UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ GALAN D. COBB, an individual, Plaintiff - Appellant/Cross- Appellee,

v. TINKER FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, a Federally Chartered Credit Union Service Organization, Defendant - Appellee, and
MULINIX OGDEN HALL ANDREWS AND LUDLAM P.L.L.C., an Oklahoma professional limited liability company; HALL AND LUDLAM P.L.L.C., an Oklahoma professional limited liability company; JEFFREY S. LUDLAM, individually; JOEL C. HALL, individually; RANDY G. GORDON, i ndividually, Defendants - Appellees/Cross- Appellants. Nos. 21-6020; 21-6024 (D.C. No. 5:20-CV-00847-J) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, MATHESON and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________

* This order and judgment is not bi nding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 16, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 12 This case presents two issues on appeal . First, Galan D. Cobb challenges on statute-of-limitations grounds the dismissal of his co mplaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Second, Tinker Federal Credit Union (“Tinker”) and the other defendants, Mulinix, Ogden, Hall, Andrews, and Ludlam, PLLC; Hall & Ludlam, PLLC; Jeffrey S. Ludlam; Joel C. Hall; and Randy G. Gordan (collectively, “Attorney Defendants”) cross-a ppeal the district court’s de nial of their motions for attorneys’ fees. Exercisi ng jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. State-Court Litigation 1 In July 2006, Tinker sued Cobb in Okla homa state court after he fell behind on his automobile-loan payments. Because C obb failed to appear, the court entered default judgment for Tinker. In September 2006, the state court entered the following docket entry: “RICKS: JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF AS PER JOURNAL ENTRY.” R. vol. 1 at 67. But this entry was apparently made in error because no final journal entry of default judgment (“ JE”) was ever filed in the state-court records. 2 Nor could the court clerk of Oklahoma County locate one. 3

1 “[F]or purposes of resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, this court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint and views those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Straub v. BNSF Ry. Co. , 909 F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 2018).

2 As we understand Cobb’s allegations, the absence of a JE means that no final judgment was filed.

3 Tinker argues that it timely filed a JE with the state court in 2006. But it concedes that it ca nnot locate the JE. Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 23 Despite this fact, Attorney Defendants began collection actions on behalf of Tinker. These actions include d garnishing Cobb’s wages, renewing the judgment, and holding hearings aimed at revealing Cobb’s assets. On October 11, 2016, another asset hear ing was set. But before the hearing, Cobb’s attorney discovered that no JE wa s on file and notified the judge—more than ten years after the mistaken docket entry was made. That same day, Tinker applied for nunc pro tunc relief to retroa ctively enter a JE in this case. 4 About six months later, the state c ourt granted Tinker’s application and directed that a JE be entered in the case. In that order, it stayed collection activities during all appeals or until the time to a ppeal had lapsed. Tinker and Attorney Defendants had ceased attempting to collect ag ainst Cobb since the last asset hearing on October 11, 2016. Cobb appealed the order to the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals (“OCCA”). In January 2019, the OCCA reversed and remanded the case. Tinker then petitioned for certiorari to th e Oklahoma Supreme Court. In September 2019, the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied certiorari. And on October 17, 2019, the mandate from the Oklahoma Supreme Court was filed on the state district court’s docket. 5

4 In Oklahoma, a nunc pro tunc order is us ed to correct an “inadvertent clerical omission” and other “facial mistakes in re cording judicial acts that actually took place.” Stork v. Stork , 898 P.2d 732, 736–37 (Okla. 1995) (emphasis removed).

5 According to Cobb, ther e is some discrepancy a bout whether the mandate was issued on October 16 or October 17. Th e one-day difference doesn’t affect our analysis. So we assume, as Cobb did, th at the mandate was is sued on October 17. Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 34 In November 2019, with the case back in the state district court, Tinker filed a motion to settle journal entry. 6 In January 2020, Tinker’s motion was granted.
II. Federal-Court Litigation In August 2020, Cobb sued Tinker and Attorney Defendants in federal court, alleging five claims: (1) abus e of process; (2) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”); (3) violation of Oklahoma’s Consumer Protection Act; (4) negligence; and (5) violation of Cobb’s due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 7 After Tinker and Attorney De fendants moved to dismiss, Cobb voluntarily dismissed his third, four th, and fifth claims. So only his abuse-ofprocess and FDCPA claims remained. The district court grante d Tinker’s and Attorney Defendants’ motions to dismiss. It held that the statute of lim itations precluded both of Cobb’s claims. After the district court dismissed the complaint, Tinker and Attorney Defendants moved for attorneys’ fees. The district court deni ed their motions.

6 The motion to settle journal entry was another attempt to resolve the missingJE issue. Cobb has appeal ed the January 2020 order gr anting Tinker’s motion in Oklahoma state court. Th at appeal is pending.

7 Cobb’s complaint also a sserted a sixth claim for re lief for punitive damages. But as the district court noted, in Oklahom a, a request for punitive damages is not a separate claim. Allred v. Rabon , 572 P.2d 979, 981 (Okla. 1977). Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 45 DISCUSSION We first address whether Cobb’s abus e-of-process and FDCPA claims were barred by the statute of limitations. We then consider Tinker’s and Attorney Defendants’ cross-appeal for attorneys’ fees.
I. Statute of Limitations We review de novo a district cour t’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Race v. Swerdlow , 519 F.3d 1067, 1073 (10th Cir. 2008). A. Abuse-of-Process Claim Because this is a diversit y action, we apply Oklahoma law to Cobb’s abuse-ofprocess claim. See Hjelle v. Mid-St ate Consultants, Inc. , 394 F.3d 873, 877 (10th Cir. 2005). In Oklahoma, a claim fo r abuse of process has a tw o-year limitations period. Greenberg v. Wolfberg , 890 P.2d 895, 905–06 (Okla. 1994). This statute of limitations is triggered by the “accrual of th e cause of action,” not necessarily the “commencement or the termin ation of a proceeding.” Id. (emphasis removed). And an “abuse-of-process claim acc rues when the process is abused and damages are incurred[.]” Id. (emphasis removed). Cobb alleged that: Defendants . . . abused the District Court and legal pr ocess by garnishing Plaintiff Cobb’s wages 44 times over a period of ten years, by renewing a non-existent Journal Entr y of Judgment twice, and by applying for three orders to appear and answer for as sets, all without a Journal Entry of Judgment filed of record. R. vol. 1 at 20. Based on those allegations, the district cour t concluded that the latest date the abuse-of-process claim could have begun accruing was October 11, 2016— Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 56 the last day Tinker and Attorney Defenda nts sought to collect against Cobb. And because Cobb didn’t sue until August 2020, th e court ruled that hi s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. In contrast, Cobb contends that hi s abuse-of-process claim didn’t begin accruing until October 17, 2019—when th e mandate from the Oklahoma Supreme Court remanding the case was placed on the trial court’s docket. According to Cobb, the state district court’s order granting the nunc pro tunc order remained in effect until then. So, he argues, he couldn’t have successfully maintained his abuse-ofprocess claim until the Oklahoma Supreme C ourt, in its mandate, reversed the nunc pro tunc order. We disagree. First, Cobb c ites no authority to suppor t his argument but merely recites the elements of an abuse-of-process claim. Second, as explained above, a claim for abuse of process in Oklahoma acc rues “when the process is abused and damages are incurred.” Greenberg , 890 P.2d at 905. In this regard, Cobb alleges that Tinker and Attorney Defendants abused the le gal process when they tried to collect on a nonexistent JE. They last attempted to do so in October 2016. So that’s when Cobb’s abuse-of-process claim accrued. And because he sued mo re than two years later, the statute of limitati ons had run, meaning the dist rict court properly dismissed the abuse-of-process claim. B. FDCPA Claim Cobb’s FDCPA claim is also barred by the statute of limitations. An FDCPA claim has a one-year statute of limitations that runs “from the date on which the Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 67 violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Cobb alleged that Tinker and Attorney Defendants violated the FDCPA by engaging in collection activi ties without a JE. Again, the last collection a ttempt occurred, at the latest , in October 2016. And Cobb did not sue until August 2020—well afte r the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations had lapsed. Thus, the district court also correctly dismissed the FDCPA claim as time barred.
C. Cobb’s Counterarguments Cobb asserts two theories for why his claims are not barred by the statute of limitations: (1) the continuing-wrongs doctrine; and (2) equitable tolling. We address each in turn. a. Continuing-Wrongs Doctrine Under the continuing-wrongs doctrine, wh en a tort “involves a continuing or repeated injury . . . , [the] limitations begin to run from, the date of the last injury.” Tiberi v. Cigna Corp. , 89 F.3d 1423, 1430 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 177 (1987)); see also Wing v. Lorton , 261 P.3d 1122, 1126 n.1 (Okla. 2011) (same). Said another way, “the statute of lim itations does not begin to run until the wrong is over and done with.” Tiberi , 89 F.3d at 14 30–31 (citation omitted)

. According to Cobb, Tinker’s and Atto rney Defendants’ wrongful actions included not only their wrongful attempts to collect without a JE, but also their motions and appeals in “pursuit of obtai ning a JE to continue their collection actions.” Cobb Opening Br. at 13. So he argues that his abuse-of-process and FDCPA Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 78 claims did not accrue until Ti nker’s and Attorney Defendant s’ appeals had ceased on October 17, 2019, the date the Oklahom a Supreme Court’s mandate issued. But Tinker’s and Attorney Defendants’ motions and appeals to settle the missing-JE issue are not continuing wrongs. We have held that subsequent appeals are generally not c ontinuing violations. See Turner v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. , 757 F. App’x 715, 720 (10th Cir. 2018) (“The subsequent stay of enforcement and appellate review . . . is not a continuing viol ation of [the plaintiff]’s constitutional rights.”); see also Mata v. Anderson , 635 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the continuing-wro ngs doctrine applies to “continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from the original violation” (citation omitted)). The only case Cobb cites to support his continuing-wrongs theo ry is a decadesold, out-of-circuit opinion, which stated th at sometimes a continuing wrong “may be perpetuated by otherwise legal actions, such as appealing the court decision in this
case.” Gordan v. City of Warren , 579 F.2d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 1978). In Gordan , the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the “continui ng wrong” was the c onstitutional violation of taking the plaintiffs’ propert y without just compensation. Id. It then explained that the defendants’ subsequent appeals “perpetuated” that wrong by making “it impossible for the plaintiffs to en joy the use of their property[.]” Id. Unlike Gordan , Tinker’s and Attorneys’ Defendants’ moti ons and appeals did not “perpetuate” Cobb’s alleged wrong of collecting against him without a JE. As discussed, Tinker’s and Attorney Defendants’ vi olations were “ over and done with” in October 2016— when they last tried to collect without a JE. Tiberi , 89 F.3d at 1431. Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 89 In sum, the district court did not e rr by declining to apply the continuingwrongs doctrine to Cobb’s a buse-of-process and FDCPA claims. b. Equitable Tolling Next, Cobb argues that the district court erred by not equitably tolling the statute of limitations for his claims. When a district court declines to apply equitable tolling, we review for abuse of discretion. Alexander v. Oklahoma , 382 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). “In the appropriate case, exceptional circumstances may justify tolling a statute of limitations.” Id. at 1219. Cobb insists that this case’s state-court litigation, including the appeals, constituted exceptional ci rcumstances. Yet, as the district court pointed out, Cobb cites no authority to supp ort his argument; he si mply asserts that equitable tolling is justified given the cas e’s “unique procedural history.” Cobb Opening Br. at 18. We conclude that the di strict court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to equitably toll the limita tions period for Cobb’s claims.
II. Attorneys’ Fees Next, we turn to Tinker’s and Attorney Defendants’ cross-app eal for attorneys’ fees under a litany of state a nd federal statutes. The distri ct court declined to award fees under any of them. “We review the district court’s decision not to award attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion.” Cowley v. W. Valley City , 782 F. App’x 712, 716 (10th Cir. 2019). Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 910 A. State Statutes Tinker and Attorney Defendants first argued that they were entitled to attorneys’ fees under three Ok lahoma statutes: (1) Okla. St at. tit. 12, § 2011.1; (2) Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 103; and (3) Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 761.1. These statutes require a court to award atto rneys’ fees to a prevailing party if it determines that a claim or defense was frivolous, brought in bad faith, not wellgrounded in fact, or unwarranted under ex isting law with no good-faith argument to change the law. 8 Here, the district court found that none of these grounds were met. But Tinker and Attorney Defendants offe r two arguments in rebuttal. First, they insist that the district court abdi cated its responsibility by failing to make the necessary findings as required by the statutes. We disagree. The district court made the required findings: “the Court finds this claim is not ‘fri volous.’ It was not asserted in bad faith; it was well grounded in fact , and plaintiff made a rational, good faith argument to support his position that the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations.” Supp. R. at 131.

8 Under § 2011.1, a court must award attorn eys’ fees if it determines that “a claim or defense asserted in the action by a nonpreva iling party was frivolous.” Section 2011.1 defines “frivol ous” as a “claim or de fense [that] was knowingly asserted in bad faith or w ithout any rational argument base d in law or facts to support the position of the litigant or to change existing law.” Similarl y, § 103 and § 761.1 mandate an award of attorneys’ fees to th e prevailing party if a court finds that a nonprevailing party’s claim or defense was brought “i n bad faith, was not well grounded in fact, or was unw arranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 1011 Next, Tinker and Attorney Defendants argue that Cobb conced ed that three of his claims were frivolous by voluntarily dismissing them after the filing of the motions to dismiss. But a party’s dismissi ng claims is not necessarily an admission that the claims were frivolous. As the dist rict court correctly pointed out, there are many potential reasons and t actics behind such a decision. We decline to speculate about Cobb’s motivation here. Thus, the district court did not abus e its discretion by declining to award attorneys’ fees to Tinker a nd Attorney Defendants under the Oklahoma statutes.
B. Federal Statutes Tinker and Attorney Defendants also a sserted that they were entitled to attorneys’ fees under 15 U.S. C. § 1692k(a)(3); 42 U.S. C. § 1988; and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under § 1692k(a)(3), a court may aw ard attorneys’ fees if a FDCPA claim was “brought in bad faith and for the purpo se of harassment.” Under § 1988, a court may, “in its discretion,” award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in civil rights

cases. See Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). And under § 1927, a court may require any attorney “who so mu ltiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously” to pay attorneys’ fees . But awarding fees under § 1927 should be reserved only for “ins tances evidencing se rious and standard disregard for the orderly process of justice.” Miera v. Dairyland Ins. Co. , 143 F.3d 1337, 1342 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 1112 Tinker and Attorney Defendants argued that Cobb’s claims were meritless because they were barred by the statute of li mitations. So, as they see it, Cobb must have sued in bad faith, to ha rass them, and to multiply the proceedings in this case. The district court rejected that argum ent. Indeed, it found that Cobb hadn’t brought his claims in bad faith or for ha rassment purposes. It also concluded that Cobb’s statute-of-limitations arguments were rational and ma de in good faith. And finally, it determined that Cobb’s attorneys’ actions di d not satisfy the demanding standard required to impose fees under § 1927 . Once more, we agree with the district court’s reasoning. Thus, we conclude that the district cour t did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorneys’ fees to Tinker or Attorney Defendants. 9
CONCLUSION The district court properly dismisse d Cobb’s abuse-of-process and FDCPA claims as barred by the statute of limitati ons. It also did not abuse its discretion by declining to award attorneys’ fees to Ti nker and Attorney Defe ndants. We affirm.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge

9 Though the district court did not addres s in its order whether attorneys’ fees would have been warranted und er § 1988, that statute is inapplicable because this case didn’t involve civ il-rights claims. Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 12