MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 8 ME 9 Docket: And

- 17

- 349 Submitted

On	Briefs: January	11,	2018 Decided: January	23,	2018

Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD
, GORMAN ,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

IN	RE	JAMES	C.

PER	CURIAM

[¶1] The	 father	of	 James	C. III appeals	 from	a	judgment	of	 the	District

Court	(Lewiston, Dow,	J. )	terminating	his	parental	rights	pursuant	to 22	M.R.S.

§ 4055(1)(A)(1)(a),	(B)(2)(a),	(b)(i)

- (ii),	(iv)	(2017)

. 1 He argues	that	the	court

erred by finding by	clear	and	convincing	evidence that	he is unfit	as	a	parent

pursuant	 to section 4055(B)(2 ) (b) (i)

, (ii),	 or	 (iv) ,	 and	 that	 it	 abused	 its

discretion by determining	that	terminat ion	of	his	parental	rights	now	i s	in the

child ’s	 best	 interest. T he	 court’s	 fi ndings	 that	 he i s	 unfit	 as	 a	 parent have

support from competent	evidence	in	the	record

, and the	court acted	well	within

its	discretion by determin ing that	termination	of the	father’s parental	rights i s

in the	child ’s	best	interest

. We therefore affirm.

1 The	court	terminated	the	mother’s	parental	rights	in	the	same	judgment

, and she	did	not	appeal.2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The court’s findings concerning the	 father ’s unfitness as	a	parent

and its	determination of the	child’s best	interest	were grounded	in	the	following

findings	of	fact from	the	termination	hearing :
As	 for	 the	 father,	 the	 jeopardy	 order	 id entified “ risks	 of serious	 physical	 harm,	 serious	 emotional	 harm	 and/or	 serious neglect	due	to	the	father’s	extensive	mental	health	issues,	patterns of	 domestic	 violence,	 impulse	 control	 issues,	 and	 anger management	issues. ”

.	.	.	. In	describing	the	i ncident	that	cause d the	mother	to	seek	a temporary	 protection	 from	 abuse	 order	 against	 the	 father,	 the father	blames	the	mo ther	for	the	fact	that	he	“love

- tapped	her”	on the	back	of	th e head	because	“she	pushed	me	to	it.	.	.	.”

The	 father	 described	 his	 history	 of “ snapping ” in	 his relationship	with	the	child’s	mother,	with	his	own	mother,	and with former	job	supervisor s

. He	also	compl ains	about	service	providers

“ not	 doing	 their	 job. ” In	 the	 father’s	 view, [the local hospital] messed	 up	 medical	 care	 for	 [the	 child],	 necessitat ing	 the	 baby’s
move	to [a specialized hospital	in] Boston. In	the	father’s	view

, [his initial] case	 management [provider] didn’t	 do	 its	 job,	 setting	 up med[ication]	management	 services	 for	 him. The	 [C ourt O rdered D iagnostic E valuation (CODE) ]	evaluator failed	to	work	with	hi m, DHHS	failed	to	make	referral s	for	him	and	failed	to	return	his	calls, the visit supervisor	failed	to	get	in	touch	with	him,	the	driver	didn’t do	his	job,	etc.

.	.	. [T]he	father	has	developed	no	insight	and	has	accepted	no responsibility	for	the	jeopardy	he	poses	to	the	child. His	testimony was	 one	 of	 the	 most	 offensive	 examples	 of	 domestic	 violence3
blaming,	 denying,	 justifying,	 and	 minimizing	 that	 the	 Court	 has

ever heard.	.	.	.

The	 father	 is	 unable	 to	 manage	 his	 own	 finances.	 	 He acknowledges	 a	 history	 of	 impulsive	 spending.	 	 His	 father	 is	 his representative	payee	for	Social	Security.	.	.	.

At	 the	 time	 of	 trial,	 the	 father	 had	 only	 recently	 begun	 the
process of	setting	up	case	management	 through	 the	hospital.		He was	 also	 looking	 for	 his	 own	 place,	 separate	 from	 his	 alcoholic mother.	 	 The	 visit	 supervisor	 found	 that [the] father	 had	 shown some	limited	progress	in	interacting	with	the	child	at	visits.	.	.	.

[ The	CODE	evaluator]	was	not	able	 to	complete	a	 full

- scale evaluation	of	the	father	due	to	the	father’s	failure	to	attend	a	second evaluation	session,	but	.	.	.	he	determined	that	“[ the father]	does	not possess	 the	 intellectual,	 emotional,	 or	 maturational	 s kills necessary	to	parent	a	child.”

.	.	.	. [The	child]	was	born	at	[thirty

- five] weeks [ ’ ] gestation.		He was	 born	 in	 Lewiston,	 but	 promptly	 transferred	 to	 hospitals	 in Portland,	then	Boston.		He	is	under	treatment	of	a	nephrologist.		He has	complex	d ietary	needs. His	caregivers	need	training	and	skill, and	caregivers	must	pay	careful	attention	to	the	food	preparation process.	 	 [The	 child]	 requires	 occupational	 therapy	 and	 speech therapy .	 	 He	 is	 in	 therapeutic	 foster	 care .	 	 The	 right	 permanent caregiv ers	for	[him]	will	be	smart,	attentive,	patient,	and	nurturing.

[The	child]	absolutely	needs	permanency.	He	is	not	currently in	a	 pre

- adoptive	 placement,	 so	 termination	 of	 parental	 rights	is necessary	for	him	to	be	available	to	move	toward	the	permanen cy of	adoption.4

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶3] There	is	more	than	sufficient competent evidence	in	the	record that

support s the court’s finding by clear	 and	 convincing evidence that ,	 on	 three

independent	grounds, the	father	is	unfit	as	a	parent

. See In	re	K.M. ,	2015	ME 79,

¶¶ 5

- 6, 8, 10, 118	 A.3d	 812; In re Michaela	 C. ,	 2002	 ME	 159,	 ¶¶ 21

- 23,

809 A.2d 1245.

[ ¶4] The	father challeng es the	sufficiency	of	the	eviden ce	of	his	unfitness

as	a	parent	by	pointing to	evidence that he loves and	shares	a	bond with the

child

. H e argues	that	he only needs more	time	to	achieve	reunification and that,

given	 their	 bond, this	 additional	 time	 for	 reunification	 is	 in the	 child’s	 best

interest. Contrary	to	the	 father’s	contention, the	court	did	not	err by finding

that he	 has h ad an adequate time

— slightly	 over	 a	 year

— to engage	 in	 the

required	 services

, attempt	 to rehabilitat e	 himself

, and reunif y	with	 the	 child

within	a	 timeframe	 that was reasonably calculat ed to meet	 the	child’s	needs.

See 22 M.R.S.	 § 4052(2

- A)	 (2017) (mandating that	 department	 file	 a

termination	 petition	after	 “a	 child	 has	 been	in	 foster	 care	 for [ fifteen ] of	 the

most	 recent [ twenty

- two ] months.” ). The	 Legislature clearly	 intended	 to

expe ditiously mov e a	 child	 toward	 permanency	 and	 to	 avoid	 needlessly5

extended	 foster	 care	 placements. See 22 M.R.S.	 § 4003(3),	 (4)	 (2017) ; In	 re

Alana	S.

, 2002 ME	126,	¶¶	20

- 24,	802 A.2d	976.

[ ¶5] As	for	the	child’s	best	interest,	w e	have said that	a	child’s	bond	with

his or	her natural	parent is	“only	one	of several factors”	and does	not	preclude

a	determination	that	terminating	an	unfit	parent’s	rights	is	in	that	child’s	best

interest. In	re	Michaela	C. ,	20 02	ME	159,	¶ ¶ 26, 31,	809	A. 2d	1245; In re David G.
,

659	A.2d 859,	862	(Me.	1995). This child	has	extensive	medical	needs that	the

court	 found will require “smart,	attentive,	patient,	and	nurturing”	permanent

caregiver s; the father	 is	 unable	 to	 manage	 his	 own	 mental	 health	 and

day

- to

- day	needs

, let	alone those	 of hi s	 son .	 	T he	 court acted well within its

discretion in conclud ing that it	is	in	 the child’s	best	interest	 to terminat e the

father’s	parental	rights so	as	to allow for	the	child’s adoption

. See In re Joseph V.
,
2017	 ME	 172,	 ¶¶	 2

- 4,	 169	 A.2d	 389; In	 re Jeffrey	 E. ,	 557 A.2d 954,	 955

- 57

(Me. 1989)

.

T he	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.6
Richard	Charest,	Esq.,	Lewiston,	for	appellant	Father

Janet	T.	Mills,	Attorney	General,	and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

L ewiston	District	Court	docket	number	PC

- 2016

- 6
F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY