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IMPACT OF LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR ON THE

EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION,

CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 28, 2007

Serial No. 110–38

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JOSEPH GIBSON, Minority Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

JERROLD NADLER, New York, Chairman 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

DAVID LACHMANN, Chief of Staff 

PAUL B. TAYLOR, Minority Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

JUNE 28, 2007

OPENING STATEMENT 

Page 

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil 

Rights, and Civil Liberties .................................................................................. 1

The Honorable Artur Davis, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Alabama, and Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 

and Civil Liberties ............................................................................................... 3

The Honorable Trent Franks, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil 

Rights, and Civil Liberties .................................................................................. 4

WITNESSES 

Ms. Lilly Ledbetter, Jacksonville, AL 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 6

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8

Ms. Martha Chamallas, Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law, Moritz College of 

Law, Ohio State University 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 31

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 33

Mr. Neal D. Mollen, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 51

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 54

Ms. Marcia Greenberger, Co-President, National Women’s Law Center 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 65

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of Wade Henderson, President and CEO, Leadership 

Conference on Civil Rights .................................................................................. 87

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Marcia Greenberger, Co-President, 

National Women’s Law Center ........................................................................... 91

(1)

IMPACT OF LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR ON 

THE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL 

RIGHTS LAWS 

THURSDAY, JUNE 28, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION,

CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in 

Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerrold 

Nadler (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Nadler, Davis, Wasserman Schultz, 

Ellison, Scott, Watt, Franks, and Issa. 

Staff present: Heather Sawyer, Majority Counsel; David 

Lachmann, Subcommittee Chief of Staff; Keenan Keller, Majority 

Counsel; Kanya Bennett, Majority Counsel; Susana Gutierrez, Professional Staff Member; and Paul Taylor, Minority Counsel. 

Mr. NADLER. Good morning. This hearing of the Subcommittee 

on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties will come to 

order. 

Today’s hearing will examine the Supreme Court’s recent decision in the case of Ledbetter v. Goodyear and its impact on the effective enforcement of the civil rights laws. 

I want to welcome everyone here today. I strongly believe in 

maintaining an open process, and the Subcommittee will proceed 

with its work. 

The Chair will recognize himself for 5 minutes for an opening 

statement. 

Today’s hearing examines the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 

the case of Ledbetter v. Goodyear in which the court severely limited the ability of victims of discrimination to seek vindication of 

their rights as guaranteed under law. 

We will have the opportunity to hear from Lilly Ledbetter directly, but I think it is important to point out that the question before the court had nothing to do with whether or not she had been 

a victim of intentional discrimination over the course of her 19 

years at Goodyear or whether she had, in fact, suffered harm as 

a direct result of that intentional unlawful discrimination. 

What was at issue was whether it was an act of discrimination 

each time she was paid less than her male counterparts solely because of her gender or whether it was only the initial decision that 

2

counted for the purpose of getting past the courthouse door under 

a discrimination complaint. 

I am very concerned that once again the Supreme Court has gone 

out of its way to read our antidiscrimination laws as narrowly as 

possible so as to deny relief to as many victims of discrimination 

as possible. I am particularly disturbed that the Congress seems to 

have addressed this particular issue very specifically in the 1991 

Civil Rights Restoration Act, and the court seems to have ignored 

that. 

The court has now rewarded employers who successfully conceal 

their discriminatory actions from their employees. That is not hard 

to do when it comes to pay. Unlike the Congress, which publishes 

all salaries quarterly and anyone can look and see what any of our 

aides or we are making by looking at those quarterly statements, 

private business can and does conceal from its employees how 

much each worker is receiving. 

The court’s decision is an open invitation to violate the law with 

virtual impunity. The court’s narrow reading of the 180-day rule 

would also seem to invite more litigation as employees rush to 

court, lest they forfeit any chance of redress. 

Perhaps, as Congress did in 1991, we will have to go back and 

clarify the law again and, this time, hope the Supreme Court does 

not ignore the plain words on the paper. If that is necessary, so be 

it. 

I recall being asked once when the court seemed incapable or unwilling to follow clear congressional intent on an antidiscrimination 

statute, ‘‘Don’t you guys have some boilerplate language you can 

put in there that says ‘We really mean it this time’?’’ Well, we really mean it. I think it is important that the Congress respond to this 

decision swiftly and effectively. 

Our colleague, the Chairman of the Education and Labor Committee, Mr. Miller of California, has introduced legislation to try to 

clarify one more time for the court the intent of Congress to provide timely, accessible recourse to victims of intentional discrimination. I have co-sponsored it, and I hope to have the opportunity to 

vote for it soon. 

I would appreciate any thoughts or suggestions members of the 

panel might have on how they believe we ought to proceed. 

I want to welcome our witnesses today. I look forward to hearing 

from your testimony. 

The Ranking minority Member is not here yet, so we will recognize him when he arrives for his opening statements. 

In the interest of proceeding to our witnesses and mindful of our 

busy schedules, I would ask that other Members submit their 

statements for the record. Without objection, all Members will have 

5 legislative days to submit an opening statement for the record. 

Without objection, the Chair will be authorized to declare a recess of the hearing at any time, especially should there be votes 

called on the floor. 

We will now turn to our first panel of witnesses. As we ask questions of our witnesses, the Chair will recognize Members in the 

order of their seniority on the Subcommittee, alternating between 

majority, minority, provided that the Member is present when his 

or her turn arrives. 

3

Members who are not present when their turn begins will be recognized after the other Members have had the opportunity to ask 

their questions. The Chair reserves the right to accommodate a 

Member who is unavoidably late or only able to be with us for a 

short time. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Georgia to do the first introduction. Did I get it wrong? Alabama? Alabama. I am sorry. 

Mr. DAVIS. I thank my friend from New Jersey. [Laughter.] 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for recognizing me to introduce a 

member of my State, unfortunately not one of my constituents. She 

is about an hour away, but I was near her territory on Saturday 

night. 

Lilly Ledbetter is from the Gadsden area, and she has worked at 

a Goodyear plant for a number of years. This case is ultimately 

about her. She is a very brave, very principled woman who did everything that she was asked to do by her company. She received 

exemplary performance evaluations. 

There was only one problem. They were committed to paying the 

men at the company more and, of course, she did not know about 

it for a long, long period of time. She eventually followed what was 

the law in the 11th Circuit and, frankly, the prevailing law of the 

United States by filing within 180 days of the last known instance 

of discriminatory pay an EEOC claim. 

She had her day in court. A jury of her peers in a district that 

is notoriously hostile to our plantiffs in title VII cases still found 

in her favor, and the jury awarded compensatory and punitive 

damages as well as backpay. 

The U.S. Supreme Court changed the rules on her in midstream, 

undercut years of established precedent in law, and I am happy to 

report to you, Ms. Ledbetter, that yesterday the Education and 

Labor Committee voted 25 to 20 to pass a bill that will correct 

what the Supreme Court did in the Ledbetter case. I assure you 

that is very prompt action by a congressional Committee. 

The ruling happened just several weeks ago. You and I were in 

Birmingham at our press conference just several weeks ago. The 

Committee on Education and Labor has acted in a prompt expeditious fashion. I compliment Chairman Miller for that, and I welcome you here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Our next witness is Martha Chamallas, the Robert J. Lynn Chair 

in Law at the Ohio State University, where she teaches employment discrimination law, torts and gender in the law. With more 

than 30 years as a law professor, she has written numerous articles on gender and race discrimination in employment, pay equity 

and sexual harassment. She has served on task forces investigating 

race and gender bias in the courts for the states of Iowa and Pennsylvania. 

Our next witness is Neal Mollen, a partner with the firm of Paul 

Hastings. He is the local office chair of the employment law department in Washington and co-chair of the firm’s appellate practices 

group. He regularly represents employers and employer associations as parties and amici curiae in labor and employment matters 

before the Supreme Court and other Federal and State courts. He 

4

is an adjunct professor of labor law at the Georgetown University 

Law Center. He appears today on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of 

Commerce. 

Our final witness is Marcia Greenberger, the founder and copresident of the National Women’s Law Center. Ms. Greenberger 

and the center have worked with the Congress in advocating the 

courts to ensure the rights of women. Ms. Greenberger received a 

presidential appointment to the National Skills Standards Board 

and is currently a member of the executive committee of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, is on the board of directors of 

the Women’s Law and Public Policy Fellowship Program, the Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice and the National Student 

Partnerships, and a councilmember of the American Bar Association’s section on individual rights and responsibilities. In 1972, she 

started and became director of the Women’s Rights Project of the 

Center for Law and Social Policy, which became the National Women’s Law Center in 1981. 

I am pleased to welcome all of you. Your written statements will 

be made part of the record in its entirety. 

I would ask each of you to summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less. To help you stay within that time, there is a timing 

light at your table. When 1 minute remains, the light will switch 

from green to yellow, and then to red when the time is up. 

And before we go to our first witness, I will now recognize for 5 

minutes the distinguished gentleman from Arizona, the Ranking 

minority Member, for his opening statement. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your forbearance here. 

I was delayed earlier, but I thank all of you for being here. It 

is a good day. We are looking forward to hearing what you have 

to say. 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an ‘‘unlawful 

employment practice to discriminate against any individual with 

respect to his compensation because of the individual’s sex.’’

An equally important provision of title VII provides that an individual wishing to challenge an employment practice must first file 

a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the 

EEOC. In order to facilitate the timely resolution of claims, such 

a charge must be filed within a specified period, either 100 or 300 

days, depending upon the State. After the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, if the employee does not submit a timely 

filing to the EEOC, the employee may not challenge that practice 

in court. 

In May, the Supreme Court handed down a case called Ledbetter 

v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Inc., and in that case, the 

plaintiff, Ms. Ledbetter, filed a charge of pay discrimination with 

the EEOC 19 years after a decision was allegedly made to pay her 

less than her male colleagues. 

Ms. Ledbetter argued that her 1998 filing with the EEOC, was 

timely regarding the decision that allegedly occurred 19 years earlier because the effect of that decision 19 years earlier was to keep 

her salary lower than it should have been until the present day. 

The Supreme Court properly rejected that claim, relied on the 

clear terms of the statute and held that a claim of discrimination 

5

must be brought within 180 or 300 days of the discriminatory act, 

not up to 20 years later when there was no evidence that Goodyear 

was currently making any discriminatory decisions. 

The court appropriately held that, ‘‘Ledbetter’s claim would shift 

intent from one act to a later act that was not performed with bias 

or discriminatory motive. The effect of this shift would be to impose 

liability in the absence of the requisite discriminatory intent. The 

statutes of limitation serve a policy of repose. They represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and the 

right to be free of stale claims.’’

The EEOC filing deadline protects employees and employers 

from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long past. Congress clearly intended to encourage 

the prompt processing of all charges of employment discrimination. 

The court also stated that it was proper to impose a statute of 

limitations on discrimination claims because ‘‘evidence relating to 

intent may quickly fade with time, and the passage of time may 

seriously diminish the ability of the parties and the fact finder to 

reconstruct what actually happened.’’

A person making a claim of discrimination will always be able 

to tell their side of the story, but, over time, an employer has less 

and less ability to tell its story, as managers quit, retire or die, and 

businesses are reorganized, taken apart or sold. Consequently, the 

timely filing of discrimination claims is essential. 

In fact, the court concluded that this case illustrates the problems created by tardy lawsuits. 

To put the case in context, at her trial, Ms. Ledbetter challenged 

every one of her employee evaluations and associated pay increases 

all the way back to 1979 when she started working at Goodyear. 

Most of her complaints centered on the actions of a single manager 

whom she claimed had retaliated against her when she refused to 

go out with him on a date. 

By the time the case went to trial, however, the manager had 

died and could not possibly have told the jury that he never asked 

Ms. Ledbetter on a date at all or that he never made a discriminatory compensation decision. 

The Ledbetter decision simply applied long-established precedent 

and a proper reading of the statutory text to what it appropriately 

called a tardy lawsuit. These claims were known to Ms. Ledbetter 

at the time they occurred 19 years earlier. That is not the proper 

way to bring a lawsuit. People should bring their claims when they 

know they have them. 

The Supreme Court upheld that principle. In so doing, it helped 

protect both victims and the accused by providing both sides and 

the judges who decide these cases with fresh available evidence 

that is absolutely essential to a just result. 

And, Mr. Chairman, with that, I look forward to hearing from all 

our witnesses today. Thank you. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

We will now hear from our first witness. Ms. Ledbetter, you may 

proceed. 

6

TESTIMONY OF LILLY LEDBETTER, JACKSONVILLE, AL 

Ms. Ledbetter. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. 

Ranking Member, for inviting me. My name is Lilly Ledbetter. It 

is an honor to be here today to talk about my experience trying to 

enforce my right to equal pay for equal work. 

I wish my story had a happy ending, but it does not. I hope that 

this Committee can do whatever is necessary to make sure that in 

the future, what happened to me does not happen to other people 

who suffer discrimination like I did. 

My story began in 1979 when Goodyear hired me to work as supervisor in their tire plant in Gadsden, AL. Toward the end of my 

career, I got the feeling that maybe I was not getting paid as much 

as I should or as much as the men, but there was no way to know 

for sure because pay levels were kept strictly confidential. 

I only started to get some hard evidence of discrimination when 

someone anonymously left a piece of paper in my mailbox at work 

showing what I got paid and what three other male managers were 

getting paid. 

When I later complained to the EEOC just before I retired, I 

found out that while I was earning about $3,700 per month, all the 

men were earning between $4,300 and $5,200 per month. This happened because time and again I got smaller raises than the men, 

and, over the years, those little differences added up and multiplied. 

At the trial, the jury found that Goodyear had discriminated 

against me in violation of title VII. The jury awarded me more 

than $3 million in backpay, mental anguish and punitive damages. 

I can tell you that was a good moment. 

It showed that the jury took my civil rights seriously and was not 

going to stand for a big company like Goodyear taking advantage 

of a chance to pay me less than others just because I was a woman, 

and it seemed like a large enough award that a big company like 

Goodyear might feel the sting and think better of it before discriminating like that again. 

I was very disappointed, however, when the trial judge was 

forced to reduce that award to the $300,000 statutory cap. It felt 

like the law was sending a message that what Goodyear did was 

only 10 percent as serious as the jury and I thought it was. 

I am not a lawyer, but I am told that most of the time, the law 

does not put an arbitrary cap like that on the amount a defendant 

has to pay for mental anguish or punitive damages. I do not see 

why a company like Goodyear should get better treatment just because it broke a law protecting workers against discrimination instead of some other kind of law. 

But, in the end, the Supreme Court took it all away, even the 

backpay. They said I should have complained every time I got a 

smaller raise than the men, even if I did not know what the men 

were getting paid and even if I had no way to prove the decision 

was discrimination. 

Justice Ginsburg hit the nail on the head when she said that the 

majority’s rule just does not make sense in the real world. You cannot expect people to go around asking their coworkers how much 

money they are making. Plus, even if you know some people are 

7

getting paid a little more than you, that is no reason to suspect discrimination right away. 

Every paycheck I received, I got less than what I was entitled to 

under the law. The Supreme Court said that this does not count 

as illegal discrimination, but it sure feels like discrimination when 

you are on the receiving end of that smaller paycheck and you are 

trying to support your family with less money than what the men 

are getting paid for doing the same job. 

According to the Supreme Court, if you do not figure things out 

right away, the company can treat you like a second-class citizen 

for the rest of your career. That is not right. 

The truth is Goodyear continues to treat me like a second-class 

worker to this day because my pension and Social Security is based 

on the amount I earned while working there. Goodyear gets to keep 

my extra pension as a reward for breaking the law. 

My case is over, and it is too bad that the Supreme Court decided the way that it did. I hope, though, that Congress will not 

let this happen to anyone else. I would feel that this long fight was 

worthwhile if, at least at the end of it, I knew that I played a part 

in getting the law fixed so that it can provide real protection to real 

people in the real world. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ledbetter follows:]

8

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LILLY LEDBETTER


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Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Professor Chamallas, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MARTHA CHAMALLAS, ROBERT J. LYNN CHAIR 

IN LAW, MORITZ COLLEGE OF LAW, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY 

Ms. CHAMALLAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Franks. I very much appreciate this opportunity to testify on the 

impact of the Ledbetter decision. 

My written testimony discusses the statute of limitations problem, and I will not address that issue now. Instead, I want to use 

my time to indicate why I think that Congress should lift the caps 

on compensatory and punitive damages currently imposed by title 

VII and by the ADA. The Ledbetter case itself dramatically illustrates the need for this reform. 

The jury awarded Lilly Ledbetter over $3.5 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Because of the title VII cap, however, 

her damages were reduced to $300,000, a sum the trial court regarded as well below that which would be sufficient to punish and 

deter Goodyear from discriminating in the future. Title VII set the $300,000 cap for employers with more than 500 

employees, even very large employers such as Goodyear who employ more than 75,000 workers. 

The title VII cap is particularly harsh because it is a combined 

cap on both compensatory and punitive damages. The caps are inequitable because they interfere with the two primary purposes of 

title VII: to prevent and deter discrimination and to make victims 

whole for their injuries. 

Because of their very nature, caps on damages do not serve to 

screen out meritless claims or otherwise streamline litigation. Instead, they have their greatest impact in two types of case. 

The first type of case, the plaintiff is able to prove that because 

he suffered severe harm, he deserves a large award for compensatory damages beyond the capped amount. A good example is a recent disability discrimination case brought by Ulysses Hudson 

against the Department of Homeland Security. 

Hudson proved that his supervisor stalked and harassed him, 

made threats to damage his property and repeatedly discriminated 

against him because of his disability. As a result of his cruel treatment, Hudson was unable to return to work, was forced to file 

bankruptcy and, through medical testimony, establish that he suffered post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and depression. 

The jury recognized the severity of this harm and awarded $1.5 

million in compensatory damages. Because of the caps, however, 

the trial court reduced the award to $300,000 representing only 20 

percent of the damages as assessed by the jury. 

In the second type of case in which the caps are inequitable, the 

plaintiff is able to prove that because her employer was guilty of 

reprehensible behavior, she should be able to receive a punitive 

damages award sizeable enough to deter the employer from discriminating in the future. 

In a 1977 Kansas case, for example, the plaintiff, Sharon Deters, 

proved that her manager created a sexually hostile environment by 

persistently ignoring her complaints of harassment by co-employees. Rather than punishing the harassers, the manager excused 

32

their conduct, telling Deters that the harassers were revenue producers and she was not a revenue producer. The manager even attempted to convince Deters that being called the F word and the 

C word was just part of the roughness of the job. 

The jury awarded Deters $1 million dollars in punitive damages. 

Because of the title VII caps, however, the court again was forced 

to reduce the award only to $300,000, even though the defendant 

was a multibillion-dollar company who would not feel the sting 

from such a small award. 

The courts themselves have recognized that the title VII caps undermine the deterrent effect of the law. In the disability case 

against Wal-Mart in which a judge was forced to slash a $5 million 

punitive damages award to $300,000, the court stated that, ‘‘Although the reduction respected the law, it did not achieve a just 

result.’’

He noted that for corporate behemoths such as Wal-Mart, such 

a small punitive damages award had virtually no deterrent value, 

given that Wal-Mart’s total net sales in 2004, for example, were 

$256 billion and that it thus took only 37 seconds to achieve a sales 

equal to the $300,000 it was required to pay to the plaintiff. 

The caps also affect plaintiffs who sue for religious discrimination. In one egregious case of religious discrimination, Albert Johnson, the plaintiff, was subjected to a hostile environment by his supervisor. The supervisor was annoyed that Johnson had asked for 

Sundays off. He called Johnson a religious freak and told him he 

was tired of his religious B.S., and he made fun of Johnson’s religion in highly insensitive and lewd terms. 

The jury awarded Johnson $400,000 for compensatory damages 

and $750,000 for punitive damages. Again, the award was reduced 

to $300,000 to stay within the cap. 

Now it is interesting because, in this case, Johnson’s jury award 

for the $400,000 in compensatory damages was itself over the 

capped amount, the reduction had the effect of totally wiping out 

the punitive damages and, with it, any chance of a deterrent effect. 

Lifting the caps would not lead to disproportionate liability. 

Under title VII, damages are only awarded in cases of intentional 

discrimination. Employers who have not deliberately violated the 

civil rights laws are thus required only to afford plaintiffs equitable 

relief. 

Moreover, since the 1999 ruling in the Kolstadt case in the Supreme Court, plaintiffs can recover punitive damages only in a very 

small subset of cases in which they prove not only intentional discrimination, but also that the employer acted with malice or reckless indifference to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights and the 

evidence shows that the employer did not even make good faith efforts to enforce the company’s antidiscrimination policy. 

These strict limits show that title VII’s enforcement scheme is 

very different from common law tort, which sometimes allows compensatory and punitive damages in negligence and strict liability 

cases. 

Since 1991, the legal landscape has changed considerably. Lifting 

the caps would allow discrimination victims who have suffered the 

most to receive fair awards. 

33

And finally, I would like to say that lifting the cap would help 

those that were injured the most and would hold the worst offenders accountable. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chamallas follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARTHA CHAMALLAS


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Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

I now recognize Mr. Mollen for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF NEAL D. MOLLEN,

U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 

Mr. MOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member 

Franks, Members of the Committee. Thank you for giving me this 

opportunity to testify. 

My name is Neal Mollen. I am here today to testify on behalf of 

the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America about 

proposed legislation that would reverse the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber.

I had the privilege of serving as counsel of record for the Chamber in the National Federation of Independent Business in the 

Ledbetter case. 

The Chamber unequivocally supports equal employment opportunities for all, and it also supports and promotes the implementation 

of fair and appropriate mechanisms to achieve that critical societal 

goal. 

When Congress passed title VII, it selected cooperation and voluntary compliance as the preferred means for achieving that result, 

with vigorous enforcement in court by private parties and the 

EEOC when those voluntary efforts fail. It seems evident to me 

that Congress’s chosen enforcement scheme has been vindicated 

over the intervening 43 years. The Ledbetter decision emphatically 

endorsed that statutory process. 

The rule emanating from Ledbetter is a simple one: If an employee believes that he or she has been treated discriminatorily by 

an employer, that matter should be raised internally and then with 

the EEOC or a similar State agency promptly. Only in this way can 

the process of investigation, voluntary cooperation and conciliation 

be expected to work. When disagreements and disputes in the 

workplace fester and potential damage amounts increase, compromise and cooperation become far more difficult. 

Ms. Ledbetter claimed, however, that the period of limitations 

was renewed every time she received a paycheck and, thus, that 

she was entitled to wait until she retired to raise her claim to bias. 

Such a rule would have utterly frustrated Congress’s design for attempting to resolve such matters, at least in the first instance, 

without litigation. 

Moreover, the Ledbetter decision recognized the profound unfairness inherent in a rule that would permit an individual to wait for 

years or even decades before raising a claim of discrimination. To 

defend itself against a claim of discrimination, an employer has to 

be in a position to explain why it did what it did first to the EEOC 

and the charging party and then perhaps later to a jury. 

To do so, it has to rely on the existence of documents and the 

availability of witnesses, memories of individuals, neither of which 

is permanent. If a disappointed employee can wait for many years 

before raising a claim of discrimination, the effort could leave an 

employer effectively unable to defend itself in any sort of meaningful way. 

Perhaps most importantly, the paycheck rule is antithetical to 

the principle goal of title VII which is eradicating discrimination. 

52

When a charge is filed promptly after an allegedly discriminatory 

decision, the decision maker can be confronted by the employer, 

and if misconduct is discovered, he or she can be disciplined, can 

be removed from decision-making authority or can be terminated. 

When the charge is delayed by a period of years, however, the 

decision maker is very likely to remain in place. There is an increased risk in that circumstance that the misconduct will be repeated and that others will suffer the same fate. Only prompt action can root out this sort of serious misconduct and prevent injuries to others. 

If the goal of title VII is eliminating discrimination and not encouraging stale lawsuits, the paycheck rule cannot be justified. 

Now critics of Ledbetter have suggested that workers do not often 

have sufficient information to conclude that discrimination has occurred in time to meet the filing deadlines. I think there are a couple of responses to this. 

First and foremost, the legislation currently being considered is 

not limited to or even primarily about that sort of circumstance. By 

embracing the paycheck rule, the legislation explicitly and unambiguously authorizes those who do have all of the pertinent information to delay for years or decades before bringing suit. Rather 

than solving the perceived problem, the legislation creates another 

larger one. 

Second, it is not common in my experience as an employment 

lawyer for someone to claim that they have worked for years on 

end without having any inkling that discrimination has occurred, 

and that plainly was not the case in Ledbetter. It is undisputed 

that Ms. Ledbetter had all the information that she needed to file 

a charge of discrimination years before she did so. That, in my experience, is a far more common scenario. 

Third, the courts have developed a number of very effective tolling rules that can mitigate the impact of filing deadlines in those 

few cases in which the employer has engaged in concealment, as 

referred to by the Chairman in his opening statement, and prevented the individual from learning the information necessary to 

file a charge. 

Finally, Ledbetter critics seem to be confusing the threshold 

standard for filing a lawsuit with a much lower standard for filing 

a charge of discrimination. 

To file a lawsuit in Federal court, one has to be able to attest 

that after reasonable inquiry, the allegations contained in the complaint have evidentiary support. This threshold requirement does 

not apply to the administrative charge of discrimination. 

The charge does not initiate litigation. It begins a fact-finding 

process in which the EEOC goes to the employer for precisely the 

sort of comparative pay information that individuals may not have 

access to. Through this process, the truth usually comes out, and 

the parties are able to mediate their dispute. 

Voluntary compliance and conciliation is the process Congress 

envisioned when it enacted title VII, and in the ensuing decades, 

it has produced remarkable results. That process cannot work if 

the employee sits on the sidelines for decades before raising the 

complaint. 

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The statute of limitations are an expression of society’s principled collective judgment that it is unfair to call upon an employer 

to answer serious charges years after the fact. A rule that refreshes 

the period of limitations with every paycheck cannot be squared 

with this important societal value. 

Accordingly, the chamber does not support proposals that would 

reverse or limit the decision handed down in Ledbetter. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mollen follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF NEAL D. MOLLEN


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Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Ms. Greenberger, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MARCIA GREENBERGER, CO-PRESIDENT, 

NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER 

Ms. GREENBERGER. Thank you. I am Marcia Greenberger, copresident of the National Women’s Law Center, and I very much 

appreciate the opportunity to testify here today on behalf of the 

Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to discuss the important 

ramifications of the Ledbetter decision. 

And I would ask that the full statement of Wade Henderson, the 

president and CEO of the Leadership Conference, who was unable 

to be here today, be submitted and be part of the record. 

Mr. NADLER. Without objection. 

Ms. GREENBERGER. Thank you very much. 

As has been discussed and, Mr. Chairman, as you have eloquently described, the Ledbetter decision has had enormous adverse implications for those who face discrimination on the basis of 

their sex, race, national origin, age, disability and religion, and, 

certainly, I think it is very difficult for anyone sitting in this room 

not to be moved by the courage that was shown by Ms. Ledbetter 

and the injustice——

Mr. NADLER. Apparently, it was not for the 20 Members of the 

Education and Labor Committee. 

Ms. GREENBERGER. Well, it is very distressing that that is the 

case, and I have to say in response to that that it is all well and 

good for those to say that they oppose discrimination in the workplace, but if they also oppose having laws that actually give us the 

tools to eliminate that discrimination, then those words of support 

for the ultimate goal ring hollow, and that is what I think those 

who unfortunately oppose the legislation that was marked up in 

the Committee yesterday would cause to happen. 

What we have here and we have been talking about is a statute 

of limitations. In fact, there is a statute of limitations that would 

apply in title VII cases and would remain unchanged. Plaintiffs 

who suffer discrimination can only recover for a limited period of 

time, going back just a few years from the time that they complain 

of the pay discrimination at issue, and that would have been and 

was a limitation in the amount that Ms. Ledbetter was awarded by 

the jury and by the judge below. 

What is at issue here, obviously, is when the actual complaint of 

the discrimination has to be made, and I must say, with all due 

respect to Mr. Mollen, that what we have here is a situation of 

Goodyear benefiting every paycheck month after month, year after 

year. How could Goodyear justify the fact that it knew it was paying all of its male employees similarly situated to Ms. Ledbetter so 

much more money every month than Goodyear was paying her? 

As Ms. Ledbetter pointed out, not only is she suffering those consequences today with lower pension benefits, with Goodyear pocketing the amount of money that she and her family should be having right now, but, for all those years, Goodyear was pocketing the 

amount of money they should have paid her that she should have 

been able to accumulate in her savings and use for herself or her 

family, and they are the ones who have been enriched by this deciVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:56 Sep 19, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\062807\36346.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36346
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sion unfairly, and they are the ones who are not being held accountable for their current actions by this 5-4 decision by the Supreme Court. 

I have a second point I want to make, and that is in bringing 

a lawsuit, it is the plaintiff who has a very high burden to show 

that discrimination, to prove the discrimination. It is not the defendant who has the burden of proving that the discrimination did 

not exist. It is the plaintiff, especially in the courts these days, who 

has an extremely difficult burden of showing that the discrimination did exist. 

The fact that Ms. Ledbetter was able to show such severe and 

unfair discrimination that she suffered and that was reflected in 

the jury award and the judge’s—the trial judge who heard the testimony—own comments and reaction to the case is testimony to 

how strong her case was, how she was able to meet that burden, 

how weak the case was for Goodyear, not based on one manager, 

but based on each time that she was getting that paycheck and 

each time that Goodyear had to know—someone had to know—that 

they were working out a paycheck that was lower for her, and, obviously, someone gave her that anonymous piece of paper because 

it was known by Goodyear up until the present time when she filed 

that complaint. 

I have another point to make, and that has to do with the issue 

of retaliation. Mr. Mollen properly pointed to the fact that we 

would like employees to come forward and to try to work out claims 

of discrimination and file complaints, but we know, all of us who 

live in the real world, that if one is the only woman in the job and 

is suffering retaliation and is dealing with harassment, to willy 

nilly expect this person to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission while she is trying to keep her job 

and without her having a sense that she has a slam-dunk case, as 

we have heard that term being used, to just see if she can rely 

upon the goodwill of Goodyear to work it out is very naive, and, 

therefore, simply filing early complaints is not realistic. 

And I would like to close also with respect to this damages issue. 

The caps have not only allowed Goodyear to take a pitiful amount 

of money, $300,000, a billion-dollar company, as a cost of doing 

business, a piddling cost of doing business, to continue to pocket 

that discriminatory pay, but also that cap reduces the ability for 

each kind of discrimination, not just the pay decimation, but any 

subsequent retaliation would have been able to be done to Ms. 

Ledbetter and other employees like her all within the cap. So they 

could retaliate with impunity. 

And, therefore, that is why this whole case shows that the 180-

day fix needs to be made and that these arbitrary caps which reduce the ability to get full relief and have full enforcement of title 

VII also have to be changed. 

And finally, if you would indulge me for one last very quick 

point, we do not have caps right now for certain victims of employment discrimination under section 1981, but we do have caps for 

other victims. It has become a defense for women of color to be told 

by employers, ‘‘Oh, no, we are not discriminating against you on 

the basis of your race. We are discriminating against you on the 

67

basis of your gender, and that is why we do not owe you a full recompense for the injury you suffered.’’ That is simply unacceptable. 

Thank you. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

We will begin the question period. The Chair will yield himself 

5 minutes for questioning. 

Let me just say that I am totally offended by this. I am offended 

by Mr. Mollen’s arguments. I am offended by the actions of the Supreme Court. I am offended by the fact that certain types of discrimination are capped and certain types are not. We have had everything we could get, we could do. We have barely managed to 

stave off further caps from being extended over the years. 

Let me ask a few questions. 

Ms. Ledbetter, when did you first realize that you were being discriminated against? 

Ms. Ledbetter. I suspected earlier in my career that I might be 

getting less based on the fact that I heard my male peers talking 

about how much overtime dollars they had earned versus mine. 

Well, I could calculate a month, you know, how much money mine 

was. 

Mr. NADLER. Why didn’t you file a lawsuit at that point? 

Ms. LEDBETTER. I did not have any proof. I went to——

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Mollen, given the fact that Ms. Ledbetter did not think she 

had proof until later, how can you say that admitted cases of discrimination should be time barred well before the plaintiff either 

knows about it or could prove it? 

Mr. MOLLEN. Well, there are actually a couple of questions embedded in that. Let me see if I can take them one at a time. First 

of all, I think that the testimony that Ms. Ledbetter gave at trial 

was that she began to believe that she had been the victim of bias 

in 1992, that she got this document that she referred to in her 

opening statement, and——

Mr. NADLER. Excuse me. Do not go through the facts of the case. 

I asked you a question, and I only have 5 minutes so please answer 

the question specifically. How can you say, since suspicion is not 

sufficient, proof is necessary? Is it not the case that very often it 

will take a long time to find the proof? 

Mr. MOLLEN. I think you are operating under a false understanding of what is required to file a charge. You do not need proof. 

The whole idea is to go to the EEOC to begin an investigatory process. 

Mr. NADLER. But if you file without proof, are you not subject to 

retaliation and all kinds of other things——

Mr. MOLLEN. Well——

Mr. NADLER [continuing]. In the real world as opposed to the fantasy world? 

Mr. MOLLEN. Mr. Chairman, there is no question that retaliation 

does occur occasionally, but that is a very different problem. 

Mr. NADLER. Don’t you think that the prospect of retaliation 

might inhibit people who are not lawyers, who are simple workers, 

from filing lawsuits when perhaps they should? 

Mr. MOLLEN. The answer then would be to eliminate all statutes 

of limitation for title VII, not just for pay cases, but all——

68

Mr. NADLER. All right. So we agree with that. 

Mr. MOLLEN. That would be a disaster, Mr. Chairman, and when 

Congress passed this statute in 1964——

Mr. NADLER. You have answered the question. 

Ms. Greenberger, lawfully, could we make any legislative fix retroactive so that Ms. Ledbetter could benefit from it? 

Ms. GREENBERGER. Well, I would not even call it retroactive because it has often been the case that Congress has made a statute 

effective as of a particular date when a decision has come down in 

order to cover that case and cases going forward and——

Mr. NADLER. We can make it effective——

Ms. GREENBERGER [continuing]. Cases that are pending. 

Mr. NADLER. So we can make it effective January 1, 2007, or 

January 1, 1995. 

Ms. GREENBERGER. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. 

Ms. GREENBERGER. Yes, you could, but, certainly, if it were effective to cover Ms. Ledbetter’s case, I would not view that as being 

retroactive. 

Mr. NADLER. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Mollen, you talked about case law as if the Supreme Court 

were following prior case law. Prior case law is completely the opposite. Oh, we have a whole bunch of cases. And, in fact, in the 

Bazemore case, which I am sure you are familiar with, made very 

clear that each paycheck is continuing discrimination, and as Ms. 

Greenberger pointed out, that is equitable because, whether they 

knew about the initial decision 20 years ago or never, they certainly knew that they were paying people differently every time 

they made out the payroll. 

In the Lorance case, the Supreme Court went the other way and 

Congress came back in 1991 and said, ‘‘Oh, no, you do not. Every 

different paycheck.’’ In the 1991 Civil Rights Restoration Act, Congress was very clear on that. 

So how can you say that we would now depart that the Supreme 

Court is following stated precedents? 

Mr. MOLLEN. Well, first of all, I think that the lower courts were 

divided on how to treat Bazemore. I do not believe that they were 

all uniform in their treatment of Bazemore.

Second of all, I think if you look at both the Lorance decision, 

but, more importantly, the EVANS decision——

Mr. NADLER. So Lorance decision was overturned by Congress, so 

we should not look at that. 

Mr. MOLLEN. With respect to seniority systems, it had nothing 

to do with pay. 

Mr. NADLER. You do not think that it had to do with when you 

could file a discrimination suit based on seniority. 

Mr. MOLLEN. Regarding a——

Mr. NADLER. Yes. You do not think that that showed congressional intent in this field? 

Mr. MOLLEN. I do not believe that it affected this at all, no. It 

was a different section. 

Mr. NADLER. Ms. Greenberger, would you comment on that? Did 

that show congressional intent——

69

Ms. GREENBERGER. Well, in fact, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out 

in the dissent, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act explicitly said it was fixing Lorance that had to do with seniority, but 

the reasoning of Lorance was entirely wrong and, therefore, Congress was expecting—and this was explicitly in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991—the Supreme Court to understand that in fixing the one bad decision, it was also fixing the 

faulty reasoning. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Mollen, one final question. Since it is your position that the 

180 days should be interpreted from the first time a decision was 

made and since it is obvious that pay scales are usually confidential, do you think it would be right—and if not, why not—and isn’t 

the only other way other than changing the Supreme Court decision to require that perhaps pay be publicized as it is in the public 

sector? 

Mr. MOLLEN. I think that there are a variety of mechanisms, including that one, that Congress could consider to——

Mr. NADLER. You would think that that would be a good idea, 

to require that everyone’s pay in the private sector be public? 

Mr. MOLLEN. I think that there are a variety of mechanisms——

Mr. NADLER. Would you endorse that position? 

Mr. MOLLEN. No, I would not endorse that position. There would 

be——

Mr. NADLER. Because? 

Mr. MOLLEN [continuing]. Problems with that particular position. 

You know, if we think that the Internet distracts from productivity 

in business today, publishing the salaries of every worker would be 

a nightmare from the employers’ standpoint. However——

Mr. NADLER. So let me ask you one last question then. Would 

you at least concede that the 180 days should not begin until the 

person discovered that there was pay discrimination? 

Mr. MOLLEN. Well, I think you and I would differ about when 

that discovery——

Mr. NADLER. Well, whenever that happens, would you concede 

that point? 

Mr. MOLLEN. Mr. Chairman, I do not think that the law ought 

to require somebody to do something that they cannot do. 

Mr. NADLER. Well, that is what it does right now under this decision. 

Mr. MOLLEN. I do not believe that is the case. In fact, Justice 

Alito, in his opinion, expressly said, ‘‘We are not dealing with a 

case in which the individual was in the dark about the pay.’’

As I was saying earlier, Ms. Ledbetter’s testimony both at trial 

and in the hearing before Education and Labor was that she knew 

years before——

Mr. NADLER. So you think that under this case, if you could show 

that you did not know about it, the 180 days does not start to run 

until then? 

Mr. MOLLEN. It is not a belief. It is what Justice Alito said in 

the opinion. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you very much. 

The time of the Chairman has expired. The gentleman from Arizona is recognized for 5 minutes. 

70

Ms. LEDBETTER. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. NADLER. My time has expired. The gentleman from Arizona 

is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to reclaim my time, I would 

like to give Ms. Ledbetter a chance to say what she wanted to say. 

Ms. LEDBETTER. Thank you, sir. 

What I wanted to respond to there quickly is I had gone to EEOC 

earlier when I really suspected I was getting paid less. EEOC told 

me that I would have to have two signatures for them to do an investigation into Goodyear, and I could not get the other female at 

the time to sign because she was afraid of losing her job, even 

though we were assured by EEOC Goodyear would not know who 

signed the requirement to investigate. 

But she said, ‘‘You know they will know who signed for the investigation,’’ the two women, and I could not get any investigation 

into it, and I had no proof. I could not tell them, ‘‘I think I am 

being paid less,’’ other than to get the investigation, and I needed 

two signatures, and I could not get it. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Ms. Ledbetter. 

Ms. LEDBETTER. Thank you. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Mollen, in the Ledbetter case, the Supreme 

Court held that ‘‘the statutes of limitation serve a policy of repose. 

They represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to 

put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of 

time and that to be free of stale claims, time ultimately comes to 

prevail over the right to prosecute them.’’

The EEOC filing deadline protects employers from the burden of 

defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long 

past. Congress clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing 

of all charges of employment discrimination. There is just no way 

to avoid that. 

Do you not believe that Congress should continue to encourage 

the prompt processing of all charges of employment discrimination, 

and what would be the practical effect of failing to do so? 

Mr. MOLLEN. I do, Congressman Franks. I think that it is essential to the effective operation of the statute, and I want to come 

back just very briefly to the discussion that I had with the Chairman. 

The Ledbetter decision did not have anything to do with the circumstance in which somebody was prevented from learning about 

the information necessary to file a charge. That is a very different 

circumstance, and, frankly, I think it is one that Congress might 

reasonably investigate. 

The legislation that has been proposed here does not apply simply to people who had no reason to know. It applies to everyone. 

It applies to someone who is told on the first day of their employment, ‘‘We are going to pay you less because of your race or your 

sex,’’ and who sits on that information for a period of 20 years before filing a charge. 

That, I think, is what the Ledbetter opinion was referring to 

when it says, ‘‘Look, if we cannot get these things resolved quickly, 

it is going to be very difficult for the processes of the act to work. 

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diate that kind of dispute. Investigation occurs through the auspices of the EEOC, and the parties can talk about that kind of dispute. 

When they are caught early, those kinds of disputes are nearly 

always resolved in the mediation and conciliation process. When 

the thing goes on for 20 years, it makes it almost impossible for 

the employer even to find out what happened. 

The Chairman referred earlier to admitted cases of discrimination, but I think really that is putting the cart before the horse because we do not get to a knowledge of what actually happened until 

there is a trial, and if the trial occurs at a time when the employer 

is unable to defend itself, then we do not really know what happened. That is the whole point. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Mollen, I am, you know, just trying to 

think from an employer’s perspective. You know, first of all, it has 

to be said just for clarity, even though I suppose it is redundant, 

that discriminating against anyone on the basis of their religion or 

sex or other things of that nature is reprehensible, and all of us 

understand that. 

But in order to reach a just ability to even respond to that effectively, isn’t it necessary to have some type of statute of limitations 

even for the sake of clarity for both parties, and what, again, would 

be the practical effect of failing to have that? In other words, if this 

legislation were to pass, what would this do to the employment 

mechanism essentially ubiquitous in America? 

Mr. MOLLEN. It makes it almost impossible for employers to 

gather the evidence that they need in order to determine whether 

what the charging party is saying is true and, if it is not, to mount 

an effective defense. 

There are instances, by the way, in which that delay will work 

to the detriment of the charging party, and I think that that has 

been said here already today. And I do not want to retry Ms. 

Ledbetter’s case because, frankly, I was not there, and we have a 

sort of skewed view of the facts because the company was not able 

to put forward its defense. 

But what she alleged was that this particular manager had made 

improper advances to her, and when she rebuffed them, she paid 

a price for that, which, as you say, is a repugnant sort of activity, 

but he was not there to say, ‘‘I never did that. That is not how it 

happened,’’ and ‘‘Here is why I made the salary decisions that I 

made with respect to Ms. Ledbetter.’’

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Mollen, let me crowd one more, if I could. In 

terms of protecting those people who are discriminated against in 

the fashion that has been under discussion today, isn’t it possible 

that if we put legislation like this that just completely throws the 

doors wide open where confusion becomes the byword, that there 

will probably be opportunities for those who have not been discriminated to make outrageous cases that cannot possibly be 

searched out in the process simply because of the stale evidence, 

and then those who are genuinely being discriminated against are 

kind of lost in all that process? 

Mr. MOLLEN. I think that the search for truth and justice is 

served on all sides by having these matters addressed promptly. 

And, yes, it is true, the longer these things are delayed, the more 

72

likely it is that the undeserving will recover and that the deserving 

will not. It is just a terrible state of affairs, and to have a blanket 

rule that permits essentially an evergreen limitations period, irrespective of the circumstance of the charging party, really strikes 

me as being nonsensical. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman from Alabama is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. DAVIS. Of course. Thank you for putting me in the right 

place, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. I would never put you in your place in the—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. DAVIS. I will settle for either one, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me try to make three quick points in the time that I have, 

and let me start, Mr. Mollen, with your observation. 

One of the things that I think bothers those of us on this side 

of the dais about the ruling is when you interpret a statute, when 

you interpret legal precedents, it is very easy to get lost in the dry 

abstractions around the words, and it is very easy to get lost in the 

theory. 

All legal regimes trigger incentives toward conduct or disincentives toward other conduct. Ms. Greenberger made that point. We 

can either have a title VII regime that, frankly, makes it harder 

to bring these cases, or we can have one that makes it easier. But 

you cannot just stop at that. 

A title VII regime that makes it harder to bring these cases will 

inevitably encourage employers to be more willing to engage in discrimination. Class example. In this instance, if you adopt the 

Ledbetter rule and you apply it, the wily discriminator, the company that is somewhat shrewd in its discrimination, can say, 

‘‘Look, if we can disguise our pay practices for a long enough period 

of time, we can get away with it. We can make an initial decision 

to pay women less than men, disguise it, make sure nobody knows 

about it, and, frankly, once the 180 days passed after that decision, 

we are home free.’’ That will produce more discrimination, and 

none of us think that is a good thing. 

Now the second point that I want to make—Mr. Mollen, my 

friend from Arizona, was speaking from the employer’s perspective, 

so let me speak from the employee’s perspective—is the legal 

standard that the court announces, but you endorse in Ledbetter

would also, I think, create a hair trigger. You have testified today 

that, well, if someone has a suspicion that they are not being paid 

properly, they ought to immediately go and file an EEOC complaint. 

Mr. Mollen is probably the only person on the panel who I think 

has practiced plaintiff’s employment law and defense employment 

law. I have done both in phases in my life before I came to this 

work. 

I cannot imagine that that is the world that you and the chamber really want. If the legal standard is such that you have to file 

a claim within 180 days of your suspicion of backpay being discriminatory, instead of waiting until the last discriminatory check, 

that would mean that if John says to Peter who says to Mary who 

73

says to Stewart who writes a note to John that there may be a difference in the pay, I have got to go in and file my EEOC complaint. 

Plaintiffs’ lawyers are pretty smart. The advice they are going to 

start giving to their clients right now is, ‘‘If you have any suspicion 

whatsoever that you are not being paid the same, go in and file an 

EEOC complaint.’’

Frankly, right when I was practicing plaintiffs work, I would say 

to my clients, ‘‘Let me see what evidence you have. Let me see 

whether you have any proof that the EEOC might find persuasive 

or that a court might find persuasive.’’ I never said to a plaintiff, 

‘‘I do not really care about the facts. Let’s just hurry in and get this 

claim filed.’’

You are creating a world where a shrewd plaintiff’s lawyer has 

every incentive to send someone into the process of filing a complaint when they know very little beyond rumor or innuendo. That 

will not be a good world for the defense bar. 

The final point that I want to make before I invite you all to respond to some of this, I am concerned—Ms. Greenberger, I would 

really like you to address this—as I read Ledbetter. I think an argument could be made that it could be far more sweeping than 

backpay claims. The Ledbetter analysis is of title VII and I think 

may have implications for the doctrine of continuing discrimination 

in other contexts, for example, in hospital environment claims that 

may be brought based on race or gender. 

I could see this Supreme Court in particular, Mr. Mollen, taking 

the position that if you are alleging hostile environment over a period of time, you have to bring a complaint within 180 days of the 

first hostile act. I could see that being interpreted very easily from 

this case, and if that is the case, once again, you create a situation 

that is very unsettling to the law that we have today. 

The final point that I would make—I would like to see if Ms. 

Greenberger first would try to find some way to make sure that 

Ms. Ledbetter herself is able to get relief from this case—is I think 

it would be a mistake if the Congress were to correct this ruling 

that I think is a wrong one, but, frankly, have future litigants benefit from it, but not her because understand the state of uncertainty today. All over the country, courts are trying to figure out, 

the EEOC is trying to figure out, litigants are trying to figure out 

the meaning and the relevance of Ledbetter. 

Every day and moment that goes by, there are cases that are at 

risk of being dismissed and thrown out because of this ruling. So, 

when Congress comes up with the fix, we need to make sure that 

all the women and all the African-Americans who may be affected 

by this gap are not left without a remedy. 

Ms. Greenberger, would you like to respond to some of that? 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The time of the 

gentleman has expired. 

Ms. Greenberger, Mr. Mollen may answer the questions. 

Ms. GREENBERGER. Okay. Well, certainly, as I said, making the 

effective date early enough to cover all pending cases as of the time 

of the decision and including Ms. Ledbetter’s decision is perfectly 

acceptable, proper and should certainly be done for all the reasons 

that you said. 

74

Secondly, with respect to having the issue that you raised about 

a plaintiff’s lawyer urging people to file complaints early without 

evidence, I think it puts plaintiffs’ lawyers in an impossible position. We have had major fights in the courts, with Justice Alito fortunately not prevailing in the Burlington case this term, trying to 

cut back on retaliation protections and a number of judges being 

very hostile to retaliation cases and real protection with respect to 

retaliation. 

So the idea that somebody who has a general suspicion without 

facts should be filing an EEOC charge, I would find that to be very 

surprising from an employer’s point of view, and very few plaintiffs’ 

lawyers would want to put their own time and effort into representing somebody who had no facts to begin with that really 

could demonstrate a strong case. 

It is extremely difficult for plaintiffs to meet a burden of proof. 

Most plaintiffs’ lawyers are reluctant to take on a matter at all unless there is a very strong case to begin with, though that is in response to the second important point you made about going in 

early to file a charge without the real facts to the EEOC. 

Also, it is really living in the Never Never Land to think that the 

EEOC then goes and investigates all the charges that it gets to figure out what the real facts are, as Mr. Mollen seemed to imply. We 

all know that there is an extraordinary backlog. The EEOC does 

not begin to investigate anything but a teeny percentage of the 

complaints that it gets. 

So people who file charges with EEOC routinely, if they do not 

want them to be dead letter, get a right-to-sue letter, then they 

have to go to court with the burden of having to go forward without 

any access to any information anyway. 

So this has nothing to do with the real world. 

And I do want to get back to the caps issue because it is so interrelated. As you pointed out, who would want a situation where the 

incentives were on the employer to delay and to retaliate and to try 

to keep people from going forward? 

But that is exactly what the combination of this 180-day ruling 

and the caps have created here so that Goodyear, by keeping things 

quiet, by making people afraid of coming forward, by harassing 

women, by paying them less, by keeping that system going forward, 

was never at risk of having to ever really own up to or pay for its 

employment discrimination because of those caps. 

And the caps, when Congress passed them in 1991, it was taking 

a step forward. We now have over 15 years. Those caps have eroded in value, as ridiculous as they were even at the time, because, 

for some employers, they start at $50,000 total, for the caps no 

matter how egregious or how extreme the discrimination. That for 

the employment cost index has gone up 67 percent over that period 

of time, so these caps are a joke. 

Mr. NADLER. These caps are not indexed to inflation. 

Ms. GREENBERGER. I’ll say. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Mollen? 

Mr. MOLLEN. Congressman Davis, let me see if I can address 

your questions quickly in some sort of order here. 

75

First of all, you expressed a concern that the Ledbetter rule 

might be applied more broadly to harassment cases. The Ledbetter

case decision embraced and built upon the court’s Morgan against 

Amtrak case from 2002, which established a separate rule, sui generis rule for harassment cases. So I think that that fear is misplaced. 

Second, you talked about the incentive that an employer would 

have for disguising, obfuscating, preventing employees from knowing about discrimination. As I said in my opening, there are rules 

currently in place regarding tolling the limitations period for just 

that kind of conduct. An employer rule that prohibits employees 

from discussing their compensation is likely unlawful under the 

National Labor Relations Act. So I think that there are already a 

number of prophylactic rules in place to deal with that situation. 

Third, regarding the hair trigger problem that you referred to, I 

am sure that my friends at the chamber would be very unhappy 

if anything I said here suggested that they would like to see a flood 

of new litigation. However, the fact of the matter is that these 

problems cannot be resolved short of litigation unless they are 

raised early. 

So I think that it is to the good for everyone if the goal is to 

eradicate discrimination, then we all benefit when these matters 

are raised early rather than late, and if Congress adopts a rule 

that gives incentive and license to individuals to wait for years or 

decades before raising them, we are going to have more litigation, 

not less. 

And finally, with respect to the role of the EEOC in investigating 

this, we get information requests at my firm regarding every 

charge that is filed. Now I am not going to claim that the EEOC 

investigates all the charges equally or that they put as much effort 

into all of them as they do uniformly across the board, but I get 

information requests from the EEOC with respect to every charge 

that is filed against one of my clients, and we produce the information. 

If that information discloses the sort of disparities that are questionable, that charge is going be carried forward. What very typically happens is that when the data is produced, the EEOC investigator looks at it and finds that there are very good substantial 

business reasons for the disparities and the matter dies with a 

quick mediation session or a no probable cause finding by the 

EEOC, and that is the way the process was designed to work. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think this is an important hearing, and I think it is an important hearing for two reasons. 

Ms. Ledbetter, I think you are getting here what you did not get 

in court essentially, an opportunity to say there was discrimination, an opportunity without consideration, if you will, of the merits, an opportunity to be considered to have been discriminated 

against. I am not going to make a judgment decision based on your 

testimony or anyone else about whether you were discriminated 

against, but, certainly, I would say that, in my opinion, today, you 

76

are getting, except for money damages, what you believe you deserve. 

Having said that, I do believe there is a strong principle here, 

and, Mr. Mollen, I would like to give you more time to elaborate, 

the basic principle that everything we do, with the exceptions 

against exceptions of Holocaust-related activities, crimes against 

humanity, first-degree murder, and I think we also do kidnapping, 

they basically have relatively short times in which to bring a case, 

and I am looking and saying, if an armed robber is free and clear 

after a decade or 2, most civil suits are done in a year, 2, 3, maybe 

4 in some States—that, in fact, for better or worse, you have a limited time, and that is fair to both sides. 

And I certainly believe that the other part of it is that the longer 

a discrimination practice goes on without being alleged, without 

getting into the process, the more companies, in fact, can be going 

the wrong direction. 

So I for one think that the question here today and that I hope 

we are dealing with is whether or not the time limits are reasonable and whether or not they should be adhered to strictly. I believe the latter. I am happy to hear your comments on whether or 

not some easing of the times would be of any value. 

Mr. MOLLEN. Well, thank you, Congressman, for the question. I 

have to tread carefully here because I am here on behalf of the 

Chamber of Commerce, and we have not really discussed what fix 

they might prefer with respect to the time, if any. 

I did point out when I testified in front of the Education and 

Labor Committee that currently there is a distinction between 

States that do and do not have fair employment practice agencies, 

180 days in the cases where no such agency exists and 300 for 

those that do. 

The vast majority of employees in this country work in States, 

in jurisdictions where the limitation is 300 days. It seems to me 

that the distinction that Congress made in 1964 between those 

kinds of States may not be sensible any longer and ought to be examined. 

Now, whether 300 days is long enough, I think that that is a 

valid question for this Committee and the Congress as a whole to 

investigate. But I think there has to be an effective date. There has 

to be a cutoff date. And, as you point out, Congressman, there is 

with respect to nearly every cause of action. Even the most opprobrious behavior that can be pursued civilly has a connected statute 

of limitations. 

Mr. ISSA. And I want to give others a chance to comment on this. 

I would like your dates, if you will, but isn’t 1 year one of the 

shortest—365 days, so to speak—periods that we allow for the statute to toll or to run out on any civil procedure? Isn’t it generally 

longer, at least 1 year? 

Does anyone see a problem because I for one think that it is perhaps too short, and I have been an employer, and I, certainly, like 

everybody else, have had somebody who—never successfully—quit 

or left and they included that in their reasons of things they 

thought. So, in your opinion of anyone, including Ms. Ledbetter, is 

there any reason that 365 days, 1 year, like most other litigation 

77

would not be a reasonable point for Congress to consider moving 

to? 

Yes, ma’am? Professor? 

Ms. CHAMALLAS. I would like to note that with respect to claims 

like tort claims, generally, the statute of limitations runs from 2 to 

5 years, and so something like 180 days and 380 days is an exceptionally short time for a statute of limitations. 

However, I think it is very important to note that in cases of pay 

discrimination, there has been a statute of limitations starting to 

run from when the last discriminatory paycheck was received by 

the plaintiff. This is the classic example of a continuing violation. 

So it does seem to me that the Ledbetter decision upset settled 

law and that, regardless of the kind of fix, which I think is very 

necessary, that Congress should do with respect to the general 

statute of limitations, it is very important that with respect to pay 

discrimination in which there are continuing violations, where 

there is a pattern of incremental harm that compounds over time 

very much like the hostile environment situation, that the statute 

of limitations begins to run only when the employer has stopped 

benefiting from its illegal discrimination, that is when the last paycheck tainted by discrimination has been——

Mr. ISSA. I know my time has expired. Does anyone else want to 

talk about the latches that essentially this creates under the 

Ledbetter decision? 

Mr. NADLER. The time of the gentleman has expired. A witness 

may——

Mr. ISSA. I just want to——

Mr. NADLER. A witness may answer the question if one of the 

witnesses wants to. 

Ms. GREENBERGER. I just want to say, Congressman, that I think 

that the statute of limitations term is a confusing term because 

there is a statute of limitations in title VII that really has not been 

at issue here at all which has to do with how far back you can go 

in recovering for the discrimination that you are suffering. 

So Ms. Ledbetter is and would under any statutory fix be limited 

in terms of how far back she could go of the number of years of 

backpay that she was denied because of the existing statute of limitations that applies. 

What we are talking about here is, in essence, really an exhaustion requirement which is not usual in many laws, where you must 

file a complaint or exhaust your administrative remedies with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or your State agency 

before you can go into court. Many, many statutes, many civil 

rights statutes and other statutes have no such requirement to 

begin with, so that full 180-day thing, which has to do with the exhaustion requirement, is an exception to begin with. 

And as the professor said, what changed here is the EEOC for 

many, many years consistently and in Ms. Ledbetter’s case below 

argued that the discrimination continued and did not stop until 

that last paycheck, and that is when you begin to think about 

when that 180 days begins, as short as it is, and because every 

paycheck was another instance of discrimination, then we deal with 

the 180 day issue from the last paycheck. 

78

The EEOC did not participate in the Supreme Court. The Administration changed the position of the government in the Supreme 

Court for the first time, but this 180-day every paycheck principle 

has been what has been in place for decades. 

Mr. NADLER. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

I now recognize the gentlelady from Florida for 5 minutes. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to speak as the only woman that serves on this entire 

Subcommittee, but also as the non-lawyer on our side of the aisle, 

and so forgive my plain English as opposed to the legal terminology 

that some of very learned colleagues have used. 

And the reason that I am even qualifying what I am saying at 

the beginning is that, Mr. Mollen, under your description of the 

way the world should work, if I were hired by a company in January, like I was essentially when my constituents hired me in January and I was sworn in, it is June now. 

So I would have immediately upon being hired by my new employer or promoted to a new position had to suspect and investigate 

under a 180-day statute of limitation whether or not I might be 

discriminated against in order to be able to preserve the possibility 

of my pursuing a claim and then pursue it within that 6-month period. 

That is just completely unrealistic and, quite frankly, it is hostile 

to the environment that is a new beginning that you begin when 

you are hired or promoted. So I would like you to address that. I 

mean, how would that possibly work or be realistic in the real 

world? 

And then, you know, I have been, on top of the time I have been 

here, in public office in my State legislature and now in Congress 

for 14 years, and I have heard time and again the U.S. Chamber 

of Commerce, the Florida Chamber of Commerce argue against the 

cottage industry of lawyers that exist where the law is designed to 

make it so that lawyers have an interest in going after plaintiffs, 

enticing them to file claims, and essentially what you are arguing 

with the logic that you are using is that that is the scheme that 

we should establish and promote. 

Can you respond to both of those things because I do not see how 

what you are suggesting is realistic for an employee? 

Mr. MOLLEN. Okay. I would be happy to respond. 

Taking the second question first, as I said earlier, it is not the 

Chamber’s view and I do not think any employers’ view that generating more litigation is a good thing. However, the statutory 

scheme that Congress devised when it passed title VII was to have 

these matters raised first administratively in a process where they 

can be resolved voluntarily. 

And so the hope and aim of the statute, and I think the remarkable success of the statute over the last 43 years is that has encouraged individuals to raise these issues early and have them resolved at a time when the expense for resolving them is relatively 

limited and positions have not hardened so much that they go forward. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Can I interrupt you for a second and 

ask you a question? 

Mr. MOLLEN. Of course. 

79

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Because I have heard the Chamber 

argue the opposite when it comes to ADA claims because I have 

been sympathetic to the Chamber’s argument that there are lawyers that shop through businesses, that go through business districts looking for ADA violations, and then encourage plaintiffs to 

file them. Well, under your argument, in that scenario, you say we 

should not have a cottage industry like that and we should tighten 

the ADA to prevent situations like that, you know, allowing lawyers to aggressively pursue businesses with ADA claims. 

But in this case, you are saying, no, no, no, which is the argument that people who have ADA claims make. Under your argument in this scenario, we should encourage employees to work it 

out, but under ADA claims, we should not. 

Mr. MOLLEN. Well, they are two very different things. 

First of all, I think that talking to folks and trying to get things 

worked out without litigation is a good thing under any statutory 

regime. That is the first thing. 

The second thing, I think that your reference to the ADA is the 

accessibility standards under the statute, not the employment 

standards. That is that there are lawyers out there who go looking 

for buildings that may or may not be accessible. 

The difference is that in the employment context, there is an existing relationship between the employer and the employee. When 

Congress passed title VII and devised this system, it determined 

that the best way to have these matters resolved and maintain that 

employment relationship was to have them raised early and disposed of at a time when, again, the fever pitch had not been 

reached and they can be resolved voluntarily. 

They are not all going to be resolved that way. I happen to think 

that a rule that encourages people to raise these matters as early 

as possible is going to lead to less litigation, not more litigation. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. You know, with all due respect, you 

are not a woman and you are never going to be a woman, and you 

are never going to be in the situation that Ms. Ledbetter was in 

along with her colleagues to be able to understand the intimidation 

and the feeling of trepidation over the possibility of losing her job 

if she raised the issue and tried to work it out. That is just not realistic. 

And, Ms. Greenberger, if you could address my question as well, 

I would appreciate it. 

Ms. GREENBERGER. Well, I am so admiring of Ms. Ledbetter for 

her determination for the stellar career and the really 

groundbreaking job that she did for so many years in such difficult 

circumstances, and it is very angering to think about the reduction 

in pay that she had to suffer through all those years with her family and to see that unresolved. I certainly hope, as we discussed 

earlier, in her set of circumstances, if her case is pending in any 

way now, that Congress is able to fix this for her, too. 

To go back to your point, though, about how unrealistic it is, Mr. 

Mollen talked about that this is an administrative scheme to try 

to resolve matters as quickly as possible. Obviously, it is not possible the minute that somebody comes in to a workplace for them, 

even if they knew about the discrimination, which they certainly 

mostly do not, to try to resolve it. 

80

And, secondly, if they get a job which was a difficult job for them 

to get to begin with and they need that job to support themselves 

and their families, who would tell them to go the next day and file 

a complaint against their employer when you do not even necessarily have all of the facts rather than hope that you could work 

it out? 

The Supreme Court on top of everything else in 2001 in a decision said you are not protected against retaliation if you file the 

complaint with EEOC and you did not have enough evidence to 

constitute a ‘‘reasonable belief,’’ that that complaint was valid, a 

cutback on retaliation principles, as I said, already. 

So we have our employees in an impossible spot and, again, to 

bring it back to these caps that are so ineffective at this point 

now,16 year after they were put into place and they were mighty 

modest to begin with, every incentive is on the employer to retaliate and keep people from learning or from acting on what they 

find. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

The time of the gentlelady has expired. The gentleman from Minnesota is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Ms. Ledbetter, I just want to express my admiration for you. I 

think you are a hero. I know you would rather just have no discrimination have ever happened, and you would rather just have 

your money if it had to happen, but, unfortunately, you are thrust 

into being the nationally known figure standing up for the rights 

of people, which I think we all owe you a debt of gratitude for. 

I think you can help me understand the decision. I happen to be 

a lawyer, but I still just sort of need a little help here. Maybe I 

am a little slow. 

How come, Ms. Greenberger, if we are going to apply the 180-

day rule, Ms. Ledbetter did not at least get the pay that she should 

have received that the Court of Appeals thought that she had coming? Why would the Supreme Court say she gets nothing? 

Ms. GREENBERGER. Well, it was the trial court, and, basically, 

what the Supreme Court 5-4—and I think that four justices of the 

Supreme Court were in your shoes in having a hard time trying to 

figure out how the five came to that conclusion themselves—decided that even though she did file within this very short timeframe within the last paychecks that she got, that that was not 

soon enough and that the minute that it was clear many years ago, 

even though she did not know it, that she was suffering discrimination, that is when she should have divined the discrimination was 

happening, that is when she should have complained, and forget 

the fact that the discrimination was re-occurring with every single 

paycheck that she was getting. 

Mr. ELLISON. What about that, Mr. Mollen? I mean, I think the 

decision was wrongly decided, I will agree, but don’t you think that 

she at least should have got the pay that she should have received 

going back 180 days at least? 

Mr. MOLLEN. No, Congressman. 

Mr. ELLISON. Why not? 

Mr. MOLLEN. Here is why. 

81

Mr. ELLISON. I mean, you agree each check was an act of discrimination? 

Mr. MOLLEN. Well, I think that that is——

Mr. ELLISON. Based on the facts that you said you already agree 

with——

Mr. MOLLEN. No. 

Mr. ELLISON. I thought I heard you say that there was admitted 

discrimination. 

Mr. MOLLEN. No. I was actually——

Mr. ELLISON. You say there was not? 

Mr. MOLLEN. I was actually quoting the Chairman who claimed 

there was admitted discrimination. 

Here is the distinction that the court attempted to make or did 

make. The court has distinguished both in Ledbetter and in a long 

line of prior cases between decisions and consequences, and the 

court has said that the time begins to run the decision has been 

made and communicated, not when the consequences come home to 

the——

Mr. ELLISON. So just assume with me then that each check 

where Ms. Ledbetter did not get her pay because of her gender, her 

sex. Are we saying that an employer can continue discriminatory 

behavior, I mean, can renew it every single month? 

Mr. MOLLEN. I mean, I think this is where you and I may disagree, where we are struggling. 

Mr. ELLISON. I am asking you to assume that there was discrimination——

Mr. MOLLEN. Okay. 

Mr. ELLISON [continuing]. That it was because of her sex and she 

got paid less because of it. Why at least doesn’t she get her 180 

days, given that each new check is another opportunity to tell her, 

‘‘You are less and you are going to get paid less because you are 

a woman.’’

Mr. MOLLEN. Because just as statutes of limitation act to cut off 

valid claims in every other form of civil action, they do here. If you 

are injured in a personal injury suit——

Mr. ELLISON. Good example, Mr. Mollen, because if I get injured 

in a personal injury suit, that is a discrete, isolated point in time, 

and then if I do not act on it within a certain amount of time, then, 

you know, I deal with that. 

But the employer could have rectified the discriminatory pay 

every check she ever got. They could have said, ‘‘You know what? 

We have been basically sticking you for the last—I do not know—

15 years, but today we are going to stop it and you are going to 

get your pay just like the men do.’’ They are the ones who continued the discriminatory behavior. 

Ms. Greenberger, why doesn’t that analysis work? 

Ms. GREENBERGER. I think it works, as I have to say, even to this 

day. You know, Goodyear is a multibillion-dollar company, and I 

would have thought that if the idea is just bring this inequity to 

Goodyear’s attention, they will fix it, I am waiting to hear. I mean, 

we may have problems——

Mr. ELLISON. Ms. Greenberger, I am sorry to interrupt you because Lord knows I would love to hear what you have to say, but 

that yellow light means I am going to be done in a moment. I just 

82

want to ask you, have we defeated sex discrimination in American 

employment? 

Ms. GREENBERGER. Well, were only that the case. When you look 

at the——

Mr. ELLISON. Have we defeated racism? 

Ms. GREENBERGER. When you look at the pay discrimination and 

the pay gaps for gender, for race, and certainly women of color who 

bear a double burden, we have a long way yet to go. When we look 

at glass ceilings that still exist in this country, we have a long way 

to go. 

When you ask the American public, as public opinion surveys 

have, do they see a real problem of pay discrimination, off the 

charts in the support to combat pay discrimination in this country 

because people know how unfair it is and how much it still exists. 

This is just a major, major step backward. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you very much, ma’am. 

And I thank all of you for your work. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, we had a hearing in the Education and Workforce 

Committee and had about the same panel. So EEOC jurisdiction is 

actually in the Education and Workforce Committee, and that is 

why they had a hearing. We are considering the civil rights implications of the decision, so, of course, we have jurisdiction over the 

same problem. 

Let me just ask Mr. Mollen a question. If Ms. Ledbetter were to 

prevail, if we passed the bill, she would still have to show that the 

paycheck she received was, in fact, discriminatory. Is that right? 

Mr. MOLLEN. It is good to see you again, Congressman. 

Yes, I believe that if the legislation that has been proposed becomes law that the burden of the plaintiff would be to show that 

there is a disparity due to bias in the paycheck. 

Mr. SCOTT. Right. 

Mr. MOLLEN. I do think that its application to Ms. Ledbetter 

would be retroactive and probably unconstitutional, but I take your 

point. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, let me ask the professor a question. Is there 

any precedent for retroactively passing legislation that would reverse the results for an unsuccessful plaintiff in private litigation? 

Ms. CHAMALLAS. I basically agree with what Marcia Greenberger 

said, that with respect to remedial legislation like this, that there 

is precedent because it is not retroactive with respect to this pending group of cases. So I think it would be possible and constitutional for Congress to do this. 

Mr. SCOTT. In her case? 

Ms. CHAMALLAS. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Now, Mr. Mollen, we asked you this question 

before. We do not know whether the discovery rule is the law of 

the land or not. Is that right? 

Mr. MOLLEN. We know that the Supreme Court refused to reach 

that question, correct. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Professor, do you know what the law of the 

land is on the discovery rule? 

83

Ms. CHAMALLAS. The lower courts have generally held that the 

discovery rule can be applied in title VII cases, but the Supreme 

Court expressly reserved that question. So there is uncertainty, 

and——

Mr. SCOTT. So, based on the law that we have now, if we lose 

on the discovery rule, in fact, the employer could have the ball for 

180 days and be free and clear for that employee forever. 

Ms. CHAMALLAS. That is the harshest feature of the Ledbetter

ruling, and I must say that there is also uncertainty as to how to 

apply the discovery rule, and the standards to be followed for the 

discovery rule. So it is certainly no help to victims of pay discrimination to know that perhaps in some rare cases they can be successful by relying on a rule that the Supreme Court has not yet totally endorsed. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, if we do not have a discovery rule and we do 

not pass legislation to allow each discriminatory paycheck to renew 

the statute, would it be the fact that an employee could be discriminated against, hide the ball for 180 days, and then the employee inquire, ‘‘Why am I being paid less than everybody else 

around here?’’ and the answers were just right between the eyes, 

‘‘Well, you are Black’’ or ‘‘You are a woman, and we just decided 

to pay you less.’’

Would there be any remedy if we do not fix the Ledbetter ruling? 

Would there be any remedy, even injunctive relief available, to 

stoop the discrimination if we do not fix this decision? 

Ms. CHAMALLAS. No. We need to fix the Ledbetter decision. 

Mr. SCOTT. And if we do not fix it, would it not be true that the 

employer could tell the person that, ‘‘Yes, you are being discriminated against, but you waited 180 days, and there is nothing you 

can do, you have no remedy, not even injunction relief.’’

Ms. CHAMALLAS. That is correct because under the Ledbetter decision, the employee has only the 180 days from the very first decision to discriminate against that employee, so after, even though 

the paychecks are tainted by discrimination, essentially the discrimination is no longer actionable in court, and the employer has 

then no incentive to go back and look at its pay scale and say, 

‘‘Have we engaged in pay equity?’’

Mr. SCOTT. And since people talk about disruption, is it not true 

everybody thought there was a paycheck rule to begin with? I 

mean, does this decision come as a surprise in most jurisdictions? 

Ms. CHAMALLAS. Yes. In fact, I must say that as a law professor, 

when I teach this area of the law, I use the Bazemore case and the 

example of pay discrimination that continues over time and builds 

and accumulates as an example of a continuing violation that is 

well accepted by the courts. 

Mr. SCOTT. Wait, Mr. Chairman. 

So that means that most people thought there was, in fact, a 

paycheck rule before this decision? 

Ms. CHAMALLAS. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

Ms. CHAMALLAS. It was a well-established rule. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. By unanimous consent, we will grant the gentleman 

from Minnesota 1 minute. 

84

Mr. ELLISON. Ms. Chamallas, just for the record, I was wondering if you would just take a minute to just talk about some of 

the breadth and scope of modern pay discrimination when it comes 

to sex in America today? How serious is the problem? 

And I ask you this question because I would like you to give us 

some context of what happened to Ms. Ledbetter. You know, she 

is not an isolated case. She stands for millions of people. Could you 

elaborate just for a moment, please? 

Ms. CHAMALLAS. Yes. I think in looking at pay discrimination, 

what is most poignant is that there still is a very big gap between 

the earnings of women and men in the workforce so that we see 

that women still make on average only 77 percent of the salary of 

men, and so for women employees, the pay discrimination issue is 

absolutely central. 

One other thing that we see is that because salaries and wages 

are not known, many women do not know that they are victims of 

discrimination and only find that out later when disparities have 

become very great. So what we have seen is this is a kind of persistent problem that has not been fixed by the various civil rights 

laws that we have and can only be compounded by Ledbetter. The other thing I will note is that not only is pay discrimination 

economic and the kind of economic harm that follows the worker 

all through her career, including into retirement, but it also affects 

a worker’s status because how highly one is paid determines a 

great deal about what their working life is like. 

So I think if we asked American women in terms of their working conditions, what would they most want this Committee and 

other Committees to address, I think it would be to assure that 

their work is not undervalued. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

And by unanimous consent, I will grant myself 1 minute to ask 

questions. I would ask Mr. Mollen and Professor Chamallas to answer briefly please. 

Mr. Mollen, because of everything you were saying before about 

the burden of proving things from 20 years ago and so forth, isn’t 

it true that in any pay discrimination case or any case like this, 

the burden of proof is on the plaintiff? 

Mr. MOLLEN. It is true, Mr. Chairman. Now the problem—and 

I think that Ms. Ledbetter’s case—again, not getting too deeply 

into the facts of her case—is a very good example of why that may 

be an illusion. Ms. Ledbetter testified about certain actions, discussions, behavior that occurred to her, and there was no way for the 

employer to rebut that. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Mollen. 

Professor Chamallas, do you want to comment on that? 

Ms. CHAMALLAS. What was that? 

Mr. NADLER. The fact that the assertion, which I will make, that 

the fact that the plaintiff has the burden of proof largely negates 

the argument of the unfairness to employers of the possibility of 

leaving these cases open for a long time. 

Ms. CHAMALLAS. I think it is crucial because not only is it very 

difficult for the plaintiff to establish intentional discrimination, 

there are all the circumstances surrounding intentional pay discrimination, because, after all, it is the employer who has all the 

85

access to the salary and other comparative data. So the plaintiff’s 

burden of proof is very difficult, and also it is very difficult for 

plaintiffs generally to succeed in employment discrimination cases. 

The success rate is often well below 50 percent. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you very much. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. NADLER. Yes. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Can I ask unanimous consent for just 

1 minute to address a——

Mr. NADLER. Certainly. Without objection. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you. And it is just 1 minute. 

Ms. Ledbetter, as a woman who has benefited from the fights 

that generations of women have led before me, I really want to 

thank you for standing up for women and what you are doing today 

and what you did in the Supreme Court to benefit generations of 

women to come, and I truly appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. And——

Ms. LEDBETTER. May I take just a moment to clarify a couple of 

points? As Mr. Mollen referred to, I did ask my superior. He told 

me that I was listening to too much B.S. from the men, to go on 

home and forget it, ‘‘You are just listening to too much B.S.’’ When 

I went to EEOC, I needed two signatures because I had no proof. 

Okay. 

Reasonable. It is not reasonable that I would wait 20 years to 

ask about a pay raise or pay differential because I would have 

earned more money. I was paid overtime. I would have gotten more 

overtime. My retirement that I put into would have been greater. 

My 401(k) would have been greater. The amount that Goodyear 

matched would have been larger. There is no reasonable way that 

I would want to sit back and wait. 

Now Goodyear did have a problem with records. In fact, the person they are referring to is deceased. He was still working when 

I retired. I had filed my charge before I retired, and the judge told 

Goodyear that they are required by law to retain those records 

until this case is settled. They could not produce those at trial because the judge asked for them and they did not have them, and 

one of Goodyear’s representatives said he did not know what happened to them. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank and——

Ms. LEDBETTER. So thank you, sir. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. And let me join the gentlelady in expressing our appreciation to you. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit to the Chair additional written questions for the witnesses 

which we will forward and ask the witnesses to respond as promptly as you can so that their answers may be made part of the record. 

Without objection, all Members who will have 5 legislative days 

to submit any additional materials for inclusion in the record. 

With that, I thank the witnesses, I thank the participants, and 

this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(87)

1Slip op. No. 05–1074 (U.S. Supreme Court) 

2 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WADE HENDERSON, PRESIDENT AND CEO,

LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS

Good Morning. My name is Wade Henderson and I am the President of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. The Leadership Conference is the nation’s premier civil and human rights coalition, and has coordinated the national legislative 

campaigns on behalf of every major civil rights law since 1957. The Leadership Conference’s nearly 200 member organizations represent persons of color, women, children, organized labor, individuals with disabilities, older Americans, major religious 

groups, gays and lesbians and civil liberties and human rights groups. It’s a privilege to represent the civil rights community in addressing the Committee today. 

Distinguished members of the Committee, I am here this afternoon to call on Congress to act. To restore the ability of victims of pay discrimination to obtain effective 

remedies, and to end the inequality of remedies across classes of victims. 

Lilly Ledbetter, a supervisor at Goodyear Tire & Rubber in Gadsden, Alabama, 

sued her employer for paying her less than its male supervisors and a jury found 

that Goodyear intentionally paid Ms. Ledbetter less than her male counterparts for 

more than 15 years, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Week 

after week, year after year, she was paid less. Significantly less. And this disparity 

was because of her sex. The jury also found Goodyear’s conduct to be bad enough 

to warrant an award of compensatory and punitive damages totaling $3 million. 

On its face, it looked like Ms. Ledbetter had won. That she had finally received 

compensation for the years of discrimination, including the impact on her pension 

and retirement benefits. But that was before the Title VII damages cap and the Supreme Court intervened. 

After the jury awarded Ms. Ledbetter her $3 million, the court was required by 

law to reduce her award to $300,000. Why? In 1991, Congress set damages caps in 

Title VII, which apply to gender, age and disability claims only, at $300,000. That 

amounts to ten percent of what the jury believed Ms. Ledbetter should receive, and 

a drop in the bucket to a corporation like Goodyear. 

Two weeks ago, the second shoe dropped. The Supreme Court issued an opinion 

in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 1 which prevented Ms. Ledbetter from recovering anything to remedy the discrimination that she endured. According to the 

Court’s new rule, Ms. Ledbetter filed her discrimination complaint too late. A 5–4 

Court held that Title VII’s requirement that employees file their complaints within 

180 days of ‘‘the alleged unlawful employment practice,’’ 2 means that the complaint 

must be filed within 180 days from the day Goodyear first started to pay Ms. 

Ledbetter differently, rather than—as many courts had previously held—from the 

day she received her last discriminatory paycheck. 

The Court’s ruling on the statute of limitations in Ledbetter is fundamentally unfair to victims of pay discrimination. First, by immunizing employers from accountability for their discrimination once 180 days have passed from the initial pay decision, the Supreme Court has taken away victims’ recourse against continuing discrimination. 

Moreover, the Court’s decision in Ledbetter ignores the realities of the workplace. 

Employees typically don’t know much about what their co-workers earn, or how pay 

decisions are made, making it difficult to satisfy the Court’s new rule. 

As Justice Ginsberg pointedly emphasized in her dissent, pay discrimination is a 

hidden discrimination that is particularly dangerous due to the silence surrounding 

88

3 Bierman & Gely, ‘‘Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way’’: Workplace Social Norms 

and the Law, 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 167, 168, 171 (2004). 4 BMW of Northern America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) 

5 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. 

6 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. 

7 347 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2003) 

salary information in the United States. It is common practice for many employers 

to withhold comparative pay information from employees. One-third of private sector employers have adopted specific rules prohibiting employees from discussing 

their wages with co-workers, and a significant number of other employers have more 

informal expectations that employees do not discuss their salaries. Only one in ten 

employers has adopted a pay openness policy.3

Workers know immediately when they are fired, refused employment, or denied 

a promotion or transfer, but norms of secrecy and confidentiality prevent employees 

from obtaining compensation information. As Justice Ginsberg’s dissent points out, 

it is not unusual for businesses to decline to publish employee pay levels, or for employees to keep private their own salaries. 

The reality is that every time an employee receives a paycheck that is lessened 

by discrimination, it is an act of discrimination by the employer. The harm is ongoing; the remedy should be too. 

In addition, the impact of the Title VII caps on Ms. Ledbetter clearly illustrates 

the need to eliminate this arbitrary provision from the law. 

Under current law, individuals who prove that they have been the victims of intentional discrimination based on sex, disability or religion are only able to recover 

compensatory and punitive damages up to a cap of $300,000. This is true no matter 

how egregious the conduct of the discriminator, nor how long the discrimination continued. The caps create an artificial ceiling on damages awards that does not exist 

for individuals whose discrimination was based on race or national origin. If a person who was discriminated against on the basis of sex suffers the same adverse employment consequences as a person discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, why should one be eligible to receive more damages than another? 

Moreover, often it is the most severe cases of discrimination that are affected by 

the damages caps. Damages caps, effectively, protect the worst offenders while denying relief to those who were harmed the most. 

Caps also minimize the deterrent effect of Title VII. If the potential liability for 

sex discrimination is capped, it is manageable for corporations. More like a cost of 

doing business. However, uncapped damages, at a minimum, create more of an incentive for employers to ensure that their workplaces are free from discrimination. 

Compensatory damages are designed to make the victim whole. If the economic 

harms suffered by the victim of discrimination are greater than the statutory cap, 

it should not be the discrimination victim who is left with less. 

Finally, in employment discrimination cases based on race or national origin—

where there are no damages caps—we have not seen runaway verdicts. This is, in 

part, due to the numerous existing limitations in the current law that guard against 

improperly high verdicts. Courts can use their remitter power to reduce or vacate 

excessive damage awards, and there are constitutional limitations on punitive damages.4

The impact of the Court’s decision in Ledbetter will be widespread, affecting pay 

discrimination cases under Title VII affecting women and racial and ethnic minorities, as well as cases under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 5 involving 

discrimination based on age and under the Americans with Disabilities Act 6 involving discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 

Here is an example. Imagine you have worked for a company for 30 years. You 

are a good worker. You do a good job. Unknown to you, the company puts workers 

who are 50 or older on a different salary track; lower than the younger workers who 

do the same work. At 60, you learn that for the last 10 years, you have been earning 

less—tens of thousands of dollars less than colleagues doing comparable work. 

How do you feel? 

Imagine you are this worker. How do you feel? 

Even more, how do you feel when you learn that 180 days after you turned 50—

six months after you started getting paid less—you also lost your right to redress 

for the hundreds of discriminatory paychecks. 

The decision in Ledbetter will have a broad real world impact. The following are 

just two examples of recent pay discrimination cases that would have come out very 

differently if the Court’s new rule had been in effect. 

In Reese v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc.7 the plaintiff, an African-American man, 

never received the raise he was promised after six months of work. He did not realVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:56 Sep 19, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CONST\062807\36346.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36346
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8 Id. at 1007

9 Id. at 1013 10 275 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2002) 11 Id. at 1008 12 Id. 13 Id. at 1008 14Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) 15 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) 16 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) 17 Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) 18 490 U.S. 642 (1989) 19 490 U.S. 228 (1989) 

ize his raise had never been awarded until three and a half years later, when he 

requested a copy of his payroll records for an unrelated investigation.8 The employee 

filed a charge of race discrimination with the EEOC, and the court initially granted 

summary judgment to the employer. On appeal, the employee argued that his claim 

was timely under the continuing violation theory, and the court concluded that the 

relevant precedents compelled the conclusion that each paycheck constituted a fresh 

act of discrimination, and thus his suit was timely.9 If the rule in Ledbetter had 

been in effect, the plaintiff would not have been able to seek relief. 

In Goodwin v. General Motors Corp.,10 an African-American woman was promoted 

to a labor representative position, with a salary that was between $300 and $500 

less than other similarly-situated white employees.11 Over time, Goodwin’s salary 

disparity grew larger until she was being paid $547 less per month than the next 

lowest paid representative, while at the same time pay disparities among the other 

three labor representatives shrank from over $200 per month to only $82.12 Due to 

GM’s confidentiality policy, Goodwin did not discover the disparity until a printout 

of the 1997 salaries ‘‘somehow appeared on Goodwin’s desk.’’ 13 She then brought a 

race discrimination action against her employer under Title VII. The district court 

dismissed the action, but the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that 

discriminatory salary payments constituted fresh violations of Title VII, and each 

action of pay-based discrimination was independent for purposes of statutory time 

limitations. Again, if the rule in Ledbetter had been in effect, the plaintiff would not 

have been able to obtain relief. 

Pay discrimination is a type of hidden discrimination that continues to be an important issue in the United States. In the fiscal year 2006, individuals filed over 

800 charges of unlawful, sex-based pay discrimination with the EEOC. Unfortunately, under the Ledbetter rationale, many meritorious claims will never be adjudicated. 

While today we are focused on the immediate problem of the Ledbetter decision, 

it is also important to understand that this decision is part of the Court’s recent 

pattern of limiting both access to the courts and remedies available to victims of 

discrimination. The Court’s decisions have weakened the basic protections in ways 

that Congress never intended by Congress. 

Under the Supreme Court’s recent rulings, older workers can no longer recover 

money damages for employment discrimination based on age if they are employed 

by the state,14 state workers can no longer recover money damages if their employers violate minimum wage and overtime laws; 15 there is no private right of action 

to enforce the disparate impact regulations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964; 16 and workers can now be required to give up their right to sue in court for 

discrimination as a condition of employment.17 In many of these cases, as in 

Ledbetter, the Court is acting as a legislature, making its own policy while acting 

directly contrary to Congress’s intent. 

For opponents of civil rights, there is no need to repeal Title VII. Instead you can 

substantially weaken its protections by chipping away at bedrock interpretations. 

Or, you can instead make it difficult or impossible for plaintiffs to bring and win 

employment discrimination cases. Or if you make the remedies meaningless. 

As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent, Congress has stepped in on other 

occasions to correct the Court’s ‘‘cramped’’ interpretation of Title VII. The Civil 

Rights Act of 1991 overturned several Supreme Court decisions that eroded the 

power of Title VII, including Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,18 which made it 

more difficult for employees to prove that an employer’s personnel practices, neutral 

on their face, had an unlawful disparate impact on them, and Price Waterhouse v. 

Hopkins,19 which held that once an employee had proved that an unlawful consideration had played a part in the employer’s personnel decision, the burden shifted to 

the employer to prove that it would have made the same decision if it had not been 

motivated by that unlawful factor, but that such proof by the employer would conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:56 Sep 19, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CONST\062807\36346.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36346
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stitute a complete defense. As Justice Ginsburg sees it, ‘‘[o]nce again, the ball is in 

Congress’ court.’’

We agree. 

We also reiterate the need to end the disparity in employment discrimination law 

by removing the damages caps that apply to women, individuals with disabilities 

and older Americans under current law. The caps undercut enforcement, are unnecessary, and reward the most egregious discriminators with a substantial limitation 

on liability for their intentional discriminatory acts. 

The issues in this case are not academic. The fallout will have a real impact on 

the lives of people across America. 

People like Lily Ledbetter. 

Members of the Committee, today you begin the process of responding to Justice 

Ginsburg’s call. A process that will reaffirm that civil rights have legally enforceable 

remedies. 

Thank you.

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RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM MARCIA GREENBERGER, COPRESIDENT, NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER


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