* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior Circuit Judge, Un ited States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designat ion.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 8/30/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BIG HORN COAL COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondents.

MANSEL JOHNSTON,

Real Party in Interest. No. 95-9522 (OWCP No. 712-12-6193) (Petition for Review)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO, BRIGHT, ** and KELLY, Circuit Judges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this petition for review. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Petitioner Big Horn Coal Company petitions for revi ew of a Benefits Review Board (Board) order affirming the order of an administrative law judge (ALJ) awarding benefits under the Black Lung Benefi ts Act to claimant Mansel Johnston. Petitioner contends that, in awarding be nefits, the ALJ improperly credited the medical opinions of claimant’s treatin g physician. We review the Board’s decision “for errors of law and for adherence to the substantial evidence standard governing the Board’s review of the [ALJ’s] factual determinations.” Maddaleni v. Director, OWCP , 961 F.2d 1524, 1525 (10th Cir. 1992)(further quotation omitted). “Substantial evi dence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequ ate to support a conclusion.’” Hansen v. Director, OWCP , 984 F.2d 364, 368 (10th Cir. 1993)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). In conducting our review, we cannot reweigh the eviden ce, but may only inquire whether evidence exists to support the ALJ’s findin gs of fact. Id. To be entitled to benefits, claimant must prove that he is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis resulting from his coal mine employment. See Davis v.1 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(4) provides the following:

A determination of the existence of pneumoconiosis may also be made if a physician, exercising sound medical judgm ent, notwithstanding a negative X-ray, finds that the mi ner suffers . . . from pneumoconiosis . . . . Any such finding shall be based on objective medical evidence such as blood-gas studie s, electrocardiograms, pulmonary function studies, phy sical performance tests, physical examination, and medica l and work histories. Such a finding shall be supported by a reasoned medical opinion. Similarly, 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)(4) provides that [w]here total disability cannot be established by [ qualifying test results or certain other evidence] . . . , [it] may nevertheless be found if a physician exercising reasoned medical judgment , based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagno stic techniques, concludes that a miner’s respiratory or pulmonary c ondition prevents . . . the miner from engaging in employment as desc ribed in . . . [other regulations].

-3- Director, OWCP , 936 F.2d 1111, 1112 (10th Cir. 1991). Here, the ALJ found that both pneumoconiosis and total disability were estab lished under regulations that allow proof of both by way of medical opinions. Se e 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.202(a)(4) and 718.204(c)(4). 1 In so doing, the ALJ credited the opinion of clai mant’s treating physician, Dr. Batty, on both issues. It is petitioner’s contention on appeal that Dr. Batty’s opinions do not constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings because they are not reasoned me dical opinions as required by the regulations.-4-

Petitioner’s entire brief is devoted to challenging Dr. Batty’s opinion as to the existence of pneumoconiosis, yet we are not per suaded by petitioner’s arguments. In his testimony, Dr. Batty explained t he basis for his diagnosis and opinion. See Hr’g Tr. at 32-33 (blood-gas studies showing insuf ficient oxygenation), 34-35 (findings upon physical examination of claimant), 43 (pulmonary function tests that indicate mild obstru ctive lung disease). Petitioner’s contentions to the contrary notwithstanding, we do not think it can be fairly said that Dr. Batty simply disregarded the n egative x-rays and nonqualifying test results in the record. See, e.g. , id. at 61-62. We believe that a complete reading of Dr. Batty’s testimony reveals t hat he considered them in light of his clinical evaluation of claimant and his clin ical experience, and either found them consistent with his opinions, id. at 32-33, 43, 48-49, 50, 63, 64, or not in and of themselves conclusive, id. at 33-34, 41, 42, 43, 51-52. The doctor who testified for petitioner obviously disagreed with D r. Batty on the extent to which the non-qualifying test results, although not determinative, supported Dr. Batty’s conclusion, but “the task of weighing conflicting m edical evidence is within the sole province of the ALJ.” Hansen , 984 F.2d at 368. Petitioner also argues that both the ALJ and the Bo ard improperly relied on the fact that Dr. Batty was claimant’s treating phy sician in crediting his opinion. This, according to petitioner, is something akin to application of the “true doubt-5-

rule,” which was invalidated in Director, OWCP v. G reenwich Collieries , 114 S. Ct. 2251, 2259 (1994). We disagree. This is no t a case where the ALJ found equally probative but conflicting medical evidence and used the treating physician rule (as the “true doubt rule” was improperly used in Greenwich ) to break the tie. Cf. id. at 2253. Nor is it a case where the ALJ mechanica lly accepted a treating physician’s opinion in the absence of supporting me dical evidence in the record. On the contrary, the ALJ specifically cited the fac t that Dr. Batty had performed the most recent, and thus most relevant, examinatio n and evaluation of claimant, and found that Dr. Batty’s opinions were supportedby that evaluation. See ALJ’s February 5, 1993 Decision and Order on Remandat 3-4. As discussed above, we find substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s reliance on the treating physician’s opinion in this case with regard to his finding of pneumoconiosis. The decision and order of the Board is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge