F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

D A V I D M. E V

A N S , an individual; R O N P I C K

E N S , an individual, DB A P& D Construction, an I daho sole proprietorship; S A G E B U I L D E R S , L P, an I daho limited liability

partnership, Plaintiffs-Appellants
,

v

.

S H O S H O N E -B A

N N O C K L A

N D U S E P O L I C Y C O M M I S S I O N ; N A T H A N S M A L L , as Chairman of the F ort Hall B usiness Council; G L E N N F I S H E R ; L E E J U A N T Y L E R ; D E V O N B O Y E R ; T I N O B A T T ; B L

A I N E J

. E D M O ; D A R R E L L D I X E Y , as members of the F ort Hall B usiness Council; T O N Y G A L L O W

A Y , S R ., as Chairman of the Shoshone-B annock L and Use Policy Commission; C A S P E R A P P E N A Y ; J O H N F R E D , as members of the Shoshone-B annock L and Use Policy Commission; A R

N O L D A P P E

N E Y , as the Ex ecutive Director of the Shoshone-B annock L and Use Department; G E O R

G E G U A R D I P E E , as an enforcement official of the Shoshone-B annock L and Use Policy Commission; U N K

N O W N S H O S H O N E

N o. 13-35003

D.C. No. 4:12-cv-00417- B L W

OPI NI ONE V A N S V

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B A N N O C K T R

I B A L C O U R

T J U D G E S , as Tribal J udicial Officers,

Defendants-Appellees

.

A ppeal from the United States District Court

f or the District of I daho B . L y nn W inmill, Chief District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted November 5, 2013—Portland, Oreg on

F iled December 5, 2013

B efore: Milan D. Smith, J r. and Andrew D. Hurwitz
, Circuit J udg es, and J ames C. Mahan, District J u dg e. *

O pinion by

J udg e Milan D. Smith, J r.

* T h e H o n orab l e J am es C. Mah an , District J u d g e f o r th e U .S. District Co u rt f o r th e District o f

Nev ad a, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.E V A N S V

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SUMMARY * *

Indian Law

R e v ersing the district court’s denial of a motion f o r preliminary injunction and dismissal of an action seek i n g to enjoin tribal c o u r t proceeding s, the panel held that the Shoshone-B a

nnock Tribes lacked the power to reg ulate the land use o f the plaintiff, a nonmember who owned land in f ee simple within the F ort Hall Reservation.

The pan e l h e ld that the p laintiff w as not required to

ex h aust tribal remedies before brin gi n g suit in federal court because the tribal court plainly lacked jurisdiction. The panel held that because the plaintiff was a n owner of non-I ndian f

ee land
, the Tribes’ efforts to reg ulate h im were p resumptively invalid under Montana v. United States
, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), and an ex c eption for the reg ulation of n onmem b er activity that directly affects a tribe’s political integ rity
, economic security
, health, or w elfare did not apply

. The panel reversed the judg ment o f the district court and r e m a n d ed the case for further proceeding s.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.E V A N S V

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COUNSEL

Aaron N. Thompson (arg ued), May
, Rammell & Thompson, CHTD, Pocatello, I daho, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Mark A. E cho Hawk (arg ued), Echo Hawk L a

w, P o catello, I daho, for Defendants-Appellees.

OP INION

M. SMI TH, Circuit J udg e :

I n this appeal, we consider whether the ShoshoneB a n n o ck Tribes plausibly have the authority to reg u late the land use of David Evans, a nonmemb er of the Tribes, w ho

owns l a n d in fee simple within the F ort Hall Reservation. 1 Acknowledg ing the g eneral r ule that tribes may not reg ulate nonmember conduct o n such “ n on-I ndian fee land,” the district c ourt n evertheless held that the Tribes had a plausible basis for asserting jurisdiction. The district court there f o r e rejected Evans’ attempt to e njoin tribal c o u r t proceeding s, ruling that Evans must first ex haust tribal remedies. B ecause, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the Tribes plainly l ack the power to reg u late Evans’ conduct, we rever s e t h e judg ment of the di strict court and remand for f urther proceeding s. 2

1 Fo r ease o f ex p o s itio n , w e ref er to P l ain tif

f s- A p p ellan ts co llectiv ely as Ev an s . W e ref

er to Def en d an ts- A

p p ellees co llectiv ely

as th e T rib es.

2 In a m e m o r a n d u m d i sp o sitio n f iled co n t em

p o ran eo u sly w ith th is

o p in io n , w e af

f irm th e d istrict co u rt’ s d en ial o f Ev an s’ m o tio n to strik e th e

m aj o rity o f th e T rib es’ ev id en tiary

su b m i ssio n s.E V A N S V

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F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK G ROUND

Plaintiff-Appellant David E vans inherited land in Pocatello, a city in Po w e r C o unty , I daho. Evans’ land is located w ithin the F ort H all Reservation, the home of the Shoshone-B a

nnock Tribes. A lthoug h his property is within the borders of the reservation, Evans is not a m e m b er of the Tribes, and he owns the land in fee simple. 3

I n 2012, after obtaining a building permit from Power County
, Evans beg an constructing a sing le-famil y r esidence

on his property

. He h ired Plaintiff-Appellant Sag e B uilders
to bu i l d t he house, and Sag e B uilders in turn retained subcontracto rs, including P& D Construction, to provide materials and construction services.

On April 13, 2012, De f endant-Appellee Georg e Guardipee, the Compliance O fficer for the Tribes’ L a nd Use Policy Commission, requested that Evans submit a building permit application to the T r ibes. Guardipee further requested that Evans pay the Tribes’ permit fee s , a n d asked Evans to

ensure that a ll of his contracto r s a n d subcontractors obtain

3 “ T h an k s t o th e In d ian Gen eral A llo tm en t A ct o f 1 8 8 7
, 2 4 Stat. 3 8 8
, as

am en d ed
, 2 5 U.S.C. § 3 3 1 et s eq ., th ere are m i llio n s o f acres o f n on

- In d ian f ee lan d lo cated w ith in th e co n tig u o u s b o rd ers o f In d ian trib e s.” Pla i n s Co mmerce Ba n k v. Lo n g Fa mily La n d & C a ttle
, 55 4 U.S. 3 1 6
, 3 28 (2 0 0 8) (citin g Atkin so n Tra d in g C o

. v. Sh irley
, 5 3 2 U.S. 6 4 5
, 6 4 8, 6 5 0 n .1 (2 0 0 1)). T h e T rib es arg u e th at th is h isto ry is n o t d irectly relev an t, as th e Fo rt Hall R eserv atio n w as allo tted in to f ee s im p le p arcels in 1 8 8 9
, rath er th an u n d er t

h e m o re w id ely ap p licab le 18 8 7 A ct. B u t th ey d o n o t d isp u te th at Ev an s o w

n s h is lan d in f

ee sim p l e. An d th ey cite n o au t h o rity

su g g estin g th at th e sp ecif ic allo tm en t- era statu t e u n der w h ich alien atio n

o f trib al lan d t o n o n m em b ers b ecam e p o ssib le is relev an t t o trib al j u risd ictio n

.E V A N S V

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business licenses and pay fees to the Tribes. Evans declined, and continued building his home without tribal approval.

On May 16, 2 012, Guardipee arrived on Evans’ land a nd demanded that all work o n the property cease. The wo r kers then left Evans’ property

.

The nex t day
, representa t ives from the Tribes posted a Stop W o rk Notice on Evans’ property

. The Tribes also sent Evans a Tribal Notice of Violation/Cease a nd Desist O rder, which instructed Evans to cont act the Tribes immediately

. Evans complied, and called Defen dant-Appellee Tony G a l l o way , Sr., the Chairman of the L and Use Pol i c y Commission. According to E vans, G a l loway warned him that the Commission would fine h i m $500 per day if he ig nored the stop work order.

I n J uly 2012, the Commission served Evans with a

summons and c o m p l aint naming him and his b uilders a s defendants

. The complaint, filed in Shoshone-B annock Tribal Court, accused Evans and the builders of violating the Tribes ’ L and Use Policy Ordinance, the Guidelines imp l ementing the Ordinance, and the Tribes’ B usiness L icense Act.

On Aug ust 10, 2012, Evans
, Sag e B uilders, and Ron Pickens (the owner of P& D Construction) broug ht suit in the United States District Court for the District of I daho, seeking

a declaration that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction and an injunctio n b a rring further tribal court proceeding s ag ainst them. The Tribes moved to dismiss, arg uing that Evans was req u i red to ex haust tribal remedies before bring ing suit in fe deral c ourt. Evans opposed the motion to dismiss a nd moved for a preliminary

injunction.E V A N S V

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On December 20, 2012, the district court g ranted the Tribes’ motion to dismiss and denied E vans’ m o tion f o r a preliminary injunction. The di s t rict court concluded that, be c a use Evans failed to ex haust tribal remedies, his federal suit was premature. I n so h olding
, the district court reasoned that tribal a

uthority to reg ulate Evans’ land use was plausible,

so the tribal co urt did not plainly lack jurisdiction. Evans timely appealed.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C

. § 1291. 4 W e review a district c ourt’s denial of a preliminary injunction for

a b u s e of discretion. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc

. , 508 F .3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007). W e review a district court’s underly ing factual finding s for clear error , a n d we review its leg al conclusions de novo. Id

. “ W hether

ex h austion of tribal court remedies is required is a question o f law reviewed de novo.” Boozer v. W ilder
, 381 F .3d 9 3 1, 934 (9th Cir. 2 004) (citing Boxx v. Long W a r r ior
, 2 65 F .3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2001)).

D ISCUSSION

I. Exhaustion of

Tribal Rem edies

“Non-I ndians may bring a federal common law cau s e o f action u nder 28 U .S.C. § 1331 to challeng e tribal court jurisdiction.” E lliott v. W

h ite Mountain A

pache Tribal Court
, 566 F .3d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2 009) (quoting Boozer
, 381 F .3d

4 T h e d i strict co u

rt’ s d en ial o f Ev an s ’ m otio n f o r a p relim in ary in j u n ctio n m erg ed i n to th e f i n a l j u d g m en t

. S

ee S EC v. Mo u n t Vern o n Mem’l Pa rk , 6 6 4 F.2 d 1 3 5 8 , 1 3 6 1

– 6 2 (9 th Cir. 1 9 8 2 ).E V A N S V

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at 934). B efore bring ing suit in fed e ral court, however, a non-I ndian g enerally must first ex haust trib a l remedies. Elliott
, 566 F .3d at 846; see a l s o Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians
, 471 U .S. 845, 850–53 (1985) (describing ex haustion requirement).

There is no dispute that Evans failed t o ex haust tribal remedies. B ut the ex haustion requirement is not absolute. “Ex haustion is prudential; it is required as a matter of comity
, not as a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Boozer
, 381 F .3d at 935 (citations omit t e d )

. To this end, the Supreme Court has
recog niz ed four ex ceptions to t h e e x haustion requirement: “(1) when an assertion o f tribal court jurisdiction is ‘motivated b y a desire to harass o r is conducted in bad faith’; (2) when the tribal court action is ‘patent l y violative o f

ex p ress jurisdictional prohibitions’; ( 3) w h en ‘ex haustion would b e f

u t i le because of the lack of an adequate opportunit y to challeng e the tribal court’s jurisdiction’; a nd (4) when it is ‘ plain’ that tribal c o u rt jurisdiction is lacking
, so that the ex haustion requirement ‘ w o u l d s erve no purpose other than delay .’” Elliott
, 566 F .3d a t 847 (quoting Nevada

v. H i c ks
, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001) (internal alteration omitted)).

E v an s contends that he is not required to ex haust tribal remed i es because the tribal court plainly lacks jurisdiction. To determine whether tribal court jurisdiction i s plainly lacking
, we analy

z e whether such “jurisdiction is colorable o r plausible

. . . .” Elliott
, 566 F .3d at 848 (quoting Atwood v

. Fort Peck Tribal Court Assin i boine
, 513 F .3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks om i t t e d)). The plausibi l i t y of tribal c ourt jurisdiction depends on the scope of the T ribes’ reg ulatory authority , as “a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not ex ceed its leg islative jurisdictio n

. ”E V A N S V

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Plains C o mm erce , 554 U.S. at 330 ( quoting Strate v. A

- 1 Contractors , 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997)).

II. P lausibility of

Tribal Court Jurisdiction

“[ T] ribes d o not, as a g eneral matter, possess a uthority

over n o n-I ndians who come within their borders

. . . .” Plains Commerce
, 5 54 U.S. at 328 ( citing Montana v. United States
, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)); see also Philip Morris USA, Inc.

v. King Mountain Tobacco Co.
, 5 6 9 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2009) ( “ As a g eneral rule, tribes do not h ave jurisdiction, either leg islative or a d

j u d i c a t i v e , over nonmembers, a

nd tribal
courts are not courts of g eneral jurisdiction.”). Particularly relevant here, “[ t] his g eneral rule restricts tribal authority

over nonmember activities taking place on t h e r eservation, and is particularly strong whe n t h e nonmember’s activity

occurs on land owned in fee simpl e b y non-I ndians—what [ the Supreme Court has] called ‘non-I ndian fee land.’” Plains Commerce
, 554 U.S. a t 328 (quoting Strate
, 520 U.S. at 446).

B e cause Evans is a

n owner of non-I ndian f

ee land, the Tribes’ efforts to reg ulate him a re “ presumptively invalid.” Plains Commerce
, 5 54 U.S. at 330 (quo t i n g Atkinson
, 532 U.S. at 659). I n o rder to reg u late E vans’ land use, the Tribes must show that at least one of two “limited”

ex c e ptions described in Montana v. U nited Stat e s a

pplies. Atkinson
, 532 U.S. at 647. Under the first ex c eptio n , tribes

m a y r e gu l at e “ n o n m e m b e r s wh o e n t e r c o n s e n s u al relationships with the tribe or its me m b e r s

. . . . ” Strate
, 520 U.S. at 446. U n d er the second ex ception, tribes may reg ulate nonmember “activity that directly affects the tribe’s political integ rity
, e conomic security
, health, or welfare.” Id.E V A N S V

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The T ribes do not arg ue that they may r eg ulate Evan s’ activit i es u nder Montana ’ s “ consensual relationships”

ex c e ption. 5 Thus, i n o r der to reg u late E vans’ land use, the Tribes must show that Evans’ “conduct threatens or has some direct e ffect on the political integ rity
, the economic security
, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Plains Commerce
, 554 U .S. at 329–30 (quoting Montana
, 450 U.S. at 566). The Tribes face a formidable burden in this respect, because “with only ‘one m i nor ex ception, [ the Supreme Court h as] never upheld under Montana the ex tension of tribal civil authority

over nonmembers on n o n-Indian land .’” Plains Commerce
, 554 U.S. at 333 ( quoting Hicks
, 533 U.S. at 360 (emphasis in orig inal)). That “minor ex ception” is Brendale v. Confeder a ted Tribes & Bands of Y a kima I ndian Nation
, 492 U.S. 4 08 (1989), in which the Supreme Court “permitted

a tribe to restrain particular uses o f non

- I n d i an fee land throug h z o ning reg ulations.” Plains Commerce
, 554 U.S. at 333 (emphasis omitted). B u t neither Bre n d a l e , nor the

s econd M ontana ex ception more g enerally
, p l a u s i b l y s u p p o r t s tribal jurisdiction here.

A. Tribal Authority to Z one Non-Indian F ee Land

I n Brendale
, the Supreme Court held, by a six to three
marg in, “that the Yakima I n d ian Nation lacked authority to

z one nonmemb e rs’ land within an area of the Tribe’s reservation open to the g eneral public

. . . .” Strate
, 520 U.S.
at 447 n.6. “The Court also held, [ five] to [ four]
, t hat the Tribe retain e d a u t hority to z one fee land in an area of the

5 T h e T rib es su g g est in p assin g th at j u risd ictio n m ay be p lau sib le ov er Ev an s ’ bu ild ers b ecau se th ey ch o se to “ en g ag e in co m m ercial activ ities in In d ian co u n try [.]” B u t th e T rib es ig n o re t h e f act th at th e p ro p erty at issu e is n o n

- In d i an

f ee lan d

.E V A N S V

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reservation closed to the g eneral p ublic. No opinion g a rnered

a majority

. ” Id. W hereas four J u s t i ces concluded that the Yakima Tribe lacked any authority to z one non-I n d i a n f ee land, Brendale
, 492 U.S. at 430–31 (opinion of W hite, J

. ),
t h ree J ustices determined that the Tribe could z o n e fee l a n d in all areas of the re s e rvation. Id. at 458–59 (opinion o f B lackmun, J .). Dec l i n i n g to join e ither of these o pinions, J ustice Stevens, joined by J ustice O’Connor, “concluded that the Tribe retained z oning authority o ver nonmem b e r land only in the closed a rea.” Strate
, 520 U .S. at 447 n.6 (citing Br en dale
, 492 U.S. at 4 43–44 ( opinion of Stevens, J .)). J ustice Stevens’ opinion is controlling

. See Marks v. United States , 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).

Under B rendale ’s controlling opinion, “the Tribes’ power to z one each parcel of land turned on the ex tent to which the Tribes maintained ownership and cont r o l over the areas in which the parcels were located.” Hicks
, 5 33 U.S. at 390 (citing Brendale
, 492 U.S. at 438–44 ( o p inion of Stevens, J .)). The Supreme Court recently emphasiz ed the narrow scope o f B r e ndale
, ex plaining that the decision merely authoriz ed tribal z oning “on nonmember fee land isolated in ‘the heart of a closed portion of the r eservation’

. . . .” Plains Commerce
, 554 U .S. at 333–34 (quoting Brendale
, 492 U.S. at 440 (opinion of Stevens, J .) (internal alteration omitted)).

To determine w hether B ren d a l e supports tribal court ju r i s d i c t ion, we consider the c haracter of the area in which E vans’ property is located and the n ature of Evans’ proje c t

. Tribal z oning a

uthority over non-I ndian fee land is plausible only if ( 1) there is an arg uable similarity bet w e e n the area surrounding the fee land and t h e c losed portion of the reservation described in Brendale ; and (2) the intended use o f the fee land w ould place the character of the surrounding areaE V A N S V

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of the r eservation “in jeopardy .” Atkinson
, 532 U.S. at 658 (quoting Brendale
, 492 U.S. at 443 (opinion of Stevens, J .)).

The area surrounding Evans’ prop e r t y b ears no resemblance to the closed portion of the reservation in Brendale

. At the time Brendale was decided, only three
per c e nt of the closed area o f the Yakima reservation was owned in fee simple. B rendale , 492 U.S. at 438 ( opinion o f Stevens, J .). T h e c l osed area was mostly forested, a nd the county g overnment maintain e d no roads traversing this portion of the reservation. Id. at 438–39 (opinion of Stevens, J .). The Yakima Tribe carefully limited and m o n i t o r ed the activities of n onmember visitors in the closed area, requiring all such nonmembers to obtain a permit before entering

. Id.
at 439 ( opinion of Stevens, J .). Notably
, “[ t] ribal police a nd
g ame officers enforce[ d ] t h e courtesy permit sy stem b y monitoring ing ress and eg r ess at four g uard stat ions a nd b y patrolling the interior of the closed area.” Id. (citing Y akima Indian Nation v. W

hiteside, 617 F

. Supp. 750, 738 (E.D. W a sh. 1985)).

The controlling opinion in B r endale acknowledg ed that “log g ing operations, the constructi o n o f [ B ureau of I ndian Affairs] roads, an d the transfer of a relatively insig nificant
amount of land in the closed area u n q u e stionably ha[ d] diminished the Tribe’s p ower to ex clude non-I ndians from that portion of its reservation

. . . .” Brendal e , 492 U.S. at 44 1 ( o p i n ion of Stevens, J .). Nevertheless, the closed area “remain[ ed] an undeveloped refug e of cultural and relig ious sig nificance, a place where tribal members may camp, hunt, fish, a nd g ather roots and berries in the tradi t i o n of their culture.” I

d. (internal q u o tation o mitted). Ag ainst this backdrop, J ustice Stevens held that “ the Tribe has authority
to prevent the f

ew individuals who own portions o f the closedE V A N S V

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area in f ee from undermining its g eneral plan to p reserve the character of this unique resource by d eveloping their isolated parcels without reg ard to an o therwise common scheme.” Id.

The a rea surrounding Evans’ p roper t y on the F ort H all Reservation is dramatically different. To beg in with, the area contains many residential p roperties owned and inhabited b y nonmembers. Additionally
, the City of Pocatello operates the Pocatello Reg ional Airport o n n o n-I ndian fee land a short distance fro m Evans’ parcel. The area is traversed by a public road (Go v ernment Road), and includes farmland a nd

a g ravel pit

. 6 I n short, the area of the F ort Hall Reservation

near Evans’ property does not in any way r esemble the “undeveloped refug e” in which the Brendale Court p ermitted tribal z o n i n g o f n o n-I ndian fee land. Brendale
, 492 U.S. at 441 (opinion of Stevens, J .).

The Tribes’ observation that the percentag e of non-I ndian fee land in the F ort H all Reservation is relati v el y l o w does
not chang e this analy sis. To the c ontrary , the Supreme Court has directly rejected the arg ument “that I ndian tribes e njoy broad authority over nonmembers wherever the a creag e o f non-I ndian fee land is m i nuscule in relation to the surrounding tribal land.” Atkinson
, 532 U.S. a t 658. Rather, the Court has ex plained that “the j u d gm e n t in Brendale turned on both the cl o s e d n ature o f the non-I ndian fee land and the fact that its development would place the entire area

6 T h e T rib es assert th at “ n o rig h t o f w ay ex ists f o r Go v ern m en t Ro ad ,”

an d th at “ u n au t

h o rized u s e o f Go v ern m en t Ro ad co n stitu tes a tresp ass on th e Fo rt Hall Reserv atio n .” B u t t h e P o w er Co u n ty Hig h w ay Div isio n , n o t th e T rib es, m ain tain s th is ro ad
, an d it is f reely accessib le t o th e pu

b lic. In

an y ev en t, th e tran sf

er o f trib al lan d t o n o n

m em b ers “ m u st im p licitly g ran t th e p u rch aser access to th at p ro p erty .” Bren d a l e , 4 9 2 U .S. at 4 3 7 (o p in io n

o f Stev en s, J .).E V A N S V

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‘in jeo p a r d

y .’” Id. (quoting B rendale
, 492 U.S. at 443 (opinion of Stevens, J .)).

I n B rendale
, the Court approved tribal efforts to prevent

a nonmember from constructing a larg e complex consist i n g of “recreational summer cabins, o n -site sewag e disposal
sy stems, and interior access roads

. . . .” Brendale
, 492 U.S.
at 440 (opinion of Stevens, J .). I n view o f t h e u n developed character of the surrounding a r ea, the controllin g o p i nion found that the proposal would undermine the Yakima Tribe’s “g eneral plan to preserve the character” of the closed area. Id

. at 441 (opinion of Stevens, J .). Here, by contrast, Evans merely seeks to construct a sing le-family hou s e i n an area that has already seen comparable development. A c cording ly
, Brendal e does not provide a plausible basis for tribal court jurisdiction. 7

B. Tribal Authority to P re v e n t E n v i r o n m e n t a l H a r m s

I n addition to their specific reliance on Brend a l e , the Tribes contend more g enerally that ju r i s d i ction is plausible because Evans’ conduct “threatens or has some direct effect

on the political integ r ity
, the economic security
, or the health

or welfare of the t r i b e. ” Montana
, 450 U.S. a t 566. To this

7 W e d eclin e th e p arties’ in v it a t i o n t o co m p are th e area su

rro u n d in g Ev an s ’ lan d to th e o p en area o f th e reserv atio n describ ed in Bren d a le

. T h e Su p rem e Co u rt’ s rej ectio n o f t rib al zo n i n g p o w er o v er f

ee lan d in th e op en

area ref lects th e ru le th at trib es g e n e rally lack au t h o rity to reg u l ate

n o n m em b er activ ity o n n o n

- In d ian f ee lan d

. S

ee Pla in s Co mmer c e , 5 5 4 U .S. at 3 2 8

. By co n trast, t h e Co u rt’ s au th orizatio n o f trib al zo n in g of

n o n

- In d ian f

ee lan d in th e clo sed area rep re s en ts a “ m in o r ex cep tio n ” to th at ru le. Id

. at 3 3 3 (q u o tin g Hicks
, 5 3 3 U.S. at 3 6 0 ). A cco rd i n g ly
, co u rts

m u st an alo g ize to th e c l o s e d a r ea d escrib ed in Bren d a le to d eterm in e

w h eth er trib al zo n in g au t

h o rity o v er f ee lan d is p lau sib le.E V A N S V

. S H O S H O N E -B A

N N O C K L UPC 15

end, the Tribes identify a variety of alleg ed problems flowing from Evans’ construction project, including : (1) g roundwater contamination; (2) improper disposal o f construction debris; and ( 3) increased risk of fire. The district court concluded that these concerns plausibly support tribal jurisdiction under Montana . W e disag ree.

“The burden rests on the t r i b e t o establish one of the

ex c e ption s to Montana ’s g eneral rule that would allow an

ex tension of tribal authority to reg u late n onmembers on nonI ndian f ee land.” P lains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 330 (citing Atks i n s on , 532 U.S. at 654). F or a tribe to have authority

over such nonmember c onduct, “[ t] he conduct must do more tha n i n j u re the tribe, it must ‘imperil the subsistence’ of the tribal community .” P l a ins Commerce
, 554 U.S. at 341 (quoting M

ontana , 450 U.S. a t 5 66)). Thus, “ Montana ’s second ex ception ‘does not entitle the tribe to c o m p lain o r obtain relief ag ainst every use of fe e l a n d that h as some adverse effect on the tribe.’” Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red W olf
, 196 F. 3 d 1059, 1 064–65 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Brendale
, 492 U.S. at 431 (opinion of White, J

. )). Rather, the challeng ed conduct must be so se v ere as to “fairly b e called catastrophic for tribal self-g overnment.” Plains Commerce
, 554 U.S. at 341 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The Tribes fail to show that Evans’ construction of a sing le-family house poses catastrophic risks. 8 The F ort H all R e s e r v a t i o n h a s l o n g e x p e r i e n c e d g r o u n d w a t e r

8 T h e T rib es i den tif

y sev eral o th er p u rp o rted risk s, in clu din g s u b stan d ard

co n stru ctio n practices an d d eg rad ati o n of n earb y h u n tin g g ro u n d s an d f ish eries. B u t th ese co n cern s are sp ecu lativ e, an d th e T rib es f ail to p ro v id e s p ecif

ic ev id en ce sh o w in g th at trib al reg u latio n of Ev an s’ m o dest

co n stru ctio n

p ro j ect is n ecessary

to av ert catastro p h e.E V A N S V

. S H O S H O N E -B A

N N O C K L UPC 16

contamination, and t h e T ribes proffer no evidence showing that E vans’ construction would meaning fully ex acerbate the problem. F urther, the T r i b es’ g eneraliz ed concerns about
waste disposal and fire haz ards are speculative, as they d o not focus on Evans’ specific p roje c t

. T o the e x tent the district
court concluded otherwise, its finding s a re clearly erroneous. See Turtle Island R e s t o ration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 672 F .3d 1160, 1165 ( 9th Cir. 2012) (“A finding of fact is clearl y e r r o n eous ‘if it is (1) illog ical, (2) implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be drawn f

rom the facts in the r ecord.’” (quoting Red Lion Hotels Franchising, I

nc. v. MAK, LLC
, 6 63 F .3d 1 080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011))). According ly
, the tribal court plainly lacks jurisdiction, and Evans need not ex haust tribal remedies.

C. Other Sources of

Tribal Authority

F inally
, the Tribes arg ue that they m a y re gulate Evans’ conduct under (1) the F ort B ridg er Treaty o f 1868, 15 Stat. 673 (1868); (2) d e leg ated authority fr o m C o ng ress; ( 3) the Org a nic Act of the Territory of I daho, 12 Sta t

. 8 08, 809 (1863); (4) the I daho Constituti o n ; a nd ( 5) the Tribes’ L a

nd Use Policy Ordinance. T he T r i b es further contend that they
may reg ulate Evans’ land use because Pow e r C ounty purportedly lacks the authority to do so, and because “no case categ orically bars the a ssertion of Tribal jurisdiction in this case.” B ut these arg uments ig nore the crucial fact that Evans’ property is non-I ndian fee land.

I t is well settled that congr e s s ional approval of a treaty does not endow a tribe with jurisdiction o ver nonmembers on fee land. See Montana
, 450 U.S. at 554, 561. Rather, “once tribal land is converted into fee simple, the tribe loses plenary jurisdiction over it.” Plai ns Commerce
, 554 U.S. at 328E V A N S V

. S H O S H O N E -B A

N N O C K L UPC 17

(citing Cnty. of Y

ak i m a v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Y a kima Indian Nation
, 502 U .S. 251, 267–68 ( 1 9 9 2 ) )

. A nd

none of the federal laws cited by the Tribes e x pressly g rants them authority

over nonmembers on non-I ndian fee land.

F inally
, the Org anic A ct of the Territory of I daho and the I daho Constitution p rovide no basis for tribal jurisdiction here because they lim it state authority over “ Indian lands
, ” not non-I ndian fee land. State v. Allan
, 607 P.2d 426, 430 (I daho 1980) (cit ing I daho Const. A rt. 2 1, § 19) (emphasis added);

see also Knox v. State ex rel. Otter
, 2 23 P.3d 266, 268 (I daho 2009) ( “The act of Cong ress o f March 3, 1863, org a niz ing the Territory of I daho, provides that i t s h al l not embrace within i ts limits or jurisdiction any territory of an Indian tri b e without the latter’s assent

. . . .” (quoting Harkness v

. Hyde
, 98 U.S. 476, 477 (1878)) (emph a s i s added)). I ndeed, the Supreme Court held long ag o that t h e go v ernment of I daho could reg ulate non-I ndian activity within the border s of the F ort Hall Reservation. See Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher
, 116 U.S. 2 8, 33 (1885). 9 According ly
, we reject the Tribes’ additional arg uments for asserting j urisdiction over Evans’ land use.

III. P relim inary Injunction

The district court denied Evans’ motion for a preliminary injunction b ecause it e rroneously c oncluded that tribal jurisdiction was plausible. The district court did n ot consider, however, whether E v ans demonstrated a likelihood o f irreparable harm, o r whether the balance of equities a n d the

9 T h e T rib es cite n o case law su p p o rtin g th eir arg u m en t th at “ t h e P o w er Co u n ty b o u n d ary d raw

n o v er th e t o p o f th e Reserv atio n is in v alid ,” an d

w e h av e f ou n d n o n e.E V A N S V

. S H O S H O N E -B A

N N O C K L UPC 18

public interest favor injunctive relief. See W inter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

Notwithstanding Evans’ overwhelming likelih o od o f

success on the merits, “[ a] preliminary injunction is an

ex traordinary remedy n e v e r a w arded as of rig ht.” Id. at 24 (citing Munaf v. Geren
, 553 U .S. 674, 689–90 (2008))

. B ecause “[ t] he g rant of a preliminary inju n c t i o n is a matter committed to t he discretion of the trial judg e,” Sierra OnLine, Inc. v. P hoenix Software, Inc.
, 739 F .2d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984), we remand this c a s e t o t h e district court for consideration of the remaining W inter factors i n t h e first instance. 1 0

CONCLUSION

B e cause the Tribes plainly lack the a u t h o r ity to reg ulate Evans’ construction of a sing le-family h ouse on non-I ndian fee land, the d istrict court e rred in concluding that e x haustion is required. W e therefore reverse the judg ment of the district

10 T h e T rib es arg u e th at Ev an s’ claim s ag ain st certain t r i b a l o f f icials

w ere p ro p erly d ism issed b ecau se Ev an s d oes n o t m ak e an y s p ecif i c f actu al alleg atio n s ag ain st th em

. T h e T rib es also assert th at th ese Def en d an ts are im m u n e f ro m su it. B u t “ t

rib al so v ereig n im

m u n ity d o es n o t b ar a su i t f

or p ro sp ectiv e relief ag ain st trib al o f f icers alleg ed ly actin g i n v io latio n of f ed eral law .” Bu rlin g to n N. & S a n ta Fe Ry. Co

. v

. V

a u g h n , 5 0 9 F.3 d 1 0 8 5 , 1 0 9 2 (9 th

Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) (q u otin g Bu rlin g to n N. R.R. Co . v. Bla ckfeet Trib e , 9 2 4 F .2 d 8 9 9
, 9 0 1 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 1 ), o verru led on o th er g ro u n ds b y Big Ho rn Cn ty. Elec. C

o o p ., In c. v. Ad

a ms , 2 1 9 F.3 d 94 4
, 9 5 3 ( 9 t h C i r. 2 0 0 0 )). B ecau se Ev an s alleg e s t h a t th ese Def en d an ts ex ceed ed th eir

au th ority u n der f ed eral law , th e T rib es’ arg u m en ts are w ith o u t m erit.E V A N S V

. S H O S H O N E -B A

N N O C K L UPC 19

court and remand this case for f urther proceeding s. 1 1 Defendants-Appellees shall bear costs on appeal. See F ed. R. App. P. 39(a)(4).

AF F IRMED IN P ART, R EVERSED IN P ART, and REMANDED.

1 1 F o r t h e reaso n s set f

o rth in th e m em oran d u m d isp o s itio n f iled

co n tem p o ran eo u sly w ith th i s o p i n io n , w e af f irm th e d istrict co u rt’ s d en i al

o f Ev an s’ m o tio n

to strik e.