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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In re Dependency of:

J.G., 

D.O.B.: 11/19/11 

 

No. 80442-1-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MANN, C.J. — Colton Bradley appeals the trial court’s order finding that his

son, J.G., was a dependent child. Bradley argues that insufficient evidence 

supports the trial court’s findings that Bradley physically abused J.G. and that he 

was incapable of adequately caring for J.G. We conclude that substantial 

evidence supports the findings of fact, and that the findings of fact support the 

conclusion of law that J.G. is a dependent child. We affirm. 

I.

Colton Bradley is the father of J.G., born in November 2011. J.G. lived 

with his mother for the first five-and-a-half years of his life. J.G.’s mother has a 

history of homelessness and drug use, and J.G. suffered trauma and neglect. In 

spring 2018, the Department of Children, Youth, and Family Services

(Department) removed J.G. from his mother’s care and placed him in the care of 

his father.1 

 1 J.G.’s mother entered into an agreed order of dependency in May 2019. She is 

not a party to this appeal. 
No. 80442-1-I/2

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On February 1, 2019, the Department received an intake about potential 

abuse of J.G. At the time of the intake, J.G. was living with his father and his 

father’s girlfriend Shawna Redding. The intake alleged that J.G. told his 

kindergarten teacher Elizabeth Hull that “I have purple, red marks” and “[my] dad 

said I’m not supposed to tell you.” J.G. further reported that “I got a whooping” 

and “Dad hit me with a belt.” 

Department social worker Bailee Lane conducted a forensic interview of 

J.G. at his school. During the interview, J.G. reported that his father hit him 7 

times with a belt on one day and 20 times on another day. He said his father 

spanked him in his room on his bed and that his pants and underwear had been

pulled down. J.G. said the belt hit his chin when he slid down the bed during the 

spanking. J.G. reported feeling unsafe at his father’s home. After Lane 

photographed bruises on J.G.’s thighs, buttocks, and chin, law enforcement 

placed J.G. in protective custody. Dr. Emily Brown, a child abuse pediatrician at 

Seattle Children’s Hospital, later performed a medical consultation and 

determined that the injuries were consistent with non-accidental trauma. 

Department case worker Grace Sorenson interviewed Bradley. Bradley 

admitted that he struck J.G. with a belt three times after J.G. rode his bike into 

the street and was almost hit by a car. Bradley asserted that he did not usually 

use physical discipline and that this was a “one-time thing.” Bradley repeated the 

same story several days later at a Family Team Decision Making meeting. The 

team did not think Bradley was being fully honest about what happened and did 

not feel comfortable returning J.G. to his father’s care. 
No. 80442-1-I/3

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On February 5, 2019, the Department filed a dependency petition alleging

that J.G. was dependent under RCW 13.34.030(6)(b) and (c). The Department 

placed J.G. in the care of his paternal grandparents. Since moving in with his 

grandparents J.G. comes to school cleaner, has fewer bathroom accidents, and 

exhibits fewer behavioral problems. 

A two-day fact-finding hearing on the dependency petition began on May 

29, 2019. J.G. was seven years old at the time of trial. The court heard 

testimony from nine witnesses, including J.G., Dr. Brown, Hull, and Redding. 

J.G. testified that his father spanked him with a leather belt “[l]ike every 

time when I lied.” He said his father hit him with the leather end, not the metal 

part. One time, J.G. thought his father struck him 20 times with the belt because 

it felt like 20 times. He changed his mind after his father told him it was only two 

times because his father would not lie to him. On a separate occasion, J.G. 

remembered that his father struck him with the belt seven times because his 

father said it was one for each year of J.G.’s age. 

J.G. reviewed the photographs taken of his bruises and explained them to 

the court. J.G. said his father caused each injury by hitting him with a belt. The 

spankings “felt like a burn” and hurt “a lot,” and the bruises were “really sore.” 

J.G. and Hull both testified that J.G. missed school around the time of the 

spankings. J.G. reported that his father told the school J.G. was sick although he 

was not. 

J.G. also said his father imposed other consequences on him, including 

wall squats, raking leaves until he developed blisters, writing sentences
No. 80442-1-I/4

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repeatedly, scrubbing the bathtub, and hand washing his bed sheets after a 

urinary accident. These consequences made J.G. feel depressed and angry. 

J.G. reported that he no longer receives such consequences since he started 

living with his grandmother. 

Dr. Brown testified that, in her opinion, J.G. was physically abused and 

that “significant force” beyond that typically used for discipline needed to cause 

J.G.’s bruises. In examining the photographs, Dr. Brown noted “large amounts of 

bruising on the bilateral buttocks extending onto the right hip.” She found this 

“concerning” for non-accidental trauma because the buttocks are a well-padded 

area of the body that requires significant force to cause bruising. She classified 

J.G.’s injuries as “blunt force trauma” and specified that significant force of this 

magnitude is like that caused by a motor vehicle accident or falling out of a multistory building. She stated that J.G.’s bruises were caused by at least two direct 

blows from an object or hand, that the bruises were consistent with being hit by a 

belt, and that there was no alternate medical explanation for the injuries. She 

also stated that the injuries constituted a temporary disfigurement of J.G.’s body

and that J.G. was likely in a significant amount of pain when the injury occurred 

and possibly afterward. Dr. Brown believed the infliction of the injury could have 

negative effects on J.G.’s psychological and emotional well-being. 

Following the hearing, the court found J.G. dependent under RCW 

13.34.030(6)(b) and (c). The court found that hitting seven-year-old J.G. with the 

belt was not reasonable or moderate discipline. The court also found that 

Bradley caused substantial injury to J.G. which went way beyond transient pain 
No. 80442-1-I/5

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or temporary marks, thereby posing a significant risk to J.G.’s psychological 

development. The court determined that Bradley does not have the insight or 

ability to understand how to appropriately discipline J.G. and that he needs 

services to educate him on how to manage a child who has been through 

trauma. Bradley appeals. 

II.

Bradley argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s 

finding that J.G. is a dependent child under any statutory prong. We disagree. 

“Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and welfare of 

their minor children.” In re Dependency of Schermer, 161 Wn.2d 927, 941, 169 

P.3d 452 (2007). “However, the State has an interest in protecting the physical, 

mental, and emotional health of children.” Schermer, 161 Wn.2d at 941. 

“Dependency proceedings are designed to protect children from harm, help 

parents alleviate the problems that led to intervention, and reunite families.” In re

Dependency of P.H.V.S., 186 Wn. App. 167, 181, 339 P.3d 225 (2015). Unlike a 

parental termination proceeding, a dependency hearing is “‘a preliminary, 

remedial, nonadversary proceeding’ that does not permanently deprive a parent 

of any rights.” In re Welfare of Key, 119 Wn.2d 600, 609, 836 P.2d 200 (1992) 

(quoting In re Dependency of A.W., 53 Wn. App. 22, 30, 765 P.2d 307 (1988)).

To declare a child dependent, a court must find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the child meets at least one of the statutory definitions of 

dependency under RCW 13.34.030. Key, 119 Wn.2d at 612. RCW 13.34.030(6) 

provides that a dependent child is any child who:
No. 80442-1-I/6

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(a) Has been abandoned;

(b) Is abused or neglected as defined in chapter 26.44 RCW by a 

person legally responsible for the care of the child; [or]

(c) Has no parent, guardian, or custodian capable of adequately 

caring for the child, such that the child is in circumstances which 

constitute a danger of substantial damage to the child's 

psychological or physical development.

The trial court found J.G. dependent under RCW 13.34.030(6)(b) and (c). 

We review a claim of insufficient evidence in a dependency proceeding to 

determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact 

and whether those findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusions of law. In 

re Dependency of C.M., 118 Wn. App. 643, 649, 78 P.3d 191 (2003). Evidence 

is substantial if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the party prevailing 

below, a rational trier of fact could find the fact in question by a preponderance of 

the evidence. In re Welfare of X.T., 174 Wn. App. 733, 737, 300 P.3d 824 

(2013). Preponderance of the evidence means “more likely than not to be true.” 

In re Dependency of M.S.D., 144 Wn. App. 468, 478, 182 P.3d 978 (2008). We 

do not weigh the evidence or make witness credibility determinations. In re

Welfare of C.B., 134 Wn. App. 942, 953, 143 P.3d 846 (2006). We treat 

unchallenged findings of fact as verities on appeal. In re Interest of J.F., 109 Wn. 

App. 718, 722, 37 P.3d 1227 (2001). 

III.

For purposes of RCW 13.34.030(6)(b), “abuse or neglect” includes “sexual 

abuse, sexual exploitation, or injury of a child by any person under circumstances 

which cause harm to the child’s health, welfare, or safety, excluding conduct 
No. 80442-1-I/7

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permitted under RCW 9A.16.100.” RCW 26.44.020(1). RCW 9A.16.100 

provides that a parent may physically discipline a child provided that the action is 

“reasonable and moderate.” The legislature has specified that chapter 26.44 

RCW, which defines “abuse,” does not “prohibit the reasonable use of corporal 

punishment as a means of discipline.” RCW 26.44.015(2). 

“A parent has the right to use reasonable and timely punishment to 

discipline a minor child within the bounds of moderation and for the best interest 

of the child.” State v. Singleton, 41 Wn. App. 721, 723, 705 P.2d 825 (1985). 

“Modern case law analyzes the physical discipline imposed by determining 

‘whether, in light of all the circumstances, the [parental] conduct itself, viewed

objectively, would be considered excessive, immoderate, or unreasonable.’” In 

re Dependency of H.S., 188 Wn. App 654, 664, 356 P.3d 202 (2015) (quoting

Singleton, 41 Wn. App. at 723). “In determining whether physical discipline is 

reasonable or moderate, a fact finder should consider the age, size, and 

condition of the child as well as the location of the injury, the nature of the 

misconduct, and the child's developmental level.” H.S., 188 Wn. App. at 664-65 

(citing RCW 9A.16.100; WAC 388-15-009(2)). Any act that is “likely to cause and 

which does cause bodily harm greater than transient pain or minor temporary 

marks” is presumptively unreasonable. RCW 9A.16.100. 

Bradley challenges these findings of fact: 

44. Dr. Brown testified that the child’s injuries were a temporary but 

substantial disfigurement of his body. 

60. Hitting the child with the belt is not reasonable and moderate 

discipline. This is a slight and small 7-year-old child. The father 
No. 80442-1-I/8

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caused extensive substantial injury to the child which went way 

beyond transient pain or temporary marks. 

61. The father does not have the insight or ability to understand 

how to appropriately discipline or guide the child. 

68. All of the statements regarded acts of physical abuse that 

resulted in substantial bodily harm. Dr. Brown testified that the 

bruising was a substantial, but temporary disfigurement. 

Bradley asserts that spanking a child with a belt as a rare form of 

discipline for endangering himself by riding his bike into the street is not 

necessarily abuse. He contends that the spanking was not presumptively 

unreasonable under RCW 9A.16.100 because it did not cause “bodily harm 

greater than transient pain or minor temporary marks.” He emphasizes that Dr. 

Brown testified J.G.’s injuries were “transitory” and “temporarily” disfiguring and 

that she declined to label J.G.’s bruises as “substantial disfigurement.” On this 

basis, Bradley asserts that the court misconstrued Dr. Brown’s testimony to find 

that his actions constituted “substantial bodily harm” and “extensive substantial 

injury.” 

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that 

Bradley’s physical discipline of J.G. was not reasonable and moderate. Dr. 

Brown testified that J.G. suffered “blunt force trauma” and temporary 

disfigurement resulting from “significant force” like a motor vehicle accident or 

falling from a multi-story building. She specified that “significant force” means 

“more than that which is typically used for discipline” and that moderate force 

would not have caused J.G.’s injuries. Moreover, Bradley did not challenge the 

court’s finding that “if the father’s report of hitting the child with the belt over his 
No. 80442-1-I/9

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clothing 3 times is accurate, the force must have been truly significant to cause 

the injury.” The finding is therefore a verity. 

Further, Lane testified that any bruise more than the size of a penny on a 

child of J.G.’s age is concerning and shows that the discipline was not mild or 

moderate for the child’s age. J.G., a slight and small 7-year-old child, sustained 

“large amounts of bruising on the bilateral buttocks extending onto the right hip.” 

The bruising was present for several days after the spankings occurred. 

Although Bradley contends that he did not intend to seriously hurt J.G. and 

that his explanation of the incident was consistent with the facts, the court found 

J.G. was “far more credible” than his father. Bradley claimed that he struck J.G. 

outside with the belt over his clothing three times and that it happened only once, 

but J.G. reported that the spankings occurred in his bedroom, that it happened 

on at least two separate occasions, and that his pants and underwear were 

pulled down. J.G. and his teacher both testified that J.G. missed school after the 

spanking. J.G. told Lane that his father told the school J.G. was sick, but it was 

really because of the bruises. 

Bradley relies on State v. McKague, 172 Wn.2d 802, 805-06, 262 P.3d 

1225 (2001) and State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wn. App. 44, 859 P.2d 60 (1993) to argue 

that J.G.’s injuries were not “substantial.” His reliance is misplaced. Ashcraft 

and McKague are criminal cases where the defendants were convicted of second 

degree assault under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a), requiring the State had to prove 

substantial bodily harm. But the Department need not prove “substantial bodily

harm” to prove that discipline is presumptively unreasonable. It only needs to 
No. 80442-1-I/10

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show “bodily harm greater than transient pain or minor temporary marks.” RCW 

9A.16.100. Here, substantial evidence provides that J.G.’s injuries met this 

standard. The trial court did not err in finding J.G. dependent under RCW 

13.34.030(6)(b). 

IV.

Bradley also argues there is insufficient evidence to prove J.G. “[h]as no 

parent, guardian, or custodian capable of adequately caring for the child, such 

that the child is in circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial 

damage to the child’s psychological or physical development.” RCW 

13.34.030(6)(c). In determining whether a parent is able to parent under RCW 

13.34.030(6)(c), the State need not prove that a parent is unfit. Schermer, 161 

Wn.2d at 944. There are no specific factors the court must consider when 

determining whether a parent is capable of adequately parenting a child. 

Schermer, 161 Wn.2d at 952. Rather, the inquiry is highly fact specific. 

Schermer, 161 Wn.2d at 952. The statute “does not require proof of actual harm, 

only a ‘danger’ of harm.” Schermer, 161 Wn.2d at 951. 

In arguing that the evidence demonstrated his ability to care for J.G., 

Bradley asserts that no evidence shows his home was unsafe, that J.G. was at 

risk of substantial damage, or that J.G.’s needs were unmet. He points to the 

court’s findings that “the father and [J.G.] love each other very much” and that 

“the father provided for [J.G.’s] basic needs in his home.” Bradley also points to 

J.G.’s testimony that J.G. felt safe with his father and wanted to live with his 

father. 
No. 80442-1-I/11

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But as discussed above, substantial evidence establishes that the belt 

strikes constituted abuse. And Bradley did not challenge the court’s finding that 

“being struck on the buttocks with a belt represents significant risk to the child’s 

psychological development and if deployed as a long-term form of punishment, it 

constitutes a danger to the child’s physical development.” Such physical 

discipline caused actual harm to J.G. and, if not stopped, poses a danger of 

future harm. We also note that J.G. reported to Lane and other professionals 

that he was afraid to go home. 

Bradley also asserts that he has already learned how to keep J.G. safe, 

noting that he completed a parenting evaluation. But Bradley did not challenge 

the court’s finding that “[t]the father needs services to [educate] him on how to 

manage a child that has been through trauma as the approach he took is not 

appropriate.” 

In sum, substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings, which in 

turn supported the court's conclusion that J.G. was a dependent child as defined 

under RCW 13.34.030(6)(b) and (c). 

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR: