NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JEFFREY CASTELLANOS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-50342 

D.C. No. 

8:18-cr-00166-JVS-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 17, 2021

Pasadena, California

Before: BYBEE and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and BATAILLON,** District 

Judge.

Jeffrey Castellanos entered a conditional guilty plea to a single count of 

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for 

the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.

FILED

JAN 18 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

841(b)(1)(B)(viii). He appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here, 

except as necessary to provide context to our ruling. Castellanos argues (1) that the 

officers conducted an unlawful search when they entered the curtilage of his friend’s 

home by walking onto a driveway that he was permitted to use, and (2) that the 

officers seized him by a show of authority and by blocking his path before they had 

a reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity.

This court reviews “the denial of the motion to suppress de novo and any 

associated factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Brown, 996 F.3d 998, 

1004 (9th Cir. 2021). “Whether an encounter between a defendant and an officer 

constitutes a seizure is a mixed question of law and fact that [this court] review[s] 

de novo.” United States v. Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 2007).

Castellanos’s first argument fails because even if the area abutting the public 

alley could be considered curtilage (an issue we do not reach), he lacks standing to 

raise a Fourth Amendment claim under the trespass theory. “[A]n overnight guest 

in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely 

present with the consent of the householder may not.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 

U.S. 83, 90 (1998). The Court “considers curtilage—‘the area immediately 

surrounding and associated with the home’—to be ‘part of the home itself for Fourth 
3 

Amendment purposes.’” Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018) (quoting 

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)). It follows that only an overnight guest 

may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment in the curtilage of a home. 

Jaime Garcia declared that Castellanos had “permission to use [the] driveway 

and to access [the converted garage].” But mere permission is insufficient for 

Castellanos to have standing to raise a trespass theory claim for the officers’ entry 

onto the driveway. Garcia did not testify that Castellanos could stay in the converted 

garage or the driveway overnight or had permission to exclude others from using the 

driveway or the garage. Cf. Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1188 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (“[M]ost importantly, [the appellant] did not have the right to exclude 

others from any portion of the [property].”). Castellanos’s argument that he had 

“possessory” rights in the driveway are unavailing. We stated in Lyall that standing 

under the trespass theory requires possessory rights “beyond mere permission to 

remain on the property searched.” Id. at 1187 n.9. The Lyall court found that the 

plaintiffs had sufficient possessory rights to a warehouse that the police searched by 

showing that they “were in charge of the property that night” because they “had 

possession of the warehouse, the right to control it, and the right to bring an action 

in trespass against intruders.” Id. at 1189. Castellanos established no such rights 
4 

here, showing only that he had the permission to park his car on the small strip 

abutting the public alley that he and Garcia describe as a driveway.

1

Castellanos’s second argument fails because, even assuming that he was 

seized when the officers approached him, the officers had reasonable suspicion to 

support the seizure. An officer may “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the 

officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois 

v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). “The officer must be able to articulate more 

than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch”’ of criminal activity.” 

Id. at 123–24 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). But reasonable 

suspicion “is not a particularly high threshold to reach.” United States v. ValdesVega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). “[T]he likelihood of criminal activity 

need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short 

of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. (quoting United States 

v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). The court considers the totality of the 

circumstances and allows officers to rely on their training and experience. See id.

First, the “fact that the stop occurred in a high crime area [is] among the 

relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Williams, 846 F.3d 303, 

1 We agree with the government that Castellanos waived the argument that the search 

violated his reasonable expectation of privacy, as he has argued only the trespass 

theory on appeal.
5 

309–10 (9th Cir. 2016). As the government argues, the officers had objective bases 

for associating this alley with frequent crime, including that Officer Silva had 

arrested more than 15 suspects in that alley for crimes related to drugs, weapons, and 

stolen cars. See United States v. Mayo, 394 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]his 

meeting took place in a high-crime area and in front of a motel that hosted previous 

narcotics activity.”); United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 

2002) (“While [the appellant’s] presence in a high-crime area cannot alone provide 

reasonable suspicion that he had committed or was about to commit a crime, [the 

officer] could consider this fact in forming reasonable suspicion.” (citation 

omitted)). Second, nervous behavior is also a relevant consideration in analyzing 

reasonable suspicion. United States v. Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d 1272, 1277–78 (9th 

Cir. 2010); United States v. Crasper, 472 F.3d 1141, 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The encounter took place shortly before midnight, and officers observed Castellanos 

make quick movements stuffing or hiding something away in his vehicle in a highrisk drug and gang-activity area, just after he saw their police vehicle approaching. 

Such “furtive movements . . . [are] relevant to our analysis.” United States v. Job, 

871 F.3d 852, 861 (9th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Burkett, 612 F.3d 1103, 

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding the fact that the defendant appeared to be “either 

hiding or retrieving something from underneath the seat” of his car to be one factor 
6 

supporting a stop and frisk). The officers could reasonably suspect criminal activity 

given these circumstances.

2

AFFIRMED.

2 We agree with the government that Castellanos has waived any argument about the 

seizure or arrest after the Officers viewed the syringe just after approaching 

Castellanos.