alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### McGINNIS’ LESSEE, v. WILLEY.

Tax title — taking judgment — 'Variance—figures and other characters in use in describing Jand.

The takingjudgment for a less tax than was claimed in the advertisement, will not vitiate the tax title, the *judgment*of the court for the tax, will cure common discrepancies while unreversed.

The use of figures, and a brief mode of describing the land in the advertisement, will not affect the title, nor will the use of other signs to describe the land in the deed, than were used in the advertisement. The real question is, was the same land sold and conveyed that was advertised and taxed; not whether the same characters or words are used to describe it.

Ejectment. The defendant claimed under a tax title, and it was agreed, that the plaintiff had a right to recover unless that title was made out. The tax title was derived under the act of the 30th! January, 1822, 20 O. *L.*27, which provided for giving notice of delinquent taxes, and taking a judgment in court for the tax. The following objections were made to the defendant’s title:

1. That the notice of intention to apply for judgment does not expressly show that the lands were in Muskingum county.

2. The notice of sale and judgment did not so describe it.

3. The notice of judgment was for $56 13 and 9 mills; while the judgment and sale were for $52 and 1 mill.

4. That in the advertisements the *land*is described in *the number*of the tract by figures, and the *range fyc.*by *letters,*while in the deed this is *written out in full.*

Adams, for the plaintiff.

*Stillwell,*contra.

Hitchcock, J.

We think the advertisements do sufficiently describe the land, and show it as lying in the county. No one reading it could be misled by it, and we see no material difference between the two advertisements. The taking the judgment for less than was claimed in the application vitiates nothing. If there were even *153a greater discrepancy than is pointed out, the *judgment of the court*upon it, would take away all objection' on that account, while unreversed. That the brief description of the land in the advertisements and duplicates, gave place to a more explicit and full description in' the deed has no better foundation. The real question is, was the same land sold and conveyed, that was charged and advertised, and not whether the same letters or characters were used to describe it.

Judgment for the defendant.
Exhibit 32.1






CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


SECTION
1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Theragenics Corporation, (the “Company”)
on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 28, 2008 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, M.
Christine Jacobs, President and Chief Executive Officer, certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company
      as of the dates and for the periods referred to in the
    Report.






Date: November
      6, 2008
            By:
            /s/ M.
      Christine JacobsM.
      Christine JacobsChief
      Executive Officer








A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Theragenics Corporation and will be retained by Theragenics Corporation and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
Exhibit 99.25





CONSENT OF QUALIFIED PERSON








Golden Star Resources Ltd.


United States Securities and Exchange Commission





Re: Golden Star Resources Ltd.





Ladies and Gentlemen:





I hereby consent to (i) being named and identified as a “qualified person” in connection with the following documents, which are either referenced in or filed as exhibits with the Annual Report on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2016 (the “Form 40-F”) of Golden Star Resources Ltd. (the “Company”) to which this consent relates: (A) the Company’s Annual Information Form for the year ended December 31, 2016, (B) the Company’s Management’s Discussion and Analysis for the year ended December 31, 2016, (C) the technical report entitled “NI 43-101 Technical Report on Resources and Reserves Golden Star Resources Ltd., Bogoso Prestea Gold Mine, Ghana" effective date December 31, 2013 and filed on March 14, 2014, (ii) the inclusion or incorporation by reference of information derived from such documents in the Registration Statements on Forms S-8 (Nos. 333-211926, 333-175542, 333-169047, 333-118958, 333-105821 and 333-105820), as amended, and Registration Statement No. 333-196906 on Form F-10, as amended, or any related abbreviated registration statement filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Rule 462(b) under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or in any amendment to any of the foregoing, or to any prospectuses or amendments or supplements thereto and (iii) all other references to the undersigned included or incorporated by reference in the above-referenced Registration Statements and in any prospectuses or amendments or supplements thereto.








/s/ John Arthur


Dr. John Arthur





March 30, 2017
#### Chapman *v.*Ray *et al.*

No. 8835.

August 13, 1932.

I-Iill, J.

Under the pleadings and the evidence in this case, the court did not err in refusing an interlocutory injunction.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*426
      *Hawes Cloud,*for plaintiff.

*J. A. Mitchell*and *P. H. Mitchell,*for defendants.
#### CUMMINS v. NUTT.

Partition by parol — acquiescence—releases decreed.

Where tenants in common make parol partition of land, fence and possess accordingly for nine years, without objection, one party improving, it is too late to object mere inequality in the partition, and reLeases will be decreed.

Where a defendant in chancery sets forth new matter in his answer, he must prove it to «lake it available to him.

Chancert. The case appears in the opinion of the Court.

*D.*Todd, for the complainant.

*Crowell*and *Pease,*for the defendant.

Wright, J.

The case made in the bill is in substance this: that the complainant was tenant in common with the defendant in one hundred and thirty-rsix acres of land, on which were a house, barn, and orchard. In 1825, the parties made a verbal partition of the land by running a line north and south, giving to the defendant about forty acres, including the improvements, and to the com* plainant, the remaining ninety-six acres unimproved. The parties *714took possession of their respective portions, agreed to execute deeds of release, made a partition fence on the line, and have ever since held accordingly. The forty acres being yet without additional improvement, though the complainant has greatly improved the ninety-six acres. The complaint is, that1 the defendant now refuses a release, and claims the partition was not permanent; the prayer is for a release and for general relief.

The defendant admits the tenancy in common, that a partition was made, a fence erected, possession taken accordingly and since held, and that the complainant has improved his part. He *denies*agreeing to release, or *refusing*one, and avers the *partition*was only of the improved land, and that the possession followed the •partition; that the unimproved land was left for further partition: he claims that the division was an unequal one.

The main points in controversy, are admitted by the parties— the tenancy, the partition, the erection of a division fence, and the possession and enjoyment by the parties under the partition for about nine years. It is also conceded that the complainant has cleared and otherwise improved his part, without objection. The limitation which the defendant sets up to the partition being new matter, he is hound to prove. The weight of the proof is with the complainant, that the improvements were made without objection under a partition of the whole land. This is irreconcilable with the claim of the defendant, as is the fact, that a very few acres of the improved land fell to the complainant in the partition. We think also the partition was unequal, in favor of the complainant; but not so grossly so, as without proof of fraud, after an acquiescence of nine years, to call upon the court to set it aside and make a new one. The land must he run out, and releases decreed, according to the original partition.
Exhibit 10.55


                                 PROMISSORY NOTE


$500,000.00                                               Atlanta, Georgia
                                                          Dated:  May 2, 2004


FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. (RMST), promises to
pay to the order Joseph Marsh and William Marino, jointly and severally, the sum
of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($500,000.00) U.S. DOLLARS plus interest to be
calculated at the Prime Interest Rate plus six percent (6%) per annum. Interest
payments are subject to and will correspond with the Prime Interest Rate as
published in the Wall Street Journal. Payments in the sum of twenty-five
thousand dollars (U.S.$25,000) plus interest will commence on July 26, 2004, and
will be made quarterly thereafter until such time as this Note is paid in full.
This Note shall be paid in full no later than five (5) years from the date
hereof.

         For further consideration and value received, the undersigned agrees to
issue 30,000 (thirty thousand) shares of RMST common stock securities, which
shall be legend, to Joseph Marsh and William Marino, to be held jointly and
severally, such shares to be issued on or before July 26, 2004.

         This Note may be prepaid, at any time, in whole or in part, without
penalty. All prepayments shall be applied in reverse order of maturity.

         The obligations set forth in this Note are unsecured.

         The undersigned and all other parties to this Note, agree to remain
fully bound hereunder until this Note shall be fully paid and waives demand,
presentment, protest and all notices of every kind, and further agree to remain
bound, notwithstanding any extension, renewal, modification, waiver, or other
indulgence by any holder or upon the discharge or release of any obligor
hereunder or to this Note, or upon the exchange, substitution, or release of any
collateral granted as security for this Note. No modification or indulgence by
any holder hereof shall be binding unless in writing; and any indulgence on any
one occasion shall not be an indulgence for any other or future occasion. Any
modification or change of terms, hereunder granted by any holder hereof, shall
be valid and binding upon the undersigned, notwithstanding the acknowledgment of
the undersigned, and the undersigned does hereby irrevocably grants a power of
attorney to enter into any such modification on its behalf. The rights of any
holder hereof shall be cumulative and not necessarily successive. This Note
shall take effect as a sealed instrument and shall be construed, governed and
enforced in accordance with the laws of the state of Georgia. The undersigned
hereby executes this Note as principal and not as surety.


                                               R.M.S. TITANIC, INC.


                                               By: ________________________

                                               Its:  ________________________
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2


                                 CERTIFICATION

           PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                                (18 U.S.C. 1350)

         Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of (18 U.S.C. 1350),
the undersigned officer of Modern Medical Modalities Corporation, a New Jersey
corporation (the "Company"), does hereby certify, to the best of such officer's
knowledge and belief, that:

         (1) The Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31,
2005 (the "Form 10-KSB") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Form 10-KSB fairly presents, in
all materials respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Date:  March 30, 2006           /s/ Minesh Patel
                              -------------------------------------------------
                              Minesh Patel, Chief Financial Officer and Chief
                              Operating Officer

         This certification shall not be deemed "filed" for purposes of Section
18 of the Securities Exchange Act, or otherwise subject to the liability of that
section. Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference
into any filing under the Securities Act or the Securities Exchange Act.
#### Walton R. Mize, Appellant, v. Lula Mize, *Appellee.*

Opinion Filed February 24, 1923.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for' Hillsborough County; F; M. Robles, Judge.

*Macfarlane*& *Macfarlane,*for Appellant;

*J. A. Rowe*and *G. E. Lemire,*for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

A bill and supplemental bill of complaint 'brought by the husband to obtain a divorce and to be awarded the custody of an adopted minor child, was dismissed on final hearing, and the complainant appealed.

As the testimony taken before a special master is clearly ample to sustain a decree .of divorce upon a statutory ground sufficiently alleged, the decree is reversed and the cause will be remanded for the entry of a decree of divorce as prayed.

Reversed.

Taylor, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Browne and West, J. J., concur.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT LAR R Y HISTON, Plaintiff - Appe lla nt, v. JAM ES TILTON; e t

a l., De fe nda

nts - Appe lle e s. No. 12-15598 D.C . No. 3:09-c v-00979-JSW M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Northe rn Distric t of C a lifornia Je ffre y S. White , Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d Fe brua

ry 11, 2013 * * B e fore : FER

NANDEZ, TASHIM A, a nd WA RDLAW , C irc uit Judge s. C a lifornia sta te prisone r Larry

Histon a ppe a ls pro sefrom

the distric t c ourt’ s sum m ary judgm e nt in his 42 U.S.C . § 1983 a c tion a l le ging de libe rate indiffe re nc e to his se rious m e dic a l ne e ds. W e hav e jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291. W e 

# FIL ED FEB 14 2013 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).re vie w de novo. Toguc hi v . C hung , 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th C ir. 2004). W e a ffirm . The distric t c ourt prope rly grante d sum

m a ry judgm e nt be c a

use Histon fa ile d to ra ise a ge nuine disputeof m ate ria l fa c t a s to whe the r de fe nda

nts we re de libe rat e ly

indiffe re nt in the i r tre atm e nt of his c a rpa l tunne l sy

ndrom e . Se eid. at 1057-58 (ne ithe r ne glige nc e nor diffe re nc e of opinion c onc e rning thec ourse of tre atm e nt a

m ounts to de libe rate indiffe re nc e ); se e also Snow v . Mc D anie l , 681 F.3d 978, 988 (9th C ir. 2012) (prisoner m ust show tha

t de fe nda nt c hose a m e dic a lly una c c e p ta ble c ourse of tre atm e nt “ in c onsc ious disre ga rd of a n e xc e ssive risk to pla i ntiff’ s he a lth” (c ita

tion a nd inte rna l quota

tion m arks om i tte d)). The distric t c ourt did not a buse its disc re tion in deny ing Histon’ s m otion for le ave to a m e nd his c om

pla int a nd to pe rfe c t se rvic e to unse rve d de fe nda nts be c a u se the m otion wa s m oot upon the c ourt’ s gra

nt of sum m ary judgm e nt. S

e eC hodos v . W e s t Publ’g C

o. , 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th C ir. 2002) (se tting forth sta nda rd of re vie w). The distric t c ourt did not a buse its disc re tion in deny ing Histon’ s m otion for a ppointm e nt of c ounse l be c a use Histon did not de

m onstra te e xc e ptiona l c irc um s ta nc e s . Se eTe rre ll v . Bre w e r , 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th C ir. 1991) (se tting forth sta nda rd of re vie w a

nd e xpla i ning “ e xc e ptiona l c irc um sta nc e s” re quire m e nt).

1 2 - 1 5 5 9 8 2W e de c line to c onside r those doc um e nts submi tte d by Histon tha

t we re not pre s e nte d to the distric t c ourt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 10(a); Unite d State s v . Sanc he

zLope z , 879 F.2d 541, 548 (9th C ir. 1989). AFFIRM E D.

1 2 - 1 5 5 9 8 3
EXHIBIT 31.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO
EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a)
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, A. Jayson Adair, certify that:

|1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Copart, Inc.; and                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
|   | Date: October 2, 2013                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
|   | /s/ A. Jayson Adair                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
|   | A. Jayson Adair                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
|   | Chief Executive Officer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           



---
#### § 1204.1513 Waivers of provisions of these regulations.

In an emergency, the Administrator may waive any provision of these regulations.
#### Capps *v.*Smith *et al.*

Bell, J.

1. In an action of ejectment the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of the defendant’s title. Civil Code (1910), § 5582.

2. Where the plaintiff’s title to the land is controverted, he must show not only that he had the legal title to the property in dispute at the commencement of the action, but that such legal title was accompanied by the right of possession. *Scisson*v. *McLaws,*12 *Ga.*166; *Graham*v. *Peacook,*131 *Ga.*785 (2) (63 S. E. 348); *Taylor*v. *Meeks,*133 *Ga.*385, 386 (65 S. E. 850).

3. A deed absolute in form may be shown to have been made to secure a debt where the maker remains in possession of the land conveyed. *Mercer*v. *Morgan,*136 *Ga.*632 (71 S. E. 1075); *Hand,*v. *Matthews;*153 *Ga.*75 (111 S. E. 408); *Dykes*v. *Porter,*31 *Ga. App.*86 (119 S. E. 455).

4. While the holder of a security deed to land may sue in ejectment to recover possession of the property, where the debt is not paid at maturity (Ray *v*. *Pitman,*119 *Ga.*678, 681, 46 S. E. 849; *Hill*v. *Winn,*60 *Ga.*337), he can not recover solely upon such a deed where the debt has been paid in full. *Gunter*v. *Smith,*113 *Ga.*18 (3) (38 S. E. 374); *Spencer*v. *Schuman,*132 *Ga.*515 (2) (64 S. E. 466); *Marshall*v. *Pierce,*136 *Ga.*543 (71 S. E. 893).

5. The proposition stated in the preceding paragraph will hold true regardless of whether payment of the debt without 'the cancellation of the security deed or a reconveyance of the property will operate to divest the *796legal title and cause it to revert to the debtor. Even if the legal title may in such a case be considered as remaining in the holder of the security deed, it is not a title accompanied by the right of possession, and for this reason will not authorize a recovery in ejectment. Cf. *Groves*v. *Williams*69 *Ga.*614; *Gilliard,*v. *Johnston,*161 *Ga.*17 (2) (129 S. E. 434); *Shumate*v. *McLendon,*120 *Ga.*396 (6), 400 (48 S. E. 10); *Grady*v. *Harris,*41 *Ga. App.*111 (151 S. E. 829).

No. 8893.

October 13, 1932.

*John H. Davis & Son, Wheeler & Kenyon,*and *Bond & McClure,*for plaintiff.

6. The evidence authorized the inference that the deed under which the plaintiff claimed was a mere deed to secure debt, and that the debt had been fully paid before the action was brought. The evidence also warranted a finding against the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant had occupied the premises under the plaintiff as landlord and thus could not dispute the plaintiff’s title without surrendering possession. The evidence was in conflict as to whether any sort of rental agreement had ever existed between the parties, thus presenting an issue of fact as to this question.

7. Under the rulings made above, the verdict in favor of the defendant was fully authorized under certain phases of the evidence, regardless of all other contentions made. It follows that the trial judge did not err in overruling the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based upon the general grounds only.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur, except Atlcinson, J., absent.*