[Cite as State v. Hackett, 2014-Ohio-2739.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

v. : No. 14AP-48 

 (C.P.C. No. 11CR-03-1392) 

Victor Hackett, : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on June 24, 2014 

 

Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael P. Walton, 

for appellee. 

Todd W. Barstow, for appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

TYACK, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Victor Hackett, is appealing from his conviction on a 

single count of possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11 following a bench trial. He 

assigns a single error for our consideration: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT 

OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE SECTION TEN OF 

THE OHIO CONSTITUTION BY FINDING HIM GUILTY OF 

POSSESSION OF DRUGS AS THAT VERDICT WAS NOT 

SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS ALSO 

AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶ 2} R.C. 2925.11(A) defines possession of drugs as follows: 
No. 14AP-48 2 

(A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a 

controlled substance or a controlled substance analog. 

{¶ 3} Columbus Division of Police officers were summoned to a bar on the south 

side of Columbus upon a report of a fight in progress. Upon arrival, they were told that 

Hackett and the bar manager had an altercation. The officers reviewed surveillance video 

and decided that Hackett should be charged with assault. 

{¶ 4} During the arrest process, the officers found a packet of white powder in 

Hackett's pants pocket. Field testing indicated that the packet contained cocaine. The 

officers then decided to add a charge of possession of drugs. 

{¶ 5} Hackett, who had been cooperative up to that time, became combative. This 

led to his being physically subdued by the officers. Hackett then passed out. This, in turn, 

led to his receiving medical attention before he was transported to jail. 

{¶ 6} "Possess" is defined in R.C. 2925.01(K) as follows: 

"Possess" or "possession" means having control over a thing 

or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere 

access to the thing or substance through ownership or 

occupation of the premises upon which the thing or 

substance is found. 

{¶ 7} "Knowingly" is defined in R.C. 2901.22(B) as follows: 

(B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when 

he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain 

result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has 

knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such 

circumstances probably exist. 

{¶ 8} There is no serious debate that Hackett had a small packet of cocaine in his 

pants pocket. For purposes of this case, the issues apparently are whether or not Hackett 

was aware that he had a small packet of white powder in his pants pocket and that the 

packet contained cocaine. Under the definition of "knowingly" he had only to be aware 

such circumstances probably existed.

{¶ 9} Sufficiency of the evidence is the legal standard applied to determine 

whether the case should have gone to the jury. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

386 (1997). In other words, sufficiency tests the adequacy of the evidence and asks 
No. 14AP-48 3 

whether the evidence introduced at trial is legally sufficient as a matter of law to support a 

verdict. Id. "The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 

259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 

(1979). The verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable 

minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier of fact. Jenks at 273. If the 

court determines that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law, a judgment of 

acquittal must be entered for the defendant. See Thompkins at 387. 

{¶ 10} Even though supported by sufficient evidence, a conviction may still be 

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thompkins at 387. In so 

doing, the court of appeals, sits as a " 'thirteenth juror' " and, after " 'reviewing the entire 

record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of 

witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly 

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered.' " Id. (quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 

(1st Dist.1983)); see also Columbus v. Henry, 105 Ohio App.3d 545, 547-48 (10th 

Dist.1995). Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence 

should be reserved for only the most " 'exceptional case in which the evidence weighs 

heavily against the conviction.' " Thompkins at 387. 

{¶ 11} As this court has previously stated, "[w]hile the jury may take note of the 

inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly, see [State v.] DeHass [10 Ohio 

St.2d 230 (1967)], such inconsistencies do not render defendant's conviction against the 

manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence." State v. Nivens, 10th Dist. No. 95APA09-

1236 (May 28, 1996). It was within the province of the jury to make the credibility 

decisions in this case. See State v. Lakes 120 Ohio App. 213, 217 (4th Dist.1964), ("It is 

the province of the jury to determine where the truth probably lies from conflicting 

statements, not only of different witnesses but by the same witness.") 

{¶ 12} See State v. Harris, 73 Ohio App.3d 57, 63 (10th Dist.1991), (even though 

there was reason to doubt the credibility of the prosecution's chief witness, he was not so 

unbelievable as to render verdict against the manifest weight). 
No. 14AP-48 4 

{¶ 13} Given the standard we are to apply at this stage of the proceedings, we 

cannot and do not disagree with findings of guilty entered by the trial court judge. It 

seems most unlikely that Hackett did not know he had the packet in his pants pocket and 

seems unlikely Hackett did not know the packet he had control over contained cocaine. 

{¶ 14} The sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

SADLER, P.J., and O'GRADY, J., concur.