Filed 10/6/21 Castanon v. Long Beach Lesbian and Gay Pride CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

ALEXA CASTANON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LONG BEACH LESBIAN AND 

GAY PRIDE, INC., et al.,

Defendants and 

Respondents.

B303662

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 18LBCP00073)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Michael P. Vicencia, Judge. Affirmed.

Leslie R. Smith for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Krieger & Krieger, Lawrence R Cagney, Linda Guthmann 

Krieger and Terrence B. Krieger for Defendants and 

Respondents.

_________________________
2

Appellant Alexa Castanon was voted out of membership in

and thus off the board of directors of Long Beach Lesbian & Gay 

Pride, Inc. (LBLGP) in its August 2018 election. Shortly 

thereafter, she filed this action for fraud against LBLGP, its 

president, Dorothea Newman, and a vice-president, LaRhonda 

Slaughter (respondents). The fraud action sought Newman’s and 

Slaughter’s removal from the board of directors and appellant’s

own reinstatement. While the fraud action was pending, 

appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking, among 

other things, to stay LBLGP’s annual August 2019 elections. 

With the stipulation of the parties in the writ proceedings, the 

court supervised a new election, in which appellant was again 

voted out of LBLGP. Then, in this action, the trial court granted 

respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on the second 

cause of action to reinstate appellant, finding it moot after the 

court-supervised elections. After losing a series of discovery 

disputes, appellant dismissed her first and only remaining cause 

of action with prejudice. This appeal, which concerns appellant’s 

membership only, followed.

Appellant contends the trial court erred in granting 

judgment on the pleadings, in denying her motion to quash a 

subpoena by which respondents sought the identity of the owner 

of the website “LongBeachGayPride.org,” and in compelling her 

to respond substantively to Requests for Admission (RFAs),

which she contends invade her right to privacy. We affirm the 

judgment of dismissal.
3

BACKGROUND

Appellant filed her complaint in this matter on December 5, 

2018. The complaint contains two causes of action. The first is 

entitled “Removal of Directors for Fraud, Malfeasance and Gross 

Misconduct [Cal. Corp. Code §5223],” the second “Declaration of 

Member’s Rights [Cal. Corp. Code §5617].”

1 A key claim of the 

complaint was that LBLGP’s August 18, 2018 election was rigged 

by Newman and Slaughter to remove appellant from 

membership. The details of the election rigging were set forth in 

the general allegations. The first cause of action alleged 14 

wrongful acts by Newman and Slaughter, including two broad 

allegations about the conduct of elections. In the second cause of 

action, appellant alleged: “As a consequence of defendants’ 

wrongful actions, Plaintiff has been denied the right to 

participate at or vote in any meetings, including board of 

director’s meetings.”

Immediately after appellant filed this action, LBLGP 

restored her to a voting seat on the board of directors.

On February 20, 2019, appellant filed a petition for writ of 

mandate (LASC case No. 19STCV05359). Initially, appellant 

complained in the petition of improprieties by LBLGP’s leaders, 

particularly denying appellant’s requests to review and copy 

LBLGP’s financial records. The petition named LBLGP’s 

treasurer as respondent. The Superior Court deemed the cases 

related and assigned both cases to the same judge.

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the 

Corporations Code.
4

While the writ proceedings were pending, respondents 

undertook discovery in the fraud action. They served a subpoena 

on GoDaddy.com to discover the identity of the owner of the 

LongBeachGayPride.org website, which had a confusingly similar 

name to LBLGP’s website LongBeachGayPride.org and which 

contained statements respondents asserted were defamatory. 

Respondents also contended identification of the owner was

necessary to prove their affirmative defense of unclean hands. 

Appellant brought a motion to quash the subpoena. The trial 

court limited the subpoena to require GoDaddy.com to respond 

only if the owner of the website were appellant or her attorney; it

otherwise denied the motion. The owner was found to be 

appellant’s attorney. Appellant has not provided this court with 

a reporter’s transcript of the hearing on the motion to quash.

On August 7, 2019, the trial court held a lengthy hearing 

on the writ petition, which included testimony by Slaughter and 

Wayne Manous. Appellant had previously sought a stay of 

LBLGP’s annual election in her writ petition, but during this 

hearing, appellant agreed to LBLGP’s proposal to hold the 

organization’s August 2019 election under court supervision. 

Appellant has not provided this court with a reporter’s transcript 

of the hearing.

A court-supervised election was held pursuant to the 

stipulation of the parties. On August 15, 2019, the court presided 

at a hearing to count the votes cast the previous day. Among 

other results, LBLGP members voted 12 to 8 against renewing 

appellant’s membership, which rendered her ineligible to sit on 

the board of directors. Appellant has not provided this court with 

a reporter’s transcript of the proceedings.
5

On October 23, 2019, the court denied appellant’s writ 

petition in its entirety. Appellant appealed. The court’s denial 

was affirmed by on November 2, 2020 in case No. B303237.2

On December 5, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on 

respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on the second 

cause of action that prayed for relief as to appellant’s personal 

membership. The court granted the motion, finding the cause of 

action moot in light of the court-supervised election. The trial 

court granted respondents’ motions to compel substantive 

responses to certain form interrogatories and RFAs. The court 

also imposed sanctions against appellant and her counsel in the 

amount of $1,500 per motion. Appellant has not provided this 

court with a reporter’s transcript of the hearing.

On December 30, 2019, appellant filed a request to dismiss

with prejudice her first case of action to remove Newman and 

Slaughter as directors. This was appellant’s only remaining 

cause of action. On January 3, 2020, the trial court signed and 

entered a judgment of dismissal in favor or respondents and 

found them to be the prevailing parties entitled to recover costs. 

This appeal followed.

2 We deny respondents’ request that we take judicial notice 

of the prior appeal. Judicial notice is unnecessary to the 

resolution of this appeal.
6

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Judgment on the 

Pleadings on the Ground of Mootness.

The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings as to 

appellant’s second cause of action on the ground that it was moot. 

Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding the second 

cause of action moot because that cause of action challenged the 

validity of the entire 2018 election and so was not rendered moot

by changes to her individual membership status. She contends, 

in the alternative, that the trial court abused its discretion in 

failing to permit her to amend her complaint.

The standard of review of a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer. (Dunn v. 

County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) 

Thus, we review an order granting judgment on the pleadings de 

novo. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 

51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) We treat as true “ ‘all material facts 

properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions 

of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be 

judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a 

reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in 

their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

Generally, when judgment on the pleadings is sustained 

without leave to amend, “we decide whether there is a reasonable 

possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can 

be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, 

there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] 

The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on 

the plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)
7

Moot cases are “ ‘[t]hose in which an actual controversy did 

exist but, by the passage of time or a change in circumstances, 

ceased to exist.’ ” (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood

City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1573 (Wilson).)3 “Regardless of 

the nature of the intervening events that lead to a finding 

of mootness, a common denominator in mootness cases is that the 

court expressly or impliedly concludes there is no longer an 

existing controversy before it upon which effectual relief may be 

granted.” (Association of Irritated Residents v. Department of

Conservation (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1202, 1223.) Simply put, “[a]

case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical 

impact or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.” (Simi

Corp. v. Garamendi (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1503.) Since 

mootness does not arise from a pleading defect in the complaint 

but from external events, it would be an unusual case in which 

mootness could be cured by amendment. Thus, when events 

render a case moot, courts should generally dismiss it. (Parkford 

Owners for a Better Community v. County of Placer (2020) 

54 Cal.App.5th 714, 722.)

Construed liberally, nothing in the complaint in any way 

indicates appellant is challenging the validity of the entire 2018 

election. In her general allegations, appellant does allege broadly 

that Newman and Slaughter attempted to have “select members 

removed from the organization by setting up an elaborate scheme 

to fix the organization’s recent annual election.” She further 

3 “California courts will decide only justiciable controversies. 

[Citations.] The concept of justiciability is a tenet of common law 

jurisprudence and embodies ‘[t]he principle that courts will not 

entertain an action which is not founded on an actual 

controversy.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573.)
8

alleges they disbanded the election committee so that they “could 

control the election process and achieve any outcome they 

desired.” However, the only desired outcome alleged by appellant

was removing appellant from membership: Newman and 

Slaughter planned and agreed to “to fix the outcome of the 

election by having Plaintiff voted out.” They “gave instructions to 

the vote counters to take all necessary measures to ensure that 

the tally of votes in favor of Plaintiff did not reflect more than 

50% of the votes cast.” Moreover, this is the only outcome 

allegedly achieved by the election fraud. Appellant alleges that 

after the election, she “was told she was not voted back into the 

organization or onto the board. Plaintiff was the only member 

who was not voted back.” (Italics added.)

The second cause of action itself is entitled “Declaration of 

Member’s Rights.” The word “member’s” is singular, indicating it 

seeks the declaration of the rights of one member, appellant. The 

only new allegation in the cause of action is: “As a consequence 

of defendants’ wrongful actions, Plaintiff has been denied the 

right to participate at or vote in any meetings, including board of 

director’s meetings.” Nothing in this allegation suggests that 

appellant is seeking to invalidate the entire 2018 election or to 

obtain a declaration of the rights of other members.

In her prayer for relief, appellant asks the court to declare 

“null and void the attempts to remove Plaintiff as a member 

and/or as a director in the August 8, 2018 election” and that 

“Plaintiff is a member in good standing of defendant corporation 

and thus entitled to vote at any board of director’s meeting” and 

to enjoin certain actions by the board until her position and 
9

voting rights are restored. She sought no other relief related to 

the 2018 election.4

We see no error in the trial court’s determination that the 

second cause of action was moot. Almost immediately after 

appellant filed this lawsuit, respondents restored her 

membership and director voting rights, pending resolution of the 

action. Then, in the related writ proceedings, the trial court 

granted appellant a statutorily approved remedy for her claim

that she was wrongfully rejected from membership by the rigged 

2018 election: a court-supervised election in which members 

voted on whether her membership should be renewed. (§ 5617, 

subd. (d).)5 Appellant stipulated to this procedure. She lost her 

membership in the court-supervised election, and with it any 

eligibility to act as a director. These events left the court with no 

effective relief to grant as to the second cause of action.

4 The only other remedy sought by appellant in her prayer 

for relief was removal of Newman and Slaughter from office and 

a bar to their reelection, but this relief is unmistakably part of 

her First Cause of Action, entitled “Removal of Directors for 

Fraud, Malfeasance and Gross Misconduct.” There is no 

allegation that Newman and Slaughter rigged the 2018 to obtain 

their own seats as directors.

5 Subdivision (d) of section 5617 provides: “The court, 

consistent with the provisions of this part and in conformity with 

the articles and bylaws to the extent feasible, may determine the 

person entitled to the office of director or may order a new 

election to be held or appointment to be made, may determine the 

validity of the issuance of memberships and the right of persons 

to vote and may direct such other relief as may be just and 

proper.”
10

Appellant contends that the trial court was statutorily 

required to set a hearing on the validity of the 2018 election 

before deciding any other matter, and the court’s failure to do so 

resulted in prejudicial error, specifically the mootness of her 

second cause of action.

Section 5617, subdivision (c) provides: “Upon the filing of 

the complaint, and before any further proceedings are had, the 

court shall enter an order fixing a date for the hearing, which 

shall be within five days unless for good cause shown a later date 

is fixed.” The record on appeal is silent as to whether good cause 

for a later date was shown, and we do not presume error on the 

part of the trial court. (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co. Inc.

(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.) Even assuming the trial court 

delayed such a hearing without good cause, appellant was not 

prejudiced by the delay. She received membership and director 

voting rights pending resolution of her claim of wrongful rejection 

from membership. The court-supervised 2019 election was a 

proceeding in the writ action, not this case. More importantly, 

appellant stipulated to the court-supervised election with full 

knowledge of the status of proceedings in this case. She cannot 

now complain about the election’s timing.

Appellant also contends the trial court “recognized” at the 

August 7, 2019 writ hearing that she could proceed with this

action challenging the validity of the 2018 election regardless of 

the results in the court-supervised 2019 elections in the writ 

proceedings. ~(AOB 28-29)~ Appellant raised this claim in her 

opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings in this 

action so the trial court was aware of her claim. Appellant has 

not provided a copy of the reporter’s transcript of the August 7, 

2019 hearing nor has she provided a copy of the reporter’s 
11

transcript of the hearing on the motion for judgment on the 

pleadings. It is appellant’s burden to provide a reporter’s 

transcript or an agreed or settled statement if one is necessary 

for appellate review. (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co. Inc.,

supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) A judgment or order of the 

trial court is presumed correct, and if appellant does not provide 

a record which is adequate for appellate review, the decision of 

the trial court will ordinarily be affirmed. (Id. at p. 187.)

There is no basis to depart from that rule here. Although 

the record is clear that appellant stipulated to the courtsupervised election proceedings, there is no written confirmation 

of the details of the stipulation or of any representations by the 

trial court. In addition, the record shows the court granted the 

motion for judgment on the pleadings with an awareness of 

appellant’s claim. This indicates to us that the court did not 

agree with appellant’s recollection of what occurred at the August 

7, 2019 writ hearing.

Appellant contends that even if the court did not 

“recognize” that she could proceed nonetheless with her second 

cause of action, the 2019 election could not resolve her claim that 

the rigging of the 2018 election deprived her of a three-year term 

as a director. We disagree. Appellant stipulated to having her 

membership status determined by the 2019 election and by so 

stipulating she necessarily agreed that this election would decide 

whether she continued as a member and director. Put 

differently, only members can serve as directors, and so by 

deciding her membership, the 2019 election also determined her 

eligibility to serve as a director.
12

Finally, appellant contends that in opposition to the 

motion, she “repeatedly requested the court to grant [her] leave 

to amend if it deemed any allegation to be insufficiently pled.”6

Appellant’s problem is not that her requests for relief were

unclear or her facts insufficiently pled. Her requests for relief are 

crystal clear and her claims of election fraud are very specifically 

pled. Her problem is that she specifically alleged that the 

purpose of the 2018 election rigging was to get rid of her and that 

she was the only person who was removed from membership as a 

result of that election. The only election-related relief she sought 

related to herself. The only directors she sought to remove were 

Newman and Slaughter, and that relief was part of the First 

Cause of Action only. It is this clarity and specificity which 

resulted in the second cause of action becoming moot.

B. The Court’s Ruling Denying the Motion to Quash the 

GoDaddy.com Subpoena Is Moot.

The owner of the website LongBeachGayPride.org took 

steps to conceal her identity. Accordingly, respondents served a 

6 On pages 3 and 4 of her opposition brief, appellant stated 

generically that if the court found the facts in the complaint to be 

“insufficiently alleged” or the nature of the relief sought 

“unclear,” she “requests leave of court to amend the complaint to 

cure any deficiencies.” On appeal, appellant provides two 

additional record cites she claims show requests for leave to 

amend, but the lines cited do not show such requests. She has 

not provided any record cites showing she proffered specific facts 

in the trial court in connection with her request to amend. Even 

if leave to amend could be appropriate in moot cases, appellant 

did not meet her burden of showing a reasonable possibility that 

the defect could be cured. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 

p. 318.)
13

subpoena on GoDaddy.com to discover the owner’s identity. 

Respondents asserted the information was needed for their 

affirmative defense of unclean hands. Appellant contends the 

trial court erred in denying her motion to quash this subpoena.

Appellant’s inaction after her motion was denied resulted 

in the revelation that the owner was her own attorney. Her 

inaction rendered this claim moot. As respondents point out, 

appellant did not seek a stay or writ review of the court’s ruling

and so GoDaddy.com provided the name of the owner to 

respondents. The identity of the owner is no longer private. It is 

not possible to undo the unmasking. (See Simi Corp. v.

Garamendi, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1503 [mootness occurs 

“when a court ruling can have no practical impact or cannot

provide the parties with effective relief”].)

Appellant contends that if this court finds error, the matter 

could be remanded and the trial court could issue a protective 

order requiring respondents and their attorneys to destroy the 

“private information they received, seal the court files that might 

include that information” and “prohibit the use or disclosure of 

any information disclosed by GoDaddy.com” unless respondents 

filed a direct action against the owner.

Appellant could have sought limitations on the disclosure 

and use of the information to protect the owner’s privacy even if 

the trial court had correctly denied her motion.7 Appellant has 

7 Appellant has not identified what private information 

GoDaddy.com might have provided apart from the identity of the 

owner, but a protective order limiting the use of any such 

information would have provided protection equivalent to its 

destruction. Similarly, a protective order could have limited the 

use of any private information to this case or to a separate direct 

action.
14

not provided any record citations showing she made such efforts.

Further, this court’s internal records do not show any efforts by 

appellant to protect the identity of the owner during this appeal. 

As a result, the information is no longer private. A protective 

order would have no practical impact at this point.

Appellant urges us to exercise our discretion to decide this 

claim even though it is moot because it involves issues of public 

interest and questions of law. We decline to do so.

The right to speak anonymously is well established in case 

law, and it is recognized in the context of speech on the internet, 

as appellant’s multiple case citations show. (See, e.g. Krinsky v. 

Doe 6 (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1154.) This right to anonymity is 

not absolute and a speaker’s identity may be ordered disclosed if 

his or her statements are actionable. (See, e.g., Glassdoor, Inc. v.

Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 623, 635.) The actionable 

nature of a statement is fact-dependent, which will vary from 

case to case, and so the issue cannot be decided as a matter of 

law. Although not determinative, an additional reason not to 

decide the issue is the state of the record on appeal. It does not 

appear to contain all documents relevant to the motion to quash, 

and appellant has not provided a reporter’s transcript of the 

hearing on the motion to quash.

The requirement of notice to the anonymous speaker before 

disclosure of his or her identity is also well established in law. 

Further, the trial court in this case recognized the need for notice 

and limited the subpoena to require disclosure only if the 

owner/speaker were appellant or her attorney, who indisputably 

had notice of the subpoena. There is no need to decide any issue

of notice.
15

C. The Trial Court’s Order Compelling Responses to Certain 

RFAs Has No Further Force and Effect and the Record Is 

Not Adequate for Review of the Sanctions Order.

Appellant contends the trial court violated her First 

Amendment rights and those of non-parties when it granted

respondents’ motion to compel responses to RFAs 52 through 77. 

She also contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting 

the motion because the RFAs sought irrelevant information.

Appellant has expressly stated she has not appealed the 

first cause of action, which she voluntarily dismissed. Appellant

dismissed the first cause of action without responding to the 

RFAs. We have found no error in the trial court’s dismissal of her 

second cause of action. Accordingly, the trial court’s order 

compelling appellant to respond to the RFAs has no force or 

effect. There is no more case.

The trial court did order appellant to pay sanctions in 

connection with the motion to compel responses to the RFAs, but 

the record is inadequate to review this ruling. Even assuming 

the trial court abused its discretion in compelling responses to 

RFAs 52 through 77, the trial court’s order addressed more than 

RFAs 52 through 57: it compelled appellant to respond to other 

RFAs as well as to interrogatories. And in sanctioning appellant, 

the court imposed an amount less than that sought by 

respondents.

Without the reporter’s transcript, which appellant has not 

provided, the record is inadequate to permit appellate review.

We have no way to determine the court’s reason for imposing 

sanctions, or even whether the sanctions were based only on 

appellant’s failure to respond to the challenged RFAs, as opposed 

to the other RFAs and interrogatories which she does not 
16

challenge on appeal. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s 

order.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents to recover costs on 

appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, J.

We concur:

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

WILEY, J.