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i 

94–746 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–35] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES HEARING 

ON

UPDATE ON THE F–35 JOINT STRIKE 

FIGHTER PROGRAM AND THE FISCAL 

YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 14, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

PAUL COOK, California, Vice Chair 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ................................................ 2 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Bogdan, Lt Gen Christopher C., USAF, Program Executive Officer, F–35 

Lightning II Joint Program Office ...................................................................... 10 

Gilmore, J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of 

the Secretary of Defense ...................................................................................... 4 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition ....................................................................................... 7 

Sullivan, Michael J., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Gilmore, J. Michael .......................................................................................... 35 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with Lt Gen Christopher C. Bogdan .............. 72 

Sullivan, Michael J. .......................................................................................... 59 

Turner, Hon. Michael R. .................................................................................. 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Duckworth .................................................................................................. 95 

Dr. Wenstrup .................................................................................................... 95 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Duckworth .................................................................................................. 105 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 99 

Mr. Veasey ........................................................................................................ 107 

(1) 

UPDATE ON THE F–35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 14, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:35 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. The Armed Services Tactical Air and Land Forces 

Subcommittee meets today in open session to receive testimony on 

the current status of the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, JSF, program. 

This hearing continues the ongoing oversight activity conducted by 

the committee on the F–35 programs. The program officially began 

in 2001. We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses. 

We have Dr. Michael Gilmore, Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation [DOT&E]; Dr. Michael J. Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, Government Accountability Office [GAO]; the 

Honorable Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Lieutenant General Christopher C. Bogdan, F–35 Program Executive Officer. 

I thank all of you for your service and look forward to your testimony today. 

The F–35 is a complex program. It is well known that, during its 

development, the F–35 program has experienced significant cost, 

schedule, and performance problems. Current acquisition costs are 

now approaching $400 billion, which, according to GAO, makes this 

DOD’s [Department of Defense] most costly and ambitious acquisition program. 

Over the last year, steady progress was achieved in development, 

production, and operations, but the subcommittee continues to have 

concerns regarding recent engine test failures and on software development and integration. 

This committee, in particular this subcommittee, has maintained 

vigilant oversight on the F–35 program through legislation, hearings, and briefings, and, most recently, a trip to Eglin Air Force 

Base, Florida, to see the F–35 operations and talk to F–35 pilots 

and maintenance personnel. 

Last year the committee required the Secretary of Defense to establish an independent team to review and assess the development 

of software and software integration for the F–35 program. This 
2 

subcommittee may recommend a similar approach as a way to effectively review the most recent engine test failures. 

I understand the substantial investment in the F–35 is more 

about the requirement for fifth-generation tactical fighter capability than it is about the F–35 itself. And let me underscore that. 

All of the members of this subcommittee are very well aware of the 

need for fifth-generation tactical fighter capability and the need to 

ensure that the F–35 is one of the most capable aircraft. 

Based on the briefings and hearings held by the subcommittee, 

I have learned that fifth-generation tactical fighter capability is essential for maintaining air dominance and national security. Despite this critical need, that does not mean that this program 

should be rubber-stamped. As we have done in the past, the committee will hold this program accountable for cost, schedule, and 

performance. The budget request for fiscal year 2016 includes $1.8 billion for F–35 research, development, test, and evaluation and $8.7 billion 

for the procurement of 57 F–35s, and $410.2 million for spares. 

This represents an increase of 19 aircraft and is also a $2.5 billion 

increase in F–35 funding from the fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. 

And we all understand that we need to get to a higher production level to get the lower per-unit cost. We also understand that 

we have to address the issues operationally for the F–35 to ensure 

its best capability for the pilots and its intended needs. 

We will hear today both the Director of the Operational Test and 

Evaluation and the GAO have concerns about the F–35 program 

for fiscal year 2016 and beyond. I look forward to all of our witnesses’ testimony today, which will provide for a better understanding of the current status of the F–35 program. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. TURNER. Before we begin, I would like to turn to my good 

friend and colleague from California, Ms. Loretta Sanchez, for any 

comments that she might want to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for calling this. I think this is an incredibly important project for us. 

So we are looking at the 2016 budget request for the F–35 Lightning II aircraft program. It totals $10.8 billion spread across 17 

separate procurement and R&D [research and development] accounts. That is an enormous amount even by the standards of the 

Department of Defense’s budget. 

The total is, for example, more than the Navy’s fiscal year 2016 

request for aircraft carrier and submarine construction combined. 

It is five times as much as the Army’s fiscal year 2016 request for 

weapons and tracked combat vehicles. So given the scale of this 

proposed funding, I think it is important that we try to understand 

what is going on with the program. 

Since World War II, America’s way of war has required air superiority. And so airpower is one of the great advantages that we give 

to our military, especially when we are in places and it has proven 
3 

time and time again. So the F–35 program, while flawed to this 

point, is really the key to retaining that airpower edge for the next 

20 years or so. It is also going to be flown by at least 12 allied nations, all of whom are likely to be our partners in future conflicts 

at some point. 

And so there have been some critics who have said we need to 

terminate this program because it is over cost, it is long overdue, 

and there are still problems with it. However, I believe that we are 

past that decision point. We have just got to make this program 

work. 

And I think you will agree with me, Mr. Chairman, we have had 

many discussions on this. We have got to get this done. 

Making it work is not an easy task. It is a very complicated piece 

of machinery, and everybody’s had their fingers in it. Lots of decision have been made, and lots of decisions have been changed. 

I am very still concerned about the engine fire last year, which 

resulted in a setback in the testing schedule. The substantive 

grounding also highlighted the risk of the current sole-source engine production arrangement that this program depends upon. 

Secondly, the highly sophisticated software for the F–35 continues to encounter developmental delays. Both the GAO and the 

DOT&E have pointed out in their most recent reports that, because 

of the pressures on the flight testing schedule, a significant amount 

of test points were deferred or entirely dropped. 

More specifically, the committee was recently informed by the F– 

35 program office at the start of development flight testing of some 

critical elements of the Block 3F software effort are on hold indefinitely, pending more progress on the critical fusion element of the 

preceding Block 2B software. 

In addition to its stealth characteristics, the ability to fuse sensor 

feeds from other F–35s and other sources is one of the most important parts of the F–35 program. So, of course, this delay is also 

troubling with respect to the program. 

And the operating and maintenance: The sustainability is significantly different than when we envisioned this project on the drawing boards. The GAO report noted in particular that the F–135 engine is far below reliability targets and that, as a result, the overall 

availability of the F–35 continues to lag significantly behind expectations. 

I know that, when we have had other aircraft, new aircraft, we 

have had some of the same problems, not to this extent, not in this 

size, but we do need to get past these issues. So given all of these 

challenges and the very large funding request for the F–35 that we 

are faced with, I think it is important in today’s hearing. 

And this is what I would like to hear about: Is the proposed increase in F–35 production numbers, which would rise from 38 in 

fiscal year 2015 to 57 in fiscal year 2016, justified, given where the 

program is in development? What would a reduction in the numbers of aircraft look in particular to this program? 

Second, we need a detailed review of what happened with that 

engine fire last year. I have been asking for it. I haven’t heard it 

yet. We know that the aircraft and the engine in question were relatively new, yet a failure still occurred. Is it a manufacturing defect? Is it a design flaw? I would like to hear about that. 
4 

Third, the sensor fusion aspect of the F–35 software is a little 

understood, but critical, issue that is still not working as planned. 

What degree of risk do we face with that portion of the software? 

And could problems in this area turn what is the current delay of 

about 3 to 6 months into years? 

So I look forward to getting some of the answers to these questions, gentlemen. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me with the time. 

Mr. TURNER. We will begin with Dr. Gilmore, being followed by 

Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Stackley, and General Bogdan. 

Mr. Gilmore. 

STATEMENT OF J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Dr. GILMORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congresswoman 

Sanchez and members of the subcommittee. I will just briefly summarize my written testimony. 

Block 2B testing was extended, but is now nearing completion. 

The program developed an additional build to the Block 2B mission 

system software designed to incorporate fixes to problems, particularly in fusion of information both from the sensors on an individual aircraft as well as from the sensors on other F–35 aircraft 

that were highlighted in testing that was conducted in December 

of last year and early in 2015. 

This so-called engineering test build was flown on 17 test sorties 

using 3 different mission systems to test aircraft in March. And although some improvement in performance was reportedly observed, 

distinguishing ground targets from clutter continue to be problematic. 

And given the limits in the improvement seen using this engineering test build, I understand the program has decided to field 

the current, that is, prior to the engineering test build version, of 

the Block 2B software as opposed to waiting and doing additional 

testing with the engineering test build and to defer fixes of the 

software to Block 3i development and testing. If the balance of 2B 

testing completes in April, this would represent a delay of about 6 

months relative to the program’s master schedule. 

Modification of early lot aircraft into a configuration usable for 

combat with Block 2B capabilities, a necessity brought on by the 

concurrency in the program, which dates to the program’s initiation 

back in early last decade, is taking longer than planned and longer 

than predicted when the Department eliminated, on my recommendation, the block to the long-planned Block 2B operational 

utility evaluation [OUE]. 

These delays, as well as other problems that motivated the extension of Block 2B testing, indicate clearly that the aircraft would 

not have been ready to conduct the OUE by beginning training 

with operational pilots this past January and convinced me that 

the recommendation I made, which was adopted, was the correct 

one. 

The trends and reliability metrics we track are unclear. The most 

recent data we have obtained generally indicate, with the exception 

of mean flight hours between critical failure for the F–35B, a 3- 
5 

month upward trend, which is good, from September 2014 to November 2014. However, when combined with data from the previous 3 months, they showed both declines and increases. Thus, I 

cannot yet conclude with confidence that reliability is continuing to 

improve. 

Aircraft availability did show improvement at the end of 2014, as 

the program focused on providing greater supplies of spares and on 

shortening maintenance activities that had heretofore required 

longer aircraft downtimes. However, that trend has not been sustained so far in calendar year 2015, as the first 2 months have 

shown a decline. But, again, that is only 2 months. We shouldn’t 

rush to conclusions about whether that constitutes a trend. 

I have also updated my analysis of the growth and reliability 

needed for the F–35A and B variants to achieve their requirements 

based on the most recent data from November 2014. And that analysis indicates that growth and selected reliability metrics for both 

aircraft, the A and the B, remain insufficient to meet requirements 

of maturity. And there is insufficient flight hours in the C variant 

to preclude that—I can’t do meaningful analysis at this point in development. It is still too early. 

Discoveries in testing continue to occur, which should be expected in a program of this complexity, such as was highlighted regarding sensor fusion, as well as the occurrence of additional 

unpredicted cracking in the F–35B durability test article, which 

was discovered in February and caused testing to pause until repairs could be completed. Testing did restart on the 1st of April. 

Flight testing of Block 3i mission systems, consisting of a Block 

2B software we hosted on the upgraded set of processor hardware 

needed before Block 3F software can be used, we started March. 

And one of the mission systems test aircraft began testing the next 

increment of software that is called 3iR5. 

Block 3F flight testing also began in March, what was limited to 

three single-ship test flights on one mission system’s test aircraft, 

AF–3, prior to it being reconfigured to support late Block 3i testing. 

This start represents an 11-month delay relative to the program’s 

master schedule and about a 1-month delay relative to the program’s more recent projections. 

Continued Block 3F testing is not scheduled until June, as the 

program’s plans for reconfiguring aircraft in the Block 2B configuration to Block 3F are under development. 

In both my annual report and my written testimony, I identified 

problems with the U.S. Reprogramming Laboratory, which is the 

government facility that is going to be used to generate what are 

called mission data files for the aircraft—mission data loads for the 

aircraft. These data loads are essential to the effective combat operations of Joint Strike Fighter. 

I had identified 2 years ago shortfalls in those labs. The program 

office has done a study that reconfirmed those shortfalls and found 

new shortfalls. About 2 years ago the Secretary of Defense provided 

resources to correct those shortfalls, but no action has been taken. 

It is my understanding, if the program office takes action very 

quickly, those shortfalls can be corrected in time for operational 

testing and, more importantly, for full operational capability, and 

I recommend strongly that that action be taken. 
6 

In my annual report and written testimony, I provided no review 

of Block 2B capabilities and limitations. The program has identified and prioritized many deficiencies for correction. Nonetheless, 

Block 2B aircraft will be fielded without a number of corrections 

of operational significance in place. 

Further discovery of problems is likely, in my view, as operational units start using JSF in ways it has not previously been 

used. I agree with the program’s assessment that there is at least 

6 months’ pressure in completing Block 3F, recently projected by 

the program to complete testing in May 2017. 

While the program has worked hard to reduce the bow wave of 

what it calls technical debt, which are fixes to problems that were 

deferred from earlier mission software versions to later versions— 

and that continues to happen—the program is now deferring fixes, 

including problems with fusion and testing to Block 3i and Block 

3F, which, together with the delays that have occurred in starting 

Block 3 testing, increase risk on the program’s projected Block 3F 

schedule. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Sullivan, who hails from the great and historic 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sorry about the Flyers this year, although they 

made it. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here to 

discuss our work on the F–35. 

Let me begin by providing context for where we are today on the 

F–35 by briefly revisiting the past. As we all know, the program’s 

overall cost has nearly doubled at this point since the program 

began in 2001 and its dates for delivering initial capabilities have 

been significantly delayed. 

No one would argue that these problems can be traced to decisions made then to start the program with little knowledge about 

technologies, designs, or capabilities needed for this fifth-generation fighter aircraft. 

A highly concurrent acquisition strategy over the next decade resulted in costly airframe redesigns and significant software and 

hardware design changes that cascaded onto the manufacturing 

floor and created more inefficiency. 

In 2012, the program experienced a Nunn-McCurdy significant 

cost breach and the Department took significant action to bring realism to cost estimates, add resources to the program, and all in 

all establish a new baseline for cost and schedule moving forward. 

So today the F–35 is on much firmer footing and is being managed in a way that has stabilized its cost. It is improving its ability 

to deliver aircraft more efficiently, and, most importantly, it remains the centerpiece of the Department’s long-term tactical aircraft inventory and one of its highest priorities. 
7 

As we move into the future, it would be nice to be able to report 

that all risk is now behind the program. However, with around 40 

percent of the developmental flight tests remaining, the program 

has already procured 179 F–35s and plans to add 339 more over 

the next 5 years for $50 billion, all before flight test is complete. 

This concurrency between testing and buying more aircraft is 

risky. Recent problems with airframe durability testing and the engine, continued delays to software development and testing with 

the most complex portions of that software development yet to 

come, and other competing national security priorities which will 

take funding as well, all add to the significant risk that remains 

and will be needed to be managed very carefully. 

The recent unanticipated engine and bulkhead failures are prime 

examples of the program’s ongoing struggle with concurrency and 

the cost and schedule risk it brings. Programs in developmental 

testing should expect to encounter discoveries that require design 

changes, just as Dr. Gilmore stated. 

However, in a concurrent testing and procurement environment, 

the destabilizing effects of these tests discoveries are amplified as 

more systems are produced and delivered, thus requiring costly design changes, retrofits, and rework. 

Given these ongoing challenges, it is important that the program, 

the Department, and the Congress fully understand the implications of increasing F–35 procurement rates in the near term in 

order to make informed funding decisions. 

In our estimation, the Department should provide answers to 

three critical questions: 

First, are major test discoveries and design changes behind the 

program, given that testing of more complex software and capabilities still lies ahead? 

Second, has the contractor’s manufacturing capability and industrial base progressed enough to meet the proposed increased production rates? 

And, third, is the program’s current procurement plan affordable 

when viewed within the context of competing fiscal priorities both 

within and outside of the Department? 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, that concludes my 

oral statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND 

ACQUISITION 

Secretary STACKLEY. Chairman Turner, distinguished members 

of the subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to testify on the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter program. 

The Marine Corps variant of the Joint Strike Fighter is on track 

to achieve its initial operational capability, or IOC, this summer. 

This milestone is, of course, but a way point, for the software build 

called Block 2B, which the Marines will employ at IOC, provides 
8 

limited warfighting capability in accordance with the program’s 

long-planned incremental build plan. 

Full warfighting capability, at least sufficient to support the 

final, of the services and our international partners and our foreign 

military sales customer nations IOCs will be delivered in a subsequent software build called Block 3F. 

That notwithstanding, it should not be lost on this subcommittee, 

the significant challenges and adversity that the program has and 

will continue to overcome in order to achieve the Marines’ IOC and 

that the milestone will be achieved more or less in accordance with 

the budget and schedule established by the program about 4 years 

ago. 

Today, increasingly, the focus is on delivering the next block of 

capability, Block 3i, which incorporates upgraded computing hardware, but otherwise is the warfighting equivalent of Block 2B, and, 

therefore, assessed as relatively low risk. We have begun flight 

testing with Block 3i, and today we assess that we are on track to 

support the Air Force IOC with Block 3i capability in the summer 

of 2016. 

Completion of the final block of capability, Block 3F, which is the 

capability that the services will ultimately deploy with, poses the 

greatest challenge to completion of the system development phase 

of the Joint Strike Fighter program. 

Block 3F software requirements are well understood and stable. 

However, this block includes the most complex functionality of the 

three software baselines, including what is referred to as sensor fusion. 

Further, coding and testing of Block 3F has been delayed as a 

result of the resource demands, software engineers, and lab facilities associated with supporting completion of earlier software 

builds. 

These factors add up to the program’s estimate of 4 to 6 months 

schedule risk with completion of Block 3F. Despite the schedule 

risk, we remain on track to support the Navy carrier variant IOC 

with Block 3F in 2018. 

In parallel with completion of the system software and related 

flight testing leading to each of the service’s IOCs, the program is 

managing the resolution of technical issues that have been discovered in testing; the ramp-up of production of the three aircraft 

variants across a large and growing industrial base that supports 

JSF; improvements to affordability and production; incorporation of 

modifications to correct deficiencies identified on earlier production 

aircraft; needed improvements to reliability and maintainability of 

the aircraft; planning and assignment of maintenance, repair, overhaul, and upgrade, or MRO&U, responsibilities across the global 

regions where the JSF will operate; and formulation of the program 

operations and support strategy with its own focus on affordability. 

To briefly summarize, today’s scorecard on technical issues largely reflects a large list of issues that are well understood with fixes 

either under development or in various stages of implementation. 

That said, we are wary that further technical issues are certain to 

emerge as we press on with system testing, and it will be critical 

that the program rapidly correct these deficiencies while mitigating 

their impact on test and production. 
9 

The most notable technical issue which emerged this past year, 

a rub condition between the engine rotor and rotor seal, led to an 

engine fire and brought flight testing to a standstill for several 

weeks while the root cause of the issue was being determined. We 

are confident that this technical issue is resolved and are proceeding with implementation of the fix across the fleet of affected 

aircraft. 

Aircraft production is demonstrating healthy labor learning curve 

performance, improving quality trends, improving schedule performance and lot-over-lot unit cost reduction. This is as expected 

for a program at this stage. 

To spur a greater cost improvement, the program, led by an industry initiative, has launched an effort referred to as Blueprint for 

Affordability, which has established a target unit cost for the F– 

35A of about $80 million by 2019. 

We are embarking on similar concerted efforts in order to improve aircraft reliability, maintainability, and availability, or 

RM&A. Overall, performance in this area has been poor. 

It is only in the past 6 months that improvements to design, 

parts availability, and maintenance, training, and support are 

starting to show needed results, providing a positive sign that we 

may meet our interim RM&A requirement of 60 percent aircraft 

availability by year’s end. RM&A is a principal focus area for the 

program in 2015. 

Lastly, the program is working closely with the services and our 

international partners and industry to formulate the operations 

and sustainment, or O&S, strategy for the Joint Strike Fighter. 

The effort encompasses activities stretching from completing development of logistics tools, to standup of depot facilities, to supply 

chain management, engineering and software support, and determination of the business plan that will accompany each of these activities and an overarching O&S war on cost. 

In summary, while maintaining its focus on achieving the services’ initial operational capability milestones, the JSF program is 

also systematically tackling a large number of risk items and 

issues that confront this program across the full spectrum spanning development, test, production, operations, and sustainment. 

We are experiencing improving trends in virtually all areas, but 

we are painstakingly aware of the significant challenges that remain ahead and are committed to meeting those challenges headon with discipline, with rigor, and with full transparency. 

Mr. Chairman, we look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley and General 

Bogdan can be found in the Appendix on page 72.] 

Mr. TURNER. General Bogdan. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN CHRISTOPHER C. BOGDAN, USAF, 

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, F–35 LIGHTNING II JOINT 

PROGRAM OFFICE 

General BOGDAN. Chairman Turner, distinguished members of 

the committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you and 

to discuss the F–35 Lightning II program. 

My overall assessment of this very complex program is that we 

are making slow, but steady, progress on all fronts and each day 
10 

the program is improving. However, this is not to say that we don’t 

have risks, challenges, and some difficulties, but I am confident we 

will be able to overcome these problems and deliver on our commitments. 

Today, in development, we’ve completed our Block 2 software development and are nearing completion of all flight testing necessary to field our initial warfighting capability, also known as 

Block 2B, which is on track to support the Marine Corps IOC this 

summer. 

Additionally, we are currently in full-swing testing of our Block 

3i software, which is on track to support Air Force IOC in the summer of 2016, and we have just begun flight testing our final version 

of software known as Block 3F, which will provide the full combat 

capability of the F–35 in late 2017 and support the U.S. Navy’s 

IOC in 2018. 

However, because we have been using our labs and test aircraft 

to complete both 2B and 3i testing for longer than we anticipated, 

flight testing of Block 3 was delayed. This delay, along with the 

complexity of the 3F software integration, has resulted in an additional risk of approximately 4 to 6 months for the completion of 

that 3F software. We are working hard to bring this potential 

schedule delay back in on time, and we do not believe it will impact 

the Navy’s IOC in 2018. 

We have had numerous accomplishments in 2014 in flight testing, most notably the F–35C initial sea trials aboard the USS Nimitz, a large-deck carrier. Our performance on the Nimitz in terms 

of carrier landings was excellent in that we completed 124 traps 

out of 124 attempts without a single missed landing and we completed all the planned testing on that ship with about 3 days to 

spare. 

Additionally, we have closed and are implementing fixes for a 

number of past technical issues, including improvements in the helmet, the hook on our C model, our fuel dump capability, our fusion 

software, lightning restrictions, and night and all-weather flying. 

However, this past year presented other challenges that included 

an engine failure on AF–27 at Eglin Air Force Base and the discovery of cracks in the main bulkheads of the B model during our 

durability testing. We are also carefully monitoring the development of our maintenance system, known as ALIS [Autonomic Logistics Information System], as it remains on the critical path for 

U.S. Marine Corps IOC, Air Force IOC, and our Block 3F capabilities. 

I am prepared to provide details of these events and the impact 

they have had on the program or may have on the program during 

the Q&A [question and answer] period. 

As for production in 2014, we planned to deliver 36 aircraft and 

we delivered 36 aircraft to our warfighters. We have now delivered 

a total of 130 aircraft to our operational test and training sites. The 

production line today is running approximately 2 months behind, 

but it is catching up over the past year and does not pose any longterm schedule or delivery risk to the program. 

The price of the F–35s continue to decline steadily lot over lot, 

just as we have committed to, and I expect such reductions to continue long into the future. 
11 

Let me turn to fielding the sustainment of our fleet. As of this 

week, we have logged over 30,000 flight hours and flown over 

18,000 sorties since our first flights in 2006. Today 130 F–35s are 

operating at 9 different U.S. locations. In the next 4 years, we will 

add 322 airplanes and over 17 new bases, including operational locations in Europe and the Pacific. 

Over the past year and a half, we have put a great deal of emphasis on maintenance and sustainment activities. We started a reliability and maintainability program last year, and the effort is beginning to make a positive difference, as we have seen a steady, 

but slow, improvement in our aircraft availability rates and our 

mission-capable rates. 

We also started a number of initiatives to address our spares 

issues, including better forecasting, more timely purchasing and 

contracting, and shortening repair cycles on our parts, all of which 

resulted in modest improvements thus far, but it will take at least 

another 6 to 12 months to fully recover from our spares deficit. 

We also began a number of other important initiatives late in 

2013 and 2014 to include our ops and sustainment Cost War Room, 

the Blueprint for Affordability, as Mr. Stackley mentioned, and a 

restructuring of the operational test program. I would be happy to 

discuss these initiatives in the Q&A session, also. 

On the international front, the partnership remains strong and 

some of our partners are now flying their own jets in training and 

operational test sites in the United States, while others are eagerly 

anticipating their first jets in the next two lots of airplanes. 

Additionally, last year South Korea signed a letter of acceptance 

and committed to buying 40 jets and Israel committed to an additional 14 jets on top of the 19 they are already purchasing. 

I would like to close by saying that the program is showing 

steady improvements as costs continue to come down, technical 

issues are being resolved, and the baseline schedule is mainly holding. I believe the program is on the right track, and we will continue to deliver on our commitments we have made to warfighters, 

the taxpayers, and our allies. My team will continue to run this 

program with integrity, discipline, and transparency, and I intend 

to hold myself and my team accountable for the outcomes on this 

program. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the Q&A period. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Bogdan and Secretary 

Stackley can be found in the Appendix on page 72.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. 

Secretary Stackley, General Bogdan, a group of us went down to 

Eglin Air Force Base 2 weeks ago or so and sat down with both 

the pilots, the maintainers, the command, to discuss the F–35. 

And, as you know from my opening statement and that of the ranking member, you have full and complete support from this subcommittee and the committee on fifth-gen development. 

We certainly understand some of the difficulty overall with concurrency. And, you know, it is a vogue word to mean inventiveness. 

Right? I mean, at the same time that we are building, we are inventing and we are trying to have a fluid process so we don’t end 

up with a product that is stale but, at the same time, we end up 
12 

with a product and we don’t merely get stuck in the inventive process. 

How those two converge is where Mr. Gilmore and Mr. Sullivan 

continue to provide us with fidelity as to how problems result. And 

the issues that we see in both their reports are obviously when a 

problem is identified, how quickly is it resolved; when a problem 

is identified, what is its effect on cost; when a problem is identified, 

how does it relate to our foreign partners and the delays, as we 

know, because we have to get to a ramp-up so that our overall 

product costs go down on a per-unit basis. 

Our trip was not in questioning the overall fifth-generation commitment or capability, but to talk to those who were on the ground 

to get some understanding of their perspective. Some of the things 

that we learned were disturbing and concerning. As you know, they 

are down there both actively flying, actively maintaining, actively 

training, and then being what will be the footprint later as the F– 

35 is expanded elsewhere. 

But one of the issues I want to talk to you about and I want to 

get your feedback is the Autonomic Logistics Information System, 

ALIS. So we had a treat. We got to sit down and watch someone 

actually go through the web pages of the system—and I am slowing 

down for effect because that is what we got to see as they got to 

it—and the cumbersomeness of the difficulty of going from page to 

page in trying to be able to enter information. 

Now, the ALIS system—real quick overview—is basically the system that you plug the plane in and it is supposed to tell you what 

is wrong with the plane and what is not wrong with the plane. It 

is supposed to aid maintenance. It is supposed to give a download 

for logistics for acquisition of parts. It is supposed to do an overall 

assessment of the readiness and capability of the plane. 

But we are also told it has an 80 percent false positive. They 

went through the process. They were telling us the purpose of the 

system. It sounds absolutely wonderful. Certainly I think everybody who has a Cadillac understands, you know, a system that 

tells you what is going on with your car, what is going on with your 

plane. 

When we asked them how many false positives you get, I thought 

that they were going to tell us a high number because it is still a 

new system. But when they said 80, I was kind of taken aback. But 

then, when they showed us how difficult it was to clear 80 because 

of the cumbersomeness of the system, I was curious as to who is 

assigned to clean this up. 

But what we probably have with false positives, as you know, is, 

one, either people get complacent and believe things are false 

positives and they get overly cleared or, two, we also don’t know 

what false negatives we have and was the system not reporting. 

So I would like both of you to tell us: Is what we are hearing 

consistent with what you are hearing? If so, what is the path forward in fixing the system and how does it represent an operational 

issue or impediment overall to the F–35? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. I will start and hand it over to 

General Bogdan. 

I don’t know if the 80 percent number is exactly right, but the 

issue of false positive is very real. And concerns with regards to the 
13 

reliability, the responsiveness, the timeliness of ALIS information 

for the maintainers and for the warfighter is at the top of our priority list. 

We scorecard readiness for initial operational capabilities, and 

we look at all the attributes associated with the program. And 

when you look at the services’ IOCs as rated by the program office 

and as rated by the services themselves, ALIS’s performance is a 

very high concern, high priority, because it is not currently meeting 

the requirements of the warfighter in terms of the maintainability 

aspects on the program. 

So it is a real problem. It is a known problem. The solution is 

not a single, simple issue. It is going after all the details inside of 

ALIS. It is a large, complex logistics, software-based system. 

And we have been on this path for several years now, since it 

was first introduced and put in the hands of the maintainers, and 

they identified the issues with everything from data reliability to 

timeliness. And this false positive issue has been brought to our attention more recently. 

So there is versions of software upgrades to ALIS that are 

planned that capture the known deficiencies. They are tested before they are turned into the field. And then, when they are put 

in the hands of the maintainers, we get that user feedback. 

So I will tell you that the program is improving. It is not where 

it needs to be. Our scorecards—right now you will see red next to 

ALIS, which has our absolute attention. And we have got a lot of 

work to do, but there won’t be one leap from that red to that green. 

It is going to be a series of upgrades to ALIS software where we 

are going to have to drive in those incremental improvements to 

get it up to the level of performance that we need. 

Mr. TURNER. One footnote and then I am going to do a followon on A–L–I–S or ‘‘ALIS,’’ as you were saying. 

I was also shocked that there is no spell check. So while the gentleman was there typing something in, there was no indication that 

something was misspelled, but he had to catch it and he had to go 

back and fix it. 

My concern is not an academic one. My concern was—because 

human error is human error—it is not searchable if someone 

makes a typographical error. If the system is supposed to be 

searchable, we have got to determine what is recurring in the system. So certainly that should probably be an addition to it. 

But the other aspect was, as I was describing it, the downstream 

aspect of A–L–I–S or ‘‘ALIS’’ issuing a report for a part. They are 

very concerned about that whole system, both with the prime contractor’s scale of control, the availability of those parts, the reporting back of the availability of those parts. 

If there is no inventory on site, they are very concerned of the 

ability of their planes to continue to be able to operate and how the 

system itself—because it is assuming that they are not going to be 

able to fix it on hand and it is going to report a problem and then 

result in a part being delivered, that that just-in-time aspect may 

be a constraint on overall operation capability. 

Do you have concerns there, also? General Bogdan, you are nodding. 
14 

Secretary STACKLEY. I will tell you that that is evolving. There 

was a vision for what ALIS would do and how this program would 

be sustained that was established years ago. We are past that 

point today. 

And the operation and sustainment plan for the program is 

evolving and being developed today with industry, with our international partners, frankly, to do better than what you are hearing 

from the maintainers today on the flight line. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

I am then going to Timothy Walz. 

Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your testimony. 

I do agree that the importance of this weapon system as to our 

airpower and our national security strategy is pretty clear to everyone. I also appreciate your optimism, but I don’t think we could 

come here without the skepticism that is probably healthy in any 

endeavor that we do. 

So just a couple of things I would ask. And I am going to build 

on this last question on long-term viability and sustainability because the issues we are talking about are just getting us to the 

baseline and where we go from there. 

And so, Mr. Sullivan, on several occasions, I think you have been 

thoughtful about it and raised long-term affordability as a key area 

of risk. Is that addressed? Do you see that moving in the right direction? And do you still consider—I think it is obvious and wise 

to think that way. But where are we headed with it? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. I think there is two separate things. There is the cost estimate on the program, which is approaching $400 billion. I think that is in control. 

The software issues we are talking about are going to add cost 

on the margins, I believe. It is mostly an issue of risk, of being able 

to do what they say they are going to do. 

The affordability issue, from our point of view, is the funding 

profile that this program—that the Congress, quite frankly, is looking at over the next 20 years just for acquisition, just for—development cost is coming down now. I think development cost will be 

done in 3 or 4 years. 

But over the next 10 or 15 years, this program is going to come 

to the Congress every year with—we mentioned today it is $10 billion for this fiscal year. That will get up to $15 billion in a few 

years, and it is going to average $12.5 billion beyond the foreseeable future. 

What typically happens is that past programs that begin to run 

into these kind of funding issues—usually, at some point, if other 

national priorities have to be taken care of, there is a lot of big 

weapon systems that are vying for the funding. The Navy and the 

Army and the Air Force has its own. The tanker is one. Long-range 

strike is one. 

Something has to give, and a lot of times it is quantities. You 

know, you get to a point—the F–22 is an example where they 

wanted to buy 750 and the funding profile was so straining that 

they wound up having to cut quantities. 

Mr. WALZ. Is there anything that indicates to you—because I 

would say the members sitting here understand from sequestration 
15 

to national debt, to competing priorities, nothing is going to change 

that. 

I think the estimate is over, if you will, a 50-year lifecycle of this is $1 trillion. We are not quite halfway there yet. The fortitude to 

come back every year is one that I think we are going to have to 

think about and think about deeply. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. I was just talking about the acquisition cost. 

Now, when you include the total ownership cost or the operation 

and support cost, which is right now estimated anywhere from 

$850 billion to a trillion dollars over 30 years, that is cost on top 

of that. 

So some of this discussion about ALIS is interesting. Because one 

of the things that the Joint Strike Fighter was supposed to be able 

to do was have a lot of commonality across a variance and reduce 

a footprint, and it hasn’t really come out that way. There were a 

lot of technologies they were counting on early in this program that 

I don’t think they have been able to achieve. 

Mr. WALZ. And I realize how difficult this is. But I can’t stress 

enough, if it falls short in any way of achieving these things, the 

difficulty on those dollars are going to be even more. I mean, it has 

to do everything that it says it is going to do. 

And so I am going to ask—and I know this is subjective, but I 

think it is important for us because this is looking ahead—what is 

this hearing going to look like in April of 2016, when we come back 

and hold this hearing on the F–35? How big of difference are we 

going to see? Is this thing going to be doing what it is supposed 

to do? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I will take that. I will start. 

A year from now we will have the Marine Corps—we will have 

IOC, their version of the aircraft. We will be working on completion 

of 3i testing and will be heavy into the 3F testing. 

I think, as Mr. Sullivan described, your concerns with cost—I 

think at this point in the program we can see the end in sight in 

terms of R&D [research and development] costs. There are still 

some risks, and we will tackle those risks. But those aren’t going 

to threaten the program. 

What we have to do is continue to drive down cost in production, 

because we still have about 2,800 aircraft to manufacture and that 

heavy weight in terms of production costs. We have got to go at 

that from our side in the program to drive the costs down. That 

bigger issue of affordability has to deal with our budgets. 

And so where will our budget be—when we are sitting here in 

April of 2016, where will our budget be? Will we have been sequestered? What will have happened to the top line? 

You have heard the services testify with regard to the impact of 

sequestration. If we are sequestered, that will have an impact on 

this program, and that will then directly have an impact on affordability. 

Mr. WALZ. I appreciate that. 

My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Maybe we will get that in another 

member’s question. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
16 

When we went to Eglin, we spent some time with the pilots and 

asked them what are the problems that they are finding. And, you 

know, that is certainly the best way to find out, I think, is to actually talk to them. And I know that I think you have been briefed 

on it and seen the list. 

And I guess kind of parlaying on what Mr. Walz asked, how 

many of these things that you see here—and I could go through 

them all; don’t necessarily have to—will we be able to address in 

the next year? 

General BOGDAN. Over the past 2 years, we have faced a number 

of technical issues that 2 years ago or a year ago, if you had said, 

‘‘Where will you be in April of 2015?’’ I would have told you, ‘‘Well, 

I would like to have this retired and that retired and that retired.’’ 

So let me give you a list of a few of the things that we have retired and now a few of the things we are working on in 2015 when 

we come back next year will hopefully retire. 

A year ago there was a lot of speculation and discussion about 

how good the helmet was going to be, the Generation III helmet, 

because the Generation II helmet had some shortfalls. It had a jitter problem. It had green glow problems. It had latency problems. 

It wasn’t good enough for the warfighter. 

Today I can tell you we are flight-testing the Gen III helmet 

right now and all indications are from the test pilots is that it is 

much improved, much improved. So I put a half a checkmark in 

that box and say, ‘‘Okay. We are controlling that.’’ 

Last year we had a major engine problem. I will tell you today 

we have the solution for that engine problem. It is being put into 

the field. And by this summer, I will have the final production 

version of that fix into the production line and that will be behind 

us. 

We had a problem with lightning. We were having a problem 

qualifying the airplane to fly in lightning last year. That problem 

is basically behind us. 

And, in fact, I don’t know if the guys at Eglin told you, but 2 

weeks ago a CF–8 flying—returning from base was struck by lightning. He was in clear air and he was struck by lightning, and absolutely nothing bad happened to the airplane. 

The pilot landed the airplane. No warnings and cautions. No 

problems. And we could see where the lightning went into the right 

wing tip and came out. So lightning is another one we would put 

on that list of last year a problem, not a problem this year. 

Fuel dumping was a problem last year because the fuel dump on 

the airplane comes from the bottom of the wing. And so, when you 

dump fuel from the bottom of the wing, there is high pressure 

there. It pushes the fuel up onto the wing and it sticks and it 

makes the wing wet. We have solved that problem. 

So those are just a few of the things that a year or two ago were 

high on our list. What is high on our list this year? 

We already talked about ALIS. ALIS has a long way to go, sir. 

It is a complicated 5-million-lines-of-code piece of equipment that 

we started treating like a piece of support equipment. It is not. It 

is an integral part of the weapon system. 

So we have had to take steps in the last 2 years to change fundamentally the way we develop ALIS. We have applied the same 
17 

techniques we used in developing software on the airplane to now 

developing software in ALIS. It is just going to take us some time 

to realize those results. 

We had a problem with the hook. When we first tested the hook 

on a C-model a year and a half ago, we missed seven out of eight 

traps at Lakehurst. We went out to the boat last year and hit 124 

out of 124. 

So I guess what I am expressing here is we are going to have 

more technical problems on this program. It is a measure of a good 

program for you to be able to absorb those, find fixes for them, and 

then continue moving the ball down the field on the program. I 

think we are in a better position now than we ever have been to 

address those kind of problems. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Well, you are there and you know these things 

are being addressed. I think it kind of took us a little by surprise, 

the 80 percent, and it was said kind of casually, like, ‘‘80 percent? 

Like, that is far from good.’’ 

General BOGDAN. Can I make two comments about that just to 

kind of put it in context? 

The first thing is—and that is not to mitigate the fact that we 

know we have a problem there—the jets down at Eglin are the oldest ones we have. They are flying 1B software and 2A software, 

and they are Lot 3 and 4 airplanes. 

So they are flying the dogs of the fleet, quite frankly, because 

many of the newer lots of airplanes have many of the improvements we have learned over the last 2 to 3 years. And the newer 

software that we are using on the 2B airplanes is going to make 

that even better. 

So I can understand the guys down at Eglin feeling like, ‘‘I don’t 

have a very good airplane here after all this time, energy, and 

money, General Bogdan.’’ 

When it comes to the false reporting, we call those things HRCs, 

health reporting codes. And on any given sortie, you may get two 

or three or four of them. 

What I believe when they are telling you 80 percent is, when you 

actually get a health reporting code on the airplane and you land, 

the ones that you get, 80 percent of them turn out to be not good, 

not that 80 percent of all—every flight you have got problems with 

the airplane that you don’t know about. 

What we have done is we have gone in and we have started to 

change the software both in ALIS and the airplane to address that. 

But at the same time, we now have a history of which health reporting—— 

Mr. TURNER. I am sorry to interject here, General Bogdan. I just 

want to make certain you are not confused, although I think I may 

be. 

When they say 80 percent false positives, they mean, out of 100 

items where it says there is something wrong with the plane, 80 

of them are nothing is wrong with the plane, but they are given 

a notice that something is wrong and then they have to deal with 

that notice—— 

General BOGDAN. Correct. Correct 

Mr. TURNER. By the way, Secretary Stackley cringed when 

you—— 
18 

General BOGDAN. No. You got that right, but here is what I am 

trying to say. 

The other important question that they should have told you was 

each airplane, when it lands, only has about four or five health reporting codes a sortie. 

Mr. TURNER. We saw the list. I mean, the point here being that, 

if something is telling you 80 percent of the time wrong information, it is suspect. Right? 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. And I am going to go check that 80 

percent number and get back to you. And it is a problem. We know 

it is a problem, and we have to address it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 95.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

With that, Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I find it comforting that—or maybe not so comforting to think 

that the question I really wanted to talk about was ALIS and it 

is one that is of concern to the chairman. As a former aviator and, 

also, a logistics officer, let’s talk maintenance and logistics and 

ALIS. 

I am concerned that the manpower it takes to clear every single 

one of those false positives—false negatives is driving up maintenance costs and now you have got more and more man-hours or 

person-hours or airmen-hours or contractor-hours that have to 

clear every single one of those. 

In addition, whether it is 80 percent or whatever it is, I would 

like to know—and you don’t have to give it to me today because 

I doubt, General, that you have it—how often are you getting a circle red X or a red X status on aircraft that is driving down the aircraft availability for missions and for different mission profiles? Because now, even if it is a false positive, you are affecting mission 

readiness for the aircraft. 

And you talked about problems with the system in the past, not 

necessarily ALIS, but problems that have been fixed, last year the 

helmets—Generation II and Generation III helmets. 

Is there a timeline in place to fix all of these problems with 

ALIS? Do you have benchmarks in place: ‘‘In 6 months you will 

have X number of lines of codes fixed and within a year we will 

be at this point’’? 

And then the final question is—one of the issues is not even software. We are talking about the size, bulk, and weight. My understanding is, during the carrier integration phase, ALIS could not 

deploy and, instead, the USS Hornet [USS Wasp] had to rely upon 

the ALIS system at Fort Worth, Texas, for logistical support because it was too bulky to deploy onto the [Wasp], which, you know, 

as someone who flew small aircraft, if you couldn’t carry it in the 

aircraft or sling-loaded under the aircraft, it didn’t go with you. 

The idea that you would have an integral part of your maintenance 

system that can’t even fit on the USS [Wasp] is very, very troubling 

to me. 

General BOGDAN. Yes, ma’am. Relative to the plan, we absolutely 

do have a plan for ALIS. As I said before, until about 2 years ago, 

we weren’t treating ALIS much other than a piece of support 
19 

equipment. We now recognize that it could be its own weapons system. 

So we have put all the system’s engineering discipline, the software metrics—the same kind of things we did for the airplane we 

are doing for ALIS. So, as an example, this summer the U.S. Marine Corps will declare IOC with a version of ALIS we call 2.01. 

Today in the field we have Version 1.03. So there is an upgrade 

program going on. 

The U.S. Air Force next summer will get 2.02 because we are 

doing incremental upgrades on ALIS. I will take it for the record 

that we will show you that integrated and incremental plan to improve ALIS. 

Relative to the deployability of ALIS, you are spot on, ma’am. 

Today ALIS sits in a squadron and it is a rack of computers that 

weighs probably 800 to 1,000 pounds. We recognized a year and a 

half ago that was not going to work for deploying forces. 

So today we are redesigning ALIS into what we call a Version 

2 deployable version. That will be ready for the Marine Corps this 

July. It is two-man portable. It comes in about three or four different racks. They take it apart and—two men can put it back together and take it apart. 

In the future, we will build all of the ALIS system in this 

deployable configuration and we will get rid of the old 1,000-pound 

racks we have at the squadrons now. But you are right on, ma’am. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I would like to make several requests, General. 

I would like to know what you think will be the point of acceptable for ALIS’s performance, 80 percent—whatever you said. I am 

sorry to be all up your tailpipe in this, but we have gotten to the 

point where Members of Congress are really concerned. 

So what are you determining to be acceptable? When will you get 

there for the software system? You already told me what acceptable 

is for the size. Right? You said July, two-man portable. 

And then I would like to know what the maintenance cost has 

been due to the false positives and how much of that cost will be 

decreased and what you expect that cost to be in terms of increased 

manpower hours for both your uniformed personnel as well as for 

the contractors and all the maintenance that comes about with 

having to clear every one of those codes. 

General BOGDAN. That is a great set of questions, ma’am. I will 

take them for the record and we will plan on having that discussion after this hearing. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 95.] 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

Dr. Gilmore, in your testimony, you talk about the limitations of 

the F–35 in close air support. Specifically, you mentioned that the 

aircraft will need to be under the direct control of a forward air 

controller using voice communications, there is no ability to use an 

infrared pointer, there is no ability to have night vision capability—this reminds me of something before the A–10, by the way, 
20 

not after the A–10—only have 20 to 30 minutes time on station, 

the current 2B would only have two weapons, but, then, even the 

follow-on is only going to have 180 bullets even if you are mounting 

the external gun. 

And so I am concerned about the capabilities in the close air support, forward air control, and combat search and rescue mission 

that the F–35 is going to be serving as it replaces aircraft like the 

A–10. 

So how many of these shortfalls—and I just mentioned a few of 

them—will actually be fixed in the 3F? And how many are just inherent, like the 20 minutes time on station and the lack of really 

total weapons capability? 

When you think of close air support aircraft like the A–10, it is 

the survivability, the lethality, which means weapons load, and the 

loiter time that really make it capable to keep Americans alive. 

And I am concerned on the second and the third I mentioned, loiter 

time and lethality as far as weapons load. 

And, also, are any tests, including survivability—you know, can 

they take hits like the A–10 can of a SAM [surface-to-air missile] 

and triple-A [anti-aircraft artillery], small arms, and still be able 

to fly back? Are you testing those types of things in a low-threat, 

so to speak, close air support environment, which is what we have 

been doing the last 25 years? 

Dr. GILMORE. With regard to the time on station, the numbers 

you quoted were for the F–35B, and that was 20 to 30 minutes. 

Now, you can extend that by refueling with tankers, but then, of 

course, you have to plan for the tankers. 

The F–35A would have up to about 45 minutes on station. That 

compares with about 90 minutes on station for the A–10. And that 

is something that will—you know, that is a limitation that will persist because of, you know, the engine and other aspects—aerodynamic aspects of the aircraft. 

With regard to some of the other limitations that are discussed 

in my testimony, like, for example, the deficiencies in the digital 

communications, you know, there are problems with the nine-line 

message. Not all elements of it are accurate at this point. It doesn’t 

work correctly. 

And so it will require some voice communications if you are performing CAS [close air support], if you are trying to do that with 

a Block 2B aircraft, and—you know, as opposed to the—you know, 

the digital nine-line that you can use in the A–10, the Harrier, and 

the F–16. Those problems are, you know, planned to be corrected 

in Block 3F. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Dr. GILMORE. Block 3F will provide additional weapons loads and 

mixed weapons loads as well as external weapons. So the weapons 

load will increase in Block 3F. 

Some of the other problems that, you know, will probably—if you 

are using a Block 2B aircraft, would require greater coordination 

with a forward air controller will, based on what the program 

hopes to achieve in Block 3F, you know, be fixed. 

And, in fact, if everything that is realized in Block 3F is realized, 

I think it would be safe to say that you will have much better situational awareness in a F–35 than you would in an A–10, again, if 
21 

all these Block 3F capabilities are realized, but the Block 2B capability is going to be limited. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. 

And the survivability piece, I mean, are you—— 

Dr. GILMORE. We are—— 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. Evaluating its ability to take small 

arms, triple-A, SAM hits and still be able to fly back? 

Dr. GILMORE. Yes. My annual report describes some of the testing that has been done, you know, testing against hits by certain 

kinds of weapons that, you know, could be employed against the 

aircraft if it were flying low as well as if we are engaged in airto-air combat. 

The aircraft has some vulnerabilities that you would have to expect a high-performance aircraft to have. And the A–10 is going to 

be able to—you know, can take hits that an F–35 couldn’t take. 

But I don’t think that the plan for having the F–35 conduct CAS 

is equivalent in all operational aspects to the way the A–10 would 

conduct CAS, and the plan would probably be for the F–35 to stand 

off more from many of these threats that the A–10 does not stand 

off from. 

So, you know, the survivability of the F–35 against some of these 

threats isn’t going to be as good as the A–10, but I think the operators would say that they wouldn’t use the F–35 the same way they 

would use the A–10 to do close air support. 

Ms. MCSALLY. And thank you. My time is expired. 

But I will share, as a former A–10 pilot and squadron commander, there are times and there will still be times in the future 

when you must get down and dirty with the guys on the ground, 

who are often on the run, unable to give you their coordinates, and 

you have to visually be able to see where are the good guys and 

the bad guys. 

And so you cannot stand off in all CAS scenarios even in the future, and that is a concern I have with the limited capabilities in 

replacing the A–10. But my time’s expired. 

Dr. GILMORE. And I agree with you, Congresswoman. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Turning to Joe Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Dr. Gilmore, tomorrow we are having a full committee hearing on the risk of losing military technology superiority and its implication for U.S. policy, strategy, and posture in the Asia-Pacific. 

What is your opinion of the continued development and production of the F–35 program as critical to our military in maintaining 

its technological superiority? 

Dr. GILMORE. That is for me? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes. 

Dr. GILMORE. I have stated previously—in fact, the last time I 

testified on Joint Strike Fighter was before the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense in the Senate—that the Department has no 

choice but to make the F–35 work. 

It is critical to the future of tactical combat aviation in the Department and in the United States. And as far as I can tell and, 
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as Mr. Stackley and General Bogdan have indicated, they and the 

Department are committed to making it work. 

However, as has also been mentioned by the chairman and others, this is an extremely complex undertaking. And I think the best 

way to characterize what is happening here is that the best projections that excellent program managers like General Bogdan make 

can be undone by the complexity and the unknowns that we continue to face. And so we can expect those kinds of unknowns to 

continue to arise and to have to deal with them. 

And so it is going to, in my judgment—and I don’t regard this 

as a horribly profound observation—it is going to take longer to get 

this job done than anybody—and cost more than anybody now 

projects, but it is an important job to do. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you very much for your clarity. 

And, General Bogdan, the F–35 is the only fifth-generation aircraft in production today. Please highlight for us what the F–35 

fifth-generation capabilities will bring to the fight. 

General BOGDAN. Congressman, the essence of the F–35 and 

what it can do for us and our allies now and in the future is a combination of different characteristics about the airplane, one of them 

being stealth, meaning, although not impossible to detect, very, 

very, very difficult to detect. 

And once you detect an airplane, you have to go through the kill 

chain to shoot it out of the sky, and this airplane, with its combination of stealth, electronic attack, electronic warfare capabilities, 

and its sensors, is very, very good at knocking pieces of that kill 

chain out. 

So it is a very survivable airplane in the most heavily defended, 

complex target environments where we wouldn’t otherwise be able 

to bring other legacy airplanes. So it does that. 

The second thing it does is its combination of sensors, when 

working properly and fused properly, provides a picture of the 

battlespace that is unprecedented for our pilots today. And the ability to see the battlespace in that clarity and to take that picture 

and send it off board to other airplanes and other platforms is a 

valuable, valuable tool. 

So the combination of the F–35 being able to go where no other 

airplanes can go and its ability to see the battlespace in that kind 

of clarity creates an advantage for the United States that is critical 

in future air dominance. 

Mr. WILSON. And, again, thank you for your clarity on that. 

And, Secretary Stackley, I previously represented Marine Corps 

Air Station Beaufort, and they have just been—the community is 

so supportive and so enthusiastic about F–35Bs being located 

there. They are located. 

What is the current status of deployment there? And what is the 

future? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. 

Right now at Beaufort I think we have about a dozen aircraft on 

site. It will be a training command near term, long term. That 

dozen or so aircraft will build up to a total of 50 across 2 squadrons, and you will see the Marine Corps training there. 

In the near term, you will see our partners—the U.K., Italy— 

training there, and that will be a long-term presence just like it is 
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today for Marine Corps aviation training with this program. It is 

a critical part of the future of the Marine Corps here. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I always like to point out that Beaufort has 

the right meteorological conditions, and that is very good weather, 

temperate, and very warm people. 

So thank you very much. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Knight. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I will just make a couple comments. 

I appreciate you changing the flight pattern for the Joint Strike 

Fighter because now it gets to fly over my house about 10 times 

a week, and I love the sound of freedom, and it is always nice to 

see that. 

I will remind the members that the F–16, our last multi-role 

fighter, went through about 138 versions and probably 15 or 16 

blocks. So they call it ‘‘test flight’’ for a reason. It is not proven 

flight. It is test flight. 

We are going into a new generation. It is a new technology. It 

is a new way for the warfighter to be further into the battle, further undetected into the battle. And so the F–35 is something new 

for the warfighter. 

Those are all the nice things I am going to say. But I am going 

to piggyback on Congressman Walz. 

I am a freshman. And in a year I am sure I am going to be sitting here and we are going to be talking about the F–35. And the 

F–35 is a program that is talked about in every one of our districts. 

Whether we have a base, whether we have an aircraft, it is talked 

about in every one of our districts. 

So not just hitting the test points, but being able to go past the 

test points and get on to the next issue that maybe a test program 

is having, and the faster that we can get on to a program that they 

see our Marines flying, that they see the Navy flying and, of 

course, our airmen flying is the best factor that we can talk about. 

So in a year, I am going to have great things to talk about the 

F–35, but I am hoping that we are going to have a lot of these 

points that the general said—that we are going to be knocking out 

and moving on. 

And then my last, last thing is our international partners. You 

don’t have a great multi-role fighter in America without international partners and a good sale program to our international 

partners. That might be 40, that might be 45, percent. But that is 

one of the best and most motivating factors for any multi-role fighter, whether it be our F–16 or back to our F–4. 

So those are all the nice things I will say about the F–35. And 

I know it is hitting a lot of the test points. I talk to the pilots and 

the mechanics at Edwards probably on a weekly basis. And it is 

moving very quickly, and these last 6 months have been very, very 

good for the program. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Graham. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. 

Just last month I had the opportunity to go on a congressional 

delegation trip to Eglin to familiarize myself with the F–35 pro-
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gram, and it was a wonderful opportunity. I was there with Chairman Turner and my fellow Floridian, Congressman Jeff Miller. 

And we share—our districts are right next to one another. And so 

we have the ability to share the unique training that is available 

in the Gulf of Mexico. 

And so my question goes to Dr. Gilmore, to the training opportunities in the Eglin Gulf training areas, and I am specifically interested in ensuring that the test ranges remain and have the capacity to test our F–35s and other future-generation capabilities. 

So can you please talk about what the Department has been 

doing to test F–35s at the Gulf Test Range and, also, the efforts 

the Department is undertaking to ensure that our ranges, and this 

range in particular, are upgraded so that they can do the necessary 

tests on this fighter and future generations of fighters. 

Dr. GILMORE. The activities at Eglin have been focused on training with the early blocks of software, which has been noted, until 

Block 2B, don’t provide any combat capabilities. 

So the training opportunities have been limited not because of 

any limitations in Eglin’s infrastructure or capabilities, but because 

of what the aircraft up to this point have offered. 

Now, with Block 2B and beyond, the training opportunities, just 

because of the capabilities that will be provided, will be greater and 

there will be greater advantage taken of the capabilities of Eglin 

to serve as a training range. 

I think, as you know, most of the flight testing that we have been 

discussing here both for flight sciences and the aerodynamic performance of the aircraft as well as the performance of the missions 

systems has been taking place at Edwards Air Force Base. 

And that continues to be the plan because of certain unique assets that exist out there that are critical to testing the capabilities 

of this fifth-generation aircraft. And so I would expect that, in the 

future, Edwards and, you know, the Western Test Range will continue to play a very important role in testing. 

Some of the weapons testing can be done at Eglin, and I expect 

that there will be more of that testing that is done in the future 

as well as training that is done at Eglin. 

So, you know, there is a mix of kind of testing that is done and 

there are certain unique aspects out on the Western Test Range 

that really—that don’t exist anywhere else that are the reason that 

most of that testing has been occurring out there. And, in fact, a 

large part—not all, but a large part—of the operational testing will 

take place at Edwards as well. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Can you just disclose without entering into any 

classified areas what is unique about Edwards that is not present 

at the Eglin test range? 

Dr. GILMORE. The things that I am discussing that are unique 

I would have to discuss with you—— 

Ms. GRAHAM. Okay. 

Dr. GILMORE. [continuing]. In the appropriate venue. 

Ms. GRAHAM. I understand. 

Dr. GILMORE. So I can’t really discuss them in an open—— 

Ms. GRAHAM. Well, I appreciate that. 
25 

I would just like to ditto my colleague about how wonderful it is 

in north Florida. We have nice people, warm weather, and great 

opportunities to test these incredible air—— 

Dr. GILMORE. And there will be testing and there can be weapons 

delivery events that are done there in the future, but there are certain unique aspects to the Western Test and Training Range. They 

have a test and training—— 

Ms. GRAHAM. Right. 

Dr. GILMORE. [continuing]. Range there, too. But I would be 

happy to discuss it with you in the appropriate forum. 

Ms. GRAHAM. I appreciate that, Doctor. Thank you for your time. 

Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I wanted to be here for this hearing, and I am sorry I had to 

leave. 

But, obviously, Cherry Point Marine Air Station is in my district, 

and as somebody said earlier, the F–35 is of great importance to 

many of us around the country. 

This was an article in Business Insider on March 27th of this 

year, ‘‘The Marine Corps want[ing] to put flawed new fighter jets 

into service is the biggest F–35 story right now.’’ 

You have touched on some of this. But I have spent 13 years of 

my life finding out more about the V–22 than I ever thought I 

would learn about anything. 

I was here at the time that the Marine Corps came forward, 

Commandant Jim Jones, saying that, ‘‘We have got to have the V– 

22. The V–22 is going to replace the helicopters, heelicopters, from 

the Vietnam war, and we have got to have it.’’ 

I saw at that point what I was hoping—and no this is not talking 

about you—but the fact that the Marine Corps was so desperate to 

get the V–22 that a lot of decisions were made like not fulfilling 

the testing of the vortex ring state and how that would impact the 

V–22. They scrapped that testing to save $50 million. 

The plane that crashed that I have gotten involved in was the 

crash on April the 8th in Marana, Arizona, where 19 marines were 

burned to death—the co-pilot’s wife lives in my district, Connie 

Gruber. Her husband was Brooks Gruber. The pilot John Brow’s 

wife, Trish, lives in Steny Hoyer’s district—and in trying to get the 

Marine Corps to write a letter to the wives saying that, ‘‘At the 

time of this accident, we did not understand the vortex ring state. 

We didn’t know how it would impact in a certain situation. So, 

therefore, the press release that we sent out the first month of that 

accident was very misleading, but the press has always picked it 

up as pilot error.’’ 

Now, what am I trying to get to? What I want to make sure— 

and I think each one of you have done a great job, what little bit 

of time I was here today. And I have read many, many articles all 

around about the V–22, the positive and the negatives. 

But I hope that, if we are going to put the pilots up and put 

them into certain situations, that we know the best that we can 

know, that we are not going to jeopardize their lives, because I 

have seen the pain with Connie Gruber and Trish Brow that they 
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have carried for 15 years because of misinformation about that accident. 

And my hope is, with the F–35—and you have done a great job 

of explaining today, and I know the chairman’s been very involved 

in this—but let’s not be so in a hurry to prove that we are right 

with this F–35 that we would jeopardize any pilot from anywhere. 

And I want to—with the minute and 30 seconds I have left, I 

really would like for you to—each one—in a very short period of 

time tell the American people that we are not going to jeopardize 

our pilots to prove a point that we have got to have the F–35. 

General BOGDAN. Sir, I will go first. 

I have been an Air Force pilot for 31 years and have over 3,300 

hours in 40 different kinds of airplanes. I would never ever ask a 

pilot to do anything in the F–35 that I wouldn’t do myself. 

Mr. JONES. Fair enough. 

General BOGDAN. Safety in this program is our number one priority. I have independent air worthiness authorities that watch 

what we do. And I would never jeopardize a maintainer or a flier’s 

life just to prove a point about a program. It is not worth it. 

Mr. JONES. That is why I respect you. 

General BOGDAN. And I won’t do it. 

Mr. JONES. I wish that had happened in the year 2000. But I saw 

the dishonesty at that time to prove a point, and that is why I feel 

so passionately and strong, and that is why I appreciate you, sir, 

for what you just said. Thank you. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, I can only echo what General Bogdan 

had to say. Safety is a top priority on this as well as, frankly, all 

of our weapons systems developments. 

We do not compromise on air worthiness. Our standards are high 

and we do not compromise on those standards. And as far as bringing those standards to bear on this program, we have got our best 

and brightest working on this. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I think, you know, speaking as one of the 

agencies that does oversight on this, I have a lot of confidence in 

the program manager and the services to be able to deliver a very, 

very safe aircraft. 

And I think that this committee is a part of all of that. It is very 

important. GAO oversight is important. And it maybe was not as 

good as it should have been back in those days, and that is one 

thing that—I think this committee, the Congress, and DOT [Department of Transportation] and even GAO are very important to 

the process. 

Dr. GILMORE. The combat capability of Block 2B aircraft are 

going to be limited and there are going to be lots of work-arounds 

that are required for pilots and for the maintainers. And that is already been discussed. 

So what I am trying to do is—and I know that the program office 

is trying to do this as well—but what I am trying to do is to make 

the operators as aware as I can of what they do have and what 

they won’t have. 

And in Block 2B, unfortunately, there will be—if you ever wanted to use it in combat—and my understanding is, associated with 

the initial operational capability, the Marines hold out the prospect 

that they would use it in combat—I will continue to seek to assure 
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that those pilots understand what they don’t have as well as what 

they do have. And in Block 2B there will be a lot of what they don’t 

have. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Walz. 

Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would just do a quick follow-up. And I would like to get 

on this—and I think I heard my colleague and friend, Mr. Knight. 

When he talks about test flights, I listen. As we all know, his family holds an important position in American aviation history and 

test flights. And I think he is right. 

And I want to get on this issue about we can’t expect a perfect 

product right out of the gate, but there is a question I want to follow up on this June 23rd fire. 

That was a relatively new aircraft. The way I understand it, it 

had 160 hours of flight time. It was flown inside its designated 

flight envelope; so, the pilot wasn’t at fault. But despite all this, we 

had a new aircraft forming at a very easy place where it should 

have been. We lost the aircraft and nearly lost the pilot. 

So, General Bogdan, here is my question to you. We have been— 

the way I understand it, we were informed that the root cause was 

the F–35 last year was a lack of accuracy in the Pratt & Whitney’s 

model on how the engine would behave under flight conditions on 

that specific aircraft. Specifically, the model did not apparently account for the rubbing you talked about between certain internal 

portions of the engine under flight conditions. 

Here is my questions to you. If that part of the model was not 

accurate, despite many years and the billions of dollars, what other 

parts of the engine performance could be inaccurate? And where is 

that high risk, in your opinion? 

And, secondly on this, the Marine Corps’ version we are going to 

see later this year, am I correct that it is going to perform lower 

than what the expectations are? This is a test flight moving to 

that. So it is at 5.5 g’s [force of gravity]. 

Are you worried that the modeling is not taking into account, 

when this gets pushed further and further into its flight envelope, 

what is going to happen, General? 

General BOGDAN. Great question, Congressman. 

You are precisely right that the original Pratt & Whitney model 

did not anticipate the amount of heat that would be generated 

when those two parts of the engine that do rub—and we intended 

on them rubbing, and they do rub when the airplane’s maneuvering—but we did not nearly expect the kind of heat generation 

we saw because their model, again, failed to capture that. 

So what we did with the independent air worthiness authorities 

that work outside of my program office—they put their best and 

brightest in the Navy and the Air Force on this to get to that root 

cause. 

And one of the requirements we had before we ever designed a 

fix for the engine for that specific problem was to go back and take 

a look at those models and decide where else was there in terms 

of risk in those models. 
28 

And the independent air worthiness authorities at NAVAIR 

[Naval Air Systems Command] and LCMC [Life Cycle Management 

Command] had to come and say that they understood where those 

models were adequate and where they weren’t and what Pratt was 

going to do to improve that before they would even allow us to put 

the fix on the airplane to get back in the air. 

Mr. WALZ. Were there improvements made to their model? Did 

you find things that—— 

General BOGDAN. Oh, yes, sir. There were a number of improvements, not the least of which was we looked at all the materials— 

all the material properties in the engine and revalidated whether 

the characteristics of those properties, in terms of heating and friction, were accurate and appropriate for what we knew to be the 

case. 

Additionally, a fighter engine moves. It moves this way. It moves 

this way. And it moves this way. We had to make sure that that 

model, which was describing how much the touching and rubbing 

would occur, was accurate, also, before we put those airplanes back 

in flight. That was part of the reason why the planes were grounded for as long as they were. 

Mr. WALZ. So later this summer, when they go and they push 

that to 5.5 g’s and they start pushing ahead of that, you are, I’m 

certain, as you said—and I know this to be the case—you are not 

going to put one of those—— 

General BOGDAN. Sure. We took the fix from—the interim fix 

from that engine mishap and we flight-tested it at Edwards on 

both engine variants and we took it up to the maximum g limit of 

the airplane, which is greater than what the Marine Corps is going 

to be allowed to do this summer. 

Mr. WALZ. And, in this case, we didn’t have a loss of life. So is 

it your assessment this is what test flights do? We learned a lot 

from this, we are better off, and it—— 

General BOGDAN. What I would tell you, sir, is no surprise discovery is good. But if you are going to have them, it is better to 

have them on the ground and it is better to have them early in a 

program before you have had thousands of engines out there. 

Mr. WALZ. Okay. 

General BOGDAN. So, from that perspective, we are okay. And I 

am just—we are just blessed that that pilot is okay. 

Mr. WALZ. Great. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the additional time. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you for your attention to this very important program. We know that you all have 

important responsibilities. And thank you for continuing to keep 

this committee informed as we look to trying to assist in the overall 

process. 

With that, we will be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 14, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 14, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 14, 2015 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. WENSTRUP 

General BOGDAN. Yes, we agree this is a valid concern/problem. 

The F–35 air system is experiencing some ‘‘false’’ Health Reporting Codes (HRCs) 

generated by the aircraft, then downloaded and filtered in ALIS. This is manifested 

in the early software versions (Block 1B and Block 2A) of the F–35 software. Many 

of the aircraft-generated HRCs do not require maintenance action (false codes) but 

do generate work orders that cause unnecessary administrative burden for maintainers and pilots to close out the action. The release of Block 2B software has resulted in a significant improvement of these false codes over earlier Block 1B/2A 

versions. 

The ‘‘80% false positive’’ figure is related to the work-orders that ALIS automatically generates after each flight. As an example, a given aircraft may generate 20 

HRCs after a flight. Of those 20, any number of them (50%, or 10, in this example) 

may be automatically flagged as not valid and removed by systems within ALIS— 

this function is called the Nuisance Filter List (NFL). The remaining 10 HRCs 

would result in work-orders requiring maintenance personnel action. This is where 

the reports of ‘‘80% false positives’’ comes into play—eight of these work-orders are 

potentially false positives and require a maintainer to take administrative steps to 

close. The final two would be ‘‘legitimate’’ work-orders that warrant maintenance actions. 

Both the aircraft (false HRCs) and ALIS (proper filtering) contribute to this issue. 

Valid HRC software fixes are being addressed in the aircraft software via Software 

Product Anomaly Reports. With these software updates, ‘‘false’’ work orders for the 

maintenance personnel will continue to be reduced with each aircraft software release. The JPO is also updating the ALIS software to improve correlation of HRCs 

and consolidation of work orders. The ultimate goal with the improvements of both 

the aircraft off-board prognostics health monitoring system and ALIS software is 

negligible false positives by the end of 3rd Quarter of 2017. [See page 18.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH 

General BOGDAN. A deployable version of ALIS (Standard Operating Unit Version 

2—SOUv2) is part of ALIS version 2.0.1 being fielded this summer to support to 

the U.S. Marine Corps Initial Operational Capability (IOC). A SOUv2 deployable 

system was fielded to Flight Test (FT) on May 3, 2015, to undergo a series of tests, 

including a formal Logistics Test and Evaluation process that will test all aspects 

of the Sortie Generation Process. ALIS version 2.0.2 is currently in work to support 

the U.S. Air Force IOC in Aug 2016. ALIS version 3.0 releases are planned to complete the ALIS capabilities required within the development program by October 

2017. Each release will have an increasingly comprehensive testing regimen 

throughout the development process, including configuration item testing, integration testing, functional testing, information assurance testing, and deployment to 

flight test. User-defined performance standards and system level performance 

benchmarks are evaluated during integration and functional testing in the lab, as 

well as during flight test. 

The F–35 performance requirement for false-positives (false alarms) is 50 flight 

hours between false alarms. In comparison to other platforms, this performance is 

2 to 25 times more stringent, e.g., 1.8 hours for P–8 Poseidon and 23 hours for F– 

18 E/F Super Hornet. A zero-percent false-positive is not a realistic expectation. 

However, the ultimate goal from the improvements in off-board prognostics health 

monitoring and ALIS software is to achieve negligible false positives by the end of 

3rd Quarter 2017. 

An initial study on the impact of the current, ‘‘less than required’’ false-positive 

ratio was performed in January 2015 and showed a minimal increase in overall 

manpower needed to maintain war-time sortie generation rate and availability. Specifically, the findings were that for a squadron of 10 aircraft requiring 77 maintainers, one additional maintainer would be needed due to the current false-positive 

ratio. A follow-on study is being performed to refine the impact analysis accounting 
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for other maintainability factors (e.g., average repair time), and will include associated costs. Results are expected in summer 2015. 

The JPO stands ready to brief the committee members or their staffs on the full 

ALIS development and fielding plan. [See page 19.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 14, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. The program had planned to conduct a Block 2B operational evaluation that would have provided some operational performance information prior to 

the Marine Corps declaring an initial operational capability. a. What knowledge/information about aircraft performance would that evaluation have provided? b. In 

your view does deferring this operational evaluation increase risk to the Marine 

Corps ability to use the aircraft with 2B capabilities? c. What was the rationale for 

deferring the evaluation? 

Dr. GILMORE. a. The Block 2B OUE test design included an evaluation of mission 

effectiveness in air-to-surface attack, close air support, defensive counter-air warfare, and suppression/destruction of enemy air defenses in a limited threat environment. It also included an evaluation of the operational suitability of the F–35A and 

F–35B. 

b. The Marine Corps IOC decision is not and was not ever dependent on the execution of, or reporting the results of, the Block 2B OUE. The Block 2B OUE was 

an event-driven operational test, which the program could not enter until entrance 

criteria were met. Having said that, it is also important to note that the combat 

capabilities of the Block 2B aircraft will be very limited, and that the opportunities 

during the next year or more to understand the implications for combat of those limitations using operational testing will also be very limited. 

c. The decision to eliminate the Block 2B OUE was based on the assessment that 

the program could not satisfy the criteria to enter the test with sufficient numbers 

of operationally representative aircraft in the Block 2B configuration or trained pilots and maintenance personnel until mid-2016. Delaying the OUE until that time 

would have a significant negative impact on the program’s ability to complete development of the full Block 3F set of capabilities in a timely manner. 

Mr. TURNER. Your latest annual report raises concerns about the progress of the 

program in meeting some of its key reliability requirements. a. From DOT&E’s perspective, what are the key reliability problems facing the program? Do you believe 

the program is taking adequate steps to address these problems? If not, what steps 

do you believe are needed? b. Current program plans indicate that IOT&E is scheduled to begin in 2019. Do you believe the program will be able to meet this schedule? What do you see as the primary challenges to beginning IOT&E on time? What 

are your primary concerns as the F–35 program prepares for IOT&E? 

Dr. GILMORE. a. Reliability has not been improving at a fast enough rate to allow 

most of the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) derived metrics to meet expectations at maturity, with some exceptions. The contract specification reliability 

metrics, however, have been improving at an adequate rate. The program has identified several high driver components that contribute to lower than expected system 

reliability and recently established a reliability improvement program and growth 

plan. It is too soon to evaluate how well the plan is being executed and whether 

sufficient reliability growth is being realized. The program must continually run the 

process of identifying and tackling high drivers, since individual component reliabilities will likely change with the operational use of the aircraft as new capabilities 

are added to fleet operations. b. The current schedule of the program of record indicates IOT&E will begin in late 2017, not 2019. The program is not likely to be able 

to meet this schedule. The primary challenges and concerns for entering IOT&E are: 

completing the modifications/retrofit of the early production OT aircraft, completing 

testing of the fixes to problems discovered thus far in Block 2B and Block 3i testing 

which have been deferred to Block 3F, correcting deficiencies that will inevitably be 

discovered in Block 3F testing, completing the technical data materials needed for 

Service personnel to maintain the aircraft, improving the functions of the Autonomic 

Logistics Information System, and improving aircraft availability through improved 

reliability. 

Mr. TURNER. What are risks to Block 2B Fleet release occurring in mid-2015? 

Dr. GILMORE. Regarding the risk that Block 2B fleet release will occur in mid2015: The program has completed the necessary Block 2B development and testing 

to support an air worthiness certification that allows the aircraft to be operated in 

the field. This air worthiness certification, when completed and released to the fleet 
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later this year, will have significant aircraft operating limitations on all variants, 

limiting the utility of these Block 2B aircraft for combat. 

The test teams and the Program Office have done an admirable job of identifying 

the residual deficiencies that will affect combat performance. We won’t have high 

confidence in the released capabilities to the field, however, because the operational 

test units will be able to only perform a few tactics development and operational 

test events envisioned between now and the end of 2015; this is primarily due to 

the problem of low aircraft availability. Continued discovery of deficiencies is likely 

well after the fleet release. It will be important for operational commands to carefully consider the limitations and level of confidence in the released capabilities before tasking F–35 units. 

The early production aircraft in Lots 3 through 5 all require extensive, depot-level 

modifications to assume the full Block 2B configuration. This process has only recently begun. Although Marine Corps operational aircraft have been prioritized and 

are planned to receive modifications this year, many aircraft, in particular the operational test aircraft, will not be complete all of the Block 2B modifications until 

early 2017. 

Mr. TURNER. What are risks to completing Block 3F such that IOT&E can at least 

begin in early 2018? 

Dr. GILMORE. Risks to completing Block 3F so that IOT&E can begin in early 

2018 include: Block 3F mission systems software integration on the program’s current timeline will be challenging. The first release to flight test occurred in March, 

but Block 3F testing was suspended after only three flights as the program focused 

test aircraft on Block 3i flight testing. Block 3F testing is not planned to restart 

until late summer 2015, at which time only a year will remain until the final release of 3F software is planned to enter flight test. By comparison, Block 2B took 

over two years from the first to final release. Block 3F mission systems flight test 

is currently planned to be a 26 month span. It is likely to take longer, ending in 

mid-2018. Block 3F includes a significant amount of weapons testing so that weapons can be added beyond the limited capabilities of Block 2B, which includes internal carriage and employment of only two air-to-ground weapons and one air-to-air 

missile integrated in Block 2B. Block 3F will add external carriage of these weapons, SDB, JSOW, and AIM–9X, and the gun. This additional weapons testing is a 

significant risk area for Block 3F. Corrections to deficiencies in fusion which inhibit 

efficient employment in complex mission environments needed for the intended ‘‘full 

warfighting’’ capability is also a significant risk area. Additional modifications are 

needed for Lot 3–8 aircraft to become the Block 3F configuration. The plan for installing these modifications is still under construction, and all the hardware modification kits are not yet on contract. The program has indicated that it is likely that 

these aircraft will be undergoing modifications as late as mid-2018, which could 

delay the start of IOT&E (because the start date of IOT&E depends on availability 

of OT aircraft in production representative configurations). Improving suitability by 

completing the technical data materials needed for Service personnel to maintain 

the aircraft, improving the functions of the Autonomic Logistics Information System, 

and improving aircraft availability through improved reliability. 

Mr. TURNER. What more can be done or focused on to improve operational suitability? 

Dr. GILMORE. The program has focused on improving aircraft availability through 

increased spare parts, trying to make maintenance more efficient, and attention to 

failures that create down-time and long cycles of repair. Operational usage will be 

changing with the release of combat capability, even for training with the new capability. The program needs to add to its campaign a rigorous approach to improving 

the reliability of components that affect mission success—in other words, attack the 

high drivers of operational mission failures in offensive and defensive systems and 

air vehicle components—not just attack the high drivers of maintenance down time 

and high cost. The program has claimed to be ‘‘turning the corner on maintainability’’. This is an impossible assessment to make since the fleet of aircraft are still 

operating in non-combat configurations, unable to actuate weapons bay or countermeasure system doors, load or drop bombs, load or shoot missiles, and may complete 

the authorized, limited training missions without the use of aircraft sensors. 

Mr. TURNER. What concerns do you have regarding the June 2014 engine failure? 

Dr. GILMORE. The program has done a good job of explaining what happened but 

we do not fully understand why this happened. We do not understand what occurred 

differently than expected during the relatively restricted flight maneuvers on the 

flight prior to the engine failure that set up the failure event. The effect on engine 

performance and reliability with the modified stators is not well understood. We understand the engine contractor has acknowledged limitations in their models, particularly associated with axial movement within the engine, and have updated those 
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1GAO, F–35 Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment Needed to Address Affordability Challenges, 

GAO–15–364 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2015). 

models as a result of the engine failure. It is not clear what exactly the models did 

not correctly predict in the original design and use of the aircraft that turned out 

to be incorrect, or how the modeling was improved. We should also determine 

through additional analysis if the containment of the damage is sufficient, given the 

nature of the failure. In this case, the pilot was able to stop the aircraft and safely 

get away from the burning airframe. However, inflight failures of this kind should 

be examined to determine if the uncontained damage is tolerable from an aircraft 

vulnerability perspective. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you feel that the program should pause further development and 

fix the deficiencies in Block 2B before moving on to Block 3F? 

Dr. GILMORE. No, the program should not pause further development to fix deficiencies in Block 2B before moving on to Block 3F. The program should do what 

it is doing now: determine what fixes are absolutely essential to the Services for 

fielding Block 2B capability for the USMC and for fielding Block 3i capability for 

the USAF, provide a solution, and focus on transitioning to Block 3F. The end-product of SDD depends, in part on two important hardware changes that are necessary 

for Block 3F capabilities: a) Technology Refresh 2 processors, and, b) Gen 3 helmet. 

The program needs to transition test aircraft, and the development team, from 

Block 2B configuration to support testing of these systems as soon as possible. Remaining Block 2B deficiencies can be worked on in the new hardware. 

Mr. TURNER. In your statement, you highlight the likelihood of future cost growth 

and schedule delays for the F–35 program. Please explain your concerns? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The program’s acquisition strategy still contains a noteworthy 

overlap between flight testing and aircraft procurement. As we found in April 2015, 

with about 2 years and 40 percent of the developmental test program remaining, 

DOD is planning to significantly increase F–35 procurements over the next 5 years, 

from 38 aircraft per year to 90 aircraft per year.1 Over that same timeframe, DOD 

will be conducting developmental and operational flight testing of the aircraft’s full 

warfighting capabilities—known as Block 3F—which are needed to perform in more 

demanding and stressing environments. With this complex and demanding testing 

still ahead, it is almost certain that the F–35 program will encounter additional discoveries, and depending on the nature and significance of those discoveries, the program could need additional time and money to incorporate design changes, retrofit 

aircraft, and complete testing. 

Mr. TURNER. Your statement mentioned that the program is making progress 

with manufacturing, however, you caution about challenges the program still faces. 

Please explain why you feel there is a need for caution. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. In April 2015, we found that Lockheed Martin continued to deliver 

more aircraft, the number of manufacturing hours needed to build each aircraft continued to decline, and efficiency rates continued to improve. However, we also found 

that a number of suppliers continued to deliver parts late to Lockheed Martin resulting in part shortages and inefficiencies on the production line. From 2013 to 

2014, the average number of part shortage occurrences at Lockheed Martin’s manufacturing facility increased by 33 percent. If not adequately addressed, these part 

shortages will likely continue and the manufacturing inefficiencies will be amplified 

as production rates increase over the next 5 years. 

Mr. TURNER. In this testimony as well as in the past, you have consistently raised 

long-term affordability as a key area of risk. In your opinion, has the department 

addressed this concern? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Our analysis indicates that the F–35 program will require an average of $12.4 billion per year through 2038 to finish the current development program—expected to end in 2017—and procure all of the remaining United States aircraft. DOD plans to steeply increase its funding requests over the next 5 years to 

support a planned increase in aircraft procurement, and then projects that it will 

need between $14 and $15 billion annually for nearly a decade. Given other significant fiscal demands weighing on the nation, and other costly, high priority acquisition efforts, like the KC–46A Tanker, the Long Range Strike Bomber, the DDG–51 

Class Destroyer, and the Ohio Class submarine replacement competing for limited 

resources, it is unlikely that the program will be able to receive and sustain such 

high and unprecedented levels of funding over this extended period. In a time of 

austere budgets, we believe fully funding all of the department’s priorities at the 

same time will undoubtedly force DOD to continue to make difficult trade-off decisions. DOD has not fully addressed our affordability concerns, and for that reason 

we recommended in our April 2015 report that DOD conduct an affordability anal-
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ysis of the program’s current procurement plan that reflects various assumptions 

about future technical progress and funding availability. 

Mr. TURNER. GAO and DOT&E have both noted that the program has made 

progress but still faces challenges as it moves into later stages of flight testing while 

at the same time significantly increasing production rates. a. What do you see as 

biggest challenges facing the F–35 program going forward? b. Do you have concerns 

with the engine’s reliability and costs; software development and flight testing; manufacturing and quality rates and supplier performance? Please explain. c. Do you 

believe the program will complete the developmental testing in 2017 as currently 

planned, and within current estimated costs? d. To what extent does your assessment account for the impacts of potential future test failures, like the ones encountered this year with the engine and bulkhead? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We believe that the two biggest challenges facing the program are 

affordability and concurrency. Our analysis indicates that the program will require 

an average of $12.4 billion per year through 2038 to finish the current development 

program—expected to end in 2017—and procure all of the remaining United States 

aircraft. DOD plans to steeply increase its funding over the next 5 years to support 

a planned increase in aircraft procurement, and then projects that it will need between $14 and $15 billion annually for nearly a decade. Given other significant fiscal demands weighing on the nation, and other costly, high priority acquisition efforts, like the KC–46A Tanker, the Long Range Strike Bomber, the CVN–78 Ford 

Class Aircraft Carrier, and the Ohio Class submarine replacement competing for 

limited resources, it is unlikely that the program will be able to receive and sustain 

such high and unprecedented levels of funding over this extended period. In addition, with more demanding and complex testing still to be done, the program faces 

the risk that new technical problems—including those related to software—will be 

discovered and additional design changes will be needed. As we found in April 2015, 

with about 2 years and 40 percent of the developmental test program remaining, 

DOD is planning to significantly increase F–35 procurements over the next 5 years, 

from 38 aircraft per year to 90 aircraft per year. Over that same timeframe, DOD 

will be conducting developmental and operational flight testing of the aircraft’s full 

warfighting capabilities—known as Block 3F—which are needed to perform in more 

demanding and stressing environments. With this complex and demanding testing 

still ahead, it is almost certain that the F–35 program will encounter additional discoveries, and depending on the nature and significance of those discoveries, the program could need additional time and money to incorporate design changes, retrofit 

aircraft, and complete testing. 

We believe that the F–35 program continues to face challenges in several key 

areas. First, as we found in April 2015, F–35 engine reliability had been consistently worse than the program expected, and improving engine reliability would likely require additional design changes and retrofits, which typically translate into additional cost. At the time, Pratt and Whitney—the engine contractor—officials had 

identified a number of design changes that they believed would improve the engine’s 

reliability. Some of those changes had been funded and were being incorporated into 

the engine design, worked into production, and being retrofitted onto fielded engines. Several other design changes had been identified, but were not yet funded. 

In addition to these reliability improvements, the program was also in the process 

of developing design changes to address the root cause of a significant engine failure 

and fire that occurred in July 2014. Second, while the F–35 program has made 

progress in software development and flight testing, we believe that cost and schedule risks still remain. F–35 software development has been consistently behind 

schedule and has needed more rework than expected to address deficiencies found 

during flight testing. For example, the program experienced a higher than expected 

amount of test point growth in 2014—nearly twice what was expected—largely because of software rework. If these trends continue the program will face cost and 

schedule challenges as it works through the complex and demanding Block 3F software development and flight testing. Finally, in April 2015, we found that Lockheed 

Martin continued to deliver more aircraft, the number of manufacturing hours needed to build each aircraft continued to decline and efficiency rates continued to improve. However, time spent on scrap, rework, and repair, as well as the average 

number of part shortage occurrences at Lockheed Martin’s facility, have been higher 

than expected. We are concerned that if these trends continue, Lockheed Martin 

could have difficulty improving its manufacturing efficiency at its expected rates. 

We believe that if these problems are not resolved they will likely be amplified as 

production rates increase over the next 5 years. 

Whether or not the program will complete developmental testing in 2017 primarily depends on DOD’s ability to complete Block 3F software development and 

to execute the flight test program as planned. At the time of our April 2015 report, 
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DOD expected to complete the final 40 percent of F–35 developmental testing by 

2017. Over that timeframe, the test program will be focused on flight testing the 

aircraft’s full warfighting capabilities—known as Block 3F—which are needed to 

perform in more demanding and stressing environments. With this complex and demanding testing still ahead, it is almost certain that the F–35 program will encounter additional discoveries. If these additional discoveries turn out to be significant, 

like the bulkhead and engine discoveries in 2014, the program’s plan to complete 

developmental testing in 2017 would be at risk, and additional time and money 

would be needed to incorporate design changes, retrofit aircraft, and complete testing. 

Mr. TURNER. GAO and others continue to raise concerns about the long term affordability of the F–35 acquisition program, noting that as procurement ramps up 

over the next 5 years annual funding requests are projected to increase significantly 

and by 2021 reach $15 billion and stay at that level for a decade. At the same time 

other high profile DOD programs will be competing for funds, including the KC–46A 

Tanker, new bomber, and the Ohio class submarine replacement. a. What are the 

key factors driving the current F–35 procurement plans–production rate levels and 

funding levels? b. Given federal budget constraints and the competition for funding 

within DOD, do you believe that sustained annual funding of that magnitude is 

going to be achievable? c. Has the Department considered different procurement options, and if so, what has been considered? Are there any viable alternatives if the 

current plan is not affordable? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Department continues to fully support the F–35 Lightning II program. We plan to steadily increase production for the U.S. Services, 

reaching full rate production of 120 aircraft per year by 2022, with the Department 

of Navy intending to procure 20 F–35B and 20 F–35C aircraft per year. Ramping 

up to this rate of production is necessary to provide the dominant, fifth-generation 

aircraft capable of Anti-access/Area Denial (A2/AD) operations and to begin replacement of our aging combat aircraft fleet. Given continued support for the program 

by Congress and other stakeholders, plus its technical progress and steadily declining costs, we are confident that sustained annual funding for the program is achievable and necessary. F–35 prices, including engine and profit, have steadily declined 

lot after lot, reaching 3–4 percent reductions per year for the last two years. Increased procurement rates are key factor in year-over-year cost reduction and any 

future procurement reductions could drive up per-unit cost. Price reductions are expected to continue, leveraging on-going initiatives, such as the Blueprint for Affordability, engine War on Cost, and Cost War Room. By 2019, the price of an F–35A 

model is expected to be between 80 and 85 million dollars, with commensurate cost 

reductions for F–35B and F–35C. The Department continues to study the correct 

force mix and successfully engage in initiatives to drive down costs. To maintain our 

air superiority advantage, it is a national imperative to recapitalize our aging legacy 

fighter fleet, and there is no alternative to the F–35 with its unique 5th generation 

survivability and lethality to maintain that advantage against emerging threats. 

Mr. TURNER. In Mr. Sullivan’s testimony he notes strong concerns about the reliability and potential implications related to the F–135 engine. a. Has the program 

identified the root cause of the engine fire that occurred in June 2014, and has a 

long-term solution been identified to fix the problem? If so please describe the root 

cause and discuss the cost, schedule, and performance implications related to the 

identified solution(s)? b. Has the Department called upon outside experts to validate 

the root cause and/or proposed solution? When do you expect to have verified 

through flight testing that the problem has been fully resolved? c. Engine reliability 

has been a concern for some time, what steps are you taking to improve the overall 

reliability of the engine? What are the cost implications and will those costs be 

borne by the government or the contractor? 

General BOGDAN. A. Yes. The root cause of the incident was unpredicted, excessive heat generated by two parts of the fan rubbing which caused part of the fan 

rotor to break. The debris from the rotor exiting the engine fan case resulted in significant damage to the engine and aircraft. Pratt & Whitney has developed an interim fix that opens the clearance between those parts which results in negligible 

performance loss. Engines on flight test assets have received the retrofit. The longterm solution is pending material testing soon to begin with a projected down-select 

of a fix in 2nd Quarter, CY 2015. To date, $5.6M has been allocated from System 

Development and Demonstration (SDD) management reserve to cover non-recurring 

engineering costs. The program’s development cost and schedule baseline contained 

margin to address these types of technical discovery and the completion of SDD is 

still expected in Oct 2017. 

B. The Department has not called on outside experts. The root cause and proposed 

solution were vetted through independent propulsion experts from the Air Force, 
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Department of the Navy and Pratt & Whitney. The interim fix remains a candidate 

as do two alternate rub systems. The interim fix has been validated through flight 

test and will be delivered in new production engines starting this month. New production parts are expected to be available for new production engines after flight 

test by mid-2016 if the interim fix is not chosen. While the interim fix has not demonstrated any measurable deficiencies, there is a concern that a minor loss in fuel 

efficiency or durability may manifest later in an engine’s useful life which is why 

we continue to entertain an alternative design as a final fix. 

C. With the exception of the before mentioned failure at Eglin AFB, the F135 engine has performed well. The high maintenance drivers on both F–35A/C and F– 

35B models have been identified, solutions to most have been developed and validated in SDD, and will be incorporated into production. The data indicates that the 

F–35A/C engines will recover to reliability projection curves with these fixes. The 

SDD program is currently adding reliability improvement tasks that are expected 

to help the F–35B propulsion system as well as adding margin to the F–35A/C system. Reliability-driven design improvements are paid for by the Government 

through the SDD contract at no additional cost (management reserve). The Government extracts financial consideration on fixed price incentive production contracts 

for parts not meeting specification. Unit cost is not projected to be affected due to 

planned reliability improvements. 

Mr. TURNER. Both GAO and DOT&E highlighted that the program made adjustments to its test plans over the past year—including the deferral and/or elimination 

of test points, and the restructuring of an operational evaluation planned for Block 

2B capabilities. a. What events required the program to adjust its test program over 

the past year? What are the implications to completing the test program going forward? Do you still project that the development flight testing will be completed in 

2017 and in time to support IOT&E? b. As mentioned earlier, the program deferred 

an operational evaluation of the Block 2B capabilities, can you explain to the subcommittee the rationale for deferring this test and the implications, if any, to the 

Marine Corps as they plan to declare IOC later this year? 

General BOGDAN. a) The Block 2B Operational Utility Evaluation (OUE) was canceled in favor of focused, limited assessments due to limited test assets. This action 

has afforded the time needed to build a plan for a successful Initial Operational Test 

and Evaluation (IOT&E) for Block 3F. 

The Integrated Test Force (ITF) focused priority effort on Mission System (MS) 

testing throughout 2014 in order to meet timelines. The MS effort focused on completing Block 2B test points by prioritizing test points that fed critical-path analysis 

reports and certification. The result was deferral of a small portion of Block 3F 

Flight Science (FS) testing, which currently being performed. 

The reduction of flight test points originally planned is part of the normal, ongoing process to manage the development program. The test plans are routinely revisited to add, change or delete test points, based on the results of previous tests 

and the needs of the certifying agencies. In this case, test points were reduced last 

year based upon what was required to verify requirements and certify the system 

in accordance with Service technical authorities’ (Naval Air Systems Command and 

Life Cycle Management Center) standards, specifications and best practices. All test 

point reductions were vetted through the independent technical authorities for their 

concurrence prior to making any adjustments. 

Current projections show the completion of Developmental Test (DT) flight test 

in the summer of 2017. The delivery of mature software, on schedule, remains the 

#1 risk in flight test. 

b) The F–35 Program was not going to have ample Operational Test (OT) test jest 

in the 2014–15 timeframe. The decision, in conjunction with Director, Operational 

Test & Evaluation (DOT&E), was to prioritize our DT MS testing. Incorporating OT 

jets and pilots (including USMC aircrew) in DT is mitigating the impact to the Marine Corps, and is not on the critical path to Marine Corps Initial Operational Capability (IOC) declaration. The Block 2B capabilities will continue to be bolstered in 

upcoming software releases. 

Mr. TURNER. In his statement, Mr. Sullivan describes positive trends in aircraft 

manufacturing, but he also identifies challenges, including supplier quality problems 

and late part deliveries, that the program faces as it plans to significantly increase 

production rates over the next five years. a. Do you agree with GAO’s assessment 

of manufacturing progress and challenges? b. What risks or challenges that you 

think are the most critical as production rates increase and what steps to do you 

think are necessary to help mitigate these concerns? 

General BOGDAN. A. JPO agrees with the GAO assessment that production 

progress is trending in the right direction and that challenges with supplier per-
105 

formance exist. The JPO remains committed to taking the necessary steps to closely 

monitor and mitigate impacts to production as rates increase in the coming years. 

B. The three most significant challenges facing production are Supplier Performance, Outer Mold Line/Seam Validation, and Rate Readiness to meet peak production. • Poor supplier performance leads to costly out of station work in assembly operations, schedule delays, and opportunities for poor quality. To alleviate this, 

Contractor teams are working closely with suppliers to reduce lead and span 

times, optimize parts inventory and availability, and reduce repair turnaround 

time and long term resolution to quality issues (root cause and preventative action). 

• Outer Mold Line/Seam Validation is critical to aircraft performance. Low observable capability requires tight tolerances, which pose a challenge to manufacturing. With this in mind, improvements in metrology, design tolerance alleviation, and producibility/process improvements are being implemented to yield 

better performance in meeting manufacturing needs and reduce assembly span 

times. 

• Significant production rate increases are expected through full rate production. 

Ensuring stability throughout fabrication and assembly is critical to meeting 

production ramp rates. Key enablers include: 

• Continuing the pace of reductions in scrap, rework, and repair, which has 

seen a 75 percent improvement since 2011; 

• Incorporating variation management improvements as basic tool sets for quality engineers; and 

• Rigorous and continual use of rate readiness risk management as part of incremental Production Readiness Review assessments 

Mr. TURNER. Ever since the first projection of a trillion-dollar lifecycle cost came 

out, we’ve seen arguments about how much the F–35 would actually cost to operate. 

We now have real-world experience with more than 100 aircraft. Understanding 

that we are still not in regular operations, what are you seeing as the actual cost 

per flight hour for each of the variants? 

General BOGDAN. The actual Cost per Flight Hour (CPFH) to date for each variant has been below the projected amount for that timeframe (FY13–14). The current 

CPFH projections for the steady state period (2035 to 2046) are $34.20K (BY12$) 

for the USAF F–35A, $38.14K (BY12$) for the USMC F–35B/C, and $36.76K 

(BY12$) for the USN F–35C. We expect further reductions in CPFH as we introduce 

more aircraft to the fleet and continue to realize reliability maturation and rate 

price improvements. We are on track to be below the steady state CPFH denoted 

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(OSD/AT&L) Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) targets of $35.2K (BY12$) 

for the USAF F–35A, $38.4K (BY12$) for the USMC F–35B/C, and $36.3K (BY12$) 

for the USN F–35C. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Section 701 of the Agile Acquisition to Retain Technological 

Edge Act (H.R. 1597) proposes that your office consider increases in cost and schedule delays related to your office’s activities. A joint study conducted last year by the 

Under Secretary of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and DOT&E found that 

testing was the least common reason for delay and that ‘‘all programs that had 

problems in test conduct also had at least one other reason that contributed to 

delay.’’ As with cost, the vast majority of schedule delays were caused by fixing 

problems that must be addressed before the program could move forward. How do 

you think this proposal might positively or negatively impact your office’s activities? 

Dr. GILMORE. Although DOT&E does indeed take cost and schedule considerations 

into account when determining what testing is needed and feasible, this proposed 

provision will have effects that undermine realistic operational testing of weapon 

systems. The House report on this proposed provision states: ‘‘The committee remains concerned that some of the unforeseen increases in cost and schedule in 

major defense acquisition programs are a result of requirements changes or other 

matters that arise during operational test and evaluation (OT&E).’’ As noted in the 

question, there is no evidence that operational testing has had this effect; therefore, 

the proposed provision is based on a false premise that belies arguments made by 

some that the proposal is benign in its intent. The proposal’s actual effects will also 

not be benign because of the perverse incentives program managers face within the 

Department’s current acquisition system. As noted by GAO, ‘‘Postponing difficult 

tests or limiting open communication about test results can help a program avoid 
106 

unwanted scrutiny because tests against criteria can reveal shortfalls, which may 

call into questions whether a program should proceed as planned.’’ (GAO, Best Practices: A more Constructive Test Approach is Key to Better Weapons System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD–00–199.) Thus, the proposed provision will strengthen and 

magnify program managers’ incentives, irrespective of the merits of DOT&E’s arguments, to plan and program for little, if any, realistic operational testing, and then 

to claim inflated costs and dire consequences if the testing that DOT&E argues is 

needed to evaluate performance is conducted. The need to counter this longstanding 

perverse incentive is a key reason Congress established DOT&E in the mid-1980s. 

Congress established the office and mandated its focus on assuring testing under 

realistic combat conditions, with independent reporting to the Secretary and the 

Congress, because of well-documented concerns with unexpected, poor performance 

of expensive weapon systems. The poor performance was unexpected because testing 

was not conducted under realistic combat conditions, and inaccurate reports of the 

results of the inadequate testing that was done were provided to the Congress and 

the Defense Department’s senior leadership. Unfortunately, these concerns remain 

just as valid today as they were during the mid-1980s because the incentives for 

unrealistic testing and inaccurate reporting remain strong. 

In a recent appearance at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Senator John McCain stated ‘‘Many of our military’s challenges today are the result of 

years of mistakes and wasted resources. According to one recent study, the Defense 

Department spent $46 billion between 2001 and 2011 on at least a dozen programs 

that never became operational.’’ A number of these failed programs, including Comanche, Crusader, Future Combat Systems, Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, and 

the Presidential Helicopter never entered operational testing, notwithstanding the 

expenditure of billions of dollars on their development. Other programs, including 

the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team 

Combat Systems, did undergo operational tests, with very negative results. Clearly, 

delays and cost increases caused by operational testing played no role at all in the 

noteworthy failures these programs suffered. Rather, poorly defined and 

unachievable requirements, inaccurate, if not misleading assessments of technology 

readiness and technical feasibility, as well as poor and misleading estimates of program costs and schedules were all causal. These problems, and the perverse incentives that create them, should be the focus of a serious acquisition reform effort. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. To the extent possible, please detail the timeline for achieving 

a deployable and fully operational ALIS system and what the associated testing and 

performance benchmarks are along that timeline. Additionally, please detail what 

constitutes ‘‘acceptable’’ performance in terms of the system identifying falsepositives. That is, what is the acceptable rate for the system returning falsepositives? Ex. Is 0% a realistic expectation? Lastly, please detail what the associated 

maintenance costs have been, to date, due to the false positives and how much of 

that cost will be decreasing as well what the costs have been in terms of increased 

manpower hours for both uniformed personnel as well as contractor support. Going 

forward, what do you expect those cost to be in terms of increased manpower hours 

for both uniformed personnel as well as contractor support on the ALIS system? 

General BOGDAN. A deployable version of ALIS (Standard Operating Unit Version 

2–SOUv2) is part of ALIS version 2.0.1 being fielded this summer to support to the 

U.S. Marine Corps Initial Operational Capability (IOC). A SOUv2 deployable system 

was fielded to Flight Test (FT) on May 3, 2015, to undergo a series of tests, including a formal Logistics Test and Evaluation process that will test all aspects of the 

Sortie Generation Process. ALIS version 2.0.2 is currently in work to support the 

U.S. Air Force IOC in Aug 2016. ALIS version 3.0 releases are planned to complete 

the ALIS capabilities required within the development program by October 2017. 

Each release will have an increasingly comprehensive testing regimen throughout 

the development process, including configuration item testing, integration testing, 

functional testing, information assurance testing, and deployment to flight test. 

User-defined performance standards and system level performance benchmarks are 

evaluated during integration and functional testing in the lab, as well as during 

flight test. 

The F–35 performance requirement for false-positives (false alarms) is 50 flight 

hours between false alarms. In comparison to other platforms, this performance is 

2 to 25 times more stringent, e.g., 1.8 hours for P–8 Poseidon and 23 hours for F– 

18 E/F Super Hornet. A zero-percent false-positive is not a realistic expectation. 

However, the ultimate goal from the improvements in off-board prognostics health 

monitoring and ALIS software is to achieve negligible false positives by the end of 

3rd Quarter 2017. 

An initial study on the impact of the current, ‘‘less than required’’ false-positive 

ratio was performed in January 2015 and showed a minimal increase in overall 
107 

manpower needed to maintain war-time sortie generation rate and availability. Specifically, the findings were that for a squadron of 10 aircraft requiring 77 maintainers, one additional maintainer would be needed due to the current false-positive 

ratio. A follow-on study is being performed to refine the impact analysis accounting 

for other maintainability factors (e.g., average repair time), and will include associated costs. Results are expected in summer 2015. 

The JPO stands ready to brief the committee members or their staffs on the full 

ALIS development and fielding plan. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VEASEY 

Mr. VEASEY. The area of sustainment for the F–35 program is critical as it moves 

forward both with the services and the partner nations. Last December, the F–35 

Joint Program Office assigned F–35 Regional Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and 

Upgrade (MRO&U) capability for airframes and engines for the European Region. 

Italy will provide the F–35 initial airframe MRO&U capability, and Turkey will provided the initial engine heavy maintenance capability. I understand the JPO is now 

preparing to launch requests for information for the European component MRO&U 

Hub. 

Q1. Can you please elaborate on the component repair strategy, including a 

timeline for additional decisions? 

Q2. Is the JPO employing a comprehensive sustainment approach where the approximate 750 components are supported at a single F35 partner nation MRO&U 

facility? 

Q3. The UK will purchase the largest number of F–35s in Europe, and the U.S. 

Air Force has announced it will base two operational squadrons of F–35 at the Royal 

Air Force Lakenheath facility. 

Q4. What plan does the JPO have to utilize this significant footprint in the UK 

when it considers MRO&U sites? 

Q5. Do you intend to put component facilities in the UK to support this already 

significant F–35 investment? 

General BOGDAN. The JPO’s component repair strategy is to establish repair capabilities for all repairable components which have been identified as Core, consistent 

with Title 10 U.S. Code Section 2464, in the U.S. Military Service Depots (MSDs). 

As the international participants and U.S. Service fleets expand overseas, the need 

for repair capabilities outside the U.S. also increases. The JPO is currently analyzing current and expected capacity in the MSDs (much of the repair capabilities 

will be stood up in the CONUS MSDs over the next 5–7 years) as well as the expected component repair demands. This analysis will result in recommendations of 

components that could have repair capabilities OCONUS to support international 

participant demand and compete for above/non-core workload. 

Of the approximately 750 components, the JPO is currently analyzing the top ∼35 

that show the highest repair demands based on forecast modeling and fleet data. 

When this analysis is concluded, the JPO will brief a draft plan for the assignment 

process of the ∼35 components to senior DOD leadership not later than late May 

2015. The JPO plans to release the initial Requests for Information (RFIs) in December 2015 to assess Partners’ interest in component repair assignments. Over the 

next two years, the JPO will continue to assess repairable components to determine 

feasibility for overseas repair assignments. 

No single partner would be responsible for repairing all 750 components, and 

many components will never have the repair demands to necessitate standing up 

repair capabilities other than that in the CONUS MSDs. The JPO envisions a single 

repair source per region per component, with no duplication of repair capabilities 

within Europe. 

The JPO anticipates the UK will respond to the component RFIs. Those responses 

will be considered, along with any other nations’ responses, to determine the best 

value repair location. All recommendations for assignment will be based on the ‘‘best 

value’’ assessment which includes: past performance, technical capability, capacity, 

and cost. The final determinations will be made by senior DOD leadership and will 

invariably be shaped by strategic and political considerations. 

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