In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-2227

SAMY A. MANKARIOUS and THOMAS K. MURPHY,

Petitioners-Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

Nos. 99-C-1450 & 95-Cr-96--Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

Argued January 7, 2002--Decided March 11, 2002

 Before MANION, ROVNER, and EVANS, Circuit

Judges.

 EVANS, Circuit Judge. Over 3 years ago,

on direct appeal, we affirmed the

convictions of Samy Mankarious and Thomas

Murphy on charges of money laundering,

wire fraud, and filing false tax returns.

See United States v. Mankarious, 151 F.3d

694 (7th Cir. 1998). They now make a

return visit to us, this time challenging

the denial of their motion for collateral

relief under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2255. We

assume familiarity with the facts and

only repeat what we think is necessary to

resolve the present appeal.

 Mankarious and Murphy’s first argument

is that they are entitled to reversal or

a new trial because the district court

did not instruct the jury on

"materiality" with regard to the wire

fraud charges on which they were

convicted. They base this argument on

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4

(1999), where the Supreme Court held that

materiality is an element of the federal

mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes and

that the issue must be submitted to the

jury./1 In denying the present sec.

2255 motion, the district court

recognized that Neder requires that the

issue of materiality be considered by the

jury but concluded that the failure to do

so in this case was harmless under
Jenkins v. Nelson, 157 F.3d 485, 496 (7th

Cir. 1998).

 Neder was decided in 1999, after

Mankarious and Murphy’s direct appeal was

resolved, and this presents a huge

problem for them under Teague v. Lane,

489 U.S. 288 (1989). Teague holds that,

unless it falls within an exception, a

new constitutional rule of criminal

procedure is not applicable to cases that

are final when the new rule is announced.

See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. The Teague

rule is important, for it serves the

interest of finality, a goal that would

be frustrated if older cases like this

one could be resuscitated every time a

new decision is announced that calls into

question modes of operation accepted in

the past as appropriate procedure. For

this reason, since Teague, "few

constitutional arguments apply

retroactively on collateral attack."

United States v. Smith, 241 F.3d 546, 549

(7th Cir. 2001).

 There are two exceptions under Teague,

and they apply to (1) new rules that

place certain kinds of primary, private

individual conduct beyond the power of

the criminal law-making authority to

proscribe, and (2) rules that define

procedures implicit in the concept of

ordered liberty. See id. at 311.

 To get around Teague, Mankarious and

Murphy argue/2 that Neder’s holding

that materiality is an element of fraud

offenses announced a change in

substantive law, not a new rule of

criminal procedure. But we held before

Neder that materiality was an element of

wire fraud in United States v. Coffman,

94 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1996).

Therefore, the only change Neder

precipitated in our circuit was requiring

that a separate instruction on

materiality be given to juries. This is a

change in procedure, not in substantive

law. For this reason, and because Neder

does not fall within an exception to the

Teague rule, Neder is not available to

Mankarious and Murphy on this collateral

review.

 But is snuffing out Mankarious and

Murphy’s claim on Teague grounds cricket?

That’s a fair question. We answer it with

a resounding yes, for even if Teague did

not bar application of Neder to their
sec. 2255 motion, Mankarious and Murphy

are still barred from raising their lack

of a materiality instruction argument for

the first time on collateral review. An

issue not raised on direct appeal is

barred from collateral review absent a

showing of both good cause for and actual

prejudice resulting from the failure to

raise it. See Prewitt v. United States,

83 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1996).

 Mankarious and Murphy argue that they

can demonstrate cause because the law in

this circuit prior to Neder rejected the

requirement of a materiality instruction.

But the fact that an argument was

unacceptable at a particular time does

not constitute cause for failing to raise

it. See Bousley v. United States, 523

U.S. 614, 623 (1998). The possibility of

a separate materiality instruction in

fraud cases was not a new issue when this

case went to trial. The defendants in

Coffman, decided 2 years before

Mankarious and Murphy’s direct appeal,

argued (although unsuccessfully) that the

lack of a materiality instruction

required reversal of their wire fraud

convictions. See Coffman, 94 F.3d at 335.

Additionally, we noted in Coffman that

the Ninth Circuit addressed the subject

of a separate materiality instruction in

mail fraud cases in 1981, 15 years before

Mankarious and Murphy’s trial. See

Coffman, 94 F.3d at 335 (citing United

States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1007-08

(9th Cir. 1981)).

 Even assuming, as the district court

did, that Mankarious and Murphy

demonstrated cause for their failure to

raise the materiality instruction issue

on direct appeal, they cannot demonstrate

prejudice. Prejudice exists where an

error has a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining a

jury’s verdict. See Jenkins, 157 F.3d at

496. On collateral review, we reverse

only if we are in grave doubt as to the

harmlessness of the error. See id. at

494.

 Here, the government presented

substantial evidence that Mankarious and

Murphy orchestrated and participated in

the wire fraud schemes. For example, one

of the government’s witnesses was Ed

Brown, partial owner of UPEC &

Associates. Brown testified that

Mankarious outlined a plan for Brown to
bilk money out of Delta, the aluminum

smelting company that Mankarious and

Murphy partially owned. (The remaining 41

percent of Delta was owned by WITECH, a

venture capital operation run by

Wisconsin Energy Corp., Wisconsin’s

largest utility.) Brown shared a cut of

the proceeds of this scheme with

Mankarious and Murphy. Under the scheme,

UPEC performed work at Delta, with Brown

submitting false invoices for each job.

Mankarious and Murphy then cut checks to

cover these invoices, sometimes making

the checks out to fictitious payees.

Brown endorsed the checks and returned

them to Mankarious, who cashed them at a

tavern. This scheme was only the first in

a series of schemes that Mankarious,

Murphy, and Brown cooked up together.

Therefore, substantial evidence of

Mankarious and Murphy’s participation in

the fraud scheme existed so that the

absence of a separate materiality

instruction could not have had a

substantial and injurious effect in

determining the jury’s verdict.

 Mankarious and Murphy also argue that

the lack of a materiality instruction

requires reversal under Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi

held that, other than a prior conviction,

any fact that increases the penalty for a

crime beyond its statutory maximum must

be submitted to the jury and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at

490. We have noted on more than one

occasion that when the defendant is

sentenced to a term of imprisonment

within the statutory maximum, Apprendi is

beside the point. See United States v.

Williams, 238 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir.

2001); Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866,

869 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, Mankarious and

Murphy were sentenced to 60 months on the

wire fraud convictions, which coincides

exactly with the maximum authorized term

of imprisonment for the offenses. See 18

U.S.C. sec. 1343.

 Mankarious and Murphy next argue that

they are entitled to a hearing to explore

whether any government witnesses received

improper inducements for their trial tes

timony. In support of this argument, they

rely on United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d

687, 689 (7th Cir. 1999), where we held

that 18 U.S.C. sec. 201(c)(2) does not

bar testimony from a witness who was

promised immunity because such a promise
is not a "thing of value" within the

meaning of the statute. Mankarious and

Murphy argue that Condon expanded the

definition of "thing of value" because it

noted that "cancellation of a private

debt could be a ’thing of value’ in the

statutory sense . . . ." Id. at 689. This

language did not expand the definition of

"thing of value." In addition to being

dicta, the quoted language states a

principle that was as obvious at the time

of Mankarious and Murphy’s trial as it is

now. Mankarious and Murphy had ample

opportunity to cross-examine the

government’s witnesses at trial (and did

so with experienced counsel) about what

sort of inducements they may have

received to testify and whether these

inducements were lawful. Therefore, they

are not entitled to a hearing.

 Finally, Mankarious and Murphy argue

that they have new evidence which

entitles them to a new trial. The

evidence is described in an affidavit

from Norm Lo Presto, an indicted

coconspirator. After they filed their

sec. 2255 motion, Mankarious and Murphy

learned that Lo Presto had resolved his

case and was willing to execute an

affidavit outlining his knowledge of the

activities of Roger Green. Green ran a

Ponzi scheme through Metal Brokers

International (MBI), which Mankarious and

Murphy discovered when Delta began

selling metal through MBI. When they dis

covered the scheme, Green offered to pay

them off, but Mankarious instead

suggested that they pursue "business

opportunities" together. Green testified

against Mankarious and Murphy, alleging

the existence of an accounts receivable

scheme. Mankarious and Murphy argue that

Lo Presto’s affidavit demonstrates that

this scheme did not exist.

 The parties disagree on the proper

mechanism for presenting this claim of

newly discovered evidence. The government

argues that Mankarious and Murphy were

required to bring the claim under Rule 33

of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Mankarious and Murphy argue

that they can press the claim as part of

their motion under sec. 2255.

 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

33, a district court may grant a new

trial on the basis of newly discovered

evidence within 3 years of the verdict or
finding of guilt. Here, the 3-year limit

expired 3 months before Mankarious and

Murphy filed their sec. 2255 motion, and

defendants, as we know, may not use sec.

2255 to circumvent Rule 33’s time limit.

See Guinan v. United States, 6 F.3d 468,

470 (7th Cir. 1993).

 But because a section of sec. 2255--

enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)-- in

some very limited cases allows a

defendant to file a second or successive

motion based on newly discovered evidence

demonstrating actual innocence,

Mankarious and Murphy say they may bring

their claim as part of their present

motion./3 But to be raised here, the

claim must still meet certain

requirements outlined in the opening

paragraph of sec. 2255. The petitioner

must allege either that the challenged

sentence was imposed in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United

States, that the court was without

jurisdiction to impose the sentence, that

the sentence was in excess of the maximum

authorized by law, or that the sentence

is otherwise subject to collateral

attack.

 Mankarious and Murphy do not allege that

the district court was without

jurisdiction to impose their sentence,

nor that the sentence was in excess of

the authorized maximum. They do make a

passing reference to due process and

suggest that sec. 2255 makes newly

discovered evidence a basis for which a

sentence is "otherwise subject to

collateral attack." But a conviction does

not violate the Constitution nor become

otherwise subject to collateral attack

merely because newly discovered evidence

may be helpful to a defendant. See United

States v. Evans, 224 F.3d 670, 674 (7th

Cir. 2000). Thus, Mankarious and Murphy’s

claim of newly discovered evidence,

untimely under Rule 33, does not meet the

requirements of sec. 2255 and may not,

therefore, be considered.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

/1 The trial judge in Neder had told the jury that

the issue of materiality "is not a question for

the jury to decide."
/2 Mankarious and Murphy also argue that the government waived reliance on Teague by not raising it

in the district court. We reject that contention.

See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976).

/3 Even generously construed, Lo Presto’s new tune

does not sing a song of actual innocence.