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Filed 9/27/23 P. v. Greer CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RONALD DEAN GREER et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

E076749

(Super. Ct. No. FVI1300018)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Daniel W. 

Detienne, Judge. Affirmed.

818 Law Group, Brett A. Greenfield and Falamak Abromson, for Defendant and 

Appellant, Ronald D. Greer.

Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant, Bianca A. Stanch.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene Sevidal and Christopher 

P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Ronald Greer’s four-year-old daughter, Samiah Downing, 

died of dehydration while locked in a room at home. A jury convicted him and his 

girlfriend, defendant and appellant Bianca Stanch, of first degree murder, torture, and 

abuse. The trial court sentenced both to a term of 25 years for the murder conviction, a 

consecutive term of seven years to life for the torture conviction, and a six-year 

concurrent term for the child abuse conviction.

Stanch and Greer argue (1) the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it had to 

find defendants acted with malice aforethought to convict them of first degree murder, (2) 

the court erroneously found that separate sentences were appropriate for each conviction, 

and (3) the matter must be remanded for resentencing under recently enacted legislation. 

Greer also argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a new trial. We reject 

defendants’ contentions and affirm the judgment.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Greer’s ex-girlfriend gave birth to Samiah in 2008. She started living with him 

and Stanch full-time in June 2012. Stanch did not like Samiah and often disciplined her 

harshly.

In July 2012, Greer and Stanch asked their friend, S.R., to babysit Samiah. Just 

after they left her in S.R.’s care, Samiah quickly drank a bottle of water. She told S.R. 
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that she was not allowed to drink water at home. Although Greer and Stanch did not ask 

S.R. to watch Samiah overnight nor bring her a change of clothes, S.R. ended up 

watching Samiah for three to five days.

About a month later, Stanch and Samiah went over to S.R.’s house to have their 

hair done. Stanch told Samiah to sit quietly in one spot, but did not instruct her own child 

to do the same. Samiah looked at S.R. for permission to do anything.

During another visit, S.R. made sandwiches for her children and asked whether 

Samiah wanted one. Stanch told Samiah that if she had a sandwich, she could not have a 

burger later, but Stanch gave her child a sandwich unconditionally. S.R. noticed that 

Samiah had what looked like a welt on her eye. Stanch said that she had spanked Samiah 

with a belt and accidentally hit her eye.

Around the same time, Samiah’s teachers noticed that she ate much more food 

during breakfast than her peers and drank an unusual amount of water. Stanch had to 

pick up Samiah at school once because she wet her pants. Her teacher noticed Stanch 

was rough with her, yelled at her, and gave her angry looks. Stanch told Samiah’s 

teacher not to give her water.

On another occasion, Samiah’s teacher noticed what looked like a belt buckle 

mark above her eye. The teacher’s aides thought it was a black eye. Samiah told her 

teacher that Stanch “whooped her” the night before. But when Greer dropped her off that

morning, he said she fell off the bed and hit her head on a dresser.
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Samiah’s teacher made a referral to Child Protective Services. A social worker

spoke with Greer, Stanch, and Samiah, who reported that Stanch hit her with a belt and 

sometimes locked her in her room.

Stanch’s cousin, Rayshawn, lived with her and Greer toward the end of 2012. He 

saw Stanch whip Samiah with a belt multiple times every day. Although Greer was 

present, he never tried to stop Stanch. Both Greer and Stanch often withheld food and 

water from Samiah, sometimes for multiple days. They both told Rayshawn not to give 

Samiah anything. Rayshawn also saw Stanch force Samiah to stand in a corner for hours 

as punishment.

Stanch’s cousin, Sharelle, learned that Greer taped Samiah’s wrists and ankles to 

stop her from drinking water. Sharelle also learned that Samiah drank cleaning supplies 

because she was so thirsty.

Rayshawn’s girlfriend, Destinee, lived with Greer and Stanch in the summer of 

2012. She also saw Stanch taping Samiah’s hands and ankles together before putting her 

to bed. Greer did not stop Stanch or help Samiah. Destinee also saw Stanch regularly 

beat Samiah with a belt and saw Greer and Stanch confine Samiah in her bedroom by 

duct taping the door shut. Although Greer hit Samiah, he did not hit her as often or as 

hard as Stanch did.

In December 2012, Stanch repeatedly whipped Samiah with a cord. Stanch then 

poured a pot of boiling water on Samiah’s back. Rayshawn told Stanch to stop, but Greer 
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did nothing to stop her. Stanch then took Samiah to her bedroom and began whipping 

her with the cord again.

Later that evening, Greer and Stanch went out to dinner while Rayshawn watched 

Samiah. As he was leaving, Greer told Samiah, who had not had water for two or three 

days, that she would get water when they got back if she was good. Greer then locked 

Samiah in her bedroom and left.

When they returned several hours later, Samiah was dead. Greer decided to bury 

Samiah in the desert. He and Rayshawn wrapped her body in a sleeping bag, carried her 

to the car, and then drove to the desert with Stanch. Greer and Rayshawn dug a small 

grave and buried Samiah. Greer and Stanch told Rayshawn to tell people that Samiah 

was visiting relatives and offered to pay him hush money.

Rayshawn, however, told his sister what happened, and her husband contacted the 

police. Law enforcement exhumed Samiah’s body and observed she had multiple facial 

injuries. Rayshawn later told law enforcement what had happened.

An autopsy revealed that Samiah had suffered extensive injuries across her entire 

body, indicating she had been whipped. There were fresh scald wounds on her back. She 

was malnourished and significantly underweight. The coroner concluded that she died of 

dehydration.

A jury convicted Greer and Stanch of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. 

(a)),

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torture (§ 206), and child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)), with an enhancement for willful 

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All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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harm resulting in death (§ 12022.95). The jury found true the enhancement allegation 

that they had inflicted great bodily injury on Samiah (§ 12022.95). The jury, however, 

found a torture special circumstance allegation against Stanch not true (§ 190.2, subd.

(a)(18)).

The trial court sentenced Greer and Stanch to 32 years to life in state prison. The 

trial court sentence consisted of 25 years to life for the murder with a consecutive seven

years to life for the torture, plus a concurrent term of six years for the child abuse 

conviction. The court stayed the sentence for the enhancement.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Greer’s New Trial Motion

After the jury convicted Greer, he moved for a new trial on the first degree murder 

conviction under section 1181(6). He argued insufficient evidence supported the jury’s 

finding that he acted willfully, deliberately, or with premeditation. Therefore, the jury 

could have convicted him of only second degree murder. The trial court denied the 

motion, finding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Greer of first 

degree murder.

When a defendant moves for a new trial under section 1181(6), the trial court sits 

as a “13th juror” and examines the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to prove 

the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Porter v. Superior Court (2009) 47 

Cal.4th 125, 133.) The court has “broad discretion” in determining whether the evidence 
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is sufficient, and its decision will not be reversed “‘absent a manifest and unmistakable 

abuse of that discretion.’” (People v. Dickens (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1252.) 

When reviewing the trial court’s decision, we consider “the entire record in the light most 

favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—

that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a rational 

trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. 

Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1068-1069.)

Defendant was prosecuted under two theories of first degree murder: (1) Samiah’s 

murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and (2) the murder was committed by 

torture. The pertinent difference between the theories is that murder-torture does not 

require proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim, while the first theory does. 

Instead, murder-torture requires only proof that the defendant intended “to inflict extreme 

and prolonged pain on the person killed while that person was still alive.” (CALCRIM 

No. 521.)

As a result, the trial court only had to find there was sufficient evidence of 

premeditation and deliberation to uphold the jury’s first degree murder verdict. In any 

event, defendant challenges only the trial court’s finding that there was sufficient 

evidence of premeditation. We conclude there was substantial evidence that Greer acted 

with deliberation and premeditation and so the trial court properly denied his motion for a 

new trial.
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“‘“Deliberation” refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a course 

of action; “premeditation” means thought over in advance. [Citations.] “The process of 

premeditation . . . does not require any extended period of time.”’” (People v. Halvorsen 

(2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 419.)

In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, the California Supreme Court

“identified three categories of evidence relevant to determining premeditation and 

deliberation: (1) events before the murder that indicate planning; (2) a motive to kill; and 

(3) a manner of killing that reflects a preconceived design to kill.” (People v. Gonzalez

(2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 663.) These factors are “‘descriptive, not normative’ . . . are not 

all required . . . nor are they exclusive in describing the evidence that will support a 

finding of premeditation and deliberation.” (Ibid.) We therefore “need not accord them 

any particular weight.” (People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 420.)

Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Greer acted with 

premeditation and deliberation. Greer not only let Stanch physically abuse Samiah 

repeatedly for months, he often participated in the abuse himself. Although he did not hit 

Samiah as often or as hard as Stanch did, he still hit her many times. On more than one 

occasion, Greer taped Samiah’s hands and ankles together so she could not drink water. 

He often withheld water from Samiah for so long that she would drink cleaning supplies 

and her teacher noticed she drank an unusual amount of water at school. Greer also 

withheld food from Samiah for days at a time, which caused her to eat an unusual amount 

at school. At the time of her death, she was malnourished and unusually thin.
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Greer’s conduct in the hours before Samiah’s death also suggests that he acted 

deliberately and with premeditation. After letting Stanch hit Samiah repeatedly with a 

cord, Greer did nothing when Stanch then poured boiling water on Samiah. He did not 

intervene when Stanch then took Samiah into her room and resumed whipping her with 

the cord. At that point, Samiah had not had water for two or three days, yet Greer locked 

her in her room and went out to dinner, causing her to die of dehydration within a few 

hours. When Greer returned, he did not summon medical help for Samiah, but buried her 

body in the desert while offering Rayshawn money to keep quiet about the murder.

From this evidence, which we must view in the light most favorable to the 

judgment, the jury could reasonably find that Greer acted deliberately and with 

premeditation. (See People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 201-202 [evidence of 

“continuing and escalating acts of abuse” in two-month period supported finding of 

premeditation and deliberation]; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408 [victim’s 

extensive wounds and injuries showed deliberation and premeditation]; People v. Koontz

(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1081-1082 [defendant’s conduct to prevent summoning medical 

care showed killing was deliberate and with premeditation].) Because substantial 

evidence supports the jury’s finding that Greer was guilty of first degree murder, the trial 

court properly denied his motion for a new trial.

Greer argues otherwise, relying on various cases in which parents were found 

guilty of second degree murder for the death of their young children. (See People v. 

Jones (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 420; People v. Latham (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 319; People 
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v. Rolon (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1206; People v. Burden (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 603.) 

But in each case, the defendant was charged and convicted of second degree murder and 

argued the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. (People v. Jones, supra, 

at p. 442; People v. Latham, supra, at p. 321; People v. Rolon, supra, at p. 1211; People 

v. Burden, supra, at pp. 606-607.) None of the cases Greer relies on addressed whether 

the evidence was sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction for first degree murder, so 

they do not apply here. (People v. Hatt (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 321, 326 [“A case is not 

authority for a proposition not considered.”].)

B. Jury Instructions

Greer and Stanch contend their murder convictions must be reversed because the 

jury instructions impermissibly “allowed the jury to impute malice” to them as an aider 

and abettor based on their participation in the underlying crimes in violation of their 

rights under federal and California law.

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 We disagree.

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human with malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. 

(a).) Malice is express “when there is manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully 

take away the life of a fellow creature.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(1).) Malice is implied “when 

no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing 

show an abandoned and malignant heart.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(2).)

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Stanch withdrew this argument in her reply brief. Later, however, Stanch 

moved for and was granted the opportunity to reassert the argument in a supplemental 

brief. We construe Greer’s joinder notice as joining Stanch’s argument in her 

supplemental brief.
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First degree murder occurs when the murder is willful, premeditated, and 

deliberate. (§ 189, subd. (a).) First degree torture-murder is a form of willful, 

premeditated, and deliberate murder. (§ 189, subd. (a).) “To prove torture murder, the 

prosecution must establish ‘“a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to cause 

extreme pain or suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or another 

sadistic purpose.”’” (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 237.)

California law previously provided that a defendant who acted without malice 

aforethought still could be liable for murder under the felony-murder rule. (People v. 

Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 972.) Senate Bill No. 1437 changed the law “to 

ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not 

act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who 

acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Senate Bill No. 1437; Stats. 2018, ch. 

1015, § 1, subd. (f).)

Section 188 now provides that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based 

solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§188, subd. (a)(3).) Instead, a defendant 

must act with malice aforethought “in order to be convicted of murder.” (§188, subd. 

(a)(3).) Senate Bill No. 1437 also amended section 189 to restrict felony-murder liability 

to require that the perpetrator of an enumerated felony be the actual killer, aid and abet 

the actual killer with the specific intent to kill, or be “a major participant in the 

underlying felony [who] acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 189, subd. 

(e).)
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CALCRIM No. 521 explained the elements of torture-murder as follows: “The 

defendant murdered by torture if: 1. He or she willfully, deliberately, and with 

premeditation intended to inflict extreme and prolonged pain on the person killed while 

that person was still alive; 2. He or she intended to inflict such pain on the person killed 

for the calculated purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or any other sadistic reason;

3. The acts causing death involved a high degree of probability of death; AND 4. The 

torture was a cause of death.” In defendants’ view, this instruction allowed the jury to 

convict them of murder without a finding of malice.

CALCRIM No. 520, entitled “First or Second Degree Murder With Malice 

Aforethought,” told the jury that the elements of murder are “1A. The defendant 

committed an act that caused the death of another person; OR 1B. The defendant Ronald 

Greer had a legal duty as a parent to care for Samiah Downing and the defendant failed to 

perform that duty and that failure caused the death of another person; AND 2. When the 

defendant acted or failed to act, he or she had a state of mind called malice 

aforethought.” (Italics added.)

The instruction then explained express and implied malice. The instruction 

defined express malice as “he or she unlawfully intended to kill.” As for implied malice, 

the instruction stated: “The defendant had implied malice if: [¶] 1. He or she 

intentionally: committed the act or failed to act; [¶] 2. The natural and probable 

consequences of the act or failure to act were dangerous to human life; [¶] 3. At the time 

he or she acted or failed to act, he or she knew his or her act or failure to act was 
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dangerous to human life; [¶] AND 4. He or she deliberately: acted or failed to act with 

conscious disregard for human life.”

CALCRIM No. 521 explained that defendants could be guilty of first-degree 

murder under a murder-by-torture theory. The instruction stated: “The defendant is 

guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that the defendant murdered by 

torture. The defendant murdered by torture if: [¶] l. He or she willfully deliberately, and 

with premeditation intended to inflict extreme and prolonged pain on the person killed 

while that person was still alive; [¶] 2. He or she intended to inflict such pain on the 

person killed for the calculated purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or any other 

sadistic reason; [¶] 3. The acts causing death involved a high degree of probability of 

death; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The torture was a cause of death.”

The jury also received instructions on aider-and-abettor liability. CALCRIM No. 

400 said, “A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she may have 

directly committed the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator. Two, he or she may 

have aided and abetted a perpetrator, who directly committed the crime. [¶] A person is 

guilty of a crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the 

perpetrator.

CALCRIM No. 401 instructed the jury: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of a 

crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The 

perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator

intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the 
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defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 

4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s 

commission of the crime. [¶] Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the 

perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does, in fact, aid, 

facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime. 

[¶] If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to actually have 

been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an aider and abettor. [¶] If 

you conclude that defendant was present at the scene of the crime or failed to prevent the 

crime, you may consider that fact in determining whether the defendant was an aider and 

abettor. However, the fact that a person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to 

prevent the crime does not, by itself, make him or her an aider and abettor.”

Defendants argue that the instructions, in particular the aider-and-abettor 

instructions, allowed the jury to erroneously impute malice based on their participation in 

the underlying crimes. In support, they rely on People v. Maldonado (2022) 301 

Cal.Rptr.3d 919. After defendants filed their supplemental opening brief, however, the 

Maldonado court granted the People’s petition for rehearing and vacated the opinion. 

(Id. at p. 919.) We therefore cannot consider it. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.1105(e)(1)(A).)

But, on rehearing, the Maldonado court held the jury instructions impermissibly 

allowed the jury to convict the defendant of first degree murder on a theory of imputed 

malice made invalid by Senate Bill No. 1437. (People v. Maldonado (2023) 87
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Cal.App.5th 1257, 1264.) The jury in that case was instructed on the elements of aiding 

and abetting a lying-in-wait murder, which included CALCRIM No. 401. (Ibid.) The 

Maldonado court held that CALCRIM No. 401 was ambiguous and could be read as 

instructing the jury that the defendant was guilty of first degree lying-in-wait murder as 

an aider-and-abettor even if he only intended “to injure or intimidate the victim in a 

surprise attack” and encouraged the direct perpetrator’s attack. (Ibid.) Under the law of 

murder as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437, however, the defendant could be found 

guilty of first degree murder only if he acted with malice, meaning that he knew the 

attack was dangerous to human life and he acted with conscious disregard for human life. 

(Id. at p. 1264.) As a result, Maldonado held that the ambiguity created by CALCRIM 

No. 401 left open the possibility that the jury convicted the defendant of murder under a 

now-invalid theory of imputed malice. (Ibid.)

We find Maldonado persuasive and follow it here. We therefore agree with 

defendants that CALCRIM No. 401 wrongly suggested that the jury could find them

guilty of first degree murder as an aider-and-abettor irrespective of their mental state. 

(See People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 981; People v. Powell (2021) 63 

Cal.App.5th 689, 714.) The instructions told the jury that either defendant was guilty of 

first degree murder “if it found that (1) the killing resulted from the actual killer’s 

intentional act; (2) [Greer or Stanch] aided and abetted that intentional act; and (3) the 

killer “deliberately performed [the act] with knowledge of the danger to, and with 

conscious disregard for, human life’—whether or not [Greer or Stanch] knew of or 
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consciously disregarded the danger to human life.” (People v. Langi, supra, at p. 981.) 

As in Maldonado, this instruction thus created an ambiguity under which the jury could 

have found either defendant guilty of first degree murder as an aider-and-abettor under an 

imputed malice theory “without finding that [he or she] personally acted with malice,”

but instead only intended to aid the direct perpetrator (the other defendant) in committing

an intentional act. (Id. at p. 982) For instance, the jury could have found one defendant 

directly withheld water from Samiah, causing her death, while the other defendant only 

intended to help the direct perpetrator withhold the water.

The People do not challenge Maldonado’s analysis as far as it goes, but contend

there is a “next step” in the analysis, which asks whether there is a reasonable likelihood 

that the jury understood the instructions as conveying an invalid theory (imputed malice 

murder). In Maldonado’s now-vacated opinion, the court did not address this issue, 

which the People raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. (People v. 

Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1268.) On rehearing, the court assumed without 

deciding that “the reasonable likelihood standard” applied in the Maldonado defendant’s 

appeal from a summary denial of his section 1172.6 petition while noting that the 

standard “originated in the direct appeal context.” (Id. at p. 1268, fn. 8.)

We agree with the People that the reasonable likelihood standard applies here. 

(See Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380 [rejecting “standard which makes the 

inquiry dependent on how a single hypothetical ‘reasonable’ juror could or might have 

interpreted the instruction”]; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 73, fn. 4 [“[W]e now 
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disapprove the standard of review language in” two intervening cases that used “could 

have understood” and “would have understood” “and reaffirm the standard set out in 

Boyde”]; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [adopting this reasonable likelihood 

standard for assessing instructions under California law].)

To satisfy the reasonable likelihood standard, a defendant “must demonstrate a 

reasonable likelihood that the jury misconstrued or misapplied the instruction in the 

manner asserted.” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 926.) Put another way, 

“‘[t]he test is whether there is a “reasonable likelihood that the jury . . . understood the 

charge,” in a manner that violated defendant’s rights.’” (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 

Cal.4th 393, 476.)

“‘Although a defendant need not establish that the jury was more likely than not to 

have been impermissibly’ directed by the ambiguous instruction, the standard is not met 

if there is ‘only a possibility’ the jury was so directed.” (People v. Maldonado, supra, 87 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1268.) We consider the instructions as a whole and the arguments of 

counsel to determine whether the defendant has met the standard. (People v. Young 

(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202.)

In the People’s view, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted 

defendants of murder solely as aider-and-abettors without finding they acted with “at 

least implied malice” given the jury instructions and the prosecutor’s closing argument.

The People note that the standard murder instruction, CALCRIM No. 520, told the 

jury that defendants were guilty of murder only if they acted with express or implied
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malice. But that does not completely dispel the ambiguity created by CALCRIM No. 

401, which the trial court told the jury applied to all counts in response to its question. 

While CALCRIM No. 520 told the jury defendants were guilty of murder only if they 

acted with malice, CALCRIM No. 400 also suggested they were guilty of murder as an 

aider-and-abettor if they intended to help the direct perpetrator’s intentional act—in this 

case, withholding water from Samiah—even if they did not have the requisite mental 

state required for murder.

But we agree with the People that the prosecutor’s argument cleared up 

CALCRIM No. 401’s ambiguity. (See People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 

1220, abrogated on other grounds by People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216.) 

The prosecutor repeatedly emphasized that both defendants were guilty of murder as 

direct perpetrators because they both withheld water from Samiah, who died from 

dehydration. The prosecutor likewise repeatedly argued that defendants’ conscious 

decision not to give Samiah water was evidence that they acted with malice. As the 

prosecutor put it, “[t]hey knew that was dangerous to her life. When they acted, knowing 

that danger to her life, they consciously disregarded it and did it anyways. . . .” “There is 

malice in this killing. . . . [T]hey caused the death by denying her water and [] they acted 

with malice. They knew the danger and denied her water anyways, and because of that, 

they are guilty of murder.”

The prosecutor later explained aider-and-abettor liability, explaining that an 

“actual perpetrator,” such as someone who “pulls the trigger,” is as guilty of murder as 
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someone who aids and abets the perpetrator. The prosecutor then outlined how the 

principle could apply in this case: “[S]o as you look at the elements of any of these

crimes, be it the first degree murder, torture, child abuse, any of these, either defendant 

can be guilty as the direct perpetrator because they directly, for instance, denied her water 

to the point she died of dehydration, or you can find that -- in fact, I think one of the 

defendants was the one directly denying the water. And I think the other defendant was 

aiding and abetting that, was facilitating or encouraging that. Now, what the direct 

perpetrator was doing and facilitated it by allowing her or him to do it. Allowing her to 

be alone with his daughter, for instance. Allowing her to take over the disciplinary role 

for instance. Knowing what she was doing to his daughter and failing to stop it. [¶] In 

fact, facilitating it by allowing her to be alone or to be the disciplinarian of that child.”

After explaining aider-and-abettor liability, however, the prosecutor argued that 

the jury that Greer was a “direct perpetrator” because he “directly deprived” Samiah of 

water. The prosecutor noted that although Greer was “a direct perpetrator of these 

crimes,” he could be liable as an aider-and abettor. The prosecutor explained: “[I]f you 

believe as you go through the facts and the three crimes charged here, that at times he 

was not the direct perpetrator, that he wasn’t the one actually running the show, he knew 

about it, he facilitated it by stepping back and telling [Stanch] she would take over, that 

she could decide when cords and belts were okay, well then, the defendant very well may 

be guilty as an aider and abettor and a direct perpetrator.” (Italics added.)
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As for Stanch, the prosecutor never argued she was guilty of any of the crimes as 

just an aider-and-abettor. Instead, the prosecutor hammered on the fact that Stanch was 

an actual perpetrator because she withheld water from Samiah. The prosecutor stated 

throughout his closing argument that she was guilty of first degree murder because she 

knowingly withheld water from Samiah to punish and torture her even though she knew 

that it was dangerous to Samiah’s life. In doing so, the prosecutor emphasized several 

times that Stanch’s conduct and inaction (withholding water) was evidence that she acted 

with malice. Given these arguments and the evidence showing that Stanch directly

contributed to Samiah’s death by withholding water from her, it is highly unlikely the 

jury convicted her of first degree murder as an aider-and-abettor. (Cf. People v. Letner 

and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 182-183 [not reasonably likely jury erroneously 

construed ambiguous instruction on coconspirator and aider-and-abettor special 

circumstance in part because the prosecutor never argued the jury “need not find intent to 

kill as to one of the two defendants”].)

The same holds true for Greer. Although the prosecutor noted that Greer could 

possibly be liable for first degree murder as an aider-and-abettor, the prosecutor 

consistently argued that he was an actual perpetrator because he withheld water from 

Samiah, which showed he acted with malice. When discussing aider-and-abettor liability

as it applied to Greer, the prosecutor notably did not argue Greer was liable as an aiderand-abettor for Stanch’s withholding water. Instead, the prosecutor suggested that the 

jury could “for instance” find that “at times” he was not the actual perpetrator because he 
21

did not stop Stanch’s physical abuse. The prosecutor continued, however, that if the jury 

so concluded, then he should be found guilty as an aider and abettor and a direct 

perpetrator.

In short, the prosecutor did not argue either defendant was guilty as an aider-andabettor because he or she helped the other defendant withhold water from Samiah,

although he acknowledged the jury could permissibly make that finding. (See People v. 

Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 688 [not reasonably likely that jury erroneously 

interpreted ambiguous instruction on accomplice liability in part because the prosecutor 

“argued that defendant was a direct participant in the crimes or acted with knowledge and 

purpose in aiding” them].) He instead emphatically argued that defendants were both 

liable as direct perpetrators because they both acted with malice by withholding water 

from Samiah, which was the undisputed cause of her death. (See People v. Bedolla

(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 535, 548 [“it was not reasonably likely that the jury 

misunderstood or misapplied the challenged instructions” where “the prosecutor’s closing 

argument . . . reinforced a correct understanding of the instructions”].)

Finally, there is a more fundamental logical problem with defendants’ argument. 

The undisputed cause of Samiah’s death was dehydration, which occurred because she 

did not have water for two to three days while in defendants’ care. Aiding and abetting 

the murder thus necessarily required withholding water from her. One defendant could 

not knowingly aid and abet the other in withholding water from Samiah without also 

withholding water from her himself or herself. If, for instance, Stanch knew that Greer 
22

withheld water from Samiah for two to three days and intended to help him do so, she 

necessarily would have had to withhold water from Samiah too. Both defendants 

therefore necessarily committed the same death-causing act of depriving Samiah of 

water, which was strong evidence that they both acted with malice.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude there is no reasonable probability that the 

jury convicted defendants of first degree murder under an aider-and-abettor theory of 

liability. (See People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 679.) As a result, any ambiguity in 

CALCRIM No. 400 did not violate defendants’ rights under federal or California law. 

(People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 668.)

C. Separate Sentences

Defendants contend the trial court erroneously imposed separate sentences for 

their murder, torture, and child abuse convictions. We disagree.

At the time of their sentencing, section 654, subdivision (a) provided in relevant 

part: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of 

law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of 

imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one 

provision.”3

3

Section 654 has since been amended to provide in relevant part: “An act or 

omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be 

punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be 

punished under more than one provision.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.)
23

The statute thus precluded “multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible 

course of conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) “‘“‘Whether a course 

of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the 

meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the 

offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may [not] be punished . . . for more 

than one.’”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354.) “If, on the other 

hand, defendant harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which were independent of and 

not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation 

committed in pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the violations shared common acts 

or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.)

This means that “a course of conduct divisible in time, though directed to one 

objective, may give rise to multiple convictions and multiple punishment ‘where the 

offenses are temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to 

reflect and renew his or her intent before committing the next one, thereby aggravating 

the violation of public security or policy already undertaken.’” (People v. Lopez (2011) 

198 Cal.App.4th 698, 717-718.)

We review a trial court’s ruling on whether section 654 applies for substantial 

evidence. (People v. McKinzie (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1368, disapproved on other 

grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 391, fn. 3.)
24

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that defendants’ three 

convictions were sufficiently divisible and thus warranted separate sentences. Samiah 

died of dehydration, which occurred because defendants withheld water from her for two 

to three days before her death. Defendants’ days-long withholding water from Samiah 

was thus temporally separated from the torture Stanch inflicted on Samiah in the hours 

before her death. The other acts of torture, including whipping and beating Samiah and 

pouring boiling water on her, were not life-threatening and thus formed a separate course 

of conduct from defendants’ fatally withholding water from Samiah. Between beating 

Samiah and boiling the water to pour on her, Stanch had plenty of time to reflect on her 

choices. The trial court thus properly found that section 654 did not apply to defendants’ 

murder and torture convictions at the time of their sentencing.

The trial court also properly found (though impliedly) that the child abuse 

conviction was distinct enough from the murder and torture convictions and thus 

warranted separate punishment. After whipping Samiah with a cord, Stanch boiled a pot 

of water to pour on Samiah’s back. While the water was boiling, Stanch had sufficient 

time to reflect and reconsider her actions. She did not stop the abuse, but aggravated it 

by pouring the boiling water on Samiah’s back, causing her new, severe injuries. The 

trial court thus could properly find that the Stanch’s whipping Samiah and pouring 

boiling water on Samiah’s back were sufficiently separated in time such that separate 

punishment was warranted for the torture and child abuse convictions. (See People v. 

Goode (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 484, 493.)
25

Finally, defendants argue that the case must be remanded for the trial court to 

exercise its newly granted discretion under recently amended section 654. (See People v. 

Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379 [“[S]ection 654 now provides the trial court with 

discretion to impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the 

trial court imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer 

sentence.”].) Because we conclude the trial court properly found that section 654 did not 

preclude defendants’ separate sentences, we need not remand for the trial court to 

exercise its newly granted discretion under the amended statute.

IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

McKINSTER

J.