in the proposal to regulate the size and layout of the physical label. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

There is no provision in the proposal to regulate the size and layout of the physical label.

| 3.7. | The more efficient use of fertilising products is an important element in the Farm to Fork strategy, which specifies a target of a 50 % reduction in nutrient losses and a 20 % reduction in fertiliser usage by 2030. The Commission says that this proposal supports the trend of improving the efficiency of use of fertilising products. The issue of soil testing is not mandatory for inclusion on the physical label. Soil testing would encourage the more efficient use of fertilising products. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

The more efficient use of fertilising products is an important element in the Farm to Fork strategy, which specifies a target of a 50 % reduction in nutrient losses and a 20 % reduction in fertiliser usage by 2030. The Commission says that this proposal supports the trend of improving the efficiency of use of fertilising products. The issue of soil testing is not mandatory for inclusion on the physical label. Soil testing would encourage the more efficient use of fertilising products.

| 3.8. | Where economic operators adopt a digital label, there should be an extra strong recommendation to the end user to consult the digital label so as to get the maximum benefit from the mandatory information about the product. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

Where economic operators adopt a digital label, there should be an extra strong recommendation to the end user to consult the digital label so as to get the maximum benefit from the mandatory information about the product.

| 3.9. | The adoption of digital labelling is voluntary on the part of economic operators. However, in the interests of promoting the more extensive use of digital labelling, priority should be given to encouraging economic operators to move to digital labelling. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

The adoption of digital labelling is voluntary on the part of economic operators. However, in the interests of promoting the more extensive use of digital labelling, priority should be given to encouraging economic operators to move to digital labelling.

| 3.10. | The need to increase the use efficiency of fertilise products is stressed in the 2022 EU Communication on Fertilisers (3). The use of digital tools is a key enabler in this process. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

The need to increase the use efficiency of fertilise products is stressed in the 2022 EU Communication on Fertilisers (3

| 3.11. | Using digital labelling should enable better communication of the properties and most efficient use of fertilisers, which will be of benefit to the environment and provide savings for end users. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

Using digital labelling should enable better communication of the properties and most efficient use of fertilisers, which will be of benefit to the environment and provide savings for end users.

| 3.12. | The EESC welcomes that the conditions for implementing digital labelling are being introduced at EU level, as this creates a level playing field and as such improves the internal market while ensuring a high standard of protection as required by Regulation (EU) 2019/1009. In addition, any changes to digital labelling can only be made at EU level. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

The EESC welcomes that the conditions for implementing digital labelling are being introduced at EU level, as this creates a level playing field and as such improves the internal market while ensuring a high standard of protection as required by Regulation (EU) 2019/1009. In addition, any changes to digital labelling can only be made at EU level.

| 3.13. | The proposal states that packages over 1 000 kg should be deemed as bulk deliveries. It would have been preferrable if packages of 1 000 kg were deemed as bulk deliveries and packages under 1 000 kg would require the physical label in addition to the digital label. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

The proposal states that packages over 1 000 kg should be deemed as bulk deliveries. It would have been preferrable if packages of 1 000 kg were deemed as bulk deliveries and packages under 1 000 kg would require the physical label in addition to the digital label.

| 3.14. | The risk of a digital divide for vulnerable users needs to be further clarified. The Commission proposal states that an alternative to the digital label must be available when requested. However, no timeline is envisaged as to how quickly such an alternative might be made available to vulnerable end users. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

The risk of a digital divide for vulnerable users needs to be further clarified. The Commission proposal states that an alternative to the digital label must be available when requested. However, no timeline is envisaged as to how quickly such an alternative might be made available to vulnerable end users.

| 3.15. | The EESC emphasises the need to ensure that no unnecessary tracking systems are attached to digital label sites. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

The EESC emphasises the need to ensure that no unnecessary tracking systems are attached to digital label sites.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) 2019/1009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 laying down rules on the making available on the market of EU fertilising products and amending Regulations (EC) No 1069/2009 and (EC) No 1107/2009 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2003/2003 (OJ L 170, 25.6.2019, p. 1).

1

(2)  Regulation (EC) No 2003/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 relating to fertilisers (OJ L 304, 21.11.2003, p. 1).

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Ensuring availability and affordability of fertilisers’ (COM(2022) 590 final) (OJ C 184, 25.5.2023, p. 109).

3

---

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/112 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/112

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) No 2019/942 as well as Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 to improve the Union’s electricity market design

(COM(2023) 148 final — 2023/0077 (COD))

(2023/C 293/17)

| Rapporteur: | Jan DIRX |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Christophe QUAREZ |

Rapporteur:

Jan DIRX

Jan DIRX

Co-rapporteur:

Christophe QUAREZ

Christophe QUAREZ

| Referral | Council of the European Union, 31.3.2023
  European Parliament, 29.3.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Adopted in section | 16.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 209/11/9 |

Referral

Council of the European Union, 31.3.2023

European Parliament, 29.3.2023

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Adopted in section

16.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

209/11/9

1.   Policy recommendations

Policy recommendations

| 1.1. | Energy, including the infrastructure for the transport and distribution, cannot be treated like any other commodity: it is an essential building block of our economic and social system and thus a central part of the provision of public services. Therefore, energy supply is classified as a service of general interest. It is therefore necessary to create regulatory framework conditions for future energy that guarantee both an environmentally-friendly, affordable and reliable supply of energy and the right to energy. This also means that energy market design must take into account the requirements associated with decarbonisation. In order to ensure affordable basic energy supply, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) believes that the new market design must guarantee basic energy supply at regulated prices. |
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1.1.

Energy, including the infrastructure for the transport and distribution, cannot be treated like any other commodity: it is an essential building block of our economic and social system and thus a central part of the provision of public services. Therefore, energy supply is classified as a service of general interest. It is therefore necessary to create regulatory framework conditions for future energy that guarantee both an environmentally-friendly, affordable and reliable supply of energy and the right to energy. This also means that energy market design must take into account the requirements associated with decarbonisation. In order to ensure affordable basic energy supply, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) believes that the new market design must guarantee basic energy supply at regulated prices.

| 1.2. | The EESC believes that the Commission should have taken more steps in its proposal for the electricity market reform to adapt market design to the new reality which requires simultaneous management of three objectives: sustainability, affordability and security of supply. The new reality will also be based on renewable energy, with a growing role for prosumers and other small market participants alongside large producers. |
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1.2.

The EESC believes that the Commission should have taken more steps in its proposal for the electricity market reform to adapt market design to the new reality which requires simultaneous management of three objectives: sustainability, affordability and security of supply. The new reality will also be based on renewable energy, with a growing role for prosumers and other small market participants alongside large producers.

| 1.3. | A system that considers these changes can only function if the merit order system is abolished and replaced with a model where electricity prices are based on the respective production costs. This system must take into account the average costs in the pricing. |
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1.3.

A system that considers these changes can only function if the merit order system is abolished and replaced with a model where electricity prices are based on the respective production costs. This system must take into account the average costs in the pricing.

| 1.4. | In the context of a reform of the electricity market, liberalisation must be critically examined in terms of its sustainability, affordability and security of supply. In addition, it must not be forgotten since the current crisis shows that liberalized energy markets are unable to meet these needs and do not create enough incentives and investment security for renewable energy. Moreover, governments will be responsible for delivering these three objectives (sustainability, affordability and security of supply) over a long period, because the market will not combine and realize them spontaneously. |
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1.4.

In the context of a reform of the electricity market, liberalisation must be critically examined in terms of its sustainability, affordability and security of supply. In addition, it must not be forgotten since the current crisis shows that liberalized energy markets are unable to meet these needs and do not create enough incentives and investment security for renewable energy. Moreover, governments will be responsible for delivering these three objectives (sustainability, affordability and security of supply) over a long period, because the market will not combine and realize them spontaneously.

| 1.5. | Therefore the EESC opts for a hybrid model, where market forces and target-driven management jointly lead to optimal market functioning within the framework of the stipulated objectives. The heart of this model is a government-established ‘E-facility’ which buys the electricity from the producers and sells it to the suppliers of household customers, SMEs, Citizen Energy Communities and large consumers, and where appropriate and possible to other countries, using the three objectives as a framework for decision making. This facility would conclude long-term contracts with electricity producers on the basis of tenders. These contracts would be of various types, such as power purchase agreements (PPA), contracts for difference (CfD) and cost+ contracts. |
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1.5.

Therefore the EESC opts for a hybrid model, where market forces and target-driven management jointly lead to optimal market functioning within the framework of the stipulated objectives. The heart of this model is a government-established ‘E-facility’ which buys the electricity from the producers and sells it to the suppliers of household customers, SMEs, Citizen Energy Communities and large consumers, and where appropriate and possible to other countries, using the three objectives as a framework for decision making. This facility would conclude long-term contracts with electricity producers on the basis of tenders. These contracts would be of various types, such as power purchase agreements (PPA), contracts for difference (CfD) and cost+ contracts.

| 1.6. | The Committee strongly supports the Commission’s proposal to empower consumers by creating the right to share renewable energy directly. This requires, among other things, that all relevant information must be clear and accessible to consumers, so that they can fulfil an independent role in the electricity market, as user and producer. The EESC also considers that the market must be organised so as to enable consumers who also generate their own electricity (prosumers) or other small market participants to benefit as much as possible from the electricity they generate themselves, even if they feed it into the grid. One example of how this can be organised in another, more honest way for small producers is an ‘electricity bank’. |
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1.6.

The Committee strongly supports the Commission’s proposal to empower consumers by creating the right to share renewable energy directly. This requires, among other things, that all relevant information must be clear and accessible to consumers, so that they can fulfil an independent role in the electricity market, as user and producer. The EESC also considers that the market must be organised so as to enable consumers who also generate their own electricity (prosumers) or other small market participants to benefit as much as possible from the electricity they generate themselves, even if they feed it into the grid. One example of how this can be organised in another, more honest way for small producers is an ‘electricity bank’.

| 1.7. | In addition to the request to accelerate the development of green gases, the Committee calls on the Commission to include a regulation for the market design of natural gas in the H2 and low-carbon gases package. In this way, a single integrated and secure natural gas market at EU level would accelerate the electrification of the energy system by guaranteeing greater price equality and security for consumers. |
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1.7.

In addition to the request to accelerate the development of green gases, the Committee calls on the Commission to include a regulation for the market design of natural gas in the H2 and low-carbon gases package. In this way, a single integrated and secure natural gas market at EU level would accelerate the electrification of the energy system by guaranteeing greater price equality and security for consumers.

| 1.8. | In order to achieve a high level of renewable energy systems integration and accelerate the transition to a decarbonised system, storage and generating your own electricity will not be enough. What is needed are flexibility markets that in the best scenario also signal the situation prevailing on the grid. When establishing these flexibility markets, it makes sense to differentiate between the voltage levels. |
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1.8.

In order to achieve a high level of renewable energy systems integration and accelerate the transition to a decarbonised system, storage and generating your own electricity will not be enough. What is needed are flexibility markets that in the best scenario also signal the situation prevailing on the grid. When establishing these flexibility markets, it makes sense to differentiate between the voltage levels.

| 1.9. | As the reform will take time to be fully effective, the EESC recommends that the inframarginal rent cap mechanism stay in place until the reform is fully operational. Revenues should be directed toward the most vulnerable, with the option of lowering prices in light of recent developments in wholesale prices. |
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1.9.

As the reform will take time to be fully effective, the EESC recommends that the inframarginal rent cap mechanism stay in place until the reform is fully operational. Revenues should be directed toward the most vulnerable, with the option of lowering prices in light of recent developments in wholesale prices.

| 1.10. | The Committee urges the Commission to monitor the effects of this proposed reform of the electricity market. This is important because the electricity market is in the middle of a paradigm shift that is far from complete and will certainly require further adjustments in the coming years. It is also important because no impact assessment has been prepared for the Commission’s current proposal. This increases the uncertainty about the effects of this reform. |
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1.10.

The Committee urges the Commission to monitor the effects of this proposed reform of the electricity market. This is important because the electricity market is in the middle of a paradigm shift that is far from complete and will certainly require further adjustments in the coming years. It is also important because no impact assessment has been prepared for the Commission’s current proposal. This increases the uncertainty about the effects of this reform.

2.   Substantiation of the policy recommendations

Substantiation of the policy recommendations

General aspects

General aspects

| 2.1. | The EESC has been calling for a reform of the EU electricity market for some time (1). This is because, in practice, the risks to which the EU electricity market is exposed are mainly passed on to consumers, a conclusion that the European Court of Auditors also drew in its Special Report: Integrating the internal market for electricity (2). |
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2.1.

The EESC has been calling for a reform of the EU electricity market for some time (1

Special Report: Integrating the internal market for electricity

2

| 2.2. | The energy price increases in 2021 and 2022 were accelerated after Russia began its war of aggression against Ukraine; the war affected the prices of fossil fuels, especially gas, and the resulting increases were passed on to the end consumers following the merit order (3). This made it clear that the existing electricity market structure is unable to keep electricity prices manageable for consumers and businesses. |
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2.2.

The energy price increases in 2021 and 2022 were accelerated after Russia began its war of aggression against Ukraine; the war affected the prices of fossil fuels, especially gas, and the resulting increases were passed on to the end consumers following the merit order (3

| 2.3. | It is also important to realise that there is a fundamental economic reason to redesign the electricity market: the marginal costs of renewable energy systems are zero. It is plain that a market system with a price mechanism where the marginal costs of the last power plant sets the clearing price does not work in the future electricity sector dominated by renewable energy systems (or other CAPEX-intense system). This is why we need a contract for difference (CfD) as a remuneration scheme for all renewable energy producers, where the levelised costs of energy (or average costs) are used to establish the reference price. |
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2.3.

It is also important to realise that there is a fundamental economic reason to redesign the electricity market: the marginal costs of renewable energy systems are zero. It is plain that a market system with a price mechanism where the marginal costs of the last power plant sets the clearing price does not work in the future electricity sector dominated by renewable energy systems (or other CAPEX-intense system). This is why we need a contract for difference (CfD) as a remuneration scheme for all renewable energy producers, where the levelised costs of energy (or average costs) are used to establish the reference price.

| 2.4. | The fundamental reason for CfD are the marginal costs of renewables. Other than suggested by the Commission, price stability will be only partially, if at all, achieved by CfD. This is true as long as CfD only cover the electricity as produced and not more complex products — such as a combination of renewable generation, storage and demand side management. The reason for this is that for periods when renewable generation is low residual energy needs to be purchased, and the respective costs can become considerably high. The Commission ignores this effect and makes promises to end-consumers that eventually won’t be fully deliverable. |
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2.4.

The fundamental reason for CfD are the marginal costs of renewables. Other than suggested by the Commission, price stability will be only partially, if at all, achieved by CfD. This is true as long as CfD only cover the electricity as produced and not more complex products — such as a combination of renewable generation, storage and demand side management. The reason for this is that for periods when renewable generation is low residual energy needs to be purchased, and the respective costs can become considerably high. The Commission ignores this effect and makes promises to end-consumers that eventually won’t be fully deliverable.

| 2.5. | The EESC points out that energy, including the infrastructure for the transport and distribution, is not a commodity like any other: it is an essential building block of our economic and social system and thus a central part of the provision of public services. Therefore, energy supply is classified as a service of general interest. It is therefore necessary to create regulatory framework conditions for future energy that guarantee both an environmentally-friendly, affordable and reliable supply of energy and the right to energy. This also means that energy market design must take into account the requirements associated with decarbonisation. In order to ensure affordable basic energy supply, the EESC believes that the new market design must guarantee basic energy supply at regulated prices. Reimbursement of costs to energy suppliers should be based on costs evidence. In return, energy suppliers must be permanently required to provide a certain share of energy for basic supply. |
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2.5.

The EESC points out that energy, including the infrastructure for the transport and distribution, is not a commodity like any other: it is an essential building block of our economic and social system and thus a central part of the provision of public services. Therefore, energy supply is classified as a service of general interest. It is therefore necessary to create regulatory framework conditions for future energy that guarantee both an environmentally-friendly, affordable and reliable supply of energy and the right to energy. This also means that energy market design must take into account the requirements associated with decarbonisation. In order to ensure affordable basic energy supply, the EESC believes that the new market design must guarantee basic energy supply at regulated prices. Reimbursement of costs to energy suppliers should be based on costs evidence. In return, energy suppliers must be permanently required to provide a certain share of energy for basic supply.

| 2.6. | It is clear that recent developments in the electricity market have highlighted the importance of finding a new and proper balance between public and private presence in the electricity market. The Committee has explored this issue thoroughly in its TEN/771 opinion on Public investment in energy infrastructure as part of the solution to climate issues (see footnote 1). At the same time, the EESC firmly believes that electricity market reforms are desperately needed in order to achieve the aforementioned objectives of sustainability, affordability and security of supply. |
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2.6.

It is clear that recent developments in the electricity market have highlighted the importance of finding a new and proper balance between public and private presence in the electricity market. The Committee has explored this issue thoroughly in its TEN/771 opinion on Public investment in energy infrastructure as part of the solution to climate issues

| 2.7. | On 14 March 2023, the Commission published the legislative proposal ‘to reform the EU’s electricity market design to accelerate a surge in renewables and the phase-out of gas, make consumer bills less dependent on volatile fossil fuel prices, better protect consumers from future price spikes and potential market manipulation, and make the EU’s industry clean and more competitive’ (4). |
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2.7.

On 14 March 2023, the Commission published the legislative proposal ‘to reform the EU’s electricity market design to accelerate a surge in renewables and the phase-out of gas, make consumer bills less dependent on volatile fossil fuel prices, better protect consumers from future price spikes and potential market manipulation, and make the EU’s industry clean and more competitive’ (4

| 2.8. | The EESC welcomes this proposal as a first step in the right direction: the energy system of tomorrow that should be decarbonised, based on renewable and carbon free sources of energy and centred on consumers. Consumers for whom all relevant information must be clear and accessible, so that they can fulfil an independent role in the electricity market, as user and producer. |
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2.8.

The EESC welcomes this proposal as a first step in the right direction: the energy system of tomorrow that should be decarbonised, based on renewable and carbon free sources of energy and centred on consumers. Consumers for whom all relevant information must be clear and accessible, so that they can fulfil an independent role in the electricity market, as user and producer.

| 2.9. | The Committee urges the Commission to monitor the effects of this proposed reform of the electricity market. This is important because the electricity market is in the middle of a paradigm shift that is far from complete and will certainly require further adjustments in the coming years. It is also important because no impact assessment has been prepared for the Commission’s current proposal. This increases the uncertainty about the effects of this reform. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

The Committee urges the Commission to monitor the effects of this proposed reform of the electricity market. This is important because the electricity market is in the middle of a paradigm shift that is far from complete and will certainly require further adjustments in the coming years. It is also important because no impact assessment has been prepared for the Commission’s current proposal. This increases the uncertainty about the effects of this reform.

| 2.10. | The electricity market reform proposal plans to introduce a peak shaving service and products; this refers to the ability of market participants to reduce electricity consumption at peak hours which are determined by the transmission system operator. According to Article 7a, contracts for peak shaving products may not be concluded more than two days before they are activated and the contracting period cannot be longer than one day. Such a short period is desirable to prevent abuse, especially by large consumers, but could prevent many consumers (and independent aggregators) from supplying these products. The Committee therefore asks the Commission to examine under what conditions the contracting period could be extended. |
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2.10.

The electricity market reform proposal plans to introduce a peak shaving service and products; this refers to the ability of market participants to reduce electricity consumption at peak hours which are determined by the transmission system operator. According to Article 7a, contracts for peak shaving products may not be concluded more than two days before they are activated and the contracting period cannot be longer than one day. Such a short period is desirable to prevent abuse, especially by large consumers, but could prevent many consumers (and independent aggregators) from supplying these products. The Committee therefore asks the Commission to examine under what conditions the contracting period could be extended.

| 2.11. | Furthermore, the Committee believes that the Commission has come up with some good proposals for adjusting the electricity market. However, it considers that the Commission should have taken more steps to adapt market design to the new reality which requires simultaneous management of three objectives: sustainability, affordability and security of supply. It will also be based on renewable energy, with, according to the promise of the Commission, a growing role for prosumers and small market participants alongside large producers (5). However, the Commission’s proposal does not sufficiently reflect this, which is why, in addition to the Commission’s proposal, the Committee submits two other proposals that would fit in the legislative proposal. |
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2.11.

Furthermore, the Committee believes that the Commission has come up with some good proposals for adjusting the electricity market. However, it considers that the Commission should have taken more steps to adapt market design to the new reality which requires simultaneous management of three objectives: sustainability, affordability and security of supply. It will also be based on renewable energy, with, according to the promise of the Commission, a growing role for prosumers and small market participants alongside large producers (5

| 2.12. | A system that considers these changes can only function if the merit order system is abolished and replaced with a model where electricity prices are based on the respective production costs. This system must take into account the average costs in the pricing. |
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2.12.

A system that considers these changes can only function if the merit order system is abolished and replaced with a model where electricity prices are based on the respective production costs. This system must take into account the average costs in the pricing.

A government facility

A government facility

| 2.13. | Since 1996, the EU has been committed to liberalising the electricity market. However, in the context of a reform of the electricity market, liberalisation must be critically examined in terms of its sustainability, affordability and security of supply. Account must be taken of past and future developments in the electricity market, including major changes in production facilities with very different cost prices. Moreover, governments will be responsible for delivering these three objectives over a long period, because the market will not combine them spontaneously. |
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2.13.

Since 1996, the EU has been committed to liberalising the electricity market. However, in the context of a reform of the electricity market, liberalisation must be critically examined in terms of its sustainability, affordability and security of supply. Account must be taken of past and future developments in the electricity market, including major changes in production facilities with very different cost prices. Moreover, governments will be responsible for delivering these three objectives over a long period, because the market will not combine them spontaneously.

| 2.14. | The EESC believes that it would be better to opt for an effective mix of liberalisation and regulation in order to combine the merits of the liberalised market with the desired direction on the part of governments; this would ensure that the objectives are safeguarded. |
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2.14.

The EESC believes that it would be better to opt for an effective mix of liberalisation and regulation in order to combine the merits of the liberalised market with the desired direction on the part of governments; this would ensure that the objectives are safeguarded.

| 2.15. | As already pointed out in EESC opinion TEN/771 the Committee is convinced that particular attention should be paid to defining grid development as an overriding public interest, including climate protection as a regulatory objective and, more generally, synchronising the planning of renewable energies and the electricity grid more effectively. There is an urgent need for specific provisions under EU law. |
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2.15.

As already pointed out in EESC opinion TEN/771 the Committee is convinced that particular attention should be paid to defining grid development as an overriding public interest, including climate protection as a regulatory objective and, more generally, synchronising the planning of renewable energies and the electricity grid more effectively. There is an urgent need for specific provisions under EU law.

| 2.16. | The model outlined here by the EESC for the reformed electricity market is therefore based on the following principle: liberalised where possible and regulated where necessary. It would be a hybrid model, where market forces and target-driven management jointly lead to optimal market functioning within the framework of the stipulated objectives. |
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2.16.

The model outlined here by the EESC for the reformed electricity market is therefore based on the following principle: liberalised where possible and regulated where necessary. It would be a hybrid model, where market forces and target-driven management jointly lead to optimal market functioning within the framework of the stipulated objectives.

| 2.17. | The model, which is also already possible under the current regulations, should create a government-established ‘E-facility’ which buys the electricity from the producers and sells it to suppliers of household customers, SMEs, Citizen Energy Communities and large consumers, and where appropriate and possible to other countries, using the three objectives as a framework for decision making. This facility would conclude long-term contracts with electricity producers on the basis of tenders. These contracts would be of various types, such as power purchase agreements (PPA), contracts for difference (CfD) and cost+ contracts. Since CfD are intended to be an instrument for promoting new investments generating electricity from renewable energy systems, this tool must not prevent the producer from striving to optimise their power generation. For a CfD auction it is necessary to define a threshold price (minimum price) and a ceiling price (maximum price), which are based on a dynamic benchmark based on the LCOE (levelized cost of energy) of the technologies considered (solar, wind, et al). Therefore, the Member States must be required to set minimum and maximum remunerations so that power producers have an incentive to optimise their production. For marginal power supply (e.g. from renewable gases or batteries) special provisions should apply. |
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2.17.

The model, which is also already possible under the current regulations, should create a government-established ‘E-facility’ which buys the electricity from the producers and sells it to suppliers of household customers, SMEs, Citizen Energy Communities and large consumers, and where appropriate and possible to other countries, using the three objectives as a framework for decision making. This facility would conclude long-term contracts with electricity producers on the basis of tenders. These contracts would be of various types, such as power purchase agreements (PPA), contracts for difference (CfD) and cost+ contracts. Since CfD are intended to be an instrument for promoting new investments generating electricity from renewable energy systems, this tool must not prevent the producer from striving to optimise their power generation. For a CfD auction it is necessary to define a threshold price (minimum price) and a ceiling price (maximum price), which are based on a dynamic benchmark based on the LCOE (levelized cost of energy) of the technologies considered (solar, wind, et al). Therefore, the Member States must be required to set minimum and maximum remunerations so that power producers have an incentive to optimise their production. For marginal power supply (e.g. from renewable gases or batteries) special provisions should apply.

| 2.18. | Given the production possibilities available and in line with the three objectives, the facility can enter into contracts with various types of production companies. The long-term contracts concluded by the facility ensure both an acceptable price guaranteed by the state for end users and investment security for producers. |
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2.18.

Given the production possibilities available and in line with the three objectives, the facility can enter into contracts with various types of production companies. The long-term contracts concluded by the facility ensure both an acceptable price guaranteed by the state for end users and investment security for producers.

| 2.19. | The facility then sells the purchased electricity on to distribution companies, large users and other market participants. Various types of contracts can also be concluded for this, determined partly by the wishes of the participants. Resale price caps are set to prevent over-profits. |
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2.19.

The facility then sells the purchased electricity on to distribution companies, large users and other market participants. Various types of contracts can also be concluded for this, determined partly by the wishes of the participants. Resale price caps are set to prevent over-profits.

Electricity bank

Electricity bank

| 2.20. | The Committee strongly supports the approach described in the Commission’s European Energy Union, to empower consumers and putting them at the heart of politics, among other things by creating the right to share renewable energy directly. We are therefore pleased that the Commission has included in its proposal that consumers will be able to sell excess rooftop solar electricity to neighbours. The EESC also considers that the market must be organised so as to enable consumers who also generate their own electricity (prosumers and renewable energy communities — REC) or other small market participants or producers to benefit as much as possible from the electricity they generate themselves, even if they feed it into the grid. One example of how this can be organised in another, more honest way for small producers is an ‘electricity bank’, an example that can be further thought through and worked out. |
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2.20.

The Committee strongly supports the approach described in the Commission’s European Energy Union, to empower consumers and putting them at the heart of politics, among other things by creating the right to share renewable energy directly. We are therefore pleased that the Commission has included in its proposal that consumers will be able to sell excess rooftop solar electricity to neighbours. The EESC also considers that the market must be organised so as to enable consumers who also generate their own electricity (prosumers and renewable energy communities — REC) or other small market participants or producers to benefit as much as possible from the electricity they generate themselves, even if they feed it into the grid. One example of how this can be organised in another, more honest way for small producers is an ‘electricity bank’, an example that can be further thought through and worked out.

| 2.21. | This is how an electricity bank might work: you have solar panels on your roof and on sunny days they produce more than you consume that day. You deliver this excess electricity via the grid to the distribution company with which you have a contract. The company can read how much electricity you have supplied via your smart meter and this amount will partly (maybe between 70 % and 90 %, depending on how much you supply to the grid; smaller suppliers are credited with a larger share) be credited to your kWh account. It is only partly credited for three reasons: firstly, to finance the company’s services, secondly the company must take into account possible price differences between the moment you supply electricity and the moment you want to purchase electricity and, thirdly, because incentives should be built into the system to add storage capacity (even just a small generator) to make the entire electricity network more resilient. An example: you have supplied 100 kWh and the bank then credits 80 kWh to your account. Then you need to get electricity from your provider, for example for your own household, or charge your car battery at a charging station using a charging card from your electricity provider. Suppose you need 200 kWh: the first 80 kWh will be debited from your account and you pay nothing for it. For the next 120 kWh you buy, you pay the price stipulated by your contract with the electricity company. |
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2.21.

This is how an electricity bank might work: you have solar panels on your roof and on sunny days they produce more than you consume that day. You deliver this excess electricity via the grid to the distribution company with which you have a contract. The company can read how much electricity you have supplied via your smart meter and this amount will partly (maybe between 70 % and 90 %, depending on how much you supply to the grid; smaller suppliers are credited with a larger share) be credited to your kWh account. It is only partly credited for three reasons: firstly, to finance the company’s services, secondly the company must take into account possible price differences between the moment you supply electricity and the moment you want to purchase electricity and, thirdly, because incentives should be built into the system to add storage capacity (even just a small generator) to make the entire electricity network more resilient. An example: you have supplied 100 kWh and the bank then credits 80 kWh to your account. Then you need to get electricity from your provider, for example for your own household, or charge your car battery at a charging station using a charging card from your electricity provider. Suppose you need 200 kWh: the first 80 kWh will be debited from your account and you pay nothing for it. For the next 120 kWh you buy, you pay the price stipulated by your contract with the electricity company.

| 2.22. | So rather than paying for the electricity bank’s services in euro, you pay in kWh. Of course, the price of the electricity you get delivered by grid includes the normal external costs, such as network fees, surcharges, levies and taxes. |
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2.22.

So rather than paying for the electricity bank’s services in euro, you pay in kWh. Of course, the price of the electricity you get delivered by grid includes the normal external costs, such as network fees, surcharges, levies and taxes.

The need for green gas, flexibility and security of supply

The need for green gas, flexibility and security of supply

| 2.23. | So far, the EU has decided to rely on LNG to replace Russian gas. However, this is a short-term solution as it has an environmental impact (such as shale gas from the US that is then shipped to Europe), an economic impact (the molecule is costlier than it was for Russian gas) and a geopolitical impact (the EU may become reliant on other partners, who are undemocratic and/or harm human rights). Therefore, two measures are paramount. First is reducing the marginality of gas. The use of gas plants will continue to be necessary as a mid-term flexible back-up system, and so a rapid transition to green gas, such as certain forms of biogas and green hydrogen, will be required. The reform should also try to identify ways and means to do so, with compulsory objectives at peak times. |
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2.23.

So far, the EU has decided to rely on LNG to replace Russian gas. However, this is a short-term solution as it has an environmental impact (such as shale gas from the US that is then shipped to Europe), an economic impact (the molecule is costlier than it was for Russian gas) and a geopolitical impact (the EU may become reliant on other partners, who are undemocratic and/or harm human rights). Therefore, two measures are paramount. First is reducing the marginality of gas. The use of gas plants will continue to be necessary as a mid-term flexible back-up system, and so a rapid transition to green gas, such as certain forms of biogas and green hydrogen, will be required. The reform should also try to identify ways and means to do so, with compulsory objectives at peak times.

| 2.24. | According to the various scenarios devised by the Commission, natural gas will continue to play an important role for the short-term in guaranteeing a supply of thermal energy to the EU production system. The production capacity for biogas must accelerate and the cost of green hydrogen must go down in order to allow natural gas to be replaced as quickly as possible. In addition to the request to accelerate the development of green gases, the Committee calls on the Commission to include a regulation for the market design of natural gas in the H2 and low-carbon gases package. In this way, a single integrated and secure natural gas market at EU level would accelerate the electrification of the energy system by guaranteeing greater price equality and security for Europeans and improving coordination to support the phasing out of natural gas use as quickly as possible. |
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2.24.

According to the various scenarios devised by the Commission, natural gas will continue to play an important role for the short-term in guaranteeing a supply of thermal energy to the EU production system. The production capacity for biogas must accelerate and the cost of green hydrogen must go down in order to allow natural gas to be replaced as quickly as possible. In addition to the request to accelerate the development of green gases, the Committee calls on the Commission to include a regulation for the market design of natural gas in the H2 and low-carbon gases package. In this way, a single integrated and secure natural gas market at EU level would accelerate the electrification of the energy system by guaranteeing greater price equality and security for Europeans and improving coordination to support the phasing out of natural gas use as quickly as possible.

| 2.25. | In 2030, according to the European Commission’s modelling scenario, renewable electricity should represent around 70 % of EU power generation. In order to achieve such a high level of renewable energy systems integration and accelerate the transition to a decarbonised system, it will be necessary to ensure that the short-term market is more efficient, enhance storage by means of facilitated access to financing and permits, and encourage consumers to use electricity they have generated themselves. However, storage and generating your own electricity will not be enough, and the short-term market is unlikely to offer an effective solution. What is needed are flexibility markets that in the best scenario also signal the situation prevailing on the grid. The reform should also avoid any risk of fragmentation by carefully monitoring the implementation of the newly adopted measures. |
| --- | --- |

2.25.

In 2030, according to the European Commission’s modelling scenario, renewable electricity should represent around 70 % of EU power generation. In order to achieve such a high level of renewable energy systems integration and accelerate the transition to a decarbonised system, it will be necessary to ensure that the short-term market is more efficient, enhance storage by means of facilitated access to financing and permits, and encourage consumers to use electricity they have generated themselves. However, storage and generating your own electricity will not be enough, and the short-term market is unlikely to offer an effective solution. What is needed are flexibility markets that in the best scenario also signal the situation prevailing on the grid. The reform should also avoid any risk of fragmentation by carefully monitoring the implementation of the newly adopted measures.

| 2.26. | When establishing these flexibility markets, it makes sense to differentiate between the voltage levels. On a high and medium voltage level, large scaled flexibility options, such as big storages, are needed and it could be an option to entitle and oblige grid operator to integrate them to their operation as own resources. On a low voltage level the task is rather to aggregate small flexibility options that are provided by prosumers, e.g. households with a own PV installation, a small storage and a heat pump. Digital platforms operated by grid operator or other market actors could become an important tool for marketing flexibility as system service provision and to integrating them into the electricity system. |
| --- | --- |

2.26.

When establishing these flexibility markets, it makes sense to differentiate between the voltage levels. On a high and medium voltage level, large scaled flexibility options, such as big storages, are needed and it could be an option to entitle and oblige grid operator to integrate them to their operation as own resources. On a low voltage level the task is rather to aggregate small flexibility options that are provided by prosumers, e.g. households with a own PV installation, a small storage and a heat pump. Digital platforms operated by grid operator or other market actors could become an important tool for marketing flexibility as system service provision and to integrating them into the electricity system.

| 2.27. | Dynamic tariffs, including dynamic grid fees, can serve as strong incentives for end-consumers to act in a system friendly way. However, this requires a digital infrastructure since in the dynamic tariffs the grid status should be reflected. Also, in the grid fees, generation that is close to consumption should be incentivized as this can be one approach how to limit grid expansion. |
| --- | --- |

2.27.

Dynamic tariffs, including dynamic grid fees, can serve as strong incentives for end-consumers to act in a system friendly way. However, this requires a digital infrastructure since in the dynamic tariffs the grid status should be reflected. Also, in the grid fees, generation that is close to consumption should be incentivized as this can be one approach how to limit grid expansion.

Energy poverty

Energy poverty

| 2.28. | As the objective of the reform was to shield consumers from the volatility of the wholesale market, the EESC welcomes the proposal that protects the end consumer (supplier of last resort, avoid disconnection to consumers in need, etc.). However, the EESC notes that the inframarginal rent cap has not been extended. As the reform will take time to be fully effective, the EESC recommends that the mechanism stay in place until the reform is fully operational. Revenues should be directed toward the most vulnerable (such as people suffering from energy poverty and SMEs), with the option of lowering prices in light of recent developments in wholesale prices. |
| --- | --- |

2.28.

As the objective of the reform was to shield consumers from the volatility of the wholesale market, the EESC welcomes the proposal that protects the end consumer (supplier of last resort, avoid disconnection to consumers in need, etc.). However, the EESC notes that the inframarginal rent cap has not been extended. As the reform will take time to be fully effective, the EESC recommends that the mechanism stay in place until the reform is fully operational. Revenues should be directed toward the most vulnerable (such as people suffering from energy poverty and SMEs), with the option of lowering prices in light of recent developments in wholesale prices.

| 2.29. | In order to guarantee an affordable basic energy supply, the EESC believes that the new market design must guarantee basic energy consumption at regulated prices. Costs for energy suppliers should be reimbursed on the basis of costs evidence. In return, energy suppliers must be permanently required to provide a certain share of energy for basic supply. |
| --- | --- |

2.29.

In order to guarantee an affordable basic energy supply, the EESC believes that the new market design must guarantee basic energy consumption at regulated prices. Costs for energy suppliers should be reimbursed on the basis of costs evidence. In return, energy suppliers must be permanently required to provide a certain share of energy for basic supply.

3.   Amendments to the legislative proposal

Amendments to the legislative proposal

3.1.   Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6)

Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council

6

Amendment 1

Amendment 1

Insert a new recital 21a after recital 21:

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (21a) | Since 1996, the EU has been committed to the liberalization of the electricity market, a process that started with Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. However, in the context of electricity market reform, this liberalization should be viewed from the perspective of sustainability, affordability and security of supply. Past and future developments in the electricity market must be taken into account, including major changes in production facilities with widely varying cost prices. In order to achieve these goals, the Member States have to provide an appropriate regulatory framework. This includes legal requirements for companies in the energy sector. The requirements shall be non-discriminatory. One way in which this can be achieved is a government-established ‘E-facility’ that buys electricity from producers and sells it to distributors and major consumers; the three objectives would thereby function as a framework for decision-making. This facility would conclude long-term contracts with electricity producers based on tenders, such as power purchase agreements and two-way contracts for difference. Such a model is already possible under the actual legislation. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(21a)

(21a)

Since 1996, the EU has been committed to the liberalization of the electricity market, a process that started with Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. However, in the context of electricity market reform, this liberalization should be viewed from the perspective of sustainability, affordability and security of supply. Past and future developments in the electricity market must be taken into account, including major changes in production facilities with widely varying cost prices. In order to achieve these goals, the Member States have to provide an appropriate regulatory framework. This includes legal requirements for companies in the energy sector. The requirements shall be non-discriminatory. One way in which this can be achieved is a government-established ‘E-facility’ that buys electricity from producers and sells it to distributors and major consumers; the three objectives would thereby function as a framework for decision-making. This facility would conclude long-term contracts with electricity producers based on tenders, such as power purchase agreements and two-way contracts for difference. Such a model is already possible under the actual legislation.

Since 1996, the EU has been committed to the liberalization of the electricity market, a process that started with Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. However, in the context of electricity market reform, this liberalization should be viewed from the perspective of sustainability, affordability and security of supply. Past and future developments in the electricity market must be taken into account, including major changes in production facilities with widely varying cost prices. In order to achieve these goals, the Member States have to provide an appropriate regulatory framework. This includes legal requirements for companies in the energy sector. The requirements shall be non-discriminatory. One way in which this can be achieved is a government-established ‘E-facility’ that buys electricity from producers and sells it to distributors and major consumers; the three objectives would thereby function as a framework for decision-making. This facility would conclude long-term contracts with electricity producers based on tenders, such as power purchase agreements and two-way contracts for difference. Such a model is already possible under the actual legislation.

Reason

Reason

See point 2 paragraphs 2.18 — 2.21.

Amendment 2

Amendment 2

Insert a new recital 50a after recital 50:

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (50a) | The right to share electricity is an important incentive for consumers and other small market parties to invest in generating their own electricity. A further incentive will be to organize the market in such a way that consumers who generate their own electricity (prosumers) or other small market participants can profit as much as possible from the electricity they generate themselves, even if they supply it first to the grid. Electricity companies in several Member States already have schemes that make this possible. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(50a)

(50a)

The right to share electricity is an important incentive for consumers and other small market parties to invest in generating their own electricity. A further incentive will be to organize the market in such a way that consumers who generate their own electricity (prosumers) or other small market participants can profit as much as possible from the electricity they generate themselves, even if they supply it first to the grid. Electricity companies in several Member States already have schemes that make this possible.

The right to share electricity is an important incentive for consumers and other small market parties to invest in generating their own electricity. A further incentive will be to organize the market in such a way that consumers who generate their own electricity (prosumers) or other small market participants can profit as much as possible from the electricity they generate themselves, even if they supply it first to the grid. Electricity companies in several Member States already have schemes that make this possible.

Reason

Reason

See point 2 paragraphs 2.22 — 2.24.

Amendment 3

Amendment 3

Article 1 is amended as follows:

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (a) | ensure that energy is not a commodity like any other, but an essential basis of our economic and social system. Therefore, energy supply is classified as a service of general interest. The main task of the energy sector is a secure, affordable, and sustainable supply of energy. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(a)

(a)

ensure that energy is not a commodity like any other, but an essential basis of our economic and social system. Therefore, energy supply is classified as a service of general interest. The main task of the energy sector is a secure, affordable, and sustainable supply of energy.

ensure that energy is not a commodity like any other, but an essential basis of our economic and social system. Therefore, energy supply is classified as a service of general interest. The main task of the energy sector is a secure, affordable, and sustainable supply of energy.

Reason

Reason

See point 2 paragraphs 2.5 and further.

Amendment 4

Amendment 4

Article 1 is amended as follows:

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (b) | Create a system where consumer prices for electricity must reflect actual production costs (plus an appropriate profit mark-up). This means that the wholesale price must correspond to the average costs of all types of electricity production and not the maximum price, as is currently the case. In order to ensure appropriate remuneration for electricity producers, investment security, and the expansion of renewable energy, technology-dependent prices are necessary. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(b)

(b)

Create a system where consumer prices for electricity must reflect actual production costs (plus an appropriate profit mark-up). This means that the wholesale price must correspond to the average costs of all types of electricity production and not the maximum price, as is currently the case. In order to ensure appropriate remuneration for electricity producers, investment security, and the expansion of renewable energy, technology-dependent prices are necessary.

Create a system where consumer prices for electricity must reflect actual production costs (plus an appropriate profit mark-up). This means that the wholesale price must correspond to the average costs of all types of electricity production and not the maximum price, as is currently the case. In order to ensure appropriate remuneration for electricity producers, investment security, and the expansion of renewable energy, technology-dependent prices are necessary.

Reason

Reason

See point 2 paragraph 2.13.

Amendment 5

Amendment 5

Article 19b is amended as follows:

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3.   [...]









  (c) | For the ‘two-way contracts for differences’, technology-specific maximum prices are to be set in each Member State. The maximum prices shall be based on the costs required to operate a cost-efficient, state-of-the-art plant. The costs shall include depreciation and an appropriate return on equity and debt capital for the investment. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

3.   [...]

(c)

For the ‘two-way contracts for differences’, technology-specific maximum prices are to be set in each Member State. The maximum prices shall be based on the costs required to operate a cost-efficient, state-of-the-art plant. The costs shall include depreciation and an appropriate return on equity and debt capital for the investment.

Reason

Reason

See point 2 paragraph 2.19.

Amendment 6

Amendment 6

Article 7a point 2(c) is amended as follows:

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (c) | the procurement of the peak shaving product shall take place using a competitive bidding process, with selection based on the lowest cost of meeting pre-defined technical and environmental criteria; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c)

the procurement of the peak shaving product shall take place using a competitive bidding process, with selection based on the lowest cost of meeting pre-defined technical and environmental criteria;

| (c) | the procurement of the peak shaving product shall take place using a competitive bidding process, with selection based on the lowest cost of meeting pre-defined technical and environmental criteria,
  competitive bids can both rely on fixed and variable prices
  ; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the procurement of the peak shaving product shall take place using a competitive bidding process, with selection based on the lowest cost of meeting pre-defined technical and environmental criteria,
  competitive bids can both rely on fixed and variable prices
  ;

competitive bids can both rely on fixed and variable prices

Reason

Reason

See point 2 paragraph 2.11.

Amendment 7

Amendment 7

Article 19b 3. is amended as follows:

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (c) | Member States shall define minimum and maximum remuneration of two-way contract for differences which have to reflect the technology specific actual production costs so that power producers are encouraged to optimize their production. The strike price of two way contracts is determined by the Member States considering the levelized cost of energy of the specific state-of-the-art technology object of the contract. The costs shall include depreciation and an appropriate return on equity and debt capital for the investment. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(c)

(c)

Member States shall define minimum and maximum remuneration of two-way contract for differences which have to reflect the technology specific actual production costs so that power producers are encouraged to optimize their production. The strike price of two way contracts is determined by the Member States considering the levelized cost of energy of the specific state-of-the-art technology object of the contract. The costs shall include depreciation and an appropriate return on equity and debt capital for the investment.

Member States shall define minimum and maximum remuneration of two-way contract for differences which have to reflect the technology specific actual production costs so that power producers are encouraged to optimize their production. The strike price of two way contracts is determined by the Member States considering the levelized cost of energy of the specific state-of-the-art technology object of the contract. The costs shall include depreciation and an appropriate return on equity and debt capital for the investment.

Reason

Reason

See point 2 paragraph 2.19.

3.2.   Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7)

Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council

7

Amendment 8

Amendment 8

Article 4 is amended as follows:

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Member States shall ensure that all customers are free to purchase electricity from the supplier of their choice. Member States shall ensure that all customers are free to have more than one electricity supply contract at the same time, and that for this purpose customers are entitled to have more than one metering and billing point covered by the single connection point for their premises. | Member States shall ensure that
  consumer prices for electricity reflect actual production costs (plus an appropriate profit mark-up) and that
  all customers are free to purchase electricity from the supplier of their choice. Member States shall ensure that all customers are free to have more than one electricity supply contract at the same time, and that for this purpose customers are entitled to have more than one metering and billing point covered by the single connection point for their premises. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Member States shall ensure that all customers are free to purchase electricity from the supplier of their choice. Member States shall ensure that all customers are free to have more than one electricity supply contract at the same time, and that for this purpose customers are entitled to have more than one metering and billing point covered by the single connection point for their premises.

Member States shall ensure that
  consumer prices for electricity reflect actual production costs (plus an appropriate profit mark-up) and that
  all customers are free to purchase electricity from the supplier of their choice. Member States shall ensure that all customers are free to have more than one electricity supply contract at the same time, and that for this purpose customers are entitled to have more than one metering and billing point covered by the single connection point for their premises.

consumer prices for electricity reflect actual production costs (plus an appropriate profit mark-up) and that

Reason

Reason

See point 2 paragraph 2.9.

Amendment 9

Amendment 9

Article 4b 1. is amended as follows:

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Member States shall ensure that the national regulatory framework enables suppliers to offer fixed-term, fixed-price contracts and dynamic electricity price contracts. Member States shall ensure that final customers who have a smart meter installed can request to conclude a dynamic electricity price contract and that all final customers can request to conclude
  a fixed-term, fixed-price
  electricity price contract of a duration of at least one year, with at least one supplier and with every supplier that has more than 200 000 final customers. | Member States shall ensure that the national regulatory framework enables suppliers to offer fixed-term, fixed-price contracts and dynamic electricity price contracts. Member States shall ensure that final customers who have a smart meter installed can request to conclude a dynamic electricity price contract and that all final customers can request to conclude
  an affordable fixed price and fixed term
  electricity price contract of a duration of at least one year, with at least one supplier and with every supplier that has more than 200 000 final customers. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Member States shall ensure that the national regulatory framework enables suppliers to offer fixed-term, fixed-price contracts and dynamic electricity price contracts. Member States shall ensure that final customers who have a smart meter installed can request to conclude a dynamic electricity price contract and that all final customers can request to conclude
  a fixed-term, fixed-price
  electricity price contract of a duration of at least one year, with at least one supplier and with every supplier that has more than 200 000 final customers.

a fixed-term, fixed-price

Member States shall ensure that the national regulatory framework enables suppliers to offer fixed-term, fixed-price contracts and dynamic electricity price contracts. Member States shall ensure that final customers who have a smart meter installed can request to conclude a dynamic electricity price contract and that all final customers can request to conclude
  an affordable fixed price and fixed term
  electricity price contract of a duration of at least one year, with at least one supplier and with every supplier that has more than 200 000 final customers.

an affordable fixed price and fixed term

Reason

Reason

See point 2 paragraph 2.9.

Amendment 10

Amendment 10

Article 27a 1. is amended as follows:

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Member States shall appoint suppliers of last resort at least for household customers. Suppliers of last resort shall be appointed in a fair, open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure. | Member States shall appoint suppliers of last resort at least for household customers. Suppliers of last resort shall be appointed in a fair, open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure.
  All energy suppliers must be available as suppliers of last resort in accordance with their market share. |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Member States shall appoint suppliers of last resort at least for household customers. Suppliers of last resort shall be appointed in a fair, open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure.

Member States shall appoint suppliers of last resort at least for household customers. Suppliers of last resort shall be appointed in a fair, open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure.
  All energy suppliers must be available as suppliers of last resort in accordance with their market share.

All energy suppliers must be available as suppliers of last resort in accordance with their market share.

Reason

Reason

It is fair that all energy suppliers can be appointed as supplier of last resort.

Amendment 11

Amendment 11

Article 27a 2. is amended as follows:

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Final customers who are transferred to suppliers of last resort shall not lose their rights as customers, in particular those rights laid down in Articles 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18 and 26. | Final customers who are transferred to suppliers of last resort shall not lose their rights as customers, in particular those rights laid down in Articles 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18 and 26.


  The contractual conditions of a supplier of last resort must not be discriminatory or deterrent. The contract conditions must reflect the actual production costs (plus appropriate mark-up). |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Final customers who are transferred to suppliers of last resort shall not lose their rights as customers, in particular those rights laid down in Articles 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18 and 26.

Final customers who are transferred to suppliers of last resort shall not lose their rights as customers, in particular those rights laid down in Articles 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18 and 26.

The contractual conditions of a supplier of last resort must not be discriminatory or deterrent. The contract conditions must reflect the actual production costs (plus appropriate mark-up).

The contractual conditions of a supplier of last resort must not be discriminatory or deterrent. The contract conditions must reflect the actual production costs (plus appropriate mark-up).

Reason

Reason

This is necessary for fair treatment of customers.

Amendment 12

Amendment 12

Article 66a is amended as follows:

Replacing paragraphs 1-4 as follows:

| Text proposed by the Commission | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.
     
  The Commission may by decision declare a regional or Union-wide electricity price crisis, if the following conditions are met:










  (a) | very high prices in wholesale electricity markets at least two and a half times the average price during the previous 5 years which is expected to continue for at least 6 months; |

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

1.
     
  The Commission may by decision declare a regional or Union-wide electricity price crisis, if the following conditions are met:

(a)

very high prices in wholesale electricity markets at least two and a half times the average price during the previous 5 years which is expected to continue for at least 6 months;

| (b) | sharp increases in electricity retail prices of at least 70 % occur which are expected to continue for at least 6 months; and |
| --- | --- |

(b)

sharp increases in electricity retail prices of at least 70 % occur which are expected to continue for at least 6 months; and

| (c) | the wider economy is being negatively affected by the increases in electricity prices. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the wider economy is being negatively affected by the increases in electricity prices.

1.
     
  If the following conditions are met:

| | very high prices in wholesale electricity markets: an average price of at least euro 100 per megawatt hour for two consecutive months. |
| --- | --- |

very high prices in wholesale electricity markets: an average price of at least euro 100 per megawatt hour for two consecutive months.

2.
     
  The Commission shall specify in its decision declaring a regional or Union-wide electricity price crisis the period of validity of that decision which may be for a period of up to one year.

2.
     
  Member States may for the duration of condition in 1. met exceptionally and temporarily set a price for the supply of electricity which is below cost provided that the following conditions are fulfilled:

| (a) | the price set for households only applies to at most 80 % of median household consumption and retains an incentive for demand reduction; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the price set for households only applies to at most 80 % of median household consumption and retains an incentive for demand reduction;

| (b) | the price must not exceed 10 cent per kilowatt hour. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the price must not exceed 10 cent per kilowatt hour.

| (c) | there is no discrimination between suppliers; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

there is no discrimination between suppliers;

| (d) | if suppliers can prove that they are supplying below cost, suppliers are compensated for that. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

if suppliers can prove that they are supplying below cost, suppliers are compensated for that.

| (e) | all suppliers are eligible to provide offers for the price for the supply of electricity which is below cost on the same basis. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

all suppliers are eligible to provide offers for the price for the supply of electricity which is below cost on the same basis.

3.
     
  Where the Commission has adopted a decision pursuant to paragraph 1, Member States may for the duration of the validity of that decision apply targeted public interventions in price setting for the supply of electricity to small and medium sized enterprises. Such public interventions shall:

| (a) | be limited to at most 70 % of the beneficiary’s consumption during the same period of the previous year and retain an incentive for demand reduction; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

be limited to at most 70 % of the beneficiary’s consumption during the same period of the previous year and retain an incentive for demand reduction;

| (b) | comply with the conditions set out in Article 5(4) and (7); |
| --- | --- |

(b)

comply with the conditions set out in Article 5(4) and (7);

| (c) | where relevant, comply with the conditions set out in Paragraph 4. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

where relevant, comply with the conditions set out in Paragraph 4.

4.
     
  Where the Commission has adopted a decision pursuant to paragraph 1, Member States may for the duration of the validity of that decision, by way of derogation from Article 5(7), point (c), when applying targeted public interventions in price setting for the supply of electricity pursuant to Article 5(6) or paragraph 3 of this Article, exceptionally and temporarily set a price for the supply of electricity which is below cost provided that the following conditions are fulfilled:

| (a) | the price set for households only applies to at most 80 % of median household consumption and retains an incentive for demand reduction; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the price set for households only applies to at most 80 % of median household consumption and retains an incentive for demand reduction;

| (b) | there is no discrimination between suppliers; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

there is no discrimination between suppliers;

| (c) | suppliers are compensated for supplying below cost; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

suppliers are compensated for supplying below cost; and

| (d) | all suppliers are eligible to provide offers for the price for the supply of electricity which is below cost on the same basis. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

all suppliers are eligible to provide offers for the price for the supply of electricity which is below cost on the same basis.

3.
     
  The compensation in 2. (d) must be financed by the revenues of cap on market revenues for the generation of electricity from inframarginal technologies.

Reason

Reason

Current energy prices have shown that in the event of corresponding market distortions, measures are necessary to ensure the basic supply of energy for private households, but also business enterprises. However, the mechanism proposed by the Commission under Article 66a is complicated and ineffective. At the same time, the co-financing of the measure is completely excluded.

We propose a simple but effective mechanism, modelled on the Austrian ‘Stromkostenzuschussgesetz’. This could come into force automatically and should be financed by skimming off windfall profits.

| — | The electricity price for the purchase of a basic supply quantity may not exceed the price of 10c net per kWh. |
| --- | --- |

—

The electricity price for the purchase of a basic supply quantity may not exceed the price of 10c net per kWh.

| — | If the average electricity exchange price in two consecutive months is more than 100 euros/MWh, suppliers who have to offer below their actual procurement costs have the right to compensation for their differential costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

If the average electricity exchange price in two consecutive months is more than 100 euros/MWh, suppliers who have to offer below their actual procurement costs have the right to compensation for their differential costs.

| — | The energy suppliers have to prove the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

The energy suppliers have to prove the costs.

| — | This ‘price brake’ is financed by skimming off excess revenues in the area of inframarginal generation. |
| --- | --- |

—

This ‘price brake’ is financed by skimming off excess revenues in the area of inframarginal generation.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Public investment in energy infrastructure as part of the solution to climate issues (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 67) and Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Short-Term Energy Market Interventions and Long-Term Improvement to the Electricity Market Design — a course for action (COM(2022) 236 final) (OJ C 75, 28.02.2023, p. 185).

1

(2)  https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/INSR23_03/INSR_Energy_Union_EN.pdf

2

(3)  Merit order: the order of power plants based on the level of their marginal costs, starting with the lowest marginal costs and ending with the highest marginal costs. So, power plants with higher marginal costs are added until the demand is met. The order is: renewable energy, nuclear energy, coal, oil and gas. In today’s electricity market design, the last power plant from the merit order (mostly gas) sets the price using its marginal costs.

3

(4)  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_1591

4

(5)  A small market participant is, for example, a municipality, energy cooperative or region that generates electricity by means of wind and/or sun and that supplies part of that electricity to the grid rather than using it all directly.

5

(6)  Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 54).

6

(7)  Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 125).

7

---

ANNEX

Benefits of a central governmental E-facility

Image 1

| — | Buys at various prices depending on sourcing






  — | Allow market parties to tender and provides certainty in the market |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Buys at various prices depending on sourcing

—

Allow market parties to tender and provides certainty in the market

| — | Sells at a long term fixed pricing






  — | Good for the market and good for consumers |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Sells at a long term fixed pricing

—

Good for the market and good for consumers

| — | Ensures Security of Supply based on an appropriate E mix






  — | Consider and steer international fuel sourcing |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Ensures Security of Supply based on an appropriate E mix

—

Consider and steer international fuel sourcing

| — | Ensure E demand can be met in view of the forecasted 2-3 fold increase in E demand (electrification) |
| --- | --- |

—

Ensure E demand can be met in view of the forecasted 2-3 fold increase in E demand (electrification)

| — | Fund, introduce and manage new technologies in the context of the existing and anticipated growth towards sustainability |
| --- | --- |

—

Fund, introduce and manage new technologies in the context of the existing and anticipated growth towards sustainability

| — | Leaves government in control and ensures market freedom. |
| --- | --- |

—

Leaves government in control and ensures market freedom.

---

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/127 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/127

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Hydrogen Bank

(COM(2023) 156 final)

(2023/C 293/18)

| Rapporteur: | Thomas KATTNIG |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Thomas KATTNIG

Thomas KATTNIG

| Referral | European Commission, 2.5.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Adopted in section | 16.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 162/0/2 |

Referral

European Commission, 2.5.2023

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Adopted in section

16.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

162/0/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the European Commission’s idea of setting up a European Hydrogen Bank (EHB) and calls on the Commission, considering the detailed comments and recommendations set out in its opinion on the European Hydrogen Strategy, to specify the following points in greater detail or to take them into account in the design and implementation of the EHB from an economic, environmental and social policy perspective. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the European Commission’s idea of setting up a European Hydrogen Bank (EHB) and calls on the Commission, considering the detailed comments and recommendations set out in its opinion on the European Hydrogen Strategy, to specify the following points in greater detail or to take them into account in the design and implementation of the EHB from an economic, environmental and social policy perspective.

| 1.2. | The EESC stresses that fossil fuels must not be subsidised with EU funds. Therefore, the ‘do no harm’ principle must also be applied to funds associated with the EHB: hydrogen (H2) must be financed through EU funding only if the electricity used comes from sources that are compatible with the Taxonomy Regulation and that are considered to make a considerable contribution to decarbonisation. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC stresses that fossil fuels must not be subsidised with EU funds. Therefore, the ‘do no harm’ principle must also be applied to funds associated with the EHB: hydrogen (H2

| 1.3. | EHB financing should prioritise the production of green H2 and must be compatible with EU rules on hydrogen. The EESC believes that, in order to manage demand and availability in hard-to-electrify sectors (especially in the steel sector) in the best possible way, the EHB should serve as a demand management tool. In addition, a common procurement mechanism in sectors that are difficult to electrify should help to avoid intra-European price competition, especially during the start-up period. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

EHB financing should prioritise the production of green H2

| 1.4. | The EESC opposes using (non-renewable) energy sources from Europe’s electricity grids for energy-intensive electrolysis processes, thereby increasing the overall demand for energy. The EESC stresses the need to promote H2 use in conjunction with the development of renewable energy resources and to use it only where direct electrification is not possible. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

The EESC opposes using (non-renewable) energy sources from Europe’s electricity grids for energy-intensive electrolysis processes, thereby increasing the overall demand for energy. The EESC stresses the need to promote H2

| 1.5. | In times of multiple crises, it is essential to fully explore the potential for job creation in developing sectors. The EESC therefore calls on the Commission to carry out an analysis to identify the skills of workers in declining industries that would be useful for new jobs in the H2 sector. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

In times of multiple crises, it is essential to fully explore the potential for job creation in developing sectors. The EESC therefore calls on the Commission to carry out an analysis to identify the skills of workers in declining industries that would be useful for new jobs in the H2

| 1.6. | According to the REPowerEU Plan, 10 million tonnes of green H2 should be produced in the EU by 2030. Priority should be given to accelerating the development and expansion of Europe’s production capacity in order to achieve energy independence and avoid contributing to new strategic dependencies. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

According to the REPowerEU Plan, 10 million tonnes of green H2

| 1.7. | The EESC believes that the cost-effectiveness of the projects to be supported should not be the only factor considered when drawing up the guidelines for allocating funding from the EHB. Rather, a number of further quality criteria, including environmental and social sustainability standards, should be included. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

The EESC believes that the cost-effectiveness of the projects to be supported should not be the only factor considered when drawing up the guidelines for allocating funding from the EHB. Rather, a number of further quality criteria, including environmental and social sustainability standards, should be included.

| 1.8. | The EESC believes that the existing EU emissions trading system (ETS) must be further strengthened; this includes effective protective measures aimed at imports (border adjustment mechanism). A predictable and less volatile price path can help create investment certainty for indispensable investments in green H2. The Commission’s top priorities should be ensuring investment security under the EU ETS, eliminating natural gas subsidies, and providing research, technology and innovation support for green H2 production and distribution technologies. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

The EESC believes that the existing EU emissions trading system (ETS) must be further strengthened; this includes effective protective measures aimed at imports (border adjustment mechanism). A predictable and less volatile price path can help create investment certainty for indispensable investments in green H2

2

| 1.9. | The EESC stresses that the use of H2 must be subject to high technical safety requirements, particularly for operational installations, and that conditions and monitoring will need to be imposed in order to identify and reduce risks. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

The EESC stresses that the use of H2

| 1.10. | The EESC regrets that insufficient thought has been given to the implementation of the strategy in the various sectors and calls for greater involvement of the public in this transformation process — at company and political level. Furthermore, the EESC calls on the Commission to assess the impact of the development of green H2 on household energy costs. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

The EESC regrets that insufficient thought has been given to the implementation of the strategy in the various sectors and calls for greater involvement of the public in this transformation process — at company and political level. Furthermore, the EESC calls on the Commission to assess the impact of the development of green H2

| 1.11. | The EESC recommends that the Commission clarify transition periods for industry according to sector-specific needs based on emission reduction pathways and targets. The steel, cement and chemical industries must be supported in converting their energy systems and production methods, as well as parts of the transport sector. The EESC stresses that these CO2 emission-intensive industries may otherwise not survive the change. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

The EESC recommends that the Commission clarify transition periods for industry according to sector-specific needs based on emission reduction pathways and targets. The steel, cement and chemical industries must be supported in converting their energy systems and production methods, as well as parts of the transport sector. The EESC stresses that these CO2

| 1.12. | The EESC believes that the EHB, in coordination with the Member States and their authorities, and with other EU funding tools and institutions, should ensure that funds are coordinated in such a way as to maximise their benefits while avoiding overfunding. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

The EESC believes that the EHB, in coordination with the Member States and their authorities, and with other EU funding tools and institutions, should ensure that funds are coordinated in such a way as to maximise their benefits while avoiding overfunding.

| 1.13. | The EESC is of the opinion that the EHB should include provisions on prevailing wages, workforce development, and apprenticeships similar to the provisions in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

The EESC is of the opinion that the EHB should include provisions on prevailing wages, workforce development, and apprenticeships similar to the provisions in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).

| 1.14. | The EESC agrees with the idea behind the EHB that incentives must be created for the emergence of a H2 market. The planned tightening of rules towards ownership unbundling of vertically integrated companies would stifle many municipal projects. This would hinder the H2 ramp-up and bring locally integrated municipal utility projects to a quick end. |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

The EESC agrees with the idea behind the EHB that incentives must be created for the emergence of a H2

2

| 1.15. | The EESC calls for public and municipal companies not to be disadvantaged compared to market-based companies under the EHB’s funding programmes. |
| --- | --- |

1.15.

The EESC calls for public and municipal companies not to be disadvantaged compared to market-based companies under the EHB’s funding programmes.

| 1.16. | The EESC is of the opinion that the European energy transition can only succeed if global trade in raw materials, and especially energy, is also based on the principles of ecological and social sustainability and the promotion of renewable energy sources. |
| --- | --- |

1.16.

The EESC is of the opinion that the European energy transition can only succeed if global trade in raw materials, and especially energy, is also based on the principles of ecological and social sustainability and the promotion of renewable energy sources.

2.   Background

Background

| 2.1. | The Communication on the EHB (1) sets out general ideas on the design of the EHB as a financial instrument to kick-start and promote the production and import of green H2 in the EU, as well as public and private funding and, therefore, market and value chain creation for it. Therefore, the EHB is not a bank. The initiative sets out four pillars of the EHB that should be operational by the end of 2023. The idea is that the EHB will close the cost gap between green H2 and fossil fuels for early projects through an auction system and a fixed price payment per kg/H2 produced for a maximum of 10 years. A system to ensure transparency and coordination regarding availability is planned, including arrangements or agreements with third countries to acquire H2. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

The Communication on the EHB (1

2

2

2

2

| 2.2. | The Communication lacks a clear link between EU H2 policy and the strategic approach of open autonomy and EU industrial and competition policy. There is only limited information on the use of resources from the innovation fund, the planned reallocation of resources and the expected relationship between public and private investment. Similarly, no priorities for the production, use and distribution of green H2 have been identified. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

The Communication lacks a clear link between EU H2

2

| 2.3. | With a budget of EUR 3 billion, the EHB is intended to help develop a H2 market, reduce dependence on fossil fuels and lower greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2040. The investment needed to develop H2 production has been estimated at EUR 335-471 billion (2), which means that most of the funding needed must come from Member States and private sources, even when taking other available EU funds in account. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

With a budget of EUR 3 billion, the EHB is intended to help develop a H2

2

2

| 2.4. | In this regard, the Commission stresses that green H2 has a key role to play in creating a smart, better integrated, optimised and secure independent energy system. Green H2 and its value chain can play an important role in offsetting variations in renewable energy flows and supplying in a targeted way sectors which are difficult or impossible to electrify. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

In this regard, the Commission stresses that green H2

2

| 2.5. | H2 can be produced in a variety of ways but is often not climate-friendly, green or even climate-neutral. The decisive factor is the energy source used to produce it, e.g. there is ‘brown’ H2 produced from the gasification of coal, ‘grey’ H2 produced from the use of fossil energy and ‘red’ H2 produced through the use of nuclear power. The production of ‘blue’ H2 generates large amounts of methane (the resulting carbon dioxide is captured and stored). However, without exception, only ‘green’ H2, produced through the use of surplus energy from renewable energy sources (wind, water or solar energy) (3), is green. In this regard, the EESC highlights its opinion TEN 718 (4), where it welcomes the Commission’s clarifications regarding the definition of clean H2. It further states, however, that, in the short and medium term, the strategy remains open to other forms of low-carbon H2 produced using fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage (CCS), a technology which is still being deployed. Worldwide, only 1 % of the energy needs could currently be met with green H2 — it is a very rare, scarce and therefore strategic resource. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

H2

2

2

2

2

2

3

4

2

2

| 2.6. | In the proposal for a REPowerEU Plan, the Commission called for accelerating the development of H2 technology by summer 2023 so as to create the infrastructure for producing, importing and transporting 20 million tonnes of H2 by 2030 (5). |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

In the proposal for a REPowerEU Plan, the Commission called for accelerating the development of H2

2

5

| 2.7. | The InvestEU Programme aims to support public and private investment in climate-friendly technologies, including H2 propulsion technologies. The GDIP proposes simplifying InvestEU procedures and adapting them to current needs. The Innovation Fund aims to support innovative technologies and solutions helping to decarbonise energy-intensive industries and expand the use of renewable energy and energy storage. According to the GDIP, EUR 40 billion will be provided for this purpose this decade. The EHB will provide EUR 3 billion to support the development of the EU H2 market. Therefore, the bulk of the investment needs must be met by Member States and private investment. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

The InvestEU Programme aims to support public and private investment in climate-friendly technologies, including H2

2

| 2.8. | According to estimates from Hydrogen Europe, EU H2 production will create approximately 1 million new jobs, including about 150 000 highly skilled jobs. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

According to estimates from Hydrogen Europe, EU H2

3.   General comments

General comments

Supporting green hydrogen without exception

Supporting green hydrogen without exception

| 3.1. | The EESC stresses that fossil fuels must not be subsidised with EU funds. The ‘do no harm’ principle that is explicitly mentioned in the EU taxonomy must therefore also be applied to funds associated with the EHB. The EESC stresses that H2 electrolysis must be financed through EU funding only if the electricity used for this purpose (6) comes from a source that is compatible with the Taxonomy Regulation and that is considered to make a considerable contribution to decarbonisation. In this respect, the EESC emphasises that green H2, as the only option compatible with climate-neutrality objectives, must be prioritised under the EHB (7). |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

The EESC stresses that fossil fuels must not be subsidised with EU funds. The ‘do no harm’ principle that is explicitly mentioned in the EU taxonomy must therefore also be applied to funds associated with the EHB. The EESC stresses that H2

6

2

7

| 3.2. | In the long run, only the production of green H2 should receive financial support. The EESC recommends that the first auction announced by the Commission for autumn 2023 to support the production of green H2 be limited to so-called hard-to-electrify sectors. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

In the long run, only the production of green H2

2

| 3.3. | At the same time, the EESC acknowledges that the use of ‘blue’ H2 will be necessary pending availability in adequate quantity and at an acceptable price. To manage demand, the EHB should serve as a demand aggregation tool, providing an overview of the demand for and availability of H2 in hard-to-electrify sectors and pooling it to make the supply price as low as possible, meaning it will function similarly to the EU Energy Platform, as suggested in the EHB Communication. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

At the same time, the EESC acknowledges that the use of ‘blue’ H2

2

| 3.4. | The EESC shares the view set out in the EHB Communication that a joint procurement mechanism for H2 in hard-to-electrify sectors could help to avoid competition within Europe and instead promote joint procurement. This joint procurement could help to build the first functioning value chains for imports into the EU. The EESC notes that being in charge of both financing and coordinating will require that the EHB command considerable professional capacity in several different fields. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

The EESC shares the view set out in the EHB Communication that a joint procurement mechanism for H2

| 3.5. | The EESC opposes using non-renewable energy sources from Europe’s electricity grids for energy-intensive electrolysis processes, thereby increasing the overall demand for energy — instead, clear and transparent rules are needed for exclusively using surplus electricity from renewable energy sources to expand green H2 production. The EESC stresses the need to promote H2 use in conjunction with the development of renewable energy resources and to use it only where direct electrification is not possible. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

The EESC opposes using non-renewable energy sources from Europe’s electricity grids for energy-intensive electrolysis processes, thereby increasing the overall demand for energy — instead, clear and transparent rules are needed for exclusively using surplus electricity from renewable energy sources to expand green H2

2

| 3.6. | As outlined in the Hydrogen roadmap Europe (8), the use of green H2 is not suitable for widespread, everyday use by the end consumer, especially in the areas of private transport and heating systems. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

As outlined in the Hydrogen roadmap Europe (8

2

| 3.7. | The EESC believes that the cost-effectiveness of the projects to be supported should not be the only factor considered when drawing up the guidelines for allocating funding from the EHB. Rather, energy security, environmental sustainability, the promotion and maintenance of high-quality jobs and the urgency of the investment needs must be key criteria. In addition, ensuring competitiveness, establishing social and environmental criteria and deploying renewable energies within the supplier countries should be mandatory. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

The EESC believes that the cost-effectiveness of the projects to be supported should not be the only factor considered when drawing up the guidelines for allocating funding from the EHB. Rather, energy security, environmental sustainability, the promotion and maintenance of high-quality jobs and the urgency of the investment needs must be key criteria. In addition, ensuring competitiveness, establishing social and environmental criteria and deploying renewable energies within the supplier countries should be mandatory.

| 3.8. | The EESC believes that the existing EU ETS must be further strengthened; this includes effective protective measures aimed at imports (border adjustment mechanism). A predictable and low-volatility price path can help create investment certainty for the required investment in green H2. The Commission’s priorities should be effectively managing volumes and ensuring investment certainty under the EU ETS, eliminating natural gas subsidies and providing research, technology and innovation funding for technologies to produce and distribute green H2. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

The EESC believes that the existing EU ETS must be further strengthened; this includes effective protective measures aimed at imports (border adjustment mechanism). A predictable and low-volatility price path can help create investment certainty for the required investment in green H2

2

| 3.9. | The EESC stresses that the development of a sectoral and application-specific H2 economy requires the acceptance and participation of the public, whether entrepreneurs, workers or consumers. It regrets that insufficient thought has been given to the implementation of the strategy in the various sectors and calls for greater involvement of the public in this transformation process — at company and political level. Furthermore, the EESC calls on the Commission to assess the impact of the development of green H2 on household energy costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

The EESC stresses that the development of a sectoral and application-specific H2

2

| 3.10. | The Commission has already paved the way for investment in green H2 technology and infrastructure development by approving the IPCEI Hy2Tech. The EESC calls for coherence between EHB support measures, and existing initiatives, support programmes and IPCEI projects. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

The Commission has already paved the way for investment in green H2

Reducing strategic dependencies

Reducing strategic dependencies

| 3.11. | According to the REPowerEU Plan, 10 million tonnes of green H2 should be produced in the EU by 2030. Priority should be given to accelerating the development and expansion of Europe’s production capacity in order to achieve energy independence and avoid contributing to new strategic dependencies. With this in mind, sources of supply and supply contracts should also be diversified and European values must be taken into account when importing H2. The geographical realities (e.g. a country’s production and exporting capabilities and capacities) and the EU’s strategic autonomy targets must be considered in this process. A commitment to environmental, social and economic sustainability should be part of agreements with third countries. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

According to the REPowerEU Plan, 10 million tonnes of green H2

2

| 3.12. | Furthermore, the EESC is of the opinion that import agreements for green H2 should only be concluded if the added value also benefits national producers in the supplier countries and if the H2 imported from third countries is only produced using surplus electricity from renewable energy. This is to the benefit of the net-zero transition of the economy in the EU and in third countries. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

Furthermore, the EESC is of the opinion that import agreements for green H2

2

| 3.13. | The EESC believes that the European energy transition can only succeed if global trade in raw materials, and especially energy, is also based on the principles of ecological and social sustainability and the promotion of renewable energy sources. EU energy and industrial policy must not hinder the countries of the global south in their own just transition and prevent them from building their own capacities in the H2 sector. Strategic energy extractivism is detrimental to the global energy transition and thus also to the European energy transition in the long term. Instead, new approaches are needed to conclude international climate and energy cooperation agreements. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

The EESC believes that the European energy transition can only succeed if global trade in raw materials, and especially energy, is also based on the principles of ecological and social sustainability and the promotion of renewable energy sources. EU energy and industrial policy must not hinder the countries of the global south in their own just transition and prevent them from building their own capacities in the H2

Funding and institutional implementation

Funding and institutional implementation

| 3.14. | The EESC believes that the EHB, in coordination with the Member States, and with other EU funding tools and institutions, should ensure that funds are coordinated in such a way as to maximise their benefits while avoiding overfunding. At the same time, to ensure the EHB’s success, bureaucratic obstacles to accessing funds must be minimised, especially in light of the simplicity of the US IRA. The EESC draws attention to the need to provide an attractive and secure environment for investors in order to prevent investments from going elsewhere, attracted by favourable long-term conditions such as those offered by the US IRA. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

The EESC believes that the EHB, in coordination with the Member States, and with other EU funding tools and institutions, should ensure that funds are coordinated in such a way as to maximise their benefits while avoiding overfunding. At the same time, to ensure the EHB’s success, bureaucratic obstacles to accessing funds must be minimised, especially in light of the simplicity of the US IRA. The EESC draws attention to the need to provide an attractive and secure environment for investors in order to prevent investments from going elsewhere, attracted by favourable long-term conditions such as those offered by the US IRA.

| 3.15. | The EESC is of the opinion that the EHB should include provisions on prevailing wages, workforce development and apprenticeships to ensure that a larger, more diverse pool of skilled workers has access to good jobs and that workers have the skills necessary to meet clean energy goals similar to the provisions in the IRA. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

The EESC is of the opinion that the EHB should include provisions on prevailing wages, workforce development and apprenticeships to ensure that a larger, more diverse pool of skilled workers has access to good jobs and that workers have the skills necessary to meet clean energy goals similar to the provisions in the IRA.

| 3.16. | Since major private investment is required alongside public investment, an ex ante estimation is needed on the multiplier effects of the latter, based on the precise ex post evaluation of recent programmes’ (InvestEU, IPCEIs, etc.) multiplier effects. |
| --- | --- |

3.16.

Since major private investment is required alongside public investment, an ex ante

ex post

| 3.17. | The EESC believes that incentives such as the development of smart grid networks, infrastructure, storage capacities and legal frameworks must be created for the emergence of a H2 market. The planned tightening, from 2031 onwards, of rules towards ownership unbundling of vertically integrated companies — often municipal utilities — that may be active in either H2 production or grid operation, would stifle many municipal projects. This would hinder the H2 ramp-up and bring locally integrated municipal utility projects to a quick end. |
| --- | --- |

3.17.

The EESC believes that incentives such as the development of smart grid networks, infrastructure, storage capacities and legal frameworks must be created for the emergence of a H2

2

2

| 3.18. | The EESC calls for public and municipal companies not to be disadvantaged compared to market-based companies under the EHB’s funding programmes. |
| --- | --- |

3.18.

The EESC calls for public and municipal companies not to be disadvantaged compared to market-based companies under the EHB’s funding programmes.

Social dimension

Social dimension

| 3.19. | In times of multiple crises, investment in future-proof jobs is essential. The EESC, therefore, stresses the importance of providing good-quality training for workers and the need to make the energy sector more attractive to young Europeans. With this goal in mind, the EU could set up centres of excellence for apprenticeships in jobs that will be needed in connection with green H2. Coherence should be ensured here with the net-zero industry academies proposed in the Commission’s GDIP. These academies should also introduce upskilling and reskilling programmes in strategic energy and production sectors such as green H2. Furthermore, the Commission should work in close cooperation with the Member States to create standardised accreditation processes, ensure mutual recognition of qualifications and produce guidelines for education and training in the field. |
| --- | --- |

3.19.

In times of multiple crises, investment in future-proof jobs is essential. The EESC, therefore, stresses the importance of providing good-quality training for workers and the need to make the energy sector more attractive to young Europeans. With this goal in mind, the EU could set up centres of excellence for apprenticeships in jobs that will be needed in connection with green H2

2

| 3.20. | In addition to these sectoral and company-specific up- and reskilling programmes, there also needs to be a broader focus in society on vocational training and further education. More must be done throughout the education system to raise awareness of the just transition and provide the necessary skills. |
| --- | --- |

3.20.

In addition to these sectoral and company-specific up- and reskilling programmes, there also needs to be a broader focus in society on vocational training and further education. More must be done throughout the education system to raise awareness of the just transition and provide the necessary skills.

| 3.21. | Fostering job creation by deploying green H2 technology requires support for SMEs, which account for almost two thirds of European private sector jobs outside of the financial sector (9). The EESC calls on the Commission to pay particular attention to supporting SMEs when designing the EHB. |
| --- | --- |

3.21.

Fostering job creation by deploying green H2

9

| 3.22. | The EESC also points out that, in order to become more competitive and resilient, the EU must keep control of its assets and industries, and address the issue of industrial dumping from other global regions. |
| --- | --- |

3.22.

The EESC also points out that, in order to become more competitive and resilient, the EU must keep control of its assets and industries, and address the issue of industrial dumping from other global regions.

Safety requirements

Safety requirements

| 3.23. | The EESC stresses that the use of H2 must be subject to high technical safety requirements, particularly for operational installations, and that conditions and monitoring will need to be imposed in order to identify and reduce risks. |
| --- | --- |

3.23.

The EESC stresses that the use of H2

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-03/COM_2023_156_1_EN_ACT_part1_v6.pdf

1

(2)  European Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2022)230, page 28.

2

(3)  
  Wasserstoff-Farbenlehre (hydrogen colour system) | SOLARIFY.

3

Wasserstoff-Farbenlehre

(4)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe’ (COM(2020) 301 final) (OJ C 123, 9.4.2021, p. 30)

4

(5)  COM(2022) 230 final, p. 7 and SWD(2022) 230 final, p. 26.

5

(6)  For example, if an electrolyser operator shows that it receives electricity for electrolysis directly from a newly-built renewable energy plant, or has an electricity supply contract that is activated only when wholesale market prices are negative.

6

(7)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe’ (COM(2020) 301 final) (OJ C 123, 9.4.2021, p. 30).

7

(8)  Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (2019): Hydrogen roadmap Europe, A sustainable pathway for the European energy transition Hydrogen roadmap Europe — Publications Office of the EU.

8

(9)  https://www.touteleurope.eu/actualite/les-entreprises-dans-l-union-europeenne.html

9

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| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/133 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/133

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on driving licences, amending Directive (EU) 2022/2561 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Regulation (EU) No 383/2012

(COM(2023) 127 final — 2023/0053 (COD))

and on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Union-wide effect of certain driving disqualifications

(COM(2023) 128 final — 2023/0055 (COD))

(2023/C 293/19)

| Rapporteur: | Philippe CHARRY |
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Rapporteur:

Philippe CHARRY

Philippe CHARRY

| Referral | European Parliament, 17.4.2023
  Council of the European Union, 20.4.2023 and 26.4.2023 |
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| Legal basis | Articles 91(1) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Adopted in section | 16.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 210/1/2 |

Referral

European Parliament, 17.4.2023

Council of the European Union, 20.4.2023 and 26.4.2023

Legal basis

Articles 91(1) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Adopted in section

16.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

210/1/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The legislative package proposed by the European Commission aims to achieve zero fatalities on European Union (EU) roads by 2050. This opinion addresses two strands of the reform: the introduction of a digital driving licence, and a clampdown on road-safety-related traffic offences across the EU. |
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1.1.

The legislative package proposed by the European Commission aims to achieve zero fatalities on European Union (EU) roads by 2050. This opinion addresses two strands of the reform: the introduction of a digital driving licence, and a clampdown on road-safety-related traffic offences across the EU.

| 1.2. | The objective of providing European Union drivers with a digital driving licence also aims to put an end to differences and bureaucratic delays between the various Member States in processing applications from foreign drivers for exchanging foreign licences, which lead to obstacles to freedom of movement. This driving licence will be held on a mobile phone or any other digital device. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) supports this objective, but hopes that paper-based driving licences will remain available to drivers who wish them. Furthermore, for reasons related to the digital inclusion of all age groups, the EESC recommends personalised and free training and coaching on using new digital driving licences. |
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1.2.

The objective of providing European Union drivers with a digital driving licence also aims to put an end to differences and bureaucratic delays between the various Member States in processing applications from foreign drivers for exchanging foreign licences, which lead to obstacles to freedom of movement. This driving licence will be held on a mobile phone or any other digital device. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) supports this objective, but hopes that paper-based driving licences will remain available to drivers who wish them. Furthermore, for reasons related to the digital inclusion of all age groups, the EESC recommends personalised and free training and coaching on using new digital driving licences.

| 1.3. | In the same vein, the EESC recommends removing the reduced validity period of driving licences on the basis of age for persons aged 70 and over, as provided for in Article 10 of the proposal for a Directive on driving licences. It calls for a non-discriminatory approach, with a concrete medical assessment, applicable to all drivers with identified impairments that affect the ability to drive. |
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1.3.

In the same vein, the EESC recommends removing the reduced validity period of driving licences on the basis of age for persons aged 70 and over, as provided for in Article 10 of the proposal for a Directive on driving licences. It calls for a non-discriminatory approach, with a concrete medical assessment, applicable to all drivers with identified impairments that affect the ability to drive.

| 1.4. | The EESC would like the proposal for a Directive on driving disqualifications to offer better safeguards against the risk of overlap with the area of cooperation in criminal matters. Indeed, the exchange of information on offences committed by drivers envisaged in the proposal is based on Article 91(1)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) concerning the common transport policy, whereas the planned exchange of information between national authorities seems to relate more to criminal offences covered by the principles of police cooperation as laid down in Article 87 TFEU and judicial cooperation in criminal matters as laid down in Article 82 TFEU. |
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1.4.

The EESC would like the proposal for a Directive on driving disqualifications to offer better safeguards against the risk of overlap with the area of cooperation in criminal matters. Indeed, the exchange of information on offences committed by drivers envisaged in the proposal is based on Article 91(1)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) concerning the common transport policy, whereas the planned exchange of information between national authorities seems to relate more to criminal offences covered by the principles of police cooperation as laid down in Article 87 TFEU and judicial cooperation in criminal matters as laid down in Article 82 TFEU.

| 1.5. | The Committee finds that the legislative package focuses on the human factor; however, many road accidents are caused by a lack of road maintenance, yet it fails to touch upon the responsibility of road infrastructure managers. In the EESC’s view, the interaction of the proposed Directive with Directive (EU) 2019/1936 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1), the transposition of which is currently being monitored by the Commission, along with a potential overlap in the planned measures, risks undermining the Directive’s effectiveness by creating a fragmentation of the applicable legislation. |
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1.5.

The Committee finds that the legislative package focuses on the human factor; however, many road accidents are caused by a lack of road maintenance, yet it fails to touch upon the responsibility of road infrastructure managers. In the EESC’s view, the interaction of the proposed Directive with Directive (EU) 2019/1936 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1

| 1.6. | The proposal for a Directive on driving disqualifications provides for the national identification number indicated on the identity card to be part of the electronic data exchanged between national authorities, where necessary. However, in many Member States the national identification number also allows access to the medical file of the person concerned. The EESC notes that the General Data Protection Regulation prohibits in principle the processing of personal data relating to health because these are ‘sensitive’ data. The Committee therefore calls for the proposal for a Directive to be clarified in relation to this matter. |
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1.6.

The proposal for a Directive on driving disqualifications provides for the national identification number indicated on the identity card to be part of the electronic data exchanged between national authorities, where necessary. However, in many Member States the national identification number also allows access to the medical file of the person concerned. The EESC notes that the General Data Protection Regulation prohibits in principle the processing of personal data relating to health because these are ‘sensitive’ data. The Committee therefore calls for the proposal for a Directive to be clarified in relation to this matter.

| 1.7. | The EESC calls for removing from the legislative proposal the provision allowing the adoption of implementing measures for the Directive on driving disqualifications even before it has been transposed in the Member States, as it violates the principles of legal certainty and the hierarchy of norms, as well as their temporal application. |
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1.7.

The EESC calls for removing from the legislative proposal the provision allowing the adoption of implementing measures for the Directive on driving disqualifications even before it has been transposed in the Member States, as it violates the principles of legal certainty and the hierarchy of norms, as well as their temporal application.

| 1.8. | The EESC takes note of the opportunity to allow young people to drive lorries accompanied from the age of 17. It also stresses the need to adapt the vocational training of lorry drivers and to improve working conditions and wages in order to make the job more attractive. It calls on the Commission to encourage employers to improve the situation by all means possible, such as strengthening training or raising awareness in the Member States. |
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1.8.

The EESC takes note of the opportunity to allow young people to drive lorries accompanied from the age of 17. It also stresses the need to adapt the vocational training of lorry drivers and to improve working conditions and wages in order to make the job more attractive. It calls on the Commission to encourage employers to improve the situation by all means possible, such as strengthening training or raising awareness in the Member States.

| 1.9. | The EESC recommends harmonisation with a view to ensuring that, after theoretical training at a driving school and practical driving lessons, apprentice drivers of heavy goods vehicles gain practical driving experience with specially trained instructors. 17-year-old drivers would be permitted to drive heavy goods vehicles only after a long apprenticeship and a highly selective driving test. The EESC calls for the proposal for a Directive to move in this direction. |
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1.9.

The EESC recommends harmonisation with a view to ensuring that, after theoretical training at a driving school and practical driving lessons, apprentice drivers of heavy goods vehicles gain practical driving experience with specially trained instructors. 17-year-old drivers would be permitted to drive heavy goods vehicles only after a long apprenticeship and a highly selective driving test. The EESC calls for the proposal for a Directive to move in this direction.

2.   General comments

General comments

| 2.1. | The legislative package proposed by the Commission aims to achieve zero fatalities on European Union (EU) roads by 2050, and to reduce road deaths by 50 % by 2030. It proposes introducing a digital driving licence valid in all Member States, and improving the cross-border enforcement of driving disqualifications. The Commission notes that lorries and cars are the cause of the majority of fatal accidents, and that in urban areas, 70 % of accident victims are vulnerable users. |
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2.1.

The legislative package proposed by the Commission aims to achieve zero fatalities on European Union (EU) roads by 2050, and to reduce road deaths by 50 % by 2030. It proposes introducing a digital driving licence valid in all Member States, and improving the cross-border enforcement of driving disqualifications. The Commission notes that lorries and cars are the cause of the majority of fatal accidents, and that in urban areas, 70 % of accident victims are vulnerable users.

| 2.2. | This opinion focuses on two of the proposals of the legislative package, which includes a preventive and an enforcement dimension:






  — | prevention consists of better preparing drivers for zero-emission vehicles and for driving on city roads alongside more bicycles, other two-wheeled vehicles and many pedestrians; |
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2.2.

This opinion focuses on two of the proposals of the legislative package, which includes a preventive and an enforcement dimension:

—

prevention consists of better preparing drivers for zero-emission vehicles and for driving on city roads alongside more bicycles, other two-wheeled vehicles and many pedestrians;

| — | enforcement comprises improved access to vehicle registers held by the Member States and enhanced cooperation between Member States in the investigation of offences. |
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—

enforcement comprises improved access to vehicle registers held by the Member States and enhanced cooperation between Member States in the investigation of offences.

| 2.3. | The particular attention paid by the legislative package to electric vehicles is also in line with the objectives of reducing carbon footprints, greenhouse gas emissions and noise pollution. |
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2.3.

The particular attention paid by the legislative package to electric vehicles is also in line with the objectives of reducing carbon footprints, greenhouse gas emissions and noise pollution.

| 2.4. | It also takes into account the technological evolution of vehicles, the transition from manual to automatic transmission, and changes in vehicle weight. |
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2.4.

It also takes into account the technological evolution of vehicles, the transition from manual to automatic transmission, and changes in vehicle weight.

Digital driving licence

Digital driving licence

| 2.5. | Proposal for a Directive COM(2023) 127 final envisages the introduction of a digital driving licence from 2023. It also includes provisions to facilitate the transition to ‘zero-emission vehicles’. |
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2.5.

Proposal for a Directive COM(2023) 127 final

| 2.6. | It amends Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2), the purpose of which was to improve road safety and facilitate freedom of movement by introducing the following:






  — | a single mandatory EU model driving licence for all drivers from 2033 onwards to ensure better protection against fraud and counterfeiting; |
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2.6.

It amends Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2

—

a single mandatory EU model driving licence for all drivers from 2033 onwards to ensure better protection against fraud and counterfeiting;

| — | the categorisation of driving licences according to the type of vehicle and the minimum age for driving; |
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—

the categorisation of driving licences according to the type of vehicle and the minimum age for driving;

| — | compulsory administrative renewal of all new driving licences every 10 years; |
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—

compulsory administrative renewal of all new driving licences every 10 years;

| — | a simplification of the administrative burden for drivers changing their place of residence in another Member State; |
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—

a simplification of the administrative burden for drivers changing their place of residence in another Member State;

| — | the application of common minimum standards on the skills, knowledge and physical and mental fitness of drivers; |
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—

the application of common minimum standards on the skills, knowledge and physical and mental fitness of drivers;

| — | progressive access to more powerful motorcycles based on age restrictions and previous experience on less powerful motorcycles; |
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—

progressive access to more powerful motorcycles based on age restrictions and previous experience on less powerful motorcycles;

| — | the creation of a network for the exchange of information on driving licences between national authorities (RESPER). |
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—

the creation of a network for the exchange of information on driving licences between national authorities (RESPER).

| 2.7. | There are two main reasons for this fourth revision of the driving licence rules. On the one hand, the driver’s ability, behaviour and health play a considerable role in many fatal road accidents, or lead to serious consequences and non-fatal injuries. Too many driving licence holders take the wheel even though they are not fit to drive. In this respect, the age criterion no longer appears to be decisive, as studies show that certain specific medical criteria relating to drug use, mental health, epilepsy, diabetes, cardiac health and sleep apnoea are not specifically related to age, and are more relevant than age for determining fitness to drive. |
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2.7.

There are two main reasons for this fourth revision of the driving licence rules. On the one hand, the driver’s ability, behaviour and health play a considerable role in many fatal road accidents, or lead to serious consequences and non-fatal injuries. Too many driving licence holders take the wheel even though they are not fit to drive. In this respect, the age criterion no longer appears to be decisive, as studies show that certain specific medical criteria relating to drug use, mental health, epilepsy, diabetes, cardiac health and sleep apnoea are not specifically related to age, and are more relevant than age for determining fitness to drive.

| 2.8. | On the other hand, knowledge, practice and awareness of risk are particularly limited among young drivers. The high number of accidents involving young drivers shows that the requirements for obtaining a driving licence are not fully suited to the objective of road safety. |
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2.8.

On the other hand, knowledge, practice and awareness of risk are particularly limited among young drivers. The high number of accidents involving young drivers shows that the requirements for obtaining a driving licence are not fully suited to the objective of road safety.

| 2.9. | In addition, the gradual development of assisted driving, automatic emergency braking and automated vehicles will have an impact on driving and make the current Directive 2006/126/EC obsolete. |
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2.9.

In addition, the gradual development of assisted driving, automatic emergency braking and automated vehicles will have an impact on driving and make the current Directive 2006/126/EC obsolete.

| 2.10. | It also appears that the free movement of European citizens is hampered by the administrative formalities linked to obtaining, recognising, maintaining or exchanging a driving licence in a Member State other than the one in which it was issued. Certain criteria in Directive 2006/126/EC, such as that of ‘normal residence’, give rise to multiple problems of interpretation, to the extent that in some cases driving licence holders are unable to drive for more than six months in their new country of residence. In addition, EU citizens residing in another Member State sometimes find it difficult to pass a driving licence test in a language other than their own, especially as the assistance of an interpreter is not provided for. |
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2.10.

It also appears that the free movement of European citizens is hampered by the administrative formalities linked to obtaining, recognising, maintaining or exchanging a driving licence in a Member State other than the one in which it was issued. Certain criteria in Directive 2006/126/EC, such as that of ‘normal residence’, give rise to multiple problems of interpretation, to the extent that in some cases driving licence holders are unable to drive for more than six months in their new country of residence. In addition, EU citizens residing in another Member State sometimes find it difficult to pass a driving licence test in a language other than their own, especially as the assistance of an interpreter is not provided for.

| 2.11. | Furthermore, there are no common rules for recognising driving licences issued in a third country to a person establishing their place of residence in the EU, bearing in mind that a licence issued by one Member State may not be recognised as valid in another Member State. |
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2.11.

Furthermore, there are no common rules for recognising driving licences issued in a third country to a person establishing their place of residence in the EU, bearing in mind that a licence issued by one Member State may not be recognised as valid in another Member State.

| 2.12. | Finally, many Member States provide for, or have already introduced, a digital driving licence which is valid without the requirement to show an identity card. However, Directive 2006/126/EC only provides for the recognition of driving licences in paper form, which creates a new obstacle to the free movement of European citizens. |
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2.12.

Finally, many Member States provide for, or have already introduced, a digital driving licence which is valid without the requirement to show an identity card. However, Directive 2006/126/EC only provides for the recognition of driving licences in paper form, which creates a new obstacle to the free movement of European citizens.

| 2.13. | The proposal for a Directive is also in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (3), which aim to help make cities and living environments more inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable by 2030, and to ensure access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all. It is also in line with the objectives of the Green Deal, as it provides for new rules on automatic transmission and on the maximum weight of most zero-emission category B vehicles. |
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2.13.

The proposal for a Directive is also in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (3

| 2.14. | It also pays particular attention to vulnerable road users, such as cyclists, pedestrians, scooter users and persons with disabilities or reduced mobility, and will facilitate the renewal of category C and D licences, an aspect which is favourable to transport undertakings, most of which are SMEs. |
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2.14.

It also pays particular attention to vulnerable road users, such as cyclists, pedestrians, scooter users and persons with disabilities or reduced mobility, and will facilitate the renewal of category C and D licences, an aspect which is favourable to transport undertakings, most of which are SMEs.

Road safety and increased enforcement

Road safety and increased enforcement

| 2.15. | In 2018, the European Union set itself the target of halving the number of road deaths by 2030. Unfortunately, the figures in the latest report published in February 2023 are alarming: 20 600 people were killed in road accidents in Europe last year. |
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2.15.

In 2018, the European Union set itself the target of halving the number of road deaths by 2030. Unfortunately, the figures in the latest report published in February 2023 are alarming: 20 600 people were killed in road accidents in Europe last year.

| 2.16. | The proposal for a Directive on the Union-wide effect of certain driving disqualifications (COM(2023) 128 final) reduces impunity by allowing national authorities to have access to national driving licence registers and by improving cooperation between these authorities in recovering fines. |
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2.16.

The proposal for a Directive on the Union-wide effect of certain driving disqualifications (COM(2023) 128 final) reduces impunity by allowing national authorities to have access to national driving licence registers and by improving cooperation between these authorities in recovering fines.

| 2.17. | It proposes that this cooperation, which already exists in the area of speeding, be extended to other offences, such as failure to respect safe distances with other vehicles, dangerous overtaking (especially when crossing solid white lines) and dangerous parking. |
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2.17.

It proposes that this cooperation, which already exists in the area of speeding, be extended to other offences, such as failure to respect safe distances with other vehicles, dangerous overtaking (especially when crossing solid white lines) and dangerous parking.

| 2.18. | The proposed reform aims to improve driving training, as two in five fatal accidents in Europe involve a driver under 30 years of age. It provides for stricter enforcement in cases of driving under the influence of alcohol by introducing a probationary period of at least two years for newly licensed drivers, with a zero-tolerance rule on drinking and driving (4). |
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2.18.

The proposed reform aims to improve driving training, as two in five fatal accidents in Europe involve a driver under 30 years of age. It provides for stricter enforcement in cases of driving under the influence of alcohol by introducing a probationary period of at least two years for newly licensed drivers, with a zero-tolerance rule on drinking and driving (4

| 2.19. | The proposal for a Directive also covers infringements committed by drivers who do not reside in the Member State in which they committed the offence. In 2019, more than 40 % of drivers who committed an offence in an EU country other than their country of residence were not prosecuted or did not pay a fine, and only 50 % of the perpetrators were identified. |
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2.19.

The proposal for a Directive also covers infringements committed by drivers who do not reside in the Member State in which they committed the offence. In 2019, more than 40 % of drivers who committed an offence in an EU country other than their country of residence were not prosecuted or did not pay a fine, and only 50 % of the perpetrators were identified.

| 2.20. | The proposal considers that residents and non-residents should be treated equally in the event of infringements, and that fines should be payable through an IT portal. However, it specifies that each country will retain its own legislation on criminalisation and penalties. |
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2.20.

The proposal considers that residents and non-residents should be treated equally in the event of infringements, and that fines should be payable through an IT portal. However, it specifies that each country will retain its own legislation on criminalisation and penalties.

| 2.21. | The reform therefore envisages that national authorities be given access to national registers and that cooperation between them be improved in the recovery of fines. This cooperation, which already exists on speeding, is to be extended to other offences, such as failure to respect safe distances with other vehicles, dangerous overtaking, and dangerous parking. |
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2.21.

The reform therefore envisages that national authorities be given access to national registers and that cooperation between them be improved in the recovery of fines. This cooperation, which already exists on speeding, is to be extended to other offences, such as failure to respect safe distances with other vehicles, dangerous overtaking, and dangerous parking.

| 2.22. | The reform also provides for the possibility to withdraw driving licences in all EU Member States and harmonise the rules on suspending and cancelling driving licences through the principle of mutual recognition for failure to comply with traffic lights, dangerously exceeding the authorised speed limit or refusal to undergo alcohol or drug tests. |
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2.22.

The reform also provides for the possibility to withdraw driving licences in all EU Member States and harmonise the rules on suspending and cancelling driving licences through the principle of mutual recognition for failure to comply with traffic lights, dangerously exceeding the authorised speed limit or refusal to undergo alcohol or drug tests.

3.   Specific comments

Specific comments

| 3.1. | The EESC considers that the proposal for a Directive on driving disqualifications, based on Article 91(1)(c) TFEU on the implementation of the common transport policy, does not provide sufficient safeguards against the risk of overlap with the scope of cooperation in criminal matters. Indeed, the planned exchange of information relates to criminal offences, and involves police cooperation under Article 87 TFEU and judicial cooperation in criminal matters under Article 82 TFEU, while the proposed Directive is based on Article 91(1)(c) TFEU. |
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3.1.

The EESC considers that the proposal for a Directive on driving disqualifications, based on Article 91(1)(c) TFEU on the implementation of the common transport policy, does not provide sufficient safeguards against the risk of overlap with the scope of cooperation in criminal matters. Indeed, the planned exchange of information relates to criminal offences, and involves police cooperation under Article 87 TFEU and judicial cooperation in criminal matters under Article 82 TFEU, while the proposed Directive is based on Article 91(1)(c) TFEU.

| 3.2. | The Committee notes that the proposal focuses on the human factor, while neglecting the fact that many road accidents are caused by a failure to maintain roads, and that it fails to touch upon the responsibility of road infrastructure managers. The EESC considers that the interaction of the proposed Directive with Directive (EU) 2019/1936, the transposition of which is currently being monitored by the Commission, along with a potential overlap in the planned measures, risks undermining the Directive’s effectiveness by creating a fragmentation of the applicable legislation. |
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3.2.

The Committee notes that the proposal focuses on the human factor, while neglecting the fact that many road accidents are caused by a failure to maintain roads, and that it fails to touch upon the responsibility of road infrastructure managers. The EESC considers that the interaction of the proposed Directive with Directive (EU) 2019/1936, the transposition of which is currently being monitored by the Commission, along with a potential overlap in the planned measures, risks undermining the Directive’s effectiveness by creating a fragmentation of the applicable legislation.

| 3.3. | Article 5(2)(c) of the proposal for a Directive on driving disqualifications provides, where necessary, for the national identification number indicated on the identity card to be part of the electronic data to which national authorities have access. Point 6 of Annex I to the proposal for a Directive on digital driving licences explicitly states that the national identity card number will be part of the data contained in the identity card microchip and readable by identity card readers. However, in many Member States the national identification number also allows access to the medical file of the person concerned. |
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3.3.

Article 5(2)(c) of the proposal for a Directive on driving disqualifications provides, where necessary, for the national identification number indicated on the identity card to be part of the electronic data to which national authorities have access. Point 6 of Annex I to the proposal for a Directive on digital driving licences explicitly states that the national identity card number will be part of the data contained in the identity card microchip and readable by identity card readers. However, in many Member States the national identification number also allows access to the medical file of the person concerned.

| 3.4. | The EESC notes that the General Data Protection Regulation prohibits in principle the processing of personal data relating to health because these are ‘sensitive’ data. The Committee therefore calls for the proposal for a Directive to be clarified in relation to this matter. |
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3.4.

The EESC notes that the General Data Protection Regulation prohibits in principle the processing of personal data relating to health because these are ‘sensitive’ data. The Committee therefore calls for the proposal for a Directive to be clarified in relation to this matter.

| 3.5. | The implementation of Article 5(2)(c) could be laid down in an implementing act adopted by the Commission under the comitology procedure, even before the transposition date. The EESC regrets this provision allowing the adoption of implementing measures for a Directive even before it has been transposed in the Member States, as it undermines legal certainty by disregarding the principles of the hierarchy of norms and their temporal application. |
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3.5.

The implementation of Article 5(2)(c) could be laid down in an implementing act adopted by the Commission under the comitology procedure, even before the transposition date. The EESC regrets this provision allowing the adoption of implementing measures for a Directive even before it has been transposed in the Member States, as it undermines legal certainty by disregarding the principles of the hierarchy of norms and their temporal application.

| 3.6. | The EESC finds that giving young people the opportunity to drive lorries accompanied from the age of 17 in order to address the shortage of workers in this profession by encouraging them to become lorry drivers addresses only part of the problem. It is also necessary to adapt the vocational training of lorry drivers and to improve working conditions and wages in order to make the profession more attractive. The EESC calls on the Commission to encourage employers to improve the situation by all means possible, such as strengthening training or raising awareness in the Member States. |
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3.6.

The EESC finds that giving young people the opportunity to drive lorries accompanied from the age of 17 in order to address the shortage of workers in this profession by encouraging them to become lorry drivers addresses only part of the problem. It is also necessary to adapt the vocational training of lorry drivers and to improve working conditions and wages in order to make the profession more attractive. The EESC calls on the Commission to encourage employers to improve the situation by all means possible, such as strengthening training or raising awareness in the Member States.

| 3.7. | The EESC considers that Member States should be able to allow drivers aged 18 and over to drive buses and D/DE category vehicles on their territory without the 50 km distance limit. |
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3.7.

The EESC considers that Member States should be able to allow drivers aged 18 and over to drive buses and D/DE category vehicles on their territory without the 50 km distance limit.

| 3.8. | The driving licence reform provides for young drivers aged between 16 and 21 to be authorised to drive limited-speed cars with a B1 licence. This is an interesting proposal for limiting the use of lightweight motorcycles or unsafe scooters and overcoming the lack of public transport in some regions, especially as limited-speed cars can also be used by drivers who do not have a B licence, or even be used as a transition for older people with reduced driving capacities. The EESC endorses these advances. |
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3.8.

The driving licence reform provides for young drivers aged between 16 and 21 to be authorised to drive limited-speed cars with a B1 licence. This is an interesting proposal for limiting the use of lightweight motorcycles or unsafe scooters and overcoming the lack of public transport in some regions, especially as limited-speed cars can also be used by drivers who do not have a B licence, or even be used as a transition for older people with reduced driving capacities. The EESC endorses these advances.

| 3.9. | It should also be possible to limit the speed of cars by means other than the speed limit proposed by the Commission. Electronic speed limitation devices are a reliable and modern alternative. For their part, Member States could lay down penalties for the unlawful modification of engine speed limitations. |
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3.9.

It should also be possible to limit the speed of cars by means other than the speed limit proposed by the Commission. Electronic speed limitation devices are a reliable and modern alternative. For their part, Member States could lay down penalties for the unlawful modification of engine speed limitations.

| 3.10. | The EESC also supports the envisaged possibility to drive alternatively-fuelled vehicles weighing up to 4 250 kg with a B licence, as this could speed up the electrification of the light lorry fleet and mitigate the shortage of drivers. Moreover, vehicle manufacturers have already introduced a large number of electric vans weighing 3 500 to 4 250 kg, which have a charging capacity equivalent to that of diesel vans currently on the market. |
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3.10.

The EESC also supports the envisaged possibility to drive alternatively-fuelled vehicles weighing up to 4 250 kg with a B licence, as this could speed up the electrification of the light lorry fleet and mitigate the shortage of drivers. Moreover, vehicle manufacturers have already introduced a large number of electric vans weighing 3 500 to 4 250 kg, which have a charging capacity equivalent to that of diesel vans currently on the market.

| 3.11. | In the view of the EESC, following theoretical training at a driving school and practical driving lessons, apprentice heavy goods vehicle drivers should gain practical driving experience with a specialist instructor. These instructors should be specially trained for this purpose. |
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3.11.

In the view of the EESC, following theoretical training at a driving school and practical driving lessons, apprentice heavy goods vehicle drivers should gain practical driving experience with a specialist instructor. These instructors should be specially trained for this purpose.

| 3.12. | 17-year-old drivers would be permitted to drive heavy goods vehicles only after a long apprenticeship and a highly selective driving test. The proposal for a Directive should therefore be amended accordingly. |
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3.12.

17-year-old drivers would be permitted to drive heavy goods vehicles only after a long apprenticeship and a highly selective driving test. The proposal for a Directive should therefore be amended accordingly.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  Directive (EU) 2019/1936 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 amending Directive 2008/96/EC on road infrastructure safety management (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, p. 1).

1

(2)  Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (OJ L 403, 30.12.2006, p. 18).

2

(3)  https://sdgs.un.org/

3

(4)  After discussion with the Commission, it has been clarified that the concept of zero tolerance is understood as what is technically reasonable.

4

---

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/138 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/138

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011 and (EU) 2019/942 to improve the Union’s protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market

(COM(2023) 147 final)

(2023/C 293/20)

| Rapporteur: | Alena MASTANTUONO |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Lutz RIBBE |

Rapporteur:

Alena MASTANTUONO

Alena MASTANTUONO

Co-rapporteur:

Lutz RIBBE

Lutz RIBBE

| Referral | Council of the European Union, 31.3.2023
  European Parliament, 29.3.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 194(2) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Adopted in section | 16.5.2023 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 217/5/5 |

Referral

Council of the European Union, 31.3.2023

European Parliament, 29.3.2023

Legal basis

Article 194(2) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Adopted in section

16.5.2023

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

217/5/5

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | As expressed in many of its previous opinions, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) finds it crucial to enhance conditions for better functioning of the energy markets, while at the same time addressing market manipulation and other phenomena that distort markets and cause negative impacts on businesses, households, and society as a whole. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

As expressed in many of its previous opinions, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) finds it crucial to enhance conditions for better functioning of the energy markets, while at the same time addressing market manipulation and other phenomena that distort markets and cause negative impacts on businesses, households, and society as a whole.

| 1.2. | Against this backdrop, the EESC welcomes the basic objective of the proposed Regulation to strengthen the monitoring and transparency of the wholesale energy markets. However, the EESC has also stressed that any initiatives must be preceded by a rigorous debate and impact analysis. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

Against this backdrop, the EESC welcomes the basic objective of the proposed Regulation to strengthen the monitoring and transparency of the wholesale energy markets. However, the EESC has also stressed that any initiatives must be preceded by a rigorous debate and impact analysis.

| 1.3. | The EESC therefore regrets that the proposals regarding electricity market design have not gone through full consultation and impact assessment. It is of the opinion that no reform should be rushed and public consultations and impact assessments are precious tools in the law-making process. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

The EESC therefore regrets that the proposals regarding electricity market design have not gone through full consultation and impact assessment. It is of the opinion that no reform should be rushed and public consultations and impact assessments are precious tools in the law-making process.

| 1.4. | In the description of the policy context for the proposed Regulation, the Commission stresses consumer, industry and investors’ concerns over exposure to volatile short-term prices driven by high gas prices. However, a proper analysis of market power abuse and market manipulation is missing. In the future, continuous monitoring and analysis is required so that appropriate interventions and regulatory responses can be made in a timely manner on a sound basis. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

In the description of the policy context for the proposed Regulation, the Commission stresses consumer, industry and investors’ concerns over exposure to volatile short-term prices driven by high gas prices. However, a proper analysis of market power abuse and market manipulation is missing. In the future, continuous monitoring and analysis is required so that appropriate interventions and regulatory responses can be made in a timely manner on a sound basis.

| 1.5. | The EESC highlights the importance of cooperation between authorities in detecting and addressing market manipulation and endorses increased collaboration and sharing of information between energy, competition, and financial regulatory authorities. In the same sense, the EESC welcomes the alignment of the definitions of inside information and market manipulation with financial market rules. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

The EESC highlights the importance of cooperation between authorities in detecting and addressing market manipulation and endorses increased collaboration and sharing of information between energy, competition, and financial regulatory authorities. In the same sense, the EESC welcomes the alignment of the definitions of inside information and market manipulation with financial market rules.

| 1.6. | The EESC also highlights the importance of cooperation between national and EU-level authorities. It stresses the need to ensure an appropriate and efficient division of duties between national regulatory authorities and the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). Strengthening the powers of ACER must reflect its capacities and conditions within which it operates and, at the same time, its limits regarding national competences such as criminal liability. Strengthening ACER’s competencies must not replace clearer and more harmonised rules for the market monitoring of national authorities. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

The EESC also highlights the importance of cooperation between national and EU-level authorities. It stresses the need to ensure an appropriate and efficient division of duties between national regulatory authorities and the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). Strengthening the powers of ACER must reflect its capacities and conditions within which it operates and, at the same time, its limits regarding national competences such as criminal liability. Strengthening ACER’s competencies must not replace clearer and more harmonised rules for the market monitoring of national authorities.

| 1.7. | While emphasising the importance of increasing the quality of data and transparency of trading, the EESC finds it important to streamline data and information processes and requirements with the aim of minimising the administrative burden. It points out that with the development of the market, new rules should not discourage new entrants. As for the new requirements regarding algorithmic trading, the proposal may contribute to an uneven playing field between market participants across the EU, as it leaves the periodicity of information obligations to be decided purely at the national level. The Committee calls for proportionality in data reporting and the application of the once-only principle. The revision should aim at creating a transparent and non-discriminatory system, while avoiding a misuse of data collected. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

While emphasising the importance of increasing the quality of data and transparency of trading, the EESC finds it important to streamline data and information processes and requirements with the aim of minimising the administrative burden. It points out that with the development of the market, new rules should not discourage new entrants. As for the new requirements regarding algorithmic trading, the proposal may contribute to an uneven playing field between market participants across the EU, as it leaves the periodicity of information obligations to be decided purely at the national level. The Committee calls for proportionality in data reporting and the application of the once-only principle. The revision should aim at creating a transparent and non-discriminatory system, while avoiding a misuse of data collected.

2.   Background and gist

Background and gist

| 2.1. | The objective of the proposed Regulation (hereinafter ‘the proposal’) is to improve the EU’s protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market. To this end, it suggests amendments to the Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) (REMIT Regulation) and (EU) 2019/942 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) (ACER Regulation). |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

The objective of the proposed Regulation (hereinafter ‘the proposal’) is to improve the EU’s protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market. To this end, it suggests amendments to the Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1

2

| 2.2. | The proposal is part of the wider package of measures proposed by the Commission to reform the design of the electricity market, which aims to accelerate the increase in renewable energy, protect consumers from price spikes and manipulation, and contribute to the competitiveness of industries. Moreover, the proposal has a linkage with financial market legislation (notably with the Market Abuse Regulation) through financial instruments such as energy derivatives. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

The proposal is part of the wider package of measures proposed by the Commission to reform the design of the electricity market, which aims to accelerate the increase in renewable energy, protect consumers from price spikes and manipulation, and contribute to the competitiveness of industries. Moreover, the proposal has a linkage with financial market legislation (notably with the Market Abuse Regulation) through financial instruments such as energy derivatives.

| 2.3. | The proposal establishes obligations on both market participants and authorities. It focuses on procedures such as data collection and management, reporting, sharing and disclosure of information, as well as investigations and penalties. It also suggests changes to definitions. The main suggestions include the following:






  — | The definitions of market manipulation and inside information are proposed to be clarified and adjusted to align with the Market Abuse Regulation. The definition of a wholesale market product would be extended to also cover the placing of orders to trade in third countries participating in the Union single day-ahead and intraday coupling that may result in delivery in the Union. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.3.

The proposal establishes obligations on both market participants and authorities. It focuses on procedures such as data collection and management, reporting, sharing and disclosure of information, as well as investigations and penalties. It also suggests changes to definitions. The main suggestions include the following:

—

The definitions of market manipulation and inside information are proposed to be clarified and adjusted to align with the Market Abuse Regulation. The definition of a wholesale market product would be extended to also cover the placing of orders to trade in third countries participating in the Union single day-ahead and intraday coupling that may result in delivery in the Union.

| — | Data collection would be extended to cover also new balancing markets, as well as algorithm trading. The national regulatory authority would be empowered to require the market participant to provide a description regarding aspects such as its algorithmic trading strategies and compliance and risk control measures. |
| --- | --- |

—

Data collection would be extended to cover also new balancing markets, as well as algorithm trading. The national regulatory authority would be empowered to require the market participant to provide a description regarding aspects such as its algorithmic trading strategies and compliance and risk control measures.

| — | Specific rules are proposed for the provision of data by LNG market participants to ACER, and the obligations of ACER to produce and publish a daily LNG price assessment and an LNG price benchmark. |
| --- | --- |

—

Specific rules are proposed for the provision of data by LNG market participants to ACER, and the obligations of ACER to produce and publish a daily LNG price assessment and an LNG price benchmark.

| — | Inside information should be disclosed to ACER via Inside Information Platforms (IIPs), while the information on transactions needs to be provided through Registered Reporting Mechanisms (RRMs). Both IIPs and RRMs would need to be authorised by ACER. |
| --- | --- |

—

Inside information should be disclosed to ACER via Inside Information Platforms (IIPs), while the information on transactions needs to be provided through Registered Reporting Mechanisms (RRMs). Both IIPs and RRMs would need to be authorised by ACER.

| — | National authorities and ACER would be obliged to share information on suspected breaches of wholesale market products on a regular basis. Cooperation is also called for between various national authorities: energy regulators, financial market authorities, competition authorities, and tax authorities. The same applies to ACER and European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) at EU level. National regulatory authorities would be competent to investigate any wholesale market products on their markets irrespective of where the market participant is resident or established. |
| --- | --- |

—

National authorities and ACER would be obliged to share information on suspected breaches of wholesale market products on a regular basis. Cooperation is also called for between various national authorities: energy regulators, financial market authorities, competition authorities, and tax authorities. The same applies to ACER and European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) at EU level. National regulatory authorities would be competent to investigate any wholesale market products on their markets irrespective of where the market participant is resident or established.

| — | The role of ACER is proposed to be strengthened in the supervision and enforcement of activities under the REMIT Regulation. The objective is to ensure proper investigations of suspected breaches by market participants established outside the EU and to coordinate investigations especially in cross-border cases. ACER would also be empowered to conduct on-site inspections, assisted by national regulatory authorities. |
| --- | --- |

—

The role of ACER is proposed to be strengthened in the supervision and enforcement of activities under the REMIT Regulation. The objective is to ensure proper investigations of suspected breaches by market participants established outside the EU and to coordinate investigations especially in cross-border cases. ACER would also be empowered to conduct on-site inspections, assisted by national regulatory authorities.

| — | The proposal also suggests harmonising penalties to be introduced at national level, including harmonised fines regarding breaches of the REMIT Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

—

The proposal also suggests harmonising penalties to be introduced at national level, including harmonised fines regarding breaches of the REMIT Regulation.

3.   General comments

General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC welcomes that its call for the review of REMIT has been heard by the European Commission. It underlines that the revision must lay down a framework to mitigate the risks of market abuse by means of improved market transparency and enhanced market data quality. The overall goal should be to mitigate the distortive effects on price-setting from possible market abuse and speculation. At the same time, attention needs to be paid to the possible effects of the market liquidity and market entry barriers for new market players. Clear market rules are necessary but they should enhance and must not hinder competition. The EESC points out that energy is not a commodity like any other: it is an essential building block of our economic and social system and thus has the characteristics of a public good and in this regard this commodity should be accessible to all. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

The EESC welcomes that its call for the review of REMIT has been heard by the European Commission. It underlines that the revision must lay down a framework to mitigate the risks of market abuse by means of improved market transparency and enhanced market data quality. The overall goal should be to mitigate the distortive effects on price-setting from possible market abuse and speculation. At the same time, attention needs to be paid to the possible effects of the market liquidity and market entry barriers for new market players. Clear market rules are necessary but they should enhance and must not hinder competition. The EESC points out that energy is not a commodity like any other: it is an essential building block of our economic and social system and thus has the characteristics of a public good and in this regard this commodity should be accessible to all.

| 3.2. | Several Member States have introduced market transparency platforms, and European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO) operates a European platform. However, a systematic analysis and public awareness of the data available on these platforms would allow consumers and smaller market players to better understand and react to irregularities. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

Several Member States have introduced market transparency platforms, and European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO) operates a European platform. However, a systematic analysis and public awareness of the data available on these platforms would allow consumers and smaller market players to better understand and react to irregularities.

| 3.3. | The EESC welcomes the basic objective of the proposal to address and protect against the manipulation of energy markets. To this end, the EESC finds it important to efficiently monitor activities on the market in a transparent way. It welcomes that the revision of REMIT completes the series of EU measures against different forms of speculation on the EU market, such as those that prevent manipulation involving non-filling of gas storage facilities. It supports the proposal to extend the definition of wholesale energy products to cover also the placing of orders to trade in third countries with potential delivery in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

The EESC welcomes the basic objective of the proposal to address and protect against the manipulation of energy markets. To this end, the EESC finds it important to efficiently monitor activities on the market in a transparent way. It welcomes that the revision of REMIT completes the series of EU measures against different forms of speculation on the EU market, such as those that prevent manipulation involving non-filling of gas storage facilities. It supports the proposal to extend the definition of wholesale energy products to cover also the placing of orders to trade in third countries with potential delivery in the EU.

| 3.4. | The EESC highlights that work and vigilance must take place at national level and encourages national authorities to cooperate as much as possible with their counterparts across Member States and with European regulators. Only then can the work be efficient. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

The EESC highlights that work and vigilance must take place at national level and encourages national authorities to cooperate as much as possible with their counterparts across Member States and with European regulators. Only then can the work be efficient.

| 3.5. | The EESC has also stressed that any initiatives must be preceded by a rigorous debate and impact analysis (3). Although it is aware that such a request would have lengthened the duration of the procedure, it underlines the need for better law-making. The EESC therefore regrets that the proposals regarding electricity market design have not gone through full consultation and impact assessment. It takes note of the Commission staff working document, but points out that this type of document does not undergo the same procedure as impact assessments. In this regard it stresses that new measures must comply with the principle of proportionality and market players should not be overburdened with reporting. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

The EESC has also stressed that any initiatives must be preceded by a rigorous debate and impact analysis (3

4.   Specific comments

Specific comments

| 4.1. | The EESC welcomes the development of the system for producing and publishing LNG price assessments and benchmarks. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

The EESC welcomes the development of the system for producing and publishing LNG price assessments and benchmarks.

| 4.2. | While highlighting the importance of increasing the quality of data and transparency of trading, the EESC finds it important to streamline data and information processes and requirements with the aim of minimising the administrative burden. As for the new requirements regarding algorithmic trading, the proposal may contribute to an uneven playing field between market participants across the EU, as it leaves the periodicity of information obligations purely at the national level. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

While highlighting the importance of increasing the quality of data and transparency of trading, the EESC finds it important to streamline data and information processes and requirements with the aim of minimising the administrative burden. As for the new requirements regarding algorithmic trading, the proposal may contribute to an uneven playing field between market participants across the EU, as it leaves the periodicity of information obligations purely at the national level.

| 4.3. | The EESC endorses increased cooperation and sharing of information between authorities working in the fields of energy, competition, and financial regulation. In the same sense, the EESC welcomes the alignment of the definitions of inside information and market manipulation with financial market rules. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

The EESC endorses increased cooperation and sharing of information between authorities working in the fields of energy, competition, and financial regulation. In the same sense, the EESC welcomes the alignment of the definitions of inside information and market manipulation with financial market rules.

| 4.4. | The EESC also highlights the importance of cooperation between national and EU-level authorities. At the same time, it is however important to ensure an appropriate and efficient division of duties between national regulatory authorities and ACER. Expanding the control powers of ACER raises concerns over its capacity to manage all the tasks, considering the challenges it faces to manage the current broad agenda. National authorities need to be strengthened and equipped with clearer rules. ACER should focus on its role as coordinator. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

The EESC also highlights the importance of cooperation between national and EU-level authorities. At the same time, it is however important to ensure an appropriate and efficient division of duties between national regulatory authorities and ACER. Expanding the control powers of ACER raises concerns over its capacity to manage all the tasks, considering the challenges it faces to manage the current broad agenda. National authorities need to be strengthened and equipped with clearer rules. ACER should focus on its role as coordinator.

| 4.5. | The power to carry out on-site inspections and issue decisions on REMIT infringements should continue to remain at national level, as the determination of the conditions of criminal liability is ultimately the exclusive competence of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

The power to carry out on-site inspections and issue decisions on REMIT infringements should continue to remain at national level, as the determination of the conditions of criminal liability is ultimately the exclusive competence of the Member States.

| 4.6. | The EESC agrees that penalties must be effective, dissuasive, and proportionate. In this context, the Committee notes that the proposed fines for legal entities and natural persons are at a very high level. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

The EESC agrees that penalties must be effective, dissuasive, and proportionate. In this context, the Committee notes that the proposed fines for legal entities and natural persons are at a very high level.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (OJ L 326, 8.12.2011, p. 1).

1

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2019/942 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 22).

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Short-Term Energy Market Interventions and Long-Term Improvement to the Electricity Market Design — a course for action (COM(2022) 236 final) (OJ C 75, 28.2.2023, p. 185).

3

---

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/142 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/142

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approval and market surveillance of non-road mobile machinery circulating on public roads and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020

(COM(2023) 178 final — 2023/0090 (COD))

(2023/C 293/21)

| Referral | Council of the European Union, 4.4.2023
  European Parliament, 17.4.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Section for Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 193/1/3 |

Referral

Council of the European Union, 4.4.2023

European Parliament, 17.4.2023

Legal basis

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Section for Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

193/1/3

Since the European Economic and Social Committee endorses the content of the proposal and feels that it requires no comment on its part, it has decided to issue an opinion endorsing the proposed text.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/143 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/143

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Act in Support of Ammunition Production

(COM(2023) 237final — 2023/0140 (COD))

(2023/C 293/22)

| Referral | Council of the European Union, 10.5.2023
  European Parliament, 8.5.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 193/2/9 |

Referral

Council of the European Union, 10.5.2023

European Parliament, 8.5.2023

Legal basis

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted at plenary

14.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

193/2/9

Since the European Economic and Social Committee endorses the content of the proposal and feels that it requires no comment on its part, it decided to issue an opinion endorsing the proposed text.

Brussels, 14 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

---

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/144 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/144

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/833 laying down conservation and enforcement measures applicable in the Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation

(COM(2023) 108 final — 2023/0056 (COD))

(2023/C 293/23)

| Rapporteur-general: | Stefano PALMIERI |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur-general:

Stefano PALMIERI

Stefano PALMIERI

| Referral | Council, 10.3.2023
  European Parliament, 13.3.2023 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Articles 43(2) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2023 |
| Plenary session No | 579 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 151/0/1 |

Referral

Council, 10.3.2023

European Parliament, 13.3.2023

Legal basis

Articles 43(2) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2023

Plenary session No

579

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

151/0/1

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) again reiterates the views it set out on the proposal for a regulation under consideration in opinions 2018/05155 (1), 2020/02842 (2) and 2022/01131 (3), the conclusions and recommendations of which were as follows. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) again reiterates the views it set out on the proposal for a regulation under consideration in opinions 2018/05155 (1

2

3

| 1.2. | The EESC believes that the conservation and enforcement measures adopted by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) should be transposed into EU law, with a view to achieving their uniform and effective implementation within the EU. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

The EESC believes that the conservation and enforcement measures adopted by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) should be transposed into EU law, with a view to achieving their uniform and effective implementation within the EU.

| 1.3. | However, it considers that the proposal under consideration does not establish an efficient mechanism for transposing the measures adopted by NAFO, and does not resolve the issue of having to update these measures each year. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

However, it considers that the proposal under consideration does not establish an efficient mechanism for transposing the measures adopted by NAFO, and does not resolve the issue of having to update these measures each year.

| 1.4. | The Committee is in favour of a more efficient, simpler mechanism, and therefore proposes drafting a regulation that contains a single article stipulating that the European Union must, without fail, apply NAFO measures to its fleet. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

The Committee is in favour of a more efficient, simpler mechanism, and therefore proposes drafting a regulation that contains a single article stipulating that the European Union must, without fail, apply NAFO measures to its fleet.

| 1.5. | The EESC stresses the risk involved in introducing a system of delegated acts, as this would give the Commission the power to legislate without being required to follow the ordinary procedures. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

The EESC stresses the risk involved in introducing a system of delegated acts, as this would give the Commission the power to legislate without being required to follow the ordinary procedures.

2.   Gist of the legislative proposal

Gist of the legislative proposal

| 2.1. | The main aim of the proposal under consideration is to transpose into EU law the conservation and enforcement measures adopted by NAFO in its annual meeting in September 2022. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

The main aim of the proposal under consideration is to transpose into EU law the conservation and enforcement measures adopted by NAFO in its annual meeting in September 2022.

| 2.2. | It incorporates amendments concerning new duties for flag Member States related to the submission of research plans, and vessel requirements for participation in research activities; the regulation of trial tows upon first entry into a division on a fishing trip; adjustments for redfish closures in Division 3M; the prohibition of landing, transhipment and retention on board of Greenland shark; and the cross-listing of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) vessels from other regional fisheries management organisations. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

It incorporates amendments concerning new duties for flag Member States related to the submission of research plans, and vessel requirements for participation in research activities; the regulation of trial tows upon first entry into a division on a fishing trip; adjustments for redfish closures in Division 3M; the prohibition of landing, transhipment and retention on board of Greenland shark; and the cross-listing of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) vessels from other regional fisheries management organisations.

| 2.3. | The proposal delegates powers to the Commission to amend Regulation (EU) 2019/833 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) concerning the duties of Member States related to the submission of research plans, and vessel requirements to carry out research activities, should NAFO amend its measures in the future. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

The proposal delegates powers to the Commission to amend Regulation (EU) 2019/833 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4

3.   General comments

General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC believes that the conservation and enforcement measures adopted at the last annual NAFO meeting should be transposed into EU law so as to ensure that they are applied uniformly throughout the EU. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

The EESC believes that the conservation and enforcement measures adopted at the last annual NAFO meeting should be transposed into EU law so as to ensure that they are applied uniformly throughout the EU.

| 3.2. | The Committee believes, however, that the transposition procedure is still not based on an efficient mechanism, since these measures are amended every year and the EU’s bureaucratic procedures are very slow, leading to a continuous time-lag between the rules adopted by NAFO and EU legislation. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

The Committee believes, however, that the transposition procedure is still not based on an efficient mechanism, since these measures are amended every year and the EU’s bureaucratic procedures are very slow, leading to a continuous time-lag between the rules adopted by NAFO and EU legislation.

| 3.3. | The EESC reiterates the need to adopt a more efficient procedure, such as that proposed by the EESC in 2019, 2020 and 2022, which was also supported by the administrations of the Member States and the sectors concerned. This would be a simple regulation containing a single article, which would include a commitment by the European Union to apply the rules approved by NAFO each year to its fleet without fail. This simple regulation will be subject to the introduction of a clause stipulating that, where any measure adopted by NAFO is incompatible with EU law, it will not apply until the co-legislators agree on this issue. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

The EESC reiterates the need to adopt a more efficient procedure, such as that proposed by the EESC in 2019, 2020 and 2022, which was also supported by the administrations of the Member States and the sectors concerned. This would be a simple regulation containing a single article, which would include a commitment by the European Union to apply the rules approved by NAFO each year to its fleet without fail. This simple regulation will be subject to the introduction of a clause stipulating that, where any measure adopted by NAFO is incompatible with EU law, it will not apply until the co-legislators agree on this issue.

| 3.4. | The Committee again warns that continuing with this regulation could lead to conflicting rules or, at the very least, periods of legal uncertainty for administrations and even businesses themselves, which will not know whether they are required to comply with the previous rules, which would be those still in force in the EU, or with the new rules. Furthermore, it creates distortions in the application of measures with regard to non-EU fleets. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

The Committee again warns that continuing with this regulation could lead to conflicting rules or, at the very least, periods of legal uncertainty for administrations and even businesses themselves, which will not know whether they are required to comply with the previous rules, which would be those still in force in the EU, or with the new rules. Furthermore, it creates distortions in the application of measures with regard to non-EU fleets.

| 3.5. | The EESC believes that the only thing that will make it easier to introduce the system of delegated acts is for the Commission to lay down rules without having to go through the ordinary procedures. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

The EESC believes that the only thing that will make it easier to introduce the system of delegated acts is for the Commission to lay down rules without having to go through the ordinary procedures.

4.   Specific comments

Specific comments

| 4.1. | The EESC recognises the important role that research vessels play in monitoring and assessing the marine environmental status, in particular in relation to fisheries. Accurate characterisation of ecological communities with respect to their biodiversity and food-web structure is essential for conservation. Local richness can show statistically significant, season-dependent changes within the catchment for fish that do not necessarily mirror those observed for biodiversity and functional feeding characteristics (5). |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

The EESC recognises the important role that research vessels play in monitoring and assessing the marine environmental status, in particular in relation to fisheries. Accurate characterisation of ecological communities with respect to their biodiversity and food-web structure is essential for conservation. Local richness can show statistically significant, season-dependent changes within the catchment for fish that do not necessarily mirror those observed for biodiversity and functional feeding characteristics (5

| 4.2. | Recently, the scientific community introduced an innovative approach to monitoring and assessing the status of the marine ecosystem, including through analysing and modelling environmental DNA (eDNA). This approach introduces techniques and concepts that can support effective governance and management of fisheries (6). The EESC recognises that eDNA is complementary data providing useful information on the status of the trophic web and the marine ecosystem. Given that some research vessels collect eDNA during their observational campaigns, the EESC asks for the collection and storage of eDNA to be taken into account as valuable data to be integrated into fish catches. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

Recently, the scientific community introduced an innovative approach to monitoring and assessing the status of the marine ecosystem, including through analysing and modelling environmental DNA (eDNA). This approach introduces techniques and concepts that can support effective governance and management of fisheries (6

| 4.3. | Most countries comply with the pillars of the Nagoya Protocol, which entered into force on 12 October 2014 and stems from the Convention on Biological Diversity. Under this protocol, research and development activities must be carried out in accordance with any applicable access and benefit-sharing (ABS) regulation and must be traceable. Where applicable, all of the required ABS procedures must have been carried out with the competent authorities before the implementation of any research programme requiring the use and transfer of genetic resources, regardless of the supplier country. The majority of countries have signed the Nagoya Protocol, and few of them still need to ratify it (7). |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

Most countries comply with the pillars of the Nagoya Protocol, which entered into force on 12 October 2014 and stems from the Convention on Biological Diversity. Under this protocol, research and development activities must be carried out in accordance with any applicable access and benefit-sharing (ABS) regulation and must be traceable. Where applicable, all of the required ABS procedures must have been carried out with the competent authorities before the implementation of any research programme requiring the use and transfer of genetic resources, regardless of the supplier country. The majority of countries have signed the Nagoya Protocol, and few of them still need to ratify it (7

| 4.4. | The proposal introduces obligations for research vessel operators to provide certain requested data, which may be inappropriate where external factors (e.g. weather conditions, specific information from satellites about the distribution of nutrients) impose or prompt quick changes in observational campaigns. Some requests, e.g. the need to have an observer with sufficient expertise on board and the obligation for vessels to change position in the event of by-catch, may also make the process less effective in supporting the conservation and management of healthy and productive marine ecosystems, especially if the information gathered is not communicated to the wider community. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

The proposal introduces obligations for research vessel operators to provide certain requested data, which may be inappropriate where external factors (e.g. weather conditions, specific information from satellites about the distribution of nutrients) impose or prompt quick changes in observational campaigns. Some requests, e.g. the need to have an observer with sufficient expertise on board and the obligation for vessels to change position in the event of by-catch, may also make the process less effective in supporting the conservation and management of healthy and productive marine ecosystems, especially if the information gathered is not communicated to the wider community.

| 4.5. | Due to the difficulty in adapting the operational process to the legislative requirements, and vice versa, the EESC welcomes a more pragmatic approach based on the transparent circulation of information. In this context, the EESC proposes introducing an ex post publication of the curricula vitae of the experts identified as competent observers, and a brief report describing the rationale and details for the change of position in the event of by-catch. Making this information publicly available could promote the sharing of best practices and improve the reputation of the stakeholders involved. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

Due to the difficulty in adapting the operational process to the legislative requirements, and vice versa, the EESC welcomes a more pragmatic approach based on the transparent circulation of information. In this context, the EESC proposes introducing an ex post

Brussels, 15 June 2023.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

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(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down conservation and control measures applicable in the Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 2115/2005 and Council Regulation (EC) No 1386/2007’ (COM(2018) 577 final — 2018/0304 (COD)) (OJ C 159, 10.5.2019, p. 60).

1

(2)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/833 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 laying down conservation and enforcement measures applicable in the Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation’ (COM(2020) 215 final — 2020/95(COD)) (OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 279).

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/833 laying down conservation and enforcement measures applicable in the Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (COM(2022) 51 final — 2022/0035 (COD)) (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 149).

3

(4)  Regulation (EU) 2019/833 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 laying down conservation and enforcement measures applicable in the Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation, amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1627 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2115/2005 and (EC) No 1386/2007 (OJ L 141, 28.5.2019, p. 1).

4

(5)  Blackman et al., Communications Biology (2022) 5:259.

5

(6)  Gilbey et al., Marine Policy (2022), 124, 104331.

6

(7)  https://www.cbd.int/abs/nagoya-protocol/signatories/

7

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Corrigenda

| 18.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 293/147 |
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18.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 293/147

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Corrigendum to the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Social Imbalances Procedure (exploratory opinion at the request of the Spanish Presidency)

(
  Official Journal of the European Union C 228 of 29 June 2023
  )

(2023/C 293/24)

On page 63, footnote 10:

| for: | ‘... (OJ C 353, 18.10.2019, p. 36)’, |
| --- | --- |

for:

for:

‘... (OJ C 353, 18.10.2019, p. 36)’,

| read: | ‘... (OJ C 353, 18.10.2019, p. 39).’. |
| --- | --- |

read:

read

‘... (OJ C 353, 18.10.2019, p. 39).’.

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