# Official Journal C 257/21 J

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 257 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6621 July 2023 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 257

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6621 July 2023

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| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| | OPINIONS |
| | Committee of the Regions |
| | 155th CoR plenary session, 24.5.2023-25.5.2023 |
| 2023/C 257/01 | Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on Do no harm to cohesion – A cross-cutting principle contributing towards cohesion as an overall objective and value of the EU | 1 |
| 2023/C 257/02 | Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on preparing for and dealing with crises: strengthening the resilience of the Union, its regions and cities | 6 |
| 2023/C 257/03 | Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework: the local and regional perspective | 12 |
| 2023/C 257/04 | Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on zero long-term unemployment: the local and regional perspective | 18 |
| 2023/C 257/05 | Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the legislative framework for sustainable food systems | 23 |

Contents

page

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

OPINIONS

Committee of the Regions

155th CoR plenary session, 24.5.2023-25.5.2023

2023/C 257/01

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on Do no harm to cohesion – A cross-cutting principle contributing towards cohesion as an overall objective and value of the EU

1

2023/C 257/02

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on preparing for and dealing with crises: strengthening the resilience of the Union, its regions and cities

6

2023/C 257/03

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework: the local and regional perspective

12

2023/C 257/04

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on zero long-term unemployment: the local and regional perspective

18

2023/C 257/05

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the legislative framework for sustainable food systems

23

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| | III   Preparatory acts |
| --- | --- |
| | Committee of the Regions |
| | 155th CoR plenary session, 24.5.2023-25.5.2023 |
| 2023/C 257/06 | Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the Interoperable Europe Act | 28 |

III   Preparatory acts

Committee of the Regions

155th CoR plenary session, 24.5.2023-25.5.2023

2023/C 257/06

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the Interoperable Europe Act

28

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| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

OPINIONS

Committee of the Regions

155th CoR plenary session, 24.5.2023-25.5.2023

| 21.7.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 257/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.7.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 257/1

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Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on ‘Do no harm to cohesion – A cross-cutting principle contributing towards cohesion as an overall objective and value of the EU’

(2023/C 257/01)

| Rapporteur: | Michiel RIJSBERMAN (NL/Renew) Regional Minister of the Province of Flevoland |
| --- | --- |
| Reference documents: | Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050
  COM(2022) 34 final
  Commission Staff Working Document Cohesion in Europe towards 2050 accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050
  SWD(2022) 24 final |

Rapporteur:

Michiel RIJSBERMAN (NL/Renew) Regional Minister of the Province of Flevoland

Reference documents:

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050

COM(2022) 34 final

Commission Staff Working Document Cohesion in Europe towards 2050 accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050

SWD(2022) 24 final

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

| 1. | welcomes the introduction of the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle (hereafter ‘DNHC’) in the 8th Cohesion Report, where it is defined as ‘no action should hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities’ (1), but regrets that the report provides no in-depth insight for getting a clear picture about the problems (harm to cohesion) and possible solutions; |
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1.

| 2. | underlines the importance of cohesion as a fundamental value of the European Union and a cross-cutting objective that the European Committee of the Regions fully supports. Points out that recent crises have stagnated convergence and particularly affected the most vulnerable citizens; insists on the need to avoid creating fertile soil for populism and extremism in the context of the upcoming European elections; |
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2.

| 3. | thanks the European Parliament (2) for calling on the European Committee of the Regions to be involved in the implementation and design of the DNHC principle and calls on the European Commission to take the proposals from this opinion on board when further developing the principle; |
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3.

| 4. | underlines the Council conclusions on the 8th Cohesion report call for a general awareness of doing no harm to cohesion in all Union policies and initiatives, and in the implementation of the internal market, including State Aid rules; |
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4.

| 5. | reminds that, according to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning on the European Union (TFEU), European policies and actions as well as the economic policies of Member States should contribute to the Union’s overall harmonious development and social, economic and territorial cohesion. Insists that, while EU Cohesion Policy has a key role in promoting cohesion, other EU policies are bound by this objective. Notices that there are currently no mechanisms in place for ensuring this; |
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5.

| 6. | demands from the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council and the Member States that DNHC be turned from a concept into reality; |
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6.

| 7. | warns the Commission that the principle is far from ready to be used as a tool to deliver cohesion, and risks compromising the purpose of cohesion policy in its own right. Cohesion policy is and should remain the main tool for a harmonious development of the Union for all regions; |
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7.

| 8. | proposes a wide interpretation of the DNHC principle, covering all European policies with spatial impact as well as relevant national policies, and encompassing a requirement to respect the cohesion principles of partnership and multi-level governance; |
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8.

| 9. | proposes that the Commission applies a mandatory ‘comply or explain’ rule linked to the DNHC principle in the explanatory memorandum for any proposed initiative; |
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9.

| 10. | calls on the Commission to develop the analysis of cohesion aspects as part of the European Semester, in particular through the annex on economic and social performance at regional level of country reports; it would be even more useful if it provided a state-of-play of cohesion at NUTS 2 level in Member States and included an analysis of existing policies that could explain the situation and possible measures for solving regional disparities; |
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10.

How Cohesion may be harmed

| 11. | recognises that the existence of many types of disparities combined with the lack of data on effects of policies in our regions and cities, either positive or negative, makes it challenging to obtain deeper insight into harm being done to cohesion and to propose manageable solutions; |
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11.

| 12. | points out that, apart from Cohesion Policy, the design and implementation of some EU policies contribute to the convergence process while others may go against it; outlines that not only funding policies but also regulatory initiatives or trade agreements may have a significant impact and create obstacles for the development of less developed regions, even if they seem ‘spatially blind’; |
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12.

| 13. | notes for instance that any relaxing of State aid rules often benefits more developed Member States to a greater extent; |
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13.

| 14. | considers that the potential synergies between EU funds that have a territorial dimension could be better exploited; |
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14.

| 15. | underlines that, despite many simplifications introduced by the Commission, the complexity of EU funds and rules for using them still make it difficult for local and regional authorities to benefit from EU programmes; |
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15.

| 16. | points out that the limited capacity of local and regional actors to access funding opportunities and to run projects also stems from an unavailability of technical skills or ability to provide the expected co-financing; calls therefore on the European Commission to support in particular Member States with low absorption rates via capacity building measures; |
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16.

| 17. | shares the view in the European Parliament’s resolution on the 8th Cohesion Report that the deployment of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) has been highly centralised at Member State level and has lacked consultation with regions and municipalities (3); |
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17.

| 18. | regrets that under the RRF there is no obligation for Member States to report on the distribution of funds in the various regions; argues for better information and transparency on where the money lands and calls on future investment programmes to be implemented at local or regional level; |
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18.

| 19. | underlines that the different EU programmes and funds running in parallel, such as RRF, REACT-EU, JTF (Just Transition Fund), ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) and ESF+ (European Social Fund Plus) oblige managing authorities to work with different rules and implementation duties, which creates uncertainties and leads to a slower start in some of the programmes; |
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19.

| 20. | regrets that there is no clear overview on the combined effect of a large number of EU regulations both on the whole and on each other. Underlines that this limits the possibility of integral spatial choices and makes it difficult to implement individual regulations, and that choices need to be made when facilitating the energy transition (through investments in e.g. heating networks/solar panels), applying greenery (e.g. in the form of trees) in the environment, providing sustainable mobility and building sufficient and sustainable housing; |
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20.

| 21. | draws attention to the fact that, even as part of Cohesion policy, unintended harm may be done diminishing its impact; national authorities may not allocate maximum levels of funding to less developed and transition regions, hampering the convergence process. Requests that the Commission and Member States optimise the use of cohesion policy funding in less developed and transition regions, including as part of the upcoming mid-term review of the 2021-2027 programmes; |
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21.

| 22. | notices that Cohesion may also be endangered by the fact that Cohesion policy funding has been used to systematically respond to recent crises; highlights that although this may have contributed to preventing a further widening of disparities, the cohesion-principles of strategic, evidence-based programming, partnership and multi-level governance should still be respected in any crisis-response instrument; |
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22.

| 23. | underlines that the CoR refuses any attempts for centralisation of EU programmes and will not accept a further disregarding of the local and regional level in future EU programmes. Stresses that shared management has proven successful and should not be undermined by centrally-managed programmes; |
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23.

Implementing the principle through reinforced ex ante assessment, mid-term, ongoing and ex post evaluation of territorial impacts of all relevant EU policies

| 24. | emphasises that the 8th Cohesion Report calls for strengthening territorial impact assessments and rural proofing ‘so that the needs and specificities of different EU territories are better taken into account’; welcomes that, in its conclusions on the 8th Cohesion Report, the Council encouraged the European Commission to consider including territorial impact assessments (regional proofing) in relevant EU policies at both their conception and evaluation stages; |
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24.

| 25. | stresses the need for a systematic ex ante assessment of potential differentiated territorial impacts on all types of regions of all new EU policies with a territorial dimension in their design phase as the most effective tool to put the DNHC principle into practice; |
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25.

| 26. | points out that the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 2016 commits the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council to carry out impact assessments, whenever possible, with particular regards to territorial impacts; considers that the 2021 EC Better regulation package (4) provides a framework for assessing territorial impacts; however, regrets that the stipulation that impact assessments should be proportionate as regards their scope and focus leads in practice to often very limited assessment or under-estimation of territorial impacts. Recalls the European Commission’s repeated commitments in recent years (5) to strengthen territorial impact assessments (TIA); |
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26.

| 27. | therefore, recommends reinforcing the assessment of potential differentiated territorial impacts and negative effects on cohesion in the EC Better Regulation toolbox in several ways:






  — | by adding a question in the list of questions in BR Tool # 18 along the lines of: ‘Does the initiative hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities?’ |
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27.

—

by adding a question in the list of questions in BR Tool # 18 along the lines of: ‘Does the initiative hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities?’

| — | in BR Tool # 34, by making the use of the TIA Necessity Check mandatory to determine the need for a Territorial Impact Assessment and by giving a strong preference to the use of ESPON (The European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion) TIA Quick Check tool over public consultations for assessing potential territorial impacts, as it is based on a combination of experts’ judgment and quantitative territorial data available for all EU regions. |
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—

in BR Tool # 34, by making the use of the TIA Necessity Check mandatory to determine the need for a Territorial Impact Assessment and by giving a strong preference to the use of ESPON (The European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion) TIA Quick Check tool over public consultations for assessing potential territorial impacts, as it is based on a combination of experts’ judgment and quantitative territorial data available for all EU regions.

| — | by introducing a recommendation that stakeholder consultations should explicitly cover territorial cohesion aspects, either with a reference in the ‘call for evidence’ and/or a set of questions in the public consultation or with targeted consultations reaching regional and local authorities, reminding that target groups in remote and rural areas with more difficult access to the internet may need to be addressed by specific channels. |
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—

by introducing a recommendation that stakeholder consultations should explicitly cover territorial cohesion aspects, either with a reference in the ‘call for evidence’ and/or a set of questions in the public consultation or with targeted consultations reaching regional and local authorities, reminding that target groups in remote and rural areas with more difficult access to the internet may need to be addressed by specific channels.

| — | by introducing an obligation to report in the Impact Assessment report on the assessment of potential differentiated territorial impacts and potential harm to cohesion, in a similar way as for the ‘do no significant harm’ principle concerning environmental impacts; impact assessments should be clear as to whether there will be impacts on EU cohesion, and what the trade-offs may be between cohesion and other objectives. |
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—

by introducing an obligation to report in the Impact Assessment report on the assessment of potential differentiated territorial impacts and potential harm to cohesion, in a similar way as for the ‘do no significant harm’ principle concerning environmental impacts; impact assessments should be clear as to whether there will be impacts on EU cohesion, and what the trade-offs may be between cohesion and other objectives.

| — | by including a specific mandatory section in the explanatory memorandum explaining how the initiative upholds the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle based on a ‘comply or explain’ rule: the Commission should either demonstrate that the implementation of the initiative does not hinder the Union’s cohesion (complies with the DNHC principle), or explain why the potential harm (remaining after mitigating measures) is justified, with regards to other objectives; |
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—

by including a specific mandatory section in the explanatory memorandum explaining how the initiative upholds the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle based on a ‘comply or explain’ rule: the Commission should either demonstrate that the implementation of the initiative does not hinder the Union’s cohesion (complies with the DNHC principle), or explain why the potential harm (remaining after mitigating measures) is justified, with regards to other objectives;

| 28. | calls upon the Commission to further develop TIA models and methods with support from JRC and ESPON; |
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28.

| 29. | calls upon the Commission to give capacity for a dedicated service to support directorates-general in the TIA process and deliver mandatory training on TIA to all Commission officials dealing with impact assessments; |
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29.

| 30. | reiterates its call for the Regulatory Scrutiny Board to include a permanent member designated by the CoR in order to ensure that EU policies are not territorially blind; |
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30.

| 31. | is eager to assist the Commission in conducting its Territorial Impact Assessments; offers in particular to help identify relevant questions for local and regional authorities in Commission consultations and help identify experts at local and regional levels to take part in Commission TIA workshops; |
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31.

| 32. | points out that the European Committee of the Regions can play a stronger role in the EU Better Regulation agenda e.g. by conducting TIA itself on EU policies which could potentially harm cohesion, if it is granted additional means; |
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32.

| 33. | insists on the need to implement the DNHC principle also in the evaluation phase (ex post, mid-term and ongoing), so it is not a one-time box-ticking exercise during the ex ante assessment, by monitoring and evaluating the impact of sectoral EU policies on cohesion; |
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33.

| 34. | suggests, in this respect, introducing in the EC Better Regulation package a recommendation that evaluated legislation or programmes should look at possible direct impacts on cohesion or (in)consistencies with Cohesion Policy; reports (equivalent to the Cohesion Report) produced in the context of sectoral policies should have a part dedicated to cohesion effects; |
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34.

| 35. | recalls the added value RegHub provides, by means of stakeholder consultations, to the evaluation of implemented EU legislation; reiterates the call to make full use of the Fit for Future platform, RegHub and the CoR itself, to ensure that the Commission has detailed evidence of impact on the ground; |
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35.

| 36. | stresses the general need for data and statistical tools at local and regional level to support the ex ante assessment and ex post evaluation of the impact of EU policies/instruments on cohesion; underlines the need for indicators and comprehensive indices (other than GDP per capita) such as the EU Social Progress Index or Regional Competitiveness Index to reflect all aspects of harmonious development as new sources of disparities may emerge. Calls for more resources to be dedicated to Eurostat and JRC for the urban and rural observatories development. Calls on Member States to implement systems for gathering data and information at local level to evaluate the impact of legislation and policies; |
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36.

Implementing the principle through a better coordination of EU policies/funds and their implementation at national and subnational level

| 37. | calls upon the European Commission to streamline investment policies and funds to ensure synergies and complementarities in order to achieve selected objectives. Calls for the Just Transition Fund as well as the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development to be governed with other funds under the same Common Provisions Regulation; |
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37.

| 38. | stresses the need to increase synergies between cohesion policy and Horizon Europe in order to strengthen research and innovation capacities in all EU regions, which allows the EU to compete on a global scale by investing in regional excellence and can be a solution to the development trap of middle-income regions; |
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38.

| 39. | calls on the European Commission, when managing EU funding, to take into account the level of development of regions and potential for reducing regional disparities going beyond GDP; |
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39.

| 40. | encourages national governments to conduct systematic ex ante territorial impact assessment so that no national policy is ‘spatially blind’, making use of lessons learnt from the Territorial Agenda 2030 Pilot Action ‘Understanding how sector policies shape spatial (im)balances’; |
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40.

| 41. | underlines the need for Member States to ensure communication and coordination between the different ministries, agencies and managing authorities to make the best of potential synergies and complementarities between different policies and funding streams and ensure there is no overlap or harm to cohesion; |
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41.

| 42. | reiterates its call on Member States and the Commission to ensure that the RRF and any successor directly incorporates the cohesion policy approach based on strategic evidence-based programming, multilevel governance and partnership; |
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42.

| 43. | emphasises that different levels of government need to work together in partnership to deliver cohesion on the ground, including by coordinating the implementation of different EU policies/instruments; |
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43.

| 44. | urges the Member States to support any of their regions whose development is lagging behind in building administrative capacity and in boosting skills development to fully benefit from EU programmes. |
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44.

Brussels, 24 May 2023.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

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(1)  See: page 30 of Cohesion in Europe towards 2050, Eighth Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion (http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/cohesion-report/).

1

Eighth Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion

(2)  Report A9-0210/2022 on economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU: the 8th Cohesion Report (2022/2032(INI)).

2

Report A9-0210/2022 on economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU: the 8th Cohesion Report

(3)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the Review Report on the Implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ C 157, 3.5.2023, p. 12).

3

(4)  Better regulation: guidelines and toolbox.

4

(5)  See EC communications A Long-Term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas (2021) and Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions (2022).

5

A Long-Term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas

Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions

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| 21.7.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 257/6 |
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21.7.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 257/6

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Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on preparing for and dealing with crises: strengthening the resilience of the Union, its regions and cities

(2023/C 257/02)

| Rapporteur: | Christophe CLERGEAU (PES/FR), Member of the Pays de la Loire Regional Council |
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Rapporteur:

Christophe CLERGEAU (PES/FR), Member of the Pays de la Loire Regional Council

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR)

Societal preparedness — a new approach to preparing for risks and crises

| 1. | believes that we cannot know which crises will affect Europe, its cities, its counties and regions in future, but that we do know who will be affected. Crises do not stop at administrative borders and therefore require a multilevel approach involving all municipal institutions, local intermediate authorities (provinces, counties, etc.) and the regional level. To avoid this, we need to develop a culture of risks and crises, a new approach based on societal preparedness for the safety, health and well-being of people. This is the main thrust of our opinion; |
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1.

| 2. | notes that the chief hallmark of crises in recent years has been their brutal and unpredictable nature. Disasters and extreme events relating to climate change could and should be envisaged and anticipated, but their violence and frequency have outweighed all expectations. The COVID-19 crisis, the war in Ukraine and the associated human suffering point to a new pattern of unpredictable, large-scale crises. Overarching preventative approaches (acting to avoid known and probable risks) or the precautionary principle (acting to prevent serious and irreversible new risks to human health or the environment) are no longer sufficient to deal with such phenomena; |
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2.

| 3. | believes that Europe must invest in a new approach: societal preparedness, defined as the collective capacity to prepare societies, in a spirit of cohesion and solidarity, for the challenges of the future, especially crises and disasters. Societal preparedness places a particular accent on the civic, social and human dimension, and on access to services and the quality of support for people. After all, crises and disasters primarily affect the most vulnerable. This is one of the lessons from COVID-19; |
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3.

| 4. | considers that the overarching approach to resilience must bring together two elements: developing societies’ capacity to drive the necessary change to deal with the challenges of economic, social and territorial inequalities, climate change and the green transition, and the capacity to tackle societies’ vulnerabilities to risks, crises and disasters, including through the development of societal preparedness activities; |
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4.

| 5. | proposes making a distinction between vulnerabilities linked to known risks — mainly of an environmental, demographic and industrial nature — and those linked to unknown risks, whether they result from climate change, are health-related or caused by human activities. These vulnerabilities cannot be tackled using management plans, however sophisticated they may be; dealing with such vulnerabilities, especially the second type, means giving priority to developing a crisis and risk culture and a collective capacity to cope with uncertainty and disaster; |
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5.

| 6. | calls for the analysis of social and territorial vulnerabilities to be made a political priority for the EU, as it will be difficult to prepare societies without this information. Only by highlighting and understanding these vulnerabilities can effective responses be provided at European and national level, but above all in each of our cities, counties and regions. We should be wary of an approach to vulnerabilities that is all-encompassing with an excessive geographical scope, and instead favour a local approach that specifically addresses the circumstances experienced by people on the ground; |
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6.

| 7. | recognises that civil protection policies are primarily the responsibility of the Member States, but notes that prevention, societal preparedness and relief activities are very often carried out by local actors, cities and counties (provinces, etc.) which usually exercise such powers, with the support of regions. These authorities must therefore be closely involved in designing, implementing and monitoring them and be provided with adequate resources, both financial and legal, in line with the principle of active subsidiarity and a multilevel governance approach that involves and includes all territorial levels; |
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7.

| 8. | stresses the need to strengthen the capacity of cities and regions to provide the services required by people, including in times of crisis. One key measure is to strengthen common security of supply across Europe. This requires identifying critical dependencies, producing the bulk of essential products and services in Europe, and providing the single market mechanisms needed to bolster security of supply of raw materials, goods and food. Critical infrastructure also needs to be enhanced in order to secure living conditions in times of crisis; |
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8.

Putting vulnerability analysis at the heart of future cohesion policy

An index and scoreboard to better understand and take into account risks relating to the vulnerabilities of local areas and their populations

| 9. | welcomes the involvement of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and its risk management unit in developing a vulnerability ‘index’ (1), bringing together environmental, territorial, economic and social dimensions. The Committee would like the JRC to have the full political and financial support to press ahead with this initiative; |
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9.

| 10. | stresses the importance of the social dimension of vulnerability. All too often it is forgotten or overlooked, even though it is a key element of resilience. Any vulnerability analysis should fully integrate the concepts of access to people, social support and access of vulnerable persons to health systems and social services, and the reduction of the digital divide and better digital accessibility. The CoR underlines the vulnerability of minorities, women, the poor, older people and people with disabilities, those with chronic diseases, and the significance of social vulnerabilities in the outermost regions and in isolated and island regions, which are at the forefront of the fight against climate change; |
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10.

| 11. | backs the JRC’s efforts to improve the quality of data and the vulnerability ‘index’, supports the desire for greater collaboration between the JRC, the other Commission Directorates-General (DGs) and the Member States for this purpose, confirms the usefulness of applying this index at all territorial levels — NUTS 2, NUTS 3 and, above all, local level — and reiterates its call for the vulnerability scoreboard to be published in order to illustrate the actual reality in each area; to this end, recommends that Member States and local and regional authorities invest in risk assessment, especially with regard to vulnerability, and that the results of this work be made public in order to strengthen risk culture in the European Union; |
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11.

| 12. | draws attention to the need for data in order to effectively map the most vulnerable populations, which means providing non-aggregated data and interlinking data to highlight specific circumstances (e.g. poor women), as well as the need for data to indicate problems of accessing services; |
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12.

| 13. | believes that rather than trying to create the perfect indicator, the priority should be on testing it as a tool for decision-making; welcomes the fact that several community organisations have signed up to this approach and calls for a pilot programme bringing together cities, counties and regions wishing to experiment with the use of the vulnerability indicator so that it can be compared with local perceptions of reality and to guide their policies and investments; |
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13.

| 14. | suggests that the JRC could initiate setting-up a European exchange platform with an overarching approach to vulnerabilities, anticipation, preparedness and the management of risks and crises, involving European institutions, Member States, local and regional authorities and stakeholders; this platform could build on the experience of smart specialisation platforms and be funded by the Interreg Europe programme. It would draw in particular on the Union Civil Protection Knowledge Network (2), which should also be supported and developed; |
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14.

| 15. | proposes getting cities, counties and regions involved in all of these initiatives; |
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15.

| 16. | calls for a European network of civic movements and non-governmental associations to be set up for the prevention and management of risks and crises and to prepare societies to deal with them; calls on the Commission to support this initiative and help set it up; therefore stands ready to work with the Union Civil Protection Knowledge Network to help create this network, by organising an annual event for all stakeholders, in cooperation with the UNDRR and the European Commission; |
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16.

Tackling vulnerabilities, a new priority for cohesion policy

| 17. | wishes to highlight how recent crises have shown that vulnerabilities in local areas and among populations can translate into deep new inequalities in health and well-being; stresses, therefore, that dealing with social and territorial vulnerabilities should become a political priority of cohesion policy; this would mean strengthening the social dimension of cohesion policy beyond employment and training by focusing on the issues of inclusion and access to health and social services. It would also bring cohesion policy closer to citizens; |
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17.

| 18. | believes that developing an ‘index’ and territorial vulnerability scoreboard is crucial in order to start a policy debate on how to use future cohesion policy to respond to such vulnerabilities. The policy should also take into account, across all its components, data at NUTS 3 level in order to ensure a more targeted, accessible and efficient approach; |
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18.

| 19. | remains cautious about using a vulnerability ‘index’ as a decision-making tool to distribute cohesion policy funds, but stresses the need for cohesion policy to play a bigger role in the most vulnerable regions; |
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19.

| 20. | suggests making crisis resilience and tackling social and territorial vulnerabilities a programming priority for cohesion policy, together with introducing top-up funding for regions and counties that are particularly vulnerable and opting to make strong use of cohesion policy for this purpose; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | considers, however, that while cohesion policy can and should be a societal preparedness tool, it cannot cover compensation for damage caused by major disasters; believes that the new Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve is more focused on providing an immediate response to disasters and pandemics than on dealing with their aftermath; calls, therefore, for consideration to be given to setting up a permanent intervention mechanism to compensate for major damage caused by disasters in a given area; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | proposes encouraging, within the framework of European funding programmes such as Interreg, Horizon Europe or Erasmus+, interregional cooperation projects, which would need to be designed according to the geographical realities of the various areas, which could lead to cooperation with third countries. These projects would focus on crisis resilience and tackling vulnerabilities, particularly on the cross-border approach to risks and crises, which is a powerful lever for bringing together — around specific subjects — the various practices in the Member States. A specific component of Interreg and the EGTC is therefore likely to be crucial; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | recognises that while instruments at EU level have proved to be very helpful, there is scope for more to be done with regard to the legal and administrative challenges of cross-border cooperation, which would also ensure more European solidarity if obstacles to cross-border cooperation were solved; in this regard, calls on the European Commission to relaunch the adoption of the European cross-border mechanism; |
| --- | --- |

23.

Moving from risk management to a shared risk culture: preparing Europe and its geographical areas for crises and disasters

| 24. | notes that since the COVID crisis, European civil protection and public health policies have proliferated. There have been many new initiatives, including RescEU and European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA). Europe’s reaction to the war in Ukraine has led to a comprehensive response to supporting the people, which has highlighted the human and social dimension of crisis management. Alongside the need for crisis management, which is still very acute, the CoR hopes that priority will now be given to societal preparedness, i.e. risk prevention, crisis preparedness and the spread of a shared risk and crisis culture in Europe; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | stresses the important role of the Emergency Response Coordination Centre as a focal point for the coordination of European responses to crises, particularly the war in Ukraine and the earthquake in Türkiye. The management of these crises has shone a light on the human and social dimension of crisis management. For this reason, alongside the crucial role of crisis management, which is still extremely relevant, the European Committee of the Regions hopes that priority will now also be given to societal preparedness, i.e. risk prevention, crisis preparedness and the spread of a shared risk and crisis culture in Europe; |
| --- | --- |

25.

EU disaster resilience goals

| 26. | welcomes the Commission’s publication of the recommendation and communication on the EU's disaster resilience goals, and shares their general principles, which include many of the proposals put forward in previous opinions. Also welcomes the fact that local and regional circumstances are better taken into account and underlines the importance of the flagship initiatives; is convinced that this framework, though non-binding, would strengthen the convergence of practices across the various Member States and thus the quality of crisis preparedness; also wishes to be closely involved in the Civil Protection Forum, which will be held in 2024 and provide an opportunity to carry out an initial review of these objectives and to adapt them; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | encourages regions to seize the new opportunities to take part in initiatives and fund projects, particularly under the second goal ‘Prepare’ and the ‘preparEU’ flagship initiative; intends to help local and regional authorities become better involved in the Union Civil Protection Knowledge Network; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | finds it regrettable, however, that these publications purely come under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and do not take a more holistic view of the vulnerability and resilience of Europe, its cities and regions to crises; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | welcomes introducing stress tests on the resilience of emergency operation centres, but calls for this to be extended to include national, regional and local crisis alert and management systems, and proposes that all aspects of vulnerability, including social and territorial factors, be better taken into account in these stress tests; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | encourages regions/local authorities to engage in stress-testing on scenarios that fit to the local/regional risk landscape. Local/regional risk atlases and public risk awareness and preparedness actions could also be encouraged, also activities in conjunction with the future EU crisis preparedness month proposed in the DRG Communication; |
| --- | --- |

30.

Building a shared culture for tackling risks and crises within the community of local, national and European decision-makers

| 31. | notes that most of the actors with whom meetings have been held are seeking a European strategic risk and crisis framework with a view to developing a systemic and coordinated approach (currently felt to be lacking). Many of them have raised the prospect of setting up a ‘risks and crises’ DG, covering the preparedness of societies, prevention, and the management of risks and crises arising from our vulnerabilities; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | maintains that the main challenge when it comes to dealing with risks and crises is to change the mindset of decision-makers and political decision-making processes. The vast majority of decision-makers are not trained to anticipate and manage crises or to deal with the challenges of resilience. Mechanisms to manage clearly identified risks have multiplied, with public policies becoming fragmented at the expense of an overarching approach centred on resilience, on the analysis of social and territorial vulnerabilities and on preparedness to deal with unknown risks. A new shared culture for dealing with risks and crises should be promoted around the principle of societal preparedness; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | proposes, therefore, setting up a European risk and crisis school, which would provide training pathways for policy-makers and those in charge of operations, and develop professional frameworks and an accreditation scheme to create cohesive professional communities and facilitate mobility and mutual recognition. It would also support ongoing training, develop networks and activities to exchange knowledge and experience, and organise workshops on lessons learned and on designing innovative operational strategies and responses; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | stresses that global crises may begin outside Europe, but can affect any Member State, for example in the form of a refugee crisis or problems accessing critical products. Steps should be taken to enhance the ability to anticipate global crises and prevent them through concerted action, including outside the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | believes it is in Europe’s interest to act where new risks emerge in order to limit the EU’s exposure to risks. The relevant authorities within the EU must have the means to network with many bodies that are already CoR partners (including, at international level, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction — UNDRR, its platform for Europe and central Asia, and the Making Cities Resilient 2030 initiative) and to take part in action outside the EU, in collaboration with the countries concerned, as soon as risks are identified, with significant resources to draw on. This cooperation must also cover the preparatory phase and, in particular, prevention measures, reducing vulnerabilities, and preparing societies for crises. To this end, existing mechanisms and stakeholder forums such as the EU Civil Protection Knowledge Network should bolster partnerships with civil society actors and local NGOs; |
| --- | --- |

35.

Resilient and proactive societies to better tackle risks and crises

| 36. | believes that one of the very building blocks of resilience is the ability of citizens to join forces in the initial hours of a crisis while they wait for help to arrive. This means both providing prior training for all citizens, preparing all households and ensuring local practices in the spirit of solidarity. The EU should therefore adopt a ‘72-hour strategy for dealing with crises’, locally adapted and taking into account the specificities of each country and region, specifically drawing on lessons learned from countries such as Japan and the United States; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | wishes to restate two strong beliefs: the best way to change mindsets is to educate children and young people; strong civic engagement, the voluntary sector and volunteer work are the best drivers of society’s resilience. With this in mind, the CoR proposes building on the EU's disaster resilience goals with three new flagship initiatives:






  — | the roll-out of ‘risk factories’ (3), adapted to local and regional framework conditions and needs, as already trialled in several countries, to educate all young children aged 6-10 on which questions they should ask and the right steps to take to prepare for and deal with risks; |
| --- | --- | --- |

37.

—

the roll-out of ‘risk factories’ (3), adapted to local and regional framework conditions and needs, as already trialled in several countries, to educate all young children aged 6-10 on which questions they should ask and the right steps to take to prepare for and deal with risks;

| — | a European framework for training in first response and first aid, providing training in each country which is transferable and can be built on, and which all young people would be encouraged to complete by the age of 20; |
| --- | --- |

—

a European framework for training in first response and first aid, providing training in each country which is transferable and can be built on, and which all young people would be encouraged to complete by the age of 20;

| — | a European campaign to promote voluntary civic engagement in both volunteer bodies and non-governmental associations; |
| --- | --- |

—

a European campaign to promote voluntary civic engagement in both volunteer bodies and non-governmental associations;

| 38. | urges a move away from an approach to risks based on probabilities which systematically underestimates major risks, as has been the case with epidemics; calls for any action not to be limited to plans for managing known and probable environmental and industrial risks, but rather to put in place, in every city, county and region without exception, a resilience strategy and local mobilisation platform to organise local resilience teams and prepare societies for crises, paying particular attention to supporting the most vulnerable. These local resilience platforms should draw on citizen engagement, encourage an interdisciplinary approach, promote data exchange and interoperability, foster cooperation, including cross-border cooperation, facilitate the crisis response chain and build resilience to crises; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | calls for strong action to reduce digital poverty, which poses an additional risk in a crisis by leaving a significant part of the population without access to essential information and services; underlines the need to build a network of physical access points to information, aid and human support as close as possible to the population in cities and regions, and for them to be operational in the event of a crisis; |
| --- | --- |

39.

RescEU and emergency response coordination systems

| 40. | supports any European financial investment to strengthen rescEU, not only so that the EU can respond more quickly, comprehensively and autonomously, but also to strengthen its role in risk and disaster management; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | welcomes the ERCC 2.0 initiative, which aims to enhance the capacity to anticipate, forecast and prepare for EU-wide cross-sectoral events and to further improve and invest in early warning systems to ensure that the provision of early information and awareness-raising become a reality. The European Committee of the Regions recognises the work carried out by the European Commission in this area in line with its mandate in the field of early warning systems, and as part of the legislation on the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. This is aimed at developing cross-border detection, information and alert systems such as EFAS (European Flood Awareness System), EFFIS (European Forest Fire Information System) and EDO (European Drought Observatory); |
| --- | --- |

41.

HERA and the European Health Union

| 42. | supports HERA and the action taken over the past year, in particular to identify health risks, identify management scenarios and medical response measures, and strengthen value chains and the ability to produce the goods and services we need in Europe; points out that HERA needs renewed and ongoing political and financial support for several years in order to carry out its tasks effectively; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | recognises that it is difficult to evaluate HERA after just one year, but reiterates its call for the European Parliament, cities and regions and societal stakeholders to play a more effective role in HERA bodies, especially the HERA Forum; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | welcomes the deployment of the new One Health approach to break down silos between human, animal and environmental health, and to integrate health policies into a coherent approach to sustainable development; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | reiterates its strong warning to the Commission and the Council about the insufficient efforts to enhance Europe's production of the products and medicines we need to deal with health crises, and about the practices of public buyers. In many countries, these practices favour low prices over production in Europe, thereby forgetting the lessons of the COVID-19 crisis; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | proposes that the resilience of health systems, including community healthcare and hospitals, should be a explored in the context of a ‘Europe of health’, involving the Member States and the relevant local and regional authorities. This includes ensuring that continuity of care can be guaranteed in times of crisis through sufficient pre-existing or temporary reception capacities. The CoR therefore calls for studies to assess the impact of care being postponed or halted because of COVID-19, particularly for cancers, chronic diseases and mental health; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | calls for a more in-depth debate on how health data can be used to identify those most vulnerable to crises, thereby making is easier to provide them with social support and to continue their medical care. While assessing ethical and operational challenges, the CoR encourages the creation of a ‘European health data space’ to gather data, improve its quality and make it available to local public services; warns of the risk of entire sections of the population being overlooked by health data due to them being excluded or the digital divide; |
| --- | --- |

47.

For a cross-cutting approach to vulnerability, crisis preparedness and crisis management

| 48. | proposes that the index and the vulnerability scoreboard be taken into account to guide developments in the various EU policies beyond cohesion policy (such as in the common agricultural policy, research and innovation policy, or the European Health Union). An inter-DG task force within the Commission might be particularly useful for carrying out this task; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | supports ‘a resilience by design’ approach that allows impacts relating to resilience and vulnerability to be integrated from the early elaboration stages of public policies, regulations, action plans, major investment programmes and large-scale infrastructure, etc.; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | believes that public procurement has a major role to play in bringing about innovation, experimenting with new approaches based on local solidarity and building the resilience of local infrastructure and equipment; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | encourages setting up a Horizon Europe ‘mission’ on risk and crisis resilience (management, preparedness, shared culture, vulnerabilities), building on the ‘Civil security for society’ focused on developing methods and technologies, in order to make it a living laboratory for innovation and engagement rooted in the realities of cities and regions. |
| --- | --- |

51.

Brussels, 24 May 2023.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

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(1)  https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/risk-data-hub/#/vulnerability-in-europe

1

The vulnerability index makes it possible to go beyond the work carried out by the JRC as part of the ‘resilience dashboard’, which reflects a broader approach to the ability of societies to adapt and anticipate (https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategic-planning/strategic-foresight/2020-strategic-foresight-report/resilience-dashboards_en).

(2)  https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/about-knowledge-network

2

(3)  E.g. in Scotland: http://www.safercommunitiesscotland.org/wp-content/uploads/the-risk-factory.pdf; in the Netherlands: https://www.riskfactorymwb.nl/over-ons/

3

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| 21.7.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 257/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.7.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 257/12

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Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework: the local and regional perspective

(2023/C 257/03)

| Rapporteur: | Thomas HABERMANN (DE/EPP), Head of Rhön-Grabfeld District Council |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Thomas HABERMANN (DE/EPP), Head of Rhön-Grabfeld District Council

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR)

| 1. | notes that the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine and the continued occupation of Ukrainian territories, in breach of international law, is not only causing immense destruction and suffering on the ground, but is also having a tangible impact on the European Union, its Member States and local and regional authorities in both rural and urban areas; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | further notes that the European Union has not yet fully recovered from the COVID-19 pandemic, which already added a financial burden, particularly for local and regional authorities; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | points out that the existing Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) was created before the start of the war in Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic, high energy costs, and high inflation. Two years after its adoption, it is clear that the current framework does not offer a sufficient response to the current crises; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | in this connection welcomes the fact that the Interinstitutional Agreement accompanying the Multiannual Financial Framework obliges the European Commission to present an MFF mid-term review, and calls for a comprehensive assessment of its scope, including its budgetary ceilings and its flexibility measures and how it functions; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | underlines the importance of the horizontal principles that underpin the MFF and all related EU policies, in particular with regard to delivering on the Union’s climate and biodiversity targets and promoting gender equality; insists that the revision must keep these principles at the heart of the MFF and deliver on the Union’s commitment to ensuring an equitable, resilient, sustainable and socially fair recovery for all, including the implementation of the revised 2030 framework for Union climate, energy and environmental targets with the objective of making the EU climate neutral by 2050; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | stresses that the design of the MFF has a significant impact on developments in local and regional authorities and that a large portion of European funds are directly used to strengthen local and regional authorities; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | reiterates the importance of EU cohesion policy in achieving economic, territorial and social cohesion in all regions. Without this key pillar of European support, the success of the European single market would be jeopardised. Commits to working on the Cohesion Alliance to ensure that the future Multiannual Financial Framework provides for a strong, improved cohesion policy that continues to play a central role in Europe; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | notes that low absorption rates of EU cohesion funds in some countries are mainly due to the late approval of programmes and the fact that a number of different EU support programmes have different rules and diverging deadlines for commitments and payments run in parallel (e.g. the Recovery and Resilience Facility, REACT-EU, the Just Transition Fund (JTF), Structural and Investment Funds), along with the excessively short planning and implementation periods for retroactively eligible crisis intervention measures; calls for aligning the rules of different shared-management funds under the common Provisions Regulation and underlines that current low absorption rates in some programmes cannot be used as a benchmark for reducing the budget allocated to cohesion funds; |
| --- | --- |

8.

An MFF that supports investment at local and regional level

| 9. | stresses that high inflation, the cost of housing, caring for and integrating refugees, and the sharp rise in energy costs also pose major challenges for local and regional authorities. Even in Member States that are more robust economically, local and regional authorities are often no longer able to make the necessary investments by themselves. In addition, the scarcity of raw materials, skills shortages, and unstable supply chains pose further challenges that threaten economic stability in Europe; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | points out that over half of the resources of the JTF come from the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) instrument and have a shorter duration to just 2023; notes with concern that, as a result, there is enormous investment pressure in the early years of the entirely new JTF that does not exist for the established cohesion policy funds; calls for the investment deadlines for JTF resources from NGEU to be extended (for example by extending the commitment deadlines), so as to avoid jeopardising the outflow of resources and to ensure that JTF resources are used in their entirety for effective and sustainable projects in line with the objectives of the European Green Deal; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | points out that, additionally, a large proportion of the rules governing their implementation, adopted to achieve common European objectives, require significant investment at local and regional level, thus directly affecting sub-national budgets. This applies, for example, to the EU’s digital targets, the European Green Deal, and the ‘Fit for 55’ package, which requires more than half of the necessary investments to be made at local and regional level; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | calls for the long overdue phase-out of harmful subsidies and for consistency between all EU funds and programmes in the MFF post 2027; insists that projects and programmes which are inconsistent with the objective of limiting global warming to under 1,5 oC, or with the objective of halting and reversing biodiversity loss, should not be eligible for support in the next MFF; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | warns that local and regional authorities are overwhelmed by their existing investment obligations, due to the poor budgetary situation in many areas, and fears that the overall shrinking of public investment will seriously jeopardise the achievement of pan-European objectives, such as those of the European Green Deal, and hamper the prosperity of citizens and the overall economic potential of regions and municipalities; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | considers, therefore, that strengthening the MFF alone, without at the same time strengthening the investment capacity of local and regional authorities, is not constructive in this context; also believes it to be important, in this context, to promote territorial development strategies (CLLD/ITI), where necessary through mandatory use, in order to involve the levels of governance closest to citizens in the planning, consultation, implementation and management of the funds; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | notes that, while European funds can make a significant contribution to supporting sub-national authorities, they will not be sufficient in all cases to enable the necessary investments at local and regional level in order to implement EU rules; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | points out, in this connection, that in most Member States there are no mechanisms whereby higher levels of government fully and automatically compensate local and regional authorities for the cost of implementing EU rules; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | believes that a strong, competitive and sustainable European Union can only be achieved if the budgets of all levels of government have sufficient, interconnected and complementary resources; therefore, calls for a real review of the MFF that takes the new challenges on board and provides additional resources to address them; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | considers that, when new EU legislative proposals are brought forward, the Commission should estimate the cost of implementation for the level responsible, consider whether compensation mechanisms exist at national level and determine the extent to which MFF resources will help to offset those costs; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that adequate resources are available to offset the expenditure in the event of an investment gap, in order to ensure consistent development across the board; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | in order to assess these aspects, calls on the European Commission to carry out a comprehensive territorial impact assessment, which should involve both the Member States and regional hubs, before drafting the rules; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | emphasises that the 8th Cohesion Report calls for strengthening territorial impact assessments (TIAs) and rural proofing, so that the needs and specificities of different EU territories are better taken into account; refers in this respect to the CoR opinion Do no harm to cohesion — A cross-cutting principle contributing towards cohesion as an overall objective and value of the EU (1); calls on the budgetary authority to use the MFF review to add financial means to finance those TIAs. |
| --- | --- |

20.

An MFF that strengthens the European Union and makes it more resilient

| 21. | notes that, in recent years, when a crisis has arisen, the responsiveness of the European Union has been constrained due to lengthy discussions on budgets, the financing of new measures and the insufficiency of available budgetary flexibility instruments; stresses its conviction that the MFF mid-term review was agreed upon to adjust those unforeseeable new challenges; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | considers that the Multiannual Financial Framework is no longer up-to-date and needs to be revised; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | points out that the MFF and own resources are interlinked; urges the Council and the Commission to respect the roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources, as agreed in the legally binding Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) signed in December 2020, which is necessary to at least cover the repayment of NextGenerationEU; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | welcomes the fact that the European Commission will present proposals for additional genuine own resources in 2023; underlines that this new revenue should enter the EU budget as non-assigned revenue and not only serve to refinance NextGenerationEU debt, but also, in the long term, strengthen the capacity of the EU, the Member States and local and regional authorities to respond to crises in the meaning of Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It should also help address, under primary law and with full consideration for the Member States’ competences, pressing policy issues in an economic environment marked by inflation and high energy prices, and reduce the EU’s dependence on GNI-based resources. The reform of the own resources system should examine the impacts on municipalities and regions as part of territorial impact assessments, take full account of the relevant EU Treaty provisions and further limit the EU’s dependency on existing GNI-based own resources; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | points out that, before any new own resources are collected, their impact on local and regional authorities, businesses and households in the EU should be examined. In particular, existing systems of taxation at national, regional and local level must be taken into account in order to avoid competition between the European and national, regional or local levels, or even double taxation. In this context, the Committee also refers to the CoR opinion on The next generation of own resources for the EU budget (2); |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | reiterates the call made in its opinion on Making ETS and CBAM work for EU cities and regions (3) to allocate a share of new revenue directly to the level responsible for implementing the relevant EU rules; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | believes that the MFF should contribute to decentralisation by strengthening the resilience and investment capacity of local and regional authorities on the ground. Pooling capacities at European level must not come at the expense of the crisis resilience and responsiveness of sub-national authorities; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | urges the European Commission to undertake an analysis of possible models of involvement in negotiating, distributing, programming and implementing cohesion policy funds (in particular the CPR funds and the EAFRD), in order to optimise the participation of regional and local authorities in every step of 2028–2034 European funds management, and use the lessons learnt from the first half of the MFF to execute this analysis; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | suggests that a central, comprehensive crisis response reserve should be set up in the MFF, which, if not used by the end of the budget period, should be used under the relevant fund to strengthen crisis prevention at the local and regional level, with longer implementation periods for measures that have already been programmed; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | reiterates that Ukraine’s reconstruction is a European necessity and a moral duty, which will require Europe-wide coordination of direct support actions by the Member States and additional resources beyond the current EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) (4); the latter could be provided by, among other things, further developing the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine, which is supported by the Commission. The reconstruction strategy should build as much as possible on the methodology of the EU’s cohesion policy in order to best prepare Ukraine for the path to EU accession and approximation with the EU acquis. |
| --- | --- |

30.

An MFF that provides tailored funding for implementing European measures

| 31. | notes that, in the past, the European Commission has regularly proposed new measures and, with regard to funding, made a blanket reference to regional policy or the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), without checking whether the funds are available to finance the measures on the ground on the basis of the programmes or plans; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | stresses, in this connection, that new tasks for the European Union also require new resources and welcomes the adoption of the interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources. In addition, when new EU policies are introduced, the European Commission is asked to consider whether funds are available in the Multiannual Financial Framework for this purpose and whether these funds can be used in all Member States to implement the rules. With regard to regional policy funds, careful consideration should be given to whether existing funds have already been committed elsewhere or whether using them requires adjustments to be made to the operational programmes; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | calls for the MFF to be aligned with EU policies and to provide the necessary financial means to implement those; stresses that the MFF review should be used to adjust shortcomings in the current multiannual budget; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | highlights that the European Commission must ensure that the Union lives up to its international climate commitments in financial terms and provide funding to international climate finance in line with pledges made, and in particular to provide funding for the Loss and Damage Fund agreed during the COP27 and the relevant programmes under Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)-Global Europe; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | points out that, since its creation almost thirty years ago, the CoR has been underfunded compared to other EU bodies with a similar remit under primary law (5); nevertheless, it has effectively promoted better regulation and territorial impact assessment measures and has strengthened European democracy through its elected local and regional representatives; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | points out that the CoR’s institutional budget in 2022 constituted less than 1 % of line 7 of the EU budget (‘European Public Administration’) (6), and that investing in the CoR is about delivering on the EU’s political priorities, bearing in mind that 70 % of EU rules are implemented at local and regional level and that local and regional authorities are responsible for, on average, half of public investment, one third of public expenditure, and a quarter of tax revenues; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | stresses, therefore, that more use should be made of taxpayers’ money via the administrative chapter of the MFF (budget heading 7), in order to restore trust and enhance dialogue with citizens, in particular through the two EU political assemblies, composed of democratically elected members, namely the European Parliament and the European Committee of the Regions, taking into account the high level of trust that citizens have in their regional and local decision-makers and the proposals of the Conference on the Future of Europe (7); |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | regrets that the European Commission’s consolidated proposal for the 2024 budget under heading 7 of the MFF (‘European Public Administration’) does not include the CoR’s 2024 budgetary estimates, adopted by a large majority on 15 March 2023 (the ‘Tapping into the local and regional authorities’ potential to strengthen the EU’ project or ‘Cinderella’ project), especially considering the exceptional conjuncture of the approaching 2024 European elections, gains from the Conference on the Future of Europe’s outcomes and lessons learned from multiple crises with the local and regional government levels ever more on the frontlines; |
| --- | --- |

38.

An MFF that promotes economic, social and territorial cohesion

| 39. | calls for the overall Multiannual Financial Framework to be aligned with the objectives of Article 174 of the TFEU and to contribute to overall economic, social and territorial cohesion through a balanced distribution of resources. In doing so, it must also be ensured that small municipalities have equal access to funding, especially through streamlined application procedures and targeted support by the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | points out that the objectives of European cohesion policy can only be achieved if resources for long-term investment are available. Cohesion policy has proved a useful tool for providing an immediate response to recent crises, thanks, among other things, to the agility and effectiveness of the principle of partnership and multilevel governance and the existence of a specialised ecosystem of European fund managers based on the ground. However, it notes that, although there must be a degree of flexibility, the funds must not be used to respond directly to crises, as has been done in recent months and years. There is a need for a crisis-proof, protected budget item that allows for predictable and long-term investments for managing authorities and beneficiaries of funding; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | stresses that it is of the utmost importance for the cohesion national envelopes to be available for all Member States as soon as possible in accordance with the legal requirements, in order not to hinder the implementation and to provide a level playing field for all beneficiaries; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | calls for all funding to continue to be distributed with full respect for the partnership principle. The funds can be most beneficial if the relevant partners are involved in identifying challenges on the ground. In order to ensure full involvement, increase legal certainty for managing authorities, and reduce administrative burdens, the European Commission is asked to review the ‘European code of conduct on partnership in the Framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds’ (8) as soon as possible; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | considers that the shared management system has proved successful in the case of the Structural Funds and should be maintained in the future. Newly created and existing funds should also follow this system and, if possible, be distributed under decentralised management; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | in this connection, criticises the fact that funds for post-crisis recovery (NextGenerationEU) are not formally part of the budget, and considers that this structure makes it difficult to use resources in a consistent way. All current and future funds should be fully incorporated into the budget; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | calls for efforts to be stepped up to combat disparities at local and regional level in Europe, which have been further exacerbated by the various crises; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | stresses that many regions with a strong industrial base are undergoing a deep structural transformation; calls, in this connection, for future investment and cohesion policy to support the transformation and to provide targeted support to the regions concerned in shaping the green, social, demographic and digital transitions, respecting the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, whereby ‘no action should hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities’; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | In this respect, in the process of drafting and implementing the transition fund, not only those territories which face the most challenges should be taken in consideration, but also those that have already, at some level started their transition. Also, if the local and regional authorities (LRAs) are not involved properly in this process, there is a risk of an unbalanced allocation of funds, without prioritising the NUTS 3 level; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | calls on the European Commission to provide budgetary resources for the just transition of automotive regions, at the latest when designing the next MFF starting in 2028, but ideally as early as at the mid-term review of the current MFF. In this connection, the regions must be allowed flexibility in the use of funding, as the challenges vary widely; |
| --- | --- |

48.

An MFF that makes the most efficient use of existing resources

| 49. | therefore calls on the European Commission to examine how existing funds could be used in the most efficient way. Requirements at European level should ensure that not only the budget of the European Union, but also local and regional budgets, can be used as efficiently as possible and that the use of resources is not made difficult by unnecessary bureaucracy; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | takes the view that EU rules and their implementation nationally in the Member States, taking full account of the principles of subsidiarity and local self-government, should, wherever possible, give local and regional authorities broad discretion, in order to allow for practical, place-based approaches; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | points out, moreover, that, particularly in the case of State aid and procurement law, the regulatory density and complexity of the legal provisions are high. A significant proportion of local and regional authorities are no longer in a position to carry out a full legal and technical assessment of the projects themselves and are obliged to seek legal and technical advice from third parties. The resources allocated to this purpose cannot be used for investments; this significantly reduces the ability of local and regional authorities to invest; calls on the legislative authority to ensure simplification measures and stresses the need to avoid gold-plating; funding is also requested to improve regional and local administrative capacity; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | also notes in this context that lengthy procurement procedures make it much more difficult to implement projects within the project or funding period; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | in order to strengthen the competitiveness of the EU and its local and regional authorities, calls for EU State aid rules to be adapted in order to ensure a level playing field for investment in future technologies and their production for all regions; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | considers that further possibilities for simplifying applications and administration should also be explored in the area of the Regulations on the Structural Funds; proposes that the administrative burdens be identified by the Commission and the Member States, taking into account the characteristics, differences and objectives of the regions when defining the aid. For example, the consistency between the different funds at European level and their interaction with national and regional funding should be improved. It also highlights the particular situations of the outermost regions, rural areas and areas with natural handicaps and/or demographic challenges, and calls for exceptions to be made from certain obligations which, in most cases, can only be effectively discharged by beneficiaries with greater budget, equipment and population. In addition, provision should be made for the flexible use of the funds in the long term, as was possible in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, this would reduce administrative burdens and, on the other hand, simplification would serve to benefit smaller municipalities and businesses in particular; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | considers that a possible EU ‘sovereignty fund’, coming in response to the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act, should support European companies through guarantees, similar to the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), by leveraging the released budgetary resources, but with an improved geographical balance which considers less developed areas in a fair and flexible way. |
| --- | --- |

55.

Brussels, 24 May 2023.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

---

(1)  COTER-VII/026 (see page 16 of this Official Journal).

1

(2)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the next generation of own resources for the EU budget (OJ C 79, 2.3.2023, p. 99).

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Making ETS and CBAM work for EU cities and regions (OJ C 301, 5.8.2022, p. 116).

3

(4)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The role of EU cities and regions in rebuilding Ukraine (OJ C 498, 30.12.2022, p. 12), paragraph 3.

4

(5)  Strengthening EU Democracy: unleashing the potential of a million local and regional politicians, European Committee of the Regions, p. 6.

5

Strengthening EU Democracy: unleashing the potential of a million local and regional politicians

(6)  154th CoR plenary session, 15.3.2023 — Appendix 1, Detailed CoR draft budget 2024, COR-2023-00005-01-00-NB-REF, p. 9.

6

(7)  Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), Report on the Final Outcome, May 2022, including strengthening representative democracy ‘not only during European elections, but ahead of national, regional and local elections as well’ (CoFoE proposal 38.4), involvement in health union-related issues (CoFoE proposal 10.2) and the establishment of local youth councils (CoFoE proposal 36.8).

7

(8)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 240/2014 of 7 January 2014 on the European code of conduct on partnership in the framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds (OJ L 74, 14.3.2014, p. 1).

8

---

| 21.7.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 257/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.7.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 257/18

---

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on zero long-term unemployment: the local and regional perspective

(2023/C 257/04)

| Rapporteur: | Yonnec POLET (BE/PES), 1st Deputy Mayor of Berchem-Sainte-Agathe |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Yonnec POLET (BE/PES), 1st Deputy Mayor of Berchem-Sainte-Agathe

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

Introductory remarks

| 1. | points out that the EU set itself the objective of ‘the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’ (1); |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | stresses that long-term unemployment, defined by Eurostat as the number of people who are out of work and have been actively seeking employment for at least a year (2), is still a challenge that needs to be met before the EU can achieve this objective. In 2021, long-term unemployment still affected 2,8 % of Europe’s active population, or nearly 6 million people (3); |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | emphasises that in 2021, long-term unemployment affected 3,5 % of people aged 15 to 29 (4), or over 2,5 million young people in Europe; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | emphasises that nearly a quarter of people aged 15 to 64 in Europe are inactive (5), including those without work who have stopped actively seeking work after becoming discouraged and are no longer counted in employment statistics; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | points out that a high long-term unemployment rate is a sign that the labour market is not working properly, resulting in a loss of human resources and of skills for unemployed people, a loss of social security contributions and a loss of economic activity; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | highlights the social impact of long-term unemployment and the fact that it becomes harder to reintegrate into the labour market the longer one is unemployed; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | underlines the high cost to society of long-term unemployment and reiterates (6) that it is important to combat long-term unemployment to ensure social cohesion and avoid marginalising part of the population; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | emphasises that the European Pillar of Social Rights states that ‘[e]veryone has the right to timely and tailor-made assistance to improve employment or self-employment prospects’ and that ‘[t]he long-term unemployed have the right to an in-depth individual assessment at the latest at 18 months of unemployment’ (7); |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | stresses that the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan sets clear objectives in terms of employment and poverty reduction and that the Porto declaration (8) reiterates these objectives while underlining the need to combat exclusion risks for particularly vulnerable social groups, including long-term unemployed people; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | points out that better preparing jobseekers for the demands of the labour market will help improve their job prospects, and welcomes the European Commission’s efforts to improve the continuous acquisition and updating of professional skills, including its proposal to make 2023 the European Year of Skills; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | regrets, however, the fact that there has been no initiative to combat long-term unemployment since the 2016 Council Recommendation (9), even though all Member States are facing this issue; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | emphasises that, for the people who are the furthest removed from the labour market, which includes long-term unemployed people, training is still too often hard to access and by itself does not enable them to return to work; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | reiterates its observation that ‘when the demand for labour stagnates [in a professional sector or locally] it is difficult for an unemployed person to find work, even if they have an individualised training programme’ (10); |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | stresses the need to put forward an employment solution for everyone, including long-term unemployed people; |
| --- | --- |

14.

The ‘zero long-term unemployment’ approach: a local innovation for returning to work

| 15. | notes that employment deprivation costs more than creating additional jobs; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | highlights the innovative nature and social and solidarity economy approach of a number of ‘zero long-term unemployment’ area experiments and stresses that all these initiatives redirect the cost of long-term unemployment towards creating decent jobs that are useful to the areas in which they are developed; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | points out that these initiatives have been carried out in at least four EU Member States: in France since 2016, in Belgium since 2022, and under the names ‘job guarantee’ in Gramatneusiedl in Austria and ‘Basisbaan’ in Groningen in the Netherlands since 2020; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | notes that these initiatives are largely based on common principles:






  (a) | no one is unemployable when jobs are tailored to people’s abilities and skills, and there are both jobs that are not provided on the labour market and activities and services that are not provided by either the private or the public sector; |
| --- | --- | --- |

18.

(a)

no one is unemployable when jobs are tailored to people’s abilities and skills, and there are both jobs that are not provided on the labour market and activities and services that are not provided by either the private or the public sector;

| (b) | long-term unemployed people take part on a voluntary basis, which, unlike forced work or conditional support, enables them to take real ownership, and schemes are extended to people who are no longer registered with public employment services; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

long-term unemployed people take part on a voluntary basis, which, unlike forced work or conditional support, enables them to take real ownership, and schemes are extended to people who are no longer registered with public employment services;

| (c) | high-quality jobs are created based on jobseekers’ skills and individual situations, in particular their health and family circumstances; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

high-quality jobs are created based on jobseekers’ skills and individual situations, in particular their health and family circumstances;

| (d) | participants are paid at least the minimum wage, have customised working hours and are given permanent contracts; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

participants are paid at least the minimum wage, have customised working hours and are given permanent contracts;

| (e) | a service is provided that benefits the whole area without creating competition with existing businesses; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

a service is provided that benefits the whole area without creating competition with existing businesses;

| (f) | a participatory, inclusive approach is taken, initiated at local level with the public and all relevant stakeholders; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

a participatory, inclusive approach is taken, initiated at local level with the public and all relevant stakeholders;

| 19. | points out that these initiatives fall under the four areas of action highlighted in the 2016 Council Recommendation on long-term unemployment, namely better mobilisation of long-term unemployed people, an individualised approach, greater cooperation with local employment stakeholders and a partnership with local employers and local communities; further stresses that the 2023 Council Recommendation (11) on adequate minimum income recommends supporting work opportunities in the social economy sector, as well as individualised support; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | notes that the jobs created in ‘zero long-term unemployment’ areas and under the ‘job guarantee’ and ‘Basisbaan’ initiatives expand the range of social, environmental and commercial services that are available and accessible to people and businesses in the local area, and that these services were not previously provided by either public authorities or private players in these areas; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | points out that the ‘zero long-term unemployment’ areas and the ‘job guarantee’ and ‘Basisbaan’ initiatives have created jobs in areas as varied as market gardening, recycling, bicycle repair, cleaning of associations’ premises, business services, concierge services, delivery, social supermarkets, care and other circular economy activities, thus contributing to the green transition and the development of care provision in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | stresses that, in addition to the individual and collective economic benefits associated with people returning to work, these initiatives help to improve long-term unemployed people’s access to training, health prospects, including mental health, opportunities for interaction, social inclusion and well-being, while strengthening social cohesion in their communities; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | notes that these initiatives involve consultation and coordination with local employment stakeholders, including enabling social services in order to build consensus at local level and stresses the importance of consulting and co-creating with local economic players, enabling services and social partners to ensure that these initiatives are accepted and successful; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | emphasises that this co-creation benefits local economic players, either in direct relation to their business when unemployed people are placed in companies, for example under Austria’s ‘job guarantee’ scheme, or indirectly through the services and economic activity developed in the area in which they are based; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | stresses that such coordination can also help with the implementation of other active labour market policies, including training, and the establishment of single contact points for jobseekers; |
| --- | --- |

25.

Local and regional dimension

| 26. | underlines the key role of local and regional authorities in setting up schemes to combat long-term unemployment, such as the ‘zero long-term unemployment’ areas, especially since they have information on the local labour market, provide enabling services for social and labour market inclusion and have links with local businesses and local social partners. The example of the State of Berlin, funding 1 000 jobs for the period 2019-2025 for people who had been unemployed from 1 to 3 years through its ‘Solidary Basic Income’ project, is yet another best practice in this direction; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | calls on local and regional authorities to put in place schemes based on the fundamental principles of the ‘zero long-term unemployment’ areas and the ‘job guarantee’ initiative by redirecting the cost of unemployment towards the creation of decent jobs; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | encourages local and regional authorities that have put in place such initiatives to involve local business leaders and trade union representatives in the various stages of the project, in particular in order to prevent any competition with existing activities and to ensure compliance with the collective agreements in force in the sectors concerned; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | encourages local and regional authorities to exchange views and share best practices concerning schemes combatting long-term unemployment with other local and regional authorities both domestically and in other Member States; |
| --- | --- |

29.

Funding ‘zero long-term unemployment’ initiatives

| 30. | stresses the importance of activating passive expenditure to ensure the success of ‘zero long-term unemployment’ initiatives and notes that this makes it possible to offset the costs of creating additional jobs with the savings made in terms of unemployment benefits, social benefits and healthcare costs paid by social security institutions; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | notes that, in France, an ad hoc fund for activating this expenditure was created in 2016 under the territorial experimentation law aimed at reducing long-term unemployment (12), to enable national resources to be allocated to creating jobs at local level; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | points out that financial support is provided by the ESF+ for the ‘Basisbaan’ initiative in the Netherlands and the ‘zero long-term unemployment’ areas in Wallonia as there is no mechanism for activating passive expenditure in the Member States in question; |
| --- | --- |

32.

Funding through the Member States

| 33. | stresses the importance of close cooperation between local employment stakeholders and regional and/or national social security institutions, and local social services; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | calls on the Member States to adopt the necessary measures to activate passive expenditure related to long-term unemployment; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | encourages the Member States to put in place the necessary structures to effectively activate passive expenditure related to long-term unemployment and to ensure that the savings made on benefits are effectively passed on to the local and regional authorities bearing the costs of initiatives put in place to combat long-term unemployment; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | emphasises that, where there is no mechanism for activating passive expenditure related to long-term unemployment, funding or joint funding provided at national or regional level helps the most relevant authorities to put in place initiatives to combat long-term unemployment by easing their financial burden; |
| --- | --- |

36.

Coordinating initiatives to combat long-term unemployment

| 37. | points out that, in 2016, the Council urged the Commission to ‘[s]upport social innovation projects to integrate long-term unemployed persons into the labour market’ (13); |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | welcomes the European Commission’s intention (14) to further support the replication of social economy success stories in all Member States; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | draws attention to the success of the Youth Guarantee, in particular the individualised approach taken towards jobseekers, an aspect it shares with ‘zero long-term unemployment’ areas and the ‘job guarantee’ initiative; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | stresses that, by aiming to systematically offer a tailor-made solution to all young people, the Youth Guarantee has already made it possible to put in place mechanisms and methodologies that are essential for rolling out initiatives similar to the ‘zero long-term unemployment’ areas and the ‘job guarantee’ initiative in many Member States; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | calls on the European Commission to map these initiatives, including by mobilising its European Network of Public Employment Services; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | suggests that the European Commission propose guidelines for implementing such initiatives in other EU Member States, based on the principles listed in point 17; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | undertakes to include these initiatives on the Committee of the Regions’ digital platform for best practices; |
| --- | --- |

43.

Access to EU funding

| 44. | stresses the role of the ESF+ as a source of funding for ‘zero long-term unemployment’ projects for local authorities that are not yet benefiting from the activation of passive expenditure related to long-term unemployment or are not being strongly supported by the national and regional authorities; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | calls for some ESF+ funds to be earmarked for local ‘zero long-term unemployment’ initiatives in order to overcome these difficulties, in particular in the form of support for starting up and developing projects at local level; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | urges the Commission, for the Council recommendation on developing framework conditions for the social economy announced for 2023, to propose facilitating access to EU funding for social and solidarity-based enterprises involved in combating long-term unemployment, including funding earmarked for social investment and skills under the InvestEU fund, in order to facilitate the implementation of ‘zero long-term unemployment’ projects; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | points out that the establishment of the EU Youth Employment Initiative in 2013, coupled with significant financial support to the tune of EUR 8,9 billion over the period 2014-2020, enabled the Youth Guarantee to be successfully implemented and allowed more than 24 million young people to find work or start a further training course, apprenticeship or traineeship; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | reiterates the recommendation it made in its opinion on The integration of the long-term unemployed into the labour market (15), drawn up by Enrico Rossi, to tackle long-term unemployment more effectively through extraordinary initiatives, such as the creation of an ad hoc fund to combat long-term unemployment; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | calls on the Commission to set up this ad hoc fund to combat long-term unemployment, modelling it on the Youth Employment Initiative and providing at least EUR 750 million in funding over five years in order to launch new pilot projects inspired by the ‘zero long-term unemployment’ areas and the ‘job guarantee’ in the regions most affected by long-term unemployment in each EU Member State. |
| --- | --- |

49.

Brussels, 25 May 2023.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

---

(1)  Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.

1

(2)  Council Recommendation of 15 February 2016 on the integration of the long-term unemployed into the labour market (OJ C 67, 20.2.2016, p. 1).

2

(3)  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/une_ltu_a/default/table?lang=en

3

(4)  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/yth_empl_130/default/table?lang=en

4

(5)  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/LFSA_IPGA/default/table

5

(6)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The integration of the long-term unemployed into the labour market (OJ C 120, 5.4.2016, p. 27).

6

(7)  https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/economy-works-people/jobs-growth-and-investment/european-pillar-social-rights/european-pillar-social-rights-20-principles_en

7

(8)  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/05/08/the-porto-declaration/

8

(9)  Council Recommendation of 15 February 2016 on the integration of the long-term unemployed into the labour market (OJ C 67, 20.2.2016, p. 1).

9

(10)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The integration of the long-term unemployed into the labour market (OJ C 120, 5.4.2016, p. 27).

10

(11)  Council Recommendation of 30 January 2023 on adequate minimum income ensuring active inclusion (OJ C 41, 3.2.2023, p. 1).

11

(12)  Act No 2016-231 of 29 February 2016 on territorial experimentation aimed at reducing long-term unemployment.

12

(13)  Council Recommendation of 15 February 2016 on the integration of the long-term unemployed into the labour market (OJ C 67, 20.2.2016, p. 1).

13

(14)  COM(2021) 778 final.

14

(15)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The integration of the long-term unemployed into the labour market (OJ C 120, 5.4.2016, p. 27).

15

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| 21.7.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 257/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.7.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 257/23

---

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the legislative framework for sustainable food systems

(2023/C 257/05)

| Rapporteur: | Joke SCHAUVLIEGE (BE/EPP), Vice-President of the Flemish Parliament |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Joke SCHAUVLIEGE (BE/EPP), Vice-President of the Flemish Parliament

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Introductory comments

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

| 1. | welcomes the intention of the European Commission to put forward the legislative framework for sustainable food systems (FSFS), as outlined in the European Commission work programme for 2023; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | stresses that a sustainable food system has to deliver food security and nutrition for all in such a way that the economic, social and environmental bases to generate food security and nutrition for future generations are not compromised (1). It should contribute to all elements of environmental, social and economic sustainability; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | stresses that the food system includes ‘the elements and activities related to producing and consuming food, and their effects, including economic, health, and environmental outcomes (2)’ from the farm to the fork, including primary production, processing, retail and catering, in addition to producers and consumers, which are already mainly targeted by the legislation currently in force while also taking into account the social and cultural dimension of food and the need to respect traditional diets; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | calls on the European Commission to ensure that horizontal and sectoral policies linked to food and food systems are in line with the objectives and targets set by the future FSFS, the farm-to-fork strategy, the European Climate law, the biodiversity strategy and zero pollution targets, with proper evaluation and regular monitoring in place; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | calls on the Commission to provide for a proper assessment of the impact of the future legislative framework on European food systems and production and of the results by means of regular monitoring, and to limit as far as possible the use of delegated and implementing legislation to decisive aspects and aspects impacting on European production systems, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and sincere cooperation, as provided for in the Treaties; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | in this regard, requests that the future regulation foresee an evaluation by the European Commission and by 2030, to review all existing horizontal and sectoral policies linked to food and food systems to ensure that they are consistent with and support the objectives and targets of the future regulation on FSFS; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | in particular, insists that the common agricultural policy (CAP) regulations should also be brought in coherence with this new FSFS regulation when they will be reviewed after 2027; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | highlights the willingness of EU citizens to move towards safe, sustainable, just, resource- and climate-responsible food production that provides guaranteed quantities and quality for all at affordable prices, respecting sustainability principles, the environment and safeguarding biodiversity and ecosystems while ensuring food security, as expressed in the Final Report of the Conference on the Future of Europe; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | calls for identifying the main reasons leading to citizens’ and environmental exposure and to surface and groundwater contamination, as well as air and soil pollution; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | calls on local, regional and other public authorities, within the framework of EU public procurement rules and the European Commission’s guidance on green and sustainable public procurement, to set their own targets for the procurement of healthy, nutritionally balanced, seasonal, local and organic food in public catering, as part of sustainable public procurement strategies supporting the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | highlights the strategic role of rural areas for climate and food security and the production of healthy and diverse food, as they preserve agricultural soil and its fertility. This is facilitated by the coexistence of rearing activities and cultivation of rural areas and landscapes across the EU, as they create jobs in farming, agri-food industries and associated sectors. Regions and cities have an important role in maintaining rural areas and landscapes, which should be taken into account in the Commission’s proposal; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | reiterates its call to set a binding target to halve food waste by 2030 within the revision of the Waste Framework Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) and on the basis of the work streamlined by the EU Platform on Food Losses and Food Waste; draws attention to the recommendations formulated by the European Citizens’ Panel on Food Waste (4); |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | emphasises the contribution of the sustainable management of forests and other wooded land, as well as agroforest systems, to food production and maintaining one health, highlights the growing interest in wild food products and calls for the use of livestock on the land referred to above to be promoted, in order to prevent forest fires, restore biodiversity and maintain and increase ecosystem services in rural areas; |
| --- | --- |

13.

A harmonised, EU-wide approach

| 14. | stresses the urgent need for setting up a comprehensive framework for sustainable food systems in the EU to make sustainability central to all food-related policies while ensuring better policy coherence; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | calls for a holistic, balanced approach, built on economic, social and environmental pillars that are based on clear, scientific, EU-wide definitions of sustainability, principles and general objectives; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | urges EU, national, local and regional authorities to ensure that sustainability is mainstreamed in all food-related policies. The framework law should look into clarifying responsibilities for all food-system actors by setting up multi-level cooperation, engaging participation at EU, Member State, regional and local level. Any potential expansion of responsibilities at local and regional level should include support and guidance, as well as adequate financial resources to fulfil the additional commitments; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Member States with outermost regions, as listed in Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, may take into account the specific needs of these regions as regards the use of plant protection products when adopting national 2030 reduction targets, due to the particular climatic conditions and crops in these regions. This shall not lead to allowing lower targets in the outermost regions; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | stresses the importance of technological innovation in achieving environmental sustainability while also ensuring economic and social sustainability and maintaining current production levels; |
| --- | --- |

18.

Governance

| 19. | is convinced that cities and regions are key actors in this field, playing an important role in addressing the challenges of food systems, and that their role should be taken into consideration with due respect for the principle of subsidiarity; food constitutes an activity within the health and school sectors, as well as within dedicated administrative organisations. Regions and cities also have an important role to play in promoting good and equitable health and good lifestyle habits among different groups in the population. Moreover, food as an economic activity has a clear link with regional development and spatial planning, a responsibility which often lies with local and regional authorities; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | highlights the importance of social innovation, to respond to collective needs and foster sustainability in production and consumption systems; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | highlights the importance of shorter value chains that bring farmers closer to their consumers through direct sales which will enable affordable food for consumers while at the same time ensuring that the price respects the producers, allowing them to live in dignity and make a decent living; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | therefore reiterates its call to establish a multi-stakeholder platform on sustainable food systems, involving the European Committee of the Regions together with other relevant stakeholders and civil society, thus creating a supporting network that would facilitate the transition to more sustainable food systems for European regions and cities while taking into account regional differences and areas’ specialisations and traditions; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | draws attention to the role played by the different actors in the food systems as potential ‘agents of change’, from primary producers, farmers and fishers, to different producer and business operators, food manufactures, traders, retailers, and hospitality and food-service businesses, health actors and consumers; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | requests the European Commission to set up a mechanism ‘polluter pays and provider gets’ in order to reward those farmers or other food producers who go beyond EU minimum legal requirements and deliver additional environmental benefits to EU society and in order to give incentives to others to improve the sustainability of their production; |
| --- | --- |

24.

Healthy and sustainable diets

| 25. | insists that the FSFS should incorporate the ‘food environment’ concept to facilitate access to healthy and sustainable diets, as unhealthy and unsustainable food environments are the main cause of inadequate dietary patterns; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | highlights the role of cities and regions in shaping food environments that promote affordable and accessible, sustainable and healthy diets while supporting sustainable producers; in this regard, highlights the importance of urban planning in facilitating access to healthy food options; this is especially important the vicinity of schools, and in the case of ‘food deserts’; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | highlights the potential of the EU school fruit, vegetables and milk scheme to facilitate the transition towards sustainable and nutritionally comprehensive food systems; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | calls for a revision of the EU school fruit, vegetables and milk scheme to enhance the consumption of products that contribute to healthy, more plant-based sustainable diets while reconnecting to agriculture through educational activities on sustainable farms; this revision should examine the circumstances of local and regional authorities with regard to promoting health and sustainable diets; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | calls for the national dietary guidelines to be regularly updated to support healthy and sustainable diets and underpin the transition to more sustainable food systems; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | calls for alignment of the promotional campaigns for agri-food products with the objectives of the farm-to-fork strategy and EU Beating Cancer Plan; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | calls for public money to be spent primarily on food associated with healthy, sustainable and more plant-based diets; This should be accompanied by support and guidance for municipalities and regions that are major public buyers; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | calls for pricing policies to align food prices with the true cost of food and to lower the relative price of more sustainable food, such as plant-based food options; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | calls for EU subsidies to support small farmers to produce ecological food and to reward farmers who are implementing sustainable practices and promoting animal welfare; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | calls for fiscal incentives and minimal VAT on staple foods; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | is worried about a possible re-introduction of genetically modified organism (GMO) in our European food with the future European regulation proposal on plants produced by new genomic techniques (NGT). This should be based on a robust assessment and sound scientific evidence of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). In any case, every food product containing GMO should show a front-of-the-pack label indicating the presence of GMO; |
| --- | --- |

35.

Food public procurement

| 36. | reiterates its call (5) to eliminate existing constraints within its public procurement rules to apply sustainability criteria. EU competition legislation prohibits territorial preferences (such as local foods) being specified in public purchasing contracts; points out that today public authorities wishing to include locally based suppliers and producers and support the regional food economy are risking legal action for potential infringement of common market rules, if they exploit existing loopholes; Clarification should be accompanied by guidance and training for regions and municipalities that are major public buyers; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | underlines that public procurement of sustainable, healthy, seasonal and local food represents a powerful tool for transition to more sustainable food systems in line with the sustainability policies and the Sustainable Development Goals, and encourages the use of green public procurement (GPP) criteria; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | stresses the need to make a shift towards more plant-based food as a foundation for a more sustainable, climate-neutral and resilient food system; in this respect, highlights the health and cultural benefits of traditional diets; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | expresses concern about the introduction of lab-grown foods on European markets, as it will not guarantee quality, well-being and the protection of culture and traditions; lab grown food remains costly, which is a significant barrier that would need to be overcome; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | underlines that a low-carbon food chain from farm to fork contributes to the GHG emission reduction targets, by introducing scientific and technical innovation while applying the principles of circularity in the farming; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | highlights the need to involve national and international procurement experts in the definition of criteria to support both the implementation at the local level and public buyers such as government authorities, regions and cities and promote a more strategic use of public procurement; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | calls for the development of practical guides for procurement officials on how to use procurement to promote sustainable development goals and healthy, seasonal, local and organic diets; advocates creating and financially supporting networks for public procurers to share guidance, expertise and best practice; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | reiterates the need for financial and technical support to be provided by the EU and the Member States for a more strategic use of procurement in line with national and local food strategies and objectives; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | highlights the benefits of socially responsible food procurement which encourages the presence of farmers in rural areas and includes the social economy and social cooperatives along the whole supply chain; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | proposes setting country-specific progressive targets for sustainable food public procurement, in line with the farm-to-fork strategy; |
| --- | --- |

45.

Labelling

| 46. | notes that the introduction of harmonised sustainable food labelling should be proportionate legally regulated and mandatory, and developed on the basis of solid and independent scientific data and should not interfere with existing systems such as geographical indications, by arbitrarily classifying foods that could mislead consumers on food choice; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | highlights that sustainable labelling should be based on science while including all aspects: environmental, social and nutritional. It should be expressed via separate individual indicators in order to minimise the trade-offs between various sustainability dimensions. The CoR supports a simple, EU-wide and front-of-pack labelling of food products based on robust and independent scientific evidence. Such an indicator should highlight both the high and lower performers in order to help the consumer to make an informed choice when buying their food. In this respect, highlights the importance of awareness-raising campaigns, sustainable food education programmes and other initiatives in local communities from early childhood onwards; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | stresses that labelling should be linked to marketing and promotion policy, as well as to a reduction of packaging and packaging waste; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | points out that it is imperative to provide farmers with effective solutions for organic or biological treatments with a view to reducing the use of pesticides and chemicals in order to improve the resilience of farms to external shocks, to protect the health of people and nature, and preserve soil fertility — ultimately strengthening food security; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | considers that voluntary labelling — schemes for food which are not coordinated at European level could have distortive and negative effects within the single market, which would be particularly detrimental to small and medium sized producers; while recognising that such considerations do not outweigh the imperative that a high level of human health protection must be ensured in the definition and implementation of all policies and activities; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | encourages EU policies to help consumers make informed, healthy, sustainable food decisions, including by adopting harmonised, proportionate European labelling schemes based on robust and independent scientific evidence; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | stresses that food labelling must be coordinated and harmonised at European level, without creating any kind of quantitative or qualitative restriction on trade within Europe or jeopardising the proper functioning of the single market unless justifiable with reference to imperatives such as the protection of human health; |
| --- | --- |

52.

Food security

| 53. | calls on the EU to ensure food security and to invest in sustainable local agriculture production, and shorten its supply chains; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | stresses the need to safeguard logistics and food transport between Member States, including in crisis situations; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | calls for dependencies to be reduced by diversifying sources of key imports, through a robust trade policy that also influences the EU’s trade partners to move towards more sustainability by applying the same sanitary conditions to the production of the products they import as apply to farmers in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | calls for strong coherence and coordination between EU policies on sustainable food production, consumption and trade, in order to make unsustainable practices sustainable. In this regard, the FSFS should also ensure the coherence and alignment between EU policies on sustainable food production, consumption and on trade, to make sure that imported agri-food products respect the same social and environmental rules of production as those existing in the European Union in compliance with World Trade Organization’s rule; |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | stresses that it is necessary to strengthen research and innovation policy on sustainable food. It will be necessary for Europe to have legislation that stimulates the use of new innovative techniques. |
| --- | --- |

57.

Brussels, 25 May 2023.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

---

(1)  FAO, 2014.

1

(2)  Food systems — OECD.

2

(3)  Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3).

3

(4)  flw_eu-actions_fwrt_20230210_recom-cit_0.pdf (europa.eu).

4

(5)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Towards a sustainable EU food policy that creates jobs and growth in Europe's Regions and Cities (OJ C 272, 17.8.2017, p. 14).

5

---

III Preparatory acts

Committee of the Regions

155th CoR plenary session, 24.5.2023-25.5.2023

| 21.7.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 257/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.7.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 257/28

---

Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on the Interoperable Europe Act

(2023/C 257/06)

| Rapporteur: | Michele PAIS (IT/ECR), President and member of the Sardinia Regional Council |
| --- | --- |
| Reference document: | Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union (Interoperable Europe Act)
  COM(2022) 720 |

Rapporteur:

Michele PAIS (IT/ECR), President and member of the Sardinia Regional Council

Reference document:

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union (Interoperable Europe Act)

COM(2022) 720

I.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS

Amendment 1

Recital 3

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The new governance structure should have a legal mandate to drive the further development of the European Interoperability Framework and other common interoperability solutions, such as specifications and applications. Furthermore, this Regulation should establish a clear and easily recognizable label for some interoperability solutions. The creation of a vibrant community around open government technology solutions should be fostered. | The new governance structure should
  allow local and regional authorities to have a fair say concerning the pace and degree of implementation in line with the principle of subsidiarity. This would give the governance structure
  a legal mandate to drive the further development of the European Interoperability Framework and other common interoperability solutions, such as specifications and applications.
  The financial implications for local and regional authorities of tasks concerning interoperability implementation should be kept to a minimum.
  Furthermore, this Regulation should establish a clear and easily recognizable label for some interoperability solutions. The creation of a vibrant community around open government technology solutions should be fostered. |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

The new governance structure should have a legal mandate to drive the further development of the European Interoperability Framework and other common interoperability solutions, such as specifications and applications. Furthermore, this Regulation should establish a clear and easily recognizable label for some interoperability solutions. The creation of a vibrant community around open government technology solutions should be fostered.

The new governance structure should
  allow local and regional authorities to have a fair say concerning the pace and degree of implementation in line with the principle of subsidiarity. This would give the governance structure
  a legal mandate to drive the further development of the European Interoperability Framework and other common interoperability solutions, such as specifications and applications.
  The financial implications for local and regional authorities of tasks concerning interoperability implementation should be kept to a minimum.
  Furthermore, this Regulation should establish a clear and easily recognizable label for some interoperability solutions. The creation of a vibrant community around open government technology solutions should be fostered.

Reason

Local and regional authorities (LRAs) have limited resources in terms of funding, human resources, tools, etc. Therefore, while complying with the principle of subsidiarity, local and regional authorities should retain a sense of control over the implementation process. They should also receive appropriate funding for additional costs imposed on them by the implementation process.

Amendment 2

Recital 3

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | In order to make the process sufficiently democratic and bottom up, citizens of European Member States should have a say concerning priorities of interoperability solutions. To this end, in line with the objective of the Interoperable Europe Act, local and regional authorities may conduct direct consultations with citizens once every two years, in order to survey which interoperability solutions citizens deem to be of priority. The European Commission shall allocate appropriate financial support for local and regional authorities to conduct such dialogues with their citizens. Local and regional authorities shall share the results of the consultations with the Interoperable Europe Board and the Interoperable Europe community. |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

In order to make the process sufficiently democratic and bottom up, citizens of European Member States should have a say concerning priorities of interoperability solutions. To this end, in line with the objective of the Interoperable Europe Act, local and regional authorities may conduct direct consultations with citizens once every two years, in order to survey which interoperability solutions citizens deem to be of priority. The European Commission shall allocate appropriate financial support for local and regional authorities to conduct such dialogues with their citizens. Local and regional authorities shall share the results of the consultations with the Interoperable Europe Board and the Interoperable Europe community.

Reason

LRAs are closest to citizens, therefore they can gain the most accurate insight into the priorities and expectations of citizens. To make interoperability a democratic and bottom-up process, sufficient and active involvement of LRAs in the monitoring of citizens’ priorities will be crucial.

Amendment 3

Recital 8

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| To set up cross-border interoperable public services, it is important to focus on the interoperability aspect as early as possible in the policymaking process. Therefore, the public organisation that intends to set up a new or to modify an existing network and information system that is likely result in high impacts on the cross-border interoperability, should carry out an interoperability assessment. This assessment is necessary to understand the magnitude of impact of the planned action and to propose measures to reap up the benefits and address potential costs. The interoperability assessment should be mandatory in three cases, which are in scope for cross-border interoperability. In other situations, the public organisations may decide to carry out the interoperability assessment on a voluntary basis. | To set up cross-border interoperable public services, it is important to focus on the interoperability aspect as early as possible in the policymaking process. Therefore, the public organisation that intends to set up a new or to modify an existing network and information system that is likely result in high impacts on the cross-border interoperability, should carry out an interoperability assessment. This assessment is necessary to understand the magnitude of impact of the planned action and to propose measures to reap up the benefits and address potential costs.
  In order to ensure the smooth implementation of the interoperability assessment, the Interoperable Europe Board should publish specific guidelines on which services are covered by the directive.
  The interoperability assessment should be mandatory in three cases, which are in scope for cross-border interoperability.
  In cases where an interoperability assessment is mandatory, training opportunities should be provided, and funding sources such as the Digital Europe Programme shall ensure that the resources for the additional costs incurred are also made available to local and regional authorities. In non-mandatory
  situations, the public organisations may decide to carry out the interoperability assessment on a voluntary basis. |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

To set up cross-border interoperable public services, it is important to focus on the interoperability aspect as early as possible in the policymaking process. Therefore, the public organisation that intends to set up a new or to modify an existing network and information system that is likely result in high impacts on the cross-border interoperability, should carry out an interoperability assessment. This assessment is necessary to understand the magnitude of impact of the planned action and to propose measures to reap up the benefits and address potential costs. The interoperability assessment should be mandatory in three cases, which are in scope for cross-border interoperability. In other situations, the public organisations may decide to carry out the interoperability assessment on a voluntary basis.

To set up cross-border interoperable public services, it is important to focus on the interoperability aspect as early as possible in the policymaking process. Therefore, the public organisation that intends to set up a new or to modify an existing network and information system that is likely result in high impacts on the cross-border interoperability, should carry out an interoperability assessment. This assessment is necessary to understand the magnitude of impact of the planned action and to propose measures to reap up the benefits and address potential costs.
  In order to ensure the smooth implementation of the interoperability assessment, the Interoperable Europe Board should publish specific guidelines on which services are covered by the directive.
  The interoperability assessment should be mandatory in three cases, which are in scope for cross-border interoperability.
  In cases where an interoperability assessment is mandatory, training opportunities should be provided, and funding sources such as the Digital Europe Programme shall ensure that the resources for the additional costs incurred are also made available to local and regional authorities. In non-mandatory
  situations, the public organisations may decide to carry out the interoperability assessment on a voluntary basis.

Reason

Local and regional authorities have limited resources and therefore cannot be expected to cover the costs of mandatory assessments by themselves. To this end, in cases where interoperability assessments are mandatory, the Commission should ensure funding for assessments.

Amendment 4

Recital 37

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to set out rules and the conditions for the establishment and the operation of the regulatory sandboxes. | In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to set out rules and the conditions for the establishment and the operation of the regulatory sandboxes
  in cooperation with relevant public sector bodies including local and regional authorities
  . |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to set out rules and the conditions for the establishment and the operation of the regulatory sandboxes.

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to set out rules and the conditions for the establishment and the operation of the regulatory sandboxes
  in cooperation with relevant public sector bodies including local and regional authorities
  .

Reason

Since regulatory sandboxes shall be operated under the responsibility of the participating public sector bodies, it would be one sided for the European Commission to establish operational conditions alone, without consulting with other relevant entities.

Amendment 5

Article 3(3)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The national competent authorities and the interoperability coordinators shall provide the necessary support to carry out the interoperability assessment. The Commission may provide technical tools to support the assessment. | The national competent authorities and the interoperability coordinators shall provide the necessary support to carry out the interoperability assessment. The Commission may provide technical tools to support the assessment.
  The national competent authorities and the Interoperable Europe Board shall provide support in pre-assessing whether the intended operation falls within the scope of this Regulation, before the interoperability assessment becomes mandatory. |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

The national competent authorities and the interoperability coordinators shall provide the necessary support to carry out the interoperability assessment. The Commission may provide technical tools to support the assessment.

The national competent authorities and the interoperability coordinators shall provide the necessary support to carry out the interoperability assessment. The Commission may provide technical tools to support the assessment.
  The national competent authorities and the Interoperable Europe Board shall provide support in pre-assessing whether the intended operation falls within the scope of this Regulation, before the interoperability assessment becomes mandatory.

Reason

The scope of the Regulation is broad and for smaller public sector bodies or municipalities it may be too complicated to assess whether the intended operation has a cross-border element.

Amendment 6

Article 3(5)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 5. | [...]






  — | When carrying out an interoperability assessment, the public sector body, or institution, body or agency of the Union concerned, shall refrain from using the expertise of their supplier of current services or employees thereof in order to prevent a potential conflict of interests. This consultation is without prejudice to the protection of commercial or public interests or the security of such systems. |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

5.

—

When carrying out an interoperability assessment, the public sector body, or institution, body or agency of the Union concerned, shall refrain from using the expertise of their supplier of current services or employees thereof in order to prevent a potential conflict of interests. This consultation is without prejudice to the protection of commercial or public interests or the security of such systems.

Reason

In order to avoid ‘vendor lock-in’, the public sector bodies concerned should use the expertise of persons independent from suppliers of current systems and/or networks as their assessments might be biased in favour of existing solutions.

Amendment 7

Article 9(2)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The policy implementation support project shall set out:






  (a) | the existing Interoperable Europe solutions deemed necessary for the digital implementation of the policy requirements; |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

The policy implementation support project shall set out:

(a)

the existing Interoperable Europe solutions deemed necessary for the digital implementation of the policy requirements;

| (b) | any missing interoperability solutions to be developed, deemed necessary for the digital implementation of the policy requirements; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

any missing interoperability solutions to be developed, deemed necessary for the digital implementation of the policy requirements;

| (c) | other recommended support measures, such as trainings or peer-reviews; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

other recommended support measures, such as trainings or peer-reviews;

The policy implementation support project shall set out:

| (a) | the existing Interoperable Europe solutions deemed necessary for the digital implementation of the policy requirements; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the existing Interoperable Europe solutions deemed necessary for the digital implementation of the policy requirements;

| (b) | any missing interoperability solutions to be developed, deemed necessary for the digital implementation of the policy requirements; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

any missing interoperability solutions to be developed, deemed necessary for the digital implementation of the policy requirements;

| (c) | other recommended support measures, such as trainings or peer-reviews; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

other recommended support measures, such as trainings or peer-reviews;

| (d) | financial support opportunities to assist the implementation of interoperability solutions. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

financial support opportunities to assist the implementation of interoperability solutions.

Reason

Financial support will be inevitable for the implementation of interoperability. To this end, it should be a specific aspect of the policy implementation support as well.

Amendment 8

Article 11(2)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Regulatory sandboxes shall be operated under the responsibility of the participating public sector bodies and, where the sandbox entails the processing of personal data by public sector bodies, under the supervision of other relevant national authorities, [...] | Regulatory sandboxes shall be operated under the responsibility of the participating public sector bodies and, where the sandbox entails the processing of personal data by public sector bodies, under the supervision of other relevant national
  or sub-national
  authorities, [...] |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

Regulatory sandboxes shall be operated under the responsibility of the participating public sector bodies and, where the sandbox entails the processing of personal data by public sector bodies, under the supervision of other relevant national authorities, [...]

Regulatory sandboxes shall be operated under the responsibility of the participating public sector bodies and, where the sandbox entails the processing of personal data by public sector bodies, under the supervision of other relevant national
  or sub-national
  authorities, [...]

Reason

Regulatory sandboxes can also be operated at local and regional level. Local and regional administrations play a key role in implementing interoperability solutions close to the citizen and provide a wide range of services at local level.

Amendment 9

Article 12(1)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The participating public sector bodies shall ensure that, to the extent the innovative interoperability solution involves the processing of personal data or otherwise falls under the supervisory remit of other national authorities providing or supporting access to data, the national data protection authorities and those other national authorities are associated to the operation of the regulatory sandbox. [...] | The participating public sector bodies shall ensure that, to the extent the innovative interoperability solution involves the processing of personal data or otherwise falls under the supervisory remit of other national
  or sub-national
  authorities providing or supporting access to data, the national
  or sub-national
  data protection authorities and those other national
  or sub-national
  authorities are associated to the operation of the regulatory sandbox. [...] |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

The participating public sector bodies shall ensure that, to the extent the innovative interoperability solution involves the processing of personal data or otherwise falls under the supervisory remit of other national authorities providing or supporting access to data, the national data protection authorities and those other national authorities are associated to the operation of the regulatory sandbox. [...]

The participating public sector bodies shall ensure that, to the extent the innovative interoperability solution involves the processing of personal data or otherwise falls under the supervisory remit of other national
  or sub-national
  authorities providing or supporting access to data, the national
  or sub-national
  data protection authorities and those other national
  or sub-national
  authorities are associated to the operation of the regulatory sandbox. [...]

Reason

Regulatory sandboxes can also be operated at local and regional level. Local and regional administrations play a key role in implementing interoperability solutions close to the citizen and provide a wide range of services at local level.

Amendment 10

Article 13(2)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The Commission shall organise training courses on interoperability issues at Union level to enhance cooperation and the exchange of best practices between the staff of public sector bodies, institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union. The courses shall be announced on the Interoperable Europe portal. | The Commission shall organise training courses on interoperability issues at Union level to enhance cooperation and the exchange of best practices between the staff of public sector bodies, institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union. The courses
  targeted at decision-makers and/or practitioners
  shall be announced on the Interoperable Europe portal
  and may comprise online information sessions, video tutorials and workshops, train-the-trainers materials and guidelines for on-the-job learning
  . |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

The Commission shall organise training courses on interoperability issues at Union level to enhance cooperation and the exchange of best practices between the staff of public sector bodies, institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union. The courses shall be announced on the Interoperable Europe portal.

The Commission shall organise training courses on interoperability issues at Union level to enhance cooperation and the exchange of best practices between the staff of public sector bodies, institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union. The courses
  targeted at decision-makers and/or practitioners
  shall be announced on the Interoperable Europe portal
  and may comprise online information sessions, video tutorials and workshops, train-the-trainers materials and guidelines for on-the-job learning
  .

Reason

When consulted, the CoR RegHub network has shown that training on interoperability is a key priority. In addition to practitioners and ICT experts, it is important to target senior management and to align middle managers as culture change may be required.

Amendment 11

Article 15(4)(r)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Inform regularly and coordinate with the interoperability coordinators and the Interoperable Europe Community on matters concerning cross-border interoperability of network and information systems. | Inform regularly and coordinate with the interoperability coordinators and the Interoperable Europe Community on matters concerning cross-border interoperability of network and information systems
  and on relevant EU-funded projects and networks. |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

Inform regularly and coordinate with the interoperability coordinators and the Interoperable Europe Community on matters concerning cross-border interoperability of network and information systems.

Inform regularly and coordinate with the interoperability coordinators and the Interoperable Europe Community on matters concerning cross-border interoperability of network and information systems
  and on relevant EU-funded projects and networks.

Reason

Other EU-funded projects of relevance, such as H2020 AURORAL, or city networks for digital transformation, such as living-in.eu, should be presented by the Board, and synergies should be sought at strategic and operational levels.

Amendment 12

Article 16(4)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (d) | support public sector bodies, institutions, agencies or bodies of the Union in carrying out interoperability assessments. |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

(d)

support public sector bodies, institutions, agencies or bodies of the Union in carrying out interoperability assessments.

Reason

This recommendation fits with a suggestion to pool experts from all EU Member States to support interoperability assessments. Contrary to peer reviews pursuant to Article 14, experts do not necessarily need to be drawn from Member States other than the Member States where the public body undergoing the peer review — relating to an interoperability assessment — is located.

Amendment 13

Article 17(2)(f)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| coordinate and encourage the active involvement of a diverse range of national entities in the Interoperable Europe Community [...] | coordinate and encourage the active involvement of a diverse range of national entities
  , including local and regional authorities,
  in the Interoperable Europe Community [...] |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

coordinate and encourage the active involvement of a diverse range of national entities in the Interoperable Europe Community [...]

coordinate and encourage the active involvement of a diverse range of national entities
  , including local and regional authorities,
  in the Interoperable Europe Community [...]

Reason

Local and regional administrations play a key role in implementing interoperability solutions close to the citizen and provide a wide range of services at local level.

Amendment 14

Article 17(3)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| The Member States shall ensure that the competent authority has adequate competencies
  and resources
  to carry out, in an effective and efficient manner, the tasks assigned to it. | The Member States shall ensure that the competent authority has adequate competencies to carry out, in an effective and efficient manner, the tasks assigned to it.
  The Commission shall ensure that competent authorities of Member States receive appropriate funding to support the performance of related tasks. |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

The Member States shall ensure that the competent authority has adequate competencies
  and resources
  to carry out, in an effective and efficient manner, the tasks assigned to it.

The Member States shall ensure that the competent authority has adequate competencies to carry out, in an effective and efficient manner, the tasks assigned to it.
  The Commission shall ensure that competent authorities of Member States receive appropriate funding to support the performance of related tasks.

Reason

Since appointed competent authorities will be assigned additional tasks relating to interoperability, the Commission must ensure that any financial implications of relevant tasks, including the potential need to hire additional personnel, are not exclusively borne by the appointed competent authorities.

Amendment 15

Article 19(2)(d)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| identification of synergies with other relevant Union
  and
  national programmes and initiatives. | identification of synergies with other relevant Union, national,
  regional and local
  programmes and initiatives. |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

identification of synergies with other relevant Union
  and
  national programmes and initiatives.

identification of synergies with other relevant Union, national,
  regional and local
  programmes and initiatives.

Reason

Regional and local administrations play a key role in implementing interoperability solutions close to the citizen and provide a wide range of services at local level.

Amendment 16

Article 21(1)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| Subject to the availability of funding, the general budget of the Union shall cover
  the costs of
  :






  (a) | the development and maintenance of the Interoperable Europe portal; |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

Subject to the availability of funding, the general budget of the Union shall cover
  the costs of
  :

(a)

the development and maintenance of the Interoperable Europe portal;

| (b) | the development, maintenance and promotion of Interoperable Europe solutions; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the development, maintenance and promotion of Interoperable Europe solutions;

| (c) | the Interoperable Europe support measures. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the Interoperable Europe support measures.

Subject to the availability of funding, the general budget of the Union shall cover:

| (a) | the costs of
  the development and maintenance of the Interoperable Europe portal; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the costs of
  the development and maintenance of the Interoperable Europe portal;

| (b) | the costs of
  the development, maintenance and promotion of Interoperable Europe solutions; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the costs of
  the development, maintenance and promotion of Interoperable Europe solutions;

| (c) | the costs of
  the Interoperable Europe support measures; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the costs of
  the Interoperable Europe support measures;

| (d) | the costs of mandatory interoperability assessments for local and regional authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the costs of mandatory interoperability assessments for local and regional authorities.

| (e) | citizen consultations conducted by local and regional authorities concerning interoperability priorities. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

citizen consultations conducted by local and regional authorities concerning interoperability priorities.

Reason

Local and regional authorities have limited resources and cannot be expected to cover the whole cost of mandatory assessments by themselves. To this end, in cases where interoperability assessments are mandatory, the Commission should ensure funding for assessments. In line with Amendment 12, local and regional authorities are closest to citizens, thus, they can gain the most accurate insight into the priorities and expectations of citizens regarding interoperability solutions to be developed. Sufficient and active involvement of local and regional authorities in the monitoring of citizens’ priorities will be crucial, for which sufficient funding will be essential.

Amendment 17

Article 21(1)

| Text proposed by the European Commission | CoR Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (e) | the additional costs incurred by the competent authorities as a result of their work on interoperability. |

Text proposed by the European Commission

CoR Amendment

(e)

the additional costs incurred by the competent authorities as a result of their work on interoperability.

Reason

Since the appointed competent authorities will be assigned additional tasks relating to interoperability, the Commission must ensure that any financial implications of relevant tasks, including the potential need to hire additional personnel are not exclusively borne by the appointed competent authorities.

II.   POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),

| 1. | notes the legislative proposal as it strives to set up a system of EU-wide interoperability governance, striking the right balance between the top-down approach in defining a procedure to set general recommendations for interoperability solutions at EU level and in taking into consideration input from local and regional authorities given that are closest to the citizens when it comes to the implementation of EU legislation; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | notes, however, that certain aspects of the proposal need to be reinforced and fine-tuned, in particular as regards new tasks for subnational authorities, the resources provided in order for them to be able to swiftly and efficiently implement interoperability solutions, and a balanced governance structure that respects the principle of subsidiarity and the different models of governance in the Member States, and allows local and regional authorities to have a say on the pace and degree of implementing interoperability solutions; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | recommends taking into account any existing national interoperability systems (general or sector-specific) that started prior to this regulatory framework, as they could conflict with the newly introduced rules. This could create misalignment and require the use of massive resources — human and financial — for implementation; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | underlines the key role of local and regional authorities in providing services to citizens and the fact that these services should be digitalised by 2030, in line with the EU Digital Decade provisions and the subsidiarity and proportionality principles; in particular, the protection of personal data must be ensured at all times and by all bodies involved; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | points out that these services typically cover sectors such as mobility, energy, population, health, agriculture and others; and points at the interlinkages with the use of data in those sectors and relevant EU legislation such as the EU Data Act (1), the Data Governance Act and the GDPR regulation (2); |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | acknowledges that with additional financial support provided, and training for staff in authorities, interoperability has the potential to substantially improve the efficiency of public administration at local and regional level. Local and regional administrations should ensure, within the framework of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, that their systems are interoperable with those of other local authorities, regional authorities, nationally, as well as those of other EU countries and those of collaborating companies and suppliers; in the context of this EU legislative proposal, a key concern is cross-border interoperability; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | recognises that many local and regional administrations face financial and human resource constraints in the current economic context, and that the digital transformation must nonetheless be considered a priority; highlights that, without financial support, these changes may jeopardise economic and social opportunities in the future and may pose a real risk to digital cohesion overall; calls on the European institutions to support the digital transition with adequate financial resources, including for smaller, and/or disadvantaged regions and islands; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | highlights that a survey among the RegHub network of local and regional administrations (3) has shown that key challenges of achieving interoperability at local level include the following: respecting relevant legal requirements; complying with technical requirements to integrate data with often complex data specifications; existing non-interoperability of various systems at the national level; lack of data that is available on a permanent basis; diversity of sources and types of consumption; in addition, there is a need to make organisations less bureaucratic and change organisational cultures in line with the interoperability of technical systems (organisational interoperability); |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | notes the work of the European Commission in drawing up this proposal, as well as its inclusive approach taking into account recommendations of the Expert Group on interoperability of public services (4), a recent opinion of the Fit 4 Future platform on the ‘Governments Interoperability Strategy’ (5) and input from a number of stakeholders and early adopters who put innovative solutions into practice at a very early stage; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | reiterates the need to ensure that coherent solutions are introduced by ensuring retrospective compatibility of new systems with the legacy ones (6); |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | praises the use of free and Open-Source solutions that will be an undoubted advantage for local authorities and European citizens as a crucial means of achieving the intended sharing and re-use of interoperability solutions and thus of improving cross-border interoperability, as referred to in Article 4(1); |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | notes that the development and implementation of common interoperability solutions will entail significant financial and staff costs for local and regional authorities; stresses that this includes the need to develop and invest in new interoperable solutions or to start transforming existing systems. To this end, funding sources such as the Digital Europe programme should help local and regional authorities to cover the associated costs; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | stresses that the use of free and open-source software is a key and necessary method of avoiding vendor lock-in, and of ensuring that the potential sharing and re-use of non-open interoperability solutions does not give right holders unfair competitive advantages (see Article 4(2)); |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | calls on the Interoperable Europe Board to provide specific information on when the mandatory interoperability assessment will take place and what factors may trigger such an assessment, for example in the case of public procurement; also stresses that it should not be mandatory to undertake the interoperability assessment until the relevant guidelines have been adopted by the Interoperable Europe Board: |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | suggests developing frameworks and guidance on appropriate licensing and use of open-source and copyrighted interoperability solutions to support public authorities’ purchasing and procurement of such solutions; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | notes that interoperability governance is fragmented, especially in decentralised countries, as a result of the voluntary nature of the European Interoperability Framework; underlines the key role of national competent authorities and ‘early-adopting’ local and regional authorities in awareness-raising and in fostering digital transformation in their peer cities and regions; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | reiterates the need to bridge digital and territorial divides; the Digital Compass (7) target of 100 % key public services to be provided online by 2030 is helping achieve this aim; stresses that providing public service interoperability digitally and/or online is of utmost importance for all regions and municipalities in the EU, regardless of their geographical location, including peripheral regions, remote islands and mountainous areas. Technology can ensure that regions and municipalities can overcome the disadvantages of their peripheral location; highlights the need for concrete and effective collaboration with insular and peripheral regions in the governance of the interoperable transition; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | welcomes the activities of proactive cities and regions that are seeking solutions and sharing best practices, working as early adopters and testing new practices; praises the work of the living-in.eu (8) movement, bringing together cities and communities in fostering digital transformation, or Open and Agile Smart Cities, that have been developing Minimum Interoperability Mechanisms as universal tools for achieving interoperability of data, systems, and services between cities and suppliers around the world; underlines that in order to achieve a more homogenous interoperability environment and widely used interoperability solutions, an EU-wide governance system needs to be set up; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | notes that procurement and tendering of new systems or upgrading existing ones will be burdensome for local and regional authorities, in particular due to lack of expertise, finances and personnel; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | reiterates the critical importance of interoperability for the digital resilience and strategic independence of the EU: by having interconnected services and systems, a potential digital pandemic as a result of a major cyber-attack on the weakest spot of the network needs to be prevented by using the same or similar solutions across interconnected entities. At the same time, using open-source solutions will decrease dependency on major suppliers of software solutions, thus increasing the strategic independence of the EU; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | recognises the concerns of cities, smaller municipalities and regions over the new tasks conferred by the proposed regulation and underlines the absolute need to take their specific interests into account; stresses the need for CoR representatives to be an integral part of the strategic layer of the interoperability governance; intends, through its participation in the Interoperable Europe Board, to ensure that local and regional concerns are taken on board; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | stresses that it is important for local and regional authorities to obtain specific guidelines from the Interoperable Europe Board and the competent national authorities concerning which services are covered by the interoperability assessment; stresses that a pre-screening of cross-border applicability ahead of any interoperability assessment should be defined and the national competent authorities should be in charge of this; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | welcomes the emphasis the proposal places on open-source solutions and also on the participation of open-source developers in the Interoperable Europe community. Having open-source as key part of service solutions at local/regional administration level will enhance transparency, reduce costs, foster cybersecurity and avoid vendor lock-in situations whereby some data that has already been collected may not be available when changing suppliers of services; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | suggests that the Interoperable Europe portal — or a portal with similar features — serve as a repository of all public services provided online in the EU Member States, clustered by type of service and Member State. The portal may then become a starting point for any citizen looking for information on how to access these public services online. This would be an effective way to pool information on key public services to be provided online by 2030; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | lastly, notes that the proposal complies with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. |
| --- | --- |

25.

Brussels, 24 May 2023.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

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(1)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — European Data Act (OJ C 375, 30.9.2022, p. 112), see Opinion Factsheet (europa.eu).

1

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).

2

(3)  Network of Regional Hubs (europa.eu).

3

(4)  Official expert recommendations for a new Interoperability Policy | Joinup (europa.eu).

4

(5)  Final opinion 2022_SBGR3_10 Governments interoperability strategy_rev.pdf (europa.eu).

5

(6)  This is also in line with a recommendation put forward by the Fit 4 Future opinion, which suggested that organizational and semantic interoperability layers be improved to reflect the time dimension of data (this concerns the compatibility of old and new versions of IT solutions).

6

(7)  https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/europes-digital-decade

7

(8)  https://living-in.eu/

8

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