Seven Months Into the Surge: 

What Does It Mean For Iraqis? 

REND AL-RAHIM FRANCKE

Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace

September 10, 2007 www.usip.org
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1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200 

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© 2007 by the United States Institute of Peace.

 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United 

States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions. This is a 

working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the 

author at rfrancke@usip.org. 
About This Report 

The military surge underway since February 2007 was prompted by the rationale that 

reducing sectarian violence in and around Baghdad and curtailing insurgency and terrorist 

attacks would, together, create a breathing space for political and social groups to engage in 

national reconciliation and agree on common principles and policies. In other words, there is 

the anticipation of a direct relationship between military achievement and political achievement, 

and of building a positive synergy that would lead to stable conditions and permit U.S. troop 

reduction. Does this relationship hold true? Has the expanded military presence and its new 

operating strategies increased security, reduced sectarian killing and sectarian purges, and 

controlled insurgent and terrorist attacks? If violence has decreased, has this provided a respite 

to government and political forces, and have they, as a result, engaged in the necessary trustbuilding measures and dialogue towards reconciliation? 

This report shows that the security and political situations in Iraq in the summer of 2007 

were tentatively and marginally improved in Baghdad but in a state of flux, and that the political 

process was far behind the military effort. The report is based on conversations held in July 

2007 with a large number of Iraqi political leaders and senior government officials, members of 

parliament from the major parliamentary groups, as well as a wide range of Iraqi citizens from 

Baghdad and the provinces. Its principal policy recommendations are that: a) international 

mediation is required to help Iraqi leaders build a new national compact; b) Iraqi leaders need to 

be encouraged to develop national political agendas and policies, and reduce reliance upon 

identity politics and narrow factional patronage; and c) that the central and provincial 

governments each require assistance to improve their capacity for constitutional governance. 

About This Series 

USIP Working Papers are unedited works in progress and may appear in future USIP 

publications, peer-reviewed journals, and edited volumes. This product is only distributed online 

and does not have a hard copy counterpart. 
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CONTENTS 

Seven Months Into the Surge: What Does It Mean For Iraqis?...................2

1. Security in Baghdad...................................................................................2 

2. National Dialogue and Reconciliation ........................................................7

2.1. The Shi'a Position .............................................................................10 

2.2. The Sunni Position ............................................................................15 

3. Political Situation .....................................................................................19

3.1. Political Dynamics .............................................................................19 

3.2. Political Alliances...............................................................................21 

3.3. State Institutions................................................................................25 

3.4. The Southern Governates.................................................................28 

4. Federation and Regional Autonomies......................................................30 

4.1. Federalism in the South ....................................................................31 

4.2. Federalism in the West?....................................................................33 

5. Conclusions .............................................................................................34 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR.......................................................................................38

ABOUT THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE...................................39

 
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SEVEN MONTHS INTO THE SURGE: 

WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR IRAQIS? 

REND AL-RAHIM FRANCKE

Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace 

1. Security in Baghdad 

People who live in the red zone have mixed experiences of the security situation. 

Residents of some “hot” neighborhoods of Baghdad say that the presence of Americans 

has a deterrent effect on militias, gangs and snipers—and thus gives comfort to citizens-

- whereas Iraqi forces, including the police, army units, or pesh merga sent down from 

Kurdistan, do little to confront trouble-makers. For example, some neighborhoods within 

the larger Amiriya district have benefited from U.S. intervention, while others, such as 

Furat and Jihad, are still in conflict because U.S. forces have not intervened and Iraqi 

police and army do a poor job of stopping violence and intimidation. The higher U.S. 

profile is also credited for a decline in the number of suicide bombings and a decrease in 

mass sectarian killings and kidnappings in the city. Another factor contributing to a sense 

of greater safety in Baghdad is the success of U.S.-Iraqi force in the area south of 

Baghdad (the so-called Triangle of Death), where Sunni tribes have recently cooperated 

with U.S. forces. Residents of some neighborhoods said that for the first time in over a 

year they have been able to shop in their area in relative peace and stay out after dark. 

Other residents say that the “surge” has done little to improve security in their 

areas, citing the continuing sectarian purges, assassinations and mortar rounds that 
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afflict their immediate neighborhoods. They complain that the “clear” operations are not 

followed by the necessary “hold” operations because the Iraqi army does not have the 

capacity to hold. The “build” is nowhere in sight. The army is not sufficiently capable, not 

motivated, afraid, or simply not there. The police are still regarded with extreme 

suspicion, and two Sunnis, one a government official and the other a simple citizen, said 

that the Ministry of Interior needs to be disbanded and rebuilt. 

 

On balance residents of Baghdad tend to think the situation is marginally better 

than it was at the beginning of the year, but believe that the gains are precarious and 

fragile. Many complain that when U.S. forces clear an area and hand over to Iraqi forces 

to hold, the neighborhood returns to lawlessness. Snipers have emerged as a relatively 

new and deadly danger in residential neighborhoods. Sniper murders are especially 

unnerving to residents because, while they look targeted, they may in fact be random. 

Because of fear of snipers, residents of some neighborhoods (particularly women) have 

had to give up their jobs and stay at home. 

But Baghdad is full of anomalies. A predominantly Sunni area in the north east 

has a sizable Shi’a population, and the two communities continue to live peacefully, 

albeit under the protection of an “enlightened” group of Mahdi Army militia. The militia 

not only provides the residents (Sunnis and Shi’a) with protection, but also mans 

checkpoints and controls entry into the neighborhood, distributes gas and kerosene, 

regulates the supply of electricity from private generators, and offers other services to 

the population. Zayyuna, an upper middle class neighborhood that houses many former 

Iraqi army officers, is still mixed and peaceful. Al-Atayfiya is a predominantly Shi’a area 

with a sizable Sunni population. It has stayed quiet in the shadow of the influential 
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Baratha mosque and under the wing of the mosque’s powerful Imam, Sheikh Jalal Eddin 

Al-Saghir, who is also member of parliament for the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 

(ISCI, formerly SCIRI). The militia that protects the mosque also protects the inhabitants 

of the area, both Sunni and Shi’a. 

The profile of Sunni-Shi’a fighting is far murkier than Western press reports 

convey. The sectarian fighting is not restricted to politically motivated militias, and 

labeling perpetrators of violence as either “Sunni terrorists/insurgents” or “Jaish alMahdi” militias oversimplifies and masks the complex facts on the ground. The lawless 

conditions originally triggered by terrorist attacks (presumed to be Sunni), counter 

attacks by militias (presumed to be Shi’a), and the impotence of Iraqi security forces, in 

effect paved the way to other forms of violence that are cloaked in sectarian garb. 

Violence in neighborhoods now includes family vendettas avenging former murders and 

assassinations, or revenge killing of former Ba’thists accused of former criminality. The 

tangled skein of violence is further complicated by the proliferation of gangs that are mini 

mafias masquerading as sectarian or political militias, but that are actually only 

interested in profit, and engage in the lucrative trade of killing or evicting residents, 

looting their homes, and renting them to new residents. In the absence of law 

enforcement, the competition of rival mafias expands the sphere of targeted violence. 

To the distress of the Sunnis, Baghdad is increasingly a Shi’a city, either 

because Sunnis are being pushed out or are choosing to leave, and the geographic area 

of the capital in which Sunnis are now a majority and feel safe is shrinking (for example, 

parts of Saydiya, a fierce battleground between Sunni and Shi’a militias, are now 

controlled by the Shi’a). Shi’a political parties and militias have brought under their 
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control large sections of the capital. While the control exercised by the Shi’a reduces 

sectarian killing, it is a source of extreme anxiety to the Sunni political groups, who fear 

above all the loss of the capital. 

Many Sunnis who leave Baghdad are escaping to Jordan rather than moving to 

safer Sunni areas of Iraq. The exodus of Sunnis from Iraq is causing consternation to 

the leaders of the community who see their numbers, political position and leverage, 

shrinking. A major Sunni demand now is not only to halt sectarian cleansing, but also to 

create the conditions in which refugees and displaced persons can return to their homes 

and restore the sectarian composition of the city. 

In addition to increased U.S./Iraqi troop presence in the capital’s neighborhoods, 

two further developments have contributed to a slight improvement in security. First, the 

sectarian battles in many areas have been settled in favor of one side or another 

(usually the Shi’ militias), providing a respite in some districts after eighteen months of 

fighting. Second, the military operations around the Baghdad periphery to the south, in 

Mahmudiya, Yousifiya, and the north (Diyala) and west (Anbar) may be helping to curtail 

the activities of insurgents and terrorists. There is evidence that terrorists being 

squeezed in these periphery areas are moving to Kirkuk, and the incidence of suicide 

cars and bombings in governorate of Kirkuk has dramatically risen. Iraqi government 

officials are concerned that Mosul (Naynawah governorate), so far relatively quiet, may 

be the next frontier for terrorists. In any event, increased security in the capital has been 

bought at a price. Neighborhoods are less mixed, though reports of complete sectarian 

homogeneity in neighborhoods are exaggerated; moving between neighborhoods is 

more difficult because of barriers and checkpoints; and where U.S.-Iraqi forces are not 
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present, militias of one stripe or another exercise control. Even without physical barriers, 

Baghdadis think of neighborhoods somewhat as cantonments. 

Iraqi security officials are optimistic that security will improve and believe that the 

surge has already shown results. According to a senior Iraqi official, of the 446 

neighborhoods in Baghdad, only 5% were classified as “insecure” in June, compared to 

10% earlier. Iraqis also cite the increased competence and readiness of Iraqi forces and 

greater intelligence capacities, which have led in recent months to the foiling of terrorist 

attacks and the capture of terrorists. There is broad agreement that the surge needs 

more time. U.S. forces were not all in place until mid-June, and the strategy of operating 

inside neighborhoods is new, complex and needs to time to mature: troops have to 

become familiar with their neighborhoods and comfortable in the new mode of operation. 

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), an important part of the more forward 

posture of the U.S. presence, have yet to settle in and be fully effective. In other words, 

it’s too soon to tell; importantly, some believe that September will be equally too soon. 

In a statement that everyone considers unfortunate, the Iraqi PM declared on 

July 12 (2007) that the Iraqi forces are ready and able to assume responsibility for the 

security of the country. This is patently unrealistic as Maliki aides acknowledge, and 

even Maliki himself has had to backtrack. It is doubtful whether Iraqi forces can, on their 

own, professionally and competently maintain the security of the International Zone (IZ). 

No one, neither Sunni and Shi’a politicians nor ordinary citizens, wants to see 

U.S. force leave any time soon. Harith Al-Dhari, the radical Sunni leader of the 

Association of Muslim Scholars, declared on July 17 that the Association does not favor 
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an immediate and precipitate withdrawal but wanted a schedule only. The Sadris, the 

one Shi’a group that has been vocal against American presence, have moderated their 

position. Privately, moderate Sadri parliamentarians are strongly opposed to any troop 

drawdown in the near future. Even publicly, Muqtada Al-Sadr (following his long and 

mysterious absence in the spring), declared that they wanted a graduated troop 

drawdown that is linked to the increasing capacity of Iraqi forces. Although in April 2007 

the Sadr bloc in parliament launched a petition for scheduling troop withdrawal and 

obtained the signatures of 144 MPs, the issue has not been highlighted by the Sadris, 

and their withdrawal from parliament in May was not been over the issue of U.S. troops 

but was rather prompted by the second bombing of the shrine in Samarra and the failure 

of the government to protect the shrine, investigate the bombings, and rebuild it. 

2. National Dialogue and Reconciliation 

The national reconciliation initiative is stalled. Launched by Prime Minister Maliki 

in June 2006 as part of his government’s program, it has been hampered by the lack of 

political will, conflicting interests, and the absence of thoroughgoing, sustained 

negotiations. The legislative items in the initiative, such as the de-Ba’thification law, 

have languished at different points along the path of approval. Disarming the militias, 

another pillar of the reconciliation initiative, is unrealistic, given the absence of political 

will, economic weakness, the absence of Iraqi forces able and willing to confront the 

militias and fill the security vacuum, and a host of other reasons. The national 

reconciliation gatherings held in the fall of 2006, with meetings for tribal figures, former 

army officers, religious leaders, and civil society organizations, were about form rather 

than substance: fleeting media events that did nothing to address deep-seated fears and 

distrust around sensitive topics such as de-Ba’thification. The committee charged with 
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reviewing the constitution completed its work in June and submitted its 

recommendations to parliament, where they will be subjected to contentious debate. A 

number of constitutional issues were left out of the committees deliberations, including 

the difficult questions of Kirkuk and the powers of the presidency. 

The gravest problems in Iraq now center around the power relations between 

Sunni and Shi’a political groups. Arab-Kurdish relations, while always sensitive, are on 

the margins, at least for the moment. But all political leaders, Sunni, Shi’a and Kurds, 

have failed to forge a common vision for the state,1

 they have not articulated common 

national objectives, and have not reached acceptable power-sharing agreements. Any 

serious effort at national reconciliation has to address these fundamental questions. 

Both Shi’a and Sunnis recognize that the legislative agenda and other items on 

Maliki’s reconciliation plan are symptoms rather than causes of an essentially political 

problem. Nevertheless, according to a prominent Sunni politician, there is no real 

political dialogue among the political parties within the governing coalition. The Political 

Council for National Security, made up of 19 political party leaders and designed as a 

forum for discussing and resolving political and strategic issues, is practically moribund. 

The Council of Ministers (cabinet) is not a suitable forum for dialogue because ministers 

are rarely decision-makers in their own parties and the cabinet as a whole does not have 

authority over political issues; and parliament is too fragmented, indecisive, and fraught 

 

1

 The discussion in the CRC regarding the Preamble to the Constitution is revealing in 

relation to the absence of a common vision. The Preamble recounts the history of 

persecution suffered primarily by the Kurds and the Shi’a, gives religious leadership a 

prominent profile in the political change, and appeals repeatedly to the Imams and 

Maraji’ as an inspiration. Efforts to change the Preamble by eliminating some language
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with personality clashes, though a committee has been formed to follow up national 

reconciliation issues. Even among the most senior leaders, discussion of difficult 

subjects is usually superficial and inconclusive. According to a member of the Political 

Council, when serious talks take place, disagreements degenerate into mutual 

accusations and verbal fights and the meetings are broken up. Each side is entrenched 

in its position, motivated by fear and ambition in varying measures, and seeks maximum 

protection and gains. 

A complicating factor for prospective national dialogue among Sunnis and Shi’a 

is the growing importance of the Sunni tribes in Anbar, Diyala, and south of Baghdad. To 

date, these tribes are not formally part of the political process and are not represented 

by any organized party. While their efforts at fighting Al-Qaeda are welcomed by the 

government, they are widely perceived as groups that, at best, have had strong links to 

the insurgency, and are more likely to have been part of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’thist 

apparatus than the Sunni Islamist groups currently in government. According to his 

advisors, Prime Minister Maliki has had talks with these groups but neither Maliki nor 

other Shi’a religious parties have a strategy for dealing with them on a political level or 

incorporating them in the political process. (The challenge presented by the tribes is 

discussed below). 

At the popular level, among the “red zone Iraqis,” the squabbles between political 

parties acquire reality only insofar as they affect their daily live and physical security. On 

both counts, the political turmoil contributes to the suffering and deprivation of Iraqi 

 

were unsuceessful. Only additions to the Preamble were accepted and included in the 

draft sent to Parliament. 
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citizens. Ordinary people are helpless and feel victimized by politics. They recognize that 

the power conflicts are being played out at the highest political levels—levels that they 

cannot hope to influence-- in Baghdad, in the provinces, and between Iraq’s neighbors. 

The reactions of Iraqis from all walks of life to the political stalemate range from 

bewilderment and incomprehension, to anger and condemnation, and—of course—to 

suspicions of deep conspiracy. 

2.1. The Shi’a Position 

Shi’a leaders are faced with the dilemma of reconciling two opposites. On the 

one hand, they are eager to assert their demographic dominance in politics to the full: in 

this conceptual framework, demography is democracy. On the other hand, they need to 

engage the Sunnis in order to build the state. Shi’a hardliners favor the 80% solution, 

arguing that a Shi’a-Kurdish alliance can run the country without need for the Sunnis. 

Even Humam Hammudi, the head of the Constitutional Review Committee, who is 

viewed as a moderate and a conciliatory figure, can be hawkish. He does not see the 

usefulness of reconciliation: “what is there to reconcile? Sunnis are unwilling to 

acknowledge their minority status and act accordingly.” As far as he and many Shi’a are 

concerned, democracy entitles the Shi’a to rule as the majority, and reconciliation is 

another word for Shi’a concessions. 

 

Nevertheless, Shi’a politicians say they are willing to forego the rewards of a 

strict democracy by making concessions to the Sunnis (and Kurds) in the interest of 

national co-existence. The principle of consensus is often accepted as the counterbalance to democracy, but it means giving a veto to the Sunnis (as well as the Kurds) 

and renders decision-making cumbersome and often impossible. The Shi’a are trying to 
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find a middle ground between the two, but claim that the Sunnis do not cooperate. (In 

practice the 80% option is thwarted by the disarray of the Shi’a bloc, as described 

below). 

Several Shi’a leaders complain that the difficulty with talking to the Sunnis stems 

from Sunni reluctance to understand and accept the new political order: the Sunnis 

cannot accept the fact that they are no longer in control, and that the Shi’a have the 

upper hand in the political process; consequently, willfully or subconsciously, they thwart 

political progress. The Shi’a believe that virtually all Sunnis are “hidden” sectarians who 

believe in Sunni supremacy, and that Sunni demands for a non-sectarian state are really 

only a mask for restoring Sunni power. 

At a visceral level, Shi’a leaders (particularly those affiliated with the religious 

parties) find it hard to dissociate “Sunni” from “Ba’thi”—with all the implications of past 

oppression by the Ba’thi regime and present support for an insurgency with strong 

Ba’thist roots. The Shi’a are therefore existentially afraid of the return of the Sunnis, who 

they believe will be a vehicle for the return of the Ba’th. In such a scenario, not only will 

they lose all their gains, but they will be subjected to renewed persecution. The 

assassination of Shi’a politicians (starting with Baqir Al-Hakim in July 2003, followed by 

Izzeddin Selim, Ali Al-Adhadh, and others) and repeated attempts on the lives of other 

Shi’a leaders, are given as proof of the efforts to eliminate Shi’a leadership. Along with 

the fear, the Shi’a party leaders also have a sense of entitlement: they believe that after 

centuries of oppression, it is their turn to rule. They define democracy as the rule of the 

(demographic) majority—therefore the rule of the Shi’a. These fears and ambitions are 

conveyed in numerous explicit and implicit ways to the Shi’a population at large. 
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While the Shi’a concede that not all Sunnis are Saddamis or Ba’this, and not all 

were criminals, they maintain that all Sunnis benefited from Saddam’s regime (Maliki). 

According to a story told by Maliki, Muhsin Abdel Hamid (a leader of the Iraqi Islamic 

Party and member of the Governing Council) and other Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) members 

were imprisoned by Saddam Hussein in the late 70s. They were treated relatively well in 

detention and released after 17 days, after appeals from Arab countries. Abdel Hamid 

acknowledged to Maliki that the detainees were spared because they were Sunnis; had 

they been Da’wa or other Shi’a detainees, they would have been tortured and killed. 

A contributing factor for Shi’a anxieties is the re-appearance of Ba’thist groups in 

Iraq and their revitalization outside Iraq. After a couple of years of silence, Ba’this 

recovered their breath after 2005 and cells began to form around the country, including 

in southern cities. Ba’thi pamphlets, press releases and propaganda circulated, originally 

under new names such as the “Awdah” party (The Return), but eventually explicitly 

under the banner of the Ba’th. To the great fear and distrust of the Shi’a, a few Sunni 

members of parliament have been arguing for legalizing the Ba’th party and allowing it to 

enter the political arena in Iraq. 2

The Shi’a fear the very Sunnis that they work with every day. They consider them 

at best tolerant of the insurgency, or, at worst, collaborators with it. Nassir Al-Janabi, an 

MP from the Sunni Tawafuq, has been charged with working with Sunni assassination 

groups. After initial reluctance, the Tawafuq acknowledged his involvement and expelled 
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him from their parliamentary ranks. Janabi is now a fugitive in Syria. Shi’a officials claim 

to have evidence incriminating other Sunni leaders in insurgency activities. Khalaf AlUleyan, a prominent Sunni MP, and Adnan Al-Duleimi, head of the Tawafuq bloc in 

parliament, are widely believed by the Shi’a (including ordinary citizens) to be associated 

with insurgent groups such as the Twenties Revolution Brigade and the Army of 

Muhammad. Household staff and guards of Sunni leaders have been accused of 

association with terrorist groups and possession of illegal weapons. The suicide bomber 

who detonated himself in parliament in April 2007, killing Mohammed Awadh, a Sunni 

MP, is alleged to belong to the retinue of a Sunni parliamentarian. As a result of these 

fears, Shi’a officials are reluctant to share security information with their Sunni 

colleagues. Thus when Salam Al-Zawba’i, the Deputy Prime Minister, complained that, 

even as DPM, he is not informed of security arrangements and strategies; Ali Al-Adib, a 

senior MP with the UIA, reportedly confirmed the DPM’s complaint, saying that it was 

only natural since Zawba’i couldn’t be trusted with security information. 

The Shi’a accuse the Sunnis of being intransigent and of deliberately hampering 

political progress, and they blame Iraq’s neighbors and the U.S. for aiding and abetting 

the Sunnis. In ranking the causes of problems in Iraq, the Shi’a place the meddling of 

Arab states at the top. The prime culprits are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Syria, and Jordan. 

They believe that these countries are relentlessly hostile to Shi’a rule in Iraq and will go 

a long way to thwart it. They accuse the Arab region of providing moral and material 

support to insurgents and turning a blind eye to the flow of money, arms and volunteers 

to the insurgency. They also accuse Arab neighbors, particularly Jordan and Saudi 

 2

 The Ba’th party has splintered into at least two factions, one led by Izzet al-Douri, 

reputed to be in Yemen, and another by Younes Ahmed, in Syria. There were efforts in
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Arabia, of encouraging Sunni political groups within the political process to play tough 

and hold out for unreasonable demands. According to this Shi’a worldview, the Tawafuq 

group is not interested in reconciliation because they expect to get a larger share of 

power in Iraq by hanging tough and leaning on Iraq’s Arab neighbors. 

The Shi’a also blame the U.S. for encouraging unyielding Sunni positions. They 

charge that the U.S. made unwarranted concessions to bring Sunnis in to the political 

fold through elections and the constitutional referendum, and continues to send signals 

that it is listening to Sunni demands and yielding to Sunni pressure. The influence of 

Saudi Arabia on the U.S. is a major problem for Shi’a parties, since the U.S. shares 

Saudi (and Iraqi Sunni) fears of Iranian interference. United States support for Sunni 

tribes in Anbar, and the prospect of incorporating elements from these tribes into the 

Iraqi army, is seen through the lens of these fears: Shi’a political parties are concerned 

that the U.S. is fostering and backing Sunni militias that can challenge Shi’a authority, 

and ultimately building an army that can stage a coup against a Shi’a-dominated 

government. 

At its extreme, this fear becomes a paranoid projection of a U.S. conspiracy to 

bring Sunnis/Ba’thists back to power. This fear of U.S. complicity to restore Sunnis to 

power is shared by most of the Shi’a political class and many ordinary Shi’a. The 

insistence of the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI, formerly SCIRI) on forming a 

federated region south of Baghdad may be in part a precautionary measure against a 

U.S.-assisted restoration of the Sunnis. 

 

Damascus recently at reconciling the two groups. 
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2.2. The Sunni Position 

Sunni concerns are the flip side of the same coin. The Sunnis have an existential 

fear of Shi’a rule. They cannot accept the reality that they are no longer the ruling elite. 

Even those Sunnis who were not associated with the Saddam Hussein’s regime, or were 

opposed to it, either because they are Islamists or Communists or a non-Ba’th brand of 

Arab Nationalist, feel their loss of power as the elite stratum of society. Whereas the 

Shi’a accuse the Sunnis of hidden sectarianism, the Sunnis accuse the Shi’a of overt 

and avowed sectarianism and of using democracy and democratic tools to justify a 

sectarian agenda. 

While the Shi’a political position is straightforward and simple -majority rule 

through democratic tools-, the Sunnis position is ambiguous. Publicly, they reject the 

model of a state built on sectarian quotas. Yet in a self-contradictory tactic, some Sunnis 

maintain that they constitute at least half the population of Iraq, if not a majority. Others 

are resigned to the system of sectarian quotas, but want a larger share and role for their 

sect. So while Sunnis publicly decry the sectarian quota system and call for nonsectarian politics, what they often demand is a larger share of the sectarian pie. Despite 

their misgivings, some Sunnis now regard a sectarian quota system as their insurance 

policy for participating in the state. 

The loss of Baghdad is particularly painful to the Sunni elite. Irrespective of 

demographic numbers, the Sunnis feel that the capital was their domain—not Fallujah or 

Tikrit, which are provincial backwaters. The intellectual elite was concentrated in 

Baghdad and rested on an infrastructure provided by the power elite, and both of these 

elite classes were Sunni. It was an undeclared class system in which Sadr City 
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(established as Revolution City in the late 1950s and changed into Saddam City in the 

1970s), Shu’la, Sha’ab, all strongholds of the poor Shi’a population of the capital, were 

not really part of Baghdad but the outer slums of the capital. 

The Sunnis fear a Shi’a hegemony in which they are relegated to second-class 

status, dependent on what the Shi’a agree to grant them. With loss of power there will be 

a loss of resources, less access to jobs, education, and commerce. Sunnis complain that 

Sunni academics are being assassinated in greater numbers than Shi’a, that Sunni 

university professors are being thrown out of their jobs or denied promotion, and that 

Sunni students are kept out of the top colleges and university programs even if their 

academic performance exceeds that of Shi’a students. Accusations continue about the 

role of Shi’a militias in the police force and the inherent bias of the police against the 

Sunnis, the exclusion of former army officers from service, and the denial of financial 

resources to the Sunni governorates, even for projects that are approved by the 

government. In sum, the Sunnis see a pattern of persistent neglect of Sunnis interests 

and demands by what they characterize as a Shi’a government and a Shi’a power elite. 

The Sunnis want to be full and equal partners in government, not 20% junior 

partners. They argue that they are excluded from policy-making and not consulted on 

major decisions concerning security or foreign policy. They believe that the government 

of Prime Minister Maliki confines its decision-making to a narrow coterie and does not 

consult with the Sunnis in what is billed as a government of national unity. 

The Sunnis have to play a delicate game with a weak hand. They believe their 

rhetoric has to be harsh in order to extract concessions from the Shi’a, and that they 
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must cling to the armed groups as their fallback position. But if they overdo either 

posture they increase the suspicions of the dominant Shi’a. They must also show their 

constituency that they are able to deliver. Thus Tariq Al-Hashimi often comes across as 

a hard-liner because he is aware that his constituency is watching him and weighing his 

achievements on their behalf against the achievements of the insurgent groups. The 

Sunnis find themselves in a dangerous position: an over-reliance on the armed groups 

makes them hostage to these groups and reduces their credibility with the government 

(and with the U.S.); distancing themselves from the armed groups leaves them exposed 

and diminishes their credibility within the Sunni community, especially if they don’t 

succeed in delivering protection and benefits to the Sunni population. 

Because of their complex position, disagreements within the Sunni camp are 

clear. Senior members of IIP, which is the largest component of the parliamentary 

Tawafuq coalition, privately regard Adnan Duleimi (leader of Ahl Al-Iraq) and Khalaf AlUlayan (leader of the Front for National Dialogue), both partners in Tawafuq, as 

impediments to Sunni political progress because of their crude political approach and 

their willingness to act as a cover to insurgent groups. Uleyan has repeatedly 

threatened to resort to “armed resistance” if Sunni demands are not met. Duleimi 

publicly declares that he is sectarian. Outside Tawafuq, Harith Al-Thari, the head of the 

Muslim Scholars’ Association, is openly accused of aiding terrorist groups and is widely 

considered a cover for Al-Qaeda and extreme factions of the insurgency. To everyone’s 

relief (especially to the relief of the Sunnis), he has left Iraq and now lives in the Gulf. 

The rising profile of the Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar, Diyala and in the “triangle 

of death” south of Baghdad adds a new factor to the Sunni calculus, which is both useful 
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and threatening. The tribal elders portray themselves as homegrown champions of the 

populations in these governorates, delivering real benefits by saving the people from the 

tyranny of Al-Qaeda. They are playing an important role in combating Al-Qaeda and 

improving the security situation in their region, thereby forging close ties with the U.S. 

military and civilian presence in the country. This places the tribes in a position of both 

political and military strength in their own communities, and vis-a-vis the national 

government in Baghdad. They will be in a position to drive harder bargains with the 

Shi’a, and therefore force other Sunni leaders to be at least equally demanding. Either 

way, the invigorated tribes will increase the clout of the Sunnis as a whole, but may 

diminish the importance of the Sunnis in parliament and in government. In addition, the 

success of the Sunni tribal chiefs in combating Al-Qaeda may reduce the danger of 

international terrorism in Iraq, but will make bargaining over power-sharing and other 

divisive issues even tougher. 

Recognizing the necessity to engage ultimately in serious political dialogue, and 

the fact that existing efforts and frameworks have reached a stalemate, some Shi’a and 

Sunnis favor international sponsorship and mediation of a national reconciliation 

process. It should be noted, however, that the Shi’a are less inclined to involve outsiders 

in internal reconciliation efforts, and view any external involvement, whether by the U.S., 

regional countries, or the international community, as detrimental to their current position 

of power. 
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3. Political Situation 

3.1. Political Dynamics 

Four years after liberation, two elections, a constitution and a referendum later, 

the Iraqi political leaders and the U.S. have not succeeded in building state institutions 

that are viable or functional, or credible in the eyes of Iraqi citizens. 

The political situation is in a stalemate. The executive branch is unproductive, 

with 17 of 36 ministers either withdrawn from their ministries altogether or boycotting 

cabinet meetings (and one minister is jailed on a murder charge). Parliament rarely 

reaches a quorum, and when it does can only reach decisions about its internal affairs 

(salaries for MPs, pensions plans, recess, etc.). Services are virtually non-existent. Oil 

production is down to 1.9 m barrels per day, far below the pre-war high of 2.4 mbd. 

Political leaders across the board are acutely aware of the stagnation and the failure of 

state institutions to meet the needs of the country but seem mired in helplessness. They 

disagree about the causes of the paralysis and the poor performance, and there are no 

agreements on remedies. 

A number of factors contribute to the failure of the state to function as a state. 

Although there are many leaders of political groups and factions in Iraq, no strong 

national leaders with broad national appeal have emerged in the post-Saddam era. The 

major political groups and their leaders are identified with a limited ethnic, sectarian, 

religious, or even regional constituency. The fragmentation of politics is exemplified by 

vocabulary: the most used word in the Iraqi political lexicon is mukawwinat, i.e. 

constituent parts, as in “the constituent parts of Iraq society,” which has replaced the 
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expression “Iraqis.” The sectarian groups follow their own narrow interest and build 

positions for self-defense. Even the most senior leaders in Iraq acknowledged that 

groups are driven more by fear than by any national or global vision. One of the 

consequences of the narrow agendas is the failure of the cabinet to act cohesively in 

implementing a unified program for reconstruction and social and economic service 

delivery. 

The absence of unified and uncontested leadership in both the Shi’a and the 

Sunni camps (in contrast to the Kurdish bloc) hinders deal-making and agreement on 

important political issues. Combined with the absence of strong leadership, the disarray 

within the UIA and the Tawafuq parliamentary blocs makes internal parliamentary 

decisions, including voting on crucial laws, difficult. Many of these laws are political in 

nature, and require either a negotiated political deal, which is not feasible without strong 

and unified leadership, or a majority vote in parliament, which is not achievable on 

critical issues because of the divergent interests of groups even within the same bloc. 

The most hopeful indicator is the recognition by all politicians that successive 

Iraqi governments have failed to restore normalcy and stability and to deliver what the 

people need, although there is no agreement about the causes of failure. There is 

universal frustration and exasperation with the political stalemate and everyone 

recognizes that political solutions are needed, though there is no agreement on what 

these solutions might be. At the same time, intricate Byzantine political activity is 

palpable in Baghdad. According to many politicians, the negotiations, bargaining, dealmaking and deal-breaking are the most hectic since the formation of the government in 
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the spring of 2006. So, while political dramas continue to occupy the political elite, so far 

there is a great deal of motion but no obvious progress. 

3.2. Political Alliances 

Shifts and fractures in political blocs have affected both the Shi’a United Iraqi 

Alliance (UIA) and the Sunni Tawafuq. These fractures affect the larger political context 

in Baghdad as well as conditions in the regions. 

The Fadhila was the first party to withdraw from the UIA in March 2007. The 

Sadris, who withdrew their ministers from the cabinet in April and temporarily suspended 

their participation in Parliament in May 2007, are by no means bound by the UIA in or 

out of parliament. Within the Sadrist parliamentary ranks there are allegedly tensions 

between hawks and moderates. The Da’wa is divided into the Maliki camp, the Ja’fari 

camp, and the Tandhim Al-Iraq, none of whom feel particularly bound by a UIA 

discipline, but who, in the end, will stick with the UIA/ mainstream. Some of the 25 

independents within the UIA parliamentary bloc have formed the “Arab National Group,” 

a liberal-leaning group headed by Qassem Daoud. Thus only ISCI and the Da’wa (in its 

varying manifestations) remain committed to a combined UIA platform. 

Outside Baghdad and the outside the national parliament, the UIA is even more 

fractured. In Basra, Diwaniya, Nasriya, Samawa and Amara, political difference and 

rivalries have erupted in armed confrontations and deadly clashes among the groups 

that make up the UIA coalition, resulting in many dead on all sides, disruption of the 

provincial economies and services, and rampant corruption. It is an open question 

whether lack of cohesion at the top in Baghdad leads to warfare in the provinces, or 
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whether the competition for power and resource in the provinces is so powerful that it 

impedes political agreements at the top. Either way, it is no longer possible to see the 

UIA as the united Shi’a coalition so adamantly called for by Ayatollah Sistani prior to the 

elections of January 2005 and December 2005. 

A similar though less overt divergence of interests has occurred within the 

Tawafuq. The voting of the Tawafuq bloc in parliament has been more predictable and 

uniform than the voting of the UIA. IIP political positions aim at bolstering its status with 

the Sunni public (partly in anticipation of provincial elections) as well as within the 

political power structure of Iraq. Although IIP has its hawks and moderates, and often 

acts in ways that the Shi’a consider obstructionist, they remain the most open to 

dialogue and deal-making. After the debacle with Nasser Al-Janabi, the suicide bombing 

in parliament, the discovery of weapons caches in the houses of some Sunni leaders 

and the infiltration of their guards by would-be terrorists, pragmatists in IIP are beginning 

to view people like Adnan Dulaimi (Ahl Al-Iraq) and Khalaf Al-Ulayan as a burden whose 

only value is to provide voting strength in parliament and possibly strategic reach into the 

more dogmatic elements of the Sunni community. 

A new card in the Sunni political game is the emergence of the tribes in Anbar, 

and increasingly in Diyala and south of Baghdad, as a vital, and menacing, force. The 

tribes pose a medium term political threat to both the Sunni Tawafuq and the Shi’a. 

Because they are “delivering,” they gain credibility within their communities and with the 

Americans, thereby challenging Sunni politicians already on the scene. The question for 

the Tawafuq partners will be how to deal with the new Sunni players, and specifically 

how to take advantage of the increased Sunni national visibility and leverage provided 
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by the Anbar tribes in negotiation with the Shi’a and Kurds, without losing out to them 

politically. With the possibility of provincial elections in the next 9 months, and national 

elections in late 2009 if not sooner, the balance of power between the tribal forces in 

Anbar, Diyala, and Salaheddin on the one hand, and the Tawafuq group, especially the 

IIP on the other, will be a challenge to all Sunnis. The Sunni parties that are already 

within the political process are faced with the difficult choice of either becoming the allies 

of these tribes or their rivals, and a re-shuffling that addresses these new factors may 

mean the end of Tawafuq and the emergence of new Sunni alliances. 

The tribal forces present a different problem for the Shi’a parties. For a long time, 

the government of Prime Minister Maliki had no political strategy towards the Sunni tribal 

leaders who began to organize in Anbar as early as the fall of 2006. Although Maliki had 

met with some of them, there was no effort to bring them into the political fold. At 

present, Shi’a leaders fear the arming of these groups and see it as the creation of 

legitimized, U.S.-supported Sunni militias. In the short term, they may find ways of 

exploiting the tribes against their Sunni partners in government, such as Adnan AlDuleimi and Al-Uleyan, or even the IIP. Indeed, trial balloons have been floated 

occasionally to test the possibility of substituting the Anbar tribes for the Tawafuq in the 

present coalition government. In the medium term the empowerment of the tribes, 

through money, arms and local support, will strengthen the bargaining power of the 

Sunnis as a whole. In the long term, the Shi’a are fearful that the inclusion of resurgent 

Sunni tribal elements in the Iraqi armed forces will bring back Ba’this to the army and 

may set the stage for a Sunni military coup in the future. 
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Recognizing that the political process is at a standstill, and that this in turn 

paralyzes other functions of the state (legislation, services, economic improvement), the 

political groups have since May 2007 been exploring new political alliances to support 

the government, or alternatively to form a new government. The impetus for a new 

alliance was first provided by groups out of sympathy with the Maliki government, 

including the Fadhila, a few Sadris, the Iraqia group headed by Ayad Allawi, and the 

small (Sunni) Hewar parliamentary group of Salih Mutlaq. While some favored declaring 

a formal opposition and withdrawing from government en masse, others were reluctant. 

In the end, neither the IIP nor the Sadris, deemed essential components of an opposition 

front, were prepared to join, and the project was put on hold. 

Of greater significance, ISCI and the Kurds, whose strategic alliance antedates 

the war of 2003, have sought to build a broader alliance that can produce a majority in 

parliament and give the government bargaining strength. With the walk-out of Fadhila 

from the UIA, and the strained relations between ISCI and the Sadr movement, ISCI was 

left with only Da’wa as a reliable partner within the UIA, in addition to some of the 25 

independents within the bloc. The strategy therefore involved forming an “alliance of 

moderates” including ISCI, Da’wa, the KDP and PUK, and the IIP.3

 An agreement 

between the two Shi’a parties and the Kurdish parties was relatively straightforward, and 

indeed was reached in July 07. Persuading IIP to join the alliances has involved tough 

and sometimes acrimonious discussions. In frustration, and hoping to force the issue on 

the reluctant Sunnis, on August 16, 2007, the two Shi’a parties and the Kurdish parties 

formally signed an agreement for a “moderate alliance” without the IIP. 
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Although the four parties stress than any alliance that is formed will be open to all 

those who wish to support the government and the political process. Nevertheless, if an 

“alliance of moderates” is formed, it implies that those who are outside it are “extreme” in 

some sense, or at least are outside the fold. Other groups will be spurred to join, or may 

intensify their efforts to form a counter-alliance. 

3.3. State Institutions 

Nearly half the cabinet seats are either vacant or non-operational, with the 

withdrawal of Sadris, the resignation of the minister of Justice (Iraqia), the arrest of the 

minister of culture (Tawafuq), and the quasi-withdrawal of Tawafuq and Iraqia ministers. 

This shortfall does not seem to make a difference in a government that, even with a full 

house, was unable to deliver and had little control over the tools of governance. 

According to government officials, the Prime Minister, who is Commander in Chief, has 

only limited authority over the army. The police in the provinces are under the control of 

the party that controls each governorate, while the national police are only tenuously 

controlled by the Ministry of Interior. Reportedly, the Iraqi intelligence agency is not 

controlled by the government but by the U.S. The government has expressed an 

intention to create a parallel, state-owned intelligence apparatus, but this so far has been 

vetoed by the Americans and the Sunnis. In areas like Basra, Amara and Dhi Qar, where 

Coalition forces have either withdrawn or reduced their troop numbers, the government 

has not been able either to maintain law and order or contain internecine fighting. 

Oil is only tenuously in the hands of the government. The militias in the south 

control the oil sector and the spoils of oil. Money from oil, collected by militias at every 

 
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stage of the operation, from fees on overland transport to sale of smuggled crude to 

import of refined products, provides enormous revenues, and drives the wars of the 

militias in cities like Basra. Indeed, control over oil facilities and the oil sector in the south 

is a major cause of intra-Shi’a fighting in the governorate of Basra and the struggle over 

political control of the provincial council. 

The government’s record of service delivery has been poor. Fuel shortages 

create long gas lines that snake around city blocks, as well as a thriving black market in 

oil products, largely controlled by militias and mafias, though residents complain that 

even black market fuel is in short supply. The scarcity of fuel exacerbates the electricity 

shortage, since owners of private generators frequently cannot find fuel to operate them. 

The health sector suffers from deep shortage of supplies and equipment at a time of 

rising demand due to endemic violence. Doctors, who have been especially targeted by 

terrorists, are fleeing the country, creating a crisis that recently prompted the 

government to attempt a ban on travel by physicians. Services are only somewhat better 

in the southern provinces than they are in Baghdad and the central area, although 

accurate comparative data on fuel availability and the health sector are hard to obtain. 

The most promising new development, designed to end the deadlock of the 

executive branch, is the decision in mid-July to create a “quartet rule,” composed of the 

PM and a three-man presidential council: Jalal Talabani, Adel Abdel Mehdi, and Tariq alHashimi. This would achieve a number of objectives. Members of the presidential 

council believed that Prime Minister Maliki was taking decisions without sufficient 

consultation with the partners in the national coalition. The quartet format would lead to 

more consultation in decision-making and ensure Shi’a, Kurdish and Sunni input and 
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endorsement. Additionally, Hashimi and the Sunnis as a whole complain that strategic 

and security decisions were taken by “the government” without consulting the Sunnis 

and that the Sunnis had little say in governance. The “quartet rule” would provide 

Hashimi, on behalf of the Tawafuq, with equal input. Ideally, the quartet will overcome 

the impediment of a fractured cabinet by providing the consensus of the major political 

blocs. 

Parliament has also been mired in problems. The top political leaders rarely 

attend meetings and the legislative process is often impeded by the absence of a 

quorum. Factional bickering is intense, and the crisis precipitated by the removal of 

Mashhadani as speaker of parliament, and his subsequent re-instatement, is 

symptomatic of the distrust that exists between the Shi’a and Sunni factions. In addition 

to these problems, parliament in reality has little power because many of the legislative 

issues it faces have political dimensions that require political responses. Parliament can 

only implement and carry through political agreements and decisions taken by leaders 

who are often detached from the parliamentary process. 

The most important pieces of legislation that require parliament’s attention are 

political in nature, including the hydrocarbon law, the revenue-sharing law, the law on 

de-Ba’thification, and the law regulating the functions of the provincial councils. These 

laws are not a matter of voting in parliament, but rather require deal-making, consensus 

of the major political actors, and approval by the top leaders. Indeed, lack of a quorum 

has been at times used deliberately to mask lack of agreement on sensitive legislation. 
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3.4. The Southern Governates 

The withdrawal of Coalition troops from southern governorates has led to 

intensified confrontations between rival militias, especially Badr, the military arm of ISCI 

and Jaish Al-Mahdi, the military wing of the Sadr Movement. Weak government 

institutions and law enforcement capability has also given rise to new militias and cults, 

such as the “Sarkhis” and “Jund Assamaa,” quasi-mystical armed groups that operate on 

the periphery of the political order. Ordinary residents of the south who wish to carry on 

with quiet lives must negotiate their way through dangerous political cross-currents. 

Elections for provincial councils in the south were held in January 2005, and 

governors were elected by the new provincial councils. At the time, the Sadr Movement 

formally boycotted the elections, although individual Sadris did run. Predictably, 

elections did not spell an end to political problems. In Basra, the governor from the 

Fadhila party is bitterly opposed by ISCI and Da’wa council members, who have tried 

hard to remove him from office. The economic stakes are high in Basra, and the city is 

reportedly over-run by militias whose primary concern is control of the city’s oil economy. 

According to residents, political assassinations of rivals and revenge killings of Ba’this 

are rampant and are under-reported by the local authorities and by the national 

government. The small Sunni community in the governorate has come under severe 

pressure and Sunni mosques have been systematically burned down. Residents claim 

that the political, military and economic influence of Iran in Basra is higher than 

anywhere else in the south. 

In Diwaniya, Nasriya, and Simawa, ISCI controls the provincial councils but, as 

asserted by a resident of Diwaniya, the Mehdi Army controls the streets. The police in 
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these governorates belong to Badr/ISCI, but they are constantly challenged by the 

Mahdi Army and often threatened in their own homes. Deadly clashes between the 

Mahdi army and the ISCI-affiliated police in these governorates have spiked, 

necessitating intervention by the Iraqi army. 

The Karbela provincial council is split among Da’wa, ISCI, Sadris, and the Islamic 

Action Party. The governorate thus maintains a precarious political balance, but because 

it shares a border with Anbar and is adjacent to the “triangle of death” area south west of 

Baghdad, the city of Karbela has been the target of suicide bomber and car explosions. 

As a result, security at the entry points to the city and within the city is very tight. Maysan 

(Amara) is the only southern governorate that is directly controlled by Sadris and the 

Mehdi Army, though clashes with the local police and Iraq army are frequent. In Amara, 

the Sadris are said to control both the legal and the illicit traffic of goods across the entry 

points from Iran. 

Only Najaf appears to be quiet and prospering. ISCI is in full control of the city, 

and despite the recent assassination of an aide to Sistani, there is no serious challenge 

to ISCI’s authority at present. As a result of the stability, Najaf’s economy is in better 

shape than other governorates in the south. In addition to control of governorate 

institutions, Ammar Al-Hakim, the son of Abdel Aziz Al-Hakim the leader of ISCI, 

founded and presides over a huge and expanding charitable organization called 

“Shaheed Al-Mihrab,” that has so far established four private schools and a string of 

summer schools, helps orphans throughout the south, deliveries assistance to displaced 

families, runs women’s organizations and women’s education programs, and provides 

countless other social services that neither the state nor the governorate are providing. 
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Some residents worry that the present calm will not endure because the Sadris will not 

cede Najaf so easily and will at some point contest ISCI’s control. 

There is widespread belief that if elections for provincial councils were held in the 

southern governorates soon, the Sadris would make considerable gains. Because the 

Sadr Movement boycotted the elections of January 2005, the present provincial councils 

do not reflect the true strength of the Movement. Additionally, there is widespread belief 

that the weak performance of the national government and the provincial governments in 

the intervening two and a half year has increased support for the Movement. Most 

residents agree that provincial elections will intensify the fighting among the Shi’a militias 

in the south. As an interesting side-light, many residents of the south express a growing 

dissatisfaction with religious parties as a whole, who, they feel, have failed to respond to 

the needs of citizens, tolerated corruption, and engaged in violent competition. 

4. Federation and Regional Autonomies 

According to its constitution, Iraq is currently a federated country composed of 

two regions: Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq. The constitution grants the governorates the 

right to form additional federated regions. In March 2007, a law presented by ISCI, 

regulating the formation of regions, was passed by a slim majority in parliament with 

minimum debate. The law does not address the crucial issues of the relationship 

between the regional government to the national government, or the competencies and 

authority of the regional government vis a vis the national government. It is assumed that 

these issues are addressed in the constitution. In fact, they are the subject of intense 

debate in Iraq, and constitute some of the thorniest questions tackled by the 

Constitutional Review Committee. 
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4.1. Federalism in the South 

ISCI has led the calls for extending federalism to other parts of Iraq, but its 

enthusiasm is not shared by other Shi’a groups. The Sadr Movement is opposed to 

federalism as a matter of principle, only grudgingly accepting Kurdish federalism; Fadhila 

and other Shi’a (both religious and secular) are opposed to the specific formula 

proposed by ISCI, and some have suggested alternative ideas for federalism or 

decentralization. The position of the Da’wa party is more ambiguous, as they are now 

inclined to view ISCI as a senior partner and go along with the ISCI platform. 

ISCI is actively seeking the creation of a single federated state covering the 

entire region south of Baghdad, presumably with Najaf as its capital—what some 

detractors call “Shi’istan.” Because a referendum is required to form a federation, 

considerable financial resources are being expended in promoting the concept among 

Iraqis in the south at every social level and among numerous social groups: for example, 

ISCI regularly holds women’s meetings with the purpose of “educating” women about the 

advantages of a southern federation. On the assumption that this southern superfederation can be achieved, and will be controlled by ISCI, ISCI, like the Kurds, will want 

to see maximum authority given to the federated regions. 

However, the situation in southern Iraq is politically quite different from the 

situation in Kurdistan, where the two major parties, at times violent rivals, have arrived at 

a power-sharing agreement that allows a unification of the region. Far from a powersharing agreement, ISCI and the Sadr movement are locked in a bloody power struggle 

in the south. As described, Basra, Diwaniya, Nasriya, Samawa, and other cities have 
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witnessed armed conflict, assassinations, and bombings that are attributable to the 

rivalry between the two factions. 

Provincial elections in the south are likely to precipitate more violence in the 

south and lead to a stronger showing by the Sadr Movement. Other, smaller groups may 

also merge in the competition. Under the circumstances, and if its control of the councils 

is less certain, ISCI enthusiasm for a greater Shi’a federated region may wane and it 

may look to other forms of federation that are more easily managed. 

In addition, the tribes of southern Iraq are at best divided over the idea of a grand 

southern federation. Although ISCI has wooed tribes in the south-central area, their 

endorsement is not certain, and the tribes of the deep south have agitated against the 

idea. In a recent and striking challenge to the grand southern federation, tribal leaders 

from Basra, Nasriya, Simawa, Diwaniya and Amara, met on August 2007 and declared 

the establishment of a single “self-governing” (but not federated) region for their five 

governorates. The declaration explicitly rejected federalism, but was otherwise vague 

about the relationship of this self-governing region and the national government. 

Traditionally, Iraq south of Baghdad has been organized around two distinct 

cultural and economic regions. The mid-Euphrates, centered around Najaf and including 

Karbela and Hilla, is a predominantly urban region organized around the Shi’a holy sites, 

in which the population is predominantly of the clerical and merchant classes. Its 

economy is heavily dependent on pilgrimage from the entire Muslim world to the holy 

shrines, and on the revenue generated by the presence of senior Shi’a marji and the 

hawza, the seminaries that attract students from around the Muslim world. Najaf and 
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Karbela have always had a more cosmopolitan/Muslim complexion than most cities in 

Iraq. 

The second region is the deepsouth, encompassing Basra, Amara, Nasriya, 

which is tribal and clustered around the historic marshes. Semawa and Diwaniya, with 

their strong tribal presence, share more characteristics with this region than with the midEuphrates. The economy is heavily dependent on agriculture, animal husbandry and 

fisheries. The local culture tends to be less cosmopolitan and less oriented towards 

religion than that prevailing in the shrine cities, tribal folklore is prominent and colorful, 

and the population continues to be attuned to Arab tribal traditions. 

In sum, intense political rivalries that include armed conflict, historical variables, 

and cultural and economic differences will make the creation of a single super federation 

in the south a considerable challenge. 

4.2. Federalism in the West? 

The Sunnis have accepted the principle of federalism for the Kurds, but find it 

hard to reconcile themselves to an overall federated Iraq. At the same time, several 

concerns have driven the Sunnis to think about the merits of self-governance and 

decentralization. A primary issue is the Iraqi security forces, encompassing the national 

police and the army, both of which are heavily Shi’a. Efforts by the central government to 

introduce Iraqi army units in Anbar province have been unsuccessful because of the 

distrust between the population and Shi’a troops. A locally recruited and managed police 

force, answering to the provincial government, is a preferable solution, although its 

relationship to the Interior Ministry is ambiguous (as indeed is the relationship of locally 
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raised police forces in other governorates, notably in the south). Allocation of revenue is 

another item of concern for the Sunnis. Sunnis complain that reliance on national 

ministries, which are often dominated by Shi’a parties, to designate projects and allocate 

and disburse funds has so far been an unproductive experience, and that they need to 

control their own finances. The undercurrent of Sunni thinking is that if Iraq’s national 

government is going to be based on sectarian quotas, therefore giving the Sunnis 

minority status, then Sunnis need autonomy over certain issues in areas in which they 

are a majority. At present, the precarious security situation and fluctuating balance of 

political forces in the majority Sunni governorates, as well as the different conditions in 

Shi’a governorates, make a clear policy on this issue difficult to achieve. 

5. Conclusions 

By the end of July, the new American military strategies had helped in reducing 

sectarian killing in Baghdad, judging by the slightly higher sense of safety reported by 

residents in some neighborhoods. In addition, operations against terrorists and 

insurgents have reduced the geographic areas which are hospitable to terrorists, and in 

which they can organize, recruit, train, plan and execute. Part of this success can be 

attributed to the increasing competence of the Iraqi armed forces. 

The sustainability and expansion of these –even modest—successes is crucial. The 

need for sustainability is well understood in Iraq. No Iraqi politician or citizen interviewed 

in July expressed a wish to see U.S. troops withdrawn or seriously redeployed in the 

near future. Withdrawal is likely to lead to several outcomes: 
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- Escalation of sectarian conflict in mixed regions of Iraq. Mehdi Army forces have 

already moved into Diyala to protect the Shi’a in this mixed province, raising the 

potential for extensive sectarian fighting if there is a security vacuum 

- Further proliferation of Shi’a militias and escalation of fighting between rival Shi’a 

faction not only in the south but eventually in Baghdad as well 

- Loss of gains made by the Iraqi forces and a decline in their competence and 

effectiveness 

- Resurgence of terrorist presence in Sunni areas 

On the political level, it is clear that national dialogue and achievement of national 

goals have not kept pace with the military thrust. Iraqi political groups espouse agendas 

that are limited to the interests of their political parties, or, at best, their sect or ethnicity. 

Iraq lacks political leaders who act on national interests and are credible to the Iraqi 

public as national leaders. As long as Iraqi political structures are based on narrow 

interests and the distribution of parliamentary seats, state offices, revenue, and other 

state largesse follows a sectarian quota system, all negotiations will be a zero sum 

game. 

Iraqi leaders need to increase the pace, candor, and seriousness of political 

negotiations and accept sometimes unpalatable compromises. In an environment of 

distrust and breakdown of communication, it is unlikely that they can undertake this 

painful process on their own in any time frame that responds to the security needs of the 

country. Given the appalling humanitarian conditions in Iraq, the breakdown of 

government at all levels, and the urgency of the security requirements, international 
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mediation is needed to assist Iraqis in undertaking focused, sustained, and utterly candid 

negotiations to arrive at specific solutions, with a view to building a national compact. 

Further, it is essential for Iraq’s political leaders to move away from the model of 

identity politics and “divvying up the spoils,” and to develop national politics based on 

national interests, where democracy is not simply demographics, and state institutions 

are based on competence and efficiency. Such a change of direction will not happen 

quickly or spontaneously, but measures have to be established within state institutions, 

and particularly within the army and police forces, to encourage this change. An 

important step towards redirecting Iraq away from sectarianism towards national politics 

lies in changing the electoral law by abandoning the closed list system and adopting 

single candidate/single district system. 

Such a redirection of Iraqi politics is not impossible given the breakdown of the 

electoral coalitions that entered the elections in January and again in December 2005. 

These monolithic lists have fractured to a degree where new alliances are now possible, 

and at lease some of these alliances can be cross-sectarian and cross-ethnic. The 

breakdown of the UIA and the incipient disagreements within the Tawafuq open new 

opportunities for re-alignment. In this regard, the rise of Sunni tribes of Anbar and 

elsewhere can be a catalyst for such new alliances. These newly-energized groups 

must be integrated into the political process and become part of an overall national 

strategy, and may indeed create a balance of forces that pushes the political process 

forward. 
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Along with the need to change the political model, it is important to ensure that 

the national government has the ability to govern within the provisions of the constitution. 

At present, the incapacity of the national government is not compensated for by strong 

provincial governments. Quite the opposite. The weakness of the national government in 

Baghdad is mirrored in equal, if not deeper, weakness, in the provinces. It is a fallacy to 

suppose that it is possible to strengthen the provincial governments and thereby render 

the government in Baghdad “irrelevant” or “superfluous.” Outside Kurdistan, Iraqis still 

look to the national government to provide basic services and the systems for 

implementation. The government in Baghdad cannot do so adequately, and the 

provinces cannot cope with the enormous demands. 
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

Rend al-Rahim Francke is a Senior Fellow in the Institute’s Jennings Randolph Program 

for International Peace. A native of Iraq, Ms. Francke is Executive Director (and one of 

the principal co-founders) of the Iraq Foundation. From November 2003 to December 

2004, she served as Iraq’s Representative to the United States and the Iraqi Chief of 

Mission. Francke has represented the Foundation with government and international 

institutions worldwide. She has contributed to many reports and books on Iraq, and 

authored policy papers and reports for the Iraq Foundation. Under her leadership, the 

Foundation has built partnerships and cooperative relations with several nongovernmental and research institutions. 

Francke has also testified about Iraq before the U.S. Congress, most recently before the 

Senate in January 2007. She is the co-author of The Arab Shi’a: Forgotten Muslims, 

published in 1999 by St. Martin’s Press. She is a frequent commentator on Iraqi affairs in 

the U.S. media and has published many op-ed pieces in prominent newspapers. She 

holds degrees from Cambridge University and the University of the Sorbonne. 
ABOUT THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and 

increase peacebuilding capacity and tools. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and 

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