DEPARTMENT OF

ENERGY

Uncertainties and

Management Problems

Have Hindered Cleanup

at Two Nuclear Waste

Sites

Statement of Ms. Gary L. Jones, Associate Director,

Energy, Resources, and Science Issues,

Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Task Force on Natural Resources and the

Environment, Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of

Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

2:00 p.m. EDT

Wednesday

July 12, 2000

GAO/T-RCED-00-248
1

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Task Force:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss management, oversight, and other

challenges that the Department of Energy (DOE) faces in its efforts to clean up

radioactive and hazardous materials at the Paducah, Kentucky, uranium

enrichment site and to remove high-level radioactive waste from more than 34

million gallons of liquid waste stored at its Savannah River, South Carolina, site.

DOE faces a number of challenges and uncertainties at Paducah as it attempts to

address about 10 billion gallons of groundwater contaminated with radioactive

and hazardous materials, contaminated surface water that is in creeks and ditches

and leaves the site, contamination in soils that may be spread by rain, tons of

buried waste, and the equivalent of about 52,000 barrels of waste stored on the

site. From 1988 though 1999, DOE spent about $388 million on the Paducah site’s

cleanup and plans to spend another $1.3 billion over the next 10 years. At

Savannah River, we focused on identifying the factors that caused delays and cost

growth of the in-tank precipitation (ITP) project. In 1983, DOE selected the ITP

process to remove high-level waste from the 49 underground tanks. DOE

estimated that the construction of the ITP facility would be completed in 1988 at a

cost of $32 million. After years of delay and spending about a half billion dollars,

in February 1998, DOE suspended the project because it would not work safely

and efficiently as designed--large amounts of explosive, toxic benzene gas were

produced by the process. Soon after the suspension, DOE began a process to find

an alternative technology to replace the ITP project. The Department has

narrowed the selection to four technologies.

Our testimony today is based on our April 28, 2000, report on the Paducah cleanup

and our April 30, 1999, report on the ITP project at the Savannah River Site.1

Our

testimony describes the challenges and uncertainties facing DOE in cleaning up

the Paducah site and the effectiveness of DOE’s oversight and management of the

ITP project. Our summary follows:

1

See Nuclear Waste Cleanup: DOE’s Paducah Plan Faces Uncertainties and Excludes Costly

Cleanup Activities (GAO/RCED-00-96, Apr. 28, 2000) and Nuclear Waste: Process to Remove

Radioactive Waste From Savannah River Tanks Fails to Work (GAO/RCED-99-69, Apr. 30, 1999).
2

• DOE expects to complete the cleanup of the Paducah site by 2010 at a cost of

about $1.3 billion. However, numerous technical, funding, and regulatory

uncertainties present challenges to DOE’s ability to complete the cleanup

within this time frame and cost estimate. For example, technical uncertainties

include the planned use of technologies that are unproven or perhaps not well

suited to the site’s conditions. If they do not work as planned, or at all, costs

will increase. In addition, even when the planned cleanup has been carried

out, billions of dollars and many years will be needed to address areas at the

Paducah site that are not in the cleanup plan. For example, the plan does not

include cleaning up nearly 1 million cubic feet of waste and scrap in areas

known as DOE Material Storage Areas (DMSA) and 16 unused and inactive

buildings and structures. Some of the waste and scrap material pose a risk of

an uncontrolled nuclear reaction that could threaten worker safety.2By not

including these areas in the plan, the Paducah cleanup managers cannot assess

risk or plan cleanup on a comprehensive, sitewide basis. Therefore, the

picture of the cleanup task at hand is distorted.

• A number of management and oversight problems caused DOE and

Westinghouse Savannah River Corporation (Westinghouse), DOE’s contractor,

to spend almost a half billion dollars and to take about a decade before

deciding that the ITP process would not work safely and efficiently as

designed. For example, in 1993, a technical review team reported that the

contractor tended to react to problems after they occurred, rather than

working to prevent them in the first place. The team also found that DOE

lacked the necessary personnel for adequate oversight. Moreover, DOE and

the contractor encountered delays in starting up the ITP facility because they

had begun construction before the design of the process was completed. DOE

and the contractor also did not adequately understand the cause of the

technical problems—such as a lack of understanding of the chemistry involved

2

In this case, an uncontrolled nuclear reaction could produce a burst of radiation that generally

lasts several hours; it is, however, a localized event that is not expected to result in an explosion or

release of radioactivity into the atmosphere.
3

in the ITP process--that made the process unworkable. Some of the problems

that led to the ITP failure may have continued in DOE’s efforts to find an

alternative. According to an October 1999 National Research Council report, a

lack of understanding of the chemistry involved in the process continues, and

the contractor appears to be focusing on an engineering solution on the basis

of untested assumptions.3

Challenges and Uncertainties Face

DOE in Paducah’s Cleanup

In 1988, radioactive contamination was found in the drinking water wells of residences

near the federal government’s uranium enrichment plant in Paducah, Kentucky.4 In

response, DOE began a cleanup program to identify and remove contamination in the

groundwater, surface water, and soils located within and outside the plant’s

boundaries. Sources of the hazardous chemical and radioactive contamination

included spills, leaks from contaminated buildings, buried waste, scrap yards, and

waste lagoons. From 1988 though 1999, DOE spent about $388 million on cleanup

efforts.

DOE’s plan for cleaning up the site includes activities, costs, and schedule that are

estimated to cost about $1.3 billion from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2010. We

identified a number of challenges to accomplishing the current cleanup plan, including

uncertainty about the nature and extent of contamination, technical risks, and

optimistic assumptions about funding and regulatory approvals. In addition, even

when the cleanup identified in the plan is complete, billions of dollars and many years

will be required to address items not included in the cleanup plan—such as about 1

million cubic feet of waste and scrap material in DOE Material Storage Areas.

3

See Interim Report – Committee on Cesium Processing Alternatives for High-Level Waste at the

Savannah River Site, Committee on Cesium Processing Alternatives for High-Level Waste at the

Savannah River Site, National Research Council (Oct. 14, 1999). The National Research Council,

as the principal operating agency of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy

of Engineering, provides the government, public, and scientific and engineering communities with

services and research.

4

A private company, the United States Enrichment Corporation, operates the plant today under

lease and produces enriched uranium for nuclear power plants.
4

DOE Plans to Clean Up Six Major

Categories by 2010 at a Cost of About

$1.3 Billion

DOE’s January 26, 2000, Paducah cleanup plan focuses on six major categories of

cleanup. The first category is groundwater contamination. About 10 billion gallons of

groundwater contaminated with radioactive and hazardous materials are flowing

toward the Ohio River. For example, trichloroethene (used as a degreaser and called

TCE) has been found in the groundwater at levels of up to 700,000 parts per billion; far

in excess of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) drinking water standard of

5 parts per billion. As interim measures, DOE has connected nearby residences to

municipal drinking water and constructed a system to pump some of the

contaminated water out and treat it.

The second category is surface water contamination in surrounding creeks and

ditches. One of the main sources of this contamination is the thousands of tons of

contaminated scrap metal stored at the plant. During rainstorms, contamination

washes from the scrap metal, and the runoff carries contaminated soils and

sediments into the ditches and creeks. By the end of 2000, DOE plans to have

removed that portion of the contaminated scrap metal called “Drum Mountain,”

which is made up of about 8,000 tons of crushed drums that contained depleted

uranium. But, after the crushed drums are removed, 57,000 tons ,or 88 percent, of

the total amount of scrap metal on site will still have to be removed. DOE also

plans to dredge ditches and creeks and install basins to catch the contaminated

water so it can be treated.

Under the third category, DOE has identified 72 areas with contaminated surface

soils and has taken interim measures, such as installing erosion control fences, to

prevent further migration of the contamination; the Department plans to excavate

and dispose of about 35,000 cubic yards of soil. The fourth category includes 12

waste burial grounds containing a variety of radioactive and hazardous

contaminants, including arsenic, beryllium, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).

DOE is planning to excavate four or five of these areas and install a protective

cover, or cap, over the remaining areas. The fifth category is the equivalent of
5

52,000 barrels of hazardous and low-level radioactive waste stored in various

locations on-site--almost 25 percent of the barrels are stored outdoors and are

deteriorating. Before it can ship this waste offsite, DOE must determine the

nature and extent of the waste’s contamination and repack most of the barrels to

make them suitable for disposal. Under the sixth and last category, two buildings

that were used in the uranium enrichment process until 1977, which are heavily

contaminated, will be decontaminated and removed.

DOE Faces Challenges in Achieving Its

Paducah Cleanup Plan

DOE faces many challenges to completing its cleanup within planned costs and

schedules. Uncertainties about the extent, source, and nature of contamination yet to

be cleaned up could increase cleanup costs. For example, the full extent of

contamination in the surface water and soils within and outside the plant boundaries

remains to be determined and could affect cleanup strategies and costs. While

Kentucky prefers the installation of eight or nine sedimentation basins as part of the

surface water cleanup, DOE has only budgeted for four.

Furthermore, uncertainties exist about the feasibility of available cleanup

technologies. Some of the technologies are new, and others remain untested for

the specific environment found at Paducah. For example, EPA officials told us

that difficulties with steam injection--which DOE plans to use to treat the source

of groundwater contamination--were encountered at another site, and there are

questions about whether the technology will work at Paducah because of the

site’s complex geologic formation. DOE’s ability to treat the contaminated

groundwater is also uncertain. DOE plans to install about 4,000 feet of permeable

treatment barriers across the paths of the highest concentrations of

contamination. Installing the barriers involves injecting a gelatinous, gummy

substance containing iron filings into the aquifer at depths of about 120 feet. The

technology is quite new, and the potential for its success at Paducah is uncertain.

For example, if groundwater flows too quickly through the barrier and thus

spends too little time in the treatment zone, the barrier may not have enough time
6

to fully treat the TCE. In that case, the actions of the barrier’s treatment zone

could change the TCE to vinyl chloride, which is even more toxic.

In addition to the technical uncertainties, the cleanup plan is built on some

optimistic financial assumptions. The plan assumes that federal funding for

cleanup at Paducah will increase to an average of $124 million annually over the

next decade--ranging from $78 million in 2001 to a high of $307 million in 2008--

compared with the annual average funding of $43 million over the last 7 years.

The plan also includes optimistic assumptions about quickly reaching agreement

with the regulators on cleanup levels, strategies, and priorities. In the past,

regulators have disagreed with some of DOE’s proposed approaches. For

example, Kentucky objected to DOE’s cleanup of PCBs in soils to EPA’s standard

of 25 parts per million for unoccupied space, saying that it wanted the soil cleaned

up to 1 part per million. The more stringent EPA standard would allow for

industrial or residential use. The resolution of this issue has been deferred until

DOE submits its plans for surface water cleanup. If DOE receives less funding

than assumed and/or eventually adopts a more stringent cleanup level than

currently planned, total costs to complete the overall cleanup will grow.

DOE’s Cleanup Plan for Paducah Does Not

Address All Areas that Require Cleanup

Even when DOE completes the cleanup that it has planned, billions of dollars and

many years will be needed to address areas at the Paducah site that are not

included in the cleanup plan because they fall under the purview of a different

departmental program.5The plan excludes nearly a million cubic feet of waste

and scrap contained in 148 DMSAs located across the site. Materials in these

areas include thousands of barrels of low-level radioactive waste, PCB waste, and

asbestos waste; contaminated equipment; various items and containers whose

contents are unknown; and scrap metal. DOE has not yet determined the exact

5

The cleanup program is the responsibility of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management, while

the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology is responsible for maintaining the site’s

infrastructure.
7

nature and extent of contamination in these areas, but it has identified 73 of them

as posing a risk of an uncontrolled nuclear reaction. In this case, such a reaction

might produce a burst of radiation that generally lasts several hours but is nto

expected to result in an explosion or release of radioactivity into the atmosphere.

At the time of our report, DOE officials said they planned to pay nearly $5 million

to conduct a nuclear criticality safety review on the 10 DMSAs posing the highest

risk.

The cleanup plan also does not address 16 unused buildings and structures that

were originally used as part of the enrichment process. These buildings and

structures, as well as the DMSAs, are excluded from the plan not because they

require no action but because they fall under a different departmental program—

the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology. DOE officials told us that

they are hesitant to transfer any more areas to the Office of Environmental

Management, the office responsible for cleanup, because this office already has a

large workload and funding for cleanup is limited.

In addition, before the site can be considered clean, DOE will need to address

almost 500,000 tons of depleted uranium stored on site as well as decontaminate

and decommission the uranium enrichment plant, when it ceases operation. DOE

estimates that it may cost between $1.8 billion and $2.4 billion to convert the

depleted uranium to a more stable form and remove it from the site. In addition,

according to DOE’s January 1998 estimate, another $1 billion would be needed for

final decontamination and decommissioning activities when the United States

Enrichment Corporation ceases operations at Paducah and the plant is returned

to DOE.

To ensure that cleanup risks and priorities are established on a comprehensive,

sitewide basis and that a more comprehensive picture of the cleanup is presented

to the Congress, our April report recommended that the Secretary of Energy

transfer the responsibility for the DMSAs and the unused buildings and structures

from the Office of Nuclear Energy to the Office of Environmental Management.

We also recommended that DOE address in the cleanup plan, regardless of the
8

current organizational responsibility, any and all materials at the site that are

potential health hazards and reexamine the sitewide contamination risks and

cleanup priorities, costs, and schedules. In response to our recommendations,

DOE officials announced, in July 2000, that it will prepare an integrated sitewide

plan that will address all aspects of the site requiring cleanup. However, it has not

transferred the responsibility for these areas to the Office of Environmental

Management. Without doing so, it will be more difficult to establish priorities and

conduct the cleanup in a comprehensive manner.

ITP Fails to Work After 10

Years and a Half Billion Dollars

The ITP process was selected in 1983 as the preferred method for separating highlevel waste from the 34 million gallons of liquid waste stored at the Savannah

River site--a step considered necessary to effectively handle this large quantity of

waste. In 1985, DOE estimated that it would take about 3 years and $32 million to

construct the ITP facility. After a number of delays, the ITP facility was started up

in 1995, but safety concerns about the amount of explosive, toxic benzene gas that

the facility generated halted start-up operations. In February 1998, after about a

decade of delays and spending almost a half billion dollars, DOE suspended the

project because it did not work as safely and efficiently as designed. DOE then

directed that its contractor begin a process to identify and select an alternative

technology. Although originally expected to be completed in the fall of 1999, that

selection process continues today with additional research and evaluations being

made on four alternatives. DOE’s plan calls for making a decision on the

preferred alternative in June 2001.

A number of factors combined to cause DOE and Westinghouse to spend almost a

half billion dollars and take about a decade to decide that the ITP process would

not work as safely and efficiently as designed. First, because of ineffective DOE

and contractor management and oversight during the 1980s and early 1990s, ITP

problems were not being adequately dealt with. In addition, DOE and the

contractor experienced difficulty managing the project’s start-up operations.
9

Furthermore, there was limited oversight and visibility of the project because of

the budgetary treatment it received. Lastly, the ITP process and the generation of

toxic, explosive benzene were not fully understood.

Weaknesses Existed in

Contractors’ Management and

DOE’s Oversight

The principal factors contributing to the delays and increased costs of the project

were ineffective management and oversight by DOE and its operating contractors.

A number of these problems were noted in 1993 by a DOE technical review team

(referred to as the Red Team) that examined the project6 as well as in semiannual

evaluations of contractor performance.

The Red Team reported that the contractor tended to use “reactive, discovery

management” to react to problems after they occurred, rather than working to

prevent problems in the first place. It found that this approach resulted in a high

potential for inadequate process development, lengthening the project, and

increasing its costs. The Red Team also reported that DOE oversight and support

functions at the Savannah River site were not adequate because DOE lacked the

necessary personnel. As a result, DOE’s guidance and responsiveness to

Westinghouse, the site contractor, were limited. Finally, the team found that

DOE’s organizational responsibilities appeared unclear and the DOE staff were

forced to respond in a reactive manner to emerging issues.

Contractor management problems also surfaced repeatedly in the semiannual

evaluations DOE performed to assess Westinghouse’s eligibility for award fees.

We found that in 14 of the 16 evaluations performed from April 1990 through

March 1998, DOE identified weaknesses needing attention in contractor

management or ITP planning activities. For example, a 1992 evaluation stated

that performance against planned work was not adequately monitored and that

6

See Independent Technical Review of In-Tank Precipitation (ITP) at the Savannah River Site, DOE

Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (June 1993).
10

technical documents had deficiencies indicating a lack of management attention.

A 1995 evaluation noted that insufficient resources had been assigned to meet the

project schedule. In addition, a 1996 evaluation noted that while safety concerns

about benzene gas from the ITP process was a key issue, the implementation of a

program to resolve the benzene issue had been fragmented and no single manager

had been given overall responsibility for resolving it.

Managing the Project’s Start-Up

Posed Difficulties

The ITP project was managed on a fast-track schedule--concurrent design and

construction--with an emphasis on pushing ahead in the belief that the problems

could be solved later. Rather than expediting the ITP project, this approach

caused a series of delays that prolonged the project for 10 years while costs

mounted. A number of studies in the early 1990s noted this problem, as the

following examples show.

• A 1992 Westinghouse management assessment concluded that a number of

start-up activities were begun prematurely--before the foundation for an

efficient program was in place.7

The key weaknesses observed included a lack

of a technical baseline and a potential for inconsistencies among the project’s

various activities because they were not completely integrated.

• Our 1992 report on Savannah River’s Defense Waste Processing Facility, which

included the ITP project, cited the fast-track management method being used

as contributing to the project’s cost growth. We also stated that there was a

risk associated with that method, especially when used with unique and

complex facilities. We recommended that an assessment comparing ITP with

an alternative technology be made.8

7

See Management Assessment: In-Tank Precipitation Project, Westinghouse Savannah River

Company (Mar. 1992).

8

See Nuclear Waste: Defense Waste Processing Facility—Cost, Schedule, and Technical Issues

(GAO/RCED-92-183, June 17, 1992).
11

• The 1993 Red Team report noted that the project’s start-up was not being

managed as a first-of-a-kind chemical-processing system. It stated that

Westinghouse was not following the accepted chemical engineering practice of

completing process development, demonstrating the operability of the process

on a pilot scale, and assessing all long-term impacts and requirements for

sustaining the process before beginning plant operations. The Red Team

recommended that alternatives to the ITP process be considered.

In response to our 1999 report, Westinghouse acknowledged that the risks

associated with new applications of existing technologies were not managed well

on the ITP project—that is, enough time was not built into the schedule to allow

for the kinds of technical problems that arose. DOE Savannah River officials

noted that ITP was a first-of-a-kind process and that because of funding

constraints, they were scaling up the technology from lab tests to full-scale

without the benefit of additional test facilities. Furthermore, DOE officials said

they considered alternatives to ITP as the project progressed. DOE said it

determined that risks were inherent in ITP and the alternative processes but that

costs still favored the ITP process, so the project proceeded. The DOE Savannah

River High-Level Waste Division Director said the Department is now attempting

to manage the high-level waste program, of which ITP is a part, using a systems

engineering approach that dictates that more testing be done up front.

Oversight and Visibility Were

Limited by Budgetary Treatment

DOE paid for the ITP project with operating funds that are subject to less

oversight and visibility than capital construction funds. Capital construction

projects are subject to periodic reviews and reports, and those costing $5 million

or more are shown as line items in the budget requests that DOE submits to the

Congress.9

Projects paid for with operating funds do not receive such scrutiny.

DOE officials said they used operating funds for the ITP project because,

throughout the life of the project, they had expected the technical issues to be
12

solved shortly, thus not warranting its conversion to a capital construction

project, which would be funded as a line item in DOE’s budget request.

This is not a new issue. We raised concerns about this practice in our 1992 report,

noting that because projects associated with Savannah River’s Defense Waste

Processing Facility were being funded from operating accounts, the Congress was

not receiving enough information to fully understand the magnitude of the

continuing cost increases and delays.10

Inadequate Understanding of the

ITP Process Extended the Project

DOE and its contractors did not completely understand the ITP chemistry that

caused excess benzene to be generated. Earlier in the project, the Westinghouse

staff at the Savannah River Site identified the principal cause of benzene

generation as the decomposition of the chemical (sodium tetraphenylborate) that

was added to the tank waste during the ITP process to separate the high-level

waste from the liquid waste solution. The benzene was thought to become

trapped in the solution and be released with the addition of water and mixing. In

1997, after a recommendation by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,

additional research into the chemistry revealed that a catalyst or catalysts that

produced large amounts of benzene were present in the waste solution.

The contractor based its initial belief on the results of the full-scale test conducted

in 1983 and on subsequent smaller-scale tests. For the 1983 test, sodium

tetraphenylborate was added to a tank with about 500,000 gallons of waste.

During the test, a good separation of high-level waste occurred. However, a

significant release of benzene was also observed--for 6 hours, the benzene levels

were higher than the level that the instruments in the tank could register. As a

result, additional studies were conducted.

9

Prior to fiscal year 1997, capital funded projects costing $2 million or more were to be shown as

budget line items.
13

According to many DOE ITP project employees with whom we spoke, the test in

1983 was viewed as successful and provided credibility for the project’s

technology. However, an ITP engineer told us that the fact that the benzene level

went over the instrumentation scale for 6 hours was not widely known. The test

results seemed to have been forgotten over time. For example, two ITP project

managers involved with the project since 1997 told us they were unaware of this

aspect of the test.

During the development of the ITP process, we and the Red Team raised concerns

about unresolved technical issues and the level of understanding the ITP process,

as shown in the following:

• Our 1992 report raised concerns about the ITP process’s unresolved technical

issues and delays and recommended that the Secretary of Energy direct that

an assessment of an alternative technology (ion-exchange process) be

prepared to determine whether DOE should replace the ITP process.11

• In 1993, the Red Team noted that the chemistry of the ITP process was not

adequately understood and that the ITP process appeared to cause more

problems than it solved. These problems included a need to control benzene

emissions; increased flammability risks; increased risk from aerosols, foams,

and respirable particulates; increased chemical reactivity of high-level waste,

leading to possible explosions; and the introduction of extremely complex

organic chemistry.

• The Red Team also questioned whether the chemical used in the ITP process--

sodium tetraphenylborate--was the best way to remove cesium from the liquid

waste. It concluded that effective technologies were available and could be

implemented. It noted that if the state environmental regulators adopted a

more restrictive benzene emissions policy, the entire high-level waste

complex, as well as the Savannah River Site itself, would be better served by a

10See GAO/RCED-92-183, June 17, 1992.
14

thorough reevaluation of alternative technologies.

In response to our 1999 report, DOE Savannah River officials told us that they

considered the concerns raised but did not change their approach for a number of

reasons. In their view, in 1992 and 1993, ITP was considered to be the best

technology available for the type of high-level waste at the Savannah River Site.

In addition, they believed that they understood the benzene generation problems

and thought the problems had been identified, evaluated, and resolved. A number

of modifications were made to the ITP facility, primarily to address the generation

of benzene and to meet the more stringent safety standards that were adopted for

all DOE facilities. Throughout this period, DOE Savannah River officials said that

they considered the ITP process to have the lowest technical risk and the lowest

cost of all the alternatives.

DOE Is Evaluating Four

Alternatives to Replace ITP

Although pointed out by the Red Team, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety

Board, and us, the lack of understanding of the chemistry of the ITP process may

plague the selection of the replacement for ITP. In the fall of 1999, the National

Research Council released an interim report on the alternative processes being

considered for the high-level waste at the Savannah River site. Regarding one of

the alternative technologies, called small-tank precipitation, which basically uses

the same chemical to separate the high-level waste as the ITP process does, the

report found that Westinghouse lacked an adequate understanding of the

chemistry underlying the process responsible for benzene generation. The

Council further reported that in place of such an understanding, Westinghouse

appeared to be focusing on an engineering design solution that was based on

untested assumptions about maximum likely benzene production. The Council

believed it would be advantageous in terms of time and cost to undertake this

research and development work before the process might be selected and

deployed. The alternative--namely, to proceed with deployment immediately and

11See GAO/RCED-92-183, (June 17, 1992).
15

engineer around the gaps in chemistry knowledge--carries a high technical risk

and could result in a repeat of the ITP failure. As a result of the National

Research Council report, DOE decided that further research and development on

each alternative was required to reduce technical uncertainty prior to selecting a

preferred alternative.

The National Research Council’s report also suggests that Westinghouse may have

a bias for its process, which is the small-tank precipitation alternative. The

Council reported that the research and development resource allocations have

been markedly inequitable for the four alternative processing options that DOE

and the contractor are considering. It said that this funding disparity appears to

be primarily responsible for the different levels of technical maturity of the four

processing options, independent of their likelihood of success. The Council found

in its discussions with the contractor and DOE staff that the contractor did not

appear to be serious about pursuing research and development on any option but

small-tank precipitation. These concerns were addressed when DOE removed

research and development management responsibility from Westinghouse for the

other options in October 1999 and limited its responsibility to the small-tank

precipitation process. Although the Secretary of Energy had announced in April

1999 that a new contractor would be sought to continue work on separation

processes at Savannah River, Westinghouse remained responsible for research

and development on all the alternatives until October 1999.

In addition, DOE officials told us that (1) DOE has developed an action plan and

project schedule that includes the steps necessary for choosing a preferred

alternative by June 2001 and designing, constructing, and operating the facility by

2010; (2) DOE is developing selection criteria that will be used to pick the

preferred alternative, which may include such factors as technical maturity, risk,

life-cycle cost, and implementation confidence; and (3) DOE is using a technical

working group to oversee the research and development being undertaken.

-----
16

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the issues we have raised today concerning these two

projects illustrate the types of issues that we have raised in the past as part of the

major performance and management challenges at DOE. For example, we

reported to the Congress in January 1999 that DOE has difficulty completing large

projects on time and within budget, that DOE contract management remains

vulnerable to risk, and that DOE’s staff lack technical and management skills.12

These were touched on in the examples we provided today. While DOE has made

improvements in all these areas, many of the issues are at the heart of DOE’s

culture as an organization and will take time and focused management attention

to change. Continued oversight by this and other committees will continue to

spotlight the progress made and challenges ahead to ensure that DOE continues

to improve.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We will be pleased to

respond to any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have.

Contact and Acknowledgement

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Ms. Gary L. Jones on

(202) 512-3841. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include

Erin Barlow, Rachel Hesselink, and Glen Trochelman.

(141469)

12See Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Energy (GAO/OCG-99-6,

Jan. 1999).
17

Orders by Internet

For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet, send an e-mail

message with “info” in the body to

Info@www.gao.gov

Or visit GAO’s World Wide Web home page at

http://www.gao.gov

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

in Federal Programs

Web site: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.html

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: 1-800-424-5454