DYE v ESURANCE PROPERTY & CAS UALTY INSURANCE COMPANY Docket No. 155784. Argued October 9, 2018 (Calendar No. 1). D ecided July 11, 2019. Matthew Dye brought an action in the Washtenaw Circuit Court a gainst Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company and GEICO Indemnity Com pany, seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) bene fits under the no -fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq ., for injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident while driving a vehicle h e had recently purchased. At plaintiff’s request, pl aintiff’s father had registered the vehi cle in plaintiff’s name at the Secretary of State’s office and obtained a no-fault insurance policy from Esurance. The declarations page of the policy identified only plaintiff’s father as the named i nsured. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was living with his wife, who owned a vehicle that wa s insured by GEICO. After Esurance and GEICO refused to cover plaintiff’s claim, plaintif f filed a breach-of-contract claim against both insurers along with a declaratory action, alleging that either Esurance or GEICO was obligated to pay his no-fault PIP benefits and requesting t hat the trial court determine the parties’ respective rights and duties. Eventually, Esurance pa id plaintiff more than $388,000 in PIP benefits, but it continued to maintain that GEICO was the r esponsible insurer. GEICO acknowledged that it was the prim ary insurer and began settleme nt negotiations with plaintiff and Esurance. Then, on Novemb er 13, 2014, the Court of Appeals ’ opinion in Barnes v Farmers Ins Exch , 308 Mich App 1 (2014), was published. Barnes held that under MCL 500.3113(b), when none of the owners of a vehicle maintains the requisite co verage, no owner may recover PIP benefits. After Barnes was published, GEICO reevaluated its legal position and ceased settlement discussions. Esurance filed a cross-claim against G EICO, arguing that GEICO had breached a settlement agreement. GEICO moved for summary dispo sition of plaintiff’s claim, arguing that plaintiff was not entitled to PIP benefits in ligh t of Barnes . Plaintiff also moved for summary disposition, arguing that Barnes was wrongly decided and, regardless, that his father was an owner and registrant for purposes of the no-fault act. The trial court, Timothy C. Connors, J., granted Esurance summary disposition on its cross- claim, ruling that GEICO and Esurance had entered into a valid settlement agreement and that GEICO had priority over plaintiff’s claim. The court deni ed GEICO’s motion for summary disposition and granted plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, thus determining th at GEICO was required to provide no-fault benefits to pl aintiff. The court granted plai ntiff’s motion against GEICO with regard to no-fault coverage and priority, stating that it did n ot need to address Barnes because plaintiff’s father was an owner and registrant of the vehicle a nd ruling that the only issue remaining between plaintiff and GE ICO was the amount of damages . GEICO filed an interlocutory application for l eave to appeal, which the Court of Appeals granted. In an Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# Syllabus Chief Justice: Bridget M. McCormack

C hief Justice Pro Tem:

David F. Viviano Justices: Stephen J. Markman Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K. Cavanagh This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court b ut has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisi ons for the convenience of th e reader. Reporter of Decisions: Kathryn L. Loomisunpublished per curiam opinion i ssued April 4, 2017 (Docket No. 330308), the Court of Appeals, B ECKERING , P.J., and B ORRELLO , J. (O’C ONNELL , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), held that the trial court had erred by granting summary disposi tion to Esurance because the parties had not yet reached a meeting of the minds on all the e ssential terms of the settlement agreement. The majority agreed with Barnes ’s interpretation of MCL 500.3101(1), and it held that the trial court had erred as a matter of law by finding th at plaintiff’s father was a “registrant” of the vehicle for purposes of MCL 500.3101(1). However, the m ajority held that there remained genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintif f’s father was an “owner” of the vehicle, and it therefore remande d the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Esurance applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and both plai ntiff and GEICO filed crossappeals. The Supreme Court grante d plaintiff’s cross-applicati on for leave to appeal and denied Esurance’s application and GEI CO’s cross-application. 501 Mich 944 (2017). 1 In an opinion by Justice Z AHRA , joined by Chief Justice M C C ORMACK and Justices M ARKMAN , V IVIANO , and B ERNSTEIN , the Supreme Court held : An owner or registrant of a motor vehicle is not required to p ersonally purchase no-fault insurance for his or her vehicle in order to avoid the statutor y bar to PIP benefits. MCL 500.3101(1) does not prescribe any particular manner by which n o-fault insurance must be maintained, and it contains no requirement that the insurance b e purchased or obtained by a vehicle’s owner or registrant. Barnes and other cases suggesting to the contrary were overruled to the extent that they were inconsistent with this holding. T he Court of Appeals judgment was reversed in part. The part of the Court of Appeals judgment re garding the purported settlement agreement between Esurance a nd GEICO was left undisturbed. 1. Under the no-fault act, an i nsurer is liable to pay PIP be nefits to any Michigan resident for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, oper ation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. These statutory benefits ari se regardless of w hether an injured person has obtained a no-fault insurance policy. Therefore, de termining whether no-fault benefits are available to an inj ured person does not depend on who purchased, obtained, or otherwise procured no-fault in surance. The onl y relevant inqui ry is whether the injured person can establish an accidental bodily injury arising out of the ow nership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. This relatively low threshold for statutory no-fault coverage was enacted to provide victims of motor vehicle accide nts assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for certain economic losses. Given that thes e benefits would be available to all Michigan residents, the Legislature sought to achieve this purpose by enacting the system of compulsory insurance set forth in MCL 500.3101(1). To ensure c ompliance with MCL 500.3101(1), the Legislature excluded persons from receiving PI P benefits under various circumstances listed in MCL 500.3113, including if the person w as the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle involved in the accident with respe ct to which the security required by MCL 500.3101 was not in effect.

1 The Legislature recently made substantial amendments to the no- fault act. See 2019 PAs 21 and 22. The opinions do not address those amendments, and all references in the opinions and this syllabus are to the pream endment version of the act.2. MCL 500.3101(1) provides that “[t]he owner or registrant o f a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for paym ent of benefits under personal protection insurance, property pr otection insurance, and residu al liability insurance.” MCL 500.3101(1) requires only that the owner or registrant “maintai n” no-fault insurance, which means to keep in an existing state. MCL 500.3101(1) does not p rescribe any particular manner by which a registrant or owner must keep no-fault insurance in an existing state, and MCL 500.3101(4) expressly contemplates that the security required b y MCL 500.3101(1) may be provided by any other method appr oved by the Secretary of State as affording security equivalent to that afforded by a policy of insura nce. If MCL 500.3101(1) were to be interpreted so that only a registrant or owner could obtain insurance on a vehicle, it w ould limit the Secretary of State’s power under MCL 500.3101(4) to allow security by any other meth od, and it would effectively read a requirement into MCL 500. 3101(1) that the Legislature di d not manifest through the words of MCL 500.3101(1) itself. When read together, MCL 500.3 101(1) and MCL 500.3113(b) did not preclude plaintiff from receiving PIP benef its. Iqbal v Bristol West Ins Group , 278 Mich App 31 (2008), did not hold that at least one owner must obtain no-fault insurance; instead, it held that MCL 500.3113(b) refers to the required security or insurance under MCL 500.3101 only as it relate s to the vehicle and theref ore a plaintiff may be entitled to PIP benefits if the vehicle was insured, regardless of whether that plaintiff was the owner of the vehicle. Thus, the factual distinctions between Barnes and Iqbal did not place Barnes outside the ambit of Iqbal ’s holding. 3. MCL 500.3113(b) provides that a person is not entitled to PIP benefits if at the time of the accident “[t]he person was the owner or registrant of a mot or vehicle or motorcycle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect.” The term “which” in this context represents one of tw o possible antecedents: the first is a person, and the last is a vehicle. The last-antecedent rule provides that a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined s olely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent unless something in the statute requi res a different interpretation, and nothing in MCL 500.3113(b) require s a different result. Moreov er, the usage notes for the definition of “which” state that the term regularly refers to i nanimate objects and never to individual persons. Accordingl y, the phrase “with respect to w hich the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in e ffect” refers to the vehicle, not the person. Because the conclusion in Barnes that “when none of the owners maintains the requisite coverage , no owner may recover PIP benefits” was contrary to the plain language of the no-fault act, Barnes was overruled. Reversed in part and remanded to t he Washtenaw Circuit Court f or further proceedings.
Justice C LEMENT , dissenting, would have held th at the no-fault act disqualifie s an owner from PIP benefits if the owner is injured in his or her own veh icle and no owner has maintained security. While she agreed with the majority that MCL 500.3113 (b) contemplates a relationship between “security” and “vehicle,” she disagreed with the majori ty’s conclusion that security “with respect to” a vehicle is the same as insurance “for” or “ on” that vehicle, given that nothing in the no-fault act requires a vehicle to be insured. Rather, she concluded that MCL 500.3113(b) requires a certain person—namely, the vehicle’s owner or regist rant—to maintain security against liability as provided in MCL 500.3101, and the phrase “ with respect to” connects thesecurity to the vehicle by way of the person. Justice C LEMENT stated that the critical nexus among owner, security, and vehicle was of a whole with the rest of the no-fault act, including the priority schemes set out in MCL 500.3114 and MCL 500.3115, and that the purpose of the nofault act would fall apart if an owner named in no policy was n onetheless understood to have maintained security through a nonow ner third party’s policy. A ccordingly, she c oncluded that plaintiff’s statutory duty to maintain security was not met mer ely by asking his father to get nofault insurance. Because the record did not reveal whether pla intiff’s father was an owner of plaintiff’s car, she would have r emanded the case to the trial court to determine whether plaintiff was disqualified from PIP benefits.
Justice C AVANAGH did not participate in the disposition of this case because th e Court considered it before she assumed office.

©2019 State of MichiganFILED July 11, 2019

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

MATTHEW DYE, by his Guardian, SIPORIN & ASSO CIATES, INC.,Plaintiff-Appellee/CrossAppellant,
v No. 155784
ESURANCE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant/CrossPlaintiff/Appellant/CrossAppellee, and GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Defendant/CrossDefendant/Appellee/CrossAppellant, and Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# OPINION Chief Justice: Bridget M. M cCormack

Chief Justice Pro Tem:

David F. Viviano Justices: Stephen J. Markman Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K. Cavanagh2 PRIORITY HEALTH,
Defendant/CrossPlaintiff/Appellee, and
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN, Defendant-Appellee.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except C AVANAGH , J.)

Z AHRA , J. This case presents the significa nt question of whether an owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident is excluded from receivin g statutory no-fault insurance benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq ., when someone other than an owner or registrant purchased no-fault insurance for that ve hicle. 1 Relying on Barnes v
Farmers Ins Exch , 2 the Court of Appeals concluded that “[a]t least one owner or r egistrant must have the insurance required by MCL 500.3101(1), and ‘when none of the owners maintains the requisite covera ge, no owner may recover [persona l injury prote ction (PIP)]

1 The Legislature recently made s ubstantial amendments to the no -fault act. 2019 PAs 21 and 22. This opinion does not ad dress those amendments and quo tes the preamendment version of the act.

2 Barnes v Farmers Ins Exch , 308 Mich App 1; 862 NW2d 681 (2014).3 benefits.’ ” 3 The insured sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we gran ted the application in part to consider this question. 4 We conclude that an owner or registrant of a motor vehicle is n ot required to personally purchase no-fault insurance for his or her vehicle i n order to avoid the statutory bar to PIP benefits. Rather, MCL 500.3101(1) only requires tha t the owner or registrant “maintain” no-fault insurance, and the term “maintain,” as comm only understood, means to keep in an existing state. Because MCL 500.3101(1) does not prescribe any particular manner by which no-fault insura nce must be maintained, we will not read into the statute a requirement that the insurance be purchased or obtained by a vehicle’s owner or registrant. Further, the grammatical composition of the MCL 50 0.3113(b) benefits exclusion, including the use of the term “which” within that pr ovision, signifies that the exclusion does not apply if the security required by MCL 500.31 01(1) was “in effect” at the time of the accident. 5 Though defendant maintains that the term “which” in this provision refers to the owner or operator of the motor vehicle, the usage of “which” at the time the no-fault act was enacted , as well as currently, reflec ts that this term is not properly used to refer to individual persons.

3 Dye v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 4, 2017 (Docket No. 330308), p 6, quoting Barnes , 308 Mich App at 8-9.

4 Dye v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co , 501 Mich 944 (2017).

5 MCL 500.3113(b) states that “[ a] person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident . . . [t]he person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle . . . involved i n the accident with respect to which the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect.”4 We therefore hold that an owner or registrant of a motor vehicl e involved in an accident is not excluded from rece iving no-fault benefits when someone other than that owner or registrant purchased no -fault insurance for that vehic le because the owner or registrant of the vehicle may “m aintain” the insurance coverage required under the no-fault act even if he or she did not purchase the insurance. The Cour t of Appeals’ decision in
Barnes and other caselaw suggesting to the contrary are overruled to the extent that they are inconsistent with our holding. 6 We reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

6 This Court stated in Citizens Ins Co of Americ a v Federated Mut Ins Co , 448 Mich 225, 228; 531 NW2d 138 (1995), that “Michigan’s no-fault act require s the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle to purchase a n automobile insurance policy . . . .” The Court apparently used the word “purchase” because owners commonly are the person s who maintain insurance on their vehicles, but in so using the word “purchase ” the Court strayed from the actual text of the no-fault act. The use of the word “purchase ” instead of the word “maintain” was inconsequential to the analysis in Citizens , because the word “maintain” had no particular significance to the issue addressed in that c ase. The question decided in Citizens was whether an insurance polic y could shift residual liability insurance from the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle to the driver of the veh icle. Citizens held that the policy was essentially unenforcea ble in this respect because “t he no-fault act unambiguously requires that a policy of automobile insurance, s old to a vehicle owner pursuant to the act, must provide coverage for residual liabili ty arising from use of the vehicle so insured.” Id . at 230. Unlike this case, there was no dispute in Citizens about whether insurance was properly maintained on the vehicles at is sue. Accordingly, we clarify that Citizens should not be read to suggest that only the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle may “ma intain” an automobile insurance policy.5 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On September 26, 2013, plaintiff Matthew Dye was involved in a motor vehicle accident and suffered serious inj uries that included a traumati c brain injury. At that time, plaintiff was 32 years old, fully employed, a member of the Nat ional Guard who had spent time in Afghanistan, and recentl y married. At some point befor e the accident, plaintiff had granted his father power of atto rney “to do bussiness [sic] at the secretary of state on [plaintiff’s] behalf.” At the time of the accident, plaintiff was driving a 1997 BMW that he had purchased two months earlier. After the purchase, plain tiff asked his father to register the vehicle for him and to obtain no-fault insurance. His father registered the vehicle in plaintiff’s name at the secretary of state’s office and obtained a no-fault insurance policy from Esurance via the Internet. The declarations page o f the policy identified only plaintiff’s father as the named insured. At the time of the ac cident, plaintiff was living with his wife, who owned a Dodge Caravan that was insured by GE ICO. After Esurance and GEICO refuse d to cover plaintiff’s claim, pl aintiff filed a breach of contract claim against both in surers along with a declarator y action, alleging that either Esurance or GEICO was obligated to pay his no-fault PIP benefit s and requesting that the trial court determine the parties’ respective rights and duties . A priority dispute between Esurance and GEICO ensued. 7 Eventually, Esurance paid plai ntiff more than $388,000 in

7 A personal protection insurance policy applies to accidental b odily injury that occurs “to the person named in the policy, t he person’s spouse, and a rela tive of either domiciled in the same household, if the injury arises from a motor vehicle a ccident.” MCL 500.3114(1). In this case, Esurance maintained that because plaintiff was no t a named insured under the no-fault policy on his own car and because plaintiff was living with his wife—not his father—at the time of the accide nt, plaintiff should look to GE ICO rather than Esurance for the payment o f PIP benefits.6 PIP benefits, but Esurance conti nued to maintain that GEICO was the responsible insurer. GEICO acknowledged that it was the primary insurer and began se ttlement negotiations with plaintiff and Esurance. Then, on November 13, 2014, the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Barnes v Farmers
Ins Exch was redesignated “for publication.” 8 In Barnes , the panel held that “under the plain language of MCL 500.3113(b), when none of the owners main tains the requisite coverage, no owner may recover PIP benefits.” 9 After Barnes was published, GEICO reevaluated its legal position and ceased settlement discussion s. Essentially, what had been—before Barnes —merely a priority dispute among potential insurers over who ha d to pay plaintiff’s claim turned into a dispute about whether plain tiff was covered under the no-fault act. Esurance filed a cross-claim against GEICO arguing that GEICO h ad breached a settlement agreement. GEICO mov ed for summary disposition of p laintiff’s claim, arguing that plaintiff was not entitled to PIP benefits in light of the now-published decision in
Barnes because plaintiff owned the subject vehicle but had not insure d it and the person who had insured it (plaintiff’s father) was not an “owner” as d efined in MCL 500.3101. Plaintiff, in turn, moved for summary disposition, arguing that Barnes was wrongly decided and, regardless, that hi s father was an owner and regis trant for purposes of the no-

8 Barnes was originally released as an un published opinion having no pr ecedential value in the Court of Appeals or lower courts. But pursuant to MCR 7 .215(D)(3), the panel granted the defendant’s request to publish the opinion, providi ng Barnes precedential effect under the rule of stare d ecisis. MCR 7.215(C)(2).

9 Barnes , 308 Mich App at 8-9.7 fault act because he had the right to use the BMW and because h e had physically registered the vehicle. The trial court granted Esuran ce summary disposition on its cro ss-claim, ruling that GEICO and Esurance had entered into a valid settlement agreemen t and that GEICO had priority over plaintiff’s claim. The trial court denied GEICO’ s motion for summary disposition and granted plaintiff’s motion for summary disposit ion, thus determining that GEICO was required to p rovide no-fault benefits to plaintiff. The trial court stated that it did not need to address the decision in Barnes because plaintiff’s fath er was an owner and registrant of the BMW. According to the trial court, the only issue remaining between plaintiff and GEICO was the amount of damages. The trial court thus entered an order granting Esurance summary disposition on its cross-claim, denyi ng GEICO’s motion for summary disposition with regard to plaintiff, and granting plai ntiff’s motion against GEICO with regard to no-fau lt coverage and priority. GEICO filed an interlocutory app lication for leave to appeal, w hich the Court of Appeals granted. 10 In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals re versed the trial court’s decision that g ranted summary disposition to Esurance. 11 The panel held that the trial court erred by enforcing the settlement agreemen t. The panel explained that “[a]lthough the issuance of Barnes promptly snuffed out what appears to have been a ‘nearly done’ deal, the parties had not yet reached a meeting o f the minds on all of the

10 Dye v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 5, 2016 (Docket No. 330308).

11 Dye , unpub op at 1.8 essential terms, and the trial court erred in granting Esurance ’s motion for summary disposition on its cross-claim fo r enforcement of the alleged a greement.” 12 In regard to the trial court’s decision denying GEICO summary d isposition against plaintiff on the basis of Barnes , the panel embraced Barnes ’s interpretation of MCL 500.3101(1) without reservation, stating: Although a motor vehicle may have more than one owner for purpo ses of the no fault act, it is not sufficient that a vehicle is insured by just anyone. At least one owner or registrant m ust have the insurance required by MCL 500.3101(1), and “when none of the owners maintains the requisi te coverage, no owner may rec over PIP benefits.” [13] The Court of Appeals then held that the trial court erred as a matter of law by finding that plaintiff’s father was a “reg istrant” for purposes of MCL 500.3101(1). 14 A majority of the panel, however, agreed with the trial court that there r emained genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s father was an “owner” o f the BMW plaintiff was driving at the time of the accident. 15 Therefore, the Court of Appeals remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 16

12 Id . at 11.

13 Id . at 6, quoting Barnes , 308 Mich App at 8-9 (citations omitted).

14 Dye , unpub op at 6.

15 Id . at 9. Judge O’C ONNELL dissented from the majority ’s conclusion that there were questions of fact about whether plaintiff’s father was an “owne r” of the vehicle but agreed with the panel in all other respects. Id . (O’C ONNELL , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) at 1.

16 Id . (opinion of the Court) at 12.9 Esurance filed an application in this Court arguing that the Co urt of Appeals improperly reversed the trial court’s decision to enforce the p urported settlement agreement by granting Esurance summary disposition on its cross-claim aga inst GEICO. Plaintiff filed a cross-appeal arguing that Barnes was improperly decided and that Esurance could not deny liability simply because plaintiff himself did not obt ain no-fault insurance. GEICO filed a cross-appeal arguing that the Court of Appeals er red by ruling that a question of fact precluded summary disposition in favor of GEIC O on the issue of whether plaintiff’s father was a co-owner of the BMW that plaintiff, in GEICO’s view, failed to insure. This Court granted plai ntiff’s cross-application for l eave to appeal and denied Esurance’s application and GEICO’s cross-application. 17 Accordingly, the sole issue before the Court is “whether an owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident may be entitled to person al protection insurance benef its for accidental bodily injury where no owner or registrant of the motor vehicle mainta ins security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance.” 18
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPL ICABLE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This Court reviews de novo a tria l court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. 19 The parties brought their resp ective summary disposition moti ons under

17 Dye , 501 Mich 944.

18 Id

. 19 Maiden v Rozwood , 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).10 MCR 2.116(C)(10), which tests the factual sufficiency of a clai m. 20 “In reviewing a motion for summary disposition brought u nder MCR 2.116(C)(10), a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositio ns, admissions, and documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” 21 If, “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuin e issue as to any material fact, . . . the moving party is entitl ed to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law,” 22 and the trial court must gra nt the motion without delay. 23
This Court also reviews de novo questions of statutory interpre tation. 24 “The role of this Court in interpreting statutory language is to ‘ascerta in the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred fro m the words in a statute.’ ” 25 “The focus of our analysis must be the statute’s express language, which offers the most r eliable evidence of the Legislature’s intent.” 26 “ ‘[W]here the statutory langua ge is clear and unambiguous, t he statute must be applied as written.’ ” 27 “ ‘[A] court may read nothing into an unambiguous

20 Smith v Globe Life Ins Co , 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).

21 Quinto v Cross & Peters Co , 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).

22 MCR 2.116(C)(10).

23 MCR 2.116(I)(1).

24 Badeen v PAR , Inc , 496 Mich 75, 81; 853 NW2d 303 (2014).

25 Hannay v Dep’t of Transp , 497 Mich 45, 57; 860 NW2d 67 (2014 ) (citation omitted).

26 Badeen , 496 Mich at 81.

27 McQueer v Perfect Fence Co , 502 Mich 276, 286; 917 NW2d 584 (2018) (citation omitted).11 statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislatu re as derived from the words of the statute itself.’ ” 28 Neither will this Court “rewrite the plain statutory language and substitute our own policy decisi ons for those already made by t he Legislature.” 29
III. ANALYSIS A. LEGAL BACKGROUND Under the no-fault act, “an insurer is liable to pay [PIP] bene fits [to any Michigan resident] for accidental bodily i njury arising ou t of the owner ship, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . .” 30 Although designated as “personal protection insurance” under the no-fault act, PIP benefits are in fact statutory benefits, arising regardless of whether an injured person has obtained a no-fault insurance policy. Indeed, a no-fault insurance carrier can be liable for no-fault benefits even if the motor vehicle it insures was not the actual motor vehicle involved in the accident. 31 PIP benefits are paid to injured persons solely by insurers who are authoriz ed to write no-fault insurance policies in this state or who have voluntarily filed a certific ate complying with MCL
500.3163. 32

28 Id ., quoting Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp , 466 Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d 663 (2002) (alteration in original).

29 DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp , 461 Mich 394, 405; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).

30 MCL 500.3105(1).

31 See Detroit Auto Inter-In s Exch v Home Ins Co , 428 Mich 43, 49; 405 NW2d 85 (1987). Amicus Michigan Defense Trial C ounsel agrees, acknowledging tha t “[e]ligibility to claim no-fault benefits for motor-vehic le-related injuries that occur in the state is not contingent upon the injured person having h is or her own no -fault insuranc e policy.”

32 The grand scope of these insure rs’ obligations became evident soon after the no-fault act12 For these reasons, determining whet her no-fault benefits are av ailable to an injured person does not depend on “who” purchased, obtained, or otherwi se procured no-fault insurance. The only relevant inquiry is whether the injured pe rson can establish an “accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operati on, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . .” 33 By establishing this relatively low threshold for statutory no-fault coverage, the no-fault act seeks to “provide victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, and p rompt reparation for certain economic losses.” 34 And given that these statutory benefits would be available to a ll Michigan residents, “[t]he Legislature believed th is . . . could be most effectivel y achieved through a system of compulsory insurance, whereby ever y Michigan motorist would be required to purchase no-fault insurance or be unable to operate a motor vehicle lega lly in this state.” 35 Accordingly, the Legislature en acted MCL 500.3101(1), which pro vides, in part, that “[t]he owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registere d in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insu rance . . . .” And to ensure compliance with MCL 500.3101(1), the Legislature excluded perso ns from receiving PIP benefits under various circumsta nces listed in MCL 500.3113. I n this case, GEICO

was enacted. In response to concerns that “Michigan’s no-fault law provision for unlimited personal injury protection benef its placed too great a burden o n insurers, particularly small insurers, in the event of ‘catastrophic’ injury claims,” In re Certified Question , 433 Mich 710, 714; 449 NW2d 660 (1989), the Legislature created the Mich igan Catastrophic Claims Association through Public Act 1 36 of 1978, codified at MCL 500 .3104.

33 MCL 500.3105(1).

34 Shavers v Attorney General , 402 Mich 554, 579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).

35 Id . at 579 (emphasis omitted).13 maintains that MCL 500.3113(b) precludes plaintiff from obtaini ng PIP benefits because, in its view, plaintiff “was the o wner or registrant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect.” In GEICO’s view, “the security required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect” because, as emphasized by GEICO, MCL 500.3101(1) mandates that an “ owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal prot ection insurance . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Against this backdrop, the legal issue before the Court, as apt ly stated by amicus Property Casualty Insurers A ssociation of America, hinges on whether the phrase “the owner or registrant of a moto r vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security ,” means that the owner (or at least an owner) must be the one to acquire the insurance policy, or whether it suffices for any person to provide the required security such that all that matters is th at the vehicle is insured. [36] GEICO maintains that the former interpretation is correct, and accordingly argues that plaintiff is exclude d from receiving PIP benefits because he ow ned the BMW and was not the one to obtain the no-fault in surance policy. Plaintiff mai ntains that the latter interpretation is correct, and he argues that he is not exclude d from coverage because he owned the BMW and the BMW was insured. While this Court has no t yet addressed this issue, the Court of Appeals has considered very similar argumen ts in two published opinions, which we now review.

36 Some emphasis omitted.14 B. COURT OF AP PEALS CASELAW

In Iqbal v Bristol West Ins Group , 37 the Court of Appeals first addressed in a published decision whether every owner of a vehicle is “require d to maintain insurance on the vehicle under the no-fau lt act . . . .” In that case, the plaintiff did not have title to any vehicle, but he frequently used his brother’s BMW. 38 The plaintiff was injured while driving the BMW and requested no-fault benefits. In his answer s to interrogatories, the plaintiff indicated that the BMW “ ‘belonged to my brother but I had primary possession.’ ” 39 The insurer claimed that the pl aintiff should also be conside red an owner of the car and that as an owner, the plaintiff must have obtain ed the insurance policy to obtain PIP benefits. The panel re jected this argument, stating : Viewing the statutory language i n the context of the given fact s, the statute would preclude plaintiff from being entitled to PIP ben efits if plaintiff “was the owner . . . of [the BMW] . . . involved in the acciden t with respect to which the security required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect.” As part of the process of construing MCL 500.3113(b), we shall make the assumption that plaintiff was an “ owner” of the BMW, as that te rm is defined in MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i). Next, the phrase “with respect to wh ich the security required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect,” § 3 113(b), when read in proper grammatical context, defines or modifies the pre ceding reference to the motor vehicle involved in the accident , here the BMW, and not the person standing in the s hoes of an owner or registrant. The statutory language links the required secu rity or insurance solely to the vehicle. Thus, the question becomes whether the BMW, and not plaintiff, had th e coverage or security required by MCL 500.3101. As indicated above, the coverage mandated by MCL 500.3101(1) cons ists of “personal protection in surance, property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance .” While

37 Iqbal v Bristol West Ins Group , 278 Mich App 31, 33; 748 NW2d 574 (2008).

38 Id . at 34.

39 Id

.15 plaintiff did not obtain this coverage, there is no dispute tha t the BMW had the coverage, and that is the only requirement under MCL 500.31 13(b), making it irrelevant whether it wa s plaintiff’s brother who pro cured the vehicle’s coverage or plaintiff. Stated differently, the secur ity required by MCL 500.3101(1) was in effect fo r purposes of MCL 500.3113(b) a s it related to the BMW. [40]
In sum, Iqbal held that the only requirement under MCL 500.3113(b) was that there be nofault insurance on the vehicle—who purchased the policy was irr elevant. Plaintiff’s position is in accordance with Iqbal

. In Barnes v Farmers Ins Exch , 41 the Court of Appeals was presented with a very similar question. In that case, the plaintiff and her mother w ere the titled owners of a vehicle. 42 The plaintiff’s mother gave a friend from church, Richard Hul ing, money to obtain insurance for the vehicle. 43 Huling purchased a policy. 44 The plaintiff was later injured in an accident, and requested PIP benefits under Huling ’s policy. 45 The insurer denied the request, and the plaintiff brought suit. 46 The insurer moved for summary disposition, contending that the “plaintiff could not recover P IP benefits from it under the

40 Id . at 39-40 (alterati on in original).

41 Barnes , 308 Mich App 1.

42 Id . at 2-3.

43 Id . at 3.

44 Id

.
45 Id

. 46 Id

.16 policy because the policy only covered the named insured, Hulin g, and was never intended to benefit plaintiff.” 47
In Barnes , after hearing arguments, “the trial court ruled that the no-f ault act required at least one of the ‘owners’ to have insurance. It re asoned that because neither plaintiff nor [her mother] had insurance, plaintiff was barred from seeking benefits under the no-fault act.” 48 The trial court granted summary disposition to the insurer. 49 The plaintiff in Barnes appealed, arguing that Iqbal required the opposite result. The Court of Appeals stated: In the present case, plaintiff cites Iqbal and argues that the fact that neither she nor [her mother] insured the Cavalier does not matt er because Huling did. Plaintiff contends that this is so regardless of w hether Huling was an owner of the Cavalier. Iqbal should not be read so broadly as to apply to even nonowners. The Court made it clear that it was address ing the problem of whether the statute re quired “each and every owner” to maintain insurance on a vehicle. The Court opined that to so hold would preclude an owner who obtained insurance from receiving PIP benefits as lon g as any other co-owner did not maintain coverage as well. [50] Thus, Barnes distinguished Iqbal , stating that “while Iqbal held that each and every owner need not obtain insurance, it did not allo w for owners to avoid the consequences of MCL 500.3113(b) if no owner obtained the required insurance.” 51 In sum, Barnes held that only a registrant or owner may procure no-fault insurance for a vehicle. Barnes is

47 Id . at 3-4.

48 Id . at 5.

49 Id

. 50 Id . at 7-8 (citations omitted).

51 Id . at 8.17 consistent with GEICO’s positi on, and plaintiff argues that Barnes improperly distinguished Iqbal

. C. APPLICATION While the Court of Appeals in Iqbal and Barnes focused primarily on the language of MCL 500.3113(b), our analysis primarily concerns the languag e of MCL 500.3101(1). After examining this provision, w e conclude that the Legislatur e carefully chose its words when it prescribed that “[t]he owner or registrant of a motor v ehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residu al liability insurance.” 52 The first and most relevant definitio n of “maintain” is: “to keep i n an existing state (as of repair, efficiency, or validity) : preserve from failure or decline[.]” 53 MCL 500.3101(1) only

52 MCL 500.3101(1) (emphasis added).

53 Merriam-Webster’s Co llegiate Dictionary (11th ed). See also Oxford University Press, English Oxford Living Dictionaries , <https://en.oxford dictionaries.com/def inition/maintain> (accessed November 30, 2018) [http s://perma.cc/T3A8-8EDR], whic h defines “maintain,” in part, as follows:
1 Cause or enable (a condition or situation) to continue.
‘the need to maintain close lin ks between industry and schools’ * * * 1.1 Keep (something) at th e same level or rate. ‘agricultural prices will have to be maintained’ * * * 1.2 Keep (a building, machine, or road) in good condition by check ing or repairing it regularly.18 requires that the owner or registrant “maintain” no-fault insur ance, which, as commonly understood, simply means to kee p in an existing state. Further , MCL 500.3101(1) does not prescribe any particular manner by which a registrant or owner must keep no-fault insurance in an existing state. Indeed, MCL 500.3101(4) expres sly contemplates that the “[s]ecurity required by subsection (1) may be provided by any o ther method approved by the secretary of state as afford ing security equivalent to that afforded by a policy of insurance, if proof of the secur ity is filed and continuously m aintained with the secretary of state throughout the period the motor vehicle is driven or m oved on a highway.” If we were to accept GEICO’s interpretation that only a registrant or owner may obtain insurance on a vehicle, we would limit the secretary of state’s power to allow security “by any other method” and we would also have effectively read a requirement i nto MCL 500.3101(1) that the Legislature did not man ifest through the words of MCL 500.3101(1) itself. 54 GEICO argues that “the common thread in all of these definition s [of maintenance] is that some affirmative act is necessary by the person required to ‘maintain’ the insurance.” We conclude that th is argument lacks merit. Even if the word “maintain” were to imply an affirmative act, plaintiff here undeniably undertoo k an affirmative act when he instructed his father to obtain no-fault insurance, the same wa y any person instructs a mechanic to “maintain” his vehic le or a father instructs his so n to “maintain” the lawn.

‘the Department for Transport is re sponsible for main taining the main roads in England [

. ] ’

54 Covenant Med Ctr, Inc v St ate Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 500 Mich 191, 207-208; 895 NW2d 490 (2017), citing Roberts , 466 Mich at 63.19 Thus, we conclude that the language of MCL 500.3101(1) does not require an owner or a registrant of a motor vehicle t o personally obtain no-fault ins urance. We further conclude, contrary to Barnes , that when read together, MCL 500.3101(1) and MCL 500.3113(b) do not preclude plaintiff from receiving PI P benefits. Again, MCL 500.3113 provides: A person is not entitled to be pai d personal protection insuran ce benefits for accidental bodily i njury if at the time of the acc ident any of the following circumstances existed:
* * * (b) The person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle involved in the accident with respect to which the s ecurity required by section 3101 o r 3103 was not in effect. As previously discussed, the Court of Appeals in Iqbal opined that “the phrase ‘with respect to which the security r equired by section 3101 . . . wa s not in effect,’ § 3113(b), when read in proper grammatical context, defines or modifies th e preceding reference to the motor vehicle invol ved in the accident , here the BMW, and not the person standing in the shoes of an owner or registrant. The statutory language li nks the required security or insurance solely to the vehicle.” 55 Despite acknowledging that Iqbal also stated that “ ‘there is no dispute that the BMW had the coverage, and that is the only requirement under MCL 500.3113(b),’ ” 56 the Barnes panel nonetheless concluded that “ Iqbal does not protect owners of vehicles if no owner provides the insurance . . . .” 57 In our view, a fair

55 Iqbal , 278 Mich App at 39-40.

56 Barnes , 308 Mich App at 7, quoting Iqbal , 278 Mich App at 40.

57 Barnes , 308 Mich App at 8.20 reading of Iqbal does not indicate that at least one owner must obtain no-fault insurance. Indeed, Iqbal concludes that [b]ecause the language in MCL 5 00.3113(b) precluding recovery o f PIP benefits links the security or in surance requirement to the veh icle only and not the person, the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff was entitled to PIP benefits because the vehicle was in fact insured, regardless of whether plaintiff was the “owner” of the vehicle. [58] Thus, while Barnes may be distinguishable from Iqbal on its facts, we conclude that those factual distinctions did not place Barnes outside the ambit of Iqbal ’s holding. In sum, we agree with Iqbal that MCL 500.3113(b) refers to the required security or insurance under MCL 500.3101 only as it relates to the vehic le. GEICO acknowledges that “[p]laintiff may be partia lly correct that [MCL 500.3113(b )] ties ‘security’ to the motor vehicle itself . . . .” Yet, GEICO contends that the reference in MCL 500.3113(b) to the “ ‘security required by section 3101—and [that section’s] use o f the mandatory term ‘shall’ in reference to ‘[t]he owner or r egistrant’—means that the vehi cle is not properly insured unless that security is maintained by an ‘owner or registrant.’ ” 59 We disagree. Initially, we iterate that GEICO’ s interpretation would ignore that MCL 500.3101(1) does not expressly pr escribe any particular manner by which a registrant or an owner must keep no-fault insurance in an existing state. 60 In regard to MCL

58 Iqbal , 278 Mich App at 46 (emphasis added).

59 Second alteration in original.

60 GEICO also argues that “the only approach that carries out the legislative intent embodied in [MCL 500.3101(1)] is to equate ‘shall maintain secu rity’ with being a named insured on a policy of automobile no-fault insurance.” In some thing of a “plain folks” appeal (at least for a legal brie f in an insurance case), GEICO explains that “anyone who owns a vehicle in Michigan knows that it is the named insured w ho applies for auto21 500.3113(b), there is no dispute that the phrase “the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect” refers to either the “owner or registra nt” or the “vehicle.” Obviously, plaintiff believes that the phrase refers to the veh icle, and the dissent and defendant believe that the phrase refers to the owner or regist rant. 61 In our view, the dispute

insurance. That’s the person who fills out the form developed by the insurer to obtain the information needed t o accurately underwrite the coverage.” The shortcoming of this argument is that statutory coverage und er the no-fault act does not depend on whether a person is a “named insured” in a n o-fault policy. The phrase “named insured” is not even contained in MCL 500.3101 or, for t hat matter, in MCL 500.3113. Rather, whether a pe rson is a “named insured” under a no-fault insurance policy is generally only relevant in deciding which potential insurer is liable for the claim. The only notable exception is MCL 500.3111, which pertains to Michi gan residents involved in out-of-state accidents. Under those circumstances, coverage is predicated on whether “the person whose injury is the basis of the claim was at the t ime of the accident a named insured under a personal prot ection insurance policy . . . .” MCL 500.3111. But this provision is not applicable in this case.

61 The dissent states that MCL 500.3113(b) contemplates a relatio nship between the security and the vehicle but ques tions the basis for our “concl usion that security ‘with respect to’ a vehicle is the same as insurance ‘for’ or ‘on’ th at vehicle . . . .” Post at 5. While we agree that many provis ions of the no-fault act are ina rtfully drafted and require interpretation, there is no stat utory basis to conclude that th e owner of an insured vehicle who is not a “named insured” in the policy is ineligible for PI P benefits. If this were the case, the Legislature could have readily predicated coverage on whether “the person whose injury is the basis of the claim was at the time of the acciden t a named insured under a personal protection insurance policy,” as in MCL 500.3111. The dissenting justice argues th at her interpretation “is cons istent with, and therefore supported by, the act’s other sections, like the prio rity schemes set out in MCL 500.3114 and MCL 500.3115.” Post at 6. She claims that “the priority scheme reflects the prenominate nexus among owner, security, and vehicle.” Post at 7. In our view, the dissent has improperly conflated coverage under the no-fault act with p riority under the no-fault act. Priority provisions do not expand coverage under the no-f ault act. The priority provisions do not provide additio nal coverage; they merely dict ate which insurer will pay claims that have already been e stablished. For this reason, th e dissent’s reliance on the priority provisions is misplaced.22 is best resolved by examining the use of the term “which” in MC L 500.3113(b). The term “which,” as applied in this cont ext, is “used relatively in res trictive and nonrestrictive clauses to represent a s pecified antecedent[]: This book, which I read last night, was exciting. The socialism which Owen preached was unpalatable to many. The lawyer represented five families, of which ours was the largest .” 62 Here, two possible antecedents precede the phrase “the security required by section 3101 or 31 03 was not in effect”: the first possible antecedent mentioned is a person, and the last p ossible antecedent mentioned is a vehicle. Plaintiff relies on the last-antecedent rule, “a rule of statutory construction that provides that ‘a modifying or restrictive word or clause c ontained in a statute is confined solely to the immediatel y preceding clause or last ant ecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation.’ ” 63 “As we have warned before, the l ast antecedent rule should not be applied if ‘something in the statute require s a different interpretation’ than the one that would result from applying the rule.” 64 But here, nothing in the statute requires a different result. Moreover, the use of the term “w hich” plainly favors plaintiff’ s interpretation. The usage notes for the definition of “which” state that the term “is use d regularly in referring to inanimate objects and, usually, animals and never, in modern us age, to individual

62 Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2000).

63 Hardaway v Wayne Co , 494 Mich 423, 427; 835 NW2d 336 (2013), quoting Stanton v Battle Creek , 466 Mich 611, 616; 647 NW2d 508 (2002). See also Scalia & Ga rner, Reading Law: The Interp retation of Legal Texts (St. Paul: Thomson/West, 2012), pp 144- 146.

64 Hardaway , 494 Mich at 428, quoting Stanton , 466 Mich at 416.23 persons . . . .” 65 Given that the term “which” by the time the no-fault system w as enacted no longer referred to individual persons, we conclude that the phrase “with respect to which the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect ” refers to the vehicle, not the person. Because the conclusion in Barnes that “when none of the owners maintains the requisite coverage, no owner may recover PIP benefits” is contr ary to the plain language of the no-fault act, we overrule Barnes

. 66

65 The Random House College Dictionary (rev ed, 1975).

66 Barnes , 308 Mich App at 8-9. GEICO also raises the specter of fraud to favor its interpretation by claiming that [f]or the system to work for all members of the pool, risk must be allocated and managed as accurately as po ssible. Through MCL 500.3101(1) , the Michigan Legislature recognized that what matters most for no-f ault insurance is the identity of the vehicle owner or registrant. Otherwise, vehicle owners with high risk fac tors would be able to avoid pr emiums applicable to the risk they present by adding their vehicles to the policies of others, including friends and even roommates. And the problem is not resolved by requiring owners of ot her vehicles to be listed as drivers because listed drivers do not fill out a pplications; they do not receiv e the same scrutiny as an applicant. First, as plaintiff rightly points out, there is no indication of fraud in this case. Second, “[t]his Court has been clear that the policy behind a statute c annot prevail over what the text actually says. The text must prevail.” Elezovic v Ford Motor Co , 472 Mich 408, 421- 422; 697 NW2d 851 (2005). In other words, the specter of fraud does not distract us from our goal of interpreting the applicable statutory language to d etermine the rule of law. Third, the Legislature clearly understands how to enact laws to mitigate fraud within the no-fault act. In fact, the Legisl ature recently did so when it enacted 2016 PA 346, which is now codified at MCL 500.3009(2): If authorized by the insured, a utomobile liability or motor veh icle liability coverage may be exclude d when a vehicle is operated b y a named person. An exclusion under this subsection is not valid unless the following notice is on the face of the policy or the declaration page or certificate of the policy and on the certificate of insurance:24 IV. CONCLUSION We hold that an owner or a regis trant of a motor vehicle involv ed in an accident is not excluded from receiving no-fau lt benefits when someone othe r than that owner or registrant purchased no-fault in surance for that vehicle becaus e the owner or registrant of the motor vehicle has nonethele ss “maintained” no-fault insuran ce. The Court of Appeals’ decision in Barnes and caselaw suggesting to the c ontrary are overruled to the ex tent that they are inconsistent with this holding. We reverse in part 67 the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case and remand the case to the Washtenaw Circu it Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Brian K. Zahra Bridget M. McCormack Stephen J. Markman David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein

Warning—when a named excluded person operates a vehicle all liability coverage is void—no one is insured. Owners of the ve hicle and others legally responsible for the acts of the named excluded p erson remain fully personally liable.

67 Although Esurance filed an application in this Court seeking e nforcement of its purported settlement agreement with GEICO, this Court was not persuaded t hat the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. See Dye , 501 Mich 944. This opinion does not disturb the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding the purpor ted settlement agreement.S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

MATTHEW DYE, by his Guardian, SIPORIN & ASSO CIATES, INC.,Plaintiff-Appellee/CrossAppellant,

v ESURANCE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant/CrossPlaintiff/Appellant/CrossAppellee,
and No. 155784

GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Defendant/CrossDefendant/Appellee/CrossAppellant, and PRIORITY HEALTH,
Defendant/CrossPlaintiff/Appellee, and
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN, Defendant-Appellee.2 C LEMENT , J. ( dissenting ). Plaintiff bought a car and asked his father to buy no-fault ins urance. His father bought a policy naming the father, not plaintiff, as the insure d. Under the no-fault act, as the owner of the car, plaintiff had to “maintain security for p ayment of benefits under” insurance for bodily injury and property damage. MCL 500.3101. Although the act provides for benefits for all pers ons injured in motor-vehicle accidents, it disqualifies from bodily-injury benefits a person injured in his or her own vehic le “with respect to which the security required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect.” MC L 500.3113. Plaintiff was injured in his own car and sought benefits under his wife’s pol icy, issued by defendant GEICO Indemnity Company. 1 See MCL 500.3114. Defendant d enied benefits on the basis that plaintiff’s car was one “with respect to which the securit y required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect.” To decide the issue on appeal, we must determine whether that security was or was not in effect. Plaintiff argues that the security was in effect because he ins tructed his father to take out a policy listing the car and his father did so. The majori ty agrees with plaintiff, reading the disqualification provision as operating only when an owner’ s vehicle is uninsured. But the no-fault act has very little t o do with insuring vehicles a s such; rather, it aims to create comprehensive insure r liability for bodily injury and property damage resulting from motor-vehicle accidents. The a ct’s text, context, and purpose support that understanding. The majority gives short shrift to each of these, analyzing fra ctions of statutory text in

1 See generally ante at 4-5.3 isolation, and as a result announces a rule that undermines the act. For these reasons, and as explained below, I dissent. 2

Defendant argues that it is not liable for plaintiff’s PIP 3 claim because plaintiff’s circumstances meet the statutory disqualification provision in MCL 500.3113(b): The person [seeking benefits] was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle . . . involved in the accid ent with respect to which th e security required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect. All agree that plaintiff owned a vehicle “involved in the accid ent,” so the question here is whether that vehicle was one “w ith respect to which the securit y required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect.” To answer that question, we mus t understand what is meant by “the security required by section 3101.” “Section 3101” refers to MCL 500. 3101, which says, in relevant part: (1) The owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be r egistered in this state shall maintain sec urity for payment of benefits u nder personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residu al liability insurance. . . . * * * (3) Security required by subsection (1) may be provided under a policy issued by an authorized insurer that affords insurance f or the payment of benefits described in subsection (1). . . .

2 As the majority notes, some of the statutes at issue in this c ase recently have been amended. See ante at 2 n 1. Like the majority, I address the preamendment versi on of the act.

3 PIP is common shorthand for “personal protection insurance” (a .k.a. “personal injury protection insurance”).4 Subsection (1) requires a vehicle’s owner to “maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insura nce, property protection insura nce, and residual liability insurance.” There are two pieces here: first, the owner must “ maintain security”; second, that security must ensure payment of benefits under PIP insuran ce (which pays for bodily injury) and property-protection insurance (which pays for prope rty damage). 4 As Subsection (3) explains, security “may be provided under a poli cy issued by an authorized insurer that affords insurance fo r the payment of benefits desc ribed in subsection (1)”— put more simply, to maintain security under § 3101 is to have a no-fault policy with PIP and property-protection insurance. According to the majority, as long as the vehicle is insured, M CL 500.3113(b)’s disqualification provision has not been triggered, no matter wh o is named in the policy. But in my view, the majority mis reads that provision. Section 3113 requires security (i.e., a no-fault policy) “with respect t o” the vehicle owned by the p erson claiming PIP benefits. 5 The majority assumes that a polic y is “with respect to” a vehic le if the policy insures the vehicle. But § 3113(b) governs PI P coverage; it isn’t aimed at vehicle coverage. Indeed, the no-fault act excludes damaged vehicles from coverage under property-protection

4 See, e.g., MCL 500.3105; MCL 500.3121; MCL 500.3131.

5 The majority explains in detail why the “which” in § 3113(b)’s “with respect to which” refers to “motor vehicle” and not to “owner.” See ante at 20-23. I generally agree. (I also observe that a similar “with respect to which” phrase is in MCL 500.3135(3), which affords limited immunity from “tort liab ility arising from the ownershi p, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor veh icle with respect to which the security required by section 3101 was in effect.”)5 insurance. See MCL 500.3123(1)(a). For that reason, I cannot credit the majority’s assumption. 6 The majority doesn’t rely on the statute’s phrase “with respect to”; indeed, it appears to toss out that language in favor of its own formulation, stat ing that insurance is “on the vehicle” or “for the vehicle.” 7 That formulation lets the majority assume, contrary to the Legislature’s text, that the statute connects only the security and the vehicle. I agree with the majority that § 3113(b) contemplates a relationship between “security” and “vehicle,” but the majority’s conclusion that security “with respect to” a vehicle is the same as insurance “for” or “on” that vehicle is not, in my view, correc t since nothing in the no-fault act requires a vehicle to be in sured. Rather, MCL 500.3101(1) requires a certain person (the vehicle’s owner or registrant) to maintain security agains t liability, and “with respect to” connects the security to the vehicle by way of the person. 8 Throughout the no-fault act, and in § 3113(b) in particular, the owner or registrant is fron t and center. In sum, there

6 The lapse is understandable—our own precedent has made the sam e assumption. See, e.g., Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 466 Mich 588, 595; 648 NW2d 591 (2002) (the act was “designed to regulate the insurance of motor vehicles”) . But to protect against accident damage to one’s vehicle , one must have collision cover age, see MCL 500.3037, which is neither required nor regulated by the no-fault act. W hat’s strange about the majority’s focus on insuring the vehicle is that, as the record shows, collision coverage was absent from plaintiff’s father’s policy, and so that policy did n’t insure plaintiff’s car. And recall that plaintiff’s claim was not for damage to his car but rather for PIP benefits.

7 See ante at 4 n 6 (“insurance . . . on the vehicles”), 15 (“insurance o n the vehicle,” “insurance for the vehicle”), 16 (“insurance for a vehicle”), a nd 18 (“insurance on a vehicle”).

8 Cf. MCL 500.3101(1) (referring to “the insured owner or registrant”) (emphasis added).6 exists security “with respect to” a vehicle not when that vehic le is insured but rather when that vehicle’s owner “ maintains security.” 9 This critical nexus among owner, security, and vehicle is of a whole with the rest of the no-fault act. While the majority hasn’t grappled with this contextual consideration, my reading is consistent with, and th erefore supported by, the act ’s other sections, like the priority schemes set out in MCL 500.3114 and MCL 500.3115. As those provisions explain, accident victims not otherwise covered by a personal o r household 10 policy must submit claims to other insurers in accordance with a priority s cheme. Under § 3114(4), an injured occupant of a vehicle must claim against insurers “in t he following order of priority”: (a) The insurer of the owner or re gistrant of the vehicle occup ied. (b) The insurer of the operato r of the vehicle occupied.

9 The majority determines that “ma intain” means “to keep in an e xisting state (as of repair, efficiency, or validity) : prese rve from failure or decline.” That’s an odd choice of definition for a few reasons. To start with, if “maintain” car ries that meaning, it’s not clear what “existing state” is being “k ept.” Before plaintiff bought the car, he lacked insurance (for himself and for the car), so under the majority’s reasonin g, plaintiff’s father’s buying insurance disrupted (rather tha n “kept”) the existing state. A nd I’m not sure what it means for an insurance policy to be in a state “of repair, efficiency , or validity.” Nor do I know what it means to “preserve” an insurance policy “from failure o r decline.” Still, the majority refers to its chosen mea ning as “commonly understood” in this context. Ante at 17-18. By my lights, a better fit is the definition “to suppor t or provide for.” MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). In any event, the larger flaw in the majority’s reasoning is its misunderstanding not of the meaning of “mainta in” but rather of what’s maintained, as explained throughout this opinion.

10 Under MCL 500.3114(1), a “personal protection insurance policy ” reaches “accidental bodily injury to the person name d in the policy, the person’s s pouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household.”7 Similarly, under § 3115(1) an in jured nonoccupant (e.g., a pede strian) must claim in this order: (a) Insurers of owners or regist rants of motor vehicles involve d in the accident. (b) Insurers of operators of moto r vehicles involved in the acc ident. At the outset, note that these provisions refer as the object o f no-fault coverage to persons (owners, registrants, operators), not to vehicles. 11 More crucially, the priority scheme reflects the prenominate nexus among owner, sec urity, and vehic le. That nexus is reflected too by the act’s design and purpose, wh ich falls apart if an owner named in no policy is nonetheless understood to have “mai ntained security” through a nonowner third party’s policy. As we’ve said, the no-fault a ct created a “system of compulsory insurance, whereby ever y Michigan motorist would be required to purchase no-fault insurance . . . [and] victims of motor vehicle acciden ts would receive insurance benefits for their injuries as a substitute for their common-la w remedy in tort.” Shavers v Attorney General , 402 Mich 554, 579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978) (emphasis omitted). Th e Legislature thus struck a balan ce between “assured, adequate, a nd prompt reparation” for accident victims and “compulsory i nsurance” to cover owners’ po tential liability for claims by those victims. Id . We have described the PIP scheme as “comprehensive,” id ., which reflects the tight fit between the owners’ compulsory insurance and the victims’ assured reparation.

11 See also MCL 500.31 25 (priority for prope rty-protection claims : “insurers of owners or registrants of vehicles involved in the accident; and insurers of operators of vehicles involved in the accident ”) (emphasis added).8 In other words, the no-fault sche me aims to assure (insofar as possible) a liable insurer for every victim. To meet that goal, the Legislature r equired two things: (1) that every owner (or registrant) “mai ntain security,” MCL 500.3101(1 ), and (2) that certain injured persons submit their cl aims according to a priority sch eme. 12 It’s plain that the act’s comprehensiveness—the tight fit between its means and its ends—falls apart under the majority’s reading, which re lieves an owner of the burden t o “maintain security” for liability for bodily injury an d property damage. To illustrate, let’s say plaintiff had hit a pedestrian not cov ered by a personal or household policy. The priority scheme, MCL 500.3115(1), direct s the hypothetical pedestrian to submit a claim to the “insurers of owners . . . o f motor vehicles involved in the accident,” but since plaintiff has no insurer, the pedestri an’s claim would be outside the priority scheme, 13 and he or she would be limited t o recovery through the assigne d-claims

12 See MCL 500.3114(4); MCL 500.3115(1); see also Royal Globe Ins Cos v Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co , 419 Mich 565, 575; 357 NW2d 652 (1984) (“The priority provisi ons of the act are designed to help implement [the act’s] goals.”).

13 Unless, of course, plaintiff’s father were determined to be an owner, in which case his personal policy’s issuer would be within the priority scheme. See MCL 500.3115(1). And as the Court of Appeals explained in Iqbal v Bristol West Ins Group , 278 Mich App 31; 748 NW2d 574 (2008), MCL 500.3113(b) doesn’t disqualify an owne r lacking insurance as long as another owner ha s a no-fault policy. In Iqbal , the Court of Appeals determined that the plaintiff, a vehicle owner lacking insurance, was not disqualified from PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(b) because hi s co-owner had a no-fault polic y. The Court observed that “the BMW had the coverage” and so appears at first blush t o have made the same mistake as the majority here, that the no-fault act is concerne d with insuring vehicles. Id

. at 40. But the Court of Appeals’ reasoning was more nuanced th an that, recognizing that the issue was “whether the BMW, and not plaintiff , had the coverage or security required by MCL 500.3101.” Id . at 39 (emphasis added). Although inartful, the Court of Appe als’ framing of the issue reveals its understanding that security is related to a vehicle not9 plan. 14 The pedestrian’s PIP benefits then would be funded through in creased rates for all policyholders, as though the pedestrian were a hit-and-run vict im. 15 This is how the majority understands the no-fault act. Yet under my reading, t he act would require security for payment of PIP benefits to be maintained by an owner (or re gistrant), and so the pedestrian would be able to recover within the no-fault act’s p riority scheme, rather than through the assigned-claims plan.

Much puzzles me about the majority’s interpretive approach. It makes some obvious lapses in its understandin g of the no-fault act’s text— I again point out the majority’s insistence that the no-fault act concerns insurance “on” (or “for”) a vehicle, despite the act’s exclusion of damaged vehicles. And its inter pretation of “maintain” in MCL 500.3101(1) lacks nuance becau se it analyzes the term in is olation from the rest of MCL 500.3101(1). According to t he majority, plaintiff “maintai ned security” (albeit

because the security insures the vehicle but because of the nex us among owner, security, and vehicle.

14 See MCL 500.3171 et seq .; see also Rohlman v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co , 442 Mich 520, 529; 502 NW2d 310 (1993) (“[E] ssentially all accidents are now covered by personal injury protection benefits or the assigned claims plan.”).

15 Note that under the majority’s understanding of the security r equirement, plaintiff in this hypothetical would enjoy limited immunity from tort liability b ecause, according to the majority, plaintiff’s car was one “with respect to which the se curity required by section 3101 was in effect.” MCL 500.3135(3); see also note 5 of this opinion. In other words, unlike most Michigan vehicle owners, who merit this limited imm unity by getting no-fault policies, plaintiff gets immunity while the cost of the injurie s he’s responsible for is spread, through the assigned-claims plan, across other policyholders’ p remiums. The majority now has charted the course for others to do the same.10 indirectly) when “he instructed his father to obtain no-fault i nsurance.” 16 Ante at 18. The majority suggests that plainti ff’s instruction to his father me t the duty to mai ntain security in the same way that a son’s duty to maintain his lawn could be met by the son’s instructing his father to mow the lawn. 17 But the son’s duty i n those circumstance s would not be met if the father mowed only the fat her’s own lawn. Likewise here, the son’s statutory duty to “maintain security” is not met by asking his father to get no-f ault insurance if his father insures only himself. For this reason, it is to me neither her e nor there that plaintiff’s father took out a no-fault policy in r esponse to plaintiff’s instructi on because that policy named the father, not plaintiff. 18 The majority’s approac h to statutory interpretation also gives short shrift to context and purpose. As I read the no -fault act, §§ 3101 and 3113 dove tail with other parts of the act, like the priority scheme; and my reading advances the act’ s purposes, which we recognized in Shavers . The majority’s reading, on the other hand, barely acknowledg es that we’re interpreting a small part of a larger system, let al one contemplates how its reading affects that larger syst em and undermines its purposes. The majority’s approach suggests (albeit implicitly) that neither context nor purpose p lays a role in statutory interpretation. Yet the light thrown by context and purpose ca n cast the text in sharper

16 What, I wonder, stops a risky driver (like one with an OWI con viction) from saving money on insurance premiums by “instructing” a third party “to obtain no-fault insurance”?

17 The majority actually uses the example of a father instructing his son to maintain the lawn. I’ve swapped the father a nd son, to better track the fac ts in this case.

18 In other words, I don’t get caught up, as the majority does, i n whether MCL 500.3101(1) requires plaintiff to have engaged in an “affirmative act,” ante at 18, because even if plaintiff’s instructing his father was an affirmative act, that act didn’t result in plaintiff’s compliance w ith § 3101.11 relief. Indeed, had the majority paused for a moment to consid er the act’s goals, it might have recognized that some of the p remises underlying its decisi on are mistaken.

As explained above, I read the no-fault act as disqualifying an owner from PIP benefits if the owner is injured in his or her own vehicle and no owner (or co-owner) has “maintained security.” But the r ecord doesn’t reveal whether p laintiff’s father, who does have a no-fault policy, is an own er of plaintiff’s car, and so I cannot determine whether plaintiff is disqualified from PI P benefits. For this reason, I favor the Court of Appeals’ resolution—remand to the trial c ourt for further proceedings.

Elizabeth T. Clement

C AVANAGH , J., did not participate in the disposition of this case becau se the Court considered it before she assumed office.