DYE v ESURANCE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 

Docket No. 155784. Argued October 9, 2018 (Calendar No. 1). Decided July 11, 2019. 

 Matthew Dye brought an action in the Washtenaw Circuit Court against Esurance 

Property and Casualty Insurance Company and GEICO Indemnity Company, seeking personal 

protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., for injuries he 

sustained in a motor vehicle accident while driving a vehicle he had recently purchased. At 

plaintiff’s request, plaintiff’s father had registered the vehicle in plaintiff’s name at the Secretary 

of State’s office and obtained a no-fault insurance policy from Esurance. The declarations page 

of the policy identified only plaintiff’s father as the named insured. At the time of the accident, 

plaintiff was living with his wife, who owned a vehicle that was insured by GEICO. After 

Esurance and GEICO refused to cover plaintiff’s claim, plaintiff filed a breach-of-contract claim 

against both insurers along with a declaratory action, alleging that either Esurance or GEICO 

was obligated to pay his no-fault PIP benefits and requesting that the trial court determine the 

parties’ respective rights and duties. Eventually, Esurance paid plaintiff more than $388,000 in 

PIP benefits, but it continued to maintain that GEICO was the responsible insurer. GEICO 

acknowledged that it was the primary insurer and began settlement negotiations with plaintiff 

and Esurance. Then, on November 13, 2014, the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Barnes v Farmers 

Ins Exch, 308 Mich App 1 (2014), was published. Barnes held that under MCL 500.3113(b), 

when none of the owners of a vehicle maintains the requisite coverage, no owner may recover 

PIP benefits. After Barnes was published, GEICO reevaluated its legal position and ceased

settlement discussions. Esurance filed a cross-claim against GEICO, arguing that GEICO had 

breached a settlement agreement. GEICO moved for summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim, 

arguing that plaintiff was not entitled to PIP benefits in light of Barnes. Plaintiff also moved for 

summary disposition, arguing that Barnes was wrongly decided and, regardless, that his father 

was an owner and registrant for purposes of the no-fault act. The trial court, Timothy C. 

Connors, J., granted Esurance summary disposition on its cross-claim, ruling that GEICO and 

Esurance had entered into a valid settlement agreement and that GEICO had priority over 

plaintiff’s claim. The court denied GEICO’s motion for summary disposition and granted 

plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, thus determining that GEICO was required to 

provide no-fault benefits to plaintiff. The court granted plaintiff’s motion against GEICO with 

regard to no-fault coverage and priority, stating that it did not need to address Barnes because 

plaintiff’s father was an owner and registrant of the vehicle and ruling that the only issue 

remaining between plaintiff and GEICO was the amount of damages. GEICO filed an 

interlocutory application for leave to appeal, which the Court of Appeals granted. In an 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan

Syllabus Chief Justice: 

Bridget M. McCormack 

Chief Justice Pro Tem: 

David F. Viviano 

Justices: 

Stephen J. Markman 

Brian K. Zahra 

Richard H. Bernstein 

Elizabeth T. Clement 

Megan K. Cavanagh 

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

Reporter of Decisions: 

Kathryn L. Loomis 
unpublished per curiam opinion issued April 4, 2017 (Docket No. 330308), the Court of Appeals, 

BECKERING, P.J., and BORRELLO, J. (O’CONNELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 

held that the trial court had erred by granting summary disposition to Esurance because the 

parties had not yet reached a meeting of the minds on all the essential terms of the settlement 

agreement. The majority agreed with Barnes’s interpretation of MCL 500.3101(1), and it held 

that the trial court had erred as a matter of law by finding that plaintiff’s father was a “registrant” 

of the vehicle for purposes of MCL 500.3101(1). However, the majority held that there 

remained genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s father was an “owner” of the 

vehicle, and it therefore remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Esurance 

applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and both plaintiff and GEICO filed crossappeals. The Supreme Court granted plaintiff’s cross-application for leave to appeal and denied 

Esurance’s application and GEICO’s cross-application. 501 Mich 944 (2017).1

 In an opinion by Justice ZAHRA, joined by Chief Justice MCCORMACK and Justices 

MARKMAN, VIVIANO, and BERNSTEIN, the Supreme Court held: 

 An owner or registrant of a motor vehicle is not required to personally purchase no-fault 

insurance for his or her vehicle in order to avoid the statutory bar to PIP benefits. MCL 

500.3101(1) does not prescribe any particular manner by which no-fault insurance must be 

maintained, and it contains no requirement that the insurance be purchased or obtained by a 

vehicle’s owner or registrant. Barnes and other cases suggesting to the contrary were overruled 

to the extent that they were inconsistent with this holding. The Court of Appeals judgment was 

reversed in part. The part of the Court of Appeals judgment regarding the purported settlement 

agreement between Esurance and GEICO was left undisturbed. 

 1. Under the no-fault act, an insurer is liable to pay PIP benefits to any Michigan resident 

for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a 

motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. These statutory benefits arise regardless of whether an injured 

person has obtained a no-fault insurance policy. Therefore, determining whether no-fault 

benefits are available to an injured person does not depend on who purchased, obtained, or 

otherwise procured no-fault insurance. The only relevant inquiry is whether the injured person 

can establish an accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or 

use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. This relatively low threshold for statutory no-fault 

coverage was enacted to provide victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, and 

prompt reparation for certain economic losses. Given that these benefits would be available to 

all Michigan residents, the Legislature sought to achieve this purpose by enacting the system of 

compulsory insurance set forth in MCL 500.3101(1). To ensure compliance with MCL 

500.3101(1), the Legislature excluded persons from receiving PIP benefits under various 

circumstances listed in MCL 500.3113, including if the person was the owner or registrant of a 

motor vehicle or motorcycle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required 

by MCL 500.3101 was not in effect. 

 

1 The Legislature recently made substantial amendments to the no-fault act. See 2019 PAs 21 

and 22. The opinions do not address those amendments, and all references in the opinions and 

this syllabus are to the preamendment version of the act. 
 2. MCL 500.3101(1) provides that “[t]he owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required 

to be registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal 

protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance.” MCL 

500.3101(1) requires only that the owner or registrant “maintain” no-fault insurance, which 

means to keep in an existing state. MCL 500.3101(1) does not prescribe any particular manner 

by which a registrant or owner must keep no-fault insurance in an existing state, and MCL 

500.3101(4) expressly contemplates that the security required by MCL 500.3101(1) may be 

provided by any other method approved by the Secretary of State as affording security equivalent 

to that afforded by a policy of insurance. If MCL 500.3101(1) were to be interpreted so that only 

a registrant or owner could obtain insurance on a vehicle, it would limit the Secretary of State’s 

power under MCL 500.3101(4) to allow security by any other method, and it would effectively 

read a requirement into MCL 500.3101(1) that the Legislature did not manifest through the 

words of MCL 500.3101(1) itself. When read together, MCL 500.3101(1) and MCL 

500.3113(b) did not preclude plaintiff from receiving PIP benefits. Iqbal v Bristol West Ins 

Group, 278 Mich App 31 (2008), did not hold that at least one owner must obtain no-fault 

insurance; instead, it held that MCL 500.3113(b) refers to the required security or insurance 

under MCL 500.3101 only as it relates to the vehicle and therefore a plaintiff may be entitled to 

PIP benefits if the vehicle was insured, regardless of whether that plaintiff was the owner of the 

vehicle. Thus, the factual distinctions between Barnes and Iqbal did not place Barnes outside 

the ambit of Iqbal’s holding. 

 3. MCL 500.3113(b) provides that a person is not entitled to PIP benefits if at the time of 

the accident “[t]he person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle involved 

in the accident with respect to which the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in 

effect.” The term “which” in this context represents one of two possible antecedents: the first is 

a person, and the last is a vehicle. The last-antecedent rule provides that a modifying or 

restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding 

clause or last antecedent unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation, and 

nothing in MCL 500.3113(b) requires a different result. Moreover, the usage notes for the 

definition of “which” state that the term regularly refers to inanimate objects and never to 

individual persons. Accordingly, the phrase “with respect to which the security required by 

section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect” refers to the vehicle, not the person. Because the 

conclusion in Barnes that “when none of the owners maintains the requisite coverage, no owner 

may recover PIP benefits” was contrary to the plain language of the no-fault act, Barnes was 

overruled. 

 Reversed in part and remanded to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for further proceedings. 

 Justice CLEMENT, dissenting, would have held that the no-fault act disqualifies an owner 

from PIP benefits if the owner is injured in his or her own vehicle and no owner has maintained 

security. While she agreed with the majority that MCL 500.3113(b) contemplates a relationship 

between “security” and “vehicle,” she disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that security 

“with respect to” a vehicle is the same as insurance “for” or “on” that vehicle, given that nothing 

in the no-fault act requires a vehicle to be insured. Rather, she concluded that MCL 500.3113(b) 

requires a certain person—namely, the vehicle’s owner or registrant—to maintain security 

against liability as provided in MCL 500.3101, and the phrase “with respect to” connects the 
security to the vehicle by way of the person. Justice CLEMENT stated that the critical nexus 

among owner, security, and vehicle was of a whole with the rest of the no-fault act, including the 

priority schemes set out in MCL 500.3114 and MCL 500.3115, and that the purpose of the nofault act would fall apart if an owner named in no policy was nonetheless understood to have 

maintained security through a nonowner third party’s policy. Accordingly, she concluded that 

plaintiff’s statutory duty to maintain security was not met merely by asking his father to get nofault insurance. Because the record did not reveal whether plaintiff’s father was an owner of 

plaintiff’s car, she would have remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether plaintiff 

was disqualified from PIP benefits. 

 Justice CAVANAGH did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court 

considered it before she assumed office. 

©2019 State of Michigan 
 FILED July 11, 2019 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

MATTHEW DYE, by his Guardian, 

SIPORIN & ASSOCIATES, INC., 

 Plaintiff-Appellee/CrossAppellant, 

v No. 155784 

ESURANCE PROPERTY & CASUALTY 

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Defendant/CrossPlaintiff/Appellant/CrossAppellee, 

and 

GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, 

Defendant/CrossDefendant/Appellee/CrossAppellant, 

and 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan

OPINION Chief Justice: 

Bridget M. McCormack 

Chief Justice Pro Tem: 

David F. Viviano 

Justices: 

Stephen J. Markman 

Brian K. Zahra 

Richard H. Bernstein 

Elizabeth T. Clement 

Megan K. Cavanagh
 2 

PRIORITY HEALTH, 

Defendant/CrossPlaintiff/Appellee, 

and 

BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF 

MICHIGAN, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except CAVANAGH, J.) 

ZAHRA, J. 

This case presents the significant question of whether an owner or registrant of a 

motor vehicle involved in an accident is excluded from receiving statutory no-fault 

insurance benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., when someone other than 

an owner or registrant purchased no-fault insurance for that vehicle.1

 Relying on Barnes v 

Farmers Ins Exch,

2

 the Court of Appeals concluded that “[a]t least one owner or registrant 

must have the insurance required by MCL 500.3101(1), and ‘when none of the owners 

maintains the requisite coverage, no owner may recover [personal injury protection (PIP)] 

 

1

 The Legislature recently made substantial amendments to the no-fault act. 2019 PAs 21 

and 22. This opinion does not address those amendments and quotes the preamendment 

version of the act. 

2 Barnes v Farmers Ins Exch, 308 Mich App 1; 862 NW2d 681 (2014). 
 3 

benefits.’ ”3

 The insured sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we granted the 

application in part to consider this question.4

We conclude that an owner or registrant of a motor vehicle is not required to 

personally purchase no-fault insurance for his or her vehicle in order to avoid the statutory 

bar to PIP benefits. Rather, MCL 500.3101(1) only requires that the owner or registrant 

“maintain” no-fault insurance, and the term “maintain,” as commonly understood, means 

to keep in an existing state. Because MCL 500.3101(1) does not prescribe any particular 

manner by which no-fault insurance must be maintained, we will not read into the statute 

a requirement that the insurance be purchased or obtained by a vehicle’s owner or 

registrant. Further, the grammatical composition of the MCL 500.3113(b) benefits 

exclusion, including the use of the term “which” within that provision, signifies that the 

exclusion does not apply if the security required by MCL 500.3101(1) was “in effect” at 

the time of the accident.5

 Though defendant maintains that the term “which” in this 

provision refers to the owner or operator of the motor vehicle, the usage of “which” at the 

time the no-fault act was enacted, as well as currently, reflects that this term is not properly 

used to refer to individual persons. 

 

3 Dye v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of 

Appeals, issued April 4, 2017 (Docket No. 330308), p 6, quoting Barnes, 308 Mich App 

at 8-9. 

4 Dye v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co, 501 Mich 944 (2017). 

5

 MCL 500.3113(b) states that “[a] person is not entitled to be paid personal protection 

insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident . . . [t]he person 

was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle . . . involved in the accident with respect to 

which the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect.” 
 4 

We therefore hold that an owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in an 

accident is not excluded from receiving no-fault benefits when someone other than that 

owner or registrant purchased no-fault insurance for that vehicle because the owner or 

registrant of the vehicle may “maintain” the insurance coverage required under the no-fault 

act even if he or she did not purchase the insurance. The Court of Appeals’ decision in 

Barnes and other caselaw suggesting to the contrary are overruled to the extent that they 

are inconsistent with our holding.6

 We reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals 

and remand this case to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for further proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion. 

 

6

 This Court stated in Citizens Ins Co of America v Federated Mut Ins Co, 448 Mich 225, 

228; 531 NW2d 138 (1995), that “Michigan’s no-fault act requires the owner or registrant

of a motor vehicle to purchase an automobile insurance policy . . . .” The Court apparently 

used the word “purchase” because owners commonly are the persons who maintain 

insurance on their vehicles, but in so using the word “purchase” the Court strayed from the 

actual text of the no-fault act. The use of the word “purchase” instead of the word 

“maintain” was inconsequential to the analysis in Citizens, because the word “maintain” 

had no particular significance to the issue addressed in that case. The question decided in 

Citizens was whether an insurance policy could shift residual liability insurance from the 

owner or registrant of a motor vehicle to the driver of the vehicle. Citizens held that the 

policy was essentially unenforceable in this respect because “the no-fault act 

unambiguously requires that a policy of automobile insurance, sold to a vehicle owner 

pursuant to the act, must provide coverage for residual liability arising from use of the 

vehicle so insured.” Id. at 230. Unlike this case, there was no dispute in Citizens about 

whether insurance was properly maintained on the vehicles at issue. Accordingly, we 

clarify that Citizens should not be read to suggest that only the owner or registrant of a 

motor vehicle may “maintain” an automobile insurance policy. 
 5 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On September 26, 2013, plaintiff Matthew Dye was involved in a motor vehicle 

accident and suffered serious injuries that included a traumatic brain injury. At that time, 

plaintiff was 32 years old, fully employed, a member of the National Guard who had spent 

time in Afghanistan, and recently married. At some point before the accident, plaintiff had 

granted his father power of attorney “to do bussiness [sic] at the secretary of state on 

[plaintiff’s] behalf.” At the time of the accident, plaintiff was driving a 1997 BMW that 

he had purchased two months earlier. After the purchase, plaintiff asked his father to 

register the vehicle for him and to obtain no-fault insurance. His father registered the 

vehicle in plaintiff’s name at the secretary of state’s office and obtained a no-fault insurance 

policy from Esurance via the Internet. The declarations page of the policy identified only 

plaintiff’s father as the named insured. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was living 

with his wife, who owned a Dodge Caravan that was insured by GEICO. 

After Esurance and GEICO refused to cover plaintiff’s claim, plaintiff filed a breach 

of contract claim against both insurers along with a declaratory action, alleging that either 

Esurance or GEICO was obligated to pay his no-fault PIP benefits and requesting that the 

trial court determine the parties’ respective rights and duties. A priority dispute between 

Esurance and GEICO ensued.7

 Eventually, Esurance paid plaintiff more than $388,000 in 

 

7

 A personal protection insurance policy applies to accidental bodily injury that occurs “to 

the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in 

the same household, if the injury arises from a motor vehicle accident.” MCL 500.3114(1). 

In this case, Esurance maintained that because plaintiff was not a named insured under the 

no-fault policy on his own car and because plaintiff was living with his wife—not his 

father—at the time of the accident, plaintiff should look to GEICO rather than Esurance 

for the payment of PIP benefits. 
 6 

PIP benefits, but Esurance continued to maintain that GEICO was the responsible insurer. 

GEICO acknowledged that it was the primary insurer and began settlement negotiations 

with plaintiff and Esurance. 

Then, on November 13, 2014, the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Barnes v Farmers 

Ins Exch was redesignated “for publication.”8

 In Barnes, the panel held that “under the 

plain language of MCL 500.3113(b), when none of the owners maintains the requisite 

coverage, no owner may recover PIP benefits.”9

 After Barnes was published, GEICO 

reevaluated its legal position and ceased settlement discussions. Essentially, what had 

been—before Barnes—merely a priority dispute among potential insurers over who had to 

pay plaintiff’s claim turned into a dispute about whether plaintiff was covered under the 

no-fault act. 

Esurance filed a cross-claim against GEICO arguing that GEICO had breached a 

settlement agreement. GEICO moved for summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim, arguing 

that plaintiff was not entitled to PIP benefits in light of the now-published decision in 

Barnes because plaintiff owned the subject vehicle but had not insured it and the person 

who had insured it (plaintiff’s father) was not an “owner” as defined in MCL 500.3101. 

Plaintiff, in turn, moved for summary disposition, arguing that Barnes was wrongly 

decided and, regardless, that his father was an owner and registrant for purposes of the no-

 

8 Barnes was originally released as an unpublished opinion having no precedential value 

in the Court of Appeals or lower courts. But pursuant to MCR 7.215(D)(3), the panel 

granted the defendant’s request to publish the opinion, providing Barnes precedential effect 

under the rule of stare decisis. MCR 7.215(C)(2). 

9 Barnes, 308 Mich App at 8-9. 
 7 

fault act because he had the right to use the BMW and because he had physically registered 

the vehicle. 

The trial court granted Esurance summary disposition on its cross-claim, ruling that 

GEICO and Esurance had entered into a valid settlement agreement and that GEICO had 

priority over plaintiff’s claim. The trial court denied GEICO’s motion for summary 

disposition and granted plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, thus determining that 

GEICO was required to provide no-fault benefits to plaintiff. The trial court stated that it 

did not need to address the decision in Barnes because plaintiff’s father was an owner and 

registrant of the BMW. According to the trial court, the only issue remaining between 

plaintiff and GEICO was the amount of damages. The trial court thus entered an order 

granting Esurance summary disposition on its cross-claim, denying GEICO’s motion for 

summary disposition with regard to plaintiff, and granting plaintiff’s motion against 

GEICO with regard to no-fault coverage and priority. 

GEICO filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal, which the Court of 

Appeals granted.10 In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed 

the trial court’s decision that granted summary disposition to Esurance.11 The panel held 

that the trial court erred by enforcing the settlement agreement. The panel explained that 

“[a]lthough the issuance of Barnes promptly snuffed out what appears to have been a 

‘nearly done’ deal, the parties had not yet reached a meeting of the minds on all of the 

 

10 Dye v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered 

April 5, 2016 (Docket No. 330308). 

11 Dye, unpub op at 1. 
 8 

essential terms, and the trial court erred in granting Esurance’s motion for summary 

disposition on its cross-claim for enforcement of the alleged agreement.”12

In regard to the trial court’s decision denying GEICO summary disposition against 

plaintiff on the basis of Barnes, the panel embraced Barnes’s interpretation of MCL 

500.3101(1) without reservation, stating: 

Although a motor vehicle may have more than one owner for purposes of the 

no fault act, it is not sufficient that a vehicle is insured by just anyone. At 

least one owner or registrant must have the insurance required by MCL 

500.3101(1), and “when none of the owners maintains the requisite coverage, 

no owner may recover PIP benefits.”[13]

The Court of Appeals then held that the trial court erred as a matter of law by finding 

that plaintiff’s father was a “registrant” for purposes of MCL 500.3101(1).14 A majority 

of the panel, however, agreed with the trial court that there remained genuine issues of 

material fact as to whether plaintiff’s father was an “owner” of the BMW plaintiff was 

driving at the time of the accident.15 Therefore, the Court of Appeals remanded this case 

to the trial court for further proceedings.16

 

12 Id. at 11. 

13 Id. at 6, quoting Barnes, 308 Mich App at 8-9 (citations omitted). 

14 Dye, unpub op at 6. 

15 Id. at 9. Judge O’CONNELL dissented from the majority’s conclusion that there were 

questions of fact about whether plaintiff’s father was an “owner” of the vehicle but agreed 

with the panel in all other respects. Id. (O’CONNELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting 

in part) at 1. 

16 Id. (opinion of the Court) at 12. 
 9 

Esurance filed an application in this Court arguing that the Court of Appeals 

improperly reversed the trial court’s decision to enforce the purported settlement agreement 

by granting Esurance summary disposition on its cross-claim against GEICO. Plaintiff 

filed a cross-appeal arguing that Barnes was improperly decided and that Esurance could 

not deny liability simply because plaintiff himself did not obtain no-fault insurance. 

GEICO filed a cross-appeal arguing that the Court of Appeals erred by ruling that a 

question of fact precluded summary disposition in favor of GEICO on the issue of whether 

plaintiff’s father was a co-owner of the BMW that plaintiff, in GEICO’s view, failed to 

insure. This Court granted plaintiff’s cross-application for leave to appeal and denied 

Esurance’s application and GEICO’s cross-application.17 Accordingly, the sole issue 

before the Court is “whether an owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in an 

accident may be entitled to personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily 

injury where no owner or registrant of the motor vehicle maintains security for payment of 

benefits under personal protection insurance.”18

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE RULES OF STATUTORY 

INTERPRETATION 

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary 

disposition.19 The parties brought their respective summary disposition motions under 

 

17 Dye, 501 Mich 944. 

18 Id. 

19 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 
 10 

MCR 2.116(C)(10), which tests the factual sufficiency of a claim.20 “In reviewing a motion 

for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a trial court considers 

affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence filed in the action 

or submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing the motion.”21 If, “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact, . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial 

judgment as a matter of law,”22 and the trial court must grant the motion without delay.23

This Court also reviews de novo questions of statutory interpretation.24 “The role 

of this Court in interpreting statutory language is to ‘ascertain the legislative intent that 

may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute.’ ”25 “The focus of our analysis 

must be the statute’s express language, which offers the most reliable evidence of the 

Legislature’s intent.”26 “ ‘[W]here the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the 

statute must be applied as written.’ ”27 “ ‘[A] court may read nothing into an unambiguous 

 

20 Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). 

21 Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). 

22 MCR 2.116(C)(10). 

23 MCR 2.116(I)(1). 

24 Badeen v PAR, Inc, 496 Mich 75, 81; 853 NW2d 303 (2014). 

25 Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 497 Mich 45, 57; 860 NW2d 67 (2014) (citation omitted). 

26 Badeen, 496 Mich at 81. 

27 McQueer v Perfect Fence Co, 502 Mich 276, 286; 917 NW2d 584 (2018) (citation 

omitted). 
 11 

statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words 

of the statute itself.’ ”28 Neither will this Court “rewrite the plain statutory language and 

substitute our own policy decisions for those already made by the Legislature.”29

III. ANALYSIS 

A. LEGAL BACKGROUND 

Under the no-fault act, “an insurer is liable to pay [PIP] benefits [to any Michigan 

resident] for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance 

or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . .”30 Although designated as “personal 

protection insurance” under the no-fault act, PIP benefits are in fact statutory benefits, 

arising regardless of whether an injured person has obtained a no-fault insurance policy. 

Indeed, a no-fault insurance carrier can be liable for no-fault benefits even if the motor 

vehicle it insures was not the actual motor vehicle involved in the accident.31 PIP benefits 

are paid to injured persons solely by insurers who are authorized to write no-fault insurance 

policies in this state or who have voluntarily filed a certificate complying with MCL 

500.3163.32 

 

28 Id., quoting Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d 663 (2002) 

(alteration in original). 

29 DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 405; 605 NW2d 300 (2000). 

30 MCL 500.3105(1). 

31 See Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch v Home Ins Co, 428 Mich 43, 49; 405 NW2d 85 (1987). 

Amicus Michigan Defense Trial Counsel agrees, acknowledging that “[e]ligibility to claim 

no-fault benefits for motor-vehicle-related injuries that occur in the state is not contingent 

upon the injured person having his or her own no-fault insurance policy.” 

32 The grand scope of these insurers’ obligations became evident soon after the no-fault act 
 12 

For these reasons, determining whether no-fault benefits are available to an injured 

person does not depend on “who” purchased, obtained, or otherwise procured no-fault 

insurance. The only relevant inquiry is whether the injured person can establish an 

“accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a 

motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . .”33 By establishing this relatively low threshold for 

statutory no-fault coverage, the no-fault act seeks to “provide victims of motor vehicle 

accidents assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for certain economic losses.”34

And given that these statutory benefits would be available to all Michigan residents, 

“[t]he Legislature believed this . . . could be most effectively achieved through a system of 

compulsory insurance, whereby every Michigan motorist would be required to purchase 

no-fault insurance or be unable to operate a motor vehicle legally in this state.”35 

Accordingly, the Legislature enacted MCL 500.3101(1), which provides, in part, that “[t]he 

owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain 

security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance . . . .” And to ensure 

compliance with MCL 500.3101(1), the Legislature excluded persons from receiving PIP 

benefits under various circumstances listed in MCL 500.3113. In this case, GEICO 

 

was enacted. In response to concerns that “Michigan’s no-fault law provision for unlimited 

personal injury protection benefits placed too great a burden on insurers, particularly small 

insurers, in the event of ‘catastrophic’ injury claims,” In re Certified Question, 433 Mich 

710, 714; 449 NW2d 660 (1989), the Legislature created the Michigan Catastrophic Claims 

Association through Public Act 136 of 1978, codified at MCL 500.3104. 

33 MCL 500.3105(1). 

34 Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). 

35 Id. at 579 (emphasis omitted). 
 13 

maintains that MCL 500.3113(b) precludes plaintiff from obtaining PIP benefits because, 

in its view, plaintiff “was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle involved 

in the accident with respect to which the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not 

in effect.” In GEICO’s view, “the security required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect” 

because, as emphasized by GEICO, MCL 500.3101(1) mandates that an “owner or 

registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security 

for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 

Against this backdrop, the legal issue before the Court, as aptly stated by amicus 

Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, 

hinges on whether the phrase “the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle 

required to be registered in this state shall maintain security,” means that the 

owner (or at least an owner) must be the one to acquire the insurance policy, 

or whether it suffices for any person to provide the required security such 

that all that matters is that the vehicle is insured.[36] 

GEICO maintains that the former interpretation is correct, and accordingly argues that 

plaintiff is excluded from receiving PIP benefits because he owned the BMW and was not 

the one to obtain the no-fault insurance policy. Plaintiff maintains that the latter 

interpretation is correct, and he argues that he is not excluded from coverage because he 

owned the BMW and the BMW was insured. While this Court has not yet addressed this 

issue, the Court of Appeals has considered very similar arguments in two published 

opinions, which we now review. 

 

36 Some emphasis omitted. 
 14 

B. COURT OF APPEALS CASELAW 

In Iqbal v Bristol West Ins Group,

37 the Court of Appeals first addressed in a 

published decision whether every owner of a vehicle is “required to maintain insurance on 

the vehicle under the no-fault act . . . .” In that case, the plaintiff did not have title to any 

vehicle, but he frequently used his brother’s BMW.38 The plaintiff was injured while 

driving the BMW and requested no-fault benefits. In his answers to interrogatories, the 

plaintiff indicated that the BMW “ ‘belonged to my brother but I had primary 

possession.’ ”39 The insurer claimed that the plaintiff should also be considered an owner 

of the car and that as an owner, the plaintiff must have obtained the insurance policy to 

obtain PIP benefits. The panel rejected this argument, stating: 

Viewing the statutory language in the context of the given facts, the 

statute would preclude plaintiff from being entitled to PIP benefits if plaintiff 

“was the owner . . . of [the BMW] . . . involved in the accident with respect 

to which the security required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect.” As part 

of the process of construing MCL 500.3113(b), we shall make the

assumption that plaintiff was an “owner” of the BMW, as that term is defined 

in MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i). Next, the phrase “with respect to which the 

security required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect,” § 3113(b), when 

read in proper grammatical context, defines or modifies the preceding 

reference to the motor vehicle involved in the accident, here the BMW, and 

not the person standing in the shoes of an owner or registrant. The statutory 

language links the required security or insurance solely to the vehicle. Thus, 

the question becomes whether the BMW, and not plaintiff, had the coverage 

or security required by MCL 500.3101. As indicated above, the coverage 

mandated by MCL 500.3101(1) consists of “personal protection insurance, 

property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance.” While 

 

37 Iqbal v Bristol West Ins Group, 278 Mich App 31, 33; 748 NW2d 574 (2008). 

38 Id. at 34. 

39 Id. 
 15 

plaintiff did not obtain this coverage, there is no dispute that the BMW had 

the coverage, and that is the only requirement under MCL 500.3113(b), 

making it irrelevant whether it was plaintiff’s brother who procured the 

vehicle’s coverage or plaintiff. Stated differently, the security required by 

MCL 500.3101(1) was in effect for purposes of MCL 500.3113(b) as it 

related to the BMW.[40]

In sum, Iqbal held that the only requirement under MCL 500.3113(b) was that there be nofault insurance on the vehicle—who purchased the policy was irrelevant. Plaintiff’s 

position is in accordance with Iqbal. 

In Barnes v Farmers Ins Exch,

41 the Court of Appeals was presented with a very 

similar question. In that case, the plaintiff and her mother were the titled owners of a 

vehicle.42 The plaintiff’s mother gave a friend from church, Richard Huling, money to 

obtain insurance for the vehicle.43 Huling purchased a policy.44 The plaintiff was later 

injured in an accident, and requested PIP benefits under Huling’s policy.45 The insurer 

denied the request, and the plaintiff brought suit.46 The insurer moved for summary 

disposition, contending that the “plaintiff could not recover PIP benefits from it under the 

 

40 Id. at 39-40 (alteration in original). 

41 Barnes, 308 Mich App 1. 

42 Id. at 2-3. 

43 Id. at 3. 

44 Id. 

45 Id. 

46 Id. 
 16 

policy because the policy only covered the named insured, Huling, and was never intended 

to benefit plaintiff.”47

In Barnes, after hearing arguments, “the trial court ruled that the no-fault act 

required at least one of the ‘owners’ to have insurance. It reasoned that because neither 

plaintiff nor [her mother] had insurance, plaintiff was barred from seeking benefits under 

the no-fault act.”48 The trial court granted summary disposition to the insurer.49

The plaintiff in Barnes appealed, arguing that Iqbal required the opposite result. 

The Court of Appeals stated: 

In the present case, plaintiff cites Iqbal and argues that the fact that 

neither she nor [her mother] insured the Cavalier does not matter because 

Huling did. Plaintiff contends that this is so regardless of whether Huling 

was an owner of the Cavalier. Iqbal should not be read so broadly as to apply 

to even nonowners. The Court made it clear that it was addressing the 

problem of whether the statute required “each and every owner” to maintain 

insurance on a vehicle. The Court opined that to so hold would preclude an 

owner who obtained insurance from receiving PIP benefits as long as any 

other co-owner did not maintain coverage as well.[50]

Thus, Barnes distinguished Iqbal, stating that “while Iqbal held that each and every 

owner need not obtain insurance, it did not allow for owners to avoid the consequences of 

MCL 500.3113(b) if no owner obtained the required insurance.”51 In sum, Barnes held 

that only a registrant or owner may procure no-fault insurance for a vehicle. Barnes is 

 

47 Id. at 3-4. 

48 Id. at 5. 

49 Id. 

50 Id. at 7-8 (citations omitted). 

51 Id. at 8. 
 17 

consistent with GEICO’s position, and plaintiff argues that Barnes improperly 

distinguished Iqbal. 

C. APPLICATION 

While the Court of Appeals in Iqbal and Barnes focused primarily on the language 

of MCL 500.3113(b), our analysis primarily concerns the language of MCL 500.3101(1). 

After examining this provision, we conclude that the Legislature carefully chose its words 

when it prescribed that “[t]he owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be 

registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal 

protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance.”52 The 

first and most relevant definition of “maintain” is: “to keep in an existing state (as of repair, 

efficiency, or validity) : preserve from failure or decline[.]”53 MCL 500.3101(1) only 

 

52 MCL 500.3101(1) (emphasis added). 

53 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). See also Oxford University Press, 

English Oxford Living Dictionaries, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/maintain> 

(accessed November 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T3A8-8EDR], which defines “maintain,” 

in part, as follows: 

1 Cause or enable (a condition or situation) to continue. 

‘the need to maintain close links between industry and schools’ 

* * * 

1.1 Keep (something) at the same level or rate. 

‘agricultural prices will have to be maintained’ 

* * * 

1.2 Keep (a building, machine, or road) in good condition by checking 

or repairing it regularly. 
 18 

requires that the owner or registrant “maintain” no-fault insurance, which, as commonly 

understood, simply means to keep in an existing state. Further, MCL 500.3101(1) does not 

prescribe any particular manner by which a registrant or owner must keep no-fault 

insurance in an existing state. Indeed, MCL 500.3101(4) expressly contemplates that the 

“[s]ecurity required by subsection (1) may be provided by any other method approved by 

the secretary of state as affording security equivalent to that afforded by a policy of 

insurance, if proof of the security is filed and continuously maintained with the secretary 

of state throughout the period the motor vehicle is driven or moved on a highway.” If we 

were to accept GEICO’s interpretation that only a registrant or owner may obtain insurance 

on a vehicle, we would limit the secretary of state’s power to allow security “by any other 

method” and we would also have effectively read a requirement into MCL 500.3101(1) 

that the Legislature did not manifest through the words of MCL 500.3101(1) itself.54

GEICO argues that “the common thread in all of these definitions [of maintenance] 

is that some affirmative act is necessary by the person required to ‘maintain’ the 

insurance.” We conclude that this argument lacks merit. Even if the word “maintain” were 

to imply an affirmative act, plaintiff here undeniably undertook an affirmative act when he 

instructed his father to obtain no-fault insurance, the same way any person instructs a 

mechanic to “maintain” his vehicle or a father instructs his son to “maintain” the lawn. 

 

‘the Department for Transport is responsible for maintaining the main 

roads in England[.]’ 

54 Covenant Med Ctr, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 500 Mich 191, 207-208; 895 

NW2d 490 (2017), citing Roberts, 466 Mich at 63. 
 19 

Thus, we conclude that the language of MCL 500.3101(1) does not require an owner or a 

registrant of a motor vehicle to personally obtain no-fault insurance. 

We further conclude, contrary to Barnes, that when read together, MCL 500.3101(1) 

and MCL 500.3113(b) do not preclude plaintiff from receiving PIP benefits. Again, MCL 

500.3113 provides: 

A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance 

benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the 

following circumstances existed: 

* * * 

(b) The person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle or 

motorcycle involved in the accident with respect to which the security 

required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect. 

As previously discussed, the Court of Appeals in Iqbal opined that “the phrase ‘with 

respect to which the security required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect,’ § 3113(b), 

when read in proper grammatical context, defines or modifies the preceding reference to 

the motor vehicle involved in the accident, here the BMW, and not the person standing in 

the shoes of an owner or registrant. The statutory language links the required security or 

insurance solely to the vehicle.”55 Despite acknowledging that Iqbal also stated that 

“ ‘there is no dispute that the BMW had the coverage, and that is the only requirement 

under MCL 500.3113(b),’ ”56 the Barnes panel nonetheless concluded that “Iqbal does not 

protect owners of vehicles if no owner provides the insurance . . . .”57 In our view, a fair 

 

55 Iqbal, 278 Mich App at 39-40. 

56 Barnes, 308 Mich App at 7, quoting Iqbal, 278 Mich App at 40. 

57 Barnes, 308 Mich App at 8. 
 20 

reading of Iqbal does not indicate that at least one owner must obtain no-fault insurance. 

Indeed, Iqbal concludes that 

[b]ecause the language in MCL 500.3113(b) precluding recovery of PIP 

benefits links the security or insurance requirement to the vehicle only and 

not the person, the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff was entitled to PIP 

benefits because the vehicle was in fact insured, regardless of whether 

plaintiff was the “owner” of the vehicle.[58] 

Thus, while Barnes may be distinguishable from Iqbal on its facts, we conclude that those 

factual distinctions did not place Barnes outside the ambit of Iqbal’s holding. 

In sum, we agree with Iqbal that MCL 500.3113(b) refers to the required security 

or insurance under MCL 500.3101 only as it relates to the vehicle. GEICO acknowledges 

that “[p]laintiff may be partially correct that [MCL 500.3113(b)] ties ‘security’ to the motor 

vehicle itself . . . .” Yet, GEICO contends that the reference in MCL 500.3113(b) to the 

“ ‘security required by section 3101—and [that section’s] use of the mandatory term ‘shall’ 

in reference to ‘[t]he owner or registrant’—means that the vehicle is not properly insured 

unless that security is maintained by an ‘owner or registrant.’ ”59 We disagree. 

Initially, we iterate that GEICO’s interpretation would ignore that MCL 

500.3101(1) does not expressly prescribe any particular manner by which a registrant or 

an owner must keep no-fault insurance in an existing state.60 In regard to MCL 

 

58 Iqbal, 278 Mich App at 46 (emphasis added). 

59 Second alteration in original. 

60 GEICO also argues that “the only approach that carries out the legislative intent 

embodied in [MCL 500.3101(1)] is to equate ‘shall maintain security’ with being a named 

insured on a policy of automobile no-fault insurance.” In something of a “plain folks” 

appeal (at least for a legal brief in an insurance case), GEICO explains that “anyone who 

owns a vehicle in Michigan knows that it is the named insured who applies for auto 
 21 

500.3113(b), there is no dispute that the phrase “the security required by section 3101 or 

3103 was not in effect” refers to either the “owner or registrant” or the “vehicle.” 

Obviously, plaintiff believes that the phrase refers to the vehicle, and the dissent and 

defendant believe that the phrase refers to the owner or registrant.61 In our view, the dispute 

 

insurance. That’s the person who fills out the form developed by the insurer to obtain the 

information needed to accurately underwrite the coverage.” 

The shortcoming of this argument is that statutory coverage under the no-fault act 

does not depend on whether a person is a “named insured” in a no-fault policy. The phrase 

“named insured” is not even contained in MCL 500.3101 or, for that matter, in MCL 

500.3113. Rather, whether a person is a “named insured” under a no-fault insurance policy 

is generally only relevant in deciding which potential insurer is liable for the claim. The 

only notable exception is MCL 500.3111, which pertains to Michigan residents involved 

in out-of-state accidents. Under those circumstances, coverage is predicated on whether 

“the person whose injury is the basis of the claim was at the time of the accident a named 

insured under a personal protection insurance policy . . . .” MCL 500.3111. But this 

provision is not applicable in this case. 

61 The dissent states that MCL 500.3113(b) contemplates a relationship between the 

security and the vehicle but questions the basis for our “conclusion that security ‘with 

respect to’ a vehicle is the same as insurance ‘for’ or ‘on’ that vehicle . . . .” Post at 5. 

While we agree that many provisions of the no-fault act are inartfully drafted and require 

interpretation, there is no statutory basis to conclude that the owner of an insured vehicle 

who is not a “named insured” in the policy is ineligible for PIP benefits. If this were the 

case, the Legislature could have readily predicated coverage on whether “the person whose 

injury is the basis of the claim was at the time of the accident a named insured under a 

personal protection insurance policy,” as in MCL 500.3111. 

 The dissenting justice argues that her interpretation “is consistent with, and 

therefore supported by, the act’s other sections, like the priority schemes set out in MCL 

500.3114 and MCL 500.3115.” Post at 6. She claims that “the priority scheme reflects the 

prenominate nexus among owner, security, and vehicle.” Post at 7. In our view, the dissent 

has improperly conflated coverage under the no-fault act with priority under the no-fault 

act. Priority provisions do not expand coverage under the no-fault act. The priority 

provisions do not provide additional coverage; they merely dictate which insurer will pay 

claims that have already been established. For this reason, the dissent’s reliance on the 

priority provisions is misplaced. 
 22 

is best resolved by examining the use of the term “which” in MCL 500.3113(b). The term 

“which,” as applied in this context, is “used relatively in restrictive and nonrestrictive 

clauses to represent a specified antecedent[]: This book, which I read last night, was 

exciting. The socialism which Owen preached was unpalatable to many. The lawyer 

represented five families, of which ours was the largest.”62 Here, two possible antecedents 

precede the phrase “the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect”: the 

first possible antecedent mentioned is a person, and the last possible antecedent mentioned 

is a vehicle. Plaintiff relies on the last-antecedent rule, “a rule of statutory construction 

that provides that ‘a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is 

confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something 

in the statute requires a different interpretation.’ ”63

“As we have warned before, the last antecedent rule should not be applied if 

‘something in the statute requires a different interpretation’ than the one that would result 

from applying the rule.”64 But here, nothing in the statute requires a different result. 

Moreover, the use of the term “which” plainly favors plaintiff’s interpretation. The usage 

notes for the definition of “which” state that the term “is used regularly in referring to 

inanimate objects and, usually, animals and never, in modern usage, to individual 

 

62 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2000). 

63 Hardaway v Wayne Co, 494 Mich 423, 427; 835 NW2d 336 (2013), quoting Stanton v 

Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611, 616; 647 NW2d 508 (2002). See also Scalia & Garner, 

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul: Thomson/West, 2012), pp 144-

146. 

64 Hardaway, 494 Mich at 428, quoting Stanton, 466 Mich at 416. 
 23 

persons . . . .”65 Given that the term “which” by the time the no-fault system was enacted 

no longer referred to individual persons, we conclude that the phrase “with respect to which 

the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect” refers to the vehicle, not 

the person. Because the conclusion in Barnes that “when none of the owners maintains the 

requisite coverage, no owner may recover PIP benefits” is contrary to the plain language 

of the no-fault act, we overrule Barnes.

66

 

65 The Random House College Dictionary (rev ed, 1975). 

66 Barnes, 308 Mich App at 8-9. GEICO also raises the specter of fraud to favor its 

interpretation by claiming that 

[f]or the system to work for all members of the pool, risk must be allocated 

and managed as accurately as possible. Through MCL 500.3101(1), the 

Michigan Legislature recognized that what matters most for no-fault 

insurance is the identity of the vehicle owner or registrant. Otherwise, 

vehicle owners with high risk factors would be able to avoid premiums 

applicable to the risk they present by adding their vehicles to the policies of 

others, including friends and even roommates. And the problem is not 

resolved by requiring owners of other vehicles to be listed as drivers because 

listed drivers do not fill out applications; they do not receive the same 

scrutiny as an applicant. 

First, as plaintiff rightly points out, there is no indication of fraud in this case. Second, 

“[t]his Court has been clear that the policy behind a statute cannot prevail over what the 

text actually says. The text must prevail.” Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 472 Mich 408, 421-

422; 697 NW2d 851 (2005). In other words, the specter of fraud does not distract us from 

our goal of interpreting the applicable statutory language to determine the rule of law. 

Third, the Legislature clearly understands how to enact laws to mitigate fraud within the 

no-fault act. In fact, the Legislature recently did so when it enacted 2016 PA 346, which 

is now codified at MCL 500.3009(2): 

If authorized by the insured, automobile liability or motor vehicle 

liability coverage may be excluded when a vehicle is operated by a named 

person. An exclusion under this subsection is not valid unless the following 

notice is on the face of the policy or the declaration page or certificate of the 

policy and on the certificate of insurance: 
 24 

IV. CONCLUSION 

We hold that an owner or a registrant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident is 

not excluded from receiving no-fault benefits when someone other than that owner or 

registrant purchased no-fault insurance for that vehicle because the owner or registrant of 

the motor vehicle has nonetheless “maintained” no-fault insurance. The Court of Appeals’ 

decision in Barnes and caselaw suggesting to the contrary are overruled to the extent that 

they are inconsistent with this holding. We reverse in part67 the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals in this case and remand the case to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for further 

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

Brian K. Zahra 

Bridget M. McCormack 

 Stephen J. Markman 

David F. Viviano 

 Richard H. Bernstein 

 

Warning—when a named excluded person operates a vehicle all 

liability coverage is void—no one is insured. Owners of the vehicle and 

others legally responsible for the acts of the named excluded person remain 

fully personally liable. 

67 Although Esurance filed an application in this Court seeking enforcement of its purported 

settlement agreement with GEICO, this Court was not persuaded that the questions 

presented should be reviewed by this Court. See Dye, 501 Mich 944. This opinion does 

not disturb the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding the purported settlement agreement. 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

MATTHEW DYE, by his Guardian, 

SIPORIN & ASSOCIATES, INC., 

 Plaintiff-Appellee/CrossAppellant, 

v 

ESURANCE PROPERTY & CASUALTY 

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant/CrossPlaintiff/Appellant/CrossAppellee, 

and 

No. 155784 

GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, 

Defendant/CrossDefendant/Appellee/CrossAppellant, 

and 

PRIORITY HEALTH, 

Defendant/CrossPlaintiff/Appellee, 

and 

BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF 

MICHIGAN, 

Defendant-Appellee. 
 2 

CLEMENT, J. (dissenting). 

Plaintiff bought a car and asked his father to buy no-fault insurance. His father 

bought a policy naming the father, not plaintiff, as the insured. Under the no-fault act, as 

the owner of the car, plaintiff had to “maintain security for payment of benefits under” 

insurance for bodily injury and property damage. MCL 500.3101. Although the act 

provides for benefits for all persons injured in motor-vehicle accidents, it disqualifies from 

bodily-injury benefits a person injured in his or her own vehicle “with respect to which the 

security required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect.” MCL 500.3113. Plaintiff was 

injured in his own car and sought benefits under his wife’s policy, issued by defendant 

GEICO Indemnity Company.1

 See MCL 500.3114. Defendant denied benefits on the basis 

that plaintiff’s car was one “with respect to which the security required by section 

3101 . . . was not in effect.” To decide the issue on appeal, we must determine whether 

that security was or was not in effect. 

Plaintiff argues that the security was in effect because he instructed his father to take 

out a policy listing the car and his father did so. The majority agrees with plaintiff, reading 

the disqualification provision as operating only when an owner’s vehicle is uninsured. But 

the no-fault act has very little to do with insuring vehicles as such; rather, it aims to create 

comprehensive insurer liability for bodily injury and property damage resulting from 

motor-vehicle accidents. The act’s text, context, and purpose support that understanding. 

The majority gives short shrift to each of these, analyzing fractions of statutory text in 

 

1

 See generally ante at 4-5. 
 3 

isolation, and as a result announces a rule that undermines the act. For these reasons, and 

as explained below, I dissent.2

Defendant argues that it is not liable for plaintiff’s PIP3 claim because plaintiff’s 

circumstances meet the statutory disqualification provision in MCL 500.3113(b): 

The person [seeking benefits] was the owner or registrant of a motor 

vehicle . . . involved in the accident with respect to which the security 

required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect. 

All agree that plaintiff owned a vehicle “involved in the accident,” so the question here is 

whether that vehicle was one “with respect to which the security required by section 

3101 . . . was not in effect.” To answer that question, we must understand what is meant 

by “the security required by section 3101.” 

“Section 3101” refers to MCL 500.3101, which says, in relevant part: 

(1) The owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered 

in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal 

protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability 

insurance. . . . 

* * * 

(3) Security required by subsection (1) may be provided under a

policy issued by an authorized insurer that affords insurance for the payment 

of benefits described in subsection (1). . . . 

 

2

 As the majority notes, some of the statutes at issue in this case recently have been 

amended. See ante at 2 n 1. Like the majority, I address the preamendment version of the 

act. 

3

 PIP is common shorthand for “personal protection insurance” (a.k.a. “personal injury 

protection insurance”). 
 4 

Subsection (1) requires a vehicle’s owner to “maintain security for payment of benefits 

under personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability 

insurance.” There are two pieces here: first, the owner must “maintain security”; second, 

that security must ensure payment of benefits under PIP insurance (which pays for bodily 

injury) and property-protection insurance (which pays for property damage).4

 As 

Subsection (3) explains, security “may be provided under a policy issued by an authorized 

insurer that affords insurance for the payment of benefits described in subsection (1)”—

put more simply, to maintain security under § 3101 is to have a no-fault policy with PIP 

and property-protection insurance. 

According to the majority, as long as the vehicle is insured, MCL 500.3113(b)’s 

disqualification provision has not been triggered, no matter who is named in the policy. 

But in my view, the majority misreads that provision. Section 3113 requires security (i.e., 

a no-fault policy) “with respect to” the vehicle owned by the person claiming PIP benefits.5

 

The majority assumes that a policy is “with respect to” a vehicle if the policy insures the 

vehicle. But § 3113(b) governs PIP coverage; it isn’t aimed at vehicle coverage. Indeed, 

the no-fault act excludes damaged vehicles from coverage under property-protection 

 

4

 See, e.g., MCL 500.3105; MCL 500.3121; MCL 500.3131. 

5

 The majority explains in detail why the “which” in § 3113(b)’s “with respect to which” 

refers to “motor vehicle” and not to “owner.” See ante at 20-23. I generally agree. (I also 

observe that a similar “with respect to which” phrase is in MCL 500.3135(3), which affords 

limited immunity from “tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use 

within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by section 

3101 was in effect.”) 
 5 

insurance. See MCL 500.3123(1)(a). For that reason, I cannot credit the majority’s 

assumption.6

The majority doesn’t rely on the statute’s phrase “with respect to”; indeed, it appears 

to toss out that language in favor of its own formulation, stating that insurance is “on the 

vehicle” or “for the vehicle.”7

 That formulation lets the majority assume, contrary to the 

Legislature’s text, that the statute connects only the security and the vehicle. I agree with 

the majority that § 3113(b) contemplates a relationship between “security” and “vehicle,” 

but the majority’s conclusion that security “with respect to” a vehicle is the same as 

insurance “for” or “on” that vehicle is not, in my view, correct since nothing in the no-fault 

act requires a vehicle to be insured. Rather, MCL 500.3101(1) requires a certain person 

(the vehicle’s owner or registrant) to maintain security against liability, and “with respect 

to” connects the security to the vehicle by way of the person.8

 Throughout the no-fault act, 

and in § 3113(b) in particular, the owner or registrant is front and center. In sum, there 

 

6

 The lapse is understandable—our own precedent has made the same assumption. See, 

e.g., Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 466 Mich 588, 595; 648 NW2d 591 (2002) (the 

act was “designed to regulate the insurance of motor vehicles”). But to protect against 

accident damage to one’s vehicle, one must have collision coverage, see MCL 500.3037, 

which is neither required nor regulated by the no-fault act. What’s strange about the 

majority’s focus on insuring the vehicle is that, as the record shows, collision coverage was 

absent from plaintiff’s father’s policy, and so that policy didn’t insure plaintiff’s car. And 

recall that plaintiff’s claim was not for damage to his car but rather for PIP benefits. 

7

 See ante at 4 n 6 (“insurance . . . on the vehicles”), 15 (“insurance on the vehicle,” 

“insurance for the vehicle”), 16 (“insurance for a vehicle”), and 18 (“insurance on a 

vehicle”). 

8

 Cf. MCL 500.3101(1) (referring to “the insured owner or registrant”) (emphasis added). 
 6 

exists security “with respect to” a vehicle not when that vehicle is insured but rather when 

that vehicle’s owner “maintains security.”9

 

This critical nexus among owner, security, and vehicle is of a whole with the rest of 

the no-fault act. While the majority hasn’t grappled with this contextual consideration, my 

reading is consistent with, and therefore supported by, the act’s other sections, like the 

priority schemes set out in MCL 500.3114 and MCL 500.3115. As those provisions 

explain, accident victims not otherwise covered by a personal or household10 policy must 

submit claims to other insurers in accordance with a priority scheme. Under § 3114(4), an 

injured occupant of a vehicle must claim against insurers “in the following order of 

priority”: 

(a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the vehicle occupied. 

(b) The insurer of the operator of the vehicle occupied. 

 

9

 The majority determines that “maintain” means “to keep in an existing state (as of repair, 

efficiency, or validity) : preserve from failure or decline.” That’s an odd choice of 

definition for a few reasons. To start with, if “maintain” carries that meaning, it’s not clear 

what “existing state” is being “kept.” Before plaintiff bought the car, he lacked insurance 

(for himself and for the car), so under the majority’s reasoning, plaintiff’s father’s buying 

insurance disrupted (rather than “kept”) the existing state. And I’m not sure what it means 

for an insurance policy to be in a state “of repair, efficiency, or validity.” Nor do I know 

what it means to “preserve” an insurance policy “from failure or decline.” Still, the 

majority refers to its chosen meaning as “commonly understood” in this context. Ante at 

17-18. By my lights, a better fit is the definition “to support or provide for.” MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). In any event, the larger flaw in the majority’s 

reasoning is its misunderstanding not of the meaning of “maintain” but rather of what’s 

maintained, as explained throughout this opinion. 

10 Under MCL 500.3114(1), a “personal protection insurance policy” reaches “accidental 

bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either 

domiciled in the same household.” 
 7 

Similarly, under § 3115(1) an injured nonoccupant (e.g., a pedestrian) must claim in this 

order: 

(a) Insurers of owners or registrants of motor vehicles involved in the 

accident. 

(b) Insurers of operators of motor vehicles involved in the accident. 

At the outset, note that these provisions refer as the object of no-fault coverage to persons 

(owners, registrants, operators), not to vehicles.11 More crucially, the priority scheme 

reflects the prenominate nexus among owner, security, and vehicle. 

That nexus is reflected too by the act’s design and purpose, which falls apart if an 

owner named in no policy is nonetheless understood to have “maintained security” through 

a nonowner third party’s policy. As we’ve said, the no-fault act created a “system of 

compulsory insurance, whereby every Michigan motorist would be required to purchase 

no-fault insurance . . . [and] victims of motor vehicle accidents would receive insurance 

benefits for their injuries as a substitute for their common-law remedy in tort.” Shavers v 

Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978) (emphasis omitted). The 

Legislature thus struck a balance between “assured, adequate, and prompt reparation” for 

accident victims and “compulsory insurance” to cover owners’ potential liability for claims 

by those victims. Id. We have described the PIP scheme as “comprehensive,” id., which 

reflects the tight fit between the owners’ compulsory insurance and the victims’ assured 

reparation. 

 

11 See also MCL 500.3125 (priority for property-protection claims: “insurers of owners or 

registrants of vehicles involved in the accident; and insurers of operators of vehicles 

involved in the accident”) (emphasis added). 
 8 

In other words, the no-fault scheme aims to assure (insofar as possible) a liable 

insurer for every victim. To meet that goal, the Legislature required two things: (1) that 

every owner (or registrant) “maintain security,” MCL 500.3101(1), and (2) that certain 

injured persons submit their claims according to a priority scheme.12 It’s plain that the 

act’s comprehensiveness—the tight fit between its means and its ends—falls apart under 

the majority’s reading, which relieves an owner of the burden to “maintain security” for 

liability for bodily injury and property damage. 

To illustrate, let’s say plaintiff had hit a pedestrian not covered by a personal or 

household policy. The priority scheme, MCL 500.3115(1), directs the hypothetical 

pedestrian to submit a claim to the “insurers of owners . . . of motor vehicles involved in 

the accident,” but since plaintiff has no insurer, the pedestrian’s claim would be outside the 

priority scheme,13 and he or she would be limited to recovery through the assigned-claims 

 

12 See MCL 500.3114(4); MCL 500.3115(1); see also Royal Globe Ins Cos v Frankenmuth 

Mut Ins Co, 419 Mich 565, 575; 357 NW2d 652 (1984) (“The priority provisions of the act 

are designed to help implement [the act’s] goals.”). 

13 Unless, of course, plaintiff’s father were determined to be an owner, in which case his 

personal policy’s issuer would be within the priority scheme. See MCL 500.3115(1). And 

as the Court of Appeals explained in Iqbal v Bristol West Ins Group, 278 Mich App 31; 

748 NW2d 574 (2008), MCL 500.3113(b) doesn’t disqualify an owner lacking insurance 

as long as another owner has a no-fault policy. In Iqbal, the Court of Appeals determined 

that the plaintiff, a vehicle owner lacking insurance, was not disqualified from PIP benefits 

under MCL 500.3113(b) because his co-owner had a no-fault policy. The Court observed 

that “the BMW had the coverage” and so appears at first blush to have made the same 

mistake as the majority here, that the no-fault act is concerned with insuring vehicles. Id. 

at 40. But the Court of Appeals’ reasoning was more nuanced than that, recognizing that 

the issue was “whether the BMW, and not plaintiff, had the coverage or security required 

by MCL 500.3101.” Id. at 39 (emphasis added). Although inartful, the Court of Appeals’ 

framing of the issue reveals its understanding that security is related to a vehicle not 
 9 

plan.14 The pedestrian’s PIP benefits then would be funded through increased rates for all 

policyholders, as though the pedestrian were a hit-and-run victim.15 This is how the 

majority understands the no-fault act. Yet under my reading, the act would require security 

for payment of PIP benefits to be maintained by an owner (or registrant), and so the 

pedestrian would be able to recover within the no-fault act’s priority scheme, rather than 

through the assigned-claims plan. 

Much puzzles me about the majority’s interpretive approach. It makes some 

obvious lapses in its understanding of the no-fault act’s text—I again point out the 

majority’s insistence that the no-fault act concerns insurance “on” (or “for”) a vehicle, 

despite the act’s exclusion of damaged vehicles. And its interpretation of “maintain” in 

MCL 500.3101(1) lacks nuance because it analyzes the term in isolation from the rest of 

MCL 500.3101(1). According to the majority, plaintiff “maintained security” (albeit 

 

because the security insures the vehicle but because of the nexus among owner, security, 

and vehicle. 

14 See MCL 500.3171 et seq.; see also Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co, 442 Mich 520, 

529; 502 NW2d 310 (1993) (“[E]ssentially all accidents are now covered by personal injury 

protection benefits or the assigned claims plan.”). 

15 Note that under the majority’s understanding of the security requirement, plaintiff in this 

hypothetical would enjoy limited immunity from tort liability because, according to the 

majority, plaintiff’s car was one “with respect to which the security required by section 

3101 was in effect.” MCL 500.3135(3); see also note 5 of this opinion. In other words, 

unlike most Michigan vehicle owners, who merit this limited immunity by getting no-fault 

policies, plaintiff gets immunity while the cost of the injuries he’s responsible for is spread, 

through the assigned-claims plan, across other policyholders’ premiums. The majority now 

has charted the course for others to do the same. 
 10 

indirectly) when “he instructed his father to obtain no-fault insurance.”16 Ante at 18. The 

majority suggests that plaintiff’s instruction to his father met the duty to maintain security 

in the same way that a son’s duty to maintain his lawn could be met by the son’s instructing 

his father to mow the lawn.17 But the son’s duty in those circumstances would not be met 

if the father mowed only the father’s own lawn. Likewise here, the son’s statutory duty to 

“maintain security” is not met by asking his father to get no-fault insurance if his father 

insures only himself. For this reason, it is to me neither here nor there that plaintiff’s father 

took out a no-fault policy in response to plaintiff’s instruction because that policy named 

the father, not plaintiff.18 

The majority’s approach to statutory interpretation also gives short shrift to context 

and purpose. As I read the no-fault act, §§ 3101 and 3113 dovetail with other parts of the 

act, like the priority scheme; and my reading advances the act’s purposes, which we 

recognized in Shavers. The majority’s reading, on the other hand, barely acknowledges 

that we’re interpreting a small part of a larger system, let alone contemplates how its 

reading affects that larger system and undermines its purposes. The majority’s approach 

suggests (albeit implicitly) that neither context nor purpose plays a role in statutory 

interpretation. Yet the light thrown by context and purpose can cast the text in sharper 

 

16 What, I wonder, stops a risky driver (like one with an OWI conviction) from saving 

money on insurance premiums by “instructing” a third party “to obtain no-fault insurance”? 

17 The majority actually uses the example of a father instructing his son to maintain the 

lawn. I’ve swapped the father and son, to better track the facts in this case. 

18 In other words, I don’t get caught up, as the majority does, in whether MCL 500.3101(1) 

requires plaintiff to have engaged in an “affirmative act,” ante at 18, because even if 

plaintiff’s instructing his father was an affirmative act, that act didn’t result in plaintiff’s 

compliance with § 3101. 
 11 

relief. Indeed, had the majority paused for a moment to consider the act’s goals, it might 

have recognized that some of the premises underlying its decision are mistaken. 

As explained above, I read the no-fault act as disqualifying an owner from PIP 

benefits if the owner is injured in his or her own vehicle and no owner (or co-owner) has 

“maintained security.” But the record doesn’t reveal whether plaintiff’s father, who does 

have a no-fault policy, is an owner of plaintiff’s car, and so I cannot determine whether 

plaintiff is disqualified from PIP benefits. For this reason, I favor the Court of Appeals’ 

resolution—remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 

Elizabeth T. Clement 

CAVANAGH, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court 

considered it before she assumed office.