YEMEN

NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA 

ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK 

RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AVIAN INFLUENZA PROTECTION 

PROGRAM 

MAY 2006 

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for 

International Development. It was prepared by ARD, Inc. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

Special thanks go to Mr. Jalal Ibrahim Faqeerah, Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI), the 

Technical Committee of the Operation Room of the MAI, and the various experts who contributed to 

the planning of events. Their cooperation and contributions ensured that discussions and subsequent 

findings were professional and thorough. Further, this work would not have been possible without the 

support of USAID and the efficient coordination of all the staff of the ARD Yemen Agricultural Support 

Program. 

This assessment was implemented under: 

Rural and Agricultural Incomes with a Sustainable Environment (RAISE) IQC 

US Agency for International Development 

Contract No. PCE-I-00-99-00001-00, Task Order No. 829 

Primary ARD Contact: Jeffrey L. Gray 

 ARD, Inc. 

 159 Bank Street, Suite 300 

Burlington, Vermont 05401 

Tel: (802) 658-3890 

Fax: (802) 658-4247 

Email: jgray@ardinc.com
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA 

ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK 

RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AVIAN INFLUENZA PROTECTION 

PROGRAM 

DISCLAIMER 

The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. 

NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) i 

CONTENTS 

Acronyms and Abbreviations.................................................................... iii

PART I. TECHNICAL SUMMARY REPORT

1.0 Overview................................................................................................ 1

1.1 SCOPE OF WORK.................................................................................................... 1

1.2 DELIVERABLES .......................................................................................................... 1

1.3 BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................ 2

2.0 Activities and Findings.......................................................................... 3

2.1 REVIEW OF PLANS AND DOCUMENTS RELATED TO AVIAN INFLUENZA 

PLANNING AND EMERGENCY ACTION POLICY IN YEMEN.................................... 3

2.2 DISCUSSIONS TO DETERMINE THE GAPS IN CURRENT AI EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS PLAN AND THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE CAPACITY OF THE 

DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AND LABORATORY DIAGNOSIS FOR MAI ...................... 4

2.3 STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (SWOT) ANALYSIS 

OF THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS....................................................................... 5

2.4 WORKSHOP/TRAINING FOR MAI LOCAL STAFF AND PRIVATE SECTOR ON HPAI

SURVEILLANCE, MONITORING, AND PREVENTION STRATEGIES............................ 6

2.5 PROCESS OF LITERATURE REVIEW, WORKSHOP AND VARIOUS OTHER ACTIVITIES 

INTO A DRAFT (PROPOSED) HPAI ACTION PLAN FOR THE GOY...................... 7

2.6 OTHER ACTIVITIES................................................................................................... 7

3.0 Consultant Itinerary, Field Visits and Workshops ............................ 8

WORK ITINERARY (BASED ON THE WORK PLAN) FOR THE CONSULTANCY OF NOEL 

L.J. MIRANDA IN YEMEN (APRIL 18 TO MAY 6, 2006)......................................... 8

WORKSHOP ON AI SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL, EAGLE HOTEL , SANA’A 24-26

APRIL 2006 ............................................................................................................10

PART II. NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN

1.0 Overview.............................................................................................. 15

1.1 GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SITUATION..................................................................16

1.2 BACKGROUND SITUATION IN YEMEN.................................................................16

2.0 Community-Based Action: A Major Strategy to Initiate ............... 18

3.0 Indication of SWOT in Relation to Yemen’s AI Response............. 19

4.0 Guiding Principles and Policies.......................................................... 22

5.0 Main Actions Requiring Effective Implementation ......................... 24

5.1 SURVEILLANCE, MONITORING AND DIAGNOSIS ................................................24

5.2 SUPPORTIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK............................................................33

5.3 HPAI OUTBREAK EMERGENCY RESPONSE..........................................................34

6.0 Community Workshops, Training and Monitoring and 

Evaluation ............................................................................................ 46

6.1 PROPOSED COMMUNITY TRAINING EVENTS ......................................................46

6.2 PROJECT SUPPORT FUNCTIONS ...........................................................................47

6.3 AI OUTBREAK EMERGENCY RESPONSE SIMULATION EXERCISES.......................48

6.4 AI ACTION PLAN IMPLEMENTATION MONITORING AND EVALUATION..........48

PART III. RECOMMENDATIONS

1.0 Recommendations.............................................................................. 51

1.1 RECOMMENDED POLICY STATEMENTS ................................................................51
ii NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 

1.2 RECOMMENDED CRITERIA FOR DECLARING THAT THE OUTBREAK RESPONSE 

FAILED ....................................................................................................................52

1.3 GENERAL SUCCESS MEASURES RECOMMENDED FOR AI RESPONSE..................52

1.4 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ACTIONS.................................53 

ANNEX 1. References............................................................................... 57

ANNEX 2. Pre-AI Outbreak State: Logistics......................................... 61

ANNEX 3. Equipment Supplies Needed for Veterinary 

Laboratories ........................................................................................ 65

ANNEX 4. Outbreak Response: Logistics .............................................. 71

ANNEX 5. Budget Templates.................................................................. 75
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) iii 

ACRONYMS AND 

ABBREVIATIONS 

AI Avian Influenza 

AGID Agar Gel Immuno-Diffusion 

CVL Central Veterinary Laboratory 

DGAR Directorate General for Animal resources 

ELISA Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay 

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 

GDP Gross Domestic Product 

GOY Government of Yemen 

GPS Global Positioning System 

HAI Hemagglutination Inhibition 

HCAI High Committee for Avian Influenza 

HPAI Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 

HQ Headquarters 

IFA Immuno-Fluoresence Assay 

IT Information Technology 

km kilometers 

LBM Live Bird Market 

MAI Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation 

MPHP Ministry of Public Health and Population 

NAIAP National Avian Influenza Action Plan 

NDV Newcastle Disease 

NGO Nongovernmental Organization 

OIE Office International des Épizooties

PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction 

PPE Personal Protective Equipment 

RT-PCR Reverse Transcriptase- Polymerase Chain Reaction 

RRT-PCR Real-time Reverse Transcriptase- Polymerase Chain Reaction 

RVF Rift Valley Fever 

SPF Specific-Pathogen-Free 

SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 

TC Technical Committee

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

WHO World Health Organization 

YASP-ARD Yemen Agricultural Support Program- ARD, Inc. 

PART I. TECHNICAL 

SUMMARY REPORT

NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 1 

1.0 OVERVIEW 

The Technical Summary Report (Part One) represents the mission report prepared by the ARD consultant, 

Dr. Noel L. J. Miranda, and provides a technical brief of major activities accomplished during the mission. 

The purpose of the mission was to assist the Government of Yemen (GOY) in synthesizing their National 

Avian Influenza Action Plan (NAIAP). The assignment covered the period April 19 to May 6, 2006. A full 

description of the technical assistance activities is found in the adjoining report (Part Two), entitled National 

Avian Influenza Action Plan; and recommendations for GOY response and further actions follow in Part 

Three. 

1.1 SCOPE OF WORK 

The Scope of Work directed the consultant to accomplish the following tasks and deliverables: 

• Review the plans and documents related to avian influenza (AI) planning and emergency action policy in 

Yemen. Review documentation regarding AI outbreaks in the region. 

• Hold discussions with the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI), Ministry of Public Health and 

Population (MPHP), Ministry of Planning and other related authorities to determine the areas of 

weakness in the (current) AI Emergency Preparedness Plan and the need to improve the capacity of the 

disease surveillance and laboratory diagnosis for MAI. 

• Conduct a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis of existing emergency 

preparedness. 

• Organize and conduct workshop/training for local staff of MAI and private sector on Highly Pathogenic 

Avian Influenza (HPAI) surveillance, monitoring, prevention strategies and ensure quality and uniform 

data collection and recording. 

• Process outputs from literature review and workshop into draft HPAI Action Plan for the GOY 

including specific steps to be taken when HPAI is detected in Yemen. 

• Draft initial report summarizing preliminary findings, and recommendation inclusive of relevant 

attachments. 

1.2 DELIVERABLES 

• Detailed Work Plan for carrying out the HPAI Emergency Response Assessment and Outline for Final 

Report. Draft completed prior to consultant’s arrival in country and finalized with GOY 

counterparts first week in country.

• Organize and conduct one workshop/training for public and private stakeholders. Workshop 

completed April 24-26, 2006.

• Prepare preliminary draft HPAI Action Plan and Report for the Yemen Agricultural Support ProgramARD (YASP-ARD), USAID and GOY while in country. Draft National Avian Influenza Action Plan 

completed with GOY counterparts and shared during out-briefing with GOY and USAID on 

May 6, 2006.
2 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 

The Yemen Agricultural Support Program Team. 

• Make oral presentations to USAID and the GOY key stakeholders. The presentation should include 

preliminary findings and plausible recommendations. Oral debriefings made to GOY and USAID on 

May 2, 2006.

• Final draft HPAI Action Plan and Report submitted to ARD within 10 days of return to point of origin. 

Draft National Avian Influenza Action Plan completed and submitted to ARD for USAID 

branding May 17, 2006.

1.3 BACKGROUND 

The Government of Yemen, mainly through its Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, started to address the 

threat of avian influenza—particularly to its growing poultry industry—in 2004, during which Cabinet Decree 

No. 48 relating to the Protection Measures to Avoid Entry of AI to the Country, was issued. Further to this, 

in October 2005, another Cabinet Decree, No. 329, relating to Practicing the Necessary Measures for Bird 

Flu Prevention, was issued, and set into action a series of activities and planning, which generated a number 

of documents (detailed below), and initiated capacity-building efforts—particularly in the area of AI 

surveillance and diagnosis. 

The Director General of Animal Resources (DGAR) at the MAI then attempted to prepare the AI outbreak 

contingency plan. This plan was mainly based on available documents from various sources, including plans 

of other countries. The Technical Committee (TC) within the MAI Operation Room reviewed this plan and 

concluded that it needed essential inputs from an experienced international specialist, which the GOY 

recognized to be lacking within their national expertise. A clearer vision of how an effective AI outbreak 

response shall be carried out was required. 

The MAI requested the necessary technical assistance in the development of an emergency action plan from 

USAID, against the eventuality of the HPAI H5N1 virus being introduced into the country. The goal of the 

National Avian Influenza Action Plan is to take into account the threat from migratory birds within Yemen 

and the region, and the need to 

strengthen capacities for HPAI field 

surveillance and laboratory diagnosis. A 

well formulated NAIAP would help to 

strengthen the early warning 

surveillance system, as well as the 

emergency response system to contain 

a HPAI outbreak, should it occur. 

An AI action planning expert was 

contracted to provide the needed 

technical assistance, and worked closely 

with a team of local consultants and 

experts from the MAI and private 

poultry sector. This assistance was 

coordinated by the USAID-funded 

Yemen Agricultural Support Program 

being implemented by ARD, Inc. in 

Sana’a. 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 3 

2.0 ACTIVITIES AND 

 FINDINGS 

The consultant followed a prearranged work plan (see Chapter 3 of this section), with minor adjustments as 

necessary, in providing technical assistance. 

2.1 REVIEW OF PLANS AND DOCUMENTS RELATED TO AVIAN INFLUENZA 

PLANNING AND EMERGENCY ACTION POLICY IN YEMEN 

The existing plans and documents relevant to the GOY AI preparedness were obtained through ARD prior 

to the consultant’s arrival in country. Once the consultant arrived in Yemen, additional documents and 

information were provided by the DGAR-MAI. The main documents included: 

• National Avian Influenza Prevention Activities: This document describes the composition of the 

High Committee for Avian Influenza (HCAI) and the Operation Room under the MAI, formed through 

the issuance of Ministerial Resolution No. 67, in 2005. It further describes the designation and tasking of 

surveillance teams at the headquarters (HQ) in Sana’a and governorate level, the tasking of the Central 

Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) and Extension and Information team at HQ, and the available veterinary 

and para-veterinary professional resources. The document provides general notes on the weaknesses in 

the command, coordination and decision-making structures; in the national and regional surveillance and 

diagnostic facility and staff capacities; in conducting village extension services; and in completing the 

preparation of the National Avian Influenza Action Plan. The NAIAP indicates the specific elements to 

be described in preventive and outbreak response functional areas, such as specific personnel and their 

training needs; specific facility, equipment and materials/supplies needs; and specific command and 

coordination structures. 

• Emergency Plan of Action: Bird Flu Precautionary Measures: This document describes the initial 

intended response to be undertaken by the GOY as of October 22, 2005. It further provides a situational 

analysis of the risk of AI introduction and spread, enumerates the activities to be implemented separately 

by the MAI and the MPHP under the supervision of the HCAI and the respective ministerial technical 

committees, and presents the general budget relating to each general activity. The initial activities under 

the MAI described in this document were superseded by a more recent plan referred to as the 

Preventative Measures Plan for Dealing with Expected Avian Influenza for January-June 2006, prepared 

by the MAI, which is described below. 

• Preventative Measures Plan for Dealing with Expected Avian Influenza for January-June 2006: 

This is a more detailed document further describing the elements, and their implementation mechanisms 

and human resource requirements, in the general preventive activities to be carried out under the MAI. 

These elements include import restrictions and quarantine; intensive surveillance; migratory bird 

monitoring; establishment of poultry-free areas near migratory bird sites; enhancement of health and 

biosecurity awareness among farmers and villagers; requests for technical cooperation and funding 

support from international organizations; strengthening of the capacity of the CVL; and finalization of 

the NAIAP. 
4 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 

• Preventive Strategy of Avian Influenza in Case of its Confirmation: This is the first attempt to 

document the strategy in case the presence of AI (H5N1) in the country has been confirmed (i.e., the AI 

outbreak response). It outlines the implementing mechanisms of the major elements in an AI outbreak 

response, including zoning, stamping out, animal movement control, vaccination, disinfection, and 

enhanced surveillance. 

• Rapid Assessment: On Yemen Preparedness and Capabilities to Respond and Contain the Avian 

Influenza, April 8, 2006: This document details the situation of the poultry sector, the various veterinary 

service capacities, poultry marketing, the regulatory framework for livestock management and health 

protection, and the current status of AI in Yemen including the existing capacity for addressing AI and 

related recommendations. 

• Ministerial Resolution No. 67 ... that is pursuant to Cabinet Resolution No. 329 for the year 

2005.

• Proposal for Urgent Assistance in the Field of Avian Influenza Laboratory Surveillance: This is a 

proposal detailing the capacity-strengthening needs of the CVL in relation to AI. 

Other documents revealed the current state of affairs on the GOY’s efforts in addressing AI prevention and 

control in Yemen. It is noteworthy that the GOY has undertaken, over a period of six months, a series of 

efforts to seriously address AI. These activities show a progressive evolution in their consideration of the 

scope of activities, with presentation of some of the weaknesses and threats to their planning and present 

functional structures and capacities, and various recommendations worthy of closer attention. Their 

recognition of their limitations to come up with a detailed and functional AI Action Plan had in fact led them 

to this stage of further planning and preparation for inclusion of specific mechanisms, strategies, and 

resources needs in their response. A significant portion of these essential inputs were generated in the series 

of discussions and workshops held from April 23-29, 2006 through the technical support of YASP-ARD 

(refer to the National AI Action Plan dated May 2006 in Part Two of this report). 

2.2 DISCUSSIONS TO DETERMINE THE GAPS IN CURRENT AI EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS PLAN AND THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE CAPACITY OF THE 

DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AND LABORATORY DIAGNOSIS FOR MAI 

The consultant held four separate meetings with the Technical Committee (TC) under the Operation Room 

of the MAI on two occasions before the workshop (April 22 and 23) and on two occasions after the 

workshop (April 27 and 29). The first and second meetings with the TC identified the weaknesses (gaps) in 

the current AI Emergency Preparedness Plan which were then given emphasis during the workshop sessions. 

The consultant also meet with Dr. Monsoor, head of the CVL, who explained the current situation, AI 

surveillance and testing, and the plans and needs for capacity building. A tour of the laboratories was 

provided, with details of the planned restructuring of the laboratory to conform to the functional 

requirements of AI testing. 

A meeting was also held with the Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, Mr. Jalal Ibrahim Faqeerah, on April 

22. The main topics the Minister focused on were issues regarding the avian influenza workshop and the 

deliverables expected of the consultant. 

Findings. The weaknesses identified included the lack of specific systems and coordination structures: 

strategies, mechanisms, capacity building (facility, methods, trainings); prioritization and specific resources 

needs for AI surveillance; monitoring and diagnosis (reporting and sample submission and testing channels--

down to grassroots level, AI antigen detection capability such as by Immuno-Fluoresense Assay [IFA] in the 

CVL and regionally); regulatory framework and enhanced enforcement (especially control of live bird trade 

and marketing); and functional AI outbreak response (zoning/comparmentalization, stamping out, farmer’s 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 5 

compensation, safe stamping out practices, vaccination strategies). Additional emphasis must be placed on 

information and education campaigns for the public and professionals, and on community organization and 

mobilization. 

In the meeting with the Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, the following were areas further emphasized 

by the Minister: 

1. Evaluation of the Central Veterinary Laboratory must include recommendations for improvement. 

2. Specific tasks must be defined and personnel associated with AI surveillance must be trained and 

equipped to respond quickly. 

3. Evaluation of the MAI plan should include disease investigation, and how it can be improved. 

4. Actions and clear lines of responsibility must be clearly defined so that quick action will occur if an 

outbreak is detected. Time is critical once a positive sample is identified. Containment and stamping out 

must begin immediately or the poultry industry will be compromised. 

5. Backyard poultry (Baladi) production puts commercial poultry facilities at great risk. Make exclusion 

zones around commercial production to prohibit backyard poultry production. 

6. Locate five strategic regional laboratories to screen samples for the CVL. Regional labs could play a role 

in strengthening the disease surveillance situation in Yemen. If effective laboratories were positioned at 

the animal import and export points, neighboring countries would be encouraged to import animals from 

Yemen again. 

7. Ensure all participants in the workshop understand the critical nature of their positions. If they do not act 

quickly and effectively in the event of an outbreak, the consequences will be catastrophic. 

Other gaps became obvious as the assignment progressed, and these are reflected in the outputs of the 

workshop and contents of the NAIAP. 

2.3 STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (SWOT) 

ANALYSIS OF THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 

The SWOT analysis was based on technical discussion outputs, personal encounters, literature reviewed and 

field visits made (see Annex 1 and Chapter 3 of this section). The SWOT were gathered and agreed upon by 

the Technical Committee of MAI. For the sake of brevity, we have cited the top five in each category. A full 

list of all the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats can be found in Part Two. 

Strengths: 

• Veterinary sectors, MAI and GOY are paying attention—as shown by series of meetings held, plans 

prepared, decrees passed, and the recent holding of training workshop. 

• There are interagency Operation Rooms defined and in place. 

• Regulation (Law No. 17) on protection of livestock has been issued (but needs to be enforced). 

• The GOY has experience from dealing with the Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outbreak in 2000-2001. 

• There is a pool of trained Animal Primary Health Care Workers in some remote areas. 
6 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 

Weaknesses: 

• Surveillance and diagnostic capacities (no clear AI case definition, cooperation among governorates, 

complete data, virus isolation and antigen detection tests, sample collection and storage, communication, 

data management, risk analysis, regional labs) are weak. 

• Line of command, especially during an outbreak, is not defined. 

• There are a lack of funds or delayed release of funds for such an outbreak. 

• There is a need for trained staff in concerned activities and sectors (veterinarians in all districts). 

• The regulatory framework needs to be enhanced (formulate the Implementing Rules and Regulations for 

Livestock Law No. 17). 

Opportunities: 

• Yemen is still AI free. 

• Chicken is the primary poultry and major farms are mostly (95%) situated in a cluster in the highlands 

(western, central, northern and southern areas) of the country. 

• Backyard chicken farming is relatively small at less than 10% of production, and far from migratory bird 

sites. 

• There is no tradition of duck and pig raising (so no mixing with chickens). 

• There is no cock fighting and therefore no fighting cocks are kept in villages. 

Threats: 

• Egypt, a victim of an AI outbreak, is just across the Red Sea. 

• Migratory birds frequent the vast coastal areas both in the West and South. 

• There is a rich wild bird population in Yemen, including crows. 

• About 73% of the population is in rural areas (this encourages low biosecurity practices). 

• Poultry production is increasing (7% growth) compared with the growth of human population—some 

farm areas are dense (e.g., Dhamar). 

2.4 WORKSHOP/TRAINING FOR MAI LOCAL STAFF AND PRIVATE SECTOR ON 

HPAI SURVEILLANCE, MONITORING, AND PREVENTION STRATEGIES 

A three-day workshop was organized according to the purposes listed above, following a set program. It was 

attended by 45 participants, mostly veterinary professionals from the governorates, representatives from 

concerned government ministries, and representatives from the private (poultry) sector. The focus was on the 

following priority functional areas of a National AI Action Plan: 

• Surveillance, Monitoring and Diagnosis 

– Prevention before, and containment during an AI outbreak (reporting and sample submission and 

testing channels down to grassroots level, AI antigen detection capability such as by IFA in the CVL 

and regionally). 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 7 

A Workshop/Training Session. 

• Supportive Regulatory 

Framework and Enhanced 

Enforcement 

– Control of chicken 

movement from farm to 

market, general biosecurity 

in farms and markets, 

controlling live bird 

marketing (LBM) in general: 

quarantine and inspections, 

veterinary officers, 

registrations, zoning, and 

sanitation. 

• Functional AI Outbreak 

Emergency Response 

– Aspects of zoning/comparmentalization, stamping out, farmer’s compensation, safe stamping out 

practices, and vaccination strategies. 

The three main workshop sessions and concluding discussions were able to generate a significant amount of 

outputs, which the TC then synthesized during further meetings held on April 27 and 29, 2006. These 

outputs were embodied in the presentations made by the consultant during his debriefing with USAID and 

MAI, and shall be reflected accordingly in the National AI Action Plan. 

2.5 PROCESS OF LITERATURE REVIEW, WORKSHOP AND VARIOUS OTHER 

ACTIVITIES INTO A DRAFT (PROPOSED) HPAI ACTION PLAN FOR THE GOY 

Refer to Part Two of this report for the National AI Action Plan. 

2.6 OTHER ACTIVITIES 

The consultant visited several poultry farms on April 20, 27 and 30, 2006. On April 27, he also made a 

presentation on avian influenza at the meeting of the Yemen Veterinary Association in Dhamar Governorate 

that was attended by 50 to 60 veterinarians from all practices.

The farm visits revealed the lack of information on AI case recognition and reporting. The low level of 

biosecurity in the small commercial farms was also noted. Even in a large commercial farm situated in Sana’a, 

layer chickens were seen to be a bit overcrowded, although higher levels of biosecurity seem to exist. Overall, 

there is still room for improvements in biosecurity at the farms visited and possibly in educating chicken 

caretakers on AI recognition and associated risk. 
8 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 

3.0 CONSULTANT 

 ITINERARY, FIELD VISITS 

 AND WORKSHOPS 

WORK ITINERARY (BASED ON THE WORK PLAN) FOR THE CONSULTANCY OF 

NOEL L. J. MIRANDA IN YEMEN (APRIL 18 TO MAY 6, 2006) 

April 18 (Arrival/ travel day)

• Arrival in Yemen (at about 4:00 pm) 

• Met briefly with the concerned ARD personnel to review the work plan and various mission matters. 

April 19 

• Met with USAID officers (made PowerPoint presentation). 

• Met with MAI officers (Central Veterinarian Lab and Animal Health Department). Toured the laboratory 

facilities and epidemiology unit. 

April 20 

• Visited the field (poultry farms around Sana’a). 

April 21 (Holiday)

April 22

• Met with the Technical Committee of the MAI (made PowerPoint presentation). 

• Met with the MAI Minister. 

• Prepared for the workshop. 

April 23

• Met with the Technical Committee and discussed gaps in the AI Plan and surveillance and diagnosis. 

• Discussed workshop matters—desired outputs. 

April 24-26 (Held Workshop with 45 participants: see separate workshop program)
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 9 

April 27 

• Made presentation in Thamar University and conducted field visits in Dhamar and Ibb (see Mission 

report).

April 28 (Holiday)

April 29

• Had final meeting with the Technical Committee (at Movenpick Hotel): 

– Initiated the SWOT analysis. 

– Finalized the synthesis of the AI Action Plan. 

April 30 

• Field visit (Marib Farms in Sana’a). 

May 1 (Labor day)

May 2 

• Debriefing at USAID at 9 am (made PowerPoint presentation). 

• Debriefing at the MAI at 11 am with Deputy Minister in attendance (made PowerPoint presentation). 

May 3 and 4 

• Prepared draft Mission Report and AI Action Plan. 

May 5 (Holiday)

May 6 (Departure/travel day)

• Submitted draft Mission Report and AI Action Plan to ARD. 

• Made presentation to the High Committee for AI (in the presence of the Ministers of the MAI and the 

MPHP). 

FIELD VISITS 

Location Name of 

Farm 

Type of 

Farm Capacity

# of 

Poultry 

houses 

Diseases Mortality 

rate Notes 

Ka'a AlGaidi Layers 16,000 2 ND 24% 

Ka'a AlGaidi Layers Empty 2 

Closed / Disease 

problems; low 

biosecurity 

University of 

Thamar/ Vet 

college Presentation on AI 

Yarim 

Hammod AlBahry Layers 70,000 9 ND 12 45 weeks of age 
10 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 

Location Name of 

Farm 

Type of 

Farm Capacity

# of 

Poultry 

houses 

Diseases Mortality 

rate Notes 

Yarin/AlFAO Many farms 

to know the density 

of farms 

Yarim/Khaw Yehya Al-Galal Layers 30,000 4 ND few 51 weeks of age 

Yarim Al-Kohizah Layers 4 projects many DN few 

different ages & 

looked from outside 

Thamak 

Slaughter 

house 3000/H 

generally low 

biosecurity 

Al-Rahabah Marib Layers 300K 17 ND few 

closed system & feed 

factory; some 

overcrowding 

WORKSHOP ON AI SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL, EAGLE HOTEL , SANA’A 24-26 

APRIL 2006 

Development of the AI Action Plan for Yemen 

Sana’a, Eagle Hotel 

Day 1 Opening and Presentation 

April 24 (AM)

Opening Ceremony will start at 9:00 am to 10:00 am (with the MAI Minister) 

10 :00 am to 1:00 pm 

Presentations from the Technical Committees 

• Yemen Poultry Industry Data (Dr. Turqi Sarakbi) 

• Current situation of disease investigation. (Dr. Sami, MAI) 

• MOH- Action Plan and Surveillance System (Dr. Al-Kohlani) 

• Action Plan and Current Prevention Measures (Dr. Monsoor, MAI) 

• Outbreak of AI (Dr. Najib) 

April 24 (PM)

2:00 pm to 4:30pm 

Workshop 1: Rapid HPAI Detection/Feedback/Monitoring and Protection of AI-Free State 

• Presentations of N. Miranda 

– AI Action Plan: Various Considerations. 

– AI Surveillance and Monitoring N. Miranda. 

• Discussion 

• This portion will focus on the Surveillance and Disease Monitoring issues, as well as on various measures 

to protect Yemen from an AI Outbreak 

________________________________________________________________________ 

Day 2 

April 25 (AM)

9 :00 am to 1:00 pm 

Summary presentations on outputs on surveillance and diagnosis, and poultry vaccination 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 11 

 

Workshop 2: HPAI Preventive or Spread Reduction Measures 

• Presentation 

- Regulations Supportive of AI Control Measures- N. Miranda 

• Discussion 

• This portion with focus on regulatory and non-regulatory approaches to AI control, the support 

measures to the general stamping out operation and the relevant command chains (e.g. IEC and 

community mobilization) 

April 25 (PM)

2:00 pm to 4:30pm 

Workshop 3: Rapid AI Stamping Out Operation 

• Presentation 

– AI Outbreak Control- N. Miranda 

– Safe Procedures During Stamping Out- N. Miranda 

– Public Health Concerns- N. Miranda 

• Discussion 

• This portion will focus on the stamping out issues including compensation, command chains, veterinary 

public health considerations 

________________________________________________________________________ 

Day 3 

April 26 (AM)

9:00 pm to 1:00 

Summary presentations on outputs on stamping out operations 

Presentation (Summary of stamping out requirements and poultry vaccination)- 

• N. Miranda 

Other Concerns and AI vaccination 

• General Situation and Biosecurity and vaccination – Dr. Turkey 

• Discussion 

• Closing ceremony 

April 26 (PM)

Meeting with Technical Committee (MAI) to summarize and synthesize the workshop outputs. 

PART II. NATIONAL 

AVIAN INFLUENZA 

ACTION PLAN

NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 15 

1.0 OVERVIEW 

Avian influenza (AI) is a zoonotic disease that can be transmitted from wild birds and poultry to people. This 

not only endangers livelihoods and food security by affecting poultry raised for food, but also compromises 

human health and survival. Socioeconomic research on the agriculture side has also shown how poultry and 

livestock can be a major component of the coping strategies of the poor, and the presence of diseases that 

compromise both these and the modest income generated from the animals of low and even middle income 

people can have disastrous consequences for the farming communities and growing poultry sector. 

Since December 2003, the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have swept through poultry 

populations across several continents. The outbreaks are historically unprecedented in scale and geographical 

spread. To date, Yemen is among the countries that are yet unaffected by the HPAI that is ravaging the 

Middle East. The Government of Yemen (GOY) is understandably concerned, as the negative implications 

for Yemen would be enormous. 

This National AI Action Plan (NAIAP) was synthesized through consultative discussions held by the 

Technical Committee (TC) for Avian Influenza of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI), with 

technical inputs from the USAID-funded Yemen Agricultural Support Program (YASP) being implemented 

by ARD, Inc., a US-based firm. Emphasis was placed on filling the gaps in the existing AI outbreak 

preparedness by specifying the essential inputs for enhancing AI surveillance, monitoring and diagnosis, AI 

antigen detection capability, regulatory framework and enforcement, and the functional areas of the AI 

outbreak response. The NAIAP also specifies proposed policy directions, major activities for further actions, 

as well as the logistical and human resources required. It takes into consideration the need to respond to the 

impending threat of AI outbreaks in Yemen, and anticipates future challenges, in particular in relation to the 

implementation of a community-based outbreak response and mitigation plan. 

This Plan also aims to place additional emphasis on community organization and mobilization at the 

grassroots level. It highlights the need to provide essential core capacities to village primary animal health care 

volunteers (or para-veterinarians), village health workers and local government staff to prepare themselves, 

under the context of the GOY NAIAP, for a possible avian influenza outbreak. It hopes to effectively link 

the national response activities to the poultry farming communities at risk of being affected by AI outbreaks. 

An important component is the dissemination of information on the overall GOY National AI Action Plan, 

the preparation of community-based prevention and outbreak action plans, and the defining of roles and 

responsibilities through training workshops at the “Uzla” (group of villages) or district levels throughout 

Yemen. 

Strengthening national, state (governorate) and local community capacities to detect, investigate and contain 

epizootics is a goal that requires continued efforts if it is to be sustainable. Thus, an objective of this Plan is 

the bridging of implementation gaps from the national level down to the village level, so that local farming 

communities will acquire core capacities in implementing the activities. This will ensure effective surveillance, 

preparedness and response to the impending threat of avian influenza in Yemen. A program for assisting 

farming communities to cope with economic loss after an outbreak occurs may be subsequently developed. 

This current document is essentially a Draft Version of what would be the final National AI Action Plan 

endorsed by the Technical Committee and approved by the High Committee for Avian Influenza (HCAI). 
16 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

1.1 GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SITUATION 

The HPAI H5N1 virus is the most recently emerged zoonosis that has vastly impacted the economies of 

many countries in Asia, and now some countries in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. HPAI has 

propagated among a wide range of wild and domestic bird populations, and has become endemic in poultry in 

Southeast Asia. Since December 2003, the pattern, scale and geographical spread of the outbreaks have been 

historically unprecedented. Their economic impact on the agricultural sector of the affected countries has 

been huge, amounting to an estimated US $10 billion. Across Southeast Asia, the impact of a single large 

outbreak was estimated to result in the reduction of up to 1.5% of GDP. Current updated estimates call for 

investments of up to US $494 million for the global fight against the disease in animals through the year 2008. 

From December 2003 to December 2005, outbreaks of H5N1 in poultry have occurred in nine countries in 

Asia (Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam). Since late 

July 2005, outbreaks in domestic poultry as well as wild birds have been reported in the Russian Federation, 

Kazakhstan, Romania, Mongolia, Turkey and Croatia. In addition, in recent months, outbreaks in poultry 

have increased again in Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and China, and H5N1 virus has spread to Austria, Italy, 

Germany, Greece, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, India, Niger, Nigeria, Albania, and Cameroon, apparently 

though migratory birds. The situation in Egypt demonstrates that even with the lessons learned, carrying out 

HPAI stamping out operations can be very difficult. 

H5N1 is the first AI virus that is capable of wiping out poultry stocks, simultaneously causing a number of 

human fatalities. Its implications thus concern both health and economics—mass culling of poultry exacts a 

heavy toll on the food security of affected farming communities, often with only minimal compensation. The 

health issue is linked to its potential to result in a catastrophic human influenza pandemic, possibly in the near 

future. 

1.2 BACKGROUND SITUATION IN YEMEN 

To date, Yemen joins other countries still free of HPAI. The poultry industry produces more than 100 

million chickens annually, and contributes US $2 million to the total agriculture revenue per annum. The total 

current investment in the entire poultry industry is estimated at US $0.5 billion. The industry is growing at a 

rate of 7% annually, similar to the rates identified in Southeast Asian countries. The occurrence of AI would 

lead to the devastation of this industry. Consequently, it will also result in the rise in prices of livestock 

products, fish and other food items, loss of market for corn producers and other raw material suppliers, and 

of course the threat to the health of the Yemeni people. 

The GOY, mainly through its Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, started to address the threat of avian 

influenza—particularly to its growing poultry industry—in 2004, during which Cabinet Decree No. 48, 

relating to the Protection Measures to Avoid Entry of AI to the Country, was issued. In October 2005, 

another Cabinet Decree, No. 329, relating to Practicing the Necessary Measures for Bird Flu Prevention, was 

issued, and set into action a series of activities and planning, which generated a number of technical 

documents and initiated capacity-building efforts, particularly in the area of AI surveillance and diagnosis (see 

Annex 1). 

The Directorate General for Animal Resources (DGAR) in the MAI then attempted to prepare the AI 

outbreak contingency plan. This plan was mainly based on available documents from various sources, 

including plans of other countries. The HCAI and Operation Rooms in both the MAI and the Ministry of 

Public Health and Population (MPHP) were then formed with the following main objectives: 

• Ensure that the Yemen remains free of HPAI. 

• Control and eradicate HPAI in case of disease introduction. 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 17 

• Control transmission of HPAI from fowls to humans. 

A Technical Committee, formed within the MAI Operation Room, reviewed the draft of the AI outbreak 

contingency plan and concluded that it needed essential technical inputs to make it more specific and 

comprehensive. A clearer vision of how an effective AI outbreak response will be carried out was required. 

The gaps identified included the lack of specific systems and coordination structures; strategies; mechanisms; 

capacity building (facility, methods, trainings); prioritization and specific resource needs for AI surveillance; 

monitoring and diagnosis (reporting and sample submission and testing channels—down to grassroots level, 

AI antigen detection capability such as by Immuno-Fluoresense Assay [IFA] in the Central Veterinary 

Laboratory [CVL] and regionally); regulatory framework and enhanced enforcement (especially control of live 

bird trade and marketing); and functional AI outbreak response (zoning/compartmentalization, stamping out, 

farmer’s compensation, safe stamping out practices, vaccination strategies). Additional emphasis must be 

placed on information and education campaigns for the professionals and the public through cooperation 

with the MPHP, and on community organization and mobilization. The filling of these gaps served as the 

focus of this National AI Action Plan document. 

A major activity currently being undertaken by the GOY is improving surveillance and diagnostic capacities, 

restricting importation from AI-affected countries, preventing contacts between migratory birds and poultry, 

and enhancing the dissemination of information for public and health worker awareness. The inadequate 

human and financial resources available to enable the implementation of this action-specific plan down to 

village levels, particularly in high risk regions, poses a challenge to the overall success of the GOY in dealing 

with HPAI. 
18 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

2.0 COMMUNITY-BASED 

 ACTION: A MAJOR 

 STRATEGY TO INITIATE 

As mentioned, an objective of this Plan is to assist in bridging implementation gaps in the GOY program. 

Another goal is to facilitate the involvement of local farming communities to acquire core capacities in 

implementing the national program at the grassroots level and in coping mechanisms in case the outbreak 

actually occurs in Yemen. To achieve these objectives, the Plan should be rooted on strengthening state 

(governorate) capacities in: 

• AI prevention and control, surveillance and monitoring, early AI case recognition and rapid reporting, 

and AI outbreak containment; 

• Networking of specific commands, functions and practical skills, as well as interdisciplinary collaboration 

up to the community and farm levels; and 

• Public health aspects of biosecurity and potential transmission of disease to human populations. 

A comprehensive grassroots action plan must consider addressing the following four key areas: 

1. Strengthening of specific grassroots capacities for early detection, reporting and response to 

possible disease outbreaks. The strategic objectives are (i) coordinating and monitoring local efforts to 

detect potential outbreaks, and (ii) developing basic capacities for prompt detection and reporting of 

outbreaks. Rather than building another system for monitoring and detecting, local systems should 

instead feed into the existing national structure for disease surveillance and reporting.

2. Strengthening of specific grassroots capacities for disease prevention and control in support of 

the implementation of the national program. The strategic objectives are (i) familiarization and 

training in biosecurity and best practices for disease prevention and control, (ii) improved hygiene and 

sanitation in immediate household environment and farm premises, and (iii) training and involvement of 

para-veterinarians and other community volunteers. 

3. Public information management and awareness campaign, including support to the production 

and dissemination of technical documents and farmer teaching materials. An important element 

of these activities will be to develop innovative strategies and tools for sharing knowledge and best 

practices to farmers and their communities. Activities such as enhancing relations with local institutions, 

NGOs, commercial stakeholders, the media and the general public will be needed to improve public 

awareness, cooperation and participation. Outreach, advocacy and external relations are included as 

support functions. These activities will likewise serve as a portal for local communities to access national 

program plans, activities and resources. 

4. Program for coping mechanisms for farmers in the event of outbreaks. The strategic objectives are 

(i) assisting in mechanisms for farmers’ compensation for animal loss after stamping out operations, (ii) 

assisting in the economic recovery efforts of affected farmers and communities post-outbreak, and (iii) 

assisting in establishment and provision of alternative sources of livelihood in case of inability to restock 

poultry and livestock post-outbreak. 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 19 

3.0 INDICATION OF SWOT 

 IN RELATION TO 

 YEMEN’S AI RESPONSE 

The identification of the following strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) served as 

guidance to the discussions that generated most of the inputs to this Plan. 

Strengths: 

1. Veterinary sectors, MAI and GOY are paying attention—as shown by series of meetings held, plans 

prepared, decrees passed, and the recent holding of training workshop. 

2. There are interagency Operation Rooms defined and in place. 

3. Regulation (Law No. 17) on protection of livestock has been issued (but needs to be enforced). 

4. The GOY has experience from dealing with the Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outbreak in 2000-2001. 

5. There is a pool of trained Animal Primary Health Care Workers in some remote areas. 

6. Health workers are available to support at villages and districts. 

7. Surveillance centers in some governorates have information technology (IT) capability (although not 

enough). 

8. The GOY has diagnosis capability and equipment but needs improvements. 

9. The Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) can link with reference labs in UK and Egypt. 

10. There is international organization support (FAO, USAID, World Bank). 

Weaknesses: 

1. Surveillance and diagnostic capacities (no clear AI case definition, cooperation among governorates, 

complete data, virus isolation and antigen detection tests, sample collection and storage, communication, 

data management, risk analysis, regional labs) are weak. 

2. Line of command, especially during an outbreak, is not defined. 

3. There are a lack of funds or delayed release of funds for such an outbreak. 

4. There is a need for trained staff in concerned activities and sectors (veterinarians in all districts). 

5. The regulatory framework needs to be enhanced (formulate the Implementing Rules and Regulations for 

Livestock Law No. 17). 

6. There is wide practice of recycling untreated manure as fertilizers in Yemen. 

7. More than 95% of poultry farms are Sector 2-3 with low biosecurity. 
20 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

8. Ambulant or street live bird markets (LBMs) are present. 

9. The implementation details of the AI Action Plan are just now being formulated. 

10. People and veterinary professionals lack motivation. 

11. Reports of suspected cases have been received mostly from accessible areas and few or none from 

remote areas. 

12. There is a need to develop the coordination between government-related authorities. 

13. There is no compensation system at present. 

14. The means of transport to support the surveillance activities is not defined. 

15. There is no reporting system between the private sector and the government. 

16. There are few central slaughterhouses (there are only two in Dhamar and one may not be functioning 

well). 

17. The quarantine ports are not fully functional (especially at high-risk areas). 

18. Full authority over meat inspection and live bird markets is not yet with the MAI. 

19. There is low public awareness (needs improvement and better approaches). 

Opportunities: 

1. Yemen is still AI free. 

2. Chicken is the primary poultry and major farms are mostly (95%) situated in a cluster in the highlands 

(western, central, northern and southern areas) of the country. 

3. Backyard chicken farming is relatively small at less than 10% of production, and far from migratory bird 

sites. 

4. There is no tradition of duck and pig raising (so no mixing with chickens). 

5. There is no cock fighting and therefore no fighting cocks are kept in villages. 

6. Climate is moderate (with low humidity) in the highlands. The coastal areas are hot and humid. Some 

areas are favorable for AI spread reduction. 

7. Rivers and lakes are dry throughout most of the year; big desert areas exist. 

8. Some high-risk farming practices are absent such as raising chickens above bodies of water. Chicken 

farms are usually far from beaches. 

9. LBMs tend to be less crowded compared with Southeast Asia. 

10. There are already lessons learned from Southeast Asia, Egypt, etc. (since 1997). 

11. Funding for AI seems to be much more readily available than before (but competition for funds 

increasing). 

12. Good poultry vaccines are becoming more available. 

Threats: 

1. Egypt, a victim of an AI outbreak, is just across the Red Sea. 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 21 

2. Migratory birds frequent the vast coastal areas both in the West and South. 

3. There is a rich wild bird population in Yemen, including crows. 

4. About 73% of the population is in rural areas (this encourages low biosecurity practices). 

5. Poultry production is increasing (7% growth) compared with the growth of human population—some 

farm areas are dense (e.g., Dhamar). 

6. Yemen is bordered on the North and East by other countries. 

7. Presence of H9N2 and Newcastle Disease Virus (NDV), other poultry diseases that may complicate case 

detection and diagnosis. 

8. Importation of chickens and poultry feeds still being done. 

9. Yemen serves as livestock transit/passage way from Africa to the Middle East. 

10. Some high risk chicken marketing practices are present (LBM, slaughtering on site, etc.). 

11. There are uncontrolled stray dogs roaming around the streets and villages. 

12. There is need for funding. 
22 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

4.0 GUIDING PRINCIPLES 

 AND POLICIES 

The following are brief policy statements that are meant to be further elaborated and elevated into their 

higher administrative forms by way of the issuance of decrees or regulations. These policies are intended to 

support the effective implementation of all the functional elements of the Plan. 

1. Ban backyard poultry raising in coastal areas. 

2. Ban backyard poultry raising around major commercial poultry farms (flocks of more than 10,000). 

3. Initiate vaccination only upon the initial AI outbreak detection. 

4. Provide incentives and compensation to farmers affected by stamping out. 

5. Strengthen the central surveillance and diagnostic capability of the MAI and set up AI surveillance 

centers for each district. 

6. Set up AI surveillance centers, including regional laboratories in priority governorates. 

7. Use at least any AI antigen detection test for determining H5N1 infections in poultry. 

8. Create an integrated public health law that addresses the outbreak threats of emerging zoonoses. 

9. Strengthen the regulatory enforcement of Livestock Law No. 17 in view of the threat of H5N1. 

10. Ban ambulant or street live bird marketing (LBM) and situate LBM at premises. 

11. Encourage central chicken slaughtering and selling of dressed chilled chicken. 

12. Stamping out shall be the first line of action against an H5N1 outbreak in poultry. 

13. Stamping out and related operations shall be a multi-agency emergency task. 

14. Staff training needs, with regard to this action plan, shall be completed and prioritized. 

15. The actions and measures in this action plan shall be directed to priority governorates as to risk and 

poultry industry loss. 

16. The criteria for declaring stamping out a failure shall be set and followed so that enhanced contingency 

measures may be applied. 

17. Enhance public awareness as this is a priority activity. 

18. Related authorities involved in implementing this action plan shall be expected to strengthen their 

coordination. 

19. Field staff expected to handle infected poultry or take part in high risk operations shall be provided 

complete prophylaxis. 

20. This National AI Action Plan shall be a unified plan from the MAI and MPHP and shall be approved by 

the National High Committee and issued through a Cabinet resolution. 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 23 

Guiding Principles/Main Considerations Relating to HPAI: 

1. Backyard or free-range poultry and the movement of live poultry through markets in general have been 

the principal means for the epizootic spread of AI infection. 

2. H5N1 is known to cause peracute infections resulting in death of poultry within one to two days with up 

to 100% mortality. 

3. The virus can easily be spread through direct contact with feces and respiratory secretions, droplets, and 

fomites (e.g., mechanical transfer in hair, clothing and footwear of people, and on equipment, materials 

and vehicles). Fomites comprise the major means of transmitting infection between premises. 

4. AI virus can remain viable for longer periods in cold and humid environments. It can survive in feces 

from 6 to 35 days. 

5. AI virus can be carried by most avian species (e.g., migratory waterfowls) without signs of clinical disease. 

It can be carried and shed by live poultry for at least two weeks and up to 30 days by recovering 

birds.The principal means by which AI viruses initiate outbreaks is through wild birds contaminating 

food or water supplies (such as lakes) of poultry. It can remain infective in lake/pond water for up to 

four days at 22°C. 

7. The AI virus may contaminate the inside and outside of eggs and poultry meat and can survive in frozen 

carcasses for as long as three weeks. 

8. Improving biosecurity (biocontainment and bioexclusion) is the most important approach for poultry 

producers in preventing the spread of AI. 

9. Widespread H5N1 infections in the animal population can result in mutations that may increase the 

disease potential of this AI virus in humans and animals. 

10. Several countries have successfully stamped out widespread AI infections in poultry through rapid 

imposition of quarantine, isolation of infected and potentially-infected poultry, culling, sanitary disposal 

of carcasses, comprehensive decontamination, movement restrictions, surveillance (reporting and 

diagnosis), and enhanced biosecurity in general. 

11. It is important that all the emergency outbreak response strategies in this National AI Action Plan will be 

carried out simultaneously within the shortest time feasible (target 24-48 hrs.) to realize an effective end 

to an outbreak. 
24 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

5.0 MAIN ACTIONS 

 REQUIRING EFFECTIVE 

 IMPLEMENTATION 

This National AI Action Plan focuses on the major functional areas in an AI preventive and outbreak 

response. These are: 

• Surveillance, Monitoring and Diagnosis (both during the AI preventive and outbreak 

containment stages): These areas are most important especially at this stage where Yemen is still AI 

free, or at the stage where HPAI H5N1 has in fact entered Yemen and an early emergency response 

could be realized. However, other preventive functions such as poultry import control and policing 

poultry movement through borders should also be established. These major functions will need to be 

enhanced during the outbreak stage. 

• Supportive Regulatory Framework: This element must address main areas where regulatory control 

may be valuable such as in the control of chicken movement from farm to market, general biosecurity in 

farms and markets, and controlling live bird marketing in general: quarantine and inspections, instituting 

veterinary supervision, registrations, zoning and sanitation. It must be anticipated that HPAI H5N1 may 

escape surveillance detection, and enters and starts to spread until its obvious detection—in this case, 

regulations that are already in place could restrict the scale of the initial outbreaks. 

• HPAI Outbreak Emergency Response (including zoning and stamping out activities, 

compensation, vaccination): These functions are most important to ensure the early containment of 

outbreaks, possibly within 24 hours from first onset. 

5.1 SURVEILLANCE, MONITORING AND DIAGNOSIS 

Surveillance activities will be conducted throughout the country; however, there are regions that seem to be 

more at risk or are important poultry-raising regions. In this regard, surveillance and diagnosis capacity 

building will be regionally prioritized based on the following AI risk criteria: 

• Coastal areas where migratory birds are present (see Figure 5.1). The western coastal areas are more important 

than the southern coastal areas as these pose greater threats to the nearby, dense, poultry population. 

• Areas where there are high backyard (free-range) poultry population, especially near the coastal areas. 

• Live poultry markets within the above areas. 

• Areas with a significant cluster of poultry farms (Figure 5.2), especially surrounded by villages with freerange chickens. 

• Areas where ducks and pigeons may be raised and are in close proximity to the above areas. 

• Areas along regional trade routes and unsecured borders, especially those in close proximity to the above areas. 
FIGURE 5.1. LOCATION OF MIGRATORY BIRDS IN YEMEN 

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Directorate General of Animal Resources 
26 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

FIGURE 5.2. LOCATION OF POULTRY FARMS IN YEMEN 

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Directorate General of Animal Resources 

Effective surveillance should start at grassroots level (that is within villages) and all the essential elements 

must be in place—early reporting/warning systems, collection of epidemiologic information, and collection 

of samples for viro-serological diagnosis. 

5.1.1 Village-Level Surveillance 

The village level serves as an important root for effective AI surveillance wherein suspected AI cases in 

chickens or wild birds can be expected to be reported within the same day as they are identified. Normally, it 

would be the farmer or villager who would first know about any suspected AI case. This person must be 

knowledgeable about the case definition of HPAI, in chickens in particular. In this regard, the approved case 

definition shall be: 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 27 

• Acute signs of depression and respiratory disease, swollen heads (possibly periorbital edema), congestion 

and cyanosis of the combs or wattles, and possibly neurological signs (incoordination) and diarrhea—

there is usually acute onset and high mortality (100%) in entire flock in 48 hours. 

• High mortality is defined as: 

– >5% daily in a flock of <250 birds for 2 days 

– >1% daily in a flock of >250 birds for 2 days 

Thus, any person seeing these signs in village chickens must immediately report the case to a designated 

village volunteer, who in some places could be a trained teacher or para-veterinarian with previous training in 

animal primary health care. Moreover village leaders (Shikhs) shall be trained on the importance and process 

of surveillance reporting. These volunteers, since they are few in number, could represent designated group of 

villages or Uzlas. These Uzlas (about 3,000 in the entire country) will have the following minimal functions 

and capability: 

1. Nominate volunteers to assist farmers to report to the Uzla (e.g., by telephone to the local council); 

2. Receive reports from the volunteers; and 

3. Recognize and record symptoms of AI and other diseases. Understands the seriousness of AI, conducts 

public awareness campaigns and encourages farmers to report suspected cases of AI. 

Volunteers in these Uzlas must be provided training in the above functions. At this stage, more volunteers are 

needed per Uzla, especially in the priority areas to be identified later. 

5.1.2 District-Level Surveillance 

The are a large number of districts in Yemen (336), and they should serve as disease surveillance centers 

where veterinary or para-veterinary professionals can be stationed to receive reports of AI cases from the 

“volunteers” as described above. There should be at least one or two of these trained professionals; they 

could be new graduates, volunteers from the private sector, or existing public health workers. They will be 

expected to do the following: 

• Investigate reported AI cases within the day the report is received; collect information and samples using 

a standard report form (see Figure 5.3); storing or immediately transporting samples to the governorate 

level or to the nearest regional laboratory for quick diagnosis, together with a copy of the report form.

Additionally the para-veterinary professionals will require the following support: 

• Training in AI case recognition as defined above; collecting/storing/transporting samples; writing case 

reports and filing report forms properly; and, possibly, how to use a Geographic Positioning System 

(GPS). 

• Equipment and supplies including refrigerators/freezers, cold boxes and ice packs, telephone/fax, sets of 

Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs), GPS, veterinary kit (materials for collecting samples), and a 

means of transport. 

5.1.3 Governorate-Level Surveillance 

There are a total of 21 governorates in Yemen, each with about 15 to 20 districts. Not all are threatened by the 

incursion of HPAI as the risks vary from area to area depending on their proximity to the coastal borders or the 

density of poultry (especially free-range) susceptible to AI infection possibly originating from wild birds. 
28 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

FIGURE 5.3. SAMPLE REPORTING FORM 

Republic of Yemen 

Directorate General of Animal Resources 

Animal Health Department 

Strategy Unit 

 Avian Influenza Surveillance Form

General information 

Farm: regional: raising : Disease suspected : Report Type: 

References Code : Governorate : District : 

Village/location : N.S: E.W: 

Farming System Commercial farm Semi commercial farm Backyard 

Infected area’s information 

Date of report( d/m/y) ............/....../........ Estimated date of first clinical 

case 

............/....../... 

Emergency report ( complete this part ) 

Bird / animal sp. Cases Deaths At risk Beginning 

of deaths 

Period of death Comments 

 (Age,sex,breed,etc ) 

Breeder of Broiler 

Breeder of Layer 

Layers 

Broiler 

Migrating bird 

Other Sp. 

If this is a Follow up report, please fill in this part 

Bird sp. No. of new cases since last 

cases 

No. of new deaths No. at risk 

 

Clinical signs 

□ Reparatory signs □ Nervous signs □ Loss of feathers 

□ Lameness □ Decreased egg production □ Dermatitis 

□ Nasal discharge □ Diarrhea □ Loss of body weight 

Other signs: 

PM Lesions 

Diagnosis 

Tentative diagnosis Differential diagnosis 

Epidemiological information 

 Yes □ No □ Did you vaccinate the poultry ? when ? for what 

? 

Recent Introductions Yes □ No □

 

□ Backyard Commercial Bird □ Wild bird □ Presence of stray cats & dogs □ 

Others □

Lab Information (sample collection) 

Type of Bird Type of samples No. of samples Use of transport 

medium 

Storage 

condition 

Remarks 

 

Date sent to lab ...../....../......... Name of local lab International lab 

 

Control 

Destroy □ Vaccination □ Animal movement □ Treatment □

Other □ Slaughter □ Quarantine □ 

Prepared by ( Vet. – Vet ass. – Vet. Tech. ) 

Name : Signature : Position : ...../....../......Date 

Tentative diagnosis
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 29 

All the governorates, especially those identified as priority areas, will appoint an Avian Influenza Technical 

Committee. Its members should be comprised of individuals who represent key government bodies such as 

the MAI, MPHP, Ministry of Environment and Water, Ministry of Municipality, local council, and police. 

The Committee’s job will be to supervise all technical actions carried out within their governorates. They shall 

then appoint three to six surveillance teams, according to their specific needs. Ideally, each team should have 

one veterinarian, one technician/assistant, and one driver. Technically the heads of surveillance should be 

accountable to the MAI or MPHP headquarters. The roles and needs in these surveillance centers are the 

following: 

• Roles: Routine disease investigation—supervise and assist the district surveillance centers, assist 

headquarters, perform quick AI antigen detection diagnosis, prepare and transmit daily and weekly 

reports, and analyze data if needed. 

• Needs: Refrigerators/freezers, cold boxes, telephone/fax, computer, sets of PPEs, GPS (three units), 

veterinary kits (materials for collecting samples), and means of transport (3-6 according to the needs per 

center). 

• Training: More advanced training courses to serve HQ’s demands for data presentation and diagnostic 

reports. 

Some designated governorates will also serve as the location for regional diagnostic laboratories (see below). 

These regional labs must be committed to diagnose cases as they are received, and immediately give feedback 

to the CVL and Epidemiology Unit at HQ for notification or confirmation of cases. 

Refer to Annex 3 for the detailed estimates of the total logistical and material resources needed to support 

surveillance activities at the districts and governorates. 

5.1.4 Surveillance at Headquarters (DGAR-Epidemiology Unit) 

The HQ must provide overall coordination for maintaining the entire reporting systems and treating 

diagnostic results. It also serves as the national data repository where data from the field are analyzed and 

disseminated to all concerned, down to the Uzlas and specific farms. Additionally, it must perform these 

functions: 

• Map locations of GPS tagged cases and generate epidemiological information and curves (suspected and 

confirmed); 

• Ensure daily reporting and feedback; 

• Report to the Supervising High Committee and High Committee for Avian Influenza (decision makers); 

and 

• Supervise all the field surveillance, monitoring activities, and perform field and trace-back investigations 

together with the governorate technical staff. 

HQ’s needs are more technical, such as training in epidemiology field data management and risk assessment. 

The number of staff needed to manage this national center should be at least 10, for contingency reasons. 

The data to be analyzed should include AI cases (probable or suspected and confirmed) by week, by poultry 

category, by village, and by virus sub-type. These are to be presented in tables, graphs, and maps. An 

epidemiological curve should be prepared. The reporting of data and feedback must be done daily and weekly 

using telephone, text, fax, or Internet, whichever is more appropriate. 
30 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

5.1.5 Surveillance During the Outbreak Stage 

During the outbreak stage, the surveillance system through the governorate and district surveillance centers 

shall be enhanced so that new cases may be detected earlier and response may be mounted sooner, thus 

preventing the spread of H5N1. If new farms are rapidly being infected and infected zones start to overlap, 

the surveillance information must be useful in answering the following questions: 

• What went wrong in the Action Plan/control strategy? What circumstances caused the spread of 

outbreaks? 

• What were the biosecurity conditions in the affected farms? 

– How were they cleaned and disinfected after stamping out? 

– Did the stamping out team practice good hygiene and safe measures? 

– What were the conditions of barriers/control points between infected and uninfected areas/zones? 

For each infected farm during or before any outbreak, information must be gathered by the governorate and 

district surveillance teams, for trace-back investigation purposes, as guided by the following key questions: 

• How and when did the farm get infected? 

• From where? 

– Through wild birds, movement of people, movement of animals, feeds, equipment, and vehicles? 

• Were animals brought to other farms/market? When? Which ones? 

• What are other possible sources of infection? 

• Further questioning to follow on to know what happened at/or around the presumed point of 

contamination which could be one to two weeks before the first clinical signs of AI were noted. 

5.1.6 Surveillance Priority Areas 

The governorates considered to be at high risk, as defined earlier, are ranked as to priority below: 

The highlands governorates: 

1. Ibb, 

2. Ta’izz (also coastal), 

3. Sana’a – Al-Amanah, 

4. Sana’a – Al-Mohafadah, 

5. Amran, 

6. Dhamar, 

7. Al-Bayda, 

8. Sa’dah, 

9. Al-Dal, 

10. Lahj, and 

11. Al-Mahwit. 

Those at the costal areas are: 

1. Aden, 

2. Lahj, 

3. Al-Hudaydah, 

4. Hajjah, 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 31 

5. Al-Mahrah, 

6. Hadramaut, 

7. Abyan, 

8. Shabwah, and 

9. Socotra. 

FIGURE 5.4. FLOW OF SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION AND SAMPLES SUBMISSION 

5.1.7 Diagnostics 

Regional Laboratories 

The diagnostic capacity must be established in priority regions as defined above. The tests of choice for 

immediate set up in these regional laboratories are the Immuno-Fluoresense Assay (IFA), rapid antigen tests 

and Agar Gel Immuno-Diffusion (AGID). The equipment and manpower needs would have to be decided 

based on the existing capacity in each selected regional facility. Some facilities are relatively more equipped 

and ready, requiring less time and funds to set up. It is estimated that 15,000 samples per month would have 

to be tested, at this pre-outbreak stage, evenly distributed to these selected laboratories. For every investigated 

farm there should always be more than five samples collected. 

The selected priority regions and their present situation are the following: 

• Ta’izz (to be improved- two staff presently available), 

• Al-Hudaydah (to be improved- three staff presently available), 

• Aden (no equipment- no staff available), 

• Hadramaut- no lab (S’ayoon –has mobile vet labs in Al-Mukalla) (no staff), 

• Hajjah - Abs (no staff, no building or Mobile vet Lab are needed), and 

• Ma’rib (to be improved- one staff available). 

Villages

Districts

Governorates

Regions

Epidem. Unit 

Farm/LBM

District 

Surveillance Center

Governorate and 

Regional Surveillance 

Center

Regional Lab

Central Vet Lab

Village volunteer (Uzla)

DGAR-MAI
32 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

It may be necessary to set up three standby mobile vet units that can conduct both surveillance and AI 

laboratory diagnosis for emergency purposes in underserved areas. The estimated time for the improvements 

of these labs varies from three to eight months, in the case a complete laboratory facility has to be built. 

Another governorate that could also be included, as a support to the CVL, is Dhamar, as it has a new 

Veterinary Medical College in Thamar University, with its own diagnostic laboratory. 

The flow of sample submissions will essentially follow surveillance information described above. Sample 

collection and storage capacities (refrigeration) will be present at the district surveillance centers. Through the 

support of the governorate center, the district staff will ensure that all samples are sent to the nearest regional 

lab or to the CVL within 24 hours. 

Diagnosis at the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) 

The CVL is an obviously important component of this National AI Action Plan. It must have the capacity to 

test all 15,000 samples submitted and tested in the regional labs for confirmation. About 1% of these samples 

are expected to be tested by Polymerase Chaine Reaction (PCR). At a minimum, the CVL should have the 

capacity to perform the following tests: 

• H5N1 antigen detection by IFA or Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA); rapid tests; and 

Real-Time Reverse Transcription-PCR (RRT-PCR). This allows for less contamination of the samples 

and ease of operation. It is also expected that RRT-PCR will improve sensitivity of initial screening tests, 

so it is advised that the CVL set this up. 

• A proper lab facility for isolating the H5N1 virus for conducting procedures under biosafety level 2 has 

been set up. Since this is highly recommended for increasing the sensitivity of detecting the H5N1 virus, 

the facility, staff and procedures for performing virus isolation must be established soon. This will require 

sourcing for Specific–Pathogen Free (SPF) or clean eggs for inoculation, and performing the 

hemagglutination inhibition (HAI) test for H5 typing. 

Antigen detection tests are essential due to the nature of HPAI H5N1 infections in chickens. As the disease is 

acute, chickens usually die before they can develop detectable antibodies against H5N1, so serology will have 

limited value. However, the existing serological capacity of the CVL must be sustained for purposes of 

monitoring the poultry vaccination operation, and also for testing for Newcastle Disease (NDV) as well as for 

the low pathogenic H9N1 avian influenza virus, a virus that is known to be enzootic in the chicken 

population in Yemen. It can also be useful for testing domestic waterfowls such as ducks, should this be 

applicable in some areas. In this regard, the following serological tests are further suggested: 

• AGID, 

• ELISA, 

• HAI test for serology, and 

• Neuraminidase assay/test. 

Figure 5.5 on the following page is a flow diagram of the laboratory diagnoses to be established at the CVL. 

An illustrative budget template to be used by the GOY for improving the capacity of the CVL and regional 

laboratories are to be finalized by the Technical Committee and are presented in Annex 5. The budget should 

include all functional areas identified in the text. The cost will consider the establishment of antigen detection 

tests and virus isolation procedures (as outlined above), improvements in safety, quality assurance/good 

laboratory practices, labor expertise and capacity, as well as the expected increase in the volume of sample 

submission. 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 33 

FIGURE 5.5. FLOW DIAGRAM OF DIAGNOSES 

5.1.8 Proper Sample Collection and Transport 

This section must be delineated by the Technical Committee. 

5.1.9 Other Functional Areas that may be Included in this Section by the Technical 

Committee 

• Migratory bird monitoring, 

• Protection from wild birds, 

• Poultry farm registration-census, and 

• Bird import control (quarantine and border policing). 

5.2 SUPPORTIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 

There is a need to impose regulatory control throughout the marketing chain of live poultry. This is 

important because throughout the farm to market chain there are prevailing risk factors (see below) for the 

transmission and rapid spread of HPAI. Also, at the end of the chain (i.e., live poultry markets) there is the 

risk of human exposure to HPAI. It has been determined that the risk of human infection with avian 

influenza (H5N1 subtypes) is high in live poultry markets where H5N1 could be present. 

Yemen currently has its Livestock Law No. 17 that requires enforcement by the MAI. The implementing 

rules and regulations or decrees relating to this particular law must be formulated to specifically address the 

reduction of the risk factors for the spread of HPAI and the risk factors for human infection. 

The lack of resources, lack of implementation know-how, and possible violations will make enforcement of 

these regulations difficult. This then poses a real challenge for the GOY as it must ensure that 

Dead or sick bird

Collection of samples

Rapid diagnosis kit

Inoculation to

embryonated chicken 

IFA RRT-PCR eggs

Type and sub-typing

by HAI tests

Detection of virus growth by HA

Rapid diagnosis kit

(Detail antigenic and genetic 

characterizations)

Viral antigens Viral genes

Rapid detection Virus isolation

(Selection of vaccine viruses)

IFA RT-PCR
34 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

implementation is done to support the other measures for AI prevention and control stipulated in this 

National AI Action Plan. 

The following are well-defined risk factors for the spread of HPAI throughout the farm to market chain that 

are known to occur in Yemen: 

• Overcrowding of chickens (from different sources); 

• Various transportation stresses (mishandling, distance/time, exposure to harsh environment, 

overcrowding); 

• Poor condition of sanitation from farm to market (accumulation of secretions and excretions); 

• On-the-spot slaughtering of chickens in the market; 

• Transport of chickens from one place (e.g., market) to another place (e.g., another market or back to the 

farm); 

• Moving around of chicken transport vehicles and traders (e.g., from market to market to farm); 

• Free-ranging of chickens; and 

• Lack of awareness among farmers, traders and market vendors (especially on basic biosecurity measures). 

Based on the above considerations, the GOY must soon initiate the formulation of detailed rules aimed at 

feasibly reducing the above risk factors and also to support the implementation of measures mounted during 

the AI outbreak response stage. These rules, in the form of decrees, must stipulate appropriate penalties. In 

the light of prioritizing the effort of the GOY for focusing on this matter, regulations for the following 

priority areas of concern should be formulated initially: 

• Control of poultry and animal feeds movement or transportation from farm to market; 

• General biosecurity in poultry farms and markets and biosecurity measures during the AI outbreak 

response stage (this may be in the form of non-regulatory measures); and 

• Control of all aspects of LBMs and marketplaces in general (quarantine and inspections, veterinary 

officers, registrations, zoning, regular market sanitation, central slaughtering). 

LBM control and bird movement/transport control will be outlined by the Technical Committee who will 

describe how these may be approached based on Livestock Law No. 17. With regard to LBM control, an 

important aspect is requiring that all LBMs be closed, vacated, cleaned and disinfected at least once or twice a 

month. 

5.3 HPAI OUTBREAK EMERGENCY RESPONSE 

AI disease control and elimination is highly dependent on the organization of a rapid and effective response. 

Speed is of the essence; the earlier the official intervention, the fewer the number of birds that will need to be 

killed. Any approach adopted must ensure complete elimination of the virus. Because of the professional 

training and competence required, veterinary authorities must take control of all activities. 

As Yemen is believed to still be free of HPAI, samples from suspected cases of HPAI will first be 

appropriately tested by laboratory methods described above to unequivocally determine whether the H5N1 

AI infection is present in the suspected poultry flocks, before initiation of stamping out operations. 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 35 

If and when H5N1 has already been positively identified in previous cases in parts of the country, the empiric 

detection of an HPAI outbreak should be considered if there are reliable reports of any poultry establishment 

experiencing an unusually high mortality rate (e.g., >15% daily mortality for 2 days) and where the mortality is 

associated with one or more of the following signs: depression and respiratory disease, swollen heads, 

cyanosis of the combs or wattles, and possibly neurological signs and diarrhea. The confirmation of these 

reports by the Governorate’s TC should be grounds for initiating the declaration of the 1 km area/zone 

around the infected premises as an infected zone and commencing the stamping out operation (see note 

below). In all circumstances, the authorities must make the declarations promptly (within 24 hours). As 

several outbreaks have started to occur, the concerned governorate(s) may assume emergency authority over 

the entire outbreak response. 

Under the present AI free-state in Yemen, the MAI Minister or the HCAI has the authority to declare 

stamping out in the initial AI outbreak occurrences. The DGAR, after due consultation with the Directors of 

the Epidemiology Unit and the CVL, the Supervising High Committee and Technical Committee, will 

provide the appropriate advice or recommendation to the Minister. The Minister will initiate the necessary 

measures to be taken through his order to the concerned governorate whose TC will facilitate the operational 

measures to be conducted. 

The Technical Committee laid down the following parameters that must be adhered to for an effective 

response: 

Time-bound parameters: 

• AI case must be detected quickly in hours (24-48); 

• Suspected sample must reach laboratory within 24 hours from collection; 

• Diagnostic result must be available within 24 hours from sample receiving; 

• Stamping out must start within 24 hours from detecting a positive result; 

• All poultry in the infected zone will be culled in 24 hours from start of operation; and 

• A maximum of three days delay will be allowed (therefore 10 days maximum total time). 

Zonal parameters: 

• No single bird (and other poultry farm or market equipment) must leave the zones until all the birds have 

been culled and no indication of presence of AI virus is found; 

• All possible exit points must be guarded from the first day of the operation; 

• There is total stop of any poultry-trading activities; 

• All free-roaming chickens (and stray animals) are destroyed; andThere is a very high level of 

biosecurity—cordoning off all poultry establishments (including empty) and strict policing.

Human-bound parameters: 

• All persons fully cooperate with the control measures—including farmers and professionals (traders of 

feed and other farm items, including veterinarians); 

• Farmers cannot smuggle out their chickens (alive or dead); 

• All officers who are guarding, regulating, monitoring and policing are active and aware of their duties; 

and
36 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

• People are well informed.

H5N1 Virus-bound parameters: 

• There must be total assurance that the virus is absent from stamped out farms, markets, premises; and.

• Laboratory testing in use must be most sensitive to detect for the H5N1 virus (virus isolation together 

with Reverse Transcriptase- Polymerase Chain Reaction [RT-PCR]/RRT-PCR or IFA). 

Logistical parameters: 

• All equipment and supplies are available, complete, and ready for immediate use at actual operational 

sites; and 

• The involved facilities are ready and functional. 

Note: The accurate diagnosis of all suspected HPAI cases shall still be done regardless of their value to 

declaring the initiation of the stamping out. All test results are useful in understanding the epidemiological 

nature of the epizootic and would help in managing the entire outbreak response operation. The criterion for 

basing the declaration on just the mortality rate and disease signs would be whether or not there is an overlap 

in the outbreak zones. If there is no overlap, then a positive diagnostic test result would have to be the basis 

for the declaration. 

5.3.1 Establishment and Surveillance of Infected Zones, Free Zones and the Application 

of Containment Measures 

The Technical Committee of the Governorate, with the support of the Epidemiology Unit at HQ, shall 

establish the zones and will ascertain that the parameters outlined below are followed: 

Infected Zone 

This zone may contain one or more infected and closely adjacent uninfected premises/farms and it shall 

occupy an area of 1-km radius measured from the location of the infected premises. The measures applied 

entail culling of all infected and potentially infected poultry flocks (and stray animals) and restricting entry 

into and exit from these farms and locations by people, materials, equipment, vehicles (cars, trucks, bicycles) 

and animals (livestock, pets and vermin) within the entire zone. 

The specific measures to be further carried out in the infected zone will include the following: 

• Diligent securing or policing of the contaminated poultry premises (demarcation of farms) and the 

boundary (circumference) of the zone by designating checkpoints; 

• Application of comprehensive decontamination measures on all poultry premises, farm equipment and 

vehicles within the zone; 

• Issuance and distribution of public advisories to residents, travellers and visitors within the zone and 

surrounding area with information on methods for HPAI infection prevention;1

• Assurance and verification by the Governorate’s TC of compliance with stamping out and quarantine 

orders, including active monitoring for the absence of poultry (until repopulation is authorized), sanitary 

disposal of poultry carcasses and debris, and decontamination of farms or other locations where poultry 

were kept; and 

 

1

 Refer to World Health Organization’s (WHO) Advice for People Living in Areas Affected by Bird Flu or Avian Influenza. 8 November 

2004. (http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/04FA6993-8CD1-4B72-ACB9-EB0EBD3D0CB1/0/Advice10022004rev08112004.pdf). 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 37 

• Intensified monitoring and control around the vicinity of the infected zone boundaries. Isolate the 

farm/zone for 30 days. 

Control Zone 

From the circumference of the infected zone, the area occupying a span of 5 km (immediately surrounding 

the infected zones) shall be declared as the control zone. Strict quarantine measures shall be applied in this 

zone even though there are no reports of HPAI infection in poultry within the zone. Strict biosecurity 

measures are to be implemented within and between establishments to make sure that poultry are kept 

isolated from other birds and animals, and strict movement restrictions (e.g., farms to markets) are in place 

(see Biosecurity Measures below). All free-range poultry (Sector 4 chickens) shall be culled. 

The specific measures to be further carried out in the control zone will include the following: 

• Implementation of heightened surveillance for poultry disease cases suspected of meeting the H5N1 case 

definition above; 

• Immediate implementation of infected zone containment measures if HPAI infection or potential 

infection is identified in the zone; 

• Enhanced biosecurity measures such as keeping poultry inside sheds or enclosures to prevent contact 

with wild birds and their excreta and keeping poultry and other animals separated and not housed in the 

same sheds or areas; and 

• Strict discouragement or control and monitoring of the movement of poultry (live or processed), eggs, 

farm materials, equipment, and vehicles within the zone. Movement of these items to outside the zone is 

strongly discouraged. All poultry trading activities may actually be totally banned. 

Free Zone 

From the circumference of the control zone, the area occupying a span of 5 km (immediately surrounding the 

control zone) shall be declared as the free zone. All free-range chickens in this zone shall be eliminated by 

encouraging their central slaughter and consumption. Strict quarantine measures shall be applied, and more 

importantly, vaccination of all Sector 2-3 chickens shall be done within a one-week period (see Vaccination 

below). As in the control zone, strict biosecurity measures are to be implemented within and between 

establishments to ensure that poultry are kept isolated, and strict movement restrictions (e.g., farms to 

markets) are in place. The measures applied to the control zone may be applied in this zone should it be 

logistically possible. 

5.3.2 Stamping Out (All Aspects) 

When a case of H5N1 has been confirmed by the CVL, the DGAR shall be promptly notified within the 

expected timeframe above. The MAI Minister shall, without any delay, be appropriately notified in order to 

make the necessary declarations as stated above, and order the implementation of all the aspects of the 

stamping out measure through the concerned governorate. The governorate’s Technical Committee shall then 

order the prompt mobilization of all the stamping out teams as specified below. 
38 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

TABLE 5.1. MOBILIZATION OF STAMPING OUT TEAMS 

Activity to conduct 

Min no. of 

persons per 

10,000 

chickens 

Remarks 

Culling team 

• Sacking (and disinfect after) 10 

• Neck crushing (and disinfect after) 10 

• Disposal (bring/transport sacks to 

pit/cleaning) 

4 

Pit digging and treatment team 5 

Support team (supplies, PPEs, setting buckets 

of disinfectants, first aid/safety, comforting, 

directing, etc.) 

4 

Security/policing/public control and 

information team 

4 

Supervision culling/disinfection (veterinarian 

or para-vet from district) 

1 

Supervision disposal 1 

Overall supervision/coordination 

(Veterinarian from district or governorate) 

1 for 3 farms 

• work only 5 hours 

• need at least 3 PPE changes 

• alternating 

• controls people 

• checks procedures 

• authority to all 

TOTAL 40 Per 1 farm of 10,000 chickens 

These teams are mostly composed of trained volunteers from the affected communities, and from the district 

and governorate veterinary services/centers. Volunteers could come, for example, from the local sanitary 

services. The teams assigned to known infected premises must be separate from the teams assigned to 

“uninfected premises” within the infected zone. A rough estimate of the possible labor requirements for the 

entire country in case the outbreak starts to spread is (assuming 10 million chickens [10% of total in Yemen] 

need to be culled) about 36,000 trained persons (less if the same persons shall be reassigned in several 

operations). 

Refer to Annex 4 for the detailed estimates of the total logistical and material resources needed for the 

accomplishment of the above activities. 

Entering and Leaving the Enclosed Stamping Out Operation Premises 

The support and security teams will cordon off the entire premises for stamping out. The outside part of the 

premises will be designated as the “clean” side and will be protected from contamination. 

All persons entering and leaving the stamping out premises will go through the Personal Protection 

Equipment (PPE) change located at a single point in the enclosed premises (one for entering and one for 

leaving). There will be persons assigned to support in these procedures, such as by providing the complete set 

of PPEs, preparing the buckets of disinfectants, and giving the necessary directions and instructions. The 

most important consideration is the avoidance of contamination of the “clean” side. Procedures of leaving 

the premises will be very strict in terms of conducting the proper removal, disinfection and disposal of used 

materials such as PPEs. The main aim is also to protect the workers involved in the operation. Their bodies 

and clothes should be protected from cross contamination as they leave the premises. The detailed entering 

and leaving procedures to be followed will be further described, and all the workers to be assigned in the 

stamping out teams will first undergo training on these procedures. 

Culling of Poultry 

Culling will be diligently performed, considering the risk of infection to poultry in adjacent HPAI free areas 

and the potential for H5N1 transmission to people. Culling will be done as close as possible to the center of 

infection, i.e., within the affected farm and away from public view. When appropriate, cull birds inside the 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 39 

poultry house or in containers just outside the poultry house. Apply moist disinfectant to the house or 

container surfaces, poultry litter and debris to reduce the spread of virus during and after the culling process. 

Under all circumstances, the culling procedure shall be as humane as possible, without compromising human 

safety. The access of wild birds, vermin and stray animals to the operation area will be prevented. 

Carbon dioxide saturation and electrocution are the methods of choice for destroying poultry species when 

large numbers are involved. However, considering Yemen’s situation, the Technical Committee has decided 

to cull chickens by cervical dislocation or by crushing using an emasculator (tool) similar to those used for 

castrating large animals. Chickens are placed inside a sack (one to two per sack) and then brought to the neck 

crushing team who performs the culling and hands over the sacked (dead) birds to the disposal team. 

 For a thorough description of various culling methods, refer to the Manual on Procedures for Disease 

Eradication by Stamping Out (FAO, 2001) and the Report of the First Meeting of the OIE Ad Hoc Group 

on the Humane Killing of Animals for Disease Control Purposes, Paris, October 14-16, 2003. However, 

these reports may not describe the neck crushing method. 

The Governorate’ TC shall ensure that all materials needed for culling are available in advance of the 

procedure, especially PPEs for the cullers. The supply of these materials will need to be adequate for the 

anticipated scale of the culling operation. The proper use of PPE is described in the WHO’s Interim 

Recommendations for the Protection of Persons Involved in the Mass Slaughter of Animals Potentially 

Infected with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses (26 January 2004. http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/ 

rdonlyres/7693BAF7-13E7-42DB-B92B-004CF5D517E7/0/WHOinterimrecommendation26012004.pdf). 

Designated cullers will first undergo training in safe and appropriate culling procedures. Cullers will be closely 

supported and supervised by the support team throughout the culling operation to facilitate their changing of 

goggles, taking rests/breaks, and proper degowning and decontamination. Individuals assigned to this team to 

assist cullers to safely remove/replace PPEs and for scheduled rests/breaks, must have been trained first in 

infection control and biosecurity. Individuals on the support team will also wear PPEs but must not be 

involved in handling the animals. Additionally, they will oversee that all the safety precautions (stipulated in 

the WHO guidelines) are in place—making sure that complete and correct PPE is provided and properly 

used, transported from storage to culling site and back, disposed of, or decontaminated and stored for 

subsequent use. 

Portable showers and toilets will be installed to further promote personal protection. Health and animal 

authorities will cooperate in coordinating the close monitoring of the health of cullers for a certain period 

following the operation.2

Disposal of Culled Birds, Litter and Other Materials 

Promptly disposed of culled birds and contaminated materials that cannot be effectively disinfected (i.e. feeds, 

litter, eggs) is a critical step in the containment of AI. According to the situation in Yemen, burial is the 

preferred method of disposal. Cover the buried carcasses with lime to protect the carcasses from being 

uncovered by animals and earthworms. Do not place lime directly on carcasses because in wet conditions it 

slows decomposition. Instead, put some soil over the carcasses first then apply the lime on top of the soil. 

Finish covering the pit with enough soil. Although it is best to bury poultry and contaminated materials at the 

affected area or farm, this may not always be possible because of the local well-water table level or other 

environmental conditions. Therefore, situate the burial place as close to the operation site as possible, and 

where it can also serve other ongoing culling operations in a given village. The pit shall be deep enough such 

that if burying 10,000 birds, there would still be at least a 1-meter deep empty space from the top of the pile 

of dead birds to the ground level (the procedures should be approved by the environmental authorities). 

 

2

 WHO. Interim Guidelines for Health Monitoring of Persons Involved in Culling of Animals Potentially Infected with Highly Pathogenic 

Avian Influenza Viruses. 22 March 2004. (http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/55DAF481-2271-4319-9C7EDE77D02C09C5/0/InterimguidelinesforhealthmonitoringpersonsinvolvedincullingofanimalspotentiallyinfectedwithHighlyPathogenicAvianInfl

uenzaviruses1.pdf). 
40 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

Under all circumstances, the transportation of culled birds and other contaminated materials in “rice” sacks 

will be done in covered leak-proof container vehicles that can be disinfected after use. These containers and 

vehicles will never leave the contaminated area without first being thoroughly disinfected. 

The disposal of litter can pose special problems as virus may be spread in dust. Therefore, the litter will first 

be moistened with detergent or disinfectant solution before disturbing the pile prior to disposal. 

Composting (thermal deactivation of the virus) of litter and other contaminated organic wastes (for 60 days) 

is a recommended option that can best be undertaken in closed and vermin proof sheds on the affected farm. 

If sheds are not available, after spraying the material to be composted with detergent or disinfectant solution, 

push it into mounds away from any potential source of surface water and cover securely with black or dark 

plastic tarps. Composting will be done in a secure area not accessible by other animals such as rodents, cats, 

dogs or birds. To ensure inactivation of virus, the mounds will not be disturbed for at least three months 

(recommendation of the United States Department of Agriculture). 

In general, open air burning of carcasses and contaminated materials is not recommended because of the 

extended time it takes to achieve complete combustion of the wet carcasses and waste, and the inability to 

easily verify that all infective pathogens are destroyed in the resulting incomplete combustion process. If 

burning will be attempted as the only practical method, closed incineration will be applied and incinerators 

shall be well maintained by knowledgeable operators. 

Refer to the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Animal Health Manual on Procedures for Disease 

Eradication by Stamping Out (2001) for a thorough description of disposal procedures. 

Before disposal work starts, the teams will be fully briefed on-site by their assigned supervisor on the nature 

of HPAI H5N1 and the hygiene requirements associated with zoonotic diseases in general. It is crucial to 

select a site that is well protected from people and scavenging animals (stray dogs). It must be ensured that no 

culled and disposed of birds will get into the food chain of humans and animals. On some occasions it may 

be necessary to mount a security guard at the site for the first few days. 

Decontamination and Disinfection 

Strict adherence to decontamination and disinfection procedures is essential to the control of HPAI infection 

in affected areas. Decontamination involves thorough cleaning and disinfection of the infected site to remove 

all contaminated material and sources of virus. The assigned individuals on the team will first be trained to 

effectively conduct the procedures. 

Again, refer to FAO’s Animal Health Manual on Procedures for Disease Eradication by Stamping Out (2001) 

for a thorough description of decontamination and disinfection procedures. 

Initially, clean organic matter from sheds, equipment, and vehicles by brushing and washing with detergent 

and water before applying chemical disinfection such as 2-5% bleach. It is important to recognize that the 

influenza virus can be spread on clothing, footwear, poultry crates, feed sacks and egg fillers, so these items 

must be disinfected, or destroyed, after each use. Paper or wood items will be destroyed and buried as these 

cannot be effectively decontaminated. 

All farm materials (e.g., feed containers, water buckets), tools, equipment, vehicles and the structures that are 

physically or functionally connected to the areas where infected poultry were located will be properly cleaned 

and disinfected. 

It is advised that disinfection be repeated after 7 to 10 days. The farm will be vacated and isolated for at least 

30 days. 

Declaring Stamping Out a Failure 

As a matter of policy, it is important to adhere to fixed criteria to say that the AI containment response is 

failing. In this regard, the Technical Committee laid down the following parameters: 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 41 

1. Could not diagnose the disease during three days; 

2. More than three days delay in starting stamping out procedures; 

3. Could not cull all targeted chickens in 48 hours; 

4. Could not police all the borders of the zones; 

5. H5N1 is still being detected and there are more than five new outbreaks related to the first outbreak—

zones are getting bigger; 

6. Farmers are protesting and there is massive lack of cooperation; or 

7. Supplies, materials and equipment are no longer available. 

Any of these outcomes will signal the need to apply more strict measures of containment (which the 

Technical Committee will further formulate). 

FIGURE 5.6. DIAGRAM OF THE MAIN FUNCTIONAL AREAS IN THE AI OUTBREAK 

RESPONSE 

5.3.3 General Biosecurity Measures for Premises/Farms in HPAI Control Zones 

In summary, the only way to eliminate HPAI from affected poultry farms is by: 

1. Rapidly destroying all infected or potentially infected poultry, and poultry products such as eggs, and 

properly disposing of them by sanitary burial, composting, or incineration; 

2. Sanitarily removing and destroying all disposable poultry husbandry equipment, feed, litter and other 

materials and equipment potentially contaminated with HPAI (burial, composting, incineration); 

Vaccinate all chickens 

in Sectors 2-3, 

consume all Sector 4 

chickens 

Infected Zone 1km radius 

Cull all chickens except

Sector 1 farms

(Cull all Sector 4 chickens) 

Intensive surveillance and 

animal movement control 

Initiate the vaccination of all breeders and layers on start of outbreak on a zonal scale (e.g., 30-km radius) 

Cull all Sector 4 chickens around 3 km of commercial farms and coastal areas - even before any outbreak (as a 

Policy of the GOY)

Control Zone - 5km

Free Zone - 5km 
42 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

3. Aggressively and completely disinfecting all nondisposable husbandry equipment and shelters exposed to 

or used in poultry and poultry product production, transportation and maintenance; and 

4. Instituting strict isolation and biosecurity procedures for human and material entering and exiting from 

affected farms and protection zones. 

The following are some recommended biosecurity practices applicable in control zones: 

1. Keep an “all-in, all-out” philosophy of flock management. 

2. In warmer climates observe at least a 35-day isolation period before reintroducing poultry into the 

protection zone, 105 days for colder climates (numbers based on estimated survival times for virus in 

‘dirty’ environments if there are breaks in the cleaning and disinfection process). 

3. Permit only essential workers and vehicles on to control zone farms. 

4. All persons entering control zone farms should use PPEs and should bring with them only those 

materials and supplies essential for the purpose of their visit to the farm. 

5. All clothing, footwear, and personal items worn on to the farm and thus subject to contamination with 

HPAI should be washed with soap and water, and, whenever possible, soaked in 2% household bleach or 

other disinfectant, then sun-dried before being reused. 

6. All persons entering a protection zone farm should not wear watches, rings, or items that cannot be 

disinfected. 

7. All persons leaving the farm must first remove all clothing, footwear, and other personal items worn on 

the farm, shower or otherwise clean their bodies with soap and water, and only wear a new clean set of 

clothing and footwear for exiting the farm. 

8. Vehicles such as automobiles, trucks, bicycles, etc. should always be decontaminated before being 

allowed to exit the control zone. This includes: 

a. Washing with soap and water any accumulated dirt or debris, then 

b. Disinfecting all surfaces by wiping them with 2% household bleach or other suitable disinfectant. 

9. External vehicle surfaces that cannot be easily washed and wiped with disinfectant (such as tires and 

undercarriages) should be sprayed wet with disinfectant and allowed to dry before leaving the farm 

(control zone) parameter. 

10. The interiors of vehicles (such as seats, dashboards) should also be cleaned and disinfected. This can be 

accomplished by wiping with disinfectant then drying by closing all windows and letting vehicle stand 

with the interior cabin exposed to direct sunlight for a minimum of 30 minutes. 

11. All persons leaving a control zone should avoid visiting any area or farm where poultry are kept or raised 

for a minimum of 72 hours. 

12. All persons living in or entering control zones should not keep and should avoid contact with pets or 

wild birds of any species. 

13. After depopulation of infected zone farms and at the end of the isolation period, protect any 

reintroduced poultry from exposure to wild birds that may try to nest in poultry houses, and do not feed 

or otherwise provide attractants to wild birds. 

14. After the end of the isolation period, all persons in control zones should exercise vigilance in helping to 

limit the movements of persons and materials associated with the disposal and handling of bird carcasses, 

litter, manure and other husbandry and production materials and equipment, and continue sanitary 

disposal of such materials by burial, composting, or incineration. 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 43 

Materials that can be used as disinfectants3 include: 

• Sodium hypochlorite 2% active chlorine solution, 10 to 30 minute contact time; 

• Quaternary ammonium 4% solution; 

• Potassium perxoymonosulfate and sodium chloride (Virkon-S) 2% (mixed at 2 grams/liter water), 10 

minutes contact time; and 

• Citric 0.2% (2 grams/liter), 30 minute contact time (safe for clothes and body decontamination). 

5.3.4 Poultry Vaccination 

Poultry vaccination against AI remains controversial, although in general vaccination is proven to prevent and 

control animal disease transmission. In the case of AI vaccination in poultry, although vaccinated birds are 

protected against clinical AI, they are not totally protected against infection that can still lead to some degree 

of viral shedding (but lowered). 

If vaccination is used not only to prevent clinical disease but also to reduce viral shedding, then in the long 

term AI vaccination must be approached with caution, considering the need for constantly matching vaccine 

formulations with prevailing field virus isolates is similar to the approach to human vaccine production. An 

additional concern is that when vaccine is used, there is risk of spread of HPAI virus by vaccination crews. 

It has been proposed by FAO that to overcome these concerns on AI vaccination, surveillance systems must 

be implemented that measure the response to vaccination and detects the presence of field virus in clinically 

normal vaccinated poultry. Isolated viruses must be fully characterized at an appropriate Office of 

International des Epizooties (OIE) or WHO reference laboratory to provide early warning of any significant 

antigenic or genetic changes that might be occurring. Furthermore, FAO recommends that the following key 

points should be carefully considered in developing a vaccination strategy: 

• Vaccination should only be considered if other approaches have failed or their implementation is not 

practical. 

• A vaccination strategy should be developed in consultation with all the stakeholders including the private 

sector. 

• Sufficient quantities of appropriate quality-controlled vaccines are available. 

• A surveillance strategy must be developed that includes the capacity to identify and monitor vaccinated 

birds and record vaccine use. 

• The types of poultry and production sectors to be vaccinated must be determined. 

• Logistical arrangements are in place for delivery and administration of vaccine. 

• A time frame for review of effectiveness of the vaccination strategy and an exit strategy is determined. It 

is suggested that initially a period of 12 months of vaccination should be completed before this 

assessment is done to allow for influence of seasonal factors. 

Given the above considerations, conducting farm-wide or village-wide AI poultry vaccination would 

successfully reduce the risk of AI transmission among poultry. Although shedding of virus may still occur, 

vaccination considerably reduces the amount of shedding. 

 

3

 See Animal Health Australia. Disease Strategy: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (Version 3.0). Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan 

(AUSVETPLAN), Edition 3, Animal Health Australia, Canberra, ACT. 2002. 
44 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

In regards to the foregoing facts and other recommendations from FAO, and the AI infection risk situation 

in Yemen, the Technical Committee decided to apply vaccination as follows: 

1. When will vaccination be done? 

a. Upon detection of an outbreak, 

b. At the time of onset of stamping out, and 

c. Must be accomplished over period of one day to one week. 

2. Where will vaccination be done? 

a. Within the free zone as defined above, or 

b. Wider depending on locations of breeders and layers. 

3. What type or sector of chickens shall be vaccinated? 

a. All breeders/parents and layers within 30 km radius from the infected zone, and 

b. All Sector 2-3 chickens in the free zones. 

Vaccination will only be conducted by highly trained veterinarians and para-veterinarians closely supervised 

by the Technical Committee of the concerned governorate. 

5.3.5 Farmers’ Compensation 

The compensation system shall at this stage be a single-time indemnity to the farmers affected by the 

stamping out. However, long-term indemnity shall be worked out in consultation with concerned 

international organizations. Currently, the GOY adopts the following compensation rates according to the 

type of chickens affected. 

TABLE 5.2. GOVERNMENT OF YEMEN COMPENSATION RATES FOR AFFECTED 

CHICKENS 

Types Age of chicken Compensation rate 

Breeders 1-20 weeks 1500 YR 

 21-40 weeks 3000 YR 

 41 – 50 weeks 1500 YR 

 > 50 weeks 1000 YR 

Layers 1 – 10 weeks 300 YR 

 11- 20 weeks 700 YR 

 21 – 40 weeks 1000 YR 

 41 – 60 weeks 700 YR 

 > 60 weeks 200 YR 

Broilers 300 YR 

Backyard Chickens 500 YR 

The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the administration of compensation systems. The private sector 

will be encouraged to support the GOY in areas within their vicinity. 

More consultations will be conducted to decide the remaining issues relating to both short- and long-term 

indemnity, including the aspects of poultry industry recovery and restructuring. 

5.3.6 Other Critical Elements to be Included in the National AI Action Plan by the 

Technical Committees 

1. General capacity building, 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 45 

2. Trainings and workshops, 

3. Information and education campaign (professionals and public), 

4. Community mobilization, 

5. Stamping out simulation exercises, 

6. Resource mobilization, 

7. Coordination, 

8. International cooperation, 

9. Funding budget, 

10. General epidemiological activities, 

11. Information management, 

12. Good governance, and 

13. Scientific development. 
46 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

6.0 COMMUNITY 

 WORKSHOPS, 

 TRAINING AND 

 MONITORING AND 

 EVALUATION 

A workshop, as stated, specifically aimed at providing a venue for interaction among the primary stakeholders 

and implementers of a community-level plan for preparedness and prevention of avian influenza in known 

risk communities in Yemen must be organized. 

The workshop will attempt to gather information on the existing resources and perceived gaps to implement 

an effective AI prevention program and preparedness for rapid outbreak response. It will also prepare 

specific community-based prevention and outbreak action plans with defined roles and responsibilities. Both 

are designed to support the National Avian Influenza Action Plan. 

There is a need to sustain community awareness in Yemen of the continuing multi-country AI outbreaks that 

are challenging public health, agriculture and food security elsewhere, and are real threats to Yemeni 

communities. It is deemed important that appropriate information emphasize simple, practical, and 

inexpensive measures for disease prevention and control. The leadership and guidance for program 

implementation can be made available at the grassroots level through trained para-veterinary and paramedical 

volunteers since they represent the major provider of public and animal health services to livestock and 

poultry smallholders in the communities. Therefore, activities to provide essential core capacities to these 

target groups in potential high-risk communities should be carried out. 

In the long run, it is envisioned that these community-based trainings reach clusters of villages in every 

district that is at risk of AI outbreak all throughout Yemen. Avian influenza can best be fought if outbreaks 

are recognized and reported early, and interventions and containments are accomplished immediately. The 

battle against this disease requires different people at different levels and sectors working together. The 

community volunteer para-veterinarians and health workers are keys to reaching out to farmers and rural 

communities. 

6.1 PROPOSED COMMUNITY TRAINING EVENTS 

Although the long-term vision is to provide community-based capacities through trainings throughout 

Yemen, it is proposed as a first phase to conduct trainings to ensure protection and outbreak preparation in 

some of the most critical areas (districts and governorates) identified. As previously mentioned, it is 

recommended to communicate and disseminate AI preparedness information through conducting 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 47 

community-based training sessions. Therefore, a consortium of stakeholders, together with the relevant AI 

Technical Committees under the MAI and MPHP will provide essential core capacities to village animal 

health volunteers, health workers, and local representatives to prepare themselves for an outbreak in their 

community. The activities will disseminate information on Yemen’s AI national and regional plans, prepare 

community-based prevention and outbreak action plans, and define roles and responsibilities through several 

two-day training workshops per governorate. It is anticipated each training event will have about 50 

participants representing at least 10 Uzlas. 

The events will be hosted and conducted in close coordination with the governorates’ Technical Committees 

and veterinary services, respective district veterinary or agriculture offices, Yemeni AI experts, and various 

NGOs and international agencies such as USAID, where appropriate. The clustered training sites will be 

chosen based on their risk for potential AI outbreak using criteria such as wild bird migration routes, legal 

and illegal trade routes, entry ports to governorates via boat or plane, domestic bird and human population 

densities, and major farm to market activities as previously defined. 

The consortium to be engaged in these activities will have the following core competencies: 

• Previously established partnership in conducting training workshops in local settings; 

• Experience with community- and farmer-based programming; 

• Can mobilize international and local expertise on avian influenza; 

• Has financial controls and systems to ensure fund usage transparency; 

• Impact—result-oriented framework with pre-post workshop evaluation and contingency action plan 

output formalized by participants to ensure ownership; 

• Relationships with national government and international organizations enabling consortium to apply 

global best practices; and 

• Ready to mobilize—on the ground presence. 

6.2 PROJECT SUPPORT FUNCTIONS 

• Information management, including support to the production and dissemination of technical 

documents and increasing access to information and training materials on epidemic alert and response 

though the outreach programs; 

• Outreach, advocacy and extension services that value local experiences and practices that are seen as 

important components of strategies for a sustainable implementation; and 

• Management and administration of the activities, including logistics, information technology support 

and monitoring and evaluation of activities. 

To this end, the activities will: 

• Support the identification of potential local partners and facilitate their engagement in collaborative 

activities; 

• Provide services to the local community, e.g., through dissemination of information on the national 

program activities including, but not limited to disease monitoring; surveillance and response; 

participating in the organization of health seminars and other events; and 
48 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

• Contribute to the development of advocacy tools corresponding to specific audiences and illustrating the 

activities and plans of the national program, and define a dissemination strategy including the use of the 

farmers’ forum, training seminars, community assemblies, audio and print media 

6.3 AI OUTBREAK EMERGENCY RESPONSE SIMULATION EXERCISES 

The stamping out operation is a complex series of events involving multi-agencies, established surveillance 

and diagnostic capacities, and numerous persons that require technical training. It also has to be strictly 

accomplished under severe time pressures. For this reason, it is highly recommended that the stamping out 

operation be simulated, even on a smaller scale of operation. The Technical Committee has decided to 

schedule this simulation exercise within the near future. It is to be guided by the final version of this National 

AI Action Plan so that it can be tested. The simulation will attempt to test the organizational and operational 

aspects of the Plan. Briefly, it will include simulating the following main functions: 

• Planning and organizing events, 

• Surveillance channels, 

• Diagnostic channels, 

• Command chains, 

• All aspects of the zoning and stamping out operations, 

• Poultry vaccination, and 

• The application of regulatory control and relevant decrees. 

The events will also be utilized to generate further information to the benefit of getting the country more 

prepared to handle an AI outbreak. Therefore, a descriptive study of the entire series of events and processes 

will be conducted. Outcomes based on the various parameters that measure stamping out success will be 

recorded and evaluated. The successes and failures will be determined and used to lay down possible “lessons 

learned.” 

6.4 AI ACTION PLAN IMPLEMENTATION MONITORING AND EVALUATION 

The progress in the implementation of this NAIAP will be through the regular mechanisms for monitoring 

and evaluation of programs. The Technical Committee shall discuss this aspect in more detail and indicate 

herein their outputs. 
PART III. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 51

Consultant presents findings to the High Committee for Avian 

Influenza. 

1.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 

The consultant focused recommendations on aspects that relate technically and organizationally to the 

response of the Government of 

Yemen (GOY) to the current 

threat from Highly Pathogenic 

Avian Influenza (HPAI) in poultry 

and to the effective 

implementation of the National 

AI Action Plan (NAIAP) that is 

currently under preparation. Most 

of these were arrived at through 

consultation with the Technical 

Committee during discussion 

meetings cited in Section 1. These 

also were embodied in the 

presentations made by the 

consultant during his debriefing 

with the USAID and the Ministry 

of Agriculture and Irrigation 

(MAI), and will also be reflected 

in the NAIAP. 

1.1 RECOMMENDED POLICY STATEMENTS 

• Ban backyard poultry in coastal areas. 

• Ban backyard poultry around major commercial poultry farms (with more than 10,000 birds). 

• Vaccinate only upon AI outbreak detection. 

• Provide farmers with incentives and compensation. 

• Strengthen the central surveillance and diagnostic capability and set up AI surveillance centers per 

district. 

• Set up AI surveillance centers, including regional laboratories. 

• Conduct testing by at least rapid antigen detection. 

• Create public health law (integrated). 

• Strengthen regulatory enforcement (Livestock Law No. 17). 

• Ban ambulant live bird markets (LBMs). 

• Encourage selling of dressed, chilled chicken. 

• Stamping out is the first line of action against an outbreak. 
52 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

• Stamping out shall be a multi-agency emergency task. 

• Complete and prioritize staff training needs. 

• Actions and measures will be directed to priority governorates as to risk and poultry industry loss. 

• Criteria for declaring stamping out a failure will be set and followed. 

• Public awareness shall be a priority activity. 

• Strengthen coordination between the related authorities. 

• Provide prophylaxis to field staff. 

• The National AI Action Plan shall be a unified plan from the MAI and Ministry of Public Health and 

Population (MPHP) and shall be approved by the National High Committee and issued through a 

Cabinet Resolution. 

1.2 RECOMMENDED CRITERIA FOR DECLARING THAT THE OUTBREAK 

RESPONSE FAILED 

• Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) could not diagnose H5N1 within three days of sample submission. 

• There is more than three days delay in starting stamping out activities. 

• All targeted chickens could not be culled in 48 hours. 

• All the borders of the entire control zone could not be policed. 

• H5N1 is still being detected in farms and there are more than five new outbreaks related to the first 

outbreak—the zones are getting bigger/overlapping. 

• Farmers are protesting and there is massive lack of cooperation. 

• Supplies, materials, and equipment are no longer available (there is shortage).

1.3 GENERAL SUCCESS MEASURES RECOMMENDED FOR AI RESPONSE 

• Policies/objectives are well observed. 

• Regulations are in place and enforced. 

• Surveillance, diagnosis, and all structures and capacities are complete and in place and are fully 

operational. 

• Enough people are trained across all major functional areas of the AI outbreak response. 

• Farmers are compensated. 

• Information to public is circulated. Farmers understand the risk to poultry, community, and their 

immediate family members. 

• Public health is well protected (for the general public and those involved in the AI responses—workers 

know how to protect themselves and the environment). 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 53

• All sectors are actively involved (including international and nongovernmental organizations). 

• Leaders are leading, staff and people are following. 

• Resources are completely available and are distributed to their destinations for immediate use. 

1.4 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ACTIONS 

• A stamping out failure contingency action plan needs to be drawn up so that alternative measures can 

quickly be put in place, such as increasing the size of the zones, engaging more people, applying more 

intensive vaccinations, improving the field investigations of cases, etc. 

• A compensation system to address the long-term loss to the commercial poultry raisers must be planned, 

taking into consideration options such as insurance/indemnity and possible participation of international 

agencies in giving out grants and loans. This can be related to some extent to the poultry industry 

restructuring or recovery plan. The FAO recommendations should be followed. The private poultry 

sector may be encouraged to participate in the compensation scheme for small chicken farmers, 

particularly in areas around their vicinity who were affected by the policy of banning the raising of 

chickens. This, of course, will require consultation with this sector. 

• Since it has been decided that poultry vaccination will be part of the outbreak response, the stockpiling of 

enough vaccines, e.g., 1 million doses, should be prioritized and made available soon. Another option is 

for the Director General of Animal Resources (DGAR) to draw up a contract with a company that can 

provide vaccines immediately upon request by the DGAR. 

• A mini stamping out simulation operation should be carried out as appropriate in the near future. 

However, the simulation operation must be guided by the final NAIAP so that the Plan can be tested. 

The simulation must test the organizational and operational aspects of the Plan. 

• As the public health aspect of the response was not elaborated in this mission, which focused on the 

agricultural aspect (saving the poultry sector), it must be emphasized that should H5N1 be detected in the 

country, the public health emergency response must also be quickly carried out. Thus, the public health 

aspects of the NAIAP must equally be addressed soon, relating it to the veterinary response. 

• The training and program implementation at the grassroots level is very important and should be 

prioritized. For example, more trained teachers or volunteers should be made available in most Uzlas (a 

group of villages—there are about 3,000 in Yemen). Training should include proper case identification, 

case information gathering, sample collection, sanitation and biosecurity (protection from infection from 

wild birds), and village education and information dissemination. 

• In public education and information dissemination, a unified message from the MAI and MPHP is 

important. Additionally, the authorities must be transparent in their messages and make sure that the 

purposes of their operational actions in the field are understood by the community. The clear 

communication of risks is important. 

• Further workshops and training must be planned in areas related to the functional areas of the outbreak 

response (stamping out operation, public health protection, vaccination, monitoring and disease 

investigation, regulatory enforcement, biosecurity, public education and information planning, etc.) and 

to target these at village community levels. 

• It must be emphasized that surveillance and laboratory capacity strengthening is the key to an effective 

HPAI prevention and containment. The expansion of this capacity must be strategically distributed 

regionally and a testing result quality assurance and validation scheme must be put in place under the 

charge and supervision of the CVL. The improvement of the capacities of the Epidemiology Unit and 
54 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

CVL should be prioritized and offer staff development including conducting trainings on advanced 

diagnostic methods, field epidemiology, data analysis, risk assessment and mapping program. Organizing 

several mobile veterinary units, which can do both surveillance and laboratory work, such as rapid antigen 

detection, should be considered in the extreme high risk areas. 

• The AI outbreak response may require the handling of a large volume of material and physical resources 

(from purchasing, transporting, storing, releasing, managing, distributing, mobilization, servicing and 

monitoring). Therefore, the logistical capacity of the government must be ensured. In some cases, the 

support of NGOs can be useful in the distribution and protection of these resources. A distribution plan 

must be formulated to this effect. 

• The policy recommendations previously laid out should be reviewed and, as a whole, formally expanded 

into decrees. In relation to this, the decision of the GOY to set up more chicken dressing plants to 

discourage consumers to buy freshly slaughtered chickens is an essential risk-reducing policy both from 

the public health and agricultural points of view. It would also encourage consumers to buy chilled, 

dressed chickens as there is a greater assurance of safety. 
ANNEXES 

NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 57

ANNEX 1 

References

NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 59

1. Animal Health Australia. Disease Strategy: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (Version 3.0). 

Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN), Edition 3, Animal Health Australia, 

Canberra, ACT. 2002. Disease Strategy: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza. 

2. Council Directive (Council of the European Communities). Introducing Community Measures for 

the Control of Avian Influenza. 19 May 1992. 

3. Food and Agriculture Organization. Global Strategy for the Progressive Control of Highly 

Pathogenic Avian Influenza. October 2005. 

4. Food and Agriculture Organization. Guiding Principles for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 

Surveillance and Diagnostic Networks in Asia. 2004. 

5. Food and Agriculture Organization (in collaboration with OIE). Recommendations on the 

Prevention, Control and Eradication of HPAI in Asia. September 2004. 

6. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Animal Health Manual on Procedure for 

Disease Eradication by Stamping Out. Rome, 2001. 

7. GOY AI preparedness documents are described below: 

• Avian Influenza Prevention National Activities: This document describes the composition of 

the High Committee for Avian Influenza (HCAI) and the Operation Room under the MAI, 

formed through the issuance of Ministerial Resolution No. 67, in 2005 by the Minister of 

Agriculture. It further describes the designation and tasking of surveillance teams at the 

Headquarters (HQ) in Sana’a and governorate level, the tasking of the CVL and Extension and 

Information team at HQ, the available veterinary and para-veterinary professional resources, and 

general notes on the weaknesses in the command, coordination and decision-making structures, 

in the national and regional surveillance and diagnostic facility and staff capacities, in conducting 

village extension services, and in completing the preparation of the National AI Action Plan that 

indicates the specific elements to be described in the AI preventive and outbreak response 

functional areas, such as the specific personnel and their training needs, the specific facility, 

equipment and materials/supplies needs and the specific command and coordination structures. 

• Emergency Plan of Action: Bird Flu Precautionary Measures: This document describes the 

initial intended response to be undertaken by the GOY as of October 22, 2005. It further 

provides a situational analysis as to the risk of AI introduction and spread, enumerates the 

activities to be implemented separately by the MAI and the MPHP under the supervision of the 

HCAI and the respective ministerial technical committees, and presents the general budget 

relating to each general activity. The initial activities under the MAI described in this document 

were superseded by a more recent plan referred to as Preventative Measures Plan for Dealing 

with Expected Avian Influenza (AI) for January-June 2006, prepared by the MAI, which is 

described below. 

• Preventative Measures Plan for Dealing with Expected Avian Influenza (AI) for JanuaryJune 2006: This is a more detailed document further describing the elements, and their 

implementation mechanisms and human resource requirements, in the general preventive activities 

to be carried out under the MAI. These elements include import restriction and quarantine; 

intensive surveillance; migratory bird monitoring; establishing poultry-free areas near migratory 

bird sites; enhancing health and biosecurity awareness among farmers and villagers; seeking 

technical cooperation and funding support from international organizations; strengthening of the 

capacity of the CVL; and finalizing the National AI outbreak emergency plan. 

• Preventive Strategy of Avian Influenza in Case of its Confirmation: This is the first attempt 

to document the strategy in case the presence of AI (H5N1) in the country has been confirmed 

(i.e., the AI outbreak response). It basically outlines the implementing mechanisms of the major 
60 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

elements in an AI outbreak response, including zoning, stamping out, animal movement control, 

vaccination, disinfection, and enhanced surveillance. 

• Rapid Assessment: On Yemen Preparedness and Capabilities to Respond and Contain 

the Avian Influenza, 8 April 2006: This document details the situation of the poultry sector, 

the various veterinary services capacities, poultry marketing, the regulatory framework for 

livestock management and health protection, and the current status of AI in Yemen including 

the national undertakings for addressing AI and related recommendations. 

• Ministerial Resolution No. 67 .... which is pursuant to Cabinet Resolution No. (329) for 

the year 2005.....

8. Office International des Épizooties. Highly pathogenic avian influenza. Paris, updated 22 April 2002. 

(http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/fiches/a_a150.htm). 

9. Office International des Épizooties. Report of the First Meeting of the OIE Ad Hoc Group on the 

Humane Killing of Animals for Disease Control Purposes. Paris, 14-16 October 2003. 

(http://www.oie.int/downld/AVIAN%20INFLUENZA/AHGroup_Humane_killing.pdf). 

10. Office International des Épizooties. Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 12th edition. Paris, 2003. 

11. Republic of Yemen. Avian Influenza Action Plan Documents (2005 to 2006) and Technical Meetings 

held with the Technical Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation Operation Room. 

MAI April 2006. 

12. World Health Organization (WHO) Advice for People Living in Areas Affected by Bird Flu or Avian 

Influenza, 8 November 2004. (http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/04FA6993-8CD1-4B72-

ACB9-EB0EBD3D0CB1/0/Advice10022004rev08112004.pdf). 

13. WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific, Manila, Philippines. Public Health Considerations in 

the Application of Measures to Contain and Control Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) 

Outbreaks in Poultry. 26 April 2004. (http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/23C21802-A0BE42B9-825F-18977C05EE58/0/Advice30042004.pdf). 

14. WHO. Interim Guidelines for Health Monitoring of Persons Involved in Culling of Animals 

Potentially Infected with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses. 22 March 2004. 

(http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/55DAF481-2271-4319-9C7EDE77D02C09C5/0/Interimguidelinesforhealthmonitoringpersonsinvolvedincullingofanimalspotenti

allyinfectedwithHighlyPathogenicAvianInfluenzaviruses1.pdf). 

15. WHO. Interim Recommendations for the Protection of Persons Involved in the Mass Slaughter of 

Animals Potentially Infected with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses. 26 January 2004. 

(http://www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/7693BAF7-13E7-42DB-B92B004CF5D517E7/0/WHOinterimrecommendation26012004.pdf). 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 61

ANNEX 2 

Pre-AI Outbreak State: Logistics 

Requirements

NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RES

Pre-AI Outbreak State: estimated logistical requirements (monthly) for surveillance and diagnosis at prioand governorates (11) 

Items Districts (2 persons) Governorates (9-1

Per District 220 Districts Per Governorate 

Computer Not needed --- 1 unit 11 Fax 1 unit 220 units 1 unit 11 Cold boxes 5 boxes 1100 boxes 10 boxes 11Materials for sample collection 

300 sets 66,000 sets 1,000 sets 11

PPEs 120 sets 26,400 sets 1,000 sets 11Bleach or iodine 10 L 2,200 L 40 L 44Liquid detergent 1 L 220 L 4 L 44 Alcohol 1 L 220 L 4 L 44 Refrigerator w/freezer 1 unit (the health center can 

also be used) 

220 units 1 unit 11 

Freezer --- ---- 1 unit 11 Pump sprayer 2 units 440 units 10 11GPS 1 unit 220 units 3-6 units 33Communication 1 unit (mobile telephone) 220 units 3-6 units 33Transportation (motorcycle or car) 

1 unit 220 units 3-6 units 33

Prophylaxis 2 courses and doses 440 courses and doses 9-18 courses and doses 99Training courses 2 courses 2-3 courses 2-3 courses 2-

• Surveillance Teams: there is only 1 team per district and 3 to 6 per governorate assisting the districts • Samples to be collected: it is estimated that about 2000 samples per day need to be collected in entire Yemen. That is about 

district or 300 samples for 1 month. The governorates shall also collect samples to support the districts in some areas (e.g. 3

governorates with diagnostic laboratories are expected to collect samples more frequently. 

• PPEs: only 2 sets per person per day. • Prophylaxes: one antiviral course and one vaccine dose per person 

• Training: There should at least be 2 broad training courses per district/governorate. The trainings can be given to several dis

at a time (e.g. 100 participants each time) 

• During the AI outbreak emergency response stage, the above requirements shall be increased by a factor of 10. Which may 

required, especially at the district level. The Technical Committee is expected to further determine the exact needs during t

NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 65

ANNEX 3 

Equipment/Supplies Required for 

Veterinary Laboratory 

NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 67

Prepared 20 March 2006 

No. Items required Unit of Issue Quantity 

Equipment and supplies 

1 Biological Safety Cabinet, class II, 6 ft EA 1 

2 Ultra pure Water System, UHQ PS system, designed to produce the ultra high 

quality water essential to laboratory application such as ELISA, Microbiological 

Analysis, and HPLC. For use with pre-purified feed water of <20μs/cm and filtered 

to at least 0.2 microns, 50 litres/8h. Feed water. For 220-240V 50Hz single phase 

supplies. 

Unit 1 

3 Ultra low temperature chest Freezer (-80), 383 L, with all needed accessories and 

safety system, suitable for tropical conditions Unit 2 

4 Floor standing Centrifuge, Conformity with the international safety standards, 

Motor overheating protecting Exceptional speed stability, , Digital controlling with 

input in minutes and second,. Performance 4000, in a Swing-out rotor 6 place with

its buckets with caps Capacity 120 x 15 ml. 

Unit 1 

5 Automatic CO2/Humidity Incubator, Digital readout of temperature CO2 and 

humidity. Supplied with stainless steel water dishes and stainless steel shelves. It 

has removable four part interior partitioning and gas baffle to reduce CO2 loss on 

opening. For 230V 50/60Hz single phase supplies. Capacity 108 liters, 

Temperature range +5 to +45 °C,CO2 range 0 to 20 %, Internal H x W x D 

480x560x400mm,Overall H x W x D 775x710x620mm, 4 shelves. 

Unit 1 

6 Dry Ice Maker- pellet maker with CO2 syphon cylinder: 

Produce CO2 Dry Ice direct from CO2 syphon cylinder in one to two minutes. 

Pellet weight 30 g, pellet size 22 x 50 dia mm and no. of pellets at least 30. 

Unit 1 

7 Laboratory Refrigerator/Freezer,Tropicalised, For storage of temperature 

sensitive samples, the refrigerator compartment maintains its internal air 

temperature between +2 °C and +8 °C, the freezer compartment 20 °C, For 220-

240V 50Hz single phase supplies. 

Unit 3 

8 Water bath, with stainless steel tanks, operating temperature rang 00-150°C with 

digital sitting a read-out by LED of temperature, with fitted pump, capacity 14 

Liter, For 220-240V 50Hz single phase supplies. 

Unit 2 

9 Timer Countdown, with memory: 

Digital reading. Measures lapsed time up to 99 minutes 59 second. With end of 

period audible alarm. The memory function allows the set time period to be 

repeated as often as desired by simple manipulation of the start/ stop switch. With

magnet attached to the back can be used to place the timer on a metal surface 

Unit 5 

10 Digital thermometers (Rang – 100 to 0C°) for a variety of applications requiring 

rapid temperature measurement with accessory probes. Unit 2 

11 Pipette Man., 200-1000 μ, conformity certified, insulting jacket for increased 

precision EA 5 

12 Pipettor, single 5- 10 μ, conformity certified, insulting jacket for increased 

precision EA 5 

13 Pipettor, single 50-200 μ, conformity certified, insulting jacket for increased 

precision EA 3 

14 Pipettor single 20-200 μ, conformity certified, insulting jacket for increased 

precision EA 5 

15 Pipettor, Multi-channel, 12 channel, 20-200 μ, conformity certified, insulting jacket 

for increased precision EA 3 

16 Pipettor, Multi-channel, 12 channel, 30-300 μ, conformity certified, insulting jacket 

for increased precision EA 2 
68 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

No. Items required Unit of Issue Quantity 

17 Pipettor, Multi-channel, 12 channel, 5-50 μ, conformity certified, insulting jacket 

for increased precision EA 2 

18 Racks (10x 12) for blood collection tubes holding EA 50 

19 Cryogenics vials 2ml, polypropylene with cap, permanent marking area. 500/pack 50 

20 Cryo-boxes, polycarbonate (9x9) array for ultra-temperature storage of 2ml cryovials, fit to stainless steel racks. EA 250 

21 Cryo-box Racks, vertical, 9 shelves for cryo-boxes (9x9) array. EA 30 

22 Cryogenic sample storage boxes, polycarbonate , 81-places , 4-5 ml vials EA 50 

23 Storage rack for EPPENDORF micro tubes, 80-places, volume 2 ml, EA 50 

24 Micro titer dilution tubes, 96-well,format, with plug strips, 1.4 ml and also bigger 

size 2.5 ml is required for the dilution of samples for the AI ELISA testing EA 50 

25 Protective clothing: coveralls, TYVEK, white, unisex, with elasticated cuffs and 

ankles zip – fronted without pockets. Where included the hood is integral. Pack/5 5000 

26 Hood, TYVEK, Cover head and shoulders, Medium size. Pack/10 100 

27 Foot protection, TYVEK, (shoe cover) white elasticated ankle grip and PCV sole. Pack/20 500 

28 Gloves PCV, Disposable .Nun – slip with good finger sensitivity. 

Glove fits ether hand. Pack/50 100 

29 Respirators, with minimum level of protection (AS/NZS 1716 Standard, US 

NIOSH Certified N-95 or European CE P2) EA 5000 

30 Safety goggles; Soft PVC frame with adjustable headband and should be covering 

the whole eye area. EA 500 

31 Eye Wash Board; Wall mounting. Complete with two 500ml bottles of sterile 

eyewash solution. EA 20 

32 First Aid boxes, standard EA 20 

33 Disposable Bags (biohazard), 1016x1143 BX/1000 10 

34 Centrifuge tube, 50 ml, Disposable - for dilution of laboratory reagents 

(polypropylene) PK/250 200 

35 Samples transport container, 5-places, holds 1-2 ml vials. Molded from high impact 

polystyrene. Lid is a friction fit design EA 2000 

36 Dispenser Trays (for multi- channel pipettors) BX/500 8 

37 Pipette Controller, Bibbyjet with charger for med-east, 230V 50Hz single phase 

supplies and all accessories and spares. EA 1 

38 Microtiter plate (V – Shaped) CS/100 50 

39 Pipette tips (1000 ul pipette), Bulk BX/1000 5 

40 Pipette tips (1000 ul pipette), Racked BX/96 3 

41 Pipette tips 300 ul (regular) - Bulk BX/1000 50 

42 Pipette tips, 300 ul (regular), Racked BX/96 20 

43 Pipettes, disposable, 1 ml PK/50 5 

44 Autoclave bags small and medium BX/3000 10 

45 Autoclave tape, self adhesive paper with indicator stripes change color after being 

autoclaved 25mm Roll 55m 10 

46 Scalpel blades 100/Pack 10 

47 Medical Gloves, small size 100/Pack 200 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 69

No. Items required Unit of Issue Quantity 

48 Medical Gloves, medium size 100/Pack 200 

49 General-purpose Gloves 12 ps/Pack 50 

50 General-purpose Gloves 12 ps/Pack 50 

51 Bench Protection Reel, smooth, highly absorbent, strong layer of impermeable 

polyethylene, Reel 50m×46cm wide 

Roles 10 

52 Lite Laboratory Wipes: Tissue wiping cloths for professional use in laboratories. 

Highly absorbent and soft for wiping up small amount of liquid and for cleaning 

pipettes and microscope slides. Chemical resistant an chemically natural, size 200x 

210 mm 

Box of 200 50 

53 Short Arc Mercury Lamp HBO 100 W/2 100W to fit Olympus Fluorescent 

Microscope, model BH2 RFCA 

Unit 6 

54 Brush, Cylinder Unit 10 

55 Brush, Flask Unit 10 

56 Brush, Test tubes Unit 10 

57 Platinum-iridium wire Reel 1 

58 Cryo-Gloves Unit 3 

59 Sterilin disposable specimen container 30ml universal, printed label, polystyrene PK/400 10 

60 White medical rolls, Rolls 100 

61 Disposable pipette, 10ml 250/pk 10 

62 Petri dishes glass, single vent, 95×15mm dia×depth PK/20 20 

63 Petri dish polystyrene single vent, 90×12mm dia×depth PK/500 10 

64 Plastic pipettes, disposable, 10 ml PK/50 100 

65 Pipettes, Pasteur, polyethylene, disposable, 2ml BX/3000 20 

66 Centrifuge bench drive with digital setting of RCF speed and time variable speed 

rang 1000-12000rpm, maximum tube size 15ml with its accessories Unit 1 

67 a TC-1 Thermal Control Unit, 

Air-Sea Containers packaging for the transport of dangerous Samples with high 

quality with the following Specification: External: 350×350×355 mm, Internal: 

210×210×210 mm up to 7 Kilos Dry Ice. With an over pack consisting of a thickwalled polystyrene box set in a fiberboard case with all labels and instructions 

Unit 

100 

 TC-2 Thermal control Unit the same as above 

Size: External: 305×305×320mm, Internal 175×175×160mm up to 4 Kilos With an 

over pack consisting of a thick-walled polystyrene box set in a fiberboard case 

with all labels and instructions 

Unit 

100 

67 b CP- 28 Thermal Control Sachet 

Specification:150×150×32mm Nominal weight:600g, 18 Sachet/Pack 1000 

 CP- 3 Thermal Control Sachet 

Size: 280×150×32mm Nominal weight:1 Kilo 12 Sachet/Pack 1000 

Chemicals required for Avian Influenza Diagnosis 

1 Sodium chloride 500 g 5 

2 Sodium Phosphate dibasic 500 g 5 

3 Sodium Phosphate monobasic 500 g 5 

4 Bovine serum albumin 100 g 5 

5 Sodium azide 500 g 5 

6 Sodium citrate 500 g 5 
70 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

No. Items required Unit of Issue Quantity 

7 Citric citrate 500 g 5 

8 Citrate acid 500 g 5 

9 Dextrose 500 g 5 

10 Agarose ( type I medium grade) 100 g 10 

11 Virkon Disinfectant powder, 50 x 50 sachets 50 x 50 Sac. 100 

 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 71

ANNEX 4 

AI Outbreak Response: Logistics 

Requirements

NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBR

AI Outbreak Response: Logistical requirements in a stumping out operation per poultry house (farm) and throug

Measures Authorities Staff No./ farm No./ zone Logistics/Supplies Sacking of birds (and disinfection of premises) 

MAI ED Sanitary 

- Para-vets - Environ./ Sanitary workers - Farmers - others 

10 200 PPEs 

Sacks (Rice sacks) Sprayers 

Neck crushing (and disinfection of premises) 

MAI ED Sanitary 

- Para-vets - Environ./ Sanitary workers - Farmers - others 

10 200 PPEs 

Neck crasher tool Sprayers 

Disposal (brings/transports sacks to pit/cleaning and disinfection) 

MAI ED 

Sanitary 

- Environ./ Sanitary workers - Farmers - others (drivers) 

4 80 PPEs 

Vehicle (truck) Wheel barrow Sprayers 

Pit digging, treatment and filling 

ED Construction LC 

- Various workers 5 100 PPEs 

Digging equipment (tractors) Trucks Lime 

Supportive (supplies, PPEs, setting buckets of disinfectants, first aid/safety, comforting, directing, etc.) 

MOS MPHP MAI LC YMCO NGOs Schools 

- Medical/para-medical - Health workers - Various workers 

4 80 PPEs 

Disinfectants Buckets Disposal bags Sprayers First aid kit Tables Chairs Cords Cellphones Ambulance/vehicle (Food and water) 

Security/Policing/Public control and information 

MAI/MPHP Police Defense LC 

- Officers - Police - Local council leaders/staff 

4 80 PPEs 

Vehicle Cellphones Info & education materials 

Supervision culling/disinfection (checks all procedures) 

MAI MPHP LC 

- Veterinarian - Para-vets - Health workers - Others 

1 20 PPEs 

Cellphones 
74 NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS)

Measures Authorities Staff No./ farm No./ zone Logistics/Supplies Supervision disposal (checks all procedures) 

ED 

Sanitary LC Civil works Defense 

- Landfill engineer/worker - Sanitary engineer/worker - Construction engineer/worker 

1 20 PPEs 

Cellphones 

Overall supervision/coordination (Authority over all) 

LC/MAI (governorate/ district) 

- Veterinarian from district or governorate/MAI 

1 6-7 PPEs 

Vehicle Cellphone 

Total 40 800 

ED = Environmental Department MAI = Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation MPHP = Ministry of Public Health and Population MOS = Ministry of Purveyance LC = Local Council NGOs = Nongovernmental Organizations PPEs = Personal Protective Equipment • Compensation team should be formed and should consist of Ministry of Finance, private sector, MAI, MHP, and a livestock specialist. 

Notes: The basic assumptions are: • Each outbreak stamping out area/zone consists of 20 poultry houses and each poultry house consists of 10,000 birds. Thus, the total is 20

• The workers can devote only 5 hours of work time per day of operation • Each person should be allotted at least 3 sets of disposable PPEs. The PPEs shall include: Disposable items: • Coverall or gown with long cuffed sleeves • N95 respirator mask is preferred. A standard well-fitted surgical mask should be used if N95 is not available • Cap, or hood is preferred Reusable items: • Goggles (non-misting type) • Boots (rubber or polyurethane that can be disinfected) • Gloves (heavy duty rubber that can be disinfected) 
NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 75

ANNEX 5 

Budget Templates

NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA ACTION PLAN (OUTBREAK RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS) 77

FY 2006: Budget Summary (USD) 

Item Quantity Unit Cost Cost 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Time Table 

Month/ 

Activities 

01 02 03 04 05 06

 

 


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Tel: (202) 712-0000 

Fax: (202) 216-3524 

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