IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

January 21, 2020 Session

RONALD LEDFORD, ET AL. v. JOHN BEN SNEED, ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for McMinn County

No. 2016-CV-32 J. Michael Sharp, Judge

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No. E2018-00904-COA-R3-CV

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This appeal concerns the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiffs 

concerning their claim for surreptitious recording of their conversations, namely 

wiretapping. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J. and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., joined.

Matthew C. Rogers, Athens, Tennessee, for the appellants, John Ben Sneed and Ray 

Wilson, Jr.

James E. Logan, Jr., Cleveland, Tennessee, for the appellees, Ronald Ledford, Stephanie 

Ledford, Kyle Motes, Ricky M. Motes, and Betty Jo Motes. 

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

Ronald Ledford, Stephanie Ledford, Kyle Motes, Ricky Motes, and Betty Motes 

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) were members of the Hillsview Fire Department (“HFD”). Mr.

Ledford also served as the captain and training officer at the time in question. In January

2016, Plaintiffs filed suit against John Ben Sneed and Ray Wilson, Jr. (collectively 

“Defendants”), also members and officers of the HFD, based upon Defendants’ taping of 

their conversations without their knowledge in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated

05/08/2020
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section 39-13-601, et seq.1 Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Ledford was fired in violation of 

the HFD’s bylaws based upon information gathered from the recordings. 

Defendants denied wrongdoing, and Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. 

Defendants submitted affidavits asserting that Plaintiffs were put on notice that their 

conversation could be recorded while in the fire hall. Plaintiffs moved to prohibit any 

consideration of the defense of consent because Defendants failed to plead consent in 

their answer. The court reserved ruling on the issue of consent and denied the motion for 

summary judgment. The case proceeded to a jury trial. 

At the outset of the trial, the jury was presented with conclusive admitted facts 

establishing, inter alia, that tape recorders were hidden in the fire hall of the HFD, that 

Defendants each purchased one recorder, that Plaintiffs were unaware of the recorders, 

and that certain conversations were recorded. Plaintiffs then confirmed through their 

testimony that they were unaware that their conversations were being recorded and that 

they had not provided their consent for the recording. 

Mr. Ledford testified that the fire hall was kept locked and that entry was gained 

via an access code or key. He stated that those who visited knocked to request entry. 

Testimony was presented establishing that Plaintiffs knew that the HFD’s security system 

was capable of audio and video recording. The minutes from a July 2014 meeting 

confirmed that all members had been informed that the security system was “up and 

running” and recorded both audio and video. However, Plaintiffs testified that they were

advised that the audio capabilities of the system were never actually activated. Mr. 

Sneed, the former Fire Chief of the HFD, confirmed that the audio capabilities were 

never activated. 

Despite this, Daryl Leamon, also a member of the fire hall, testified that Mr. Sneed 

and Mr. Wilson advised the members of the HFD to refrain from gossip because someone 

could be listening. Mr. Sneed likewise confirmed that he advised the members that they 

would be listening in an attempt to impede the gossip that had been occurring in the fire 

hall. He stated that he affixed a sticker to the main door advising entrants that video 

surveillance was in use on the property and that another sticker also advised entrants that 

the premises was protected and monitored by a security system. He then authorized Mr. 

Wilson, a Senior Lieutenant, to place one of the recorders purchased under the table in 

the HFD. He noted that the tape recorder purchased by him was never used and that the 

recorder was placed without his participation. 

 

1

Providing that a person who “[i]ntentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other 

person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication” commits an 

offense of wiretapping and electronic surveillance.
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Mr. Sneed testified that the fire hall was used for various social gatherings in the 

community. He confirmed that a member of the fire hall was always present for events 

and that those in the community generally remitted payment for their use of the facility 

on a donation basis. 

Following the trial, the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict at the 

close of the case, holding that Defendants violated Section 39-13-601 when they 

intentionally intercepted private oral communications without consent and used the 

contents thereof. In so holding, the court found the minutes from the July 2014 meeting 

unreliable. The court awarded each plaintiff $10,000, in addition to costs and attorney 

fees. The court sustained Plaintiff’s motion to bar the defense of consent but also found 

the issue inconsequential given its grant of a directed verdict. 

Defendants filed a motion for new trial with an attached affidavit from a juror 

(“Juror”). The court declined to consider the affidavit, finding that such testimony was 

inadmissible pursuant to Rule 606(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.2 This appeal 

followed the court’s denial of the motion for new trial.

II. ISSUE

We consolidate and restate the issues on appeal as follows: Whether the trial court 

erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on the claimed violation of 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-601.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure provide for directed verdicts as follows:

A motion for a directed verdict may be made at the close of the evidence 

offered by an opposing party or at the close of the case. The court shall 

reserve ruling until all parties alleging fault against any other party have 

presented their respective proof-in-chief. A party who moves for a directed 

verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer 

evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having 

reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not 

 

2

“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or 

statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon any 

juror’s mind or emotions as influencing that juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or 

concerning the juror’s mental processes, []; nor may a juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by 

the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for 

these purposes.”
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been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a 

waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for 

directed verdicts. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed 

verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 50.01.

In considering a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must take the 

strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all 

reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. 

Newcomb v. Kohler Co., 222 S.W.3d 368, 390 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting Crain v. Benton, 

823 S.W.2d 187, 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)); Johnson v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. 

Co., 205 S.W.3d 365, 370 (Tenn. 2006). A motion for a directed verdict should not be 

granted “if the party with the burden of proof has presented sufficient evidence to create 

an issue of fact for the jury to decide.” Burton v. Warren Farmers Co-op., 129 S.W.3d 

513, 520 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing White v. Vanderbilt Univ., 21 S.W.3d 215, 231

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)). A party has created a jury issue when there is doubt about the 

conclusions drawn from the evidence. Id. The grant or denial of a motion for directed 

verdict is a question of law; therefore, the court’s decision is subject to a de novo review 

with no presumption of correctness. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn. 

2008); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

IV. ANALYSIS

Tennessee law provides that it is lawful for a person to intercept an oral 

communication if (1) the person intercepting the communication is a party to the 

communication or (2) one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to 

the interception. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-601(b)(5). Otherwise, a person commits an 

offense who “[i]ntentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other 

person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic 

communication[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-601(a)(1)(A). The legislature defines an 

oral communication as “any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an 

expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under circumstances 

justifying that expectation[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-303(14). The legislature defines 

intercept as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral 

communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device[.]” Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-6-303(11). 

Here, the evidence presented was uncontroverted that neither defendant was a 

party to the communication. Defendants argued at trial and now on appeal that Plaintiffs 

consented to the recording of their communications. We, like the trial court, believe that 

the record overwhelmingly established that Plaintiffs did not consent to the interception 
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of their communications. The record reflects that Plaintiffs believed that the audio 

portion of the security system had not been activated and that Defendants confirmed that 

the audio had not been activated, despite a contrary assertion contained in the July 2014 

minutes to a fire hall meeting. Defendants’ vague assertions that they would be listening 

were also not enough to garner consent from Plaintiffs to record their conversations via a 

tape recorder taped under the table. 

Defendants next claim that the court’s refusal to consider Juror’s affidavit was 

error when the affidavit established that there was doubt about the conclusions that could 

be drawn from the evidence. The Tennessee Rules of Evidence prohibit a juror from 

testifying concerning the “the effect of anything upon any juror’s mind or emotions as 

influencing that juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning 

the juror’s mental processes[.]” Tenn. R. Evid. R. 606(b). Exclusion of the affidavit was 

proper. 

Lastly, Defendants alternatively claim that Plaintiffs had no reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the fire hall that was open to the community. While recovery 

for interception of an oral communication is limited to those “who possess an expectation 

that the communication is not subject to interception,” the legislature did not exclude 

liability for those who intercept a communication in an area open to the public. Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-6-303(14). While community events were routinely held at the fire hall, 

the record reflects that the fire hall remained locked and only permitted access via keypad 

or physical key in the absence of such events. Plaintiffs’ communications were not 

recorded during any such event. In consideration of the foregoing, we affirm the court’s 

entry of a directed verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. 

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the decision of the trial court and remand for such further proceedings 

as may be necessary. Costs of the appeal are taxed equally to the appellants, John Ben 

Sneed and Ray Wilson, Jr.

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JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JUDGE