ED 203 071

TITLE

INSTITUTION

SPONS AGENCY

PUB DATE

NOTE

AVAILABLE FROM

DOCUMENT RESUME

CE 029 121

Enhanced work Projects--The Interim Findings from the

Ventures in Community Improvement Demonstration.

Youth Work Experience. Youth Knowledge Development

Report 7.5.

Corporation for Public/Private Ventures,

Philadelphia, Pa.

Employment and Training Administration (DOL),

Washington, D.C. Office of Youth Programs.

May BO

525p.: For related documents see CE 029 106.

Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing

Office, Washington, DC 20402 (Stock No.

029-014-00173-2, $9.50).

EDRS PPICE MF02/PC21 Plus Postage.

DESCRIPTORS Adolescents: *Building Trades: Community Change:

*Community Programs: Construction Industry:

Demography: Demonstration Programs; Disadvantaged

Youth: Economically Disadvantaged: Linking Agents:

Models: Out of School Youth: Participant

Characteristics: Program Descriptions; *Program

Development: *Program Effectiveness: Program

Implementation: Work Experiende Programs: Youth:

*Youth Employment: *Youth Programs

IDENTIFIERS Connecticut (New Haven) : Florida (Broward County) :

Georgia (Atlanta): Illinois (Chicago): New Jersey

(Newark): New York (New Yorkl: Pennsylvania

(Philadelphia): *Ventures in Community Improvement

Program: Wisconsin (Milwaukee)

ABSTRACT

The Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI

demonstration, a national research and demonstration program, was

designed to test the effectiveness of a youth employment program in

various settings. Eight VICI programs, each of which enrolled up to

60 unemployed, out-of-school, economically disadvantaged youths

between the ages of 16 and 19, were started at the following sites:

Broward County, Florida: Chicago, Illinois: Milwaukee, Wisconsin;

Newark, Jersey: New Haven, Connecticut: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:

and the Sonth Bronx in New York City. Program participants worked

five days a week under supervision of union lourneyman drawn from the

construction and building trades. Although the work varied among the

sites, it was aimed at making tangible community improvements through

such activities as refurbishing public facilities or repairing homes

occupied by poor or elderly people from the same neighborhoods as the

youths enrolled in the program. The VICI model relied heavily on a

set of linkages (including educational institutions, labor unions,

and various local agencies) to tie the program to other institutions.

Activities at each site were E nmarized and evaluated, and practical

suggestions for prime sponsors eeking to implement VICI-type

projects were made. (Other youth knowledge and development reports

are available separately--see note.) (MN)
YOUTH KNOWLE

R

YOUTH WO

Enhanced Work Proj

From the Ventures I

Dem

414 'F'gr
DEVELO

T

PERIENCE

The Interim Fi

munity Improv

tion

0

.4'
U.S. Department of Lebo,

Ray Marshall, Secretary

Employment and Training Administration

Ernest G. Green, Assistant Secretary for

Employment and Training Administration

Office of Youth Programs

Material contained in this publication is

in the public domain and may be

reproduced, fully or partially, without

permission of the Federal Government.

Source credit is requested but not

required. Permission is required only

to reproduce any copyrighted material

contained herein.
YOUTH KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT REPORT 7.5

ENHANCED WORK PROJECTS- -

THE INTERIM FINDINGS FROM THE

VENTURES IN COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT

DEMONSTRATION

Corporation for Public/Private Ventures

Vor sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington. I). C. 20402
OVERVIEW

Work projects have always been and will remain a fundamental

component of youth programming. There is almost infinite

diversity in the focus of such projects as well as in their

scale, duration, organizational complexity, linkages, supervision and skill requirements. The most prevalent projects

are short-term. They spend the preponderance of resources on

the wagesand salaries of participants. Materials, equipment

and supervision are at a minimum. The work requires and transmits limited skills. Such projects are relatively easy to

organize. There are few risks. On the other hand, the work

experience rarely leads directly to career jobs and is less

likely to hold the attention of youth participants than more

demanding and rewarding projects. Productivity may also be

limited; certainly there are not likely to be lasting community

improverrents because of the absence of capital investment as

part of the projects.

"Enriched" projects are those with more ambitious objectives

which usually require greater organization, planning and linkages. To accomplish their missions, they tend to use more

skilled and higher cost supervisors, as well as a greater proportion of nonlabor inputs. With more interrelated compohents,

"enriched" projects are "riskier" to mount although they may be

more productive in their output as well as their lasting impacts

on youth. To the extent they spend more for capital, supervision and management, they have reduced direct employment

effects per dollar of outlay.

Clearly, there are a set of tradeoffs in choosing between basic

and "enriched" projects. Successful "enriched" projects are

likely to be very attractive in terms of their visible outputs,

the quality of the work experience, the impact on enrollees and

the cooperation in their design and operation. Yet the "success"

rate with which enriched projects fulfill their objectives LT

less than that of projects which are more pedestrian in their

goals. More Youth are employed per dollar in the less ambitious

projects. Productivity per dollar of youth wages may be

different than productivity per dollar of program cost because

of the high overhead costs related to enrichment.

A major knowledge development objective under the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act is to learn more about these

tradeoffs, as well as to determine the conditions and approaches

to maximize program "batting averages" and to identify the types

of youth who can most benefit from the "enriched" and "nonenriched"

approaches. There are several discrete demonstrations exploring

these issues in multiple sites, with varying delivery agents

and careful research designs.
The Ventures in Community Improvement or VICI program is an

attempt to replicate a model "enriched" project in a number

of different locations. It utilizes an intermediary, the

Corporation for Public/Private Ventures as the replication

and research agent, to assure that the fundamental enrichment

elements are maintained in the projects. Fifteen local agents

selected on the basis of need were initially invited to submit

proposals, From these, nine were selected for funding, of

which eight were to be mounted under the unbrella of CPPV.

The eight local projects share certain basic elements:

o Scale - The projects all are budgeted for 60 participants.

NE= they operate locally through a variety of worksites, this

represents a large undertaking for a single local delivery

agent. For instance, most projects mounted under YCCIP

have less than ten participants. The VICI projects are larger

than all the combined projects under formula"funded YCCIP

in some smaller prime sponsors.

o Continuity - Work projects are usually funded through annual

grant applications. Most are limited in their period of

operation to less than a year, after start-up and phase-down.

VICI projects were initially scheduled for 18 months and

have been extended.

o Enrichtd Supervision - VICI projects are budgeted on the

basis of a 1 to 6 supervisor/youth ratio. Arlequate supervisory wage levels are provided to permit employment of

journeymen.

o Linkages - All of the projects draw on other sources of

funding for materials and equipment; in some cases, these

alternatives amount to a substantial share of total project

costs. There is a heavy emphasis on linkages with labor

unions and apprenticeship programs, both in a formal sense

and in the hiring of journeymen as supervisors.

o Planning and Oversight - Extensive planning and development

was rf....luired for sites to be funded. Through the intermediate agency, each project receives an inordinate degree

of oversight and technical as well as problem-solving assistance.

o Research - Extensive research requirements are built into

the grants in order to learn more about laws-scale work

experience efforts. These requirements are burdensome

but also contribute to more disciplined management.
o Cost - VICI projects are costly because of scale, but also

generate less youth employment per dollar of expenditure

because of the emphasis on supervision and the use of high

cost journeymen.

The purpose of the VICI demonstration was to test whether "enriched" projects with these elements could be feasibly replicated in a variety of locations, and whether the activities

would be more cost effective than traditional, nonenriched

work projects as measured by comparative enrollee impacts and

the productive output generated. This report contains a process study of implementation, the early results of the impact

assessments, and a summary report on the VICI experience.

There is convincing evidence that the "enriched" project approach

is both feasible and replicable. Site selection was based on

need, yet at least six of the eight sites mounted under CPPV's

auspices must be considered successfully meeting most major objectives. There were problems, as anticipated, which were related mostly to linkages in securing outside funding for materials

and equipment, but these have generally been overcome.

There is convincing evidence that the "enriched" projects have

a greater impact 3n job placement and entrance into apprenticeship than do less ambitious work projects mounted under YCCIP

and other national demonstrations.

There is evidence that the projects produce valuable output and

that the efficiency and effectiveness of the projects increase

with time.

There is evidence concerning the types of youth who benefit most

within the disadvantaged participant group. It would appear that

VICI might best serve as an advanced component within a local

CETA system which would draw on youth of demonstrated maturity

who had decided on a career in construction related work Given

the higher cost per participant, it is important that those most

needing and likely to benefit from this approach be directed to

it.

Until the full participant impact studies are completed, as

well as the cost and output analysis of other projects, it

is difficult to make a judgment about relative cost-effectiveness of enrichment. However, there are clearly differential

impacts resulting from enrichments and the approach is feasible,

which would suggest that the more comprehensive findings will

be positive.

This volume is one of the products of the "knowledge development"

effort implemented under the mandate of the Youth Employment and

Demonstration Projects Act of 1977. :rhe knowledge development

effort consists of hundreds of separate research, evaluation and

demonstration activities which will result in literally thousands
of written products. The activities have been structured from

the outset so that each is self-standing but also interrelated

with a host of other activities. The framework is presented in

A KnoWledge Development Plan for the Youth Employment' and Demonstration Pro4edts Act of 1977, A Knowledge DeVelopMent Plan for

the Youth 'I'n'itia't'i've's F'isca'l' 1979 and Completing the Youth

Agenda: A, Plan for Knowledge Development, Dissemination and

Application for Fiscal 1980.

Information is available or will be coming available from these

various knowledge development efforts to help resolve an almost

limitless array of issues. However, policy and practical application will usually require integration and synthesis from a

wide array of products, which, in turn, depends on knowledge

and availability of these products. A major shortcoming of

past research, evaluation and demonstration activities has been

the failure to organize and disseminate the products adequately

to assure the full exploitation of the findings. The magnitude

and structure of the youth knowledge development effort puts a

premium on structured analysis and wide dissemination.

As part of its knowledge development mandate, therefore, the

Office of Youth Programs of the Department of Labor will organize,

publish and disseminate the written products of all major research,

evaluation and demonstration activities supported directly by

or mounted in conjunction with OYP knowledge development efforts.

Some of the same products may also be published and disseminated

through other channels, but they will be included in the structured series of Youth Knowledge Development Reports in order to

facilitate access and integration.

The Youth Knowledgo Development Reports, of which this is one,

are divided into twelve broad categories:

1. Knowledge Development Framework: The products in

this category are concerned with the structure of knowledge

development activities, the assessment methodologies which

are employed, validation of measurement instruments, the

translation of knowledge into policy, and the strategy for

disseminating findings.

2. Research on Youth Employment and Employability

Development: The products in this category represent analyses

of existing data, presentation of findings from new data

sources, special studies of dimensions of youth labor market

problems and policy analyses.

3. Program Evaluations: The products in this category

include impact, process and benefit-cost evaluations of youth

programs including the Summer Youth Employment Program, Job

Corps, the Youth Adult Conservation Corps, Youth Employment

and Training Programs, Youth Community Conservation and

Improvement Projects, and the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit.

iv 5
4. Service and Particivant Mix: The evaluations and

demonstrations summarized in this category concern the mate--

ing of different types of youth with different service

combinations. This includes experiment- with work vs. work

plus remediation vs. straight remediata,a as treatment options.

It also includes attempts to mix disadvantaged and more affluent

participants, as well as youth with older workers.

5. Education and Training Approaches: The products in

this category present the findings of structured experiments

to test the impact and effe- tiveness of various education

and vocational training approaches including specific education methodologies for the disadvantaged, alternative education approaches and advanced career training.

6. Pre-Employment and Transition Services: The

products in this category present the findings of structured

experiments to test the impact and effectiveness of school-towork transition activities, vocational exploration, job-search

assistance and other efforts to better prepare youth for

labor market success.

7. Youth Work Experience: The products in this category

address the organization of work activities, their output,

productive role, for youth and the impacts of various employment approaches.

8. Implementation Issues: This category includes crosscutting analyses of the practical lessons concerning "howto-do-it." Issues such as learning curves, replication

processes and programmatic "batting averages" will be addressed

under this category, as well as the comparative advantages

of alternative delivery agents.

9. Design and Organizational Alternatives: The products

in this category represent assessments of demonstrations of

alternative program and delivery arrangements such as consolidation, year-round preparation for summer programming,

the use of incentives and multi-year tracking of individuals.

10. Special Needs Groups: The products in this category

present findings on theWEEral problems of and adaptations

needed for significant segments including minorities, young

mothers, troubled youth, Indochinese refugees and the

handicapped.

11. Innovative Approaches: The products in this category

present the findings of those activities designed to explore

new approaches. The subjects covered include the. Youth

Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects, private sector initiatives, the national youth service experiment, and energy

initiatives in weatherization, low-head hydroelectric dam

restoration, windpower and the like.
12. Institutional Linkages: The products in this

category will include studies of institutional arrangements

and linkages as well as assessments of demonstration activities to encourage such linkages with education, volunteer

groups, drug abuse AO other youth serving.auencies.

In each of these knowledge development categories, there

will be a range of discrete demonstration, research and

evaluation activities, focused on different policy, program

and analytical issues. For instance, all experimental

demonstration projects have both process and impact evaluations, frequently undertaken by different evaluation agents.

Findings will be published as they become available so that

there will u3ually be a series of reports as evidence

accumulates. To organize these products, each publication

is classified in one of the twelve broad knowledge development categories, described in terms of the more specific issue,

activity or cluster of activities to which it is addressed,

with an :sdentifier of the product and what it represents

relative to other products in the demonstration. Hence, the

multiple products under a knowledge development activity are

closely interrelated and the activities in each broad cluster

have significant interconnections.

This volume on the Ventures in Community Improvement demonstration should be read in conjunction with the other reports

in the "youth work experience" category. In particular, the

work valuation methods applied in this study might be contrasted

with the approach and its applications in Work Valuation--The

Methods and Finu.Lngs from Their Application. There are two

other interim reports on enhanced work projects, An Analysis

of Local Experience and Findings from the HUD/DOL Community

Development Demonstration. Finally, practical lessons for

prime sponsors seeking to implement VICI-type projects are

contained in Jobs and Community ImprovementsIn the "implementation

issues" category.

ROBERT TAGGART

Administrator

Office of Youth Programs

vi
CONTENTS

PAGE

PART I. The Ventures in Community Improvement

Program: A Demonstration of Program

Replication Through the CETA System

Introduction 1

Overview of Program Start-Up 7

The Sites 16

Demographic F. Termination Profile of 31

CICI Participants

Aggregate Comparison 42

Interprogram Comparison 47

Impact Analysis 55

Work Valuation 66

Program Officers' Observations 94

Preliminary Comparison Between VICI 97

and Control Group Youths

PART II. Research Report on VICI

Impacts and Effectiveness

Introduction

Statistical Pescription of the VICI

Demonstration

Impact Analysis

Interprogram Comparison

Work Valuation

PART III. The Development of the VICI

Demonstration

The Origins of the Demonstration

The Proposal Development Process at

the Local Sites

Concluding Thoughts

PART IV. The Launch' 1g and Early

Operations of the Ventures

In Community Improvement Demonstration

Introduction

An Overview of the VICI Demonstration

The Sites

Summary

100

106

174

200

208

237

269

399

405

410

432

481
7 I

PART 1

The Ventures in Community Improvement

Program: A Demonstration

of Program Replication

Through the CETA System
This report is part of an ongoing effort to record and analyze the

forces that have shaped the first full year's development of the

Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI) demonstration. VICI is a

national research and demonstration project which seeks to test the

effectiveness of a model youth employment program in various settings.

Several techniques and several groups of researchers, administrators,

and analysts have beo involved both in monitoring VICI and in the

production of this report. The demonstration is financed by the U.S.

Department of Labor's Office of Youth Programs (0IP), while the

Corporation for Public/Private Ventures (P/PV) has the responsibility

for designing, managing, and analyzing the operation of the demonstratio

and for reporting findings to DOL. Research for Better Schools (RBS)

subcontracted with P/PV to conduct a statistical analysis for the demonstration; RBS' findings are presented in Chapters IV through VIII of

this report. Tb capture the non-quantifiable, historical and personal

factors that have affected VICI, P/PV engaged two "process documentors,"

Harvey D. Shapiro and Hank Blakely, to visit sites, interview participants, administrations, and others associated with VICI, and report thel

findings to P/PV. Their work is presented in the first two chapters.

After the basic design elements of the VICI demonstration were settled,

CETA prime sponsors in a number of cities were invited to submit proposs

for operating a VICI program. ,fn mid-1978, eight localities were select

for funding under the auspices of P/PV. The sites were Atlanta, Georgia

Broward County, Florida; Chicago, Illinois; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Newer)

New Jersey; New Haven, Connecticut, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and the

South Bronx in New York City. Each VICI program was to enroll up to 60

unemployed, out-of-school, economically disad,Intaged youth between the

ages of 16 and 19. They were to work five days a week under the supervision of union journeymen drawn from the construction and building trig(

Although the work would vary, among the sites, it was aimed at making

tangible community improvements through such activities as refurbishing

public facilities or repairing homes occupied by poor or elderly ppople

from the same neighborhoods as the youth enrolled in the program./

Using program elements drawn from the Emergency Home Repafrr Program in

Portland, Oregon, and from several other youth programs, / /the VICI

model relied heavily on a sat of linkages which tied the program to

/

other institutions. Various local institutions ware chosen to recruit

and refer youth to V CI. Educational institutions agreed to provide

certain educational services to VICI youths. Locals of unions in the

building and construction trades agreed to provide union. journeymen to

serve as instructors in the program and to assist VICI youth to gain

entranceto union apprenticeship programs and to job opportunities. Loa organizations of various kinds agreed to identify or provide work projei

to be undertaken by the youth. And the local CETA prime sponsor, or iti

designated local management agency, had overall responsibility for open

the program and coorinating its linkages. As shown in Table 1, a variel

of local organizations agreed to serve as linkages. But while there

were differences among the sites as to precisely which craft union

or which youth referral agency would be involved with VICI,
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all sites shared the emphasis on linking the youth to other institutions

so that this employment and training program would not operate in a

vacuum. Rather, it would give the enrollee access to various services

that might improve his or her employability and also employ the youth in

activities that would improve the area in which he or she lived.

The VICI demonstration was scheduled to rm. for 18 months, however, the

starting point differed from site to site due to prevailing local conditions relating to start-up. Broward, Chicago, Milwaukee, Newark and

New Haven starter; in October 1978; Atlanta and Philadelphia in December

1978; and South Bronx in January 1979. Thus, by March 1979, while Atlanta

Philadelphia and South Bronx were beginning to send youths out to work

on repairing homes, Milwaukee, Newark and the other sites had begun seeking

apprenticeships and jobs for youth deemed job ready due to their stay in

the program. Six of the sites will have completed their 18 months'

operations by June 1, 1980; however, Chicago, due to its interrupted history, and South Bronx, due to its late start, will complete their program

operations in August 1980.

THE SITES

The following section was prepared by P/PV program staff who maintain

regular and frequent contact with each site. A brief profile is given

of the VICI program in each of the eight sites.

Atlanta. The prime sponsor, the Atlanta CETA office, has subcontracted

with the Atlanta Urban League to manage :he demonstration. This demonstration focuses solely on emergency home repair, with a r-lximum expenditure

for matcrials and supplies of $1,800 per home. The prime sponsor has

selected the City of Atlanta's Bureau of Buildings as the work provider.

The Bureau of Buildings refers properties cited for building code violations, after determining that the property owners are eligible for VICI

services.

The Atlanta demonstration uses $108,000 in HUD Community Development

funds to provide materials and supplies to job sites where the VICI

youth are working. The supplementing of DOL funds with HUD monies has

resulted in a number of homes being renovated in an area where private

contractors have been reluctant to work.

Participants rotate among four, different skills: carpentry, electricity,

plumbing and painting. Under the supervision of skilled journeymen from

the North Georgia Building and Construction Trades Council, each participant works a four-day, thirty-five hour week: the fifth day is devoted

to GED instruction. The journeymen provide all skills training, while

the Atlanta Board of Education provides GED instruction. Pre-apprentice

credit may be granted to VICI trainees recommended by journeymen.

Broward County. The Broward Employment and Training Administration

(BETA), the prime sponsor, manages the demonstration. Until recently,

the Fort Lauderdale Housing Authority acted as work provider. However,

FLHA precipitously withdrew from the demonstration and has been replaced

by the Broward County Community Development Division (BCCDD) which had

ample worksites for VICI.

3
The VICI work crews concentrate on five skills: carpentry, electricity,

plumbing, painting and masonry. Supervis1d by journeymen under the

Auspices of the Fort Lauderdale Building and Construction Trades Council

work crews have built divider walls, walkways and barbecue pits. They

have also rewired electrical systems, improved security lighting, scraped

and painted apartments and improved existing plumbing services. Points

toward apprentice and pre-apprentice credit may be gained by VICI participants.

The Advisory Council in Broward is comprised of local and state government

representatives, organized labor and the prime sponsor, as well as the

Housing Authority. This Advisory Board represents the commitment of a

variety of different organizations in the Broward County area who have a

common interest in the success of the VICI program.

Chicago. The Mayor's Office of Employment and Training has contracted

directly with the 18th Street Development Corporation to operate the VICI

Demonstretion. GED and other support services are provided by the Industrial Skills Center of the Chicago School Board and the Department of

Human Services.

Sixty participants are gutting and renovating a large six-apartment

building in the Pilsen neighborhood, as well as several smaller dwellings

Additional vacant properties in this neighborhood will be secured

from the Department of Planning, City and Community Development for renovation as these initial projects are completed.

Journeymen crew chiefs are provided by the Chicago District Council of

Carpenters. They have received training in supervisory and instructional

techniques from the Carpentry Apprentice Instructors at the Washburn

Trade School. The journeymen have developed a highly strict,red skills

progression for the VICI participants, and because of this. the Carpenters'

Union will waive for VICI graduates the three-month classroom training

requirement normally imposed on carpentry apprentices. The union has

agreed to accept up to 100 percent of qualified VICI graduates for its

apprenticeship program.

Milwaukee. The CETA Division of the Milwaukee County Executive Office is

the prime sponsor and has contracted with the Opportunities Industrialization Center of Greater Milwaukee to operate this VICI demonstration.

The Milwaukee Builetng and Construction Joint Apprenticeship Council has

agreed to place into apprenticeships VICI graduates who pass a rigorous

entrance examination. VICI participants are tutored for these examinations

by BIGSTEP, a minority apprentice preparation program. After 10 months of

VICI enrollment, 10 participants have passed the examination and have

been placed as apprentices.

4
The Milwaukee Carpenters' and Painters' Unions have provided journeymen

crew chiefs who supervise participants in the correction of major building

code violet/6h in low-income, owner-occupied homes identified by the

City.Building Inspection Department. These corrective actions range

from complete interior and exterior painting to gutting and structural

rehabilitation. The VICI demonstration has been awarded a Home Improvement Contractor's License by the City of Milwaukee, the only communitybasee rehabilitation group to be so licensed in that city.

Newark. The prime sponsor, the Mayor's Office of Employment and Training,

manages the demonstration. Work orders come from the Newark Redevelopment

and Housing Authority (NHRA) and the Department of Public Works (DPW).

The NHRA refers apartments from housing projects; the DPW refers multiunit dwellings which were formerly privately owned but for which the city

has assumed ownership responsibility.

The Newark VICI program teaches painting skills, and the painting union

has made a serious commitment to the success of the VICI program. The

participating union has required that the VICI participants attend

evening classes (two hours on each of two nights per week) with union

apprentices. The union has pledged that VICI graduates who demonstrate

strong skills and excellent attitudes will be given strong consideration

for available apprenticeship positions.

Not only do the NHRA and DPW provide worksites, they also provide funds,

facilities and equipment. The NHRA provides all paint and materials

necessary for services being performed on assigned public housing. It

also provides for delivery services to worksites. Each worksite

allows VICI staff to use existing storage facilities. The DPW provides

office space and equipment for the VICI administrative staff. These

services are made possible by a commitment by the city of $108,000 in

municipal funds.

New Haven. The New Haven Employment and Training Administration, the

prime sponsor, has chosen to operate the project directly. The VICI

demonstration enjoys the full support of the New Haven Carpenters' And

Painters' Unions, which provide skilled journeymen crew supervisors and

actively participate on the project's advisory board. The New Haven

Public Schools provide educational support.

New Haven was one of the first VICI cities to become fully active. Its

participants are engaged in major carpentry, rehabilitation and painting

projects supplied by a consortium of city and community redevelopment

agencies. Since VICI provides the essential labor, these agencies

can apply their limited renovation funds solely to materials' costs.

A very active Advisory Board, consisting of representatives from the

unions, work providers, school district and city government provides

direction, technical assistance and problem - solving Support to the

project'. Due perhaps to New Haven's small size, VICI occupies a central

role in New Haven's own efforts to rehabilitate some of its faltering

housing and some of its public facilities. It is anticipated that, by

the end of the project, the VICI crews will have left a clear imprint on

the entire city.
Philadelphia. This VICI demonstration is sponsored by the Area Manpower

Planning Council, the Philadelphia Prime Sponsor, which has contracted

with the non-profit Franklin Foulidation to operate the project. Four

neighborhood settlement houses work cooperatively to refer participants

to the project and to provide counseling and other support services as

needed. The Franklin Foundation has secured GED facilites and services

from the School District of Philadelphia and the prime sponsor in order

to ensure that participants are prepared for apprenticeships end other

job opportunities as they become available.

The Carpenters, Electricians, Plasterers, Painters, Roofers and Skilled

Laborers Unions all provide journeymen crew chiefs for the project. The

participants are currently developing their skills by gutting and rehabilitating large two-family residences for the Philadelphia Housing Development

Corporation (PHDC). Commensurate with their growing skills, participants

also now offer emergency home repairs to low-income homeowners identified

by the Office of Housing and Community Development (OHCD). Both PHDC

and OHCD utilize HUD block grant funds to support this project.

South Bronx. The prime sponsor is the Department of Employment of New

York City's Human Resources Administration, which has contracted with a

community-based organization, Operation Open City, to manage the demonstration. The demonstration targets the South Bronx for its participant

recruitment and work order activities. The work orders are solely

weatherization projects and emphasize energy conservation through proper

insulation. Work activities include window caulking, weatherstripping,

replacing window sashes and roofing and boiler system repair. The

selected worksites are referred through other community-based organizations which also inspect the quality of the work product.

The South Bronx demonstration involves many linkages. The Department of

Energy and the Community Services Administration have committed approximately $250,000 to the demonstration for materials and supplies. The prime

sponsor will also provide several Title I slots to the demonstration. These

funds and staff will maximize the program's visibility and its impact upon

the designated area.

Participant recruitment and referral are the responsibility of the Bronx

Residents to Attain Scholarship in Housing (BRASH) and the Neighborhood

Engage, Recruitment and Training Program (RTP). Twenty high school

seniors will receive school credits from Smith High School for their

participation in the VICI demonstration. BRASH and Neighborhood Engage

also refer the work orders to the demonstration.

The journeymen instructors are referred by the New York Building and

Construction Trades. The journeymen are responsible for in-house skill

training and participant orientation, as well as for worksite training.

Based on journeymen's evaluation of participants' performance, preapprentice credit may be gained by qualifying participants.

6
I. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM START-UP AND OPERATIONS

The transitions from proposal to program implementation and from planning

to operation were not inordinately difficult for most VICI sites. Although

time was short, most sites began to identify potential staff and resources

as soon as their proposals were submitted; and when they learned they

were to be funded, they were able to act quickly. With the exception of

New Haven, where the principal planners remained involved i the program,

program implementation led to major staff changes, and as operating

people were brought in to make good on the proposals and promises developed by others, they raised important questions about P/PV and the

proposals it had approved. In Atlanta and Chicago, P/PV'srole was

rigorously questioned and even rejected. Thus, P/PV had to reestablish

its legitimacy and its authority there. As the operating people tested

the proposals, they encountered assorted start-up problems at each site,

but no one argued that the proposals or major parts of them were inherently unworkable.

A. REPLICATION

The only significant efforts to depart from the proposals centered on

recruitment. A number'of programs had difficulty in recruiting sufficient

youths, particularly those from certain groups, such as Hispanics or

females. In response to these problems, Atlanta, Broward County, and

Newark proposed widening the recruitment target areas. This would

broaden the pool of potential applicants, but it violated a fairly

central principal of the program model. VICI sites were supposed to

focus both recruitment and community improvement work on the same area,

so that the youths would be making improvements in their own neighborhoods. Nonetheless, bending to realities, p/pv permitted Newark to

expand its target area beyond the largely black Central Ward in order to

recruit more Hispanic youth.

This kind of modification probably has no effect on the validity of the

program, because, in fact, the target areas in most cities were already

broader than the communities with which the youths identified themselves.

Thus, participants interviewed in Newark considered their neighborhood

to be the housing project in which they lived or a few blocks around

their home, not the entire Central Ward. And in Newark and elsewhere,

while the beneficiaries of the repair work commented favorably on the

youth, they did not clearly identify them as neighborhood kids unless

they were already personally acquainted with them.

Beyond the modification of the recruiting area, P/PV generally held firm

in keeping sites to their proposals and thus replicating the program

model. In Newark, for example, P/PV declined a request made by the

Department of Public Works, one of the work providers, to undertake work

outside the original target area.

B. MAKING THE LINKAGES WORK

A major test of the proposals came when sites sought to implement the

linkages established during the planning period. Generally, these

7
linkages existed to a significa.nt degree, except in the South Bronx,

where the linkages were weak and required the most bolsterinfl. In

all sites, the education linkage proved to be the weakest, and received

the least emphasis. This had been predicted by P /PV staff members during

planning.

The crucial linkage was the union linkage. It played a major role in

making programs work, particularly in Newark, and it was closely tied to

problems of other p :ograms, for example, in the South Bronx. The union

linkage had effects extending from the selection of journeymen for

employment in the program, through the final placement of participants.

A strong union linkage provided a variety of benefits, some of which

Were not anticipated in the planning stage, most notably the role played

by union journeymen in the placement process.

Many of the linkages described in VICI proposals were already in existence

and this could be a strengthening factor. For example, a large measure

of Milwaukee's success in operationalizing its linkages resulted from

the pre-existing relationships among several key organizations who were

simply brought together again in the VICI project. Similarly, in Newark

the close working relationship between the painters union and the prime

sponsor was built upon a history of working together on other programs.

C. RECRUITMENT, INTAKE, AND ORIENTATION

Recruitment was an early and enduring concern at most sites. There were

two kinds of problems: recruiting enough youth to operate the program,

and recruiting enough youth to meet P/PV's research needs. (The latter

problem--the issue of the major waiting list--is discussed later in this

chapter.)

Many of those involved in the demonstration were surprised to find that

initial recruitment efforts did not identify as many youth as anticipated.

In some cases, there were barely enough youth to mount the program and

maintain a small pool of replacements. Moreover, there were shortages

in the recruitment of Hispanics and women at many sites. This problem

has been attributed to everything from the state of the economy, to the

nature of the program, to the methods used. It seems clear that recruitment methods used for VICI were fairly standard for CETA youth programs.

VICI's recruitment drive was neither better nor worse than other CETA

recruitment efforts. Why these methods did not produce large numbers of

youth for VICI, however, remains largely unclear, though some reasons

can be given.

The difficulty in recruiting Hispanics can be attributed to the lack of

Hispanics in the original target area in Newark. When the target area

was expanded and a Spanish-speaking staff member was added, this problem

eased. The underenrollment of women, according to local VICI staff

members, seemed to stem from the nature of the work VICI entailed.

While there are significant numbers of women seeking entry into the

building trades, most of these tend to be older than the VICI target

group. For a young woman, the decision to enter training for an unconventional job is still decidedly unconventional, and VICI staff

members believed this limited the number of women applicants.

8
Just as there was little deviation from CETA procedures in VICI's recruiting efforts, its intake and orientation efforts were also typical

of CETA youth programs. Screening was fairly limited at some sites, and

there seems to have been little attempt to "cream" applicants. Many

journeymen profeused amazement at recruits' deficiencies, such as inability to read a ruler or perform simple arithmetic computations.

There was not much uniformity in program orientation. Some programs,

such as Broward County and Milwaukee, had very high dropout rates in the

first few days. These were the sites which recruited widely and did not

screen applicants intensively. So only after they entered the program

did some youth discover that it e%tailed work they were not interested

in doing.

D. VICI AT WORK: PROGRAM OPERATIONS

There was a curious disjunction between the inner workings of VICI and

the program's external relationships. At many VICI sites, dealings with

local government agencies, trade unions, and others, were often turbulent.

Yet, surprisingly perhaps, the administrative crises and major convolutions

at many sites did not prevent VICI youths from learning skills and

carrying out useful tasks.

Of course, there were many problems with individual youths at every

site. For example, Chicago experienced a job action by a number of

disgruntled youth, while in the South Bronx a crackdown on behavior led

to twelve dismissals in one month. Nonetheless, the basic fact is that

at most sites, most of the time, most of the youth were actively employed

and were producing tangible results as well as makiii visible improvements

in their skills.

E. THE ROLE OF JOURNEYMEN

A key factor in the effective internal operations of VICI, and a surprisingly important element in many other aspects of the program, was

the role played by union journeymen. They were the VICI staff members

who supervised youth training and dealt with the youths on a day-to-day

basis. They also dealt with property owners and with work providing

agencies.. Thus, the manner in which they did their jobs had an important

effect on all aspects of the program. And they were a major positive

force in VICI.

Their job turned out to be a very complex one. Indeed, many felt it was

not one job but several, and the demands made on journeymen sometimes

seemed contradictory. Journeymen saw no problems in expecting journeymen

to act as teachers or trainers. While few of the journeymen had any

formal training as teachers, teaching younger people is an integral part

of the work in many trades. Apprentices receive most of their training

on the job, at the elbows of journeymen. Thus, many journeymen had

provided training as a matter of course in their jobs, and at least one

VICI journeyman also had been a teacher in vocational schools. Moreover,

those who became involved in VICI generally had an interest in teaching

or in young people.
Having journeymen serve as instructors did not present any problems, but

expecting journeymen to provide training in the context of completing

community improvements raised some questions. The journeymen were

uncertain whether their prime goal was to produce improvements or to

provide training. Several journeymen said they were caught between two

ideals, unsure of the extent to which they were to function as journeymen plying their trades in an improvement project or as instructors in a

training program. Should they strive to finish a job on schedule or

could they take additional time until everyone had mastered the task?

Should they work with everybody or just with those who showed promise?

The conflict between what they saw as alternative and contradictory

goals was a major one for most journeymen, and it had repercussions on the entire programs at some sites, particularly Newark, where the debate

went beyond individuals. Here, the journeymen held strongly to the

tradesman's ideals and emphasized production and "real world" working

conditions, while the office staff pushed for a more pedagogical, trainingoriented approach. The split remained because the Newark program director

identified with the journeymen to the exclusion of other considerations.

There was no easy resolution to this conflict in Newark or elsewhere.

However, at every site, a middle ground was eventually developed in

which the journeymen could feel they were adhering to the standards of

their trade, yet were tempering concerns for production and quality with

a recognition of the needs of the youth. This balance was hard to

define in principle and hard to find in practice, but at every site

there was clear movement towards it.

After the first few weeks of the program, there were fewer and fewer

instances of the journeymen doing all the work with two or three favored

youth while the others just watched. The initial focus on production

was diluted with a growing concern for the youth. The journeymen became

increasingly interested in the individuals assigned to them and the

youth responded well to this. At most sites a close bond grew up between

work crews and their journeymen. The journeyman took a genuine interest

in "his crew," and this led many of them to play an active, unanticipated,

and very useful role in helping participants find jobs.

Thus, the role played by the journeymen turned out to be a critical and

highly interesting part of the VICI demonstration. The initial problems

they encountered could, in the future, be obviated by additional preparation and training. Milwaukee, for instance, developed workshops for

journeymen to help them cope with these kinds of problems.

F. WOMEN IN VICI

An important aspect of VICI was its commitment to recruit females and

train them for building and construction jobs not traditionally held by

women. The program is making headway in this effort, but several sites

remain short of their goals. However, the dropout rate for females is

about the same as for males.

10
VICI's problems with women probably reflect the untraditional nature of

the work it offers. A 16 to 19 year old woman has to be well motivated

and fairly unconventional to be willing to enter the building trades.

While a growing number of women have been entering the building trades,

most have been in their mid to late 20's, and frequently they have

children to support. These women have already experienced the kind of

work and wages available to untrained females, and they tend to be

highly commited to training that will lead to a relatively well-paid

building trades job. By contrast, a 16 to 19 year old VICI enrollee has

limited experience with low-wage jobs, and still has many illusions and

unrealistic aspirations. Thus, she lacks the kind of experience that

often provides older women with the strong motivation needed to enter

the building trades.

Those who were recruited experienced several kinds of problems. One

problem was kidding from the young men in the program. Much of this was

the usual good natured banter that goes on among fellow workers or

students of either sex, but some of it had an edge that bordered on

harassment. Many of the young men were still too unsure of themselves

to be comfortable with women entering what they considered to be a man's

world and men's jobs. Some women handled the verbal play well, and some

didn't.

A second problem was the way journeymen dealt with females. While they

expressed support for women entering their trade, many journeymen questioned the depth of the women's commitment and wondered whether they

merited the attention that could otherwise go to young men. Other

journeymen had gentlemanly concerns about women doing the work. Some

shied away from letting women climb ladders or lift heavy paint cans or

do messy work. Instead, they tended to assign the women to more "artistic"

jobs, like plastering or painting trimmings, while reserving the hard

work for men. This treatment did not go unnoticed by the women.

A third problem was the primitive facilities at many work sites. Often,

the crews would be working at isolated, abandoned buildings with no

bathrooms or locker rooms. The women had to hope the work site was near

a gas station or school or other place with a bathroom they could use,

and often very makeshift changing rooms had to be created for them.

Finally, it appears that the kind of young woman attracted to VICI was

also the kind likely to leave it. An 18 year old woman who was prepared

to do the untraditional and enter VICI sometimes turned out to be the

kind of woman who, upon being criticized, would walk off the program in

a huff, journeymen said. All these problems were exacerbated by the

lack of role models. Many women were employed in VICI, including secretaries, administrators and even program directors in New haven and

Philadelphia. But there were very few female journeymen.

Nonetheless, by the fall of 1979, there were fewer significant differences between males and females in their length of stay in VICI or their

dropout rates. This suggests that the programs had begun to learn how

to deal with the problems faced by female enrollees in a non-traditional

training program.

11
Despite the problems of recruiting and retaining women, there was a

widely shared pride in "our girls" at most VICI sites. On a number of

occasions, those ranked as best workers or first placements were women,

and even the most grizzled male chauvinist journeyman tended to express

a peculiar pride in helping to produce what might be the first female

carpenter in his locality.

G. PLACEMENT

Each site was required to develop a placement strategy for submission to

P/PV, and by August 1979 all but Chicago and the South Bronx had completed and implemented their" plans. The South Bronx's late start delayed

the need for a placement plan somewhat, but the continued delays there

and in Chicago essentially represented a managerial failing. Milwaukee,

New Haven, and Newark, by contrast, were working hard on placement by

mid-1979.

The placement campaign mounted by the VICI sites included many standard

techniques; For example, VICI job developers made-telephone calls to

major employers and screened help wanted notices to generate information

ab' it job possibilities for VICI youth. But P/PV field representatives

estimate that only about 10 percent of placements came via this route.

Most placements resulted from personal contacts made VICI staff

members. Staff members asked suppliers and vendors whether they needed

workers or knew of any customers who did; they asked work providers and

city agencies if they were aware of any job openings; and, above all,

VICI's journeymen used their network of contacts to seek jobs for VICI

participants.

The involvement of the :ourneymen in placement was not originally envisioned in the VICI program model, but it appeared to be a highly effective

mechanism. By virtue of their work experience, they had a breadth of

k.oiwlcdge about local employment possibilities. And their efforts to

plzae youth were well received; indeed the approval or recommendation of

a journeyman carried a certain cachet that a job developer or program

director couldn't 'raster. As one New Haven staff member said, "It's not

some Vassar social work major saying 'Larry would make a good painter,'

it's a painter saying 'I know one when I see one.'"

In Milwaukee and New Haven, journeymen were particularly del%lly involved,

in placement. In newark, the painters union's business agent and apprenticeship coordinator took a personal role in attempting to find jobs for

VICI participants. In the South Bronx, where there was a weaker formal

trade union linkage, the journeymen were still proving to be very helpful

in placement. Indeed, in all sites, the involvement of journeymen in

placement as.well as in training was an unexpected but highly useful and

instructive development.

H. RESEARCH

The research requirements of the VICI program were often a source of

irritation at most VICI sites. Fundamentally, this reflected the classic

12 ) 4 6
conflict found in demonstration programs between program operators who

simply wish to provide services and researchers who need data to meet

the research requirements which are an integral part of the demonstration. The grumbling that accompanied the VICI research was generally no

more shrill or enduring than that encountered in other demonstrations.

Both program operators and P/PV staff agreed that p/pv required more

forms and data than many other demonstrations. Moreover, the data were

scanned with some care. If deficiencies were evident, p/PV required

sites to improve their performance. Since several sites completed their

forms accurately and on time without great difficulties, it was clearly

feasible to meet P/PV's demands. Moreover, P/PV provided each VICI site

with an additional allocation of $9,000 to be used for data collection and

research.

However, a major concern at the sites was that data gathering had no

meaning or return for them. They felt, they said, like "data plantatiow' ,"

which produced data but never saw any results of the data gathering.

Thus, there was no direct incentive to work on compiling data, except to

avoid the wrath of P/PV. P/PV argued that if the forms were used properly,

they would provide data that would be useful to the local -anagement.

Thus, the Journeyman's Weekly Progress Report, for example, could serve

both as a management tool for the site and as a source of data for ?NV

researchers. In fact, little of the data gathered for PJPV was put to

use by local program staff. Thus, the range and depth of information

sought by P/PV seemed doubly useless to local program managers for it

provided no direct benefit to the sites and no research reports for the

demonstration as a whole.

An issue that particularly troubled many sites was P/PV's efforts to

produce a "major waiting list." For research purposes, P/PV sought to

produce a large list of youths who would be compared with youths in the

VICI program. New Haven was excused from this effort because of its

small population base, and the seven other sites were told their participation was not mandatory. Nonetheless, these sites regarded involvement as a requirement, and they were strongly opposed to it, not only

because it put an additional burden on them but also because they regarded

it as harmful to the youths. Program operators viewed the waiting list

as a confusing device which seemed to hold out a promise of services

that would not be delivered, and they considered it a potential betrayal

of youngsters who already had enough problems. P/PV staff required that

youths have the opportunity to enter other training programs, but staff

members at two sites said that the existence of the VICI waiting list

acted as a disincentive for recruitment into other local CETA youth

programs.

Ultimately,only Newark completed the major waiting list, although three

other sites gathered enough names for the list to be used for research

purpose's. In the spring of 1979 P/PV told the sites to stop work on it.

However, P/PV's willingness to abandon the effort only strengthened the

conviction of many program operators that the device represented idle

fiddling by researchers who had no sympathy for the psyches of youth or

the problems of program operators.

13

U
P/PV had a research advisory committee which met once and then essentially

broke into subcommittees. Sites were represented in discussions of

various research plans, and P/PV provided training in form completion.

Several forms were modified in response to suggestions or complaints

from the sites. Nonetheless, P/PV could not allay the feeling at many

sites that the research component of the program was too broad and

wide-ranging, as well as useless to the program operators. The opposition to the research effort became muted over time, largely because

the program operators became resigned to the researcher needs. Also,

when P/PV's computer system was developed, and when research data began

to be fed back to the sites, it seemed likely that views might change,

because program operators displayed a strong competitive interest in

developments at other sites.

I. P/PV'S ROLE

P/PV's role during the VICI planning period was controversial and sometimes confusing because DOL was also directly involved in the process.

By the time the VICI programs were being launched, however, DOL had

largely disappeared, and P/PV was the lone source of direction and

supervision. Because localities no longer encountered a variety of

organizations claiming a role in monitoring VICI, they gave less thought

to the precise nature and role of P/PV, even though they continued to be

deeply involved with the organization. While DOL monitors might visit a

training program only once a year and were often interested mainly in

financial records, P/PV's field representatives were regular visitors' at

each site, sometimes coming weekly, and Seldom less often than every six

weeks. They delved into every aspect of the program and offered extensive

advice.

At first, there was some resistance to P/PV's role, particularly in

Atlanta and Chicago. But sites soon adapted to "the Philadelphians."

Some did so with an air of resignation; others viewed P/PV in a more

positive light. At several sites, VICI staff argued that P/PV was not

functioning differently from a 'federal or state monitor; it was just

more active. They did not see anything unique in the nature of CPPV

other than its ability to invest more time and money in supervision.

That, however, is a significant difference from other monitoring

agencies.

P/PV played a major role in enabling most of the eight VICI sites to

begin operations within a relatively short period of time, and P/PV's

continuing involvement in overseeing VICI clearly improved the operations of the weaker programs. In sites such as New Haven, which generally

experienced smooth sailing, P/PV staff members provided a source of

dispassionate analysis and advice. In troubled sites, such as Chicago,

the South Bronx, and Broward, P/PV helped resolve disputes that threatened

the programs. P/PV could do this because it existed independent of

competing local powers and interests, because it could threaten to

withhold funding and close down a site, and, most important, because the

advice its staff gave was generally perceived as wise; indeed, P /PV

staff provided new and workable ideas at several sites.

14
Some sites turned this outside supervision to their own advantage. At

several sites, program directors found it useful to tell other local

organizations certain actions were required because "the Philadelphians

are on our backs." And P/PV field representatives occasionally abetted

such efforts: a field representative might provide a stern letter to a

site knowing that it would be used by the local program director to urge

another .ocal agency to take action which VICI wanted. Such close

involvement with the sites had some effect on P/PV's field staff. The

P/PV VICI director believed there were at least occasional indications

of field representatives becoming over-sympathetic to the plight of

localities or identifying too closely with them.

In the early months of the program, several sites, most notably New

Haven, believed that P/PV was not giving them enough information. There

were complaints that P/PV should facilitate the exchange of ideas among

sites so that each site wouldn't have to reinvent the wheel regularly,

or wait for its field representative to bring them blueprints for it.

Much of this concern was dispelled by P/PV's mid-term conference in

Ihiladelphia in late June 1979. This event permitted all the sites to

learn of one another's problems and achievements. Indeed, the value of

the conference to P/PV seemed to lie equally in its morale-boosting

effects and in the information gained by P/PV. While P/PV was already

familiar with much of what was said, many new issues surfaced. Moreover,

the sites took great delight in hearing what their counterparts elsewhere were doing. P/PV also responded to the communications gap by

creating a VICI newsletter in September 1979.

J. OTHER EXOGENOUS FORCES

DOL and P/PV were occasionally at odds during the VICI planning period.

Once the programs were operating, however, DOL and P/PV generally worked

together harmoniously, and acted in. tandom on major issues. Other

outside forces exerted an effect on VICI, however.

In the South Bronx, the local management agency's contretemps with the

city government delayed implementation of the program for months, and

this may have caused irreparable damage to the rhythm of the program.

Moreover, the U.S. Community Services Administration's long delay in

forwarding $250,000 for supplies created serious financial problems. In

Broward, HUD raised questions about the Davis-Bacon Act which endangered

operations, and in Chicago blizzards and election returns both affected

VICI.

It is too early to determine how changes in local economies will affect

VICI placements, but some effect can be expected. One thing that is

clear after nearly a year of operation is that VICI's attempts to boost

resources can cut two ways. Typically, P/PV may provide a million

dollars to a site which then raises perhaps a further $200,000 from HUD,

or CSA, or other sources. But, while P/PV gets more than a million

dollars worth of programming for its money, this kind of fund raising

opens its programs to the influence of others. Thus, P/PV's control was

sometimes challenged by others with a stake in VICI. The working out of

that phenomenon differed from site to site, however, as did so many

other aspects of the VICI program, and Chapter VIII examines developments

as they occurred at each site.

15

)
II. THE SITES

A. ATLANTA

The Atlanta VICI project suffered from prolonged conflicts between its

prime sponsor, the Atlanta CETA office, and its local management agency,

the Atlanta Urban League. The failure of these agencies to work together

seriously hampered program startup and caused continued difficulties

for program development. An additional problem lay in union conflicts,

which further hindered program development. However, despite these

grave weaknesses in Atlanta VICI's linkage system, the program was

largely successful from the viewpoint of participants, who acquired

skills and training, and who performed useful work in their community.

Misunderstandings between the prime sponsor and other VICI agencies

began with the August 1978 resignation of the Atlanta CETA's senior

planner, who had played a key role in planning the VICI project. With

his departure, earlier understandings were rejected, and relationships

among the Atlanta CETA, the Urban League, and P/PV deteriorated. Atlanta

CETA strongly resisted P/PV's role and authority in VICI, and P/PV found

Atlanta CETA's budget and staffing plans for VICI unacceptable. Until

such conflicts were resolved, and money began to flow from CETA to the

Atlanta Urban League, all program startup activity--recruitment, staffing,

work site provision, transportation leasing--was seriously hindered, if

not entirely prevented. By December 1978, enrollment stood at 17 partici

pants, and P/PV had reached the conclusion that most of the project's

problems stemmed from Atlanta CETA's failure to carry out its responsi

bilities as prime sponsor, a failure due partly to the quite uncooperative

attitudes of one or two key CETA staff members. Lending support to

P/PV's conclusion is an incident which typifies events in Atlanta. The

Urban.League submitted a $46,000 invoice to the Atlanta CETA, which

refused all payment due to its questioning of a single, $32 item.

In January, a new recruitment drive raised the participant roster to 52,

and in February Atlanta CETA hired three people to help recruit waiting

list members. At this time, the relationship between the prime sponsor

and the Urban League improved--briefly--due to a visit made by DOL

Secretary Ray Marshall and HUD Under Secretary Gino Baroni, only to

worsen again shortly afterwards due to a dispute over cash advances. By

March, the project was seriously behind schedule in waiting list recruit

ment and in completion of work orders. Also, a promised $100,000 in

community development funds was delayed by the city's complex laws for

work provision and public funding.

All the program's startup problems were continued throughout the stage

of program development. Further conflicts between the prime sponsor,

the local management agency, and the Atlanta Bureau of Buildings centered

on the efficiency of the work crews, the accuracy and reasonableness of

the work orders, and the number of houses scheduled to be completed

during the life of the project. (In August 1979, p/pv succeeded in

engineering a mutually acceptable work schedule for completion of 35-40

houses.)
However, a further difficulty arose in another area--union linkages.

The primary union linkage in Atlanta is the Atlanta Residential Carpenters Union. However, in what appears to have been a coup on the part of

the North Georgia Building and Construction Trades Council (BCTC), all

the carpenters hired by VICI were from the Commercial Carpenters Union.

The residential carpenters--who are not members of the BCTC--were furious,

and threatened to withdraw from the project. This was doubly serious in

view of the facts that all of the work sites were residential properties

and that 70 percent of participants were being trained in carpentry.

The dispute virtually paralyzed work progress and jeopardized future

participant indenturing into the residential carpenters union. The

issue was not resolved until early September 1979, following intervention by the National Carpenters Union and the somewhat reluctant

involvement of the Atlanta CETA office.

Atlanta VICI's major problems are traceable to its key linkages. CETA,

the Urban League, the Bureau of Buildings, and the union organizations

had all struggled with one another on different issues long before this

project. As a result, only a rather fragile entente cordiale existed

among thed when the VICI program began. That coalition could not sustain

intense stress, and it frequently became contentious.

The prime sponsor's reluctance to respond adequately to the local management agency's funding needs clearly contributed to the latter's financial,

hardships. On the other hand, the Urban League wasn't as responsible as

it might have been. It failed to document accurately verbal understandings

with the prime sponsor, and, on at least one occasion, it issued checks

merely on the assumption that CETA funding was on the way.

The complexity of the city's mechanisms for work provision and funding

presented yet another problem. Laws and policies designed to protect

public funds and to stimulate public representation in the expenditure

of those funds introduced delays not encountered in other cities.

However, in Atlanta, as in other VICI sites, despite the problems and

disputes, there were consistent signs of improvement in participant

skills and work habits. The work completed by the project seemed to be

of a high level, and the relationships that developed between the journeymen and the youth were highly beneficial for the youth.

Atlanta Urban League staff regarded VICI's problems, particularly the

debate over indirect costs, as crises. In retrospect, however, P/PV

staff members argue that the problems were not as potentially explosive

as they appeared to VICI staff members. Indeed, some P/PV staff members

argue that a certain level of tension between various actors may have

helped sharpen and clarify goals and responsibilities, thus leading to a

better program.

B. BROWARD COUNTY

The VICI program in Broward County, Florida, began auspiciously but

deteriorated as time went on. Again, interagency conflicts scarred the

program, and in this site VICI was seriously hampered by a threatened

cut-off of funds.

17
The Broward Employment and Training Administration (BETA) serves both as prime sponsor for the project and as its local dinagement agincy. The

Fort Lauderdale Housing Authority (FLHA) is the work providing agency.

By late October 1978, VICI had selected 60 program participants, plus

33 reserves. Key administrati7e staff and journeymen were also hired,

and the Florida International university had arranged to deliver 50 hours

of instruction to each student.

Shortly after program start-up, however, several problems quickly emerged.

First, the project's streetcorner recruitment strategy and limited

screening policy resulted in a very high dropout rate--33 percent in the

first 45 days. Second, the area HUD office claimed that the VICI project

violated the Davis-Bacon Act, which required payment of local prevailing

wages on federally-financed construction work. HUD threatened to cut

off funding to the FLHA if it was not assured of compliance. Third,

BETA found recruitment increasingly difficult and, in late November 1978,

it requested an expansion of its target area. Fourth, staff turnover

rates were unusually high. And, finally, before the year was out, the

prime sponsor and the work provider began to express the first of a

series of complaints regarding each other's intent, capability, and

performance.

Some of the increasing strain between these two organizations was relieved

through the institution of a revised scheme for assigning work orders.

However, tensions continued, with FLHA raising increasingly serious

complaints about the performance of VICI participants and staff. Worse

still, in February 1979, the area HUD office cut off the flow of modernization funds (approximately $800,000) to FLHA, forcing it to suspend

partially its provision of work orders. This in turn forced BETA to

begin a search for an auxiliary work provider, and to subsist temporarily

on one-family residential repair.

In March 1979, FLHA withdrew completely from the project--a serious

blow, and one matched by equally traumatic staff changes within VICI.

Thuh, by April the program had an almost entirely new staff, a broken

link with a key organization, and no clear ideas regarding the ultimate

implementation of its mission.

In April, BETA entered into discussions with the Seminole Indian tribe

regarding transplanting VICI to perform on its Hollywood reservation.

However, the FLHA suddenly changed its mind and decided that it wished

to remain as work provider, and, in any case, the Broward County Board

of Commissioners rejected the Seminole project. However, both the

Office of Youth Programs and plPv insisted that the Davis-Bacon issue

and the availability of HUD funds be clarified and documented before

FLHA's status as work provider could be officially reinstated.

The effect of these disruptions was exacerbated by further staff changes

in May, but by June it seemed that the antagonism between BETA and PLHA

had subsided, and the project was beginning to work rather well. However,

HUD had not yet approved the allocation of modernization funds to FLHA,

and work continued under FLHA's own funding.

18 :3
In September 1979, inter-agency discord began afresh, ana the FLHA

Director again withdrew xom participation in the project, citing a

complete lack of funds, along with HUD's refusal to provide guarantees

and what he regarded as unnecessary refinements in architectural drawings.

Not surprisingly, BETA staff seem bitter about their relationship with

FLHA, and VICI staffers have complained about the erratic and heavily

political managerial styles displayed by the directors of both FLHA and

BETA.

VICI staff also complained about the nature of the work provided, arguing

that it varied in quality and did not always provide for suitable skills

progression. VICI staff also said that FLEA chronically garbled orders

for supplies, a problem rooted, perhaps, in that organization's lack of

construction experience and in its serious understaffing. FLHA, on the

other hand, cited its dissatisfaction--shared with HUD--with the slow

progress and "rotten attitudes" of the participants. FLHA complaints

extended to BETA's "mismanagement" and to the extremely high turnover

rates among key VICI personnel and within the participant roster.

Certainly, FLEA was rightly concerned about the'high turnover of VICI

staff, but in any comparison of organizational effectiveness (at least

in terms of VICI) between the prime sponsor and FLHA, BETA would appear

a sure winner. For example, by the FLHA Director's own admission,

certain accounting difficulties were traceable to FLHA's decision to

obligate $30,000 in non-VICI related funds in a manner that directly

violated city purchasing directives, in a "calculated risk" that subsequent HUD funding would replace the money. Furthermore, several key

VICI staff members claim that FLHA's sudden withdrawal was their first

inkling that a fiscal problem of such magnitude existed.

Much of the conflict that was a characteristic of the VICI program in

Broward County can be traced to the nature of the county government.

Each of the agencies involved in VICI had separate agendas and needs,

and there was no strong executive branch in the county government with

the power needed to achieve unity. Thus, conflicting organizational

goals and personalities often could not be harmonized unless P/PV or

other outside forces intervened.

By early September 1979, the Broward VICI program, at P/PV's instigation,

had identified a county community development organization as its new

work providing agency. VICI staff were developing for P/PV's review a

new proposal and a new timetable to reflect the changed relationships.

C. CHICAGO

The Chicago VICI project is characterized both by an above-average

record of achievement by participants, and by a somewhat complex administrative structure, which has given rise to an unusually high number of

administrative problems and delays. At start-up, the program seemed

efficiently planned and staffed, though even then, P/PV staff expressed

concern about Chicago's ability to develop strong administrative techniques.

However, within a few months, it became clear that Chicago's linkage

system was too complex and fragile a coalition to sustain any meaningful
program development. Here as elsewhere, inter-agency tensions and

changes in key staff members led to serious difficulties.

At start-up, most indications were auspicious: by mid-October, 18 participants had begun work, and between 20 and 30 more were ready to

begin. Ten journeymen had been hired and trained, and interior demolition and cleaning had started at a six-unit apartment building. The

Mayor's Office of Manpower (MOM) was the prime sponsor, with the City

Department of Human Services (DHS) as the project's local management

agency. A VICI steering committee was formed, consisting of representatives from the two VICI sites at Chicago (Pilsen and Lawndale) and from

the DHS.

In November, the extensive and somewhat fragile management structure

began to show signs of strain. And, beginning in December, Chicago's

worst winter in memory had devastating effects. Work on the sites was

greatly delayed, and supply and logistical problems began to emerge.

At this early point in the program's development, fundamental administrative weaknesses gave rise to a number of difficulties, beginning with

a series of administrative delays. The testing and screening linkage--the

Apprenticeship Information Center--proved unable to carry out its responsibilities; the VICI Project Coordinator resigned in mid-December and was

not replaced till late January, despite P/PV's insistence that a new

coordinator be appointed immediately; the process of collecting, processing,

and transmitting data faltered; the development of the major waiting

list reached a virtual standstill; and, finally, the project was very

far behind in reaching its self-imposed quota of 30 percent female

participants.

Next, a number of disputes over payment arose, most of them apparently

rooted in DHS's time-consuming payment proceedings. A local architectural

service refused to deliver its drawings before payment and, rather more

serious, at the Pilsen site, financial and other disputes led to three

separate "job actions," including strikes and picketings, on the part of

participants, administrative staff, and journeymen. Chronically delayed

payrolls, violation of work rules, and declining morale apparently

sparked the incidents. DHS's reaction, a new policy of non-audited

prepayment of vouchers, helped calm the situation but, clearly, carried

some financial risk.

In addition to--and perhaps because of--these delays and disputes P /PV

found it difficult if not impossible to gather good data from this site.

Despite occasional staff efforts to bring data collection and reporting

up to date, and despite P/PV's constant attention to the problems of

this site, there was no consistent timeliness of reporting, and P/PV

found serious' inaccuracies and deficiencies in the reports that were

made.

By June 1979, work site progress had slowed considerably due to new

breakdowns in the supply, logistical, and funding processes administered

by the Lawndale Peoples Planning and Action Conference (LPPAC), the

primary project operator. As a result, p /PV and DOL began a formal

review of the Chicago project's problems, and officially requested DES

to submit a revised management plan.

20 33
P/PV raised four major, concerns. First, the research data were typically

late, inaccurate, unusable, or all three; second, the project had not

developed a comprehensive strategy for participant placement; third,

recruitment for the waiting list was far behind schedule, and the female

recruitment goal of one-third of participants was not being met; and,

fourth, p/pv made a general complaint about project administration,

organizational dysfunction, and overall uncooperativeness.

DHS responded by citing normal attrition and lack of continued candidate

interest as factors in the waiting list recruitment problem. It rejected

both the one-third female goal, and any ultimate responsibility for

participant placement. Moreover, DHS stated its belief that P /PV was a

functionary without real authority, and it refused to develop or submit

a new management plan.

In August, LPPAC replaced its Project Director. The change was the

result of steadily worsening management and morale and of an apparent

$50,000 discrepancy on LPPAC's books (an amount later estimated to,be

closer to $3,000). The discrepancy clearly signaled the need for a

radical restructuring of the project's administrative and management

policies and hierarchies, and dramatically undercut any basis for DHS's

refusal to consider radical reform.

The roots of the Chicago project's problems are reasonably clear. At a

critical point in its development, the project endured a nearly total

change in key personnel. The new people felt little responsibility for

previous understandings or linkage networks. Moreover, they did not

share their predecessors' sense of the project's purposes and goals, and

they were tremendously confused by (and resentful of) P/PV's role in the

process.

However, even without such staff changes, the project might well have

encountered equally severe problems. The administrative structure was

so complex that any deterioration--or improvement--was slow to manifest

itself, and could be well underway before anyone could detect it.

Moreover, communication within and among the various organizations

involved was not of the highest quality, while, at the same time, the

program was somewhat "over-linked." The ties between DHS and LPPAC were

too extensive and too mutually reinforcing to allow for objective consideration of each other's strengths and weaknesses. For example, it

appears that the Lawndale administrators did not exercise scrupulous

regard for the required separation of VICI's financial and personnel

resources from those of their other projects.

Chicago's powerful Mayor's Office of Manpower historically has had a

close relationship with the regional and national offices of DOL. Thus,

the VICI program was me of the first instances where MOM was facing

outside pressure to make changes or risk losing certain federal funds.

It was not clear, however, that MOM was any more responsive to outside

pressures than LPPAC or other Chicago organizations. By September 1979,

the continued existence of the Chicago VICI project was in doubt. Both

DOL and P/PV had rejected DHS's revised management plan and insisted on

a new one. Moreover, at that point, there were several indications that

21

,
Chicago's prime sponsor and the local management agency were b9coming

increasingly eager to drop the entire project.

D. MILWAUKEE

P/PV had high expectations for the Milwaukee proposal, and, true to its

early promise, the Milwaukee VICI project has generally gone forward in

a very smooth and straightforward manner. Disruptions have been minor,

and shortfalls have been few. The key to the program's ease of implementation lies in the efficient management and monitoring procedures developed

by VICI staff and in the usually strong and effective system of linkages.

Where the program did encounter difficulties, they were the result of

linkage weaknesses stemming from mutual misunderstanding regarding

program goals and areas of responsibility.

At Milwaukee, VICI is sponsored by the CETA division of the Milwaukee

County Executive Office; the local management agency is the Opportunities

Industrialization Center of Greater Milwaukee (OIC). VICI's project

director is a former site foreman, whose strong construction background

is complemented by the administrative skills of his assistant, a management specialist.

By October 1978, 18 participants had begun work in the program, three

journeymen had been hired, and three more were in reserve. The initial

recruitment goal of 60 participants was achieved in the following month,

and the project began with the renovation of the OIC building, a wise

step since it avoided any possible delays in work provision.

In its first two months, the project developed a number of highly effective management and monitoring procedures, including specific processes

for procurement, journeymen orientation and training, data collection

and collation, and screening of applicants. The project also developed

an effective mechanism for tracing the progress of each recruit through

the recruitment and screening process. In January 1979 ten participants

were enrolled in the apprenticeship tutorial and orientation program

conducted by BIGSTEP, a minority apprentice-preparation program sponsored

by the Milwaukee Building and Construction Joint Apprenticeship Council.

In February, the project received the unique distinction of being licensed

as a Home Improvement Contractor by the Milwaukee Building Inspection

Department.

In this period, VICI staff turned their attention to rationalizing

procedures for forming the major waiting list, the program's only shortfall to date. There was, however, a rather high rate of participant

attrition - -by mid-April, there had been 44 terminations. Nearly half of

those negatively terminated had served less than ten working days in the

program, and P/PV interpreted this to mean that the first two weeks

served as a de facto screening process. By June, an improved screening

process had some success in reducing negative terminations.

In May and June the project turned to the problem of placement, making

an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to reconvene its Planning Task Force,

the highly effective organization that had beei!iSnstrumental in the

22
development of the original Milwaukee VICI concept. The next step

included development of aft' assessment/preparation process for VICI

graduates, and the institution of a mass campaign to alert employers to

the program's output.

Milwaukee's only significant problem lay in the nature and quality of

some of its linkages, which, in some cases, proved to be more apparent

than real. For example, the relationship with the Milwaukee Area

Technical College seems to have been based on several misunderstandings.

With the appointment of a new college director, the initial, rather free

and flexible, agreements gave way to talk of costs, quotas, and the

like. Apparently, too much had been based on personal understandings

rather than on organizational commitment, so that when the planners left

the scene and were replaced by program operators, the latter had to make

numerous adjustments. Further, according to VICI staff, OIC's initial

intention to assume responsibility for intake recruitment and screening

was never fully realized, and in time was turned back to VICI.

The relationship between VICI and BIGSTEP also underwent some deterioration.

VICI staff. neither appreciated nor welcomed BIGSTEP's role as a politically

acceptable channel for the introduction of participants to the unions,

and BIGSTEP's director resented this attitude. Despite such misunderstanding, however, the Milwaukee program has been characterized by a

particularly strong and systematic development, due largely to each

organization's willingness to attack and resolve problems as they have

arisen.

E. NEWARK

The Newark program faced an inherent difficulty in the state of the

local economy, and suffered from staff divisions and a partisan program

director. But despite these hurdles, Newark VICI has had outstanding

success in many regards, and its smooth development is a testimony to

the efficacity of its linkages--particularly the union link--and to the

beneficial influence of its prime sponsor, the Mayor's Office of Employment and Training (MOET).

Project start-up was surprisingly swift, with a program director, ten

journeymen painters, and 93 eligible youths identified and work begun by

October 1978. However, several problems emerged with equal speed,

chiefly difficulties in recruiting Hispanics and in completing P/PV

forms, and divisions of opinion among VICI staff.

MOET concluded that the target area included too few Hispanics, and in

December the area was expanded. VICI also hired a Hispanic research

coordinator to help complete P/PV forms and to provide translation and

Hispanic recruitment services. As a result, Hispanic participation

rose, but still the great majority of Newark participants were black,

reflecting the Central Ward's population. Newark also worked at filling

the major waiting list, and was the only VICI site to complete the list

by P/PV's March 1979 deadline.
Despite this good start, however, a serious rift quickly developed among

VICI staff regarding program objectives. The journeymen emphasized work

and production as the primary goal, and insisted that youths needed to

adapt to the realities of the working world. On the other hand, the

counseling and administrative staff argued for counseling and compassion,

for supportive services and understanding rather than a plunge into

harsh realities. Unfortunately, the program director identified completely with the journeymen and made no attempt to heal the divisions.

In January 1979, P/PV met with Newark VICI staff in an effort to close

the breach. However, though improved communications channels were

instituted, the split in the Newark staff was never fully closed.

Despite this, the program ran smoothly for two reasons. One was the

involvement of MOET's director, who cared about the success of the

program and used his position to clear obstacles in its path. His staff

were always in close touch with the program. The second factor was the

program's strong linkage to the International Brotherhood of Painters

and Allied Trades (IBTAT), District Council No. 10. The union took its

commitment seriously, and its business manager and apprentice coordinator

worked closely with VICI. The union even provided special programs with

its own funds, such as a seminar on safety in the painting traded'. For

several months, VICI youth attended biweekly classes sponsored by the

union for its apprentices, and the union was also deeply involved in

placing program graduates. Significantly, MOET and union personnel had

worked together successfully on previous employment programs and therefore brought to VICI a history of mutual cooperation.

Newark VICI staff began to develop a placement strategy in the spring of

1979. Several difficulties confronted them, the most pernicious being

the continuing decline of Newark's economy, particularly in its inner-city,

where participants lived. Early in 1979, the city announced substantial

layoffs in public employment areas which had been viewed as likely job

sources for VICI graduates. At this time too, District Council No. 10

was experiencing a business slowdown. In any case, the Council's jurisdiction encompassed several counties and its placement efforts were

likely to generate jobs mainly in suburban communities far from participants' homes and lacking in public transporation.

Consequently, VICI staff developed a drivers education program, and

instruction began in September 1979. Not surprisingly, though, helping

youths paid VICI wages to finance car purchases was beyond any program

resources. Nonetheless, VICI staff moved aggressively on placement,

initiating job development activities and pre-employment counseling, and

making contacts with the business community. Over the summer of 1979,

the Newark VICI program placed 34 youths, giving it the highest job

placement rate among all VICI sites.

The Newark program validates the concept of linkages that characterizes

the VICI program model. There were, to be sure, continuing problems in

recruiting Hispanics and females, but the program's clear successes

reflect the commitment and cooperation of its prime sponsor, MOET, and

of the local union.

24
Few at P/PV expected much success in Newark after reading its original

proposal. But intensive redrafting and rethinking by MOET, at the

behest of P/PV, led to a more sound proposal, and the deep involvement

of MOET and of the painters union made it work. The questions to be

answered over the long term are whether this involvement will continue

at its current high level, and whether it will be sufficient to overcome

the problems presented by Newark's declining economy, the transportation

difficulties, and the limited capacity of the area to absorb youth who

are training in only one skill, painting.

F. NEW HAVEN

New Haven's VICI program is a tribute to the commitment of its staff and

to the successful operation of its linkages. While several difficulties

arose in the course of program development, most were due to external

events, and VICI staff and linkage personnel made strong and usually

effective efforts to overcome them.

The prograM experienced no abrupt transition as it moved from planning

to implementation, because its central personnel did not change. The

New Haven Employment and Training Administration (ETA) is the project's

prime sponsor, and its two principal VICI planners became, respectively,

director of the program and the prime sponsor's liaison with the program

as well as an informal advisor. While this continuity minimized transitional problems, New Haven's VICI program encountered many of the start-up

problems experienced elsewhere, most notably, difficulties in recruiting

participants and orchestrating the flow of resources. The program

reached its full complement of 60 participants only in December 1978,

and enrollment of females fell short of expectations.

Recruitment remained a continuing problem, as did coordination of personnel

and resources. During planning, P/PV was concerned over the complexities

of New Haven's plan to rely on six work providing agencies. Problems

quickly emerged, though not for the reasons expected. Trade unions

launched a strike against the Housing Authority to protest the use of

temporary CETA PSE workers, and this led to litigation. As a result of

the strike, no work was provided by the HoUsing Authority, and VICI had

to rely more heavily on smaller agencies. The program adjusted well,

but in August 1979 the inventory of suitable work sites dropped to

critical levels, and VICI staff put out an urgent call to the work

providing agencies to help the program avoid running out of sites.

The large number of personnel and agencies involved in VICI also raised

problems: subcontractors often failed to complete their work on schedule,

disrupting plans for VICI crews; at two work sites, minority subcontractors

were unable to obtain bonding until, at the intervention of ETA and the

VICI adVisory board in August 1979, bonding requirements were waived;

ETA promised to provide the program with two vans, but only one was

provided, leaving. the program short of transportation, which, in turn,

led to irregularities in the delivery of materials; work providers were

also occasionally late in providing materials and supplies.
The program was able to surmount many of these problems and operate

rather smoothly because of two factors: the cooperation of the linkages

and the commitment of the staff. The trade unions helped screen and

hire journeymen, and their involvement extended through the program into

placement efforts. The work providing agencies also were quite helpful

because VICI seemed to be serving them in precisely the mutually beneficial way that the program model envisioned. The only weak link was

the education component. VICI staff did not see this as a serious lapse

at first, but placement efforts made clear its importance as participants

needed preparation for GED examinations.

The linkages formed an advisory board whose monthly meetings were well

attended and well regarded. In general the linkages thought well of the

program and of its staff: "The management is on top of everything," a trade union official noted, a conclusion endorsed by P/PV staff in their

March 1979 report. However, the New Haven VICI staff had two significant

concerns in their dealings with P /PV : they felt that research requirements were onerous, and they expressed a good deal of frustration at

what they perceived as P /PV's failure to communicate developments among

the sites; Much of this concern was assuaged by the June 1979 VICI

conference convened by p /PV and by the launching of a VICI newsletter in

September 1979.

While the VICI staff had some success in improving the orchestration of

their disparate resources, they were unable to solve the continuing

problem of recruitment (a problem shared by the New Haven CETA). In the

spring of 1973, VICI staff undertook an extensive recruiting campaign,

including radio and television announcements and a television discussion

of VICI. Nonetheless, low enrollment, particularly of women, c ',ntinued.

In June 1979, New haven Jegan moving on placement. Project staff contacted local contractors and, in :uly a formal plan was developed

specifying in detail the activities, timeframes, and goals that were to

guide the placement caweign. By August, ten participants had found

jobs and one entered college. However, GATB testing policies hampered

these efforts. In eaLly 1979, eleven participants were elimi,lated from

consideration for carpertry apprenticeship positions as a result of GATB

examinations taken at intake. New Haven CETA officials met with the

city's Department of Employment Services to resolve the ;problem, but

though ETA received assurances from the state employment service in the

spring that all eleven applicants would be retested, local job service

staff seemed unwilling to accept this decision, and ETA's executive

director continued to seek a solution at the state level.

After a year of operation, the New Haven VICI staff was bringing the

same strong commitment to placement that had characterized their efforts

at each previous stage of the program. The New Haven program was generally regarded byP/PV as one of the best VICI programs, and its quality

is a reflection of its committed management as well as its firm linkages.

In contrast toP/PV's deep involvement in the day-to-day operations of

some VICI sites, in New Haven P /PV served largely as a sounding board.

The New Haven VICI staff called P/PV's attention to problems they had

perceived and proposed actions to deal with those problems. The

question remaining to be answered is whether the relatively small local

labor market can absorb significant numbers of VICI graduates.

26

33
G. PHILADELPHIA

In Philadelphia, the VICI project made a rather shakey

development was a period of encountering and resolving

misunderstandings arising from the complexities of the

Ultimately, the program here has emerged as a success,

the area of participant-supervisor relationships.

start, and program

the problems and

program's linkages.

particularly in

The project began with a commitment to effective administrative, monitoring, and operational procedures. By October 1978, 20 participants

had been recruited, and most journeymen and other staff were hired. The

local management agency here acts through a delegate agency, the Franklin

Foundation (FF), which represents fifteen neighborhood settlement houses;

the prime sponsor is the Area Manpower Planning Council. The Philadelphia

Housing Development Corporation (PHDC) provides architectural services

to the project.

Initially, some delays arose due to minor conflicts between the local

management agency and the PHDC regarding areas of responsibility and the

quality of services PHDC was providing. However, by early 1979, operations began on four sites, and most aspects of the program--administration

and management, logistics and supply, work crew relationships, and

linkages--ran smoothly. However, each organization harbored some reservations regarding various aspects of the project.

FF chafed under the research requirements, and particularly resented and

failed to comprehend the need for a waiting list. Also, being a constituent organization, it was subject to pressures from the settlement

houses it represented. VICI was limited to a primarily black area

containing only four settlement houses, and the excluded neighborhoods

and whites felt considerable resentment.

FF was also concerned about the recruiting design. Its staff believed

that too many applicants were rejected, and they doubted the validity

and predictive usefulness of testing and screening. As a result,

screening has not been as rigorous at Philadelphia as at other sites.

Nonetheless, .a comparison of average test scores recorded upon entry

into the VICI program showed that youth in Philadelphia were at least as

skilled as those in other sites. Indeed, Philadelphia enrollees had, on

average, higher test scores than the youth at several other sites.

On the other hand, production-oriented organizations such as PHDC were

concerned that the project emphasized training over improvements in

housing. And, finally, a number of bureaucratic complications arose in

working with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Employment. Due to all these

factors, recruitment for the waiting list was several weeks behind by

March 1979.

The unions were relatively tolerant of the project and of its goals,

though they argued for a 3:1 (rather than a 6:1) supervisory ratio.

After an initially rocky start, however, the relationship between

supervisors and their work crews settled into one of close--sometimes

alarmingly intense--mutual respect and identification with particular

sites, journeymen, or teams.

27
Plans for a placement strategy were initiated in early November, 1979;

but, despite P/PV's urgings, the strategy remained undeveloped. By

this time, FF had developed a reasonably well-integrated network of

support services, chiefly an educational needs assessment and delivery

process, and expanded participant counseling.

Overall, Philadelphia's problems are much milder than might have been

expected. Despite FF's status as a constituent organization, which

imposed a very different political reality than that confronting other

local management agencies, and despite some largely bureaucratic delays

among its network of linkages and an initially negative attitude on the

part of FF, the Philadelphia VICI project appears successful.

A major concern expressed by the Philadelphia VICI staff was what they

saw as a special intensity with which their program was monitored by

P/PV staff members located only blocks away. Although P/PV staff members

do not perceive any special relationship with the VICI program located

in the same city as P/PV's offices, FF felt they were "over-overseen."

In fact, there did appear to be unique ties between P/PV and the Philadelphia VICI program, but they were encouraged by both sides. Proximity

simply led to more frequent formal and informal communications: P/PV

could easily bring visitors to the local VICI program, but the program

could easily raise questions with P/PV staff. While contacts were more

numerous, there does not appear to have been any detectable effect on

VICI operations, nor any slowing of research.

Despite a great improvement in the Philadelphia VICI's attitude toward

PM, there is still some residual resentment over the emphasis on

research--though that resentment now extends to DOL as well. GPFS's

board is, in a rather unfocused way, angry over the need for such items

as the waiting list--a perspective which reduces the danger that they

will be held responsible for a failure to meet the recruitment goals.

H. THE SOUTH BRONX

The South Bronx VICI program was the last program to get started, and it

has remained a very troubled site throughout much of 1979. Its original

problems can be traced to an external conflict that held up its starting

data several months. And serious problems related to finances, linkages,

and management continued long after the program began.

Soon after approval of the South Bronx proposal, the New York City

Community Development Administration alleged fiscal irregularities at

Operation Open City (OOC), VICI's proposed local management agency. The

city suspended payments to OOC, pending results of an audit, and DOL

also suspended its own payments to OOC. After lengthy negotiations and

the resignation of several OOC officials, OOC was formally redesignated

as VICI,'s local management agency, and late in December, it reassembled

as many of the people, properties, and ideas as were still available. A

number of staff members were hired, 36 youths were enrolled, and work

sites were identified in the two target areas.

28
At this point, a new difficulty arose, concerning $250,000 which the

Community Services Administration (CSA) in Washington had pledged the

program to pay for materials and supplies. In addition, in early 1979,

the program's landlord sought to cancel the program's lease because of

the delays in funding. Also, the chairman of the Apprenticeship and

Manpower Committee of the New York Building and Construction Trades

Council became ill, delaying referral of journeymen for jobs. Finally,

the city failed to provide needed scaffolding and trucks, and OOC itself

continued to move very cautiously, particularly on expenditures, because

of its recent contretemps with the city government.

At this time, P/PV staff met with the prime sponsor (the Department of

Employment of New York City's Human Resources Administration) and OOC to

discuss the slow start-up process. The prime sponsor agreed to streamline

the process of certifying youth for VICI. But, long after start-up, the

program continued to experience problems related to its finances, linkages,

and management.

The $250,000 promised in writing by CSA was not forthcoming, and OOC was

hard pressed because it had counted on these funds for supplies. Later,

the city's Community Development Administration loaned $100,000 to the

program and agreed to provide more if necessary. Eventually, CSA and

the U.S. Department of Energy funds were expected to provide the full

$250,000, but CSA's failure to honor its commitment was a financial

burden which hampered early operations. In addition, the new city

Commissioner of Employment refused to provide the seven CETA slots for

VICI staff that his predecessor had pledged.

A second major problem was the failure of linkages to materialize. For

example, early problems in recruitment reflected the failure of the

referral mechanism involving the Alfred E. Smith Vocational High School.

Counseling and education were to have been provided by Hostos Community

College, but its counseling program failed to get funding for several

months, and no counseling linkage emerged. The most crucial linkage

failure, however, was the trade union connection. When the program

sought to implement the linkages listed in the proposal, union officials

denied that they had made any commitments. The New York Building and

Construction Trades Council did little to help participants interested

in apprenticeships. Later, the plasterers union took several apprentices,

but this was the result of an agreement worked out well after the program

began, rather than a part of the original proposal.

The third fundamental problem in the South Bronx was poor management.

The drafting of the proposal and early VICI operations were directed by

an OOC veteran who proved to be a generally disorganized administrator

unable to set priorities, and in an effort to improve matters, a program

coordinator was hired in May. However, this led only to further orguaizational difficulties and personal rivalries. Moreover, while the VICI

program director's highly informal, unpremeditated manner led to disorganization, the coordinator's formal, textbook management style, in which

he removed himself from day-to-day operations, had equally negative

results.

29
A crucial question is how the South Bronx proposal passed P /PV's rigorous

review with linkages that were never firm. P /PV staff believe that the

six-month delay in starting the program caused commitments to be eroded

as organizations found other calls on their resources. However, inefficient management must be held responsible for the Bronx program's

innumerable difficulties at virtually every level. Participant regulations remained vague through the summer of 1979, then, in a sudden

crackdown, twelve youths were dismissed in August for behavioral problems.

Furthermore, OUC's fiscal report due on July 31 was not submitted until

September; the program seemed unable to certify homes at the pace it

projected due to staffing problems; the program was regularly deficient

in meeting enrollment and work production goals, and in July had an

insufficient number of certified work orders; andP/PV staff compalined

that the program had been forwarding incomplete and inaccurate information.

Surprisingly, however, despite the problems of management and linkages,

program participants seemed to be busily and fruitfully engaged when

sites were visited. They were idle more than at other sites because of

logistical bottlenecks, but they seemed to regard the program as useful,

and they seemed to be learning.

The recent departure of the VICI coordinator from the program raises the

prospect of improved management, but the South Bronx will present any

successor with major problems. New linkages must be forged with the New

York labor movement; counseling facilities must be developed; and recruitment and referral mechanisms need to be strengthened. Moreover, the

South Bronx VICI program will have to continue to endure an essentially

insecure system of financing materials and supplies.

SUMMARY

VICI's transition from planning to program operation was characterized

by a wide range of problems, some of which were common to most sites

while others reflected particular local forces. By early 1979, all

eight programs were operating and, although there were varied degrees of

success, the internal workings of the programs--particularly the relationship between journeymen and youth--were proving to be interesting and

effective. There was little new in VICI regarding recruitment or intake

of youth. However, the programs were designed to make innovative use of

union journeymen as trainers, and beyond this most useful planned innovation, the journeymen were also assuming a very important role in the

programs' placement efforts.

P/PV exhibited flexibility and effectiveness as an intermediary unit in

its management of the demonstration. The quality of its tecnnical

assistance seemed high, and it was perceived as useful by many local

program managers. As the demonstration progressed, and as a second wave

of participants began training, P /pV focused increasingly on placement

and on improving the performance of the programs. p /pV has also begun

to consider and plan for VICI's continuance beyond the period of research

and demonstration.

30
III. DEMOGRAPHIC AND TERMINATION

PROFILE OF VICI PARTICIPANTS

The statistical description presented here provides a profile, based

on key selected variables, of youth enrolled in the VICI program and

on how youth fared at program termination.

The information obtained from the statistical description is useful in

several ways. It serves P/PV in its role as a monitoring and technical

assistance agency. It also provides a context within which to interpret

program developments and final outcomes.

The information provided in this section covers the period from program

start-up in the tall and winter of 1978-79 through February 1980. The

reader will note some disparities in variable response rates. These

stem from two sources. First, where possible the computerized MIS was

updated by including recent data from P/PV's manual data control system.

Secondly,, over one hundred termination forms have not been entered

onto the computer system because P/PV is in the process of rectifying

data inconsistencies (e.g., varying participant identifier numbers).

The reader who is interested in examining a comprehensive item by item

statistical description of VICI participant data through November, 1979,

is referred to the companion appendix document. The appendix also reports results of descriptive analyses which point up possible relationships between selected demographic, economic, and termination status

variables and selected indicators of program success. Table III.1 which

follows the narrative presents a site by site breakdown of selected demographic variables.

Results. The results of the profile analysis are reported in a series of

brief narrative highlights accompanied by the relevant statistical tables.

The narrative presents a summary of the information derived from the statistical tables.

A. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

The descriptive statistics presented in this section are based on information obtained from participant intake records of 1125 VICI youths. This

represents all available data from P/PV's computerized management information base and has been updated from P/PV's manual data control system to

include information through February 1980.

To be eligible for VICI, youths must be between 16 and 19 years at

time of intake. The majority of participants (69%) were 18-19 years of age*

Sex: Overall, 81% of all VICI participants are males, 1 % are females.

*P/PV's data monitoring system identified 5 "age-ineligible" (i.e., below 16

or above 19) youths. Programs were notified promptly of any errors.
There are four sites with approximately 25% female participants: South

Bronx, Newark, Atlanta and Broward. Milwaukee has accepted the smallest

percentage (12%) of females.

Ethnic Group: Of the total population, 80% of the VICI participants are

Black, 14% Hispanic, 5% are White, and 1% are considered "Other." Atlanta,

Broward, and Philadelphia are all more than 90% Black. Chicago and South

Bronx have the highest concentration of Hispanic participants. New Haven

has the largest percentage (22%) of White youth. All remaining sites are

less than 8% White.

Education of the Participants: Approximately 73% of VICI participants were

high school drop-out completing up through grades 9, 10, and 11. Another - 4% had completed only eighth grade or less. Of the total population, 22%

attained high school diplomas or GED's prior to entering the VICI program.

South Bronx (12%) reported the loY;est ratio of participants with GED's or

diplomas which at the opposite pole, in Chicago and Atlanta (33%) had graduated high school or achieved GED's.

Fundamental Achievement Series - Verbal (FAS -V) Test: The FAS-V Test is a 100-item test of verbal ability. The test is administered to all VICI applicants for research purposes and not for screening. Individual VICI participant scores ranged from 7 to 99 with an overall mean of 65.1. This

compares to an overall mean of 69.4 on a normal group of 1175 trainees in

public anti-poverty programs. Chicago was the site with the highest mean

FAS-V score, 76.1; and Newark reported the lowest mean FAS-V score, 58.8.

Previous Employment: At time of intake to VICI over 90% of youths were un- employed or not in the labor force. Twenty percent reported never having

any previous job. Of the 80% youths who had worked prior to VIM, the mean

hourly wage in their most recent jobs was $2.87. Atlanta and Milwaukee

youths earned the highest hourly rates, $2.98 prior to VICI entry while

South Bronx youth reported lowest average earnings at $2.64 per hour. Half

of the pre-VICI jobs were unsubsidized. The highest proportion of subsidized jobs is found in Aladelphia where 77% of youth reported that their

most recent pre-VICI job was subsidized. The average hours worked per week

on pre-VICI .jobs was 33.4 hours. On a site specific basis, average hours

per week ranged considerably, from 29.2 hours in New Haven to 37.7 hours in

Broward County. Across all sites, 41% of VICI trainees were out of work

for 6 months or more before making application to VICI.

32
TABLE III,1

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OFITICI YOUTHS BY SITE

SITE .N

Atlanta

I

Brovard NMI;Chicago Milwaukee

IIMININ

Newark New

Haven Philadelphia

IN

South Bronx

X

TOTAL

I AGE

15 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 *

16 11 8 36 21 3 4 2 1 5 3 19 15 2 2 11 9 89 8 *

17 20 14 48 28 4 5 44 22 54 33 31 26 17 14 37 30 257 23

18 46 33 48 28 35 41 73 37 55 34 40 31 63 52 40' 33 400 36

19 60 43 37 22 42 49 79 40 49 39 36 28 38 31 32 26 373 33

20 or older 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 5 *

SEX

Male 109 79 132 78 72 85 175 88 119 73 110 86 105 87 91 75 913 81

Female 29 21 38 22 13 15 23 12. 44 27 18 14. 16 13 31 25 212 19 ETHNIC GROUP White 4 3 5 3 2 2 15 8 0 0 28 22 3 2 1 1 58 5 Black 134 , 97 164 96 47 55 163 82 122 75 84 66 113 93 78 64 905 80 Hispanic 0 0 1 1 35 41 19 10 40 25 14 11 5 4 42 34 156 14 Other 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 1 1 6 1

A Less than one-half of one percent.
TABLE III,1 - (cont'd) DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF VICI YOUTHS BY SITE

SITE BLOM

Atlanta

N1N212N2N2N2N

Broward Chicago Milwaukee Newark

New Haven Philadelphia

2N,

South Bronx

2 TOTAL H 2 HIGHEST LEVEL OF

EDUCATION OF

APPLICANT Grade 8 or lees 5 4 4 2 0 0 5 3 14 9 7 5 1 1 '6 5 42 4 Grade 9, 10, 11 84 61 126 74 55 65 159 80 123 75 83 65 87 72 100 82 817 73 High School

Diploma or GED 45 33 39 23 28 33 31 16. 25 15 36 .28 32 26 15 12 251 22 Poet Secondary

School 15

FAS -V TEST

Mean 62,4 61.6 76,1 64,3 58,8 69,A 68,0 68,4 65.1 N 135 169 83 194 163 128 117 121 1110

4

L)
TABLE 111.2 DESCRIPTION OF MOST RECENT

PRE-VICI JOBS

ITE BLONT Atlanta

N ININEN

Broward, Chicago Milwaukee

:NEN

Newark New RavenEN

Philadelphia

:NEN%

S. Bronx Total

Suboidized/Unsubsidized

Subsidized 58 50 52 40 24 53 65 46 72 56 43 40 70 77 31 42 415 50

Unsubsidized 58 50 77 60 21 47 75 54 56 44 64 60 21 23 43 58 415 50

Mean Hourly Wage Mean $2,98 $2.95 $2.88 $2.98 $2.76 $2.89 $2.77 $2.64 $2,87 N 119 133 61 138 141 116 93 80 887

Mean Hrs. Per Week Mean 34.3 31.7 31.6 32,5 33.9 29.2 35.0 31.8 33,4 N 119 133 61 141 151 116 93 80 894

Moe. Since Last Job

Still on Job 0 0 8 5 2 2 5 3 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 19 2 Never had Job 17 12 36 21 24 28 55 28 16 10 12 9 28 23 42 34 230 20 0-3 Months 67 49 63 37 37 44 87 44 72 44 54 42 46 38 36 30 462 41 4-6 Menthe 26 19 32 19 6 7 20 10 25 15 24 19 25 21 20 16 178 16 7.12 Mouths 16 12 23 14 11 13 16 8 18 11 15 12 10 8 10 8 119 11 13 Mos.-2 Years 10 7 5 3 4 5 10 5 20 12 16 13 9 7 8 7 82 7 25 Mos. -3 Years 0 0 2 1 0 0 3 2 7 4 3 2 2 2 3 2 20 2 37 Mos. -5 Years 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 5 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 15 1
B. TERMINATION PROFILE

The following narrative description refers to the data presented in

Table 111.3.

Termination Type

A total of 784 participants terminated from the VICI program through

February 1980. Overall 42% were. positive, 56% were non-poSitive and

3% were classified as "other." Positive terminations are those resulting

in employment, further training, or return to school. Non-positive

terminations include all involuntary terminations and such events as

injury or health problems, dropping out of the program, looking for work,

family responsibility and moving living quarters. "Other" terminations

include those recorded as "unknown" and "other." Atlanta and New Haven

reflected the highest percent of positive terminations with 49% and

48% respectively. Philadelphia reported the lowest rate (28%) of

positive terminations.

Sixty percent of all terminations were voluntary with Broward County

having the highest proportion (73%) and Philadelphia the lowest (40%).

Reasons for Voluntary and Involuntary Terminations

Across all sites 57% of all voluntary terminations resulted from offers

of employment. In three sites (Atlanta, Newark, and New York) over twothirds or more of voluntary terminations were due to employment. Another

12% of terminations were the result of decisions to return to school or

to attend other training offerings. Personal circumstances such as health,

family responsibility, and changing place of residence resulted in

another 9% of voluntary exits from VICI.

Unsatisfactory attendance was the reason for 50% of the involuntary

terminations. Unsatisfactory work performance was connected to only 4%

of involuntary terminations. Misconduct and end of the demonstration

each accounted for 16% of involuntary terminations.

Type of Employment After Demonstration

The majority (44%) of all VICI youths who terminated to accept jobs were

employed in related trades. An additional 23% entered union apprenticeships. A quarter of terminees secured jobs in non-related trades and

9% entered the U.S. military.

Jobs Requiring Construction Skills

In 70% of the cases where youths secured jobs, the use of construction

skills learned in VICI were part of the required job duties.

Types of Jobs

Thirteen percent of youths reported acquiring temporary jobs upon

termination as opposed to 87% who secured permanent employment.

Ninety -one percent of jobs were unsubsidised.
Wages

The average hourly wage upon termination across all sites was $4.59 per

hour. This ranges considerably at local sites. Chicago, Milwaukee and

Philadelphia all reported average starting wages for terminees that

exceeded $5.00 per hour. Only South Bronx reported average wages less

than $4.00 per hour; namely $3.83.

Length of Stay in VICI

On the average youngsters remained in VICI for 22.4 weeks. For most

sites, in-program time closely approximated the mean but in Chicago,

the 56 terminees averaged 31.8 weeks whereas in Milwaukee the mean

length of stay was 16.3 weeks.

Sex

Eighty-one percent of youths who terminated were male and 19% were

female. This proportion is exactly that of the number of males and

females who ever entered VICI.
TAILS

TERMINATION PROFILE IzOR VICI PARTICIPANTS TOMB FEBRUARY, 1980

SITE WENT

Atlanta Broward N

Chicago

N I

Milwaukee

N I

Newark N I

New

Haven N IN

Philadelphia

South Bronx N

TERMINATION

TYPE -A Voluntary 53 57 93 73 31 57 102 71 65 SS 56 67 26 40 27 42 Involuntary 40 43 35 27 23 43 41 29 54 45 28 33 39. 60 )7 58 TERMINATION

T1 11-11 Positive 44 49 54 44 22 39 60 41 56 46 46 48 23 28 22 32 Non-Positive 43 48 59 48 34 61 84 57 65 53 47 49 59 71 45 66 Other 3 3 9 7 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 REASON FOR

SOLONTAIT

TERMINATIONS

47 67 44 48 19 61 45 42 54 78 44 70 16 52 16 53 riployedl

Training

2

6 9 4 4 0 0 8 7 3 4 0 0 1 3 3 10 School 4 6 7 8 3 10 10 9 2 3 2 3 5 16 3 10 Injury/Health 2 13 5 5 1 3 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 10 1 3 Fully Respons, 2 3 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0

Look for Work 1 1 5 5 1 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Moved 1 1 1 1 2 6 7 7 1 1 3 5 3 10 3 10

Cannot locate 0 0 1 1 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lost Interest 0 0 9 10 3 10 10 9 2 3 8 13 0 0 3 10

Unhappy with

Program 1 1 4 4 1 3 6 6 1 1 0 0 1 3 0 0

Other 2 3 3 3 0 0 6 6 3 4 2 3 1 3 1

TUAL

INI

453 60 297 40,

32b 42

437 56

21 3

275 57

25 5 36 7 20 4 6 1 10 2 21 4

6 1 35 7

14 3

3 18 4

17

1:: t,
TABLE 111.3 (contd.)

TERMINATION PROFILE FOR VICI ,PARTICIPANTS THROUGH FEBRUARY, 1980

SITE

SIEMER

Atlanta

NI

Broward

N2N%N

Chicago Milwaukee

%NININ

Newark

New

Philadelphia%RINI

South

Bronx TOTAL

Raul

Employment

after Termination

Job in related

trade.

13 35 20 45 1 5 29 64 24 44 25 57 4 25 5 31 121 44

Job in nonrelated trade16 43 12 27 2 11 11 24 6 11 8 18 9 56 4 25 68 25'

Union Apprenticeahip4 11 9 20 15 79 2 4 22 41 6 14 1 6 3 19 62 23

0 Military Serv, 4 11 5 3 7 2 4 5 11 13 4 25 24 9 Reasons for

Involuntary

Terminations

Unsat. Attend. 20 50 5 15 16 70 30 71 28 52 13 46 18 46 17 46 147 50 Unsat, Work 0 0 1 3 2 9 2 5 2 4 4 14 0 o 2 5 13 4 Performance

. Misconduct 5 13 5 15 1 4 7 17 10 19 9 32 10 26 1 3 48 16

End of Demo, 14 35 4 12 4 17 0 0 1 2 1 4 7 18' 16 43 47 16

Other 1 3 19 56 0 0 3 7 13 24 1 4 4 10 1 3 42 14

Sex of Terminations

Males, 107 77 128 77 74 81 163 89 120 73 124 86 130 91 85. 70 931 81 Females 32 23 38. 23 17 19 20 11 44 27 20 14 13 9 36 30 220 19
TABLE 111.3 (contd.)

TERMINATION PROFILE FOR VICI PARTICIPANTS THROUGH FEBRUARY, 1980

SITE

Element

Altanta N X Broward

N YN

Chicago

% Milwaukee N II Newark

N%

New Haven N % Philadelphia N %X

South'Bronx %NTOTAL

%

Number of

weeks in the

program

Mean 25.45 20,28 31.80 16,34 22.63 23.66 21.73 26.43 22,42 N

abMUiria

ranstructio4

90 123 56 146 123 95 83 67 783

Akilla

Yes 15 48 35 73 10 77 33 70 43 88 25 74 5 45 7 54 173 70

No 16 52 13 27 3 23 14 30 6 12 9 26 6 55 6 46 73 30

Job Permanence

Permanent 19 53 44 98 11 85 41 91 46 88 39 95 13 93 14 93 227 87

Temporary 17 47 1 2 2 15 4 9 6 12 2 5 1 7 1 7 34 13

Job Subsidization

Subsidized 7 19 1 2 0 0 0 0 4 8 3 7 6 37 2 13 '23 9

Unsubsidized 30 81 44 98 13 100 45 100 '48 92 38 93 10 63 13 87 241 91
TABLE 11.3 (contd.)

TERMINATION PROFILE FOR VICI PARTICIPANTS 'THROUGH FEBRUARY, 1980

SITE

EMIT

Hourly Wage

Kean

Atlanta

N s:

$4.04.

31

Brovard

N I

$4.33

44

Chicago Milwaukee N % N X

$5,93 I $5,12

13 I 42

Newark

N X'

$4,59

51

Nev

Haven 'N

$4.26

40

Philadelphia N X

$5,39

14

South

Bronx

N 2

$3,83

13

TOTAL

N

$4.59

248

1;1
The primary Vintt* -f 1%1: t-..: is 01, of Via with

two .major formula-fl1t *.4C ev:Aay-;.. o Youth Carennit7. Zenv.....-!,:;_at. A": tips. rieftlat 'Programa

(YCCIP) IdX-Ans community

improvemenr,e, 4o lec*i94,4iy imply constructionrelated prsjoklts.

o Youth EmploymaLt and rmining Programs (YETP) which offer

career employment experience, classroom training and work

experience and can be applied in either an in-school or

an out-of-school setting.

This comparison is intended to provide a summary profile of the

types of youth participating in the three programs and some indications

of what happens to participant° upon termination.

The basic analytic approach for the aggregate comparison task is

descriptive. Gross statistical comparisons on several variables of

concern will be made'between VICI, YCCIP, and YETP. Rigorous

experimental analyses of outcomes are not appropriate, due to lack of

comparability between program goals and features, participant background characteristics and existing data bases.

The selection of variables for study was dictated to some extent

by the existing data bases for the different programs. Only existing

data was used in the aggregate comparison task. Comparison data was

drawn from prime sponsors' quarterly reports to DOL, including the

Quarterly Summary of Participant Characteristics and the Youth Program

Status Summary for VICI, YCCIP, and YETP. Prime sponsor reports were

used as the source of data to preserve the comparability of data bases.*

For this Interim Report, data from the fourth fiscal quarter of FY 1979

were available for six of the eight VICI sites. Complete sets of

reports were not available for the other two sites. The statistics

presented here cover the period from October 1, 1978 through September

30, 1979 for the six reporting sites which submitted complete data.

Simple descriptive statistics, frequencies and percents, were

used as the primary basis for analysis.

A11 comparisons were conducted using pooled data from the six

reporting sites. It is recognized that on a site specific basic

programs may at times differ markedly in terms of participant

characteristics;** however, pooled data will serve to point up generic

trends and differences.

*Slight differences are detectable between prime sponsor and P/PV

data relative to VICI youths.

**Site specific comparisons are included in the Appendix of this

report which is issual under separate cover.

42
Eligibility criteria differ somewhat among the three programs.

VICI and YCCIP youth must fall between ages sixteen and nineteen

while YETP participants my range from sixteen through twenty-one

years. Further, VICI youths must be out-of-school to qualify for

the program while YCCIP and YETP can enroll in-school youngsters.

While YCCIP and YETP strongly focus upon youths who are economically

disadvantaged, in VICI this is an absolute criteria for program

participation.

Furthermore, the program objectives also vary. VICI places

highest priority upon placing a youngster who has gone through the

program in an unsubsidized job. VICI youths are encouraged to

complete GED requirements while in VICI through VICI's formal'

educational support services. YCCIP and especially YETP as part of

their mission in working with in-school youth place strong emphasis

upon a young person's remaining or returning to school. When

examining the termination. data one must keep in mind this differentiation among program goals.

Analysis

Table IV-1 presents selected descriptive statistics. As noted

in the table, YETP programs are much larger than their VICI and YCCIP

counterparts. During Fiscal Year 1979 YETP programs enrolled about

ten times more youth than each of the other programs. YETP programs

were the only ones that showed a majority of female participants.

This is less surprising in lieu of the Chapter I documentation of

problems that women encounter is construction oriented training

programs.

All three programs enrolled over 90% economically disadvantaged

youths with VICI reporting the highest percent (99%).

Black youths constituted 75% or more of the populations in all . three programs with the YCCIP program enrolling the greatest proportion

of Hispanic young persons (192).

The majority of YETP youth (61%) were in-school at the time of

enrollment. This contrasts to VICI reporting only 2% of in-school

youths. Conversely VICI and YCCIP served the highest percentages of

high-school drop outs, 712 and 65% respectively. Among the three groups,

the highest-proportion of high school graduates or GED attainers is

found among VICI participants (26%).

In terms of program activities, VICI and YCCIP both reported a 1002

activity rate for work experience. Over half of the YETP activity

consisted 6f career employment experiences with work experience

constituting another quarter.
TABLE IV.1

SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS

(OCTOBER 1978 through SEPTEMBER 1979)

PROGRAM

CHARACTERISTICS VICI YCCIP YETP

ENROLLMENT

Current 294 296 4407

Total to Date 728 1302 11,869

SEX

Male 592 (81%) 843 (65%) 4997 (42%)

Female 136 (19X) 459 (35%) 6872 (58%)

ECONO 'CALL? DISADVANTAGED 718 (99%) 1244. (96%) 10,979 (93%)

RACE/ETHNIC GROUP

White (not Hispanic) 40 ( 5%) 65 ( 5%) 1642 (14%)

Black (not Hispanic) 596 (82%) 983 (75%) 8857 (75%)

.Hispanic 83 (11%) 246 (19%) 1244 (10%)

Amtrican Indian/Alaskan 1 - 6 - 71 ( 1%)

Asian/Pacific Islander 8 ( 1%) 2 - 55 - EDUCATIONAL STATUS

High School Student 11 ( 2%) 244 (19%) 7289 (61%)

High School Drop-Out 520 (71%) 843 (65%) 2130 (18%)

High School Graduate

(Equiv.) 189 (26%) 202 (16%) 1765 (15%)

Post High School 8 ( 1%) 13 ( 1%) 685 ( 6%)

PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

Career Employment Experience - - 6385 (53%)

Transition Services - - 865 ( 7%)

On-the-ob Training - - 14

Classroom Training - - 1632 (14%)

Work Experience 728 (100%) 1302 (1C0%) 3075 (26%)

* Six sites reporting.

Percents do not always sum 100% due to rounding.

44
Table IV-2 provides a summary of termination information. As

indicated on the table, YETP recorded a positive termination rate

(64%) about one and a half times that of the other two programs.

As predicted, YETP led all programs with 15% of youths who continued

or enrolled in full-time secondary of post-secondary schools. Slighzly

fewer YCCIP participants (11%) returned or remained in school and

very few VICI youths (5%) were reported in this category.

The DOL Program Status Summary includes an "Other" positive

termination category. This includes participants who enroll in nonCETA employment and training programs or participants who have "completed

program objectives not involving entry into unsubsidized employment."

Examples of the latter are participants enrolled in the program for

purposes of upgrading training, receiving supportive services, obtaining

GED training, and so on. Since the major goal for VICI is unsubsidized

employment, very few terminations (3%) were reported in this category.

Percentages for YCCIP and YETP, however, are higher, with 17 percent

and 27 percent, respectively, in this category.

"Job placements" indicates the percentage of youths who entered

unsubsidized employment at the time of termination. Twice the amount

of VICI terminees secured unsubsidized jobs when compared to the other

two programs. Overall approximately 35% of VICI terminees entered

employment as opposed to 14% for YCCIP and 18% for YETP.

In summary, in examining positive termination rates for VICI, YCCIP,

and YETP, it is essential to .tep programmatic goals in mind and to

look at specific termination categories. VICI and YCCIP had similar

overall positive termination rates while YETP was clearly higher. However, when examining differences in placement (i.e., unsubsidized employment) rates, VICI was considerably higher than both YCCIP and YETP.

In terms of VICI's programmatic goal of placing participants in unsubsidized jobs, the program seems to be effective in relation to other

major formula-funded efforts.

45
TABLE IV.2

TYPES OF TERMINATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1979

PROGRAM

TERMINATION

TYPE VICI YCCIP YETP

Total Number of

Terminations 434 1006 7462

Percent Positive 44X 46% 64%

Percent Job

Placements 35% 14% 18%

Percent "Other"

Positive 3% 17% 27%

Percent Enrolled/

Continued in School 5% 11% 15%.
V. INTERPROGRAM COMPARISON

The Interprogram Comparison involves a comparison of VICI programs with

selected formula-funded DOL-YCCIP and HUD-YCCIP demonstration programs

operating at VICI sites. Relevant variables fall into two major categories, descriptive comparisons, and possible indicators of comparative

program effectiveness. Each category includes several specific variables:

Descriptive Comparisons

1. Characteristics of entering youth

2. Characteristics of program staff (especially instructors)

3. Nature of work performed (i.e., the community improvements)

4. Linkages (with special references to funding sources and

the amount of funds provided from sources other than

those mandated by the Youth Employment Demonstration

Projects Act)

5. Salaries and !ncentives/bonuses paid to youth and staff

6. Other budgetary items, including materials costs, administrative costs, supportiva sources and other non-personnel

costs

7. Intake and screening procedures

8. Disciplinary policies and procedures

Possible Indicators of Comparative Program Effectiveness

1. Retention, turnover, and attendance in program

2. Ability of programs to 3ear up, achieve, and maintain

projected service levels

3. Quantity and quality of community improvements

4. Positive outcomes, including type of post-program placements (e.g., apprenticeship program, occupational area,

return to school, and post-program wages)

5. Cost per positive outcome

A. GENERAL DESIGN

To ensure valid comparisons, the selected alternative programs should

closely match VICI programs in several important respects, in particular,

youth characterisitcs, type of work, location, program factors, size of

participant groups, and data quality and availability.

Only three of the eight VICI sites--Chicago, Philadelphia, and the South

Bronx--had sufficient numbers of DOL-YCCIP participants, or had DOL-YCCIP

programs similar enough to VICI, to provide a basis for meaningful

comparisons. A total of eleven YCCIP programs, four in Chicago, four in

New York, and three in Philadelphia, selected for comparison.

HUD-YCCIP sites overlap with VICI in four cities: Atlanta, Chicago,

Newark, and the South Bronx.

Both contextual and statistical data are needed for making interprogram

comparisons. Contextual data are collected through site visits to

comparison programs, and are most relevant to the descriptive comparison

47
variables. Interviews and program documentation are the primary sources

of contextual data, and one round of site visits has been conducted by

RBS andP/PV research staff. In addition, written materials on several

of the comparison programs have been collected.

Statistical data are the best indicators of comparative program effectiveness. RBS has received statistical data on HUD-YCCIP programs and

is currently obtaining comparable data on DOL -YCCIP programs in Chicago,

Philadelphia, and the South Bronx. These data are currently being

analyzed, and will be presented in a subsequent report.

B. RESULTS

1. Atlanta

Only one comparison program was selected in Atlanta, Exodus, Inc., a HUD

demonstration program. Information on the program was obtained through

project documentation and a preliminary interview conducted byP/PV..

Exodus, Inc. Exodus, Inc., the recipient of the HUD-YCCIP grant in

Atlanta, is a community organization offering minority youth nontraditional educational and social services since 1972. The agency

had little experience in construction projects prior to receiving

the HUD grant.

The Exodus project is designed to train participants in work habits

and technical skills in home rehabilitation and energy conservation.

The object is to help them obtain unsubsidized jobs in constructionrelated areas, upon termination. Projects include the rehabilitation

of HUD-owned and private homes and the refurbishment of community

facilities. Work includes painting, roofing, carpentry, masonry,

landscaping, and weatherization. Participants may choose their

work crew, and one participant in each crew is chosen as crew

chief. Typically, there are 11 or 12 participants in each crew,

and supervisory ratios are normally about 15 or 16:1. This has

dropped to about 8:1 recently, since enrollment has declined.

Participants are paid on a scale of $2.50 to $4.50 per hour; incentive raises and team bonuses are given.

Exodus offers counseling, placement, and educational services.

Staffing for the project includes a three-person project management

team and six field supervisors. All field supervisors have previous

experience in housing/construction or community development, and

most have extensive experience in working with minority youths

and/or,community organizations.

About 260 youths have participated in Exodus through Spring 1979.

In May, there were 48 enrollees. The program is planning a gradual

phase-out and will limit future enrollment to 36. Most participants

were 18 or 19 years old, and almost all were black. All were

economically disadvantaged. About one-fifth were females, and

approx4mately a quarter were high school graduates or GED recipients. At least 7 percent were ex-offenders.

48
2. Chicago

Five training programs were selected for comparison with VICI, a HUD

demonstration project and four formula-funded YCCIP programs. Information on the HUD project was obtained from program documentation and a

P/PV site visit. Only limited information, based on a RBS site visit,

is currently available on the YCCIP programs here.

The Woodlawn Organization (TWO). The Woodlawn Organization is a

community-improvement "umbrella organization," with about 120 member

agencies. The Woodlawn HUD program began in March 1978 with a HUD

grant of $1,180,000. The purpose of the project, known as the

Urban Restoration and Conservation Corps, is to provide skills

training to minority youths, and to improve and restore the

Woodlawn community through minor home repairs and vacant land

clearance.

Participants are trained in several skills, including carpentry,

landscaping, painting, electrical, cement masonry, and plumbing.

Work projects have included home repairs, energy conservation and

weatherization, public works, (repair of parkway areas and snow

removal) and refurbishment of community facilities (a state hospital and playlots). Youths are paid on incentive scales of $2.90,

$3.18, and $3.50 per hour, with work and education bonuses.

Participants work in crews, supervised by eleven "tradesmen," five

of whom are union members. There are also three Public Service

Employee (PSE) assistants and one youth crew chief per crew. Other

administrative and support staff are provided to the project through

TWO.

Participants spend four hours per week in a vocational shop. Group

and individual counseling is available, as needed, and job development and placement services are currently being developed. In

Spring 1979, approximately 165 youths were participating in-the

program. About one-third of them were in school, cost were 17 or

18 years old; and all were black and economically disadvantaged.

About 70 percent were males. The program tried to select those

hardest to employ, such as high school dropouts or juvenile

delinquents.

South Austin Realty Association Rehabilitation Project. This is a

formula-funded YCCIP program emphasizing placement in the construction-related trades, and focusing on home repair and rehabilitation.

Training is provided in painting, carpentry, plumbing, and electrical

trades. The program started in January 1979. In December 1978,

seven participants were anticipated, and were expected to be disadvantaged 18 or 19 years old, black, out of school, and male.

Kenwood Oakland communityormEllatlonsncol. The code Enforcement/

Deferred Maintenance and Weatherization program run by KOCO is a

formula-funded YCCIP project, focusing on energy conservation and

home maintenance. Work skills include painting, roofing, carpentry,

and landscaping. The project started in January 1979, and had

49

I,
openings for 30 youths. These were expected to be 19 years old,

black, male, out of school, and economically disadvantaged.

Puerto Rican Congress Academy (PRC). The Rehabilitation and Beautification Project run by PRC is a formula-funded YCCIP program,

begun in January 1979. The program emphasizes home repair and

rehabilitation, and provides training in painting, carpentry,

masonry, plumbing, electrical skills, and landscaping.

The program has slots for 15 participants. Youths were expected to

be 18 or 19 years old, black or Hispanic, male, economically disadvantaged, and out of school. A number of former drug abusers were

expected.

Voice of the People (VOP). The Uptown Rehabilitation Training

Project run by VOP began in January 1979. The program involves

home repair and rehabilitation. Training is provided in painting,

carpentry, and landscaping. The program has slots for 10 youths.

These were expected to be 18 or 19 years old, white or Hispanic,

economically disadvantaged, male, and out of school.

3. Newark

Only one comparison program was selected in Newark, a HUD demonstration

project operated by the North Ward Education and Cultural Center (NWECC).

Information was obtained through project documentation, staff interviews,

and direct observation made during a site visit ofCPPV and RBS research

staff.

North Ward Educational and Cultural Center. The Center began

operation in 1970. The agency operates in an Italian-American

neighborhood, has a long history of community service, and appears

to have very good political support. The program focuses on construction-related skills through work experience such as major home

repair and rehabilitation, public works, and refurbishment of

community facilities. All construction skills are taught, emphasized, including painting, roofing, carpentry, plumbing, electrical,

and landscaping. Youths typically work in crews of 8 to 10, and

may switch crews.

The program attempted to place participants in the Painters and

Carpenters unions but, in constrast to VICI's experience, the

unions were not very responsive. The NWECC program uses pay

incentives, with pay levels of $2.90, $3.20, and $3.60.

The program is staffed by non-union supervisors who have constructionrelated experience. Supervisors are PSE employees who must be

replaced when their CETA time expires.

The New Jersey State Employment Service screens program applicants;

those lacking commitment are screened out. As of April 1979,

approximately 280 youths had been enrolled. About 100 were out-ofschool youths, and many participated only during the summer. There

were 31 current enrollments in April. About two-thirds of the

youths were white; about one-fifth was Hispanic; and approximately

50 t)
13 percent were black. About one-quarter were females. Youths

were aged...16-19, and all were economically disadvantaged.

Although the NWECC program goals and its focus on community improvement resemble the VICI program in Newark, there are several important

differences, notably the ethn4c group composition and the enrollment

of in-school youths.

4. Philadelphia

Three comparison programs were selected in Philadelphia, all formulafunded YCCIP programs. Information was obtained through interviews and

from RBS' site visit.

Simmons Youth Development Corporation. The Simmons Youth Development Guild is a non-profit agency operating educational, vocational,

and social-cultural programs for disadvantaged youths, including

construction-related training programs.

The Simmons YCCIP program began in January 1978 and seeks to place

participants in construction-related trades. The program emphasizes

carpentry and electrical work; plumbing is also taught. Projects

include home repair and rehabilitation for senior citizens. Program

staff include administrative personnel and four crew leaders. In

addition to CETA funding, the project receives money from the Urban

Coalition.

As of March 1979, there were 19 participants, 18 working in construction-related positions, the other in a clerical position.

Participants were 17-19 years old, and only one (in the clerical

job) was female. All were black Rnd economically disadvantaged.

All were high school dropouts, but about three-quarters of them

planned to return to some for of schooling.

Community Action Group and Youth for Change. The Community Action

Group formula-funded YCCIP program aims for placement in construction trades. Projects include building rehabilitation, and home

repair for senior citizens. In addition to learning general construction skills, youth are taught how to use power tools, purchase

materials, and salvage old materials. Staffing includes administrative personnel and three retired craftsmen who serve as supervisors

and instructors. Participants are organized into three work teams.

The agency also provides psychological and career counseling to

participants.

In March 1979, there were 23 participants, and three positions were

clerical. Youths were 16-19 years old, economically disadvantaged,

and were either high school dropouts or had finished school.

Participants were required to spend approximately three or four

hours per week on an educational program.

Mantua Youth Painting Project. The Mantua project is a formulafunded YCCI: program which receives additional support from the

United Way. The program began in January 1978, and focuses on
community improvement projects such as home repair and window box

construction. The program teaches painting and carpentry and

emphasizes placement in construction-related trades. As of December

1978, the program enrolled 16 youths, aged 16-19, black, out of

school, and economically disadvantaged.

5. The South Bronx

Five alternative training programs were selected in New York, a HUD

demonstration project and four formula-funded YCCIP projects. Information on the HUD project was obtained from project documentation, staff

interviews, and direct observation made during a site visit by CPPV

staff. Information on the YCCIP program was obtained through interviews

with the five New York City YCCIP contract offices and descriptions

prepared by the prime sponsor. The four programs were selected among

43 YCCIP programs operating in New York City because of their similarity

to VICI.

People's Development Corporation (PDC). The Youth Training and

Incentive Program (YTIP) run by the PDC began in January 1978,

funded by HUD ($500,000) and the New York State Division for Youth.

The program employs 60 neighborhood youths, age 16 -19, to work on

neighborhood improvement projects in the South Bronx. Projects

include rehabilitation, public works, refurbishment of community

facilities, and apartment repair in community-managed apartments.

Skills taught include painting, roofing, carpentry, masonry,

plumbing, electrical skills, demolition, weatherization, landscaping, and community management. YTIP seeks to place

participants in union apprenticeships or as helpers to construction

workers, plumbers, and electricians.

YTIP also has counseling and education components, including basic

adult education, pre-GED, and GED training for three hours per week

or more. Job-related skills are emphasized here. An Audio-Visual

Unit was established to document YTIP activities, and some participants study primarily photography. Project staff include a project

director, an administrative assistant, a counselor, a job developer,

and work supervisors (some union journeymen).

Youths are paid $3.25 per hour (as of May 1979). The program

originally utilized incentives, but later these were dropped due to

budget problems. Participants receive bonuses for completing GEDs.

Their average age is 18. About one third are females, 60 percent

are black, 40 percent are Hispanic, and all are disadvantaged.

About one third are graduates of the Alfred E. Smith Vocational

High School. Another third were referrals from the New York

Departient of Youths (mostly court cases).

Banana Kelley Community Improvement Association. The Banana Kelley

program is a formula-funded YCCIP project operating in the South

Bronx, funded by the City for approximately $137,000. The project

began in April 1978. It focuses on home repair and rehabilitation,

energy conservation and weatherization, and the refurbishment of

52
community facilities. Activities include painting, roofing, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, electrical work, and landscaping.

Participants pursue short-term projects, such as a community garden,

block and apartment clean-ups, and apartment rehabilitation. The

program seeks to place participants in construction-related trades,

and is attempting to set up community businesses, such as a cabinet

shop and home repair services. The program provides no support

services, but makes referrals to other agencies.

Staff include a project director, a vocational coordinator, and a

union and non-union supervisor. Banana Kelley enrolls 12 participants, aged 16-19. Ten are male, all are black or Hispanic, and

all are disadvantaged. Participants are paid $2.90 per hour.' The

program has close ties with the People's Development Corporation

(HUD-YCCIP program).

Opportunities Industrialization Center cf New York (OIC). The OIC

program is a formula-funded YCCIP project opera 'n the Bushwick

section of Brooklyn. The program attempts to train housing rehabilitation aides and to place them in construction-related trades.

Participants receive theoretical and practical training in electrical

maintenance, carpentry, painting, roofing maintenance, concrete and

masonry, oil burner/heating, plumbing and pipe fitting, and reading

blueprints. Work experience is acquired through rehabilitating and

reconditioning run-down apartment buildings, low- income ho'ises, and

public structures, and through renovating vacant public lots. Participants are supervised by skilled, licensed technicians. The OIC

program provides skill-related basic education instruction, designed

to complement the vocational training component, give GED training,

and prepare participants for the labor market. Participants are

paid $2.95 per hour.

The OIC YCCIP program has approximately 40 participants. Most are

18 or 19 years old. All but ore males. About two-thirds are

black, a quarter are Hispanic, ,,ximatAy ten percent are

white. All are disadvantaged.

Prospect Heights Neighborhor: :orEor4:tion. The Prospect Heights

Program is a YCCIP project fynded fa: approximately $100,000.

Goals are to train unemployed commuip.t.of youths as housing repair

and maintenance aides and tc refurbivh an old'achool building. The

program attempts to provide 1,ert$clu Its with good work habits and

with a variety of skills, such as .,%cernative energy technology,

waste recycling, painting, weoi,olization, carpentry, plumbing, and

electrical skills. The progra.. provides placement services through

the New York Urban Coalition and aims et placement In coustructionrelated trades.

Twelve low-income youths, aged 16-19, are enrolled. TUj are fema.111

all are black. Participants are paid minimum wages.

University Settlement Society of New York. Jww;rsity Settlement

is a formula-funded YCCIP program, funded foss $100,000 during the

last fiscal year. The program goal is to train building repair and

53
maintenance aides through the renovation of the Society's sevenstory building. Participants are trained in replastering and

repainting, resurfacing of floors, weatherization, and plumbing

repair. The project hopes to place youths in construction-related

trades. Participants receive educational and vocational counseling

from the US professional staff. The program enrolls 12 participants.

No detailed information on participants is currently available.

The prime sponsor indicated that a "careful selection" process was

used to determine enrollment.

54
VI. IMPACT ANALYSIS

The aim of the follow-up study is to determine the effects of the VICI

demonstration on the post-program labor market and educational experiences of trainees. This involves several steps: (1) interviews at

three points in time--approximately one month, three months, and eight

months after program termination; (2) assessment of program effects,

compared with those of other selected federally sponsored youth training

programs; (3) assessment of effects on participants, compared with a

similar group of non-trainees.

A. STUDY OXAJPS

The DOL's L:cowleage Development Plan (1977) focuses on the relative

effectiveness of the various YEDPA demonstration programs. Hence, plans

for the VICI follow-up research call for making comparisons between

outcomes of the VICI program and those of two other key efforts: (1)

formula-funded DOL -YCCIP programs; and (2) HUD-YCCIP demonstration

programs. A third group of VICI-eligible youths placed on waiting lists

serves as a control group. Currently, ten DOL-YCCIP, four HUD-YCCIP

programs and four control groups are participating in the follow -up

study. Table VL1 shows the distribution of comparison programs and

control groups among the eight VICI demonstration sites.

TABLE VL 1

DISTRIBUTION OF STUDY GROUPS ACROSS

VICI DEMONSTRATION SITES

SITE VICI DOL-YCCIP HUD-YCCIP CONTROL TOTAL

Atlanta 1 1 1 3

Broward 1

1 Chicago 1 4 1 6

Milwaukee 1 1 2

Newark 1 1 1 3

New Haven 1 1 Philadelphia 1 2 1 4

South Bronx 1 4 1 6

TOTAL 8 10 4 4 26

55

4)
A waiting list is used to control by lottery, entrance to VICI.

Each youth on the waiting list is assigned a "chance number" regardless

of date of application. Thus, as soon as the attrition waiting list is

depleted, youths on the major waiting list enter VICI according to the

lottery number (lowest number first). Applicants with little chance of

entering VICI are given job referrals. A selected applicant may refuse

to enter VICI, may not be located, or may fail to meet eligibility

criteria upon rescreening (for example, because he or she has turned 20).

The major waiting list, therefore, consists of youth who are presumably

similar to VICI trainees because they have been deemed program eligible

on all basic criteria and have been screened in the same manner as

actual participants. Four VICI sites recruited control groups.

A check of site procedures revealed that different programs have used

different assessment methods and/or criteria for selecting VICI youths.

However, no significant departures were made from the planned strategy.

Thus, VICI youths and their counterparts on waiting lists should be

"similar" on a wide range of important characteristics. Since comparability is such an important issue for the follow-up reaearch, some preliminafy comparisons between VICI and control group youths are

described in Supplement A.

B. SAMPLING

Table VI2 shows the basic sampling plan, by site, and by the expected

sample sizes and expected number of completed interviews in each interview wave.

TABLE VI.2

SAMPLING PLAN FOR THE FOLLOW-UP RESEARCH

Group

Number

of

Sites

Sample

per

Site

Target

Sample

Expected Number of Completed Interviews

WAVE I

(1 mo.)

WAVE II

(3 mos.)

WAVE III

(8 mos.) TOTAL

VICI 8 85 680 480 336 236 1,052

CONTROLS 4 45 180 126 88 62 276

DOL -YCCIP 3 85 340 240 168 118 526

HUD-YCCIP 4 120 480 336 235 165 736

TOTAL 1,680 1,182 827 581 2,590

56
Assuming a sample of 1,680 youths and a 70 percent capture rate for each

wave of interviews, the follow-up Etudy would yiel 1182, 827, and 581

interviews of Wave I-III, for a total of 2,590 ii-Ierviews, giving 581

respondents with complete sets of interviews.

Guidelines were established by DOL, P/PV, and RBS etermine sample

eligibility and timing for the sampling process. ss are:

1. Tenure

To be eligible for the target sample, a youth mu: have been enrolled

in a program for at least 30 calendar days.

2. Out-of-School Status

All target sample youths must be out of school (a dropout or

graduate) at the time of intake. All VICI and DOL-YCCIP youths are

automatically eligible on this criterion. However, HUD-YCCIP

program participants may be enrolled in school; those who are in

school are screened out of the sample.

3. Timing

Several factors influenced the timing for selecting the Wave I

sample and commencing interviews: date of program start-up, sample

size, ease of implementation, and readiness to begin field interviews. All these factors suggested March 15, 1979, as an optimal

cut-off date for sample inclusion. Therefore, all terminations from

all participating programs occurring on or after March 15, would

potentially constitute the target interview sample. This cut-off

date allowed VICI programs from approximately three to six months

to reach their full enrollment capacity of 60 and to stabilize their

program operations.

The March 15th termination rule also applies to the VICI control

group. Controls are selected for interviews in proportion to the

number of terminations from the VICI program. Specific proportions

for individual programs are set according to the size of the waiting

list. For example, if the waiting list contains 120 names or twice

the VICI enrollment, then two controls would be selected for each

VICI termination. 'The most likely control subject to be selected

would come from those with the highest lottery numbers, since lowest

numbers are selected first.

C. STUDY DESIGN

The research design for the impact analysis calls for observations prior

to termination, at termination, and after termination (see Table VI.3).

Intake'and progress records provide before-termination data. The former

give basic information on demographic characteristics and pre-i,cogram

employment and education. Weekly progress records provide information

on work hours, attendance, work tasks, and perfcrmance ratings. Attermination data are derived from termination records that typically

describe the type of termination and the terminee's employment and

educational status. Post-termination information is derived from the

three sets of interviews administered to all study groups, according to

the sampling rules described above.

57
TABLE VI. 3

RESEARCH DESIGN FOR THE IMPACT ANALYSIS

Before Termination After Termination

Study Group Intake Progress At Termination Wave: I II III

VICI X

CONTROL X

DOL-YCCIP X

HUD-YCCIP X

X X X X

X X X

X X X X

X X X X

The VICI demonstration has developed its own Participant Intake Form,

Weekly Participant Progress Report, and Termination Form (described in

P/PV's March 1979 Interim Report). HUD and DOL-YCCIP programs use a

different set of forms for intake and termination, and do not maintain

participant progress data on a weekly basis. As Table VI.3 shows,

intake information is available for all study groups, termination data

for all comparison programs (except controls), and weekly progress data

for VICI programs only. A more detailed assessment of the availability

and quality of progress-type information from comparison programs will

be made in forthcoming site visits by RBS research staff.

D. INSTRUMENTATION

The primary data for the follow-up study are derived from interviews

designed by RBS. Instrument content is largely based on questionnaires

developed by the Educational Testing Service in connection with the Assessment of Youth Alternatives Project. Additional questions were included to

address research concerns specific to the VICI demonstration. A further

data source is the standardized test of verbal ability, called the Fundamental Achievement Series - Verbal Form (FAS-V), administered to all VICIeligible youths at the time of, intake.

E. DATA COLLECTION

Since March 1979, a ten-person field interview staff has been hired and

trained. Nine interviewers are male, eight are black, and one is Hispanic.

Most have post-high school education, and several have college or graduate

degrees. Many have had direct professional working experience with disadvantaged, minority youths. An administrative control system organizes and

channels interview cases to field interviewers and monitors interview activities and results..

Interviewing began in early June 1979. Table VI.4 reports the total

number of Wave I and Wave II interviews completed in the follow-up study,

by site and by study group, based on field records available up to January

15, 1980. A total of 578 interviews, 321 Wave I and 257 Wave II, have been

conducted. Interviews are progressing at a slower rate than was expected,

but the pace is accelerating. Two general problems should be noted. One

58
TABLE V1.4 - CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS COMPLETED BY GROUP, BY SITE AND BY WAVE

THROUGH JANUARY 15, 1980

GROUP VICI CONTROL HUD YCCIP TOTAL

GRAND

TOTAL WANE

1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 SITE N %

Atlanta 9 1 5 0 2 18 - - 16 19 35 6

Broward 30 16 - - - - - - 30 16 46 8

Chicago 7 5 - - 9 39 7 11 23 55 78 13

Milwaukee 30 12 13 0 - - - - 43 12 55 10

Newark 25 10 26 0 60 35 - 111 45 156 27

New Haven 32 24 - - - - - - 32 24 56 10

Philadelphia 7 7 17 0 - - 2 2 26 9 35 6

South Bronx 20 12 - - 19 14 1 51 40 77 117 20

Total 160 87

1 61 0 90 1062

10 64

3 321 257 578 100

Wave (%) 65 35 100 0 46 54 13 87 55 45 -

Group (%) 43 10 34 13 - 100

10f 87, regular Wave 2 Interviews (i.e., Wave 2 - 2nd interview) numbered 57.

20f 104 regular Wave 2 Interview (i.e., Wave 2 - 2nd interview) numbered 46,

3Of 64,regular Wave 2 Interviews (i.e., Wave 2 - 2nd interview) numbered 6.
concerns establishing initial liaison with DOL-YCCIP programs to start

interviews; the other is related to interview activities.

Originally, eleven DOL-YCCIP programs agreed to participate in the

follow-up research. One Philadelphia-based program is being phased out,

and may be dropped from the study. The four South Bronx programs only

recently reported their termination information to RBS; interviews will

begin there as soon as possible. RBS has been unable to establish satisfactory liaison with two Chicago-based programs; one of these programs

apparently has been terminated, and we are considering dropping it

from the study. A further problem is that DOL-YCCIP programs have re- latively low enrollment, and few terminations occur at any one time.

The second major problem that appears to account for a relatively slow

interview completion rate is that a significant number of respondents

fail to attend interview appointments. After a no-show, the interviewer

must re-contact the respondent and schedule another interview, employing

the tracking procedures that were followed in making the initial contact.

This process is time-consuming and tedious, and partially accounts for

lagging completion rates.

F. THE INTERVIEW SAMPLE

As Table VI.4 indicates almost half (43 percent) of the total number of

interviews were conducted with VICI participants; approximately one-third

(34 percent) were conducted with HUD participants; the remaining interviews

were evenly divided between VICI controls (10 percent) and-YcCIP youth

(13 percent). Overall, approxiMately half (55 percent) Were first-wave

interviews; the rest (45 percent) were Wave 2 interviews.

Two types o Wave 2 interviews exist, a regular Wave 2/and A special Wave 2.

A regular Wave 2 is one conducted with a respondent wtio--hai been previously

interviewed at Wave 1. A special Wave 2 intervietil-s one administered with

the same instrument as that used for a regular Wave 2 interview, but it is

the first interview conducted with that respondent. There are a substantial

number of special Wave 2 interviews (148), representing 58 percent of the

total number of Wave 2 interviews. This number is large because, in order

to build a sufficiently large pool of eligible respondents for the study,

it was necessary to include youngsters whose program terminations occurred

after the target period for Wave 1 interviews (i.e., one month after termination).

The interview sample is described in Table VI.5 in terms of sex, age, and

race. As is apparent from this data, some notable differences exist across

study groups. For example, HUD youngsters tend to be younger and have a

larger percent of whites than other groups. The latter seems to be attributable to the fact that substantial HUD interviews have occurred in Newark

where the majority of participants are white.

G. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

This section presents frequencies of certain consequential variables selected

from the follow-up instruments* Factors such as study group heterogeneity,

*A comprehensive item by item analysis of follow-up da7:a is found in the

companion appendix document.

60
TABLE VI.5 - SEX, AGE AND RACE CHARACTERISTICS

OF INTERVIEW SAMPLE

****r.....,.%,..,,G...110UP

VARIABLE N

VICI

%

VICI Control

N %

HUD-YCCIP N ZNIN% DDL-YCCIP TOTAL

S Malr 194 78 40 66 146 74 63 85 443 77 1

X Female 53 22 21 34 50 26 11 15 135 23

16 6 2 0 0 51 26 1 1 58 10

17 30 12 7 11 47 24 6 8 90 16

A

G

18 78 32 15 25 46 23 23 31 162 28

E

19 87 35 28 46 30 15 28 38 173 30

Above 19 46 19 11 18 21 11 16 22 94 16

Black 199 81 57 93 118, 61 57 7 368 64 R

A

White 13 5 3 5 59 30 0 0 138 24

C

E

Hispanic 34 14 1 2 18 9 17 23 70 12

Other 1 . <1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 <1

63
undersized samples, and the lack of local contextual (e.g., labor market)

information preclude drawing firm inferences at this time. Formal statisticel testing is therefore inappropriate at thig,time and fipdings noted

here are tentative.

Tao areas are considered here:

o participants' ratings of their respective programs

and their satisfaction with program offerings

o participant employment and wage status

Participant Ratings showed no substantial differences in terms of general

satisfaction with programs.

The responses to specific learning outcomes or changes revealed some differences among the groups; these were related to learning on-the-job skills

and further education. On both questions, VICI youths responded "more

favorably." Seventy-four percent of VICI ouths said their program helped

them a lot in learning on-the-job skills, whereas only 44 percent of HUD

youths felt this way. Eighty-two percent of VICI youths said that participants in their program increased their desire to get further education, whereas

52 percent of HUD youths responded this way.

Responses to questions on Program Policies/Procedures indicated that a larger

percentage (70 percent) of VICI youths considered their supervisors "very

helpful" as opposed to HUD youths (58 percent). Generally, most respondents in each of the groups felt that the strictness of the rules was "just

about right."

Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of satisfaction with several

different program components in which they participated. No apparent systematic differences among groups were found.

The VICI group were coneistently more satisfied with program components

(except for job referral) than the HUD complement in terms of: personal

counseling, reading/math classroom training, and actual work experience.

Table VI.6 displays these response percentages. Because of the very small

respondent rate (between 1 and 10 youth per item) YCCIP data has not been

included here.

Employment and Wages - Companion Table VI.7 A and B display Wave 1 and 2

employment information. At Wave 1,25% of the 57 control subjects were employed as opposed to 35% of the VICI youth and 32% of the HUD youth.
A substantially larger proportion of VICI youth who had gained work held

full-time jobs and commanded a markedly higher hourly wage ($4.51). VICI

youths also tended to be employed at jobs that were more similar to the

training they had received. VICI controls did not fare as well as either

VICI or HUD youth regarding wages, getting permanent unsubsidized employment, becoming a member of a union, or enrolling in a union apprenticeship

program.

At Wave 2, a larger percentage of VICI youths were currently employed than

of HUD or YCCIP youths. Unfortunately, no control group data are yet ready

at Wave 2 fur purposes of comparison. VICI youths tended to be more successful in getting full-time jobA, enrolling in union apprenticeship programs,

or becoming union members. Au average hourly wage '$3.95) was much higher

among VICI youths also.

The Wave 1 interview included a small set of questions concerning jobs held

prior to entry into training programs. Inspection of the limited number of

responses in hand revealed that VICI youths reported that they were making

over $.60.more per hour than their HUD counterparts in these earlier jobs.

Interestirigly this difference was basically maintained through Wave 1 and

Wave 2. The durability of this early pattern will be assessed as the sample

increases to determine the extent and possible effect. A second phenomenon

which raises a series of questions is the fact that both the HUD and VICI

average hourly wages fell by over $.50 from Wave 1 to Wave 2. Again this

early finding will be closely tracked to determine if it is an artifact of

the currently limited sample size.
TABLE VI.6 - SELECTED PARTICIPANT RATINGS Olr PROGRAM

IMPACT: WAVE I

QUESTION RESPONSE x VICI % BUD N

LEARNING/OUTCOMES/

GRANGES

A lot

A l'..tle Not too such

7421 160

5

44

35 88

21

ITEM 4 In the program, bow

such did you learn in

the vey of important

skills that you can

actually use on iota ITEM 7 Want to get further

education

Not want to get further

education

Did not make any &I-

; formes

--

2 ,t1,1 lc

520 88 48

Didparticipating

in the progrem make

you:

PROGRAM POLICIES/

PROCEDURES

VT.,: helpful

:omaa;,.., helpful riX.: tmlfol

*-'4 sc. 25 159 Sa 18

. 5

, 6

ITEM J

In general, how helpful were the program

supervisors in your

program?

ITEM 13

Vary satisfied

Sumeteum satisfied

Not satisfied

i 4545 71

7

39 54 28

7

In general, bow eat isfled were you with the

part you took in?

Personal counsellog

Job counse'ing

Very satisfied

Somewhat satisfi4d

Not option.,

45

38 89

17

31 61 39 8

Classiocm tritinin (Where you learned

specific tau skills)

Very sAeofied

Sowvahat satisfied

Not satisfied

50

37 92

13

50

37 16

13 ;rosproom training

ivhsre yco learned

to improve yon:

Reading, writing or

-,thl

Yet, satisfied

Scoewhat satisfied

Not satisfied

5736 SO

7

39 SO 18 Il

Classroom training

(where you studied

for a GED)

Very satisfied

Somewhat satisfied

Not ibatisflod

4744 34 20

60 20

Actual work on a job

Very satisfied

Somewhat satisifed

Not satisfied

..__29__

60

i 35 138

5

49

`° 80

u A referral to a

full-time job

Very satisfied

Somewhat satiseiJ

Slot satisfied

II 52 26 61 122

730

27

64 Lit)
TABLE VI.7.A - WAVE I COMPARISONS ON

EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES

GROUP

VARIABLE

VICI

X N

VICI

CONTROL

2 N

BUD

2 N

YCCIP

2 N

Presently working 35 55 25 14 32 28

If not working, ever

worked since program .7 37 30 13 24 14 30

Job is/was full-time

(30 or more hours

per week) 90 78 70 19 57 19 67

Mean hourly earnings

current/last job $4.51 77 X3.16

48

29

14

$3.93

68

19

13

J2.80

0 0

,Job was permanent 65 50

Job was unsubsidized 95 73 72 21 89 17 100 2

Job was similar to

training 53 41 NA 32

Union apprenticeship

program 24 18 4 2 18 3 0 0

TABLE VI.7.B - WAVE IT COMPARISONS ON

EIIPLOIYLOT AND WAGES

GROUP

VARIABLE

VICI

2 N

HUD

2 N

YCCIP

2 N

Presently working 49 43 34 36 27 17

If not working, ever

worked since program 34 i5 33 23 40 18

Job is/was full-time

(30 or more l.urs per

week) 86 48 49 29 79 30

Mean hourly earnings

current/last job $3.95 57 53.33 56 ALE 35

Job was ermanent 74 4: 59 35 67 26

Job was unsubsidized 88 50 93 55 .,--

74 28

Unim apprenticeship

program 17 10 2 1 3 1

65
VII. WORK VALUATION

The purpose of the work valuation is to demonstrate that an employment

training program, such as VICI, can and does create valuable tangible

byproducts such as the improvements and repairs to housing occupied

(generally) by low-income families in urban areas. These improvements

and repairs have a "market" value, which can be represented as their

cost if performed by a building contractor or other professional craftsmen. The work valuation assesses this market value and compares it with

program expenditures.

This comparison permits us to make several quantitative statements about

each VICI site. One such statement is the simple demonstration that one dollar of expenditure creates a tangible and measurable value in home

improvements and repairs. This return can be called a program "benefit,"

and it can also be viewed as an offset to the cost of training, so that

training costs are reduced by the amount of the "work value" created by

the youths. Second, a set of statements can be made about the types of

work skills taught and performed with respect to the amount of work

value they create. For example, do some skills produce a higher market

value than others in return for the cost of teaching them?

The methodology and data collection procedures used in this analysis are based on an ongoing, job-by-job accounting system. A job is defined as

work, or activities, done at an individual location or address, such as

a home or apartment. One site may be working on over one thousand such

jobs, while other sites may work on one hundred or less. This system of

evaluation differs from the usual procedure of periodic or end-of-the

project san-ling of results. The job-by-job accounting system provides

a very satisfactory data set for economic and statistical analysis, and

the evaluator can have substantial confidence in the analytical results.

In addition, it allows some ongoing monitoring of activities at each

site. At present, this monitoring capability is developed for use on a quarterly evaluation basis. Currently, P/PV is discussing with DOL the

possibility of refining the management potential of this estimation

method.

Thus, the results of the work valuation reported here are twofold.

First, there are the quantitative statements that can be made about the

value or return on training expenditures. The second result is the

evolution of a monitoring and evaluation tool which can be replicated

or adapted to other applications. The latter is quite distinct from the

training objectives of the VICI demonstration.

This chapter updates and expands the work valuation data with information

reported through mid-March, 1980. In addition, the formulas used for

the'work valuation procedures are revised and explained. The following

sections discuss the nature and purpotie of the wo:k valuation task,

and present the mathematical formulations and indicators for estimating

work value. Section C reports and compares numerical results through

June 30, 1979 and through December 31, 1979 or mid-March 1980, and a

final section formulates a means of evaluating the performance of a VICI

project.

66
A. DATA COLLECTION

Table VII.1 lists the five type3 of forms used to collect data for the

work valuation.* These forms include: (1) A format for estimated large

job costs and value, completed when the job is started (VICI Form VII);

(2) two versions of a final job cost report, completed when a job is

finished (VICI Form VIII for jobs initially reported on VICI Form VII,

and VICI Form VI for "small" jobs, where this is the only reporting form

used): (3) the VICI Quarterly Fiscal Report, which describes the overall

project costs using a simple chart of accounts format; and (4) a report

from the independent consultants on the job value. Crawford & Company.

The principal types of data ilected are:

1. Expenditures (total and jobby-job) for youth labor, crew

chiefs, materials and supp-ies, etc. (see Table VII.1, rows

a-e).

2. Estimates of what a private contractor would charge for the

job being done by the VICI crews (Table VII.1, row f).

3. Identifying data for each job (Table VII.1, row g-i).

4. An independent judgment about the quality of the VICI crews'

work (Table VII.1, row j).

Items 1, 2, and 3 are prepared by each VICI site for each job, using

VICI Form VI or VICI Forms VII and VIII. Crawford & Company provide an

additional estimate for data item 2, on a sampling basis, and also give

a second opinion on the quality of work performed (data item 4).

Table VII.2 shows how data collection and processing proceeds. Data

collection originates at the project site, where one of two alternative

forms is used to report on each job. For small jobs, demanding only a

few working days, a simple reporting form (Form VI - VICI Job Reporting

Form: Short Form) is filled out when the job is completed. It is sent

to P/PV's Data Editing Unit, which reviews the form for accuracy, and

forwards it to RBS, who process and analyze the data and prepare reports.

Larger jobs require two data reports. The first report (Form VII - VICI

Cost Estimate Form) provides some cost estimates for a job that is

beginning. Upon completion of this job, a revised cost report (Form VIII -

Materials and Equipment .Thst Form) is completed and forwarded to P/PV.

This two-form procedure provides data to anticipate and monitor work in

progress and is useful for jc.os lasting several months.

Forms VI, VII, and VIII, each include some items estimating private

contractor charges for a job in prop_ess. The estimates are checked by

Crawford & Company, who report directly to RBS.

The fifth data form is a quarterly fiscal report providing an overall

total for expenditures for the project. This permits the estimation

of expenditures which cannot be directly attributed to a particular job, so

that a type of "overhead" expenditure can be calculated. Total expenditures given by the job-by-job reports are compared with the quarterly

*All pertinent tables are included at the end of Chapter.

67
data. Expenditures not attributable to a job become an expense which

must be allocated to the job cost esimates. The mathematical formulas

described below illustrate how the five sets of data are used.

B. FORMULATING WORK VALUE

A simple formulation of the work value is:

Total of estimated

Value of VICI work private contractor

bids. Found on

Forms VI, VII or VIII.

Adjustment

(concordance) of

* VICI value estimates.

Based on Crawford & (a)

Cr. reports.

Here, value is equated with what a private contractor would bid (charge)

for the job. This simple estimate of value can be used to make further

evaluations of VICI work. For example, it can be used to estimate work

value created by the project, per dollar of total expenditure on the

project, thus:

Total of estimated

Work value created private contractor

per bids. Found on

dollar of expenditure Forms VI, VII or VIII

Adjustment of VICI

value estimates.

Based on Crawford &

Co reports (b)

Total expenditures to date.

Found in Quarterly Fiscal Report

This second formula gives the ratio of the total "value of VICI work" to

the total expenditures for the VICI project. As an example of how these

equations are estimated, consider Atlanta through June 30. 1979, where

the calculations are as follows:

Calculation of formula (a):

Total value of VICI work . Total value

(13 jobs reported) on VICI Form * VIII (13 jobs)

($82,696)

. $87,575

68

Adjustment factor

from Crawford & Co.

reports (5 jobs

inspected)

* 1.059
Calculation of formula (b):

Work value created Value from formula (a)

der Reported expenditure to date from

dollar of expenditure Quarterly Report

$ 87,575

$366,842

$ 0.239

The low "efficiency" indicators in the example is apparently due to

substantial start-up costs in a period when no job-related work was

performed. .As the Atlanta project progresses, start-up costs could be

allocated to all jobs completed, as in normal bus ...Limas accounting, which

would automatically raise the efficiency indicator.). The alternative,

followed in the present report, is to use "with and without" indicator

ratios. A "with" indicator, that includes start-up costs and overhead

items, is given in formula (b). The "without" indicator, which ignore

start-up costs and overhead expenses, is:

Work value created

dollar of direct

job expense

Value from formula (a)

Total of estimated or actual

job-related expenses. Reported

on VICI Forms VI, VII, Lad VIII

(c)

Schemes to allocate "fixed" or "sunk" costs, such as stare -up costs,

are typically required for (a) regulated rate setting, such as public

utility rate setting, and (b) for income tax calculations. A typical

allocation scheme, applicable to VICI, would be (1) to project the total

dollar volume of jobs that will be completed (using a cost basis); next,

(2) to project the start-up and overhead costs for he entire period; then,

(3) calculate the ratio of rtart-up and overhead coats to projected total

job cost (put-in-place); and (4) apply this "pro-rated" ratio or allocation

as an add-on to the cost of each job or the total of interim costs. For

example, while the 9-month total of start-up and overhead costs may equal

$350,000 the projected total for 18 months are $700,000, the ratio is

5 : 7 - .$0.7143; this means that an interim actual total of direct cost

and overhead costs added on, rather than the $350,000 actual total of

start-up and overhead costs accrued at the 9th month. The allocation

technique would raise the numerical indicator in formula (b).
For example, using the Atlanta data through June 30, 1979,

Work value created $ 87,575

per $140,478

dollar of direct

Job expense $ 0.623

In this :aim, every $1.00 of direct, job-related costs (youth labor,

crew-chief time, materials and supplies) results in the creation of

$0.623 in work value, where work value is equated with a private contractor's bid to do the same job.

The difference between the $140,478 of direct, job-related expenses and

the $366,842 of total expenditure represents the sum of start-up costs

and overhead expenditures -- $226,364, based on data reported through

g\II

Jurug 30th. Each of these reported values is rovisional, representing

only estimates of the correct numbers. At the end of the project, and

accurate accounting of all jobs and expenditum. will tee possible, and

those numerical values will be the best basis for a work evaluation of

the VICI demonstration.

The two ratio indicators of equations (b) and (c) are aggregate indicators

of the work value. In the March 1979 Interim Report, value-added indicators

were described. These show the amount of work value that remains if all

non-youth labor costs are deducted. Value-added indicators are calculated

thus:

Value added by Value created - All direct job-related

youth labor (formula a) costs except youth labor (d)

Using the Atlanta data:

Value added by $87,575

youth labor $25,026

$62,549

"Value added by youth labor" produces a comparison ratio when it is

divided by the total of direct job-related youth labor expenditures

(typically, excluding training time, sick leave, etc.), thus:

Value added formula (d)

per Direct, job-related

dollar of direct youth labor costs

youth labor

70

(e)
Using the Atlanta data:

Value added $25,026

per $77,929

dollar of

youth labor

$ 0.321

The numerical value from formula (e), a value-added indicator of

$0.321 per dollar of youth labor, does not include overhead and

start-up costs. These costs can be used to formulate a further

ratio indicator:

Start-up and Start-up and overhead costs (f)

overhead costs Direct, job-related youth

per labor costs

dollar of direct

youth labor

Using the Atlanta data:

Start-up and

overhead costs

per

dollar of direct

youth labor

$226,364

$ 77,929

$ 2,905
The numerical value of $2.905 per dollar of direct youth labor represents

the penalty of allocating all start-up costs to a few jobs. It will

decrease as more work is done.

The value-added indicator, formula (d), is useful for evaluating whether

certain crafts or types of jobs seem to produce a better work value than

others. Subtracting the formula (e) number causes the value-added

indicator to fall to zero or less for four of the five sites (see Section

C).

Two new formulas have been developed since the October. 1979 report.

The first is:

Ratio of direct job

costs to total id Total of direct job costs reported to date

expenditures;717Ee Reported Total Expenditures to Date (g) = 140,478

366,842 = 0.383

This ratio is a measure of efficiency. It measures the amount of total

expenditures that is directly operated to home repairs and construction.

Since VICI emphasize:on-the-jab training, a substantial proportion of

total expenditures should be directly job-related.

The second formula is

Ratio of start-up and

overhead costs to

direct lob costs

Difference between total expenditures

= direct job costs

Direct job costs

= 366 842 - 140 478

140,478

= 1.611

This formula is a variation of formula (g), and is also an efficiency

measure. Optimally, this ratio should be less than 1.0 for a long-term

work training program.

(h)

Table VII.3 summarizes the formulas given above. Results of calculations

using these indicators discusses the numerical values found and are

reported in Section C.

72 ;)4
2. Development of the Work Valuation System

The numerical analysis described above is only part of the evaluation

task. The second part is to develop and refine a system of work valuation monitoring and evaluation reporting which can be used by other

youth employment programs. The system was outlined in Tables VII.1-VII.3.

It consists of a set of data collection fc':ms (Table VII.I), a process for

data collection and handling (Table VII.2), and a set of analytical equations and indicators (Table VII.3). The system is currently working, and

it provided the results described above. However, its principal use to

date has been for making interim evaluations. Its potential for ongoing

monitoring and management has not yet been developed, for two reasons:

1. Data collection, processing, and analysis is done on a

quarterly basis and does not produce timely reports or

quick feedback either to VICI project officers or to

VICI site management. Converting the reporting to a

monthly basis would increase the costs; but without timely

reporting, much of the usefulness of these reports for

quick identification and correction of problems may be

lost.

2. The potential users of the analytical reports may not

understand the concepts, equations, and indicators, and,

hence, may not be able to use the reports for monitoring

or management purposes.' Some investment in training may

be necessary if the system is to be extended to other

projects.

The work valuation system is a good and useful evaluation tool; the

methodology can be replicated; the procedures are straightforward; and

the results are accurate and verifiable. However, the system does

require some analytical sophistication and willingness to learn on the

part of users. For large applications, a subcontractor would probably

be needed to handle the computing, though small projects, consisting of,

say, one hundred jobs or less, could use the system manually.

As the system has developed, a number of refinements have been made in

it:

1. Items and formats of the data collection forms (Table VII.1)

were changed frequently in the first months, due to certain

ambiguities in the forms and the need to train users.

2. Data collection and handling seem to be working smoothly

(Table VII.2), but some sites are very slow in forwarding

completed forms, resulting in a lack of data. A possible

improvement in this process could be more frequent reporting

of the type of results shown in Table VII.3 and VII.5, but

this would raise costs.

73
3. The data analysis formulas (Table VII.3) are still evolving.

The following sections describes some refinements, and

further improvements are possible.

4. Delays in data reporting from sites have led to the use

of projection formulas which fill in the missing data.

These formulas were used in this and in preceeding

reports, and -Ire still undergoing refinement.

5. Staff turnover at VICI sites results in a frequent need

to train new staff in using the work value forms. This

problem is handled by P/PV.

In summary, job performance, as measured in Table VII.4 and 5, is

perhaps not exceptional, but, on the other hand, is providing a fair

return on each dollar spent. As the program proceeds and matures,

improvements can be expected in those sites with lower value ratios.

However, not all sites should be expected to be outstanding; there

will inevitably be variations in performance among sites, due to

many factors. The work valuation system itself is an adequate and

useful method for deriving the value of outputs. It appears to be

a replicable procedure for use in similar programs.

74
C. RESULTS

1. Numberical Results Through June 30, 1979 and through December 31, 1979

Table VII.4 includes data through December 31, 1979 for all eight sites.

The inclusion of three additional sites since the last Interim Report

has lowered the simple ratio of work value to total expenditure from

60 percent to 42 percent. The reason for this is that the formerly

excluded sites were not completely exemplary in reporting and, apparently,

were not efficient managers of their resources.

Table VII.5 presents the numerical values for the aggregate and value-added

indicators, and reports the total number of jobs included in the calculations. The formula (c) ration indicator, "value created per dollar of

direct job expenses," varies from 0.618 to 1.510. When overhead and

start-up costs are included, using formula (b), the range drops to

0.178 to 0.756. Of course, these indicators take no account of program

benefits such as the increased.Orobability of employment and increased

future earnings.

As part of their on-site assessments of job value, Crawford & Company

evaluated the quality of the work done relative to local contractor

norms. Crawford & Company's judgments for 42 jobs are listed in Table

VII.6, which shows that 87 percent of the ratings are "average" or "above

average." Moreover, favorable ratings appear to be increasing as the

project matures.

Table VII.7 measures timeliness of job completion. Smaller jobs took less

time to'complete, as would be expected. Shortages in materials or weather

problems accounted for most of the delays in what should have been brief

jobs.

More detail evaluation can be made about the relative values produced

by each site, each type of job, and each type of craft. The procedure

used for this is a simple one-way analysis of variance, a techniqta was

used on a sample of 275 jobs. Three tables of the formula (e) 4Alcator

value added per dollar of direct youth labor, were prepared (see ItCJies

VII.8.A - VII.8.C). In each table, the value-added ratios differ

significantly.

The numbers in the tables do not include the concordance

are any reports on Form VI included, (so Newark data are

These tables will be refined in future analyses, but the

been deferred because of some still-unanswered questions

ness of the formula (a) indicators vis-a-vis the formula

(c). indicators.

adjustment, nor

missing ).

improvements have

about the useful-

(b) or formula

Finally, Table VII.9 shows the numbers and types of jobs completed and in

progress. Two versions of this table are given: The first shows the

percentage of job types per site and throughout VICI (based on a sample of

791 jobs);the second includes all jobs reported through mid-March 1980.

75
D. CONCLUSION: HOW GOOD CAN A VICI PROJECT BE?

Evaluation of a VICI project should be based on realistic expectations

and standards of performance. That is, a set of maximum values for

performance indicators must first be established; a VICI program can then

be measured against these standards. For instance, one might ask: Whft

are realistic numerical values for the ratios shown in Table VII.5? What

is the best value for each ratio? The comparative data shown in the

updated Table VII.5 provide one estimate of the best value of each of five

ratios. Another approach would be to establish= on empirical and/or

theoretical grounds, the "best" values of the work value ratios (indicators). In this section, we discuss the question of efficiency, using

comparative data from eight sites, and considering empirical and theoretical interpretations of the indicators' range of values.

1. Reformulation the Efficiency Equation

In terms of work valuation, the overall economic efficiency of a project

is defined in terms of a simple output-to-input ratio (see Table VII.3,

formula (b)), thus:

Project's overall economic

efficiency indicator

Concorded work value created

= Total of direct and indirect

expenditures for this project

This formula expresses the value of the work created during the VICI project;

it does not include any other direct benefit (such as the employment effects

on trainees) or secondary benefits (such as the effect of VICI expenditures

on the local economy).

Based on this formula, estimates of work value ratio for the eight VICI

projects range from a low of 0.178 to a high of 0.756 (see Table VII.5,

update). This wide range from minimum to maximum value has prompted a reformulation of the overall efficiency equation, as follows:

Overall Job- Management/

economic related Allocation

efficiency efficiency X efficiency

indicator indicator indicator

These three efficiency indicators can be expressed as:

Concorded work

value

Total of expenditures

Concorded Work

value

Direct job costs

76

X

Direct job costs

Total of expendi

tures
These values are found In Table VII. 3 as: (formula b) = (formula c) x

(formula h).

As an example, consider the Atlanta data shown in Table VII.10. Data on

number of jobs, concorded work value, direct job-related costs, and total

VICI site expenditures are given for each quarter of 1979. The totals

rise steadily over each quarter, as do the three efficiency indicators.

This trend probably reflects the project's increasing maturity over time.

Note, however, that the rate of increase differs for each indicator.

Three reasons for this disparity are:

1. The job-related efficiency indicator rises from 0.583 to

0.673, a small change. This ratio measures the value of

the work done against the actual cost of doing the work.

Improvements over time would indicate increasing productivity of the youth crews. The reported information used

here is based on estimates, however, and does not represent

a final accounting, so these values are provisional. However,

they may be representative for this project.

Two factors explain the changes in the job-related efficiency indicator. The first is the hypothesis of increasing

productivity over time. The second may be stated thus:

different types of jobs (carpentry, painting, small repairs,

etc.) appear to have different job-related efficiency values

for the youth crews:

A youth crew, working primarily on painting public

housing apartments (as in the Newark site) can be

very productive compared with professional painters.

This is because the youths use the same tools and

techniques, and achieve nearly the same speed in

painting, but their wages are much lower than those

of professionals. In these cases, the job-related

efficiency ratio may exceed 1.0; that is, the

youth crews are more productive, per dollar spent,

than the professionals.

In contrast, where the work is particularly complex

and recuires knowledge and experience, it is unlikely

that the youth crews' productivity will riv11 that

of professionals. Some sites undertake the A -)re

complex jobs (e.g., larger home repair pre', 4. ;);

hence, expectations of those sites' produc_. -y and of the job-related economic efficiency inuicators should be lowered. A ratio of 0.5 or less

would perhaps be appropriate for such jobs, especially where inexperienced crews are involved.

These factors may, however, cancel out one another. A site

may work on simple jobs until the crews are experienced and

then tackle complex jobs in order to provide them with more

77
training. Thus, the effects described in the first example

would be offset by those of the second example, and the jobrelated efficiency indicator will not increase dramatically.

2. The management/allocation efficiency indicator for Atlanta

rises from 0.22 to 0.41 over the four quarters. The 0.41

ratio is about equal to the median value for the eight

sites. Its ratio measures the direct, job-related costs

versus total expenditures. A project should show an improving ratio over time, as startup costs are spread over

a larger basis. This site already shows an improvement

in this ratio, and the final ratio may be even better.

3. The overall economic efficiency ratio is the product of

the two more specific indicators. This indicator more

than doubles over the four quarters due to a small increase in job-related efficiency and a larger increase

in management/allocation efficiency.

A preliminary indication of the overall efficiency of the VICI programs can

be based on the equation of the three indicators. The overall economic

efficiency is constrained, or limited, by the two specific efficiencies:

the job-related efficiency and the management/allocation efficiency.

2. Comparative Efficiency Ratios for Eight Sites

Table VII.11 gives numerical values for the work value indicators for each

site, using the most recent data available. The column showing job-related

efficiency displays a range of 0.618 to 1.510 (reflecting program maturity

and complexity factors). Possibly, some of the lower ratios could be

improved, and some additional on-site evaluation will be performed. (The

differences in concordance factors among sites are important here.)

However, the range in numerical values found here seems reasonable, and

the high values could be duplicated by other sites by changing the types

of jobs.

The management/allocation efficiency column of Table VII.11 shows a range of

0.209 to 0.658. The lower values represent some start-up and reporting

problems, but the highest value is found for a project which has been

exemplary in reporting and attending to productivity. It would appear

that a numerical value of 0.65 to perhaps 0.75 is optimal for this ratio

in the VICI project. This means '..hat between 65 and 75 percent of all

expenses are directly related to jobs and can be identified as direct

costs. A different type of project--perhaps one of a shorter duration,

focusing only on training--would have a much lower efficiency ratio of

this type.

The overall economic efficiency ratios shown in the extreme right-hand

column of Table VII.11 is the product of the ratios discussed above. The

numerical values range from 0.178 to 0.756. The lower values are due to

78

I
low management/allocation efficiency ratios. Optimal values for this

ratio would result from a job-related efficiency ratio of 1.0 or greater

and/or a management/allocation efficiency ratio of 0.65 or greater, for

a combined product of 0.65 for the overall economic efficency ratio.

Only two VICI projects performed so well, Milwaukee and Newark. Overall

efficiency may be improved at other sites through management efforts and

a reconstruction of missing reports.

3. Answering the Basic Question

Possible and expected numerical values for the three indicators have been

suggested in this section. Values for job-related efficiency of 1.0 or

more, management/allocation efficiency of 0.65 or more, and overall

economic efficiency of 0.65 are perhaps reasonable from an empirical

and statistical perspective and can be acutally attained, as is apparent

from Table VII.11. Hence, some specific expections about project performance can be established. However, further analysis of the reasons

for variations among project sites will help establish whether these

suggested indicator values represent reasonable expectations.
TABLE VII.1

TYPES OF DATA COLLECTED

AND FORMS USED

Tvoes of Data

VICI SITE Preared

1 Crawford

and

Company

Reorts

Job-by-Job

Accounting/Reporting Forms

Quarterly

Fiscal

Report

Form VI

(Final)

Form VII

(Estimate)

Form VII

(Final)

Ex.enditures:

-

-Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-

-

- Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-

-

-

-Yes

Yes

Yes

Revised

values

Yes

Yes

Yes

-

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Yes

Yes

Yes

-

Yes

a. Administrative Items

Personnel, Office

Space

b. Services g Training

Items

c. Youth Labor

d. Crew Chiefs

e. Job related, nonpersonnel items

Bid Estimates:

f. Private Contractor

Sid Estimates

Identification:

g. Job Number

h. Job Description

i. Dates When Work was

Done

Other Data:

J. Judgements About

the Quality of Work
Table VII.2

FLOW OF DATA

VIAE

AT

VICI JOB

SITE

For Larger Jobs:

Visit to Job Site.

Prepare work orders.

Material Requests, etc.

done by VICI persons

Prepare

VICI Form VII Work 1s

Begun and

Completed

Prepare

VICI Form

VIII

For Small Jobs: For a Sample of Jobs:

Visit to Job Site,

Prepare work orders,

Material Requests, etc.

done by VICI persons

Work Is

Begun and

Completed

Prepare VICI Form

VI

Visit to Job Site

by Crawford b Co.

Estimator, accompanied by VICI

person

Prepare

Outside

Estimator Form

Accounting for

VICI Expenditures

Prepare Quarterly

Fiscal Report

DONE

BY CPPV Receives

and Reviews Form

VII

Receives

and Reviews Form

Viii

Receives

and Reviews Form

VI V

RecC'ves and Reviews

Quarterly Fiscal

Report

DONE

BY RBS

Receives, Processes

and

Analyzes

Data .1110 Quarterly Reports

on Work Value

I--

and Performance

Indicators
Table VII.3 Data, Formulas and Indicators

Part I. Data

a. Total Value of Jobs in Progress

or Completed, Forms VI, VII and VIII

b. Concordance ratio between VIC( value

estimates and Crawford Values

c. Total expenditure to date, Quarterly

fiscal report

d. Total of Estimated or Actual Job

related expenses, reported on

Forms VI, VII and VIII

e. Total of Job Related expenses less

Youth Labor Costs

f. Total of Job Related Youth Labor

Costs

g. Startup and overhead Costsa

difference between c and d.

$ 82,696

1.059

a $366,842

a $140,478 a $ 62,549

S 77,929

$226,364

Part II. Formulas and Indicators

formula a: Value of VICI work a a * b

formula b: Value created per dollar of

expenditures

formula c: Value created per dollar of

direct job expenses

formula d: Value added by Youth Labor

formula e: Value added per dollar of

direct youth labor

formula f: Startup and overhead costs

per dollar of direct youth

labor

formula g: Net value created by Youth

Labor

formula h: Ratio of direct costs to

total expenditure

formula 1: Ratio of startup and

overhead costs to direct

job costs

82,696 * 1,059 s $87,575

(a * b) 4.c a $ 0.239

(a * b) 4-d a $ 0.623

(a * b) e a $25,026

a (a * b) -e) f a $ 0.321

g f m 2.905

e - f $ 2.584 a d c 1 0.383

g $ 1.611
Table VII,4

.,

The Aggregated Data Totals through Deciallierll',. 1979f $$$$ '.$

for Most Sites

Site and Reporting

Period

(1)

Reported Reported

Expenditures Jobs

to In Progress

End of Period or Completed

(2) (3)

Aggregated Job Data Invents of Expenditures

Direct Ccst

of Jobs in Concorded

Progress or Nalue

Completed of Jobs

(Estimated) (Estimated)

(4) (5)

Other

Costs of Job Costs Not Youth Labor Related Charged

In Jobs Costs to Jobs

(6) (7) (8)

Atlanta

(December 31 1 79) $ 777 556 31 $ 315 221 $ 212 127 $ 14 076 $ 161,145 $ "s62

(December 31 1979) 684 972 119..

1 417 226

5

163

783,114 426

418,562 4091577

61 219 450 618

515 756 521 7 9

210,875 207,687 266,410

245 892 41121., 7989EL.

232 272 283 484 268 607

Chicago

ritojected)

Milwaukee

(December 11.2191._72363

Newark

(December )1, 1979) 392,264 592 136 187,379 204,885 390,850

New Haven Number 31 1979 792 74 86 26803 IEIOLJ51,21

147 122 155 271

175 88 465 511

27 894 119 228 555 406

Philadelphia

(Seitember 0 1.79) 702 528 40

South Bronx

Jk,PZmber"n''I...LL2.--IVL..j.LILL"6t6L6LaaNALjaa , logi.._...._.WDV'1'0"9O2",....L.L.J...LLsLt--I'211
Table VII.5 Summary Table on Work Value Ratios, Indicators With

and Without Overhead Included Through December 1919

Site and

Reporting Reported

Period Jobs

!mate Indicators Value Added Indicators

Ratio:

( Concorded

Value) to

VICI Job

Cost w/o 0/H

Ratio:

(Concorded

Value) to

Total of VICI

Costs to Date

-"m57176----

(4)_

Dollar Value Overhead

Added Per $ Per $ of

of Youth Youth

Labor, NO Labor in

Overhead Jobs

Dollar

Value

Added with

Overhead

Included

(1)

(2)

71177.

(3)

761Me Frri

(5) (6)

form f (7)

Atlanta

(December 31, 1979 31 0.673 0.273 $0.331 $3,000 $-2.67

Broward

..10ecember 31 1979) 310 0.979 0.598 $0.957 $1,263 0 31

Chicago

(PaiSqeci.......,-5.......128.---1:318...LL.-----I""

Milwaukee

31,..1979) 163 1,012 0,665 $1, 025 ..December $1.156 $ -0.13

Newark

..December

New

31, 1979) 426 1,510

0,769

0.I......

0.317

$2.128 $2.09

IV° $/1912

$0.04

$4.58

Haven

(December )1, 1979) 86

Philadelphia

(September 30, 1,79) 40

.

1.055 0,221 $1.292 $19.91 $ -18,62

South Bronx $eteni1O46$4.71

Totals (Weighted Averages) 0.924 0,99 $0.852 $2.148 $1.90 7
Table VII.6 Independent Estimators Ratings of Job Quality

Based on a Sample of 42 Jobs

ludgement

Rating

(Based on Average Work of a Professional Contractor)

Far Below

Average

Below

Average Average

Above

Average

Far Above

Average

Total Count

on Ratings

kppearance of the

Final Product 1 4 16 11 0 32

'reparation of

Work Surfaces

and Cleanup 1 6 18 9 0 34

luality of

Materials Used 0 0 32 5 0 37

luality of

Workmanship

of Job 2 14 16 10 0 42

Total 4 14 92 35 0 145

(%) 2.7% 9.7% 63.4% 24.1% 0%

_ 99.9%
Table v11.7 Completion Time by Job Type

(sample of 586 Jobe)

Type of Job

Time to Complete

1 week

or less

1-4

Weeks

5-8

Weeks

2-3

Mths.

4-5

Mths.

6 Mths.

or Less Total

Small Home Repairs 40 25 2 1 2 - 70

Large Home Repairs 4 17 9 5 3 1 39

Rehab/Major Repairs

Unoccupied Dwellings - 10 1 4 - - 15

Weatheriz4tion 12 2 - - - - 14

Painting 321 99 4 - - - 424

Rehab pf Vacant Shell -

- - 1 - - 1 Major Renovation Large

Public Building - 2 I - - - - 3

Maintainance/Other 10 10 - -

. - - 20

Total 387 165 17 I.-, 5 1 586

Key: Small Home Repairs: Estimated materials cost less then $500.00

Large Home Repairs: Estimated materials cost between 500 and 1000

Rehabilitation: Major repairs on occupied dwellings cost over 1000

Painting: Estimated (apartments in public housing, major large buildings)
Table VII 8.A Value Added Ratio by Site (Formula (e) Used)

Site

Count on

Jobs

Mean Value

of Ratios

for each job

Standard error

of Mean

Estimate

Atlanta 13 0.2632** 0.0533

froward 128 3.2817 0.1062

Chicago 3 0.7097 0.0181

Milwaukee 75 1.3953 0.1414

New Haven 52 0.7314 0.0981

Philadelphia 4 1.2006 0.1627

Total 275 2.0836* 0.0955

* The "F" statistic for the comparison of between and within group variance

Is 61.468.

** This numerical value of

value of 0.239 found In

using the same, or even

5 whereas a variation

ference In formulas are

0.2632 for Atlanta differs from the numerical

Tab4VII.5 These two values are not calculated.

similar, formulas. Formwa (b) was used in Table VIIof formula (e) Is used In thls:table. The difthese factors:

1) the concordance adjustment has not been included In this table,

2) overhead and startup costs have not been Included in this table,

3) the values In this table are derived from an unweighted summation

of the individual ratios, whereas the Table approach uses ao

Implicit weighting of ratios.

The text comments that the use of formula (b) or (c) indicators ahould be

used as alternatives to the formula (e) indicator. The formula (e) model

was used in the March Interim Report.

sicson"gdOrvZs

Notes:

(1) ToZil:eh::4111111,1r:g17:d1.°117na (:)he sit:: atdatiest- the private contractor bids, these value added ratios are an

overstatement of the true value.

(2) Overhead and startup costs have not been Included.

(3) As the text discusses, the use of the formula (b) or (c) indicators

should be studied as an alternative to the formula (e) Indicator.

The formula (e) model was used In the March Interim Report.

(4) These are unweighted means, 1.e. the overall mean Is derived

from the product of the mean by category multiplied by the

number of Jobs per category.
Table VII.8.B Value Added Ratio by Type of Job (Formula (e) Used)

Type of Job

Count on

Jobs

Mean Value

of Ratios

for each job

Standard error

of Mean

Estimate

Small home repairs 57 2.4268 0.2609

Major home repairs 76 1.7378 0.1523

Rehabilitation 33 1.6323 0.2610

Weatherizing 13 0.8557 0.2416

Painting 75 2.5195 0.1698

Rehabilitation of Shells 5 0.8903 0.1781

Major-Public Buildings 11 2.8113 0.3905

Maintenance 4 3.1526 0.5006

., Other 0 0.0

, 0

Total 274 2.0888* 0.0957

....---.

* The "F" statistic for the comparison of between and within group variance

Is 4.595.

Notes: Same as for Table

88
Table VII.8.0 Value Added Ratio by Craft (Formula (e)) Used)

Type'

of Craft

Count

on

Jobs

. Mean Value

of Ratios

for each job

Standasd error

of Mean

Estimate

Carpentry 109 1.5453 0.1549

Masonry 24 3.0989 0.2021

Roofing 0 0 0

Painting 114 2.1131 0.1354

Plumbing 11 3.7270 0.5064

Electrical 16 2.9441 0.2803

Other 1 1.1818 0

Total 275 2.0836* 0.0955

* The "F" statistic for the comparison of between and within group variance

Is 9.036.

Motes: Same as for Table
TABLE VII.9.A PERCENTAGE AND TYPE OF JOBS COMPLETED AND IN P116,..1-'JSS

SITE ATLANTA BROWAED CHICAGO MILWAUKEE NEWARK NEW HAVEN PHILA.

Date of

art-Up 1/79 10/78 10/78 10/78 10/78 10/78 10/78 Total.

Type of Job

Small Home Repair - 22.6 - 37.0 - - - 11.3

Large Home Repair 20.0 19.3 - 58.3 - 15.1 75.0 19.9

Rehab/Major Repairs to Occupied80.0 11.5 - 1.9 - 15.1 - 6.7

Dwellings

Weatherization - - - - - 29.7 - 29

Painting - 41.5 - 1.9 84.4 40.9 - 53.5

Rehab: Vacant - - 100.0 - - 2.2 25.0 .9

Shell

Renovation: - 6.9 - .9 2.0 2.2 - 3.2

Public Bldgs.

Maintenance - 3.2 - 13.5 - - 6.8

*Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.2 100.0 100.1

Total No. Jobs 15 217 3 108 397 93 8 841

CODE: Take from EST Form

1
Table VII.9,B (Update). Number of Jobs Completed or Started

Job Projected Projected

Site and Reports Direct (Concorded)

Reporting i'er1°d in Hand Job Costs Work Value

Atlanta 40 $406,736 $273,76

(mid-March 1980)

Broward 318 429,363 4k0,146

(mid-March 1980)

Chicago 5 No change from Table (Update)

Milwaukee 198 635,580 655,119

(mid-March 1980)

Newark 501 448,513 695,635

(mid-March 1980)

New Haven 91 346,336 265,598

(mid-March 1980)

Philadelphia 43 No change from Table (Update)

South Bronx 29 No change from Table . (Update)

91
Table VII.10 Illustration of the Reformulated Indicators for Atlanta

Period

Number

of

Jobs

Data Indicators

Concorded

Work

Value

Direct

Job Related

Costs

Total

VICI Site

Expenditures

Job

Related

!am

(a ; b)

Management!

Allocation

Efficiency

Overall

Efficient

(a) (b) (c) (b ; c)

la . b il !)

\li C. mci

March 30, 1979

June 30, 1979

Sept. 30, 1979

Dec. 31, 1979

7

14

22.

31

24,818

94,318

151,870

212;127,

42,579

151,284

234,010

315,221

193,829

391,516

567,805

777,556

0,583

0.623

0.649

0.673

0.220

0.386

0.412

0.405

0.128

0.241

0.267

0.273

11

1 H;
Table VII.11 Reformulation of the Work Value Indicators

Site

Data Indicators

Concorded

Work

Value

Direct Job Related

Costs

Total VICI Site

Expenditures

(c)

Job Related

Efficiency

Management/

Allocation

Efficienc

Overall Economic

Efficient

(a) (b) (a ; b) (b ; c) b

b i C

Atlanta 212,127 315,221 777,556 0.673 0.405

o 0.273

Broward 409,577 418,562 684,972 0.979 0.611 0.598

Chicago 450,618 619,219 1,417,226 0.728 0.437 0.318

Milwaukee 521,739 515,756 784,363 1.012 0.658 0.665

Newark 592,136 392,264 783,114 1.510 0.501 0.756 '

New Haven 251,305 326,803 192,314 0.769 0.412 0,317

Philadelphia 155,271 147,122 702,528 1.055 0.109 0.221

South Bronx 76,695 124,076 431,101 0.618 0.288 0.178

Data Source Table (Update) Calculated using formulas, also found

Col, 5 Col, 4 Col, 2 In Table

1L

VIII PROGRAM OFFICERS' OBSERVATIONS

VICI is a rigorous program, Seeking to train participants in marketable

skills, it sets exacting performance standards, However, its rigor is complemented and balanced by the low staff-participant ratios which

permit a great deal of individual attention, The combination of professional standards and intensive training seems to be effective. Certainly, if the quality of work performed by VICI trainees, the increasing strength of VICI's local linkages, and the number of job

placements are any measure of the program's quality, we have reason to

believe that VICI's first nine months of operation have been successful.

CPPV's role in this success must be neither under-nor over-emphasized.

Intermediaries like CPPV do not build buildings, supervise enrollees,

place young persons in jobs, or get work done, What they can do--and

what CPPV has striven to do--is to insist upon high standards for work

quality and placement efforts; offer technical assistance; facilitate

program operations; arbitrate disputes; and keep the program on track, to the betterment both of the communities where the work takes place and

of the VICI participa is themselves. These goals are more easily attained

by an intermediary, with its ability to operate outside a city's bureaucratic structure.

Quality of Work

The quality of work produced by VICI trainees has far exceeded our

expectations. The work valuation procedure (described in Chapter VII) estimates the market value of the MI 7ork, and compares it with program

expentidures. The eight sites examined it this way indicated an average morn on %penditures of 42C per dollar he three highest sites yielded an caragi return of 68c per dollar. Moreover, "outside," professional

estimators report that, of 42 VICI work projects rated in terms of quality,

81 percent were equal to or above the average work performed by private

oiltractora, Thus, both the work valuation and the estimators' report

have confirmed our judgement that the quality of VICI work is exceptional.

Linkages

The linkages have been both the most exciting and the most frustrating

part of the VICI program. The linkages with labor unions have been very

positive, notably in the informal area of journeymen seeking jobs,

within their own unions, for graduating VICI enrollees. An informal

network has evolved that we did not anticipate in the original design.

Also, the use of journeymen as supervisors at the sites has proved, if

anything, even more positive than indicated in our previous report. The

journeymen are not only excellent instructors, but are also demanding

taskmasters, determined that the trainees will get the work done. There

was, and still is, in the program an inherent tension between productivity and training: journeymen want to complete the work, while trainees

sometimes need simply to learn a skill, even if it means that a job

takes longer to be completed. However, even though this tension exists,

the work valuation data certainly support the conclusion that substantial

production has gone on. Our numerous site observations, field visits,

94
and discussions with both journeymen and trainees have enabled us to

affirm our original view that the 1:6 supervisor-trainees ratio has a

significant influence on the high quality of work being done.

it

The work provider linkage has had someWhat mixed results so far. On the

negative side, the Broward County program suffered a change in work

providing agencies that severely hampered the program for two months.

On the other hand, the New Haven work provider has spent an enormous

amount of money on materials and supplies for VICI and has worked very]

harmoniously with the project. Overall, the linkages with work providing

agencies have been salutary, and we have seen youngsters learning skills,

buildings being rehabilitated, and both work provider and VICI reaping

benefits from this relationship. Even in Broward County, the loss of

one agency was quickly followed by the enlistment of another, more than

willing to provide.: materials and supplies for VICI youngsters' work on

community development projects throughout the county.

The use of advisory boards has also had mixed results. In some cities,

such as the South Bronx, advisory boards have had difficulty in making

themselves an effective force in the program, since they are a relatively

new concept in employment training programs. In other cities, such as

New Haven and Broward, the advisory board has operated strongly as a

Board of Directors for the project, helping in diverse areas 'such as

placement, GED training, and quality control.

The educational linkage has been somewhat problematic This is a

linkage that does not always benefit the linking agency (as is the case

with the labor union and work providing linkages), and our data at this

point indicate that it is a linkage very much dependent upon pre-existing

relationships within the cities. We believe that future VICI programs

would benefit from a much tighter set of arrangements between VICI and

educational institutions than was at first envisioned.

City Size

In our first Interim Report, we noted the differences between large and

small cities that might affect the VICI program. We felt that it was

more difficult to launch VICI in the larger cities because of the many

institutional obstacles that exist there. At this juncture, it appears

that these differences, and their effects, still remain, but with some

exceptions. In the large cities, payroll problems, the failure of

equipment to arrive, contracts held up because of a backlog at city

council meetings, and the like have all required that P/PV play a more

active role. P/PV staff have had to act as facilitators and expeditors

more than was necessary in the small cities. However, in some large

cities, once the complex logistics were worked out, the quality of work

performed did not differ substantially from those in small cities.

The Data

As part of its responsibility for monitoring VICI and providing sites

with technical and managerial assistance, p/pv sends program officers

to visit each sit at least monthly, and usually more often. By means

of such first-hand observations, P/PV staff have become thoroughly

familiar with the day-to-day operations and problems of the sites.

951
We have therefore examined the data presented to see whether they reflect our own observations and judgements. In most cases, we have found

that the data do support our judgement of the quality of the program.

For example, in the case of union apprenticeships, we have noticed with

increasing pleasure the informal networks being built between journeymen

instructors and VICI youth. The data show that a sizeable percent of

all VICI youths who have terminated to accept employment have become

union apprentices; this confirms our own on-site observations that the

VICI union link is an extremely effective one.

Another significant statistic is that the majority of youths who left

VICI to accept jobs gained employment in related trades. Considering

the limited opportunities for young people in the construction job

market in most VICI cities, we feel this is notable.

However, the data gathered so far permit no easy generalizations. They

must be interpreted against factors such as differences among sites in

how a program is conducted or how smoothly its local linkages work together, or in terms of external phenomena such as the national or local

construction job market. As VICI matures and as more data become available, it will be possible to make general statements about VICI based on

sufficiently large samples and rigorous research design.

96
SUPPLEMENT A

PRELIMINARY COMPARISON BETWEEN VICI AND CONTROL GROUP YOUTHS
Preliminary statistical comparisons between VICI youths and controls have been

made on a wide range of variables, including demographic characteristics, verbal

ability, and pre-training educational and labor market experience. Data were

derived from the VICI Participant Intake Form and the FAS-V test administered

at intake. Data included in the analyses cover the period of time from program

start-up through May 1979.

Table A.1 shows verbal ability scores for VICI trainees and control group subjects,

for all control group sites combined, and for each site separately.

TABLE A.1

FAS -V TEST SCORES OF VICI YOUTH AND CONTROL GROUPS

SITE H MEAN S.D. T -VALUE

All Sites

VICI 337 64.13 13.92 2.16*

Control 491 61.93 14.98

Atlanta

VICI 71 65.63 12.07 1.63

Control 109 62.33 14.93

Milwaukee

VICI 110 64.28 13.11 0.66

Control 108 63.03 14.47

Newark

VICI 82 57.70 15.41 1.40

Control 194 60.57 15.60

Philadelphia

VICI 74 69.59 12.39 2.98*

Control 80 63.21 14.16

*p .05

**p .01

On average, VICI youths scored significantly higher than control group youths on

the FAS-V test of verbal ability across all sites. However, no statistically

significant differences were found between the two groups in Atlanta, Milwaukee,

or Newark. In Philadelphia, the average score for VICI youths was more than six

points higher than control youths; this large difference appears to account for

the significant difference in the combined data.

Chi-square analyses were performed on several demographic and pre-training

experience variables to identify any important differences between VICI and

control subjects. Analyses were performed with data for all control group sites

98
combined and for each site separately. Twenty-two variables were examined, and

statistically significant differences were found only on five. No significant

differences were 41ind on the following 17 variables: age, sex, ethnicity,

father's education, mother's education, family economic status, number of dependents,

number of members in the household, U.S. citizenship, cash public assistance to

family, English language as job obstacle, handicapped status, veteran status,

offender status, migrant status, employment status, and most recent type of job

(construction versus non-construction-related).

Table A.2 reports chi-square results for the remaining five variables that were

associated with statistically significant differences between VICI versus

control group youths:

TABLE A.2

CHI-SQUARE RESULTS OF SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

VICI AND CONTROL GROUP YOUTHS ON SELECTED VARIABLES

VARIABLE

ALL

SITES ATLANTA MILW. NEWARK PHILA.

Applicant has

Education Beyond

High School X

UI Claimant X

Cash Public

Assistance to

Applicant X

Family Above

Poverty Level X

X

Most Recent Job

(subsidized or

unsubsidized) X X X X

Compared with controls, VICI youths have, on average, more education beyond high

school (x2 = 8.04, p <.05), were more likely to be UI claimants (x2 = 5.10, p <.05),

to receive cash public assistance (x2 = 5.13, p <.05), and to have families above

the poverty level (x2 = 7.91, p <.01). They were less likely than controls to have

previously worked.in unsubsidized jobs (x2 = 6.30, p <.05).
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VENTURES

IN COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT DEMONSTRATION

A review an analysis of the process

through which a demonstration project

was mounted under the Youth Employment

Demonstration Projects Act of 1977

Harvey Shapiro

Hank Blakely
PART 3.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VICI DEMONSTRATION

Harvey Shapiro

Hank Blakely
Part 2

Research Report on

VICI Impact and Effectiveness
INTRODUCTION

This report is part of an ongoing effort to record and analyze the

forces that have shaped the first nine months' development of the

Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI) demonstration. VICI is a

national research and demonstration project which seeks to test the

effectiveness of a model youth employmeat program in various settings.

Several techniques and several groups of researchers, administrators,

and analysts have been involved both in monitoring VICI and in the

production of this report. The demonstration is financed by the U.S.

Department of Labor's Office of Youth Programs (OYP), while the

Corporation for Public/Private Ventures (CPPV) has the responsibility

for designing, managing, and analyzing the operation of the demonstration and for reporting findings to DOL. Research for Better

Schools (RBS) subcontracted with CPPV to conduct a statistical analysis

of the demonstration; RBS' findings are presented in this report. To

capture the non-quantifiable, historical and personal factors that have

affected VICI, CPPV engaged two "process documentors," Harvey D. Shapiro

and Hank Blakely, to visit sites,interview participants, administrators,

and others associated with VICI, and report their findings to CPPV.

Their work is presented in CPPV's Winter 1980 Interim Report.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The primary objectives of the quantitative research currently being

undertaken on VICI participants are:

To compare the post-program experiences of VICI participants

with those of a comparable group of youths who have participated in other manpower training programs.

To develop a work valuation methodology for determining the

economic value of the community improvements resulting from

the VICI demonstration as well as from other formula-funded

community improvement efforts.

To fulfill these objectives, five specific research tasks have been

defined and undertaken. These are:

Statistical Description of the VICI Demonstration

This task provides data on participant characteristics, progress in the

program, and termination status. These data facilitate CPPV's role in

monitoring the demonstration, and serve as important basic research data

for identifying and interpreting the effects of the demonstration.

100
Aggregate Comparison

This task compares VICI programs with alternative youth employment and

training programs operating in each of the eight VICI sites. Using

aggregated data from the formula-funded Youth Community Conservation

and Improvement Programs (YCCIP) and the Youth Employment and Traintng

Programs (YETP), a general statistical comparison is made of each

program, in terms of participant characteristics and termination

status.

Interprogram Comparison

This task calls for a more detailed comparison of VICI with selected

YCCIP programs similar to VICI in several key ways: nature of work,

program size, participant characteristics. Selected programs include

four. HUD-sponsored YCCIP and ten formula-funded, prime sponsor YCCIP

programs.

Impact Analysis

The purpose of this task is to determine the effects of the VICI demonstration on the post-program employability of VICI trainees. This

involves a follow-up study of participants and of control and comparison

group youths up to eight months after program termination.

Work Valuation

This task is to define the value and efficiency of the work done by VICI

participants in order to provide a measure of program benefits above and

beyond direct benefits to participants.

PROGRAM DESIGN

After the basic design elements of the VICI demonstration were settled,

CETA prime sponsors in a number of cities were invited to submit proposals

for operating a VICI program. In mid-1978, eight localities were selected

for funding under the auspices of CPPV. The sites were Atlanta, Georgia;

Broward County, Florida; Chicago, Illinois; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Newark,

New Jersey; New Haven, Connecticut; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and the

South Bronx in New York City. Each VICI program was to enroll up to 60

unemployed, out-of-school, economically disadvantaged youth between the

ages of 16 and 19. They were to work five days a week under the supervision of union journeymen drawn from the construction and building trades.

Although the work would vary among the sites, it was aimed at making

tangible community improvements through such activities as refurbishing

public facilities or repairing homes occupied by poor or elderly people

from the same neighborhoods as the youth enrolled in the programs.

101

Lij
1 G. Using program elements drawn from the Emergency Home Repair Program in

Portland, Oregon, and from several other youth programs, the VICI model

relied heavily on a set of linkages which tied the program to other

institutions. Various local institutions were chosen to recruit and

refer youth to VICI. Educational institutions agreed to provide certain

educational services to VICI youth. Locals of unions in the building

and construction trades agreed to provide union journeymen to serve as

instructors in the program and to assist VICI youth to gain entrance to

union apprenticeship programs and to job opportunities. Local organizations of various kinds agreed to identify or provide work projects to

be undertaken by the youth. And the local CETA prime sponsor, or its

designated local management agency, had overall responsibility for

operating the program and coordinating its linkages. At each of the

sites, a variety of local organizations agreed to serve as linkages.

But while there were differences among the sites as to precisely which

craft union or which youth referral agency would be involved with VICI,

all sites shared the emphasis on linking the youth to other institutions

so that this employment and training program would not operate in a

vacuum. Rather, it would give the enrollee access to various services

that might improve his or her employability and also employ the youth

in activities that would improve the area in which he or she lived.

The VICI demonstration was scheduled to run for 18 months. However, the

starting point differed from site to site because of different local

conditions and start-up problems. Broward, Chicago, Milwaukee, Newark

and New Haven all started in October 1978, while Philadelphia began in

December, and Atlanta and South Bronx officially were launched in

January 1979. Thus, by March 1979, while South Bronx and Atlanta were

just beginning to send youths out to work on repairing homes, Milwaukee

and Newark and other sites were beginning to seek jobs for youth who

were nearing the end of their stay in the program.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Observations of the VICI program during its implementation and early

operating period are encouraging in terms of both major research objectives: program impact and the value of the work produced. However,

all the evidence remains preliminary, as programs are still in progress

and long-term effects on youth remain to be assessed.

Objective 1: To assess the impact of the VICI program upon youth

employability, paying special attention to comparing VICI participants'

post program experience with those of youths in other employment and

training programs:

Comparable programs have been selected in five of the

eight VICI sites. These include both formula-funded

YCCIP programs and programs sponsored by HUD via

demonstration funds from DOL.

102

I)
Control groups have been assembled from VICI waiting

lists in four sites.

A narrative description of each comparison group is

included in the report, as well as demographic information.

Follow-up interviews are being conducted and program

data are being assessed.

Three sets of interviews with youths from the VICI and HUD demonstrations

and from formula-funded YCCIP programs have been planned; at one month,

at three months, and at eight months after program termination. Interviews and data analysis (conducted by CPPV's subcontractor, Research

for Better Schools, Inc. (RBS)) began in April, 1979. Full information

on the effects of VICI will not be available until the Fall of 1981

when RBS completes the follow-up study.

Findings to date include:

The demographic profile of VICT participants is quite

similar to that of the average unemployed youth in America.

The typical participant in the VICI program is a black

male who is 18 years old and self-supporting, and who

has a ninth, tenth or eleventh grade education.

About one thousand youth have enrolled in the program

since its beginning, in the Fall of 1978. All were

economically disadvantaged, out of school and between

16 and 19 years of age. Nineteen percent were female;

81 percent were male; 81 percent were black; 13 percent

Hispanic; 5 percent white; one percent American Indian

and one percent Other. One-fifth of the group had

no previoud job. experience. Those who had held jobs

prior to VICI earned an average of $2.84 per hour.

A total of 577 terminations occured through November, 1979

yielding a positive termination rate of 43 percent. (These

were youth who either secured jobs, returned to school, or

entered the military or other training programs.) Of. the

248 positive terminations, 55 youths secured union apprenticeships and 86 youths began jobs in construction-related

work. The average wage for VICI youth in both construction

and non-construction related work is $4.59 per hour. In

almost all areas, jobs were permanent and unsubsidized.

In a comparison of placements (i.e., unsubsidized employment), VICI placements were almost double those of

either YETP or YCCIP. In terms of overall positive

103

14.
termination rates, VICI and YCCIP are very similar, while

YETP is clearly higher. However, approximately one-third

of the YCCIP overall positive termination rate, and almost

one-half of the YETP rate represent transfers to other

CETA programs or return to school, not placements in jobs.

Preliminary results from the follow-up study indicate that

at approximately three months after participants have terminated from the program, relatively more VICI participants

(49 percent of 87 youths) were employed, compared with HUD

participants (34 percent of 105 youths) and YCCIP youths

(27 percent of 63 participants). VICI youths were more

successful in getting full-time jobs, enrolling in union

apprenticeship programs, or,becoming union members. VICI

youths also earned a much higher average hourly wage ($3.95

per hour) than other youths, and reported greater satisfaction with their program than did HUD or YCCIP participants.

Objective 2: To Develop and Implement a Work Valuation Methodology

A straightforward method for accurately determining the dollar value of

the work products (i.e., community improvements) has been developed by

CPPV and is operational in all eight sites. Work value is defined as

the cost that a private contractor would charge for performing the jobs

being done by VICI participants.

The methodology builds on the customary work of local estimators.

Traditionally, community improvement programs have a person on staff

(the local estimator) who visits each potential job site and estimates

the costs of the materials and supplies needed to complete the job. The

CPPV methodology calls for local program estimators to assess the price

that a private contractor would charge to perform the same job. Local

estimators were trained in computing private contractor bids. For each

VICI job (over 3,000) the private contractor's price will be estimated

on standardized forms. The forms are sent to CPPV for review and forwarded to RBS for processing and analysis.

It is apparent that the methodology is dependent upon the accuracy of

local estimators' assessments of private contractor bids. To maximize

the validity of estimates, a private estimating firm will visit all

sites and conduct approximately 200 independent estimates. The results

of 42 independent estimates have been included in this report. Concordance between local and independent estimates can be calculated and

systematic errors identified and shared with local personnel. In this

way, local estimates can be continually improved and, if necessary,

corrected.

Findings to date include:

104
Feedback from L1ocal staff indicates that this methodology

is both practical and capable of being incorporated (give.:

refinement) into other community improvement efforts.

On average, VICI produces $0.42 of value for .very dollar

spent in the program, and three sites returned $0.67 on

every dollar. This significantly offsets the cost of

training and work experience for youth. This value has

been adjusted in accordance with the results obtained by

the private estimating firm.

Independent professional estimators rated the quality of

the work performed by VICI crews as equal to or superior

to the average product which would be expected from a

private contractor in 87 percent of the 42 projects

assessed.
I. STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE VICI DEMONSTRATION

The statistics presented here provide a comprehensive profile of youth

enrolled in the VICI program. Participants are described in terms of: (1)

demographic characteristics, (2) economic characteristics, (3) weekly

progress in the program, and (4) termination status when they leave the

program. The description includes intake and termination information

through November 30, 1979 and weekly progress data through October 31,

1979. Analyses of the relationships between selected indicators of program

success are also presented in this chapter.

Results are reported in a series of brief narratives accompanied by statisti- cal tables. The tables give numerical and percentage information on each

variable across the eight VICI sites, and report means and standard

deviations for selected variables.

A. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF VICI YOUTH: Table 1.1

The statistics presented here are based on information obtained from the

participant intake records of 944 VICI youths. These results represent all

available data from CPPV's computerized management information system through November, 1979. Table I.1 presents the results of the demographic variables for VICI youths, by site.

Ala. To be eligible for VICI, youths must be between 16 and 19 years old

at intake. Ninety percent of participants were 17-19 years of age. CPPV's

data mDnitoring system identified five "age-ineligible" (i.e., below 16 or above 19) youths. According to CPPV, sites were notified promptly of such

occurences.

Sex. Overall, 81 percent of all VICI participants are males, and 19 percent

are females. Four sites have approximately 25 percent female participants-- the South Bronx, Newark, Atlanta, and Broward. Philadelphia has the smallest

percentage of females (11 percent).

Ethnic Group. Of the total population, 80 percent of VICI participants are

black, 13 percent are Hispanic, 5 percent are white, 1 percent are American

Indian, and 1 percent are considered. Other. Atlanta, Broward, and Philadelphia are all more than 90 percent black. Chicago and the South Bronx

have the highest concentration of Hispanic participants, and New Haven has

the largest percentage (21 percent) of white youth. All remaining sites

are less than 7 percent white.

Family Status. The majority of VICI participants (83 percent) consider

themselves "family members." Of the remainder, 10 percent consider themselves members of a "family of one" and 7 percent consider themselves

"heads of family."

Number in Household. Forty-nine percent of VICI participants live in

households of 1-4 persons, and 43 percent live in households of 5-8 persons. In both Broward and Chicago 14 percent live in households of 9-12 people.

106
..ova mw6w,

English Language. Across all eight sites, only one percent of participating youth report difficulty in communicating in English. Chicago has

the largest percentage of youths (6 percent, or a total of five youths)

who felt they were unable to communicate in English. These results are

consistent with the ethnic composition of the Chicago site which is

42 percent Hispanic.

Hai .sapped. Of the total sample, only 2 percent of participants are

handicapped. No site has more than two handicapped youths, and six of

the eight sites have none or only one handicapped participant.

Veteran. Two percent of all VICI participants are veterans.

Citizenship. Overall, 99 percent of the VICI youths are U.S. citizens.

Chicago reports the largest percentage of participants (5 percent, or

four youths) who are not U.S. citizens.

Offender Status. Across all eight sites, 10 percent of participants

were ex- offenders. New Haven (20 percent), Broward (17 percent) and

Milwaukee (13 percent) reported the highest percentages of ex-offenders.

Migrant Status. Less than one percent of the total VICI population are

members of migrant/seasonal farm families.

Education of Applicant. Approximately 72 percent of VICI participants

completed school through grades 9, 10, or 11. Of the total VICI population, 23 percent received high school diplomas or GEDs before entering

V1CI. Atlanta (with 35 percent) aid Chicago (33 percent) had the highest

percentages of youths with high school diplomas or GEDs. The South

Bronx reported the 1...west percentage (11 percent) of participants with

diplomas or GEDs. Only 4 percent or fewer participants at each site had

attended post-secondary schools.

Education of Father. Overall, 20 percent of VICI participants reported

that their fathers had received high school diplomas or GEDs, and 47 percent

said they did not know the highest level of education attained by their

fathers. Chicago fathers had the lowest level of educational attainment.

Education of Mother. Twenty-nine percent of participants reported that

their mothers had received high school diplomas or GEDs, and 24 percent

said they did not know the highest level of education attained by their

mothers. Chicago mothers had the lowest level of educational attainment.

Funaamental Achievement Series-Verbal (FAS-V) Test, The FAS-V Test, a

100-item test of verbal ability is administered to all youths applying

to the VICI program at the time of the intake interview. This test is

not used for screening purposes. The mean FAS-V score for all enrolled

VICI participants was 65.79 (compared with a mean score of 66.6 for

comparable trainees in a Northeast anti-poverty program). Chicago had

the highest mean FAS-V score, 76.06; and Newark reported the lowest

score, 58.91. Individual scores on this test ranged from 7 to 99.

107
Summary

The typical VICI participant is a black male who is 18 years old, selfsupporting, and who has a 9th, 10th, or 11th grade education. Atlanta,

Chicago, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia tend to have younger participants

(age 16-17). Elsewhere, participants tend to be 18-19 years old.

Atlanta, Broward, Newark and the South Bronx have relatively large

female enrollments (approximately 25 percent), and New Haven has the

largest percentage of white youths. Chicago is distinctive in several

ways. It has the highest percentage of Hispanic youths, the highest

percentage of youths reporting as heads of family, has enrolled no ex-offenders, has the highest percentages of participant parents without

a high school diploma or GED, and the highest average ability score

among participants, as measured by the FAS-V test.

B. ECONOMIC PROFILE OF VICI YOUTHS: Table 1.2

The following economic analysis is based on available participant intake

records of 944 youths through November, 1979. Table 1.2 summarizes the

results of this analysis for each VICI site.

Unemployment Insurance (US) Claimant. Only 2 percent of all VICI program

participants are UI claimants.

Reasons for Disadvantaged Status. In order to qualify as eligible for

enrollment in the VICI program, all participants must conform to CETA

eligibility poverty standards; that is, either the participant's family

receives cash public assistance (CPA), or the participant receives CPA,

or the family income is below the poverty level. All VICI youths met

these income eligibility criteria.

Employment Status. Of the total population of VICI youths, 93 percent

were unemployed at intake, 3 percent were underemployed, and 4 percent

were not in the labor force. The South Bronx and Chicago were the only

sites in which the proportion of unemployed youths was less than 90 percent. These sites reported 84 percent and 89 percent unemployment

rates, respectively.

Source of Referral to VICI. The four major sources of referral to the

VICI program were friends, program staff, community organizations, and

employment services. These sources accounted for three-fourths of all

youths who enrolled in the VICI program. At some sites, such as Atlanta,

Broward, and Milwaukee, "other CETA programs" served as a significant

source of referrals to VICI.

Previous Job Training Programs. The minority (21 percent) of VICI en- rollees did participate in other job training programs before entering

VICI. The average length of time youths participated in job training

programs prior to VICI was 6.31 months. More than two-thirds of those

who participated in previous job training programs were enrolled in

108
programs which were not construction-related. Sixty-nine percent of all

terminations from the various job training programs were non-positive.

(Non-positive terminations.sre defined as due to the following: completed

program but was not placed, program terminated, injury/health-problem/

pregnancy, moved, did not like program, transportation problems, and

family responsibilities.)

Previous Employment. About one-third of the VICI youths had some previous

employment experience. On average, they worked a total of 8.02 months

before beginning VICI. They.reported that 55 percent of their previous

jobs were unsubsidized, and 85 percent of these jobs were not constructionrelated. The average number of hours worked per week was 33.52. The

average wages earned by youths prior to enrollment in VICI was $2.84.

Months Since Last Job. Across all sites, 77 percent of VICI trainees

had been out of work for between zero'and six months when they applied

to VICI.

Reason for Most Recent Job Termination. Job lay-off was the most frequently

given reason for job termination. Across all sites, 18 percent cited

this reason. Twelve percent reported that they terminated because they

did not like the job. The largest percentage of trainees (38 percent)

gave Other as the reason for termination.

Summary

There appears to be considerable homogeneity among VICI sites in terms

of participants' previous employment experience. Prior to entering

VICI, participants were either unemployed (93 percent), underemployed (3

percent), or were not in the labor force (4 percent). They were referred

to V1CI primarily by friends, community organizations, program staff,

and local employment services. Approximately one out of five youths had

participated in a job training program for an average of about six

months. Job training programs were, for most participants, not

construction-related.

About one-third of VICI youths had some previous employment experience.

On average, they were employed for about eight months. The majority of

youths worked more than 30 hours at a minimum wage on unsubsidized jobs

that were unrelated to construction.

C. WEEKLY PROGRESS OF VICI PARTICIPANTS: Table 1.3

A total of 944 V1CI participants are included in this analysis. Weekly

Progress Reports are filled out for each VICI youth for each week he or

she participates in the program. A total of 18,477 individual weekly

progress reports are summarized in the following results.

109

137
Attendance. Overall, 68 percent of the days VICI enrollees spend in the

program are "full work days." Fifteen percent of the remaining days are

considered "excused absences," which includes absences due to illness,

holidays, and inclement weather. Only 6 percent of all absences are

unexcused. VICI participants are recorded late 3 percent of the time.

These figures are based on the daily attendance records kept, for each

participant.

Disciplinary Action. Across all eight sites, 56 percent of all VICI

youths were involved in at least one incident requiring disciplinary

action at some time. Atlanta, Chicago, and New Haven reported that more than two-thirds of their participants required disciplinary action at

some time.

GED or Certificate: GEDs have been earned by 37 participants while

enrolled in the VICI program. This represents 4 percent of the total

sample. Chicago had the largest percentage--17 percent--of participants

who completed GEDs.

Performance Ratings. Combined weekly performance ratings (i.e., subjective evaluations made by journeymen) on the three most advanced tasks

performed by VICI youths yielded the following results. Across all

sites, 53 percent of the performance ratings were "good" or "excellent;"

42 percent of all ratings were "adequate;" 4 percent were "poor;" and

one percent was "inadequate."

Receipt of Pay Raise Incentive. Overall, 83 percent of pay raise incentives were received by VICI participants when due.

Reason for not Receiving Pay Raise. Among the reasons for participants'

failure to earn pay raise incentives were absenteeism/lateness, and

rarely poor work performance or misconduct.

Summary

There is considerable consistency in the weekly progress profiles of

participants across VICI programs, though some programs are atypical in

some respects. For example, South Bronx participants work longer hours,

on average, than those in any other program. Chicago is distinctive in

several ways: it reports the largest percentage of full work days for

participants, the next-to-smallest number of participants receiving

disciplinary action, and the largest percentage of GEDs attained.

D. PROFILE OF VICI TERMINATIONS: Table 1.4

Termination Type. A total of 577 participants had terminated from VICI

by November 30, 1979. Overall, 63 percent of these terminations were

110 , 138
voluntary and 37 percent were involuntary. Voluntary terminations are

defined as those initiated by the participant; involuntary are those

initiated by the program staff. Voluntary terminations can include,,

terminations classified- as either positive or negative; involuntary

terminations are always negative. (Voluntary and involuntary terminations are discussed in more detail below.) Broward had the highest

percentage (74 percent) of voluntary terminations; Philadelphia had the

lowest (41 percent).

An analysis of reasons for terminations from VICI revealed that 53

percent of all terminations were non-positive, 43 percent were positive,

and 4 percent were Other. Positive terminations are those due to employment, training, or school; non-positive terminations are those due to

injury or health problems, family responsibilities, the need to find

work, relocation, failure to locate participants, loss of interest or

dissatisfaction with the program, and all involuntary terminations;

Other terminations include those listed as Unknown and Other. Atlanta

had the highest percentage (48 percent) and Philadelphia had the lowest

percentage (25 percent) of positive terminations.

Reasons for Voluntary Terminations. Across all eight sites, 57 percent

of all voluntary terminations were due to offers of employment. At four

sites--Atlanta, Chicago, Newark, and New Haven--two-thirds or more of

all terminations were due to employment. A further 13 percent of the

terminations were the result of decisions to attend school, to enroll in

other work training programs, or to look for work. Personal circumstances

or problems such as health, family responsibilities, or relocation,

accounted for 12 percent of all voluntary terminations and loss of

interest and unhappiness with the program accounted for a further 12

percent. The remaining 6 percent were either Unknown or Other.

Philadelphia has the lowest percentage (33 percent) of terminations due

to employment and the highest percentage of those due to return to

school (27 percent) and to injury or health problems (17 percent).

Type of Employment After Termination. Sixty-seven percent of all VICI

youth who terminated to accept jobs were employed in related trades or

entered union apprenticeships; 24 percent accepted jobs in non-related

trades; and 9 percent went into military service. There was considerable

variation among sites on this variable.

Job Requires VICI Construction Skills. Seventy-three percent of participants obtaininb jobs reported that their jobs required the use of

construction skills learned in VICI.

Type of Job. Four variables--Job Permanence, Job Subsidization, Hourly

Wage, and Type of Job Placement--were used to evaluate post-program

jobs. Most youths who accepted jobs after termination from VICI obtained

permanent, unsubsidized positions at an average hourly wage of $4.59.

Sixty-one percent of the job placements of VICI youth were direct

that is, the participant found employment as a result of the program's

placement efforts, as opposed to finding his or her own job.

111239
Reasons for Involuntary Terminations. As of November 31, 1979, 57 percent

of all involuntary terminations were due to unsatisfactory attendanee; 19

percent were due to misconduct; 16 percent were Other; and 6 percent were

due to unsatisfactory work performance.

Program Completion Upon Termination. Program completion is defined as

meeting the programrs criteria for skill acquisition. This judgment is

made subjectively by program staff and is not based on strict quantifiable

criteria (e.g., mastery tests). Seventy-nine percent of all terminees --

including those with positive terminations--left VICI before completing

the program.

Number of Weeks in Program. The average amount of time participants are

enrolled in VICI is about 20 weeks for the total sample. The average was

highest in Chicago (34 weeks) and lowest in Philadelphia (13 weeks).

Apply for/keceive Public Assistance. Of the 577 terminees recorded through

November, 1979, only 6 percent have either applied for or received public

assistance. However, no information on this variable was available for 51

percent of the terminations. Philadelphia had the largest percentage (25

percent) of terminees applying for or receiving public assistance. Atlanta,

Chicago, and New Haven reported no applicants for public assistance.

Summary

Over all sites, approximately two-thirds of terminations were voluntary,

and nearly half (43 percent) were positive. About two out of five youths

who became employed obtained a job in a related area, and about one fourth

obtained union apprenticeship positions. Clearly, most youths got jobs

that were permanant and unsubsidized, at an hourly wage substantially above

federal minimum wage standards.

E. SELECTED CROSSTABULATION ANALYSES

This section presents an analysis of the relationships between selected

demographic, economic, and termination status variables and indicators of

program success. This analysis consists of the crosstabulation of 15

selected intake (demographic and economic) and termination variables with

termination status variables.

The intake and termination variables are:

1. Sex

2. Ethnic Group

3. Age

4. Highest level of education of applicant

5. FAS-V score

14

112
6. Previous participation in job training program

7. Total months of participation in previous job training progiiim

8. Job training--construction-related or not

9. Reason for termination from job training program

10. Total months of previous employment

11. Previous job--subsidized or unsubsidized

12. Previous job--construction-related or not

13. Reason for termination from previous job

14. Completion of VICI program

15. Number of weeks in VICI program

Each of the above variables was crosstabulated with four termination status

variables:

1. Termination Type A: Voluntary or Involuntary

2. Termination Type B: Positive, Non-Positive, or Other

3. Type of Job at Termination: Related Trade, Non-Related Trade,

or Union Apprenticeship

4. Wages at Termination

The information derived from these crosstabulations can be used to

determine if any relationships exist between participant background and

demographic characteristics and indicators of program success. Knowledge

of these relationships may be useful both for monitoring the program and

for suggesting further analyses to assess the effects of the demonstration

on trainees.

The following narrative has four parts, corresponding to the four termination variables. Accompanying tables give frequency and percent data for

each variable.

1. Termination Type A (Voluntary or Involuntary)

Table 1.5 presents the results A intake and termination variables crosstabulated with termination status variable, termination type A.

Sex. More than 60 percent of ' ch male and female terminations are voluntary.

Ethnic Group. A larger 'kern., tage (70 percent) of white participants

terminate voluntarily Oa.. of black (64 percent) or Hispanic (60 percent)

participants.

hit. At all ages, more than half of the participants terminate voluntarily.
Highest Level of Education of Applicant. The percentage of voluntary

terminations steadily increases as the leval of the,applicanes,education

increases. Of the VICI participants who had attnded post-secondary

school, 89 percent were considered voluntary terminees, whereas only 50

percent of participants with less than a ninth grade education terminated

voluntarily.

FAS-V Score. As participants' FAS-V scores increase, the percentage of

voluntary terminations increases. The higher a participant's FAS-V Score,

the more likely it is that the termination will be voluntary.

Previous Participation in Job Training Program. Previous program participation appeared to have little correlation with voluntary or involuntary

termination status. However, the percentage of voluntary terminations was

slightly higher among participants who had participated in prior job

training programs.

Total Months of Participation in Previous Job Training Program. The

largest proportion (75 percent) of voluntary terminations occurred in the

group who had participated in previous job training programs for a period

of 13 to 24 months.

Job Training--Construction-Related. A larger percentage (72 percent) of

voluntary terminations was found for participants who participated in job

training programs taat were not construction-related than for those whose

training programs were construction-related (52 percent).

Reason for Termination from Job Training Program. Positive terminees of

previous job training programs had the largeit percentage (71 percent) of

voluntary terminations from VICI. Non-positive and Other terminees of

previous programs had similar percentages of non-positive (66 percent) and

Other (65 percent) terminations from VICI.

Total Months of Previous Employment. Participants who had been employed

for more than 25 months before entering VICI were more likely to terminate

voluntarily than those with less than 25 months of previous employment.

Previous Job--Subsidized or Unsubsidized. There is no apparent relationship between this variable and the proportions of voluntary and involuntary

terminations.

Previous Job--Construction-Related. The percentage of voluntary terminations was slightly greater for those whose previous jobs were not

construction-related (64 percent) than for those whose jobs were

construction-related (57 percent).

Reason for Job Termination. Sixty-three percent of both positive and

non-positive terminees of previous jobs had voluntary terminations from the

VIC1 program.

Completion of the VICI Program. Ninety-three percent of those who completed

the VIC1 program were considered voluntary terminees. Only 55 percent of

those who did not complete the program terminated voluntarily.

I 42

114
Number of Weeks in Program. The largest percentages (71-83 percent) of

voluntary tertairiations were found among those who participated in VIC1hfor

more than 25 weeks. Among those who participated for 25 weeks or less,

only 52-60 percent of terminations were voluntary.

Summary

The results of these crosstabulations reveal certain interesting relationships between variables. The likelihood of a voluntary termination

increases as a function of an applicant's level of education and the number

of weeks he or she spends in the program. Similarly, the likelihood of a

voluntary termination increases as FAS-V scores rise and with completion of

the VICI program. Voluntary terminees are less likely to have participated

in construction-related job training programs than are involuntary terminees.

No relationships were found between termination type and the remaining

variables.

2. Termination Type B (Positive, Non-Positive, or Other)

The results of the crosstabulation of intake and termination variables with

the termination status variable, termination type B, are presented in Table

1.6..

Sex. More than 50 percent of both male and female terminations are

non-positive.

Ethnic Group. The majority of all terminations, regardless of ethnic

group, are non-positive.

A slightly larger proportion (4b percent) of older youths (age 18-19)

terminated positively than did youths 16-17 years old (3b percent). A

larger percentage of younger youths terminated non-positively than of older

youths.

highest Level of Education of Applicant. The proportion of VICI participants with positive terminations increased as level of education rose.

FAS-V Score. As participants' FAS-V scores increase, the percentage of

positive terminations also increases. Thus, the higher a participant's

score, the more likely it is that the termination will be positive.

Previous Participation in Job Training,Program. Previous participation in

a job training program appears not to be related to positive/non positive

termination status. The percentages of both positive and non-pc ,:tive

terminations were the same among those who had participated in previous job

training programs as among those who had not participated in prev:ous job

training programs.

115

143
Total Months of Participation in Previous Job Training Program. The

percentage of positive terminations increased with the number of months of

participation in previous job training programs. The largest percentage of

positive terminations occurred among those with 25 or more months of participation in previous job training programs.

Job Training--Construction-Related. A larger percentage (46 percent) of

positive terminations was reported for participants whose previous job

training programs were not construction-related than for participants whose

previous job training programs were construction-related (36 percent).

Reason for Termination from Job Training Program. Positive terminations

from previous job training programs formed the largest proportion (64

percent) of positive terminations from the VICI program. Proportions of

non-positive (41 percent) and Other (38 percent) terminations from VICI

approximately reflected proportions of such terminations from other

programs.

Total Months of Previous Employment. The proportion of positive terminations tended to increase with the total number of months of previous

employment. The exception to this was a decrease in the percentage of

Positive terminations for those who had been previously employed for 13-24

months.

Previous Job--Subsidized or Unsubsidized. This variable bears little

relation to the percentages of positive, non-positive, or Other

terminations.

Previous Job--Construction-Related. This too has little effect on the

percentages of positive, non-positive, and Other terminations.

Reason for Termination from Previous Job. A slightly higher percentage of

positive terminations from VICI were reported for those who had terminated

positively from previous jobs.

Completion of VICI Program. Ninety-one percent of those who completed the

VICI program terminated positively, whereas only 30 percent of those who

did not complete VICI did so.

Number of Weeks in Program. The percentage of positive terminations

increases with length of time spent in the VICI program. The highest

percentage of positive terminations (76 percent) was found among youths who

participated in the VICI program for 36-45 weeks.

Sumrua ry

The crosstabulations of termination status with intake and termination

variables revealed no significant relationships between termination statue

and the following variables: sex, ethnic group, age, previous participation

in job training programs, prior construction - related job training, reason

for termination from previous job training program, whether a previous job

was subsidized or unsubsidized, whether a previocq job was constructionrelated, and reasons for termination from a previous job.

116 1 41
The redults did, however, suggest relationships between certain variables.

The proportion of positive terminations increased as a function of the

applicant's level of education and his or her FAS-V score. The percentage

of positive terminations also increased with the number of months of participation in previous job training programs and with the total number of

months of previous employment. The likelihood of a positive termination

also increased with completion of the VICI program and with the amount of

time spent in VICI.

3. Type of Job at Termination: Related Trade, Non-Related Trade, or

Union Apprenticeship

A crosstabulation of job type at termination with intake and termination

variables appears in Table 1.7.

Sex. A smaller percentage of females obtained jobs in related trades and

union apprenticeships than did males. Far more females obtained jobs in

non-related trades (55 percent) than did males (23 percent).

Ethnic Group. Blacks and Hispanics were much less likely to obtain jobs in

related trades than were whites. A larger percentage of Hispanics (56 percen,:)

obtained union apprenticeships than did blacks (25 percent), and blacks

obtained a larger percentage of union apprenticeships than whites (10 percent).

Aml. A smaller proportion of older youths (age 18-19) obtained jobs in

related trades than of younger youths. For jobs in non-related trades and

union apprenticeships, the pattern is fairly similar.

Highest Level of Education of Applicant. The likelihood of a VICI participant obtaining a job in a related trade decreased with the amount of his or

her education. Participants who completed only the eighth grade or lower

were the most likely to obtain jobs in related trades. Participants who

attended post-secondary school obtained the largest percentage of jobs in

non-related trades. Youths who completed only the eighth grade or lower

and youths with high school diplomas or GEDs obtained the largest proportion

of union apprenticeships.

FAS-V Scores. Test scores do not appear to be correlated with job type at

termination.

Previous Participation in Job Training Program. Higher proportions of

youths with prior experience in job training programs were found obtaining

each type of job at termination, compared with youths with no prior job

training program experience.

Total Months of Participation in Previous Job Training Programs. Youths

whose total participation in a previous job training program was one year

or more were more likely to obtain jobs in both related and non-related

trades than youths with less job training experience. However, a plurality

of union apprenticeship positions went to youths with previous training of

one year or less.

110 45
Job Training--Construction-Related. Youths whose job training programs

were construction-related were more likely to obtain jobs in both nonrelated trades and union apprenticeships than youths whose job training

programs were not construction-related.

Reason for Termination from Job Training Program. Most jobs in related

trades were obtained by youths whose terminations from previous job training

programs were positive or Other.

Total Months of Previous Employment. This variable has little or no effect

on type of job at termination.

Previous Job--Subsidized or Unsubsidized. Participants whose previous jobs

were unsubsidized obtained a plurality of jobs in related trades, but most

union apprenticeships were obtained by youths whose previous jobs were

subsidized.

Previous Job--Construction-Related. Forty-eight percent of those whose

previous jobs were not construction-related obtained jobs in related trades,

whereas only 28 percent of those whose previous jobs were construction-related

did so. However, participants whose previous jobs were construction-related

obtained more union apprenticeships than did those whose previous jobs were not construction-related.

Reason for Termination from Previous Job. There was no discernable relationship between positive or non-positive termination from a previous job and

type of job obtained at termination from VICI.

kgpletion of VICI Program. Participants who completed the VICI program

were more likely to obtain jobs in related trades and union apprenticeships

than those who did not complete the program.

Number of Weeks in Proem. Trainees who spent a half year or more in the

VICI program were more likely to obtain jobs in related trades and union

apprenticeship programs than those who were enrolled for less than half a year.

Summary

The crosstabulation analysis revealed no major correlation between job type

at termination and the following variables: FAS-V score, previous participation in lob training programs, total months of participation in previous

job training program, total months of previous employment, previous job-- subsidized or unsubsidized, and reason for termination from previous job.

However, the analysis did reveal a number of relationships between job type

at termination and certain other variables. For example, a smaller percentage

of females than of males obtained jobs in related trades and union apprenticeships. Blacks and Hispanics obtained relatively fewer jobs in related

trades than did whites, while a plurality of union apprenticeship positions

was obtained by Hispanics.

118 1 46
The proportion of VICI participants obtaining jobs in related trades

decreased with the amount of education obtained. Surprisingly, youths

whose job training programs were construction-related were more likely

to accept jobs in non-related trades. However, the greatest percentage

of jobs in related trades was obtained by those whose terminations from

previous job training programs were positive or Other. Participants

whose previous jobs were not construction-related were more likely to

obtain jobs in related trades than those whose previous jobs were

construction-related. However, completion of the VICI program was

positively correlated with obtaining a job in a related trade or a union

apprenticeship: participants who completed the VICI program were more

likely to obtain these positions than those who did not complete the

program. Furthermore, VICI trainees who were enrolled a half year or

longer were more likely to obtain jobs in related trades and union

apprenticeships than those enrolled for shorter periods of time.

4. Wages at Termination

The results of intake and termination variables crosstabulated with

wages are presented in Table 1.8.

Sex. Twenty-six percent of males were offered jobs at $4.01-$5.00

per hour at termination, whereas 48 percent of females were offered jobs

at $3.00 per hour or less.

Ethnic Group. A plurality of whites (30 percent) took jobs at $3.01-$4.00

per hour. A plurality of blacks (26 percent) took jobs at $4.01-$5.

Most Hispanics took jobs at either $3.01-$4.01 per hour or at $6.01-$7.00

per hour.

A10. Of all 16 year olds obtaining jobs at termination, the majority

--(11-4 percent) were paid $3.01-$4.00 per hour; a plurality of 17 year olds

(37 percent) were paid $4.01-$5.00 per hour; a plurality of 18 year olds

(48 percent) were paid $4.01-$6.00 per hour; and a plurality of 19 year

olds (46 percent) were paid either $3.00 or less, or $5.01-$6.00 per hour.

These results suggest a trend towards increased pay as age increases.

Highest Level of Education of Applicant. Most participants (58 percent)

whose last completed grade was 8 or lower are earning either $3.00 or

less per hour or $5.01-$6.00 per hour. Thirty percent of those whose

last completed grade was 9-11 are earning $3.01-$4.00 per hour. The

largest percentage of participants (29 percent) who obtained High School

Diplomas or GEDs are earning $4.01-$5.00 per hour. Most participants

(8U percent) who attended post secondary school are earning either $3.00

or less per hour or $4.01 to $5.00 per hour.

FAS-V Score. A plurality of participants (28 percent) who scored 70 or

below on the FAS-V test were offered jobs at $3.01-$4.00 per hour. A

26 percent plurality of those scoring 71 or above were offered jobs at

$4.01-$5.00 per hour.

119 1 4 7
Previous Participation in Job Training Program. Seventy-three percent of

those who had not participated in a previous job training program were paid

$3.)1-$4.00 per hour, while a plurality (33 percent) of those who had

participated in a previous job training program were paid $4.01-$5.00 per

hours.

Total Months of Participation in Previous Job Training. No relationship

was found between number of months of participation in previous job training

and wages at termination from VICI.

Job Training--Construction-Related. The greatest proportion (37 percent)

of participants whose job training was construction-related were offered

$3.00 or less per hour. An equal proportion of participants whose job

training was not construction-related were offered $4.01-$5.00 per hour.

Reason for Termination from Job Training Program. A 40 percent plurality

of positive terminees from other job training programs were paid $4.01-$5.00

per hour. A 31 percent plurality of non-positive terminees were also paid

$4.01 to $5.00 per hour.

Total Months of Previous Employment. There is no clear relationship between

length of previous employment and wages at termination from VICI.

Previous Job: Subsidized or Unsubsidized. Of those participants whose

previous jobs were subsidized, a 33 percent plurality were offered $5.01-

$6.00 per hour at termination from VICI. A 29 percent plurality of

participants whose previous jobs were not subsidized were offered

$4.01-$5.00 per hour.

Previous Job: Construction-Related. Equal percentages (22 percent) of

participants whose previous jobs were construction-related received $3.01-

$4.00, $4.01-$5.00, $5.01-$6.00, and $6.01-$7.00 per hour. A plurality

(26 percent) of participants whose previous jobs were not constructionrelated received $4.01-$5.00 per hour.

Reason for Termination from Previous Job. The largest proportions of both

positive (32 percent) and non-positive (30 percent) terminees from previous

jobs were offered $4.01-$5.00 per hour.

Completion of the VICI Program. A plurality (36 percent) of participants

who completed the VICI program are earning $4.01-$5.00 per hour. A plurality

(35 percent) of those who did not complete the VICI program are earning

$3.00 or less per hour.

Number of weeks in program. The results indicate a pattern of increasing

wages as a function of weeks spent in the VICI program.

Summary

For most variables under examination, no distinct relationships between

variables could be determined. However the crosstabulations did indicate a

trend towards increasing wages as a function of weeks spent in the VICI

program. Surprisingly, there was no distinct difference in the wages of

participants with a GED and those with only a grade 9-11 education.

120

1.48
Concluding Remarks

The statistical description presented here provides a comprehensive profile

of the participants enrolled in VICI from its Feginning in late 1978 through

November, 1979. It also supplies a context for determining and interpreting

the final outcomes of the demonstration. The full value of the data presented

here cannot be fully realized, however, until the followup study has

neared completion. No firm conclusions or inferences, therefore, should be

drawn from this statistical description at this time.

121 149
Table 1.1 Demographic Profile of VICI Youths by Site

SITE

E N Atlanta MINI(Inward Chicago

N 1

Milwaukee 111111

Newark New Haven

N 1

Philadelphia 111111

S. Bronx N

Total1

0 0 1 1 0 0 0, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 I 9 9 30 ',19 3 4 1 1 5 4 16 14 2 2 7 8 73 8

16 15 39 27 4 5 34 11 50 36 30 26 16 16 28 31 217 23

32 31 46 31 35 43 58, 37 43 31 39 33 53 50 31 35 337 35

;f 44 3z 22 40 41 64 41 41 29 32 27 32 31 24 26 312 32 or older 1 I 0 0 I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 4 1

e 79 75 112 76 70 84 138 88 103 74 101 86 93 89 65 71 761 81 ale 26 25 36 24 13 16 19 12 36 26 16 14 11 11 26 29 183 19 CROUP

to 2 2 5 3 2. 2 II 7 0 0 25 21 I I I 1 47 5 ck 103 98 143 97 45 55 134 85 108 78 77 66 99 95 57 63 166 80

panic 0 0 0 0 35 42 11 7 30 21 13 II 4 4 32 35 t25 13 dein Indian 0 0 0 0 I I 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 I er 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 U 1 I 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 STATUS

d 7 7 10 7 15 18 10 6 10 7 4 3 I I 4 4 61 7 bar 96. 91 132 89 61 74 108 69 119 86 92 79 102 98 78 86 788 83 Ily of One 2 2 6 4 7 8 39 2S IQ 7 21 18 1 I 9 10 95 10
Table IA Demographic Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

SITE 11.01ENT

Atlanta

N

Irouerd

N

Chicago N % MI lwaukee

N Newark N % WhinN I

Philadelphia

N

S. Iron* N Total N

NUMER IN HOUSEHOLD

1.4 47 45 58 40 33 40 97 61 52 37 68585541158 463 49

5-8 52 49 62 43 38 46 50 32 79 57 42 36 46 44 37 41 406 43 912 6 6 23 14 12 14 9 6

8 6 7 6 3 3 I I 69 7

10 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1

INNER OF DEPENDENTS

0 83 79 119 81 73 88 128 82 98 71 110 94 75 72 55 60 741 79

17 16 24 16 6 7 22 14 35 25 6 5 25 24 28 31 163 17

2 2 2 5 3 5 6 4 3 0 0 4 4 6 7 31 3 3'8 3 3 0 0 0 2 I I I 0 0 2 2 9 1

UNABLE TO COMMUNI- UT7707

Yes 0 0 2 1 .5 6 2 1 2 I 0 0 0, 0 I I 12 I No 105 100 146 99 78 .94 155 99 131 99 117 100 104 100 90 99 932 99

HANDICAPPED

Yes I I 2 .1 0 0 I I 2 I I I I I I I 9 1 No 104 99 146 99 83 WO 156 99 137 99 116 99 103 99 90 99 935 99

VETEPAN

Yes 3 3 1 1 2 5 0 0 2 2 I I 2 2 18 2

No 102 97 147 99 81 98 150 95 139 100 115 98 103 99 89 98 926 98

152

153
Table Ia Demographic Profile of VICI Youth by Site (Continued)

, SITE

ELEMENT

At lents

NR

Sward

NI

Chicago NI

Milwaukee NIN%. Newark New Haven

N 1

Philadelphia

N t

S. Bronx

II % Total lit

.CITIZENSHIP

Yes 105 100 147 99 79 95 157 100 139 100 117 100 10 100 89 98 937 99

No 0 0 1 1 4 . 5 0 0, 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 1 OFFENDER

Yes 8 8 25 17 0 0 21 13 12 9 24 20 3 3 4 4 97 10 No 97 92 123 83 83 103 136 87 127 91 93 80 101 97 87 96 80 90 MICIPAT/SEASONAt FAAM FAMILY Yes 0 0 % 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 1 No 105 loo ikk 97 83 100 155 99 139 100 117 100 1011 100 90 99 937 99 NICHEST LEVEL OF

laTION OF APPLI- UrCade 8 or loss 3 3 3 2 0 0 4 3 12 8 6 5 1' I 4 4 )3 3 0009'11 61 58 108 73 54 65 127 81 103 74 75 64 72 69 76 64 676 72 N.$, Diplom

or CEO

37 35 36 24 27 33 23 111 23 17 34 29 30 29 10 II 220 23 Postsecondary 4 4 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 I 15 2 Wool

154
Table Ill. Demographic Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

sin

ILENINT

Atlanta

N 1

Ward

N 1

Chic*

111

billwaan

N 8

honk

N 1

llow Nom

N 1

PhIlklolphla

N 8

S. Iron N11 Total

8

4 HIGHEST LEVEL OF 100CATION OF FAB

Grade 8 or lost 12 II 33 23 24 29 18 11 11 8 13 II 4 i 9 10 Ilk I)

Grades 9-11 25 24 IS 10 12 15 26 17 26 19 16 lk 25 24 14 15 159 17 N.S. (Hoke or ili 23 24 16 15 18 31 20 28 20 27 13 19 II 24 26 192 20 GED Post Hondo',

school 3 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 9 1 1 1 6 7 28 3 Woo 6? 39 73 69 31 37 lo 51 71 51 52 44 55 5) 38 42 441 47 HIGHEST LEVEL OF DU CATION OF NO ER Grade 1 or 110 to 5 27 II 11 37 26 IS I 6 II 1 S 5 13 A 129 16 Grade 9II 40 38 46 31 15 18 36 22 33 23 27 2) 4o 38 25 28 260 28

H.S. Diplom or 31 30 28 19 13 16 49 31 48 35 38 32 37 36 26 29 270 29 GEO Post secondary

school 6 6 4 3 ID 12 6 3 7 5 10 9 4 4 4 4 49 s

Unknown 18 17 43 29 14 17 46 29 43 31 31 2 11 17 23 25 236 24 FAH TEST

Non 62.99 62.05 76.06 OA 58.91 7102 au 71.14 65.79

S.D. 12.65 13.91 11.25 12,89 15.14 13.38 12.79 11.46 14.07

N 102 167 83 153 139 117 100 90 931

156

157
Table 1.2 Economic Profile of VICI Youths by Site

SITE ELEMENT

Atlanta

11 1 Oftwerd

11 1

, Chicago

II 2

Milwaukee

II 8

Newark

II 8

New Haven

II 8

Philadelphia

II 8 S. WA

N % Tool

11 I UI CLAIMANT Yes 0 0 I I 2 2 9 6 1 I 2 2 4 4 0 0 19. 2

1 No 105 100 141 99 81 98 148 94 130 99 115 98 100 96 91 100 525 98

1 MASONS FOR OISAD

I ri,WUSA

(I) Family re. selves cash

public assIs

Lance Yes 29 21 36 24 '23 27 65 41 39 28 51 44 83 80 41 45 367 39

(2) Applicant re

celved cash

public MIS'

tance

Yes 7 7 II 7 14 I/ 37 24 15 II 25 21 16 15 6 7 131 14 (3) Ida/ poverty

level Yes 80 76 118 80 65 78 109 69 117 86 67 57 24 13 65 71. 645 68 EMPLOYMENT STATUS Unemployed 103 98 135 91 14 89 144 92 136 98 114 97 101 97 76 84 833 93 Underemployed I I 5 3 4 5 9 6 I I 3 3 2 2 1 1 26 3 Not In labor force

I I 8 6 5 6 4 2 2 I 0 0 I I 14 15 35 4

Percentages do not sue to 1001, These data are derived from three separate "yesno" questions, Only "yes' responses are reported,
Table 1,2, Economic Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

sin Atlanta Inward Chicago Iii haulm Newark New Now Philadelphia

...

S. Bronx OMNI Total

ELI' IT Ilt lit Nt N tNt lit N tNt Nt

SOURCE V REFERRAL VICI

Program steff 19 '18 41 29 21 26 31 20 37 27 21 18 1 I 4 4 175 18 Employment Sonic 7 7 6 4 0 0 23 15 11 8 6 5 73 69 9 10 135 14. Friends 20 19 42 29 34 41 21 14 56 41' 36 31 14 14' 10 II 233 25 Other CITA Progran

IA I) 21 19 2 .2 21 17 3 2 3 2

I I 1I 79 8 Comunity Orion. 20 19 4 3 12 IS 43 27 1 8 17 15 14 14 53 S9 174 18

ItatIon

Church I I 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 School 4 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 8 0 0 11 12 25 3 Newspaper, TV, 12 II II 4 5 6 0 0 3 2 7 6 0 0 0 0 38 4 Radio

Probation, Parole 1 I I 1 I I 4 12 10, 0 22 2 Court;

Previous Eiployer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I 0 0 4 I Other 4 4 14 10 6 7 8 5 14 10 6 5 0 0 2 2 54 6

PREVIOUS PARTICIPAliCti IN .101 fltAIN1111

NOM

No 17 64 ill 82 74 89 79 50 127 91 102 87 89 86 82 90 742 79 Yes 38 36 26 18 5 11 3 50 12 9 15 I) 15 14 9 10 202 21

161
la

co

Table 1.2. Economic Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

SITE ELEMINAtlanta ItBrood

NI

Chicago

NS

Milwaukee MINewark New Nave NSPhiladelphia

NINS

S. Ironx NS

Total

TOTAL NORMS OF PAR. TICIPATION IN PRI

VIGO J01 TRAINING

Mean 4.42 4.73 9.33 6.58 3.33 5.67 14.67 5.56 6.31

5.0. 3.9) 3.34 10.12 10.59 2.40 4.64 11.91 3.81 8.39 N 36 26 3 78 9

15 IS 9 Ill J01 TRAININGCON

STRUCTION RELATED To 17 45 5 19 ) 38 21 27 4 3) 5 )3 6 40 4 44 65 )2 No 11 55 21 81 5 62 57 73 8 61 10 67 9 60 5 56 1)6 68

REASON FOR TERNINA

TION FI/OM JOB TRAIN. INO MAN

Positive 0 0 3 12 I,, 11 1) 17 2 17 I 7

. 3 20 2 ;2 25 11 lionPosiThi 36 95 2: 85 5 56 .43 55 8 66 8 5) 11 73 7 78

. 140' 69 Other 2 5 1 3 3 3) 22 :8 2 17 6 40 1 7 0 0 3f 19

TOTAL ROOKS OF PRE. VIOSEr07DIEN

Mean 10.92 8.0) 15.13 9.14 5.45 7.06. 738 4.74 8.02

5,0, 146 9.39 14,93 9,12 5.94 9.00 5.99 9.24 '8.64

N 36 37 2) 6) 58 54 25 )9 335

1'3
Table 1.2* EconlmIc Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

SITE

ELEMENT

Atlanta

'II t

Proud

11.1

Chicago

N % Milwaukee PINSNewark New Haven N t

Philadelphia

N I

S. Prone

N t NI

Total

MONTHS SINCE LAST

JOB Still on Job 0 0 8 5. 2 2, 5 3 0 0 2 2 0 0 2. 2 13 2 Never held Job 13 11 28 19 22 27 33 11 12 9 II 9 26 25 20 21 165 18 01 months 53' 51 57 38, 37 145 75 48 64 45 52 411 38 36 35 38 411 43 4.6 months 20 19 25 17 6 7 17 II 22' 16 20 17 23 22 '15 17 1141 16 3.12 .months 9 8 22 15 11 13 14 9 Ik 10 15 13 5 '5 9 10 99 ll

19 rothet2 years 9 9 5 4 4 5 8 5 16 12 I) II 9 9 7 1 71 7 25 ronthst3 years 0 0 2 I 0 0 3 2 6 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 II 2 37 renths5 years I I I I I I 2 1 5

4 1 I I I I I 13 I MOST RECENT MgE0 CI" r---fOIN.TE111. II I Mother Job 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 4 2 2', 3 3 0 0 1 ' 5 20 3 School 10 II 9 7 17 28 .5 2 2' 3 3 I I 13 'II 60 8

Training program 12 13 9 7 1 2 It 9 2 2 7' 7 3 4 3 4 48 6 Fired 2' 2 8 6 3 5 I) II 6 5 II 10 2 3 3 4 48 6 Laid off' 16 17 14 12 10 16 15 12 28 22 II 17 13 30 li 20 138 II

Injury/health

prob., pregnancy

2 2 3 3 0 0 3 2 I' I 0 0 I I I' I II I

Moved

, 2 5 4 '4 7 6 5 3

2 6 6 3 4 2 2 31 4 Picket Ilke Job 6 7 23 19 2 3 19 15 II I 14 13 7 9 II II 1) 12 Transportation,

problems

7 8 5 4 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 I I 2 1 19 2'

Family responsi 0 0 2 2 2 3

4 3 0 0 1 I I I 2 2 12 1

Willies ,.. Other 32 35 39 33 19 31 41 33 72' 56 41 40 36 46 19 26 19 ,'38

165

1.64
Table 1.2, Economic Profile of VICI Youths by Slte (Continued)

SITE

ELEMENT

Atlanta

N 8 Sward

11INININI

Chime Milwaukee Newark New Haven .0 11118

Philadelphia S. ROM Total

N%

PREVIOUSJOB.SUISI.

01210ANSU0SIDIZEO

Subsidized 34 39 41 36 24 53 45 38 63 57 40 40 56 73 22 34 325 .45 UnsobildInd 54 61 711 64 21 47 75 63 47 43 . 59 60 21 27 43 66 394 55 IMI

Related 17 21 11 18 8 16 14 12 7 8 20 24 7 9 5 8 56 i5 Unrelitid 66 79 80 82 41 84 107 88 77 92 65 16 11 91 61 92 568 85 MST WENT JO! -MEAN

11WPIF---"IM

Mean 33.51 31.86 31.57 32.68 35.32 29.35 34.7/ 30.97 33.52

6,0, 10.47 6.91 10.49 10 14 6.56 . 9.71 7.96 9.41 9.18

N 90 119 61 122 Ill 106 18 71 774 MOST REGENT JO!-MEAN

HOURLY WAGE Mein 2.94 2,92' 2.88 1.96 2.75 2.80 2.74 2.67 2.84 1.0. .11 .52 .68 .69' .41 .49 57 .49 .59 N 90 119 61 118 127 106 71 71 770

t66
Table 1.3, Weekly Progress of VICI Youths by Site

ELEMENT

ATTENDANCE Full work dry

Nol 1day, rein,

'flow

Other excused sl

ltsacuud ebsence

Lite

Reim Olt for

etec, activities

Other

011C IIL INARY ACTION

Yes No CID OA CERTIFICATE

ATTAINED

Yes No

SITE

600

Atlanta

N

5285 62 445 5

366 4

711 8 385 4

161

130 8

11 68

34 32

2 2 103 91

Ircward

II

10,140 14 642 5

625 4 401 3

905 7

501 4

83 I

312 2

56 38 92 62

0 0

148 100

9295 1 1 441 4

234 280

480

194 2

144

422

Chicago

59' 11 24 29

14 11 69 83

Ni Imam

N

6841 51

625

385 3

1530 13

1581 13 321 3

114 I

651 5

93 59

64 1.

156 It

Newark N

9560 ec

110 5

04 4

64: 5

112

1:51 3

24D 2

1138 8

lb 56

61 44

New Hawn N I

8253 67

554 4

1062 9

518

370

329 3

364

810 '

84 1228

5 ; 5 04 9', 112 96

Fh 1 ladelctla N

6340 61 366 3

351 3

1834 11

321 18; 8

114

445

56 54 48 46

100 96

S, trona

I

4665 61

201 3

193 3

'134

103

146 2 23

1425 19

30 33

61 67

6 7

85 93

Total N I

66,315 68

3,984 4

3,722

5,972 7

5,736 6

3,123 3 1,303 I

5,933 7

521 56

07 44

37 4

901 96

168

.MM/MMINNIMIBM fa0111MW IIMMWM11111~

169
Table 1,34 Weekly Progress of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

SITE

E L E M E N T

Wants

N 1

Irowerd

N 8 Eke?) N 8 Milwaukee N 1 Newark N 8 New New1 8

Philadelphia

N 1 S. Ironx

11

Totel,

N8

PERFORINCE RATING

Excellent )2 I 106 2 878 30 381 10 91 2 390 7 26k 9 97 10 2,239 I Good oilk 30 2441 64 1507 5) 1916 49 2110 40 2354 4) 979 31 626 61 12,917 45 Adequete 2054 61 117) 30 999 14 1298 )) 2943 55 2575 47 1454 46 23) 2) 12,129 42 Poor 217 ii 100 3 51 2 195 5 95 1 105 2 325 10 56 5 1'144 4

Inadequate 64 I 12 I 1 I 109 3 62 I I I 118 4 8 I 311 I RECEIPT OF PH RAISE

INCENTIVE WHEN DUE Yee 144 96 211 91 109 92 104 96 335 86 BA 62 157 95 35 28 1,179 1) No 6 6 22 9 9 8 k 4 53 1k 52 38 5 5 88 72 239 17

PERSONS FOR NOT RE. nIVING PAY PRISE

INCENTIVE Poor work perform 0 0 2 9 0 0 1 16 0 0 29 -33 3 33 0 0 35 13 Pence

//settling/late 3 50 1 36 2 22 4 68 0 0 hi 51 3 )3 0 0 64 2)

Ms

Misconduct 0 0 5 1) 0 0 I 16 0 0 10 11 2 22 0 0 II 6

Other 3 50 7 32 1 18 0 0 53 100 4 5 I 12 88 100 163 51

..... ..............................
Table I,4, Termination Profile of VICI Youths by Site

SIZE ILININT

Atlanta N 228Inward CgIcep

11.88t11%

NIlwatieo Newark New Novo NI

PhIledolphli

8281

S. Iron

M,

Total1

TIININATION TYPEA

Voluntary 35 63 11 74 29 60 86 71 52 53 45 66 18 ii 23 61 365 63

lavolultsry 11 37 27 26 19 60 35 29 46 47 23 34 .26 59 15 39 212 47

TINIIATION TYPE", Polk 27 48 46 44 22 46 49 40 46 41 32 47 II 25 15 39 248 43

'Non.posl Hy. 26 46 69 47 26 54 69 57 '50 51 34' 50 32 73 22 58 308 5) Other 3 6 9 9 0 0 3 3 2 2 2 3 1 2 I 3 21 4 MASONS FON ;MN

IAN TEANINATICOS

E/010TIM 13/4 70 37 id 19 66 39 46 46 85 30 67 6 3) 9 40 208 57 Trolningl I 3 2 3001112 0 0 0 0 3 13 I 2

School I 5 7 9 1 10 9 1 1 1 2 2 t S 17 3 13 31 9

look for ;orb 1 ) 5 6 1 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 2

Injury /health 2 5 5 6 0 0 3 3 I 2 0 0 3 17 I 4 15 4 Folly lop. 13 110 011 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 5 I Neysdlcannot be

located 0 I I 2 1 H 13 0 0 3 1 2 11 1) 22 i

Transportation

problems 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0

1 I

Wet Intsrlithm I 3 10 13 4 14 15 18 3 5 6 14 1 6 3 13 4) 12 *PT with Prof.

Other 13 2 3 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 4 0 0 1 4 8 2

1111631111 2 5 7 9 0 0 ) 3 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 1) 4

I. Includes Jobs In related end unrelated troll, Lmlan apprenticeships end mIlltery lerylc4.

2. Includes training program; In related and unrelated trades, and transfer; to CETA programs.

173

172
A

Table 1,4, Termination Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

ANNOMM.111111M1111MMMINIINIMIP ..,........,-

SITE At Ibita Oruro Chic* Milwaukee bark New Wawa Philadelphia 5, ;rope Total

E L I M E N 1 1 I 1 1 II I N t M t; I I I N 1 Nt NI

TR OF MOMENT

II TEllas-r1010100 3 29 I/ 46 I 5 25 64 16 36 11 58 I 11 2 12 16 41 kb In related

trade

Jab In mere

lilted trade

12 50 11 30 2 11 11 211 4 9. 3 10 4 66 3 34 SO 14

Lilian apprentice.

ship

2 8 1 19 IS 79 2 S 22 50 S

16 0 0 2 22 55 26 Military urvIcs 3 13 2 S I S 1 3 2 5 5 16 1 11 2 12 13 9

JCS RE INES VICI

TiloC ON KILLS

Yet 10 45 29 71 10 77 30 73 38 90 22 II I 20 5 50 145 13 Ni 12 55 10 26 3 23 II 21 4 10 5 19 4 80 S SO 54 27 NOV VW

Mean 9.32 4.35 5.93 5.13 4.81 11.23 5,00 3.73 1459 S.D. 1.Ik 1.19 1.39 1,64 .87 .137 IA: .n

1,14

N

19 39 13 39 41 26 $

ID 193 A RIFOISNLI

Ferramt 19 86 38 97 II IS 37 90 39 93 15 93 4 60 9 90 182 91.

Toorary 3 14 I 3 2 IS i 10 3 1 2 7 1 20 1 10 17 I,

17i
Table I,4, Termination Profile of VICI Youth by Site (Continued)

siti

!LINEN

Atlanta

N t

Inward

II 2

CA lap

N I

1111wsioe

I t

Newark

I A

Now kw NI

Ohlladolphla III!S. Iron NI Total

I ISSIIIZATION

Saaldlad 6 27 I 3 0 0 0 0 ) 7 3 II 4 13 2 20 19 10

lanoltIdlood 16 73 38 97 I] 100 41 100 39 93 74, 89 1 20 0 80 113 90

TM OF XII KA

NUT

Alroct Plow 1 II 8 64 S 39 27 66 41 98 19 70 0 0 0 0 III 61

1111It Sol( Flocoosot II 82 14 36 0 61 14 34 I 2

$ 30 5 100 10 100 li 39

MUMS IRA MYR

SSW TRONA? IONS

li

0

71

0

S 19

1 )

12

2

63

II

25

2

71

6

24

2

52

5

II

4

48

10

II

0

61

0

12

I

79

7

121

12

57

6

losatIsfactory

attendance

tkoatlifactory

lark oorfor- amco NIumixt S 24 S 19 1 5 6 17 IS 30 II 31 1 1 40 19

the of'd000nstrr 0 0 0 0 4 21 0 0 I 2 C 0 0 0 0 0 S 2 Hos

Other 0 0 16 59 0 0 2 6 12 26 I 4 2 0 I 1 34 II

177

176
Table 1.4, Termination Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

sin

E L E N E N

Allah

NO

irabrd

N1

Chimp

NI

II Ilwateso

N i

Nook

N 1

Now kw

N % FbIladolphloN 1

S. Iron

N 1

Total

N, . 1

r

TEMINATING

TIMPTs

carntim Ai NITA

Tot 0 0 25 24 21 44 14 12 44 45 16 24 0 0 3 1 123 21 Ni 56 100 $0 76 27 56 106 111 Sk 55 52 16 44 IN )5 4S4 79 MIR OF WEEKS IN

11.11

13.60

11,11

14,31

34,10

1545

16.94

15.56

23.14$

14.63

23,00

13.11

13.03

10,13

15.11,

5.53

20,19

15.01 Nun

5.8. N 56 105 NI 110 9$ 61 4 37 176 WV/ FN/NLEIVE MERIT=

Yu 0 0 15 14 0 0 4 4 1 1 0 0 II 15 1 I 32 6

Ni 44 71 ic 15 19 40 ss 40 17 Ii 53 31 :5 57 If k7 1S0 k3

11 il 74 71 29 60 Si 41 10 12 15 22 1 11 19 50 295 51
Table 1.5 Termination Type A

Variable

Voluntary Involuntary

Sex

Male 301 63 174 37

Female 64 63 38

Ethnic Group

White 21 70 9 3u

Black 295 169

Americaq Indian 0 1 Hispanic 48 32 40

Other 1 1 SO

Age

IS 1 100 0 0

16 ?9 57 22 43

17 78 58 56 42

18 126 64 72 36

19 129 68 61 32

20 1 50 1 53

23 1 100 .0 0

1371(10
Table 7 5. Termination Type A (continued)

Variable

Highest level of Education

of Applicant

Grade 8 or less

Grades 9-11

High School Diploma or

GED

Post Secondary School

FAS-V Score

0-50

51-60

61 -70

81-90

91-99

Previous Participation in

in Job Training Program

No

Yes

Total months of participation in previous job

training program

0-6

7-12

13-24

25+

Voluntary involunta. ,

N

9

2Ji5

50

59

9

169

50

41

103 76 33 24

8 89 1 11

41 48 44 52

70 64 40 36

91 59 63 41

95 69 42 31

51 73 19 27

11 85 2 15

272 62 165 38

93 66 47 34

63 66 33 34

18 67 9 33

6 75 2 25

2 67 1 33

is

138
Table 1.5. Termination Type A (continued)

Variable

Voluntary

N %

Involuntary

N %

Job Training--Constructi6n

Related

Yes 22 52 20 48

No 71 72 27 28

Reason for Termination from

Job Training Program

Positive 10 71 4 29

Non-positive 66 66 34 34

Other 17 65 9 35

Total Months of Previous

Employment

0-6 100 65 55 35

7-12 21 66 11 34

13-24 14 58 10 42

25-36 11 85 2 15

37+ 4 80 1 20

Previous Job--Subsidized

Unsubsidized

Subsidized 127 64 72 36

Unsubsidized 164 65 87 35

Previous Job--Constru,:tion

Related

Related 33 57 25 43

Not Related 223 64 123 36

1391 8 2
Table 1.5. Termination Type A (continued)

Variable

Voluntary

N %

Involuntary

N %

Reason for Termination from

Previous Job

Positive 50 63 30 37

Non-positive 129 63 76 37

Other 131 67 65 33

Completion of VIC1 Prdgra..

Yes 115 93 8 7

No 250 .55 204 45

Number of Weeks in Program

. 1-5 62 60 41 40

6-15 99 54 83 46

16-25 43 52 40 48

26-35 57 71 23 29

36-45 71 83 15 17

46-52 92 76 10 24
Table 1.6. Termination Type B

Variable

Positive

N %

Non-Positive

N %

Other

N %

Sex

Male 215 45 240 51 19 4

Female 33 32 67 66 2 2

Ethnic Group

White 11 37 13 60 1 3

Black 204 44 240

.1 52 19 4

American Indian 0 0 1 100 0 0

Hispanic 32 40 47 59 1 1 Other 1 50 1 50 0 0

Age

15 0 0 0 0 1 100

16 14 28. 32 64 4 8

17 52 39 77 57 5 4

18 .92 46 103 52 3 2

19 88 46 94 49 8 5

'Abblid 19 2 67 1 33 0 0
Table 6 Termination Type B (continued)

Variable

Positive

N

Non-Positive

%

Other

N %

Highest Level of Education

of Applicant

Grade 8 or less 8 44 10 56 0

Grades 5-11 143 36 246 60 18 4

High School Diploma or

GED 84 62 49 36

Post Secondary School 7 78 2 22 0 0

FAS-V Score . 0-50 21 25 55 65 8 10

51-60 47 43 58 53 5 4

61-70 65 42 86 56 3 2

71-80 66 48 67 49 4 3

81-90 36 51 33 47 1 2

91-99 10 77 3 23 0 0

Previous Participation in

In Job Training Program

No 188 43 233 53 15 4

Yes 60 43 74 53 6 4

Total months of participation in previous job

training program

( 0-6 39 41 54 56 3 3

7-12 11 41 14 52 2 7

13-24 4 50 3 37 1 13

25+ 2 66 1 33 0
Table I.6. Termination Type B (continued)

i Variable

Positive I N %

Non-Positive

N %

Other

N %

Job Training--ConstructiOn

Related

Yes 15 36 27 64 0 0

No 45 46 47 48 6 6

Reason for Termination from

Job Training Program

Positive 9 64 5 116 0 0

Non- po3itive 41 41 54 54 5 5

Other 10 38 15 58 1 4

Total Months of Previous

Employment

0-6 73 47 80 52 2 1 7-12 16 50 15 47 1 3

13-24 9 38 14 58 1 4

25-36 7 54 5 38 1 8

37+ . 4 80 1 20 0 0

Previous Job--Subsidized

Unsubsidized

Subsidized 94 47 97 48 8 5

Unsubsidized 114 46 127 51 9 3

Previous Job--Construction

Related

Related /4 41 34 59 0 0

Not Re,lated 156 45 177 51 13

143

186
Table 1.6. Termination Type B (continued)

Variable

Positive

N %

Non - Positive.

N % N

Other

%

Reason for Termination from

Previous Job

Positive 39 49 38 48 3 3

Non-positive 85 41 113 55 7 4

Other 96 49 92 47 7 4

Completion of VICI Program

Yes 112 51 11 °.. 0 0

No 136 '30 296 65 21 5

Number of Weeks in Program

1-5 20 20 75 73 7 7

6-15 56 31 116 64 10 5

16-25 25 33 56 67 2 3

26-35 52 65 27 34 1 1 36-45 65 76 21 24 0 0

46-52 29 69 12 29 1 2

1. 7

144
Table 17 Type of Job at Termination

Variable

Job in

Related Trade

N A

Job In I Non- Related Trade

N %

Union.

Apprenticeship

N t.

Sex

Male 79 46 39 13 53 31

Female 7 35 11 55. 2 ;0

Ethnic Group

White 6 60 3. 30 1 10

Black 73 47 44 28 40 25

American Indian 0 0 0 0 0 0

Hispanic 7 30 3 13 13 57

Other 0 0 0 0 1 100

Age

16 4 40 I 4 40 2 20

17 22 56 7 18 10 26

18 29 40 21 30 21 30

19 31 45 17 25 21 30

20 0 0

. 1 50 1 50 ,

145 1 S8
Table 1.7. Type of Job at Termination (continued)

Variable

Job in

RelatieTride

N %

Job in

Non- Related.Trade. 'Apprenticeship

N .1

Union . N %

Highest level of Education

0 Applicant

Grade 8 or less 3 60 0 0 2 40

Grades 9-11 59 51 31 27 25 22

.0 f High School Diploma or GED 22 34 17 26 26 40

Post Secondary School 2 33 2 33 2 34

FAS-V Score

0-50 13 62 a 29 2 10

51-60 17 47 7 19 12 34

61-70 19 38 15 31 15 31 71-80 28 57 8 16 13 27

b1-90 6 25 8 33 10 42

. 91-99 2 22 4 44 3 34

Previous Participation in

In Job Training Program

No

62- 43 36 25 47 32

Yes 24 52 14 30 8 18

Total months of participation in previous job

training program

0-6

17 61 6 21 5 1$

7-12

3 33 5 56 1 11 13-24 2 50 2 50 0 0

25+

1 100 0 0 0 0

146
Table 1.7. Type of Job at Termination (continued)

Variable

Job in

Related Trade

N %

Job in

Non-Related Trade

N %

Union

Apprenticeship

N

Job Tralning--ConstructiOn

Related

Yes 4 33 5 42 3 25

No 20 59 9 26 5 15

Reason for Termination from

Job Training Program

Positive 3 60 0 0 2 40

Non-positive 16 48 12 37 5 15

Other 5 63 2 25 1 12

Total Montns.of Previous

Employment

0-6 23 44 8 15 21 41 7-12 5 42 3 25 4 33

13-24 4 50 1 13 3 37

25-36 3 42 2 29 2 29

37+ 1 25 2 50 1 25

Previous Job--Subsidized

Unsubsidized

Subsidized 29 40 17 24 26 36

Unsubsidized 44 51 24 28 18 21 Previous Job--Construction

Related

Related 5 28 5 28 8 44

Net Related 58 48 34 28 28 24
Table 1.7 Type of Job at Termination (continued)

Variable

Job in

Related Trade

N A

Job in

Non-Related Trade

N %

Union

Apprenticeship

N %

Reason for Termination from

Previous Job

Positive 13 46 8 29 7 25

Non-positive 30 43 22 32 17 25

Other. 35 49 13 18 24 33

Completion of VIC1 Program

Yes 56 51 5 5 49 44

No .. 30 37 45 56 6 7 Number of Weeks in Program

1-5 2 17 10 83 0 0

6-15 10 31 21 66 . I 3

16-25 10 56 4 22 4 22

26-35 26 59 3 7. 15 34

36-45 21 37 11 19 25 44

46-52

. 17

. 61 1 4 10 35

148
TABLE 1.8. Wages at Termi ration

$0-$3.00

N %

$3.0114.00

N %

$4.0115.00

N %

$5.01-$6.00 N %

$6.0117.00

N %

$7.0149.00

N 2 VARIABLE

Sex Male 26 15 4124,4426' / 39 23 16 9 6 3

Female 10 48 4 19 4 19 2 9 1 5 0 0

Ethnic Group

White 2 20 3 30 2 20 1 10 1 10 1 10 Black 32 20 37 23 42 26 38 23 11 7 3 1 American Indian 0 U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

NIspanIc 1 6 5 28 3 17 2 11 5 28 2 10 Other 1 50 0 0 1 50 0 0 0 0 0 0

Age

16 2 18 7 64 2 Id 0 0 0 0 0 0

17 5 13 11 29 14 37 8' 21 0 0 0 0

18 13 17 15 20 18 24 18 24 8 11 4 4

19 15 23 11 17 14 21 15 23. 9 14 2 2 s19 1 50 1 50 0 0 0 C 0 0 0 0

.

1 92
TABLE 1.8 Wages at Termination (cont.)

$o -$3.00 N

$3.oi-$4.00

N % VARIABLE

2 29

20 17

12 19

14 36 3o 8 13

Nlghest Level of Education

of Applicant

Grade 8 or less

Grades 9-11

Nigh School Olploma,or

GEN

Post Secondary School 2 40 0

FAS-V Score

0-50 6 27 5 23

51-60 3 7 15 38 61-70 15 31 11 22 71-8o Is 8 8 .17 81-90 8 33 3 13 91-99 0 0 1 12. Previous Participation in

in Job Training Program

No 24 14 3P 23 Yes 12 24 .7 14 rota! months of parti-clNotion in previous Job

training program

0 -6 7'24 2 7 7-12 4 i 36 2 19 13-24 0 0 1 33 25* 1 100 0 0

$4.0 -$5.00 $5.01 -$6.00 N X S6.61-$7.00 $7.0-$9.00

N

27

18

1423

29

224

14

2S

20

23

18814

7

13

0

4

2

0

33

2 40 1 20 0 0 0 0

7 32 2 9 2 9 0 0

8 21 11 28 1 3 1 3 12 24 8 16 2 4 1 '3 12 25 15 31 7 15 2 3 6 25 3 13 2 8 2 8

3 38 1 12 3 38 0 0.

32 19 I 35 21 II 6 16 33 6 12 6 12 2 5

13 45 3 10 2 7 2 7

1 9 1 9 3 27 0 0

1 33 1 34 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TABLE I.8. Wages at Termination (cont.)

$0-$3.00 i 13.01-$4.00

N t ; N 2

$4.01-B5.00

N 2

$5.01 -$6.00 N 2

$6.0147.00

N 2

$7.01-$9.00

N 2

VARIABLES

Job Training--Construction ( Related

1 Related 5 37 1 3 21 3 21 1 7 1 7 1 7 Non-related 7 20 ! 4 11 13 37 5 14 5 14 1 le Reason for Termination from

Job Training Program

Positive 1 20 1 20 2 40 1 20 0 0 0 0

Non-positive 9 (i6 I 6 17 11 31 2 6 5 14 2 6

Other 2 22 ! 0 0

3 33

3 3; 1 12 0 0

L . . Total Months of Previous

1 Employment

0-6 10 19 8 15 15 29 14 27 3 6 2 4 7-12 1 9 1 3 23 2 15 5 38 2 15 0 0

13-24 0 0

I 2 29 2 29 1 13 2 29 0 0

25-36 0 0 2 29 2 29 2 29 0 0 1 13 37* 1 25 1 25 0 0 0 0 2 50 0 0

Previous Job--Subsidized

Unsubsidized

Subsidized 8 12 17 25 13 19 23 33 7 10 1 1 Unsubsidized 22 24 20 22 27 29 13 14 7 8 3 3 riiiiiiiirglOb--Construct ion

Related

Related 2 12 4 22 4 22. 4 22 4 22 0 0

Not Related 24 20 28 23 31 26 23 19 9 7 5 5

, . ..-
TABLE I .8. Wages at Termination (coot )

50-$3.00 $3.01-$4.00 1 $4.01-$5.00 $5.01-56.00

N % N = N N %

VARIABLES

Reason for Termination from

Previous Job

Positive

Non-positive

Other

Completion of VICI Program

4 15 17 23

9 13 19

17 Yes h No 32 4 19 35 26

Number of Weeks in Program I. 1-5 7 44 5

6-15 17 49 10

16-25 3 14 7 26-35 2 5 11 36-45 5 9 7 46-52 1 5 5

15 25

25

8

22

13

3230

19

59

23

19 37 36 29

29 11 12 12

31 2 13 1 29 3 9 4 33 h 19 5 26 13 30 11 12 16 28 19 25 10 50 1

11)

19 1233 I 1

28 i 13

6

11 24

26

335

$6.01-$7.00

N %

$7.01 N -$9.0

%

5 19 0 0

5 4 5 6 9 1 1

11 11 2 2

6 7 4 4

0 0 1 6

O 0 1 2

1 5 1 5

5 12 1 1 8 14 2 4

3 15 0
II. AGGREGATE COMPARISON

The purpose of the aggregate comparison task is to compare the VICI project

with other youth employment and training programs. To make a general

statistical comparison among these programs, we have used aggregated data

from the formula- funded Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Programs

(YCCIP) and from the Youth Employment and Training Programs (YETP) operating

at each VICI site. This comparison provides a profile of the types of

youths participating in the various employment and training demonstrations

and gives some preliMinary indications of what happens to participants upon

termination.

The basic approach followed here is descriptive, and gross statistical

comparisons on selected variables are maae among VICI, YCCIP, and YETP.

Rigorous experimental analyses of program effects are not appropriate, due

to a lack of comparability among program goals and features, participant

background characteristics, and the various data bases.

The selection of variables for study was dictated to some extent by the

existing data bases for the different programs. The study variables to be

analyzed here can be classified under the following categories:

Participant Background

1. sex

2. educational status

3. economic disadvantagedness

4. race/ethnic groups

5. limited English speaking

6. handicapped

7. offender

8. labor force status

Program Status

1. cumulative total of participants

2. current enrollment

3. program activities

4. terminations

5. turnover rate

Termination data must be interpreted cautiously since the demonstration

programs have not yet been completed and comparisons may be misleading at

this time. Also, differences among programs with respect to participant

characteristics, program goals, and reporting procedures limit the comparability of the available data bases. For example, both YCCIP and YETP

participants may be currently enrolled full-time in school, whereas VICI

participants, by program design, may not attend high school. (The DOL

Quarterly Reports state that small numbers of I/ICI participants attend high

school. ,It's not clear at this time whether this represents a miscount or

a misrepresentation of the data. CPPV is investigating this issue.)

153
The aggregate comparison task involves using data from each program

site. To ensure comparability among data bases, the comparison data

were drawn from prime sponsors' quarterly reports to DOL, including the

Quarterly Summary of Participant Characteristics, the Youth Program

Status Summary, and the Youth Financial Status Report for VICI, YCCIP,

and YETP. Data are now available for the fourth fiscal quarter of

FY 1979. Quarterly reports are available for six of the eight VICI

sites. Complete sets of r ports were not available for Philadelphia or

the South bronx. Hence, results are presented for six sites: Atlanta,

Broward County, Newark, New Haven, Chicago, and Milwaukee.

Simple descriptive statistics--frequencies and percents--were used as

the primary basis for analysis, and aggregate statistical profiles were

prepared for each of the six sites. These profiles are presented in

tabular and narrative form, by site, in the remainder of this chapter.

They include summaries of two types of data: (1) participant characteristics; and (2) program status (including termination information).

Results should be reviewed cautiously given the limitations and preliminary nature of the data. A brief discussion of terminations follows

the site profiles.

A. ATLANTA: Tables II.1, 11.2

To date, totals of 113, 164, and 1,798 youths have participated in VICI,

YCCIP, and YETP programs, respectively, in Atlanta. Though females were

a minority (21 percent) of VICI participants, they were the, majority in

YETP, (65 percent) and constituted 42 percent of YCCIP youth. With regard to

educational status, VICI was very similar to YCCIP, with approximately

half the participants being high school dropouts and half high school

graduates. YETP differet.:, with about 19 percent of its participants in

school. Most youths in all programs were classified as economically

disadvantaged, and all programs had a similar racial or ethnic composition (approximately 98 percent black). All participants were unemployed

prior to program entry. YETP had a few participants (less than one percent)

who were handicapped or ex-offenders, and 3 percent of VICI participants

were ex-offenders. All VICI and YCCIP participants and 25 percent of

YETP participants were involved in work experience activities. A

majority of YETP youths (56 percent) were engaged in classroom training.

Turnover rates for VICI, YCCIP, and YETP programs were 1.04, 2.80, and

4.14, respectively. Hence, relative to program capacity (i.e., average

quarterly enrollment), total turnover for YETP for the year occurred

about four times, while VICI had the lowest turnover rate.

To date, YETP demonstrated the highest percentage of positive terminations

(77 percent), with positive terminations outnumbering non-positives by

more than three to one (raft.) of 3.3). For VICI, 41 percent of the

tv.ainations were positive (ratio of 0.71), and for YCCIP, 45 percent

care positive (ratio of 0.82). However, closer examination of termination categories shows that most YETP "positives" were actually in the

Other category, whereas most VICI positives have "Obtained Employment."

154

1:I7
In fact, almost one third of the VICI terminees have fpund jobs, while

only 24 percent of YETP terminees have done sc. In the YCCIP program,

which has program goals similar to VICI, only 11 percent of the terminees

have found jobs.

B. BRUWARD COUNTY: Tables 11.3, 11.4

To date, totals of 146, 14U, and 1,483 youths participated in VICI,

YCCIP, and YETP programs, respectively, in Broward County. While only a

relatively small proportion of VICI participants was female (21 percent),

YETP was 64 percent female and YCCIP was 41 percent female. With regard

to educational status, VICI was similar to YCCIP, although VICI had

slightly more high school graduates. YETP listed 42 percent of its

enrollment as high school students. Most participants in all programs

were classified as economically disadvantaged, and all programs had

fairly similar ethnic compositions, with mostly black participants,

though YETP had more white participants than either VICI or YCCIP. Each

program had a number of ex-offenders, with YCCIP having a fairly large

number (24 percent).

All VICI and YCCIP participants and 27 percent of YETP participants were

involved in work experience activities. YETP youths were enrolled in a

number of activities, and 48 percent of them were enrolled in career

employment experiences. Turnover ratEs for all of the programs were

similar, at 1.70, 2.41, and 1.90 for VICI, YCCIP, and YETP, respectively.

The average stay for youths in all programs was about four months.

To date, YETP and YCCIP have had fairly high percentages of positive

terminations (80 and 64 percent, respectively). Positive/negative

termination ratios for these programs are 3.90 and 1.19. VICI had a

smaller number of positive terminations (45 percent, a rate of 0.82),

but 35 percent of these have been placements in employment. YETP had

slightly fewer placements (28 percent of terminations), but YCCIP had

far fewer (14 percent). Most. VICI participants who obtained employment

were indirect placements.

C. CHICAGO: Tables 11.5, 11.6

In Chicago to date, totals of 96, 546, and 4,614 youths have participated

in VICI, YCCIP, and YETP programs, respectively. Both YCCIP and YETP

had large proportions of females (4U percent and 56 percent), while VICI

had very few (14 percent). The groups also differed widely with regard

to educational status. Most YCCIP participants (86 percent) were high

school dropouts. VICI too had a large number of dropouts (68 percent),

but also had several high school graduates (32 percent). All YETP

participants were either current high school students (90 percent) or

youths with some post-high school education (10 percent). All participants in each group were economically disadvantaged. EtAnic group

composition was somewhat similar among groups, with a majority of blacks

in each; VICI had a large Hispanic population (36 percent). YETP and

YCCIP enrolled a few offenders and handicapped youths whereas VICI did

not. All VICI and YCCIP participants were unemployed prior to program

entry while all YETP participants were placed in the Other category.

155
All YCCIP and VICI participants were engaged in work experience activities. Most YETP youths (84 percent) were involved in career employment

experienc3s, with the remainder (16 percent) receiving transition services.

Turnover rates for VICI, YCCIP and'YETP were 0.92, 1.46, and 0.64,

respectively. Turnover rates are very low, particularly for YETP.

Positive/non-positive termination ratios were similar across projects,

ranging from 0.64 to 0.91. Approximately 40 percent of YCCIP and YETP

terminations were positive, while half of the VICI terminations were

positive. However, VICI had a much higher placement rate (29 percent)

than either YCCIP (8 percent) or YETP (15 percent).

D. MILWAUKEE: Tables 11.7, II.8

To date, totals of 142, 227, and 2,128 youths have participated in VICI,

YCCIP, and YETP programs, respectively. In this city, there were wide

difference.: jn participant characteristics among the groups. 1 YEW . differed from both other programs in sex composition; YETP had a 51

percent female enrollment, while VICI and YCCIP each had only 14 percent. There were also substantial differences among programs with

regard to educational status. VICI reported one participant as

currently a high schonitudentwhereas 71 percent of the YCCIP group

and 43 percent of theYETP group were-reported as being in school. Most

VICI youths were school dropouts, while few participants in other groups

were dropouts. Approximately 80 percent of the YCCIP and YETP groups

were economically disadvantaged, compared with 96 percent of the VICI

group. Differences among groups were also found with regard to ethnic

composition. The VICI group was almost entirely black (85 percent):

The YCCIP program, although about two-thirds black, also'had sizable

Hispanic representation (26 percent). YET? had a varied mixture of

ethnic groups, with about a 43 percent white enrollment. YCCIP (at

9 percent) and YETP (at 12 percent) had a relatively large handicapped

group, but VICI did not. About 11 percent of the VICI participants were

ex-offenders. Most VICI and YCCIP participants were unemployed prior to

enrollment, but about half the YETP group were in the Other category.

All VICI and YCCIP participants and about four-fifths of the YETP participants were enrolled in work experience activities. The remainder of

the YETP group was enrolled in career employment experience activities.

Turnover rates for VICI, YCCIP, anti YETP were 1.95, 3.13, and 1.96,

respectively. All YCCIP participants terminated by the end of the Third

Quarter and no programs were operating. YETP terminated most participants

by the end of the Third Quarter, but enrolled a new group during the

Fourth Quarter.

Positive terminations outnumbered non-posittkre terminations for YETP and

YCCIP (ratios of 2.14 and 1.08). The positive termination ratio for

VICI was relatively low (.55), although VICI, had a, higher placement rate

(26 percent,, compared with 14 percent and 15 percent for the other

groups). YETP and YCCIP had many terminations in the Other Positive

category.

V.
E. NEWARK: Tables 11.9, II.10

To date, totals oe125, 188, and 1,162 youths participated-in VICI,

YCC1P, and YETP programs in Newark, respectively. Fewef females participated in. VICI Ca) percent) than in YCCIP (42 percent) orYEtP (60.percent).

Both YCCIP (11 percent) and YETP (58 percent) reported large numbers of

in-school youths; whereas VICI (with 8 percent) did not, but had' a much

higher total:of high school dropouts (74 percent). All VICI and YCCIP

participants were economically disadvantaged,,while 19 percent of YETP

participants were not. Ethnic group composition was similar for the

three programs; about 80 percent of all participants were black and most

of the remainder were Hispanic. Newark YCCIP accepts only handicapped

youth, whereas few of the YETP participants and no VICI youths were

handicapped. Each group had a small numb..!r of ex- offenders (between

2 and 7 percent). For the most part,` participants were unemployed prior

to enrollment.

All VICI and YCCIP participants and 48 percent of the YETP paiticipants

were engaged in work experience activities. The remainder of the YETP

youths were engaged either in career employment experiences, or classroom

training activities.

Turnover ratelpof VICI, YCCIP, and YETP programs were 1.49, 3.52, and

4.36, respectively. Thus, VICI's yearly turnover was lower than that of

YCCIP or YETP, both of which had. fairly high rates.' To date, a *high

percentage of YETP terminations have been positive (positive /non - positive

ratio of 1.96). A .large4najority of, these have been school-related

(i.e., a return to or continuation in school). YCCIP terminations

(ratio of 0.83) showed a similar pattern,-with slightly fewer positive

terminations (45 percent). Approximately 51 percent of the VICI terminations (ratio of 1.05) have been positive. However, most of these

have involved participants who entered employment. The placement rate

for VICI (49 percent). is much higher than that of both YCCIP (19 percent)

and YETP (13 percent).

NEW HAVEN: Tables II.11, 11.12

In New Haven to date, totals of 106, 37, and 684 youths have participated

in VICI, YCCIP, and YETP programs, respectively. Few females participated

in VICI (15 percent) and YCCIP (5 percent), 0111: a majority of females

were enrolled in YETP (54 percent). Most YFfri:rticipant's (85 percent)

were in school; none of the YCCIP or VICI rart4..:I!ants was in school and

most were dropouts. Almost all participant. ';er,, economically disadvantaged. Ethnic group composition was fairly similar for all groups;

approximately 20-35 percent of participants were white, 50-60 percent

black, and about 15 percent Hispanic. YCCIP had a higher percentage of

white participants than VICI or YETP.. A few YETP participants were

limited English speaking (4 percent) or handicapped (6 percent). All

groups had a number of ex-offenders. Most VICI and YCCIP-participants

_were unemployed prior to program entry, while moat YETP youths were

classified in the Other category for labor force status. All VICI and

YCCIP participants were engaged in work experience activities, and most

YETP participants were engaged in career employment experience activities.

° 157
Turnover rates for VICI, YCCIP, and YETP were 1.17, 2.27, and 2.67,

respectively. Participants tended to remain in VICI longer than in

other programs. The positive/negative terminatl...n ratio for YET? is

very high (2.67). A large majority (63 percent) of YETP terminations

were categorized as Other Positive, but most (58 percent) were, in fact,

in the Other category (see Table 11.12). About 29 percent of total

terminations were non-positive and *percent were placements. Most of

the VICI positi terminations were placements (29 percent of all terminations), and almost half of all VICI terminations were positive.

YCCIP had an ex remely high number of positive terminations (79 percent

of all terminations) and a high placement rate of 55 percent of all

terminations. '

G. AGGREGATED TERMINATIONS, FY L979: Table 11.13

The termination data described above give a preliminary picture of what

happens to participants when they leave their respective programs.

Table 11.13 displays total group sizes for each site and program, and

presents the percentages of participants in each termination ategory.

Data were taken from the DOL ?rogram Status Summary for the .fourth quarter

of 1979. The term, Placements, indicates the percentages of youths who'

entered unsubsidized employment at the time of termination. This includes'

youths placed directly without training, those placed through program

efforts, and those who found their own jobs.

When examining the termination data, one must keep in'mind that the

major goal of VICI and YCCIP is unsubsidized employment, whereas this is

often not the case for YETP. In general,.a much higher percentage of

VICI participants were placed in unsubsidized jobs than was the case for

YCCIP and YETP participants. Between 26 percent and 49 percent. of VICI

terminations resulted in placements, and, over all sites, apprgximately.

35 percent of VICI terminees entered employment--compared with 14 and

18 percent for the other two programs. Most.sites display similar

placement patterns, with the exception of New Haven, whose YCCIP program

had an unusually high placement rate (although this is based on a very

small group). The Newark VICI site is also noteworthy, since almost

half the terminees entered unsubsidized employment. Overall, YETP

placement rateg are generally higher than those of YCCIP.

Few terminations involved the transfer of youths to other CETA programs.

Overall, only 2 percent of the VICI group transferred to other CETA

programs, while rates for YCCIP and YETP were slightly higher. A further

positive termination category indicates the number of participants who

enroll .o continue in full-tiTne, secondary or postrsecondary schools.

This is particularly appropriate for YETP, which enrolls a large number

of disadvantaged,J,in-school youths. Overall, about 15 percent of YETP

youths returned to school after completing their program, but there was

considerable variation across sites. Two-sites reported 40 to 50 percent

of their.terminations.in this category, and two reported none. Overall,

slightly fewer YCCIP participants (11 percent) returned to school, while

very few VICI participants (5 percent) did so, an4/ most of these were in

Chicago.

1582'11
The DOL Program Status Summary includes an Other positive termination

category. This includes participants who enroll in non-CETA employment

and training programs and participants who have 'completed program

objectives not involving entry into unsubsidized employment." Examples

of the latter are participants enrolled in Me ,xogram for purposes of

upgrading training, receiving supportive services, obtaining GED training,

and so on. Since the major goal for VICI is unsubsidized employment,

very few terminations (3 percent) were reported in this category.

Percentages in this category for YCCIP and YETP, however, are very high,

at 17 percent and 27 percent,.respectively. At two YETP sites, more

than 50 percent are listed as Other Positive.

With regard to overall positive terminations, VICI and YCCIP are very

similar, having Cates of 44 percent and 46 percent, respectively,. YETP

has a considerably higher rate of 64 percent. Note, however, that

}'transfers, returns to school, and other positives account for about a

third of the YCCIP overall positive rate and for almost half of the YETP

rate, but for only one-tenth of the VICI rate. Most of the VICI positive

terminations are placements.

In summary, in examining positive termination rates for VICI, YCCIP, and

YETP, it is essential to keep program goals in mind and to look at

specific termination categories. VICI and YCCIP had similar overall

positive termination rates, while YETP was clearly higher. However,

when differences in type of placements are noted, it is apparent that

VICI had a considerably higher placement rate for unsubsidized jobs ',tam

either YCCIP or YETP. Very few VICI terminations were transfers, returns

to school, or Other. In terms of VICI's program goal of placing participants in unsubsidized jobs, the program seems to be doing very well

compared with maj)r formula-funded youth employment and training programs.
Table II.1. Summary of Participant Characteristics

SITE: Atlanta REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79

CHARACTERISTICS VICI YCCIP YETP

TOTAL #

---. 113 164 1798

Sex

- NJe 89 (79%)

(21%)

95

69

1 88

74

1 155

9

155

0

0

0

(58%)

(42%)

(1%)

(54%)

(45%)

(1%)

(95%)

(5%)

(95%)

(-)

(-)

(-)

627

1171

340

611

825

22

1684

20

1772.(99

2

13

(35%)

- Female 24 (65%)

(19%)

(34%)

(46%)

(1%)

(94%)

(1%)

%)

(-)

( )

(-)

Education Status

- H.S. Student 0 (0%)

- H.% Dropout 64 (57%)

- H.S. Graduate (Equiv. ) 47 (42%)

- Rost H S. . 2 (2%)

Economically Disadvantaged 112 (99%)

Race/Ethnic Group

- White (not Hisp.) 1 (1%)

- Black (not Hisp.) 112

0

. 0

(99%)

(-)

(-)

- Hispanic

4 Amer. Indian/Alaskan

- Asian/Pacific Isl. 0

0

(-)

Limited English Speaking (-) 0 (-) 0 (-)

Handicapped 0 (-) 0

0

0

164

-0

(-)

......... (-)

(-)

(100%)

6 _.

5

0

1798

(-)

. (-)

H

(100%)

( - ) .__.

Offender 3 (3%)

Labor Force Status

- Underemployed 0

113

(-)

- Unemployed (100%)

- Other -6- 0 (-) -f _

0

160
Table 11.2. Program Status Summary

SITE: Atlanta REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79

VICI YCCIP , YETP

TOTAL ENROLLMENT 113

55 (49%)

164

0 (0%)

- (-)

1798

104 (6%)

32311t18%)

Current Enrollment

Activities

- Career Employ. Experience - (-)

- Transition Services (-)

- (-)

(-)

(-)

.. ._.._

(-)

164 (100%)

(-)

- On-the-Job Training 14 (1%)

__... .... , 1009 (56%)

452 (25%)

- Classroom Training - (-)

- Work Experience 113 (100%)

Total Terminations 58 (51%) 164 (100%) 1694 (94%)

- Entered Employment 18 (31%) 18 (11%)

0 (0%)

4 (2%)

14 (9%)

56 (34%)

410 (24%)

0 (0%)

308 (18%)

102 (6%)

894 (53%)

- Direct 0 (0%)

- Indirect 3 (5%)

- Obtained Empl. 15(26%)

- Other Positive 6 (10%)

- Transfers 0 (0%) 0 (0%)

5 (30

51 (31%)

90 (55%)

0.82

2.80

... 0 (0%)

43 (3%)

851 (51%)

. .390 (23%)

- School 2 (3%)

4 (7%)

34 (59%)

- Other

. - Non-Positive

Positive/Non-Positive Termination

Ratio

0.71 3.34

4.14

Turnover Rate 1.04
Table 11.3. Summary of Participant Characteristics

SITE: Broward County

* REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78 9/30/79

CHARACTERISTICS VICI YCCIP %c.TP

TOTAL # 146 140 1483

Sex

- Male 116 (79%) 83,(59%) 539 (36%)

- Female 30 (21%) 57 (41%) 944 (64%)

Education Status

- H.S. Student 0 (-) 4 (3%) 629 (42%)

- H.S. Dropout 109 (75%) 123 (88%) 440 (30%)

- H.S. Graduate (Equiv.) 37 (25%) 13 (9%) 375 (25%)

- Post H.S, 0 (-) 0 39 (3%)

Economically Disadvantaged 142 (97%) 138 (99%) 1328 (90%)

Race/Ethnic Group

- White (not Hisp.) 5 (3%). 4 (3%) , 262 (18%)

- Black (not Hisp.) 141 (97%) 136 (97%) 1194 (81%)

- Hispanic 0 (-) 0 (-) 22 (2%)

-0' Amer. Indian/Alaskan 0 (-) 0 (-) 4 (-)

- Asian/Pacific Isl. 0 (-) 0 (-) 1 (-)

Limited English Speaking 0 (-) 1 (1%) 4 (-).

Handicapped 3 (2%) 7 (5%) 54 (4%)

Offender 20 (14%) 33 (24%) 57 (4%)

Labor Force Status

- Uhderemployed 2 (1%) 0 (-) 31 (2%)

- Unemployed 80 (55%) 84 (60%) 601 (41%)

- Other 64 (44%) 56 (40%) 851 (57%)
Table 11.4, Program Status Summary

SITE: Broward County REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79

VICI YCCIP YETP

TOTAL ENROLLMENT

Zurrent Entollment

ACTT-011W146

- Career Employ. Experience

55 (38%)

- ,Transition Services

- On-the-Job Training

- qiassroom Training

- Work Experience

Total Terminations

- Entered Employment

- Direct

146 (1000

91 (62%)

32 (35%)

- Indirect

-' Obtained Empl.

Other Positive

- Transfers

School

- Other

- Non-Positive

0 (0%)

20 (22%)

12 (13%)

9 (10%)

7 (8%)

50 (55iT

fall-Iva/Non -Positive Termination

Ratio

..,8

ks;

140

.37 (26%)

1483

582 (39%)

719 (48%)

123 (8%)

316 (24)-

140160i) 394 (27%)

103 174jj---------901 (61%)

Turnover Rat2 1.70 2.41 1.90

16 3

2u
Table 11.5. Summary of Participant Characteristics

SITE: Chicago REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/80

CHARACTERISTICS VICI YCCIP

TOTAL # 96 546

Sex

- Male 83 (86%) 326 (60%)

Female 13 (14%) 220 (40%)

Education Status

- H.S. Student 0 (-) 0 (-)

- H.S. Dropout 65 (68%) 469 (86%)

77 rlifir.

546'000%)

20 (4%)

380 (70%)

H.S. Graduate (Equiv. 31 (32%).-

- --Post H.S. 0 (-)

Economically Disadvantaged 96 (100%)

1 (1%)

Race/Ethnic Group

- White (not Hisp.)

- Black (not Hisp.) 52 (54%)

- Hispanic 35 (36%) 146 (27ir

Amer. Indian/Alaskan 0 (-) 0

- Asian/Pacific Isl.. 8 (8 %) 0 (-)

Limited Engllih Speaking 2

0 (-)

O (-)

9 (2%)

10 (2 %)

0 (-)

"Wender

Labor Force Status

- Underemployed o (-)

- Unemployed

- Other

96 (100%)

0 (-)

546 (100%)

0 (-)

0

(..f)

164

YETP

4614

2012 (44%)

2602 (56%)

4152 (90%)

277 (6%)

3608 (78%)

60115%-)

. . 12 (-)
Table 11.6. Program Status Summary

SITE: Chicago REPORT PERIOD:10/1/78-9/30/79

VICI YCCIP YETP

TOTAL ENROLLMENT 96

Current Enrollment 47 (49%)

Aalvities

- Career Employ. Experience (-)

- Transition Services

On-the-Job Training

- Classroom Training

or xperience

Total Terminations

Entered Employment

rect

KaTiect

- Obtained Empl.

-------ITFeTiros it ive

- Transfers

- School

- Other

Non-Positive

14 (29%)

10 (20%)

9 (18%)

1 (2%)

Positive/Non-Positive Termination

Ratio

25 (51%)

0.96

Turnover Rate 0.92

546

211 (39%)

4614

2773 (car

3874 (84%)

74o (i6%)

C-)

546 (100%)

335 (61%) 1841(40%)

276 (15%)

( -) 113 (6%)

466 (25%)

6 (-) .

77 (23%) 256 (lie%)

264

0 64 0.68

1.46 0.64
Table II.7. Summary of Partitipant Characteristics

SITE: Milwaukee

CHARACTERISTICS

REPORT rERIOD; 10/1/78 - 9/30/79

VICI YCCIP YETP

TOTAL # 142

Sex

- Male 122 (86%)

- Female 20 (14%)

liffEiFT6FStatus

- H.S. Student

- H.S. Dropout

- H.S. Graduate (Equiv.)

- Post H.S. . conom ca y Disadvantaged

Race/Ethnic Group

- White (not Hisp.)

227 2128

195 (86%) 1046 (49%)

1 (1%) 161 (71%) 906 (43%)

115 (81%) 36 (16%) 685 (32%)

20 (9%) 406 (19%) _ . 1 (1%) 10 (4%) 131 (6%)

137 (96%) 182 (80%) 1758 (83%)

- Black. (not Hisp.)

- Hispanic

Amer. Indian/Alaskan

- Asian/Pacific Isl.

Limited English Speaking

Handicapped

Offender

Labor Force Status

- Underemployed

- Unemployed

t er

10 (7%) 16 (7%) 908 (43%)

120 (85%) 145 (64 %) (39 %)

11. (8%) 58 (26%) 302 (14%)

1 (1%) 6 (3% )- 53 (2%)

'0 (-.) 2 11%) 25 (1%)

1 (1%) 262 (12%)

16 (11%) 79 (4%)

16 (11%) 11 (5%)

119 (84%) 153 (67%)

-63 (28%)

57 (3%)

1030 (48%)

1041 (49%)

166 L.?!13
Table 11.8. Program Status Summary

SITE: Milwaukee REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79

VICI YCCIP YETP

1

TOTAL ENROLLMENT

Current Enrollment

ct1vj ties

142

46 (32%)

- Career Employ. Experience

- Transition Services

- On-the-Job Training

- Oassroom Training

- Work Experience

Total Terminations

- Entered Employment

Direct

- Indirect

142 (100%)

96 (68%)

25 (26%)

fCifF

13 (14%)

- Obtained Empl. 11 (11%)

- Other Positive 9 (9%)

Transfers

School

Other

Non-Positive

227 2128

703 (33%)

422 (20%)

227 (loot)

227 (loot)

31 (14%)

0 (ox)

18 (8%)

13 (6%)

87 (38%)

1 (1%) 20 (9%)

1706 (80%)

1425 (67%)

214 (15%)

0 (--)

o (--) ; 38 (17%)

t- 8 , 29 (l3%) 533 (37%)

79 (6%)

135 (9%)

757 (53%)

220 (15%).

4 (--)

Positive/Non-Positive Termination

Ratio

-7-6r-65i) 109 (48%)' 1 454 (32%)

0.55. 1.08 1 2.14

-11- Turnover Rate 1.95 3.13 1 1.96

167

2
Table 11.9 Summary of Participant Characteristics

SITE: Newark REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79

CHARACTERISTICS VICI YCCIP YETP

TOTAL i 12.5 188

109

79

1162

Sex

- Male 92 (74%) (58%)

(42%)

460 (40%)

- Female 33 (26%) 702 (60%)

--TWJERT6F-Status

- H.S. Student 10 (8%) 78 (41%) 678 (58%)

- H.S. Dropout 92 (74%) 96

12

(51%) 318 (27%)

- H.S. Graduate (Equiv.) 21 (17%) (6%) 149 (13%)

- Rost H.S. , 2 (2%) 2 (1%) 17 (1%)

Economically Disadvantaged 125 (100%) 188 (100%) 940 (81%)

Race/Ethnic Group

- White (not Hisp.). 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 26 (2%)

- Black (not Hisp.) 103

22

(82%)

(18%)

149

38

(79%)

(20%)

1013

122

(87%)

- -Fri-panic (10%)

4 Amer. Indian/Alaskan 0 (0%) 0 (--) 1 (--)

- Asian/Pacific Isl. 0 (0%) 0. (-- ) 0 (--)

Limited English Speaking 0 (--) 0 (--) 1 (--)

Handicapped 0 (--) 188 (100%) 13 (1%)

Offender 6 (5%) 14 (7%) 29 (2%)

Labor Force Status

- Underemployed 3 (2%) i 0 (--) 9 (I%)

- Unemployed 108 (86%) 188 (100%) 707 (61%)

- Other 14 (11%) 0 (--) 446 (38%)
Table 11.10. Program Status Summary

SITE: Newark REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79

VIC1 YCCIP YETP

TOTAL ENROLLMENT 125 188 1162

Current Enrollment 47 (38%) 40 (21%) 182 (16%),

--Ai TiTil ties

- Career Employ. Experience OPM - Transition Services

- On-the-Job Training

- Classroom '[reining

Work Experience

--TTaT-Termlnat Ions

( - -) O. (--)

125 100 %)

- Entered Employment 38 (49%)

436 (38%)

279 (24%)

188 (100%) 447 (38%)

148 (79%) 980 (84%)

28 126 (13 %)

- Direct 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)

- Indirect 16TC6% Y iiiT%) . 83 (8%) - Obtained Empl. 2(3%T-- 18 (12%) 43 (4%)

- Other Positive 2 (3%) 39 (26%) 523 (53%)

- Transfers 1 clir 2 6ii 7 4 r:-T.

- School ----1(1i).- .-37(2%)----------5j9 c53 ii. - Other

- Non-Positive

Positive /Non- Positive Termination

Ratio

Turnover Rate

38 (49%)

1.05

1.49

O (--)

81 (55%)

0.83

3.52 4.36
:able 11.." summary of rarticipant Lnaracteristics

SITE: New Haven

CHARACTERISTICS

TOTAL i

Sex

- Male

Female

EducafiliJi-Status

- H.S. Student

-=--HTS. Dropout

raduate Equiv.

- .ost H.1

Economically Disadvantaged

Race/Ethnic Group

- Wh:te (not Hisp.)

- Black (not Hisp.)

- Hispanic

4 Amer. Indian/Alaskan

Asian (Pacific Isl.

Limited English Speaking

Handicapped

Offender

Labor Force Status

- Underemployed

- Unemployed

- Other

REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79

VICI YCCIP YETP

106 37 684

90 (85%)

1-6715%)

35 (95%) 313 (46%)

2 (5 %) 37113-4--%r

o (--) 0 (--) 584 (85i)

75 (71%) 31 (84%) 76 (11%)

28 (26%) 6 (16%) 10 (1%)

3 (3%) 0 (--) 14 (20-

106 (100%) 37 (100%) 655 (96%)

23 (22%) 15 (41%) 149 (22%)

68 164%) 18 (49 %) 430 (63 %)

15 (14%) 4 (11%) 103 (15%)

0 (=I 0 (--) 0 (--)

o (--) o (--) 2 (--)

(--) (--) 29 (4%)

1 (1%) 2 (5%) 40 (6%)

19 (18%) 4 (11%) 30 (4%)

3 (3 %) 0 (--) 16 (2%)

99 (93%) 37 (100%) 186 (27%)

4 (4%) 0 (--) 482 (70%)

(7)

170

9 ,

:,/
Table 11.12. Program Status Summary

SITE: New Haven REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79

TOTAL ENROLLMENT

Current Enrollment

106 37

44 (42%T- -E-T22%

YETP

684

63 -ffir

Activities

- Career Employ. Experience ()

Transition Services (--) (-.)

611 (89%)

2 (--)

On-the-Job Training ( -)

Classrocr.TtIni.g

(--)

____,

28 (4i)

- Work Experience 106 1100%) 37 (100%)

Total Terminations

ered Employment

- Indirect

ta ne Empl.

- Other Posit ve

- Transers

-29173ir

o 0

16 (26%) 5 (17%)

-11 (13%3 11 (38)

5 (8 %) 7 (24%)

- School

Other

on-Ppsitive

Positive /Non - Positive

Ratio

_ . Termination 0.88

1 12 %)

-7 (2r4i)--

0 ( )

1 (2%) 0 (--)

33 (53%) 6 (21%)

Turnover Rata 1.17

3.83

3 (")

390 (63%)

29 (5%)

0 ( - -) 361 (58%)

178 (29%)

2.49

2.27
Table 11.13. Aggregated Terminations for FY 1979

VICI I YCCIP YETP

Total # Terminations

, Atlanta 58 164 1,694

Broward Co. 91 103 901

Chicago 49 335 1,841

Milwaukee 96 227 1,425

Newark 78 148 980

New Haven 62 29 621

OVERALL 434 1,006 7,462

Placements

Atlanta 31% 11% 24%

Broward Co. 35% 19% 28%

Chicago .

. 29% 8% 15%

Milwaukee 26% 14% 15%

Newark 49% 19% . 13%

New Haven 39% 55% 9%

OVERALL 35% 14% 18%

CETA Transfers

Atlanta 0% 0% 0%

Broward Co. 2% 7% 9%

Chicago 0% 1% 0%

Milwaukee 1% 9% 15%

Newark 1% 1% 0%

New Haven 5% .24% 5%

OVERALL 2% 4% 5%

Return to School . Atlanta 3% 3% 3%

Broward Co. 8% 3% 42%

Chicago 18% 7% 11 %. Milwaukee 0% 17% 0%

Newark 1% 25% 53%

New Haven 2% 0% 0%

OVERALL 4% 10% 15%

172
Table 11.13. Aggregated Terminations for FY 1979

(continued)

, VICI YCCIP YETP

Other Positive

. Atlanta 7% 31% 51%

Broward Co. 0% 25% 1%

Chicago 2% 23% 14%

Milwaukee 8% 13% 37%

Newark 0% 0% 0%

New Haven . 2% 0% 58%

OVERALL 3% 18% 27%

Positive Terminations,

Excluding Placements

Atlanta 10% 34% 53%

Broward. Co. 10% 35% 51%

Chicago 20% q 31% 25%

Milwaukee 9% 39% 42%

Newark- 3% 26% 53%

New Haven . 8% . 24% 63%

OVERALL 9%- 33% 47% : Total Positive

Terminations

Atlanta 41% 45% 7774 Droward Co. 45% 54% 86%

Chicago- 49% 39%. 40%

Milwaukee 35% 52% 68%

Newark 51% 45% 66%

New Raven 47% 79% 71%

OVERALL 44% 47% 65%

Total Nonpositive

Termination.

Atlanta 59% 55% 23%

Broward Co. 55% 46% 20%

Chicago 51% 61%. 60%

Milwaukee 65% 48% 32%

Newark 49% 55% 34%

New Haven 53% 21% 29%

OVERALL 56% 53% 35%

-

173 2/6
III. IMPACT ANALYSIS

The Fall Interim Report reported preliminary results on youths' post-program

employment, wages, job training, and educational experience. These results

were based on 52 first-wave interviews conducted with VICI, VICI control, and

HUD youths. The results reported in this chapter are based on nearly 600

interviews, conducted at both the first and second interview waves conducted

with all four major study groups of the follow-up study: VICI, VICI control,

HUD, and YCCIP youths.

This chapter first describes the interview sample in terms of the overall

data collection design and the demographic characteristics of respondents.

Next, the interview data are analyzed and, as appropriate, the study groups

are compared regarding their responses to interview questions about their

perceptions of the training program, and their post-program employment, wages,

job training and educational experiences.

A. THE INTERVIEW SAMPLE

Table III.1 shows the number of interviews completed and processed through

January 15, 1980, by study group, by site, and by interview wave.

Almost half (43 percent) of the total number of interviews were conducted

with VICI participants; approximately one-third (34 percent) were conducted

with HUD participants; the remaining interviews were evenly divided between

VICI controls (10 percent) and YCCIP youth (13 percent). Overall, approximately half (55 percent) were first -wave lnterviews; the rest 45 percent)

were Wave 2 interviews. Wave 1 interviews were conducted using.. the Program

Completion Questionnaire with VICI, HUD and YYCIP youths, and the Program

Completion Questionnaire for controls with VICI controls. The Three-Month

Follow-Up Survey was used for Wave 2 interviews with VICI, HUD, and YCCIP

groups. No Wave 2 interviews were included in the analysis for VICI controls

since the questionnaire for this group was not fully developed until midNovember, 1979. (Chapter V discusses this and other difficulties.)

As Table III.1 indicates, two types of Wave 2 interviews exist, a regular

Wave 2 and a special Wave 2. A regular Wave 2 is one conducted with a

respondent who has been previously interviewed at Wave 1. A special Wave 2

interview is one administered with the same instrument as that used for a

regular Wave 2 interview, but it is the first. interview conducted with that

respondent. There are a substantial number of special Wave 2 interviews (148),

representing 58 percent of the.total number of Wave 2 interviews. This

number is large because, in order to build a sufficiently large pool of eligible respondents for the study, it was necessary to include youngsters whose

program terminations occurred after the target period for Wave 1 interviews

(i.e., one month after termination).

The data collection design for Waves 1 and 2 called for interviews to be completed approximately at one month and at three months after a youth's termination from a program. Wave 1 interviews were conducted about six weeks after

174

1
program termination on average, and Wave 2 interviews (according to respondents) about four to five months afterward, on average.

Two fa&tord were primarily responsible for the delay. First, in a substantial number of cases, RBS did not receive termination information from

the programs in time for an interview to be completed within the specified

one-month time frame. Second, it often takes some time for interviewers to

make contact with a respondent, especially when the tracking information

given to interviewers is inadequate. Then,-when contact is made and an

interview scheduled, many respondents miss their-appointments, and the

interviewer must then begin again. In such cases, an interview may not be

conducted for several weeks after the initial contact. Consequently, many

interviews were completed after the time limits of the data collection

design. This situation poses little or no problem for data analysis since

the integrity of the multi-wave structure of this study can be maintained

by completing each wave of interviews in time periods that are nonocferlapping.

The interview sample is described in Table 111.2 in terms of sex, age,

and race characteristics. The typical (modal) respondent is a 19 year

old black male: males outnumber females in,the sample by three to one;

about 75 percent are 18 years old or above; and blacks make up about twothirds of the sample. Across study groups, however, there are some notable

differences. Compared with other groups, greater percentage of HUD youngsters are younger (16-17 years old), and a higher percentage of HUD

respondents are white, compared with other roups. It is possible to compare the sex and race characteristics oiariEerview respondents with those

of VICI participants, based on VICI MIS intake forms (see Table I.1). For

example, in the VICI population 81 percent are male, 31 percent are 16-17

years old, and 80 perwt are black. These figures compare very closely

with those of the interview sample: 78 percent male and 81 percent black.

B. ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW DATA

This section presents the analysis of the follow-up interview. Three major

areas are considered: (1) Program Assessment; (2) Employment and Wages;

(3) Job Training and Education.

Program Assessment. There are at least two important sources of information for evaluating the VICI demonstration. One source is participants'

own perceptions about the effects of the program. Another is objective

evidence of job placement, wages, and other positive experiences, such as

further job training or education.

The Program Completion Questionnaire (PCQ) used at Wave 1 contains a series

of questions designed to assess the respondent's perceptions of or degree of

satisfaction with different aspects of the training program. Simple descriptive comparisons, expressed in frequency and percent data, are made on

responses to program assessment questions for VICI, HUD, and YCCIP programs.

Since only a small number of interviews were conducted with YCCIP participants, the chief comparison is between VICI and HUD.

175
Employment and Wages. The four major sample groups in this followup study--VICI, VICI controls, HUD, and YCCIP participants--are compared

in terms of their responses to interview questions about the nature and

number of their employment experiences, including wages. Comparisons are

made at three points in time--before the program began, and at the time of

the Wave 1 and Wave 2 interviews (approximately from July, 1979 to midJanuary, 1980). Specific Wave 1 comparisons are made among all four study

groups; Wave 2 comparisons are made among VICI, HUD, and YCCIP participants

only, since the results of these interviews for controls are not yet available.

Cross-wave comparisons are then made among VICI, HUD, and YCCIP groups.

Job Training and Education. Findings on post-program job training

and education, which are considered desirable outcomes of training programs,

are presented in the same manner as data on employment and wages; Wave 1

data are reported first, followed by Wave 2 data.

All comparisons among programs are both statistical and descriptive in

nature. They may suggest real and important differences among programs in

their effects on post-program labor market and educational experiences (or,

in the case of the VICI control group, differences may be apparent in the

effects of training versus no training). However, since the interview

sample is still quite small, and since no analyses have yet been performed

on the data to estimate more precisely and comprehensively whether observed

differences can be considered true effects, no final conclusions should be

drawn about these issues.

1. Program Assessment

Table 111.3 shows the responses of VICI, HUD, and YCCIP youths to a series

of 15 questions from the PCQ pertaining to four areas of program assessment:

,(1) general satisfaction with the program; (2) perceptions about specific

learning outcomes or changes; (3) perceptions of specific program policies

and procedures; and (4) satisfaction with specific program components.

(Questions are numbered in the table as they are on the PCQ.)

The. data showed no clear differences among the groups regarding their

responses to the two questions on general satisfaction. Perhaps YCCIP

youths felt slightly more positive toward their programs than did either

VICI or HUD youths, but there were only ten respondents in the YCCIP interview sample, far too few to be a reliable indicator. Generally, small

percentages of respondents in any group felt unsatisfied with or disliked

their programs.

The responses to two of the four questions on specific learning outcomes

or changes revealed some differences among the groups; these were Question.4

on learning on-the-job skills and Question 7 on further education. On both

questions, VICI youths responded "more favorably." Seventy-four percent of

VICI youths said their program helped them a lot in learning on-the-job

skills, whereas only 44 percent of HUD youths and 60 percent of YCCIP youths

felt this way.* Eighty-two percent of VICI youths said that participation in

their program increased their desire to get further education, whereas 52

percent of HUD and 70 percent of YCCIP youths responded this way. Responses

176

O
to the two remaining questions on labor unions, showed that, regardless

of program, most respondents whose feelings about labor unions had changed

as a result of their being in the program felt more positive toward labor

unions. . Responses to questions on Program Policies/Procedures indicated that a

larger percentage (70 percent) of VICI youths considered their supervisors

"very helpful" than of. either HUD youths (58,percent) or of YCCIP youths

(40 percent). Generally, most respondents in each of the groups felt that

the strictness of the rules was "just about right."

Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of satisfaction with several

different program components in which they participated, No apparent system- ea atic differences among groups were found, but very few YCCIP respondents

answered this group of questions. Comparisons between VICI and HUD. youngsters

show a general similarity of response to most questions when the "very

satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied" categories are considered together.

However, in the areas of personal counseling, job counseling, classroom

training (reading, writing, math), classroom training (GED), and actual

work on a job, a larger percentage of VICI than of HUD youths responded in

the "very satisfied" category.

2. Employment and Wages

Responses to interview questions concerning post-program employment experiences and wages for participants in VICI, HUD, and YCCIP programs and for

VICI controls are summarized in this section. Results are presented first

for Wave 1 interview data, next for Wave 2 data (minus VICI controls), and,

finally, for cross-wave data.

Wave 1 Results. Table 111.4 shows the results of Wave 1 data gathered

approximately six weeks after program termination. The table shows whether

a youth was currently employed or ilad ever been employed since program

termination, and if so, what kind okjob it was and its hourly wage. For

VICI, HUD, and YCCIP groups, these data reflect participants' experiences

since program termination, whereas for VICI controls the data reflect

experience since application to the VICI program. Consequently, the amounts

of experience--even within the time period covered by interviews with program participants vs. controls--are not exactly comparable and will differ

to the extent of how long and when participants were enrolled in their

respective programs.

Terminaticn data from VICI programs show that the average length of time

spent in VICI is about 20 weeks. On average, therefore, VICI control

data cover about five months more job-seeking experience than do the

follow-up data for regular VICI participanti. Further, results on nature

and type of job for VICI controls refer to the most recent job held since

application to VICI, not to any other previously held job.

Table 111.4 indicates that approximately one-third of VICI youths, one-half

of controls, about one-third of HUD youths, and no YCCIP youths were currently

employed. Responses to the question on whether respondents ever worked

revealed a similar pattern, at least for VICI youths and VICI controls. Only

177
about one in four HUD participants ever worked since leaving their program,

while about 30 percent of YCCIP trainees ever worked. However, the sample

size for YCCIP is very small (ten youths) for the general employment questions, and even smaller (two or three) for other questions. Therefore,

this discussion focuses on comparisons between VICI participants, VICI

controls, and HUD trainees.

A larger percentage of VICI participants than of controls or HUD youths

reported that their jobs were full-time (more than 30 hours per week),

unsubsidized, and similar to the type of training they received: VICI

participants also earned a high average hourly wage--$4.51--compared with

$3.16 and $3.98 for controls and HUD youths, respectively. About twothirds of VICI and HUD youths were employed in permanent jobs, compared to

about a half of the controls. It appears that wages fot trainees (VICI or

HUD) are higher and that jobs are more likely to be permanent and unsubsidized than for non-trainees (controls); a comparison of VICI and HUD youths

on these variables reveals a difference only in hourly wages, which are

higher for VICI youths.

About one-half of VICI, one-tenth of controls, and one-third of HUD youths

reported being enrolled in a union apprenticeship program or on a waiting

list to get into such a program. Compared with HUD youths, a slightly

larger (though still small) percentage of VICI youths were union members;

but union membership was three to four times as frequent for VICI and HUD

trainees as for controls.

It was possible to classify job desctiptions for respondents who reported

being currently employed. The classification system is based on the Alphabetical Index of Industries and Occupations which was developed to classify

the industry and occuRation returns of the 1970 Census of Population and other

demographic surveys conducted by the Bureau of Census. Table 111.5 shows the

results of classifying jobs for VICI and HUD youths. (Only two jobs were

available for classification among YCCIP respondents; they are, therefore,

omitted from this part of the analysis.)

Categories 8-16 of Table 111.5 are,perhaps, the most interesting. They

represent types of jobs or crafts in the construction trade area. Of the

total number of jobs classified for VICI respondents, 43 (57 percent) fall

into the construction job area. The corresponding figures for HUD are 5 and

28 percent. From this small set of data, it appears that VICI youths are

considerably more likely than their HUD counterparts to obtain constructiontype jobs, many of which are specifically related to their training. Category

9- -painting, paper hanging, and decorating--and category 12-- carpentry --

accounted for 81 percent of the construction-related jobs and 45 percent of

all jobs for VICI youngsters.

Wave 2 Results. The results of Wave 2 interviews regarding employment and

wages are reported here for VICI, HUD, and YCCIP participants. Wave 2 interviews were conducted about four to five months, on average, after program

termination. Table III.1 shows that 257 Wave 2 interviews were completed,

109 (42 percent) of which were regular Wave 2 interviews (i.e., second

interviews with respondents); the remainder were first interviews. This

178 2:2
distinction is important.for the following reason: the Three Month

Follow-Up Survey (FUS-3) used as the instrument for Wave 2 interviews

was designed to obtain information covering the period since program

termination, not since the last interview. Consequently, for regular

Wave 2 respondents, information reported in this section from the FUS-3

will presumably include information obtained at Wave 1 with the PCQ.

Wave 2 first interviews, on the other'hand, provide, for the first time, a

history of information on employment, wages, and so on. These interviews,

therefore, provide substantively new information on new respondents in the

follow-up study.

As a matter of convenience and prudence, we decided to present Wave 2

results on employment and wages for only the most recent job held,by the

respondent and to omit from the analysis data on any previous jobs held.

This approach is taken for three reasons: (1) data on earlier jobs probably have already been reported in the previous section on Wave 1 results,

at least for regular Wave 2 respondents; (2) out of several possible jobs

to report, the most current job is probably the most important; and (3) in

actuality, relatively few respondents have held more than one job since

program termination, which minimizes the importance of reporting the results

for all jobs.

Table 111.6 contains response data for selected questions about general

employment and nature of job. When the interview was given, 49 percent of

VICI respondents reported being currently employed, compared with 34 percent

of HUD and 27 percent of YCCIP respondents. About two out of three VICI and

HUD respondents had never been employed since program termination, a higher

percentage than for YCCIP (52 percent). A much higher percentage of VICI

(38 percent) than of HUD (19 percent) or YCCIP (23 percent) respondents

held more than one job since termination.

A larger percentage of VICI participants had full-time, permanent jobs than

of HUD or nap participants; the gap was wider between VICI and HUD participants than between VICI and YCCIP groups. About 90 percent of the jobs held

by VICI and HUD youths, and about 75 percent of jobs held by YCCIP youths

were unsubsidized. A much larger percentage of VICI participants were either

enrolled in a union apprenticeship program or were members of a union than of

HUD or YCCIP participants; however, more than three-fourths of all respondents

were neither enrolled in an apprenticeship program nor members of a union.

Finally, the average hourly VICI wage, $3.95, was much higher than the HUD

average ($3.33) or the-YCCIP average ($3.07).

Jobs were classified according to an index of industries and occupations.

Table 111.7 presents these classifications by VICI, HUD, and YCCIP groups.

The construction trade categories (8-16) include about 34 percent of the VICI

jobs, and about 18 percent and 32 percent of HUD and YCCIP jobs, respectively.

Cross-Wave Comparisons. Results from Wave 1 and Wave 2 interview data are

presented here in order to compare groups according to key employment and

wage variables and to determine if there is any consistency in the data across.

time. The Wave 1 interview included a small number of questions about jobs

held immediately prior to enrolling in thE VICI, HUD, or YCCIP programs. By

179

ti
including these pre-program job data in this cross-wave analysis, it is

possible to assess the possible effects of training. The results of this

analysis are reported in Table 111.8.

The post-program (i.e., Wave 1 and 2) data reflect uniformly higher levels

of employment and wages than the pre-program data for all groups. Before

training, the percentage of employed youth was about 20 percent in each

group; by Wave 2, this had increased_to about 33 percent for VICI and HUD

youths, and to 27 percent for YCCIP youths. (The sample size for YCCIP is

quite small and the results should not be considered very reliable.)

Average wages increased for each group, and for VICI and HUD about equally

from pre-program to Wave 2. VICI youth received higher wages than HUD

youth before training and this difference was maintained at Wave 2., The

percentage of unsubsidized jobs for VICI youth increased from 71 percent

to 88 percent, while little change was observed for the HUD group, whose

percentage of unsubsidized jobs remained very high over time, and was even

slightly higher (93 percent) than that of the VICI group at Wave 2. The

percentage of VICI youth with full-time employment rose from 64 percent to

86 percent, whereas the corresponding figures for HUD youth were 25 percent

to 49 percent. Higher percentages of both groups obtained full-time work

over time, and at Wave 2 the initial differences between the two groups

were maintained. However, since sample sizes for the pre-program data are

generally quite small, the analysis must remain tentative.

3. Job Training and Education

In this section, we compare the groups with respect to post-program entry

into other job training or education (school) programs. Results are reported

for Wave 1 interviews conducted with VICI, VICI control, HUD, and YCCIP

respondts, and for Wave 2 interviews conducted with all groups except

VICI controls. As in the previous section on employment and wages, crosswave comparative results are also presented.

Wave 1 Results. Interview data reported in Table 111.9 indicate that, among

program participants who were not employed at termination, a small percentage

enrolled in another CETA or job training program; only 8 percent of VICI

trainees, 2 percent of HUD trainees, and none of. the YCCIP group'. HOwever,

a much larger percentage (33'percent) of VICI controls entered at least one

job training program, after they applied to VICI. Additional interview data

indicate that most controls enrolled in non-construction related training

programs

With respect to education, 14 percent of VICI, 50 percent of VICI controls,

69 percent of HUD, and 40 percent of YCCIP participants entered school after

program termination. Perhaps the reason for such a large percentage of HUD

participants entering school is the fact that a significant portion of the

HUD interview sample probably includes youths who were enrolled in school

when they entered the program: an estimated two-thirds of Newark trainees

were in school at program intake, and the Newark HUD data constitute about

two-thirds of all Wave 1 HUD data. Possibly, this group was simply returning

180 2 :23
Table 111.9; Wave 1 Comparisons Among Groups

on Entry into Job Training or

Education Programs

GROUP

Job Training

CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN

Program School

VICI 92 8 97 14

VICI Controls 60 33 18 50

HUD 54 2 59 69

YCCIP 10 0 10 40

to school. This fact might also account for the data on Wave 1 HUD job

placeents, reported in the previous section as small in comparison to VICI

job pl ements.

--- Wave 2 Results. Participants in VICI, HUD, and YCCIP programs were asked

at Wave 2 if they had ever enrolled or if they were currently enrolled in a

job training program or in school since program termination. Their responses

are summarized in Table III.10. A larger percentage of VICI trainees (29

percent) reported having ever enrolled in a job training program since termination than of HUD trainees (7 percent) or YCCIP trainees (21 percent). A

much larger percentage (53 percent) of HUD respondents said they had ever

entered school than of either VICI (25 percent) or YCCIP (30 percent) respondents. The same general pattern is evident in the data on current enrollment.

One finding in particular stands out: a substantially higher percentage of

HUD participants entered or returned to school after termination. This finding

was also evident at Wave 1 (see Table 111.9).

Cross-Wave Comparisons. Table III.I1 shows numbers and percentages of HUD

and YCCIP groups currently enrolled in a job training program and/or in

school, for Wave 1 and Wave 2. The validity of the comparisons is limited

by the small size of the Wave 2 sample, especially that of YCCIP youth.

Generally, the results indicate a sharp rise from Wave 1 to Wave 2 in the

percentage of participants enrolled in either a job training or an education

program.

C. SUMMARY

The purpose of this analysis has been to describe the results of the followup interviews conducted with VICI, VICI citrols, HUD, and YCCIP youths from

June 1979 to mid-January 1980. This section summarizes the major findings

within each area of this analysis.

181 2 )4
Program Assessment. Generally, a large majority of respondents, regardless of program, expressed general satisfaction with their training

experience; only a very small percentage was dissatisfied. Compared with

HUD youths, VICI youths tended to report slightly higher levels of satisfaction (i.e., in the very satisfied category) with personal counseling,

job counseling, classroom training for basic skills and for GED, and with

actual work on the job, but these differences in most cases were not large.

By larger margins, VICI participants said they learned a lot about important

skills on the job and that the program made them want to get further education. The major comparison group in this analysis was the HUD group, since

the sample size for YCCIP was very small.

Employment and Wages. At Wave 1, the VICI control group appeared to have

the most success in getting employment, compared with. VICI, HUD, and YCCIP

youths. About half the respondents in the control group reported currently

working or having worked since they applied to VICI. This finding, however,

may be attributed to the fact that control youths had considerably more

time than program participants to seek employment; while others were being

trained, many control group youths were looking for and finding jobs. In

addition, the program design called for referrals of control group youth

to the prime sponsor for placement services. In short, this difference in

favor of the control group may be an artifact of the study design.

VICI youth did not appear to fare appreciably better than HUD youth in

overall job placement. However, a larger percentage of VICI youths than of

either control group or HUD youth obtained.full-time jobs, and at a much

higher average hourly wage. VICI youths also tended to be employed at jobs

that were more similar to the training they had received. VICI controls

did not fare as well as either VICI or HUD youth regarding wages, getting

permanent unsubsidized employment, becoming a member of a union, or enrolling in a union apprenticeship program. These findings would suggest the

superiority of training over no training at least on these outcomes.

At Wave 2, a larger percentage of VICI youths were currently employed than

of HUD or YCCIP youths. Unfortunately, no control group data were available

at Wave 2 for purposes of comparison. VICI youths tended to be more successful in getting full-time jobs, enrolling in union apprenticeship programs,

or becoming union members. The average hourly wage was much higher among

VICI youths also. It is noteworthy, however, that VICI youngsters who were

employed before entering the program were receiving a much higher hourly

wage than their HUD counterparts. Generally, pre-program differences

between VICI and HUD on selected employment variables and wages persisted

across time from Wave 1 to Wave 2.

/-

Job Training and Educatio9/ A relatively small percentage of youths in any

group, including controlr, entered job training programs, though at Wave 1

the percentage was much higher in the control group than in all other groups.

A large difference was found among groups at both Wave 1 and Wave 2 with

respect to education: a much larger percentage of HUD youths were enrolled in

school than of either VICI or YCCIP youths. This finding may be explained

by the fact that a significant portion of the HUD data was gathered from

Newark where many youths who entered the program were enrolled in school at

program intake.

182 2.);7-
The results of this analysis are still very preliminary and tentative. For

example, further information about the specific objectives and operations

of comparison programs is needed to help clarify and interpret the results.

Also, many of the comparisons are based on very stall samples, and so may

prove unreliable. A further limitation is that other factors, such as

local economic conditions and participant characteristics, have not been

taken into account either in performing the'analyses or in explaining the

'results. Hence, no conclusions can be drawn from these results about the

potential success or lack of success of the VICI demonstration at this time.

183 2:2G
Table III.1.Cumulative Number of Follow-vp Interviews.

Completed by Group, by Site and by Wave

Through January 15, 1980

GROUP VICI Control HUD YCCIP TOTAL. GRAND

NTOTAL

% WAVE

SITE

1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 /4----2,

/

Atlanta 9 1 5 0 2 18 - - 16 19 35 6

Broward 30 16 - - - -

- ,-

( 30 16 46 8

Chicago 7 5 - - 9 39 7 11 23 55 78 13

Milwaukee 30 12 13 0 - - - - 43 12 55 .10

Newark 25 10 26 0 60 35 - - 111 45 156 27

New Haven 32 24 - - - - - - 32 24 56 10

Philadelphia 7 7 17 0 - - 2 2 26 9 35 ,6

South Bronx 20 12 - - 19 14 1 51 40 77 117 20

Total 160 871 61 0 90 1 062 10 643 321 257 578 100

Wave (%) 65 35 100 0 46 54 13 87 55 45 - Group (%) 43 ;0 34 13 - 100

Of 87, 57 were regular Wave 2 (i.e.; Wave 2--2nd interview).

Of 106, 46 were regular Wave 2 (i.e., Wave 2--2nd interview).

/Of 64, 6 were regular Wave 2 (i.e., Wave 2--2nd interview).
Table 111.2 Sex, Age and Race Characteristics of

Interview Sample

GROUP

VARIABLE

VICI

N X

VICI Control

N , X

HUD-YCCIP

N %\.-/

DOL-YCCIP

N %

TOTAL

N %

Male 194 78 40 66 146 .74 63 85 443 77

SEX

Female 53 22 21 34 50 26 11 15 135 23

16 6 2 0 0 51 26 1 . 1 58 10

17 30 12 7 11 47 24 6 8 90 16

AGE 18 78 32 15 25. 46 23 23 31 162 28

19 87 35 28 46 30 15 28 38 173 30

Above 19 46 19 11 18 21 11 16 22 94 16

Black 199 81 -57 93 11P 61 57 77 368 64

White 13 5 3 5 59 30 0 0 138 24

RACE Hispanic 34 14 1 2 1S 9 17 23 70 12

. Other 1 <1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 <1

229
Table 111.3 Wave I Comparisons Among VICI, HUD and YCCIP Programs on Program

Assessment

QUESTION RESPONSE MI.(%) N HUD (%) N YCCIP ($) N

GENERAL SATISFACTION

_. . 3. How much do you

like the program?

A lot

Only a little

69

27 160

60

39 87

70

30 10

Not at all 4 1 0

15. Thinking about

the program as a

whole, would you

say you are:

Very satisfied

Somewhat satisfied

46

44 159

47

41 87

60

30 10

Not satisfied 11 J2 10

LEARNING OUTCOMES/

CHANGES

-............ 4. In the program,

how much did you

learn in, the way

of imporiant

skills that you

can actually use

on a job?

A lot

A little

Not too much

74

21

5

160

44

35

21

88

60

30

10

10
Table m. 3 Wave 1 Comparisons Among VICI, HUD and YCCIP Programs on Program

Assessment (continued)

QUESTION RESPONSE VICI (%) N HUD ( %) N YCCIP (%)

LEARNING OUTC, S/

CHANGES (cont%. Jed)

Vant to get further

education

Not want to get further education

Did not make any difference .

Yes

No

. .. More positive

More nevalve

82

2

16 .

29

1 71

,-

75

25

160

159

44 -

52

0

48

9

81

78

22

.

.1 88

47

9

70

10

20

.. 30

70

f- 100

0

.

10

. 10

2

, 7. Did participating

in the program

make you:

8. Do you think that

your feelings

A about labor union'

changed as a result of being in

the program?

8A. (If Yes to Q. 8)

Old your feelings

become more postaim or

ative?

-.

,
Table £11.3 Wave 1 Comparisons Among 111C1, HUD and YCCIP Programs on Program

Asseisment (continued)

QUESTION RESPONSE VICI CO N HUD (%)

. N

, YCCIP ( %) N

PROGRAM POLICIES/

PROCEDURES

5. In general, how

helpful were the

program supervisors in your

program?

Very helpful

Somewhat helpful

;'Jot helpful

70

25

5

159

58

34

8

88

40

40

20

10

6. Generally, how

strict would you

say the rules

were in your

program?

Much too strict

Just about right

Not strict enough

23

58

19

159

11 68

20

88

10

50

40

10

SATISFACTION WITH PROGRAM COMPONENTS

13. In general, how

satisfied were you

with the things

you took part in?

Personal counseling

Very satisfied 45 39 20

Somewhat satisfied 48 71 54 28 60 5

Not satisfied 7

_. 7 20

;.'.,t
Table 111.3 Wave 1 Comparisons Among VICI, HUD and YCCIP Programs on Program

Assessment (continued)

QUESTION

PROGRAM COMPONENTS

(continued)

RESPONSE

3. Continued

Job counseling

VICI (%) HUD '(%) N

Very satisfied

Somewhat satisfied

Not satisfied

45

38 89

17

31

61 39

8

Classroom training

(where you learned

specific job skills)

Very satisfied

Somewhat satisfied

Not satisfied

50

37 92

13

YCCIP (%) N

86

0

14

50 67

37 16 33 3

13 0

Classroom training

(where you learned to

Improve your reading,

writing or math.)

Very satisfied

Somewhat satisfied

Not satisfied

57,

36 50

7

Classroom training

(where you studied for

a GED)

Very satisfied

Somewhat satisfied

tipt satisfied

47

44 34

9

39 100

.50 18 0

11 0

20 0

60 20 0 0

20 0

Actual work on a job Very satisfied

Somewhat satisfied

Not satisfied

60

35 138

5

49 78

45 80 11 9

6 11

232
Table 111.3 Wave I Comparisons Among VICI, HUD and YCCIP Programs on Program

Assessment (continued)

QUESTION RESPONSE VICI (2) N HUD (2) N YCCIP (2) N

13. Continue di 1

PROGRAM COMPONENTS

(continued)

A referral to a fulltime job

Very satisfied 52 73 100

Somewhat satisfied 26 61 0 11 0 2

Not satisfied 22 27 0

s, r
Table 111 ,4 have I Comparisons between VICI, VICI Controls, HUD and YCCIP

Respondents on Employment and Wages

QUESTION

ommilessurgemmimmium----

Response VICI (%) N

VICI

CONTROL (%) N HUD. (%) N YCCIP (%) N

GENERAL EMPLOYMENT

ii....00~0....,..............r....' 17. Are you presently

working?

Yes 35 55 25 14 32 28 0 0

No 65 102 75 43 68 59 100 10

19. Have you ever worked

since leaving the

program (since air

plication to 1:10)?

Yes

No

37

63

37

64

30

70

13

30

24

76

14

45

30

70

3

7 remoimmomim-Pnommen---------------

NATURE OF JOB

20. Did you work 30 or

more hours per

week?

Yes

No

90

10

78

9

70

30

19

8

57

43

19

13

67

33

2

1

23, How much per hour

did you earn at

this job?

Mean ($) 4.51 77 3,16 29 3.98 19 2.80 2

231

23
TableIII.4 Wave'l Comparisons between VICI, VICI Contvols, MD and YCCIP

Respondents on Employment and Wages (continued)

a

QUESTION Response VICI (%) N VICI

CONTROL (%) N HUD (t) N v".CIP (%) N

.........., NATURE OP JOB (CONTINUED1

24. Was this a per- Permanent 65 59 48 14 68, 13 c 0

. manent or temporary job? Temporary 35 18 52 15 32 6 100 2

'25. Was this job subsidized .... or

unsubsidized?

Subsidized

Unsubsidized

2

95

2 73

28 8

72 21

1189

211

0

100

0

2 Not sure 2

2 0

0 0 0 0 0

.4

26. Was this Job simliar to the kind

Similar 53 41 Question not

relevant

32 6 0 0

of training you

received from

your program?

Not similar 46 36 68 13 100 2

28. Were you enrolled

in a union apprenticeship program,

or on a waiting

list to get into

en apprenticeship

program?

Apprenticeship

Waiting fist

Neither

24

27

49

18

20

37

4 1 4 I 92. 25

18

18

65

3

3

11

0

0

100

0

0

2

, .., 29. Were you a member

of a labor union?

Yes 15 11 4 1 11 2 0 0

No 85 65 910 ) 26

f.$)0

89 16 100 2
Table 111.5 Comparisons Between VIT1 and NUO Respondents.

on Most Recent Type of Job

JOB TITLE VICI HUD

1. Agriculture

2. Private household workers

3. Professional, technical and kindred

workers

4. Managers, administrators (non-farm) 1 1 5. Sales workers

6. Clerical and kindred workers 3 3

7. Other craftsmen and kindred workers

(non-construction)

1

8. Plumbing, heating and air conditioning

workers

1

9. Painting, paperhanging, and decorating 19

10. Electrical work 1 5

11. Masonry, plastering, bricklaying 4

12. Carpentrying 15

13. Roofing and sheetmetal 2

14. Concrete work

15. Well drilling

16. Miscellaneous construction

17. Operatives (except transport) 3 2

18. Transportation operatives (truck

drivers, cab drivers)

1

19. Non-construction, non-farm laborers

(ditch diggers, truck loaders,

unskilled laborers)

7

20. Construction laborers (unskilled

laborers/assistants)

1 1 21. Servi4e workers (except private household)

17 6
Table 111.6 Wave 2 Comparisons Among VIC1, HUD and YCCIP

Respondents on Employment and Wages

QUESTION

GENERAL EMPLOYMENT

. Are you presently

working?

Response VICI (%) N

Have you ever worked

since leaving the

program?

How many Jobs, full-

.time or part-time,

have you had since

leaving the program?

Yes . No

Yes

No

One

Two

Three

NATURE OF JOB

. Was this job fulltime (30 or more

hours per week) or

part-time (less than

30 hours per week)?

Full-time

Part -time

49 43

51 44

34 15

66 29

p- 62 35

27 15

1 1 6

86 48

14 8

2 "Li

HUD (%) YCCIP (%) N

34 36 27 17

66 69 73 46

33 23 48 22

67 46 52 24

.- 81 47 77 30

10 6 :5 . 6

9 5 8 3

149 29 79 30

51 30 21 8
Table III.6 Wave 2 Comparisons Among ViCI, HUD and YCCIP

Respondents on Employment and Wages (conti....4cd)

QUESTION Response

)

VICI (%) N HUD (%) N YCCIP (%)

11. Was this a temporary or permanent

Temporary 26 15 41 24 33 13

job? Permanent 74 42 59 i", 67 26

12* Was this Job subsidized .... or

Subsidized 12 7 7

ti 26 10

unsubsidized? .Unsubsidized 88 5(1 93 55 74 28

16. Were you enrolled

ina union apprenEnrolled 17 10 2 1 3 1 ticeship program

or on a waiting

Waiting list 7 4 5 3 18 7

list to get into

an apprenticeship

program?

Neither 76 44 93 56 79 30

18. Ware you a member

of a union?

Yes 16 9 9 5 0 0

No 84 46 91 54 100 37

20. What was your

starting hourly

salary?

Mean ($) 3.95 57 3.33

... .3.07 35

2 3'3
TableIII.7. Wave 2 Comparisons Among VICI, HUD, and

YCCIP Respondents on Most Recent Type

of Job

. JOB TITLE VICI MUD

. YCCIP

I. Agriculture

2. Private household workers 1 3. Professional, technical

and kindred workers

4. Managers, administrators 1 1 4 (non-farm)

5. Sales workers 1 5

6. Clerical and kindred workers

6 8 3

7. Other craftsmen and kindred

workers (non-construction)

2

8. Plumbing, heating and air

conditioning workers

1

9. Painting, paper hanging,

and decorating

9 2

10. Electrical work

11. Masonry, plastering, bricklaying

12. Carpentrying 9 4 I 13. Roofing and sheetmotal 2

14. Concrete work

15. Well drilling

16. Miscellaneous construction 1 17. Operatives (except transport)

6 4' 4

18. Transportation oprrativ,s 1 (truck drivers, cab drivers)

19.

20.

Non-construction, nonfarm laborers (ditch

diggers, truck loaders,

unskilled laborfirs)

k.-4,

Construction laborers

1

2

2 3

1 (unskilled 'shows/

assistants)

IP

21. Service workers (except

private household)

19 21 17 .--_

;

196
Tablern .8. Cross-Wave Comparisons among VICI, HUD . and YCCIP Groups on Employment and Wages

VARIABLE GROUP

BEFORE PROGRAM

N % N

WAVE 1

% N

WAVE 2

%

Employment Status

at_ ree Time

VICI 74 19 55 35 43 49

IdgMais HUD 48 19 28 32 36 3!

YCCIP 5 20 0 0 17 27

Average Hourly VIC) 13 (3.0) 77 (4.51) 47 (3.95)

Wage (Most Recent

Job) HUD 9 (2.71) 19 (3.98) 56 (3.33)

YCCIP 1 (2.90) 2 (2.80) 35 (3.07)

Most Recent Unsubsidized Job

VICI 14 71 73 95 50 88

HUD 8 100 17 89 55 93

YCCIP 1 0 2 100 28 74

Most Recent Full- VICI 9 64 78 90 48 86

Time Job

HUD 8 25. )9 57 29 49

YCCIP 100 '2 67 36 79

NOTE: Numbers In parenthesisosre dollar and not percentage figures.

2.41.
Table III.10. Wave 2 Comparisons Among VICI, HUD, and YCCIP

Groups on Entry to Job Training and Education

Programs

GROUP

ENROLLED IN SINCE LEAVING THE PROGRAM: CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN:

Job. Training

Program School

Job Training

Program School

N . N N

/

N %

VICI

HUD

YCCIP

21 29

54 7

19 21

85 25

105 53

63 30

0

10 70

9 56

10 60

20 60

56 91

20 55
TableIII .11. Cross-Wave Comparisons Among VtCI, HUD and YCCIP

Group on Entry into Job Training and Education Programs

. CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN:

0 Job Training Program School

GROUP WAVE N %

. VICI 12

92 8 97

10 70 20'

14

60

IP HUD

,

r 12

. 54 2 59

't, 9 56

0

56

69

91

YCCIP

.

12

10 0

10 60

..............--&---

.,_

10

20

, 40

55

.

.

21 3.

.

.

.

.
IV. INTERPROGRAM COMPARISON

The Interprogiam Comparison involves a.comparison of VICI programs with

selected formula-funded DOL-YCCIP and HUD-YCCIP demonstration programs

operating at VICI sites. Relevant variables fall into t40 major categories, descriptive comparisons, and possible indicators of comparative

program effectiveness. Each category includes several specific variables:

Descriptive Comparisons

. Characteristics of entering youth

.alaracteristics of program staff (especially instructors)

Nature of work performed (i.e., the community improvements)

Linkages (with special reference, to funding sources and

the amount of funds provided from sources other than

those mandated by the Youth Employment Demonstration

Projects Act)

5. Salaries and incentives/bonuses paid to youth and staff

6. Other budgetary items, including materials costs, administrar;..ve costs, supportive sources and other non-personnel

Costs

7. Intake and screening procedures

8. Disciplinary policies and procedures

Possible Indicators of Comparative Program Effectiveness

1. Retention, turnover, and attendance in program

2. Ability of programs to gear up, achieve, and maintain

projected service levels

3. Quantity and quality of community improvements

4. Positive outcomes, including type of post-program placements (e.g., apprenticeship program, occupational area,

return to school, and post-program wages)

5. Cost per positive outcome

A. GENERAL DESIGN

To ensure valid comparisons, the selected alternative programs should

closely match VICI programs in several important respects, in particular,

youth characterisitcs, type of work, location, program factors, size of

participant groups, and data quality and availability.

Only three of the eight VICI sites--Chicago, Philadelphia, and the South

Bronx--had sufficient numbers of DOL-YCCIP participants, or had DOL-YCCIP

programs similar enough to VICI, to provide a basis for meaningful

comparisons. A total of eleven YCCIP programs, four in Chicago, four in

New York, and three in Philadelphia, were seleCted for comparison.

HUD-YCCIP sites overlap with VICI in four cities: Atlanta, Chicago,

Newark, and the South Bronx.

Both contextual and statistical data are needed for makihg interprogram

'comparisons. Contextual data are collected through site visits to

comparison programs, and are most relevant to the descriptive comparison

200 2 t
C variables. 'Interviews and program documentation are the primary sources

of contextual data, and one round of site visits has been conducted by

RBS and CPPV research staff. In addition, written materials on several

of the comparison programs have been collected.

Statistical data are the best indicators of comparative program.effectiveness. RBS ha: received statistical data on HUD-YCCIP programs and

is currently obtaining comparable data on DOL-YCCIP programs in Chicago,

Philadelphia, and the South Bronx. These data are currently being

analyzed, and will be presented in a subsequent report.

B. RESULTS

1. Atlanta

Orly one comparison program was-selected in Atlanta, Exodus, Inc., a HUD

demonstration program. Information on the program was obtained through

project documentation and a preliminary interview conducted by CPPV.

Exodus Inc. L.codus, Inc., the recipient of the HU') -YCCIP grant in

Atlanta, is a community organization offering minority youth nontraditional educational and social services since 1972. The agency

had little experience in construction projects prior to receiving

the HUD grant.

The Exodus project is designed to train participants in work habits

and technical skills in home rehabilitation and energy conservation.

The object is to help them obtain unsubsidized jobs in constructionrelated areas, upon termination. Projects include the rehabilitation

of'HUD-owned and private homes and the refurbishment of community

facilities. Work includes painting, roofing, carpentry, masonry,

landscaping, and weatherization. Participants may choose their

work crew, and one participant in each crew is chosen as crew

chief. Typically, there are 11 or 12 participants in each crew,

and supervisory ratios are normally about 15 or 16:1. This has

dropped to about 8:1 recently, since enrollment has declined.

Participants are paid on a scale of $2.50 to $4.50 per'hour; incen -'

tive raises and team bonuses are given.

Exodus offers ci-mseling, placement, and educational services.

Staffing for the project includes a three-person.project management

team and six field supervisors. All field supervisors. have previous

experience in housing / construction or community development, and

most have extensive experience in working with minority youths

and/or community organizations.

About 260 youths have participated in Exodus through Spring 1979.'

In May, there were 48 enrollees. The program is planning a gradual

phase-out and will limit future enrollment to 36. Most participants

were 18 or 19 years old, and almost all were black. All were

economically disadvantaged. About one-fifth were females, and

approximately a quarter were high school graduates or GED recipients. At least 7 percent were ex-offenders.

201

2 1 5
2. Chicago

Five training programs were selected for comparison with VICI, a HUD

demonstration project and four formula-funded YCCIP programs. Information on the HUD project was obtained from program documentation and a

CPPV site visit. Only limited information, based on a RBS site visit,

is currently available on the YCCIP programs here.

The Woodlawn Organization ,(TWO). The Woodlawn Organization is a community-improvement "umbrella organization," with about 120 member

agencies. The Woodlawn HUD program began in March 1978 with a HUD

grant of $1,180,000. The purpose of the project, known as the

Urban Restoration and ,Conservation Corps, is to provide skills

training to minority youths, and to improve and restore the

Woodlawn community through minor home repairs and vacant land

clearance.

Participants are trained in several skills, including carpentry,

landscaping, painting, electrical, cement masonry, and plumbing.

Work projects have included home repairs, energy conservation and

weatherization, public works, (repair of parkway areas and snow

removal) and refurbishment of community facilities (a state hospital and playlots). Youths are paid on incentive scales of 42.90,

$3.18, and $3.5,0 per hour, with work and education bonuses.

Participants work in crews, supervised by eleven "tradesmen," five

of whom are union members. There are also three Public Service

Employee (PSE) assistants and one youth crew chief per crew. Other

administrative and support staff are provided to the project through

TWO.

Participants spend four hours per week in a vocational shop. Group

and individual counseling is available, as needed, and job development and placement services are currently being developed. In

Spring 1979, approximately 165 youths were participating in the

program. About one-third of them were in school; most were 17 or

18 years old; and all were black and economically disadvantaged.

About 70 percent were males. The program tried to select those

hardest to employ, such as high school dropouts or juvenile

delinquents.

South Austin Realty Association Rehabilitation Project. This is .a

formula-funded YCCIP program emphasizing placement in the construction-related trades, and focusing on home repair and rehabilitation.

Training is provided in painting, carpentry, plumbing, and electrical

trades; The program started in January 1979. In December 1978,

seven participants were anticipated, and were expected to be disadvantaged, 18 or 19 years old, black, out of school, and male.

Kenwood Oakland Community Organization (KOCO). The code Enforcement/

Deferred Maintenance and Weatherization program run by KOCO is a

formula-funded YCCIP project, focusing on energy conservation and

home maintenance. Work skills include painting, roofing, carpentry,

and landscaping. The project started in January 1979, and had

202

216
openings for 30 youths, These were expected to be 19 years old,

black, male, out of school, and economically disadvantaged.

Puerto Rican Congress Academy (PRC). The Rehabilitation and Beautification Project run by PRC is a formula-funded YCCIP program,

begun in January 1979. The program emphasizes home repair and

rehabilitation, and provides training in painting, carpentry,

masonry, plumbing, electrical skills, and landscaping.

The program has slots for 15 participants. Youths were expected to

be 18 or 19 years old, black or Hispanic, male, economically disadvantaged, and out of school. A number of former drug abusers were

expected.

Voice of the People (VOP). The Uptown Rehabilitation Training

Project run by VOP began in January 1979. The program involves

home repair and rehabilitation. Training is provided in painting,

carpentry, and landscaping. The program has slots for 10 youths.

These were expected to be 18 or 19 years old, white or Hispanic,

economically disadvantaged, male, and out of school.

3. Newark

Only one comparison program was selected in Newark, a HUD demonstration

project operated by the North Ward Education and Cultural Center (NWECC).

Information was obtained through project documentation, staff interviews,

and direct observation made during a site visit of PPV and RBS research.

staff.

North.Ward Educational and Cultural Center. The Center began

opekation in 1970. The agency operates in an Italian-American

neighborhood, has a long history of community service, and appears

to have very good political support. The program focuses on construction-related skills through work experience such as major home

repair and rehabilitation, public works, and refurbishment of

community facilities. All construction skills are taught, emphasized, including painting, roofing, carpentry, plumbing, electrical,

and landscaping. Youths typically work in crews of 8 to 10, and

may switch crews.

The program attempted to place participants in the Painters and

Carpenters unions but, in constrast to VICI's, experience, the

unions were'not very responsive. The NWECC program uses pay

incentives, with pay levels of $2.90, $3.20, and $3.60.

The program is staffed by non-union supervisors who have constructionrelated experience. Supervisors are PSE employees who must be

replaced when their CETA time expires.

The New Jersey State Employment Service screens program applicants;

those lacking commitment are screened out. As of April 1979,

approximately 280 youths had been enrolled. About 100 were out-ofschool youths, and many participated only during the summer. There

were 31 current enrollments in April. About two-thirds of the

youths were white; about one-fifth was Hispanic; and approximately

203 2.1r
13 percent were black. About one-quarter were females. Youths

were aged 16-19, and all were economically disadvantaged.

Although the NWECC program goals and its focus on community improvement resemble the VICI program in Newark, there are several important

differences, notably the ethnic group composition and the enrollment

of in-school youths.

4. Philadelphia

Three comparison programs were selected in Philadelphia, all formulafunded YCCIP programs. Information was obtained through interviews and

from RI3S' site visit.

Simmons Youth Development Corporation. The Simmons Youth Development Guild is a non-profit agency operating educational, vocational,

and social-cultural programs for disadvantaged youths, including

construction-related training programs.

The Simmons YCCIP program began in January 1978 and seeks to place

participants in construction-related trades. The program emphasizes

carpentry and electrical work; plumbing is also taught. Projects

include home repair and rehabilitation for senior citizens. Program

staff include administrative personnel and four crew leaders. In

addition to CETA funding, the project receives money from the Urban

Coalition.

As of March 1979, there were 19 participants, 18 working in con- struction-related positions, the other in a clerical position.

Participants were 17-19 years old, and only one (in the clerical

job) was female. All were black and economically disadvantaged.

All were high school dropouts, but about three-quarters of them

planned to return to some form of schooling.

Community Action Group and Youth for Change. The Community Action

Group formula-funded YCCIP program aims for placement in cOnstruction trades. Projects include building rehabilitation, and home

repair for senior citizens. In addition to learning general con- struction skills, youth are taught how to use power tools, purchase

materials, and salvage old materials. Staffing includes administrative personnel and three retired craftsme who serve as supervisors

and instructors. Participants are organized into three work teams.

The agency also provides psychological and career counseling to

participants.

In March 1979, there were 23 participants, and three positions were

clerical. Youths were 16-19 years old, economically disadvantaged,

and were either high school dropouts or had finished school.

Participants were required to spend approximately three or four

urs per week on an educational program.

Mantua Youth Painting Project. The Mantua project is a formulafunded YCCIP program which receives additional support from the

United Way. The program began in January 1978, and focuses on 204

2.13
community improvement projects such as home repair and window box

construction. The 'program teaches painting and carpentry and

emphasizes placement in construction-related trades. As of December

1978, the program enrolled 16 youths, aged 16-19, black, out of

school, and economically disadvantaged.

5. The South Brcnx

Five alternative training programs were selected in New York, a HUD

demonstration project and four formula-funded YCCIP projects. Information on the HUD project was obtained from project documentation, staff

interviews, and direct observation made during a site visit by CPPV

staff. Information on the YCCIP program was obtained through interviews

with the five New York City YCCIP contract offices and descriptions

prepared by the prime sponsor. The four programs were selected among

43 YCCIP programs operating in New York City because of their similarity

to VICI.

People's Development Corporation (PDC). The Youth Training and

Incentive Program (YTIP) run by the PDC began in January1978,

funded by HUD ($500,000) and the New York State Division for Youth.

The program employs 60 neighborhood youths, age 16-19, to work on

neighborhood improvementprojects in the South Bronx. Projects

include rehabilitation, public works, refurbishment of community

facilities, and apartment repair in community-managed apartments.

Skills taught include painting, roofing, carpentry, masonry,

plumbing, electrical skills, demolition, weatherization, landscaping, and community management. YTIP seeks to place

participants in union apprenticeships or as helpers to construction

workers, plumbers, and electricians.

YTIP also has counseling and education components, including basic

adult education, pre-GED, and GED training for three hours per week

or more. Job-related skills are emphasized here. An Audio-Visual

Unit was established to document YTIP activities, and some participants study primarily photography. Project staff include a project

director, an administrative assistant, a counselor, a job developer,

and work supervisors (some union journeymen).

Youths are paid $3.25 per hour (as of May 1979). The program

originally utilized incentives, but later these were dropped due to

budget problems. Participants receive bonuses for completing GEDs.

Their average age is 18. About one third are females, 60 percent

are black, 40 percent are Hispanic, and all are disadvantaged.

About one third are graduates of the Alfred E. Smith Vocational

High School. Another third were referrals from the New York

Department of Youths (mostly court cases)

Banana Kelley Community Improvement Association. The Banana Kelley

program is a formula-funded YCCIP project operating in the South

Bronx; funded by the City for approximately $137,000. The project

began in April 1978. It focuses on home repair and rehabilitation,

energy conservation and weatherization, and,the refurbishment of

205

24
community facilities. Activities include painting, roofing, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, electrical work, and landscaping.

Participants pursue short-term projects, such as a community garden,

block and apartment clean-ups, and apartment rehabilitation. The

program seeks to place participants in construction-related trades,

and is attempting to set up community businesses, such as a cabinet

shop and home repair services. The program provides no support

services, but makes referrals to other agencies.

Staff include a project director, a vocational coordinator, and a union and non-union supervisor. Banana Kelley enrolls 12 participants, aged 16-19. Ten are male, all are black or Hispanic, and

all are disadvantaged. Participants are paid $2.90 per hour. The

program has close ties with the People's Development CorporatiOn

(HUD-YCCIP program).

Opportunities Industrialization Center of New York (OIC). The OIC

program is a formula-funded YCCIP project operating in the Bushwick

section of Brooklyn. The program attempts to train housing rehabilitation aides and to place them in construction-related trades.

Participants receive theoretical and practical training in electrical

maintenance, carpentry, painting, roofing maintenance, concrete and

masonry, oil burner/heating, plumbing and pipe fitting, and reading

blueprints. Work experience is acquired through rehabilitating and

reconditioning run-down apartment buildings, low-income houses, and

public structures, and through renovating vacant public lots. Participants are supervised by skilled, licensed technicians. The OIC

program provides skill-related basic education instruction, designed

to complement the vocational training component, give GED training,

and prepare participants for the labor market. Participants are

paid $2.95 per hour.

The OIC YCCIP program has approximately 40 partie4pants. Most are

18 or 19 years old. All but seven are males. A it two-thirds are

black, a quarter are Hispanic, and approximately ten percent are white. All are disadvantaged.

Prospect Heights Neighborhood Corporation. The Prospect Heights

Program is a YCCIP project funded for approximately $100,000.

Goals are to train unemployed community youths as _lousing repair

and maintenance aides and to refurbish an old school building. The

program attempts to provide participants with good work habitS and

with a variety of skills, such as alternative energy technology,

waste recycling, painting, weatherization, carpentry, plumbing, and

electrical skills. The program provides placement services through

the New York Urban Coalition and aims at placement in constructionrelated trades.

Twelve low-income youths, aged 16-19, are enrolled. Two are female;

all are black. Participants are paid minimum wages.

University Settlement Society of New York. University Settlement

is a formula-funded YCCIP program, funded for $100,000 during the

last fiscal year. The program goal is to train building repair and

206 ,)

1 I
maintenance aides through the renovation of the Society's sevenstory building. Participants are trained in replastering and

repainting, resurfacing of floors, weatherization, and plumbing

repair. The project hopes to place youths in construction-related

trades. Participants receive educational and vocational counseling

from the US professional staff. The program enrolls 12 participants.

No detailed information on participants is currently available . . The prime sponsor indicated that a "careful selection" process was

used to determine enrollment.
V. WORK IALL,4-01.1

The purpose of the work valuation is .1 ficytistr.2

training program, such as VICI, can an doe:4

byproducts such as the improvements acct u, (generally) by low-income families in Jrt.a:, area;,. ':11f,I.L improvements

and repairs have a "market" value, wnic be reveced as their

cost'if performed by a building contracr of cv:he.: professional craftsmen. The work valuation assesses this market value and compares it with

program expenditures.

This comparison permits us to make several quantitative statements about

each VICI site. One such statement is the simple demonstration that one

dollar of'expenditure creates a tangible and measurable value in home

improvements and repairs. This return can be called a program "benefit,"

and it can also be viewed as an offset to the cost of training, so that

training costs are reduced by the amount of the "work value" created by

the youths. Second, a set of statements can be made about the types of

work skills taught and performed with respect to the amount of work

value they create. For example, do some skills produce a higher market

value than others in return for the cost of teaching them?

The meth000logy dud data collection procedures used in this analysis are based on an ongoing, job-by-job accounting system. .A job is defined as work, or activities, done at an individual location or address, such as

a home or apartment. One site may be working on over one thousand such

jobs, while other sites may work on one hundred or less. This system of

evaluation differs froze the usual procedure of periodic or end- of -theproject sampling.of results. The job-by-job accounting system provides

a very satisfactory data set for economic and statistical analysis, and

the evaluator can have substantial confidence in the analytical results.

In addition, it all)ws some ongoing monitoring of activities at each

site. At present, this monitoring capability is developed for use-on a quarterly evaluation basis. Currently, CPPV is discussing with DOL the

possibility of refining the management potential of this estimation

method.

Thus, the results of the work valuation reported here are twofold.

First, there are the quantitative statements that can be made about the

value or return on training expenditures. The second result is the

evolution of a monitoring and evaluation tool which can be replicated or

. adapted to other applications. The latter is quite distinct from the

training objectives of the VICI demonstration.

This chapter updates and expands the work valuation data with information

reported through December 1979 and, in some cases, through mid-March,

1980. In addition, the formulas used for the work valuation procedures

are revised and Explained. The. following sections discuss the nature

and purpose of the work valuation task, and present the mathematical

formulations and indicators for estimating work value. Section C

reports and compares numerical results through June 30, 1979 and

through December 31, 1979 or mid-March 1980, and a final. section

formulates a mean of evaluating the performance of a VICI project.

208 2-- ,',
A. DATA COLLECTION

Table V.1 lists the five types of forms used to collect data for the

work valuation. These forms include: (1) A form for estimated large

job costs and value, completed when the job is started (VICI Form VII);

(2) two versions of a final job cost report, completed when a job is

finished (VICI Form VIII for jobs initially reported on VICI Form VII,

and VICI Form VI for "small" jobs, where this is the only reporting form

used); (3) the VICI Quarterly Fiscal Report, which describes the overall

project costs using a simple chart of accounts format; and (4) a report

from the independent consultants on the job value, Crawford & Company.

The principal types of data collected are:

1. Expenditures (total and job-by-job) for youth labor, crew

chiefs, materials and supplies, etc. (see Table V.1, rows

a-e).

2. Estimates of what a private contractor would charge for the

job being done by the VICI crews (Table V.1, row f).

3. Identifying data for each job (Table V.1, rows g-i).

4. An independent judgment about the quality of the VICI crews'

work (Table V.1, row j).

Items 1, 2, and 3 are prepared by each VICI site for each job, using

VICI Form VI or VICI Forms VII and VIII. Crawford & Co. provide an

additional estimate for data item 2, on a sampling basis, and also give

a second opinion on the quality of work performed (data item 4).

Table V.2 shows how data collection and processing proceeds. Data

collection originates at the project site, where one of two alternative

forms is used to'report on each job. For small jobs, demanding only a

few working days, a simple reporting form (Form VI - VICI Job Reporting.

Form: Short Form) is filled out when the job is completed. It is sent

to CPPV's Data Editing Unit, which reviews the form for accuracy, andforwards it to RBS,.who process and analyze the data and prepare reports.

Larger jobs require two data reports. The first report(Form VII'- VICI

Cost Estimate Form) provides some cost estimates for a job that is

beginning. Upon completion of this job, a revised cost report (Form VIII -

Materials and Equipment Cost Form) is completed and forwarded to CPPV.

This two-form procedure provides data to anticipate and monitor work in

progress and is useful for jobs lasting several months.

Forms VI, VII, and VIII, each include some items estimating private

contracter charges for a job in progress. The estimates are checked by

Crawford and Co., who report directly to RBS.

The fifth data form is a quarterly fiscal report providing an overall

total for expenditures for the project. This permits the estimation of

expenditures which cannot be directly attributed to a particular job, so

that a type of "overhead" expenditure can be calculated. Total expenditures given by the job-by-job reports are compared with the quarterly

209
data. Expenditures not attributable to a job become an expense which

must be allocated to the jou cost estimates. The mathematical fonanlas

described below illustrate how the five sets of data are used.

B. FORMULATING WORK VALUE

A simple formulation of the work value is:

Total of

estimated

private conValue of VICI work .= tractor bids. X

Found on Forms

VI, VII or VIII

Adjustmer,c

(concor0,1ce)

of VICI valui

estimates. Based (a),

on Crawford & Co.

reports

Here, value is equated with whmt a private contractor would bid (charge)

for the job. This simple estimate of value can be used to make further

evaluations of VICI work. For example, it can be used to estimate work

value created by the project, per dollar of total expenditure on the

project, thus:

Total of esti- Adjustment of

Work value created' mated private of VICI value

per = contractor bids. X estimates.

dollar of expenditure Found on Forms Based on

VI, VII or VIIi Crawford & Co.

. reports' (b)

Total expenditures to date.

Found in Quarterly Fiscal Report

This second formula gives the ratio of the total "value of VICI work" to.

the total expenditures for, the VICI project. As an example of how these

equations are estimated, consider Atlanta through June 30, 1979, where

the calculations are as follows:

Calculation of formula (a):

Total value of VICI work

(13 jobs reported)

210

Total value Adjustment factor

on VICI Form X from Crawford &

VIII (13 jobs) Co. reports (5

jobs inspected)

($82,696)

$87 575

X 1.059
Calculation of formula (b):

Work value created

dollar of expenditure

Value from formula (a)

Reported expenditure to date

from Quarterly Report

1811511

0A0Mt

$ 0.239

The low "efficiency" indicator in.the example is apparently due to

substantial start-up costs in a period when no job-related work was

performed. As the Atlanta project progresses, start-up costs could be

allocated to all..jobs completed, as in normal busintss accounting, which

would automatically raise the efficiency indicator. The alternative,

followed in the present report, is to use "with and without" indicator

ratios. A "with" indicator, that includes start-up costs and overhead

items, is given in formula (b). ,The "without" indicator, which ignores

start-up costs and overhead expenses, is:'

Work value created

221

dollar of direct

job expenses

1

Value from formula (a) (c)

Total of estimated or actual

job-related expenses. Reported

on VICI Forms VI, VII, and

VIII.

Schemes to allocate "fixed" or "sunk" costs, such as start-up costs,

are typically required for (a) regulated rate setting, such as public

utility rate setting, and (b)"for income tax calculations. A typical

allocation scheme, applicable to VICI, would be (1) to project the total

dollar volume of jobs that will be completed (using a-cost basis); next,

(2) to project the start-up and overhead costs for the entire period; then,

(3) calculate the ratio of start-up and overhead costs to projected total

job cost (put-in-place); and (4) apply this "pro-rated" ratio or allocation as an add-on to the cost of each job or the total of interim costs.

For example, while the 9-month total of start-up and overhead costs may

equal $350,000 the projected total for'18 months may be only $500,000;

then if the projected total job-related costs are $700,000, the ratio is

5 7 al $0.7143; this means that an interim actual total of direct cost

job of $300,000 would have an additional $214,290 of projected start-up

and overhead costs added on, rather than the $350,000 actual total of

start-up and overhead costs accrued at the 9th month. The allocation

technique would raise the numerical indicator in formula (b).

211

255
For example, using the Atlanta data through June 30, 1979,

Work value created

dollar of direct

job expense

MN

$ 0.623

In this c4.se,aevery $1.00 of direct, job-related costs (youth labor,

crew-chief time, materials and supplies) results in the creation of

$ 0.623 in work value, where work value is equated with a private contractor's bid to do the same job. This $ 0.623 value ratio was, again,

the lowest found for the five sites with sufficient data.

The difference between the $140,478 of direct, job-related expenses and

the $366,842 of total expenditufe represents the sum of start-up costs

and overhead expenditures--$226,364, based on data reported through st

June 30. Each of these reported values is provisional, representing

only estimates of the correct numbers. At the end of the project, an,

accurate accounting of all jobs and expenditures will be possible, aId

those numerical values will be the best basis for a work evaluationof

the VICI demonstration.

The two ratiio indicators of equations (b) and (c) are aggregate indicators

of the work value. In the March 1979 Interim Report, value-added indicators

were described. These show the amount of work value that remains if all

non-youth labor costs are deducted. Value-added indicators are calculated

thus:

Value added by

youth labor

Using the Atlanta data:

Value created - All. direct job-

(formula a) related costs

except youth labor

Value added by - $87,575 - $62,549

youth labor $25,026

"Value added by youth labor" produces a comparison ratio when it is

divided by the total of direct job-related youth labor expenditures

(typically, excluding training time, sick leave, etc.), thus:

Value added , formula (d)

.P-el Direct, job-related

dollar of direct youth labor costs

youth labor

212

(e)

(d)
(),

Using the Atlanta data:

Value added

2.tE

dollar of

youth labor

'as

$25 ,026

. $77,929

$ 0.321

The numerical value from formula (e)a valueaddect indicator of $0.321

per dollar of youth labor, does not include overhead and start-up costs.

These costs can be used to formulate a further ratid indicator:

,I .Start-up and = Start-up and overhead costs

overhead costs :Direct, job-related youth

Lei labor costs

dollar of direct

youth labor

Using the Atlanta data:

Start-up and =' $226,364 , overhead -costs $ 77,929

LS-S. dollardf direct

youth labor

$ 2.905,

(f)

The numerical value of $2.905 per dollar of direct youth labor represents

the penalty of allocating all start-up costs to a few jobs. It will

decrease as more work is done.

The value-added indicator'; formula (d),is,useful for evaluating whether

certain crafts or types of jobs seem to produce a better work value than.

others. Subtracting the formula (e) number causes the value7added

indicator°tO fall to zero or less for four of the five sites (see

Section C);

Two new formulas have been developed since the October, 1979 report.

The first is:

Ratio of direct job

costs to total expen- Total of direct job costs reported to date

ditures to. date Reported Total Expenditures to Date (g)

140 478

366,842

= 0.383

213

25 7
This ratio is a measure of efficiency. It measures the amount of total

e xpenditure that is directly related to home repairs and construction.

Since VICI emphasize,on-the-job-training,na substantial proportion of

total expenditures should be directly job-related.

r, The second formula is:

.Ratio of start-up and

overhead costs to

direct lob costs

Difference between total expendi-

- tures and direct job costs

Direct job costs

366,842 m1421.418 (h)

140 ,47

1.611

This formula is a variation of formula (g), and is also an efficiency

measure. Optimally, this ratio should be less than 1.0 for a long-term

work training program.

Table V.3 summarizes the formulas given above. Results of calculations

using these indicators are reported in Section C.

C. RESULTS

1. Numerical Results Throu h June 30 1979 and throw h December 31 1979

The data was analyzed on both a site-by-site and a combined basis.

Table V.4 includes data through December 31, 1979 for all eight sites.

The inclusion of three additional sites since the last Interim Report

has lowered the simple ratio of work value to total expineicure from

60 percent to about 42 percent. The reason for this is that the formerly

e xcluded sites were not completely exemplary in reporting and, apparently,

were not efficient managers of their resources.

Table V.5 presents the numerical values for the aggregate and value-added

indicators, and reports the total number of jobs included in the calculations. The formula (c) ratio indicator, "value created per doller of

direct job expenses," varies from 0.618 to 1.510. When overhead and

start-up costs are included, using formula (b), the range drops to 0.178

to 0.756. Of course, these indicators take nr account of program benefits

such as the increased probability of employment and increased future

e arnings.

As part of their on -site aboassments of job value, Crawford 6 Co. evaluated the quality of the work done relative to local contractor norms.

Crawford 6 Co.'s judgements for 42 jobs are listed in Table V.6, which

shawl that 87 percOnt 'f the ratings are "average" or "above average."

Moreover, favorable ratings appear to be increasing as the project

matures.

23.4 0

..
Table V.7 measures timeliness of job completion. Smaller jobs took less

time to complete, as would be expected. Shortages in materials or

weather problems accounted for most of the delays in what should have

been brief jobs.

More detailed evaluation can be made about the relative values produced

by each site, each type of job, and each type .of craft. The procedure

used for this is a simple (daeway analysis of variance, a technique was

used on a sample of 275 jobs. Three tables of the formula (e) indicator

value ad4ed per dollar of direct youth labor, were prepared (see Tables

V.8aV.8c). I.. each table, the valueadded ratios differ significantly.

The numbers in the tables do not include the concordance adjustment, nor

are any reports on Forr. VI incladed, (so Newark data are missing).

These tables will be refined in future analyses, but the improvements

have been deferred because of some stillunanswered questions about the

usefulness of the formula (e) indicators visavis the formula (b) or

formula (c) indicators.

Finally, Table V.9 shows the numbers and types of jobs completed and in

progress. Two versions of this table are given: the first shows the

percentage of job types per site and throughout VICI, based on a sample

of 791 jobs. The second includes all jobs reported through midMarch 1980.

In summary, job performance, as measured in Tables V.4 and 5, is perhaps

not exceptional, but, on the other hand, is providing a fair return on

each .liar spent. As the program proceeds and matures, improvements

cars be expected in those sites with lower value ratios. However, not

all sites should be expected to be outstanding; there will inevitably be

variations in performance among sites, due to many factors.

2. Development of the Work Valuation System

The numerical analysis described above is only part of the evaluation

task, The second part is to develop and refine a system of work valua

tion monitoring and evaluation reporting which can be used by other

youth employment programs. The system was outlines in Tables V.1V.3.

It consists of a set of data alection forms (Tp:,le V.1), a process for

data collection and handling (Table V.2), and a Let of analytical equa

tions and indicators (Table V.3). The system is currently working, and

it provided the results described above. However, its principal use to

date has been for making; interim evaluations. Its potential for ongoing

monitoring and management has not yet been developed, for two reasons:

1. Data collection, processing, ani analysis is done on a

quarterly basis and does not produce timely -sports or

quick feedback either to VICI project officers or to

VICI site management. Converting the reporting to a

monthly basis would increase the costs; but without timely

reporting, much of the usefulness of these reports for

quick identification and correction of problems may be

lost.

215
2. The potential users of the analytical reports may not

understand the concepts, equations, and indicators, and,

hence, may not be able to use the reports for monitoring

or management purposes. Some investment in training may

be necessary if the system is to be extended to other

projects.

The work valuation system is a good and useful evaluation tool; the

methodology can be replicated; the procedures are straightforward; and

the results are accurate and verifiable. However, the system does

require some analytical sophistication and willingness to learn on the

part of users. For large applications, a subcontractor would probably

be needed to halldle the computing, though small projectb, consisting of,

say, one hundred jobs or less, could use the system manually.

As the system has developed, a number of refinements have been madein

it:

1. Items and formats of the data collection forms (Table V.1)

were changed frequently in the first months, due to certain

ambiguities in the forms and the need to train users.

2. Data collection and handling seem to be working smoothly

Table V.2), but some sites are very slow in forwarding

completed forms, resulting in a lack of data. A possible

improvement in this process could be more frequent reporting

of the type of results shown in Tables V.3 and V.5, but this

would raise - .costs.

3. The data analysis formulas (Table V.3) are still evolving.

The following sections describes some refinements and

further improvements are possible.

4. Delays in data reporting from sites have led to the use

of projection formulas which fill in the missing data.

These formulas were used in this and in preceeding

reports, and are still undergoing refinement.

5. Staff turnover at VICI sites results in a frequent need

to train new staff in usilg the work value forms. This

problem is handled by CPPV.
D. CONCLUSION: HOW GOOD CAN A VICI PROJECT BE?

Evaluation of a VICI project should be based on realistic expectations

and standards of performance. That is, a set of maximum values for

performance indicators must first be established; a VICI program can then

be measured against these standards. For instance, one mfg'ir ask: What

are realistic numerical values for the ratios shown in fable V.5? What

is the best value for each ratio? The comparative data shown in the

updated Table V.5 provide one estimate of the best value each of five

ratios. Another approach would be to establish, on empirical and/or

theoretical grounds, the "best".values of the work value ratios (indicators). In this section, we discuss the question of efficiency, using

comparative data from eight sites, and consider empirical and theoretical interpretations of the indicators' range of values.

1. Reformulating the Efficiency Equation

In terms of work valuation, the overall economic efficiency of a project

is defined in terms of a simple output-to-input ratio (see Table V.3,

formula (b)), thus:

Project's 'overall economic

efficiency indicator

Concorded work value created

= Total of direct and indirect

expenditures for this project

This formula expresses the value of the work created during a VICI project;

it does not include any other direct benefit (such as the employment effects

on trainees) or secondary benefits (such as the effect of VICI expenditures

on the local economy).

Based on this formula, estimates of work value ratio for the eight VICI

projects range from a low of 0.178 to a high of 0.756 (see Table V.5, update).

This wide range from minimum to maximum value has prompted a reformulation

of the overall efficiency equation, as follows:

Overall Job- Management/

. economic related Allocation

efficiency = efficiency X efficiency

indicator indicator indicator

These three efficiency indicators can be expressed as:

Conrorded work Concorded Work Direct job costs

value = value X Total of expendiTotal of expen- Direct job costs tures

ditures

217
These values are found in Table V.3 as: (formula b) (formula c) x

(formula h).

As an example, consider the Atlanta data shown in Table V.10. Data on

number of jobs, concorded work value, direct job-related costs, and total

VICI site expenditures are given for each quarter of 1979. The totals

rise steadily over each quarter, as do the three efficiency indicators.

This trend probably reflects the project's increasing maturity over time.

Note, however, that the rate of increase differs for each indicator.

Three reasons for this disparity are:

1. The job-related efficiency indicator rises from 0.583 to

0.673, a small change. This ratio measures the value of

the work done against the actual cost of doing the work.

Improvements over time would indicate increasing productivity of the youth crews. The reported information used

here is based on estimates, however, and does not represent

a final accounting, so these values are provisional. However,

they may be representative for this project.

Two factors explain the changes in the job-related efficiency indicator. The first is the hypothesis of increasing

productivity over time. The second may be stated thus:

different types of jobs (carpentry, painting, small repairs,

etc.) appear to have different job-related efficiency values

for the youth crews:

A youth crew, working primarily on painting public

housing apartments (as in the Newark site) can be

very productive compared with professional painters.

This is because the youths use the same tools and

techniques, and achieve nearly the same speed in

painting, but their wages are much lower than those

of professionals. In these cases, the job-related

efficiency ratio may exceed 1.0; that is, the

youth crews are more productive, per dollar spent,

than the professionals.

In contrast, where the work is particularly complex

and requires knowledge and experience, it is unlikely

that the youth crews' productivity will rival that

of professionals. Some sites undertake these more

complex jobs (e.g., larger home repair projects);

hence, expectations of those sites' productivity

and of the job-related economic efficiency indicators should be lowered. A ratio of 0.5 or less

would perhaps be appropriate for such jobs, especially where inexperienced crews are involved.

These factors may, however, cancel out one another. A site

may work on simple jobs until the crews are experienced and

then tackle complex jobs in order to provide them with more

218
training. Thus, the effects described in the first. example

would be offset by those of the second example, and the jobrelated efficiency indicator will not increase dramatically.

2. The management/allocation efficiency indicator for Atlanta

rises from 0.22 to 0.41 over the'four quarters. The 0.41

ratio is about equal to the median value for the eight

sites. Its ratio measures the direct, job-related costs

versus total expenditures. A project should show an improving ratio over time, as startup. costs are spread over

a larger basis. This site already shows an improvement

in this ratio, and the final ratio may be even better.

3. The overall economic efficiency ratio is the product of

the two more specific indicators. This indicator more

than doubles over the four quarters due to a small increase in job-related efficiency and a larger increase

in management/allocation efficiency.

A preliminary indication of the overall efficiency of the VICI programs can

be based on the equation of the three indicators. The overall economic

efficiency is constrained, or limited, by the two specific efficiencies:

the job-related efficiency and the management/allocation efficiency.

2. Comparative Efficiency Ratios for Eight Sites

Table V.11 gives numerical values for the work value indicators for each

site, using the most recent data available. The column showing job-related

efficiency displays a range of 0.618 to 1.510 (reflecting program maturity

and complexity factors). Possibly, some of the lower ratios :...01 be

improved, and some additional on-site evaluation will be per.hri.r The

differences in concordance factors among sites are important hPrP.;

However, the range in numerical values found here seems re/14=01)1f:- and

the high values could be duplicated by other sites by chi ,,:ng tAie types

of jobs.

The management/allocation efficiency column of Table V.11 3hri.n n age of

0.209 to 0.658. The lower values represent some start-up 'Lie .sting

problems, but the highest value is found for a project whi'. hc peen

exemplary in reporting and attention to productivity. It G ,A appear

that a numerical value of 0.65 to perhaps 0.75 is optimal this ratio

in a VICI project. This means that between 65 aid 75 percent of al?

expenses are directly related to jobs and can be Identified as direct

costs. A different type of project--perhaps one o, a shorter duration,

focusing only on training-. doull have a much lower efficiency ratio of

this type.

The o, :rall economic efficiency ratios shown in the extreme right-hand

column of Table V.1.1 are the product cf the ratios discussed above. The

numerical %aluea range from 0.178 to 0.756. The lower values are due to

219
low management/allocation efficiency ratios. Optimal values for this

ratio would result from a job-related efficiency ratio of 1.0 cr greater

and/or a management/allocation efficiency ratio of 0.65 or grcatx, for

a combined product of 0.65 for the overall economic efficiency ratio.

Only'two VICI projects performed so well, Milwaukee and Newark. Overall

efficiency may be improved at other sites through managemew: efforts and

a reconstruction of missing reports.

3. Answering the Basic Question

Possible and expected numerical values for the three indilitors have been

suggested in this section. Values for job-related efficiency of 1.0 or

more, management/allocation efficiency of 0.65 or more, and overall

economic efficiency of 0.65 are perhaps reasonable from a:. empirical

and statistical perspective and can be actually attained, .is is apparent

from Table V.11. Hence, some specific expectations aboLt project performance can be established. However, further analys:ls c;' the reasons

for variations among project sites will help establish wlether there

suggested indicator values represent reasonable exp:taticns.
Table VI. Types of Data Collected and Forms Used

Iyof__

Ex.enditures:

VICI SITE Prepared

Quarterly

Fiscal

Report

Crawford

and.

Company

Reorts

Job-by-Job

Accountinelmortias Forms

Form VI Fcrn VII Form VII

(Final) (E:t;mate) (Final)

-

-Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-

-

- Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-

-

-

Yes

Yes

Yes

Revised

values

Yes

Yes

Yes

-

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

,

-

-

-

,

-

-

w

-

-

-

Yes

Yes

Yes

-

Yes

a. Administrative Items

Personnel, Office

Space

b. Services 5 Training

Items

. Youth Labor

d. Crew Chiefs

e. Job related, nonpersonnel items

Bid Estimates:

F. Private Contractor

aid Estimates

Identification:

g. Job Number

h. Job Description

i. Dates When Work was

Done

Other Data:

j. Judgements About

the Quality of Work

( 221
Table M. Flow of Data

DONE AT

VICI JOB

SITE

For larger Jobs:

Visit to Job Site,

Prepare work orders,

Material Requests, etc.

done by VICI persons

Prepare

VICI Form VII*

For Small Jobs: For Sample of Jobs:

Visit to Job Site,

Prepare work orders,

Materiel Requests, pm.

done by VICI persons

Work Is Work is Begun and Begun and

Completed omelette,

Prepare VICI Form

VIII*

DONE

BY CPPV y

Receives and Reviews Form

VII

Receives

and Re- views Form

VIII

DONE

BY MIS

Receives, Processes

and Analyses

Data

Visit to Job Site

by Crawford i Co.

Estimator, accompanied by VICI

person

ir

[Prepare Outside

E;timator

Form*

Accounting for

VICI

Expendi t

Prepare Quarterly I

Fiscal Report

Esceves and

Quarterly Fiscal

Report.

Quarterly Reports

on Work Value and Performance

Indicators2

*See Appendix II
Table 14 3. Data, Formulas and indicators

Part I. Data

a. Total Value of Jobs In Progress

or Completed, Forms VI, VII and VIII $ 82,696

b. Concordance ratio between VICt value

estimates and Crawford Values 1.059

c. Total expenditure to date, Quarterly

fiscal report $366,842

d. Total of Estimated or Actual Job

related expenses, reported on

Forms VI, VII and VIII $140,478

e. Total of Job Related expenses less

Youth labor Cost's 0 $ 62,549

f. Total of Job Related Youth Labor

Costs $ 77.929

g. Startup and overhead Costs -

difference between c and d. IP $226,364

Part II. Formulas and Indicators

formula a: Volt: of VICI work .a * b 82,696 * 1,059 $87,575

formula b: Value created per dollar of

expenditures (a * b) c formula c: Value created per dollar of

direct job expenses

formula d: Value added by Youth Labor

(a * b) d

(a * b) -

$ 0.239

$ 0.623

$25,026

formula e: Value added per dollar of

direct youth labor (a * b) -e) f $ 0.321

formula f: Startup and overhead costs

per dollar of direct youth

labor

formula g: Net value created by Youth

Labor

formula h: Ratio of direct costs to

total expenditure

formula I: Ratio of startup and

overhead costs to direct

job costs

f $ 2.905

f $ 2.584

d c $ 0.383

9 d $ 1.611

223

0
Table 11,4. The Aggregated Data Totals through December 31, 1979

for Most Sites

Site and Reporting

Period

(I)

Reporttd

Expenditures

to Ind of Period

(2)

Reported

Jobs

In Progress

or Completed

(3)

Aggregated Job Data Comtonents of Expenditures

Direct Cost

of Jobs in Concorded

Progress or Value

Completed of Jobs

(Estimated) (Estimated)

(4) (5)

Other Costs of Job Costs Not YoUth Labor Related Charged.

in Jobs Costs to Jobs

(6) (7) (8)

Atlanta

(December 31 1979) $ 777 556 31 $ 315,221 $ 212,127 $ 154,076 $ 161,145 $: 462,335

Droward

(December 11, 1979) 684 972

1)417226

310

5

418,562

619,219

409,577

0'4,618

210j875

245,892

207,687

373,327

266,410

798,007

Chicago

(Projected)

Milwaukee

(December 31 1979) 784,363 163 515,756 521,739 232,272 283,484 268,607

Newark

(Decemberlij 1979) 183 114 426 392,264 S92 136 187 379 204 885 390 850

New Haven

(December )1, 1979 792 374 86 326 80 251 05 1 1 21 1 5 588 465 571

Philadelphia

(September 30) 19791 702,528 40 147,122 155 271 27 894 119 228 555 406

South Bronx

iplberEdlISetert101

Totals .

29. 12476 76,695 891055

1 278 658

55,021

1 580 65

307,025

, 3 514 211 6 3 3 2 4 1 090 2 8 9 023 2 66. 468
Table V.5. Summary Table on Wbrk Value Ratios, Indicators With

and Without Overhead Included, through December 1979

Site and

Reporting Reported

Period Jobs

N.graialt...t.....licaln

Ratio:

(Concorded

Value) to

VICI Job

Cost w/o 0/H

Trirr

(3)

Ratio:

(Concorded

Value)ito

Total of VICI

Costs to Date

Value Added Indicators

Dollar Value

Added Per $

of Youth

Labor, No

Overhead

'71.77.--orn

. (5)

Overhead

Per $ of

Youth

Labor ih

Jobs

Dollar

Value

Added with

Overhead

Included

(1) (2)

Toliiir---

(4)

7O FT

(6)

form 3-form f,

(7)

Atlanta

December 31, 1 79 31 0.673 0.273 $0.331 $3.000 $-2.67

Broward

(December 31 1979) 310 0.979 0.598 $0.957 $1.163 $-0.31

Chicago

5 0.728 0.318 $0.314 $3.245 $-2.0

.....(22jected)

Milwaukee

(December 31 1979) 163 1,012 0.66,5 $1,025 . $1,156 S-0.3

Newark

(December 31 1979) 426 1.510 0.756 $2,128 $2.09 PO 04

New Haven

(December 31 1979) 86 0 W 0 317 $0.500 , 079 -2 58

Philadelphia

(September 30, 1979) 40 1.655 0:221 $1.292 $19.91 $18.62

South Bronx

lyytember 30 1979 29 0.618 0 1 8 0 14 $4.446 $-4 13

0,' 4 0 41. 0.852 $2 48 1 0

Totals (Weighted Avera es

2'] 2
Table V.6. independent Estimators Ratings of,Job Quality

Based on a Sample of 42 Jobs

Judgement

Rating \

Based on Avera.e Work of a Professional Contractor)

Far Below

Averae

Below

Avera.e Aver . Above

. Far Above

ra e Total Count

on Ratin s

kppearance of the

Flnal Product 1 4 16 11 0

. 32

Preparation of

Work Surfaces

and Cleanup 1 6 18 9 0 34

Quality of

Materials Used 0 0 32 5 0 37

Quality of

Workmanship

of Job

. 2 14 16 10 0 42

Total 4 14 92 35 0 . 145

-(2) 2.78 9.7% 63.4%

. 24.1% .0% 99.9%

2 1 0.0)
1 Table V.7. Completion Time by Job Type

yType of Job

Time to Complete

1 week

or less

1-4

Weeks

5-8

Weeks

2-3

Mths.

4-5

Mths.

6 Mths.

or Less Total

Small Home Repairs 40 25 2 1 2 - 70

Large' Home Repairs 4 17 9 5 3 1 39

Rehab / Major Repairs

Unoccupied Dwellings - 10 1 4 - 15

Weatjerization 12 2 - - - - 14

Painting 321 99 4 - - - 424

Rehab pf Vacant Shall -

- - 1 - - 1 Major Renovation Large

Public Building - 2 1 - - - 3

Malqtainance/Other 10 10 - - - - 20

, Total 387 165 17 11 5 1 586

Key: Small Home Repairs: Estireted materials cost less then $500.00

Large Home Repairs: Estimated materials cost between 500 and 1000

Rehabilitation: Major repairs on occupied dwellings cost over 1000

Painting: Estimated (apartments in public housing, major large buildings)

1 Data based on five sites reporting completed 12121 only through June 1979.

227

t_j)
TABLE V.8a

VALUE-ADDED RATIO, BY SITE (formula e)

Site

Count

on

Jobs

Mean Value - of Ratios

for each job

Standard error

of mean

Estimate

Atlanta 13 0.2632** 0.0533

Broward 128 3.2817 0.1062

Chicago 3 0.7097 0.0181

Milwaukee 75 1.3953 0.1414

New Haven 52 0.7314 0.0981

Philadelphia 4 1.2006 0.1627

TOTAL 275 2.0836* 0.0955

itThe "F" statistic for the comparison of between and within group

variance is 61.468.

**This numerical value of 0.2632 for Atlanta differs from the numerical

value of 0.239 found in Table VI-5. These two values are not calculated

using the same, or even similar, formulas. Formula (b) was used in

Table VI-5 whereas a variation of formula (e) is used in this table. The

difference in formulas are these factors:

(1) the concordance adjustment has not been included in this table,

(2) overhead and start-up costs have not been included in this table,

(3) the values in this table are derives from an unweighted summation

of the individual ratios, whereas the Table VI-5 approach uses

an implicit weighting of ratios.

The text comments that the use of formula (b) or (c) indicators should

be used as alternatives to the formula (e) indicator. The formula (e)

model was used in the March Interim Report.

Notes: (1) These means are based on formula (e) but the concordance

adjustment has not been applied. Since the sites seem

to overstate the private contractor bids, these valueadded ratios are an overstatement of the true value.

(2) Overhead and start-up costs have not been included.

(3) As the text discusses, the use of the formula (b) or (c)

indicators should be studied as an alternative to the

formula (e) indicator. The formula (e) model was used

in the March Interim Report.

(4) These are unweighted means, i.e., the overall mean is

derived from the product of the mean by category multiplied by the number of jobs per category.

228
Table V8B. Value Added Ratio by Type of Job (Formula (e) Used)

Type of Job

Count

on

Jobs

Mean Value

of Ratios

for each job

Standard error

of Mean

Estimate

Small home repairs 57 2.4268 0.2609

Major home repairs 76 1.7378 0.1523

Rehabilitation 33 1.6323 0.2610

Weatherizing 13 0.8557 0.2416

Painting 75 2.5195 0.1698

Rehabilitation of Shells 5 0.8903 0.1781

Major-Public Buildings 11 2.8113 0.3905

Maintenance 4 3.1526 0.5006

Other 0 0.0 0

Total 274 2.0888* 0.0957

The "F" statistic for the comparison of between and within group variance

is 4.595.

Motes: Same as for Table V.8A.
Table V.8C. Value Added Ratio by Craft (Formula (e) Used)

Type

of Craft

Count

on Jobs

Mean Value

of Ratios

for each Job

Stareard error

of Mean

Estimate

Carpentry 109 1.5453 0.1549

Masonry 24 3.0989 0.2021

Roofing 0 0 0

Painting 114 2.1131 0.1354

Plumbing 11 3.7270 0.5064

Electrical 16 2.9441 0.2803

Other 1 1.1818

Total 275 2.0836* 0.0955

11MOD

* The "F" statistic for the comparison of between and within group variance

is 9.036.

Notes: Same as for Table V. 8a

230

2''
Table V.9. Percentage of Job Types Completed and in Progress

Site Atlanta Broward Chicago Milwaukee Newark New

Haven

Phila.

Date of Start-up 1/79 10/78' 10/78 10/78 10/78 10/78 10/78 Total

Type of Job

Small Home Repair 22.6 37.0 11.3

Large Home Repair 20.0 14.3 - 58.3 - 15.1 75.0 14.8

Rehab/Major Repairs to Occupied

Dwellings 80.0 11.5 - 1.9 - lf.1 6.7

Weatherization - - - 24.' 29.0

Painting 41.5 - 1.9 89.4 40.9 - 53.5

Rehab: Vacant

Shell - 100 - - 2.2 25.0 0.9

Renovation:

Public Buildings 6.5 0.9 2.0 2.'? 3.2

Maintenance - 3.2 - - 13.5 6.8

Tote]. %* 100 100 100 99.9 99.9 10n.2 100 100

Total No..of Jobs 15 217 3 108 347 93 8 791

*Totals may not add to 100Z due to rounding.
Table V.9 (Update). Number of Jobs Completed or Started

Site and

Reporting Period

Atlinta

(mid-March 1980)

Broward

(mid-March 1980)

Job Projected Projected

Reports Direct (Concorded)

in Hand Job Costs Work Value

40 $406,736 $273,713

318 429,363 420,146

Chicago 5 No change from Table V-4

Milwaukee 198

(mid-March 1980)

Newark 501

(mid-March 1980)

New Haven 91

(mid-March 1980)

Ph6adelphia

South Bronx

635,580 655,119

448,513 695,635

346,336 265,598

40 No change from Table V-4

29 No change from Table V-4

2.78

232
Table V.10. Illustration of the Reformulated Indicators for Atlanta

Period

Number

of

Jobs

Data Indicators

Concorded

Work

Value

Direct

Job Related

Costs

Total

VICI Site

!Tr litures

Job

Related

Efficiency

Management/

Allocation

Efficiency

Overall

Efficiency

(a) (b) (c) (a ; b) (b ; c)

la . 1) = al

q sc. C7

March 30, 1979

June 30, 1979

Sept. 30, 1979

Dec. 31, 1979

7

14

22

31

24,818

94,318

151,870

212;127,

42,579

151,284

234,010

315,221

193,829

391,516

567,805

777,556

0.583

0.623

0.649

0.673 .......,

0.220

0.386

0.412

0.405

0.128

0.241

0.267

0.273

2:J
CS Table V.11. Reformulation of the Work Value Indicators

Site

Data Indicators

Concorded

Work

Value

Direct

Job Related

Costs

Total

V1CI Site

Expenditures

Job

Related

Efficiency

Management/

Allocation

Efficiency

Overall

Economi

Efficien

(a) (b) (c) (a ; b) (b ; c)

fa . b = a

Vi7 c Z

Atlanta 212,127 315,221 777,556 0.673 0.405 0.273

Broward 409,577 418,562 684,972 0.979 0.611 0.598

Chicago 450,618 619,219 1,417,226 0.728 0.437 0.318

Milwaukee 521,739 515,756 784,363 1.012 0.658 0.665 , Newark 592,136 392,264 783,114 1.510 0.501 0.756

......I New Haven 251,305 326,803 792,374 0.769 0.412 0.317

Philadelphia 155,271 147,122 702,528 1.055 0.209 0.221

South Bronx 76,695 124,076 431,101 0.618 0.288 0.178

Data Source Table V.4

Col. 5 Col. 4 Col. 2

Calculated using formulas, also fou

in Table V.5.
I. The Origins of the Demonstration

Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI) is a demonstration

program funded by the Office of Youth Programs, U.S. Department

of Labor (DOL). The demonstration was created as part of a

Knowledge Development Plan which was to guide the expenditure

of discretionary funds appropriated by Congress for the Youth

Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977. The VICI

demonstration was to replicate an exemplary youth program

model in a variety of settings. OYP selected the newly created

Corporation for Public/Private Ventures, Inc. as an "intermediate

unit" to design and manage the demonstration and the research

that would accompany it. CPPV chose to replicate a model program based on the essential features of the Emergency Home Repair

Program of Portland, Oregon, under which previously unemployed

young people repair the homes of low income and elderly people.

Each of the eight CETA prime sponsors.involved in the demonstration was to operate a program for 18 months with a.capacity of

60 youth, who could be enrolled for no more than 12 months each;

thus, over the course of the program, each site was expected to , enroll a:minimum.of 120 youth. The demonstration sites began

operating their programs one at a time,'from September 1978

through February 1979.

The VICI'demonstration thus had several elements. It was

testing a program model based on the Emergency Home Repair
Program in a variety of settings. Even more fundamentally, it

was testing a concept--the idea of replicating,a program model

under a variety of conditions. And it was also testing a mechanism--CPPV--as an intermediate unit to develop and manage the

operation of a governmental employment and training program.

Thus, CPPV was to be both a test,-)r of models and a model to be

tested.

This interim report is part of the research effort that is

accompanying the VICI demonstration. This report will attempt

to record and analyze the process by which the demonstration was

conceived and mounted. When the first VICI programs began to

recruit young people in September 1978, this step was, in fact,

the result and outgrowth of efforts that were set in motion in

early 1977. To understand the nature of the VICI demonstration

and the context in which it was to take place, one must examine

the emergence of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects

Act of 1977 and the efforts being undertaken at the Ford Foundation and the Department of Labor as the outlines of the impending youth legislation were becoming clear.

A. The Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977

Youth unemployment has been a serious and steadily worsening problem in the United States throughout the post-World. War

Two period. During the 1950 s and early 1960's, national attention was focused on the rising unemployment rates among youth.

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 established such programs

as the Neighborhood Youth Corps and the Job Corps to provide work

experience and training for disadvantaged and unemployed young

235

26'3
people. But as the nation confronted two recession in the

.first half of the 1970's, resources were shifted away from

youth towards efforts to aid unemployed adults, who were often

heads of households and primary wage earners

In the mid-1970's, however, interest in youth unemployment

grew as the jobless rate among teenagers, particularly minority

teenagers, reached levels of 40 percent or more. Roger Wilkins

wrote in The New York Times that:

Urban affairs experts agree that one of the most

important problems facing American cities is the

unemployment and perhaps the unemployability, of

large numbers of poor youngsters, many of them

members of minority groups.

And Forbes Magazine noted, "The hardest knot in the whole unemployment tangle consists of just short of 400,000 minority group

16-to-19-year-olds, most of them black."*

During the 1976 Presidential campaign, candidate Jimmy

Carter made youth unemployment a major campaign theme, and early

in his administration he announced major plans to combat youth

unemployment. These were presented in conjunction with a massive

economic stimulus package he submitted to the Congress.

A few months later the President signed into law the Youth

Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 (PL-95-93).

An initial $1 billion a4ropriation for this legislation had

NN

been provided by the Economlb,,Stimulus Appropriations Act (PL 95-29),

approved May 13, 1977, in anticipation of the youth legislation.

\.

*See, Roger Wilkins, "A New Approach to Job Problems of

City Youth," New York Times, January 16, 1978, p. A23; and

"The Jobless Teens," Forbes (February 6, 1978), p. 62.

236
YEDPA, which was signed by the President on August 5, authorized

four programs:

* The Young Adult Conservation Corps, which provides

year-round programs employing youth in public parks,

forests, and recreation areas. Modeled after the

Depression-era CCC, this program would be administered

by the Departments of Agriculture and Interior under

an inter-agoncy agreement with DOL. It had a firstyear budget of $233 million, and it was the only

YEDPA program assured of three-year funding rather

than a single-year appropriation.

* The'Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects (Fintitlement), which would test the results of guaranteeing a job and/or training to all economically

disadvantaged 16-to-19-year-olds residing in selected

areas who agreed to enter or remain in school during

the period of entitlement. Some $115 million was

budgeted for the first; year of, the program.

* Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects

(YCCIP), which was also budgeted at $115 million.,

This program would hire young people,to work,on community improvement prOjects, ranging from housing

rehabilitation to energy conservation.

* Youth "ThIployment and Training Programs, which extended

the wide range of existing programs to enhance the

job prospects of youth through career information,

work experience, and other activities.. Some 22 percent

of the YETP funds were, earmarked for.in-school programs to forge closer ties.betweeb school officials

and employment and training officials.

The responsibility for administering YEDPA was placed in

the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Administration,

It created a new Office of Youth Programs (0YP).to administer

the newilinitiatives aF ',:311 as existSng DOL youth programs,

such as the Jet Corps,. and the Summer Program for Economically

Disadvantaged Youth (SPEDY). As director of the new Office of

Youth Programs, DOL chose_ROgert Taggart, formerly eXecutive

directoi'of :he National Manpower Policy Task Force,

The vast majority of the funds appropriated for YEDPA were

to be allocated by formula among the 445 "prime sponsors"

237
established under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act.

However, the Act also provided the Secretary of Labor with discretionary authority over 21 percent of the YCCIP funds, 13 percent of the YETP funds, anl all of the funds for Entitlement

Projects. A substan'Aal portion of these discretionary funds

were to be used to support a range of demonstrations, experiments, and evaluations. Section 348(a)(1) of the Act specified

that:

The Secretary of Labor is authorized, either directly or by way of contract or other arrangement, with prime

sponsors, public agencies and private organizations

to carry out innovative and experimental programs to

test new approaches for dealing with the unemployment

problems of youth and to enable eligible participants

to prepare for, enhance their prospects for, or

secure employment in occupations through which they

may reasonably be expected to advance to productive

working dives.

YEDPA was, after all, a "Demonstration Projects Act." It

not only sought to stimulate the economy and ameliorate unemployment but also to encourage research and experimentation as

a means of developing the knowledge needed to formulate more

effective long-term national policies and programs to aid young

people in moving into the labor force.

To assure productive and coordinated use of the YEDPA funds,

DOL officials formulated a Knowledge Development Plan to design,

organize, and guide the discretionary allocations. With some

$100 million in discretionary funds, the DOL clearly needed a

well-developed plan not only for intellectual and administrative

purposes, but also to provide a framer -Irk within which the

political pressure for access to thes eunds could be contained.

The Knowledge Development Plan listed a set of goals and

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objectives and went on to specify ten demonstration projects

and eight spgial studies which were designed to help answer

the questions that DOL officials believed were important to the

design of effective youth employment policies.

The Knowledge Development Plan proposed three demonstrations projects under the YCCIP program. One would explore the

value of utilizing neighborhood-based Community Development

Corporations for planning and running community improvement projects. This demonstration would use funds transferred from DOL

to the Department of Housing and Urban Development and then to

various community development corporations. A second demonstration would "explore the feasibility of federal inter-agency

work projects," by developing arrangements through which other

federal agencies would be linked to community improvement youth

projects.

The third demonstration, which would become the VICI project, was described in the Knowledge. Development Plan as:

a special effort to replicate in 5 - 10 communitizs

around the country a selected Community Improvelt

Program model drawn from a review of both appropre

past programs and designs of projects financed

through the formula allocation for Community Improvement.

A crucial element in this case was that:

This program replication demonstration project will

be undertaken by a nonprofit corporation, established

under private foundation auspices, staffed with individuals with particular experience and expertise

in the area of community conservation and improvement

work.

The Knowledge Development Plan identified three "underlying objectives of this demonstration project." They were:

(a) to demonstrate and test the feasibility and

effectiveness of a replicating methodology

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itself (i.e., how and under what conditions can the

program model be adequately replicated in various

communities);

(b) to develop and refine a "work valuation" methodology

which may eventually be incorporated into the

formula-funded Community Improvement type efforts;

(c) to compare the post-program experience of youth

participating in the replicated program . . . with

those for a comparable group of young people of

similar backgrounds who have participated in other

manpower programs . . . in the same localities.

While the project which would become the VICI demonstration

was outlined in the Knowledge Development Plan released in the

fall of 1977 following the passage of the Youtn Employment

Demonstration Projects Act, the groundwork for the VICI demonstration and the organization which would operate it was being

laid well before the Knowledge Development Plan appeared.

B. The Creation of CPPV

As the new Carter Administration began displaying increasing

interest in youth unemployment in early 1977, these developments

were being closely watched by staff members of the Ford Foundation in New York. Ford, the nation's largest philanthropic

foundation, had for many years been interested in youth unemployment. Mitchell Sviridoff, the vice president for national

affairs, had an abiding personal interest in issues of work and

employment. In early 1977 he became increasingly concerned that

the federal government was moving toward what he saw as a repetition of the 1960's, when massive sums of money were thrown

into social programs with little sense of how to deal effectively

with problems.
In February 1977, Sviridoff asked Michael Bailin to survey

existing youth employment programs and to identify exemplary

programs. Bailin, a young lawyer who had been an officer of

Franconia College and a consultant to several New York City

municipal agencies, was soon joined in this project by Hilary

Feldstein, a long-time Ford Foundation consultant. Soon, Sviridoff would ask Graham Finney to head the effort. Finney, an

occasional Ford consultant, had previously been a Deputy Superintendent of Schools in Philadelphia and Commissioner of the

Addiction Services Agency in New York City.

This team consulted with some 27 national organizations as

well as a variety of state and local organizations, and it talked

to numerous knowledgeable individuals. The result was the development of an inventory of over 150 youth programs. Over

0

two-thirds of these were contacted by telephone, and over 30

sites were visited, chiefly by Bailin.

During the summer of 1977, however, Sviridoff began to talk

with Robert Taggart, who was then head of a youth employment

task, about the youth employment legislation that was being developed by the Administration. The Department of Labor was

also developing a Knowledge Development Plan and pr "p ging to

mount several demonstration programs. Sviridoff pr aggart

began focusing on the use of intermediary units to mount demonstration projects, using Ford Foundation funds to help finance

the launching of such demonstrations.

Amid these talks, the nature of the project Finney was

heading began to change. The emphasis on uncovering innovative

youth programs began to be eclipsed by increasing interest in

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designing a mechanism which might mount demonstration prbgrams.

By the late summer of 1977, there was an emerging concensus on

the use of intermediary nonprofit corporations to operate some

of the demonstrations that were to be mounted under the YEDPA

legislation. While Sviridoff talked to Taggart about the role

of Ford Foundation funds in helping to create these nonprofit

corporations in August or September, Sviridoff also began inquiring into Finney's interest in heading such a corporation.

Sviridoff's interest in furthering the use of intermediary

units was an outgrowth of his long-standing views about effective utilization of scarce public resources. Since becoming

Ford Foundation vice president of national affairs in the late

1960's, he had made large grants to support institutional approaches to social issues which combined the energy and resources

of both the public and private sectors. Thus, one major Ford

Foundation program had been support of community development

corporations. Another major program of the National Affairs

Division had been the creation of the Manpower Demonstration

Research Corporation (MDRC) as an intermediary unit which would

design and manage a demonstration of "supported work" on behalf

of the Department of Labor and other federal agencies.

Graham Finney shared much of Sviridoff's outlook. He had

written the original Ford Foundation paper proposing the creation

of MDRC to operate the national supported work demonstration.

And 'he had recently been managing partner cf the Philadelphia

Partnership, which sought to bring together leaders from the

city's public and private sectors in joint efforts at ameliorating

local problems.

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Thus, in September 1977, the Ford Foundation released an

information paper which had Finney prepared called "PublicPrivate Partnerships to Address the Employment Problems of Youth."

This paper spelled out precisely what a new intermediate unit

might look like and what role it might fill in helping to achieve

the objectives of YEDPA.

The nascent Office of Youth Programs was clearly receptive

to talk of intermediary units. Taggart had an intellectual

interest in testing alternative mechanisms for mounting programs

and delivering services. Moreover, OYP had been created de novo

to administer a giant program which had to immediately begin

dispensing money to help stimulate the economy and ameliorate

conditions at the same time it was to pursue longer term goals

of knowledge development. As Harriet Michel, OYP's director of

youth employment programs,told a March 28, 1978 CPPV board

meeting, OYP was under heavy pressure to "get the money out on

the street," yet it had a very small staff. About 40 staff

people would be in charge of programs under YEDPA, and only a

few of them would be available to deal with discretionary funds.

Many of them were new to Washington and the bureaucratic maze

that characterized the Department of Labor. Thus, OYP had administrative as well as intellectual reasons to support such

alternatives as intermediate units. And the prospect of receiving foundation funds, permitting OYP to husband its own

limited resources, made this mechanism even more attractive.

Because Sviridoff's goals coincided with those of Taggart,

the two gradually agreed to work together. Ir an October 11,

1977 letter to Sviridoff, Taggart said:

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The Office of Youth Programs is delighted that the

Ford Foundation is willing to devote its energies

and resources to the challenging experimental and

demonstration efforts mandated by the Youth Employ- ment and Demonstration Projects Act.

Taggart's letter went on to note that OYP's Knowledge Development

Plan and the Ford Foundation's information paper on "PublicPrivate Partnership to Address the Employment Problems of Youth"

both described ways in which "intermediate organizations" supported by foundation resources could provide managerial and

evaluation assistance to the government in undertaking innovative

projects and replicating the results. Taggart said that "four

special subject areas had been identified where such organizations will be'utilized":

1. Providing management monitoring and research guidance

for the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects;

2. Serving as a selection, support and evaluation

mechanism for innovative in-school projects;

3. Replicating high quality and innovative Community

Conservation and Improvement Projects in a number

cf localities; and

4. Developing a range of private sector initiatives

for youth and carefully testing their effectiveness.

Taggart's letter said arrangements had been made for MDRC to

provide assistance in the first area, but he indicated he would

like the Ford Foundation's help with the latter three. Taggart

noted, "For the exemplary in-school projects intermediary, we

would hlpe that the Ford Foundation could join with nonprofit

groups to provide needed support and would cooperate in gettirg

this off the ground." (Ultimately, a new entity called Youthwork would be created with Field Foundation support to operate

the in-school demonstration, as it became clear that leaders of
the American Federation of Teachers would be wary of any organization operating in the schAvilis.which was closely linked to

the Ford Foundation. The teachers' union and the Ford Foundation had been at odds since the Foundation's role in supporting

the controversial school decentralization experiment in the

Ocean Hill-Brownsville section of New York City.)

In contrast to the limited Ford Foundation role proposed for

in-school projects, Taggart wrote:

The community improvement replication and the private

sector initiatives intermediaries would be solely

Ford Foundation ventures or else the Foundation would

take the lead in finding other sources of support in

developing these organizations.

Given the urgency of the unemployment situation, Taggart said,

"It is important to get the community improvements project

underway rapidly," so he indicated that DOL:

would like t0 move ahead immediately to establish a

nonprofit Youth Employment Demonstration Corporation

which would implement the community improvement

efforts as soon as possible. When this planning is

completed, hopefully within 2 or 3 months, a decision

could be made whether to initiate a new organization

to manage the private sector initiatives project or

to continue it under the Youth Employment Demonstration Corporation.

By the end of October, what Finney calls a gentleman's

agreement was reached between Taggart and Sviridoff to the effect

that Ford Foundation funds would be used to launch a new intermediary unit, which Graham Finney would head and which would

operate the YCCIP and private sector initiatives demonstration.

Armed with a commitment for the two demonstrations, Sviridoff

could go to the Ford Foundation board to obtain start-up funds.

An internal account was created November 1, 1977, to support

the staff until a nonprofit corporation could be establisned.

245 2,93
The new entity was to be located in Philadelphia, at Finney's

insistence.

Finney hoped that if this new "gadget," as he called the

intermediate unit, demonstrated ability in handling the demonstration, it could go on to undertake other tasks. The name he

chose, the Corporation for Public and Private Ventures (CPPV),

not only suggested an interest beyond employment and training

programs, but also a focus on an area--the intersection of the

public and private sectors--rather than any substantive field

like employment and training.

Despite clear signs of aspirations going beyond the demonstrations, Finney approached the new enterprise conservatively.

He says he felt there was still much uncertainty, and he be- .

lieved DOL funding was not completely nailed down. Thus, the

new organization rented very modest quarters in center city

Philadelphia, but the space provided options for significant

expansion. On November 1, Michael Bailin, who had done the

field work in examining exemplary youth programs, formally

joined the new organization and would become its head of operations. Richard de Lone, who had been associated with Finney at

the Philadelphia School system and the New York City Addiction

Services Administration, became the head of planning and research. Two members of the support staff were also recruited,

and by mid-December CPPV had been incorporated as a nonprofit

corporation under the laws of Pennsylvania. Julia Robinson,

iirector of the Philadelphia Neighborhood Housing Services_

Program, had agreed to join CPPV in January 1978 to head the

VICI demonstration, and the process of recruiting field staff

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had begun. As 1977 came to an end, a board of directors also

was being recruited.

C. Designing the Demonstration

As the new Corporation for Public/Private Ventures was

establishing itself, it was also developing plans for the proposed YCCIP demonstration. It had to formulate the design of

the program which was to be replicated, the criteria for the

selection of sites, and the processes under which the programs

would be launched.

In the fall of 1977, CPPV had a mechanism without a message:

it was to replicate a model program, but it lacked a model. However, the Ford Foundation study of youth programs whidh Finney

and Bailin conducted in the spring of 1977 provided CPPV with

a broad background in existing youth employment programs. In

developing a model program for replication, according to an

early CPPV work plan, the program had to meet the following

criteria:

1. A community conservation and improvement focus,

meaning that the work performed by the youth would

result in tangible improvements in the community.

2. Year-around operation.

3. Substantive tasks for the youth, providing a basis

for the development of valid skills training and

producing products of lasting value to the

community.

4. Skilled supervisors and a supervisory - participant

ratio low enough to permit skills training.

5. Existence for at least a year with demonstrated

Ability to recruit and retain a complement of 40

or more young people and demonstrated ability to

complete work satisfactorily.
6. Built-in linkages to unions. employers, city government agencies, and to employment and training and educational opportunities.

7. Compatibility with the objectives of YEDPA and the DOL knowledge development plan.

Largely on the basis of the screening and field work Bailin

had undertaken as a consultant to the Ford Foundation, CPPV

identified three programs as approximating its criteria: Emergency Home Repair, Portland, Oregon; World of Work, Rochester,

New York; and Mavericak Service Corp., Hartford, Connecticut..

All three programs had been visited twice by CPPV officers.

While none of the three was a perfect fit in every dimension

required by the demonstration, the model selected for replication

was most closely based on the EHR program in Portland. Thus,

the model tended to be known at CPPV as "the augmented Portland

model."

The Portland EHR program offered both in-school and out-ofschool youth between the ages of 16 and 21 work experience and

skill training, while providing emergency repairs to the homes

of the poor, the elderly, and handicapped persons in Portland.

Participating youth were paid the minimum w.icm and could stay

in tne program for Lp to one year. Unioz jonrneymen provides

supervision and training. Seven journeymen, representing four

trades--carpentry, painting, cement work, and drywall work- -

supervised six work teams of up to six youth each. While enrolled in the program, youth either remained in school or pursued a GED. In addition, those demonstrating satisfactory performance received credit toward apprenticeship training.

Salaries of the journeymen instructors and participating youth

248 2;j6
were provided from CETA funds, while materials were paid for

by the Portland Development Commission out of its Community

Development Block Grant.

The original concept of the program was jointly developad

in 1971 by officials of the city's Youth Services Division, the

director of training for Partland's Associated General Contractors, and the Portland Development Commission. The program was

administered by the Portland public school system. There was

no single charasmatic personality or agency which stood out as

a guiding force of the program. Rather, a major distinctive

characteristic was the deep involvement of a variety of actors

representing trade unions and contractors, as well as the schools,

city agencies on youth and aging, and the local Family Court.

CPPV believed that the program's great strength was its

system of comprehensive institutional linkages which facilitated

smooth operation of the program and built in post-program placement opportunities 4 bringing together key institutions in a

new set of working relationships. As an early CPPV work plan

recognized:

The relatively small, homogeneous character of the

city no doubt helped achieve the degree of collaboration necessary to create and operate a text-book

model of inter-agency coordination and cooperation.

But the success of the program did not simply grow out of

any special traits of Portland's population. The work plan

noted that, "First, the glue which holds the institutional

linkages together is the simple fact that, above and beyond goodwill, the EHR program .provides something for each institutior

involved." CPPV added, "Conversely, the program is not a threat

249
to the interests of any group." Thus, despite special qualities

of Portland, CPPV added, "It is CPPV's assessment that such

cooperation can be replicated if careful attention is paid to

process and design. . The major weakness of the Portland model for a YCCIP replication was its focus on in-school since disadvantaged

out-of-school youth were to be the focus of the demonstration.

Thus, while endorsing the basic elements of the Portland

model, CPPV wept on to propose several modifications. Most

fundamentally the CPPV model would focus on training youth for

jobs rather than simply providing work experience, and the target population for the demonstration would be modified to focus

on out-of-school rather than in-school youth. Moreover, from

the Hartford and Rochester models, CPPV would borrow provisions

for incentives for good performance and strict rules to assist

in acclimating participants to the requirements of the wolscing

world.

CPPV also prNposed to include two planned variations as an

experimental aspect of the demonstration. One variation proposed was to have an education component in some programs but

not in others. OYP replaced this with variations in the range

of work undertaken under the rubric of community improvement:

however, the other planned variation would be in the supervisorparticipant ratios, Half the sites were to have a ratio of

12:1, a close approximation of the Rochester ratio, and the

other half would have a more closely supervised 6:1 ratio. These

variations would permit research on the importance of

250

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supervisory ratios in affecting the merits of both the training

provided and the community improvements produced.

Thus, the model to be replicated is generally referred to

as "the augmented Portland model." Interestingly enough, the

program chosen to be the centerpiece of CPPV's first demonstration was never visited by Graham Finney. Bailin went to Portland

twice, and in the fall of 1977 de Lone also visited the Emergency Home Repair program, however.

In addition to developing the program model for replication, CPPV staff members were also outlining the research program

that would accompany the demonstration. The major knowledge

goals of the demonstration, as listed in CPPV's revised work

plan, were:

* to determine whether a carefully replicated "model"

program produces greater impact per program dollar

than discretionary programs generated by other delivery systems (e.g., HUD CDC model). Impact is defined to include both the value of work performed

to the community and the contribution of.program

participation to the subsequent labor-force and/or

educational experience of youth;

* to test the impact of variations in nature of work

performed and supervisory ratio on both the value

of work performed and participant outcomes;

* to identify programmatic features which help disadvantaged and jobless youth successfully enter the

employment stream. . .; * to increase understanding of the process of replication itself and of the utility of "intermediate

units" in that process.

In pursuit of these knowledge goals, CPPV divided the research into three major tasks:

a. A comparison of the effectiveness of replicated

community conservation and improvement projects

with the effectiveness of other YCCIP's. . .

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b. Statistical analysis of determinants of (intrademonstration) success in "transitioning" youth

to subsequent employment, training or education. This analysis will attempt to illuminate what

works for whom under what circumstances. . . . c. A documentary analysis oaf the process of repli- cation itself.

Early in the spring of 1978, CPPV hired John M. Kelley to

head the VICI research. CPPV also engaged two outside research

contractors, RBS to undertake the quantitative research, and

Harvey Shapiro and Hank Blakely to conduct the documentary

analysis.

D. Defining CPPV's Relationship with DOL

In addition to developing a model and a process to guide

the VICI demonstration, early on CPPV also had to work out its

relationship with the Department of Labor and the CETA system.

At the outset, at least some CPPV staff members believed their

"intermediate unit" would operate independently of the CETA

system and that it would mount its demonstration subject to

regular OYP review of major decisions but without frequent

intervention by OYP. OYP's formal expectatici.s are uncleir:

The Knowledge Development Plan, for example, discusses the programs to be mounted by nonprofit corporations, but it doesn't

indicate what relationships these corporations would have to DOL.

In any case, CPPV began developing work plans which called

for it to select program operators subject to OYP approval and

to contract directly with them. Gradually, however, OYP began

to link the VICI demonstration more closely to the CETA system.

Following a November 29, 1977, planning meeting, for example,

252 3C;()
Taggart wrote to Finney that:

The work.plan needs to clarify the role of the prime

sponsor in this pfocess. It is important that the

prime sponsor not only be notified of interested prospective organizations but also be involved frum the

outset in the consultation and negotiations that

take place. The success of the programs locally will

depend to a large extent on the quality of the working relationships that is developed between these

two parties.

By the end of 1977, OYP had made it clear that it wishad

the demonstration to be operated through the CETA prime sponsor

system rather than independently of it. In contrast to the

national supported work demonstration, in which MDRC contracted

directly with local program operators, CPPV was to enter into

contracts with local prime sponsors, which would either operate

VICI programs themselves or delegate the operation to a subcontractor.

OYP officials argue that it might be appropriate to operatapart from the CETA system if a demonstration were to be developing new concepts and, as Joe Seiler of OYP says, "starting

from ground zero." Indeed, CPPV's private sector initiatives

demonstration, like the supported work demonstration, 'was to be

mounted independently of the CETA system. But Seiler says the

VICI demonstration was testing replication of a program, and

if the demonstration offered positive results, the logical consequences would include further replication across the country.

Since that process would have to occur within the CETA system,

OYP officials concluded that it would be inappr,priate to test

a model being replicated outside the CETA system.

In addition, OYP officials note that they were under

pressure from CETA prime sponsors and DOL regional offices not

253

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to go around the system again. The delegation of the Entitlement Projects selection process to MDRC hadIstirred fairly

intensive criticism of OYP in the field.

Howeve-7, CPPV officers were somewhat surprised at being

linked to the CETA system. As Michael Bailin notes, for better

or worse, "Going through the prime sponsors made it a different

kind of demonstrr.ion." He adds that, "My idea of an intermediary unit was that it would be more independent," and beyond

the change in concept, ha adds, "This set a precedent for DOL

setting future terms. We gave on the big issues, although we

couldn't really fight."

The decision to operate the demonstration through the prime

sponsors carried much is its train. It meant, for example,

that the regional offices of DOL would have a role in the demonstration. This was acknowledged in the winter of 1977-78 as

CPPV updated its work plans. The initial work plan simply said:

Although CPPV will have no formal relationship with

regional offices of DOL during the planning or operation of this demonstration, regional offices have a

potentially important role to play in helping disseminate and further replicate successful programs and

they will be kept fully informed throughout.

But a revised work plan added a section "3.3a Involvement of

DOL Regional Offices." This retainea the sentence just cited

but added that, "It is important that they be kept fully informed throughout the life of the demonstration." Moreover, it

said, "CPPV expects to seek the advice and counsel of regional

offices at key junctures throughout the life of the demonstration."

However, the regional offices gradually began'to assume

an even more specific, and importantant, role. After several

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changes of plans, DOL determined that the application package

for prospective VICI sites would be routed to the prime sponsors

through the DOL regional offices rather than through the DOL

national office. Moreover, originally CPPV and OYP talked in

terms of letting contracts for the VICI project from the national

DOL office, thus assuring standardization in their treatment.

However, DOL decided early in the spring of 1978 that contracts

would have to be processed through the DOL regional offices.

This would make the regional offices the contractors with prime

sponsors, and the regional grant officers would have legal responsibilities for various aspects of the contract. CPPV staff

met with DOL's Office of Field Operations to standardize the

regional office processes and a telex was sent out by OFO, outlining the roles of CPPV, national DOL, and regional DOL offices.

The regional offices would not play a major part in the review

of proposals, but a variety of questions about the substance of

the VICI projects would later be raised by regional DOL officials who had differing interpretations of their rights and obligations vis a vis the VICI programs in their region. The

delegation of contract responsibility to the regional offices

reflected several factors. A labor dispute within DOL's

Washington contracts office made it expedient to move the process of arranging contracts elsewhere. Moreover, there was the

traditional pressure from the regional offices for a stronger

role in activities occurring within their territory.

But the results of this series of decisions at DOL was to

significantly alter the role of CPPV, at least in the eyes of

its officers. Instead of operating apart from the ongoing

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employment and training system, it was be:oming a part of it.

At the March 28, 1978 board meeting of CPPV, Harriet Michel

rather pointedly said that the original role of the intermediate;

organizations was "grandiose" in terms of its freedom to act

outside the CETA system. According to the minutes of that meeting, she said that since all programs could not be run from the

national office, it had been decided that intermediate organizations like CPPV should be used to augment the national office.

This approach was not viewed as a way to diminish the CETA system but to illustrate ways to improve total DOL operations, she

said.

From the fall of 1977 to the spring of 1978, as the autonomy of CPPV slowly seemed to be eroding, CPPV's staff members

were informally divided into two groups. One group, led by

Michael Bailin, wanted to resist what they saw as encroachments

on CPPV's prerogatives. Others, including Finney and de Lone,

tended to be more willing to accept compromises and sought to

negotiate the best arrangements that could be obtained. But

both sides recognized that decisions regarding CPPV could ultimately be made unilaterally by OYP. OYP was a new office with

a staff made up of several newcomers to the Department of Labor,

but gradually it seemed inclined to absorb CPPV and VICI into

the ongoing DOL ways of doing business. This was symbolized in

the eyes of CPPV officers by the problems they perceived in

explaining to CPPV's DOL project officer that the organization

should not, in fact, be tiwyted as just another staff arm or

delegate agency of DOL. DOL was not as eager to accept that

view as CPPV was to offer it.

256 3").1
E. Site Selection and Notification

A major set of issues that emerged early 1978 revolved

around the number of sites, the procedure for selecting them,

and the duration of the demonstration. CPPV originally envisioned 10 to 12 sites, each operating a program for 18 months.

It intended to invite applications from as many sites as it

wished to have in the demonstration, and if some of them were

unable to develop a satisfactory program, then a second wave of

invitations would be sent out.

Early in 1978, however, OYP officials proposed to CPPV that

they fund 18 sites and cut the duration of the demo :stration to

12 months--with an eye toward refunding it for an additional

year once it was operating. CPPV perceived the effort to increase the number of sites as OYP's response to the Entitlement

Projects selection process, which left DOL facing a number of

angry and disappointed losers. CPPV refused to limit the demonstration to 12 months because Finney said this was too brief a

period to mount and conduct a program. But CPPV reluctantly

agreed to send application packages to more than 12 sites. While

the 18-month demonstration period was retained, in early 1978

CPPV began developing plans to invite 18 sites--this later

dropped to 15--and to recommend 12 of them for funding. In the

wake of the bitter Entitlement competition, this transformed

site selection into a competitive process in the eyes of some

sites, and to some extent it altered CPPV's relationship with

the applicants. Instead of helping them meet absolute standards,

some applicants would feel CPPV was judging them against one

another.

2573j5
In the fall of 1977 CPPV began to develop a list of potential sites for VICI programs. OYP had advised CPPV to develop

a list for OYP approval that focused on central cities, where

the problems of minority youth unemployment were most acute,

rather than on rural or suburban areas. Each of the cities on

CPPV's list was to have high levels of unemployment and poverty,

and, taken as a whole, the list was to offer geographical,

social, and economic diversity.

Near the end of 1977, CPPV provided OYP with a list of 50

cities--ten in each of five population categories. In reviewing

the list, OYP officials say they recognized they would have to

justify their choices not only in terms of need but also in response to other pressures. They were, for example, operating in

the wake of the bitter Entitlement. allocation process, and DOL

wanted to offer some solace to the losert and refrain from

giving more to the winners. OYP decision-making was also influenced by external concern over three sites: The White House

expressed an interest in the South Bronx, where President Carter

had promised aid, and Northeastern Ohio, where a major steel

plant was to be shut down. In addition, the Assistant Secretary

for Employment and Training wanted Central Harlem to be included

among the sites.

In early 1978 there was a period of extensive juggling of

sites and a half dozen lists of 25 cities were developed. But

in February a fairly definitive list of 25 potential sites was

sent to DOL regional administrators for comments. The regional

offices were essentially being asked to eliminate prime sponsors

in their areas which lacked the managerial skills to mount a

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demonstration effectively. Five of the 25 sites were eliminated

by the regional offices, and another five were eliminated at

DOL in Washington. Taggart says, "I carried the list to

[Assistant Secretary Ernest] Green and asked him 'which ones do

you want to go with' and in a 15-minute conversation he checked

off the list." The result was a list of 15 sites, which together

represented a broad mix of characteristics and had successfully

weathered not only tests of need but also managerial skills and

political realities.*

While the list of sites was being honed, CPPV was also

developing an application package to send to the prime sponsors

who would be selected. CPPV sent its first draft application

package to DOL in late December 1977, but it was not until late

March that this package would finally be approved. The process

for inviting applicants also changed significantly, reflecting

the changing relationship of CPPV to DOL. Initially CPPV wanted

to send the application packages directly to potential program

operators. But DOL first decided that CPPV should send this

material to prime sponsors and then that DOL would send the

applications to the primes, while CPPV itself wouldn't communicate directly with prime sponsors or potential program operators.

Ultimately, the invitation to apply for funding under the VICI

*The 14 prime sponsors invited to apply were those serving

Atlanta, Georgia; Broward County, Florida; Chicago, Illinois;

Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin;

Newark, New Jersey; New Haven, Connecticut; New York, New York;

Northeast Ohio; Oakland, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;

St. Louis, Missouri; and Washington, D.C. The New York City

prime sponsor was invited to apply for two grants, one for Central

Harlem and one for the South Bronx. Thus, it should be emphasized

there were to be 15 sites and 14 prime sponsors involved.

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3 'j7
demonstration was sent to the 14 prime sponsors via the DOL

regional letters in a memorandum from Assistant Secretary Ernest

Green dated March 28, 1978. Green noted that the demonstration's

basic aim "is knowledge development for improving youth programs

and policy," and he added:

To help achieve this goal, we have contracted with

the Corporation for Public/Private Ventures (CPPV)

to provide special resources to design, guide, and

research this demonstration.

The memorandum also directed those with further questions to

contact Julia Robinson at CPPV.

F. The y're... Iss of Developing and Reviewing Proposals

The 14 prime sponsors who received Green's March 28 memorandum inviting them to participate in the demonstration were

also invited to a workshop to be held in Philadelphia on

April 19th and 20th. The workshop, conducted by CPPV, was to

explain the VICI program's goals and guidelines in some detail

and launch the invitees on the process of developing proposals.

The Philadelphia workshop featured presentations by CPPV staff

members and individuals involved in Portland's Emergency Home

Repair program. During the day-and-a-half workshops, the plenary

sessions and small group meetings sought to acquaint local

officials with both the program to be replicated and the process

that was to be followed in preparing and submitting a proposal.

Discussions ranged from broader aspects of the Portland program

and the VICI demonstration to the details of labor regulations,

participant medical examinations, and myriad other subjects.

The workshop also sought to explain tae outlines of the research

260 ,t3:)8
accompanying the demonstration, and an underlying objective of

the workshop was to make it clear that CPP7 was responsible for

mounting the demonstration under a mandate from DOL.

Audience reaction was generally favorable at the workshop.

Many agreed the meeting was well organized and sought to clarify

potential questions, but there was nonetheless some uncertainty

as to the role of CPPV and the relative importance of research

vs the provision of service in the VICI program. Many participants were somewhat overwhelmed by the volume of information

to be digested. A discordant note was sounded by a staff member

of a DOL regional office who raised a number of questions about

the demonstration. Moreover, some participants were a bit

troubled by CPPV's inability to provide on-the-spot answers to

all questions raised. These led some prime sponsors to conclude

CPPV was uncertain about aspects of its program while others believed it simply showed that CPPV was caught up in changing

priorities at OYP.

There were two important changes that occurred around the

time of the workshop. The day the workshop began, OYP refused

to receive and approve proposals one at a time, as CPPV expected.

Instead, OYP insisted that it must receive all proposals before

making its choices. Some felt this gave the selection process

even more of a competitive air.

Another change occurred shortly after the workshop. The

application package listed two alternative supervisory ratios

as one of the planned variations in the demonstration, and at

the workshop the 15 sites drew straws which gave some as 12:1

ratio and others a 6:1 ratio. The latter was obviously more

261

3 di
desirable since it provided funds for a more tightly managed

demonstration. Many of the would-be participants were wary of

the 12:1 ratio. Milwaukee, for example, made it clear at the

Philadelphia workshop that it would not participate if it drew

a 12:1 ratio; however, it drew a 6:1 1%,tio.

After the Philadelphia workshop, CPPV officials met with

leaders of the international building trades, unions in Washington, who said that if their local unions asked if they should

participate in programs with a 12:1 supervisory ratio, the

international leaders would advise them not to do so. Shortly

afterwards, the Broward County prime sponsor called CPPV to

inform the staff that all of the trade unions contacted had refused to participate because of the 12:1 ratio. Thus, there

was grol.:.:g concern at CPPV about the ability to mount a demonstration with the ratio.

On May 1, 1978, CPPV called OYP to explain these problems,

and on May 3, Harriet Michel wrote to CPPV to state that DOL

had decided to settle for a6.1 ratio for all accepted programs

to avoid potential problems with the unions. The letter stated

that additional funds necessitated by the increased number of

supervisors would be met by DOL and that CPPV should inform the

prime sponsors of the change in supervisory ratios.

In retrospect, Joe Seiler of OYP says he erred in agreeing

to change the supervisory ratios. As a result of this decision,

he says, CPPV would be managing programs with a 6:1 supervisory

ratio, while other YCCIP programs with which VICI was to be compared, would be required to have a 12:1 ratio. "So right now

we've got something that is technically not a model under YCCIP

262

3 i 0
regulations," he says. Seiler believes CPPV should have been

told either to retain the planned variations or to require all

sites to have a 12:1 ratio. He says of CPPV, "I don'; think

they touched all the bases before deciding it couldn't be done,"

and at OYP, he adds, "We let time become the crucial variable."

CPPV staff members say they had fully appraised the situation

and had good reason to be concerned before they approached OYP

seeking a change in the supervisory ratios. Moreover, they note

that VICI's supervisory ratio is only one of a number of aspects

of the program in which YCCIP regulations have been waived.

In any case, shortly after the decision to operate all

sites with a 6:1 ratio, according to Finney, Taggart told him

that the higher costs involved might make it necessary to reduce the number of sites from 12 to 11. Nothing definite was

decided, but at the May 24, 1978 CPPV board meeting, there was

a long discussion following Finney's report on this matter.

Some board members saw it as a major problem, involving CPPV's

credibility with the prime sponsors, since CPPV had assured

them that 12 of the 15 would. be selected. The board agreed

that a meeting should be set up between Taggart and representatives of CPPV to discuss this specific problem and look at the

overall working relationship between CPPV and DOL.

Meanwhile, armed with the information provided at the workshop and with answers provided to specific questions, in late

April the 15 sites set out to develop their proposals. A CPPV

field representative was assigned to each site to answer questions and to provide technical assistance by telephone or during

field visits. The watchword of this process, 'to "not drag the

263
sites over the finish-line," hints at the often subtle--and

classic--conflicts involved in the distinction between assistance and direct intervention. Generally, CPPV assistance took

the form of making sure that planners and organizations were

fully aware of the VICI goals and criteria, encouraging local

planners, and acquainting them with locally available resources

which were not immediately obvious. CPPV offered itself as a

resource to any organization or individual involved in the planning and development effort.

All proposals were due at CPPV's office in Philadelphia on

May 19, 1978. And once they were received, CPPV began its own

group review process. Teams were assigned to read and evaluate

each proposal according to the criteria listed in the application

package. During the first few days in June, the CPPV field

representative assigned to each site, together with another

CPPV staff member, visited the site to probe more deeply into

the claims made in the proposal.

While the CPPV field representatives tended to develop a

certain allegiance to "their" sites, CPPV's analysis and evaluation of proposals were conducted on a highly objective basis

through the use of review teams and collective decision-making.

A general concensus was developed regarding not only the

strengths .I.nd weaknesses of individual sites but also the rank

order of the proposals received.

On June 8, 1978, CPPV recommended to OYP that it approve

three sites: Broward County, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and

New Haven, Connecticut. During June CPPV informed the other

prime sponsors of the deficiencies it perceived in the original

264

3 1 2
proposals, and it provided technical assistance to those revising their proposals. On June 30, as scheduled, CPPV offered

its recommendations on the remaining sites. It offered an

unqualified recommendation for approval to Atlanta, Miami, and

New York City (South Bronx). It also offered a conditional

recommendation for approval of Chicago, Los Angeles, New York

City (Central Harlem), Newark, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.

It did not recommend approval of Northeastern Ohio; Oakland,

California; and St. Louis, Missouri.

On August 10, 1978, CPPV again wrote to OYP offering a

"resolution of issues" on the five sites that had received only

conditional approval and had made additional modifications of

their proposal during the month of July. Chicago, Newark, and

Philadelphia had resolved the conditions troubling CPPV and

were recommended for approval. Los Angeles had not resolved

the issues. New York City (Central Harlem) had not resolved

one of the three issues, CPPV said, though it made no explicit

recommendation.

Broward, Milwaukee, New Haven, Atlanta, and South Bronx

were approved by DOL in June and July, and in August DOL approved

Chicago, Newark, and Philadelphia. It would also approve Central Harlem, despite CPPV's doubts. Thus, the 15 potential sites

would yield a demonstration consisting of eight sites plus Central

Harlem, which would operate a program with DOL funding but not

under the aegis of CPPV. In order to understand more fully what

occurred during the site selection process, we shall examine

each of the 15 sites separately.
II. The Proposal Development Process at the Local Sites

A. Atlanta, Georgia

Atlanta is the 29th largest city in the United States, and

it is the central city of the 18th largest SMSA. The city has

a population of nearly 400,000 persons, approximately 55 percent

of whom are black. About 43,000 persons are in the 16 - 19 age

bracket, and about 16 percent of the population lives below

the poverty level.

There has been a significant shift in the ethnic power

base in Atlanta in recent years, reflecting the growing proportions of blacks in the city's population. A decade ago virtually all power was concentrated in the hands of a few influential white leaders. In 1973, however, recognizing the changing

demographic profile of the city, some members of the white

power structure decided to back Maynard Jackson, then vice

mayor, for the top job.

When Jackson was elected as the city's first black mayor,

he was seen by many as a key ingredient in a new coalition of

middle class blacks and business leaders seeking to continue

Atlanta's rapid economic growth. During his first term, Jackson was often at odds with the white business community, but

more recently relations have improved and he is steadily

coming to be perceived as an ally of the business community

as well as a friend of the tax-conscious middle class.
Jackson has aptly described Atlanta's people as "ideologically liber=1 and fiscally conservative." A major reason

for this has been Atlanta's six black universities, which have

helped create and anchor a solid black middle class in the

city. The business community is also very influential in Atlanta, and it is usually represented by Central Atlanta Progress, an organization which speaks for the major corporations

and downtown business interests in the city.

Atlanta is the economic center of the southeastern portion of the U.S. It is a transportation and distribution hub

as well as a major financial and service center. Some 1,800

manufacturers in the area provide employment for about 20 percent of the area's labor force. While the city had experienced

rapid economic growth, symbolized in the redevelopment of its

downtown, behind the architecturally innovative skyline, there

is an everyday city plagued with familiar problems of crime,

racial friction, and unemployment.. Black unemployment has been

a major problem in the city, which has long been a magnet for

unskilled blacks from rural areas. Moreover, the tremendous

building boom of the early 1970's set off a speculative wave

that eventually led to major real estate failures and repercussions throughout the local economy. New construction has

only recently resumed, and there is optimism accompanying the

development of a $2.1 billion dollar rapid transit system

scheduled for completion in 1980.

Since the boom years of the 1960's, Atlanta has experienced relatively tranquil labor relations. While organized

labor has not achieved the kind of foothold in Atlanta that
it enjoys in northern industrial cities, most major firms have

long been unionized, particularly large corporate employers

such as Lockheed, Ford, and General Motors. Public employment

has been a trouble spot in the labor picture, however. Mayor

Jackson has been at odds with the city's employees on several

occasions, most notably when the sanitation workers went on

strike in 1977.

Atlanta CETA Senior Planner John Gilman first heard of

the VICI program through the Employment and Training Council of

the U.S. Conference of Mayors, a source which he describes as

being "faster and better than DOL." Gilman immediately organized

a series of meetings with city housing officials and union personnel as a means of establishing working relationships and defining the nature of the prospectie program. Gilman remained

the principal drafter of Atlanta's proposal, while working with

a team that included key staff members from several Atlanta

Urban League training projects.

Early on city officials decided to focus the program on

providing emergency home repair and bringing homes in violation

of the building code up to standard. John Andersen, who had

been head of the city's Housing Code Inspection Unit, saw the

VICI program as the "first ray of hope" for significant improvement in the city's housing stock. His department had been involved in a. rehabilitation effort known as HR-1, and he viewed

VICI as "HR-2"--a program to take some of "the pressure of

scarce funds and materials off of HR-1."

The VICI program was also welcomed by the Housing Appeals

Board, which functioned as a kind of citizen's court of last

268

31G
resort for obtaining housing improvements. As a result of an

earlier series of public hearings on residential code violations,

the City Council had declared that the Board would have the

authority eitt,er to force compliance when violators were able

to afford it, or to make grants up to a maximum of $4,000 to

destitute homeowners. However, a lack of funds forced the

Appeals Board to develop a large backlog of people eligible for

these grants. Thus, the Board saw VICI as a means of directly

addressing the needs of poor homeowners. It also pushed hard

for the selection of a site in the southeastern portion of the

city.

The selection of a local management agency was delayed because Atlanta regulations required the city to conduct an advertised bidding procedure for contracting out work of the kind to

be performed by the VICI project. However, by late May CETA

had selected the Atlanta Urban League to serve as LMA. The

Urban League had operated a number of employment and training

programs in Atlanta, gaining familiarity with CETA and DOL requirements. Moreover, the Labor Education Advancement Project

(LEAP) had given the Urban League experience in working closely

with trade unions, while the Preparation for Employment Program

PREP) was similar in concept to VICI in several respects. PREP

was part of the national supported work demonstration, funded

by DOL and operated by MDRC, another intermediate unit.

The Atlanta Urban League had been selected from a field of

six bidders which included the Economic Opportunity Astn., the

local AFL-CIO Human Resources Development Institute, and the

269

31
Associated General Contractors. The Urban League was the only

bidder which directly contacted the Portland EHR program for

further information.

When the program planners turned to developing the union

linkages, they found that the Carpenters Union had seen many of

its members emigrate to other parts of the country in the wake

of Atlanta's 1974-75 construction downturn. Amid a gradual rise

in commercial and residential construction, the Carpenters yaw

the program in terms of its impact on their decimated ranks.

The Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 72 was also enlisted, along

with the North Georgia Building and Cofistruction Trades Council,

and the local HRDI.

The VICI project was seen as similar to a design which

two HRDI officials had developed a year earlier but never implemented. However, HRDI personnel had some initial misgivings

which preceded their decision to seek to become the LMA. These

misgivings increased after the Urban League was selected to run

the program. Atlanta labor officials had been leery of both

community organizations and the city prime sponsor. They were

concerned about allegations of scandal in both kinds of institutions, and they felt the labor movement had been threatened by

both the CETA system and CBO's. Nonetheless, HRDI had a tenyear history of working with the Atlanta Urban League, and the

labor participation was soon firm.

Since Atlanta's CETA program and its city housing agency

are both lodged within the city Department of Community and

Human Development, there were good lines of communications which

enabled the VICI program to obtain community development block

2703
grant monies as well as CETA Title VI funds for two counselors

for the program. Roy Norman, Director of the Office of Grants,

Planning and Management of the Department of Community and

Human Development, says he was interested in the VICI program's

potential for reducing the city's backlog of files on code

violations.

Other elements of the proposal which Atlanta submitted to

CPPV on May 19, 1978, include using the Georgie Employment

Service for youth referral and the Urban League and the participating trade unions for post-program placement.. The Carpenters Union was to provide training related instruction, and if

participants didn't have a high school diploma, they would be

required to enroll in G.E.D. preparation classes offered by the

Atlanta Board of Education. The city's Bureau of Buildings was

to be the Work Providing Agency, and a broad-based advisory

committee was to meet bi-monthly to coordinate activities.

The Atlanta proposal was recommended for approval by CPPV

on June 29, 1978, and shortly afterwards DOL announced that

it would be funded. One factor which delayed Atlanta's start-up

was the sudden and unexplained disappearance of the senior

planner. His apparently traumatic leave-taking virtually

paralyzed the implementation of the proposal for a critical

period of time, and necessitated re-establishment of the AtlantaCPPV relationship.

While preparing to launch the program, there were several

issues which emerged. The Atlanta Urban League was upset by

what thc-- .1 as CPPV's "unreasonable" refusal to permit
an unitemized ten percent overhead charge. PREP director

Donald Woods felt it was impossible to allocate every penny of

overhead expense to a specific project or activity. Indeed, the

Urban League felt caught between two intermediate units, CPPV

and MDRC, each of which wanted to provide funding to support a

specific PREP project without supporting PREP's administrative

overhead. Urban League officials were also suspicious of the

unions, feeling they were not really in sympathy with the goals

of the project and were participating only because they were

being "handed jobs on a silver platter," as one Urban League

official put it.

The unions, however, were developing a number of additional

concerns beyond their original reservations about working-with

the Urban League and the CETA program. There was, for example,

concern over such issues as trainee transportation and the

security of materials and tools left overnight at project sites.

There was also a good deal of union frustration over what they

saw as bureaucratic delays by the city and a general inflexibility in the program. While George Caudelle, business manager

of the North Georgia Building and Construction Trades Council,

insisted he supported the program, he thought the potential

problems were "monstrous," and he questioned the need for the

program in Atlanta amid an upturn in construction in the city.

He was also concerned about the structure of the program and

the involvement of so many institutions because he believed

"one head is better than two." He also doubted that the program could meet its goal of bringing 200 homes up to standard.
B. Broward County, Florida

Broward County, which is the chief component of the Fort

Lauderdale-Hollywood SMSA in southeastern Florida, covers approximately 1,216 square miles. Fort Lauderdale and Hollywood,

the county's two major cities, contain some 280,000 people or

35 percent of the county's population. Broward's population is

nearly 90 percent white. The 15- to 19-year-old cohort make

up slightly more than seven percent of the total population.

Spanish-speaking residents account for less than three percent

of the population. Though blacks are less than ten percent of

the population, recent estimates indicate that they constituted

nearly 36 percent of the county's family's living below the

poverty line and 25 percent of the unrelated individuals living

below the poverty level.

The twelfth Congressional district, consisting chiefly of

Broward County, is slightly more than 54 percent urban. The

median voting age is 47. Until, the late 1960's, the area's

political orientation was solidly conservative, but it has become increasingly liberal.

The civilian labor force is approximately 351,000 persons,

of whom 12 percent are non-white. The area's employment is

distributed as follows:

Construction 12%

Manufacturing 11%

Transportation 6%

Wholesale/retail trade 28%

Real estate, finance,

insurance 7%

Services 31%
Since 1975, the area's construction industry has suffered a

decline in the wake of the 1972-73 real estate glut. However,

official estimates of employment growth in construction are

considerably more optimistic than they have been in years.

There are predictions of increases on the order of 23 percent.

The Broward Employment and Training Administration (BETA),

the county prime sponsor, is a significant factor in the local

economy. BETA professes to have adopted a deliberately national

focus in all of its operations. This orientation has been developed as a means of ensuring the agency's viability and keeping it abreast of new trends and developments.

Communications between BETA and national and regional

offices of DOL appear to be very solid. BETA director Robert

"Skip" Johnston has been careful to establish a fairly close

network relationship with other primes in the region and some

across the country. Additionally, BETA's solid reputation as

a program operator and Johnston's frequent role as an expert

witness at Congressional hearings appear to have given this

prime greater than usual access to the thinking at national DOL.

Whether or not BETA has actually established a special working

relationship with the Office of Youth Programs, BETA staff

believe they have, and they are convinced there has been special

communications between OYP's director and BETA.

According to BETA staff members, the Broward site first

learned of the VICI project as a result of a chance conversation

with Robert Taggart during his visit early in 1978. Following

up on an indication that the program was to be based on Portland's EHR project, Ray Popkin--a planning analyst on BETA's

27i322
Planning, Research, and Development staff--immediately initiated

a series of inquiries around the country. Popkin's two most

significant requests for information were made directly to CPPV

and EHR. It appears BETA enjoyed a slight lead in proposal

preparation time, although the benefits, if any, of this lead

are not clear.

BETA executive director Johnston's initial concept of the

program was that replication should be absolute. However, his

staff was able to convince him that replication should concentrate on results rather than process.

From the outset Popkin had lead responsibility for the

development of the concepts and the proposal. His first thought

was to utilize the local Public Housing Authority as the sole

work-providing agency, he recalls, but the PHA felt that it

couldn't provide enough work. He then attempted to split the

work-provision role between Fort Lauderdale's Public Housing

Authority and that of Dania, a nearby city with a' population of

about 11,000. This divided approach to the project, and its

implicit administrative difficulties, motivated renewed discussions between PHA and BETA, with the result that the HoUsing

Authority eventually agreed to provide all of the required work

sites and projects.

PHA Director William Lindsey initially objected to the

project, he says, because it sounded like just another summer

youth program that would only raise hopes and fade away before

they were realized. However, Lindsey was becoming increasingly

frustrated at what he terms the "categorical mentality" of most

Broward County programs and agencies, and at their refusal to
see the need for an integrated approach to social development.

He says he became a VICI supporter when he realized that the

program would not only help to eliminate some significant gaps

in several of his existing programs, but that it would have payoffs in employment, general improvements in youth skills, housing

improvement, and greater minority memberships in the unions.

The plan placed heaviest emphasis on the painting trades

as the principal focus for instruction and work. It was felt

that at least some exposure to such trades as carpentry, bricklaying and masonry, and others would be gained by association.

Popkin explains BETA's selection of painting as the primary

trade on several grounds. First, entrance requirements for the

painters unions are less stringent thar for other unions and

thus better suited to VICI's target population. Second, he

states, many people have an erroneous and limited view of the

painting trade. It actually involves a number of aspects which

stimulate wide-ranging skill progressions. Third, there is virtually no market for failed construction and carpentry trainees,

while painters are always employable whether or not they pass

through a program.

Popkin and BETA convened a preliminary meeting with local

business agents of the Building Construction and Trades Council,

the Labor Council of the AFL-CIO, and the Roofers Union, to

discuss their potential roles in the VICI project. At the same

time, Popkin'sent materials explaining the VICI project and

BETA's emerging concept for its implementation in Broward County

to a wide range of local government agencies, labor unions,

276 3
community development organizations, and other county housing

authorities in an attempt to elicit the widest possible support

and comment.

The union linkage presented problems. Organized labor had

been perhaps the only significant failure in Director Johnston's

efforts to develop and maintain close contacts with vital county

sectors. It is generally recognized by Most of those interviewed that Johnston and several key officials of the local

unions had almost diametrically opposed perspectives and as a

result communicated poorly.

The unions were particularly concerned about the 12-to-1

supe:visor/trainee ratio which BETA drew in the CPPV lottery.

One described the programs as "just twelve kids hanging around

one old lady's apartment." Moreover, one official of an electrician's union checked with the Portland IBEW and reported

back that most of the Oregon trainees had gone non-union after

their program.

In addition, several labor leaders had racist viewpoints

which fueled opposition to the entire program. And nearly all

had a deep mistrust of federal programs, particularly those

concerned with labor--and especially CETA. There was also a

great deal of enmity resulting from continuous federal prosecution of local union officials and the "harassment" of the unions

themselves. Finally, there were many fears concerning the

introduction of a new work force in a decliipg labor market.

There were, on the other hand, several countervailing

realities:
First, labor is weak in the South in general--and in

Florida in particular (perhaps a reason why the very politically

oriented Johnston did not feel (highly motivated to establish a

solid communication with the unions).

Second, most of the current union members were accustomed

t :ife under previous trade booms, and were having trouble

adjusting to new--and lower--economic realities. This fact

compromised rank and file unity to some degree.

Third, the unions were convinced that federal authorities

would ultimately compel where they could not persuade, so that

stringent regulations concerning minority union membership

were just around the corner. Exacerbating that fear was the

fact that unions in many places were experiencing creeping

"open-shopism" and a declining membership in both quantitative

and qualitative terms.

Fourth, BETA staff was becoming increasingly concerned

about its failure to establish a meaningful communication with

the unions, and had been casting about for some structural

method of easing tensions and friction.

Opposition to the VICI program was lessened partly as a

result of these inherent pressures to cooperate in a project

of this sort, and through the efforts of BETA and union staffs.

In particular, Margaret Croxton--well known to local labor

leaders--and Bob Neff of the AFL-CIO, were instrumental in convincing the unions to participate or at least, give their

blessings. Croxton assured them that the trainees would not be

influenced in anti-union ways, but that the unions would be

responsible for their own recruitment.

278 i'3,2i;
The unions came to recognize the fact that the program

would meet several of their most vital needs, while at the same

time allowing them to get to know the trainees under actual

working conditions. Additionally, the rehab-nature of the

project was a significant factor in the reduction of opposition

from contractors and the unions.

As noted earlier, the principal responsibility for developing the linkages was exercised by Ray Popkin, a middle level

planner wLo was very effective in guiding the devethpment effort

so as to avoid the pitfalls threatening a cooperative effort

of this kind. Popkin was responsible for formulating and delivering most of the arguments that won the PHA and the unions

over to the project.

But underlying Popkin's efforts was the fact that BETA's

nearly $60 million annual funding is very large in relation to

its economy. Moreover, "Skip" Johnston had spent a good deal

of his professional life in southeastern Florida, and he had

both a great deal of experience with local problems and a

superior network of contracts throughout the area's more important public and private sector institutions.

Many of Johnston's contacts were institutionalized in the

Special Planning Group (SPG) founded by Johnston, Commissioner

Moss, and various heads of other County services organizations.

The SPG takes a quiet pride in its image as a group of "movers"- - experts and professionals who have both the clout to make significant changes in the system. The SPG grew out of its

founders' early recognition that centralization of planning

279
and services was the only answer to the increasingly pervasive

problems each organization faced.

There is a substantial unanimity among SPG members concerning local issues and needs and their remedies. The SPG's

main source of strength, however, is the tremendous leverage

gained from its economic clout. The principal member organizations and the amounts of funding they control are as follows:

Health Rehabilitation Services

(HRS 10)

BETA

United Way

Sched System

$ 97 million

57 million

10 million

400 million

$564 million (plus)

That economic clout, combined with the fact that the organizations--through their boards, staffs, or membership--have

access to virtually every other significant organization and

Individual within the county--and beyond--has been a significant

factor contributing to the developmental successes of BETA

staff.

The proposal BETA submitted to CPPV on May 19 was well

received in Philadelphia, and Broward was one of three sites

that CPPV recommended that OYP approve on June 8, 1978. At the

end of the planning process, Popkin had several concerns about

the program. First, he was afraid that the research and data

gathering would turn out to be far more expensive than the ten

percent administrative allocation envisioned. Second, he was

concerned about the delays in creating the research council

promised at CPPV's April Workshop. Third, he was very concerned

with the fact that CPPV "despite an overall excellent

280 3 26
performance to date" would be hapdicapped by its lack of staff

members with CETA and DOL experience, particularly in the areas

of Davis-Bacon regulations and other realities of training

program operations.
C. Chicago, Illinois

Chicago, the nation's second largest city, has a population of more than three million, of which a majority are black.

Approximately 30 percent of the city's 1.4 million workers are

engaged in manufacturing occupations, but the city is also an

important financial and transportation center and has a diversified economic base.

In recent years the city has experienced the familiar

out-migration of affluent families and jobs to the suburbs.

But Chicago has coped with change better than many cities. It

has an AA rating from Moody's Investors Services, a moderate

debt level, and a reputation for relatively effective delivery

of city services.

For more than two decades the city was governed by Richard

J. Daley, who headed a political machine which was able to contain the problems arising out of Chic,go's changing population

and economy. Daley was able to mount remarkably ambitious projects with little opposition, and the central business district

expanded, even as areas just beyond the celebrated Loop declined.

Following Daley's death, the appointment and subsequent election

of Mayor Michael Bilandic created much concern about the ability

to maintain the coalition that Daley had built.

Some three years after Daley's death, however, the coalition seems to be holding. Chicago's politics continue to rest

on the organization's ability to embrace and absorb its antagonists. In Chicago no group or interest gets everything it

282 3,,l)
wants, but each gets something, and all have a stake in the

existing system. Any interest which has enough power--economic,

social, or political--is brought into a circle very near the

heart of the city's power elite. This technique has not only

served to ensure the continued existence of that elite but also

helped make it sensitive to interests which might normally be

far removed from its own. The Chicago style of resource allocation is closed-mouthed and secretive; only when the arrangements are completed are the announcements made.

Much of the Chicago style was to permeate the development

of the VICI proposal in Chicago, particularly since Chicago's

prime sponsor, the Mayor's Office of Manpower (MOM) and its

director, Samuel C. Bernstein, are particularly adept at this

style. If jobs are the currency of modern urban politics,

then MOM, which allocates the city's CETA funds, is something

of a political exchequer in Chicago.

MOM held its'first official working session on the VICI

project in late April of 1978. But prior to this meeting,

there had been several ground-breaking discussions between MOM

staff members and Chicago United, a powerful local business

coalition especially active in employment and training issues

which was to play a major role in developing the VICI project

in Chicago.

The groundwork for Chicago United was laid in the late

1960's, when John W. Gardner urged Chicago's black and white

leaders to form a local unit of the Urban Coalition which he

headed. Mayor Daley strongly opposed the idea. However, the

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heads of such local companies as Commonwealth Edison, Sears

Roebuck, and the First National Bank of Chicago, recognizing

that confrontation wouldn't work with Daley, quietly formed an

organization which they called "The Group"--a coalition of 20

of the city's largest corporations and leading black and white

business leaders. The organization was formalized as Chicago

United in 1973, and since then it has worked quietly behind the

scenes, focusing on jobs and also working on housing, transportation, education, and other issues. Because of its economic

and political clout, Chicago United was a major influence on

decision-making at MOM, the CMA's, and the unions.

The VICI project was almost precisely the vehicle that

Chicago United had been searching for. It had grown increas,

ingly dissatisfied with such federal programs as CETA Title II

Public Service Employment because the organization had concluded

these were deadend soluti^ns which were not sufficiently comprehensive. Thus, Chicago United had helped develop an emplOyment program similar to VICI which had been mounted in the

Lawndale section of Chicarl. Chicago United hoped to replicate

and expand the program, which had developed linkages to educational institutions, commt..ty-based organizations, and city

agencies.

The only linkage that VICI required which was missing from

the Lawndale program was the involvement of union journeymen

as supervisors. Chicago United was particularly interested in

gaining the cooperation of the carpenters union. But this

union was very concerned about being associated with failures

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or with the poor quality work that had emerged from other projects. Union leaders were also concerned about the quality of

the trainees and the training methods they had seen in similar

projects. However, William Higginson, special assistant to

the president of Chicago United, and Phillip Viso, assistant

superintendent of schools, were able to reassure the carpenters

and other unions as to the quality of the'VICI project being

developed. Another inducement to the unions was their expectation that VICI represented a new trend in public programs,

and they wished to influence that trend early on.

Once MOM and Chicago United had obtained participation

agreements from the Board of Education, the Carpenter's Union,

and various community-based organizations, in early May there

was a formal decision to designate the Department of Human

Services as the local management agency for the project. MOM

had no experience in program operation and always chose to

delegate responsibility for CETA programs to other agencies.

Some suggest the involvement of DHS facilitated the provision

of Community Development Block Grant monies for VICI materials

and supplies. DHS Commissioner Cecil Partee was co-chairman of

the Community Development and Housing Coordinating Committee

along with Lewis Hill, Commissioner of the Department of Planning, City and Community Development. That committee was respon3ible for disbursing the city's Community Development Block

gran Ls. Moreover, Hill's department was made the work-providing

agency for the VICI program. However, some observers argue that

CD's involvement was secured through the efforts of Chicago

United, and that the prime was reluctant to contract with DHS.

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As all these pieces were falling into place, there was

some initial confusion concerning the number of sites and delegate agencies. A basic canon of public resource allocation in

Chicago is that no group must appear to be getting very much

more than another for very long. Thus, Chicago's instinctive

reaction to the VICI project's requirements of a limited target area was to view it as a threat to political stability.

City officials selected two target areas for the program, Lawndale and Pilsen, and they delegated all managerial responsibilities (except for payroll and participant counselling) to groups

active in the two target areas: the Lawndale People's Planning

and Action Conference (LPPAC) and the 18th Street Development

Corporation (formerly the Pilsen Neighborhood'Council). However, as a means of reducing administrative complexity, CPPV insisted that one of the delegate organizations be designated as

the lead organization, and LPPAC was chosen.

At the upper levels of DHS, there was concern about being

left out of the initial planning of the VICI program, despite

DHS's role as LMA. A DHS official notes, for example, that

there had been a pre-selection of sites, and when DHS asked

that even more be added, MOM appeared to agree and late- reneged (at CPPV's insistence). DHS was also irritated ow.: its

apparently subordinate role vis a vis Chicago United.

The various pieces were combined ln a proposal sub,,Jtto0,

to CPPV on May 19 in which youth would rehabilitation

abandoned properties. Title to the properties would init

be conveyed to the delegate agencies, then sold with the profitc

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reinvested in the program. The two delegate agencies would

also provide youth referral, along with the Chicago board of

Education. The Board would also provide the educational linkage

through its Industrial Skills Center, as well as post-program

placement. The carpenters and painters unions would provide

journeymen as well as help with placement. The Chicago Alliance

of Business Manpower Services would also provide post-program

poacement help. Like Chicago United, this was another business

organization to which MOM delegated extensive influence, and

which operated all of the CETA OJT projects in Chicago.

At the end of June, CPPV offered conditional approval of

the Chicago proposal. It sought clarification of the relationship of the LMA to a proposed steering committee composed of

three representatives of the Lawndale Peoples Planning and

Action Conference, the 18th Street Development Corp., and the

Department of Human Services. A memorandum of understanding

on this matter was drawn up for CPPV in July, and the program

went forward.

The Chicago VICI program involves a complex web of relationships among a number of organizations. Both Chicago Unitees

Higginson and MOM planner David Brunson found it mildly ironic

that CPPV could object to DHS's involvement on the grounds

that it constituted an extra layer of management, since they

said that CPPV could be accused of precisely the same offense.

Indeed, there were so many operational levels in the

Chicago program that it was not surprising that most of those

involved construed it as a service project rather than a research and demonstration effort.

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It appears that none of the key organizations and individuals in'-,lved in developing the Chicago proposal emerged with

any great affection for CPPV, although their criticisms were

sometimes tempered with recognition of the difficulty of CPPV's

role. Chicago United's Higginson complained that CPPV staff

members generally appeared "CETA-ignorant." And nearly everyone was particularly angry about CPPV's testing of the elements

in the proposal. Staff members at DHS and MOM viewed it as

insulting, while at Chicago United there was concern that too

much probing might disturb efforts to forge certain linkages,

such as those with the Carpenters' Union. Some complained CPPV

seemed more concerned with linkages than project output. While

DHS's Todhunter confessed to becoming increasingly irked by

what he called CPPV's "truth squad tactics," he also admitted

that CPPV's techniques forced Chicago planners to think more

deeply about their design and ultimately to design a better pro-.

ject. Others also agreed that CPPV had played a beneficial

role in enhancing communications among the institutions involved in developing the proposal.

In addition to finding CPPV's requests for informatiori

overly burdensome, many of those interviewed also disliked what

one called the "commando research methods" and complained about

the researchers' insensitivity to operational goals and to the

welfare of the trainees. The need for over- recruitment to

provide a control group drew particular special concern.

However, many of those who criticized CPPV also acknowledged

that it was often what one called "DOL's whipping boy," and

288
they sympathized with what they were sure were cases of CPPV

being blamed for DOL reversals on guidelines and policies. Indeed, several of those interviewed felt CPPV had been instrumental to Chicago's success, and there was particular praise

for CPPV field representative Lane L. Smith, who was described

as a facilitator, clarifier of issues, task-master, and pace-setter.

There was much criticism of the VICI concept in Chicago.

Beyond the familiar feeling that their city was very different

from Portland, there was a vigorous, although not altogether

cogent, argument about the multiplier efiect of VICI forcing

the city to spend large additional sums in order to meet the

journey man wage rates in the city and to carry out full-scale

"gut-level" property rehabilitation instead of "mere cosmetic

repairs." As the project approached the operational stage,

there was also growing concern about it becoming more bureaucratic and less flexible and exciting.
D. Los Angeles, California

Los Angeles is the nation's third largest city, with a population of nearly three million, according to the 1970 census. Its residents are a polyglot mixture of whites, blacks,

Mexican-Americans, and Orientals. As one of the few major

American cities to develop after the introduction of the automobile, Los Angeles has become the quintessential "spread city."

Its 464 square miles of territory make it far larger in area

than any other major American city, and its dispersed, low-rise

profile is quite different from the older major cities of the

East and Midwest.

The ETA letter inviting the Los Angeles prime sponsor to

apply for a VICI program came to the planning unit of the

Training and Job Development Division of the City of Los Angeles

Department of Community Development (CD). Under Los Angeles'

unique administrative arrangement, the Community Development

Department handled Titles I and III of CETA, while the city's

Personnel Department had administrative jurisdiction over

Titles II and VI.

When the planning unit received notification of the VICI

competition, staff members were ambivalent. The unit was below

desired staffing levels and busy with other projects, "so we

were reluctant to go after this," recalls Reynold Blight,

supervisor of the unit. Moreover, they were not impressed

with the overall program design, considering it similar to

290 3:j8
other YCCIP programs, expensive, and difficult to replicate

on a large scale. It was seen as unique "only in requiring . trade union participation instead of just having it as voluntary," notes Irving Ostrov 'Of the planning unit staff. The

planning unit had been having "troubles" with local unions, so

staff members felt this prograM would only cause more difficulties. The local Building and Construction Trades Council was

one of the CD Department's contractors which had been cut back

recently, so relations were not good. Planners were also concerned about their ability to identify a VICI sub- contractor

since the CPPV timetable offered little time for a formal RFP

or selection process.

But, Blight says,.politically, they knew they would have to

seek these funds--or any others--held out to them. In examining

the development of Los Angeles' YCCIP programs, VICI planners

noted that the City Council had recommended contracting with

the East Los Angeles Community Union (TELACU) if any additional

YCCIP funds were made available to the city, so they felt justified in selecting TELACU to be the local management agency

for the VICI program. TELACU, created in 1968 with the help

of the United Auto Workers union, had been operating a number

of economic and social development programs in the largely

Hispanic East Los Angeles area. Aided by large grants from

the Ford Foundation and other sources, it had developed into a

large-scale program operator with a highly professional and

entrepreneurial staff.

So, planning unit personnel decided to respond to the

VICI invitation in conjunction with TELACU. They began a

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series of meetings with city housing and youth program agencies

to identify needs and resources. They concluded that they could

obtain HUD bloc grant funds to provide materials for refurbishing residences.

But they quickly encountered problems in developing a

proposal because the planners felt they lacked necessary technical information. The problem, according to planning unit

staff members, was that CPPV's Philadelphia briefing was regarded a q ":reebie," within the CD Department--a pleasant

trip to East Coast. So it was given to high officials of

the department. "But we needed to have a technician there as

well, and we ended up with things not being clear," a planner

complains. In any= case, the planners quickly ran into two major

and intractable problems: the LMA and the budget.

After settling on TELACU, the planners elected to target

the program in three Of Los Angeles' six labor market planning

areas. The choice of three was made on political grounds:

YCCIP had already brought $2.9 million to the city, so if VICI

brought another million, a 33 percent increase, it would be

politically impossible to spend the money in a single area.

Since they needed to target funds to meet CPPV criteria, yet

spread them to meet local political demands, the planners elected to recruit youth from three of the six labor market areas

and target the community improvements on three small census

tracts, one within each of the three labor market areas. The

areas to be improved, the Boyle Heights, Echo Park, and Exposition Park areas, had a combined population of 24,000 and contained 1,100 unsound housing units. All three sites could draw

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on HUD bloc grant "Handyman" funds for materials, and all three

contained community facilities as well as residences in need of

refurbishment.

When the proposal went to the Los Angeles City Council for

approval, however, this targeting quickly encountered problems.

TELACU was identified with East Los Angeles and the MexicanAmerican community, but one of the target areas, the Exposition

Park area south and west of LA's downtown business district,

was close to South Central Los Angeles, the focus of the city's

black community. The City Council members representing the

South Central area were concerned about TELACU coming irto

their area, according to council staff members. and they proposed that another, indigenous, organization oe added.

The powerful Watts Labor Community Action Committee was

not interested in becoming involved, since it already had its

own youth programs, so planning unit officials say the only

other South Central organization large enough to apply was

Community Care and Development Services (CCDS), and it agreed

to submit a proposal. CCDS was a private nonprofit human services agency established in 1966 by the Los Angeles Council of

Churches. It had obtained local CETA funds to operate several

youth programs, including a $383,000 Title III YCCIP program.

City Council members endor :ed a plan to have CCDS operate a

VICI program in the Exposition Park area, while TELACU would

operate the programs at the other two sites, but CPPV strongly

opposed having two LMA's because it would be an unwieldy

management structure.
Meanwhile, the Los Angeles planner had obtained an agreement from the building and construction trades unions to cooperate with the program, and the other elements of the proposal

had also been worked out. The proposal Los Angeles forwarded

to CPPV on May 19 was budgeted at $1, 170,000, slightly above

the levels in the CPPV guidelines. The proposal was aimed at

18 and 19 year olds, and it featured two LMA's and three target

areas in which the youth would repair 600 homes and a number of

community facilities. There were formal linkages to the Los

Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, and the education linkage was that the youth would be eligible for counseling and referral if they wished to return to school, obtain

a G.E.D., or enroll in other forms of education. The participants could also be eligible for academic credit for work performed within the VICI project. The planners saw the education

link as "a weak part." "There was nothing new in it," one

planner said, adding, "We didn't push to develop new formal

linkages with the schools since they're already obligated to

help kids who come in. And if you've got 12 kids, the schools

will send a teacher for a G.E.D. class."

CPPV recommended approval of the Los Angeles proposal on

the condition that it reduce the project budget to $949,274

and designate a single local management agency. The Department

of Labor set a deadline of August 11, 1978, for receipt of

CPPV's further recommendations.

The Los Angeles planners were fully cognizant of the

problems, but they found one problem only got worse and the

294 `)
other proved unsolvable. In the proposal initially submitted,

the trade union journeymen were to have been paid $15,000 a year,

but when the building trade unions began to examine the VICI

program more closely, they demanded that supervisors receive

full journeyman wages, which in Los Angeles amounted to over

$10 an hour, plus fringe benefits that added 40 to 65 percent

to the basic wage. The unions also decided that they would not

accept the proposed $3,00 an hour wage for program participants

and eventually insisted they be paid a rate equal to half the

journeyman wage, or about $5.32 an hour. The union leaders

noted that CETA had set a precedent in Los Angeles by establishing a preapprenticeship program in which participants were

paid union scale apprentice wages, and they insisted that the

prime sponsor continue at that level.

Planning unit staff members say that in Los Angeles the

building trades are in a relatively strong position so that

the journeyman rate is generally the going rate, but the planners recognized that the union wage demands would make the VICI

program far more costly than permitted under CPPV guidelines.

Unsuccessful in their efforts to get local unions to moderate

their wage demands, CD department staff members urged DOL and

CPPV to intervene with the international headquarters of the

unions involved. Blight also pursued other alternatives to hold

down costs. He proposed to CPPV that instead of using union

journeymen for all supervisory positions, the journeymen would

be used as "consultants" or "trainers" while lower cost PSE

participants would serve as first-line supervisors. Blight also
proposed hiring journeymen under Title VI and supplementing

their wages with VICI funds, but DOL officials said this was

contrary to existing regulations. Unable to find a way of

lowering the program's costs, the planners then attempted to

raise supplemental funds. Initial conversations with OYP gave

Blight some hope of additional funding, he recalls, but no

funds were located. Ultimately, he says, there was a feeling

that it would be inappropriate to fund one part of a demonstration in special manner, Blight believes. Thus, as Los

Angeles sought to revise its proposal, the budget rose from

$1.1 million to $1.7 million due to higher wage costs.

As for the question of the two LMA's, it was politically

impossible to resolve the issue since the City Councilmen involved were unable to agree. The final Council motion proposed

creation of a new single LMA which would be a joint venture

created by TELACU and CCDS. This was seen as a way of appeasing

CPPV, though few believed such a joint venture could paper

over rivalry between the two parent organizations and the different constituencies they represented.

While the CD Department planning unit was unable to resolve

the issues, during CPPV's June 23 site review, Los Angeles

Deputy Mayor Grace Davis called Julia Robinson in Philadelphia

and asked for information. Moreover, at a meeting with CPPV

field representatives, she indicated a willingness to help

reach a settlement. During July, Julia Robinson of CPPV twice

placed calls to Davis in the hopes of "picking up the pieces,"

she says, but on neither occasion did Davis return the calls.

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296
On July 28, Robinson wrote Davis, informing her of the impending deadline and the need to resolve the issues. But as one

of the planners noted, "Basically it just sort of expired."

Could the two major issues which scuttled the proposal

have been avoided? It's clear CPPV's field representative, who

was relying on the CD Department for information, was caught

largely unaware by the problems which emerged. In a May 16

memo, Will Maddox wrote, "At this point all is well and the

unions have given an initial blessing to the program," and a

day later he wrote, "I don't foresee any problems."

There is reason to think the problem of the two LMA's

could have been avoided. Neither the CD Department planners

nor the CPPV staff recognized the potential problems raised

by involving TELACU in the Exposition Park area until the City

Council raised the issue. Yet black-Hispanic rivalries are

hardly unknown in Los Angeles, and*TELACU and East Los Angeles

are as closely identified with the city's Mexican-Americans as

WLCAC and South Central are with its blacks. A TELACU official

says, "The top administrators of the CD Department didn't do

their homework in testing the political climate."

There is less reason to think the union problems could

have been resolved or avoided. CPPV officials say they were

told by the CD Department that the unions "owed" them one and

had given their blessings to the VICI program. But Blight insists, "It was clear to me from the outset that the budgets

were not workable here." He argues that the Portland model and

the budget guidelines could not be fitted to Los Angeles. When
the Portland model was launched, he says, there were many

building trades union members out of work, so the unions may

have been more agreeable and more anxious to obtain the supervisory jobs. The Los Angeles building trades, however, already

had some YCCIP funding, and they were too large to regard ten

VICI supervisor jobs as a significant incentive to participate.

Rather, they were concerned that the program would swell the

ranks of non-union workers in the building trades. These

unions, which had already had several disagreements with the

Community Development Department, were not eager to accept compromises, particularly since, according to planning unit staff

members, CPPV staff members had told the unions there would

be no program in Los Angeles unless they participated. In

addition, planning unit staff members complain CPPV was not

attentive to their efforts to find alternatives, nor was it

clear on what else could or should be done in lieu of meeting

the union wage demands.

The passage of Proposition 13 on June 6 only heightened

the unions' intransigence. Proposition 13, which put a limit

on the property taxes the state could levy, seemed to promise

significant cutbacks in government services and extensive paring

of government staffs. It had a polarizing effect on the unions,

making them even more adament, Blight says. They would no

longer discuss the kinds of compromises they had made in participating in YCCIP programs mounted prior to Proposition 13.

While Blight says the planning unit may have "underestimated our problems with the trade unions," he also argues

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that the VICI guidelines on wages "were just not appropriate

for the Los Angeles area. The program could not be fitted."

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E. Miami, Florida

Dade County, Florida, the natl..!, 's 21F%, sagest metropolitan area, contains 27 municipali4-ies and a large unincorporated mass, but the area is best known for the cities 3f Miami

and Miami Beach. Tourism has long been an economic mainstay of

the area and real estate speculation a favored pursuit, but

while both have declined in recent years, Miami has become an

important center for trade between the U.S. and Latin America.

The County's conduct of employment and training programs

has been seriously compromised by instances of fraud and mismanagement. At the close of 1976, a new Dade County Manager

conducted a review of county CETA operations which disclosed

a number of administrative weaknesses prompting him to seek the

resignation of the CETA director in the fall of 1977. That

resignation was publicly criticized by the DOL regional office

in Atlanta because the county program was "far from the worst

in Florida," as well as because the County Manager's authority

to discharge a CETA director was arguable.

Meanwhile, the South Florida CETA consortium, composed of

the CETA programs of Dade, Monroe, and Hialeah Counties and

the cities of Miami and Miami Beach, was also under scrutiny by

the national office of DOL, the Dade County Organized Crime

Bureau, a separate grand jury investigation, and two newspapers.

These inquiries produced four key conclusions:

1. There were serious administrative deficiencies in

the Consortium's management.

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2. There was widespread misrepresentation by both CETA

employees and clients as to their eligibility and

backgrounds.

3. There were clear instances of fraud and criminal

violations by CETA sub-grantees in municipal and

county jurisdictions.

4. There were serious allegations of political interference and excessive patronage in CETA employment

throughout the area.

Amid these allegations, the announcement of the VICI proexam was -received by the South Florida CETA Consortium and

directed to Miami's Department of Citizen Services. Immediately

several of that Department's key technical personnel met to

develop a concept and a strategy for developing the proposal and

Implementing a program. They decided that a technical. specialist would be made responsible for each separate phase of the

overall plan. Department of Citizen Services staff members

say their initial focus was on linkages. They sought to calculate what each of the various potential linkages could get

out of the program, what additional "sweeteners" and guarantees

would have to be made in order to secure the cooperation of all

sectors, and how each organization would fit into the master plan.

The result of these initial deliberations was a decision

to place primary emphasis on securing the cooperation of the

labor unions, since they were thought to be "the toughest nut

to crack," according to Department of Citizen Services staff

members. However, they found the unions were generally enthusiastic about the program, although they were particularly insistent that they have control over the selection of journeymen, the entry level of the trainees, and the criteria for

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349
"graduation" from the program. Thus, the planners were able

to secure the cooperation of local unions representing the

masons, carpenters, electricians, and plumbers, as well as the

AFL-CIO's Human Resource Development Institute.

Much of this cooperative spirit was influenced by the

social and economic context in which Florida unions ',Jaye had

to operate. Particularly in Miami, the construction and building trades unions have had a very transient membership. At the

same time, there has been a long waiting list of largely unskilled aplicants for apprenticeship positions. Moreover,

Florida's unions have been affected by the general decline in

what they see as the quality as well as numbers of members, and

this has meant a lessening of their political influence.

Accordingly, the opportunity VICI seemed to present an opportunity to add qualified new members, provide work for current

members, and improve the unions' public image.

Having lined up the trade union linkages, the VICI planners

then turned to the educational linkage. They arranged for VICI

participants to enroll in classes offered by the public schools'

Vocational and Adult Education Division, as well as to utilize

resources of HRDI and Florida International University's Labor

Study Institute. Meanwhile, the city agreed to enact special

legislation, waiving several provisions and permits ordinarily

required for rehabilitation projects, and those permits and

inspections which were required would be provided free of

charge.

According to the proposal which the South Florida CETA

Consortium submitted to CPPV on May 19, the work providing

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330
agency would be Dade County's Department of Housing and Urban

Development. It would identify houses in need of emergency

repairs in two areas within the Miami Model City area. The target population, recruited from the same area, would be 16 to

19 year old, out-of-school, unemployed youth. Referrals would

be made by the North Central Manpower Office .)f Dade County,

and post-program placement would be provided by HRDI and the

Department of Citizen Services. The program would have an advisory council which would not only include representatives of

the primary linkages but also residents of the target area.

By all accounts an almost military precision.and a highly

coordinated effort enabled the Miami development team to bring

most of the key elements of the plan together in a relatively

short period of time. The proposal was well received in Philadelphia, and there seemed to be good prospects for unconditional

approval and funding. And, indeed, on June 8, CPPV offered

its recommendation for approval to OYP, but the program was

rejected by DOL, based on negative reports from the DOL regional office in Atlanta.

The reasons for the rejection have to do with the ongoing

investigation of the prime sponsor's integrity and managerial

capabilities. Because of the problems that had been uncovered

and the questions that were being raised, DOL regional officials considered it inappropriate to "reward" the prime sponsor

with additional discretionary ftnding, despite the region's

earlier expressions o- support for the prime sponsor.

303
This decision was accepted with equanimity at CPPN. The

staff recognized that broader considerations could justifiably

countervene its recommendations, but there was some questioning

of why DOL waited so long into the site selection process before

removing Miami from consideration. Interviews with those who

helped to draft the Miami proposal were characterized by resentment over the failure of their efforts, resentment directed

at both DOL and the Consortium. The planners were galled because they felt the rejection had nothing to do with the capabilities of the proposed LMA, the Office of Citizen Services.

The Miami planners generally expressed positive responses to

CPPV, however, describing it as more flexible and fair than

DOL and more willing to be helpful.

304
F. Miliaukee4County, Wksconsin

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, is at the center of the nation's

23rd largest SMSA, with a population of more than one million

people. The City of Milwaukee, which contains much of the

territory and the majority of the people of Milwaukee County,

is bisected by the Milwaukee River. The communities which

meet at the river are very different in social and economic

terms.

The city's South Side, which together with some suburban

areas, comprises Wisconsin's Fourth Congressional District, is

largely Polish and German. Two percent of the population is

Spanish speaking, and blacks are not sufficiently numerous to

constitute a statistically significent presence. Some 24 percent of the families have annual incomes above $15,000, while

only five percent are below the $3,000 level.

On the north side of the Milwaukee River, however, lies

the Fifth Congressional District. Blacks are the largest

ethnic group in this area, composing 21 percent of the population. The blacks in this area represent 82 percent of the

entire state's black population. In this area 19 percent of

the families have annual incomes above $15,000; nine percent

are below the $3,000 level.

The C.ity of Milwaukee has long had a distinctive political

style which has been at odds with the rest of this heavily rural

and small town state. In the first quarter of this century,
when Wisconsin was a bastion of Progressives and Republicans,

Milwaukee elected a string of socialist mayors and Congressmen.

A strong but pragmatic style of liberalism has survived in

Milwaukee. In the mid-1960's, there was a degree of social

turbulence, particularly surrounding the open housing battles

led by Father James Groppi. But the formal and informal pattern

of segregating housing by racial and ethnic groups has continued.

The County's labor force totals nearly 500,000. Manufacturing employment currently stands at about 32 percent of total

employment, but it has been declining 'steadily over the past

few decades, while the service sector and employment in trade

have increased. Construction employment within the central

city has declined by a quarter in the last few decades.

Control of all employment and training programs is vested

in the office of County Executive, which has delegated the role

of the prime sponsor to the office of Economic Resources

Development.

The Milwaukee County prime was first notified of the VICI

project on April 10, 1978, and Senior Planner Charles Perry

was given principal responsibility for development of the proposal. Perry responded by immediately establishing a top-level

task force, consisting of chief executive officers of such organizations as the Community Development Agency (CDA), the

Milwaukee Building and Construction Trades Council, the Milwaukee Carpenters District Council, the local OCI chapter, the

City Transportation Division, the Milwaukee Area Technical

College (MATC), the City Building Inspection Department, the
Department of City Development, and the City Office of Human

Resources Development. The Task Force was made responsible

for developing key facets of the overall concept, developing

and reviewing sections of the draft proposal, and for assisting in development of linkages and support.

At the saw time, Perry established a proposal development

team consisting of an economic developer, a statistician, a

labor expert, and two experts (in delegate agencies and work

referral) drawn from external agencies.

The prime sponsor and the Task Force next made a determined

effort to obtain the participation, support, and blessings of

the various unions.

From the point when he first heard of the VICI program,

Perry says he was immediately sure that Milwaukee could do it.

He felt that the level of cooperation and linkage among Milwaukee's public and private sectors certainly equalled that of

Portland.

Perry saw mayor payoffs in the program to the trainees,

while he viewed the neighborhood improvement as just an incidental nicety. He also saw an opportunity for the prime sponsor

to develop cooperative relationships with organizations which

they did not know well--such as the labor unions. Interestingly,

however, the operational benefits do not seem to have provided

the principal motivation for the high energy and dedication

evidenced by Perry and his staff. Perry says that he and the

other team members felt from the beginning that the prime could

have only "minimal impact" on Milwaukee's youth employment

problem. He says that their high esprit was the direct result

307 355
of their respect for their director--May Ellen Powers--and for

her dedication and drive.

The Community Development Agency became involved because

of VICI's direct relevance to the agency's experience and needs.

The agency had been funding a number of service projects similar

to VICI and, as a result, had identified a large inventory

("endless") of houses in need of rehabilitation. CDA Director

Burkee was personally concerned with the City's 40% black

teenage unemployment rate and felt that VICI might both alleviate that problem and possibly help to create a "new crop" of

minority contractors as a spin-off product. In addition,

Burkee had always believed that hands-on experience was the

best training method. He was also impressed with the distinctly

practical ("non-cosmetic") nature of the Task Force.

The choice Jf OCI as local management agency was not difficult. The only other possible contender was the Social

Development Commission--a 20 million dollar community-based

super-organization with an approximately 300-person staff, and

offices all over the city. However, the Task Force as a body

gave little formal consideration to SDC because of allegations

of corruption sirrounding the organization, even though many of

the Task Force members felt the allegations were untrue and the

organization was sound and effective.

There was initial opposition from the labor unions because

of previous failures of similar programs and fears that the

program would ultimately help to displace their current membership. But this was offset by a number of internal and external

308 356
factors: First, the quality of individuals entering the trades

was declining--in terms of maturity and work-ethic orientation,

and the unions were becoming increasingly worried about it.

Second, the unions came to see the project as m:Lns of eventually building a bigger and better membership, And thus gaining greater organizational and political. leverage. Third, the

program seemed to signal anew form of government intervention

just off the horizon, and that, coupled with the fact of increasing social pressure to accept more women and minorities,

made participation in the program appear to be an increasingly

politic action. Fourth, the program didn't appear to be at

all bad when examined closely, union leaders said. Moreover,

the unions--particularly the Building and Trades Council--had

already established good working or social relationships with

many members of the Task Force, and were thus reassured.

Finally, the Building and Trades Council had the basic concept

of such a program "working on a back burner," but had been hesitant to undertake the administrative burden.

OIC and Big Step, a joint creation of the OCI, the Building

and Trades Council, and the Urban League, were particularly

concerned with stabilizing and holding together the city's

neighborhoods, as well as with the welfare of their trainees.

They saw VICI as a means of accomplishing those two objectives,

while simultaneously enhancing their organizational viability.

Moreover, OIC viewed the project as a "laboratory" for testing

possible in-house spin-off programs to deal with construction

and training in administration and market-valuation techniques.
In addition, the program gives OIC and other community organizations a chance to establish .a good working relationship with

the traditionally conservative unions. Some have suggested

that Big Step's participation would be more cosmetic than real

as this skills training delegate of OIC sought to establish

itself.

The Milwaukee Area Technical College (MATC)--the primary

educational linkage for the project--was attracted to the program because it wished to become more involved in minority

issues and programs.

In the proposal that the Milwaukee County prime sponsor

submitted to CPPV on May 19, the City of Milwaukee's Building

Inspection Department would be the work providing agency, while

there would be several referral sources, including the Wisconsin Job Service, the Milwaukee Public Schools, and the Social

Development Commission, as well as OIC and Big Step. Big Step

and OIC would handle post-program placement in apprenticeship

programs or fulltime employment, respectively.

The Milwaukee proposal was one of three that was recommended

for approval to OYP on June 8, 1978.

Pre-existing relationships among primary actors are

definitely a key to Milwaukee's success in minimizing misdirected

efforts and wasted time in developing its plans. As noted

earlier, communications among the unions, county government,

and city agencies were very good, particularly considering the

differing perspective and priorities of the city and the county.

Milwaukee County is unique in that the responsibility for

both economic development and human resource development is

310
centered in separate halves of the same agency and is located

within the office of the powerful County Executive. Moreover,

the prime sponsor also had good communications and a good relationship with the DOL regional office in Chicago and an excellent reputation at the national level.

The only evidence of significant concern for the project's

national implications has been expressions of interest by local

labor leaders in the potential impact on national unions.

Add to the pre-established relationships the early establishment of a proposal development team and the high degree

of participation allowed members of the Task Force, and there

is little reason for surprise at the fact that the program

developed smoothly and generated much excitement.

"Success" for the VICI project is defined according to

the organizational perspectives of the various entities involved in the program. For the prime, it's a smooth-running

program--one which meets the primary objectives and ind

which satisfies the Task Force. For Building and Trades

Elliot, it's a program which is accepted by both i'JJ conv.inity

and the union membership. For OIC, a more quantitltlye 6.finition: 400 houses finished, and a 50 to 60% rate of

pant placement. OIC is also concerned that the pry lam hold

trainees to real-world standards of performance, attitude, and

behavior.

Criticism and concern are mild -- hardly in evidence at all.

The prjme and the OIC at the time of the interviews were worried about DOL's delay in funding and the subsequent effect on

311
the trainees and on their operational schedules. Nearly

everyone was complimentary to CPPV, with the primary opinion

being that it seemed, as Perry put it, a "distiller of variety."

Everyone interviewed at the prime also cited the proposal

development process as a useful learning experience. There is

some concern over the supervisory ratios; most (e:-,9ecially

labor) feel that 6 to 1 is high but manageable.

312
G. Newark, New Jersey

Since the civil disorders which rocked this city in the

summer of 1967, Newark has often been invoked as an exemplar of

urban pathologies. Newark's population, estimated at 400,000,

has been declining since 1960. 'n two decades the city population has turned from 83 percent white to 67 percent black, and

in recent years there has been an influx of Puerto Ricans as

well as Cubans and Portuguese. One out of three residents

was receiving some form of public assistance in 1978, and since

1973 Newark's unemployment rate has fluctuated between 10 and

20 percent, always well above the national level. Although the

demand for labor has exhibited some strength in the Newark area,

Newark's unskilled labor force has suffered from structural

unemployment, particularly the youth population which has been

growing amidst overall population declines.

Like several other prime r,onsors, the Mayor's Office of

Employment and Training (MOET) in Newark was informed by its

DOL federal representative that it would be receiving an invitation to apply for a VICI program. When that invitation was

received at MOET, it was sent to Dr. JoAnne Coble Foster, the

MOET Youth Coordinator and head of the Office of Youth Services.

"We're anxious to take advantage of whatever money there is,"

Coble Foster says, "so we immediately committed ourselves to

apply."

Newark planners waited for the CPPV briefing in Philadelphia to provide the information they felt they needed, but

313 36./
Coble Foster recalls she returned from that briefing somewhat

confused. "There were questions unanswered, CPPV was feeling

its way, they were not very concrete on things, only nebulous

and ambiguous," she recalls. Consequently, one of her first

actions after the meeting was to see that a letter was sent

over the signature of MOET Director Harry Wheeler to the DOL

regional office in New York, seeking clarification of the relationships that were supposPd to exist among MOET, CPPV, and

DOL's national and regional offices. MOET sought to determine

if it could develop a VICI program without working with CPPV.

After receiving some clarification from DOL and CPPV, however, Newark CETA planners turned to developing a proposal.

Harry Wheeler, an influential figure in. Newark's government,

supported the proposal. It was immediately clear that it should

be targeted on Newark's Central Ward, the area that was the

most depressed as measured by unemployment, crime, or physical

deterioration. And it was clear the city would run this program, as it did most employment programs; there was no consideration of sub-contractors, Coble Foster says. Planners

decided the city Department of Public. Works (DPW) would be the

local management agency, along with MOET, and also the work

providing agency. DPW had previously provided work sites for

500 youth in MOET's Summer Program for Economically Disadvantaged

Youth and had managed a Title III community improvement project

and a MOET-funded Painters Pre-Apprentice Training Program for

CETA participants. Thus, there was a well established relationship between DPW and MOET. MOET and DPW planners decided to
have VICI participants work on two kinds of community improvements: "accessing" for the handicapped, and refurbishment of

occupied and abandoned housing.

VICI planners ran into major problems when they sought to

develop linkages with trade unions. "We worked on that the

most--the other linkages were fairly easy," Sheila Oliver of the

MOET Office of Youth Services notes. The local building trades

unions had a number of unemployed apprentices and were concerned

about adding still more. When VICI planners contacted union

representatives about becoming involved with the program, the

unions raised a number of questions, including the wages to be

paid participants. Unable to obtain any commitments, Newark

planners turned to CPPV field representative Robert J. Robinson.

Robinson, a CPPV consultant who was executive director of the

Negro Trade Union Leadership Council headquartered in Philadelphia, helped MOET obtain something of a commitment to support

the program from the Newark building trades council head, "but

it didn't pan out, it didn't happen," Coble Foster says.

The exception to this union reticence was the painters

union. Through the intervention of Peter Yablonsky, president

emeritus, the International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied

Trades, District Council 10, agreed to cooperate with the

demonstration. Of this linkage Coble Foster notes, "They're

always involved." The painters union had participated in

several MOET projects and ots officers, particular Yablonsky,

had served on various advisory bodies. Yablonsky had a warm

relationship with MOET and the city government.
The VICI planners were unable to develop any other union

relationships other than with the painters, however, so the

proposal they developed called for identifying and hiring as

supervisors journeymen who belonged to the various building

trades unions and who were employed by the city. (They were

represented in labor negotiations with the city bh the building

trades since the city had no municipal employees union.) The

planners also proposed to use the Recruitment and Training Program (RTP), together with MOET's own Comprehensive Employment

and Training Delivery System (CETDS) for recruitment and intake.

And the educational linkage was to be the Newark Skills Center,

funded by the city CETA program, which was to provide G.E.D.

instruction for all who entered the VICI program.

When this proposal was submitted to CPPV on May 19, however, CPPV responded by calling for a major redesign of the

program, together with requesting adultional detail and

specificity.

CPPV told the Newark prir.e sponsor that if it could get

the building trade unions to agree that they wouldn't oppose

the program and the participation of their journeymen, then

they could go ahead with their plan to use municipal employees

who were also members of building trades unions as supervisors.

After the planners found that they couldn't obtain trade union

approval for this plan, however, they decided to work only

with the painters union. Using only painters as supervisors,

however, would requ:.re paring down the work proposed to focus

on painting. This would also change the educational linkage
needed, since the painters union didn't require a high school

diploma or G.E.D. for admission to apprenticeship. Instead,

the VICI program would offer three hours of classes two evenings

a week at the Essex County Vocational School to provide the

same training given painting union apprentices.

In addition to seeking this major revision in the program,

CPPV was also concerned that Newark planners had dispersed control over the program too widely, leaving a central administrative apparatus that was too thin and too weak, so they urged

Newark planners to beef up and centralize some control over the

various aspects of the program. In addition, Sheila Oliver of

HOET recalls, "We were required to expand and be more specific

on a number of items." For example, planners were called on

to spell out more clearly how the work flow would be developed

and coordinated at DPW.

Thus, the Newark proposal was significantly revised during

the month of June, and a very different proposal emerged. It

retained both RTP and CETDS as recruiting sources, but the role

of CETDS was enhanced. Work was to consist of painting the interiors and exteriors of housing units provided by the Newark

Redevelopment and Housing Authority and the DPW Division of

Surplus Property, which managed housing abandoned by its owners.

There was a total of 2,952 housing units in need of painting

within the Central Ward, and the program proposed to paint

1,244 interior and exterior units as well as 300 public areas-- hallways, laundry rooms, etc. The maximum material expenditure

was to be $100 per unit.
The work would be supervised by ten journeymen painters

and closely monitored by the Apprentice Coordinator of District

Council 10 of the International Brotherhood of Painters and

Allied Trades. The Apprentice Coordinator also supervised

apprentice recruitment and placement for District Council 10

and monitored MOET's existing CETA-funded Pre-Apprenticeship

Painting Program. District Council 10 would also provide

classroom instruction for participants two evenings a week

at the Essex County Vocational School, and it agreed to give

preferential treatment to those who performed well in the VICI

program if they sought union apprenticeships.

The City of Newark pledged to support the program with

$108,C00 for materials and supplies. In addition, DPW was

to provide $63,600 of in-kind contributions for furniture,

meeting space, drivers, and other items.

In a June 30 letter to Robert Taggart, CPPV recommended

the Newark proposal for approval, conditional upon clarification

of the labor linkage and substantiation of the $108,000 of city

funds; and after satisfying these concerns, on August 10, CPPV

recommended Newark for approval. OYP formally approved Newark

on August 23.

Meanwhile, meetings were held in August between Newark

and the regional office of DOL to discuss research design and

annual plan preparation. The annual plan was completed and

submitted to OYP and the DOL regional office, and at the end of

August questions were raised by the regional office regarding

female participation rates in the program ani non-positie

termination, projections.
In October the program was operating with 53 youth. Remaining slots were kept vacant because of difficulties in recruiting sufficient Hispanic youth to meet the goals established

for the program.

Newark planners gave CPPV high marks for helping them develop and refine their proposal. "It was a good experience for

us," Coble Foster says, adding that her staff was inexperienced

so VICI "was a useful learning experience." .She and others at

MOET credit CPPV with forcing the planners to think through the

inner workfngs of the program they envisioned and to flesh out

all the details. For their part, CPPV staff members were originally somewhat concerned about whether the Newark program

had a management structure with enough leadership and authority

to give direction to the program.
H. New Haven, Connecticut

New Haven had a population of 138,000, according to the

1970 census. Some 23,000 of its residents were living below

the poverty line, including 16,925 of the city's 36,000 black

residents and 3,266 of its 4;900 Hispanics. The city's unemployment rate stood at 9.7 percent in mid-1977. New Haven's

labor market was primarily oriented toward service occupations,

with Yale University the largest source of employment, but there

were also a wimber of good-sized manufacturing plants. A 1976

survey of large employers in South Central Connecticut showed

155 firms employing 100 or more people, with six of the ten

largest located within the city limits of New Haven.

New Haven's municipal government had acquired a national

reputation for its efforts to redevelop the city's downtown and

to rejuvenate the commercial-industrial complex at its harbor.

In an analysis prepared in connection with a review of New

Haven's entitlement proposal, MDRC staff members noted, "The

prime sponsor's staff seems to be knowledgeable about CETA

programs in general and have had experience with large youth

programs during their summer work programs."

When New Haven's prime sponsor, the Employment and Training

Administration, received an invitation to apply for a VICI

program, ETA Youth Planner Lou D'Antonio recalls, "There was

no question we would apply. The philosophy here is don't let

even ten dollars go by." The amount of money which VICI could
bring to New Haven--nearly a million dollars over 18 months- -

would represent a sizable increment in the city's youth programs,

which had been budgeted at less than four million dollars per

year.

Given the brief period for preparing a proposal, New Haven

CETA planners immediately concluded they would need additional

help, so they once again called on Thomas Peterson, a classroom

instructor in an ETA training program, and Sally Connelly, an

education coordinator and program assistant in the ETA Out-ofschool work experience unit. Both had been conscripted earlier

for marathon drafting efforts in connection with the city's unsuccessful Entitlement application.

Peterson and D'Antonio attended the CPPV briefing in

Philadelphia, and Peterson says they returned to New Haven

"with a clear view" of the program. Upon their return, two

teams were created. One was a planning team which would consist

of the trade union representatives and other linkages, and the

second team was a working team to do the nuts and bolts of

drafting a proposal. This latter group consisted of Peterson

and Connelly, plus D'Antonio; James Begina, ETA's director of

planning and management: and a member of the ETA budget staff.

Peterson coordinated the overall effort.

They were able to proceed with assurance not only because

this team had recently gone through a proposal writing process

for Entitlement, but also because in developing the substance

of their proposal, they were replicating something besiddi the

Portland model. D'Antonio notes that the planners saw the VICI
program "as an expansion, not a departure from other programs.

It's an expanded version of YCCIP with added trade union ties.

And since 1975 we've had a construction and building trades

activity as part of our Title I out-of-school youth programs.

So this was an expanded version of that too." Thus, D'Antonio

says, "We used Title I as a reference," and Sally Connelly, who

had been supervising that program, would help dreft the VICI

proposal.

From the outset the planners knew ETA would operate the

program itself, as was its custom, so there was no need to consider locta management agencies. And because the planners already had experience with New Haven's trade unions, Peterson

recAlls, "We knew you can forget about plumbing and masonry, etc.

These unions aren't cooperative." Instead, they quickly concluded that they had to solicit the carpentry and painting

unions. New Haven's ETA had recently worked with Painters

Local 186 and Carpenters Local 24 on a Title VI project and on

other programs as well. So they approached these unions,

offering the carrot of ten journeymen jobs, and received a

positive response after a period of discussion.

The planners then turned to education, and once again, the

planners recall, "it was easy." They called on existing well

developed linkages with the City Board of Education to arrange

for the enrollment of VICI participants in adult education and

G.E.D. classes offered by the Board of Education or OIC as well

,a for the awarding of academic credits for work experience.

The new linkages that had to be forged were with the work

providing agencies. James Begina recalls, "The only real

322 3
problem we had was wondering do we have enough work." In a

city of New Haven's size, no single municipal agency could

provide enough work to sustain the program, and even two or

three might be hard-put to keep 60 people busy. So the planners

chose to rely on six work providing agencies, believing that

this large number would provide more than enough work as well

as better opportunities for offering skills progression and

development.

The work providing agencies selected were the New Haven

Redevelopment Agency and its Neighborhood Preservation Unit,

the Housing Authority, the Human Resources Administration,

Neighborhood Housing, Inc., and the Regional Rehabilitation Institute. The work would consist of weatherization and refurbishment of private residences, public housing, and public

facilities.

When the 'ICI planners initially approached these six

agencies, they met with some skepticism, but New Haven's community development funds had been cut in half following the 1977

amendments to the U.S. Housing and Community Development Act, so

these agencies were receptive to new alternatives. ETA planners say the agencies found it politically attractive to be

able to become involved in community improvements, "So this

part went surprisingly easy," Connelly says.

The proposed program would obtain referrals from local

high schools, community-based organizations, welfare agencies,

and the participating carpenters and painters unions. The

target area for the program was to be six New Haven neighborhoods, which collectively contained 35 percent of the city's

323

3 '71
land area, 48 percent of its youth age 16 through 19, and 68 percent of all poverty level residents.

While putting together the pieces of their proposal, New

Haven planners were in frequent contact with CPPV field representative Jerry Kolker and other CPPV staff members. Thus,

when Kolker made his May 4 field visit to New Haven, the discussions centered on details and procedures rather than broad

questions of demonstration design.

The proposal New Haven's ETA submitted on May 19 wa

received in Philadelphia. Shortly after reading it, Kolker

said, "New Haven is a joy; it's the be!J :-opcsal of all."

There were several areas of c'ancern, of core. CPPV felt

there were too many work providing agencies, uld its staff

about the program's ability to monitor anA schedule amid

so many agencies. But CPPV accepted New Haven's argument

that it needed this number of agencies to provide abundant and

varied work. At CPPV's urging, New Haven agreed to increase

the size of the program's administrative staff to cope with

the number of agencies involved and to change the administrative

budget considerably. New Haven ?ASO broadened tae mixture of

skills to be taught. CPPV also raised questions about the

fringe benefit level, was budgeted at 29 percent 'z'f

basic wages instead of 20 per-ent considered appropriate

by CPPV. And there was concern about the lack of commitment

by the unions to provide apprenticeships. Genen,lly, though,

concerns were assuaged with minor revisions or explanations,

and Kolker recalls that CPPV staff members "were strainlng in

review sessions to find things to say."

324
Thus, with only mincr revisions, New Haven's proposal

was quickly approved by CPPV, and on June 8 it was recommended

for approval by OYP, well in advance of most other cities.

After DOL approval was granted, in July New Haven's ETA developed an annual plan for submission to DOL, and as the summer

progressed, they began receiving referrals of journeymen for

the program's supervisory jobs. In August meetings were held

between CPPV staff, DOL national and regional office staff,

and New Haven's ETA for briefings on the VICI project. Questions were raised by the Boston regional office of DOL regarding the respective monitoring roles of CPPV and DOL, as well

as such issues as female participation and post-termination

projections. Additional meetings were also held in August to

finalize the research design to be used in New Haven.

As the fall of 1978 arrived, there was confidence at CPPV

that New Haven was well primed to mount its demovstraticr. program. There was some concern as to whether or not the large

number of actors involved could be managed succ( .sful,-.7, but

the betting at CPPV was that New Haven's program operators had

the skills to make it work.

While CPPV staff regarded New Haven's ETA as well stocked

with skilled professionals, at the end of the proposal development process, New Haven officials also spoke highly J1 CPPV.

James Begina says New Haven was annoyed with the series If

proposal competitions and "was a little turned off by the

Entitlement process." But he credits CPPV with being nonpolitical and "clearly spelling out the hoops." ETA staff
members generally say they found CPPV helpful, cooperative,

and less "mysterious" than MDRC during the Entitlement process.

The ease with which New Haven jumped through CPPV's

"hoops" and satisfactorily replicated the Portland model may

reflect the fact that New Haven had two models of its own to

employ in directing its efforts. In preparing the VICI application, it was not only able to call upon the team that had recently prepared its Entitlement application, but it also relied

on the process of preparing that application to guide its

efforts to develop a VICI proposal. And it also had the experience in designing and seeking linkages for its YCCIP program

to guide ETA planners in shaping the substance of the VICI proposal. Another factor New Haven planners found helpful was

the fact that New Haven, like Portland, was a smaller city,

where linkages could be est...blished because many of the actors

already knew one another personally or professionally, and

where all concerned were to be found within walking distance

of one another.

326
I. NEW YORK CITY (CENTRAL HARLEM)

New York City is the nation's largest city, and by virtue

of its size and cultural impact, it generally has been a leader

in experiencing social problems and proposing s.lutions. By

the mid-1970's, the city's preeminence seemed to be threatened

in many fields, and its economy was in a continuing slide, putting the city government at the edge of bankruptcy. The Carter

Administration had singled out the South Bronx as a symbol of

urban decay, and it was to be a centerpiece of whatever urban

initiatives the administration would mount.

In 1975 New York City's population was put at 7,567,800.

The population was 59 percent white, 25 percent non-white, and

16 percent Hispanic. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported

on August 1, 1977, that there were 507,000 New Yorkers between

the ages of 16 and 19. Minority teenage unemployment estimates

were generally unavailable for New York CIty, but joblessness

among youth was widely regarded as a major problem in the poor

black and Hispanic communities that existed la four of the

city's five boroughs; only Staten Island was largely middle

class.

BLS statistics showed an overall loss of 600,a00 jobs in

New York City in the decade ending in 1978. White collar and

professional jobs sere growing in several fields; the massive

losses in jobs came in manufacturing and other low-skill areas

that had traditionally provided employment to newcomers and

minorities.
The city's political system was often unable to cope with

this economic decline. Though New York was widely regarded as

one of the most liberal cities in the country, there was a conservatism about its local government which prevented responses

to the new economic conditions. New York City politics were

characterized by a balkanization of power, with interested

groups exerting significant influence over narrow spheres of

policy.

The city's political and social life were also characterized by an often surprising fierceness. The political system

in New York seemed to make it far easier to stop something from

occurring than to get it done.

The city's CETA prime sponsor, the Department of Employment, was headed by Stanley Brezenoff. Before he was appointed

Commissioner of Employment, he had been a program officer at

the Ford Foundation who had been involved in the creation of

MDRC as an intermediary unit, and he had participated in early

discussions that led the way to the development of CPPV.

The Central Harlem site was different from others with

which CPPV was involved, not only because it, along with the

South Bronx, were the only sites where specific portions of

the city or nounty were specified by OYP, but also because a

local management agency was recommended to the New York prime

sponsor. CPPV officials say they were told by the Office of

Youth Programs that the Ministerial Interfaith Association was

to be the LMA at the Central Harlem proposal, because Assistant

Secretary of Labor Ernest Green wanted it.

328

/) j
The Ministerial Interfaith Association (MIA) was founded

in 1964 by Reverend William James and other Harlem clergymen

to deal with social problems in Harlem. MIA has provided housing information and relocation services, operated a Neighborhood

Youth Corps, CETA Title I work experience program, and other

programs. Because the clergymen who formed MIA are widely influential in this black community, MIA has been deeply involved

in the development and direction of such institutions as the

Opportunities Industrialization Center, the Harlem Urban Development Corporation, and other organizations.

According to Rev. James, MIA's involvement in VICI resulted from a visit he and others made to the offices of DOL on

February 17, 1978. In meetings with Harriet Michel and others,

Rev. James expressed a desire for a program focused on 18 to

27-year-olds and emphasizing education. "We asked to do a

demonstration of this in Harlem," Rev. James recalls, "and they

agreed we would send in a proposal of this sort, but they said

'meanwhile we've already got a YCCIP program,' and they said

do a program for 16-to-19-year-olds and on our own we should

do some follow-ups."

Following Rev. James's visit to Washington, MIA was invited

by the prime sponsor to attend the CPPV workshop in Philadelphia,

and it called on the Harlem Urban Development Corporation (HUDC)

to help develop a VICI proposal. Jackie Pope and others with

technical skills at HUDC worked up a program in conjunction

with Rev. James, who was board chairman of MIA. Robert Cowan,

the executive director of MIA, was ill during much of this

period and played a limited role.

3299 '77
CPPV began to raise questions about the proposal as soon

as it began to take shape. The CPPV field representative for

the site, Gerald Kolker, was a former New York City employment

and training official, blt he had not had any first-hand experience with MIA, and he was unable to find out anything significant about MIA other than that it had a good fiscal record.

(New York City has tended to emphasize fiscal monitoring of

employment programs rather than any substantive evaluations.)

However, the CPPV field representative received indications from

HUDC staff members that there were problems with tLe proposal.

Following his initial May 5, 1978 visit to Central Harlem,

Kolker wrote a memorandum to Julia Robinson, in which he noted:

I am concerned in the short run about whether the

proposal will be decent form by May 19th and I

am concerned in the long run whether MIA has the

managerial capacity to effectively run the program.

Conversely, I am reasonably impressed with HUDC and

feel that their history in home repair augers well

for a project such as ours. I would not be adverse

to HUDC being the direct program operator in this

case, but of course that is nct a decision that we

make here in Philadelphia.

Following this May 5th field visit, the CPPV field representative also told the New York prime sponsor that he was worried about the proposal being ready by the May 19th deadline,

and he suggested the Department of Employment assume a larger

role.

Kolker's dealings with MIA during the proposal development

stage also led him to conclude that the organization 'acked

the management skills to operate the VICI program successfully.

But Rev. James's view is that:

330 3
There was negativism all the way. Everytime there

would be something else left out. We convinced them

on education, then on recruitment, and so finally we

got it all in and they said MIA had no experience in

the building trades, and we said we've got HUDC and

they said HUDC isn't MIA. We concluded that they

just didn't want us to have it any way.

In any case, CPPV's opposition increased still further

when MIA proposed that Joseph Bacote, Jr. be the director of

the VICI project. To CPPV Bacote embodied precisely what was

wrong with MIA and its concept of the program. For the previous

half dozen years Bacote had been a counselor at Bronx Community

College. He had no experience as a leader or manager, no experience operating employment and training programs, and no

background in the kind of building trades and construction

activities that VICI would entail.

CPPV regarded the selection of a program director so early

in the proposal development process as another sign that MIA

believed its approval for funding was a sure thing. However,

because the interval between approval and start-up was so short,

a number of sites had identified potential program directors

at approximately the same time as Central Harlem. MIA's

director-designate was one of a number of Harlem young people

Rev. James had helped send to college. Bacote was not only a

member of Rev. James's Metropolitan Community United Methodist

Church in Harlem, he was also chairman of the church's. Council

on Ministries, on which Rev. James also served, and a member

of the William M. James Scholarship Fund Committee, which raised

funds and awarded scholarships in honor of Rev. James.

The proposal submitted by the New York Department of Employment for Central Harlem on May 19 would have MIA operate a

331 3 .79
program targeted on 16-to-19-year-olds living in the Central

Harlem area. The targeted area was the subject of some confusion, but work site locations were centered on West 131 and 13f,

Streets. The work would consist of refurbishment of brownstsmes

occupied primarily by low-income or elderly homeowners. The

Interfaith Committee Against Poverty would refer youths to the

demonstration program, while HUDC would be the work providing

agency, identifying the buildings on which the VICI crews would

work. The Metropolitan Church-GED program would be a mandatory

requirement for all VICI participants. The Citywide Building

Trades Council, plus locals of the plumbers, roofers, and carpenters and joiners agreed to cooperate by supplying journeymen,

assisting in the design of the training, and serving on an advisory council. MIA would handle post-program placement.

Optional features included wages increases after a month of

field work and night school plus the use of supervisor's and

teacher's evaluations as a basis for obtaining raises. Wage

increases would depend on both field work and GED attendance

and progress.

CPPV staff members were not impressed with the proposal

they received, however. In a May 30, 1978 letter to the prime

sponsor in New York, CPPV indicated:

The proposal from Central Harlem is deficient in virtually all of the areas raised by the application

process. Some items were totally ignored, and others

were responded to in a manner that is not acceptable....

For example, the letter said the proposal

needs a much more detailed description of work to

be done and how it will be done. Progression and

evaluation of progress are also inadequate. Two

360

332
nine month cycles as indicated in prior discussions

is not satisfactory. We would refer you to the

application guidelines to fully understand the number

of areas thac were not even addressed in this section; such as time tables, staff phasing, orientation

schedules, etc., (Jtc.

Similarly, on the issue of linkages, CPPV wrote:

A timetable is not included, the structure of maintaining these linkages is not included, information

on who is going to be responsible for the linkage is

inadequate and the one letter from Mr. White of the

United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of

America is not sufficient to create an authentic

labor linkage.

CPPV's May 30, 1978 letter concluded by indicating that the

organization was

ready, willing and able to provide New York City with

the necessary technical assistance to make this a

viable proposal. However, in all candor, one must

say that the proposal submitted is inadequate in so

many areas that it will take a concerted effort by

many people to bring this proposal up to a standard

where it can be comfortably recommended to the

Department of Labor.

The prime sponsor replied with a letter voicing confidence in

MIA and its ability to revise the proposal to meet CPPV's

standards.

The Central Harlem proposal was revised during June, but in

its June 30, 1978 memorandum to OYP, CPPV placed the Central

Harlem proposal in the conditionally approved category, and it

identified three conditions needing resolution:

1. Conformity of youth wages and administrative costs

to the application guidelines;

2. Further evidence that the proposed youth referral

agency could meet the program requirements;

3. Much stronger evidence that the management agency

for the project has experience in the administration

of a complex construction related program.

33333'1
Following this memorandum to OYP, CPPV sent a detailed

letter to the New York City prime sponsor on July 17,.explaining

the three conditions. From that date until August 8, when an

addendum to the original proposal was submitted, there were

frequent communicRtions among the various parties involved. In

early August, representatives of MIA, Harlem Urban Development

Corporation, and the prime sponsor made a conference call to

Harriet Michel to contend that CPPV was being unreasonable and

to propose alternatives for shoring up the alleged weaknesses

in the LMA's expertise. On August 3, 1978, Julia Robinson and

Jerry Kolker met with MIA in New York and were told of a proposed new management structure, which included a black contractor

who would serve as an advisor to the project management and an

associate director who would be someone with a background in

construction. However, Robinson told MIA she was concerned the

advisor would "never be there," and the additional people would

simply blur managerial responsibilities.

Moreover, at the August 3 meeting, Robinson recalls, "It

was clear to me they wanted to run an education project, which

is what they're good at and have a background in." Rev. James

essentially agrees. He and others at MIA insist that work experience alone is inadequate to meet the needs of Harlem teenagers. A major emphasis on education and counseling was indispensable in developing a program that would have a lasting

impact, he insists.

After the lengthy meeting on I lust 3 between CPPV and MIA

representatives, it was clear they would be unable to reach
agreement on the issues dividing them, and both sides agree the

meeting marked the end of negotiations between the two

organizations.

Afterwards, MIA submitted an addendum to its original proposal, which dealt with the conditions raised by CPPV. In an

August 10, 1978 memorandum to OYP, CPPV communicated MIA's

three additions, and CPPV's response to them.

The original proposal's administrative costs were above

the ten percent level permitted by DOL and the youth wages were

below the DOL minimum of 58.6 percent. The addendum effectively

resolved this issue by using HUDC funds for administrative purposes. The budget could then be rewritten so that the administrative costs and participant wages and fringe benefits fell

within the DOL guidelines.

The second issue was the youth referral agency, and it was

also resolved. CPPV had complained the referral activities to

be undertaken by the Interfaith Committee Against Poverty were

not spelled out sufficiently and were too broadly targeted geographically. MIA agreed to use RTP staff to train ";'AP in

selection procedures. Thus, the August 10 CPPV memorandum said:

The inclusion of RTP in the selection and referral

process is of great value to the project. The issue

of city wide recruitment has not been addressed in

the addendum but is a matter that is amenable to

prompt solution.

The third issue was the crucial one, however; this was the

question of whether or not MIA had the skills to operate a

program such as VICI. In response to CPPV's concerns, the

prime sponsor submitted a revised project management structure

which featured three new elements:

335
1. The hiring of an associate director with construction related experience. This associate director

would devote 75 percent of his time to the VICI

project. (The remaining 25 percent of his time

would be used to monitor a nearby HUDC construction

project.) This associate director would be on

the staff of RTP and his salary would be paid from

a prior grant from HUDC to RTP.

2. The establishment of a four-member Project Management Board, three of whose members would have

direct construction-related experience. This board

would have a direct policy-making and management

role in the project, and the project director and

associate director would report to the board at

regular bi-weekly meetings.

3. The assignment by HUDC of its Spruce-Up program

construction manager to devote 25 percent of his

time to monitoring the proposed project.

In r^sponse to this revised management structure, CPPV wrote

in its August 10, 1978 memorandum to OYP, "after reading the

addendum and evaluating the August 3rd site visit, the issue of

central management has been addressed but remains unresolved...."

CPPV argued that the proposed Project Management Board could not

provide the kind of day-to-day management the project needed.

Thus, CPPV said, "we conclude that no matter how expert the

Project Management Board, such a structure is no substitute

for a full time staff and sound organizational structure." As

for the proposed assistant director and HUDC monitor, CPPV contended this was unsatisfactory, because:

Since two key positions are occupied by person who

are not full time employees and are paid by a different organization than MIA, their availability

and accountability are in question. It is our

judgement that this type of organizational structure is not adequate for the VICI project.

However, the August 10, 1978 cover letter from Finney to

Taggart accompanying the CPPV memorandum on Central Harlem did

not explicitly recommend refusing to approve Central Harlem.

336
The letter simply noted that three deficiencies had been cited

in the original assessment, and one of them had not been resolved to CPPV's satisfaction. Finney's letter, which also

discussed other sites, said, "I trust that the attached information is sufficient to guide your final decision regarding

these remaining sites." Central Harlem was the only case where

CPPV not offer a definite formal recommendation to OYP.

In the wake of Finney's letter, OYP asked the New York

City Department of Employment to respond to the concerns raised

by the end of August. The prime sponsor wrote to DOL, indicating that it had full confidence in MIA and the program it designed. Shortly afterwards, Central Harlem became the only

VICI program that would be approved for funding without a positive recommendation from CPPV. According to Taggart and Seiler

of OYP, this was simply a case where reasonable men and women

differed; OYP did not share CPPV's lack of confidence in MIA,

nor did it harbor the same doubts about the management structure. OYP officials emphasize the issue was settled on the

merits of the proposal and not on the basis of politics.

At CPPV's September 21, 1978 board meeting, which was held

in Washington, Taggart and Seiler were in atte,. nee. Seiler

told the board OYP had reviewed CPPV's recommeh.A-tion and had

determined that Central Harlem should be funded. If CPPV did

not agree, he noted that OYP was prepared to have the Central

Harlem program monitored by an outside group. Taggart also

raised that possibility in his remarks, according to the minutes

of that meeting. Finney recommended that the board vote not to
include Central Harlem in the demonstration and agree to have

it monitored by someone else. According to the minutes, he

said that the finding of deficiencies would make it hard for

CPPV to work with MIA. The board then unanimously voted "that

the central Harlem project not be included in the demonstration

for which CPPV is responsible."

Following this decision by the CPPV board, OYP chose

Boone, Young & Associates, a New York consulting firm, to monitor the Harlem project. An October 16, 1978 letter from Harriet

Michel, director, Office of Community Youth Employment Programs,

to Finney noted that OYP was "directing CPPV to enter into a subcontract with Boone, Young as soon as possible" to permit

the firm to assume the responsibilities that CPPV would have

exercised vis a vis the MIA program. Michel's letter noted:

By this action, we are not holding CPPV responsible

for the performance of the Central Harlem VICI project. We are expecting CPPV to (a) provide the funds to Boone, Young, (b) cooperate with them by providing copies of the MIS forms and instructions,

project monitoring and assessment plans, research

design parameters, work value measurement methodolgy instruction and forms, etc., and (c) oversee

Boone, Young's performance of the subcontract's

work statement. Boone, Young will conduct and report on the same work items for its VICI project

as CPPV will for the other eight projects.

Michel then stipulated an amount which CPPV would have to

provide to Boone, Young as payment for this subcontract. Finney

attempted to return the funds to OYP and let it deal with

Boone, Young. But OYP refused to free CPPV of responsibilities

for monitoring Boone, Young, preferring not to have funds returned to it at the end of a fiscal year.

338
The Central Harlem proposal development process remains

the most complex and bitter component of the VICI site selection

process. In its wake there are not only lingering differences

of opinion but differences as to the nature of the facts.

All of those involved agree that from the outset MIA had

beea designated as the local management agency for a Central

Harlem site. Early on CPPV had doubts about MIA and discussed

the desirability of having another LMA, with HUDC mentioned

most frequently. OYP officials insist they told CPPV that

Ernest Green had indicated that he wanted Central Harlem in

the demonstration, but he was willing to have another LMA if

necessary. CPPV's federal representative, Pamela Clark, insists,

"We told them early on" that CPPV didn't have to accept MIA,

and Robert Taggart is adamant on this point: "It is a question

of fact as to whether there was pressure to stay with MIA.

There was no pressure to stay with MIA." Seiler suggests that

a CPPV staff perception may have "led people astray." But CPPV

staff members note that only the prime sponsor, not CPPV,

could choose an LMA, and the New York City Department of Employment showed no interest in replacing MIA.

Since CPPV staff members believed they did not have the

option of obtaining another LMA, their only recourse was to

try to shape an acceptable proposal.

Moreover, CPPV found the Harlem organization had a vastly

different perception of what the program should be. While this

required prolonged negotiating as CPPV sought to reorient the

program from education and counseling to :York experience and

339
training, those negotiations convinced CPPV staff members that

MIA lacked both the general managerial sophistication and the

specific construction-related backgidund tb'rdd'a'VICrbtbkArri:

The elaborate advisory board and the two part-time associates

only emphasized the essential weaknesses at the center of the

proposed management structure, in the eyes of CPPV.

It is difficult to obtain objective and disinterested

opinions on the managerial strengths of MIA. Its executive

director was absent during much of the proposal development process. Rev. James is a vigorous leader, but as MIA board chairman he would not have a day-to-day role in the VICI program.

While MIA was more of a forum of clergymen than an operating

organization, it had run CETA and neighborhood youth corps

programs on a scale similar to VICI.

However, the nature of MIA suggested that the success of

a program it managed would depend heavily on the person directly

responsible for running it, and MIA's proposed director had no

experience in administration ,nd management. Although he correctly notes that it was the union journeymen-supervisors and

not the program director who would need to kno% how to drive

nails, nonetheless he had no background in programs similar to

VICI.

While individuals could differ about how good was good

enough to run a VICI program or how much construction knowledge

was really necessary and relevant for a program direcor, MIA

has concluded that its problems resulted from biases held by

CPPV. Since CPPV's primary contact with Central Harlem, Gerald

Kolker, previously worked in New York City's manpower system,

340
Rev. James suggests that Kolker's previous experience may have

....qqlored his view, but Kolker insists he had no previous dealings with, or knowledge of, MIA. Joseph Bacote raises the possibility that race entered the considerations, since Kolker is

white. However, in addition to Kolker, Julia Robinson, who is

black, was directly involved in meetings with MIA in New York,

and she and others at CPPV fully shared Kolker's views on MIA.

Another possibility raised by MIA is that CPPV sought to

keep out MIA simply because CPPV believed it was being foisted

on the demonstration by the Department of Labor. CPPV staff

members insist they evaluated MIA solely on the merits, but one

foundation observer noted in a memorandum about the Central

Harlem situation, "I still feel there's just a touch of 'I want

to defend my security and guard my independence' attitude in

CPPV's posture."

Perhaps having "just a touch" of this attitude, combined

with MIA's at least arguable weaknesses and significantly different goals for the program, were sufficient to set CPPV and

MIA at odds, and once differences arose, they quickly degenerated

to a point where it would have been impossible for CPPV and

MIA to work together fruitfully. For its own reasons, however,

OYP chose to retain Central Harlem rather than accept the

findings of CPPV.
J. New York City (South Bronx)

After President Jimmy Carter made his celebrated visit to

the South Bronx in 1977, that beleaguered section of New York

City became a symbol of urban decay, and it would also become a

test of the Administration's achievements on urban issues. New

York City officials first learned they would be invited to apply

for a VICI program for the South Bronx from Jack Watson of the

White House staff. VICI was part of a list of items that the

city learned it could seek from the federal government for the

South Bronx.

Donald Menzi, director of the city's Manpower Planning

Council, first brought the VICI idea to the Parks Department.

But when there was no progress after a week, he contacted Lloyd

Kaplan, a member of the Mayor's staff who was working on the

South Bronx. Kaplan asked Allan Bell, an analyst in the city's

0.efice of Management and Budget, to develop the proposal, and

Bell would prove to be the leader of this effort.

Because it dealt with the South Bronx, Bell says, he started

his efforts "with the clear idea that if we put it together

right, it would be funded." A recent recipient of an M.A. degree from M.I.T., Bell felt familiar with developments in the

employment and training field and with the idea of replication.

He quickly turned to several aspects of the proposal, since,

he says, the timetable required quick decision-making.

A major concern in financially hard-pressed New YorX City

would be the source of materials money for the VICI project.

342 3;
Bell's first thought was the city's community development block

grant, but New York allocates these funds through a year-long

highly politicized process which would not fit the CPPV timetable. Bell concluded that weatherization funds were a likely

alternative, so the city approached the Community Services Administration, knowing not only that it had a weatherization program but also that it was seeking ways to get involved in the

South Bronx, Bell says.

The limits on Yo,terials funds and the nature of regulations

regarding the payment of prevailing wages on construction work

in New York suggested to Bell that the program would have to

focus on refurbishing one- to three-family houses, not the multiple dwellings that characterized parts of the South Bronx, so

this helped narrow the search for target areas.

Meanwhile, Bell was looking for a local management agency.

The time constraints meant that the proposed LMA had to be an

existing organization, with a fiscal staff, and with a record

with the City Department of Employment. "These three requirements limited the number of potentials, plus we had to deal

with the political situation," Bell says. Essentially any LMA

had to be acceptable to Deputy Major Herman Badillo, a former

Bronx borough president and the city's leading Hispanic politician. This narrowed the search to two groups: The South

Bronx Community Housing Corp. and Operation Open City.

"I was disposed to Bronx Housing," Bell says, adding, "I

went to them first." But this organization essentially wanted

.c,o use the VICI funds to rehabilitate buildings it owned, which

343
contained more than eight units. "They were just not very interested," Bell says. So he turned to Operation Open City, a

citywide organization headquartered in Harlem. It was considered

competent,. Bell says, but "they were not very creative." When he

contacted them, however, he found they were not only interested,

they also were already the city's major weatherization contractor and were receiving CSA funding. Moreover, they already had

Department of Employment contracts, and they had a field office

in the South Bronx. In short, Bell says, "They were all set up

to do it, so we went with Open City."

Moise Williams, Operation Open City's director of training,

and some of her colleagues joined Bell in drafting the proposal.

However, Donald Menzi was instrumental in putting together a

number of elements, including the involvement of RTP in recruitment and the formation of educational linkages with a vocational

high school and Hostos Community College. Operation Open City

handled initial trade union contacts, but ultimately Merr7d

worked these relationships with Charles Fanning, a representative of the building trades council who was on Menzi's Manpower

Planning Council. Menzi obtained acc.-*ments from most unions

to work at 75 percent of union scal.-1.

The target areas chosen were the Aldus Green/Longwood and

Concourse East sections of the South Bronx. Both were part of

the city's preliminary South Bronx plan and contained one- to

three-family residences occupied by low income and elderly home

owners. Buildings in these areas would meet DOL requirements

regarding wages and CSA requirements for receiving weatherization funds.

344
The work providing agencies would be the Association for

the Improvement ,.of the Brownstone Community and the Bronx Resi-,

dents to Attain Sponsorship in Housing (BRASH). The two would

identify buildings to be weatherized, make initial contacts

with tenants, designate the scope of work t3 be done, and conduct an evaluation of the work after it was completed. The two

work providing agencies would also be the principal sources of

youth referrals, while RTP would screen applicants and have

principal responsibility for post-program placement. Bell

notes that:

I pushed for the involvement of these two neighborhood organizations to do the recruitment of youth

and to help fill out applications and certify the

work done. Open City was opposed to this chock

on their work.

The education linkage was with nearby Alfred E. Smith

Vocational High School, which would refer its graduates to the

program and which would allow VICI enrollees who had completed

six months in V1CI to enter the school's work-study program..

The high school would also provide GED classes, as would Hostos

Community College. The labor linkages included ties to local

unions representing carpenters, roofers, and plumbers. They

agreed to provide journeymen as supervisors and to offer special

consideration_ to selected VICI participants wishing to enter

appropriate training programs. Optional features included wage

incentives for youth who remained in the program, and part-time

work for selected youth who returned to school after six months.

While the substance of the proposal developed smoothly

enough, as Moise Williams notes, "The major problem was money."

345 3j3
Open City was constantly insisting the program could not be

mounted for the amounts specified by CPPV. Despite wresting a

number of budget cuts, Bell says, the field visit of CPPV

was crucial. "I wanted CPPV to tell Open City they must cut

more, and the major value of the field visit was that they

played it very well; they were firm and convincing."

In a memorandum describing CSPV's May 24 field visit to

the South Bronx, Gerald Kolker noted that Operation Open City

staff suggested additional funds were necessary. According to

Kolker's memo:

I explained to them that the money was not negotia- ble, that the negotiations had already taken place

at the Department of Labor and that while I could

understand them thinking that this was like a traditional RFP where one asks for considerably more money than one needs and then negotiates downward, in this case the figure was a fixed figure.

When Open City balked, Kolker's memorandum says, he told them:

I didn't see any organization pulling out of a one

million dollar contract for monies to come to tae

South Bronx and that the political fallout of them

refusing to be part of it would be devastating to

them in terms of other monies they get from the

Department of Employment, City of New York.

Kolker offered a number of suggestions on how the budget might

be cut. He proposed leasing vehicles rather than buying them

for the 18-month program and lowering the project director's

salary from the proposed $25,000 per year. Despite this,

Operation Open City insisted they would still need additional

funds from the Department of Employment. They asked Kolker to

meet with Commissioner Stanley Brezenoff to request more funds,

but Kolker said that would be inappropriate for him. Instead,

he informed Donald Menzi of the situation, and Menzi arranged a

346 3j,1
special Saturday meeting with Brezenoff at which the Commissioner

agreed to provide several Title VI slots to help absorb some

of the supervisory costs. The City also agreed to pay for insurance, a significant expense in New York, while CSA eventually

pledged some $200,000 for materials.

Thus, a satisfactory budget was developed, and the South

Bronx proposal was among those recommended for approval to OYP

on June 30th. It was approved shortly afterwards, and in July

Operation Open City began interviewing a director, receiving

referrals for journeymen, and preparing an annual plan.

However, in early October, the City cut off funding to

Operation Open City because of "a number of possible fiscal

irregularities." According to the October 10, 1978 editions

of the New York Post, the City's Community Development Agency,

which had provided Operation Open City with $1.34 million in

fiscal 1978, found such irregularities as unauthorized salary

increases and consultant fees and funds paid without vouchers.

John Bess III, chairman of Operation Open City, said the City's

actions were "politically motivated," but the City's announcement prompted federal agencies to withhold payments to Open City

until the questions were resolved. This meant CPPV's plans

were thrown into suspension for two months. Eventually the

chairman of the Open City board resigned while the executive

director and fiscal officer were fired. On November 8, 1978,

Operation Open City submitted a plan for reorganization to the

Community Development Agency, and once the problems with the

City were resolved, CPPV and Open City were to spend the last
month of 1978 picking up the pieces, reviving interest in the

program, and preparing for intake. When youth finally went to

work in this program in the first quarter of 1979, the South

Bronx would be the last of the VICI sites to become operational.

As was the case at several other proposed VICI sites, the

major problem and the major delay resulted from forces totally

extraneous to the demonstration. In this case, there was a

delay of at least two months in the fall of 1978 because of

fiscal questions raised in connection with another project.

However, the process of designing a program and drafting

a proposal proceeded fairly smoothly in the South Bronx. There

were several reasons for this. One was the priority the city

gave to the South Bronx. This helped get the Office of Management and Budget involved, acid Bell says of that agency, "We

happen to have access to people--I can get to the Deputy Mayor-- that's a tradition of the budget office here." Moreover, the

Commissioner of Employment gave the proposal sufficient priority

to warrant providing additional CETA slots to resolve the budget

problems. Other city officials say he was motivated by a desire to bring money into the South Bronx, but also, says one,

"It was clear Brezenoff wanted to make a good impression with

Finney."

Another helpful element in easing the drafting process

was Operation Open City's experience with weatherization. In

designing the VICI program, Williams says, "We were trying to

slim down weatherization and run it to fit the needs of youth.

The program was closely patterned after the program we already

348 3Jfi
had in place, so there gbouldn't be flaws in it. We've had

experience with everything in it except 16 and 17 year olds."

The other expediting element, according to E-11, was the

role played by CPPV. "CPPV had a different style than DOL,"

Bell says, adding, "They were interested in the demonstration

and after something. They could play the heavy, especially in

budget negotiations, and they were out of the political process.

With DOL you always feel you can go the political route." An

additional benefit, he says, was that CPPV field representative

had experience in New York City.

The program that emerged closely resembled the Operation

Open City weatherization program, and Williams says her organization had worked with both schools and unions on other occasions, "but we never brought them both together, so this is new.".

Bell's view of the program he essentially designed is that "It's

good training and useful housing programs. This is where I

see the strengths, not in the linkages." He believes the

linkages forged by VICI would not have occurred otherwise, but

he's not certain how real they will turn out to be. "Portland

evolved over time. You can't forge linkages like that right

away in New York. Portland lacks the polarization of New York,"

he says.
K. Northeast Ohio

The Northeast Ohio Employment and Training Consortium

serves several counties in the area around Youngstown, Ohio.

This area, which has been described as "the Ruhr of North

America," has faller on hard times in recent year, reflecting

the difficulties and consolidation in the American steel

industry.

When the Consortium received its invitation to participate

in the VICI demonstration, it submitted a letter of intent to

apply for a grant and it sent three staff members to Philadelphia for the April workshop. These staff members, headed by

David Dallessandro, the Deputy Director for Planning, proceeded

to develop a brief project design that indicated potential work

sites in three of the four political jurisdictions. Design

problems began to crop up almost immediately. The educational

linkage was weak. The ability to provide local matching funds

for materials and supplies was limited. The transportation

and logistical problems involved with projects in two or more

political jurisdictions were never adequately resolved. During

a technical assistance field trip, it became apparent to CPPV

that very little work was being done to solve these problems

and lay the groundwork for an effective program.

Soon after this trip the reason for the health-hearted

planning effort became clear. The local building and construction trades council was vetoing any involvement by its membership

350
in the VICI project. The local unions were completely disenchanted with CETA and its application in the Youngstown metropolitan area. They complained that CETA PSE projects had reduced the net growth of unionized municipal work forces and

used funds that should have been devoted to public works that

would employ local union craftsmen. The Western Reserve Building

and Construction Trades Council viewed the VICI application as

an ideal vehicle for registering their complaints. The President of the Council quite candidly explained his actions to the

Executive Director entirely in terms of the symbolic nature of

their resistance to VICI.

Moreover, with union unemployment in the Youngstown area

running far above the national levels, the unions were not

really interested in flooding the labor market with more

trained youth. It is not clear whether the union membership

was aware that in registering this protest the union leadership

was in effect rejecting ten full-time 18-month jobs.

The Prime Sponsor's executive director was reluctant to

get too heavy-handed with the union leadership for fear of jeopardizing future cooperation from the unions on the new CETA

Title VII funding. CPPV proposed to the Executive Director

that VICI supporters from National HRDI be asked to intervene

with the recalcitrant local union: The Executive Director

agreed, provided that this intervention was not traceable to

him. National HRDI staff, when approached on this subject,

described the Youngstown area locals as perhaps the nation's

most militant opponents of CETA-funded employment projects.

351 3U9
Based upon their assessment of this situation, they regarded

any action'on their part as futile.

Another dimension of the NOETC proposal development process

was provided by the Youngstown mayor. NOETC is directed by a

four-person executive committee consisting of one commissioner

from each of the Counties and the Mayor of Youngstown. The

mayor was adamant that NOETC receive a VICI demonstration award.

Regardless of union stance, he argued, the Executive Director

should be able to "get on a plane to Washington or Philadelphia"

and bring in the grant. CPPV's insistance that the unions be

firmly behind the demonstration also carried no weight with

the Mayor. Indeed, he indicated that failure to bring in the

VICI grant would be taken as evidence that the executive director

had, at the least, not tried hard enough.

This required the executive director to choose between

expending a great deal of valuable staff time to develop each

of the linkages comprising a viable VICI proposal, all the while

realizing that the unions were dooming his application or submitting only a pro forma proposal, which CPPV's review would

quickly disclose to the executive committee.

He eventually chose to submit a terse proposal that minimally conformed to the application format, and little more.

During its review CPPV cited the application for several major

weaknesses. NOETC chose not to pursue its application further.

Shortly afterwards, the friction between the Mayor and the executive director led to the executive director's resignation.

1)

352
L. Oakland, California

Oakland, California, the principal city of the East Bay

area across the bay from San Francisco, had an estimated population of 37,4,000 in 1978, or 10.38 percent less than the

361,561 people recorded in the 1970 census. Its youth population has been growing, however, with the number of 16- to 19-

year -olds nearly doubling from 10,210 in 1970 to 20,260 in 1978.

Overall, minorities composed 53.8 percent of the city's population, but minority youth represented 68.3 percent of all youths

age 16 to 19. About 60 percent of the 16- to 19-year-olds were

black and 14 percent were listed as Hispanic, according to the

California Employment Development Department figures. Estimates

for 1978 indicated that 52,450 people, or 16.2 percent of Oakland's population, would have incomes below the poverty level.

Blacks composed about 53 percent of this group, and Hispanics

composed 11 percent. Unemployment in the San Francisco-Oakland

SMSA was averaging nearly ten percent from 1975 through 1977,

and the City of Oakland had been experiencing a steep long-term

decline in industrial and commercial employment.

As in several other cities, Oakland officials first

learned they would be invited to apply for a VICI program from

their DOL federal representative. When the official ETA invitation arrived at Oakland's Office of Economic Development and

Employment Training (0EDET), the prime sronsor, OEDET director

of planning Robert Bloom notes, the planners had just completed

a frenetic Entitlement effort, "so the attitude here was one

353

4 U/
of fatigue." The planning staff felt "inundated" with requests

to prepare proposals for a variety of competitive grants

programs.

Beyond the dismay at the proposal sweepstakes, Bloom says,

the planners also had initial concerns about the design of the

VICI demonstration and its appropriateness for Oakland. OEDET

staff members regarded their organization as "a very placementoriented CETA," and they felt it would be difficult to place

VICI participants in Oakland's hard-pressed construction sector.

They were also concerned about their ability to obtain trade

union involvement or to find funds for supplies. Moreover,

in the spring of 1978, there was something called the JarvisGann initiative, which would go on the California ballot in

June 1978 as Proposition 13, and which raised the spectre of

sharp cuts in spending for social services. Finally, OEDET

was caught up in some internal struggles reflecting the arrival

of a new mayor in Oakland's city hall. Given all this, Bloom

says, "There was a real question if we would apply."

However, Bloom felt, "There wasn't enough good enough information in advance for a prime to make a yes or no decision,"

so he attended the CPPV conference in Philadelphia. He came

away feeling the conference was well structured, his questions

had largely been answered, and the program was worth pursuing.

Back in Oakland, Bloom commenced drafting a proposal together

with Margaret Rogers, the Youth Division Supervisor who would

soon become Director of the Employment and Training Department,

and other planners.

4;KI

354
The planners quickly made two significant departures from

what they saw as the typical VICI model. Bloom says they believed repairing houses in Oakland would present grave problems

in obtaining funds for materials. The city's community development funds were dispensed on a loan basis, SD VICI's ability to

obtain materials would depend on the ability of homeowners to

obtain loans to purchase materials. This could make it difficult to insure a continuous flow of work. Consequently, the

planners turned from home repair to the refurbishment of public

facilities--parks, playgrounds, etc. Here, they believed

funds would be available for painting, weatherization, and other

kinds of improvements.

The turn to public facilities helped prompt a decision to

develop linkages with the municipal employees union rther

than the local building trades unions, since municipal workers

were directly involved in working on the facilities that VICI

participants would be rehabilitating. But there was another,

more fundaments.: reason to turn away from the building trades

unions. Bloom mys he was convinced that "trade union support

could only be .ninimal given the condition of the building trades

in this area." Unemployment had been high since 1975, Bloom

noted, and the building trades unions in the East Bay area

would have great problems in absorbing the number of youth involved in the VICI into apprenticeship programs. Moreover,

California law prohibited these unions from granting preapprenticeship credit or giving any preference to VICI participants. Thus, even though the local building trades; unions

were under pressure to train minorities, Bloom believed the

355 4 u3
program would ultimately result in the youths getting jobs

outside the unions, and "This would just get us in bad with

the unions," Bloom says. In electing to work on city facilities and employ members of the municipal employees union as

journeymen supervisors, Oakland planners believed they were still

fulfilling the mandate to "replicate" the program model, particularly because they were developing a number of "linkages."

However, as early as the April 19, 1978 workshop in Philadelphia, CPPV was suggesting to Oakland planners that the union

linkage proposed would not be acceptable.

The program they devised called for targeting on 18 and 19

year olds. Aa with most Oakland CETA programs, VICI would be

op,:rated by the city. The work providing agency would be Oakland's Office of General Services, which was responsible for

the upkeep of municipal facilities. It would select city

facilities which the youths would paint or refurbish or resurface. The proposed target area was the "flatlands," an area

that included all seven of Oakland's community development districts and covered about half the city's area. Oakland traditionally had not targeted funds narrowly but rather divided

them among councilmanic districts, and VICI would continue

that practice. The program would obtain supervisors from, and

operate under the supervision of, the United Public Employees

Local No. 390, AFL-CIO, which represented city employees.

However, the building trades unions would have some connection with the program through the involvement of the Bay

Area Construction Opportunities Program (BACOP), which provided

356

40,1
information and training to young people interested in construction trades. BACOP had been operated since 1968 by the Bay

Area buildings trades unions with DOL funding. BACOP would

also provide youth referrals to the program, in conjunction

with the city's OEDET. And BACOP would provide an education

linkage by offering tutorial and pre-apprenticeship training for

participants and program-graduates. The-Oakland United School

District's Adult Education Department would also provide the

option of enrolling in their courses. The city generally

opposed servicing drop-outs with special programs, preferring

to re-enroll them in school. BACOP would also participate in

post-program placement, together with the state employment

service.

During the drafting process, Margaret Rogers remained

generally opposed to the demonstration, while Bloom supported

it, and the May 10 site visit of CPPV field representative Will

Maddox was regarded as crucial in determining whether or not

Oakland would submit a proposal. Although Maddox indicated

CPPV would not accept the target areas or union linkage Oakland

envisioned, Oakland officials concluded they faced no insurmountable problems, so Rogers gave her approval, and the drafting continued. The major remaining concern was Proposition 13,

an imponderable wnose fate wouldn't be known until after the

May 19th deadline for the submission of proposals. While Oakland was proceeding, Maddox was growing concerned after his

field visit. In a May 17 memo, he noted, "The trip to Oakland

was at best disappointing. Oakland," he wrote, "has yet to

make a concerted commitment toward proposal development."

357

4u5
OEDET sent its proposal to the City Council for approval

on May 16, and two days later it left Oakland for Philadelphia.

"We knew we would submit in fairly rough form, since time was

short," Bloom says. But after their submission, Oakland planners were told by CPPV that, as Bloom recalls, "the proposal

was totally unacceptable." Among the issues raised by CPPV,

according to Will Maddox, was the involvement of the municipal

employees union instead of the building trades, the failure to

target the program on a narrow area, and the intention to integrate the VILA demonstration with the Office of General Services

Facilities Renewal Project, so that the identity of the demonstration would be blurred.

Maddox was scheduled to visit Oakland on June 2, and

shortly before that date, he called Bloom to discuss CPPV's

crWque of the proposal. At that point Oakland officials

cancelled his si:heduled visit. "The whole program hung on the

structure we proposed, and since they opposed that, there was

nothing there, so we said let's hold off on the site visit,"

an OEDET staff member says.

Shortly afterwards, Proposition 13 was approved by California voters, and then, Bloom says, "We went to the City Council and said we should withdraw and everybody approved."

Maddox was informed informally, and then CPPV was notified

officially that Oakland was withdrawing its VICI proposal.

The proximate cause was Proposition 13. "It reduced our capability to provide supplies from general funds," Margaret

Rogers notes. Sharp cuts in municipal services were expected

358

4 Uf.;
to result from passage of this important, but at that time

little-understood initiative, and OEDET officials did not believe they could obtain resources to sustain the launching of

a new program.

Oakland officials did not make any effort to find ways of

mounting the demonstration in the face of Proposition 13. Oakland's tepid enthusiasm for VICI from the outset, weakened

still further by an inability to find a formula that immediately

met CPPV's standards, simply left the planners unwilling to

continue making any efforts on behalf of this demonstration.

They never entered into serious negotiations with CPPV on any

aspects of their plans, unlike other cities which sought to

wrest compromises to suit their local needs. While there is no

denying the roadblocks raised by Proposition 13 and by CPPV's

preliminary opposition to the structure Oakland proposed, city

officials never vigorously pursued VICI.

In retrospect, OEDET staff members explain this lack of

enthusiasm as a combination of their response to the Portland

model, demonstrations, and CPPV. Rogers says they felt the

proposed program was not innovative, but simply a mild revision

of other YCCIP programs, and, "Basically it wasn't a performanceoriented project; it would just give kids some work, without

future jobs." Oakland's CETA was more "performance oriented,"

she says, and moreover the city differed in atmosphere from

Portland in important ways. Oakland was less friendly, so

linkages would be more difficult to develop and maintain in a

meaningful way. Bloom believed, as was noted, that the program

would only get OEDET "in bad" with local unions.

359

4u7
Nor was Oakland keen on mounting a demonstration project.

In this financially hard-pressed city, Bloom says, "Demonstrations raise expectations, and then there is no follow up."

VICI was seen as too costly for the city to envision continuing

with its own resources, and yet, Bloom says, "The community

doesn't understand demonstrations; they feel there is inconsistency in programs." There was also a concern that any

failures in the demonstration would be blamed on the city administration, while "Philadelphia would get the glory."

Finally, CPPV was faulted for not being sufficiently

helpful. One OEDET staff member notes, "CPPV was not inept,

they were just not knowledgeable about CETA. None of them ever

worked at a prime. They don't see the problems of putting

five or six agencies together on a project." Moreover, this

OEDET staff member believes CPPV was "whipsawed" by DOL and

would have been better off, "getting things straight before

coming out to see us."

In short, Oakland was a somewhat reluctant participant

from the outset, and the passage of Proposition 13 provided

the straw that broke any resolve to obtain the demonstration.

360 4 {rd
M. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Philadelphia, with a population of nearly 1.8 million, is

the fourth largest city in the nation. Some 685,000 people, or

40 percent of its population, are non-whites. Non-whites constitute 36 percent of the labor force and 72 percent of the

city's public aid recipients, although non-whites compose only

50 percent of the total disadvantaged population.

Contemporary Philadelphia is a highly heterogeneous city.

Sometimes described as "200 small towns looking for a city," it

is a city of neighborhoods filled with residents who are

strongly attached to their part of the city. The city's efforts

to cope with its heterogeneity have often made it a battleground for different interest groups.

Philadelphia has experienced the classic problems of the

nation's older big cities: a movement of the affluent to the

suburbs, rising crime rates, deteriorating housing stock, and

a secular decline in employment. The city's employment is distributed as follows:

Services 24%

Government 20%

Manufacturing 20%

Wholesale/retail 19%

Construction 2%

However, between 1972 and 1975, the city lost 42,500 blue

collar jobs, a decline of 9.1 percent. In response to the movement of jobs to the suburbs or to other regions, Philadelphia's

public and private sectors have often joined together to undertake innovative cooperative efforts to find solutions to economic
problems. The Philadelphia Garment Board, for example, linked

business, labor, and government in an attempt to protect the

local garment industry from a further loss of jobs. The Philadelphia Partnership, headed by Graham Finney, was a broader

effort to provide this kind of linkage between the public and

private sectors.

Philadelphia's leadership structure is characterized by a

large number of competing public and private institutions who

are involved in deciding public policy. The active constituencies of many of these institutions have been shrinking, and

their leaders have been losing touch with many of those they

seek to represent. But Philadelphia is very much a pluralistic

city in which no single institution or group has a monopoly

position in civic and political affairs. Rather there are a

large number of diverse institutions which provide avenues of

pressure and influence on the city's public affairs. The relative lack of wide participation in many of these groups has

convinced many, however, that the pluralism of Philadelphia

is a pluralism of competing elites.

Despite Graham Finney's close ties to Philaddlphia leaders,

neither he nor others at CPPV treated the city any differently

than the other sites that were involved in the proposal development and site selection process.

Anthony Neri, a senior planner with the Area Manpower

Planning Council (AMPC), the local prime sponsor, was given

principal responsibility for the overall development of the

VICI proposal. The prime sponsor turned for assistance to the

362 4 ;
Greater Philadelphia Federation of Settlement Houses (GPFS), a non-profit coalition of a dozen community settlement houses

funded by the United Way. CPFS seemed the obvious choice for

LMA for several reasons. First, the organization was currently

operating a Housing Improvement Project (HIP) which was similar

in many respects to VICI. Second, in developing that project,

GPFS's Housing Program Coordinator, Ellie Spaeth, had established good rapport with the construction unions as well as

a reputation for diligence and integrity. Third, GPFS was one

of the few local organizations which dealt with a broad range

of people on a citywide basis.

However, GPFS's initial reaction to the VICI project was

negative. Spaeth says they saw it as "another one doomed to

failure." They disliked the supervisory ratio and considered

the budget for supervisors too small. However, after GPFS considered VICI's potential benefits for the city's housing stock

and unemployed youth and recognized the similarities between

VICI and the existing HIP program, Spaeth says the Federation

decided to enter the competition. Comments made by AMPC staff

members suggest that the prime sponsor would not have pursued

the VICI proposal if GPFS had refused to serve as LMA.

Ellie Spaeth assumed the roles of proposal writer and

union liaison. In the latter capacity, however, she enlisted

the aid of Joseph Stearn, Deputy Director of the City Office

of Community Development. That Office was increasingly interested in identifying new, and it was hoped, minority and

nonprofit contractors forthe 75 to 80 contracting jobs it

generated each year. By coincidence, therefore, Joe Stearn had
been pushing for some kind of emergency home repair program,

such as an expansion of the HIP project, just as the VICI invitation arrived. His immediate reaction to the project was not

enthusiastic, since he objected to the 12:1 superw!sory ratio.

He had negative experiences with high training ratios in previous programs. The subsequent change to a 6:1 ratio'convinced

him to participate. Stearn was well known and trusted by local

unions since his family had been active in the labor movement.

When he and Spaeth approached union officials, however, they

initially encountered opposition to the program. Why train the

sons when the fathers are out of work, they were asked. And

why train more competitors for jobs? Why encourage new apprentices who will demand still more preferential treatment? Despite early reservations, the view which came to prevail among

union leaders was that the program would give unions a chance to

improve their image. At worst, it would be only minimally successful and provide no threat. And, with 4,000 carpenters out

of work, as one union official noted, "Ten jobs was ten jobs."

Spaeth and Stearn were able to secure the support and cooperation of most of the construction and building trades unions

except the plumbers, who thought that even a 6:1 ratio was too

high. (The supervisory ratio for plumbers on the HIP project

was one-to-one.) However, through a bit of subterfuge, Stearn

managed to secure the participation of plumbers without the

formal acquiescence of the plumbers union. Since there were

plumbers under contract to the HIP project, Stearn suggested

that HIP simply serve as a plumbing subcontractor to the VICI
project. Privately Stearn was sure that the experience would

prove acceptable to the plumbers union--even at the 6:1 ratio-- so they would eventually agree to participate on a formal basis.

In developing the proposal, Spaeth also encountered a mild

problem with Henry Fornara, business representative of the

Building and Construction Trades Council, regarding that body's

involvement in the project. She believed she had reached an

understanding with him regarding the Council's involvement in

the project, but after the proposal was submitted, Fornara objected to being committed without his approval. He later muted

his objections after Spaeth apologized and explained she had

proceeded on a mistaken impression.

The selection of a target area presented another problem

because of the nature of GPFS. The Federation was built on

the assumption that each constituent settlement house would

receive a roughly equal return on its investment in the umbrella.

organization. CPPV's insistence on targeting the work directly

threatened that principle. But eventually, the planners

agreed that the project' would consist of emergency home repair

and housing rehabilitation to be performed in four settlementhouse areas in South and lower Northwest Philadelphia.

The proposal AMPC submitted to CPPV on May 19th formally

designated the Franklin Foundation, a GPFS affiliate which

operated GPFS housing programs, as the LAMA. The target population would be 16 to 19 year old, out-of-school, unemployed

youth living in the tour target areas. The state Bureau of

Employment Security would join the four settlement houses in

365 4

311.3
providing referrals to the program. The city office of Community Development would be responsible for providing emergency

home repair sites, while the Philadelphia Housing Development

Corporation would provide properties for more extensive

rehabilitation.

The city school system and community college would provide

an educational linkage by making available GED programs to VICI

trainees. Post-program placement was to be provid'd by the

Bureau of Employment Security and the Negro Trade Union Leadership Council. The proposal also featured an advisory committee

to meet monthly and an incentive wage system to reward trainees

for good performance.

On June 29th, CPPV forwarded to OYP a conditional recommendation for approval. CPPV's approval required that:

(1) an unjustified $10,000 budget item, affecting

the proposed organization and pattern of responsibility within the management agency is adjusted and

clarified; and (2) the support of the plumbers union

is obtained.

Following an August 3 site visit, CPPV offered its unconditional approval of the Philadelphia proposal. In its

August 10, 1978 memorandum to OYP, CPPV noted that the Philadelphia VICI management agency had removed the $10,000 budget

item for a management consultant and assigned these functions

to the project director, putting the budget in conformance with

VICI guidelines in all respects.

However, despite substantial efforts, the planners were

unsuccessful in securing the cooperation of the Plumbers Union,

so the LMA won CPPV's approval to drop the plumbing work crews

3 611'1
from the project. Plumbing requirements of property to be

renovated would be met by subcontracting with HIP for plumbing

services. Thus Stearn's strategem was approved.

As the Philadelphia VICI project was preparing to begin

operations, there was concern among its planners about the extent to which Philadelphia differed from Portland as a context

for the program. There were also signs of some minor friction

between GPFS and the prime sponsor because of what the Federation regarded as overcaution at AMPC in dealing with CPPV and

DOL.

There were also a number of criticisms from the prime

sponsor and GPFS which were directed at CPPV. Both felt they

had faced a number of delays and changes in guidelines and

deadlines, and they blamed CPPV for these. At one point the

GPFS board even refused to participate further until it received a definite commitment on timing and funding from DOL.

As Spaeth says, there was a feeling that they were "being

walked on with cleats" by CPPV. Beyond what they saw as CPPV's

apparent inconsistency, Spaeth and Neri also concluded that

CPPV was more interested in the integrity of the project design

than with the output of the project.

The most serious complaint raised was that CPPV's insistence on convening a meeting of union leaders during an early

site review was responsible for arousing the suspicions of the

plumbers union and causing their refusal to participate.

Spaeth also objected to what she viewed as CPPV's "insulting

lack of trust" which she found somewhat humiliating. There was
also a good deal of criticism of CPPV's lack of knowledge

about labor and training issues, and its general insensitivity

to the needs of program operators. Both GPI'S and AMPC were

critical of CPPV's first field representative on the grounds

that she was uncertain as to program goals and inexperienced

with labor projects and project management. In response, CPPV

notes that many of the criticisms regarding program changes do

not take account of the fact that the changes were brought

about by OYP. Moreover, CPPV staff members say that the Philadelphia planners' confusion regarding the program's goals was

the result of a reluctance (on the part of the prime and the

LMA) to accept CPPV's role.

There was much confusion about CPPV's role; most of those

interviewed thought it was a profit-making DOL subcontractor,

and no one recalled even hearing the term "intermediate unit."

More generally, both Neri and Spaeth were troubled by the

growing number of middlemen and monitors to which program

operators were being made accountable.

On the other hand, both the prime sponsor and the LMA

agreed that CPPV's professionalism and energetic participation

would probably result in a project that was more productive

than most training programs. There was also a strong feeling

that CPPV held them to higher standards than others they had

dealt with in developing programs.

368 4 16
N. St. Louis, Missouri

Between 1970 and 1976, St. Louis lost 16.5 percent of its

population, the second largest percentage decline of any major

city. The movement was an intensified version of a familiar

pattern: the affluent fleeing the city, leaving behind a

population increasingly composed of minorities and the poor.

St. Louis has the third largest black population of any northern

city, and racial tension has been a major concern, although the

city has had less racial violence than many other large urban

centers.

St. Louis is a highly unionized city: the ratio of union

members to the labor force is third highest among the nation's

big cities. But the business community, led by executives of

such firms as Ralston-Purina, Monsanto, Anheuser-Busch, the May

Company, and McDonnell-Douglass, exercises much influence in

city affairs. The area's large and diversified manufacturing

sector, which has steadily shifted from labor intensive to

more capital-intensive modes, has experienced a steady decline

in employment for a number of years, although an increase in

non-manufacturing jobs has mitigated the impact of this decline

somewhat.

Faced with a continuing loss of population and employment,

the business community his been attempting to attract industry

to the city. However, the St. Louis area has continued to

lose the industry that must provide jobs for the remaining

population. And much of the middle ring of the metropolitan
area, the part between downtown and the prosperous suburbs,

has become a true wasteland, the home of what threatens to

become a permanent underclass living amid poverty, unemployment, and crime.

When the St. Louis Agency on Training and Employment (SLATE)

first received word of the VICI project, like several other

prime sponsors, it saw the program as a triple-barreled Godsend,

addressing not only the city's housing and employment needs,

but also--once they understood the program--offering an opportunity to cement SLATE's relationship with the unions.

The primary responsibility for development of the proposal

was assigned to SLATE's Technical Assistance Division and to

Donald Terrell, a technical assistant with limited experience.

It s-ems clear that Terrill was thrust into the project too

quickly and with too little support from elsewhere in the organization. However, for reasons not entirely clear, SLATE

had recently undergone a substantial turnover in staff, during

which several white staff members and planners had resigned and

taken with them a great deal of project information and local

data. Moreover, the SLATE director recently appointed by the

Mayor was a newcomer to the organization. Thus, SLATE's planning

resources were decidedly limited as Terrell turned to the VICI

project.

As a result, the project fell heir to several fatal errors

very early in the developmental process. Neither Terrell (nor,

it seems, his director) were able to form a concise picture of

certain of the VICI guidelines and requirements. They were particularly unclear as to the "active union participation" element,

370 41
and the requirements for the LMA relationship.

As a result, the agency essentially marked time in the

period between notice of the program and the April 19th and

20th conference. The major effort in this period involved contact with the Community Development Agency, and the Adult Basic

Education facility of the Board of Education. These were

linkages which presented no problems, since SLATE already had

a good existing relationship with both. In essence, then,

SLATE took the easier path and deferred the tougher problems

until later.

Upon later examination, however, even the supposedly "easy"

linkages proved to be weak--consisting of little more than perfunctory contact and a hasty explanation of the basic goals of

the program.

Developing linkages to labor was expected to be difficult

because SLATE's relations with the labor movement had been

tenuous at best. Many CETA staff members believed the unions

were racist preserves, while a number of union leaders saw

CETA as inefficient, meddlesome, and potentially threatening.

When SLATE began to seek active union involvement (as opposed

to the "union blessings" SLATE originally thought sufficient),

another major error was committed. The primary effort to develop

a labor linka e was directed at the Building and Trades Council,

and there was only a perfunctory effort to go through the local

Human Resources Development Institute. However, St. Louis'

HRDI had a great deal of influence over local labor attitudes.

This oversight apparently offended the HRDI representative and
effectively cut off any possibility of support from that

quarter, yet the executive secretary of the Building and Trades

Council was proving difficult to reach, let alone involve.

Once it became clear that there would be problems in

securing union participation, SLATE sought to substitute its

proposed local management agency for the union component. The

proposed LMA was the Missouri-Kansas Minority Contractors

Association (Mo-Kan). SLATE director Charles Bussey was particularly interested in involving Mo-Kan, which had already

participated in other CETA projects, because one of the Mayor's

chief projects and political promises had been to increase the

role of minority contractors, and Bussey was an ally of the

mayor likely to be particularly responsive to that priority.

SLATE argued that most of Mo-Kr..'s constituents were union members, and its involvement was, therefore, "as good as a union."

When CPPV objected, SLATE dopped this plan and renewed its

efforts to secure union invo3ve:aent.

However, by the time SLATE's director had met personally

with the Building and Trades Council's executive secretary and

the Council had agreed to participate, it was too lat-. The

proposal deadline was at hand, and SLATE had too few essentials

in place to be a serious contender for funding.

Thus, SLATE submitted a somewhat truncated proposal to

CPPV on May 19, 1978, which called for 18 and 19-year-old,

out-of-school youth to be employed in bringing houses up to

code standards in the Mid-Town Redevelopment Area. Community

Development Block Grant funds had been targeted for this area

372 4.(2()
and could be made available to VICI. Ten of the 60 youth were

to be selected for training as estimators. The Missouri-Kansas

Minority Contractors Association would be the LMA and would

provide post-program placement, while the city Community Development Agency would be the work providing agency, developing

work sites and assigning work orders. The Board of Education's

Adult Basic Education program would provide the educational

linkage, while a local group called Project 70,001 would be

the youth referral agency. However, the proposal did not inOicate any participation by organized labor, and moreover, no

budget for the program was submitted. Thus, CPPV did not

recommend St. Louis for approval, and OYP concurred.

More than any other site, St. Louis was very much of a

one-man show. As noted, Terrell appears to have had very little

guidance or assistance in developing the project. And what

help was provided appears to have been either misguided or belated. Some of SLATE's oversights are difficult to explain.

Why, for example, did it fail to contact the Human Resources

Development Institute more quickly? And why did it not secure

the Building and Trades Council's involvement sooner, particularly since SLATE director Bussey was personally acquainted

with the head of both organizations?

In analyzing SLATE's problems, it's clear the agency--and

Terrill in particular--was very leery of unions. Moreover,

Terrell persists in speaking of union leaders as being far

above his own rank and station in life. A more aggressive

approach might have yielded better results, even after the false

373
start. In addition, whether the result of overwork or simple

mismanagement, SLATE personnel do not appear too reliable.

(This local view was borne out when CPPV's process documentor

flew to St. Louis for a scheduled meeting only to find that

Terrell failed to come to his office that day and had not informed anyone else of his appointment.) There is evidence of

high staff turnover at SLATE. Moreover, by several accounts,

SLATE failed to make timely or proper use of CPPV's technical

assistance.

SLATE personnel are quick to accept the lion's share of

the blame for their failure. And staffers are full of praise

for the CPPV field representative's help and guidance--particularly in urging the director to become more involved in the

union participation effort. Indeed, the project appears to

have had some beneficial residual effects: the unions and SLATE

are about to work together on a YCCIP project very similar to

the VICI design; and the staff feels more confident and knowledgeable about the practical aspects of project design,

logistics, and implementation of linkages.

4 ))

374
0. Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C., the nation's twelfth largest city, is

a one-industry town: some 45.4 percent of its 580,000 workers

are employed by government--37.9 percent by the federal government and 7.5 percent by the city. While the number of government agencies and tax-exempt organizations means that 55.5 percent of the land in the District is not taxable, the importance

of government as an employer has meant stable employment in

recessions and a general long-term increase in jobs.

Washington's stable, recession-proof economic base has

made the metropolitan area one of the nation's most affluent

areas. The District's per capita income is $7,742, which is

above the national average, though far below the level of surrounding suburbs. But by the mid-1970's the flight out of

Washington to the suburbs had slowed. The number of majolr

crimes in the District'had declined by a third since 1970, and

the real estate market was booming.

However, in the late 1970's about 15 percent of the population received some form of welfare, and unemployment among

minorities, who form 70 percent of the District's population,

was high. An estimated 50 percent of all black teenagers in

the District were jobless. The job categories which were expanding in the District were specialized white collar fields

poorly suited to the needs of the unemployed, and the types of

jobs requiring only minimal skills, in such fields as retailing,

375 4:e3
wholesaling, and service industries, were expanding in the

suburbs outside the District.

Developments in the District have been heavily influenced

by the business community, particularly two business groups,

the Washington Board of Trade and the Federal City Council.

The District's political development has been slow and power

has rarely been allowed to concentrate in the hands of the

blacks who form a majority of the District's population.

Washington has only recently begun to develop any tradition of

neighborhood and community bases for political and social action.

Since the District was granted Home Rule in 1973 and held

its first municipal election in 1974, however, a new political

style has been created, and a new and powerful black political

elite has begun to emerge. The new elite arose from three

sources: those already in power under the old appointed MayorCity Council system; those with prior organizational experience

and constituencies, such as clergymen; and the growing number

of largely black technocrats and social developers.

Since the granting of Home Rule, there has been only a

gradual abatement in the original feeling that those who worked

so hard for the city's emancipation deserved a place at the

head of the new political table. That attitude, coupled with

an automatic tendency to view criticism as racism, explains

why the District has experienced severe administrative problems

and a crisis in its civil service system. In recent years the

District government has lost millions of dollars from federal

agencies because of an inability to effectively manage its

376 4,2.1
activities. And the inability of the city's prime sponsor,

the Department of Manpower, to pull together its personnel

and resources in a manner sufficient to develop an acceptable

VICI proposal would provide yet another example of the problems

in running this newly self-governing city.

The development of Washington's unsuccessful VICI proposal

is obscured by seeral factors. Chief among these is the fact

that several of the individuals who were key participants in

the process are no longer in their former positions; and the

fact that those who remain are somewhat embarrassed by the

city's failure to mount a winning effort, and are therefore

not entirely forthcoming as to their roles and opinions. However, the picture that emerges from the interviews is as

follows:

When the D.C. prime sponsor received CPPV's application

package, responsibility for developing the proposal was assigned

to Harriel Williams, Manpower Specialist for the city's Office

of Manpower Training Programs, and Reverend Carleton Veazey,

who serves as both Staff Director of the Manpower Advisory

Planning Commission and as a staff member of the Department of

Manpower.

Assigning the application to two separate offices and individuals apparently introduced a note of conflict and confusion

from which the effort never recovered. By several accounts

there was a degree of strain between Williams and Veazey, as

well as between their respective offices, complicating the communications between them. Moreover, several of those interviewed
described Veazey as a manifestly incompetent administrator.

Indeed, that view is widely held among the city's employment

and training specialists.

The lack of communication and the basic misconception,

errors, and delays which were occurring reached such alarming

proportions that Doris Woods, director of what was at that

time the Office of Program Planning and Development (since reorganized into the Office of Employability Development), stepped

in--with no official authority or mandate to do so--and assumed

control of the project. After first firing one or two staff

persons, and officially citing Veazey for incompetence, Woods

began to direct development of the project along more rational

lines sometime in early May.

However, the project files which she inherited were scanty.

And she says notes on planning and design were often erroneous

and always confusing. As a result, she never fully understood

several': ey VICI concepts and goals. In addition, Woods also

inherited some embarrassing organizational encumbrances. Primarily, there had been an early decision to select the National

Black Veteran's Organization as the Local Management Agency

for VICI. Woods and many other local labor experts were

opposed to that selection on the grounds that the NBVO was

administratively weak and otherwise generally unsuitable as an

LMA. Moreover, the Veteran's organization was implacably hostile to labor unions--largely on the grounds of union racism- -

and thus could expect very little cooperation from organized

labor. Rejecting NBVO and two other hopefuls--OIC and the

378

42i;
United Planning Organization, Woods managed to steer the LMA

role to the D.C. Department of Housing and Community Development's Property Management Administration (PMA), located within

the PMA's Resident Services Division.

The Department of Housing and Community Development had

. felt all along that implementation of the project most logically

belonged with them. Housing and Development was, from the beginning, opposed to the NBVO. Not--they say, because of envy,

but because "NBVO would bring nothing except their name" to the

project, and because DCHD could not stomach the idea of allocating their own CD funds "merely to buy NBVO new staff and

facilities." Furthermore, DCHD wanted the project because it

would help to offset administrative costs. Similarly, DCHD

objected to the $50,000 administrative allotment going to the

prime, on the grounds that it should go to the LMA--in its

capacity as project implementor. (Within the Department of

Manpower, Doris Woods felt the same way--and strove to get

those funds allocated to the DCHD.)

According to staff members of the Department of Manpower

and the Department of Housing and Community Development, local

unions were not especially enthusiastic about VICI. Originally

there was great reluctance to participate in any project in

which NBVO had even a small role, much less primary responsibility. Moreover, Washington unions have exhibited a sense of

helplessness amidst the city's powerful business interests, as

well as a constant suspicion of imminent betrayal, so they were

extremely wary of the VICI project. The size of the project
was not regarded as sufficient to warrant union aid in removing

obstacles such as the need to meet local union wage scales.

Nonetheless, the planners eventually succeeded in obtaining

commitments of cooperation from the Washington Building and

Construction Trades Council as well as locals of the Carpenters,

Plasterers, Cement Masons, and Road, Highway and Heavy Construction Laborers' unions. The proposal DOM submitted to

CPPV on May 19th called for youth to be recruited from six

public housing projects in the Anacostia area of the District.

The youth would provide rehabilitation, maintepence, and energy

conservation services to the housing projects from which they

were recruited. The Division of Adult and Continuing Education

of the District public school system provided the educational

linkage, while DOM would provide youth referrals and postprogram placement.

CPPV raised a number of questions about the original proposal, and the .'.apartment of Manpower submitted a new one on

June 23. On June 29, 1978, CPPV offered a conditional recommendation for approval to OYP. CPPV noted that, "Present inadequacies are f't to stem from a second start-up application'

process and not from insurmountable structural problems." Before

offering unqualii.ed approval, CPPV noted that it needed satisfactory cor: -1- ion that all required linkages were in place

as well as remedy of several inadequacies in the proposal. It

also awaited completion of a DOL regional assessment of the

June 23rd proposal. The DOL regional office said that the

Washington prime sponsor would be unable to monitor a VICI

380

ti
subcontractor effectively, and at the regional office's behest,

Washington was dropped from consideration.

i4

Most District interviewees were neutral on the subject of

CPPV's general effect on the project. There was some fairly

specific criticism of CPPV's first field representative--largely

on the grounds of hesitancy, and an alleged lack of experience

and "transferrable" understanding of the project's goals and

structure. Woods, in particular, complains that she was unable

to form a coherent sense of the project, based on the field

rep's information.

More intense--though understated--criticism was directed at

national and regional DOL. It was reported that one regional

official had told DOM that they obviously couldn't handle the

efforts they had underway already. Further, DOM and DCHD are

convinced that they lost out not because of their proposal or

a lack of administrative capability, but because the District

was in the midst of a fury of allegations of corruption and

mismanagement in the CETA program.

However, one DOM official admitted that the fault was more

basic and closer to home than that. This individual explained

that the proposal would have been meaningless once the project

got underway, and that "they would have found a way to screw

it up before long."

This interviewee also raised a number of philosophical and

conceptual disagreements with the VICI program. Several officials at DCHD opposed the emphasis on unions. One commented

that the decline in union power didn't necessarily mean that

381 4,:ja
minority membership or participation would increase. And,

that even if it did, minorities would only--once again--be

following, rather than leading; in effect, "moving into the deserted slums, rather than a new house." Others felt that union

apprenticeships were not the answer, that minorities and women

needed to concentrate on high-paying jobs, with a higher concentration of white collar employment. Ted Greer of the Property

Management Administration argued that, if unions were necessary,

the AFL-CIO was not. He felt that the American Federation of

Government Employees (AFGE) would have served at least as well,

and better, considering the District's chief occupations. Doris

Woods criticized the project's research design AS "insufficient"

--although she admitted that her opinion might be based on a

still incomplete perception of the project goals. Greer was

officially tolerant of, but personally uncomfortable with, the

research aspect. He admitted to a bias in form of the service

orientation, but he said, "if you're going to use meaningless

vocational-technical assessment techniques (progress charts,

etc.), then why not use vocational-technical training methods,

too? Why not do it all or mostly in the c1aFroom ?"

4,4)

392
P. An Overview of the Proposal Development Process

The proposal development and site selection process that

CPPV guided from mid-April through the end of August 1978

started with 15 sites and ended up with nine, one of which

would be operating a program outside the demonstration. Six

sites were eliminated: Northeast Ohio and St. Louis were not

able to complete workable proposals. Oakland dropped out in

the wake of Proposition 13. Los Angeles was unable to develop

an acceptable budget or management structure. And Washington

and Miami were eliminated as a result of questions raised by

the regional DOL offices about these prime sponsors. A seventh

site, Central Harlem, ended up in a completely unanticipated

special category, having been approved by OYP yet severed from

the demonstration under an agreement reached by OYP and CPPV.

Thus, the VICI demonstration would consist of eight sites,

six of which ran along the eastern seaboard, with two in the

Midwest. Though this national demonstration ended up highly

limited geographically, its components still offered considerable

diversity in other respects. The sites offered a mix of economic and social qualities. They included cities with the

classic problems of older Northeastern and Midwestern cities,

as well as two Sunbelt sites, Atlanta and Broward dounty. There

was also diversity in the activities planned by the programs

and the institutions linked to VICI.

The central concept guiding the development of the proposals and the selection of sites was the focus on replication.

383
The sites were not directed to establish programs meeting exact

specifications, as has frequently been the case withLfederally

funded activities. Nor were the localities simply given money

to be used within broad guidelines, a hallmark of the "new

federalism." Instead, as the background paper issued by OYP

as part of. the VICI application package noted, this was to be

a "planned replication by CETA prime sponsors." The paper

explained:

Replication is the close reproduction of a model, but it is not xeroxing. The successful transfer

of EHR in different and diverse jurisdictions must be based on the clear distinction between essential

characteristics of the model and incidental features of a particular program manifestation. The basic

principles, processes, roles, and functions which

underlie the model are its essence while the concrete particulars of a program are the incidentals. For example, an essential aspect of EHR is union

involvement, but it is only incidental that the

lead role is played by the Carpenter's Local in

Portland.

The background paper added that:

The process of replication must adhere to the essential principles integral to program success and yet

be flexible and sensitive to the incidentals and

perogatives [sic] of diverse communities.

The background paper then went on to list the required

program elements for VICI, some optional features, and two

planned variations. The program features included:

Required Program Elements Include:

1. Participants 16-19 years old who are unemployed,

underemployed, economically disadvantaged and confronted by severe difficulties in obtaining access

to jobs.

2. Work projects which provide both needed physical

community improvements and varied work and training

for participants. The work projects must be completable within the life of the demonstration; and

384

4 ,j1) I 4,
the work must be of a kind which would not be

routinely done in the absence of the program.

3. Project participants recruited from the areas

where youth work activity will take place.

4. Well defined work crews led by skilled supervisors

and a supervisor-participant ratio small enough to

permit skills training.

5. Linkages of public and private agencies with clear

assignment of (and agreement to) roles and responsibilities to include:

(a) A local management agency with the experience and

capacity to conduct and manage the program.

(b) A youth referral agency with demonstrated access

to and experience in working with youth who are

the target population for this program.

(c) A work providing agency with the demonstrated

capacity to provide a suitable inventory of projects and work orders in a timely and continuous

fashion.

(d) Labor unions and trade organizations cooperating

in the referral of journeymen instructors and

provision of apprenticeship training credit for

youth who work in the program.

(e) Educational institutions which can provide

youth participants with opportunities to receive

a G.E.D. or enroll in other forms of continuing

education.

6. Provision for obtaining licensing approval and/or

permits to undertake physical improvements work, inspection of completed work, and valuation of work

performed.

7. Provisions for post program training, education or

employment.

8. A commitment to provide the necessary data and information to meet the research requirements of the

demonstration.

9. Local funding to supplement the amount provided by

DOL, particularly for building materials and

supplies.

385

433
Optional Program Features could include:

1. The pattern of agencies and organizations to par- ticipate in the program and the combination of tasks they perform.

2. Establishment of a coordinating committee, made up

of representatives of all participating agencies, to plan and guide the program at the local level.

3. Payment of incentive wages to participants (strongly

encouraged).

4. Part-time work for selected youth who return to

school after six months of full time program

enrollment.

5. Program additions to the basic model, if local funds are available to finance them.

Planned Variations of the Model

For research purposes some variations in the model, given the required elements in all sites, offer opportunities for further knowledge development. Two such variations, nature of work and supervisory ratios, are planned for the replication of this demonstration.

1, 3: Participants

Nearly half the sites elected to limit participation to

18 and 19 year olds, and the remaining sites also planned to

concentrate on the older, more employable portion of the eligible age group while officially remaining open to 16 and 17

year olds. Most sites felt 16 and 17 year olds were too young

to be dealt with in this kind of work experience and training

program. The programs planned to recruit trainees from limitd

target areas which were generally coterminous with, or inclusive

of, the areas in which the community improvement work would be

done. The recruitment areas were sometimes broader than the

work areas because of a need to have access to a sufficiently

large population pool.

386 434
2, 4: Work and Work Sites

All 01 the localities planned to use well defined work

crews led by skilled journeymen supervisors working under a 6:1

supervisory ratio. At one point Los Angeles suggested using

CETA Title II workers as supervisors rather than union journeymen, but this unacceptable alternative was raised only as a

means of solving budget problems in the proposal. Ten of the

sites chose to focus the work efforts on private homes, and

the rest included public facilities. Nearly all sites chose

more than one antivity. Most planned rehabilitation and emergency home repair, but painting, weatherization, and sundry

other activities were prominent at six sites. And one site,

St. Louis, proposed to train participants to become construction

estimators.

Two-thirds of the sites elected to carry out their work

in two or more areas. All of the proposed work areas were

clearly in need of refurbishment, but political considerations

helped determine the boundaries or breadth of the target areas

in some localities.

5: Linkages

This was regarded by many as the heart of the VICI program.

It was the element which made Portland interesttng to many, and

it was the factor which many believed would shape the success

or failure of the VICI programs. The 15 sites followed a

variety of different routes in working on linkages. Five sites

elected to serve as their own Local Management Agency, while
six chose private organizations and four selected public agencies to serve as LMA's. In three cases the youth referral

linkage was to be a public agency, while five chose private

organizations, and four sites decided to work primarily with

the local employment service. Four sites chose to handle youth

referral themselves or to let the LMA perform that task. Two

sites selected a mixture of public and private referral organizations. Nine of the sites utilized public agencies as

tneir chief work providing agency; the rest chose private orations. All developed linkages providing for either a

return to regular public schools or access to special GED

classes.

The greatest effort and concern surrounded efforts to

develop linkages with trade unions. Ten sites developed linkages to more than one trade union, and seven also forged

linkages with labor umbrella groups, such as the local Building

and Trades Council or the Human Resources Development Institute.

The unions most frequently involved were the Carpenters and

Painters and Plasterers. The unions which agreed to work with

the VICI program tended to shape the kind of work to be undertaken by the program, rather than vice versa. Thus, in Newark

and Fort Lauderdale, for example, the choice of the painting as

a primary activity was made because the painters' unions were

less demanding in educational requirements and more sympathetic

to the program. In Chicago and the South Bronx, decisions

about union linkages were shaped by local politics.

Overall, the union linkages were the most difficult to

forge, and some remained uncertain, but once agreements were

388 4 ,
reached, planners and VICI field representatives tended to

have a good deal of confidence in the substance of these linkages. While some unions were reluctant to make commitments in

writing, they had given strong pledges; and moreover, because

the unions were referring journeymen to the program, this seemed

to imply an automatic ongoing linkage. In examining the other

linkages, there was often a feeling that the educational linkages in particular would turn out to offer less than what was

promised in the proposal.

In most localities, the linkages which we're the easiest

to firm up and held the greatest promise of being maintained

were those in which there was already an existing relatiotmllip.

Conversely, new linkages were difficult to establish and were

often considered suspect by many of the involved in planning

them.

7: Post-program Placement

Eight sites chose to undertake much of the placement work

themselves or to delegate the task to the LMA. Two chose private agencies other than their LMA, four elected to have the

local employment service carry out this task, and five assigned

at least some degree of placement responsibility to the participating unions or labor councils.

8: Commitment to Research

The details of the research program were being developed

at the same time as the proposals, so all of the sites essentially made pro forma commitments to cooperate with the research

389
effort. Later, as specific research requirements were promulgated, there would be some minor grumbling. But the bulk of

this was the traditional carping by program operators about

researchers who didn't care about the feelings of the participants or the burdens of the program managers.

9: Local Funding

All of the successful applicants obtained local funding

to supplement the DOL funds. These funds, which were to be

used largely for materials and supplies, were often provided

from Community Development Block grants earmarked for the work

areas. Among the other sources tapped was CSA, which had a

special interest in Operation Open City's South Bronx weatherization program. The inability to find sources of local funds

helped to scuttle both California proposals.

Optional Program Features

CPPV listed several optional program features in the VICI

application package, and encouraged applicants to consider

adding others. But the only ones of significance offered in

the proposals were those on CPPV's list. Among the most common

options proposed was the payment of incentive wage increases

to program participants. Another common option was the establishment of a coordinating committee or advisory group made up

of all the participating agencies. Several proposals also provided for part-time work for selected youth who returned to

school after six months of fulltime enrollment in VICI. Chicago

also proposed to provide training for the journeymen supervisors.

390
Planned Variations

OYP had blocked CPPV's original desire to have variations

in the educational component of VICI, and the application package

noted that for research purposes, variations in the nature of

the work and in the supervisory ratios were planned "to offer

opportunities for further knowledge development." However, the

planned variation in supervisory ratios was eliminated in May,

following complaints about the 12:1 alternative. Thus, the

only planned variation left was in the nature of the work being

undertaken. Since each site developed its work plan in the

light of its own situation, the variations which emerged were

not planned so much as a by-product of local off icials'assessing their own needs and abilities.

Overall, this attempt at replication was clearly understood

by almost all of those involved. The proposals they developed

did not stray far from the essential features of the Portland

model. While replication permitted the localities to adapt the

program model to local needs, those needs were often political

or administrative as well as substantive. The diffei-ences in

the nature of the work to be undertaken or the educational or

trade union linkage not only reflected local economic and

sociological factors, but also personal and professional alliances

and networks, friendships, and enmities.

There were significant differences in the environment or

context in which the various prime sponsors developed their

programs and the attitudes they brought to their efforts. The

CETA programs in several proposed sites were already under

391
fire from a variety of critics. Washington, D.C. had lost

millions of CETA dollars as a result of incompetence or inaction

and it was under attack for corruption as well as mismanagement.

The Miami prime sponsor was also involved in a massive investigation into allegations of scandal and corruption. In such

cities as Fort Lauderdale, New Haven, and Milwaukee, the prime

sponsors had developed and maintained solid relationships with

a broad range of urban actors. However, primes in several other

sites were at least mildly estranged from other public and private institutions. In St. Louis, Northeast Ohio, and Los

Angeles, the prime sponsors' relationship with the labor movement had deteriorated to a point where meaningful interaction

was in grave doubt.

Union leaders in Oakland, Fort Lauderdale, and several

other cities feared that the program would create even more

apprentices or would-be trade members at a time when unemployment was high, so these young people would end up undercutting

the unions' position and membership. Thus, one union leader

saw participation in VICI as "fattening frogs for snakes."

More fundamentally, some union leaders were becoming increasingly

wary of involvement with CETA programs amid a growing concern

in the American labor movement that CETA programs, by accident

or design, might become inimical to the interests of organized

labor.

The initial response to the VICI program included a good

deal of grumbling at several sites. A number of sites felt

ie timetable was too rushed and the "demonstration" contained

392 4,u
nothing new in terms of the substance of the program or the

mode of organization, although most agreed the formal requiring

of linkages was an innovation. The larger cities complained

that the budget was unrealistic, and they said they were being

"shoe-horned" into the Portland model financially, if not

substantively.

Despite specific doubts, however, most sites exhibited

some degree of enthusiasm for the program. Nearly all saw it

as an attractive source of additional funds. The VICI budget

represented a sizable increase in New Haven's youth budget, but

even in a New York or Chicago, a million dollars was not to be

taken lightly; there were expectations of consequences if those

developing the proposal "blew it." Many prime sponsors also

saw VICI as an opportunity to improve their relations with

other local institutions. Milwaukee wanted closer ties to

unions. Fort Lauderdale looked upon the program as a vehicle

for knitting together formerly disparate programs and goals,

while Chicago planners used it in local efforts to maintain the

system of political control and resource allocation.

In nearly every city, the driving force behind the development of the proposal was one or two middle-level members of the

staff of the prime sponsor or the proposed LMA. The recent

work on the somewhat similar Entitlement proposal writing process seemed to have left several sites with a proposing writing

ready reserve, a team with some experience in working together

in developing a proposal and some knowledge of the people and

attitudes likely to be found at relevant local institutions

and agencies.
One factor apparently central to success was attitude.

There wag quite a difference between the extrqmely positive

attitude of cities like Milwaukee and New Haven and the overly

diffident approach of a St. Louis or Washington's sense of

overwhelming obstacles, or Oakland's half-heartedness. It is

no coincidence that the most enthusiastic sites turned in what

were regarded as the best proposals. Fort Lauderdale, Miami,

New Haven, and Milwaukee each approached development of their

proposals with tactical precision. All four cities appear to

have carefully reviewed the application package, considered

their options and political strategies, correctly prioritized

their tasks, and then moved in the most direct manner toward

their goals.

At the other extreme, such sites as Washington, D.C. and

St. Louis appear to have had great difficulty in understanding

the program goals, matching those goals to the!r own needs,

and formulating an appropriate process. Moreover, others, including Chicago and Central Harlem, were newhat hampered by

programmatic concepts differing from those of CPPV.

The degree of political support mustered by those developing the proposals had an impact on the speed with which the

proposals were developed and the quality of the work. The

clear backing of local officials in the South Bronx and Milwaukee

could be contrasted with St. Louis or Washington where the

municipal leadership never indicated any support for the program.

In Chicago and Fort Lauderdale, the support of a local powerelite was a central factor in the successful development of
the proposal. Conversely, the Los Angeles proposal was severely

hampered when-it became caught between the political aspirations

of the city's black and Hispanic communities.

Generally, neither CPPV nor the localities were troubled

by CPPV's dual role as a source of assistance in the development of proposals and the evaluator of those proposals. Most

of the sites had positive things to say about the technical

assistance they received from CPPV, although several complained

about either the skills of the field representative or their

lack of knowledge about the local situation. CPPV was less

effective than it might have been had its staff capabilities

included a greater understanding of the CETA system and more

knowledge of the individual cities in which the proposals were

being developed.

A number of prime sponsors attempted to circumvent CPPV

and made pleas for special consideration to DOL. However,

CPPV was generally upheld, and it emerged from the site selection procegs with a reputation for meaning what it said.

Several local sites noted that there were fewer "negotiable"

issues with CPPV than with DOL.
III. Concluding Thoughts. The

As was noted at the ov.sr:t, the,, ao tame critical

aspects to the VICI demonstr: the program model, the process of replication, and the i.se of CPPV as a mechanism for

mounting and managing this replication.

The program model being utilized was developed on the

basis of visits to Portland's Emergency Home Repair program,

and it was augmented with a few features of other programs.

There are, as will be noted, some who see certain special qualities to Portland which limit the replicability of the youth

programs undertaken there, but CPPV's choice of the program

that became the foundation for the VICI model is not easy to

fault. The examination of exemplary youth programs which Finney

and Bailin undertook for the Ford Foundation in early 1977 provided CPPV with a basis for rocking a reasonable judgement.

The concept of replicating a specific youth program or

program model was clear to most of those who became involved.,

No one interviewed failed to understand the need to reproduce

essential features rather than incidental details, and there

would be few occasions when the proposals CPPV received were

accused of deviating too sharply from the model. One reason why

replication proceeded smoothly, however, was that those involved

believed the model to be replicated was similar to other YCCIP

programs. In addition to the Portland model, those drafting

the proposals also had local models which they were consciously

replicating, or even Xeroxing. The ability to replicate a

396

4,11
familiar local program made the program development process

swift and sure in several sites without leading to program

features that were unfaithful to the Portland model.

While few planners had difficulty envisioning program elements that would replicate the Portland model, there were two

major complaints or problems about replicating CPPV's model.

One was the budget. The larger cities felt the VICI budget

guidelines were unworkable. Los Angeles never found a way to

meet the propoaed budget, and the South Bronx made it only because of an infusion of CSA funds and a bit of juggling of

CETA slots to shift some of the VICI overhead out of the budget.

The other replication issue surrounded the linkages. A

major feature of the Portland model to be replicated was the

set of linkages to such institutions as the schools, unions,

and employers. However, a number of localities insisted these

linkages were not simply a function of the design of the EHR

program but rather an outgrowth of the friendly ethos of a

smaller city like Portland. Others insisted linkages could

not be created by fiat but rather had to emerge organically

over an extended period of time. Thus, there was .much concern

that no designing or planning could create meaningful linkages,

particularly in the polarized, politically charged atmosphere

of some of the nation's largest cities.

CPPV argued that the linkages did not emerge in Portland

because of any particular local attitude or ethos but because

the linkages were designed to advance the interests of each

institution involved. A similar harnessing of diverse selfinterests could, in fact, be designed in other contexts, CPPV
argued. In Portland, however, the provision of ten journeymen

1. 4

jobs was a major inducement to unions, in a period of high

unemployment; so was the opportunity to meet affirmative action

pressures by becoming involved in the program. Elsewhere ten

jobs were still an attraction, but in bigger cities these

stakes were not an overwhelming inducement, particularly in the

face of concerns about union security. In the biggest cities,

it was argued by some planners, even the potential affirmative

action payoff provided by VICI was too small relative to the

issues and animosities that might keep institutions at odds.

All of the successful sites managed to create linkages for

their proposals, but there'was a good deal less certainty as

to whether they would work out in practice.

CPPV, as has been noted, was not only developing and testing a model, the organization was also a model being developed

and tested. During the period in which it was designing and

launching the VICI demonstration, it was also settling into a

relationship with the Department of Labor and other elements of

the nation's employment and training system.

The relationship that CPPV developed with DOL has turned

out to be quite different from what some people at CPPV envisioned. CPPV has emerged as an entity that is in large

measure a part of the nation's manpower service delivery system.

At the outset, some CPPV staff members expected their new

intermediate unit to function rather autonomously, subject to

OYP review at specific points. Thus, they were unprepared for

the kind of almost day-to-day involvement with DOL which emerged.

398 41(')
OYP saw it differently. It decided that it would not be

appropriate to mount this kind of exercise in replication outside the CETA system, particularly since OYP was encountering

opposition to earlier efforts to circumvent the system. Thus,

the VIC! program became plugged into the CETA system. It was

to deal with prime sponsors rather than local program operators,

and once the prime sponsors entered the picture, the DOL

regional offices supervising them were brought in as well.

Once contracts were routed through the DOL regional offices,

CPPV was to become heavily tied to an existing bureaucracy. As

this linkage developed, CPPV encountered a degree of criticism

from the sites to the effect that its staff lacked anyone

with firsthand knowledge of the folkways of the CETA system.

CPPV was slow to accept the need to deal with local prime

sponsors and DOL regional offices, in part because OYP's concepts regarding the configuration of relationships between CPPV

and the national delivery kystem continued to change, in the

eyes of CPPV.

Despite an occasional feeling at CPPV that it was being

swallowed up by the very system that created it to be a separate

entity, CPPV has maintained a separate identity in the eyes of

the localities it dealt with, and a distinctive character. It

is seen as acting more swiftly than DOL and as holding more

firmly to its standards and its positions. It is regarded as

apolitical. But the sites have not reached a final judgement

on whether or not appeals to political powers cannot sway DOL

to impose its views on C?PV. Some localities have regarded

393 T7
CPPV as occasionally indecisive, while others have believed

CPPV was simply caught amid changing signals from DOL. But by

early 1979, it seemed clear that CPPV had not only designed

and set up a demonstration, it had also worked out a set of relationships with a variety of organizations. From the outset

it was clear that an intermediate unit like CPPV was to stand

in between other institutions. Just where CPPV was to stand

in that in-between region was something that has had to be worked

out, and after its first year of operation, CPPV appears to be

operating closer to the existing employment and training system

than some of its founders had envisioned.

4110
PART IV.

THE LAUNCHING AND EARLY OPERATIONS

OF THE

VENTURES IN COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT DEMONSTRATION

Harvey D. Shapiro

Hank Blakely

44.9
INTRODUCTION

This interim report is part of an ongoing effort to

record and analyze the forces that have shaped the development of the Ventures in Community Improvement demonstration.

This ongoing process documentation effort is an integral

part of the VICI demonstration's research component. An

initial process documentation report was released in February,

1979. Entitled, "The Development of the Ventures in Community

Improvement Demonstration," it covered the events which led

to the creation of the demonstration as well as the process

through which proposals to operate VICI programs were prepared

by various localities and selected for funding. This report

continues the exploration of many of the themes and events

discussed in that initial report.

Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI) is a national

research and demonstration project which seeks to test the

effectiveness of a model youth employment program in several

settings. The demonstration is financed by hhe U.S. Department

of Labor's Office of Youth Programs (0YP), while the Corporation

for Public/Private Ventures (CPPV) has been given responsibility

for designing, managing, and analyzing the operation of the

demonstration.

As chronicled' in the initial process documentation report,

after the basic design elements of the VICI demonstration

were settled, CETA prime sponsors in a number of cities were

invited to submit prol''sals for operating a VICI program.

In mid-1978, eight localities were selected for funding under

402
the auspices of CPPV. The sites were Atlanta, Georgia;

Broward County, Florida; Chicago, Illinois; Milwaukee,

Wisconsin; Newark, New Jersey; New Haven, Connecticut;

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and the South Bronx in New York

City. Each VICI program was to enroll up to 60 unemployed,

out-of-school, economically disadvantaged youth between the

ages of 16 and 19. They were to work five days a week under

the supervision of union journeymen drawn from the construction

and building trades. Although the work would vary among the

sites, it was aimed at making tangible community improvements

through such activities as refurbishing public facilities or

repairing homes occupied by poor or elderly people from the

same neighborhoods as the youth enrolled in the programs.

Using program elements drawn from the Emergency Home

Repair Program in Portland, Oregon, the VICI model relied

heavily on a set of linkages which tied the program to other

institutions. Various local institutions had been chosen to

recruit and refer youth to VICI. Educational institutions

had agreed to provide certain educational services to VICI

youth. Locals of unions in the building and construction

trades had agreed to provide union journeymen to serve as

instructors in the program and also to assist VICI youth to

gain entrance to union apprenticeship programs and to job

opportunities. Local organizations of various kinds agreed

to identify or provide work projects to be undertaken by the

youth. And the local CETA prime sponsor, or its designated

local management agency had overall responsibility for

4031.
operating the program and coordinating its linkages. As

shown in Table 1, a variety of local organizations had

agreed to serve as linkages. But while there were differences

among the sites as to precisely which craft union or which

youth referral agency would be involved with VICI, all sites

shared the emphasis on linking the youth to other institutions

so that this employment and training program would not operate

in a vacumm. Rather it would give the enrollee access to

various services that might improve his or her employability

and also employ the youth in activities that would improve

the area in which he or she lived.

The VICI demonstration was scheduled to run for 18 months.

However, the starting point differs from site to site because

of different local conditions and start-up problems. Broward,

Chicago, Milwaukee, Newark and New Haven all started in

October 1978, while Philadelphia began in December, and

Atlanta and South Bronx officially were launched in January

1979. Thus, by March 1979, while South -ronx and Atlanta

were just beginning to send youths out to work on repairing

homes, Milwaukee and Newark and other sites were beginning to

seek jobs for youth who were nearing the end of their stay

in the program. And while five sites would complete their

18 months in May, 1980, Philadelphia was scheduled to run

until August and Atlanta and South Bronx would run through

September 1980.

This report will attempt to describe and analyze the

forces and events that have shaped the development of the
VICI demonstration since the point in time when the

proposals of the eight sites received final approval and

the localities began preparations foy launching their programs.

Thus, this interim report begins Jt tre point where the

original process documentation report ended: roughly the

beginning of September, 1978. This interim report then

tracks developments affecting the demonstration for a oneyear period ending in mid-September 1979.

The first section of this report offers a general

overview of the unfolding of the demonstration. The next

section provides a more detailed chronicle of the developments at each of the eight sites.

406
Part I: An Overview of the VICI Demonstration

TRANSITION FROM PLANNING TO OPERATING

The transition from proposal to program, and from

planning to operating, was not inordinately difficult for

most VICI, sites. Although time was short, most of the

sites had begun identifying potential staff and resources

following submission of their proposals, and when they learned

they were to be funded, they were able to act quickly.

With the expection of New Haven, where the principal

planners remained involved fn the program, the movement

toward implementation meant major changes in the VICI cast

of characters. As operating people were brought in to make

good on the proposals and promises developed by others, they

raised important questions about CPPV and the proposals it

had approved.

In Atlanta and Chicago, shifts in VICI actors meant

that CPPV's role was rigorously questioned and even rejected.

Thus, CPPV had to re-establish its legitimacy and its authority.

As the operating people tested the proposals they were

handed, they encountered assorted start-up problems at each

site, but no one argued that the proposals or major parts of

them were inherently unworkable.

REPLICATION

The only significant efforts to depart from the proposals

centered on recruitment. A number of programs had difficulty

in recruiting sufficient youth, particularly those from certain
certain groups, such as Hispanics or females. In response,

to these problems, Atlanta, Broward County, and Newark

proposed widening the recruitment target areas. This would

broaden the pool of potential applicants, but it violated a

fairly central principal of the program model. VICI sites

were supposed to focus both recruitment and community improvement work on the same area so that the youth would be making

improvements in their own neighborhoods. Nonetheless, bending

to realities CPPV permitted Newark and Atlanta to eYpand the

target area beyond the largely black Central Ward in order to

recruit more Hispanic youth.

This kind of modification seems to have meant little to

the validity of the program, because, in fact, the target

areas in most cities were already broader than the areas with

which the youth identified themselves. Thus, participants

interviewed in Newark considered their neighborhood tL be the

housing project in which they lived or a Illocks around their

home, not the entire Central Ward. And, In Newark and elsewhere,

while the beneficiaries of the repair crp.mented favorably

on the youth, they did not clearly idertify th,m as neighborhood kids unless they were already pen:owe?* acquainted with

them.

Beyond the modification of the recrulting area, MTV

generally held firm in keeping si.ces to their proposals 4.nd

thus replicating the program model. In Newark, for example,

CPPV declined a request made the by Department of Pu73114: Works,

one of the work providers, to undertake work outside the geographic arca originally targeted.

408 4.7 ti
OPERATIONALIZING THE LINKAGES

A major test of the proposals came when each site

sought to utilize the linkages that were supposed to have

been established during the planning period. Generally,

these linkages existed to a significant clagree. The major

exception was the South Bronx, where vil"ually none of the

linkages amounted to anything. Elsewhere, the education

linkage proved to be the weakest, but z!2so the least

.effective. This had been predicted bl CPPV staff members

during the planning period.

The crucial linkage was the union linkage. It played

a major role in making programs woax, as in New.irk, and it

was closely tied to problems of other px-ograut:2, such as South

Bronx. The union linkage had an impac,: w4;1, extended from

the selection of journeymen for employment the program,

through the placement of youth. Thus, a strong union linkage

provided a variety of benefits, some o: which were not anticipated in the planning stage, mo-t notably the role played by

union journeymen in the placement process.

CPPV knew that many of the linkages described in VICI

proposals were not being creatiA de novo, but this could cut

two ways. A large measure of Afl.ilwaukee"s success is operationalizing its linkages resulted from the pre-existing

relationshi.ps among several key oganizations, who were simply

brought together again in VtCI. Similarly, in Newark the

close working relationship between the painters union and the

prime sponsor was built upon a history of working together
on other programs.

RECRUITMENT, INTAKE AND ORIENTATION

Recruitment was an early and enduring concern at most

sites. There were two kinds of problems: recruiting

enough youth to ops:ate the program and recruiting enough

to meet CPPV's rewire!: needs. The latter problem, the

issue of the major waiting list, will be discussed in the

context of research.

Many of those involved in mounting the demonstration

were surprised to find that initial recruitment efforts

did not turn up as many youth as anticipated. In' some cases,

there were barely enough youth to mount the program and maintain a small pool of replacemnts. Moreover, there were shortfalls in the recruitment of Hispanics and women at many sites.

The problems in recruiting sufficient numbers of applicants

have been attributed to everything from the state of the

economy to the nature of the program, to the methods used.

It seems clear that recruitment methods used for VICI were

fairly standard for CETA youth programs. VICI's recruitment

drive was neither better nor worse than other CETA recruitment

efforts. The reasons why these methods did not turn up large

numbers of youth for VICI, however, remain unclear and complex.

The shortfall in Hispanic recruiting could be attributed

to the lack of Hispanics in the, original target area in Newark.

When the target area was expanded and a Spanish-speaking

staff member was added, this problem eased.

410 4 , 7
The underenrollment of women, according to local VICI

staff members, seemed to be a result of the nature of the

work VICI entailed. While there are significant numbers of

women seeking entry into the building trades, most tended to

be older than the VICI target group. For a young woman,

the decision to enter training for an unconventional job

was still decidedly unconventional, and local VICI staff

members believed this circumscribed the number of women

applying.

Just as there was little innovative about VICI's

recruiting efforts., its intake and orientation efforts

were also typical of CETA youth programs, according to

CPPV staff. Screening was fairly limited at some sites, and

there seems to have been little "creaming" going on. Many

journeymen professed amazement at certain deficiencies among

the recruits. Chief among these was the participants'

inability, to read a ruler or perform simple arithmetic computations.

There was not much uniformity in orientation. Some programs, such as Broward County and Milwaukee, had very high

dropout rates in the first few days. These were the sites

which recruited widely and did not interview applicants

intensively. So only after they entered the program did some

the program did some youth discover it was not what they were

interested in doing.

VICI AT WORK--PROGRAM OPERATIONS

The.-e was a curious disjunction between the inner

workings of VICI and the program's external relationships.
As the first part of this report documented, at ma VICI

sites deaJings with local government agencies, tra' pions,

and others, were often turbulent and fiery. Yet s.. 'singly,

perhaps, the administrative crises and major convolu.:Ions at

many sites did not keep the youth from remaining busily

engaged in learning. skills and carrying out useful tasks.

There were many problems with individual youths at every

site, to be sure. Chicago experienced a job action by a

number of disgruntled youth, while in the South Bronx a crackdown on behavior led to 12 dismitsals in a month. Nonetheless,

the basic and sometimes startling fact was that at most sites,

most of the time most of the youth were actively employed

and producing tangible results as well as making visible

improvements in their skills.

THE ROLE OF JOURNEYMEN

A key factor in the effective internal operations of

VICI, and a surprisingly important element in many aspects

of the program was the role played by union journeymen. They

were the VICI staff members who. supervised the training and

dealth with the youth on a day-to-day basis. They also dealt

with property owners and worked with the work providing

agencies. Thus, the manner in which they did their jobs had

an important impact on all aspects of the program. And they

were a major positive force in VICI.

The job they were supposed to do turned out to be a very

complex one. Indeed, many felt it was not one job but several

and the demands made on journeymen seemed contradictory to some.

412 4
Journeymen saw no problems in expecting journeymen to act

as teachers or trainers. While few of the journeymen had

any formal training as teachers, teaching younger people is

an integral part of the work in many trades. Apprentices,

after all, receive most of their training on the job, at

the elbows of journeymen. Thus, many journeymen had provided

training as a matter of course in their jobs, and at least

one VICI journeyman also had been a teacher invocational

schools. Moreover, those who became involved in VICI generally

had an interest in teaching or young people which prompted

them to see a job with VICI.

While having journeymen serve as instructors did not

present any problems, expecting journeymen to provide

training in the context of completing community improvements

caused many journeymen to wonder about their mission. They

were uncertain whether they wt.:re to emphasize producing

improvements or providing training. The conflict between

what they saw as alternative goals loomed large in the minds

of many journeymen, and it was also reflected across their*

programs. In commenting on the conflict they felt, several

journeymen said they believed they should have pride in their

trade: they saw a value to be placed on a job well-done, on a

good piece of carpentry. The journeymen not only valued doing

a job well and properly, but also doing it on time and efficiently.

The journeymen said journeymen had an obligation to pass along

their ski116, but only to those who showed a genuine interest

and displayed promis. In their role as teachers, however,

413

4t,*()
the journeymen felt the emphasis was supposed to be on the

youth: he or she was central and the work or task or job was

only a means to an end. For a teacher, as long as the student

learns, there need be little concern about the quality or pace

of production.

The journeyman's ethos emphasized helping those with

potential to master the craft while ignoring the rest. The

teacher's ethos said spend time with the worse and hope the

best will manager on their own. The journeyman's pride in

his trade said reserve the hardest jobs for yourself so they

will be done; the pedagogue said let the youth do everything

so they could learn more. The journeyman worried about production; the teacher didn't.

Several of the journeymen interviewed said they were

caught between to ideals, unsure of the extent to which they

were to function as a journeyman plying his trade in an

improvement project or an instructor in a training program.

Should they strive to finish a job on schedule or could they

take additional time until everyone had mastered the task?

Should they work with everybody or just those who showed promise?

While many journeymen internalized these questions, at

some sites the debate went beyond individuals. The journeymen

held strongly to the tradesman's ideals and emphasized production and "real world" working conditions, while the o2fice

staff pushed for a more pedagogical, training-oriented

approach. This split was not evident and complete in Uewark,

where it was permitted to fester because the program director

414 4
was a weak leader who identified himself with the journeymen.

But there was no easy resolution to this conflict in

Newark or elsewhere. A middle ground had to be developed in

which the journeymen could feel they were adhering to the

standards of their trade yet tempering concerns for production

and quality with a recognition of the needs of the youth.

This balance was hard to define in.principle and hard to find

in practice, but at every site there was clear movement towards

it.

After the first few weeks of the program, there would he

fewer and fewer instances of the journeymen doing all the.

work with two or three favored youth while the others just

watched. The initial focus on production would soon be diluted

by a growing concern for the youth. The journeymen became

increasingly interested in the individuals assigned to them

and the youth responded well to this.

At most sites a close bond grew up between work crews

and their journeymen. The journeymen took a genuine interest

in '"his crew," and this led many of them to take an active,

unanticipated, and very useful role in helping them find jobs,

as will be noted.

critical and highly interesting part of the VICI demonstration.

The role played by the journeymen turned out to be a

The problems they had in settling into their role could be

obviated with additional preparation and training. Milwaukee

developed workshops for the journeymen.

415
WOMEN IN VICI

Another important aspect of VICI was to have been its

commitment to recruit females and train them for building and

construction jobs not traditionally held by women in great

numbers. The program was making headway in this effort.

But several sites were generally under the goals they set

for recruiting women,and initially the dropout rate for

females was higher than for males, although later there would

be some signs of convergence. The dropouts were particularly

'roublesome to VICI managers because it was widely believed

that VICI was sure to place any woman who stayed in the program.

VICI's problems with women were thought to reflect the

untraditional nature of the work it offered. A 16 to 19

year old woman had to be well-motivated and fairly unconventional to be willing to enter the building trades at the

VICI program's age group of 16 yo 19, VICI program staff

members said. While a growing number of women have been

entering the building trades, most have been in their mid

to late 20's and frequently they had children to support.

These women have seen first-hand the kind or work and wages

available to them, and they were strongly motivated to stick

with training that would lead them to a building trades job

that they knew would pay them far more than they made before

or could make elsewhere. By contrast, a 16 to 19 year old

VICI enrollee had limited first -hand experience with low wage

jobs and still had many illusions and aspirations. Thus,

she lacked the kind of experience that often provided the

416

400
strong motivation nei-Ofld to enter the building trades.

Those who were re,:ruited experienced several kinds of

problems that contributed to their dropout rate. One

problem was kidding from the young men in the program. Much

of this was the usual good natured banter that goes on among

fellow workers or students of either gender, but much of it

had a hard edge that bordered on harassment. Many of the

young men were still to unsure of their identity and their

sexuality to be comfortable with women entering what. they.

considered a man's world and a man's job. Some women.

handled the verbal play well, and some didn't.

A second problem was the way journeymen dealt with

females. Many journeymen were middle-aged men and wouldbe gentlemen of the old school. While they expressed

support for women entering their trade, they questioned the

depth of their commitment and wondered whether they merited

the attention that could otherwise go.to young men embarking

on careers and lives as heads of households. Other journeymen had gentlemanly concerns about women doing'the work. Some

journeymen shied away from letting women climb ladders or

lift heavy paint cans or do messy work. Instead, they tended

to assign the women to more "artistic" jobs, like plastering

or painting trimmings, while reserving the hard work for men.

This treatment did not go unnoticed by the women.

A third problem was the primitive facilities at many

work sites. Often the crews would be working at isolated,

abandoned buildings with no bathrooms or locker rooms. The

417 464
The men, as one journeyman noted, "can take a pee off

the back porch anytime they want." The women had to hope

the work site was near a gas station or school or other

place with a bathroom they could use. A separate and often

decidedly makeshift changing room would have to be created

for the women to change into their uniforms or overalls.

Finally, it appears that the women attracted to VICI

sometimes led to their own undoing. The kind of 18 year old

woman who was prepared to do the untraditional and who entered

VICI sometimes turned out to be the kind of woman who, upon

being criticized, just might walk off the program in a huff,

journeymen said.

All of these problems were exacerbated by the dearth

of relevant role models. There were many women around VICI,

including secretaries, administrators, and even program

directors in New Haven and Philadelphia: But there was only

one female journeyman.

Nonetheless, by the fall of 1979, there were fewer

significant differences between males and feMales in their

length of stay in VICI or their dropout rates. This suggests

that the programs had begun to learn how to deal with the

problems faced by female enrollees in a non-traditional

training program.

Despite the problems in recruiting and retaining women,

there was a widely shared pride in "our girls" at most VICI

sites. On a number of occasions, those ranked as best workers

418 44577-
or achieving the first placements were women, and even

the most grizzled male chauvinist journeyman expressed

a peculiar pride in helping to produce what might be the

first female carpenter in that locality.

PLACEMENT

As each of the VICI sites completed its first few months

of operation, in many cases with prodding from CPPV, it

turned to preparation of a placement campaign. CPPV required

each site to develop a placement strategy to be submitted by

August, 1979, all but'Chicago, Philadelphia and South Bronx

had completed and implemented Lheir. plans. South Bronx's

late start delayed the need for a placement plan, but

essentially the delays there, and even more clearly in Chicago,

represented a managerial failing. Milwaukee, New Haven and

Newark, by contrast, were working hard on placement by mid-1979.

The placement campaign mounted by the VICI sites includes

many standard techniques. For example, VICI job developers

made telephone calls to major employers and screened helpwanted notices to generate information about job possibilities

for VICI youth. But CPPV field representatives estimate that

only about 10 percent of placements came via this route.

The bulk of the placements resulted from personal

contacts made by VICI staff members. This meant staff members

asked suppliers and vendors whether they needed workers or

knew of ahy customers who did. It meant asking wurk providers

and city agencies if they were aware of any job openin,s. And

419

b
above all, it meant that VICI's journeymen used their network

of contacts to seek jobs for VICI participants.

The involvement of the journeymen in placement was not

originally envisioned in tne VICI program model, but it

appeared to be a highly effective.mechanism. By virtue of

their work experience, they had a breadth of knowledge about

local employment. possibilities. And *their efforts to place

youth were well received; indeed the approval or recommendation

of a journeyman carried a certain cachet that a job developer

)r program director couldn't muster. As one New Haven staff

member said, "It's notsome Vassar social work major saying

'Larry would make a good painter'; it's a painter saying 'I

know one when I see one'."

Milwaukee and New Haven seemed to have honed the involvement of journeymen in placement. In Newark, the pair.ters.

union's business agent and apprenticeship coordinator took

a personal role in attempting to find jobs for VICI participants.

In the South Bronx, where there was virtually no formal trade

union linkage, the journeymen were still proving to be very

helpful in placement. Indeed in all sites, the involvement f

journeymen in placement as well as training was an unexpected

but highly useful and instructive development.

RESEARCH

The research requirements of the VICI program wrre

often a source of irritation at most VICI sites. Fundamentally,

420
this reflected the classic conflict found in demonstration

programs between program operators who simply wished to

provide services and researchers who need data to meet the

research requirements which were also an integral part of

the demonstration. The grumbling that accompanies the V1CI

research was generally no more shrill or enduring than that

encountered in other demonstrations.

Both program operators and CPPV staff agreed that CPPV

required more forms and data than many other demonsi...

Moreover, the data collected was treated differently

in some other DOL programs, local , CI staff members sa

CPPV took it seriously, and forms wez.. It simply del ande,.'

but read If deficiencies were evidertt, -PPV would YLquire

sites to improve their performance. nce several'sites

completed their forms accurately and on time without great

difficulties, it was clearly feasible to meet CPPV's demands.

Moreover, when CPPV provided each VICI site with an ,unexpected

allocation of $9,000; many of the sites used these funds to

finance work on data collection.

However, a major concerti t'the sites was that data

gathering had no me-ring or return for them. They felt, as

has been noted, V..e a "data plantation," which produced data

yet never saw any feedback or results of the data gathering.

Thus, there was no direct incentive 1,o work on compiling data

except to avoid the wrath of CPPV. CPPV tried to ',argue th-t

if the forms were used properly, they would provide data that
would be u- Sul to the local management. Thus, the Jcurneymen's

Weekly Progress Report, for example, could serve as a aanagement

tool f-. the site, as well as a source of data for CPPV reseat'_ners. In fact, however, little of the data gathered for

CPPV ,was put to use by local program staff. Thus, the range

and depth of information sought ay CPPV seemed double useless

to local program managers for it 1.rovided no direct benefit

to the sites and no research reports for the demonstration as

a whole.

CPPV had intended to provide research results to the VICI

sites, but its efforts were hampered by several factors. A

dispute between the two major quantitative research subcontractors in the winter of 1978-79 regarding the allocation of

additional contracts stopped the analysis of research data for

a period of time. Moreover,, one research subc.)ntractors was

several months late'in developing an "enhancement package"

to link data, so no monthly reports we pos ible until August

1979. Moreover, analysis of research data was hampered because

individual sites were often slow in forwarding data .yet

budgetary constraints limited the number of emputer runs that

could be undertaken.

An issue that particularly troubled m.ny s:_tes was CPPV's

efforts to produce a "major waiting list." For research

purposes CPPV sought to recruit a large list of youth -iho

might be compared with youth in the VICI program. New Have

was excused from this effort because of its small Populati-m

base, and the seven other sites were told their participation

422
was lot mandatory. Nonetheless, these sites regarded involvement as a requirement, and they were strongly opposed to it,

according to VICI staff members interviewed.

The waiting list aroused resentment among program operators

not only beca'ise it put an additional burden on them but

also because they regarded it as harmful to the youth. They

viewed the waiting list as a confusing device which seemed

to hold out the promise of services that would not be delivered.

They considered it a potential betrayal and disappointment for

youth who already had enough problems, even thought CPPV staff

sought to modify the procedures so that youth would have

opportunities for other training programs. Moreover, staff

members at two sites expressed concern that this disincentive

was having a negative impact on recruitment for other local

CETA youth programs.

Ultimately, only Newark completed the full major waiting

list although three other sites gathered enough names to use

the, list for research purposes. In the spring of 1979, CPPV

told the sites to cease their efforts to compile the major

waiting list, but CPPV's willingness to abandon the effort

only strengthened the conviction of many program operators

that the device was idle fiddling by researchers who had no

sympathy for the psyches of youth or the problems of program

operators.

CPPV had a research advisory committee which met once

and then essentially broke into subcommittees permitting sites

423
to be represented in discussions of various research plans.

CPPV also provided training in completion of its forms

and modified several forms in response to suggestions or

complaints from the sites. Nonetheless, it could, not

the feeling at many 'sites that the research component of the

program was too broad and wide-ranging as well as useless to

the program operators. The opposition to the research efforts

was muted over time, largely because the program operators

became resigned to the researcher needs, but it seemed likely

to remain an enduring bone of contention in the demonstration.

When research data began to be fed back to the sites, it seemed

likely that these views might be altered, however, because

some program operators expressed a strong competitive interest

in deVelopments at other sites.

CPPV'S ROLE

CPPV's role during the VICI planning period was controversial and sometimes confusing because DOL was also directly

involved in the prodess. By the time the VICI programs were

being launched, however, DOL had largely disappeared, and CPPV

was the major source of direction and super.viston. Because

localities no longer encountered a variety of coganizations

claiming a role in monitoring VICI, they gave less thought to

the precise nature and role of CPPV, even though they continued

to be deeply involved with the organization. While DOL monitors

might visit a training program only once a year and were often

interested mainly in financial records, CPPV's field representatives

424
were regular visitors at each site, sometimes coming weekly,

and seldom less often than every six weeks. They delved

into every aspect of the program and offered extensive advice.

At first there was some resistance to CPPV's role,

particularly in Atlanta and Chicago. But sites soon adapted

to "the Philadelphias." Some did so with an air of resignation--it had to be, so they made the best of it, while others

viewed CPPV in a more positive light. At several sites,

VICI staff argued that CPPV was not functioning any differently

than a federal or state monitor, it wa:., just more active.

They did not see anything unique in the nature of CPPV other

than its ability to invest more time and money in supervision.

That, however, is a significant difference from other monitoring

agencies, although the merits of that difference might not be

appreciated by program operators feeling burdened by outside

scrutiny.

CPPV played a major role in enabling most of the eight

VICI sites to begin operations within a shorter period of time

once the OYP funding decisions had been announced; and CPPV's

continuing involvement in overseeing VICI clearly improved

the operations of the weaker programs. In sites such as New

Haven, which generally experienced smooth sailing, CPPV staff

members still provided a source of dispassionate analysis

and advice. In troubled sites, such as Chicago, South Bronx,

and Broward, CPPV helped resolve disputes that threatened the

programs. CPPV could play this role because it existed

425
independent of competing local powers and interests, because

it could threaten funding and close down a site, and because

the advice its staff gave was generally perceived as wise.

CPPV staff provided new and workable ideas at several sites.

Some sites turned this outside supervision to their own

ends. At several sites program directors found it useful

to tell other local organizations certain actions were

required because "the Philadelphias are on our backs."

Indeed, CPPV field representatives occasionally abetted such

efforts: a field representative might provide a stern letter

to a site knowing that it would be used by the local program

director to urge another local agency to take action which

the VICI site wanted.

The close involvement with the sites had some impact on

CPPV's field staff. The CPPV VICI director believed there were

at least occasional indications of field representatives

becoming overly sympathetic to the plight of localities or

identifying too closely with them.

In the early months of the program, at several sites,

most notably New Haven, there was a feeling that CPPV was not

communicating enough information to the sites. There were

complaints that CPPV should facilitate the exchange of ideas

among sites so that each site wouldn't have to reinvent the

wheel regularly, or wait for its field representative to bring

them blueprints for it. Much of this concern was dispelled

by CPPV's mid-term conference in Philadelphia in late June.

4-4 )

426
This event permitted all of the sites to learn one another's

problems and achievements. Indeed, the value of the conference

to CPPV seemed to lie as much in its morale boosting effects

as in the information gained by CPPV. While CPPV was already

familiar with much of what was said, the sites took.great

delight in hearing what their counterparts elsewhere were

doing. CPPV also responded to the communications gaps by

creating a VICI newsleter in September, 1979.

OTHER EXOGENOUS FORCES

Although DOL had spawned CPFV, the two groups were

occasionally at odds during the VICI planning period. Once

the programs were operating, however, DOL and CPPV generally

worked together harmoniously and acted in tandem on major

issues. There were other outside forces that exerted their

effect on VICI, howeyer.

In the South Bronx, of course, the LMA's contretemps

with the city government delayed implementation of the program

for months and may have caused irreparable damage to the

rhythm of the program. Moreover, the. Q.S. Community Services

Administration's long delay in forwarding $250,000 for supplies

created serious financial problems. In Broward, HUD raised

questions about the Davis-Bacon Act which endangered operations,

and in Chicago blizzards and election returns both had an

Impact on VICI.

Because placement was just beginning it was too soon to

determine how changes in the local economies would alter the
obtained by VICI, but an impact could be expected.

One thing that was clear after nearly a year of operation

was that VICI's attempts to leverage its resources could

cut two ways. Typically, CPPV could provide a million dollars

to a site which then raised perhaps $200,000 from HUD, CSA,

or other sources. While CPPV got more than a million dollars

worth of programming for its efforts, its leveraging also

opened the programs to the influence of others. CPPV found,

for example, that while HUD giveth it also taketh away, and

CPPV's influence was sometimes challenged by others with a

stake in VICI.

The working out of that phenomenon differ-ad from site

to site, however, as did so many other aspects of the VICI

program, and, consequently, the next section of this report

will examine developments as they occurred at each site.

428
PART II: The Sites

ATLANTA

In ..ugust of 1978, for reasons not entirely clea,,, the

Atlanta CETA lost the services of its senior planner. His

departure occurred at a critical pass in the development of

the Atlanta VICI plan and had a serious and enduring effect

on the project. The senior planner had been a very important

component in the frail network of reinforcements holding the

Atlanta VICI linkages together. He had funCtioned as ar

interface with several key organizations that might otherwise.

prefer not to work together. His sudden departure precipitated

a deterioration in earlier understandings and agreements.

The chief casualties were the relationships between CPPV and

the CETA and between CETA and its LMA, the Atlanta Urban

League.

Suddenly, the Atlanta CETA claimed that it was completely

unaware of CPPV's role or authority in the development and implementatik.% of VICI. That assertion completely undermined

the monitoring structure and introduced one of the earliest

and most serious of a long series of .delays in the project.

At the same time, and possibly related to the CETA

assertion, CPPV rejected the Atlanta VICI budget. CPPV took

issue with Atlanta's continued push for the inclusion of an

$18,000 indirect cost item, and it found certain staffing

and compensation policies unacceptable.

As a. result of these and related issues, the Atlanta

429
process became a study in delay. By late October, VICI

had succeeded in identifying -- not hiring -- only 32

participants. Many vital functions such as work site provision and staffing, either remained to be completed or had

yet to begin. By late November, following the intervention

of the Office of Youth Programs, the Atlanta CETA had accepted

CPPV's role and had submitted a revised budget containing an

indirect costs item, which CPPV accepted. However, only 17

participants had entered the program by that time, and the

agency had been unable to produce a zavised project timetable.

Substantive and procedural delays at the CETA level affected the performance of virtually every party to the project.

In addition to the greatly slowed recruiting effort, the LMA

was unable to finalize a subcontract with the Atlanta Associated

Contrators, with whom the Urban League hoped to offset the

delay in granting of $100,000 in community development funds.

Moreover, the delay in implementing the van- leasing arrangements

ultimately resulted in a much higher transportation cost to

the project.

A great deal of the energies of the LMA and the prime

'sponsor were expended in adminitiative battles with each other,

and in blaming each other for the delays. Meanwhile, the recruitment problem worsened. Recruitment dropped to only six

persons in December. The prime sponsor, citing the limited

number of eligible candidates in the original target area, requested a revision and expansion of that area. By late

430 4.77
January, as the result of a new recruitment effort, the participant roster had reached a level of 60, only to fall to

52 at month's end. In February, the prime sponsor hired

three persons to assist in the recruitment effort for the

waiting list.

In the months after Atlanta's rather tentative launching

of VICI, CPPV had concluded that the majority of the project's

problems were traceable to the prime sponsor's failure to carry

out its responsibilities, fueled by a decidedly uncooperative

attitude on the ,art of one or two key CETA staff members.

An event which tends to support that conclusion and typify

the state of affairs concerns the LMA's submission of a $46,000

invoice which resulted in a dispute over one expenditure of

$32.00. There was a considerable delay in settling the dispute,

during which the prime sponsor apparently refused to issue a

check for the undisputed amount, thus seriously inconveniencing

the LMA. The LMA regards that event as evidence of deliberate

malice, while the prime sponsor dismisses it as a "managerial

bottleneck" that has since been resolved.

The spirit of cooperation between these two parties underwent a sudden -- but brief -- uplift when Labor Secretary Ray

Marshall and HUD Under Secretary Gino Baroni visited Atlanta

on February 28, 1979. Shortly after the visit, however, the

two organizations were embroiled in a dispute regarding CETA's

. provision of cash advances. By March, the project was seriously

behind in recruitment fc the waiting list and in completion

of its work orders. The long and often-promised $100,000

in community development funds was still delayed by a host of

431

4 :Id
procedural complexities.

Meanwhile, a new and potentially more threatening situation had, after a long gestation, finally matured. The primary

union linkage in Atlanta was the Atlanta Residential Carpenters

Union. However, in what appeared to be a coup on the part of

the North Georgia Building and Construction Trades Council (BCTC),

all of the carpenters hired by VICI were from the Commercial

Carpenters Union. The residential carpenters -- who were not

members of the BCTC and were not on good terms with it -- were

furious and threatened to withdraw from participation in the

project. This was doubly serious in view of the fact that 70%

of the participants were being trained in carpentry, and all

of their practical experience was being gained on residential

properties. This dispute virtually paralyzed work progress

and jeopardized VICI participants' prospects for being indentured into the residential carpenters union. The issue remained

unresolved, despite limited intervention by the National Carpenters Union and the somewhat reluctant involvement of the

CETA prime sponsor. The LMA's apparel--; slow progress on the

work orders occasioned another dispute :)atween the prime sponsor and the LMA. CETA complained that the work crews were

slow and inefficient, while the LMA alleged the Bureau of

Building's work orders were too extensive and often understated actual damage and estimates of effort required to repair

them.

Another problem in this vein concerned the question of

the projected number of houses to be completed during the life

432
of the project. CETA had originally proposed 100 houses.

However, the Urban League termed that number "ridiculous"

and reduced it to 54. At one point, the Bureau of Buildings

said 25 was a more reasonable estimate. at an agreement on

goals was postponed due to the prime sponsor's delay in meeting

with the Bureau of Buildings. By June, CPPV was involved in

urging all parties to develop a mutually acceptable work schedule,

and, by August, a schedule for 35 to 40 completions was developed.

The Atlanta VICI program's primary problems could be traced

to the nature of the linkage among its key organizations. CETA,

the Urban League, the Bureau of Buildings and the union organizations had all struggled with each other on different issues long

before this project. As a result, only a rather fragile entente

cordiale existed between them as the VICI program was mounted.

That coalition could not sustain intense stresses, and it frequently became contentious.

The prime sponsor's reluctance to respond adequately to

the LMA's funding needs clearly contributed to the LMA's financial hardships. On the other hand, the LMA wasn't as responsible

as it might have been It failed to document accurately verbal

understandings with the prime sponsor, and on at least one occassion it issued checks on the supposition that CETA funding was

on the way.

The complexity of the city's mechanisms for work provision

and funding presented another problem. Laws and policies designed to protect public funds and to stimulate public representation in the expenditure of those funds (i.e., the City

433

4C,0
Council's deliberations before approving the CD funds) introduced delays not encountered in other cities.

However, in Atlanta, as in other VICI sites, despite

the problems and disputes that swirled around the program's

management, in the day-to-day interaction of youth and journeymen., there were consistent signs of improvement in participant

skills and work habits. The work completed by the project

seemed to be of a high level, and the relationships that deveLoped between the journeymen and the youth were highly beneficial for the youth.

Donald Woods and others associated with the Atlanta Urban

League regarded VICI's problems, particularly the debate.over

indirect costs, as crises but, at least in retrospect, CPPV

staff members argue that the problems were not as potentially

explosive as they appeared to VICI staff members. Indeed, some

CPPV staff members argue that a certain level of tension between

various actors may have helped sharpen and clarify goals and

responsibilities, thus leading to a better program.

BROWARD COUNTY

By late October, the Broward Coun4 ''ICI project had

selected 60 participants and had 33 m -. standing in reserve.

The key administrative staff and journeymen had been in place

since early October. In addition, the project had acquired

the services of one CETA public service employee (PSE) enrollee

to serve as a data collector, and another to serve-as a materials

purchaser and deliverer.

434 4

t5"
By November, the project had made arrangements for the

delivery of a total of 50 hours of instruction to each student

(donated by the Florida International University) in subjects

related to unions and the world of work.

In a December report, CPPV noted that:

The Fort Lauderdale Housing Authority is

providing more leadership and involvement

than required by the submitted proposal. Its

leadership is dedicated to training and improving housing conditions. The availability of

their staff and economic resources has been a

tremendous plus for the program.

Offsetting that fine start, however, were several problems

that grew more serious daily. For one thing, the project's

streetcorner recruitment strategy and limited screening policy

resulted in a very high dropout rate -- one third in the first

45 days. Second, the area HUD office claimed the VICI project

violated the Davis-Bacon Act, which required payment of local

prevailing wages on federally financed construction work.. HUD

threatened to cut off funding to the Fort Lauderdale Housing

Authority, the local VICI work providing agency, if it was not

assured of compliance. Third, BETA (The Broward Employment

and Training Administration), which served as the LMA, was tinding recruitment ever more difficult and, in ]rye November, it

requested an expansion of its target area. Further, staff seemed

to be turning over at an unusually high rate. Fifth, before

the year was out, the prime and the work provider began to express the first of a series of complaints regarding each other's

intent, capability and performance.

Some of the increasing strain between these two organi4 354
zations was relieved through a revision in the procedure for

assigning work orders. In the original method, FLHA would refer

work orders to the project's administrative staff, a somewhat

circuitous routing. In the revised format, orders were sent

directly to the journeymen for estimates and forwarded from

them to the Project Operations Manager for assignment.

However, FLHA was raising increasingly serious complaints

about the performance of VICI participants and staff. The

Director of FLHA cited numerous tenant complaints and fears

regarding participant behavior on the work site. BETA replied

that the fears were unwarranted. Privately, at first, and less

privately later, the Director of FLHA complained that BETA had

a history of ineffective motivation of youth project participants and openly complained that BETA was an inappropriate

vehicle for VICI.

In February, still unsatisfied as to VICI's compliance

with the Davis-Bacon Act, the area HUD office cut the flow of

modernization funds (approximately $800,000) to FLHA, forcing

FLHA to suspend partially its provision of work orders. This,

in turn, forced BETA to begin a search for an auxillary work

provider, and to subsist temporarily on one-family residential

repair.

In March, FLHA withdrew completely from the project -- a

serious blow, but one matched by equally traumatic internal

changes within VICI. That same period saw the resignation of

the VICI Director and the BETA Youth Programs Director. The

VICI Operations Manager (himself tentatively considering

436 4v3
resignation) was elevated to the position of VICI Director,

and the VICI secretary was promoted and subsequently removed.

Thus, the program went into the month of April with an almost

completely new cast of key characters, a broken linkage with

a key organization and no clear ideas regarding the ultimate

implementation of its mission.

In April, BETA entered into discussions with the Seminole

Indian tribe regarding transplanting VICI to perform on the

Seminole Hollywood reservation. After a good deal of work,

and several sessions with CPPV staff, BETA and the Seminoles

developed an at least minimally acceptable project proposal

and schedule and convinced CPPV of their intent to renew the

project.

However, FLEA suddenly changed its mind and decided that

it wished to remain the work providing agency. Any concern

or misgivings CPPV might'have had about this eleventh hour

reversal were laid aside when the Broward County Board of

Commissioners rejecteu the Seminole proposal (for reasons

having to do with an ongoing tax dispute with the tribe rather

than the substance of the Seminole proposal). However, before

FLHA's status as work provider could be officially reinstated,

both CPPV and OYP insisted that the Davis- Bacon. issue and the

availability of funds be clarified and documented.-

The effect of these disruptions was exacerbated in May

by the departure of yet another VICI director and in June of

another VICI secretary.

Nonetheless, by the end of May the thorny David- Bacon

437

4bI4
issue had been resolved. CPPV had taken the lead in seeking

a solution, but ultimately a chance meeting brought a solution; a visitor from DOL learned of the problem and preVailed

on an Assistant Secretary of HUD to send a telegram ending the

dispute. By June, it appeared that the antagonism between

BETA and FLHA had subsided, and the project was beginning to

work rather well, according to CPPV staff. HUD had not yet

approved the allocation of modernization funds to FLHA, and

work continued with funding from FLHA, but in relative terms,

CPPV staff would soon regard the months of May through September

as an "idyllic period" for the Broward program.

In late September, however, the relationship flew apart

again ina surprisingly informal way. By chance, the FLHA.

director informed a mid-level VICI staff member of his decision to withdraw again from participation in the project. The

FLHA director attributed this decision to a complete' lack of

funds, along with HUD's refusdl to provide guarantees and its

insistence on what he regarded as unnecessary refinements in

architectural drawings. Thus, in September 1979, BETA had

to locate a new work providing agency for the VICI program.

Not surprisingly, BETA staff members were bitter about

their relationship with FLHA, but VICI staff members complained

about the erratic and highly political styles displayed by

the directors of both FLHA and BETA. VICI staff also complained about the nature of the wc'-k provided, arguing it was

of variable quality and sometimes didn't permit suitable skills

progression. VICI staff also said FLHA chronically garbled

438 4 5'5
orders for the materials supplied by the housing authority -- a problem rooted, others believe, in FLHA's lack of construction

experience and serious understaffing.

FLHA, on the other hand, cited its cissatisfaction -- shared with HUD -- with the slow progress and the "rotten

attitudes" of the participants. FLHA complaints extended to

BETA's "mismanagement" and to the extremely high turnover

rates among key VICI personnel and within the participant

roster.

One former VICI staffer, while complaining that the FLHA

was poorly managed, had some sympathy for its Director, theorizing that he and BETA were both victims of a racist and largely

uncaring City Commission, concerned only with conserving public

funds and holding taxes down,

Certainly, FLHA was rightly concerned about the puzzlingly

high rates of departure among VICI staff, but in any comparison

of organizational effectiveness between the prime and the'FLHA,

at least in terms of VICI, BECA would apper to be a sure winner,

despite FLHA's insistence that it should have had complete

control of the project from the start. For example, the Housing Authority Director has stated that certain FLHA accounting

difficulties were traceable to his decision to obligate $30,000

in non-VICI-related funds in a manner that was in direct violation of city purchasing directives. his "calculated risk" that

subsequent HUD funding would replace the money was frowned upon

by both the city and the area HUD, according to BETA and FLHA

officials. Furthermore, several. key VICI staff members claim
that FLHA'a sudden withdrawal was their first inkling that

there was a fiscal problem of that magnitud%:, and they contend

that the FLHA Director had played the situation too close to

his vest.

Much of the conflict that was a characteristic of the

VICI program in Broward County can be traced to the nature of

the county government. Each of the agencies involved in VICI

had separate agendas and needs, and there was no strong executive branch in the county government with the power needed to

achieve unity. Thus, conflicting organizational goals and personalities often could not be harmonized unless CPPV or other

outside forces intervened.

By early September 1979, the Broward VICI program had

identified a county community development organization as its

new work providing agency. VICI staff was developing a new

proposal and a new timetable to reflect the changed relationships. And staff members were also wondering what sort of

relationship would emerge between the program and its new

work provider.

CHICAGO

Chicago VICI's problems, like the Chicago program itself,

were complex and circular. The myriad problems were political,

m-nagerial and occasionally even meteorological.

The ,beginnings of the Chicago project were auspicious:

by mid-October, the Chicago Ventures Program had screened

and started 18 participants at the Pilsen site. Between 20
and 30 more were ready to go to work as soon as final conveyance

on three work sites took place. Ten journeymen had been hired

and were being trained. Interior demolition and cleaning had

started in November at a six-unit apartment building on the

Pilsen site, and, as promised, the Mayor's Office of Manpower

(MOM) executed a management subcontract with the Department of

Human Services (DHS). A VICI steering committee was formed, consisting of representatives from the two VICI sites and the DHS.

However, even at this early stage, CPPV staff members

expressed reservations about the Chicago program's ability

to develop strong administrative techniques. Moreover, there

was additional concern regarding the slow pace of both Pilsen's

recruiting efforts and Lawndale's movement toward closure On

the three work sites.

In the fall of.1978, a number of troubling administrative

delays began to arise. The testing and screening linkage -- the Apprenticeship Information Center -- was unable to. carry

out its responsibility for GATB and BOLT testing, and a backlog began to develop. It totalled approximately 80 persons by

late December. As expected, the VICI Project Coordinator resigned in mid-December, and DH1.4 was alarmingly slow to fill

this vital 'position. A courvelor .!illed the position for several

weeks despite CPPV's insistence that a new coordinator be appointed immediately.

The new Project Coordinator appointed in late January

faced several fairly serious problems which had worsened during

the one-month administrative gap. First, the process of col443. 466
lecting, processing and transmitting data was seriously out

of kilter. Second, the development of the major waiting list

had reached a virtual standstill. Third, the project was

very far behind in reaching its self-imposed quota of 30% female participants. Finally, there were significant logistical

and administrative problems regarding the procurement of materials and supplies and the preparation fo vouchers and payrolls.

At first the change in VICI administration seemed to

promise that attention would be focused on these problems.

However, by February, despite much work on a revised management

plan by the VICI advisory committee, and intense examination

of the problems by DHS and CPPV staff, there had been no real

turnaround in the bulk of VICI's difficulties. The waiting

list remained in a holding pattern. Although staff efforts

managed to bring three-quarters of the participant and jobcost data up to date, the information wasn't sent to CPPV.

The onset of winter brought two major surprises to the

troubled program. Chicago experienced some of the worst

blizzard in recent memory, disrupting operations of the program. Moreover, Jane Byrne upset Mayor Michael Bilandic

in the March mayoral primary and was elected Mayor in April.

Her upset victory over the regular Democratic organization

and she ensuing replacement of its army of patronage workers

with new cadre of city officials placed in jeopardy the somewhat fragile coalition of forces involved in Chicago's VICI

program. The change in cast of characters also delayed attempts to resolve VICI's growing problems.
New problems -- and new permutations of old problems --

continued to arise. Because of a dispute concerning DHS's

reluctance to allow cost overruns, the architectural service

under contract to DHS's housing resource center refused to

turn over its final drawings until it was paid for its work.

And, at the Pilsen site, a complex set of problems led to

three "job actions." Thube were instituted separately and

sequentially by the three categories of project personnel:

participants, administrative staff and journey persons.

Chronically delayed payro.ls and violation of work rules were

the causes specifically cited for the actions, which included

strikes and picketing, but steadily declining morale had created

an atmosphere in which people were no longer willing to work

together to solve problems.

Many of the problems were related to DHS's time-consuming

procedures for payment. In an attempt to resolve these problems,

DHS instituted a policy of non-audited prepayment of vouchers.

Ultimately, the prepayment policy would prove to be more

dangerous than the disease it was intended to cure; however,

and it appeared to spark an immediate turnaround as cash began

to flow more readily to the delegate agencies and subcontractors.

That improvement, together with CPPV's constant attention,

brought some uplift in morale at the work sites. Moreover,

CPPV seemed to have sparked a renewed interest on the part of

the prime sponsor and DHS in correcting the project'smanAgement and administrative problems. By April much project data

had been brought up to date and sent to CPPV, and, by May, 14

443 4n()
participants had been identured into the carpenter's union

apprenticeship program.

Indeed, CPPV staff perceived a significant improvement

in program operations during the months of March, April and

May. Much of this was due to creative responses to journeymen who had adapted the program to difficult circumstances

of the preceding winter. When there was no heat or light at

work sites, for example, they developed.projects to be done

in a classroom.

However, despite the apparent progress, the problems of

data collection and management grew steadily worse. The

VICI staff's effort to bring their reports up to date did

not result in a permanent commitment to timeliness. Moreover, CPPV was raising increasingly serious objections to

the inaccuracies and substantive deficiencies it found in

the reports. CPPV maintained that the data problems were

merely symptomatic of greater administrative and managerial

ills. Moreover, by this point, the steering committee's earlier

concensus had disintegrated and as conflicts occurred much of

the cooperative spirit was gone.

By June, the program started deteriorating overall. Work

site progress had slowed considerably due to new breakdowns

in the supply, logistical and funding processes administered

by the Lawndale Peoples Planning and Action Conference, the

primary project operator. CPPV began to find instances of

trainees sitting around with no work aNailoble. CPPV was

finding it increasingly difficult to get any meaningful response

Ink

444
to its inquiries to DHS and the LPPAC. As a result, CPPV

brought its concerns to the attention of DOL, and in July

1979 CPPV and DOL began a formal review of the Chicago project's problems. They officially requested DHS to submit a

revised management plan to address the deficiencies they had

'identified.

In a meeting with the newly appointed DHS Commissioner

and in a July letter requesting the new plan, CPPV raised

four major concerns. First, the research data was typically

late, inaccurate, unusable, or all three. And CPPV complained

DHS did not appear at all committed to making corrections or

explanations. Second, as of late July, the project had not

developed a comprehensive strategy for participant. placement

(although 'the Chicago United Organization had earlier drafted

a basic placement plan). Indeed, the youth indentured in May

were slow to receive any placement services. Third, recruitment for the waiting list was very far behind schedule, and

the female recruitment goal of one third of the participants

was not being met. And, fourth, CPPV raised a broad complaint

about project administration, woric site operations, general

organization and a lack of cooperation.

DHS responded by citing normal attrition and lack of

continued condidate interest as factors in the waiting list

recruitment problem. And, surprisingly, it issued a pointed

disavowal of the one-third female goal and of any ultimate

responsibility for participant placement. Moreover, DHS

stated its belief that CPPV was a. functionary without real
authority and refused to develop or submit a new management plan.

CPPV responded with an amplification of its original

complaints and a series of document excerpts demonstrating

that it did have the authority to request the revision.

Further, it sought to make it clear that the project's continuation rested squarely on CPPV's and DOL's acceptance of

that plan.

In August, amid steadily worsening management and morale

problems, LPPAC responded to pressures by replacing its Project Director with a former lead journeyman the Lawndale

site. The key to this change was what at first seemed to be,

a $50,000 discrepancy on LPPAC's books. The amount was later

estimated to be closer to $3,000 and to be the result of displtes concerning the allowability of certain categories of expenses. But the confusion clearly signaled the need for a. radical restructuring of the project's administrative policies

and hierarchy and dramatically undercut any basis for DHS's

refusal to consider radical reform.

Although their interaction is complex, the roots of the

Chicago project's problems are reasonably clear. At an early

period in its development, and over a relatively short time,

the project withstood a sweeping -- and nearly total -- change

in key personnel most directly responsible for performance.

The new people clearly felt little responsibility for previous

understandings or linkages. Moreover; they did not share their

predecessors' sense, of the project's purposes and goals. And

446 4 :),;
And they were tremendously confused by (and resentful of)

CPPV'3 role in the process. The weather only served to further the resulting administrative deterioration, or at least

to provide a convenient rationale for failure.

Another problem was that the Chicago VICI structure was

so complex and ponderous that deterioration -- or improvement --

was difficult to perceive. Communication within and between

the various agencies and organizations involved in VICI were

not of the highest quality. These "micro level linkages" are

one key to Chicago's difficulties. Paradoxically, however,

another key is the fact that, to some extent, the city is

somewhat "over linked." It appeared that DHS and LPPAC's

ties to each other were too extensive to allow for objective

considerations of each other's strengths and weaknesses. It

also appeared that the Lawndale administrators had not exercised

much regard for the required separation of VICI's financi,t1

and personnel resources from their other projects. This severely

hampered project operation under the former LPPAC Project Director, who, it seems clear, was required to share his time and

his staff with other operations. There was a strong feeling

among some key Chicago peisonnel that the level of commingling

would be even higher if "LPPAC throught they could get away

with it." Yet LPPAC was the only politically powerful communitybased organization in Lawndale, so it was difficultfor outsiders

to contest 'it.

Chicago's powerful Mayor's Office of Manpower historically

has had a close relationship with the regional and national
offices of DOL. Thus, the VICI program was one of the first

instances where MOM was facing outside pressure to make changes

or risk losing certain federal funds. It would not be clear,

however, whether MOM, any more than LPPAC or other Chicago

organizations, would be responsive to outside pressures.

By September 1979, the continued existence of the Chicago

VICI project was in doubt. Both DOL and CPPV had rejected

DHS's revised management plan and insisted on a aew one. At

that point, there were several indications that Chicago's

prime sponsor and the LMA were becoming increasingly willing

to simply drop the entire project.

MILWAUKEE

CPPV had high expectations for the Milwaukee proposal,

and, true to its early promise, the Milwaukee VICI project

has generally gone forward in a very smooth and straightforward

manner. Disruptions have been minor and shortfalls have been

few.

During the period between the completion of the planning

stage and the implementation of ..he program, there were several

minor administrative and personality skirmishes among staff members at OIC, which would be the LMA. These were thought to have

been resolved by the appointment of a journeyman to the post of

VICI project director. However, so that the director's Strong

construction background was not compromised by his lack of administrative experience, OIC appointed a co-director for management. This arrangement created more problems than it solved and

448 4:)5
was later ended. Another important beginning step was the

assignment of the first work crews to begin renovation of

the OIC building; thus, the prospect of delays in work provision was circumvented by launching the program close to home.

By October, 18 participants divided into three work crews

had begun five emergency home repair projects. Three journeymen had been hired, and three more were awaiting hiring pending

recruitment of additional participants. The recruitment effort

had not been as successful as the prime of the IAA had hoped.

Original plans had called for a full complement of 60 persons

by this time, but that figure was not reached until the following month.

In its first two months, the VIII project developed a number of highly effective management and monitoring procedures.

Chief among these were specific processes for procurement, journeyman orientation and training, data collection and collation,

and screening of applicants. In November, the project developel

an effective mechanism for tracing the progress of each recruit

through the recruitment and screening process.

In December, the project was running ahead of the projected

rate of initiation of work orders, and the attrition waiting

list had been completed. The major negative developments were

a slowdown in recruitment for the major waiting list and a decrease in participant attendance -- both attributed to the onset of the particularly harsh winter.

In January, ten particpants were enrolled in the apprenticeship tutorial and orientation program conducted by BIGSTEP. In

449 4u;;
February, the project obtained a unique distinction when it

received a license as a Home Improvement Contractor, granted by

the Milwaukee Building Inspection Department.

In this period, the staff developed a fairly sophisticated

systems model of the recruiting process as a means nr rationalizing procedures with a major waiting list. The most significant problem encountered in this period was a higher-than-expected rate of participant attrition. By mid-April, there had

been.44 terminations. Seven of these were for'various forms

of misconduct, and another seven for absenteeism. Nearly half

of the participants negatively terminated and served less than

ten working days in the program, and CPPV interpreted this to

mean that the first two weeks served as a de facto screening

process. By June, an improved screening process had some slight

success in reducing negative terminations.

In May and June, the project began to bear down on the

problem of placements. It also made an ultimately unsuccessful,

attempt to reconvene the Planning Task Force, the highly effective organization that had been instrumental in the development

of the original Milwaukee VICI concept. The PTF was supposed

to work on the development of a placement strategy. The next

step included development of an assessment/preparation process

for VICI graduates, and the institution of an information campaign to alert employers to the program's output.

Milwaukee's only significant problem was in the nature and

quality of some of its linkages. When program operators sought

to call upon the linkages outlined in Milwaukee's proposal, they

found these linkages proved to be more apparent than real in

450 4:17
some cases. The relationship with the Milwaukee Area Training

College, for example, seems to have been based on several misunderstandings. The somewhat free and flexible nature of the

agreement as reflected in the initial proposal evaporated once

a new MATC director took over. Suddenly, there was talk of

costs, quotas and the like. According to VICI staff, OIC's

initial intention to assume responsibility for intake recruitment and screening was never fully realized and in time was

turned back to the VICI. In retrospect, it seems too many

items were left as personal understandings rather than as organizational commitments, so when the planners left the scene

and were replaced by program operators, the latter had to make

numerous adjustments.

The relationship between VICI and BIGSTEP also underwent

some deterioration. VICI staff neither appreciated nor welcomed BIGSTEP's role as a politically acceptable channel for

the introduction of participants to the unions, while BIGSTEP's

director resented this attitude.

NEWARK

When the Mayor's Office of Employment and Training (MOET),

the Neward prime sponsor, learned that the proposed VICI program had been funded, it moved rapidly toward implementation.

As October 1978 began, a program director, ten journeymen painters,

and other staff members had been hired, and that month 93 youth

were screened and designated as eligible for VICI. Fifty three

451

4 V3
were placed in the program, and 40 were put on a waiting list.

Participant.; paincd seven one-bedroom Jpartments in public

housing projects as well as assorted public facilities in October, using paint provided by the Neward Housing and Redevelopment Authority. Apprenticeship classes offered by the painters

union began on October 3 at Exxex Vocational School, and attendance was mandatory for VICI enrollees. Thus, when MOET's

director of the Office of Youth Services resigned on December 15,

the program was in place.

While the program geared up quickly, however, several problems also emerged quickly. These included recruitment of Hispanics, difficulties in accurately completing CPPV forms, and

divisions of opinion in the local VICI staff.

Initial recruitment efforts failed to turn up meaningful

numbers of Hispanic youth. MOET began to prepare recruiting

literature in Spanish, and it contacted local Hispanic organizations. But as Hispanic recruitment continued to lag in November, MOET concluded that the basic problem was too few Hispanic

youths lived in the Central Ward, the recruiting target area.

In December, Newark succeeded in getting CPPV and OYP approval

to expand its target area.

In addition, when a new staff position of research coordinator was created to help Newark keep up withCPPV forms,

VICI hired its first Hispanic staff member, who could then provide translation services and help attract more Hispanics to

a program whose journeymen were largely white and whose office

staff was largely black.

452 4
As a result of these efforts, there was some improvement

in recruiting Hispanics, and by the end of January 1979, the

program had 55 participants, including seven Hispanics and

12 females. The overshelming majority of VICI participants

in Newark were black, reflecting the Central Ward's population.

Newark also worked at recruiting enough young people to

fill the "major waiting list" sought by CPPV for research purposes. Working with only three staff members, VICI developed

a list of 210 youth prior to the March 30, 1979 deadline; it

would be the only VICI site to complete the full list.

In addition to continuing to paint public housing projects,

in early 1979 the work crews initiated work at abandoned and

tax-delinquent. residential buildings acquired by the city, such

as a high-rise apartment building on Clinton Avenue. Thisproperty, managed by the city's Department of Public Works, provided

for greater skill development because of the amount of preparatory work and repairs needed before painting could begin.

While the VICI program seemed to be operating smoothly and

doing significant amounts of painting, shortly after it began

a split developed in the staff and it widened sharply as winter

arrived. There were two camps: the journeymen at the sork

sites and the counseling and administrative staff in a downtown

office building. The journeymen took a hardheaded practical

view of thw world and insisted the youth must quickly adapt

to the realities of the working world if they were to have

any hope of entering it. The counselors argued that the youth

were generally from troubled family situations and needed sup453 'JOU
portive services and understanding rather than harsh treatment. The journeymen emphasized work and production; the

counselors talked about counseling and empathy.

The split was allowed to widen because of the program

director. He was a journeyman painter with little managerial or teaching. experience. He tended to spend most of his

time with the journeymen at the work sites rather than in the

downtown office. He was far more interested in the problems

of a particular painting assignment than in the work of the

counselors or the overall direction of the program. He identified completely with the views of the journeymen and was most

comfortable with them.

Thus, he was insensitive to the problems emerging or the

role he might play in healing any divisions. Indeed, he

virtually abrogated leadership of the program, amid much joking

by the downtown staff. The program was administered by the

lead journeymen in the field and the program assistant in the

office.

By December, 1978, CPPV had recognized the split and met

with the Newark VICI staff on January 10, to discuss the need

for a cohesive staff effort. This and other meetings led to

efforts to close the breach through increased communications.

Bi-weekly staff meetings were scheduled to improve communications, and in April 1979 counselors devised a schedule for

visiting participants on the work sites. Nonetheless, the

diVisions were never really healed, and there would be an enduring dichotomy in the Newark program along with a leadership
vacuum. The manager and his journeyman ran a painting program in various city properties, while the administrative

staff carried out counseling and placement activities in a

downtown office building. Each site went about its business

fairly independently, with no signs of either rapprochement

or polarization.

Despite this, the program ran smoothly for two reasons.

One was the involvement of MOET's director. He made it clear

that he cared about the success of the program, and he used

his position to clear obstacles in its path. His staff wz,s

always in close contact with the program. The second important factor was the strong linkage to the International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades (IBPAT), District Council

No. 10. The union took its commitment seriously, and its business manager and upprentice coordinator worked closely with

VICI. Indeed, the union's apprentice coordinator got to know

virtua1.ly each youth in the program. The union even provided

special programs with its own funds, such as a January 27, 1979

seminar on safety in the painting trade.

The VICI youth were required to attend the classes sponsored by the union for its apprentices twice a week from 6:30

to 9:30. However, these classes were suspended for the summer

months, and the participation of 'MCI youth was not continued

when classes resumed in the fall of 1979 because of disciplinary

problems. The painters union was also deeply involved in placing youth. Says one VICI staff member, "The union is beautiful.

This has to do with the person of John Ginder (the apprentice

coordinator)." But the program benefitted from the relationship
between the union's leadership and Harry Wheeler, director of

MOET. The two organizations had worked together on previous

employment programs. Wheeler had agreed that the director of

VICI would be a member of the painters union, and both took

their VICI commitments seriously.

As the spring of 1979 arrived, the VICI program moved

from interior to exterior work and gained public attention by

painting outdoor swimming pools in the Central Ward. And

as the program progressed, VICI staff turned to placement.

One large potential problem caught their eye early on.

District Council No. 10 encompassed several counties in northern

and central New Jersey, so its efforts to place youth could

lead to jobs well outside of their home neighborhoods -- as

far south, for example, as Trenton. Moreover, it was clear

the economically declining area in which the youth lived was

not likely to generate many jobs. Rather, the demand for painters would be outside the old central city of Newark, in surrounding parts of New Jersey. These were archetypical sprawling

bedroom communities which lacked public transportation.

Thus, it seemed clear that to get to work the youth would

have to be able to drive. In May, 1979, the VICI staff contacted the state Department of Motor Vehicles and the city Board

of Education to discuss a drivers education course. In June,

the staff began to develop its own drivers ed curriculum, and

instructions began in September 1979. Thus, there; was hope that

many youth would obtain a drivers license. Clearly, many youth

456

b
also might need their own cars in order to take jobs far

from home, but not surprisingly, finding a solution to this

for youth earning VICI wages eluded the program staff.

The Newark VICI staff began to develop a placement strategy in the spring of 1979. By then CPPV staff had become

quite concerned, since Newark's economy was continuing its

long-term decline, and the city announced early in 1979 that

it would lay off substantial numbers of employees at the

city's Housing and Redevelopment Authority and Department of

Public Works, both of which had been regarded as potential

placement sites for VICI. In addition, although District Council No. 10 had been enjoying a prosperous period, Council staff

members noted that new business seemed to be slow in developing

in early 1979.

Nonetheless, the VICI staff moved aggressively on placement.

In May, they initiated job development activity and pre-employment counseling for youth who had been in the program at least

seven months. The prime sponsor was unable to complete its

review of VICI placement plans because the prime was preoccupied.

with preparations for the summer youth employment program, but

CPPV visited Newark twice in June to help with the placement

stra-egy.

While the placement strategy was not formally approved by

the prime sponsor until August, as summer began VICI staff began to make contacts with the business community and developed

an exemplary record in placement. In June, the program placed

six participants; five became apprentices while one registered

44 4
full-time in a trade school. In July, 17 participants were

placed in either apprenticeships or painting:-related jobs.

During August, seven more youth were placed, including two

youth who had been placed and laid off by their first employers.

Thus, by Labor Day 1979, the Newark. VICI program had placed

34 youth, making it the best VICI site in terms of placement

rates, with the highest number of apprenticeship placements.

(27).

In many respects, the Newark. program was testament to the

usefulness of linkages that underpinned the VICI program model.

There were, to be sure, continuing problems in recruiting

Hispanics and females. But as the August CPPV monthly report

noted:

...che Newark demonstration fulfills its obliga- tions and remains an exemplary demonstration. The

Ventures Advisory Board, Prime Sponsor, International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, District Council #10, and work providers work in

close harmoney to ensure that a high level of op- eration continues.

The program's relative success also reflected the commitment

and scrutiny provided by the head of MOET. Harry Wheeler made,

sure the staff did its best, even in the face of a reak program

director.

Few at CPPV would have expected much success in Newark

after reading its original proposal. But intensive redrafting.

and rethinking by MOET at the behest of CPPV led to a more sound

proposal, and the deep involvement of MOET and the painters union made it work. The questions to be answered over the longer

term were whether this involvement would remain at a high level,

458 5U5
and whether it would be sufficient to overcome and surmount the

-1

problems presented by Newark's declining. economy, the transportation difficulties and the limited capacity of the area to absorb

youth who were training in only one trade, painting.

NEW HAVEN

New Haven's VICI program did not experience any abrupt

transition as it moved from the planning stage to implementation

in the fall of 1978 because the central actors did not change.

one of the prime sponsor's two principle VICI planners was named

director of the program, and the other main planner became the

sponsor's liaison with the prouram as well as an informal advisor.

Thus, there would be no need to explain the proposal to newcomers

hired to operate the program, nor would there be an interregnum

when no one was in control of it.

While the continuing involvement of Connelly and Peterson

minimized transitional problems, New Haven's VICI program encountered many of the startup problems experienced elsewhere,

most notably difficulties in recruiting participants and orchestrating the flow of resources.

In the fall of 1978, staff was hired and a recruitment

drive began. "We did all the normal procedures," Tom Peterson

said, "But there were less kids than we thought." By the end

of October, only 32 trainees had begun work renovating low-income

scatter-site housing, and by the end of November there were only

24 participants. In December, the program finally reached its

459

51./R
full complement of 60, but enrollment of females fell short

of expectations. Recruitment would remain'a continuing problem

for the program.

So would coordination of the actors and resources. During

the planning period, CPPV was concerned over the complexities

of New Haven's plan to rely on six work providing agencies.

Problems quickly emerged, although not for the reasons expected.

Trade'unions launched a strike against the Housing Authority to

protest the use of temporary CETA PSE workers, and this led to

litigation. As a result of the strike, no work was provided

by the Housing Authority, which was to have been a major work

provider. Inst.ead, VICI 11F!(1 !() rely more heavily on smaller

agencies.

By the time the dispute was resolved in mid-1979, a good

deal of work had been made available by the other work providers,

so the VICI program did not initiate any work at Housing Authority

sites. While the Housing Authority strike required a major effort to find enough work at first, the VICI program seemed to

have adjusted. But then the inventory of suitable work sites

dropped to critical levels in August, and the VICI staff had

to put out an urgent call to the work providing agencies to

help the program avoid running out of work sites by late September 1979.

The large cast of characters also contributed to other

problems- A good deal of work was to be performed by subcontractors and often it was not completed on schedule, disrupting

plans for VICI work crews. Moreover, two work sites had to be

put on hold when minority subcontractors were unable to obtain

460

51j 7
bonding. Late in August 1979, the intervention of the prime

sponsor and the VICI advisory board finally succeeded in getting the bonding requirements waived for these two sites. Meanwhile, the program had been promised two vans by the prime sponsor, but only one would eventually be provided, leaving the

program strapped for transportation. This resulted in irregularities in the delivery of materials to various sites. The work

providers were also occassionally late in providing materials

and supplies.

The program was able to surmount many of these.pfoblems

and operate rather smoothly because of two factors: the cooperation of the linkages and the commitment of the staff.

Among the linkages, the trade unions helped with the early

screening and hiring of journeymen. and their involvement extended through the program into placement efforts. The work

providing agencies also were quite helpful because VICI seemed

to be serving them in precisely the self-interested way that

the program model envisioned. .According to a staff member of

Neighborhood Preservation, Inc., one of the work providers:

I had much apprehension because of our experience with summer work crews which never

did very much. But I've been pleased with

VICI because it's not burdensome and it makes

me a hero to some people without doing anything.

The one linkage that had not provided much to the program, VICI

staff members said, was the education linkage, but they did not

see this as an important lapse at first. As they turned to

placement, however, in mid-1979, they began to see the education

461 59&
linkage as more important because the youth needed preparation for GED examinations.

The linkages were joined together in an advisory board

whose monthly meetings, beginning in October 1978, were well

attended and well regarded by those on it. "The meetings are

good; they have a purpose," said a staff member of Neighborhood

Housing, anotherof the work providers.

In general, the New Haven VICI program was highly regarded

by those involved with it. A Neighborhood Preservation staff

member said, for example, that "VICI compares well with regular

contractors as far as finishing the job in the right period of

time."

And the major factor in its success was generally thought

to be its dedicated staff. "The management is on top of everything," a trade union official noted, while a Neighborhood Housstaff member said, "I think CETA stinks -- the people they send

to us are no good. So why is this working when adult CETA isn't?

The staff is always around; so that's the secret: good supervision."

CPPV staff reached the same conclusion in its March 1979 monthly

report. It said of New Haven, "The staff is enthusiastic, hard

working, and committed to the job at hand. The results can be

seen in the quality of the program."

The program director brought to the program a strong dedication and a personal interest in each participant. While her

deep involvement in various aspects of the program violated

administrative theories, it made for effective control. And

the construction savvy she lacked at the outset was provided

462 5U9
by the assistant director, who formerly had supervised a large

staff of journeymen as head of maintenance for the local Housing

Authority. He brought not only dedication and strong cohstruction skills but also a certain ambition that strengthened his

commitment to make the program work. Other staff members were

also highly regarded by CPPV.

However, the New Haven VICI staff had two significant concerns in their dealings with CPPV. At the outsLt, the research

requirements seemed onerous. In particular, the assistant director felt the estimation tasks were taking too much of his time

and effort, and he sought additional funds for help in this area.

Moreover, New Haven staff members, more than those at other VICI

sites, expressed a good deal of frustration at what they saw as

CPPV's failure to communicate developments among the sites. Thus

New Haven VICI staff members toyed with arranging their own meetings or starting their own Newsletter to facilitate the exchange

of ideas among VICI sites. A good deal of New Haven's concern

was assuaged by the June VICI conference convened by CPPV and

by the VICI newsletter CPPV launched in September 1979.

While the VICI staff had some success in improving the

orchestration of their disparate resources, they were unable to

solve the continuing problems of recruitment. However, the

New Haven CETA found a lack of eligible applicants for other

New Haven CETA youth programs as well.

In the spring of 1979, it became clear that an extensive

recruiting campaign would have to be started. And VICI staff
took aggressive action. They helped place an article on a

VICI crew in a local newspaper. They prepared public service

announcements for local radio and television stations, and a

staff member arranged an appearance on a local television station to discuss VICI. Nonetheless, the low census and underenrollment of females continued.

In June, New Haven began moving on placement. Several

local contractors were contacted by project staff and two contractors made site visits. One of them hired two participants.

One contractor was contacted by a staff member of a work providing agency and agreed to hire a carpentry participant. In

July, the placement campaign continued, and a formal plan was

developed at CPPV's request specifying in detail the activities,

timeliness and goals that were to guide the placement campaign.

There wer six placements in July and in. August, four participants found construction jobs while one left the program to

enter college.

However, early on GATB testing policies had beCome an issue

which would later hamper the placement efforts. In early 1979,

eleven VICI participants were told they had been eliminated for

consideration for carpentry apprenticeship positions as a result

of GATB examinations taken during VICI intake. These youth

learned they were neither eligible to retake the GATB nor able

to obtain a waiver from it. VICI staff members and CPPV argued

that results of GATB tests taken prior to completion of VICI

should not be an impediment to participants, and in March the

utive director of New Haven's CETA asked the Connecticut

464 51
Employment Service to waive the one-year waiting period for

'retaking the GATE in order to help the eleven applicants whose

test scores had been too low. In addition, a special effort

was made to assist these applicants to find jobs as well as to

become prepared for the next application period for the apprenticeship program.

NeHaven CETA officials met with the city's Department of

Employment Services to resolve the GATE problems, but while the

prime sponsor had received assurances from the state employment

service in the spring that all eleven applicants would be

retested, the local job service staff was unwilling to accept

this decision. The prime sponsor's executive director continued

to seek a solution at the state level.

After a year of operation, the New Haven VICI staff was

bringing the same strong commitment to placement that had characterized their efforts at each previous stage of the program.

The New Haven program was generally regarded by CPPV as one of

the best VICI programs, and its quality was a testament to its

committed management as well as its firm linkages. In contrast

to CPPV's deep involvement in the day'-to -day operations of some

VICI sites, in New Haven CPPV served largely as a sounding board.

The New Haven VICI staff called CPPV's attention to problems

they had perceived and proposed actions to deal with those problems.

The major question which remained to be answered in New Haven

was whether the relatively small local labor market could absorb

significant numbers of VICI graduates.
PHILADELPHIA

By late October, the Philadelphia VICI program had recruited

and referred for screening 20 participants and had hired or

identified the majority of their staff and journeypersons. More

important, the project began this phase of its operation with a

specific and widely shared commitment to the installation of

effective administration, monitoring and operation procedures.

The major problems in this early operational period resulted

from delays in securing adequate architectural services and in

closing on the work sites.

Initially, there had beep a mild tug-of-war between the IAA's

delegate agency (the Greater Philadelphia Federation of Settlements)

and the Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation as to which

organization would provide the architectural services. The PHDC

prevailed, but the arrangement did not proceed smoothly. GPFS had

several complaints regarding the quality of the services. In addition, there were numerous delays in the execution of contracts

between GPFS and PHDC, and the Office of Housing and Community Development. The PHCD contract with GPFS wasn't signed until February 1979

and PHDC continued working with GPFS under a memorandum of understanding into early Marc.

By February 1979, the VICI project had identified, secured

and started operations on four work sites, and the project had

launched weekly participant counseling /training sessions. Most

aspects of .the project -- administrative and management, logistics and supply, work crew relations and linkages with other organizations -- were positive. However, each organization involved

466 51
in the project harbored some reservations regarding various aspects

of the project. The LMA itself was chafing under the research and

recruitment requirements. Given GPFS's structure, compilation of

the required data meant a sacrifice in either counseling or recruitment time. This problem was later mitigated somewhat by the hiring

of a part-time employee to compile data for CPPV. But GPFS viewed

the major waiting list -- which it construed as a requirement --

as a major burden.

Moreover, because of GPFS's status as a representative of

15 neighborhood settlement houses, it inevitably confronted demands

from the settlement houses for equal treatment as well as for

attention to particular constituent concerns, so GPFS was required

to walk a very fine line in administering the project. That balance

was unsettled early in the VICI design phase wher. DOL and CPPV insisted that the project's geographic scope be Umited to an area

containing only four settlement houses. The fat that these were

primarily in black areas led to criticism regarding the de facto

exclusion of white, as well as some jealousies on the parts of excluded neighborhoods.

There was also a strong feeling among key staff that the recruitment procedures acted as a negative incentive, sending away

three to four times as many candidates as it absorbed, with the

feeling that the odds were against their selection. GPFS and its

affiliate, the Franklin Foundation, were convinced that the chief

purpose of a project of this nature was -- or should have been --

the "opening of doors to kid, who have had too many doors slammed

in their faces." This view, combined with an inherent suspicion

of the validity and predictive usefulness of testing and screening,

led to an emphasis cn what one GPFS staffer called "virtual self467 5 ,4
selection by the kids."

That inclination was further strengthened by the GPFS staff's

conviction that IDOL and CPPV ground rules specificaly prohibited

them from doing anything "even remotely resembling 'creaming.' "As

a result, GPFS staff felt that its testing and screening was not

as rigorous as it has been at other sites.

Recruiting was further constrained by attitudinal and administrative factors. Even as late as February, despite its embrace of

such aspects of the program as randomized enrollment GPFS could

not commit itself to the entire VICI concept. This occasioned some

foot dragging. Furthermore, two of the four project area settlement

houses were having difficulties meeting their recruitment goals -- largely, GPFS believes, as a result of a certain lack of commitment

by one and a lack of qualified candidates in the area of the other.

And, finally, there were a number of bureaucratic complications: in

working with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Employment Security. Due to

a combination of all these factors, the waiting list recruitment was

several weeks behind by March of 1979.

Philadelphia's VICI staff was also very concerned about what

it saw as an abysmally low level of skills possessed by its enrollees.

While other VICI sites anticipated sharp limits on their enrollees'

skills, and some viewed this as a challenge, Philadelphia saw it

as a burden and an imposition. In fact, a comparison of average

test scores recorded upon entry into the VICI program showed that

youth in Philadelphia were at least as skilled as those in other

sites. Indeed, Philadelphia enrollees had, on average, higher test

scores than the youth at several other sites'.

The unions, according to VICI staff, though relatively tolerant of the project and its goals, were united in their preference'

468 r0 1 0
for a three-to-one supervisory ratio. In fact, it was not possible

to find anyone who felt that six-to-one was reasonable. Staff members at both the sponsor and the LMA have become convinced that the

unions will not repeat this or similar experiments at that ratio.

Conversely, there is also a feeling that union acquiescence to the

VICI design requirements has, in the words of one, "softened the

beachhead for ratios higher than the unions would have previously

stood still for."

In March, th: project added roofing as a new training area.

And in August, bricklaying was added.. At the same time, CPPV's concern was shifting toward the development of a comprehensive placement strategy and skills progredsion within each trade's training.

By this time, the LMA had developed a reasonably well-integrated

network of support services, chiefly an educational needs assessment.'

delivery process and expanded participant counseling. And by June,

work was proceeding on the formulation of a comprehensive strategy

for placement, but three months later the strategy still hadn't, progressed past the outl.Ine. stage,

A major concern expressed by the Philadelphia VICI staff was

what they saw as a special intensity with which their program was

monitored by CPPV staff members located only blocks away. Although

CPPV staff members do not perceive any special relationship with the

VICI program located in the same city as CPPV's offices, GPFS felt

they were "over oversighted." In fact, there did appear to be unique

ties between CPPV and the Philadelphia VICI program, but they were

encouraged by both sides. Proximity simply led to more frequent

formal and informal communications: CPPV could easily bring visitors

to the local VICI program, but the program could easily raise questions with CPPV staff. While contacts were more numerous, there

469

51
does not appear to have been any detectable effect on VICI operations nor any skewing of research.

Despite a significant improvement in Philadelphia VICI's

attitude toward CPPV as '1979 progressed,.. there was still some residual resentment bad come to be focused on DOL as well. The LMA's

board was angry in a somewhat diffuse way about the need. for such

activities as recruitment for the major waiting list. But the

board's perspective reduced the danger that it might holdthe staff

responsible for a failure to meet recruitment goals.. GPFS was

also concerned that CPPV was not turning data back to the program

in the intervals or amounts promised. Thus, the LMA saw. itself

as a huge "data plantation" toiling endlessly to churn it out,

yet receiving little benefits for its efforts.

Overall, philadelphia's problems were much milder than those

affecting many other VICI. sites. Despite GPFS's status as a con-.

stituent organization, wnich imposed a very different political

reality than that confronting other LMA's, and despite some largely bureaucratic delays among its network of linkages, and an

ally negative attitude on the part of the LMA, the Philadelphia

VICI project appears to have emerged as a success. The 'relationship among supervisors and work crews, after an initially rocky

start, has settled into a pattern of very close and intense--sometimes alarmingly intense--identification with particular sites,

journeymen and crews.

SOUTH BRONX

The South Bronx VICI program was the last program to get

started, and it remained one of the most troubled sites throughout much of 1979. Its original problems can be traced to a con470

0 1
flict unrelated to VICI, which held up the starting date several

months, but after the VICI program began, its management was unable to resolve many of the severe operational problems it encountered.

Soon after CPPV and OYP had approved the South Bronx proposal,

it was put into a state of suspended animation because the New York

City Community Development Administration (CDA) alleged that there

were fiscal irregularities at Operation Open City (OOC), the proposed LMA. The city suspended payments to 00C pending results of

an audit, and the DOL also suspended payments to OOC, which had

been running 4 large weatherjzation program in New York.

After lengthy negotiations, the chairman of OOC's board resigned and the executive director,and fiscal officer were fired.

The executive successor subsequently appealed her firing, which

delayed appointment of a successor, while CDA required OOC to submit a reorganization plan and to provide assurances that it would

have procedures to prevent future fiscal irregularities. The

prime sponsor then formally redesignated Operation Open City as

the LMA for VICI, and OOC sought to pick up the pieces of the program.

Late in December 1978, 00C.reassembled as many of the people,

properties and ideas as were still available. In December, a num,

ber of staff members were hired and 36 youth were enrolled. Buildings to be worked on were identified in the two target areas,

and a number of meetings were held to prepare for the mid-January

starting date.

On January 26, 1979, a press conference and official opAning

ceremonies were held for the VICI project, but in January only

471.51t,3
40 youth were enrolled instead of the 60 projected, and .t..) work

projects had actually begun.. Moreover, there seemed to be some

problems concerning tile $250,000 which the U.S. Community Services

Administration (CSA) had pledged to the program to pay for materials

and supplies. In addition, in early 1979, the landlord cancelled

the program's lease on a building conveniently located one block

from OOC's Bronx office because of the delayed funding. Also,

the chairman of the Apprenticeship and Manpower Committee of the

New York Building and Construction Trades Council had become ill,

delaying referral of journeymen for jobs. And the city never pro

vided the scaffolding and trucks needed to do the work. Thus,

.VICI was forcedto borrow OOC's truck and scaffold whenever possible Moreover, OOC was acting very cautiously, particularly

on expenditures, .because of its recent contretemps with the .city

government.

At first, CPPV was sympathetic. It recognized the problems

OOC had to overcome as it launched its program. Moreover, in its

report for January 1979, CPPV staff noted, "It is anticipated because of the complexity of New York City government that there.

will be startup problems.." As of February .23, there were only

36 participants and nine journeymen. In March, however, the program reached its full complement of 60 youth, and VICI work crews

seemed to be working on two work sites.

On March 15, CPPV staff met with the prime sponsor and LMA

to discuss the slow startup process. The prime sponsor agreed

to streamline the process of certifying youth as eligible for VICI

But the program continued to experience problems, long after the

startup period. These fell into several categories having to do

with finances, linkages and management.

472 51;1
The $250,000 promised in writing by CSA was not forthcoming.

CSA budget cuts made it impossible for city officials to wrest

the funds from Washington. 00C was hard pressed from the outset

because it had counted on these funds for supplies. In April,

CDA provided a $100,000 loan to the program to be repaid out of

the CSA funds, and later it agreed to provide more if necessary.

CPPV tried several approaches to pry loose the funds, and eventually CSA and U.S. Department of Energy funds were expected to

provide the full $250,000, but the failure of CSA to honor its

commitment provided a financial burden which hampered early operations. In addition, the new city Commissioner of Employment refused to provide the seven CETA slots for VICI staff that his predecessor had pledged.

A second major problem area was the failure of linkages. to

materialize once the program began. Early problems in recruitment

reflected the failure of the referral mechanism involving the

Alfred E. Smith Vocational High School to produce many youths. To

ease the recruitment problem for the major waiting list, CPPV's

additional allocation of $9,000 was divided between the two community

groups which had been referring properties to the program: BRASH

and Neighborhood Engage. Their efforts turned up 93 youth before

the major waiting list was closed in June 1979.

Counseling and education were supposed to be provided by

Hostos Community College, but its counseling program failed to

get funding for several months, and there was no counseling linkage.

The most crucial failure in the linkages was the trade union

connection. When the program sought to implement the linkages

listed in the proposal, union officials felt there was no commitment. While trade unions in New York City had often been

473

52,0
uncooperative with CETA programs, the problem with VICI seemed to

be a lack of understanding of the role they supposedly were committed

to play, Eventually, the head of the New York City Department of

Employment called the head of the Building and Construction Trades

Council who, in turn, told his union locals to cooperate with the

program. This resulted in a meeting with CPPV staff and assistance

in recruiting journeymen. But CPPV staff felt the unions didn't

understand that they had a continuing commitment to the program.

The uri!on leaders felt they had done what they were obliged to do.

Later, the plasterers union would take several apprentices, but this

was the result of an agreement worked out well after the program

began operating, rather than a part of the original proposal.

The failure of the linkages to develop was most visible in

the efforts to develop a VICI Advisory Board. The initial meeting

was scheduled for June 13. It was poorly attended, as were VICI

Advisory Board meetings held on July 11 and July 25. As CPPV's

June report noted, "At this point interest on behalf of most linkages appear to be limited." And in July it added, "Minimal interest

has been shown by the demonstration's linkages."

The program's head sought to connect with the unions and to

develop alternatives to other linkages. One might ask how the proposal passed CPPV's rigorous review with linkages that never materialized. CPPV staff said the long delay in starting the program

caused commitments to be eroded as organizations found other calls

on'their resources. Moreover, CPPV recognized the trade union

commitment was always somewhat shallow. By contrast, Hostos Community College expected to be deeply involved, but it failed'to

get the funding it anticipated.

Another fundamental problem in the South Bronx was poor manage474

t)

r- .ti t
ment. The drafting of the proposal and early VICI operations were

directed by the head of OOC's weatherization program in the Bronx.

A veteran of OOC from its volunteer days, she was generally a disorganized administrator unable to set priorities. In an effort

to give VICI its own identity and full-time management, a program

coordinator was hired in May 1978, while the head of the weatherization program continued to hold the title of Bronx director of OOC.

However, the VICI coordinator was to report direotly to the head

of OOC, not to the Bronx director. This potentially difficult

organizational arrangement was only exacerbated by rivalry between

these two OOC staff members. The Bronx director tried to exercise

some control over VICI's resources if not its operations, while

the VICI coordinator guarded his program's staff turf carefully.

While the VICI coordinator, formerly a city employee, had

to contend with a difficult situation in terms of personalities

and organization, he also brought to VICI a managerial style which

quickly proved unsuitable. While the first director's highly informal, unpremeditated ma.ner led to disorganization, the VICI

coordinator's formal, textbook management style, in which he removed himself from day-to-day operations, had the same results.

He issued orders from his office, but he seldom knew what was going

on in the program.

What was going on was often not good. The program had innumerable management problems. In April y journeyman had to be

terminated for drinking. In May, dnother staff member was Tired

due to a disagreement with the program coordinator. The development of rules and regulations for participants dragged on through

June, July and August, awaiting the approval of the OOC board,

and then, in a sudden crackdown on the youth, there were 12 dis475

522
missals in August for behavioral problems. The LMA's quarterly

fiscal report for the period ending June 30, 1979, was due on

July 31 but was not submitted until October -- and then had to be

redone. The program seemed unable to certify homes at the pace

it projected due to staffing problems, and in July it had an insufficient number of certified work orders. Work was often not done

on time. And in its July report, CPPV staff said, "The demonstration has forwarding incomplete and inaccurate information via the

Weekly Participant Progress forms."

The demonstration was regularly failing to meet its own goals

for enrollment or work production, and CPPV noted in its July 1979

report:

The demonstration is showing an inability to prioritize and

effectively utilize staff. Administratively, the program is

extrqmoly structured and limits the flow of information between

the program coordinator and.the journeyman staff.

Despite the problem, the VICI coordinator resisted suggestions

made by CPPV until the OOC executive director intervened. In late

August, when the VICI coordinator got into a dispute with a CPPV

field representative making an unannounced visit, this was the

climax of mounting problems. The VICI coordinator, whose original probationary period had been extended from mid-June to midSeptember, was fired by OOC on the last day of his probationary

period.

Surprisingly, perhaps, despite the problems of management

and linkages, the youth participating in the program seemed to

be busily and fruitfully engaged when sites were visited. They

were idle more than at other sites because of logistical bottlenecks, but they seemed to regard the program as useful and seemed

to be learning.

r

476 )ti ''j
The departure of the VICI coordinator in mid-September opened

the prospect for improved management, but the South Bronx VICI

site presented the new management with major problems.

Whoever took on the job of managing this VICI program would

have to resuscitate and revise linkages with the labor movement in

New York. VICI" management would also have to develop counseling

relationships and beef up recruitment and referral mechanisms.

And they would have to live with a system of financing materials

and supplies based on funding from several demonstrably fickle

sources.

Thus, as the choice of new management was being made, there

were major questions as to whether that management could find ways

to make the second half of.the 18-month program significantly better

than the rocky first half.

477 5:2 4
PART III

SUMMARY

The transition of the VICI program from the planning stage

to the actual operation of programs was characterized by a wide

range of problems, some of which were common to most sites while

others reflected particular local forces. By early 1979, all of

the eight programs were operating, and although there were varied

degrees of success, the internal workings of the programs -- the

relationship between journeymen and youth -- was proving to be.

interesting and effective. There was little new in VICI as far

as recruitment or intake of youth. The programs were designed

to'make innovative use of union tourneymen-as trainers, and be- . yond this useful planned innovation, the journeymen were also

assuming a very important role as part of the program's placement.

efforts.

.CPPV. was exhibiting flexibility and effectiveness of an intermediary unit in its management of the demonstration. The quality

of its technical assistance seemed high, and it was perceived

as useful by many local program managers, but they questioned

whether any entity investing the resources employed by CPPV could

do an equally effective job.

As the demonstration progressed. CPPV focused increasingly

on placement and on improving the performance of the programs as

a second wave of youth began to be enrolled in it. CPPV also became more interested in ways of turning VICI into a more permanent institution as the demonstration period moved into the second

half of its 18-month life span.

478 r.