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Special Report 187 June 2007

United States Institute of Peace

Special Report

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions .

Contents 

Introduction 2

Sistani and the Najaf Hawza 3

Sistani’s Transnational Network 5

Sistani and the Transition to a Democratic Iraq 8

Sistani and the Iraqi Constitution 11

Sistani and the Post-December 2005 Elections 13

Post-Sistani Iraq: Who Will Succeed Sistani? 17

The Younger Sistani 18

Conclusion and Recommendations 19

About the Report

Based on historical analysis and personal interviews with a 

number of aides and representatives of the grand ayatollah 

in Iran and Iraq since 2005, this report examines the role 

of Ayatollah Ali Hussaini Sistani in the democratization of 

post-Ba‘athist Iraq. 

Babak Rahimi was a senior fellow at the United States 

Institute of Peace in 2005 and 2006. He is currently an 

assistant professor of Iranian and Islamic studies at the 

University of California, San Diego. A specialist in medieval 

and modern Islamic history, he has published a number of 

articles on the political and religious history of Iraq, Iran, 

and Turkey. He is working on a book project, titled Between 

Carnival and Mourning: Muharram Rituals and the Rise of the 

Iranian Public Sphere in the Safavid Period, 1590–1666 C.E.,

due for publication in 2008.

Babak Rahimi

Ayatollah Sistani and 

the Democratization of 

Post-Ba‘athist Iraq

Summary

• Since spring 2003, Sistani has become the preeminent and best financed of the grand 

ayatollahs remaining in the city of Najaf—and by extension, in Iraq. He remains one 

of the most powerful figures in Iraq and he brings the Shi‘is closer together across 

the greater Middle East. 

• Since 1997, the Internet has increased the size and the prestige of Sistani’s social 

organization to an astonishing degree on a global basis. 

• Like his father, Sistani is an adherent of a democratic Shi‘i tradition that dates back 

to the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906 to 1911 and continued with the 

Khatami reformist movement (1997–2005). 

• As the general representative of the Hidden Imam, quietist Sistani can remain totally 

aloof from all political matters, while at times of perceived moral decadence, political corruption, great injustice, or foreign occupation, he can become more active in 

political affairs by engaging in activities such as consultation, guidance, and even 

the promotion of sacred norms in public life.

• Sistani’s religious network is increasingly becoming an important source of local governance in southern Iraq, where many Iraqis are hired and at times agree to conduct 

duties that are usually carried out by the state.

• Sistani’s insistence on recognizing Islam as a fundamental component of the Iraqi 

constitution is not intended to make Iraq an Islamist state based on juridical sharia 

strictures, but rather to limit the total secularization of the constitution, which would 

deprive a Muslim country of an “authentic” national identity based on its Islamic 

heritage. 

• Sistani could contribute to reducing sectarian tensions by working with other Sunni 

and Shi‘i religious leaders (including tribal leaders) to organize a National Recon-
ciliation Initiative in order to display a united, powerful Sunni-Shi‘i front with an 

emphasis on common Islamic ideals; to express condemnation of anti-Shi‘i Wahabi 

extremism and anti-Sunni Shi‘i radicalism; and to form communal solidarity through 

the ceremonial process of intersectarian group gatherings. 

• Sistani remains a key religious figure who has influence as a peacemaker and mediator 

among various Shi‘i factions and ethnic groups in Basra and Kirkuk that are competing for economic and territorial dominance in the northern and southern regions of 

the country. 

• As long as the state army is unable to independently fight off the Sunni insurgency 

and Shi‘i militias, it is highly unlikely that Sistani will call for a U.S. withdrawal from 

Iraq.

• Sistani is mainly concerned with maintaining stability in the region while rejecting 

any form of U.S. military adventurism that could seriously endanger the integrity and 

autonomy of Muslim countries in the greater Middle East.

• Although Sistani is still a powerful figure within Iraq, his influence has diminished 

since the bombing of the Shi‘i shrine in Samarra in February 2006 and the ensuing 

increase in Sunni–Shi‘i violence. Washington should recognize that until the sectarian 

warfare subsides, there is no effective way for Sistani to become involved in the Iraqi 

political process. However, Washington should engage Sistani now, because of the 

positive role he would have in the democratization of Iraq if the sectarian tensions 

subside.

Introduction 

The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘athist regime in April 2003 by U.S.-led forces and 

the liberation of Iraqis from authoritarian rule have inaugurated a new era of state-society 

relations in Iraqi history. The eradication of a secular one-party political system and the 

crystallization of a new democratic order in Iraq have opened up fertile ground for the 

growth of various political parties and civic associations that are mostly organized along 

ethnic and sectarian lines. Such organizations represent new religious communities with 

distinct network operatives and both civic and militant organizational apparatuses that 

increasingly dominate the political landscape of post-Ba‘athist Iraq using sectarian and 

anti-occupation agendas. They have emerged and continue to evolve within a new Iraqi 

public sphere that is characterized by old and new ethnic and sectarian divisions, which 

were partly caused by the power vacuum created in the postwar period.

A case in point is the Sadrist movement. Led by the young cleric Moqtada Sadr, who 

enjoys a cult-like following among Shi‘i masses in poorer urban regions like Kut and Sadr 

city, the Sadrist phenomenon evolved from a nascent millenarian movement into a fullblown political organization in the two years between 2003 and 2005.1 Much of the rapid 

growth in popularity of groups like the Sadrists lies in the anti-occupation sentiment that 

has rapidly intensified, mostly in the poorer sector of the Shi‘i population (especially in 

Sadr city), which has long felt excluded by the Sunni rulers in Baghdad. 

In terms of state-society relations, the upsurge of these various civic-political movements, dormant under the Ba‘athist regime, has also heralded a new period in Iraq’s political history, as a sharp decline in the privatization of religion is leading to the formation 

of new public religions that, in turn, have a bearing on the state-building processes.2 In 

sharp contrast to the totalitarian state control of public and private spheres under Saddam 

Hussein’s regime, the post-invasion period marks the development of a new civil society, 

mostly composed of religious associations and sectarian movements that are influencing 

(both positively and negatively) the structure of the Iraqi state. The overwhelming influence of various Islamist groups was evident in the drafting of the permanent constitution 

during the summer of 2005. 

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

non-partisan institution established and funded by 

Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve 

violent conflicts, promote post-conflict peacebuilding, 

and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by 

empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, 

as well as by its direct involvement in conflict zones 

around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, 

Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, 

ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, 

Founder and former President, Peace Links, Washington, 

D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Vice President of Government 

Affairs, International Justice Mission, Washington, D.C. 

• Chester A. Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of 

Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown 

University, Washington, D.C. • Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, 

Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • Charles 

Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. 

• Mora L. McLean, President, Africa-America Institute, 

New York, N.Y. • Barbara W. Snelling, former State 

Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt. 

Members ex officio

Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • Robert M. Gates, 

Secretary of Defense • Richard H. Solomon, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) • Frances C. 

Wilson, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps; President, 

National Defense University.
Therefore, the appearance of a quiescent Shi‘i cleric, the grand ayatollah Ali Hussaini 

Sistani, who has come to play a significant political role in Iraq, serves as a reminder 

of the critical relevance of religion in the postwar era.3 Since summer 2003, Sistani has 

called for democratic elections and citizen participation that advanced the institutionalization of a legitimate Iraqi government. He has also promoted the active role of the 

clerical establishment in civic associations and state organizations in order to protect a 

vibrant civil society against the potential resurgence of authoritarian forces during the 

transition to democracy. What the Sistani phenomenon has revealed, at this point in time, 

is how a network led by clerics can reconcile the domains of religion and politics in ways 

that appear mostly compatible and complementary. Sistani continues to promote a nonsecularist concept of democratic politics, which, ironically, is challenging what the Bush 

administration aimed to achieve in Iraq prior to the invasion—namely, the formation of 

a liberal-secular democracy as a model for other states in the Middle East. 

This report argues that Sistani’s critical role in stabilizing a democratic Iraq since 

2003 will continue to expand into the post-December 2005 election era. Sistani and 

his religious network will contribute to the building of Iraq’s civil society and local 

governance, which are central features of a stable Iraq. With the active involvement of 

his representatives and followers in regional governance affairs and the expansion of 

his public programs in southern Iraq, Sistani can bolster Iraq’s civil society in ways that 

were impossible under Saddam’s autocratic regime, which kept a tight control over local 

governance and public programs, especially those run by Shi‘i clerics. The strengthening of 

the civil society will pose a serious challenge to the antidemocratic current of insurgency 

and inter- and intrasectarian tensions that continue to act as destabilizing forces in the 

country—particularly in the overwhelmingly Shi‘i regions of southern Iraq and the lower 

Tigris. However, Sistani’s presence will also create problems for various secularist groups 

in Iraq upon which both the stability and the inclusive structure of the elected unity 

government, led by Nuri al-Maliki, depend. Although Sistani remains a powerful figure, 

his influence has decreased since the bombing of the Shi‘i shrine in Samarra, and the 

sectarian conflict has reduced his ability to help democratize Iraq. 

This report is divided into four sections. The first describes Sistani as a major political 

and religious figure in Iraq, elaborating on his Najaf-based hawza and his transnational 

network. The second turns to the heyday of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and briefly 

explores how Sistani, beginning with his initial forays into politics when he rejected the 

idea of an appointed constituent assembly in summer 2003 and called for early elections, 

contributed to the beginning of what is now the transitional democratization of Iraq. 

The third focuses on Sistani’s role in advancing the idea of Islam as a source of legal 

authority. The fourth discusses the political relevance of Sistani and his network for the 

future of Iraq. 

Sistani and the Najaf Hawza

In a small, two-story brick building, tucked away inside a winding old alley off a primary, 

crowded road leading to the shrine of Imam Ali, lives Iraq’s most senior marja‘ (religious 

jurist), Ayatollah Ali Hussaini Sistani. Sitting cross-legged on a thin mattress on the 

floor in a large, undecorated white room next to his trusted wazir (minister), Shaykh 

Muhammad Hassan Ansari, Sistani receives visitors who enter the room, kiss the ring on 

his finger, and utter greetings to the most revered cleric in Iraq. The visitors seek his 

advice on matters ranging from marriage to divorce, from rules of piety to political issues. 

At his house, which is protected by his loyal guards and managed by his second oldest 

son, Muhammad Reda Sistani, the grand ayatollah oversees a loyal body of activists, 

students, ministers, representatives, and wakils (agents) who operate and administer his 

vast, multimillion-dollar transnational network of seminaries, mosques, and welfare-based 

Sistani continues to promote a 

nonsecularist concept of democratic 

politics.

The grand ayatollah oversees 

a loyal body of activists, who 

operate and administer his vast, 

multimillion-dollar transnational 

network of seminaries, mosques, 

and welfare-based organizations.
organizations from India to Nigeria, from London to New York, and from Qom to Najaf, 

arguably representing the most organized religious association in post-Ba’athist Iraq. 

Born on August 4, 1930, in the northeastern Iranian city of Mashhad, Sistani can 

trace his lineage back to the Hussainis, a sayyad family, which means they are descendents of the Prophet. Mulla Sayyad Muhammad Hussaini, a prominent cleric who resided 

in the city of Isfahan, was appointed to be the Shaykh al-Islam of the eastern Persian 

province of Sistan by Sultan Hussain Safavi (1692–1722), the last shah of the Safavid 

dynasty (1501–1722 C.E.). It was after this appointment that the Hussaini family settled 

in Sistan, where they remained even after the collapse of the Safavid Empire in 1722. It 

was most likely in the eighteenth century that the title “Sistani” was added to the family 

name of Hussaini as a means of specifying the family’s local identity after their migration 

from the city of Isfahan in the seventh century.

Sistani’s father, Sayyad Ali b. al-Sayyad Muhammad Reda Sistani, was a highly respected cleric who studied in Najaf and Samarra and—upon the completion of his studies in 

1897—returned to the Iranian city of Mashhad. A politically informed cleric, Sistani’s 

father was in communication with a number of high-ranking Iraq-based clerics, such as 

Shaykh Kazim Khurasani and Muhammad Hussain Na’ini, who is famous as an advocate 

of constitutionalism, as was evidenced by his prodemocracy tract Tanbih al-Umma and 

involvement in the Shi‘i uprising of 1920 in Iraq. Although it is not clear to what extent 

he participated in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1906–11), Sistani’s father was 

most certainly sympathetic to Na‘ini’s prodemocracy position, which sought to limit 

monarchical rule. Na’ini taught Ayatollah Abu’l-Qassim Khu’i, Sistani’s mentor in Najaf, 

best known for his quietist stance in dealing with the Ba’athist state in the eighties and 

early nineties. This could explain, in part, Sistani’s adherence to the quietist tradition of 

Shi‘ism, which will be further elaborated on in the second section of this report. 

Sistani began his life of theological scholarship at age five, when he studied the Quran 

at the Ghuharshad Mosque in Mashhad, where his father served as the head cleric. First 

and foremost, the popular reverence for Sistani lies in the fact that he was born into a 

sayyad family, which imparts immediate reverence among the Shi‘is for being physically 

and spiritually linked with Muhammad. Second, the clerical and scholarly background of 

Sistani’s family since the seventeenth century provided the social capital for Sistani to 

pursue a life of Islamic legal-theological scholarship.

Sistani’s Iranian origin should not be seen as a disadvantage for the Mashhad-born 

ayatollah, because many Shi‘i Iraqis still see him as an Arab notable who is a direct 

descendent of Muhammad. Despite his Iranian citizenship (he refuses to apply for an Iraqi 

passport) and his thick Iranian accent when he speaks Arabic, many of his Iraqi followers 

say, “Sistani is in appearance (zaher) an Iranian, but at heart (batan) he is an Arab,” a 

paternal figure who cares for and seeks to protect them at any cost.4

In 1949 Sistani traveled to Qom, where he studied under the famous cleric Ayatollah 

Muhammad Mahdi Burujirdi, known for his staunch adherence to the quietist school of 

Shi‘ism, which advocates that clerics remain aloof from day-to-day political administrative 

matters. While at Qom, he shared classes with other present-day grand ayatollahs, such 

as Ayatollah Morteda Montazeri. Ayatollah Burujirdi praised Montazeri and Sistani as two 

of his best students in Qom.5 Sistani then migrated first to Karbala and then to Najaf 

in 1951, where he came under the supervision of three outstanding clerics, most prominently Ayatollah Khu’i. In 1960, upon his return to Mashhad, he was honored by Ayatollah 

Khu‘i with the title of mujtahid, which is a clerical jurist with religious law training who 

is recognized by other clerics as a person of Islamic piety. At thirty, Sistani became one 

of only three mujtahids who was granted written permission to practice jurisprudence by 

a cleric as high-ranking as Khu’i. 

In 1961 he returned to Najaf to begin a life of scholarship, teaching, and writing religious tracts. Sistani has since resided in Najaf, leaving Iraq only a few times, such as for 

the Hajj pilgrimage in the 1970s and in 2004 for medical treatment in London. Since 2003 

he has refused to travel to Iran, mostly because he does not want the Iranian government 

to take political advantage of his travel to his homeland.6

Sistani began his life of theological 

scholarship at age five at the 

Ghuharshad Mosque.

The quietist school of Shi‘ism

advocates that clerics remain 

aloof from day-to-day political 

administrative matters.
In the 1960s, when the Da’wa party emerged as one of Iraq’s original Islamist parties, 

Sistani refused involvement in any Shi‘i organization. He also kept a distant but cordial 

relationship with Ayatollah Ruhu’llah Khomeini, who was exiled to Iraq for his political 

activities in Iran under the reign of Muhammad Reda Pahlavi. Sistani’s life after the 

Iranian Revolution in 1979 and during the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88) is relatively unknown 

to analysts. During that time, he kept a low profile, given that the Ba‘athist regime kept 

a close watch over Najaf throughout the eighties until the early nineties, especially after 

the failed Shi‘i uprising in 1991. It is known, however, that after the death of Ayatollah 

Khu’i in 1992, Sistani began emerging as a leading religious figure in Najaf. 

The succession process after Khu’i’s death appears to have been brief but somewhat 

problematic. Because Khu’i was the leading marja’ in the Shi‘i world after the death of 

Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, and he was endowed with a vast income from religious taxes, 

a competition for succession rights was bound to occur. According to one of Sistani’s 

senior aides in Najaf, Khu’i’s original wish was to appoint his son-in-law as his successor. 

However, the untimely death of Khu’i’s son-in-law established Sistani as the leading candidate, although some opposed him. After the death of Khu’i in 1992, Sistani inherited a 

large network of religious endowments and a financial network that made him the most 

prestigious senior cleric (marja’) in Iraq. 

From 1992 to 2003, Sistani was under surveillance by Saddam’s regime and survived 

a number of assassination attempts. Saddam prohibited Sistani from spending money he 

received from his followers in the Shi’i community, and in 1993, he shut down the alKhaza Mosque, where Sistani led communal prayers, which forced him to severely limit 

his public appearances.

Beginning in 1998, and especially after the Ba‘athist assassination of Ayatollah 

Muhammad Sadeq Sadr in 1999, Sistani quit teaching and rarely left his home. For nearly 

five years (1998–2003) Sistani did not even visit the nearby Shrine of Ali. Security 

problems and Baghdad’s tight grip on Najaf forced Sistani to oversee his vast financial 

infrastructure from a distance, because it was based in the Iranian city of Qom. With the 

help of his trusted son-in-law, Jawad Shahrestani, who is also his most senior representative outside of Iraq, Sistani was still able to maintain a steady flow of income while 

residing in Najaf. 

Sistani’s Transnational Network

The “Hawza-al Illmiya” of Najaf is a cluster of seminaries and religious scholarly institutions governed by high-ranking clerics who receive religious taxes from devotee Shi‘is 

around the world. Historically, the burial of Ali, the cousin of Muhammad and the first 

imam of Shi‘i Muslims, at Najaf in 661, established this religious center, which Shi‘is 

identify as one of their most sacred sites.7 But Najaf saw a major transformation in 1057, 

when Shaykh Muhammad at-Tusi, a leading Shi‘i cleric, migrated from Baghdad to Najaf, 

where he initiated systematic instruction of Shi‘i teachings and created a university-like 

institution that is still in operation. The hawza represents not only the intellectual center 

but also an important source of political and religious authority in the Shi‘i world; it 

embodies the seat of Shi‘i learning against a backdrop of Sunni-dominated governments 

from the Seljuq era to the Tikriti-Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein. 

As the most senior of the Shi‘i clerics, the grand ayatollah controls most of the Najaf 

seminaries, with a large following of students in Iraq and abroad (mostly in Iran, Lebanon, 

and Syria). These seminaries are funded through religious taxes, and since April 2003 have 

expanded financially with the influx of foreign capital (particularly from Britain, Kuwait, 

and Iran) to the southern regions of the country. The financial infrastructure of the hawza 

consists of millions of dollars bequeathed to Sistani’s foundation in the form of religious 

taxes and pious endowments (waqf), which are publicly or privately funded institutions 

to support the poor or needy. 

After the death of Ayatollah Khu’i, 

Sistani began emerging as a leading 

religious figure in Najaf. 

The burial of Ali, the cousin of 

Muhammad and the first imam 

of Shi‘i Muslims, at Najaf in 661, 

established this religious center.
Religious taxes donated by believers (zakat) are intended to assist the poor, needy, 

orphans, travelers, and those in debt. Part of zakat is paid to cover the expenses of collecting taxes by religious administrators. Khums, on the other hand, is a special annual tax 

that Shi’is pay of one-fifth the value of their land, silver, gold, jewelry, and profits made 

from goods found in the sea, which is spent mostly on the needy, orphans, travelers, and 

on the prophet and his family. However, one-tenth of khums is required to be paid to a 

high-ranking cleric or marja‘ at-taqlid (“The Source of Imitation”), who is the most knowledgeable and pious among the clerics and whom the believers (moqalids) are expected to 

imitate in everyday life and follow on religious matters. The role of marja‘ at-taqild is crucial in the institution of religious taxation since it is under his authority—as the definitive 

representative (Na’ib al-Amm) of the Hidden Imam, which is the twelfth male descendant 

of the Muhammad who has been hiding since 874 C.E. and whose return is expected at 

the end of time—that the collected money is distributed to pious causes. 

Religious or pious endowments are primarily land, have historically been bequeathed 

to the clerics, and also give substantial financial resources to the leading mujtahids, since 

one cleric (or a number of clerics) can distribute them as he sees fit. Historically, this 

religious financial system, built on income mostly from wealthy merchants and artisan 

classes, has given the clerics (especially the Shi‘i ulama or clerical authority) a considerable degree of independence from the state. 

This huge foundation is represented and operated by thousands of wakils, or officially 

approved agents, around the world. The wakil system is a complex network of agents 

who interact on a daily basis via phone and the Internet to monitor and administer the 

ayatollah’s financial infrastructure. Sistani’s network comprises thousands of members and 

activists who operate a vast network of social services—ranging from schools (madras) to 

pious endowments, from hospitals to libraries—and who interact to administer his funds 

and represent his views in a number of cities around the world. 

One may view the wakil system as a centralized and hierarchical institution with Najaf 

as the religious, symbolic authority and Qom as the financial base that Sistani’s representatives ultimately depend upon for religious and economic support. However, the wakil

network is operated in a more decentralized fashion. The religious taxes are received by a 

local wakil who sends a portion to Qom and distributes the rest in the local region where 

he administers his religious center. The wakils often have competing philosophies about 

how to administer religious tax revenue and views differ on how the money should be 

spent and who should spend it. This creates a somewhat decentralized and self-governing 

network.8 Often, the local wakil is not required to report to another with a higher-ranking 

status, although all are held accountable by higher ranking wakils and, ultimately, by the 

grand ayatollah as they are required to keep receipts of money received and spent at their 

local center. 

Sistani’s son, Muhammad Reda Sistani, who lives in Najaf, and Sistani’s two sons-inlaw, Shahrestani, who lives in Qom, and Murtada Kashmiri, who lives in London, are the 

most senior of the wakils, and are called wakil taam. They have led Sistani’s organization 

since 1992 and have continued to play a significant role in the spread of Sistani’s network 

since 2003. Another important wakil, Sayed Mutada Muhammadi, heads Sistani’s center at 

Kuwait City, where huge sums of money are received from wealthy Kuwaiti sea merchants. 

Perhaps due to the large sums of money involved, tension appears to exist between wakils, 

who often compete for prestige and power over the administration of their respective 

centers. At times, for instance, Muhammad Reda Sistani does not approve of the financial 

investments that Shahrestani has made in Qom, but he rarely intervenes in his brotherin-law’s decisions. 

Wakils are responsible for sending a portion of the charity monies to Najaf, where it is 

mostly spent on seminary students (talabe), charity centers, and local governance (such 

as paying Sistani’s personal guards). The transfer of money to Iraq is obviously not done 

through the banking system, which is run and monitored by the state, but with the help 

of many trusted Iraqi devotees of Sistani who travel on a daily basis between Iran, Iraq, 

Sistani’s son, Muhammad 

Reda Sistani and Sistani’s two 

sons-in-law, Shahrestani and 

Murtada Kashmiri, are the 

most senior of the wakils.
Syria, and Kuwait. The amount of assistance sent to Iraq annually appears to be huge. 

According to a report published by Sistani’s office in Qom, from 2003 to 2004 the center 

has sent, on seven occasions, twenty-one trucks, each weighing five tons, carrying various charity goods, such as clothes, food, and medicine, that total one billion toman (one 

million U.S. dollars) to Iraqi cities such as Najaf, Kufa, Karbala, Basra, al-Amarah, and 

Samarra.9 It is also reported that in 2004 Sistani’s foundation gave $25,000 to the imam 

of the mosque of Kadhemiya in Baghdad to be spent on charity.10 With approximately 

$5 million a month (an amount that has grown quickly since 2004) distributed in the form 

of stipends to students and teachers in cities such as Damascus, Karbala, and Mashahad, 

the Sistani network is growing.11 Additionally, as more pilgrims—mainly Iranians—make 

their way to the holy cities, aided by a new direct flight between Tehran and Najaf, the 

ayatollah’s financial income through religious taxes is steadily growing.12

Since the fall of Saddam, the Sistani network has emerged as the most organized 

transnational civic institution in Iraq, with offices not only throughout Iraq, but also in 

Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Britain, Georgia, India, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and the United States. With Sistani’s rise to prominence 

since 2003, the Qom center has established a number of civic institutions, including 

many libraries, residential housing for seminary students, an eye hospital, and even an 

astronomy center with a high-tech telescope in Qom and similar public institutions in 

many Iranian cities such as Ilam, Isfahan, Shiraz, and Tabriz.13 The seminary students 

supported by Sistani’s center are well paid and are even offered a health insurance plan 

that covers their families during the period of their studies.14

Likely due in part to the good pay and benefits, the Najaf hawza continues to grow 

in popularity, regaining its prestigious status in the Shi‘i world since the failed uprising 

of 1920, when many clerics left the city for Qom. Because it is the religious center of 

Sistani’s network, Najaf is now the hub from which many Sistani centers around Iraq are 

established and managed. Since 2003, the center in Najaf has opened educational (including libraries and publication centers) and information technological facilities in cities 

like Basra, Karbala, Kufa, Kut, and Samarra. These facilities not only provide books and 

Internet service, but also offer teaching facilities, where ordinary Iraqis are instructed on 

religious and even secular matters, including how to browse the Internet for educational 

purposes. Although for security reasons the centers are still relatively small, Iraqis can 

also seek the religious advice and the financial support of Sistani’s charitable organization 

at the centers.

The most important of these facilities is the Najaf center of al-Mortada Islamic Guidance. Built in 2005, it publishes magazines and cultural and religious texts, disseminates 

religious tapes, and provides a space for the commemoration of the Shi‘i rituals of 

Muharram. Najaf also hosts another major religious center and a library that provide services to seminary students and social services to mosques in the city and surrounding rural 

areas. The Center of Professional Services at Najaf provides training in computer sciences 

and organizes community competitions for both male and female youth on religious and 

scientific topics. Besides its community functions, the Global Center of Aalbayaat in Najaf 

provides intensive computer training services for seminary students and Najaf residents, as 

well as cyberconferences on religious topics, allowing the students to interact with seminary students from countries ranging from Iran to the United States.15 A number of Internet centers have been established in cities such as Karbala, Kadhamayn, and Basra.16

The Internet has increased the size and the prestige of Sistani’s social organization 

worldwide. Despite objections by a number of high-ranking clerics in Qom about the possibility of spreading vice through the Internet, Sistani was the first marja‘ to take advantage 

of cyberspace. Sistani approved the establishment of an Internet center in Qom in 1996 

after his son-in-law, Shahrestani, introduced the idea to him, and the center has since 

been the host domain of a number of religious institutions and clerical websites based 

in Iran.17 According to one of his aides in Qom, Sistani and his son-in-law believed the 

In 2004 Sistani’s foundation 

gave $25,000 to the imam of 

the mosque of Kadhemiya in 

Baghdad to be spent on charity.

The Internet has increased the 

size and the prestige of Sistani’s 

social organization worldwide.
Internet was a way to reach out to Sistani’s millions of followers in an age of globalization.

They saw no vice in the new technology but only the ability to spread the cause of Shi‘ism. 

They saw Islam as the heart of science and the Internet as its capillary. 

The Aalulbayat Global Information and Media Center is the most popular computer 

center in Qom.18 The center provides one of the most significant and well-known religious 

websites in the Shi‘i community (www.al-shia.com), and is the hub for websites dedicated 

to spreading the word of more than fifty high-ranking clerics, including Ayatollah Ali Khameini, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic. Sistani’s personal website, www.Sistani.

com, offers the faithful information ranging from news articles about Sistani to answers 

to practical questions of a religious nature. In fact, in a small office on the first floor of 

the center, Sistani receives more than 1,000 questions a day concerning issues ranging 

from personal piety to politics. Most of the questions are forwarded to Najaf, where Sistani 

replies and his representatives forward the answers back to Qom; the rest are answered by 

clerics who are personally approved by Sistani at his center in Qom.

Sistani leads one of the most advanced transnational networks in the region through 

the digital information superhighway. Equally important to Sistani’s power is the fact that 

he is the preeminent and best financed of the ayatollahs remaining in Najaf, and—by 

extension—in Iraq. By spreading his network via the Internet and acquiring increasing 

amounts of wealth Sistani has become a powerful figure who can bring the Shi‘is closer 

together across the greater Middle East. 

Sistani and the Transition to a Democratic Iraq

Sistani made his first major political appearance in the post-Ba‘athist era on June 26, 

2003, when Sistani’s office in Najaf issued an edict that challenged the primary mandate of 

the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was to form an interim government for the 

transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi government. In a brief statement, Sistani demanded an 

immediate general election, stating that every Iraqi man and woman should vote for his 

or her official representatives to a constitutional assembly, eventually to be confirmed by 

a national referendum.19 Later, responding to a Washington Post reporter, Sistani issued 

his most famous statement in support of a democratic Iraqi polity: 

The instrumentality envisaged in it [the CPA plan] for electing the members of 

the transitional Legislature does not guarantee the formation of a parliament that 

truly represents the Iraqi people. It must be changed to some other method, which 

would guarantee it. And that is [direct] elections, such that the parliament would 

derive from the will of the Iraqis and would represent them in a just manner and 

will safeguard it from any challenge to its legitimacy.20

The above assertion was one of a number of statements in which Sistani denounced 

the U.S. involvement in the transfer of power while calling for a peaceful transition of 

authority via a democratic electoral process. 

However, the November 15 agreement between the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council 

(IGC), which was appointed by Paul Bremer, called for a speedy transfer of power in the 

form of council-based elections by June 30, 2004. The CPA’s vision was to have a sevenstep process in which the United States maintained strict control over the transfer of 

power to Iraqis. Elections were to take place after a complicated succession of caucuses 

that would elect an assembly and design a constitution that was expected to be ratified 

by a national referendum. 

Sistani was against the caucus plan for two main reasons: first and foremost, according 

to Sistani, the caucuses system was not built around a “one man, one vote” paradigm that 

would immediately empower ordinary Iraqis to participate directly in the election of official representatives. Second, the non-popular electoral system, regulated and organized 

by a foreign occupying force, would make the transition process illegitimate and even 



Sistani receives more than 1,000 

questions a day concerning issues 

ranging from personal piety to politics.
“treasonable” in the eyes of both the religious establishment and ordinary Iraqis. Sistani

viewed direct popular elections “with an acceptable level of transparency and legitimacy” 

as essential to forming a democratic Iraq; a caucuses system would only lead to the 

transfer from one illegitimate government to another.21 

In mid-January 2004, as CPA officials pressed forward with the caucus plan, the hawza 

network began to disseminate Sistani’s views. In a matter of days, the hawza network, 

mainly operating through mosques and religious forums, was able to stage a demonstration and organize a relatively united Shi‘i front against the CPA’s plans. The network 

brought together thousands of protesters in cities like Basra, Hilla, and Najaf, demanding 

general elections and an end to the caucus plan. 

When the CPA and the IGC finally gave in to Sistani’s call for popular elections and 

Sistani compromised by agreeing to a delay of general elections until December 2004, 

many in the United States, including the media and academia, speculated on Sistani’s 

intentions in calling for popular elections. Skeptics believed that after years of oppression 

by Sunni-led states, Sistani’s true interest was to advance the Shi‘i hegemony to attain 

a majority in government. Others, however, believed that Sistani was aiming to create 

an Islamist state by drafting a religious constitution through the electoral process. What 

many observers failed to recognize (or even attempt to understand) was, in the words 

of Larry Diamond, Sistani’s “sincere belief in the political legitimacy of a social contract 

between rulers and ruled.”22

In fact, in the days of early transition, the CPA officials failed to understand the true 

meaning of Sistani’s quietist Shi‘i orthodoxy. For many, a quietist cleric referred to someone who is “apolitical” and would allow the United States to manufacture a new Iraq 

without the involvement of the country’s religious leaders. However, quietist clerics are 

not passive about politics. Rather, quietist clerics can stay aloof from politics while making sure that the principles of Islam are respected in public life. A quietist cleric neither 

demands to participate in government nor presumes to exercise control over the state. As 

a representative of the Hidden Imam, he can at times remain totally aloof from all political matters, but during times of moral decadence, political corruption, serious injustice, 

or foreign occupation he can become more active in politics by offering advice, guidance, 

and even the promotion of sacred law in public life. 

The key point to bear in mind is that the degree of authority that a high cleric can 

exercise in political matters has never been clearly defined in the history of Shi‘i Islam. 

This is chiefly because what determines the level of political participation by a Shi‘i cleric 

primarily depends on the particular historical and social issues the cleric confronts. This 

flexibility gives him a certain leeway to overcome problems creatively by using reason 

(‘aql) regarding the application of divine law for the best interests of the community. 

The use of rational judgment as a means to advance Islamic norms for the benefit of the 

community is a distinctive and primary component of the Usuli school of jurisprudence, 

which achieved prominence among Shi‘is in Najaf in the late eighteenth century and in 

Qajar Persia in the nineteenth century.

The central concept of applying reason to the rules of divine law according to changing 

social and political problems allows clerics to act upon “probable knowledge” innovatively 

to regulate social and political affairs. It is because the most learned of all clerics is a 

supreme source to be emulated—one whose authoritative rulings on socioreligious matters every believer should follow—that he is able to remain detached from day-to-day 

state politics while maintaining an active role in the public life of ordinary Muslims. Civic 

participation has underpinned the political power of the Shi‘i clerics from the Tobacco 

Concession in 1891–92 to the 1920 Shi‘i uprising in Najaf, and, most recently, Sistani’s 

involvement in Iraqi politics. 

Sistani’s activist stand in the transition to democratic politics can be credited to his 

adherence to the democratic tradition dating back to the Constitutional Revolution in 

1906–1911, during which prodemocracy grand ayatollahs such as Ayatollah Na’ini advocated the ideal of democratic governance over autocratic rule. According to this tradition, 

CPA officials failed to understand the 

true meaning of Sistani’s quietist 

Shi‘i orthodoxy.
10

the role of the cleric is to guide the Muslim community while securing a social contract 

between the ruler and the ruled and promoting the ideals of Islam. However, Sistani 

has refused to advocate a council of guardians or a body of clerics to monitor the bills 

that would be introduced in a national assembly in order to ratify its Islamic merit.23

This could lead one to believe that the grand ayatollah’s frame of mind is closer to that 

of the post-1997 Iranian reformist thinkers, such as Muhsen Kadivar and Abdul-Karim 

Soroush, whose ideas developed the early twentieth century Shi‘i constitutional tradition 

and emphasized the significance of elections and participatory politics free from clerical 

domination. Sistani, who has studied the writings of many reformist thinkers, is a major 

advocate of this latter school of thought, which emerged in the Shi‘i world after the election of Muhammad Khatami in 1997.24

Sistani’s June 2003 and November 2004 fatwas on the doctrine of welayat-e faqih 

(“Guardianship of the Jurisconsult”) further highlighted his conception of democratic 

governance in a more innovative manner. As Reidar Visser has lucidly stated, according to 

Sistani, the doctrine of welayat-e faqih broadly signifies the “rule of jurisconsult,” which 

is not limited in authority to religious affairs (umur hasbiyya), such as the propagation 

of religious law, collection of religious taxes, or custody over an orphan or a minor, but 

extends to “general affairs on which the Islamic social system depends.”25 Sistani’s notion 

of an expanded clerical involvement in political affairs entails the explicit role of the 

high-ranking cleric in protecting the community, especially political issues that directly 

relate to the well-being of a Muslim community. Sistani’s concept of welayat-e faqih, 

therefore, implicitly rejects Khomeini’s conception of absolutist rule of the supreme jurist 

as an official member of the state, running the day-to-day political affairs of his community. The authority of the marja’, therefore, lies in the defense of Islam and the Muslim 

community, not in absolute power over all state affairs as manifested in its authoritarian 

form in Iran.

In light of his adherence to such a democratic tradition, the following two points best 

describe Sistani’s most significant contributions to the democratization of Iraq: 

Promotion of democratic political culture. Since the summer of 2003, Sistani has 

consistently advocated the institutionalization of elections and formation of political 

parties. Perhaps Sistani’s most significant contribution is his call for political participation 

and active citizenship in building a vibrant democratic polity. He even helped form the 

United Iraqi Alliance, a major Shi‘i-dominated political party that twice won a majority 

of seats in the 275-member Iraqi parliament. Sistani has also been a primary advocate 

of accountability of government and the formation of legitimacy based on the ideals of 

popular sovereignty as a way to challenge CPA’s insular plans for a top-down form of 

democratization of Iraq. He has also issued a number of fatwas demanding that the 

faithful vote and requiring women to participate in elections even without the consent 

of their husbands.26 

Hawza civic association and local governance. Sistani’s “hawza civic association” 

comprises a body of non-governmental religious organizations that operate on behalf of 

Sistani and interact with one another as a large association independent of state control. 

Sistani and his religious type of political activism have provided (and most likely will 

continue to provide) democratization and peace building in Iraq by strengthening the 

country’s civil society. Sistani’s growing network in southern cities like Amarah, Basra, 

Karbala, Kufa, Najaf, and Nasiriyah is cultivating grassroots political participation through 

the hawza civic association to enhance a civil society structure that would be independent 

from the state but dependent on the Shi‘i citizens of Iraq. 

In addition, Sistani’s network is increasingly becoming an important source of political 

authority in southern Iraq, where many Iraqis are hired to perform duties that are usually 

carried out by the state. These duties include maintaining security in certain regions in 

the south—and especially in Najaf—by tribal chieftains, who have consistently proven 

Sistani has consistently advocated 

the institutionalization of elections 

and formation of political parties.

Sistani’s network is increasingly 

becoming an important source of 

political authority in southern Iraq.

The role of the cleric is to guide 

the Muslim community while securing a social contract between the 

ruler and the ruled and promoting 

the ideals of Islam. 
11

that they can be effective in maintaining security after intra-Shi‘i struggles for power and 

Sunni insurgent attacks on Shi‘i communities and holy sites. 

Sistani and the Iraqi Constitution 

The exact impact of Sistani’s active involvement in writing the constitutions, both the 

Transitional Administration Law (2004) and the permanent Dastor (2005), has been a 

topic of heated debate. Many of the arguments in favor of Sistani’s interest in advancing 

an Islamist state via the constitution stem from his demand to allocate “undisputed” 

rulings of Islam as a central feature of Iraq’s judicial establishment as part and parcel 

of maintaining the country’s national identity and cultural heritage. As a result, many 

secular-minded thinkers have questioned Sistani’s commitment to democracy, defined 

in the liberal terms of individual liberties, and critically viewed his stance as a move to 

a possible institutionalization of the sharia legal system, similar to what exists in Iran. 

Many secularists view Sistani’s call for a legal institution that maintains an Islamic character consistent “with the religious facts and the social values of the Iraqi people” as an 

attempt to enforce certain rules and values grounded upon a set of puritanical codes of 

morality and punishment, such as amputation for the crime of theft, stoning for adultery, 

and death for apostasy. 27 

But this view fails to recognize Sistani’s beliefs about the relationship between religion and the constitutional state. His apparent call for the Islamization of the constitution seeks not to form a sharia-based legal institution in which religious law is the sole 

normative value for justice, but to ensure that Islam, as one (highly significant) source 

of legitimate authority, is not excluded from Iraq’s legal body. However, because Sistani 

approved the constitution in October 2005, he has already given consent to article 2 of 

the charter of the constitution, which not only explicitly recognizes Islam as a source 

of legislation but also prohibits passing laws that violate the principles of democracy in 

terms of individual rights and freedoms. For many, article 2 is a contradiction in terms. But 

for Sistani, the article actually articulates the most legitimate form of political authority. 

It is important to understand why he believes this to be true. 

According to the school of thought to which the grand ayatollah adheres, the principles of democracy, such as political participation, competition, accountability, and accessibility, not only do not contradict Islam but, in fact, reinforce it. As he participated in the 

constitution-making process by calling for a directly and popularly elected constitution 

drafting council in November 2003, Sistani feels that the constitution is a way to reaffirm 

popular sovereignty, reflective of Islamic norms of virtue and justice. With this in mind, it 

is crucial not to confuse the Islamist conception of the constitution with Sistani’s constitutional notion of Islamic democracy: whereas the Islamists seek to bring the state into 

total conformity with an Islamic legal system, Sistani aims to accommodate Islamic law 

along with other legal norms of various social and political significances in daily life.

This is not to say that Sistani’s notion of democratic values fully embraces the democratic principle of inclusion. As in the case of other consolidated democracies, political 

parties and religious associations like the socially conservative movement led by the evangelical Protestants in the United States may have an exclusive understanding of democratic polity. In this sense, Sistani’s socially conservative views on gays ’ and women’s 

sociolegal status resemble the views of a number of religious leaders in the United States, 

such as the late Jerry Falwell and Pat Robinson.28 In the context of competing visions of 

public morality, Sistani will do his best to make Islamic law the basis of Iraqi civil law, 

though at the same time he will refuse to endorse an Iranian-style judicial system dominated by the clerical establishment. 

Potentially more significant, however, is Sistani’s role in helping to institutionalize a 

federal government. Federalism has been one of the most controversial issues, as many 

Sunni and some Shi‘i Arabs fear the eventual breakup of Iraq as a unified nation-state, 

Sistani will do his best to make 

Islamic law the basis of Iraqi civil 

law, though he will refuse to endorse 

an Iranian-style judicial system dominated by the clerical establishment. 

His apparent call for the Islamization 

of the constitution seeks to ensure 

that Islam, as one source of legitimate authority, is not excluded from 

Iraq’s legal body.
12

with the Kurds gaining autonomy in the north and the majority of Shi‘is achieving 

autonomy in the south. Although Sistani has remained neutral on the controversial issue 

of federalism, he has consistently rejected the sectarian and embraced the multiethnic 

and multisectarian model of a provincial federated model of governance.29 He accepts 

local governance and provincial administration, but rejects ethnic or sectarian federated 

governance, especially if it involves any control over national resources, particularly oil, 

which he believes should be shared by all Iraqis. Whatever the system of governance, 

Sistani is a staunch Iraqi unionist, opposing the breakup of Iraq into ethnic and sectarian 

provinces. 

While federalism will be a primary issue of contention in the constitutional amendments proposed by the constitutional committee in May 2007, Sistani is likely to back a 

simple model of constitutional government that all parties—Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi‘is—

can agree to support, though at the same time he will challenge any law that opposes the 

principles of Islam’s jurisprudence. For the most part, one can expect Sistani to be fully 

engaged in the finalization of the constitution-making process, mediating between vying 

Shi‘i groups who attempt to determine the language of the amendments while resisting 

anyone who attempts to exclude Islam from the Iraqi legal order.

Considering the contentious issues inherent in the making of a constitution, the Iraqi 

government could anticipate the following scenarios with regard to Sistani’s role in the 

completion of the constitution-making process: 

• Sistani will certainly play the role of a mediator between the antifederalist groups, 

such as Da’wa and the Sadrists, and the profederalist groups like the Social Council 

for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), as the contentious issue of federalism will 

eventually be returned to the table for another referendum—which is expected to 

take place after the constitutional committee announces its proposed amendments 

to the constitution in May 2007.

• Given Sistani’s refusal to endorse a sectarian-based federal state, SCIRI could increase 

pressure to persuade the grand ayatollah to accept a federal type of state, but Sistani 

would most likely resist. This resistance, however, could encourage SCIRI to ensure 

that the Badr organization militarily takes over the city of Najaf and dominates the 

religious seminaries—further diminishing the already eroding authority of Sistani. 

This scenario could resemble the Revolutionary Guards’ military takeover of the shrine 

city of Qum in the early years of the Iranian revolution of 1979, despite the protests 

of several quietist senior clerics. 

The potential influence of groups such as antifederalists and profederalists and the 

Badr organization over the political process poses a real threat to Iraq. In such a situation, Sistani needs to have the influence to mediate between these political actors, 

especially between Sunni and Shi‘i parties, involved in the revision of the constitution, 

though his authority should not overshadow the constitutional process by dictating a 

particular agenda. 

The United Nations could play a critical role in bringing Sistani to the fore of negotiations and the bargaining process between vying political actors on various constitutional 

issues, especially federalism and the distribution of oil revenues. The United Nations 

should maintain a mediating role between Sistani and the United States, as it did under 

the CPA rule in 2003, by providing the grand ayatollah a political platform in helping to 

prevent Iraq’s meltdown into a failed state.30

Furthermore, given the Islamist domination of Iraqi politics, the Constitutional Review 

Commission, conceived prior to the referendum of October 15, 2005, should guarantee the 

appointment of a number of secular and non-sharia-minded jurists to the Iraqi Supreme 

Federal Court. These appointments would ensure the fair distribution of secular and 

religious members in the interpretation of human rights issues, particularly on matters 

related to children and gay and women’s rights. This can be done by making constitutional 

provisions that guarantee a place for a liberal-minded bloc and adopting a system that 

would prevent any group (either secular or religious) from holding a monopoly. In other 

One can expect Sistani to be fully 

engaged in the finalization of the 

constitution-making process.
13

words, the new Iraqi government should consider facilitating healthy, agnostic political 

interaction between the secular- and sharia-minded members of the new Iraqi judicial 

system. 

In broad terms, the future Iraqi judicial institution should be viewed, like its American 

counterpart, as engaging in a constant process of negotiation over various ethical and 

moral issues. Jurists will most likely fall into secularist and religious factions. However, 

such an adversarial legal forum should not be seen as harmful to the political system 

but as a vibrant feature of a healthy democratic polity in the process of redefining its 

authoritarian past. 

Sistani and the Post-December 2005 Elections 

How might Sistani contribute to the promotion of democracy after the December 2005 

elections? The following are different scenarios in which Sistani and his network can operate to prevent conflicts (or perhaps create new ones) and bolster a postwar transitional 

democratic government for Iraq. 

Intersectarian Challenge (National Reconciliation Initiative)

Although the wave of violence began in 2004, the terrorist attack on the Shi‘i Golden 

Mosque in Samarra on February 22, 2006, has escalated violent sectarian warfare between 

the Sunni and Shi‘i communities that had been virtually absent in the modern history of 

Iraq. It is highly unlikely that the sectarian struggle for power will end with the finalization of the constitution before a national referendum in summer 2007. As the Iraqi 

unity government faces possible disintegration in the near future due to the inability of 

the Maliki government to defeat sectarian tensions, violence will continue to haunt Iraqi 

society for years to come.

In the context of the pervasive sectarian mayhem, Sistani’s presence has been both a 

blessing and a curse. On the positive side, he has consistently opposed any Shi‘i retaliation against Sunni attacks and has advocated restraint, especially after incidents such 

as the Kadhemiya Bridge tragedy in August 2005 when almost 1,000 people were killed 

in a stampede of Shi‘i pilgrims on a bridge leading to the Kadhemiya Mosque because of 

rumors that a suicide bomber had targeted the religious ceremony. He even advocated 

restraint after the attack that destroyed the Golden Mosque at Samarra. As Sistani’s son, 

Muhammad Reda Sistani, explains, “We will do our best to control the Shi‘is from taking 

revenge on Sunnis for the recent attacks. We believe these attacks are nothing else but 

to ignite the flames of fitneh (sedition) against the Iraqi people.”31 

However, on the negative side, Sistani’s endorsement of the United Iraqi Alliance 

(UIA) as a sectarian political party has contributed to intersectarian tensions. Although 

the ayatollah’s intention was never to encourage sectarianism, his support for the Shi‘idominated party has helped pave the way for growing animosity between Sunni and 

Shi‘is since the January 2005 elections. This is because most Sunnis felt increasingly 

marginalized and even experienced oppression from certain autocratic aspects of the UIA 

government, namely its shadowy, anti-Sunni death-squad operations.32 

Since the Golden Mosque bombing, Sistani’s role as a moderating influence on Shi‘i 

militias has been undermined by the popular call for revenge against Sunnis. As the 

Wahabi-led Sunni attacks on the Shi‘i community grow with the indiscriminate bombings 

of places of worship, funeral processions, and markets, concurrent with Shi‘i retaliation 

through the Iraqi police force, Sistani’s ability to restrain Shi‘is has diminished. According 

to Muhammad Reda Sistani, “We have our limits and there is only so much we could do 

to stop the sectarian bloodshed.”33

Sistani could contribute toward reducing sectarian tensions by working with other 

Sunni and Shi‘i religious leaders (including tribal leaders) to engage in a National RecHowever, Sistani’s endorsement 

of the United Iraqi Alliance 

(UIA) as a sectarian political 

party has contributed to intersectarian tensions.

Sistani has consistently opposed 

any Shi‘i retaliation against 

Sunni attacks and has advocated 

restraint. 
14

onciliation Initiative with three aims: to display a united, powerful Sunni-Shi‘i front 

with emphasis on common religious ideals; to express condemnation of anti-Shi‘i Wahabi 

extremism and anti-Sunni Shi‘i radicalism; and to form communal solidarity through the 

ceremonial process of intersectarian group gatherings. This project should take place on 

the civic association level, since such an initiative could also indirectly contribute to the 

civil society building process that is crucial to advancing democracy in Iraq. 

The project would include the religious leaders of major urban and rural regions of 

Iraq—and especially the Sunni leaders, who can best benefit from such an initiative—

who would organize a number of academic, theological, and public events that would 

bolster national ties between Iraqis across ethnic and sectarian lines. With this proposed 

project, it is my intention to propose that any attempt to reconcile Iraqi society, which 

is divided over its ethnic and sectarian identity, requires holding public events in which 

every member of society can share and feel that they belong.

Intrasectarian and Tribal Challenges

Since summer 2005, Iraq has witnessed a series of intrasectarian clashes in its southern 

province. The most infamous are the August 26 clashes between the Sadrists and the Badr 

Brigade, when Sadr’s followers fought against the SCIRI militia forces in Baghdad, Basra, 

Karbala, and Najaf. The May 2006 clashes between Fadhilla, a Shi’i militant organization 

based in Basra; Sadrists; and the SCIRI’s Badr organization in the southern city of Basra 

highlight an expanding Shi‘i versus Shi‘i conflict, underlining an unfolding intrasectarian 

tension unprecedented in Iraqi history. 

In the case of Basra, the problem lies mainly in the factional political landscape of 

the oil-rich province, where the three main Shi‘i groups—the Fadhilla, Moqtada Sadr 

and his followers, and the Badr organization, each spearheading a distinct militia 

organization—continue to battle over territory and military control. Although many of 

the hostilities have been between the Fadhilla and the SCIRI factions, Sadr and his followers, who control Basra’s police force and hospitals, continue to seek influence in a 

province where Sadr does not maintain much grassroots support. After he broke away from 

the UIA, Iraq’s ruling Shi‘i coalition, in fall 2006, Sadr’s ambition to play a greater role in 

the future of the country has relied primarily on his loyal militia, the Mahdi Army, which 

appears to have grown in number and military strength since the summer of 2004, when 

it was severely defeated by U.S. forces in Karbala and Najaf. 

However, the intrasectarian tension may get worse with the waning of Maliki’s authority due to his government’s inability to provide security and assert Baghdad’s authority 

over Basra, where Shi‘i political parties and tribal chiefdoms compete for control of the 

region and of tribal territories. Since Maliki has failed to create security by using more 

troops in troubled cities like Baghdad and Basra, Iraq may see an increase in tension 

between the emerging state army and the Sunni and Shi‘i marshland tribal factions. The 

tribal problem, however, will be secondary to the problem of militias, which remain loyal 

to different Kurdish and Shi‘i political parties, and in various provinces comprise much of 

Iraq’s police and security forces. This military structure reaffirms the ethnic and sectarian 

split in post-Ba‘athist Iraq. The sectarian makeup of the army, mostly composed of vying 

Kurdish and Shi‘i militias, also continues to spur further sectarian tensions as Sunni Arabs 

experience a greater sense of fear and insecurity. At the same time, Maliki will certainly 

face greater Shi‘i dissension as he moves to tackle not just the disarmament of the Badr 

organization, but also Sadr and his Mahdi Army. 

The complexity of Shi‘i political parties suggests that there will be more intense rivalry 

in cities like Baghdad, Basra, and even the northern city of Kirkuk, where ethnic Turkish 

Shi‘i could trigger ethnic-sectarian strife with the Sunni Kurds, and groups loyal to Sadr 

could seek to exploit the tension for political prestige and influence.

Ideally, Sistani can be recognized as a key religious figure who will have influence 

as a peacemaker and a mediator among the contending Shi‘i factions and even ethnic 

Ideally, Sistani can be recognized 

as a key religious figure who will 

have influence as a peacemaker 

and a mediator.

In Basra, the problem lies mainly in 

the factional political landscape of 

the oil-rich province.
15

groups, especially in cities like Basra and Kirkuk. He can protect smaller Shi‘i groups, like 

the Islamic Allegiance Party based in Karbala, against the pro-Iranian SCIRI organization 

and especially against Sadr, whose militia has gained control of Karbala since 2003. Where 

struggles between followers of rival populist and conservative Shi’i clerics can lead to violence in cities like Basra and Baghdad, Sistani and his network of clerical associates can 

step in as peacemakers. An example of this role is a meeting on January 2, 2007, which 

Sistani led, bringing the Shi‘i parties together and urging Sadr and his party to return to 

the Maliki government. 

So far, however, the ongoing intrasectarian tensions, especially between Sadrists and 

SCIRI, over the issues of governance (federalism) and relations with the occupying forces, 

have diminished Sistani’s ability to bring about some form of unity among the Shi‘is. 

Sistani’s power is decreasing mainly because of group rivalry among the Shi‘is, which 

began to surface after the January 2005 elections. When Sistani criticized the UIA-led 

government in 2005 for its inability to ensure protection for ordinary Iraqis and demanded 

the government improve security in the country, Ibrahim Jafari, the prime minister in 

the transitional government following the January 2005 elections, was unable to respond 

to Sistani’s request. Jafari’s government was too fractured to provide a centralized army 

devoid of militias loyal to various Shi‘i groups. Despite Maliki’s good relations with Sistani, 

the new prime minister was also unable to bring about any meaningful results with the 

formation of his unity government. As a result, Iraq saw the emergence of a stronger 

Sunni insurgency and the explosion of sectarian warfare. 

Since 2005, Sistani has grown increasingly cynical because of the Shi‘i divisions, 

and, hence, less active in Iraq’s political process. His unwillingness to become involved 

in Iraqi politics is certainly a negative factor, since it will provide a huge opportunity 

for the Sadrists and other Shi‘i groups to step into the vacuum created by his absence. 

To what extent, and under what conditions, Sistani will return to politics as a mediator 

remains uncertain. 

The Sadrist Challenge 

Since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Sadrists have emerged as one of the most populist 

grassroots movements of the post-Ba‘athist era. But the movement also poses the most 

serious threat to clerical orthodoxy and its somewhat conservative, quietist tradition—

best embodied by Ayatollah Sistani—since the revival of the usuli school of thought in 

the late eighteenth century. 

Much of the “heterodoxy” of the Sadrist movement lies in its early (2003–04) rejection of clerical monopoly. Led by some young clerical students and followers of Sadr 

who accused Sistani of transforming the shrine city of Najaf into a “sleeping house of 

learning,” the heretical tendencies of the Sadrist movement also entailed rejecting the 

religious authority of a living, high-ranking cleric in favor of the rulings of a deceased 

marja’, a blasphemous idea according to the usuli orthodox thinking that Sistani and his 

hawza represent. The tensions between the firebrand junior cleric Sadr and the quietist 

Sistani were at their worst when the cleric followers of Sadr criticized the grand ayatollah 

and even urged him and other quietist clerics to leave Iraq in 2003. At this critical juncture, the local tribal forces protected the quietist clerics, and if future conflicts between 

Sadr and Sistani supporters occur, the same local tribes will likely step in to protect the 

clerical establishment in Najaf. 

The shift in the balance of power from Sadr to the quietist establishment occurred on 

August 26, 2004. After three weeks of intense fighting between the Mahdi Army and U.S. 

and Iraqi forces around the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, Ayatollah Sistani was able to broker a cease-fire deal with Sadr. In a show of strength against the upstart Sadr, the grand 

ayatollah proved that he is a force with which to be reckoned. Sistani made it clear that 

he will not only control populist figures like Sadr in the Shi‘i Iraqi community, but will also 

exert a moderating influence on Iraqi Shi‘is to bring a peaceful transition to democracy 

Sistani has grown increasingly 

cynical because of the Shi‘i divisions, and, hence, less active in 

Iraq’s political process.

The shift in the balance of power 

from Sadr to the quietist establishment occurred on August 26, 2004. 
16

in Iraq. In a sense, the Sistani organization was able to provide a counterweight to the 

Sadrist challenge, especially in the face of growing tension between various Shi‘i groups, 

as well as with the Anglo-American armies. 

Whether Sistani will be able to help disarm the Shi‘i militias largely depends on whether 

he would be willing to issue a fatwa for disarming the militias amid the ongoing inter- and 

intrasectarian tensions. So far he has refrained from doing so.34 Following the Samarra 

attack, Sistani alluded to the use of militia forces in the protection of holy places, where 

the state army has failed to offer such protection. Sistani’s tolerance of the Shi‘i militias in 

the Samarra case highlights the emerging sectarian overtones of his attitude toward Iraqi 

affairs as he seeks to find ways to protect his Shi‘i community against Sunni extremism. 

His ability, and perhaps willingness, to limit the power of the militias is eroding. 

Although Sistani maintains high authority among many followers of Sadr, many other 

Sadrists regard him as a traitor for not standing up to Saddam Hussein in the nineties 

and the Americans in 2003 and the summer of 2004. Many Sadrists will most likely follow 

their young leader regardless of a possible call by Sistani to disarm his forces. Also, many 

shadowy groups within the Mahdi Army and Sadrist dissenters will likely challenge any 

ruling issued by Sistani to disarm their fighters, especially with the possible overstay of 

the U.S. troops in Iraq. Since these splinter groups are highly anti-Iranian, Sistani may 

find parts of southern Iraq hostile to his Najaf-based hawza and to any other non-Arab 

Iraqi clerics. 

The future of the Sadrist movement may rest upon these splinter groups, which continue to build their strength amid the sectarian warfare and the weak presence of the Iraqi 

government. It is from these groups that another charismatic and populist leader will most 

likely challenge the clerical establishment in Najaf, the Iraqi government, and the U.S.-led 

occupation of Iraq. Facing such prospects, Sistani will surely lose influence in places such 

as Sadr City, where an anti-occupation ideology like that of the Sadrists can prevail. 

Sistani’s future strategy in dealing with the Sadrist movement remains uncertain. Sistani will most likely continue to negotiate with Sadr and the movement’s future leaders 

for restraint and patience, as he did in August 2004 and later in September 2004 in a 

meeting that included Abdul Aziz Hakim, Sadr’s main rival. In an important meeting in 

early January 2007, Sistani persuaded Sadr to end his boycott of the UIA and return to the 

parliament.35 The January 21, 2007, return of the Sadrists to their seats in the Iraqi parliament, to which they were elected in December 2005, is indicative of Sistani’s enduring 

influence in the Shi‘i political community, despite his diminishing authority in the face of 

sectarian conflict and growing competition between Shi‘i groups in southern Iraq. 

The Question of U.S. Withdrawal 

Responding to a question on the possibility of a long-term U.S. presence in Iraq, Muhammad Reda Sistani, the ayatollah’s highest-ranking representative in Iraq, was quick to 

reply with the following statement: “We could tolerate the U.S. forces to a certain extent; 

however, if the Americans continue to extend their stay we will not have our autonomy 

and that is not compatible with democracy.”36 The younger Sistani later noted that the 

reason his father did not issue a fatwa against the U.S. troops in the spring of 2003 was 

mainly due to the fact that, at that moment, a Shi‘i-led insurgency would have created 

increased instability in a country that has been war-ridden for more than two decades. 

Sistani believed that the wisest move was to maintain calm in order to create a democratic 

government that would represent and protect the Iraqi people. 

The younger Sistani’s remark is crucial to understanding Sistani’s attitude toward the 

U.S. military presence in Iraq. It involves two major points: first, the United States could 

stay in Iraq as long as the Iraqis need U.S. troops to train their army to create security 

in a post-conflict period; and, second, the United States should leave Iraq once stability 

has been established and announced by the Iraqi government, bringing autonomy to a 

country that has experienced years of bloodshed. But such a vision of autonomy will not 

Sistani’s future strategy in dealing with the Sadrist movement 

remains uncertain.
17

be easily realized if the heavily armed militia of Sadr and the Sunni militant insurgency 

continue to pose an immediate threat to the well-being of Iraqis, despite the gradual 

building of an Iraqi national army with the help of the Americans. 

As a pragmatist, Sistani understands this predicament, and it is due to the Sunni 

insurgency and the Sadrist threat that he may not resist the U.S. presence in Iraq for a 

considerable period of time. As long as the national army is unable to fight off the Sunni 

insurgency and Shi‘i militias, it is highly unlikely that Sistani will call for a U.S. withdrawal 

from Iraq. Since any future Iraqi government is bound to depend on American troops 

against the insurgency, Sistani will refrain from opposing the presence of any foreign 

forces that ensure the stability of the country—at least for the time being. 

However, other questions and controversies remain. What will happen if the United 

States becomes involved in a military intervention against pro-Iranian Shi‘i militias that 

may aim to take revenge for the situation in Lebanon or if the United States attacks Iran? 

Will Sistani issue a fatwa to prevent the Shi‘i-led insurgency from taking on the Americans or the British, or will he object if U.S. attacks involve civilian deaths or a violation 

of the sanctity of holy spaces? In fact, both of these situations have already occurred, 

once in Najaf in the summer of 2004, when Sistani objected to the U.S. military incursion against the Mahdi Army in the holy city, and in July 2006, when he spoke against 

the Bush administration support for Israel against the Lebanese Hizbollah. Will Sistani 

muster support against the U.S. troops in Iraq if the administration decides to engage in 

a military operation against Iran and its nuclear facilities? 

To answer these questions, we must bear in mind that Sistani is primarily concerned 

with maintaining stability in the region while rejecting any policy or military adventurism that could endanger the integrity, autonomy, and security of Muslim countries in the 

greater Middle East. U.S. policymakers must recognize that any perceived belligerent U.S. 

action in the region could provoke the wrath of Sistani and his numerous followers in 

countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon.

The U.S. aim should be to secure a pragmatic cooperation with Sistani’s network 

through the Iraqi government, assuring the grand ayatollah that the United States’ longterm objective is to protect the autonomy of Iraq, keep it free from military occupation, 

and to promote stability in the region. The United States should also demonstrate its 

intent to protect Iraqi citizens from sectarian warfare. If not, Sistani could rally hundreds 

of thousands of Shi‘is, as he did in January 2004 to reject plans for a caucus system. The 

key player here is a competent and trustworthy Iraqi government that is able and willing 

to maintain peace and stability. If the Iraqi government cannot do so, then the United 

States should seek a third party, such as the United Nations, to work toward the goal of 

bringing stability to the country against sectarian conflict.

Post-Sistani Iraq: Who Will Succeed Sistani? 

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Sistani’s influence on the future of Iraq concerns 

the impact of his death. The grand ayatollah has not yet appointed a successor according to the traditional clerical succession process. Yet Sistani is now 76 years old and his 

health could easily deteriorate, as it did in summer 2004, leaving a leadership vacuum in 

the Shi‘i Iraqi community. Notwithstanding Sistani’s decreasing influence since February 

2006, no other cleric in the post-Ba‘athist era has had so much authority in Iraq, and his 

death could precipitate a major intrasectarian conflict that would cause major problems 

in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities in the south. 

The leading candidate to replace Sistani is the Afghan-born, Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Ishaq Fayadh. He is an old seminary student friend of Sistani since the 

1950s and a staunch ally since 1992. Ayatollah Khu’i reportedly recognized Fayadh as one 

of his most trusted and loved students, and it is likely that Sistani will soon appoint him 

as his successor.37 As a successor, Fayadh is more likely to deal directly with the AmeriThe U.S. aim should be to secure 

a pragmatic cooperation with 

Sistani’s network through the Iraqi 

government. 

Sistani is now 76 years old and 

his health could easily deteriorate, 

leaving a leadership vacuum in the 

Shi‘i Iraqi community.
18

cans and get involved in the transition process; however, he is also likely to antagonize 

the Sadrist nationalists, who view him as an Afghan foreigner who should not have a say 

in Iraq’s politics. 

Two other Najaf-based clerics, the grand ayatollahs Bashir Hussein al-Najafi and 

Muhammad Said Hakim, are also potential candidates. A major problem in the succession 

for most Shi‘i Iraqis (excluding the Sadrists) will likely be the non-Arab ethnicity of Fayad 

and Najafi—Fayadh is an Afghani and Najafi is an Indian by birth. However, it should be 

recalled that Ayatollah Khu’i was an ethnic Azari and a national of Iran, yet he was revered 

by most Iraqi Arab, Kurdish, and Turkmen Shi‘is. Sistani himself is an Iranian, and he has 

remained the most respected cleric with the largest number of adherents in Iraq. It is 

important to remember that the most important feature of a successor to a high-ranking 

cleric like Sistani would be his recognized piety and knowledge among the clerical establishment and the global Shi‘i community. Therefore, it is unlikely that Najafi and Hakim 

will be the successors because they are considered lesser scholars than Fayadh, who is 

highly respected by many Shi‘i Iraqis, particularly by the tribal chieftains of Najaf.

The main question is when, amid the sectarian turmoil and the democratic transition 

of Iraq, Sistani will appoint a successor. As Mehdi Khalaji has explained, traditionally, a 

marja’ usually avoids appointing a successor, since he carries the responsibility for the 

successor’s possible impieties or mistakes after the marja’s own death.38 Choosing a successor can also create animosity among competing candidates, generating problems for 

the community. The process of succession will be a challenging one, a process with which 

Sistani might have to engage seriously in the near future. Whichever marja’ becomes the 

successor, however, he will certainly face responsibilities similar to Sistani’s, with perhaps 

fewer supporters and less religious authority.

The Younger Sistani 

Regardless of who emerges as Sistani’s successor, the person who will continue to manage 

Sistani’s center at Najaf after his death will probably be Muhammad Reda Sistani, the oldest son and the most trusted wakil of the grand ayatollah. In his early forties, Muhammad 

Reda has a reputation for being the most able of all Sistani’s representatives in Iraq. At 

Najaf, he maintains a great deal of respect among the local tribal leaders and many Shi‘i 

political leaders and he is highly intelligent and articulate. The younger Sistani exemplifies 

much of what his father has been revered for since 2003: he is a man of religious integrity 

and ascetic piety with the wisdom to guide and unite the Iraqi people against domestic 

and foreign enemies. 

Although his authority will be second to whomever succeeds his father, the younger 

Sistani can be expected to play a major role in the organization and the management of 

Sistani’s center in Najaf after his father’s death. For the most part, Muhammad Reda will 

continue to be responsible for managing the accumulated wealth of Sistani’s religious 

organization. Should his father become seriously ill, Muhammad Reda might be one of the 

only Shi‘i leaders who could offer political solutions to Iraq’s problems. At this moment, 

he is in full control of his father’s affairs at the Najaf center. He maintains a low profile, 

but is highly active in expanding tribal loyalty against potential threats from radical Shi‘i 

groups. 

However, it is unlikely that the Sadrists will yield to Muhammad Reda as they have to 

Sistani since August 2004. It is highly possible that after the death of Sistani, the followers of Sadr, especially those local commanders of the Mahdi militia who have become 

increasingly independent of Sadr since the December 2005 elections, might attempt to 

either expel or assassinate Sistani’s son. But this scenario will also depend on how SCIRI’s 

Badr organization reacts to such a situation, in case a problem of succession occurs. If the 

Sadrists attempt to gain control of Najaf as they did in the summer of 2004, SCIRI will 

The most important feature of a 

successor would be his recognized 

piety and knowledge among the 

clerical establishment and the 

global Shi‘i community.

In his early forties, Muhammad 

Reda has a reputation for being 

the most able of all Sistani’s 

representatives in Iraq.

It is unlikely that the Sadrists 

will yield to Muhammad Reda 

as they have to Sistani since 

August 2004.
19

most likely support Muhammad Reda. This could lead to a bloody confrontation between 

the Sadrists and SCIRI in the central provinces of southern Iraq. 

Conclusion and Recommendations

At a public lecture at the United States Institute of Peace in July 2005, former CPA 

spokesman Dan Senor described his perplexity over the Sistani phenomenon during the 

height of the postwar period: “Those days we were constantly trying to figure out if Sistani was Archbishop Tutu or Ayatollah Khomeini.” What Senor, and certain members of 

the CPA, who lacked any serious training in the history and cultural life of Iraq, failed to 

recognize was that Sistani is neither Tutu nor Khomeini; bluntly put, Sistani is Sistani. 

To appreciate him and to understand his role in Iraqi politics, one has to understand 

his ideas, thoughts, and works in relation to the distinct religious tradition to which he 

belongs, seen in the context of Iranian and Iraqi histories. Knowing the history of Iraq 

and particularly its religious tradition would have saved U.S. officials from many avoidable 

missteps and mistakes, including the failure to design a comprehensive plan to engage 

Sistani in Iraq’s political process. 

Washington would do well to heed the views of Vali Nasr laid out in the 2004 summer 

issue of The Washington Quarterly. While discussing the revival of Shi‘i Islam and the resurgence of the militant Sunni forces as an aftermath of the 2003 overthrow of Saddam, Nasr 

wisely suggested that the U.S. government “avoid confrontation with Iraq’s Shi‘a and, 

most importantly, al-Sistani.”39 Two years later, Nasr’s statement continues to be relevant, 

as Sistani maintains a tight grip on some of Iraq’s most important democratic building 

blocks: numerous civic associations, tribal orders, and political parties in the southern 

regions of the country. Even among some of the Sadrists and the followers of Ayatollah 

Yaqubi of the Fadhilla party in Basra, Sistani holds a high level of authority.

To ignore Sistani, as Bremer and the CPA did in the summer of 2003, is to fail to recognize the deep-seated spiritual authority and historical influence of the clerical establishment in post-Ba‘athist Iraq. The relevance of Iraq’s most influential religious figure in the 

democratization of Iraq will be a critical variable. To attempt to build a new Iraq without 

the participation or the intervention of Ayatollah Sistani and other Shi‘i clerics on the 

local level would be highly unrealistic and certainly unwise.

But to rely too heavily on Sistani as a mediator and a peacemaker is also a mistake. 

Sistani maintains considerable traditional authority, but his power is limited due to the 

political situation on the ground, which is becoming more unpredictable with the ongoing 

sectarian tensions. Sistani’s current influence in Iraq is, therefore, ambiguous: he remains 

a major figure with a huge financial and religious network, but his influence is increasingly challenged as a result of sectarian tensions and the rise of low-ranking clerical leaders, like Sadr, who seek to make a name for themselves in their sectarian communities.

So how might Baghdad and the United States deal more effectively with Sistani? 

First, Baghdad and Washington should recognize that until the sectarian warfare 

subsides, Sistani is unlikely to regain his pre-2006 authority. While he still maintains 

enormous authority over Shi‘is, Sistani is limited to expanding his religious organization 

and helping to build a vibrant civil society in southern Iraq amid anti-Shi‘i attacks conducted by Sunni Salafists and rivalries among Shi‘i militia groups. Only after the central 

government has attained firm control over major urban areas can Sistani reclaim his 

traditional authority and maintain cohesion within the Shi‘i political coalition. U.S. support for building a strong Iraqi military, therefore, is indirectly connected to bolstering 

Sistani’s authority. 

Second, it is primarily in the constitutional process that Sistani could play a major 

role in overcoming sectarian tensions in the Iraqi government. The months leading 

up to the revision of the constitution are crucial, especially after recommended amendments to the constitution will have to be approved by another referendum. Because the 

Knowing the history of Iraq and 

its religious tradition would have 

saved U.S. officials from many 

avoidable missteps and mistakes.
20

United States has lost influence over the Iraqi government since Maliki’s rise to power, 

and because the Sadrists wield greater popularity under his reign—particularly since 

their withdrawal from the parliament on April 16, 2007—it will become more crucial to 

involve Sistani in the negotiating process as a bridge-builder. Sistani could play the role 

of someone who would seek to achieve compromise between political factions over issues 

such as deba‘athification and redistribution of oil.

His staunch stance against a sectarian model of federalism will be welcomed by many 

Iraqi nationalists who fear the breakup of their country. His involvement could also 

encourage the Sunnis to use greater political participation as a way to break down the 

Kurdish-Shi‘i hegemony over the Iraqi government. But if the constitutional negotiations 

fail due to sectarian agendas promoted by groups such as SCIRI, democratization in Iraq 

could be dealt a major blow and tensions could be expanded with the greater marginalization of the Sunnis. 

Third, the United States should be realistic in its assessment of what it can expect 

from Sistani, and it should recognize that Washington’s interests may not always 

coincide fully with those of Sistani. The United States should not rely too heavily on 

Sistani as a peacemaker who can ultimately serve U.S. interests in Iraq and the region. 

Washington should, in particular, avoid considering Sistani as an ally who can potentially 

help American troops in case of a Shi‘i uprising against the U.S. occupation. Sistani 

is not, in the words of an American official, a “pro-American” cleric; nor is he “antiAmerican.” The ayatollah is highly suspicious of any foreign forces on Muslim lands, 

whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Lebanon. For the most part, Sistani views the U.S. presence as an act of occupation and believes that the Americans have no moral or political 

legitimacy to maintain their troops in Iraq. As noted earlier, he emerges from the quietist 

tradition, which holds the clerical establishment responsible for challenging and even at 

times resisting foreign occupation, especially if such an occupation is perceived to be 

jeopardizing the contract of social relations among the Muslim believers in an Islamic 

country. Sistani’s call for U.S. withdrawal from Iraq may be inevitable, and Washington 

should not ignore his demands. 

Finally, rather than viewing the politics of post-Ba‘athist Iraq as an opportunity 

to create a liberal democracy that could serve as a model for the greater Middle East, 

Washington should anticipate the possible emergence of a “postliberal”—though not 

necessarily “illiberal”—democracy that may not be well-disposed to U.S. interests in 

the region. Liberal democracy has been viewed as an ideal option for Iraq by many policymakers, but in reality Iraqi democracy may develop to become something completely 

different than expected when the United States invaded the country with the intention 

of making it a model of liberal democracy for the Middle East in order to transform the 

political regime of Iraq’s neighbors. For the most part, the fledgling Iraqi democracy can 

be described as becoming a hybrid communitarian and liberal order that may display the 

following three features: 

(a)Different practices of citizenship and accountability than the Western practice of 

democracy, including the practice of accountability through non-state actors, mainly 

religious organizations led by clerical authorities. 

(b)Islam playing a predominate role in the makeup of the government through political 

party structure.

(c)Consolidation of a democratic state that may be potentially hostile to other democratic states, especially countries like Britain and the United States. 

Ideally, a postliberal form of democracy includes not only the protection of the freedom 

of religion but of all modern liberties and civil rights, as well as the very right of civil polity to exist against absolutist trends. Sistani’s effort to accommodate religion in the Iraqi 

constitutional democracy should not be seen as something negative (or anti-democratic), 

but as offering the possibility of creating a new democratic order that is simply different 

Sistani is not a “pro-American” 

cleric, nor is he “anti-American.” 
21

from the type of democratic system known in the United States. The new political order 

most likely will not include any dominant secular features, especially the presence of a 

major secular political party in the government, but the democratic practices of access, 

accountability, competition, and participation may be intact. 

In short, liberal democracy, as understood and practiced in its American federated 

sense, may not (or perhaps should not) be the yardstick by which to measure all other 

types of democracy, especially in the Iraqi case. The United States must nonetheless do 

all it can to accommodate and support the new Iraqi government and its civil society 

with the aim of maintaining the ideal of accountability and popular sovereignty that is 

common to all types of democracies. 

Building a democracy is the art of fostering a sense of accountability, backed by a 

strong state that can provide security and safety for its citizens. Democratization requires 

the shaping of a political community whose members feel that they belong to a collective 

body of institutions that represent and allow them to govern themselves via legitimate 

and transparent means. 

At this critical juncture, Iraq lacks both a fully legitimate democratic state and transparent political institutions; it also lacks a shared sense of democratic solidarity, which is 

increasingly being replaced by provincial tribalism and militant sectarianism, especially 

in the Shi‘i populated regions of southern Iraq. What is also missing is an autonomous 

Iraqi state, independent of the U.S. military and solely dependent on and transparent to 

the Iraqi people: a state that can govern beyond the Green Zone bubble and combat the 

onslaught of insurgency without the assistance of U.S. forces. 

In this milieu, nonetheless, the grand ayatollah and his socioreligious network are 

likely to continue to be a force for moderation amid the ongoing sectarian tensions and 

intra-Shi‘i competition. Sistani’s staunch support for popular sovereignty and a united 

Iraqi government, devoid of sectarian politics, can be one of the most momentous factors 

for the promotion of democracy and stability in a country that appears to be descending 

into a major civil war. Iraq simply cannot be held together by Iraqi army and police forces, 

even with the full backing of the U.S. forces. What Iraq needs is a political system that is 

made up of democratically minded actors loyal to a new democratic order, inclusive of all 

ethnic and sectarian groups in the country. Policymakers would be well advised not to 

underestimate the role of the grand ayatollah Sistani in their quest for this new Iraq. 
22

Notes

 1. The Sadrists have not only advanced an Islamist political agenda in an attempt to 

redefine the Iraqi state in terms of chiliastic visions of authority, but also mobilized 

a grassroots movement composed of disenfranchised Shi‘i youths initiated in the 

cult of martyrdom and impassioned with anti-American sentiments; their network 

operatives and ideological popularity among many Iraqis since spring 2003 may 

serve to illustrate the growing tide of public religion based on militant overtones 

in post-Ba‘athist Iraq.

 2. The term “public religion” can be described as a modern phenomenon whereby 

religion enters the public domain to question, contest, or protect religious ideals 

of individual action and social normality from administrative state penetration, in 

the process opening up a new public domain with religious overtones and network 

mobilization of religious interaction, breaking down the strict secularist separation between the “religious” and “political” spheres. For a comprehensive study of 

public religion, see José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1994). 

 3. Unless otherwise stated, in this report the term “Shi‘i” refers only to the Twelver 

sect, which represents the overwhelming population of Iraqi Shi‘is. 

 4. According to my informal studies, this view is not shared by many Sunni Arabs, who 

see Sistani as a sectarian religious figure of Iranian nationality. The Iranian element 

plays a major role in Sunni-Shi‘i relations in the post-Ba‘athist era. 

 5. Based on a conversation with Ayatollah Morteda Montezari, Qom, Iran, May 2005. 

 6. Based on a conversation with a seminary student at Sistani’s center, Qom, July 

2006. 

 7. It should be noted that Sunni Muslims, too, revere the shrine of Ali as a major 

sacred site. 

 8. As a result of such a decentralized network of civic associations, many of the representatives (including the high-ranking ones) do not necessarily share the exact 

views of or agree with the rulings of Sistani. This has been a major problem in 

determining how Sistani “really” views certain political matters since 2003. See 

Reidar Visser, “Sistani, the United States and Politics in Iraq: From Quietism to 

Machiavellianism?” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, no. 700 (2006): 

5–6. 

 9. Abdul Rahim Aghighi Bakshaishi, Faqih Rasteh (Qom: Islam, 2004): 114. 

10. Sandro Magister, “Shiite Islam: The Grand Ayatollah Sistani Wants Najaf as the Capital,” April, 3, 2004, www.chiesa.espressonline.it/printDettaglio.jsp?id=7021&eng=y. 

[Accessed February 14, 2007]

11. For a rough account of Sistani’s financial sources in 2004, see Magister, “Shiite 

Islam.” For the best recent study of Sistani’s financial system, see Mehdi Khalaji, 

“The Last Marja: Sistani and the End of Traditional Religious Authority in Shiism,” 

Policy Focus no. 59 (September 2006), 51 pages, especially page 10. According to 

Khalaji, Sistani’s “annual income is between $500 million and $700 million and his 

worldwide assets exceed $3 billion.” 

12. Vali Nasr, “Understanding Sistani’s Role,” Washington Post, April 19, 2004, A19. 

13. The hospital is the second most advanced in the region. 

14. After Ayatollah Ali Khameini, Sistani pays the largest stipend to the seminary students in Qom. Sistani pays 70,000 tomans (roughly $77) per month to unmarried 

seminary students and 100,000 tomans (roughly $112) to married students. An 

added 100,000 toman ($112) is paid to the students at the end of the year. However, Ayatollah Khameini pays the Qom seminary students more than 25 percent of 

Sistani’s stipend. In Najaf, however, Iraqi seminary students are paid 70,000 tomans 
23

and those with families are paid 100,000 tomans per month by Sistani’s son, 

Muhammed Reda, who runs the Najaf center. Author interview with a representative 

of Sistani, Qom, Iran, July 17, 2006. 

15. www.holynajaf.net. 

16. www.holykarbala.net; www.holykadhmia.com; www.basracity.net.

17. These websites would include Sistani’s centers in many cities, including Beirut and 

Damascus. See www.sistani.org/html/far/main/index.php?page=9&lang=far&part=9. 

18. The two computer servers that the center uses are based in California and Canada. 

For the website of the Aalulbayt Global Information Center, see http://www.

al-shia.com/html/eng/index.htm. 

19. See Visser, “Sistani, the United States and Politics in Iraq,” 11. 

20. Quoted by Juan Cole, “The Ayatollahs and Democracy in Iraq,” ISIM Review no. 17 

(spring 2006): 34–35.

21. Edward Wong, “Direct Election of Iraqi Assembly Pushed by Cleric,” New York Times, 

January 12, 2004, A1. 

22. Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort 

to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2005), 86.

23. Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi‘a in the Modern Arab World: Reaching for Power (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 9. 

24. Author interview, a representative of Sistani, Qom, July 18, 2006. 

25. Visser, “Sistani, the United States and Politics in Iraq,” 13–14.

26. Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New 

York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 189. 

27. Alex Berenson, “Iraq’s Shiite Insist on Democracy: Washington Cringes,” Common Dreams News Center, November 30, 2003. www.commondreams.org/

headlines03/1130-03.htm. 

28. Juan Cole, “Sistani the Big Winner; Kurds Furious,” Antiwar.com, June 10, 2004. 

Accessed February 14, 2007, www.antiwar.com/cole/?articleid=2779.

29. On August 5, 2005, Ibrahim Jafari quoted Sistani on the constitution: “Ayatollah 

Sistani does not disagree with the principle of federalism if the Iraqi people choose 

it.” www.iran-daily.com/1384/2342/html/index.htm. 

30. This point is suggested by Larry Diamond in his article “What to do in Iraq: A 

Roundtable,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, 152.

31. Author interview, Najaf, August 8, 2005. 

32. As a representative of Sistani describes, it was for this reason that Sistani decided 

to keep his distance from the UIA in the December 2005 elections. 

33. Author interview, Najaf, August 8, 2005. 

34. In May 2006, Sistani issued a statement favoring the disarmament of militias, but 

he never issued an official fatwa. 

35. Hussain Al-Kabi, “al-Sadr Yahath Mowaqf al-tiyar al-Sadri beshan al-Hukumat wa 

al-barleman ma al-Sistani,”alsabaah, January 9, 2007. http://www.alsabaah.com/

paper.php?source=akbar&mlf=interpage&sid=35299.

36. Author interview, Najaf, August 8, 2005. 

37. Author interview, Qom, July 17, 2006. 

38. Mehdi Khalaji, The Last Marja: Sistani and the End of Traditional Religious Authority 

in Shiism (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006), 

18. 

39. Vali Nasr, “Regional Implications of Shi‘a Revival in Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly,

vol. 27, no. 7 (2004): 21.
United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

Of Related Interest

A number of other publications from the United States Institute of Peace examine issues 

related to democracy and Iraq.

Recent Institute reports include

• Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, March 

2007)

• Iraq’s New Political Map, by Phebe Marr (Special Report, January 2007)

• Scenarios for the Insurgency in Iraq, by Alan Schwartz (Special Report, October 

2007)

• Weak Viability: The Iraqi Federal State and the Constitutional Amendment Process, by 

Jonathan Morrow (Special Report, July 2006)

• Who Are Iraq’s New Leaders? What Do They Want? By Phebe Marr (Special Report, 

March 2006)

• Strategies for Promoting Democracy in Iraq, by Eric Davis (Special Report, October 

2005)

• The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Governance in Iraq, by Celeste J. 

Ward (Special Report, May 2005)

• Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq, by Amatzia Baram (Special Report, 

April 2005)

• Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Shaping a Vision for the Country’s Future (Special Report, 

February 2005) **Arabic version available

• Promoting Middle East Democracy: European Initiatives, by Mona Yacoubian (Special 

Report, October 2004) **Arabic version available

• Donor Activities and Civil Society Potential in Iraq (Special Report, July 2004)

• Post-Conflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy (Special Report, 

May 2004)

• Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein, by Graham E. Fuller (Special Report, 

August 2003)

Recent Institute books include

• Islam and Democracy: Religion, Politics, and Power in the Middle East, by Timothy D. 

Sisk