IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matterofthe Dependency of No. 79885-5-I C.G.-P. (DOB: 02/25/2004), consolidated with No. 79889-8-I STATE OFWASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, DIVISION ONE

Respondent,

V. UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHERYL GREEN, Appellant.

_______________________________ FILED: March 9, 2020 KORSMO, J.1

—A mother appeals an orderterminating her parental rights. We conclude that shewas afforded due process, an unfit parent, and unlikelyto resolve her parental deficiencies in a timelyfashion. Accordingly, we affirm. FACTS C.G. is the motherofa teenager, C.G.-P. The Department ofSocial and Health Services (Department)2 filed a dependency petition regarding C.G.-P. in April 2017, aftera school truancy officer reported the youth had not attended school since June 2016. C.G.-P., then age 13, was removed from C.G.’s care and never returned.

1 Judge Kevin M. Korsmo is a Division Threejudge serving with the Court ofAppeals, Division One, under CAR 21(a).

2 In July2018, the Department of Social and Health Services transferred child welfare responsibilities to the Department of Children, Youth, and Families. RCW43.216.906. We referto both as “the Department” in this opinion.No. 79885-5-112
C.G. agreed to the dependency in June 2017. A dispositional orderwas entered in July2017. To address her parental deficiencies of mental health and/orsubstance use issues, these orders required 0G. to complete random urinalysis, mental health counseling, medication management, an alcohol/drug evaluation, a psychological evaluation with a parenting component, and follow all treatment recommendations. The court ordered visitation atthe youth’s discretion and required 0G. to keep the Department informed of hercontact information. The assigned social worker metwith C.G. on multiple occasions and offered the ordered services through letters, in-person meetings, text messages, phone calls, and at a shared planning meeting. 

### C.G. did notfully complete any ofthe ordered services. The Department petitioned fortermination in August 2018. Though C.G.
neveranswered the petition, the termination action proceeded to a bench trial in April 2019. C.G. failed to appear, but both she and the youth were represented by counsel attrial. The court heard testimonyfrom the assigned social worker, from C.G.’s mental health counselor, and considered 25 exhibits. The social workertestified aboutthe entry ofthe dependency and dispositional orders, the numerous times and methods she offered ordered services to C.G., the youth being in out-of-home care fortwo years, and the mother not completing the ordered services. The social worker recommended termination because C.G. had not “mitigated oreliminated the reasons” thatthe youth became dependent, and stated that itwould take C.G. at least six months



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to complete the ordered services. The social worker also informed that C.G.-P. wanted to be adopted bythe foster placement and had not elected to visit C.G. since July 2018. The mental health counselortestified to treating 0G. “very sporadically”
overthe pastyearand a half, not recalling the lasttime she saw C.G., C.G. being not in compliance with the mental health treatment plan, and being unaware of C.G.’s urinalysis results being “positive foramphetamines” ortesting as “not human.” On April 3, 2019, the trial court adopted the facts in the termination petition
as true and correct based on C.G.’s failure to file an answer, determined thatthe Department had proved the statutorytermination factors by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and terminated C.G.’s parental rights. C.G. timely appealed to this court. A panel considered the matterwithout oral argument. ANALYSIS C.G. asserts three arguments, which we address in the order presented. Due Process First, C.G. contends thatthe trial court’s adoption ofthe facts in the termination petition as “true and correct” infringed on her “rights to examine witnesses and to receive a decision based solely on evidence introduced” atthe hearing, and “was based on hearsaythatwas purportedly inadmissibleforthe truth ofthe matter asserted but nonetheless not limited in the written findings.”

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In orderto terminate the parent-child relationship, the Department must first establish the six elements of RCW 13.34.180(1).~ The trial courtthen must find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence thatthe parent is currently unfit.4 In re Welfare ofA.B., 168 Wn.2d 908, 918-19, 232 P.3d 1104 (2010). The trial court’s findings are entitled to great deference on review and those findingswill be upheld when supported by substantial evidence.5 In re Dependencyof K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d 918, 925, 976 P.2d 113 (1999). Here, there is no indication thatthe trial court admitted the termination petition as an exhibit attrial or considered any of its content in making the termination findings. There is no dispute that C.G. had notice ofthe termination trial, that she failed to attend, that hercounsel cross-examined witnesses, and that hercounsel had an opportunityto presentwitnesses on her behalf. Moreover, based on our reviewofthe record, we are satisfied that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination thatthe Department proved all sixfactors of ROW 13.34.180(1). 

### C.G. was afforded due process below.

~ The six elements are: (1) the child has been found to be dependent, (2) the court has entered a dispositional order, (3) the child has been removed from the custody ofthe parentforat least six months, (4) all the necessary services have been afforded to the parentto correctthe parental deficiencies, (5) there is little likelihood of remedying the parental deficiencies, and (6) continuation ofthe parent child relationship clearly diminishesthe child’s prOspects of permanent placement. ROW 13.34.180(1).

~‘ ‘‘Olear, cogent, and convincing’ means highly probable.” In re Welfare ofM.R.H., 145 Wn. App. 10, 24, 188 P.3d 510 (2008).

~ Substantial evidence is thatsufficientto “persuade a fair-minded, rational person ofthe truth ofthe declared premise.” In re Welfare ofT.B., 150 Wn. App. 599, 607, 209 P.3d 497 (2009).
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Parental Fitness Next, C.G. argues thatthe Departmentfailed to show how her alleged substance abuse rendered hera currently unfit parent. ‘[A] parent has a due process right notto have the State terminate his or her relationship with a natural child in the absence ofan express or implied finding that he orshe, atthe time oftrial, is currently unfitto parentthe child.” A.B., 168 Wn.2d at 918. To meet its burden of proof in establishing a parent is currently unfit, the Department must prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence thatthe parent’s deficiencies prevent him or herfrom providing the child with “basic nurture, health, orsafety.” RCW 13.34.020. Here, the trial court explicitlyfound C.G. “currently unfitto parentthis child.” In its oral ruling, the court made following unchallenged findings: (1) 

### CC.
was not compliantwith her mental health treatment, (2) CC. did notfollowthe recommendations of her psychological evaluation, (3) CC. did not obtain a substance abuse evaluation, and (4) C.G. “does not have the abilityto make good decisions to supportthe best interests” ofthe youth. These findings are nowverities. In re DependencyofM.S.R., 174 Wn.2d 1, 9, 271 P.3d 234 (2012). The trial court’s determination was supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Problems Remediable in the NearFuture Lastly, C.G. challenges the trial court’s finding concerning herabilityto
overcome her parenting deficiencies.

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In termination proceedings, the Department must prove thatthere is “little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so thatthe child can be returned to the parent in the nearfuture.” RCW 13.34.180(1 )(e). What constitutes the “near future” depends on the child’s age and placement circumstances. In re Welfare ofC.B., 134Wn. App. 942, 954, 143 P.3d 846 (2006). The “nearfuture” is a short period for a child in fostercare in need ofa permanent placement. Id. Here, the trial court determined thatthe youth’s future was a matter of months, notyears. Ample evidence supports this finding. Atthe time oftrial, the then 15-year-old youth had epilepsy, which was being managed by a stable foster placement. The youth was thriving in school and desired to continue learning, which was hindered when in C.G.’s care. Lastly, the youth wanted to be adopted bythe foster placement and desired permanence now, as opposed to at least six months in the future. Underthese circumstances, we conclude that there was little likelihood C.G. could correct herdeficiencies in a future near enough to successfully and safely parent C.G.-P. Affirmed. A majority ofthe panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but itwill be filed for public record pursuantto RCW2.06.040.

WE CONCUR:



## ~ ig.~ J. Kors~/J.