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Special Report 177 February 2007

United States Institute of Peace

Special Report

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Contents 

Introduction 2

Bargaining Chips, Defensible Borders, and the x

Jordanian Option 3

The Rise of Likud and the Idea of “Greater Israel” 4

The First Intifada 5

The Oslo Process, Mutual Recognition, and x

Negotiations over Statehood 6

The Collapse of the Oslo Process 7

The Effect of the Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon and the x 

Hezbollah War 9

Israeli Security Thinking and the Hamas Election Victory 9

The Rise of Demography 10

Why Israel Needs a Viable Palestinian State 11

The Nature of the Palestinian State and Its x 

Relationship with Israel 12

How Do We Get to a Palestinian State? 13

The Role of Third Parties 14

Conclusions and Recommendations 15

The Future Evolution of Israeli Thinking 16

About the Report

The United States Institute of Peace’s Project on Arab-Israeli Futures 

is a research effort designed to anticipate and assess obstacles and 

opportunities facing the peace process in the years ahead. Stepping 

back from the day-to-day ebb and flow of events on the ground, this 

project examines deeper, over-the-horizon trends that could offer new 

openings for peace. The effort brings together American, Israeli, and 

Arab researchers and is directed by Scott Lasensky, a Senior Research 

Associate at the Institute.

In this report, General Shlomo Brom traces the development of Israeli 

national security thinking about Palestinian statehood, and the 

implications it holds for American policy. The first study in the series, 

“The Future of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Critical Trends Affecting 

Israel,” by Yossi Alpher, was published in September 2005. The second 

report, “Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the 

Peace Process,” by Khalil Shikaki, was published in January 2006.

Shlomo Brom, one of Israel’s foremost authorities on national security 

affairs, served as Israel’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic 

Affairs and as the head of Strategic Planning in the Israel Defense 

Forces. A former Guest Scholar at the Institute (2005–06), Brom 

is presently a senior researcher at the Israeli Institute for Strategic 

Studies at Tel Aviv University. 

Shlomo Brom 

From Rejection to 

Acceptance

Israeli National Security Thinking and 

Palestinian Statehood 

Summary

•	 Despite the current stalemate between Israel and the Palestinians, the issue of Palestinian statehood is sure to reemerge. 

•	 Israeli national security thinking on Palestinian statehood and the two-state solution 

has undergone a revolutionary change in the past two decades from total rejection to 

broad acceptance.

•	 After the 1967 war, Israeli thinking was characterized by the denial of the existence 

of a Palestinian national identity, and the perception that a Palestinian state would 

pose an existential threat to Israel.

•	 The first intifada, which broke out at the end of 1987, convinced the Israeli security 

community that the denial of Palestinian national identity was pointless and that only 

a political solution could resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although security 

measures alone may have contained the conflict, they simultaneously perpetuated 

it. 

•	 At the same time, Israel’s regional threat perceptions began to change as the conventional balance of power tilted in Israel’s favor, and the likelihood of large-scale ground 

war was gradually replaced by the threats of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 

missiles on one hand, and terrorism and guerrilla warfare on the other.

•	 These new perceptions led Israel’s political leadership to initiate the Oslo process, 

which enjoyed wide support among the security community. This process led to mutual recognition between the state of Israel and the Palestinian people, and implicitly 

to Israel’s recognition of the Palestinian right to statehood. 

•	 The collapse of the Oslo process in 2000 and the outbreak of the second intifada 

had a conflicting impact on Israeli national security thinking. On one hand it had a 

moderating effect on Israeli thinking about the terms of the resolution of the conflict 
and led to broad acceptance of Palestinian statehood, while on the other it deepened 

Israel’s mistrust of the Palestinians and shook its belief in the feasibility of negotiating a permanent status agreement with the Palestinians.

•	 The most salient facet of present Israeli national security thinking is the growing importance of demography over geography because current population trends 

threaten Israel’s Jewish and democratic character. As the acquisition of territory has 

become less important, national security is being defined in broader terms to include 

threats to the character of the state. 

•	 The wide acceptance of Palestinian statehood has not precluded an intense debate on 

the nature of this state and its relationship with Israel. Those who assume that it will 

be a dysfunctional state hostile to Israel favor unilateral separation, while those who 

believe in the feasibility of a Palestinian state living in peace with Israel continue to 

argue for a negotiated settlement. 

•	 These findings lead to several conclusions:

Most Israelis are prepared to accept a withdrawal from most of the West Bank that 

will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. This may facilitate future 

negotiations.

However, those who want to establish a limited, constrained Palestinian state 

through a unilateral process will create a self-fulfilling prophecy: a Palestinian 

state that is irredentist and in continuous armed conflict with Israel. 

The United States and its allies must try to prevent this development, which is 

detrimental to their interests, by encouraging dialogue between the two parties, 

and a negotiated settlement. At the very least, the United States should strive to 

turn a unilateral Israeli process into a cooperative process. 

The United States needs a policy that can accommodate renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations with the reality of Hamas holding public office. A nuanced, cautious policy of engagement may be the best option. 

•	 From the Israeli perspective, the question of Palestinian statehood is deeply intertwined with the following three scenarios: 

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations resume following a Palestinian national dialogue 

that leads to positive changes in Hamas policies.

Negotiations do not resume, because Hamas does not modify its positions, and 

Israel pushes ahead with unilateral disengagement from the West Bank. The recent 

war in Lebanon made this unilateral option less popular in Israel, but it is likely 

to reemerge.

A mixed scenario in which unilateral Israeli steps are carried out in parallel with 

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over less than comprehensive agreements. This 

scenario is more feasible than the first and more promising than the second.

Introduction

The international community widely accepts a two-state solution as the framework for 

resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli approach to this formula has 

undergone a revolutionary change in the past two decades, from total rejection to broad 

acceptance. National security perceptions and arguments played a major role in this evolution, due to the centrality of the national security issue in Israeli life. The purpose of 

this study is to describe the evolution of Israeli national security thinking on the issue of 

Palestinian statehood, analyze the current thinking with all its variations, and conclude 

with the implications of this shift on the prospects for Middle East peace, and some recommendations for U.S. policy. 

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About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by 

Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent 

conflicts, promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase 

conflict-management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, ACCION 

International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, Founder 

and former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C. 

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Vice President of Government Affairs, 

International Justice Mission, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. 

Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, 

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University • Laurie S. 

Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • 

Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, 

D.C. • Mora L. McLean, President, Africa-America Institute, 

New York, N.Y. • Barbara W. Snelling, former State Senator 

and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt. 

Members ex officio

Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of 

Peace (nonvoting) • Frances C. Wilson, Lieutenant General, 

U.S. Marine Corps; President, National Defense University 
The study concludes that the change in Israeli national security thinking leading to 

acceptance of the establishment of a Palestinian state presents opportunities for the 

resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.1 It also addresses ideas such as unilateralism, which may lead to the creation of a two-state reality characterized by an adversarial 

relationship, and enumerates steps that should be taken to counter these ideas.

In many cases the resolution of a conflict is an interactive play among not only the 

two parties to the conflict but various external actors as well. This is certainly true for 

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore an analysis of one party can lead only to partial 

conclusions that should be complemented by a similar analysis of the Palestinian side, 

followed by an attempt to understand the complicated interplay among the two parties 

and external actors.

Israeli policy toward the Palestinians is not determined solely by national security 

considerations. Domestic politics, historical narratives, religion, and emotions also play 

important roles. In this study the term “national security thinking” refers to the thinking 

of the Israeli national security community that is based mostly, but not only, on national 

security considerations. This national security community is composed of the military as 

well as the other security services, former senior military and security service personnel, 

political leaders who are engaged in national security matters, and the (surprisingly small) 

part of Israeli academia that deals with national security.

Bargaining Chips, Defensible Borders, and the Jordanian Option

When Israel found itself occupying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an unexpected 

result of the June 1967 war, two competing impulses developed within the security and 

political communities: (1) to use these territories as bargaining chips in negotiations 

that could lead to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict; and (2) to realize suppressed national urges to break out of the confined boundaries of pre-1967 Israel. The 

first impulse dominated immediately after the war and led to a decision not to annex 

the occupied territories to Israel, with one exception, East Jerusalem and its periphery, 

which were annexed by administrative decision in June 1967 and later by the Knesset in 

the Basic Law on Jerusalem.2

There was no place for Palestinian nationalism, and certainly no place for Palestinian 

statehood, in Israeli security thinking during these years. The main problem was perceived to be the unwillingness of the Arab world to accept the existence of a Jewish 

state in its midst. According to this conception, the Arab world was actually one unitary 

actor. The separate Arab states were not authentic manifestations of separate national 

movements, but artificial creations of the colonial powers Great Britain and France. 

Paradoxically, Israeli security thinking adopted the paradigm of pan-Arabism espoused 

by the person perceived as Israel’s archenemy during the fifties, Egyptian leader Gamal 

Abdel Nasser. Palestinian nationalism was perceived as one of these artificial phenomena, 

a tool created by the Arab world for the purpose of fighting and destroying Israel. It 

was an effective tool from the Israeli point of view because it turned the conflict from a 

territorial one, focused on a very small chunk of territory, to an existential one between 

two peoples living on the same piece of land. In 1969, then Prime Minister Golda Meir, 

summed up this attitude by stating flatly “There was no such thing as Palestinians. When 

was there an independent Palestinian people with a Palestinian state?” The implication 

of this mind-set was that Israel had to negotiate the fate of the occupied territories with 

the states that had controlled these areas before the war. Therefore, when Yigal Allon, one 

of Israel’s leading politicians and national security thinkers, developed his famous Allon 

Plan, he did so based on the assumption that in order to create secure borders for Israel 

the West Bank would have to be divided between Israel and Jordan. Israel would annex 

the Jordan Valley and the western slopes controlling it, while the rest of the West Bank 

would return to Jordanian sovereignty. A corridor passing through Jericho would link the 

West Bank to Jordan.

There was no place for Palestinian 

nationalism, and certainly no place 

for Palestinian statehood, in Israeli 

security thinking during these years.
Israeli security thinking in this period was also characterized by the supremacy of 

geography over demography. This is best illustrated by the term “defensible borders,” 

which was frequently invoked at the time. The main lesson learned in the aftermath of 

the 1967 war was that the initiation of a preemptive war had been necessary because 

of Israel’s inability to defend itself from the pre-1967 borders. Since a preemptive strike 

would not always be possible, the conclusion drawn was that Israel must have defensible 

borders. Former Foreign Minister Abba Eban, one of Israel’s most eloquent spokesmen, 

labeled the pre-1967 borders “Auschwitz borders.” The boundaries of expanded Jerusalem 

found in the Basic Law on Jerusalem reflect this thinking because they were determined 

mainly by the wish to control the hills overlooking Jewish neighborhoods, with very little 

attention paid to the effect that the annexation of these areas and their Palestinian 

inhabitants had on the demographic balance.

At the same time, Allon made some effort to reconcile geography with demography 

by suggesting that the densely populated central West Bank would be returned to Jordan 

while the sparsely populated Jordan Valley and the surrounding hills would be annexed to 

Israel.3 This concept was generally followed by the ruling Labor coalition at the time in its 

settlement policy. The government initiated and encouraged the establishment of settlements in the Jordan Valley and tried—not always successfully—to prevent settlements 

in the populated Palestinian areas. The willingness to give up the areas populated by 

Palestinians did not constitute recognition of the Palestinian people, because, according 

to the Allon plan, these areas of the West Bank were supposed to be returned to Jordanian 

sovereignty.4 The Labor party continued to be committed to the “Jordanian option” even 

after its defeat in the 1977 elections. The “Jordanian option” died only in 1988, following 

the collapse of the London talks between King Hussein and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres 

in 1987, and Hussein’s subsequent decision to wash his hands of the West Bank.

The Rise of Likud and the Idea of “Greater Israel”

The fall of the Labor coalition in 1977 and its replacement by successive Likud-led coalitions headed by Menachem Begin led to a fundamental change in Israeli thinking. Following this change of governments, demography ceased to be of any concern whatsoever. 

The concept of defensible borders was united with and fortified by the perception that the 

Jewish state had historical and religious rights to all the territory of Eretz Yisrael, historical Palestine, and a national obligation to settle these areas and, when possible, annex 

them. Selection of areas for settlement was no longer based on security considerations,5 

although attempts were sometimes made to use them as an excuse, especially when the 

issue was brought before the Israeli Supreme Court. Token attention was given to the 

problem of controlling and settling areas populated by a hostile Palestinian population. 

It was argued that massive settlement of these areas, coupled with encouragement of the 

local population to emigrate, would change their demographic composition and solve the 

problem. The selection of areas for settlement was mostly determined by the availability 

of state land, that is, land that was not the private property of individuals.

Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation, often through the use of terrorism, 

did not have much effect on Israeli national security thinking at this time. Israel succeeded in achieving control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, thwarting attempts 

by the various armed groups under the PLO umbrella to make these areas ungovernable. 

Nevertheless, it was during this time, in the Camp David Accords of September 1978, 

that Israel first formally recognized the existence of the Palestinians as a people deserving some sort of self-determination. The accords stated that Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and 

representatives of the Palestinian people should engage in negotiations to resolve the 

Palestinian problem in all its aspects. It was also agreed that there would be a transition 

period of five years, during which full autonomy and self-government would be provided 

to the Palestinian inhabitants of these areas. The possible implications of these interim 

Israeli security thinking in this 

period was also characterized 

by the supremacy of geography 

over demography. 

It was during this time, in the Camp 

David Accords of September 1978, 

that Israel first formally recognized 

the existence of the Palestinians as a 

people deserving some sort of 

self-determination.
arrangements and a final status agreement on Israel’s national security were recognized 

when the accords stipulated that “all necessary measures will be taken and provisions 

made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transition period and 

beyond.”

Ultimately, the “autonomy talks” that were supposed to negotiate the implementation 

of the Palestinian-related part of the Camp David Accords failed, and Israel avoided a serious discussion of the implications of Palestinian autonomy and a final status agreement 

on its national security. Instead, Israel became more absorbed in settlement activities in 

the West Bank. This outcome reflected the lack of real commitment by Begin and his government to these stipulations.6 They were looked upon as something that the Egyptian 

president needed politically vis-à-vis his fellow Arabs, rather than a real commitment. At 

the same time, the failure also reflected the fact that Egypt was much more committed 

to the return of the Sinai than it was to the Palestinian cause. 

The First Intifada

The first intifada broke out at the end of 1987. It persisted for some three years before 

winding down in 1990, following Arafat’s ill-advised decision to support Saddam Hussein 

during the Gulf crisis, thus drawing Arab and global attention away from the Palestinians. 

The intifada, however, left a deep impression on both the Israeli psyche and its security 

thinking.

What impressed Israelis most was the popular nature of the uprising. Although armed 

groups engaged in terrorism and guerilla operations during the intifada, it was characterized mostly by unarmed mass protests. The Israeli security forces knew very well how 

to deal with the armed groups and did so quite effectively. At the end of the intifada, 

Israel had captured nearly all wanted Palestinians. Israel did not, however, know how to 

deal with unarmed mass protests. Its attempts to suppress Palestinian protests led it to 

several conclusions: 

•	 The Palestinian population was not going to accept Israeli occupation indefinitely. 

Although in 1987 a substantial part of the Palestinian population had lived most of 

their lives under Israeli occupation and did not know any other reality, they were 

nevertheless unwilling to accept it. 

•	 The debate regarding the existence of a Palestinian people was senseless, because 

the Palestinians’ existence was dependent on how they defined themselves—and the 

ongoing struggle with Israel only served to strengthen their separate identity. 

•	 There was no way to subjugate a people fighting for their freedom without paying a 

price in human rights abuses that is unacceptable in a democracy. As a result of the 

intifada, Israelis became aware of the malignant effect the occupation had on their 

society.

•	 If there was no military solution, Israel had to look for a political solution. This 

period was characterized by repeated pronouncements by the military leadership that 

there was no military solution to the conflict with the Palestinians.7

•	 The Jordanian option did not exist anymore. Palestinians’ self-awareness had reached 

a level where they could not be coerced into accepting Jordanian rule. That was 

manifested clearly in July 1988 when King Hussein ceded to the PLO all claims to 

the West Bank. 

Although an intensive discourse on these subjects developed in the Israeli public and 

security community, the political leadership was the slowest to accept these conclusions. 

Prime Minister Shamir was adamant in his refusal to consider any political settlement with 

the Palestinians. The Palestinian leadership was quicker to understand the implications 

of the intifada and try to build on them. This awareness was manifested in the Algiers

declaration of Palestinian statehood on November 15, 1988.8 The PLO based its declaraThe intifada left a deep impression 

on both the Israeli psyche and its 

security thinking.

Although an intensive discourse on 

these subjects developed in the Israeli 

public and security community, the 

political leadership was the slowest to 

accept these conclusions.
tion on the partition plan set out in UN General Assembly Resolution 181, thus accepting 

the two-state solution and Israel’s right to exist.

It took a few more years and the first Gulf War for the new Israeli discourse to start 

affecting Israeli policies. The Gulf War was significant because the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq resulted in the end of the threat from the “eastern front.” Since the inception 

of the state of Israel, its threat perception was focused on the possibility of a united Arab 

military coalition that would exploit Israel’s “soft underbelly” by attacking from the east 

at Israel’s narrowest point. In the Gulf War, Iraq’s military capabilities were decimated, and 

thus a central pillar of this potential anti-Israeli military alliance was removed. This development was an important element in Israel’s changing threat perception. It solidified the 

process of gradual fragmentation of the Arab world that had begun with the defeat of the 

Arab states in the 1967 war and accelerated after the 1973 war. The wars had undermined 

pan-Arabism, and as the Arab states began to look inward, separate national identities 

began to crystallize, which made an anti-Israeli military coalition much less likely. The first 

major manifestation of this process was Egypt’s decision in 1977 to conclude a separate 

peace agreement with Israel. 

The collapse of the Soviet empire at the end of the eighties further weakened the antiIsraeli elements in the Arab world. These elements, both states and nonstate actors, lost 

their superpower patron and primary source of weapons and political backing. All these 

changes tipped the strategic balance in favor of Israel. Many in the Israeli strategic community started to acknowledge that a central pillar of Israeli strategic thinking, the asymmetric relationship between Israel and the Arab world, began operating in a fundamentally 

different way. What used to be a source of Israeli weakness and Arab strength had in many 

ways become the opposite. The large Arab populations only contributed to their political 

fragmentation and socioeconomic ailments.

There were several outcomes of the changing strategic balance. First, Israel gained 

enough self-confidence to make territorial concessions and take riskier political initiatives, 

as the threat of Arab conventional forces had dissipated. Second, two new kinds of security 

threats were gradually becoming more significant: weapons of mass destruction and terrorism/guerrilla warfare. The Iraqi missiles that were launched at Israeli cities during the 

1991 Gulf War illustrated one of the new threats while driving home the point that control 

of the West Bank did not provide protection against these threats. These threats cannot 

be defeated by more advanced military capabilities. Weapons of mass destruction have to 

be dealt with using a delicate combination of deterrence, defensive means, and diplomacy 

designed to prevent any situation that may bring about the use of such weapons. Similarly, 

terrorism can be contained but not eliminated through the use of security means; the 

underlying conflict must be solved through political arrangements.

The 1991 Gulf War also provided the international context for a change in Israel’s 

approach toward the Palestinian question because President George H. W. Bush and his 

European and Arab coalition partners wanted to use the results of the war as a springboard 

for the resumption of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Bush initiated the Madrid conference, 

where parallel bilateral and multilateral negotiating tracks were launched. Israeli Prime 

Minister Shamir was dragged to Madrid while still refusing to accept the separate identity 

of the Palestinian people. As a compromise, it was agreed that one of the bilateral tracks 

would be a joint Jordanian-Palestinian track. The Bush-Shamir confrontation over Madrid 

and later over the U.S. refusal to provide Israel loan guarantees because of ongoing settlement activities also had an impact on Israeli security thinking because it demonstrated 

that the continuation of settlements and occupation threaten one of Israel’s most fundamental security interests, the U.S.-Israeli alliance.

The Oslo Process, Mutual Recognition, and Negotiations over Statehood 

The Oslo process can be seen as the culmination of the effects of the first intifada and the 

changing Israeli threat perception. The Israeli public began to realize that there was no 

way to eliminate terrorism by security means alone. This realization resulted partly from 

It took a few more years and the first 

Gulf War for the new Israeli discourse 

to start affecting Israeli policies. 

The Oslo process can be seen as 

the culmination of the effects of 

the first intifada and the changing 

Israeli threat perception. 
a series of stabbing incidents in Tel Aviv in 1992.9 It also stemmed from public disapproval of the Shamir government’s refusal to take advantage of and adjust to the dramatic 

changes in Israel’s strategic environment, not to mention the related confrontation with 

the United States. This led directly to the victory by the Labor party, headed by Yitzhak 

Rabin, in the 1992 election. 

The Oslo process was based on the mutual recognition between the state of Israel 

and the PLO, as the representative of the Palestinian people. This occurred through an 

exchange of letters between the two parties, which constituted formal Israeli recognition 

of the Palestinian people and its right to self-determination. The Declaration of Principles 

of September 1993, however, left the question of Palestinian statehood unanswered and 

did not formally go beyond an agreement to establish Palestinian self-rule in parts of the 

occupied territories. Israel only declared its willingness to agree to the establishment of a 

Palestinian state six years later, when Prime Minister Ehud Barak began permanent status 

negotiations with the Palestinians. The Labor governments of Rabin and Peres always 

avoided any mention of the term “state.” In November 1995, Yossi Beilin, a deputy minister in the Labor government, presented the so-called “Beilin-Abu Mazen plan” to Peres 

and suggested a permanent status agreement that would include the establishment of a 

Palestinian state. Peres rejected the idea, arguing that he did not accept the idea of a 

Palestinian state. He supported a functional solution, namely, a solution that would maintain Palestinian autonomy under Israeli control. This suggests that throughout the Oslo 

process there was no Israeli consensus on where the process was headed. The interaction 

reflected a struggle that developed within the Israeli establishment between those who, 

like Beilin, believed that the two-state solution was in the best interest of Israel, and 

those who, like Peres, were still concerned that the establishment of a Palestinian state 

would be a security threat. 

The Oslo process was based on the assumption that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a negotiated agreement would result in greater security for Israel, 

and that therefore Israel should be willing to take more risks in the short run to create a 

better security environment in the long run. As a result, the Israeli government was ready 

to continue negotiations even when the security situation deteriorated. Rabin declared 

that Israel should fight terrorism as if there were no negotiations and should negotiate 

as if there were no terrorism. This strategy was based on the concept of “peace before 

security,” in other words, on the proposition that the only way to end the violence is 

through a negotiated peace agreement that will nullify the reasons for terrorism.10 After 

Rabin’s assassination in 1995, Peres took over as prime minister. However, Peres was 

shortly thereafter succeeded by Binyamin Netanyahu of the Likud party, who narrowly 

defeated Peres as a result of the perceived failure of the “peace before security” concept. 

The Israeli people were not willing to risk their short-term security for what seemed to be 

a dubious promise of better future security. The violence that continued throughout the 

Oslo period—along with both sides’ failure to implement commitments—overwhelmed 

and ultimately halted the process.

The Collapse of the Oslo Process

Ehud Barak won the 1999 election largely because of the public’s disenchantment with 

Netanyahu and the impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship that characterized his 

government. Barak’s election raised hopes, nurtured by him during the campaign, that 

he would seek a swift resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His approach seemed 

to make a lot of sense to many in the security community because he asserted that he 

intended to overcome the main weakness of the Oslo process—its open-endedness—by 

avoiding more interim steps and negotiating a full permanent status agreement. Several 

members of the security community, especially in the intelligence community, distrusted 

The Oslo process was based on the 

assumption that the resolution 

of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 

through a negotiated agreement 

would result in greater security 

for Israel.
Arafat’s intentions and concluded that a permanent agreement was not possible, and 

Barak’s approach appealed to them because, as he argued, in this way he would uncover 

Arafat’s true intentions. A failure to conclude a permanent status agreement would indicate that Arafat did not really recognize Israel’s right to exist.

The collapse of the Oslo process in 2000, as a result of the failure of the Camp David 

negotiations, and the subsequent outbreak of the second intifada had a deep impact on 

Israeli national security thinking. On one hand, it had a moderating effect by promoting 

the notion that Israel needed a permanent status agreement to end the conflict. On the 

other hand, however, it tremendously increased the level of Israeli mistrust of the Palestinians and therefore undermined the belief that it was possible to reach a negotiated 

agreement along the new, moderate lines that Israelis were willing to accept.

The broad acceptance in Israel today of the need to establish a Palestinian state as 

part of the two-state solution is the most striking manifestation of the moderating effect 

that Oslo’s violent collapse had on Israeli thinking. The violence made absolutely clear for 

most Israeli strategic thinkers and the majority of the public that it is in Israel’s national 

interest to pull away from the Palestinians and reach a two-state solution. The close linkage with the Palestinians and the lack of an identifiable border poses clear and imminent 

risks to Israel’s security on both the strategic and the tactical levels. On the strategic level, 

as a direct result of the events since 2000, many Israelis suspect that the Palestinians are 

not willing to accept Israel’s existence as the sovereign state of the Jewish people. Thus, 

the Palestinians’ greatest weapon against Jewish sovereignty is to remain part of a single 

territorial unit and rely on demographic trends to overwhelm the Jewish majority. On the 

tactical level, the lack of separation between Israelis and Palestinians makes Israeli society 

highly vulnerable to Palestinian terrorist attacks, as was clearly demonstrated by Palestinian suicide bombers in Israeli cities during the second intifada.

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s evolution represented the long road the Israeli polity and 

society have traveled toward recognition of the need for the establishment of a Palestinian 

state. In 1973 Sharon founded Israel’s dominant right-wing party, the Likud, and in 1977 

he contributed to its first election victory, which ushered in a long period of Likud dominance. He spearheaded its settlement policy in the occupied territories, wishing to annex 

these areas to Israel. His settlement policy was designed to make the establishment of a 

Palestinian state unfeasible, by planting Israeli settlements that would fragment the Palestinian populated areas. While doing this, he faithfully represented the school of thought 

that looked upon the establishment of a Palestinian state as an existential threat to Israel. 

In September 2001, only a few months after being elected prime minister, the same Sharon began to suggest that Israel should let Palestinians have their own state.11 By saying 

this, and by implementing his unilateral disengagement plan, he started a struggle with 

the ideological hard core of his party, which led eventually to his decision to leave Likud, 

splitting it into two parties—one consisting of Sharon and like-minded officials, and the 

other consisting of those faithful to Likud’s original ideology. Thus, Sharon brought about 

a realignment of Israel’s political landscape that paralleled the changes in Israeli thinking 

about a Palestinian state.

At the same time, the growing disbelief in the feasibility of negotiating an agreement 

with the Palestinians has created a greater tendency to support unilateral steps that 

do not require the consent of the Palestinians, but which may nonetheless lead to the 

establishment of a Palestinian state. This tendency is also a consequence of the changing 

perception of the relationship between peace and security. The collapse of the Oslo process 

is perceived as the failure of the “peace first” approach and has led to the ascendancy of 

the “security first” concept, which holds that it is not possible to make progress toward

peace unless a reasonable level of security is achieved first. In this way of thinking, if the 

Palestinians are not capable of providing this minimal level of security, then they cannot 

be partners to a negotiated deal, and Israel will have to take unilateral steps to separate 

from the Palestinians. Once this prerequisite is achieved, the Palestinians can establish 

their own state if they wish.



The collapse of the Oslo process in 

2000, as a result of the failure of the 

Camp David negotiations, and the 

subsequent outbreak of the second 

intifada had a deep impact on Israeli 

national security thinking. 

The broad acceptance in Israel 

today of the need to establish a 

Palestinian state is the most striking 

manifestation of the moderating 

effect the violent collapse of Oslo had 

on Israeli thinking.
The Effect of the Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon and the 

Hezbollah War

The unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000 reflected an additional 

change in Israeli security thinking: a greater understanding of the significance of international and domestic legitimacy. The withdrawal was based on the assumption that once 

Israel fully withdrew from Lebanese territory, Hezbollah would lose the international and 

the domestic Lebanese legitimacy necessary for continuing the fight against Israel. At the 

same time, Israel’s presence in southern Lebanon had lost domestic legitimacy because 

most Israelis no longer saw the utility of an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) presence that was 

not fulfilling its original role of protecting the civilian population from rocket attacks. In 

practical terms, after the withdrawal Israel believed it could react forcefully to Hezbollah 

provocations, with broad international support. 

For several years, until the outbreak of war with Hezbollah in July 2006,12 the withdrawal from southern Lebanon was generally perceived in Israel as a success story that 

underlined the notion of international legitimacy. Still, some skeptics argued that the 

withdrawal worsened Israel’s security because Hezbollah gained freedom of movement 

along the border, which threatened Israeli towns, and because it damaged Israeli deterrence. For some, the Israel-Hezbollah war validated the skeptics’ concerns. It indicated 

on one hand that Hezbollah’s deployment along the Israeli border was indeed posing a 

serious threat to Israel’s security, and on the other that although Hezbollah had no legitimate reason for attacking Israel, it was still willing to provoke Israel in a way that forced 

it to enter into a large-scale and costly military clash. As a result, the general notion of 

unilateralism suffered a dramatic decline among the Israeli public, leading Prime Minister 

Olmert to abandon his campaign promise to withdraw unilaterally from the West Bank 

and, by so doing, establish Israel’s permanent borders. But this abandonment was the 

immediate fallout. It is too early to “bury” the idea, which is likely to emerge in the future 

if further Israeli attempts to engage the Palestinians do not bear fruit.

Another important aspect of the withdrawal was Israel’s interest in and respect for 

the United Nations’ border delineation and verification. The UN seal of approval gave the 

withdrawal international legitimacy. In the Palestinian context, the Lebanon experience 

has reinforced the understanding that Israel cannot get international legitimacy for its 

arrangements with the Palestinians without getting rid of the “occupation,” and it has 

strengthened the desire to have borders with the Palestinians that are accepted by the 

international community. In fact, the Israeli government initially considered asking the 

United Nations to verify the Gaza border after the disengagement, but abandoned the 

idea because it was assumed that the partial nature of the disengagement—in contrast to 

the comprehensiveness of the Lebanon withdrawal—would preclude a UN endorsement.

Israeli Security Thinking and the Hamas Election Victory

One can only speculate on the long-term effects that Hamas’s victory in the January 2006 

election may have on Israeli security thinking. In the short term, it is adding to Israeli 

skepticism regarding whether there is a Palestinian partner for a negotiated settlement, 

and hence strengthening support for unilateral disengagement. Olmert chose to present 

unilateral disengagement as a central plank in his platform during the election campaign 

because he assumed it was a popular idea, especially after the Palestinian election. On 

the other hand, Hamas’s victory increased Israeli uneasiness over a unilateral withdrawal 

from the West Bank that will give Hamas control over areas that are so close to the heart 

of Israel.

It is not clear whether the Hamas government will survive the enormous obstacles it 

is facing, but if it does succeed in entrenching itself in government, it will play a major 

role in the development of Israeli thinking. Although most Israeli security thinkers do 

The unilateral withdrawal from 

southern Lebanon in May 2000 

reflected an additional change 

in Israeli security thinking: a 

greater understanding of the 

significance of international 

and domestic legitimacy.

It is not clear whether the Hamas 

government will survive the enormous 

obstacles it is facing, but if it does 

succeed in entrenching itself in government, it will play a major role in 

the development of Israeli thinking.
10

not believe it is possible for Hamas to change and become a partner for Israel, there is 

an undercurrent of thinking that posits that sooner or later Israel will have to talk to 

Hamas, and that in the long run Hamas could develop into a more trustworthy partner 

then Israel’s traditional Palestinian partners.19 Paradoxically, Hamas also may be a more 

convenient partner for a coordinated Israeli unilateral disengagement in the West Bank. 

Its aversion to permanent status negotiations makes unilateral disengagement a more 

attractive option. A unilateral move may also give the two parties the time they need. 

Hamas needs time to consolidate its government and adjust to its new governing role, 

while Israel needs to study Hamas as a governing party and evolve an appropriate policy 

for dealing with it.

The Rise of Demography

The most salient development in Israeli national security thinking in recent years has been 

the growing role of demography at the expense of geography. Since the inception of the 

state of Israel, Israelis have been concerned with the implications of the demographic 

disparity between Arabs and Jews. That meant primarily the fact that the Arab states, 

having large populations, would be able to mobilize armies much larger than the IDF. 

Since the 1967 war and the subsequent occupation of areas populated with large numbers 

of Palestinians, the emphasis shifted toward the demographic balance in Israel and the 

occupied territories. The immigration of approximately one million Jews from the former 

Soviet Union in the late eighties and nineties created the illusion that Israel would be 

able to preserve the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs. But at the end of the 

nineties it became clear that the reservoir of potential Jewish immigrants was drying up 

and that it would not change the basic demographic trends resulting from the higher birth 

rate of the Palestinian population.13

Based on current and predicted demographic trends, it is clear that Palestinians, currently 40 percent of the population living between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan 

River, will become a majority in the next few years. If Israel continues to occupy the Palestinian areas, its identity as the democratic state of the Jewish people will be threatened. 

Once Jews become a minority, Israel could not remain both Jewish and democratic unless 

it became an apartheid state in which a minority controls the majority. For most Israelis 

engaged in national security thinking, this “South African” option is simply unacceptable. 

It is unacceptable not only because it does not fit the dominant value system in Israel, 

which is both liberal and democratic, but also because of Realpolitik considerations. If 

Israel adopted such a position, the international community would not accept it and most 

likely would force Israel to bear gradually increasing costs that would also threaten its 

security. Thus, Israel must leave the Palestinian areas in order to remain both Jewish and 

democratic. Sharon himself presented this choice in the clearest terms when he invoked 

the founding father of Israel, David Ben Gurion, in a speech in 2005, stating: “We never 

forgot that this is our country and we never gave it up. Nevertheless for peace we are 

willing to give up part of our right. When we had to choose between the completeness 

of the land without a Jewish state or a Jewish state without the completeness of the 

land, we chose a Jewish state.” For Ben Gurion, too, the option of a Jewish minority ruling an Arab majority was unthinkable. At the same time, the reduction in the threat of 

a ground invasion, coupled with the growing threat of ballistic missiles and weapons of 

mass destruction, has reduced the value of the territories acquired by Israel in 1967, thus 

allowing for this shift in priority between demography and geography.

This kind of analysis represents a broadening understanding of the concept of national 

security. It means that in current Israeli security thinking, national security is concerned 

not solely with physical threats against the existence and welfare of the nation, but also 

with social trends that pose existential dangers to its identity. That may create situations 

in which the optimal solution involves willingness to take more physical risks in order to 

The most salient development in 

Israeli national security thinking in 

recent years has been the growing 

role of demography at the expense 

of geography.

Based on current and predicted 

demographic trends, it is clear that 

Palestinians, currently 40 percent of 

the population living between the 

Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan 

River, will become a majority in the 

next few years.

In current Israeli security thinking, 

national security is concerned not 

solely with physical threats against 

the existence and welfare of the 

nation, but also with social trends 

that pose existential dangers to 

its identity.
11

avoid these new threats. The wide acceptance of this reprioritization of security risks has 

led to wide acceptance of the need for “separation” between Israelis and Palestinians, 

or in other words “disengagement” from the Palestinians.14 It means that Israel has to 

relinquish control of the Palestinian population by making it a separate political and 

geographical entity.

Sharon is the most visible example of this change in Israeli national security thinking, 

but there are even more interesting cases of leaders involved in national security that 

underwent this evolution. Three such persons are former ministers Dan Meridor and Tzahi 

Hanegbi and current Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. All three grew up in families that were 

part of “the fighting families.” In Israeli terminology this means that their parents were 

leaders of the two radical underground movements (the Irgun and Lehi) that fought the 

British before 1948 and later became the founders of the right-wing Herut party, which 

eventually became part of Likud. They followed their parents and became political activists in Herut and Likud. During the Oslo years, the three of them gave up their dream of a 

“Greater Israel” that would control all the biblical land of Israel, because they realized that 

this pursuit would result in the end of the Jewish homeland. This transformation was much 

harder for them because of their background than for Sharon, who came out of the Zionist 

Labor movement and therefore had a more natural inclination toward pragmatism.15

Why Israel Needs a Viable Palestinian State

The dominant view is that true disengagement and separation necessitate the establishment of a Palestinian state for the following reasons:

•	 Israeli disengagement from the Palestinians will be granted international legitimacy 

only if it is perceived by the international community as a step that enables the 

Palestinian people to realize their right of self-determination. It is also hoped that 

disengagement will lead to international recognition of Israel’s borders. Israel, a 

state that since its inception has never had recognized borders, fully understands the 

importance of such recognition. This was the reason for the Israeli decision to have 

the United Nations delineate the line of withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and later 

for its decision to withdraw fully from the Gaza Strip rather than keeping a strip of 

land along the northern border, a step that makes much sense from a purely military 

point of view.

•	 The need to have a responsible party on the other side of the border. Even after 

disengagement Israel needs a contact on the other side of the border, even if only to 

address accusations or complaints. Somebody must have responsibility for the territory.

•	 It is better to be engaged in border skirmishes or even war with a neighboring state 

than to occupy another people. Israel will continue to be perceived as the occupier 

of the Palestinians as long as a Palestinian state is not established.

•	 The establishment of a Palestinian state will put an end to the idea of establishing 

a unified Israeli-Palestinian state, a notion that is still alive and is considered the 

biggest threat to the security of Israel because of the implications of its demography 

on Israel’s character as the democratic state of the Jewish people. 

Israel and the Palestinians have actually undergone a complete role reversal on this 

issue. In 1999 the hottest topic in Israel and among the Palestinians—and a source of 

concern to Israel—was the possibility that the Palestinian Authority would unilaterally 

declare Palestinian statehood (after the passing of the five years stipulated in the Oslo 

accords to bring about a permanent status agreement). Today more and more Israelis 

engaged in national security thinking believe that the establishment of a Palestinian 

state is a fundamental Israeli interest. On the Palestinian side, however, the collapse of 

Israeli disengagement from the 

Palestinians will be granted international legitimacy only if it is 

perceived by the international 

community as a step that enables 

the Palestinian people to realize 

their right of self-determination.
12

the Oslo process, and the intifada reinvigorated the idea of the so-called one democratic 

state that would include Israel and the Palestinians. The best example of this role reversal 

is the development of the idea of a Palestinian state with provisional borders, which is so 

central to the Quartet’s road map for peace. The idea was actually developed by former 

foreign minister Peres and his team and presented to the Palestinians in talks that were 

held between Peres and Abu Ala during 2001, which led to a draft agreement that included 

this idea. It was then marketed to the Quartet, which incorporated the idea into the road 

map.16 Israel had many reservations about this document but not about this idea. The 

Palestinians, however, have opposed a provisional state, preferring to establish their state 

only after all Israeli-Palestinian issues have been resolved.

The wish to separate from the Palestinian population, shared by the vast majority of 

Israelis, does not necessarily imply support for the establishment of a Palestinian state. 

Some argue that this state, if created, would be an irredentist state bent on destroying 

Israel and would have the capabilities of a state in the service of this goal. Another argument used by opponents of a Palestinian state is the problem of viability. They maintain 

that it is going to be a dysfunctional state that is not economically or politically viable, 

and that it will not be able to contain its problems within its own borders; they will spill 

over into Israel.

The Nature of the Palestinian State and Its Relationship With Israel

Israeli proponents of the establishment of a Palestinian state can be roughly divided into 

two groups. The first group overlaps with the proponents of a negotiated settlement with 

the Palestinians. They believe that Israel can have a positive influence on the shape and 

conduct of the Palestinian state by aligning with the forces on the Palestinian side that 

share the wish to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict peacefully. This group would like 

to see a peaceful, demilitarized Palestinian state with strong economic links to Israel. An 

arrangement of this sort implies a necessary flow of goods and people across the border 

between the two states. They acknowledge that this border will have to be fenced and well 

controlled to defend against violent Palestinian opposition groups, which most likely will 

continue to initiate terrorist attacks even in this scenario. Proponents of this school of 

thought, however, believe it will be possible to contain the violence through a combination of controlled borders and security cooperation between the two states.

The other group, presently the dominant one, overlaps with the proponents of comprehensive unilateral disengagement. They have a bleaker outlook of the likely developments 

in the Palestinian state. They assume, based on the history of the past decade, that the 

range of realistic scenarios runs from a dysfunctional state in a constant state of anarchy, 

in which independent armed militias proliferate, to an irredentist, rejectionist state ruled 

by Hamas. They do not believe that Israel can do anything to alter these scenarios, and 

therefore envision an adversarial relationship between the two states, without any links, 

even in the economic arena. One can find indications of this conception in the language of 

the Israeli government resolution on the disengagement plan from June 6, 2004: “In the 

longer term, and in line with Israel’s interest in encouraging greater Palestinian economic 

independence, the State of Israel expects to reduce the number of Palestinian workers 

entering Israel, to the point that it ceases completely.” They look at Israel as a “fortress 

state,” surrounded by fences and fortifications and having limited connections, if any, 

with its close neighbors. This school of thought is dominant because of the effects of the 

collapse of the Oslo process and the five bloody years of intifada that followed it. Lack of 

trust in the Palestinians is prevalent.

Another issue on which proponents of the establishment of a Palestinian state differ 

is the territorial delineation of this state. Those who believe the Palestinian state can be 

viable and have a good relationship with Israel support what seems to them a “fair” settlement with the Palestinians that will create a Palestinian state on territory based on the 

The wish to separate from the 

Palestinian population, shared 

by the vast majority of Israelis, 

does not necessarily imply support for the establishment of a 

Palestinian state.
13

1967 lines, with slight modifications enabling Israel to annex the major concentrations of 

settlements along this line while compensating the Palestinians with an equal amount of 

territory from inside Israel. This approach is exemplified by the Geneva agreement, which 

was supported by a substantial number of former security officials, including former chief 

of staff General Amnon Shahak and former Shin Bet chief Avraham Shalom. They assume 

that a settlement of this kind will create a contiguous state with a better chance of 

viability while also creating the psychological impact and goodwill needed to establish a 

positive relationship between the two states.

The pessimistic school of thought argues that Israel should unilaterally determine its 

borders based only on its security and other interests, assuming that it will have an adversarial relationship with the Palestinian state. That means that the border should generally 

follow the contour of the separation barrier that is presently being erected. That implies 

annexation of between 8 and 20 percent of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and 

the settlement blocs of Ariel and Maale Adumim. The difference in percentage relates to 

the fate of the Jordan Valley. Many supporters of this approach think that Israel should 

retain control over the Jordan Valley—possibly a remnant of the “defensible borders” 

arguments of the sixties and seventies.

How Do We Get to a Palestinian State?

The collapse of the Oslo Process led many Israelis to believe that a Palestinian state 

will not be established through a negotiated agreement. The continued disarray in the 

Palestinian Authority after the death of Arafat and the Hamas victory in the parliamentary elections increased these doubts. There is, however, still a general awareness of the 

advantages of a negotiated agreement as opposed to a unilateral disengagement that 

would create a de facto Palestinian state. In the latter case,

a. The Palestinians may refuse to establish their state and may argue that the occupation continues because Israel is still controlling them by other means.

b. Israel’s new borders at the end of the disengagement may not attain international 

legitimacy.

c. Israel’s relationship with the newborn entity will probably be marked by confrontation 

and lack of cooperation.

d. The new Palestinian entity will not take upon itself any commitments to which it will 

be held accountable.

As a result, Israelis who accept the establishment of a Palestinian state are divided 

into two groups that generally coincide with the optimistic and pessimistic schools of 

thought mentioned in the previous section. The first group thinks that negotiations 

should be given another try. This could be achieved by following the road map, that is 

to say, by negotiating the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders 

and only later negotiating with this state the permanent status agreement, or alternatively by skipping the second stage of the road map and starting with permanent status 

negotiations.

The other, dominant group (as the scope of support for the new Kadima party indicates) does not believe that Israel has a credible partner for negotiations on the Palestinian side, and therefore argues that Israel should create a Palestinian state by unilaterally 

disengaging from the West Bank, leaving contiguous territory under Palestinian control. 

According to this conception, there will be a difference between the disengagement from 

the Gaza Strip and the disengagement from the West Bank. Whereas in the Gaza Strip Israel withdrew to the 1967 lines, in the West Bank Israel needs border modifications, even 

in permanent status arrangements, and should therefore retain the areas that it wants to 

annex to Israel in the framework of a permanent status agreement (mostly the settlement 

There is, however, still a general 

awareness of the advantages of a 

negotiated agreement as opposed 

to a unilateral disengagement that 

would create a de facto Palestinian 

state.
14

blocs close to the 1967 line) and some other areas of strategic importance that will be 

used as bargaining chips in future negotiations. It seems that this unilateralist group also 

includes those who do not want negotiations with the Palestinians because they assume 

that no Palestinian will be willing to accept the territorial arrangements being suggested 

and that Israel should therefore determine its postdisengagement borders unilaterally. 

There is also a difference between the two groups in their approach to the first stage 

of the road map. The first group is aware of the disarray on the Palestinian side but thinks 

that Israel should have realistic expectations of the Palestinians, and that if the Palestinians succeed in keeping relative and partial security based mainly on cooptation and 

dialogue with the armed groups, this would be sufficient to start negotiations. This would 

create the context for security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians and would 

gradually strengthen the capabilities and legitimacy of the Palestinian security organs, 

leading eventually to the disarming of the militias. The second group demands that the 

Palestinians dismantle the infrastructure of the terrorist groups as stage one of the road 

map. Part of this group believes that successful negotiations cannot take place as long as 

there is no security (i.e., security before peace). Others are using the demand as an excuse 

because they know that the Palestinians cannot comply in their present state.

For many in the two groups the most urgent need is to separate from the Palestinians; therefore, many who belong to the first group will eventually be willing to support 

unilateral disengagement if negotiations are restarted and fail again. This kind of thinking 

was already manifested in 2005 before the disengagement from the Gaza Strip. Only the 

support of the political movements that prefer a negotiated settlement enabled Sharon, 

who faced stiff resistance in his own party, to realize his plan. Actually, this reflects the 

fact that many of the unilateralists choose this path not because they think final status 

talks are undesirable but because they are not feasible at present, especially when Israel 

faces a Palestinian Authority, governed by Hamas, that favors Israel’s destruction. Most 

Israelis see unilateralism as a default option because of the perceived lack of a partner for 

permanent status talks. As Prime Minister Olmert has said, “We prefer to reach an agreed 

settlement with the Palestinians. That is our wish and our intention, but we will not wait 

indefinitely for the Palestinians. If the present situation continues Israel will determine 

our borders unilaterally and the Palestinians will lose immensely.”17

The Role of Third Parties

Another important development in Israeli security thinking in recent years is the growing acceptance of the role of third parties—both states and nongovernmental organizations—in the Israeli-Palestinian theater.18 The Israeli security community understands 

that anarchy on the Palestinian side could be much worse without third-party involvement. This is leading to reconsideration of the various roles that third parties can fulfill 

in establishing a Palestinian state and in security arrangements between Israel and a 

Palestinian state. This is true in both a negotiated process and a unilateral process. During 

the Camp David negotiations in 2000, Israel was willing to establish an international force 

in the Palestinian territory to fill various security roles in the framework of a permanent 

status agreement. The most interesting recent example is the agreement, reached after 

Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, on the operation of the Rafah crossing with Egypt, which 

established a third-party monitoring mechanism manned by the European Union. The 

new role of the United Nations in enforcing the cease-fire in Lebanon also reflects this 

changing Israeli attitude.

However, this new thinking is competing with the traditional suspicions and concerns 

that have characterized the Israeli outlook toward third-party involvement for many years. 

These include skepticism about their role during crises, when they are most needed, and 

the general belief that any third-party involvement will be counter to Israel’s interests 

Another important development in 

Israeli security thinking in recent 

years is the growing acceptance of 

the role of third parties.
15

because of third parties’ tendency to side with the weaker party. Israelis who belong to 

the pessimistic school of thought and do not believe in the possibility of a constructive Israeli-Palestinian relationship are also more prone to the old security thinking 

on third-party involvement. The experience on the ground with the present third-party 

involvement will determine how much the new, more open thinking develops. So far, 

the experience has been mixed. The arrangements at the Jericho prison for third-party 

wardens to monitor those responsible for the assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister 

Rehavam Zeevi ultimately collapsed when the wardens were pulled out by their government following Palestinian violations. In contrast, the Rafah arrangements are functioning reasonably well. 

Conclusions and Recommendations

Israeli national security thinking has reached a point in which disengagement from the 

Palestinians is considered the central security interest. The establishment of a Palestinian 

state is a necessary end result of the disengagement process and may help Israel realize 

the goals of disengagement while at the same time realizing the Palestinians’ right of selfdetermination. In mainstream Israeli national security discourse the two-state solution is 

becoming a genuine Israeli interest and not simply something Israel should do as a favor 

to the Palestinians or because of pressure from the international community. Although 

the parties are now deeply mired in a stalemate, this change in Israeli national security 

thinking is likely to contribute to an accelerated resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This change is contributing much to the realignment of the Israeli polity that former 

prime minister Sharon started by forming the new Kadima party.

The questions that remain open and debated in Israeli discourse pertain to the nature 

of this state, namely, its territorial delineation, the status of its borders, the level of 

economic and security cooperation between the two states, and the circumstances under 

which this state is established. What is the real road map that will lead to the realization 

of this goal? The answers to these questions will determine the nature of the future Israeli-Palestinian relationship. Will the two states live peacefully side by side, maintaining 

the kind of links that normal states have, or will they be hostile states in constant confrontation? A completely unilateral process will probably bring about the latter scenario 

because it will be perceived as dictated by Israel, which will undermine the legitimacy 

and viability of the nascent Palestinian state. At the same time, future scenarios are not 

dependent solely on the answers to these questions; Palestinian domestic developments 

also will affect the chances of a peaceful Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Many in Israel 

and the international community are concerned that the election of a Hamas government is the kind of development that could nullify the positive effects of this evolution 

in Israeli thinking. Nonetheless, the possibilities arising from this evolution imply that 

efforts should be made to increase the probability that a Palestinian state will emerge 

in a more positive atmosphere, while being aware of and prepared for its emergence in a 

negative environment.

The United States has an interest in the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has 

the Palestinian question at its core. This development would create a more favorable 

atmosphere for other U.S. policy interests in the region. In spite of the greater Israeli 

willingness to accept a Palestinian state, its establishment is not guaranteed even after 

a full Israeli disengagement, because the Palestinians may see it as in their interest to 

maintain the “occupation” by not establishing their state. Even the establishment of a 

Palestinian state itself will not end the conflict if Israel’s relationship with the new state 

is more confrontational than cooperative. Hence, U.S. interests require not only establishing a Palestinian state, but bringing it about in such a way that the new state will live in 

peace with Israel. This can be done only by a continuous effort to reconstitute a negotiating process that will lead to a negotiated settlement. It is not an easy task, especially 

Israeli national security 

thinking has reached a point 

in which disengagement from 

the Palestinians is considered 

the central security interest.

The United States has an interest in 

the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 

which has the Palestinian question 

at its core.
16

when developments on the Palestinian side make negotiations difficult, but ultimately it 

is in the interest of the two parties and the United States. 

It is difficult to analyze the long-term implications of the Hamas victory for a negotiated settlement, but the short-term implications are clear. Hamas objects to negotiations 

with Israel and to a permanent status agreement that will recognize Israel’s existence, 

while Israel is reluctant to negotiate with Hamas, its bitterest enemy. However, the dissonance between Hamas’s ideology and political positions and its responsibility as elected 

leaders for the welfare of its people may lead to a change in Hamas positions that in the 

long term will increase the prospects for a negotiated solution.

In many cases, U.S. involvement can make the difference and turn a completely unilateral Israeli process into a cooperative or even negotiated process. The best example is 

the success of Secretary of State Rice in bringing about a negotiated agreement between 

Israel and the Palestinian Authority in November 2005, on the reopening of the Rafah 

crossing to Egypt and the operation of the other transit points into and out of the Gaza 

Strip. Although this agreement serves the interests of the two parties, they were nevertheless incapable of reaching it without U.S. involvement, because of deep mutual distrust.

As noted, there is also greater acceptance in Israeli national security circles for thirdparty arrangements. The United States could initiate and lead these third-party mechanisms even if its role in their implementation is limited by commitments elsewhere. The 

Rafah arrangement is a useful model; it was mediated by the United States but implemented by the European Union.

The United States already has several instruments available for managing a higher 

level of involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian process: the Quartet, the road map, and 

the security coordinator. The U.S. administration may also consider nominating a political 

coordinator as well, since the secretary of state cannot fulfill this role full-time.

Although the road map has many weaknesses, including an unrealistic timetable, too 

many unresolved questions, and too much room for alternative interpretations, it remains 

the only initiative accepted by all the parties. The United States can reenergize the road 

map by integrating a series of coordinated unilateral steps that each of the parties has an 

interest in implementing, putting forth its own interpretation of the road map’s disputed 

points, and pressing the two parties to implement their commitments according to the 

U.S. interpretation. In this way, the United States could form a bridge between unilateral 

steps and a negotiated process and make the Israeli process of disengagement a more 

cooperative process—or even a negotiated one.

The United States will have to develop a policy that will reconcile the wish to restart 

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations with the reality of a Hamas government. For that purpose, 

a nuanced, cautious engagement policy that will facilitate a process of change in Hamas 

may be the best option.19

The Future Evolution of Israeli Thinking

As this study has shown, events in Israel, the Palestinian territories, and the region have 

shaped and reshaped Israeli national security thinking over the past forty years and will 

inevitably continue to do so. One can imagine several scenarios in which the evolving 

Israeli national security thinking on Palestinian statehood will play an important role:

•	 In the first scenario, internal developments in the PA will enable the renewal of 

Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. For instance, a Palestinian national dialogue could 

lead to an agreement between Hamas and Fatah, leading to a policy shift coordinated 

between Abu Mazen and the Hamas government. In this scenario, the Israelis may 

wish to establish a Palestinian state as soon as possible through the road map—that 

is, by establishing a Palestinian state with provisional borders—because this would 

allow movement toward a Palestinian state and an accelerated negotiation process 

while postponing some of the sticky issues involved in the permanent status agreeThe United States could form a 

bridge between unilateral steps 

and a negotiated process and 

make the Israeli process of disengagement more cooperative.

U.S. interests require not only 

establishing a Palestinian state, 

but bringing it about in such a way 

that the new state will live in peace 

with Israel.
17

ment. In this framework, based on its new thinking regarding the Palestinian areas, 

Israel would probably be willing to withdraw from substantial parts of the West Bank. 

It is also possible that going through this interim stage will serve Hamas's interest 

by postponing a final agreement, allowing the group time to adjust and modify its 

ideology, which currently rejects a negotiated final agreement. This scenario may lead 

to a relatively calm and stable situation, and possibly to permanent status negotiations.

•	 In the second scenario, negotiations with the Palestinians will not take place, 

because of a perceived lack of a credible Palestinian partner. This could result if the 

ruling Hamas party does not give up its radical positions or if the Palestinian Authority slides into anarchy. Based on its new security thinking, Israel may decide on 

some form of disengagement in the West Bank that will be completely unilateral. The 

probability that the Israeli government will choose this option has been reduced as 

a result of the Israel-Hezbollah war and the continued violence emanating from the 

Gaza Strip even after Israel’s withdrawal. Nevertheless, unilateral disengagement may 

reemerge because it is still popular among a segment of the Israeli elite that deals 

with the Israeli-Palestinian question and because Israel most likely will be frustrated 

in future attempts to engage and reach agreements with the Palestinians, leading it 

back to the unilateral approach. It is more likely to emerge if the new arrangements 

in southern Lebanon laid out in UN Resolution 1701 prove stable and resilient. In 

this case, Israel’s perspective on the Hezbollah war may change, leading to renewed 

support for unilateral options. Still, this scenario is not without problems, because 

although this partial disengagement will include evacuation of settlements, the presence and activities of the IDF are unlikely to change. Even if Israel withdraws the 

IDF from parts of the West Bank as part of the disengagement, the lack of adequate 

Palestinian security control will probably lead to terrorist attacks on Israeli cities 

that will draw the IDF back into the West Bank. Israel cannot bear in the West Bank 

incidents that are a daily event in the Gaza Strip, such as the launching of rockets, 

because of the proximity of the West Bank to Israel’s main cities. 

•	 The third scenario is a mixed one. It would involve a dialogue between the two sides 

but not necessarily formal and comprehensive negotiations. In this scenario, the two 

parties will establish a process of mutual coordinated unilateral steps and partial 

agreements leading gradually to more stability, less violence, and a buildup of mutual 

trust. Although this process may also include some stages of the road map, such as 

establishing a Palestinian state with provisional borders, it will involve less formal 

negotiations, more coordinated unilateral acts, and a less rigid timetable. Nevertheless, it could build a bridge to a new political process and eventually a permanent 

status agreement.

Of these three scenarios, the mixed scenario presents the best combination of feasibility and desirability. Although it would be a slow process, its main advantage lies 

in the fact that it builds on the evolution in Israeli national security thinking without 

overburdening it with unrealistic expectations.
18

Notes

1. Throughout the study I assume that an Israeli willingness to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state 

is genuine. I am aware that, based on the limitations that some Israelis want to put on the attributes of 

sovereignty of a future Palestinian state, some observers think it is not a real acceptance, but I disagree. I 

believe that arrangements can be reached that would prevent the Palestinian state from posing a security 

threat to Israel and still allow for a viable, sovereign state.

2. Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel, Knesset Web site, www.knesset.gov.il/.

3. Another school of thought in the Labor party during these years was the “functionalist” school, advocated 

by Moshe Dayan, which suggested a division of authority that would give broad autonomy to the Palestinian population, with citizenship rights in Jordan, while Israel would continue to hold responsibility for 

security. This “functionalist” thinking is still alive today, for instance, in the approach of Shimon Peres, 

now in the Kadima party.

4. Yigal Allon, “Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders,” Foreign Affairs October 1976: 38–53.

5. Although some settlements in Palestinian-populated areas were initiated during Labor governments, they 

started as unapproved, illegal settlements, and only later did the government yield to heavy political pressure from the settler movement to accept them. Kiryat Arba and Elon Moreh were established in this way. 

6. The nomination of Josef Burg—the leader of the National Religious Party, which gave birth to the settlement movement—to head the Israeli delegation to the autonomy talks reflected this lack of commitment. 

In his opening statement at the talks, Burg said, “We are met with the goal of reaching agreement on the 

establishment of an elected administrative council in order to provide full autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Samaria, Judea, and the Gaza district.” The use of the terms “Arab inhabitants” and “Samaria and 

Judea” indicate the continued nonacceptance of the Palestinian right of self-determination, and the wish 

to continue to control and settle the occupied territories. 

7. The last two points were best illustrated by the Israeli chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Shomron, in June 1989, 

when he said, “Everyone who wants the intifada eliminated must understand that there are only three 

ways to do this: by transfer, starvation, or physical elimination, that is, genocide.” www.passia.org/palestine_facts/chronology/19891990.htm.

8. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., The Israel-Arab Reader (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 542–46.

9. Although these events are little known or remembered outside Israel, they had a great impact at the time 

because they were not initiated by organized terrorist groups. They were initiated by Palestinian individuals 

and thus represented the depth of the population’s frustration.

10. See, for example, Rabin’s speech after the terrorist attack at Beit Lid on January 23, 1995: “There is no 

other alternative. We will achieve peace, for this is the solution for the long term, and to the terrorism, 

even if it is difficult for us now. I am convinced that the path the Government has taken, is the path which 

will lead to the end of control over another people.” www.nmmc.net/Guide/rabinI.html.

11. Some believe Sharon’s support was disingenuous, but the mere fact that he was prepared to pay a 

significant political price for his position suggests that it was a firm conviction. Sharon accepted that 

disengagement may lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state, but he preferred a state with limited 

sovereignty.

12. In July 2006 Hezbollah gunmen crossed the border, attacked an IDF position, and kidnapped two Israeli 

soldiers. Israel responded with a month-long air and ground campaign in Lebanon designed to destroy 

Hezbollah’s ability to strike Israel with rockets. Israel’s reaction was based on its belief that it had the 

right to respond because Hezbollah had initiated the fighting by launching an unprovoked attack across 

an international border.

13. Arnon Sopher, “Demography Will Do the Work,” Haaretz, June 29, 2004; Arnon Sopher and Yevgenia Bistrov, 

“The Demography of Israel 2004–2020,” Haifa University, October 2004.

14. Yossi Alpher, “The Future of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” USIP Special Report 149, September 2005; 

Asher Arian, “Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2003,” Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Memorandum No. 67, October 2003, 7.

15. See, for example, Tzipi Livni’s interview to Nahum Barnea: “I came to understand that I cannot have it 

all, that Jabotinsky’s ambition that ‘the son of Arabia, the son of Nazareth [Christians], and my son could 

live in comfort’ cannot happen, no matter how painful it is.... This is what I think. If we want to uphold 

democracy and a Jewish majority here, there is no way to avoid dividing this land.” Nahum Barnea, “This 

Isn’t the Only Way,” Yedioth Aharonot (Leshabat Supplement), March 11, 2005.

16. Yossi Verter, “Peres Will Try To Market His Agreement with Abu Alaa to the Public,” Haaretz, February 11, 

2002; Aluf Benn, “Peres Acts To Integrate the Understandings with Abu Alaa,” Haaretz, March 1, 2002; 

Nathan Gutman, “Has Someone an Idea What to Do with This Conflict in the Middle East,” Haaretz,

February 11, 2002.
19

17. Roni Sofer, “The instruction for the terror attack came from Damascus,” www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L3242018,00.html, April 21, 2006.

18. Alpher, “Future of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 9–10.

19. Shlomo Brom, USIPeace Briefing, March 2006.
Of Related Interest

A number of other publications from the United States Institute of Peace examine issues 

related to Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

Recent Institute reports include 

• Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process, by Khalil 

Shikaki (Special Report 158, January 2006)

• The Future of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Critical Trends Affecting Israel, by Yossi 

Alpher (Special Report 149, September 2005)

Recent books from USIP Press include

• The Peace Process and Palestinian Refugee Claims: Addressing Claims for Property 

Compensation and Restitution, by Michael R. Fischbach (2006)

• Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy, by Yoram Peri 

(2006)

• Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers, by Mohammed 

Hafez (2006)

• How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process, 

edited by Tamara Cofman Wittes (2005)

For book sales and order information, call (800) 868-8064 (U.S. toll-free only) or (703) 

661-1590, or fax (703) 661-1501.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

The United States Institute of Peace and Arab-Israeli Relations

The Institute is a leader among nongovernmental organizations working toward a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has supported the work of more than two 

dozen resident scholars and fellows, provided more than 150 grants in this area totaling 

over five million dollars, published dozens of books and reports, and facilitated highlevel dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian political and religious figures. The Institute also serves as a forum for promoting new thinking about U.S. policy and operates 

a variety of educational and professional training programs in the region.