J-A19043-16

2016 PA Super 307

FREYDA NEYMAN, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellant

v.

FLORENCE BUCKLEY

No. 2203 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered June 19, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court

at No(s): 008400, Term June 2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

OPINION BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED DECEMBER 28, 2016

Appellant, Freyda Neyman, appeals from the order of the Philadelphia 

County Court of Common Pleas Family Court Division that dismissed her 

complaint in divorce seeking the dissolution of her Vermont civil union. 

Appellant claims the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint for lack of 

jurisdiction, and in support, she argues that under principles of comity, the 

Family Court Division had jurisdiction to dissolve her civil union under the 

Pennsylvania Divorce Code.1 We hold that a Vermont civil union creates the 

functional equivalent of marriage for the purposes of dissolution and 

conclude the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. Therefore, we 

reverse and remand for further proceedings. 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3101-3904. 
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On July 12, 2002, Appellant and Appellee, Florence Buckley 

(collectively, “the parties”), two adult Pennsylvania residents, entered into a 

civil union in Vermont, the first state to offer civil unions. The parties began 

living separate and apart in December 2002. At that time, same-sex 

marriage was not recognized in the United States. 

 In 2014, the parties each signed respective affidavits of consent, 

which specified that their civil union was irretrievably broken and stated the 

intention to request a final decree of divorce/dissolution. On June 2, 2014, 

Appellant filed a complaint in the trial court averring that the parties were 

adults who had resided in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for at least six 

months prior to the complaint and seeking the entry of a divorce/dissolution 

decree under Section 3301(c) of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code. On 

February 4, 2015, Appellant filed a praecipe to transmit the record of the 

entry of a final decree/dissolution of the civil union. 

On June 22, 2015, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint 

stating:

[T]he Family Court Division may only divorce parties from 

the ‘bonds of matrimony.’ Pa.R.C.P. 1920.1 (a). This court 

cannot issue a Decree or Order dissolving the Vermont 

Civil Union that is the subject of this action. Therefore, the 

Complaint in Divorce is hereby dismissed. The Civil Trial 

Division of Philadelphia County has jurisdiction over 

complaints seeking dissolution of civil unions as actions in 

equity and has entered order/judgments dissolving same. 
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Order, 6/22/15.2

 Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court did 

not address. Appellant took the instant timely appeal on July 22, 2015. On 

August 20, 2015, Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

The trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) responsive opinion on 

February 23, 2016. The court observed the Pennsylvania Constitution of 

1968 vests jurisdiction in the family court division for matters implicating 

domestic relations, including “divorce and annulment and property matters 

relating thereto.” Trial Ct. Op., 2/23/16, at 6-7 (discussing Pa. Const. art. 

V, Sched. § 16). The court concluded the Divorce Code and the Rules of 

Civil Procedure refer to “divorce from the bonds of matrimony,” and did not 

authorize the dissolution of civil unions. Id. at 4-5. Moreover, the court 

determined it was under no obligation to recognize a Vermont civil union as 

a marriage because Vermont maintains a distinction between a civil union 

and a same-sex civil marriage. Id. at 5. Lastly, the court noted that the 

appropriate forum for Appellant’s action was in the civil trial division. Id. at 

8. 

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review: 

 

2 Although the order dismissing Appellant’s complaint was signed on June 

19, 2015, it was not entered until June 22, 2015. 
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1. Whether the Court of Common Pleas Family Division has 

jurisdiction over the dissolution of a Vermont civil union 

entered into by Pennsylvania residents?

2. Whether a Vermont civil union may be treated as a 

marriage by a Pennsylvania court for purposes of 

dissolving that civil union under the Divorce Code. 

Appellant’s Brief at 4.3

As the instant case involves the question of whether a legal cause of 

action in dissolution exists, our standard of review is de novo and this Court 

must independently review the record to determine whether a legal divorce 

action is presented. Jayne v. Jayne, 663 A.2d 169, 172 (Pa. Super. 1995).

As to the jurisdiction of the family court divisions of the courts of 

common pleas, Section 952 of the Judiciary Code provides:

The divisions of a court of common pleas are 

administrative units composed of those judges of the court 

responsible for the transaction of specified classes of the 

business of the court. In a court of common pleas having 

two or more divisions each division of the court is vested 

with the full jurisdiction of the whole court, but the 

business of the court may be allocated among the divisions 

of the court by or pursuant to general rules.

42 Pa.C.S. § 952.

The Schedule to Article 5 of the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution 

pertains to Philadelphia and states: 

(q) The court of common pleas through the family court 

division of the court of common pleas shall exercise 

jurisdiction in the following matters:

 

3 We note that because Appellant’s issues on appeal are inextricably linked, 

we discuss them in tandem.
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(i) Domestic Relations: desertion or nonsupport of 

wives, children and indigent parents, including children 

born out of wedlock; proceedings for custody of 

children; divorce and annulment and property matters 

relating thereto.

Pa. Const. Sched. Art. 5, § 16(q)(i)

The Divorce Code defines ”divorce” as “divorce from the bonds of 

matrimony.”4 23 Pa.C.S. § 3103; see also Pa.R.C.P. 1920.1. The courts of 

common pleas have “original jurisdiction in cases of divorce and for the 

annulment of void or voidable marriages[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3104(a). 

Courts with jurisdiction of domestic relations have broad jurisdiction to 

resolve matters uniquely pertaining to matrimonial causes, including 

disposition of property between the parties, issues related to children, and to 

resolve “[a]ny other matters . . . which fairly and expeditiously may be 

determined and disposed of in such action.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3104(a)(5). The 

Divorce Code aims to “[m]ake the law for legal dissolution of marriage 

 

4 The phrase “bonds of matrimony” is not expressly defined by statute or 

rule. However, in its common usages, matrimony is a synonym for 

marriage. See Black Law Dictionary 8th ed. 999 (defining matrimony as 

“The ceremony or state of being married; MARRIAGE (1)”) (2004); 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1393 (1986) (defining 

matrimony as “1 a : the union of a man and woman as husband and wife :

married state : married life : MARRIAGE); Black Law Dictionary 5th ed. 882 

(1978) (defining matrimony as “Marriage (q.v.), in the sense of the relation 

or status, not the ceremony). Additionally, the policies set forth in 23 

Pa.C.S. § 3102 make clear that matrimony refers to marriage. See 23 

Pa.C.S. 3102(a)(1).
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effective for dealing with the realities of matrimonial experience.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 3102(a)(1). 

The family court division, therefore, may exercise broad equitable 

power:

In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full 

equity power and jurisdiction and may issue 

injunctions or other orders which are necessary to 

protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate 

the purposes of this part and may grant such other 

relief or remedy as equity and justice require against 

either party or against any third person over whom 

the court has jurisdiction and who is involved in or 

concerned with the disposition of the cause.

23 Pa.C.S. § 3323(f). In Magee v. Magee, 519 A.2d 994 (Pa. Super. 

1987), this Court discussed the specialized role of the family court division 

as follows: 

The Family Court Division has all the powers that can 

be exercised by a court of common pleas. The need 

to have all matters relating to family problems 

directed to this specialized division is obvious, 

particularly when there are different claims relating 

to the same issue, as is the case here. Obviously, 

the Family Division judge is equally competent to 

decide the action in assumpsit, if properly brought, 

relating to support, medical expenses and education, 

founded on contract law under a separation 

agreement, as he is to determine the same matters 

under statutory and common law, pursuant to a 

complaint in support. 

 

Id. at 996.

A brief review of the evolution of Pennsylvania, Vermont, and federal 

law regarding same-sex marriage and civil unions provides necessary 
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context to understanding the legal properties of a Vermont civil union vis-avis Pennsylvania law. In September 1996, the United States Congress 

passed the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which codified a definition of 

“marriage” and “spouse” as follows: “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal 

union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 

‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a 

wife.” See 1 U.S.C. § 7. Additionally, DOMA provided:

No State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public 

act . . . of any other State . . . respecting a relationship 

between persons of the same sex that is treated as a 

marriage under the laws of such other State . . . or a right 

or claim arising from such relationship. 

See 28 U.S.C § 1738C. 

One month later, in October 1996, Pennsylvania amended its Marriage 

Law to include a definition of marriage and mandate the non-recognition of 

marriage between persons of the same sex. Specifically, Section 1102 

states:

The following words and phrases when used in this part 

[the Marriage Law] shall have the meanings given to them 

in this section unless the context clearly indicates 

otherwise:

* * *

“Marriage.” A civil contract by which one man and one 

woman take each other for husband and wife.

23 Pa.C.S. § 1102. Section 1704 provides:

It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding 

public policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be 
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between one man and one woman. A marriage between 

persons of the same sex which was entered into in another 

state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered 

into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.

23 Pa.C.S. § 1704.

In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the Vermont 

Constitution required same-sex couples be afforded the same statutory 

rights and protections as opposite-sex couples. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 

864, 886 (Vt. 1999). However, the Baker Court did not mandate that 

same-sex couples be permitted to marry. Id. at 867. Rather, the Court 

required the Vermont legislature to take action to comply with its holding. 

Id. at 867. In 2000, the Vermont legislature responded to Baker by 

creating a civil union scheme. 

The Vermont civil union statute specifically provided “all the same 

benefits, protections and responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to 

spouses in a civil marriage.” 15 V.S.A. § 1204(a); see also Miller-Jenkins 

v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 968 (Vt. 2006) (noting intent of Vermont 

legislature “in enacting the civil union laws was to create legal equality 

between relationships based on civil unions and those based on marriage”) 

Additionally, the Vermont civil union statute provided that any term or 

definition denoting a spousal relationship, such as spouse, family, immediate 

family, dependent, next of kin, included “a party to a civil union.” 15 V.S.A. 

§ 1204(b). Significantly, all of the laws concerning divorce, including 

property division, apply to civil unions under Vermont law. 15 V.S.A. § 
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1204(d); see also id. § 1206(a) (as enacted effective in 2000, Section 1206 

stated: “The family court shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings relating 

to the dissolution of civil unions. The dissolution of civil unions shall follow 

the same procedures and be subject to the same substantive rights and 

obligations that are involved in the dissolution of marriage in accordance 

with chapter 11 of this title, including any residency requirements.”) 

Although Vermont initially did “not bestow the status of civil marriage” 

to same-sex unions, the Vermont legislature recognized same-sex marriage 

in 2009. See Solomon v. Guidry, ___ A.3d ___, ___, 2016 WL 5338492 at 

*1-2 (Vt. Sept. 23, 2016). The 2009 statute also repealed parts of the civil 

union statutes, but specified that civil unions entered into prior to September 

1, 2009, were to remain in effect. Id. Under the 2009 law, parties to a civil 

union were free to marry each other, but were required to dissolve their civil 

union before marrying a different individual. See 15 V.S.A. §§ 4, 1204(c). 

Effective in 2012, Vermont amended its divorce and civil union law to 

address the specific problem faced by “same-sex out-of-state couples joined 

in a Vermont civil union or marriage because their state of residence does 

not recognize their union or marriage.” Solomon, 2016 WL 5338492 at *2 

(citation omitted). Vermont law thereafter recognized separate tracks for 

filing a complaint in divorce and a dissolution of a civil union, although both 

matters are subject to the jurisdiction of Vermont’s family court. See 15 
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V.S.A. § 592(b) (relaxing residence requirements for complaint in divorce); 

see also 15 V.S.A. § 1206(b) (as amended effective 2012). 

There are few cases in Pennsylvania addressing out-of-state civil 

unions. In 2011, the Berks County Court of Common Pleas Orphans Court 

Division in Himmelberger v. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 0610-286 (Berks Cty. 

Sept. 28, 2011) (slip op.), considered whether a petitioner, who was a party 

to a New Jersey civil union and whose partner had died, could apply a zeropercent spousal tax rate for inheritance purposes. The trial court rejected 

the petitioner’s claim that she was entitled to an exemption to the 

inheritance tax because she conceded she was not married and therefore, 

she and her partner were not “husband and wife” as required by the tax 

statute. Id. at 11 (discussing 72 P.S. § 9116).

In Himmelberger, the trial court addressed the petitioner’s argument 

that her New Jersey civil union granting legal rights was entitled to full faith 

and credit. The court suggested that New Jersey civil unions were the 

equivalent of marriage in Pennsylvania:

“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other 

name would smell as sweet.” Romeo and Juliet, Act II, 

Scene 2, W. Shakespeare. That which New Jersey calls a 

“civil union” has the odor of a “marriage.” By the very 

terms of its statutes, New Jersey gives civil union couples 

the very same rights, benefits, burdens, and 

responsibilities as spouses in a marriage, except the right 

to call themselves “spouses” or “married.” In general, in 

New Jersey, partners in a civil union are treated no 

differently than spouses in a marriage with respect to 

procedures for forming and dissolving the legal 

relationship, rights of support, the taking of title to real 
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estate, causes of action normally reserved for spouses 

(such as wrongful death and loss of consortium), surname 

changes, survivors benefits, and probate rights. The only 

differences distinguishing the two forms of legal 

relationships are sexual orientation and semantics. The 

[c]ourt firmly believes the civil union entered into in New 

Jersey is the equivalent of a marriage . . . .

Id. at 5-6. The court concluded the petitioner’s argument to extend full 

faith and credit to New Jersey’s civil union law failed because DOMA 

“forg[ave] Pennsylvania from recognizing New Jersey’s law.” Id. at 12. On 

appeal, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed on the basis of the 

trial court’s opinion on all issues. See Himmelberger v. Dept. Revenue, 

47 A.3d 160 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

On June 26, 2013, the United States Supreme Court decided United 

States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). At issue in Windsor was 

DOMA’s definition of “marriage” as “only a legal union between one man and 

one woman as husband and wife” and a “spouse” as “a person of the 

opposite sex who is a husband or wife.”5 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 

(discussing 1 U.S.C. § 7). In that case, the Internal Revenue Service relied 

on DOMA to determine an individual in a same-sex marriage, which was 

recognized under New York law, was not a surviving spouse entitled to the 

marital exemption from federal estate tax. Id. at 2683 (discussing 26 

U.S.C. § 2506(a)). The Windsor Court held that “DOMA is unconstitutional 

 

5 Windsor did not address 28 U.S.C. § 1783C permitting states to refuse to 

recognize another states’ law regarding same-sex marriage. Windsor, 133 

S. Ct. at 2682-83. 
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as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth 

Amendment of the Constitution.” Id. at 2695. The Court, however, limited 

its holding to “those lawful marriages,” that is, those persons to “whom the 

State, by its marriage law, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.” 

Id. at 2696. 

Nearly one year later, on May 20, 2014, the United States District 

Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania concluded that Pennsylvania’s 

Marriage Law’s definition of marriage and refusal to recognize out-of-state 

same-sex marriages were unconstitutional. See Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 

F. Supp. 2d 410, 423-24 (M.D.Pa. 2014). The Whitewood court enjoined 

the defendants, a county and Commonwealth official, from enforcing 23 

Pa.C.S. §§ 1102 and 1704 Id. at 423-24. The court cited Windsor and 

reasoned, “Pennsylvania’s non-recognition law robs [same sex couples] who 

are already married of their fundamental liberty interest in the legal 

recognition of their marriages in Pennsylvania.” Id. at 424.

The United States Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 

S. Ct. 2584 (2015), on June 26, 2015—two years after Windsor, and four 

days after the Family Court dismissed the instant complaint for dissolution of 

the parties’ civil union. The Obergefell Court held that states must 

recognize same-sex marriages entered into in other states:

Being married in one State but having that valid marriage 

denied in another is one of the most perplexing and 

distressing complications in the law of domestic relations. 

Leaving the current state of affairs in place would maintain 
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and promote instability and uncertainty. For some 

couples, even an ordinary drive into a neighboring State to 

visit family or friends risks causing severe hardship in the 

event of a spouse’s hospitalization while across state lines. 

In light of the fact that many States already allow samesex marriage—and hundreds of thousands of these 

marriages already have occurred—the disruption caused by 

the recognition bans is significant and ever-growing.

. . . if States are required by the Constitution to issue 

marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the justifications 

for refusing to recognize those marriages performed 

elsewhere are undermined. The Court, in this decision, 

holds same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental 

right to marry in all States. It follows that the Court also 

must hold-and it now does hold-that there is no lawful 

basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex 

marriage performed in another State on the ground of its 

same-sex character. 

Id. at 2607-08. The United States Supreme Court in Obergefell held that 

the right to marry is a fundamental constitutional right, which may not be 

withheld from same sex couples and concluded “that there is no lawful basis 

for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in 

another State on the ground of its same-sex character.” Id. at 2607-08.

Obergefell does not resolve all questions regarding the status of civil 

unions and divorce. As discussed by the Vermont Supreme Court, 

[B]ecause civil marriage and civil unions remain legally 

distinct entities in Vermont and because Obergefell 

mandated that states recognize only same-sex marriage, 

uncertainty remains as to whether Obergefell requires 

other states to recognize and dissolve civil unions 

established in Vermont. For that reason, § 1206(b) is still 

necessary to remedy the issue originally addressed by the 

Legislature in 2012—that “there are many same-sex 

couples who established a civil union . . . in Vermont who 

are no longer together, yet they continue to be legally 
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bound with no recourse other than moving to Vermont and

becoming residents.” 2011, No. 92 (Adj. Sess.), § 1. 

Thus, nonresident couples who wish to dissolve their 

Vermont civil unions may do so in Vermont courts, as long 

as they follow the requirements of § 1206(b). 

Solomon, 2016 WL 5338492 at *3.

With this background in mind, we consider whether the legal principle 

of comity mandates recognition of a Vermont civil union as the legal 

equivalent of marriage for purposes of dissolution pursuant to the Divorce 

Code in Pennsylvania. Comity refers to the principle that one state “will give 

effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state out of deference and 

mutual respect, rather than out of duty.” Smith v. Firemens Ins. Co. of 

Newark, N.J., 590 A.2d 24, 27 (Pa. Super. 1991). This principle of comity 

permits litigants to seek relief in Pennsylvania courts based upon a different 

state’s applicable law:

We recognize the demands of comity, and our courts 

should be, as they are, always ready to accede to them; 

but comity requires of us that we administer the laws of 

another state between suitors in our own courts whenever 

this becomes necessary to the proper administration of 

justice in the particular case. It does not require us to 

dismiss the parties with directions to proceed to Maine or 

California or some other state in which the contract was 

made, or the parties were domiciled, so that the law of a 

given state may be administered by the courts of that 

state, but simply that we shall apply the same rule that the 

courts of the proper state would apply.

Commonwealth v. Daven, 148 A. 524, 526 (Pa. 1930)

“However, application of comity is a matter of judicial discretion.” 

Chestnut v. Pediatric Homecare of America, Inc., 617 A.2d 347, 350 
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(Pa. Super. 1992). “This Court has previously exercised comity when 

application of another state’s law contradicts no public policy of Pennsylvania 

and instead furthers a Pennsylvania policy.” Id.

Pennsylvania has historically had a strong public policy preference 

toward the recognition of various definitions of marriage involving oppositesex couples:

Specifically regarding conflicts as to recognition of marital 

status, there is a strong policy favoring uniformity of 

result. In an age of widespread travel and ease of 

mobility, it would create inordinate confusion and defy the 

reasonable expectations of citizens whose marriage is valid 

in one state to hold that marriage invalid elsewhere. On 

the other hand, each state may, within constitutional 

limits, create laws and procedures concerning the 

sanctification of marriages . . . and those laws and 

procedures should not be circumvented by the sham of 

traveling to a nearby less stringent jurisdiction. 

In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. 1974) (holding that 

decedent’s Virginia marriage, which was prohibited in Pennsylvania due to an 

adulterous spouse law, must be recognized in Pennsylvania for inheritance 

tax purposes). Indeed, it is beyond cavil that unless a marriage runs afoul 

of Pennsylvania public policy, “the general rule as to the validity of foreign 

marriages prevails.” Schofield v. Schofield, 51 Pa. Super. 564, 575 

(1911) (holding that Delaware marriage of first cousins would be recognized 

in Pennsylvania in spite of statutory prohibition of such marriages in 

Pennsylvania).
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In the instant case, we conclude that the legal properties of a Vermont 

civil union weigh in favor of recognizing such unions as the legal equivalent 

of marriage for purposes of dissolution under the Divorce Code. The 

Vermont legislature created civil unions in order to provide same-sex couples 

with a statutory equivalent to marriage at a time when same-sex marriage 

was not yet available anywhere in the United States. See Baker, 744 A.2d 

at 867. The Vermont statute specifically grants parties to a civil union all 

the same “benefits, protections and responsibilities under law” as are 

conferred to “spouses in a marriage.” 15 V.S.A. § 1204(a). Further, 

Vermont law explicitly provides that the law of domestic relations, including 

divorce and property division, are applicable to parties to a civil union. See 

id. As noted by a Pennsylvania court in Himmelberger, a distinct “odor of 

marriage” is present in circumstances where the only substantive difference 

in the institutions of a civil union and marriage are “sexual orientation and 

semantics.” See Himmelberger at 5-6.

Nonetheless, we recognize that the legal principle of comity should 

only be utilized when the application of another state’s law contradicts no 

public policy of Pennsylvania. See Chestnut, 617 A.2d at 350. In the 

past, Pennsylvania has favored marriage as a union between opposite sexes 

only, as was codified in the Marriage Law in 1996. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 1102, 

1704. The policies in Sections 1102 and 1704 of the Marriage Law followed 

the federal DOMA. See 1 U.S.C. § 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. However, the 
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tectonic shift in the law regarding same-sex marriage, while not 

determinative in this appeal, is significant. The United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in Whitewood specifically held that

Pennsylvania statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage and declaring samesex marriages entered in other jurisdictions to be void in Pennsylvania were 

unconstitutional and constituted an impermissible abridgment of the 

fundamental right of same-sex marriage. See Whitewood, 992 F. Supp. at 

423-24. That decision, which included a permanent injunction on the 

enforcement of 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 1102 and 1704, was not appealed. 

Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell cemented the 

fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry and prohibited any lack of 

recognition of such marriages based upon the relationships “same-sex 

character.” See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct at 2607-08. 

In this case, when the parties entered into a Vermont civil union in 

2002, civil marriage was not available to them because they are of the same 

sex. Moreover, the parties separated before other states began to recognize 

same-sex marriage. Therefore, declining to acknowledge the parties’ civil 

union as the equivalent of marriage would essentially penalize the parties 

simply for their same-sex status because the Vermont civil union statute 

explicitly granted same-sex couples equivalent rights to those only available 

to opposite-sex couples through marriage at that time. 
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Further, recognition of a Vermont civil union as the legal equivalent of 

a marriage for purposes of dissolution under the Divorce Code would 

promote the strong Pennsylvania public policy interest in uniformity of 

result, particularly in the context of the recognition of marriage. See In re 

Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d at 258; Schofield, 51 Pa. Super. at 575. In 

In re Estate of Lenherr, our Pennsylvania Supreme Court warned that 

failing to recognize a marriage deemed valid in another jurisdiction would 

“create inordinate confusion and defy the reasonable expectations of 

citizens.” In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d at 258. In this case, when 

the parties entered into a Vermont civil union, they were aware that they 

were subject to all of the same rights and responsibilities provided to 

opposite-sex couples through civil marriage. Therefore, in order to provide 

the parties with the uniformity of result strongly favored in Pennsylvania, 

this Court must recognize their Vermont civil union as the legal equivalent of 

a marriage for purposes of dissolution. 

The application of the principle of comity to Vermont civil unions 

further promotes interstate uniformity and would limit forum shopping aimed 

at avoiding the responsibilities imposed by Vermont law in the event of 

dissolution. For instance, if a party to a Vermont civil union wished to avoid 

the equitable distribution of “marital” property or other domestic support 

obligations, that party could search for a jurisdiction that would decline to 

recognize such obligations even though they are expressly provided under 
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the Vermont statute. 15 V.S.A. § 1204; See Elia-Warnken v. Elia, 972 

N.E.2d 17, 20 (Mass. 2012) (recognizing Vermont civil union is the functional 

equivalent of marriage and noting that refusal to recognize civil union as 

such would permit parties to shirk their financial responsibilities under 

Vermont law and potentially engage in polygamy). But see O’ReillyMorshead v. O’Reilly-Morshead, 19 N.Y.S.3d 689, 697 (Sup. Ct. Monroe 

Cty. 2015) (dissolving civil union under general equitable principles but 

declining to apply equitable distribution to divide the couple’s property). 

We acknowledge that Vermont maintains two separate statutory 

schemes for the dissolution of civil unions and divorce for civil marriages. 

However, both institutions are subject to the same benefits and obligations 

under Vermont law. See 15 V.S.A. § 1204. Under the legal precept of 

comity, Pennsylvania residents should not have to travel to Vermont to avail 

themselves of the rights and obligations they undertook when they entered 

into a Vermont civil union. See Daven, 148 A. at 526 (holding that applying 

the principle of comity in Pennsylvania relieves litigants of the necessity of 

traveling to other jurisdictions). 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a Vermont civil union 

should be considered the legal equivalent of a marriage for the purposes of 

dissolution under the Pennsylvania Divorce Code. Precluding family court 

jurisdiction simply due to the use of the word “marriage” and “divorce” in 

Pennsylvania jurisdictional authority elevates mere semantics over the 
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fundamental domestic character of the relationship at issue. See Magee 519 

A.2d at 996 (“The need to have all matters relating to family problems 

directed to this specialized division [family court] is obvious[.]”). The family 

court division possesses the expertise and the unique toolbox available, via 

the Pennsylvania Divorce Code, necessary to resolve the intimate and 

complex domestic matters likely to be at issue incident to the dissolution of 

a Vermont civil union, such as equitable distribution, child custody, and 

support. These benefits and obligations of marriage are the precise legal 

protections explicitly provided under Vermont’s civil union statute and 

exactly what the parties knowingly accepted when they entered into a 

Vermont civil union. See 15 V.S.A. § 1204. In Vermont, the enforcement of 

the domestic benefits and obligations attendant to a civil union, including 

dissolution, is relegated to Vermont family courts. Likewise, jurisdiction over 

Vermont civil unions should properly vest with Pennsylvania’s family courts.

Accordingly, we reverse the family court’s order dismissing Appellant’s 

complaint for dissolution of her Vermont civil union and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
J-A19043-16

- 21 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/28/2016