William B. Walker, M.D.

HEALTH SERVICES DIRECTOR

Randall L. Sawyer

CHIEF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OFFICER

Contra Costa

Health Services

Hazardous Materials Programs

4585 Pacheco Boulevard, Suite 100

Martinez, CA 94553-2233

Ph (925) 335-3200

Fax (925) 646-2073

October 28, 2014

OSWER Docket

EPA Docket Center

Mail Code 2822-1T

Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW.

Washington, DC 20460

Attention Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328

Contra Costa County has been implementing accidental release prevention programs 

since 1989. The prevention programs include the California Risk Management and 

Prevention Program (RMPP), the California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) 

Program, and the County’s Industrial Safety Ordinance. The CalARP Program replaced 

the RMPP in 1997. The CalARP Program is the US EPA’s Risk Management Program 

with addition requirements. The County’s Industrial Safety Ordinance expands on the 

CalARP Program. The Industrial Safety Ordinance requires facilities to the following:

• Perform a root cause analysis as part of an incident investigation,

• Include Human Factors as part of operations, maintenance, and Health and 

Safety

• Perform Inherently Safer Systems analyses,

• Perform safety culture assessments, 

• Develop process safety performance indicators with four indicators that will be 

made public, and

• Perform an analysis of the safeguards that are used in a process hazard 

analysis. 

Five engineers audit and oversee compliance and enforcement of the California 

Accidental Release Prevention and the Industrial Safety Ordinance. The number of 

serious accidents at chemical facilities and petroleum refineries has decreased 

significantly since the implementation of the Industrial Safety Ordinance. During the 

1990’s on an average there was a serious accident that occurred in Contra Costa 

County each year. From 1999 to 2012 there was not this type of serious accident. On 

August 6, 2012 there was a major fire at the Chevron Richmond Refinery. There were 

over 15,000 people that sought medical evaluation from health concerns as a result of 
William B. Walker, M.D.

HEALTH SERVICES DIRECTOR

Randall L. Sawyer

CHIEF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OFFICER

Contra Costa

Health Services

Hazardous Materials Programs

4585 Pacheco Boulevard, Suite 100

Martinez, CA 94553-2233

Ph (925) 335-3200

Fax (925) 646-2073

the fire. There has not been another serious accident since August 6, 2012 in Contra 

Costa County.

The engineers reviewed the Request for Information on the proposed changes to the 

Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the 

Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7). The document that is included with this cover letter 

includes comments in response to the questions that were asked for in the Request for 

Information and the comments are arranged under the different section titles from the 

Request for Information. 

Please contact me at (925) 335-3210 or randy.sawyer@hsd.cccounty.us if you have 

any comments or questions.

Sincerely,

Randall L. Sawyer
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

 I. Background

 A. Statutory Authority

 B. Executive Order 13650

 C. EPA Risk Management Program Regulations

 II. Discussion and Request for Data, Information, and Comments

 A. Introduction

 B. Potential Costs and Economic Effects of Regulatory and Policy Changes

 C. Items in OSHA's RFI Relevant to EPA's RMP Regulation

 1. Update the List of Regulated Substances

1) Concerning the severity of any acute adverse health effects: AEGL list includes chemicals with 

acute exposure toxicity and effect on general population. AEGL will also be pertinent in 

determining the toxic end point for the same reason.

2) Some ERPG-2 values have changed since the regulation was developed. AEGLs have gone 

through a very stringent process to develop the different concentrations of concern for different 

chemicals and the EPA should consider using the AEGLs that have been developed at a one 

hour exposure.

 a. Adding Other Toxic or Flammable Substances

1) Concerning the Chemical List, Suggest viewing the CDC website of their list of chemical 

agents of concern: http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlistchem.asp#t

2) EPA should add to the RMP list of regulated toxic and flammable substances

3) Also, consider adding chemicals that are already in CalARP regulations (ethylene 

fluorohydrin, fluoroacetyl chloride, Lewisite, lithium hydride, methyl vinyl ketone, mustard gas, 

nitrogen dioxide, sarin, tabun.

 b. Adding High and/or Low Explosives

1) EPA should reconsider listing explosives on the RMP list

2) In current regulations and practice, the biggest safety gap is with the manufacturing of 

explosives, but there was the fireworks explosion in HI when disposing of fireworks. 

Manufacturing sites may be covered by PSM, but OSHA does not routinely audit facilities 

unless there has been an incident or complaint.

3) High explosives should be covered and low explosives could be covered with a higher 

threshold. 

4) The basis of the TQ should be the estimated pressure wave that could be created and the 

establishing an area that a 1psig overpressure would cover from that quantity of explosive 

material. 

5) RMP regulation should apply to manufacturers of explosives, end users, and/or explosive 

recyclers

6) EPA should consider establishing requirements for safe separation distances between 

explosive materials and public receptors similar to those required by ATF, OSHA and Fire 

Code for separation distances.

 c. Adding Ammonium Nitrate
1) EPA should regulate AN under CAA section 112(r) authority to improve chemical safety 

practices at facilities handling AN.

2) Manufacturing or storage of large amount of AN should be subject to RMP regulations.

3) AN should be regulated as fertilizer, explosives and blasting agents. As discussed before 

OSHA regulates only the process, ATF address the storage and handling. The two agencies 

with jurisdictions lack manpower/time to provide oversight. Inclusion in the RMP plan will 

ensure compliance because of local agencies’ involvement. 

4) The specific requirement that is appropriate for AN is that facility sitting should cover the 

concern of proximity to storage or handling.

5) The benefit of regulating AN under RMP is that the RMP would require practices on 

preventing releases and explosions, while the Safety Data Sheet and reporting would only 

give information that would assist in the response. 

6) The basis of establishing TQ could be as discussed above the equivalent of TNT in 

determining the threshold quantity and the physical form that the AN is being handled. If AN is 

in a solution the threshold quantity may be a lot higher than AN that is being used as an 

explosive.

7) Concerning the storage and managing of AN, all form changes should be covered. If the 

energy of the AN handled is not enough to reach a public receptor, then there would be 

minimum requirement under Program 1.

8) If the amount of AN that farmers store for fertilization reaches above the threshold, then those 

farmers should be covered. AN used as a fertilizer should have a different TQ than AN used 

as an explosive. There could be conditional exemption if the worse case scenario does not 

reach a public receptor.

 d. Adding Reactive Substances and Reactivity Hazards

1) EPA should add reactive chemicals to the list of RMP-covered chemicals in 40 CFR 68.130. 

EPA should investigate how well TCPA is working and if it is working then use TCPA.

Otherwise, list known reactive and water reactive chemicals and then require handlers to

know the exothermic energy that could be generated from a reaction from a chemical

process. If the energy from an exothermic reaction could reach a certain energy level the

process that has that reaction would be included.

 e. Adding Other Categories of Substances

1) EPA should consider adding organic peroxides Class I-III of NFPA 432, oxidizers, 

combustible dusts, flammable solids, or other additional types of chemicals to the RMP list

2) Flammable solids could be listed in RMP. One of the concerns from flammable solids other 

than thermal or pressure wave is the byproducts of combustion, which may go much farther 

than an overpressure. 

3) Dust that is formed from handling organic material, including plastics and specific metal dusts

such as aluminum and magnesium, should be included in an EPA’s list of combustible dusts.

4) Material that could produce dust at a quantity where an explosion could occur then RMP 

should include the handling where dust could be produced, such as grinding, cutting, handling 
of fine particulates, etc. When determining when a material should be added because of 

potential dust explosion the accident history in a particular industry should be considered, 

such as grain silos, sugar refineries, etc.	In Contra Costa County there was a major explosion 

where a worker was killed and there was a major impact to the surrounding community at a 

facility that recycle computer equipment. The dust was formed when cutting plastics and the 

dust from the cutting operation was being collected in a dust collector. The ducting going to a 

dust collector from a cutting operation a dust explosion occurred.

 f. Removing Certain Substances From the List or Raising Their Threshold Quantity

1) The 6 substances for which the Agency has not received any RMP report should not be 

considered as a criterion to delist the chemicals. The chemicals may now being handling the 

TQ and if the chemical is not listed then a company may increase the amount of the chemical 

being handled or the chemical may be used in the future.

 g. Lowering the Threshold Quantity for Substances Currently on the List

1) In general, TQs are at least one order of magnitude too high. If the intent of the risk 

management program is to reduce the probability of an accidental release from causing 

immediate harm to the public or the environment, then the TQ and the distance to the nearest 

public receptor should be more interconnected. For example, according to RMP*Comp a 

release of 500 pounds of hydrogen sulfide could travel 1.1 miles to its toxic endpoint. With this 

example, how protective is EPA’s 10,000-pound TQ for H2S if public receptors are less than a 

mile away and the process does not exceed the TQ?

2) The example of TQ being too high is that Chlorine is at 2500 pounds in RMP and 1500 

pounds by OSHA. Chorine’s TQ should be lowered to at least1500 pounds. This may be too 

high, since 150 lb. cylinders of chlorine may be used in very close proximity to the public at a 

swimming pool.

 2. Additional Risk Management Program Elements

1) Clarification of PHA and hazard review revalidation requirements will be beneficial..

2) Concerning the expanding of the scope of the RMP regulation to require additional 

management system: Senior management should be monitoring leading and lagging metrics. 

A section of the regulations should state the management systems that should be used and 

what is to be achieved by using the management systems. Process metrics is a means to 

determine how well a stationary source accident prevention program is working and where 

improvements can and should be made. This management of facilities should establish 

metrics to be achieved, including specific metrics that could be reported in the RMP Submit. 

This section would include communication of the prevention program and how this 

communication would flow up, down, and across the organizations. This section should 

include setting the responsibilities of the different elements and the overall responsibility of all 

of the elements. This section should include how the facility is achieving an ongoing review of 

the programs and how to improve the programs and the implementation of these programs. 

The regulations should include a Process Safety Culture Assessment, which could be a 

separate section or included in the management section. If a stationary source has good 

process safety culture, then the implementation of the different element would go beyond 

what is required, there would be good communication throughout the organization, and there 

would be a means of continuing the improving the prevention elements. The requirements of 

the accidental release prevention programs should be part of how the stationary source 

performs its duties. 

3) Leading indicators need to be designed to give an indication of problems or deterioration in 

key safety systems early enough that corrective action may be taken to avoid a process 
safety incident. Examples of leading metrics include: leadership involvement with line safety 

meetings; manual interventions to stop work/process for safety concerns; assigned action 

items not completed on time (e.g., from PHAs, compliance audits, incident investigations, 

etc.); overdue operating procedure reviews; equipment failure upon testing/inspection; 

overdue temporary MOCs; overdue training; spurious trips of independent protection functions 

(IPFs); API 754 Tier IV LOPCs; process running in bypass; disabled safety systems. Once the 

workforce knows a metric is being watched, the frequency of the issue or its reporting may 

drop in frequency. A metric that is frequently zero is not a good metric.

4) Concerning the safety culture assessment in RMP facilities, If a safety culture assessment is 

done well, there is the ability to remove blinders that a stationary source may have and to see 

where improvements can be made. This can be done in a proactive way instead of reactive.

5) Stop Work Authority means if employees were empowered in a way that they knew that they 

could stop operations if there is an unsafe situation, major accidents would be prevented. If 

this had been done at the Chevron Richmond Refinery in 2012, the accident would not have 

occurred.

6) Other management system elements suggests performing safeguard protection analyses; 

allow only one PHA revalidation between full PHAs; defining what must be performed in a 

PHA revalidation; limit ranking-away a serious consequence (for PHA risk ranking) just 

because something is unlikely to occur; requiring MOCs for organizational changes.

7) In the existing RMP management system, requiring a hierarchy of control analysis should be 

done with an emphasis to implement inherently safe technologies to the greatest extent

feasible. Root cause analysis should be done as part of the incident investigation, the PHA 

team should have personnel that understand the different damage mechanisms that could 

occur, damage mechanism reviews should be done as part of the mechanical integrity 

element and pre-startup reviews should be done prior to starting up a modified process.

8) EPA should work closely with trade associations and technical groups, such as the Center for 

chemical Process Safety, in setting up guidance and what should be required as part of the 

safety evaluation and how to implement and regulate the safety evaluation.

 3. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable Recognized and Generally Accepted Good

Engineering Practices

1) Concerning evaluating updates, not every industry or trade group publication should be 

considered RAGAGEP. Major publications like API should be considered RAGAGEP for 

petroleum refineries and even then the API recommended practices may not be RAGAGEP 

for an example API’s recommended practice on fatigue. New updates to API standards or 

recommended practices should be reviewed and incorporated by petroleum refineries as soon 

as practicable. How soon is a good question? One facility identified it takes about 3 years to 

review, plan and begin implementing a new API standard.

2) RAGAGEP should be included in the PHA revalidations, MOC requirements, writing of 

operating procedures, and incident investigations

 4. Extend Mechanical Integrity Requirements To Cover Any Safety-Critical Equipment

1) EPA should amend the mechanical integrity provisions of the RMP rule to explicitly cover all 

safety critical process equipment.
2) Expanding the scope of § 68.73 to explicitly cover the integrity of all equipment critical to 

process safety will assist in the prevention of accidental releases.

3) The regulations should require that the stationary sources determine where different types of 

equipment or systems should be installed. This may be a situation where RAGAGEP may be 

used. It may not be practicable to encompass all of the different opportunities to list different 

equipment or systems.

4) Uncontrolled emergency shut down should be addressed in the facility’s PHA or hazard review 

along with the review of the adequacy of safeguards. Another suggestion is to not allow or limit 

how facilities perform risk ranking in the PHA. High consequence, low probability events must 

have minimum safeguards.

5) Mechanical Integrity is the most complex subject covered by the RMP rule although the rule is 

short on specifics. Expand the rule to clarify: list of equipment covered (fire protection systems, 

boilers, heat exchanger, heaters/furnaces, emergency shutdown systems, SIS, electrical 

power, critical utilities, structural components, secondary containment, test/measuring and 

evaluation equipment, employee alarms, portable gas detectors, control room building 

ventilation systems, cathodic protection, lifting equipment (cranes, JLG), stacks/chimneys/flare 

towers, any device critical to process safety, communication devices); written rationale for 

decisions made to include or exclude equipment from the MI program; define inspection, test, 

and preventive maintenance plan or procedure (ITPM) for all equipment; follow ISA S84.01 for 

emergency shutdown system safety instrumented systems; written procedures for ITPM and 

corrective maintenance; facilities must publish their ITPM schedules to the workforce and follow 

that schedule; require that each ITPM describe what is RAGAGEP for that equipment; changes 

to ITPMs only through MOC process; specialized training and certifications; decommissioning; 

verifying repurposed/used equipment adequacy, etc.

 5. Require Owners and Operators To Manage Organizational Changes

1) An MOC should be required when there are changes in operations, including operators, 

operation supervisors and management, and process/production engineers; the portion of 

Health and Safety that implements process safety; emergency response personnel; equipment 

and piping inspectors; and maintenance, including mechanical and instrumentation. The MOC 

should be implemented when one of the following three situations are triggered: 1) 

organization structure (roles and responsibilities, reporting structure); 2) management 

practices (hours in a shift, days of operation, budget; 3) personnel changes (replace unit 

manager).

2) Concerning the examples of organizational changes, these should all be included, as any one 

of the changes will adversely affect the process safety. Examples include longer work hours,

reduced budget or lack of experienced manager/supervisors/operators. Suggest that a MOOC 

screening process be required to document that organizational changes were evaluated to 

determine whether the formal MOOC process was needed. When making personnel changes, 

the experience, expertise, should be assessed as to not decrease the overall safe operations.

3) The MOC of organizational change should be done by teams that would evaluate the impacts 

of the changes on process safety and the teams should include management and employee

representatives (selected by the unions if the facility is under an union contract). The process 

must be documented. The baseline or existing situation (e.g., complete list of duties) for all 

positions impacted needs to include those duties officially assigned and all those acquired over 

time. Criteria for rejecting a proposed change should be established. Time sequencing 

analysis is useful for evaluating whether certain tasks are time critical and may need 

equipment automation to make the proposed change work. The MOOC analysis and 
implementation of recommendations must be performed before the organizational change 

takes place. For non-union facility, employee representative should be included. In the 

assessment of time sequencing, must include normal operations and in emergency situations.

 6. Require Third-Party Compliance Audits

1) Concerning compliance audits: Documentation requirements for compliance audits should 

also be expanded to list all areas reviewed. This includes specific documentation that 

identifies how thoroughly each RMP program was looked at (e.g., blank questionnaires to be 

used) as well as sufficient documentation (e.g., completed questionnaires) maintained that 

supports which RMP programs were found to be working well. 

2) In concept a third-party performing makes sense but in reality there is a concern on the 

qualification of the third party performing the audit. There may be third party auditors that 

perform an excellent evaluation of a company’s process safety practices but there may be 

third auditor audits that have low bids and do very poor evaluations. If there was a means to 

certified process safety auditors and a means to evaluate the auditors, a third-party audit 

may work. Another advantage of having the regulated source performing their own audits, is 

that regulated source will learn firsthand on where changes need to be made

3) If the requirement to perform compliance audits by third parties the EPA should revise §68.58 

and §68.79 to require owners and operators to use compliance auditors (internal or thirdparty) with certain minimum credentials. For general program auditing it could include 

specific RMP/PSM auditing training coursework and/or CSP (certified safety professional) 

and/or a minimum number of years of experience. For “experts” (e.g., mechanical integrity) 

could use years of experience in related industry. There should be additional requirements 

for the compliance audits to have a minimum thoroughness. Asking 1 or 2 questions for a 

topic is not sufficient.

4) The owner/operators should put a plan on addressing how they will address the findings and 

recommendations of the third-party auditors, including a schedule of when the items will be 

addressed. There should be a means where the owner/operator determine that a 

recommendation or finding is not correct and document why they believe that to be so. This 

documentation should be complete and should enough to satisfy an EPA auditor.

5) Concerning the timeframe for addressing the findings from third-party auditors, should be 

addressed as soon as practicable, maximum 1 year particularly if safety related. Address 

issues as soon as practicable. Require facilities to post on their website, or other publically 

available locations, in a conspicuous location the rationale for not addressing each finding 

within 2 years after the compliance audit was started (start date not report date).

6) A full compliance audit is not needed as part of an incident investigation but the 

investigations should look at where changes need to be made to the different prevention 

elements and management systems that failed and what improvements should be made to 

the appropriate prevention element and management system. A root cause analysis should 

identify the management system failure(s) and implement the appropriate corrective actions.

7) EPA should clarify §68.58 and §68.79 to explicitly indicate that all covered processes must 

receive a full compliance audit at least every three years.

8) The identity of the auditor (e.g., in-house, contractor, professionally-certified, party licensed 

by EPA) does affect the credibility of the audit for potentially impacted communities. The 

most credible is a compliance audit that is performed by a third-party auditor that is approved 

by EPA. 
 7. Effects of OSHA PSM Coverage on RMP Applicability

1) RMP-covered municipal water and wastewater plants that are not eligible for Program 1 

should always be subject to RMP Program 3, regardless of whether or not they are located in 

a state with a Federally-delegated OSHA program, because the potential impact of a release 

of chlorine or sulfur dioxide could be large and impact a large area of the public. There 

should be the most stringent prevention requirements when handling these chemicals. Many 

times water treatment plants are located near residential areas. To protect public due to their

proximity to residences. 

2) If OSHA restricts its retail exemption to facilities selling regulated substances in small 

containers, then EPA should eliminate RMP Program 2. If there is a possibility of a release 

that could have an impact on the public, the stationary source should have the most stringent 

programs in place to prevent such a release from occurring.

3) Eliminating Program 2 would put in place more stringent requirement for operators that do 

not always understand the impact of their chemicals that they handle

4) Concerning the appropriate level of protection, the US has not placed a value on human life 

like the Netherlands “Yellow Book”. Nevertheless, the toxic and flammable endpoint values 

in the RMP rule have established a limit, or almost an outer bound, that says accidents that 

produce these impacts are not good and should be minimized. EPA should expand their rule 

to link TQs and endpoint values to include facilities into the program regardless of how much 

material they handle if a release above the toxic or flammable endpoint could reach a public 

receptor. If not, eliminating Program 2 may encourage some facilities to switch chemicals or 

handle them in lower amounts so they do not have to comply with Program 3 requirements. If 

a facility does eliminate or switch chemicals to be out of the program, that would be 

consistent with the intent of the risk management program to reduce the probability of an 

accidental release from causing immediate harm to the public or the environment. If a facility 

remains subject to the RMP rule under Program 3 requirements, that means they would need 

to implement additional safety programs, which also meets the intent of the risk management 

program.

 D. Additional Items for Which EPA Requests Information

 1. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis

1) As of June 2014, Contra Costa County has increased when Inherently Safer System are 

required to be implemented IST has expanded to include that all processes are reviewed for 

IST, recommended actions from an incident investigation, and when performing an MOC.

2) CSB found that the use of a safer material, such as high-chromium steel, would have 

prevented the accelerated corrosion and failure of carbon steel involved in the equipment 

rupture at the Tesoro Refinery in Anacortes, Washington in 2010, which resulted in an 

explosion and fire that killed seven employees. [50] CSB also cited the failure to use more 

corrosion resistant high-chromium steel as a factor in the 2012 Chevron Refinery accident in 

Richmond, CA, which released hydrocarbons that ignited, endangering 19 employees. 

Neither of these is inherently safer, since neither reduces the hazard. The upgrading to 

metallurgy that is more resistant to corrosion will reduce the probability of the release and 

reduce the overall risk.

3) Concerning integration of the safer technologies and alternatives analysis into the PHA: This 

should be incorporated in the covered process design/construction phase. Unless the PHA is 

during the design phase for a new process, there will likely be little traction in significantly 

revising a process to incorporate inherently safer design. Instead, most PHAs will result in 

risk reduction measures like changing pipe metallurgy to reduce the impacts of corrosion. 
4) EPA should require a safer alternatives options analysis either as a new prevention program 

element, as part of the existing PHA/Hazard Review element, or as a separate new 

requirement under CAA section 112(r), and A separate new requirement. Safer alternatives 

should also be considered in developing recommended actions from an incident investigation 

and when making a major change in the MOC process.

5) California is drafting regulations that would require petroleum refineries to perform a Hierarch 

of Hazard Control Analysis. This would be an analysis that would require a facility to 

implement inherently safer alternatives whenever feasible and to the greatest extent feasible. 

If an inherent safer solution is not applicable or even when it is, the stationary source should 

look at reducing the risk by implementing passive, active, and procedural means to do so. 

The analysis would move from inherent to passive to active to procedural. Hierarchy of 

Hazard Control is defined as: “Hierarchy of Hazard Control” means a system used to 

eliminate or minimize a hazard or to reduce the risk presented by a hazard, and which ranks 

prevention and control measures from the most effective to the least effective, as described 

in Appendix B (Appendix B is the diagram that is used in the CCPS book on inherent safety 

(Figure 2).

6) .Hazard prevention and control measures ranked from most effective to least effective are: 

(1) First Order Inherent Safety: Prevents a major incident by eliminating the hazard(s) 

altogether. Examples include eliminating a hazardous chemical or reducing high-pressure or 

high-temperature systems to ambient pressures and temperatures (2) Second Order Inherent 

Safety: Reducing the severity of a hazard or the likelihood of a release without the use of 

add-on safety devices. Examples include operating at lower temperatures, quantities, and/or 

pressures, or using a chemical with lower toxicity, lower vapor pressure, or lower 

flammability. (3) Independent Layers of Protection (ILPs) means hazard prevention and 

control measures, in priority order, to eliminate or minimize a hazard. 

7) When a facility does an analysis to determine if a safer alternative exists for their particular 

process, stationary sources should at a minimum do a literature search and in some cases, 

lab work, and should look into industry standards, manufacturer guidelines, and chemical 

compatibility.

8) RMP national databases can be structured to promote the exchange of information both with 

industry and other stakeholders.

9) Ideally risk tolerance criteria would be developed that would make it possible to see if the 

change would meet the tolerance level and be feasible to implement.

10)Concerning incentives, Some facilities may be able to handle other materials than what 

subjected them to the RMP rule. If safer alternatives are found that are not covered under the 

RMP rule, the incentive could be exemption from the RMP rule in the future.

11)EPA should require an analysis to be done using tools such as the IST checklist or 

incorporating guidewords in a hazard and operability study.

12)When determining if the implementation of an inherent safer technology, the stationary 

source should determine the risk that is associated with the implementation of IST vs. the risk 

that exists or other means to reduce the overall risk.

13)The benefits of such programs in risk reduction or process safety for the facilities covered 

under these requirements is that the overall hazards in Contra Costa County have been 

reduced. Reducing the hazard will reduce the impact if there is a release.
14)IST can be used for many processes and stationary sources. In Contra Costa County, all 

wastewater plants have eliminated the use of chlorine and sulfur dioxide by using sodium 

hypochlorite and sodium bisulfide or using UV. At the minimum high hazard facilities should 

be required to implement IST. Chemical processing plants and petroleum refineries should 

be included as a high hazard facility if the facilities use a subset of the list of chemicals that 

are considered more toxic, explosive, and more volatile. This list could include chlorine, 

hydrogen fluoride, phosgene, ammonium nitrate, etc. As a start, EPA could expand on the 

work performed by the DHS and CFATS and identify any facility subject to Tiers 1-4 are 

considered High Risk and must implement IST

15)The concern of cost is a barrier for industry to adopt safer alternatives. The Agency should 

provide special recognition to companies that implement safer alternatives, especially if the 

IST is published so that other companies can use the same technology.

16)One incentive is for facilities that implement a meaningful IST, EPA would do compliance 

audit and work with the facility in coming to compliance in lieu of fines unless the failure to 

implement the prevention programs are egregious. EPA can also modify its practice for 

issuing fines and penalties to facilities for them to place all or a portion of the fine into IST

17)EPA should have a role in approving such analyses or plans when a facility determines that 

an IST is not feasible that they document the reasons for their conclusions to the satisfaction 

of EPA. However, EPA should not be involved with “approving” any safer alternative. If an 

accident still occurs or something does not work right, EPA does not want to be in the 

position of potentially being culpable.

18)Disclosure options may be difficult to do because of the confidential business information that 

may be used as part of the analysis. It is possible to have the stationary sources report the 

IST that have been incorporated and when an IST was not implemented because it was 

determined to be infeasible and the justification to support that conclusion. It is extremely 

difficult to share enough information with anyone who was not deeply involved with a 

thorough IST evaluation to adequately do it justice. The intent of doing IST evaluations is to 

get the right people involved. Regulators may have an interest to observe the process, but 

the key is to observe. Safer options implemented could be summarized annually on the 

facility’s website for the public.

19)Oversight will also be difficult and likely inconsistent. EPA inspectors should be trained on the 

concepts of IST and how to audit a facility’s IST evaluation. If third-party compliance audits 

are required, EPA could require that those doing the audit have met EPA’s IST training 

criteria and look at IST. In general, any oversight should be focused on does the facility have 

a process for performing IST evaluations that meets the regulatory requirements, documents 

the analyses in reports, complies with the feasibility criteria established, and implements the 

chosen options. Determining whether IST analyses are “thorough” and “decisions are 

appropriate” will be like counting grains of sand on a beach.

 2. Emergency Drills To Test a Source's Emergency Response Program or Plan

1) Some RMP-regulated facilities are currently exercising their emergency response plans. The 

petroleum refineries and some of the chemical plants are doing drills and exercises and 

coordinating with the local response agencies. Contra Costa County works with the different 

facilities in performing exercises and drills and with other local emergency response agencies.

2) Contra Costa County and Solano counties have a number of petroleum refineries and chemical 

plants and has formed a mutual aid agreement through the local Community Awareness 

Emergency Response (CAER) group. Guidelines were developed for the Petro-Chemical 
Mutual Aid stakeholders to perform drills, assess emergency supply readiness, activations, and 

share lessons learned.

3) The exercise/drill program should include internal (emergency response, notifications, and 

evacuation) and external elements (involving community and federal and state responders, as 

appropriate). The elements should include checking the communications between the facility 

and external responders; what roles would be played by the different response agencies, 

testing the Incident Command System, and how each organization would participate in ICS.

4) A variety of scenarios should be performed with a variety of personnel. Operating units should 

perform monthly tabletop drills for each crew (sometimes sitting around the control room and 

sometimes going out in the plant and hanging tags on equipment they pretend to operate). 

These monthly drills should be documented and shared with all crews for learning potential. 

Other drills could be performed quarterly and include individual factions of an actual response 

(e.g., making internal communications, plant evacuations, opening the facility’s EOC, 

assembling emergency response team, suiting up, practice installing a “A”, “B”, “C” kits, 

notifying agencies, activation or simulated activation of emergency shutdown systems or safety 

systems (e.g., deluges), following select emergency shutdown procedures). Larger drills could 

be done annually and involve multiple disciplines including invitations to local emergency 

response agencies.

5) The drills/exercises should be performed at least once every three years. 

6) The stationary source personnel and outside response agencies should be involved in the 

exercise program. 

7) The management team should be an integral part of the drill. Metrics should be kept for each 

drill and discussed at management meetings to assess participation level and preparedness.

8) The designated official responsible for coordinating the exercises and drills will be different for 

the location of the stationary sources. Language may be something like the most appropriate 

response agency. Local emergency response agencies should be involved since if it is an 

event that impacts the public, they will be involved.

9) Program 1 facilities (and Program 2/Program 3 facilities that do not respond to accidental 

releases with their own employees) should be required to conduct external exercises with 

community responders and test notification procedures. Program 2 and Program 3 facilities 

whose employees respond to accidental releases should conduct both internal and external 

exercises.

10)The findings and recommendations of the exercise/drill should be documented and an action to 

address these. The documentation should be complete within one month of the final debrief of 

the exercise.

11)Stationary source operators should be required to document and address lessons learned and 

recommendations when they respond to an actual accidental release.

12)Information such as the date of the most recent exercise involving the emergency response 

plan should be required to be reported to EPA in the facility's RMP.

13)It is a lot less expensive to require an exercise/drill program for all or a subset of RMP facilities 

than an unprepared facility having an incident.
 3. Automated Detection and Monitoring for Releases of Regulated Substances

1) Facilities should be required to install air monitoring equipment or sensors to detect releases of 

RMP regulated substances, or the conditions that could lead to such a release. 

2) The systems should provide for continuous detection and monitoring. 

3) In many situations, facility monitoring can be done with alarms back to a location that is 

appropriate for the facility.

4) In most situation, an automated mechanism should not notify, alert and warn the local 

responders and surrounding public of an incident included as part of any detection and 

monitoring system requirement, because of the possibility of false alarm. 

5) The advantage of continuous monitoring is that it is continuous and can be 24 hours per day. 

A third-party alarm agency is dependent on the third party determining when a leak is 

occurring.

6) To appropriately detect thresholds should be established for activating alarms and/or alerts.

The levels should be established for the facility to react to an alarm before a potential health 

impact to the surrounding community. The levels should be established for each chemical of 

concern and could use AEGLs Level 1 criteria or 1/10 IDLH or odor thresholds.

7) The frequency to monitor equipment or sensor is already covered under the RMP rule under MI 

or ER. Testing and calibration should be done in accordance with the specific equipment 

manufacturer’s recommendations or more frequently. The tests should be documented once 

per month, including the date of the test and the results of the test, and also if any actions need 

to be taken to correct any problems with the equipment and what was done and when 

completed. The record of those documents should be maintained for two years. Also calibrate 

according to equipment manufacturer; annual third party certification. If equipment is covered 

under the MI program, which it should be, all test and inspections should be maintained for the 

life of the process. A case could be made to only require records for 5 years for frequent (daily) 

inspections

 4. Additional Stationary Source Location Requirements

1) It would be good to consider siting before new facilities or expansions infringes on buffer zones 

in a community. It is beneficial to have buffer zones for highly toxic or flammable facility to 

allow for emergency response before communities are impacted. 

2) All Program 3 sites should be required to follow API 752 and 753 even if they are not 

petroleum refineries. Nevertheless, most siting criteria includes methods for assessing 

overpressure and toxic impacts to employees, which is more suited to OSHA. EPA RMP was 

written to address potential impacts to public and environmental receptors. New criteria would 

need to be developed to assess this.

 5. Compliance With Emergency Response Program Requirements in Coordination With Local

Responders

1) In Contra Costa the Hazardous Materials Programs are aware of the emergency response 

capability of the different RMP facilities but coordination has not always occurred with other 

emergency response agencies. Contra Costa Hazardous Materials Programs are capable of 

responding properly to such events at RMP facilities. We visit our RMP facilities at our 

jurisdiction. We conduct emergency drills at large RMP facilities at least every three years. 

We believe that RMP facilities should generally respond to emergencies using their own 
employees, but there are times it would not be safe for a facility to respond because not 

having the appropriate number of available employees. EPA in general clarifies what is 

necessary for RMP facilities to adequately coordinate their emergency response plan with the 

community emergency response plan, with such language that a non-responding agency is to 

ensure that an adequate response from an outside agency can be done and that outside 

response agency signs off on the plan that would require response from an outside agency.

2) There are certain substances or types of facilities that present particular response challenges 

for local authorities, including facilities that handle specifically large quantities of highly 

hazardous materials such as hydrogen fluoride and facilities that have the possibility of an 

uncontrolled reaction or fire.

3) If public responders are not capable of responding to a particular type of chemical or release 

event at an RMP-regulated facility, the owner or operator of the facility should be required to 

provide for an effective response, either with the facility's own employees, response 

contractors, a mutual aid agreement with nearby facilities, or some other means.

 6. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements

1) Incidents that meet the API and ACC reporting criteria should be investigated and incidents that 

could have met that criteria under slightly different circumstances.

2) A specific time frame for incident investigations to be completed would benefit overall safety. As 

to time frames, some of the refineries in Contra Costa County have corporate requirements to 

complete all investigations within 30 to 60 days. Exceptions can be granted for large events. 

There are challenges and limitations to completing an incident investigation within a specified 

timeframe. It may be appropriate that a specific time be required that could be changed by 

documented justification. Six months in many cases is enough time.

3) There are benefits from requiring that investigations must be performed even in cases where 

the owner/operator elects to decommission the process involved, where the process is 

destroyed in the incident, or where a facility determines there were no actual or potential off-site 

consequences, because there is almost always lessons that can be learned that can be used at 

other process units at the facility or other facility sites, or by industry in general.

4) Use the API and ACC criteria for reporting incidents to modify the definition of “catastrophic 

release” assist in addressing the concerns regarding the appropriate scope of incidents that 

require investigations.

5) A modification of the accident history reporting requirements to reflect a broader range of 

incidents being investigated would assist in disseminating lessons learned across industry.

6) In most cases, there would be overkills for EPA required facilities to have incidents or near 

misses to conduct a full compliance audit under § 68.58 and § 68.79. A thorough incident 

investigation including a root cause analysis will find the management systems that failed and 

develop a plan to address the deficiencies. 

7) It is appropriate for facilities to share the results of accident investigations with the local 

community or alternatively a summary of the accident, and its root cause. Regulated facilities 

should be required to post summaries of their incident investigations for large events on their 

own website or other means to share information with the public. Information to include within 

the summary includes: introduction; scope of investigation; investigation team makeup; 

description of the incident, including on-site and off-site affects; brief description of the process 

involved; facts, including a time line; causal factor analysis, concluding with citing of the direct 

cause, contributing causes, and root causes; recommendations; justification for not 
implementing recommendations, if any; schedule for implementing recommendations; and 

glossary (if needed)

 7. Worst Case Release Scenario Quantity Requirements for Processes Involving Numerous Small

Vessels Stored Together

1) The worst case release quantities should include the sum of the containers within one storage 

area of the process. Revising the worst-case scenario quantity determination requirement in 

this manner would better represent the true worst-case scenario for such processes.

2) This change would promote stronger process safety controls and help prevent accidents.

3) The types/kinds of the vessels that should be covered should not be considered, nor is the size 

of containers subject to the aggregation requirement.

4) There should be a specific distance between vessels established in order to consider them as 

grouped together for purposes of worst-case scenario calculation. If a single event could 

potentially impact the area. This could include an earthquake where the storage building fails 

and all of the contents in the building are impacted. It could also determine the distance of 

separation that is needed in case the initiating event could have a direct impact of any vessel 

in the area.

5) The WCS should not include facilities that are interconnected by pipes if that is the only criteria 

used.

 8. Public Disclosure of Information To Promote Regulatory Compliance and Improve Community

Understanding of Chemical Risks

1) EPA should amend the RMP regulation to require RMP-regulated facilities to post chemical 

hazard-related information on their Web sites, at least a subset of this information such as 

RMP chemical names, chemical quantities, executive summaries, release notification reports, 

accident history. However, misuse of information could be a probability.

2) Requiring facilities to make this information available on the company Web site would promote 

improved regulatory compliance, because the more willing a facility is to be open and 

transparent the greater that company is willing to address issues that relate to safety.

3) Facilities should not post P&IDs or PHAs for the process. The executive summary should be 

okay as long as it does not include the off-site consequence analysis.

4) Posting the RMP executive summary on a Web site may cause facility owner/operators to 

remove important information from the executive summary. So the regulations would have to 

be written to address this concern. EPA does need to better define the contents of an 

executive summary in order to allay security concerns.

5) The incident investigation and root cause analyses of incidents that raised community concern 

should be made publicly available.

 9. Threshold Quantities and Off-Site Consequence Analysis Endpoints for Regulated Substances Based

on Acute Exposure Guideline Level Toxicity Values

1) Revising the RMP rule to incorporate AEGL-2 and ERPG-2 values (when an AEGL is not 

available), as the basis for TQs and toxic endpoints would make the RMP rule more protective
of human health and the environment. It would result in significant changes to the universe of 

RMP-regulated facilities due to potential changes in TQs, if that facility is an RMP facility 

because of a toxic chemical. Facilities with toxics will be mostly affected, if that change does

occur.

2) 1-hour exposure time should be used if the AEGL is used to determine the TQs and/or toxic 

endpoints. 1 hour would make it consistent with ERPGs if an AEGL has not been established 

and an ERPG has been established.

3) If AEGLs have not been established for a chemical, ERPG values should be used instead if 

they exist. If no ERPG value exists, an LOC based on the IDLH value should be used instead if 

it exists.

4) For an alternate method for establishing an equivalent LOC for those chemicals not having an 

AEGL or ERPG that will result in an appropriate TQ, Use the original method when the RMP 

was initiated - mammalian toxicity data using a methodology described in Appendix D of the 

Technical Guidance for Hazard Analysis, Emergency Planning for Hazardous Substances.

5) For a short-term release of ten minutes – worst-case scenarios could look at 10, 30, and 60 

minutes exposures with the one that would impact the largest area being the worst-case

scenario. For releases for 60 minutes – a 30-minute and a 1 and 4 hour exposures should be 

considered.

6) AEGL 2 would be where protective actions such as shelter-in-place or evacuation may be 

needed and as such the toxic endpoint should be based on AEGL 2

 10. Program 3 NAICS Codes Based on RMP Accident History Data

1) The new set of code should not eliminate industry that has high potential regardless of history 

of release, and the new set of codes should contain the most accident and the industry 

sectors that show the accidents with the greatest impact to the public.

2) The agency should take into account the number of sources, the severity of the reported 

accidents, and a ratio of the number of reported accidents and the number of sources in a 

category, in selecting updated Program 3 NAICS codes.

3) Would prefer to add more NAICS than to delete any from the original list of data analysis. 

RMP data should include accidents that have occurred from non-RMP facilities such as dust 

explosions and reactive chemical accidents.

4) The original NAICS codes should continue to be included, because facilities with toxic will be 

affected. These industries have already developed the prevention elements to be compliant 

as a Program 3 source. If they were then only required to the Program 2, it would lessen their 

accidental release protection.

5) It should not cause confusion within the regulated community to change the list of NAICS 

codes for which Program 3 is required. 

 11. The “Safety Case” Regulatory Model

1) NRC has nearly 4000 employees. Assuming similar math, EPA and OSHA would need to 

employ more employees (29% more) than the total number of stationary sources subject to 
the requirements. The Safety Case regime as implemented in Great Britain, as I understand 

it, would require about 1500 employees for just the petroleum refineries with many having 

degrees in chemical engineering or other related engineering discipline. This would require 

that US EPA and OSHA to need many more employees to implement the safety case regime 

for petroleum refineries and this is not taking into consideration the many chemical facilities.

2) US EPA should look at what are the best practices from the safety case regime and look to 

see if it could be implemented in the existing regulatory regime. This could include the 

concept of ALARP and the RMP include how their implementation of RMP will reduce the 

possibility of accidents to the greatest extent feasible. If it is decided that the safety case 

regime is to be implemented, then high-risk facilities are the facilities that it would be most 

applicable.

 12. Streamlining RMP Requirements

1) To simplify the process of determining whether the RMP rule applies to particular facilities, do 

not limit the determination of TQ of the chemicals to a process but to the complete facility. 

The complete facility should be subject to RMP if any one process is subject

.

2) Other potential revisions include expanding on a previous comment, once a process is subject 

to the RMP rule, every process would be subject to the highest program level on-site. If a 

facility has one process subject to program 3 and two processes subject program 2 or 1, then 

all processes are subject to program 3. 

3) If the CEO was required to sign off on the RMP, there would, in most cases, be more an 

emphasis of implementing the required program. Especially if the CEO is signing off that the 

implementation of the different programs would reduce the possibility of an incident to the 

greatest extent feasible.

4) The Program 2 level should be eliminated but a new level should be added to the high-risk 

facilities that would have additional elements, such as requirement of hierarchy of control 

analysis, safety culture analysis, a detailed management system that include process safety 

performance metrics, expansion of human factors, and requiring that a root cause analysis be 

included as part of the incident investigation. Also management of organizational change.

5) More emphasis on the accident prevention program should be placed on making procedures 

accurate. Most seasoned operators do not read each procedure as closely as they should 

since they “know” what they need to do. Walking down a procedure with an experienced 

operator may reveal many inaccuracies in the written steps even though the procedure has 

been certified current and accurate every year. The operating procedure element should be 

clarified to specifically identify what is an operating procedure. Many facilities use written 

procedures, job aids, call cards, checklists, and a number of other ways to identify a list of 

tasks to perform. Also, facilities should be required to evaluate every task performed to 

determine whether it needs a written operating procedure, or one of the items described 

above. MOC should include the accepted means to inform/train all affected personnel prior to 

startup (e.g., is email notification acceptable, what if the employee does not read the email 

before working on the process; how to inform personnel away on medical leave or temporary 

assignment; can a facility inform current shift before startup and then inform other crews of 

the change as they come to work?) The requirements for doing PSSR should be modified to 

simply say if the change triggered a change in PSI then a PSSR must be performed. Could 

define minor and major changes to streamline the PSSR process. Employee participation 

should be expanded to say that employees and their representatives should assist in the 

ongoing implementation of the RMP elements.
6) PSSR should be clarified for the timing for training of each employee prior to introduction of a 

regulated substance. If a change is imminent, it should be allowable that the training of other 

crewmembers be conducted as soon as they report to work, and the change is allowed to be 

implemented after the initial training of the affected employees. However, the PSSR should 

not be allowed to be considered complete until all affected crewmembers have been 

documented to receive the training. A PSSR should be required for all process start-up after 

major maintenance work or a turnaround even if there are no MOCs associated. This PSSR 

do not have to verify training but must assure positive materials and process and equipment is 

in accordance with design before introduction of regulated substance.