IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0421

Filed June 30, 2021

KELLY ANGSTROM and CHERYL ANGSTROM,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.

CALHOUN COUNTY, IOWA, MICHAEL COOPER, CARL LEGORE and SCOTT 

JACOBS,

Defendants-Appellees,

_________________________________

CALHOUN COUNTY, IOWA,

Counterclaim Plaintiff,

vs.

KELLY ANGSTROM and CHERYL ANGSTROM,

Defendants to Counterclaim.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Calhoun County, Adria Kester, 

Judge.

Lessors Kelly and Cheryl Angstrom appeal a district court order declaring 

their lease agreement with Calhoun County void. AFFIRMED.

Ernest Kersten, Fort Dodge, for appellants.

Aaron W. Ahrendsen, John C. Werden, and Curt S. Steger of Eich Werden 

Steger & Ahrendsen, P.C., Carroll, for appellees.

Considered by May, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
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MAY, Presiding Judge.

Contracts entered “in contravention of a statute are void, and Iowa courts 

will not enforce” them. Bank of the W. v. Kline, 782 N.W.2d 453, 462 (Iowa 2010); 

see Pike v. King, 16 Iowa 49, 52 (1864). The district court declared a lease 

agreement void because Calhoun County (the County) failed to comply with Iowa 

Code sections 331.361 and 331.305 (2019). Lessors Kelly and Cheryl Angstrom 

appeal. We affirm.

I. Factual Summary

The story of this case begins with Ted and Jan George, who are not parties. 

The Georges owned property located on Twin Lakes Road in Rockwell City. In 

2006, the Georges had a dispute with Calhoun County about the extent of their

property. Both sides knew a quiet title action was “the one way” to resolve their 

dispute. But both sides wanted to avoid litigation. So, as a compromise, the 

County and the Georges entered into a lease agreement.

Significantly, the lease agreement did not resolve the parties’ dispute over 

the extent of the Georges’ property. But it did lease the right to keep docks in 

North Twin Lake to the Georges. In return, the Georges agreed to pay $1 per year. 

The lease’s term was fifty years. 

Later that year, the Angstroms bought the Georges’ property, including their 

interest in the lease. Over a decade later, in 2017, the county attorney raised

concerns that the Angstroms had breached the lease agreement by, among other 

things, attempting to limit the public’s access to the lake. Then in 2018, the county 

attorney advised the Angstroms that the lease had been terminated because of 

their alleged breaches. In a separate letter, the county attorney contended the 
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lease was “void ab initio” because, before approving it, the Calhoun Board of 

Supervisors had not followed the notice requirements of section 331.305.

This litigation followed. The parties filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment. The district court concluded the lease was void. The Angstroms appeal.

II. Standard of Review

“We review a district court’s summary judgment ruling ‘for correction of 

errors at law.’” Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 36 (Iowa 

2018) (quoting Walderbach v. Archdiocese of Dubuque, Inc., 730 N.W.2d 198, 199 

(Iowa 2007)). Summary judgment is proper if the record shows “that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3).

III. Analysis

Here, the facts are undisputed, and the legal issues are fairly narrow. First,

the Angstroms contend that, because the lease agreement did not trigger section 

331.361(2), the County was not required to comply with the notice requirements of 

331.305. Section 331.361(2)(a) provides:

In disposing of an interest in real property by sale or 

exchange, by lease for a term of more than three years, or by gift, 

the following procedures shall be followed, except as otherwise 

provided by state law:

The board shall set forth its proposal in a resolution and shall 

publish notice of the time and place of a public hearing on the 

proposal, in accordance with section 331.305.[

1

]

 

1 Section 331.305 provides:

Unless otherwise provided by state law, if notice of an 

election, hearing, or other official action is required by this chapter, 

the board shall publish the notice at least once, not less than four nor 

more than twenty days before the date of the election, hearing, or 

other action, in one or more newspapers which meet the 
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We look for the meaning of statutes in their texts, in the “words chosen by the 

legislature.” State v. Childs, 898 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted).

In the Angstroms’ view, section 331.361(2) did not apply because the 

agreement was not a “lease” or any other “dispos[ition] of an interest in real 

property.” We disagree. Numbered paragraph 1 of the “lease agreement” states:

“Lease of Disputed Property. Calhoun County, Iowa hereby leases to [the] 

George[s], their successors and assigns the Property as described below and 

shown on Attachment A of this Agreement.” The description “below” is a set of

boundaries for real estate. And “Attachment A” is a picture of land.

It is true, of course, the lease agreement has some severe limitations. 

Paragraph 5 clarifies: “The Property is being leased . . . solely for the purpose of 

placing a dock . . . .” But its limited scope does not change the lease’s basic

character. And it does not change our view that, as a matter of law, the lease 

agreement was a “lease” of “an interest in real property” for purposes of 

section 331.361(2).

Because section 331.361(2) applied, the County was required to comply 

with the notice requirements of section 321.305. And no one claims those 

requirements were met. It would appear, therefore, the lease is void. See Miller

v. Marshall Cnty., 641 N.W.2d 742, 750–51 (Iowa 2002) (“If a municipality fails to 

appropriately exercise its authority or comply with statutory procedures, the 

contract is void.”). 

 

requirements of section 618.14. Notice of an election shall also 

comply with section 49.53.
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But the Angstroms claim the lease is saved by a curative provision, Iowa 

Code section 589.31. It provides:

All deeds and conveyances of land executed by or purporting 

to be executed by the governing body of a city or county, and placed 

of record more than ten years earlier, which deeds or conveyances 

purport to sustain the record title, are legalized and valid, even 

though the record fails to show that all necessary steps in the 

conveyance and deeding of the property were complied with. The 

deeds and conveyances are legalized and valid as if the record 

showed that the law had been complied with, and that the 

conveyances and deeding had been duly authorized by the 

governing body of the city or county.

Iowa Code § 589.31 (emphasis added).

As the district court recognized, the key question under section 589.31 is 

whether the lease agreement constituted a “deed[] [or] conveyance of land . . . 

purport[ing] to sustain the record title.” The Angstroms do not claim the lease

agreement was a “deed.” Instead, they argue that if the agreement is a “lease,” it 

should also be considered a “conveyance of land.” Moreover, the Angstroms note, 

the lease has been on file for more than ten years. In the Angstroms’ view, these 

facts are enough to trigger section 589.31. 

We disagree. We assume without deciding that a lease of real property 

rights—however limited in scope—might qualify as a “conveyance[] of land” for 

purposes of section 589.31. See Iowa Code § 4.1(13) (“The word ‘land’ and the 

phrases ‘real estate’ and ‘real property’ include lands, tenements, hereditaments, 

and all rights thereto and interests therein, equitable as well as legal.” (emphasis 

added)); but see Tenney v. Atl. Assocs., 594 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Iowa 1999) (noting, 

in the context of apartment leases, “the traditional analysis of a lease as being a

conveyance of an interest in land—with all the medieval connotations this often 
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brings—was reappraised, and found lacking in several respects” (citation 

omitted)).

As the district court understood, however, a “conveyance[] of land” only 

triggers section 589.31 if it “purport[s] to sustain the record title.” And the

Angstroms do not argue the lease “purport[s] to sustain the record title.” So we 

conclude section 589.31 does not apply.

IV. Conclusion

The district court was correct in declaring the lease agreement void.

AFFIRMED.